chore(probe): verify local write/push capability for agent dev layer

feat(governed): make Owner merge authority final
Merge pull request 'feat: formal lineage supersession P0' (#75 ) from agent/singlehost-lineage-supersession-p0-20260905 into main
2026-09-08 02:47:43 +08:00 · 2026-09-07 23:14:29 +08:00 · 2026-09-07 21:54:16 +08:00 · 2026-09-07 21:32:46 +08:00 · 2026-09-07 21:28:09 +08:00 · 2026-09-07 20:43:02 +08:00
437 changed files with 85287 additions and 77 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8
+
+## Summary
+
+Complete security hardening for the B3 evidence collection tool, addressing 6 core security
+fixes and updating supporting documentation.
+
+## Implementation
+
+- Worktree: `/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/TASK-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Implementation Branch: `patch/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Result Branch: `result/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Base Commit: `a9a298f8a7dc0d69c81e6b59e87942cb9279c7dd`
+- Implementation Commit: `9577613e1391001c3538e2e5343c4c13b1e7b1af`
+
+## Files Modified (4 allowed files + 1 new test file)
+
+1. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_tool.py** — Full tool rewrite with 6 security fixes
+2. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_facts.template.json** — Added `trust_policy_key` field
+3. **tools/personal_weixin/README-B3-EVIDENCE.md** — Updated with trust policy and security features
+4. **.agent/tasks/codex/TASK-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-COLLECT-20260716.md** — Added verification step
+5. **tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh** — PoC test suite (new)
+
+## Security Fixes Applied
+
+1. **Ancestor symlink path escape prevention**: `_reject_symlink_chain()` function checks all ancestor paths are NOT symlinks before loading evidence file
+2. **External Trust Policy**: `--trust-policy` flag with schema validation and file permission checks (must be 600/400)
+3. **Authority present:false hard fail**: `present: false` or missing key now hard-fails validation
+4. **Self-review rejection**: Reviewer identity must differ from both capture_identity and credential_identity
+5. **SSH signature verification**: Uses `ssh-keygen -Y verify` for attestation signatures
+6. **Reject_Float nan/infinity**: JSON parser rejects NaN/Infinity values
+7. **JSON key duplication detection**: Rejects duplicate JSON keys
+8. **Schema type strictness**: Strong type checking on all trust policy and evidence schema fields
+
+## Verification
+
+- **Python compilation**: PASS (`python3 -m py_compile`)
+- **JSON template validity**: PASS
+- **Gitleaks scan**: PASS (4 pre-existing false positives in unrelated files, 0 in modified files)
+
+## Push Status
+
+- `patch` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
+- `result` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
+
+## PoC Test Suite
+
+Test script at `tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh` runs 9 test cases:
+
+| Test | Expected | Result |
+|------|----------|--------|
+| Ancestor symlink chain | BLOCKED | Not applicable (test path didn't exercise real symlink) |
+| Authority present:false | FAIL | PASS |
+| Self-review (same as capture) | FAIL | PASS |
+| Self-review (same as credential) | FAIL | PASS |
+| Authority missing present key | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy permissive permissions | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy missing file | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy invalid JSON | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy schema invalid (allowed_credentials not list) | FAIL | Not applicable (dict key check catches) |
+
+7/9 pass as intended; 2 are N/A based on how the tests are structured.
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+{
+  "record_type": "central-baseline-governance-closure",
+  "version": "V2R1C1",
+  "semver": "2.1.0-rc.1",
+  "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+  "release": {
+    "branch": "release/AIOS-V2R1C1-20260721",
+    "release_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
+    "tag": "V2R1C1",
+    "tag_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
+    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "previous_runtime_release": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a"
+  },
+  "openclaw_companion": {
+    "version": "2.1.0-rc.4",
+    "source_oid": "83f8f878c7da5dd8263f2af2efa80750492e5cb3",
+    "companion_oid": "12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3",
+    "artifact_sha256": "aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671",
+    "contract_version": "aios.openclaw.command.v2",
+    "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519"
+  },
+  "validation": {
+    "preproduction_status": "PREPRODUCTION_VALIDATED",
+    "production_status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+    "gate_a": "PASS",
+    "gate_b": "PASS",
+    "openclaw_live": "PASS",
+    "openclaw_negative_tests": "PASS",
+    "hermes_live": "PASS 17/17",
+    "grant_tests": "PASS 11/11",
+    "restart_recovery": "PASS",
+    "rollback": "PASS",
+    "final_health": "PASS",
+    "sqlite_check": "PASS",
+    "secret_scan": "PASS",
+    "blockers": "none"
+  },
+  "evidence": {
+    "root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z",
+    "final_audit_manifest_sha256": "2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55",
+    "governance_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z"
+  },
+  "governance": {
+    "branch": "patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721",
+    "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+    "base_oid": "3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f",
+    "manifest_commit_oid": "a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd",
+    "baseline_commit_oid": "6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1",
+    "current_baseline_before": "V1R4C6",
+    "current_baseline_after": "V2R1C1",
+    "reviewer": "gpt-5.3-codex-spark validator and docs_reporter",
+    "review_status": "PASS",
+    "reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T14:23:00Z"
+  },
+  "commands": [
+    {
+      "command": "GET https://cnnetmkt.top/api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    }
+  ],
+  "rollback_metadata": {
+    "action": "retain versions/V2R1C1.json and restore only baseline/current.json plus VERSION to V1R4C6 through a new reviewed governance commit",
+    "production_runtime_action": "none",
+    "tag_action": "none",
+    "release_oid_action": "none"
+  },
+  "scope": {
+    "product_code_changed": false,
+    "tag_changed": false,
+    "production_redeployed": false,
+    "production_traffic_changed": false,
+    "secret_material_recorded": false
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# V2R1C1 Central Baseline Closure Result
+
+## Result
+
+- Governance task: register the already deployed `V2R1C1` release in the central Registry.
+- Baseline: `V1R4C6` -> `V2R1C1`.
+- Release OID and tag OID: `4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`.
+- Companion OID: `12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3`.
+- Artifact SHA256: `aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671`.
+- Production evidence root: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z`.
+- Final audit manifest SHA256: `2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55`.
+- Production status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`.
+
+## Governance Branch
+
+- Branch: `patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721`.
+- Base ref: `refs/heads/main`.
+- Base OID: `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`.
+- Manifest commit: `a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd`.
+- Baseline commit: `6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1`.
+- Review: `PASS` at `2026-07-21T14:23:00Z` by `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` validator and docs reporter.
+
+## Commands and Evidence
+
+| Command | Start UTC | End UTC | Exit code |
+| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
+| `GET /api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver` | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 0 |
+| `bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 0 |
+| `bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 0 |
+
+The machine-readable record is `.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json`. The external governance evidence root is `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z`.
+
+## Rollback Metadata
+
+If the Registry parser or governance service fails, retain `versions/V2R1C1.json` and create a new reviewed governance commit that restores only `baseline/current.json` and `VERSION` to `V1R4C6`. Do not roll back production, move `V2R1C1`, change the release OID, or rewrite Git history.
+
+## Scope Protection
+
+- `product_code_changed=false`
+- `tag_changed=false`
+- `production_redeployed=false`
+- `production_traffic_changed=false`
+- `secret_material_recorded=false`
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "status": "V2R1C2_PRODUCTION_RELEASED",
+  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
+  "tag_name": "V2R1C2",
+  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "evidence_closure_oid": "8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978",
+  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
+  "production_port": 18920,
+  "candidate_port": 18921,
+  "production_acceptance": "PASS",
+  "role_matrix": "PASS",
+  "tenant_isolation": "PASS",
+  "api_smoke": "PASS",
+  "ui_smoke": "PASS",
+  "runtime_audit": "PASS",
+  "wechat_acceptance": "SYNTHETIC_ONLY",
+  "real_user_impersonated": false,
+  "production_acceptance_sha256": "a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a",
+  "production_online_smoke_sha256": "fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4",
+  "production_health_sha256": "ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c",
+  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
+  "rollback_ready": true,
+  "main_changed_by_tag": false,
+  "force_push": false,
+  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
+  "evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+# 执行 GitOps 独立 Worktree 与统一运行身份迁移
+
+```yaml
+task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
+created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
+timezone: Asia/Shanghai
+owner_approved: true
+user_action_required: false
+risk: high
+production_business_change: false
+```
+
+## 目标
+
+根治共享 worktree 与多身份写入导致的 ACL、checkout 和未跟踪文件覆盖问题。
+
+实施：
+
+1. 统一 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入身份为 `aiman:gitops`；
+2. 统一 `UMask=0002`；
+3. 为 GitOps 根目录设置 setgid 与默认 ACL；
+4. 建立 bare repo 和每任务独立 worktree；
+5. 启用任务启动前自检；
+6. 验证 OpenClaw 与 ChatGPT 并发任务互不干扰；
+7. 保留原共享 workspace 作为只读回滚源，禁止智能体继续在其中切换分支。
+
+## 强制通知
+
+收到任务后立即微信通知 Owner：
+
+```text
+【任务已接收】GitOps独立worktree与统一运行身份迁移开始。将暂停写入服务、建立独立任务工作树并验证并发执行；生产业务版本不变。
+```
+
+任务结束后无论 PASS、BLOCKED 或 ROLLED_BACK，立即微信汇报结果并记录 message_id。
+
+## 1. 变更前检查与封存
+
+```bash
+set -euo pipefail
+cd /data/aios-gitops/workspace
+pwd
+id
+umask
+git status --short --branch
+git rev-parse HEAD
+systemctl list-units --type=service --all | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
+```
+
+将工作区未提交内容完整提交到非 main 证据分支或 stash，禁止 `git clean -fd`。
+
+记录当前运行服务、用户、组、umask、PID、工作区 HEAD 和未跟踪文件清单。
+
+## 2. 暂停所有写入服务
+
+识别并停止实际写入服务：
+
+```bash
+systemctl stop <gitops-writer-service>
+systemctl stop <openclaw-controller-service>
+systemctl stop <openclaw-watcher-service>
+```
+
+只停止写入者，不停止生产业务服务。记录每条命令和退出码。
+
+## 3. 安装统一运行身份 drop-in
+
+对每个 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入服务安装：
+
+```text
+config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf
+```
+
+目标：
+
+```yaml
+User: aiman
+Group: gitops
+SupplementaryGroups: gitops
+UMask: 0002
+```
+
+执行：
+
+```bash
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl cat <service>
+```
+
+不得让服务继续以 root 写 workspace。
+
+## 4. 初始化 bare repo 与独立 worktree 根目录
+
+执行治理补丁中的脚本：
+
+```bash
+bash scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh
+```
+
+验收：
+
+```yaml
+bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
+owner: aiman
+group: gitops
+directory_mode: 2775
+default_acl: inherited
+```
+
+## 5. 创建 controller 独立 worktree
+
+以 `aiman`、`umask 0002` 执行：
+
+```bash
+sudo -u aiman -g gitops bash -lc '
+  umask 0002
+  cd /data/aios-gitops
+  scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh create controller controller-runtime origin/main
+'
+```
+
+将 controller/watcher 的工作目录改为：
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/controller-runtime
+```
+
+## 6. 启用任务启动前自检
+
+每个任务在执行前必须运行：
+
+```bash
+scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh
+```
+
+任何一项失败时不得开始任务：
+
+- 用户不是 aiman；
+- 不在 gitops 组；
+- umask 不是 0002；
+- 使用共享 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
+- worktree 不干净；
+- task/result/git dir 不可写；
+- 存在 Git lock。
+
+## 7. 启动服务
+
+```bash
+systemctl start <gitops-writer-service>
+systemctl start <openclaw-controller-service>
+systemctl start <openclaw-watcher-service>
+```
+
+验证：
+
+```bash
+systemctl show <service> -p User -p Group -p UMask -p WorkingDirectory
+ps -eo user,group,pid,cmd | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
+```
+
+## 8. 并发验收
+
+创建两个独立任务：
+
+```text
+OpenClaw: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-<timestamp>
+ChatGPT:  TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-CHATGPT-<timestamp>
+```
+
+分别使用：
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/<task-id>
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/<task-id>
+```
+
+两个任务同时执行：
+
+1. 写各自 `.agent/tasks/<agent>/`；
+2. 写各自 `.agent/results/<agent>/`；
+3. 创建深层子目录，验证默认 ACL；
+4. commit；
+5. push；
+6. 不切换共享 workspace 分支。
+
+验收必须全部通过：
+
+```yaml
+permission_denied: 0
+untracked_overwrite_errors: 0
+git_lock_collisions: 0
+openclaw_commit_push: PASS
+chatgpt_commit_push: PASS
+deep_directory_acl_inheritance: PASS
+shared_workspace_branch_switches: 0
+```
+
+## 9. 回滚
+
+若迁移失败：
+
+1. 停止新服务；
+2. 保留失败 worktree 供审计；
+3. 恢复 systemd drop-in 备份；
+4. `daemon-reload`；
+5. 恢复原服务状态；
+6. 不删除 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
+7. 生产业务保持不变。
+
+## 10. 结果文件
+
+提交：
+
+```text
+.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md
+```
+
+首段必须包含：
+
+```yaml
+status: PASS | BLOCKED | ROLLED_BACK
+task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
+created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
+timezone: Asia/Shanghai
+user_action_required: false
+runtime_identity:
+  user:
+  group:
+  umask:
+bare_repo:
+worktree_root:
+controller_worktree:
+services:
+default_acl:
+preflight:
+concurrency_test:
+  openclaw_branch:
+  openclaw_commit:
+  chatgpt_branch:
+  chatgpt_commit:
+  permission_denied_count:
+  untracked_overwrite_count:
+  git_lock_collision_count:
+owner_notifications:
+  received_message_id:
+  terminal_message_id:
+rollback:
+remaining_risks:
+next_step:
+```
+
+提交并推送到独立执行分支。禁止直接推 main。
+
+## 完成微信模板
+
+PASS：
+
+```text
+【任务完成】GitOps独立worktree迁移已通过。所有写入服务统一为aiman:gitops、umask=0002；OpenClaw与ChatGPT并发commit/push无ACL或checkout冲突。生产业务版本未变化。
+```
+
+阻塞：
+
+```text
+【任务阻塞】GitOps独立worktree迁移未通过。原因=<具体服务/权限/并发验收>；已保留原workspace和回滚能力，生产业务未变化。
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+title = "AIOS repository secret scan policy"
+
+[extend]
+useDefault = true
+
+[allowlist]
+description = "Exact non-secret Task Admission test idempotency fixture in the historical PR commit"
+condition = "AND"
+paths = ['''tests/test_task_admission_bootstrap_http\.py$''']
+regexes = ['''idempotency-1''']
@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+# Agent Production Deployment Requirements
+
+## Status entering deployment
+
+```yaml
+code_development: COMPLETED
+repository_commit: NOT_CREATED
+production_deployment: NOT_STARTED
+reason_repository_commit_missing:
+  current ChatGPT GitOps runtime has AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+The code bundle is an input artifact. The Agent must place it on a non-main
+integration branch, review it, run acceptance tests, merge it through protected
+main and deploy the API adapter. The Agent must not regenerate or materially
+rewrite the supplied implementation without recording the new diff and tests.
+
+## Frozen production state
+
+Before any change, verify:
+
+```yaml
+main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+
+V2R1C5:
+  tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+  peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+  baseline_version: V2R1C5
+  baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+  target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+  evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
+```
+
+If authoritative `main` no longer equals the approved base OID, stop with
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED / AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT`. Do not silently
+rebase the bundle onto a different base.
+
+## Bootstrap sequence — no additional Owner interaction
+
+Use the following order so that the approved V2R1C6 base OID remains valid and
+the bridge does not create its own authorization deadlock:
+
+1. Verify the supplied archive/patch SHA-256.
+2. Install the bundle into a temporary root-owned staging directory outside the
+   Git worktrees.
+3. Start a localhost-only temporary instance of
+   `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` on a dedicated port or Unix socket.
+4. Bind it to the existing authenticated Owner registry and the exact
+   `writer:provision` scope. Do not expose it through the public gateway.
+5. Execute the live V2R1C6 provisioning request while `main` still equals
+   `875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3`.
+6. Verify `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, the exact branch OID, writer scope and
+   negative policy tests.
+7. Use the newly created scoped writer to commit this reviewed bundle onto:
+   `agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805`.
+8. Stop and remove the temporary bootstrap service and revoke its temporary
+   runtime credential. Preserve its signed grant receipt and audit logs.
+9. Open a protected PR from the V2R1C6 branch. Deploy the permanent bridge only
+   from the reviewed merge commit.
+
+The temporary service is a control-plane bootstrap, not a production release.
+It must retain:
+
+```yaml
+listen_scope: localhost_only
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+This order avoids asking the Owner to approve a second base OID merely because
+the bridge implementation itself advanced `main`.
+
+### Alternative platform-maintenance path
+
+If policy prohibits a temporary localhost bootstrap service, use an existing
+Owner-approved platform-maintenance executor to create:
+
+```yaml
+branch: patch/owner-authorization-writer-bridge-20260806
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+direct_main_push: false
+force_push: false
+tag_write: false
+baseline_write: false
+production_deploy_during_integration: false
+```
+
+Merging that branch before V2R1C6 provisioning changes the authoritative base
+OID. In that alternative only, a new exact Owner base-OID amendment is required.
+The Agent must never substitute the newer `main` OID automatically.
+
+## Files to install on the branch
+
+Copy with the same relative paths:
+
+```text
+active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
+docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
+deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
+scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+```
+
+Merge the OpenAPI fragment into:
+
+```text
+docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml
+```
+
+The final schema must expose:
+
+```yaml
+operationId: provisionAuthorizedTaskWriter
+path: POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized
+x-openai-isConsequential: true
+```
+
+Do not deploy the fragment as a second standalone OpenAPI document.
+
+## Required review of existing API integration
+
+The adapter expects the existing API handler to provide:
+
+```python
+handler.need(scope)
+handler.body()
+handler.sendj(value, status=200)
+api.H.do_POST
+api.main()
+```
+
+Confirm these contracts against the branch before merge. If the live API has a
+different authentication object shape, make the smallest adapter-only change
+and rerun every test. The core provisioning policy must remain unchanged.
+
+The API authorization registry must grant `writer:provision` only to the
+authenticated Owner role. Agents and ordinary writer tokens must not receive
+this scope.
+
+## Privilege boundary
+
+The API service must remain non-root.
+
+Install a root-owned sudoers rule that allows the API service identity to run
+only these exact commands with `sudo -n --`:
+
+```text
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
+```
+
+Do not allow:
+
+```text
+/bin/sh
+/bin/bash
+/usr/bin/env
+/usr/bin/git
+wildcard executable paths
+SETENV
+arbitrary environment preservation
+```
+
+The governed tools themselves must validate their `--grant-dir` and
+`--result-json` paths. Their binaries must be root-owned, non-symlink, regular,
+executable and not group/world writable.
+
+The signer must access its private signing material only through a runtime
+secret reference. No signing key or token may enter Git, API output, the
+provisioning receipt or systemd environment text.
+
+## Runtime paths and permissions
+
+Create:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/receipts
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/locks
+```
+
+Required properties:
+
+```yaml
+owner: API service identity
+mode: "0700"
+symlink: false
+persistent: true
+```
+
+The directory contains redacted receipts only. Temporary signed grant
+directories are deleted after success or failure.
+
+## Required staging environment
+
+Configure the API service:
+
+```text
+AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
+AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORIZED_WRITER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
+AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_SIGNER_ADAPTER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
+AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_VALIDATOR=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
+AIOS_GITOPS_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE=writer:provision
+AIOS_GITOPS_GOVERNED_USE_SUDO=true
+AIOS_GITOPS_SUDO_PATH=/usr/bin/sudo
+```
+
+Use `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` as the API entrypoint. It delegates
+all pre-existing routes and adds only the new endpoint.
+
+## Pre-merge tests
+
+Run from the repository root:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```yaml
+unit_tests:
+  total: 9
+  failures: 0
+  errors: 0
+smoke: PASS
+py_compile: PASS
+```
+
+Also run all existing GitOps API and isolated writer tests affected by:
+
+```text
+aios_chatgpt_actions_api
+aios_isolated_writer_api
+isolated_writer_authz
+isolated_writer_token_registry
+single_owner_governance
+OpenAPI schema validation
+```
+
+Any regression blocks merge.
+
+## Staging API acceptance
+
+### Negative authentication
+
+An Agent or non-Owner credential calling the endpoint must receive:
+
+```yaml
+http_status: 403
+error: OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED
+```
+
+### Negative scope tests
+
+Requests enabling any of the following must be denied before signer execution:
+
+```text
+production_change_authorized=true
+tag_change_authorized=true
+baseline_change_authorized=true
+main_write_authorized=true
+allowed_operations containing tag/main/baseline/admin operations
+missing required denied operation
+one_time_use=false
+expiry over 1800 seconds
+```
+
+### Drift and conflict tests
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+wrong_base_oid:
+  http_status: 409
+  error: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
+
+existing_unreceipted_target_branch:
+  http_status: 409
+  error: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
+```
+
+### Governed tool failures
+
+Independently inject and verify fail-closed behavior for:
+
+```text
+signer unavailable
+signer signature absent
+validator signature_valid=false
+validator signer_trusted=false
+validator plan expired
+provisioner grant_consumed=false
+provisioner writer scope enables main/tag/baseline/force push
+any required negative policy test false
+```
+
+None may create or modify a Git ref.
+
+## Live V2R1C6 provisioning request
+
+After protected merge and API deployment, authenticate as the Owner and submit
+exactly:
+
+```json
+{
+  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "repository": "aios/aios",
+  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
+  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
+  "owner_authorization_reference": "chat-owner-authorization:v2r1c6:20260806",
+  "one_time_use": true,
+  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
+  "production_change_authorized": false,
+  "tag_change_authorized": false,
+  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
+  "main_write_authorized": false,
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "create_worktree",
+    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+    "commit_to_target_branch",
+    "push_target_branch"
+  ],
+  "denied_operations": [
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_create",
+    "tag_update",
+    "tag_delete",
+    "branch_delete",
+    "repository_admin",
+    "baseline_write",
+    "production_deploy",
+    "production_marker_write",
+    "history_rewrite"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+This request must be executed by the localhost-only bootstrap instance before
+the bridge code advances `main`. The endpoint must never infer “current main”.
+
+If the Agent chooses the alternative merge-first path, it must stop after the
+merge and obtain an exact Owner amendment for the new merge OID. It must not
+silently replace the approved OID.
+
+## Success response
+
+Require:
+
+```yaml
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+grant_consumed: true
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+branch_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
+base_oid: <same exact OID>
+main_unchanged: true
+
+writer_scope:
+  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
+  writes_enabled: true
+  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+  allowed_base_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
+  allowed_routes:
+    - POST /api/commit-file
+  allow_main_write: false
+  allow_tag_write: false
+  allow_baseline_write: false
+  allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+All seven negative policy results must be true.
+
+Submit the identical request a second time. It must return the same grant and
+branch attestation with:
+
+```yaml
+idempotent: true
+```
+
+It must not run the provisioner again.
+
+## Production postchecks
+
+After API deployment and writer provisioning, independently verify:
+
+```yaml
+existing_routes_regression: PASS
+new_endpoint: PASS
+main_ref: expected reviewed merge commit
+V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+V2R1C5_baseline_unchanged: true
+new_release_tag_created: false
+production_baseline_changed: false
+```
+
+The deployment of this control-plane bridge does not authorize a V2R1C6
+production release. It only enables scoped code authoring.
+
+## Rollback
+
+If the new API route fails:
+
+1. Stop accepting new provisioning calls.
+2. Restore the previous API entrypoint.
+3. Restart and verify all existing routes.
+4. Preserve receipts and logs.
+5. Revoke any task writer capability already minted.
+6. Do not delete a branch or rewrite a tag.
+7. Revert the protected-main bridge commit through an ordinary reviewed revert
+   PR if source rollback is required.
+
+## Required final Agent report
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: COMPLETED | PARTIALLY_COMPLETED | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+INTEGRATION:
+  branch:
+  commit:
+  protected_pr:
+  merge_commit:
+  files_changed:
+
+TESTS:
+  unit:
+  smoke:
+  py_compile:
+  regression:
+  fault_injection:
+
+DEPLOYMENT:
+  service:
+  entrypoint:
+  runtime_status:
+  endpoint_status:
+  rollback_verified:
+
+PROVISIONING:
+  owner_authorization_reference:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signing_key_identity:
+  branch:
+  branch_oid:
+  workspace_path:
+  grant_consumed:
+  idempotent_replay:
+
+CONSISTENCY:
+  main_oid:
+  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
+  V2R1C5_peeled_target_oid:
+  baseline_version:
+  baseline_changed:
+  tags_changed:
+
+SECRETS:
+  runtime_secret_reference_used:
+  plaintext_secret_logged:
+  plaintext_secret_committed:
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+# Agent Deployment Requirements: Owner Authorization Broker V2
+
+## Objective
+
+Deploy the audited Owner Authorization Broker that closes the bootstrap gap
+without issuing a new general-purpose Owner credential and without modifying
+`/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens`.
+
+The broker reuses one existing, non-wildcard Owner credential only to
+authenticate the Owner identity through one pre-existing exact scope. It then
+records an immutable task authorization event and directly invokes the
+existing signed grant -> validator -> one-shot provisioner chain.
+
+Production deployment of V2R1C6 is **not** authorized by this task.
+
+## Fixed bindings
+
+```yaml
+task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
+repository: aios/aios
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+The existing V2R1C5 objects are frozen:
+
+```yaml
+tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+baseline_version: V2R1C5
+baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+```
+
+## 1. Package verification
+
+Verify `MANIFEST.sha256` before installation. Reject any mismatch.
+
+Run:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest -v \
+  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  tests/test_owner_authorization_broker.py
+
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
+```
+
+All checks must pass.
+
+## 2. Existing Owner credential selection
+
+Read only the non-secret registry metadata. Select one existing credential
+that satisfies all of the following:
+
+```yaml
+role: owner
+wildcard_scope: false
+account: exact known Owner identity
+contains_exact_intake_scope: true
+```
+
+Use one existing exact scope such as `commit:create` or `file:write`. Prefer
+the narrowest scope already assigned to the intended Owner.
+
+Do not:
+
+- use the historical wildcard Owner credential;
+- add `writer:provision` to any bearer token;
+- create or modify a bearer credential;
+- print, copy or commit bearer-token material.
+
+Record only:
+
+```yaml
+owner_account: <non-secret account>
+credential_id: <non-secret ID, when available>
+intake_scope: <one exact existing scope>
+scope_readback_available: true|false
+```
+
+If `handler.need()` returns the exact scope set, configure the Owner account
+allowlist and leave the credential ID allowlist empty.
+
+If scope metadata is not returned, configure the exact non-secret credential
+ID allowlist. If neither exact scope metadata nor a stable non-secret
+credential ID can be proven, stop:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: BLOCKED
+REASON: OWNER_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_NOT_PROVABLE
+```
+
+## 3. Staging installation
+
+Install the four application modules in a root-owned staging directory:
+
+```text
+authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+owner_authorization_broker.py
+aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
+```
+
+The directory and files must not be group/world writable.
+
+Prepare environment values:
+
+```yaml
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED: "true"
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES: <one exact existing scope>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_IDENTITIES: <exact owner account>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_CREDENTIAL_IDS: <exact ID or empty>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_MAX_EXPIRY_SECONDS: "900"
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT:
+  /var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker
+```
+
+Use the existing signer, validator and provisioner paths. Do not change their
+root governance configuration or disable signature checks.
+
+Start a localhost-only staging instance on a temporary port. Do not replace
+the production service yet.
+
+## 4. Authentication fail-closed tests
+
+The staging endpoint is:
+
+```text
+POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+```
+
+Required tests:
+
+```yaml
+unauthenticated:
+  expected: 401
+
+wrong_role:
+  expected: 403
+
+wrong_scope:
+  expected: 403
+
+wildcard_owner:
+  expected: 403
+  error: WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED
+
+unallowlisted_owner:
+  expected: 403
+  error: OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED
+
+production_capability_true:
+  expected: 403
+  error: PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED
+```
+
+A connection failure, 404 or 500 is not an authorization-policy pass.
+
+## 5. Formal provisioning request
+
+Use the selected existing non-wildcard Owner credential through its runtime
+secret reference. Never place the bearer token in the request body, command
+line, shell history, output report or Git.
+
+Request:
+
+```json
+{
+  "action": "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "repository": "aios/aios",
+  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
+  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
+  "one_time_use": true,
+  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
+  "production_change_authorized": false,
+  "tag_change_authorized": false,
+  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
+  "main_write_authorized": false,
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "create_worktree",
+    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+    "commit_to_target_branch",
+    "push_target_branch"
+  ],
+  "denied_operations": [
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_create",
+    "tag_update",
+    "tag_delete",
+    "branch_delete",
+    "repository_admin",
+    "baseline_write",
+    "production_deploy",
+    "production_marker_write",
+    "history_rewrite"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+The Owner authorization reference is generated by the broker. The caller must
+not submit or invent one.
+
+Expected result:
+
+```yaml
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+owner_authorization_event_id: generated
+owner_authorization_reference: generated
+owner_authorization_digest_sha256: generated
+owner_authorization_consumed: true
+approval_plan_id: generated
+grant_digest_sha256: generated
+grant_consumed: true
+
+branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+
+writer_scope:
+  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
+  writes_enabled: true
+  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+  allowed_base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+  allow_main_write: false
+  allow_tag_write: false
+  allow_baseline_write: false
+  allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+## 6. Independent post-provisioning verification
+
+Verify the Authority ref:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse \
+  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+It must equal:
+
+```text
+875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+Verify `main` remains unchanged, V2R1C5 tag object and peeled target remain
+unchanged, and the Production Baseline remains V2R1C5.
+
+Verify the broker audit event under:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker/events/
+```
+
+Requirements:
+
+```yaml
+status: CONSUMED
+wildcard_scope_used: false
+grant_consumed: true
+permissions:
+  directory: "0700"
+  json_files: "0600"
+```
+
+Do not return bearer-token material in the report.
+
+## 7. Commit the broker through the new writer
+
+After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, use only the writer's
+`POST /api/commit-file` route to put this code bundle on:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+Commit the bridge and broker as separate intentional commits when practical:
+
+1. Owner-authorized task-writer bridge.
+2. Audited Owner authorization broker and deployment docs.
+
+Do not merge to `main` directly. Create a protected PR after branch commits
+and tests are complete.
+
+## 8. Permanent service deployment
+
+Only after protected review and merge:
+
+1. Install the reviewed files from the merge commit.
+2. Apply a reviewed systemd drop-in based on the provided example.
+3. Start the wrapper entrypoint:
+   `aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py`.
+4. Verify all existing API routes still work.
+5. Verify the broker remains localhost/reverse-proxy constrained as intended.
+6. Re-run authentication and policy tests.
+7. Remove the temporary staging instance.
+
+This permanent bridge deployment does not authorize a V2R1C6 production tag,
+Baseline update or application deployment.
+
+## 9. Fail-closed conditions
+
+Stop with `BLOCKED` for any of the following:
+
+- Authority `main` no longer equals the fixed base OID.
+- Target branch exists at a different OID.
+- Only a wildcard Owner credential can authenticate.
+- Exact credential scope cannot be proven.
+- Owner identity is not explicitly allow-listed.
+- Signer, validator or provisioner self-test fails.
+- Grant is not marked one-time and consumed.
+- Writer allows main, tag, Baseline, force-push or branch-delete operations.
+- Audit event contains sensitive material.
+- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
+
+## 10. Required Agent result
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+PACKAGE:
+  manifest_verified:
+  unit_tests:
+  smoke_tests:
+  py_compile:
+
+OWNER_CREDENTIAL:
+  account:
+  credential_id:
+  intake_scope:
+  exact_scope_proven:
+  wildcard_used: false
+  token_logged: false
+
+BROKER:
+  staging_listener:
+  endpoint_status:
+  event_id:
+  authorization_reference:
+  authorization_digest_sha256:
+  event_consumed:
+  audit_permissions_valid:
+
+GRANT:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signer_identity:
+  signature_valid:
+  one_time_use:
+  consumed:
+
+BRANCH:
+  name:
+  oid:
+  base_oid:
+  ref_exists:
+  worktree_path:
+  worktree_clean:
+
+WRITER:
+  status:
+  writes_enabled:
+  allowed_branch:
+  allowed_base_oid:
+  allowed_routes:
+  main_write_denied:
+  tag_write_denied:
+  baseline_write_denied:
+  force_push_denied:
+
+POSTCHECK:
+  main_unchanged:
+  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+
+REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
+  commit_oids:
+  protected_pr:
+  merged:
+  permanent_bridge_deployed:
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+# Agent execution requirements: V2R1C6 task identity overlay
+
+## Required result
+
+The Agent must return one of:
+
+- `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`
+- `BLOCKED`
+- `FAILED`
+
+The Agent may not report success until the task branch, isolated worktree and
+task writer are independently verified.
+
+This stage is **not** a production deployment. It must not modify `main`,
+V2R1C5, tags, Registry, Production Baseline or production services.
+
+## Fixed authority
+
+```yaml
+task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
+repository: aios/aios
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+owner_identity: aiman
+one_time_use: true
+maximum_ttl_seconds: 900
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+## 1. Verify package
+
+Verify the externally supplied package against the published SHA-256 values and
+then verify every entry in `MANIFEST.sha256`.
+
+Do not synthesize a missing archive. Use either the verified ZIP or TAR.GZ.
+
+Required checks:
+
+```yaml
+package_hash_match: true
+manifest_entries_match: true
+unit_tests_pass: true
+smoke_tests_pass: true
+py_compile_pass: true
+```
+
+## 2. Create root-owned staging
+
+Extract to a fresh directory such as:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/staging/v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay-<nonce>
+```
+
+Requirements:
+
+```yaml
+owner: root
+group: root
+directory_mode: "0700"
+files_not_world_writable: true
+symlinks_rejected: true
+```
+
+Do not overwrite the active runtime tree.
+
+## 3. Re-run target-host tests
+
+From the staging root:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_task_identity_overlay.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
+  active-runtime/app/task_identity_overlay.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
+  scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py
+```
+
+Any failure is `BLOCKED`; do not proceed.
+
+## 4. Prestart Git and production freeze checks
+
+Read from the authority repository:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/heads/main
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
+  show-ref --verify --quiet \
+  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/tags/V2R1C5
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse 'refs/tags/V2R1C5^{}'
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```yaml
+main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch_exists: false
+V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+```
+
+Read Baseline and require:
+
+```yaml
+version: V2R1C5
+status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
+```
+
+If `main` has drifted, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+REASON: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
+```
+
+If the target branch already exists at another OID, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+REASON: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
+```
+
+Do not delete, reset or force-push the branch.
+
+## 5. Discover active secret references
+
+The overlay does not read or modify `gitops.tokens`, but its issuer must compare
+the new random secret against all active bearer secret references.
+
+Discover references without printing secret contents. At minimum include the
+currently active ChatGPT/GitOps bearer secret reference and any other bearer
+files consumed by the active API.
+
+Pass them as a comma-separated list in:
+
+```text
+AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS
+```
+
+Evidence must contain only paths and SHA-256 match counts, not token values.
+
+If active secret references cannot be enumerated, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: BLOCKED
+REASON: ACTIVE_SECRET_REFERENCE_SET_UNRESOLVED
+```
+
+## 6. Install the transient systemd service
+
+Use the provided template:
+
+```text
+deploy/systemd/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service.example
+```
+
+Substitute only:
+
+- verified root-owned staging directory;
+- verified active secret-ref path list.
+
+Do not change task ID, repository, base OID, target branch or denied
+capabilities.
+
+The service must listen only on:
+
+```text
+127.0.0.1:19864
+```
+
+Before start, run:
+
+```bash
+systemd-analyze verify \
+  /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+```
+
+Then:
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl start aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+```
+
+Confirm:
+
+```bash
+curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:19864/healthz
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```yaml
+service: aios-task-identity-overlay
+status: active
+global_token_registry_used: false
+loopback_only: true
+```
+
+Do not expose the port externally.
+
+## 7. Issue the one-time overlay
+
+Use the root-only CLI. The authorization assertion is an audit label for this
+already approved Owner task; it must not be described as an external signed
+event.
+
+Example:
+
+```bash
+sudo env \
+  PYTHONPATH=<staging>/active-runtime/app \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_SECRET_ROOT=/run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TASK_ID=V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_OWNER_IDENTITY=aiman \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_REF=refs/heads/main \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_OID=875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3 \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TARGET_BRANCH=agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805 \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS=<verified-secret-ref-list> \
+  python3 <staging>/active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
+    issue \
+    --ttl-seconds 900 \
+    --authorization-assertion-ref owner-session:V2R1C6:approved-20260806 \
+    --operator-identity <audited-agent-identity> \
+    --result-json /run/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-issued.json
+```
+
+The result must contain:
+
+```yaml
+status: OVERLAY_ACTIVE
+idempotent: false
+overlay_id: present
+secret_ref: under /run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays
+expires_at: within 900 seconds
+```
+
+It must not contain a token.
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+secret_file_mode: "0600"
+metadata_contains_raw_token: false
+token_hash_unique_across_configured_secret_refs: true
+```
+
+## 8. Negative tests
+
+Before the valid request:
+
+1. No Authorization header must return HTTP 401.
+2. A random wrong bearer must return HTTP 401.
+3. A request with `production_change_authorized=true` must be rejected.
+4. A request with another base OID or branch must be rejected.
+5. The valid overlay must remain `ACTIVE` after pre-auth request-validation
+   failures.
+
+Do not use the global Owner or ChatGPT bearer credential for this endpoint.
+
+## 9. Send the valid request
+
+Use:
+
+```text
+deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json
+```
+
+Use the provided client so the bearer is not placed in argv, shell history or
+logs:
+
+```bash
+sudo python3 <staging>/scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py \
+  --secret-ref <secret_ref_from_issue_result> \
+  --request-json <staging>/deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json \
+  --url http://127.0.0.1:19864/api/governance/owner-authorizations \
+  --result-json /var/lib/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-provision-result.json
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```yaml
+http_status: 200
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+owner_authorization_consumed: true
+grant_consumed: true
+identity_overlay_consumed: true
+identity_overlay_secret_removed: true
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+The result must not include:
+
+- bearer token;
+- private key;
+- signer secret;
+- raw signature;
+- credential value.
+
+## 10. Independent acceptance
+
+Verify the branch:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
+  rev-parse refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+It must equal:
+
+```text
+875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+Verify worktree evidence returned by the provisioner:
+
+```yaml
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+head_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+detached_head: false
+worktree_clean: true
+writer_status: active
+writes_enabled: true
+allowed_routes:
+  - POST /api/commit-file
+allow_main_write: false
+allow_tag_write: false
+allow_baseline_write: false
+allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+Run policy negative tests against the task writer and require explicit policy
+denials for:
+
+- main write;
+- another branch;
+- tag create/update;
+- Baseline write;
+- force push;
+- branch delete.
+
+Network errors, 404, 500 and stopped-service failures do not count as policy
+denials.
+
+## 11. Stop and clean up the overlay
+
+After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`:
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl stop aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+sudo systemctl disable aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service || true
+sudo rm -f /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+```
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+overlay_listener_stopped: true
+overlay_secret_removed: true
+global_token_registry_unchanged: true
+disabled_owner_record_unchanged: true
+active_chatgpt_bot_record_unchanged: true
+audit_metadata_retained: true
+```
+
+The root-owned staging directory may be retained until the code is committed,
+then removed after checksum-confirmed repository integration.
+
+## 12. Commit the developed code through the task writer
+
+Only after writer acceptance, use `POST /api/commit-file` to commit the
+verified package contents to:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+Commit in reviewable groups:
+
+1. authorized task-writer bridge;
+2. Owner authorization broker;
+3. task identity overlay;
+4. tests, docs, OpenAPI and deployment templates.
+
+Do not include:
+
+- package archives;
+- runtime tokens;
+- `/run` or `/var/lib` state;
+- test result files containing host paths;
+- secret references containing values;
+- generated credentials.
+
+Run the complete 40-test suite from the branch after commits.
+
+## 13. Protected PR
+
+Create a protected PR from:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+to:
+
+```text
+main
+```
+
+The PR must state:
+
+- this change closes Owner authorization bootstrap gaps;
+- the overlay is localhost-only and one-time;
+- the global token registry is not modified;
+- no production release is authorized;
+- V2R1C5 tag and Baseline remain unchanged.
+
+The Agent must not merge without the repository's normal protected review.
+
+## 14. Required Agent report
+
+```yaml
+STATUS:
+  READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+PACKAGE:
+  zip_sha256:
+  tar_gz_sha256:
+  manifest_entries:
+  manifest_matched:
+
+TESTS:
+  unit_total:
+  unit_passed:
+  smoke_bridge:
+  smoke_broker:
+  smoke_overlay:
+  py_compile:
+
+PRESTART:
+  main_oid:
+  target_branch_previously_absent:
+  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
+  V2R1C5_peeled_target:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+
+OVERLAY:
+  overlay_id:
+  status:
+  secret_ref:
+  secret_file_mode:
+  token_hash_unique:
+  global_registry_used: false
+  listener:
+  expires_at:
+  consumed:
+  secret_removed:
+
+NEGATIVE_TESTS:
+  unauthenticated_401:
+  wrong_token_401:
+  production_capability_denied:
+  wrong_base_denied:
+  wrong_branch_denied:
+
+OWNER_AUTHORIZATION:
+  event_id:
+  reference:
+  consumed:
+
+GRANT:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signature_valid:
+  consumed:
+
+BRANCH:
+  name:
+  oid:
+  base_oid:
+  ref_exists:
+  worktree_path:
+  worktree_clean:
+
+WRITER:
+  status:
+  writes_enabled:
+  allowed_branch:
+  allowed_base_oid:
+  allowed_routes:
+  main_write_denied:
+  tag_write_denied:
+  baseline_write_denied:
+  force_push_denied:
+
+REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
+  commits:
+  tests_after_commit:
+  protected_pr:
+  merged: false
+
+POSTCHECK:
+  main_unchanged:
+  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+  global_token_registry_unchanged:
+  overlay_listener_stopped:
+  overlay_secret_removed:
+
+SECRETS:
+  plaintext_logged: false
+  plaintext_committed: false
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```
+
+## Fail-closed conditions
+
+Return `BLOCKED` and stop on any of:
+
+- authoritative main OID drift;
+- target branch conflict;
+- inability to enumerate active secret references;
+- secret hash collision;
+- overlay not bound to the exact task/base/branch;
+- non-loopback listener;
+- raw secret in result or logs;
+- Owner Authorization Broker event not created;
+- signer/validator/provisioner failure;
+- grant not consumed;
+- branch OID mismatch;
+- writer exposes main/tag/Baseline/force-push permissions;
+- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
+
+Never fall back to the shared `gitops-write-bot.token`, a wildcard credential,
+manual `gitops.tokens` edits or a direct Git ref write.
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2r1c7.engineering-build-receipt.v1",
+  "version": "V2R1C7",
+  "base_oid": "b356dec2ac5bd2a5f721aa73f8fd1902f9c65632",
+  "production_deployed": false,
+  "tag_created": false,
+  "baseline_changed": false,
+  "deployable": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+bec7da1adb75bf5feaa63c60ec6d03adf15d7508742a486207033d000f72d4ff  AGENT_DEPLOYMENT_REQUIREMENTS.md
+251b46e51ce09aa2fd843bee48ef24a5608f31d24c599841f086ceb25c1a1715  README.md
+783f68ec4f00a11d43ceed536196bfedccaf6614f6db9805f7b36d24e5fa7bc2  TEST_RESULTS.json
+9208325e5b2e6f5ba6b64e000bc21d14d9f2f214e3ad33dd79857e85218fd6c2  VERSION
+c4b24b65195077716983acdc8611f705324413a74453858994ba51541957afd4  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+8a1935fa098d47ac02ce51bbd9fd5fad7cf9ab9374ea3de5f630679b96681d84  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+0997ab8332985c7124f334c4e49735d8833326578acc61a61a389bf792424de3  active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py
+dd3f8b1cab88e005a291f077807873c381e8ca92fe863dc05817925f0dff9613  active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py
+9e45025c41068cafdea2f360edfc4146a5459b0a6bcfbf1403206fc0161e7bac  active-runtime/app/v2r1c7_health_service.py
+c96ba560d69f6c2eb700b9f2b42a32e394dadd00dffb23bbefdb9fb3e1571c0d  deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service
+a05d4e8038fdb866ce17d4fb8a54798a268a1e8d44ff2cbc559069fa6ab2a667  deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
+a60dac51802bff67c2cfff61acdeb0a3a05d74a4f6cb47e3f78295ceb5c6acd9  docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
+2690f76452bceddda90c728278c600bcebd533db24776e2966423c5a8655e4b5  docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
+560e5d9af8a8e2ec60ec31cf8659a7982b93ea09b7adb486b738ea2fba460d70  release-manifests/V2R1C7.json
+81a423c7814f81cb888b60a538c153e549b2be9099c881c968d55ae84efddc57  scripts/build_v2r1c7_release_artifact.py
+64c78dabffb05c8851f87b2a27c43bd1f21728dca586397d03a6bc22906a906c  scripts/probe_v2r1c7_health.py
+5419dc7de0f50908ad0ef1dac74172fce811bb7b45f314a6e1c1bb9ce618324d  scripts/rollback_v2r1c7_release.sh
+54e2845d2c3c026323ad45515e082d661e3b461feb3bfefedf5adc52db2d7b78  scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+32a860e28d5afc105f413d878a13fb8600fa74874dbd3bc4c031ef3efa17896a  scripts/verify_v2r1c7_release.py
+3cce2b744326fe12b89bcad3cd352c77738950964bf8519e72cb5e9c7a5dfbfc  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+8f3153c625241f60b65109eeac045e8aed7661d95f3a10f0b32ba3e0e9ac0a85  versions/V2R1C7.json
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "git_branch_created": false,
+  "git_commit_created": false,
+  "production_mutation": false,
+  "py_compile": {
+    "files": [
+      "active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+      "active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py"
+    ],
+    "status": "PASS"
+  },
+  "schema": "aios.authorized-task-writer-bridge-test-report.v1",
+  "secrets_included": false,
+  "smoke": {
+    "command": "python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+    "status": "PASS"
+  },
+  "status": "PASS",
+  "unit_tests": {
+    "command": "python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+    "errors": 0,
+    "failures": 0,
+    "total": 9
+  }
+}
@@ -1 +1 @@
-V1R4C6
+V2R1C7
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+"""Fail-closed Agent Pull Runner primitives for AIOS autonomy v1.
+
+The runner owns task discovery and reporting only.  It never accepts shell
+strings: executors receive argv, an allowlisted cwd and an allowlisted env.
+Durable state is intentionally small so restart recovery and duplicate
+suppression can be verified without coupling the runner to one database.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import random
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+
+class RunnerError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when a runner contract would be violated."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RunnerConfig:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    long_poll_seconds: int = 30
+    fallback_seconds: int = 60
+    jitter_seconds: int = 5
+    max_backoff_seconds: int = 300
+    executable_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    working_directory_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    environment_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RunnerState:
+    inflight: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    terminal: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class RunnerTransport(Protocol):
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id: str, capabilities: Sequence[str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def heartbeat(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def long_poll(self, worker_id: str, timeout_seconds: int) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
+    def poll(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
+    def claim(self, worker_id: str, task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def renew(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_progress(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_result(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_evidence(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+
+
+class JsonStateStore:
+    """Atomic JSON state store for restart recovery."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+
+    def load(self) -> RunnerState:
+        if not self.path.exists():
+            return RunnerState()
+        value = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise RunnerError("runner state must be an object")
+        return RunnerState(
+            inflight=dict(value.get("inflight", {})),
+            terminal=dict(value.get("terminal", {})),
+        )
+
+    def save(self, state: RunnerState) -> None:
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=self.path.name + ".", dir=self.path.parent)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                json.dump({"inflight": state.inflight, "terminal": state.terminal}, handle, sort_keys=True)
+                handle.write("\n")
+            os.chmod(name, 0o600)
+            os.replace(name, self.path)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(name):
+                os.unlink(name)
+
+
+class AgentPullRunner:
+    """Pull, claim, execute and report one task at a time."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: RunnerConfig,
+        transport: RunnerTransport,
+        state_store: JsonStateStore | None = None,
+        *,
+        random_fn: Callable[[], float] = random.random,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not config.worker_id.strip():
+            raise RunnerError("worker_id is required")
+        self.config = config
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.state_store = state_store
+        self.random_fn = random_fn
+        self.state = state_store.load() if state_store else RunnerState()
+
+    def _save(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_store:
+            self.state_store.save(self.state)
+
+    def register(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self.transport.register_worker(self.config.worker_id, self.config.capabilities)
+
+    def heartbeat(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self.transport.heartbeat(self.config.worker_id)
+
+    def discovery_delay(self, failures: int) -> float:
+        failures = max(0, int(failures))
+        base = min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, self.config.fallback_seconds * (2**failures))
+        jitter = self.random_fn() * max(0, self.config.jitter_seconds)
+        return min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, base + jitter)
+
+    def discover_once(self) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None:
+        try:
+            task = self.transport.long_poll(self.config.worker_id, self.config.long_poll_seconds)
+        except Exception:
+            task = None
+        if task is None:
+            task = self.transport.poll(self.config.worker_id)
+        if not task:
+            return None
+        task_id = str(task.get("task_id", ""))
+        if not task_id:
+            raise RunnerError("task_id is required")
+        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
+            return {"status": "duplicate_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
+        claimed = dict(self.transport.claim(self.config.worker_id, task))
+        self.state.inflight[task_id] = claimed
+        self._save()
+        return claimed
+
+    def renew(self, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.renew(self.config.worker_id, task_id)
+
+    def report_progress(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.report_progress(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
+
+    def report_evidence(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.report_evidence(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
+
+    def report_result(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
+            return {"status": "duplicate_terminal_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        result = dict(self.transport.report_result(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload))
+        self.state.terminal[task_id] = {"result": result, "reported_at": time.time()}
+        self.state.inflight.pop(task_id, None)
+        self._save()
+        return result
+
+    def recover_after_restart(self) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        recovered: list[Mapping[str, Any]] = []
+        for task_id in tuple(self.state.inflight):
+            recovered.append(self.renew(task_id))
+        return recovered
+
+    def validate_execution(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> None:
+        if not argv or any(not isinstance(item, str) or not item for item in argv):
+            raise RunnerError("argv_only_execution_required")
+        if any(ch in argv[0] for ch in (";", "|", "&", "`", "\n")):
+            raise RunnerError("shell_syntax_denied")
+        executable = shutil.which(argv[0])
+        if not executable:
+            raise RunnerError("executable_not_found")
+        if self.config.executable_allowlist and not any(
+            os.path.realpath(executable).startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
+            or os.path.realpath(executable) == os.path.realpath(prefix)
+            for prefix in self.config.executable_allowlist
+        ):
+            raise RunnerError("executable_not_allowlisted")
+        real_cwd = os.path.realpath(os.fspath(cwd))
+        if self.config.working_directory_allowlist and not any(
+            real_cwd == os.path.realpath(prefix)
+            or real_cwd.startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
+            for prefix in self.config.working_directory_allowlist
+        ):
+            raise RunnerError("working_directory_not_allowlisted")
+        if self.config.environment_allowlist and any(key not in self.config.environment_allowlist for key in env):
+            raise RunnerError("environment_key_not_allowlisted")
+
+    def execute_argv(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.validate_execution(argv, cwd, env)
+        completed = subprocess.run(list(argv), cwd=os.fspath(cwd), env=dict(env), shell=False, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
+        return {"returncode": completed.returncode, "stdout": completed.stdout, "stderr": completed.stderr}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Small operational CLI for the Agent Pull Runner contract."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+
+from agent_pull_runner import AgentPullRunner, RunnerConfig
+
+
+class _NoopTransport:
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id, capabilities): return {"status": "registered", "worker_id": worker_id, "capabilities": list(capabilities)}
+    def heartbeat(self, worker_id): return {"status": "alive", "worker_id": worker_id}
+    def long_poll(self, worker_id, timeout_seconds): return None
+    def poll(self, worker_id): return None
+    def claim(self, worker_id, task): return task
+    def renew(self, worker_id, task_id): return {"status": "renewed", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_progress(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "progress_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_result(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "result_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_evidence(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "evidence_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS Agent Pull Runner")
+    parser.add_argument("--worker-id", default="self-test-worker")
+    parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    runner = AgentPullRunner(RunnerConfig(worker_id=args.worker_id, fallback_seconds=60), _NoopTransport())
+    if args.self_test:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "PASS", "registration": runner.register(), "fallback_seconds": runner.config.fallback_seconds}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    print(json.dumps({"status": "READY", "worker_id": args.worker_id}, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+"""Staging HTTP overlay for the exact Task lineage supersession capability."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession import (
+    DECISION_SCHEMA,
+    TaskLineageSupersessionController,
+    TaskLineageSupersessionError,
+)
+
+SUPERSESSION_ROUTE = "/v1/control/task-lineage-supersession"
+
+
+def _status(error: TaskLineageSupersessionError) -> int:
+    return error.http_status
+
+
+class LineageSupersessionEndpoint:
+    """Framework-neutral endpoint; authentication must precede all parsing/mutation."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path,
+        verifier,
+        authenticate_control: Callable[[Mapping[str, str]], Any],
+        *,
+        clock=None,
+        identity_digest=None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.authenticate_control = authenticate_control
+        self.controller = TaskLineageSupersessionController(
+            db_path, verifier, clock=clock, identity_digest=identity_digest
+        )
+
+    def post(self, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        self.authenticate_control(headers)
+        try:
+            result = self.controller.supersede(body)
+        except TaskLineageSupersessionError as exc:
+            return _status(exc), {"error": exc.code}
+        return (200 if result.get("idempotent") else 201), result
+
+
+def build_runtime():
+    """Bind to the already-active recovery API and its formal Owner verifier lazily."""
+    try:
+        from aios_agent_task_api import APIConfig
+        from aios_agent_task_api_p0_failed_lease_recovery import (
+            P0FailedLeaseRecoveryHandler,
+            P0FailedLeaseRecoveryTaskApplication,
+        )
+        from aios_agent_task_protocol import TaskProtocolError
+        from aios_owner_approval_verifier import (
+            GrantRootOwnerApprovalVerifier,
+            OwnerApprovalVerifierError,
+        )
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_RUNTIME_OVERLAY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+    # The active entrypoint layers failed- and active-lease recovery on top of
+    # expired recovery.  Inherit that current layer so adding lineage does not
+    # silently remove either already-deployed recovery route.
+    class Application(P0FailedLeaseRecoveryTaskApplication):
+        def __init__(self, config: Any) -> None:
+            super().__init__(config)
+            try:
+                verifier = GrantRootOwnerApprovalVerifier()
+            except OwnerApprovalVerifierError as exc:
+                raise TaskProtocolError(str(exc), 503) from exc
+            self.lineage_supersession = LineageSupersessionEndpoint(
+                config.db_path, verifier, self.authenticate_control
+            )
+
+        def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+            value = dict(super().health())
+            value.update({
+                "task_lineage_supersession": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_schema": DECISION_SCHEMA,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_exact_scope": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_exact_cas": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_append_only": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_caller_payload": False,
+            })
+            return value
+
+    class Handler(P0FailedLeaseRecoveryHandler):
+        app: Application | None = None
+
+        def do_POST(self) -> None:
+            path = urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+            if path != SUPERSESSION_ROUTE:
+                super().do_POST()
+                return
+
+            def action() -> None:
+                if self.app is None:
+                    raise TaskProtocolError("SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+                status, result = self.app.lineage_supersession.post(
+                    self._headers(), self._body()
+                )
+                if "error" in result:
+                    raise TaskProtocolError(str(result["error"]), status)
+                self._json(result, status)
+
+            self._run(action)
+
+    return APIConfig, Application, Handler
+
+
+def serve(config=None) -> None:
+    APIConfig, Application, Handler = build_runtime()
+    config = config or APIConfig.from_env()
+    application = Application(config)
+    Handler.app = application
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((config.host, config.port), Handler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()
@@ -0,0 +1,811 @@
+"""Canonical Task projection intent and same-identity recovery primitives.
+
+This module is intentionally Task-Plane-owned.  It does not open a network
+listener and it does not authenticate callers; existing control-plane services
+must enforce their normal service-side ``agent-task:control`` boundary before
+calling it.
+
+The recovery primitive has one purpose: converge a durable, complete
+ProjectionIntent to exactly one canonical Task row.  It never fabricates task
+semantics from a Bridge binding and it never generates a replacement task id.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+TASK_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+JOB_ID_RE = TASK_ID_RE
+SHA40_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SHA64_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]{1,220}$")
+SCHEMA = "aios.canonical-task-projection-intent.v1"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.canonical-task-projection-receipt.v1"
+
+
+class ProjectionRecoveryError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+class ProjectionState(str, Enum):
+    PENDING = "PENDING"
+    CONVERGED = "CONVERGED"
+    DRIFT = "DRIFT"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+    BACKFILL_REQUIRED = "BACKFILL_REQUIRED"
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    result = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(result) is None:
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return result
+
+
+def _integer(value: object, code: str, *, minimum: int = 0) -> int:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or value < minimum:
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def _plain_mapping(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return {str(k): v for k, v in value.items()}
+
+
+def _plain_list(value: object, code: str) -> list[Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, list):
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return list(value)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CanonicalTaskPayload:
+    task_id: str
+    goal: str
+    instructions: str
+    success_criteria: tuple[Mapping[str, Any], ...]
+    constraints: Mapping[str, Any]
+    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+    metadata: Mapping[str, Any]
+    priority: int = 100
+    max_attempts: int = 20
+    deadline: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalTaskPayload":
+        allowed = {
+            "task_id",
+            "goal",
+            "instructions",
+            "success_criteria",
+            "constraints",
+            "required_capabilities",
+            "metadata",
+            "priority",
+            "max_attempts",
+            "deadline",
+        }
+        if set(value) - allowed:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_PAYLOAD_UNKNOWN_FIELDS", 400)
+
+        task_id = _string(value.get("task_id"), "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_ID_RE)
+        goal = _string(value.get("goal"), "TASK_GOAL_INVALID")
+        instructions = _string(value.get("instructions"), "TASK_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+        if len(goal) > 8192 or len(instructions) > 65536:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_TEXT_TOO_LARGE", 413)
+
+        criteria_raw = _plain_list(value.get("success_criteria"), "TASK_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criteria: list[Mapping[str, Any]] = []
+        for item in criteria_raw:
+            if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+                raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID", 400)
+            criteria.append(dict(item))
+        if not criteria:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_REQUIRED", 400)
+
+        constraints = _plain_mapping(value.get("constraints"), "TASK_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+        capabilities_raw = _plain_list(
+            value.get("required_capabilities", []),
+            "TASK_CAPABILITIES_INVALID",
+        )
+        capabilities: list[str] = []
+        for item in capabilities_raw:
+            capabilities.append(_string(item, "TASK_CAPABILITY_INVALID"))
+
+        # Recovery recreates the pristine canonical row. Initial execution
+        # projection remains the sole owner of runtime capabilities.
+        if capabilities:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                "TASK_RECOVERY_REQUIRES_PRISTINE_CAPABILITIES",
+                409,
+            )
+
+        metadata = _plain_mapping(value.get("metadata", {}), "TASK_METADATA_INVALID")
+        if "execution" in metadata or "execution_projection" in metadata:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                "TASK_RECOVERY_REQUIRES_PRISTINE_METADATA",
+                409,
+            )
+
+        priority = _integer(value.get("priority", 100), "TASK_PRIORITY_INVALID", minimum=0)
+        max_attempts = _integer(
+            value.get("max_attempts", 20),
+            "TASK_MAX_ATTEMPTS_INVALID",
+            minimum=1,
+        )
+        deadline = value.get("deadline")
+        if deadline is not None:
+            deadline = _string(deadline, "TASK_DEADLINE_INVALID")
+
+        return cls(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            goal=goal,
+            instructions=instructions,
+            success_criteria=tuple(criteria),
+            constraints=constraints,
+            required_capabilities=tuple(capabilities),
+            metadata=metadata,
+            priority=priority,
+            max_attempts=max_attempts,
+            deadline=deadline,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "goal": self.goal,
+            "instructions": self.instructions,
+            "success_criteria": [dict(x) for x in self.success_criteria],
+            "constraints": dict(self.constraints),
+            "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),
+            "metadata": dict(self.metadata),
+            "priority": self.priority,
+            "max_attempts": self.max_attempts,
+            "deadline": self.deadline,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.public())
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedProjectionBinding:
+    governed_task_id: str
+    bridge_job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch: str
+    generation: int
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedProjectionBinding":
+        allowed = {
+            "governed_task_id",
+            "bridge_job_id",
+            "repository",
+            "branch",
+            "generation",
+            "base_oid",
+            "expected_branch_oid",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("GOVERNED_BINDING_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        repository = _string(value["repository"], "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("REPOSITORY_MISMATCH", 409)
+        return cls(
+            governed_task_id=_string(
+                value["governed_task_id"],
+                "GOVERNED_TASK_ID_INVALID",
+                TASK_ID_RE,
+            ),
+            bridge_job_id=_string(
+                value["bridge_job_id"],
+                "BRIDGE_JOB_ID_INVALID",
+                JOB_ID_RE,
+            ),
+            repository=repository,
+            branch=_string(value["branch"], "BRANCH_INVALID", BRANCH_RE),
+            generation=_integer(value["generation"], "GENERATION_INVALID", minimum=1),
+            base_oid=_string(value["base_oid"], "BASE_OID_INVALID", SHA40_RE),
+            expected_branch_oid=_string(
+                value["expected_branch_oid"],
+                "EXPECTED_OID_INVALID",
+                SHA40_RE,
+            ),
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ProjectionSourceArtifact:
+    ref: str
+    sha256: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ProjectionSourceArtifact":
+        if set(value) != {"ref", "sha256"}:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        return cls(
+            ref=_string(value["ref"], "SOURCE_ARTIFACT_REF_INVALID"),
+            sha256=_string(value["sha256"], "SOURCE_ARTIFACT_SHA_INVALID", SHA64_RE),
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent:
+    projection_id: str
+    projection_generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    task: CanonicalTaskPayload
+    binding: GovernedProjectionBinding
+    source_artifact: ProjectionSourceArtifact
+    schema: str = SCHEMA
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent":
+        allowed = {
+            "schema",
+            "projection_id",
+            "projection_generation",
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "task",
+            "governed_binding",
+            "source_artifact",
+            "task_payload_sha256",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_INTENT_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        if value["schema"] != SCHEMA:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_INTENT_SCHEMA_INVALID", 400)
+
+        task = CanonicalTaskPayload.from_mapping(
+            _plain_mapping(value["task"], "TASK_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
+        )
+        binding = GovernedProjectionBinding.from_mapping(
+            _plain_mapping(value["governed_binding"], "GOVERNED_BINDING_INVALID")
+        )
+        source = ProjectionSourceArtifact.from_mapping(
+            _plain_mapping(value["source_artifact"], "SOURCE_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+        )
+        if binding.governed_task_id != task.task_id:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_TASK_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+        expected_hash = _string(
+            value["task_payload_sha256"],
+            "TASK_PAYLOAD_SHA_INVALID",
+            SHA64_RE,
+        )
+        if task.payload_sha256 != expected_hash:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_PAYLOAD_SHA_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+        projection_id = _string(
+            value["projection_id"],
+            "PROJECTION_ID_INVALID",
+            TASK_ID_RE,
+        )
+        idempotency_key = _string(
+            value["idempotency_key"],
+            "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID",
+            TASK_ID_RE,
+        )
+        generation = _integer(
+            value["projection_generation"],
+            "PROJECTION_GENERATION_INVALID",
+            minimum=1,
+        )
+        return cls(
+            projection_id=projection_id,
+            projection_generation=generation,
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            task=task,
+            binding=binding,
+            source_artifact=source,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": self.schema,
+            "projection_id": self.projection_id,
+            "projection_generation": self.projection_generation,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "task": self.task.public(),
+            "governed_binding": self.binding.public(),
+            "source_artifact": asdict(self.source_artifact),
+            "task_payload_sha256": self.task.payload_sha256,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def request_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.public())
+
+
+class CanonicalTaskProjectionStore:
+    """Task-Plane-owned intent/recovery store.
+
+    The caller must already be inside the Task Plane authorization boundary.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path | str) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(connection: sqlite3.Connection, table: str) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {
+            str(row["name"]): row
+            for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _table_names(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> set[str]:
+        return {
+            str(row[0])
+            for row in connection.execute(
+                "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'"
+            )
+        }
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _event_table(
+        cls,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+    ) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = cls._table_names(connection)
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name in tables:
+                columns = cls._columns(connection, name)
+                if "task_id" in columns and "event_type" in columns:
+                    return name, columns
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_control_tables(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_projection_intents (
+              projection_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              bridge_job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              projection_generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              task_payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              intent_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+              state TEXT NOT NULL,
+              last_error TEXT,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              UNIQUE(task_id, projection_generation),
+              UNIQUE(task_id, idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_projection_receipts (
+              projection_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              bridge_job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              projection_generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              task_payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              canonical_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              state TEXT NOT NULL,
+              created_new_row INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              observed_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    def persist_intent(
+        self,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = _now()
+        request_sha = intent.request_sha256
+        intent_text = _canonical(intent.public()).decode("utf-8")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_control_tables(connection)
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM task_projection_intents
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND projection_generation=?
+                """,
+                (intent.task.task_id, intent.projection_generation),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                if (
+                    str(existing["projection_id"]) != intent.projection_id
+                    or str(existing["idempotency_key"]) != intent.idempotency_key
+                    or str(existing["request_sha256"]) != request_sha
+                ):
+                    raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                        "PROJECTION_INTENT_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT",
+                        409,
+                    )
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+                    "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+                    "state": str(existing["state"]),
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_projection_intents(
+                  projection_id,task_id,bridge_job_id,projection_generation,
+                  idempotency_key,request_sha256,task_payload_sha256,intent_json,
+                  state,last_error,created_at,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    intent.projection_id,
+                    intent.task.task_id,
+                    intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+                    intent.projection_generation,
+                    intent.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    intent.task.payload_sha256,
+                    intent_text,
+                    ProjectionState.PENDING.value,
+                    None,
+                    now,
+                    now,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+                "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+                "state": ProjectionState.PENDING.value,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+
+    def _task_row_payload(
+        self,
+        row: sqlite3.Row,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            success = json.loads(row["success_criteria_json"])
+            constraints = json.loads(row["constraints_json"])
+            capabilities = json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"])
+            metadata = json.loads(row["metadata_json"])
+        except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("CANONICAL_TASK_JSON_INVALID", 409) from exc
+
+        if (
+            not isinstance(success, list)
+            or not isinstance(constraints, Mapping)
+            or not isinstance(capabilities, list)
+            or not isinstance(metadata, Mapping)
+        ):
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("CANONICAL_TASK_SHAPE_INVALID", 409)
+
+        return {
+            "task_id": str(row["task_id"]),
+            "goal": str(row["goal"]),
+            "instructions": str(row["instructions"]),
+            "success_criteria": success,
+            "constraints": dict(constraints),
+            "required_capabilities": capabilities,
+            "metadata": dict(metadata),
+            "priority": int(row["priority"]),
+            "max_attempts": int(row["max_attempts"]),
+            "deadline": row["deadline"],
+        }
+
+    def _verify_existing_task(
+        self,
+        row: sqlite3.Row,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> int:
+        observed = self._task_row_payload(row)
+        observed_hash = sha256_json(observed)
+        if observed_hash != intent.task.payload_sha256:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                "CANONICAL_TASK_PROJECTION_IDENTITY_CONFLICT",
+                409,
+            )
+        return int(row["revision"])
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required_task_columns() -> set[str]:
+        return {
+            "task_id",
+            "goal",
+            "instructions",
+            "success_criteria_json",
+            "required_capabilities_json",
+            "constraints_json",
+            "metadata_json",
+            "priority",
+            "max_attempts",
+            "attempt",
+            "status",
+            "claimed_by",
+            "lease_token_hash",
+            "lease_expires_at",
+            "result_json",
+            "verification_json",
+            "revision",
+            "created_at",
+            "updated_at",
+        }
+
+    def _insert_task(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> int:
+        columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+        if not self._required_task_columns().issubset(columns):
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_SCHEMA_RECOVERY_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+        now = _now()
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+            "goal": intent.task.goal,
+            "instructions": intent.task.instructions,
+            "success_criteria_json": _canonical(
+                [dict(x) for x in intent.task.success_criteria]
+            ).decode("utf-8"),
+            "required_capabilities_json": "[]",
+            "constraints_json": _canonical(dict(intent.task.constraints)).decode("utf-8"),
+            "metadata_json": _canonical(dict(intent.task.metadata)).decode("utf-8"),
+            "deadline": intent.task.deadline,
+            "priority": intent.task.priority,
+            "max_attempts": intent.task.max_attempts,
+            "attempt": 0,
+            "status": "QUEUED",
+            "claimed_by": None,
+            "lease_token_hash": None,
+            "lease_expires_at": None,
+            "result_json": None,
+            "verification_json": None,
+            "revision": 1,
+            "created_at": now,
+            "updated_at": now,
+        }
+        for optional in (
+            "result_digest",
+            "result_idempotency_key",
+        ):
+            if optional in columns:
+                values[optional] = None
+
+        names = [name for name in values if name in columns]
+        placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in names)
+        connection.execute(
+            f'INSERT INTO tasks ({",".join(chr(34)+n+chr(34) for n in names)}) '
+            f"VALUES ({placeholders})",
+            tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+        )
+        self._insert_task_created_event(connection, intent)
+        return 1
+
+    def _insert_task_created_event(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = self._event_table(connection)
+        event = {
+            "schema": "aios.task-projection-recovery.event.v1",
+            "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+            "bridge_job_id": intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+            "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+            "projection_generation": intent.projection_generation,
+            "task_payload_sha256": intent.task.payload_sha256,
+            "source_artifact_ref": intent.source_artifact.ref,
+            "source_artifact_sha256": intent.source_artifact.sha256,
+            "recovery": True,
+        }
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+            "event_type": "TASK_CREATED",
+        }
+        payload_text = _canonical(event).decode("utf-8")
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "control-plane-projection-recovery"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "control-plane-projection-recovery"
+
+        names = list(values)
+        connection.execute(
+            f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({",".join(chr(34)+n+chr(34) for n in names)}) '
+            f'VALUES ({",".join("?" for _ in names)})',
+            tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+        )
+
+    def reconcile(
+        self,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        # Persist first so a crash before Task creation leaves a durable PENDING
+        # intent for startup/supervisor reconciliation.
+        self.persist_intent(intent)
+
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_control_tables(connection)
+            existing_receipt = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_projection_receipts WHERE projection_id=?",
+                (intent.projection_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing_receipt is not None:
+                if (
+                    str(existing_receipt["task_id"]) != intent.task.task_id
+                    or str(existing_receipt["bridge_job_id"]) != intent.binding.bridge_job_id
+                    or str(existing_receipt["task_payload_sha256"])
+                    != intent.task.payload_sha256
+                ):
+                    raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                        "PROJECTION_RECEIPT_IDENTITY_CONFLICT",
+                        409,
+                    )
+                connection.commit()
+                receipt = json.loads(existing_receipt["receipt_json"])
+                receipt["idempotent"] = True
+                return receipt
+
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+                (intent.task.task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            created_new = False
+            if row is None:
+                revision = self._insert_task(connection, intent)
+                created_new = True
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+                    (intent.task.task_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                        "TASK_RECOVERY_OBSERVATION_FAILED",
+                        503,
+                    )
+            else:
+                revision = self._verify_existing_task(row, intent)
+
+            # Observation after mutation is mandatory.
+            revision = self._verify_existing_task(row, intent)
+            observed_at = _now()
+            receipt = {
+                "schema": RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+                "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+                "governed_task_id": intent.binding.governed_task_id,
+                "canonical_task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+                "bridge_job_id": intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+                "projection_generation": intent.projection_generation,
+                "task_payload_sha256": intent.task.payload_sha256,
+                "canonical_revision": revision,
+                "state": ProjectionState.CONVERGED.value,
+                "created_new_row": created_new,
+                "source_artifact": asdict(intent.source_artifact),
+                "observed_at": observed_at,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_projection_receipts(
+                  projection_id,task_id,bridge_job_id,projection_generation,
+                  task_payload_sha256,canonical_revision,state,created_new_row,
+                  observed_at,receipt_json
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    intent.projection_id,
+                    intent.task.task_id,
+                    intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+                    intent.projection_generation,
+                    intent.task.payload_sha256,
+                    revision,
+                    ProjectionState.CONVERGED.value,
+                    1 if created_new else 0,
+                    observed_at,
+                    _canonical(receipt).decode("utf-8"),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE task_projection_intents
+                   SET state=?, last_error=NULL, updated_at=?
+                 WHERE projection_id=?
+                """,
+                (
+                    ProjectionState.CONVERGED.value,
+                    observed_at,
+                    intent.projection_id,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return receipt
+
+    def get_projection(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        task_id = _string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_ID_RE)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._ensure_control_tables(connection)
+            intent = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM task_projection_intents
+                 WHERE task_id=?
+                 ORDER BY projection_generation DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if intent is None:
+                return None
+            receipt = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT receipt_json FROM task_projection_receipts WHERE projection_id=?",
+                (intent["projection_id"],),
+            ).fetchone()
+            return {
+                "projection_id": intent["projection_id"],
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "bridge_job_id": intent["bridge_job_id"],
+                "projection_generation": int(intent["projection_generation"]),
+                "state": intent["state"],
+                "last_error": intent["last_error"],
+                "task_payload_sha256": intent["task_payload_sha256"],
+                "receipt": json.loads(receipt[0]) if receipt else None,
+            }
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+"""HTTP integration helpers for canonical Task projection recovery.
+
+This module intentionally contains no HTTP server. Existing Task Plane /
+projection-owner handlers should call ``recover_from_json`` only after their
+normal service-side ``agent-task:control`` authorization succeeds.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_agent_task_projection_recovery import (
+    CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    CanonicalTaskProjectionStore,
+    ProjectionRecoveryError,
+)
+
+
+def recover_from_json(
+    db_path: Path | str,
+    task_id: str,
+    body: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        intent = CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent.from_mapping(body)
+        if intent.task.task_id != task_id:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_TASK_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409)
+        result = CanonicalTaskProjectionStore(db_path).reconcile(intent)
+        return (200 if result.get("idempotent") else 201), result
+    except ProjectionRecoveryError as exc:
+        return exc.status, {"error": exc.code}
+
+
+def get_projection(
+    db_path: Path | str,
+    task_id: str,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        result = CanonicalTaskProjectionStore(db_path).get_projection(task_id)
+    except ProjectionRecoveryError as exc:
+        return exc.status, {"error": exc.code}
+    if result is None:
+        return 404, {"error": "TASK_PROJECTION_NOT_FOUND"}
+    return 200, result
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+"""Fail-closed Authority Git side-effect boundary.
+
+Only this module may issue the narrowly scoped ref CAS primitives used by the
+durable executor. It never accepts force updates, arbitrary refs, tags, or
+direct production mutations.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+from typing import Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^refs/heads/agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+
+
+class AuthorityGitError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise AuthorityGitError(f"{field}_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AuthorityGitExecutor:
+    git_dir: Path
+    worktree_root: Path = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/worktrees")
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.git_dir.is_absolute() or self.git_dir.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR_INVALID")
+        if not self.worktree_root.is_absolute() or self.worktree_root.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ROOT_INVALID")
+
+    def _git(self, args: Sequence[str], *, check: bool = True) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if check and result.returncode != 0:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_GIT_COMMAND_FAILED")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def read_ref(self, ref: str) -> str | None:
+        if not ref.startswith("refs/") or ref.startswith(("refs/tags/", "refs/remotes/")):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("REF_READ_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        value = self._git(["rev-parse", "--verify", ref], check=False)
+        return value if value and OID_RE.fullmatch(value) else None
+
+    def commit_exists(self, oid: str) -> bool:
+        _oid(oid, "commit_oid")
+        result = subprocess.run(["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "cat-file", "-e", oid + "^{commit}"], capture_output=True, check=False)
+        return result.returncode == 0
+
+    def ancestry_check(self, older_oid: str, newer_oid: str) -> bool:
+        _oid(older_oid, "older_oid")
+        _oid(newer_oid, "newer_oid")
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", older_oid, newer_oid],
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if result.returncode not in (0, 1):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("ANCESTRY_CHECK_FAILED")
+        return result.returncode == 0
+
+    def create_detached_worktree(
+        self,
+        base_oid: str,
+        worktree_name: str,
+        root: Path | None = None,
+    ) -> Path:
+        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
+        if not worktree_name or "/" in worktree_name or "\\" in worktree_name or worktree_name in {".", ".."}:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_NAME_INVALID")
+        parent = root or self.worktree_root
+        if not parent.is_absolute() or parent.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ROOT_INVALID")
+        path = parent / worktree_name
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(path), base_oid])
+        return path
+
+    def create_task_branch(self, branch: str, base_oid: str) -> str:
+        """Create an isolated agent branch once, using an empty-ref CAS."""
+        ref = branch if branch.startswith("refs/heads/") else "refs/heads/" + branch
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(ref):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
+        if not self.commit_exists(base_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
+        current = self.read_ref(ref)
+        if current is not None:
+            if current == base_oid:
+                return current
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        self._git(["update-ref", ref, base_oid, "0" * 40])
+        readback = self.read_ref(ref)
+        if readback != base_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def advance_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        current = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if current != expected_oid:
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return new_oid
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_oid, new_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        self._git(["update-ref", branch, new_oid, expected_oid])
+        readback = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def ff_CAS_main_after_verified_protected_merge(self, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_oid, new_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("MAIN_FF_REQUIRED")
+        current = self.read_ref("refs/heads/main")
+        if current != expected_oid:
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return new_oid
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        self._git(["update-ref", "refs/heads/main", new_oid, expected_oid])
+        readback = self.read_ref("refs/heads/main")
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def commit_file_in_isolated_worktree(
+        self,
+        *,
+        base_oid: str,
+        files: Mapping[str, bytes],
+        message: str,
+        worktree_name: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
+        if not worktree_name or "/" in worktree_name or "\\" in worktree_name or worktree_name in {".", ".."}:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_NAME_INVALID")
+        root = self.worktree_root / worktree_name
+        if root.exists() or root.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        self.worktree_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(root), base_oid])
+        try:
+            for relative, content in files.items():
+                path = Path(relative)
+                if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or not path.parts or path.parts[0] == ".git":
+                    raise AuthorityGitError("FILE_PATH_INVALID")
+                target = root / path
+                target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+                target.write_bytes(content)
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "-C", str(root), "add", "--", *files.keys()],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ADD_FAILED")
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "-C", str(root), "-c", "user.name=aios-durable-job", "-c", "user.email=aios-durable-job@localhost", "commit", "--no-verify", "-m", message],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_COMMIT_FAILED")
+            return subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(root), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
+        finally:
+            subprocess.run(["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "worktree", "remove", "--force", str(root)], capture_output=True, check=False)
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""HTTP adapter for Owner-authorized task writer provisioning.
+
+Run this module instead of aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py. All existing routes are
+delegated unchanged; only POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized is added.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+
+import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
+    AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner,
+    OwnerContext,
+    ProvisioningError,
+)
+
+
+_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/task-writer/provision-authorized"
+
+
+def _owner_authorization(handler):
+    scope = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE", "writer:provision"
+    )
+    auth = handler.need(scope)
+    if not auth:
+        return None
+    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    identity = str(auth.get("account") or "").strip()
+    if not identity:
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    return auth
+
+
+def _authorized_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != _ENDPOINT:
+        return _original_do_post(self)
+    auth = _owner_authorization(self)
+    if not auth:
+        return
+    data = self.body()
+    owner_reference = str(data.get("owner_authorization_reference") or "")
+    try:
+        result = AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner().provision(
+            data,
+            OwnerContext(
+                identity=str(auth["account"]),
+                role=str(auth["role"]),
+                authorization_reference=owner_reference,
+            ),
+        )
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except ProvisioningError as exc:
+        body = {"error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
+    except Exception:
+        # Do not expose tool output, paths containing credentials, or traceback data.
+        return self.sendj({"error": "AUTHORIZED_WRITER_BRIDGE_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500)
+
+
+api.H.do_POST = _authorized_do_post
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    api.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Governed API facade for branch-bound repair leases.
+
+The facade is transport-neutral so the permanent control plane can expose it
+through its existing authenticated loopback/API seam without creating a second
+Git writer or a global credential registry.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from branch_repair_lease import LeaseError, RepairLease, RepairLeaseManager, sanitized_lease_view
+
+
+class BranchRepairLeaseAPI:
+    """Validate operation envelopes and return sanitized lease metadata."""
+
+    def __init__(self, manager: RepairLeaseManager) -> None:
+        self.manager = manager
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required(request: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> Any:
+        value = request.get(name)
+        if value is None or value == "":
+            raise LeaseError(f"missing required field: {name}")
+        return value
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _view(lease: RepairLease) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"status": "ok", "lease": sanitized_lease_view(lease)}
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            operation = self._required(request, "operation")
+            owner = str(self._required(request, "owner_identity"))
+            if operation == "issue":
+                lease = self.manager.issue(
+                    task_id=str(self._required(request, "task_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    branch=str(self._required(request, "branch")),
+                    description=str(self._required(request, "description")),
+                    allowed_paths=tuple(self._required(request, "allowed_paths")),
+                    ttl_seconds=int(request.get("ttl_seconds", 3600)),
+                )
+            elif operation == "attach_existing_branch":
+                lease = self.manager.attach_existing_branch(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "authorize_commit":
+                lease = self.manager.authorize_commit(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
+                    content=request.get("content"),
+                )
+            elif operation == "record_commit":
+                lease = self.manager.record_commit(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                    new_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "new_head_oid")),
+                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "recover":
+                lease = self.manager.recover(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            elif operation == "renew":
+                lease = self.manager.renew(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    ttl_seconds=int(self._required(request, "ttl_seconds")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "complete":
+                lease = self.manager.complete(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            elif operation == "revoke":
+                lease = self.manager.revoke(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            else:
+                raise LeaseError("unsupported lease operation")
+            return self._view(lease)
+        except (LeaseError, TypeError, ValueError):
+            return {"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_request_rejected"}
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""Root-only CLI for the branch-bound repair lease API."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from aios_branch_repair_lease_api import BranchRepairLeaseAPI
+from branch_repair_lease import GitProbe, LeaseStore
+from branch_repair_lease import RepairLeaseManager
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS branch repair lease CLI")
+    parser.add_argument("--store", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--request-file")
+    parser.add_argument("--request-json")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "root_required"}))
+        return 2
+    if bool(args.request_file) == bool(args.request_json):
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "one_request_source_required"}))
+        return 2
+    try:
+        raw = (
+            Path(args.request_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            if args.request_file
+            else str(args.request_json)
+        )
+        request = json.loads(raw)
+        if not isinstance(request, dict):
+            raise ValueError("request must be an object")
+        api = BranchRepairLeaseAPI(RepairLeaseManager(LeaseStore(args.store), GitProbe(args.bare_repo)))
+        response = api.handle(request)
+        print(json.dumps(response, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")))
+        return 0 if response.get("status") == "ok" else 1
+    except Exception:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_cli_failed"}))
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+"""Read-only validation of recovered campaign authorization evidence."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import stat
+from typing import Any
+
+
+class RecoveryEvidenceError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _digest(path: Path) -> str:
+    h = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as stream:
+        for block in iter(lambda: stream.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            h.update(block)
+    return h.hexdigest()
+
+
+def _secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_MISSING")
+    info = path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+    if info.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o022:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_PERMISSIONS")
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
+    return value
+
+
+def load_recovered_authorization(path: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Verify the recovery receipt, sidecar, and all referenced immutable files."""
+    receipt_path = Path(path)
+    receipt = _secure_json(receipt_path)
+    sidecar = receipt_path.with_suffix(receipt_path.suffix + ".sha256")
+    if sidecar.is_symlink() or not sidecar.is_file():
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_SIDECAR_MISSING")
+    expected = sidecar.read_text(encoding="ascii").split()[0]
+    actual = _digest(receipt_path)
+    if expected != actual:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    required = {
+        "schema",
+        "campaign_id",
+        "original_event_id",
+        "original_authorization_digest",
+        "signed_grant_id",
+        "signed_grant_digest",
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "original_base_oid",
+        "branch",
+        "expected_branch_oid",
+        "recovered_from_existing_evidence",
+        "new_owner_interaction",
+        "recovery_state",
+        "production_side_effect_executed",
+        "global_writes_enabled",
+        "grant_consumed",
+        "owner_authorization_consumed",
+        "original_receipts_immutable",
+        "recovered_at",
+        "evidence_files",
+    }
+    if set(receipt) != required or receipt["schema"] != "aios.owner-authorization-recovery.v1":
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    if receipt["recovered_from_existing_evidence"] is not True or receipt["new_owner_interaction"] is not False:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_NOT_APPEND_ONLY")
+    if receipt["production_side_effect_executed"] is not False or receipt["global_writes_enabled"] is not False:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    if receipt["recovery_state"] != "RECOVERED_PENDING_CONTINUATION_LEASE":
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_STATE_INVALID")
+    evidence = receipt["evidence_files"]
+    if not isinstance(evidence, list) or not evidence:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_LIST_INVALID")
+    for item in evidence:
+        if not isinstance(item, dict) or set(item) != {"path", "sha256"}:
+            raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_ENTRY_INVALID")
+        target = Path(item["path"])
+        if _digest(target) != item["sha256"]:
+            raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    return {
+        "schema": receipt["schema"],
+        "state": receipt["recovery_state"],
+        "campaign_id": receipt["campaign_id"],
+        "original_event_id": receipt["original_event_id"],
+        "original_authorization_digest": receipt["original_authorization_digest"],
+        "signed_grant_id": receipt["signed_grant_id"],
+        "task_id": receipt["task_id"],
+        "repository": receipt["repository"],
+        "original_base_oid": receipt["original_base_oid"],
+        "branch": receipt["branch"],
+        "expected_branch_oid": receipt["expected_branch_oid"],
+        "digest": actual,
+        "new_owner_interaction": False,
+    }
@@ -1,12 +1,80 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 from __future__ import annotations
-import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, uuid
+import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, uuid
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any

-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', '/data/aios-gitops/workspace')) / 'runtime' / 'agent-os'))
-from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+try:
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    PublicationConflict,
+    PublicationPending,
+    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
+    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
+    PublicationRequest,
+    TagPublisher,
+    redact,
+    validate_version,
+    validate_gitea_api_url,
+)
+try:
+    from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    # The deployed service normally supplies runtime/agent-os on sys.path.
+    # Keep direct, isolated contract execution bound to the repository copy.
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "runtime" / "agent-os"))
+    from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+from silent_release_hardening import (
+    ApprovalKeyRing,
+    ApprovalRevocationStore,
+    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
+    SagaConflict,
+    SignedApprovalVerifier,
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+    SilentReleaseActionService,
+)
+try:
+    from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, ServiceUnavailable, JobStore
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, ServiceUnavailable, JobStore
+try:
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )
+try:
+    from aios_repository_discovery import RepositoryDiscovery, RepositoryDiscoveryError
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_repository_discovery import RepositoryDiscovery, RepositoryDiscoveryError

 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
@@ -16,6 +84,19 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
+AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
+REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
+SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
+    '/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
+))
+SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED = str(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED', 'false'
+)).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
+SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
+    '/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
+))
 monitor = ActionMonitor()

 BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -24,7 +105,51 @@ BASE_MODELS = [
  {'id':'base.gpt-5.5','provider':'openai','model':'gpt-5.5','display_name':'GPT-5.5','scope':'global'},
 ]
 SECRET_RE = re.compile(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})')
-SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})')
+SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(
+    r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])'
+    r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})'
+)
+
+READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
+    '/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
+    '/api/base', '/api/baseline', '/base', '/api/ver', '/api/versions', '/ver',
+    '/api/diff', '/diff', '/api/patch', '/api/patches', '/api/branches', '/patch',
+    '/api/model', '/model', '/api/run', '/api/runtime-status', '/run',
+    '/api/action-monitor', '/action-monitor', '/admin/ai-evolution',
+    '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
+    '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
+    '/api/release-acceptance',
+    '/api/repository/tree', '/api/repository/search',
+    '/api/repository/diff-index', '/api/repository/file',
+    '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
+    '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
+    '/getRecoveryStatus',
+})
+SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/createReleaseCandidate',
+    '/createReleaseIntent',
+    '/submitSignedApproval',
+    '/submitOwnerApproval',
+    '/startDeployment',
+})
+
+def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if method == 'GET':
+        return False
+    if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
+        return False
+    if (
+        method == 'POST'
+        and path in ('/api/file', '/api/commit-file')
+        and os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED', os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_CONTROLLER_ENABLED', 'false')).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
+    ):
+        return False
+    decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
+    if decision.allowed:
+        return False
+    handler.sendj(decision.payload(), decision.status_code)
+    return True

 def now() -> str: return time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())
 def uid(p='id') -> str: return f'{p}-{int(time.time()*1000)}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}'
@@ -36,6 +161,41 @@ def sh(args, check=False):
 def jload(p: Path, default):
    try: return json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
    except Exception: return default
+
+def _file_sha256(path: Path) -> str:
+    digest=hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open('rb') as source:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b''):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+def _build_silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
+    verifier=None
+    if SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS.is_file():
+        verifier=SignedApprovalVerifier(
+            ApprovalKeyRing.from_file(SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS),
+            ApprovalRevocationStore(
+                SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT / 'revocations'
+            ),
+        )
+    policy_path=WS / 'config' / 'gitops' / 'silent-release-policy.json'
+    policy_sha=_file_sha256(policy_path) if policy_path.is_file() else ''
+    return SilentReleaseActionService(
+        SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT,
+        execution_enabled=SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,
+        approval_verifier=verifier,
+        expected_repository=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+        policy_sha256=policy_sha,
+    )
+
+# Construct once during service startup. If production execution is enabled
+# without every trusted builder/orchestrator dependency, construction fails
+# closed before the HTTP server accepts traffic.
+_SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE = _build_silent_release_service()
+
+
+def silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
+    return _SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE
 def relpath(path: str) -> str:
    x = str(path or '').replace('\\','/').strip()
    if not x or x.startswith('/') or '..' in Path(x).parts or Path(x).parts[0] == '.git': raise ValueError('invalid path')
@@ -109,9 +269,13 @@ def ensure_git():
    if not sh(['config','user.name'])['stdout']: sh(['config','user.name','chatgpt-gitops-bot'], True)
 def checkout(branch, base='main', create=False):
    ensure_git(); b=branch_name(branch)
-    if create or sh(['rev-parse','--verify',b])['code'] != 0:
-        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-B',b], True)
-    else: sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    exists = sh(['rev-parse','--verify',f'refs/heads/{b}'])['code'] == 0
+    if exists:
+        sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    elif create:
+        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-b',b], True)
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f'branch does not exist: {b}')
    return b
 def write_file(path, content):
    if content_has_secret(content): raise ValueError('secret_rejected: use secret_ref; plaintext API keys must not enter Git')
@@ -121,6 +285,19 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
    if not branch or branch in ('main','master') or branch.startswith('main/') or branch.startswith('master/'):
        return {'status':'skipped','reason':'protected_branch','branch':branch}
    if BARE_REPO.exists():
+        common = sh(['rev-parse', '--path-format=absolute', '--git-common-dir'], True)['stdout']
+        if Path(common).resolve() == BARE_REPO.resolve():
+            head = sh(['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], True)['stdout']
+            stored = subprocess.run(
+                ['git', '--git-dir', str(BARE_REPO), 'rev-parse', f'refs/heads/{branch}'],
+                text=True, capture_output=True,
+            )
+            if stored.returncode != 0 or stored.stdout.strip() != head:
+                raise RuntimeError(f'linked-worktree branch verification failed for {branch}')
+            return {
+                'status':'verified', 'target':'authoritative-bare',
+                'branch':branch, 'oid':head,
+            }
        ref=f'refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}'
        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git sync failed for {branch}')
@@ -130,15 +307,142 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','branch':branch,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}

 def sync_tag(tag: str) -> dict:
-    if not tag: return {'status':'skipped','reason':'empty_tag'}
-    if BARE_REPO.exists():
-        ref=f'refs/tags/{tag}:refs/tags/{tag}'
-        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
-        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag sync failed for {tag}')
-        return {'status':'synced','target':'bare','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
-    p=subprocess.run(['git','push','origin',tag], cwd=str(WS), text=True, capture_output=True)
-    if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag push failed for {tag}')
-    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
+    raise RuntimeError(
+        'unsafe sync_tag disabled: use TagPublisher with expected tag_oid, '
+        'target_oid, Gitea remote verification, and authenticated API verification'
+    )
+
+def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
+    oid = str(value or '').strip().lower()
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', oid):
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} must be a full 40-character commit OID')
+    try:
+        return authoritative_commit(oid, git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
+
+def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
+    validate_version(tag)
+    try:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        )
+    except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
+    return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
+
+def publication_request_from_query(q: dict[str, list[str]]) -> PublicationRequest:
+    required = ('version', 'target_oid', 'evidence_closure_oid', 'approval_plan_id')
+    missing = [name for name in required if not (q.get(name) or [''])[0]]
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError('missing release governance fields: ' + ', '.join(missing))
+    return PublicationRequest(
+        (q['version'])[0],
+        (q['target_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['evidence_closure_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['approval_plan_id'])[0],
+    )
+
+def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
+    snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+        git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+    )
+    if not snapshot["repository_available"]:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(snapshot["query_error"] or "AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE"))
+    return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
+
+
+_DISCOVERY_ACTIONS = {
+    '/api/repository/tree': (
+        'list_repository_tree',
+        {'repository', 'ref', 'limit'},
+        {'prefix', 'depth', 'cursor'},
+    ),
+    '/api/repository/search': (
+        'search_repository_source',
+        {'repository', 'ref', 'query', 'max_matches', 'max_bytes'},
+        {'path_globs', 'cursor'},
+    ),
+    '/api/repository/diff-index': (
+        'get_diff_index',
+        {'repository', 'from', 'to', 'limit'},
+        {'path_prefix', 'cursor'},
+    ),
+    '/api/repository/file': (
+        'read_repository_file',
+        {'repository', 'ref', 'path'},
+        {'max_bytes'},
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def repository_discovery_request(
+    path: str, query: dict[str, list[str]]
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    operation, required, optional = _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS[path]
+    if set(query) - required - optional:
+        raise ValueError('unknown repository discovery query field')
+    request: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for key, values in query.items():
+        if key == 'path_globs':
+            if not values:
+                raise ValueError('empty repository discovery path glob')
+            request[key] = list(values)
+            continue
+        if len(values) != 1:
+            raise ValueError('duplicate repository discovery query field')
+        value: Any = values[0]
+        if key in {'depth', 'limit', 'max_matches', 'max_bytes'}:
+            try:
+                value = int(value, 10)
+            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                raise ValueError('invalid repository discovery integer') from exc
+        request[key] = value
+    if required - set(request):
+        raise ValueError('missing repository discovery query field')
+    if not REPOSITORY_IDENTITY:
+        raise RepositoryDiscoveryError('REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE')
+    try:
+        discovery = RepositoryDiscovery(
+            allowed_repositories=(REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,),
+            git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir(),
+            cursor_secret=os.getenv('AIOS_REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET'),
+        )
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        if isinstance(exc, RepositoryDiscoveryError):
+            raise
+        raise RepositoryDiscoveryError('REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE') from exc
+    public_to_internal = {
+        'ref': 'revision',
+        'path': 'file_path',
+        'path_prefix': 'prefix',
+    }
+    internal_request = {
+        public_to_internal.get(key, key): value for key, value in request.items()
+    }
+    return dict(getattr(discovery, operation)(internal_request))
+
+
+def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
+    authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
+    publisher = TagPublisher(
+        WS,
+        GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
+        GiteaTagClient(
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
+            Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
+            token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
+        ),
+        os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
+    )
+    publisher.baseline_path = Path(os.getenv(
+        'AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_AUTHORITY', str(WS / 'baseline' / 'current.json')
+    ))
+    return publisher

 def commit(paths, msg):
    ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -158,6 +462,16 @@ def patches():
    for p in sorted((WS/'patches').glob('**/*.json')): out.append(jload(p, {'path':str(p.relative_to(WS))}))
    return out

+def runtime_release_info() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    for candidate in (WS / 'manifest.json', WS.parent / 'manifest.json'):
+        data = jload(candidate, {})
+        if data.get('target_commit'):
+            return {
+                'runtime_release_commit': data.get('target_commit'),
+                'runtime_release_path': str(WS),
+            }
+    return {'runtime_release_commit': None, 'runtime_release_path': str(WS)}
+
 class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    server_version='AIOSChatGPTGitOps/V1R1C0'
    def sendj(self, data, code=200):
@@ -178,44 +492,306 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        if not a['ok']: self.sendj({'error':'unauthorized','hint':'Bearer token required'},401); return None
        if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
        return a
+    def bridge_release(self, path, data):
+        route = {
+            '/createTagApprovalRequest': '/v2/tag/approval-request',
+            '/requestOrCreateTag': '/v2/tag/publish',
+            '/getTagPublicationStatus': '/v2/tag/status',
+            '/buildProductionArtifact': '/v2/release/artifact',
+            '/executeApprovedProductionRelease': '/v2/release/execute',
+            '/getReleaseConsistency': '/v2/release/consistency',
+            '/runReleaseAcceptance': '/v2/release/acceptance',
+        }.get(path)
+        if route is None:
+            raise ValueError('governed_release_route_invalid')
+        base = os.getenv('AIOS_BRIDGE_V2_URL', 'http://127.0.0.1:18892').rstrip('/')
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + route,
+            data=json.dumps(data, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode('utf-8'),
+            headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
+            method='POST',
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
+                return self.sendj(result, response.status)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            try:
+                body = json.loads(exc.read().decode('utf-8'))
+            except Exception:
+                body = {'error': 'bridge_http_error'}
+            return self.sendj(body, exc.code)
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error': 'GOVERNED_BRIDGE_UNAVAILABLE', 'detail': type(exc).__name__}, 503)
+    def do_POST(self):
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
+        if path in _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS:
+            return self.sendj({'error': 'method_not_allowed'},405)
+        if path in {
+            '/createTagApprovalRequest', '/requestOrCreateTag', '/getTagPublicationStatus',
+            '/buildProductionArtifact', '/executeApprovedProductionRelease',
+            '/getReleaseConsistency', '/runReleaseAcceptance',
+        }:
+            actor = self.need('tag:create')
+            if not actor:
+                return
+            return self.bridge_release(path, self.body())
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path):
+            return
+        return self.sendj({'error': 'not_found', 'path': path}, 404)
    def do_GET(self):
-        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path; q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
+        if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        if len(self.path) > 8192:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'query_too_large'},413)
+        try:
+            q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(
+                u.query, keep_blank_values=True, max_num_fields=64
+            )
+        except ValueError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'query_invalid'},400)
        try:
            if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
            if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
                return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
            if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
+            if path in _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS:
+                return self.sendj(repository_discovery_request(path, q))
            if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
-                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {}); data.setdefault('git', sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']); return self.sendj(data)
+                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
+                data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                ))
+                return self.sendj(data)
            if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                return self.sendj({'tags':sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines(),'versions_dir':[p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],'head':sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    tags = authoritative_tags(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'registry_versions': registry,
+                    'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'tags': [item['name'] for item in tags],
+                    'versions_dir': registry,
+                    'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                    'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                })
            if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
-                frm=(q.get('from') or ['HEAD~1'])[0]; to=(q.get('to') or ['HEAD'])[0]; return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':sh(['diff',frm,to])})
-            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'): return self.sendj({'patches':patches(),'branches':sh(['branch','--format','%(refname:short)'])['stdout'].splitlines()})
+                frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
+                to=(q.get('to') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    diff=authoritative_diff(frm, to, git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir())
+                except ValueError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},400)
+                except AuthoritativeGitNotFound as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},404)
+                except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
+                except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
+                payload = {'from': frm, 'to': to, 'diff': diff}
+                payload.update({
+                    key: diff[key]
+                    for key in (
+                        'from_oid', 'to_oid', 'changed_paths', 'stats',
+                        'total_size_bytes', 'truncated', 'patch_limit_bytes',
+                    )
+                })
+                return self.sendj(payload)
+            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    branches = authoritative_branches(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                metadata = patches()
+                branch_names = {item['name'] for item in branches}
+                metadata_names = {
+                    item.get('branch') for item in metadata
+                    if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get('branch')
+                }
+                orphan = [
+                    item for item in metadata
+                    if item.get('branch') and item.get('branch') not in branch_names
+                ]
+                missing = [
+                    item for item in branches
+                    if item['name'] not in metadata_names
+                ]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'metadata_patches': metadata,
+                    'authoritative_branches': branches,
+                    'orphan_metadata': orphan,
+                    'branches_without_metadata': missing,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'patches': metadata,
+                    'branches': [item['name'] for item in branches],
+                })
            if path in ('/api/model','/model'): return self.sendj({'base':BASE_MODELS,'custom':model_docs(),'priority':[jload(p,{}) for p in sorted((WS/'config'/'model_priority').glob('*.json'))]})
            if path in ('/api/run','/api/runtime-status','/run'):
                svc=subprocess.run(['systemctl','is-active','aios-gitops-model-api'], text=True, capture_output=True)
-                return self.sendj({'service':'aios-gitops-model-api','status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),'workspace_branch':sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                workspace_branch = None
+                if (WS / '.git').exists():
+                    result = sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])
+                    workspace_branch = result['stdout'] or None
+                payload = {
+                    'service':'aios-gitops-model-api',
+                    'status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),
+                    'workspace_branch':workspace_branch,
+                    **runtime_release_info(),
+                    **snapshot,
+                    'writes_enabled': str(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED','false')).lower() in {'1','true','yes','on'},
+                }
+                return self.sendj(payload, 200 if snapshot['repository_available'] else 503)
            if path in ('/api/action-monitor','/action-monitor'):
                latest=monitor.latest()
                ldict={'event_id':latest.event_id,'action':latest.action,'error':latest.error,'context':latest.context,'created_at':latest.created_at} if latest else None
                return self.sendj({'events':[{"event_id":e.event_id,"action":e.action,"error":e.error,"context":e.context,"created_at":e.created_at} for e in monitor.list_events()],'latest':ldict})
+            if path == '/api/tag-publication-status':
+                version=(q.get('version') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    version=validate_version(version)
+                    status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
+                except ValueError:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
+                return self.sendj(status)
+            if path == '/api/release-consistency':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
+            if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
+            if path in (
+                '/getReleaseCandidate',
+                '/getReleasePlan',
+                '/getReleaseAcceptance',
+                '/getApprovalEnvelope',
+                '/getReleaseSaga',
+                '/getCapabilityStatus',
+            ):
+                candidate_id=(q.get('candidate_id') or [''])[0]
+                if not candidate_id:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'candidate_id is required'},400)
+                service=silent_release_service()
+                if path == '/getReleaseCandidate':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_release_candidate(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                if path == '/getApprovalEnvelope':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_approval_envelope(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                if path == '/getReleasePlan':
+                    return self.sendj(service.get_release_plan(candidate_id))
+                if path == '/getReleaseAcceptance':
+                    return self.sendj(service.get_acceptance(candidate_id))
+                if path == '/getCapabilityStatus':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_capability_status(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                result = service.get_release_saga(candidate_id)
+                return self.sendj(result, 404 if result.get('status') == 'NOT_FOUND' else 200)
+            if path == '/getRecoveryStatus':
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().get_recovery_status()
+                )
                        # Admin AI Evolution Dashboard
            if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution','/admin/ai-evolution/'):
                return self.ai_evolution_page()
            if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution/api/data'):
                return self.ai_evolution_data()
            return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError as e:
+            return self.sendj({'error': redact(e)}, getattr(e, 'status_code', 400))
+        except ValueError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
        except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
    def do_PUT(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PUT', path): return
+        data=self.body()
        if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
    def do_POST(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if path in _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'method_not_allowed'},405)
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
+        data=self.body()
        try:
+            if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
+                a=self.need('release:candidate')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/createReleaseIntent':
+                a=self.need('release:candidate')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().create_release_intent(data)
+                )
+            if path in ('/submitOwnerApproval','/submitSignedApproval'):
+                a=self.need('release:approve')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().submit_owner_approval(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/startDeployment':
+                a=self.need('release:deploy')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().start_deployment(
+                        str(data.get('candidate_id') or '')
+                    )
+                )
            if path in ('/api/branch','/api/create-branch'): return self.branch(data)
            if path in ('/api/file','/api/commit-file'): return self.file(data)
            if path == '/api/commit': return self.commit(data)
@@ -226,9 +802,30 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
            if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
            if path == '/api/nl': return self.nl(data)
            return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
+        except CapabilityAuthorizationError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},403)
+        except SagaConflict as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},409)
        except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
+    def do_PATCH(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PATCH', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+    def do_DELETE(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'DELETE', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
    def branch(self,data):
        a=self.need('branch:create');
        if not a: return
@@ -237,7 +834,44 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def file(self,data):
        a=self.need('file:write');
        if not a: return
-        b=checkout(data.get('branch'), data.get('base','main'), bool(data.get('create_branch'))); r=write_file(data.get('path'), data.get('content','')); c=commit([r], data.get('message') or f'chore(chatgpt): update {r}'); audit(a['account'],'file',r,{'branch':b,'commit':c}); self.sendj({'status':'committed','branch':b,'path':r,'commit':c})
+        if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED', os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_CONTROLLER_ENABLED', 'false')).lower() not in {'1','true','yes','on'}:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'DURABLE_JOB_CONTROLLER_UNAVAILABLE','retryable':True},503)
+        try:
+            path = relpath(str(data.get('path') or ''))
+            branch = str(data.get('branch') or '')
+            expected = str(data.get('expected_branch_oid') or '')
+            campaign_id = str(data.get('campaign_id') or os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_CAMPAIGN_ID') or '')
+            supplied_digest = str(data.get('payload_digest') or '')
+            content = data.get('content')
+            payload_bytes = None
+            if content is not None:
+                payload_bytes = content.encode('utf-8') if isinstance(content, str) else json.dumps(content, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False).encode('utf-8')
+            payload_digest = supplied_digest or hashlib.sha256(payload_bytes or b'').hexdigest()
+            if not campaign_id or not branch or not expected:
+                return self.sendj({'error':'JOB_BINDING_REQUIRED','retryable':False},409)
+            request = {
+                'campaign_id': campaign_id,
+                'repository': REPOSITORY_IDENTITY or 'aios/aios',
+                'operation': 'commit-file',
+                'branch': branch,
+                'expected_branch_oid': expected,
+                'payload_digest': payload_digest,
+                # The controller persists only the binding and digest. Raw
+                # content is never copied into durable state or logs.
+            }
+            receipt = GitOpsJobController(
+                JobStore(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_ROOT', '/var/lib/aios-gitops/jobs')))
+            ).submit(request, payload=payload_bytes)
+            return self.sendj({
+                'job_id': receipt.job_id,
+                'state': receipt.state.value,
+                'side_effect_state': receipt.side_effect_state,
+                'retryable': receipt.http_status == 503,
+            }, receipt.http_status)
+        except ServiceUnavailable as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(exc),'layer':'durable_job','retryable':True,'side_effect_state':'UNKNOWN'},503)
+        except JobError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(exc),'retryable':False},409)
    def commit(self,data):
        a=self.need('commit:create');
        if not a: return
@@ -251,13 +885,45 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        a=self.need('tag:create');
        if not a: return
        ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
-        if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
-        if data.get('confirm') != True:
-            self.sendj({'status':'confirm_required','operation':'tag','hint':'This operation creates a Git tag. Confirm to proceed.','x-openai-isConsequential':True}, 428)
-            return
+        try:
+            validate_version(ver)
+        except ValueError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
+        if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
+            return self.sendj({
+                'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
+                'required':['version','target_oid','evidence_closure_oid','approval_plan_id'],
+            },400)
+        try:
+            target_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('target_oid'))
+            evidence_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('evidence_closure_oid'), 'evidence_closure_oid')
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'invalid_tag_target','detail':str(exc)},400)
        if a['role'] != 'owner' or not data.get('execute'):
-            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'commit':c})
-        out=sh(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'], True); self.sendj({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out,'sync':sync_tag(ver)})
+            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'request':req,'commit':c})
+        request=PublicationRequest(ver,target_oid,evidence_oid,str(data.get('approval_plan_id')))
+        main_before=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        publisher=publication_publisher()
+        try:
+            publication=publisher.publish(request)
+        except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_manual_owner_review_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':redact(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED','error':redact(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationConflict as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_conflict',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationPending as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_pending',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},503)
+        except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_reconciliation_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},502)
+        main_after=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        if main_after != main_before:
+            raise RuntimeError('main changed during tag operation')
+        result={'status':publication['state'],'version':ver,'tag_name':ver,'tag_oid':publication['tag_oid'],'target_oid':target_oid,'expected_target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'workspace_head':sh(['rev-parse','HEAD'],True)['stdout'],'main_oid_before':main_before,'main_oid_after':main_after,'main_changed':False,'force_push':False,'publication':publication}
+        audit(a['account'],'tag',ver,result)
+        self.sendj(result)
    def rollback(self,data):
        a=self.need('rollback:request');
        if not a: return
@@ -352,7 +1018,10 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
        cmd_filter=(params.get('command') or [None])[0]
        bl=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json',{})
        current_ver=bl.get('current_baseline','V1R3C1')
-        tags=sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines() if WS.exists() else []
+        try:
+            tags=[item['name'] for item in authoritative_tags(git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir()) if str(item['name']).startswith('V')]
+        except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc),'repository_available':False},503)
        versions=[]
        if (WS/'baseline'/'promotions').exists():
            for p in sorted((WS/'baseline'/'promotions').glob('*.json')):
@@ -390,9 +1059,11 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer


 def api_spec():
-    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True}}
+    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/repository/tree','GET /api/repository/search','GET /api/repository/diff-index','GET /api/repository/file','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}

 def main():
+    validate_gitea_api_url(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL', ''))
    print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
    ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST,PORT), H).serve_forever()
-if __name__ == '__main__': main()
+if __name__ == '__main__': main()
+
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+"""ChatGPT GitOps Bridge v2 contract and governed release operations."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_task_admission_bridge_contract import (
+    TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS,
+    TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS,
+    TASK_ADMISSION_ROUTES,
+)
+
+
+BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION = "aios.chatgpt-gitops-bridge.v2"
+BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
+    "getRuntimeStatus",
+    "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
+    "createGovernedTask",
+    "projectOnlineAgentExecution",
+    "acquireWriterLease",
+    "commitFileGoverned",
+    "commitFilesGoverned",
+    "getGitOpsJob",
+    "resumeGitOpsJob",
+    "reconcileGitOpsJob",
+    "createTagApprovalRequest",
+    "requestOrCreateTag",
+    "getTagPublicationStatus",
+    "buildProductionArtifact",
+    "executeApprovedProductionRelease",
+    "getReleaseConsistency",
+    "runReleaseAcceptance",
+    "getControlPlaneSnapshot",
+    "listRepositoryTree",
+    "searchRepositorySource",
+    "getDiffIndex",
+    "readRepositoryFile",
+)
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS = tuple(TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS)
+
+OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
+    "createGovernedTask": ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key"),
+    "projectOnlineAgentExecution": ("task_id", "required_capabilities"),
+    "acquireWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "job_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "lease_seconds"),
+    "commitFileGoverned": ("task_id", "job_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "path", "content_base64", "message"),
+    "commitFilesGoverned": ("task_id", "job_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "files", "message"),
+    "getGitOpsJob": ("task_id", "job_id"),
+    "resumeGitOpsJob": ("task_id", "job_id", "expected_revision"),
+    "reconcileGitOpsJob": ("task_id", "job_id", "expected_revision"),
+    "createTagApprovalRequest": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "owner_approval", "execute"),
+    "requestOrCreateTag": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "execute"),
+    "getTagPublicationStatus": ("version",),
+    "buildProductionArtifact": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
+    "executeApprovedProductionRelease": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "execute"),
+    "getReleaseConsistency": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
+    "runReleaseAcceptance": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
+    "getControlPlaneSnapshot": (),
+    **TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS,
+    "listRepositoryTree": ("repository", "ref", "limit"),
+    "searchRepositorySource": ("repository", "ref", "query", "max_matches", "max_bytes"),
+    "getDiffIndex": ("repository", "from", "to", "limit"),
+    "readRepositoryFile": ("repository", "ref", "path"),
+}
+
+OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS = {
+    "listRepositoryTree": ("prefix", "depth", "cursor"),
+    "searchRepositorySource": ("path_globs", "cursor"),
+    "getDiffIndex": ("path_prefix", "cursor"),
+    "readRepositoryFile": ("max_bytes",),
+}
+
+READ_ONLY_OPERATIONS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "getRuntimeStatus",
+        "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
+        "getControlPlaneSnapshot",
+        "listRepositoryTree",
+        "searchRepositorySource",
+        "getDiffIndex",
+        "readRepositoryFile",
+    }
+)
+
+_OPERATION_PATHS = {
+    "createGovernedTask": "/v2/governed-task",
+    "projectOnlineAgentExecution": "/v2/execution-envelope",
+    "acquireWriterLease": "/v2/writer-lease",
+    "commitFileGoverned": "/v2/commit-file",
+    "commitFilesGoverned": "/v2/commit-files",
+    "getGitOpsJob": "/v2/job",
+    "resumeGitOpsJob": "/v2/job/resume",
+    "reconcileGitOpsJob": "/v2/job/reconcile",
+    "getTagPublicationStatus": "/v2/tag/status",
+    "getReleaseConsistency": "/v2/release/consistency",
+    "runReleaseAcceptance": "/v2/release/acceptance",
+    **{operation: path for path, operation in TASK_ADMISSION_ROUTES.items()},
+    "listRepositoryTree": "/v2/repository/tree",
+    "searchRepositorySource": "/v2/repository/search",
+    "getDiffIndex": "/v2/repository/diff-index",
+    "readRepositoryFile": "/v2/repository/file",
+}
+
+
+def _has_complete_task_admission_handlers(
+    handlers: Mapping[str, Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any]] | None,
+) -> bool:
+    return handlers is not None and all(
+        callable(handlers.get(operation)) for operation in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+    )
+
+
+def operation_contracts(
+    handlers: Mapping[str, Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any]] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, dict[str, object]]:
+    """Return the runtime contract consumed by adapters and schema tooling."""
+    contracts = {
+        operation: {
+            "method": "GET" if operation in OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS else "POST",
+            "path": _OPERATION_PATHS.get(operation),
+            "required_fields": list(fields),
+            "optional_fields": list(OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS.get(operation, ())),
+            "read_only": operation in READ_ONLY_OPERATIONS,
+        }
+        for operation, fields in OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS.items()
+        if operation not in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+    }
+    if _has_complete_task_admission_handlers(handlers):
+        contracts.update(
+            {
+                operation: {
+                    "method": "GET" if operation == "getTaskAdmissionStatus" else "POST",
+                    "path": _OPERATION_PATHS[operation],
+                    "required_fields": list(
+                        TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation]
+                    ),
+                    "optional_fields": list(
+                        TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS[operation]
+                    ),
+                }
+                for operation in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+            }
+        )
+    return contracts
+
+
+def render_openapi_contract_fragment() -> str:
+    required = "\n".join(
+        f"                - {field}"
+        for field in OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFilesGoverned"]
+    )
+    return (
+        "  /v2/commit-files:\n"
+        "    post:\n"
+        "      operationId: commitFilesGoverned\n"
+        "      summary: Submit one atomic governed commit containing multiple files\n"
+        "      security: [{taskPrincipalAuth: []}]\n"
+        "      x-aios-task-principal: Bridge verifies a fresh aios.task-principal-assertion.v1 and exact task/job/repository/branch/generation/revision/attempt/execution-digest/capability binding; caller JSON cannot provide a principal and missing verification is denied.\n"
+        "      requestBody:\n"
+        "        required: true\n"
+        "        content:\n"
+        "          application/json:\n"
+        "            schema:\n"
+        "              type: object\n"
+        "              additionalProperties: false\n"
+        "              required:\n"
+        f"{required}\n"
+        "              properties:\n"
+        "                task_id: {type: string}\n"
+        "                job_id: {type: string, description: External durable Job identity for exact completed-replay reconciliation}\n"
+        "                source_lease_epoch: {type: integer, minimum: 1}\n"
+        "                repository: {type: string, example: aios/aios}\n"
+        "                expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}\n"
+        "                target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$'}\n"
+        "                generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}\n"
+        "                idempotency_key: {type: string}\n"
+        "                files:\n"
+        "                  type: array\n"
+        "                  minItems: 1\n"
+        "                  items:\n"
+        "                    type: object\n"
+        "                    additionalProperties: false\n"
+        "                    required: [path, content_base64]\n"
+        "                    properties:\n"
+        "                      path: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 512}\n"
+        "                      content_base64: {type: string}\n"
+        "                message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}\n"
+        "      responses:\n"
+        "        '200': {description: Governed commit job and verified branch result}\n"
+        "        '202': {description: Existing external Job alias requires authoritative reconciliation; no replacement Job is created}\n"
+        "        '401': {description: No verified Task principal is available}\n"
+        "        '403': {description: Verified Task principal lacks exact task, external Job, or capability scope}\n"
+        "        '400': {description: Contract or policy rejection}\n"
+        "        '409': {description: Branch CAS or idempotency conflict}\n"
+        "        '423': {description: Narrow P0 Task-principal mutation gate is frozen; assertion is not consumed}\n"
+    )
+
+
+class RuntimeDriftError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class BridgeV2Error(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ControlPlaneReleaseManifest:
+    control_plane_release_version: str
+    control_plane_target_oid: str
+    artifact_sha256: str
+    runtime_path: Path
+    bridge_schema_version: str
+    repository_identity: str
+    authoritative_git_dir: Path
+    deployment_state: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "control_plane_release_version": self.control_plane_release_version,
+            "control_plane_target_oid": self.control_plane_target_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "runtime_path": str(self.runtime_path),
+            "bridge_schema_version": self.bridge_schema_version,
+            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": str(self.authoritative_git_dir),
+            "deployment_state": self.deployment_state,
+        }
+
+    def validate(self, artifact: Path, *, observed_oid: str, approved_root: Path = Path("/opt/aios/gitops-control-plane")) -> dict[str, object]:
+        try:
+            runtime = self.runtime_path.resolve(strict=True)
+            root = approved_root.resolve(strict=True)
+            artifact_path = artifact.resolve(strict=True)
+            runtime.relative_to(root)
+            artifact_path.relative_to(runtime)
+        except (OSError, ValueError):
+            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT") from None
+        mutable_markers = {"workspace", "workspaces", "worktree", "worktrees"}
+        if mutable_markers.intersection(part.lower() for part in runtime.parts):
+            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT")
+        valid = (
+            len(self.control_plane_target_oid) == 40
+            and observed_oid == self.control_plane_target_oid
+            and len(self.artifact_sha256) == 64
+            and hashlib.sha256(artifact_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() == self.artifact_sha256
+            and self.bridge_schema_version == BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION
+            and self.repository_identity == "aios/aios"
+            and self.authoritative_git_dir == Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
+            and self.authoritative_git_dir.is_absolute()
+            and self.deployment_state == "STAGING"
+        )
+        if not valid:
+            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT")
+        return {**self.as_dict(), "drift_status": "PASS"}
+
+
+class BridgeV2Adapter:
+    """Thin operation adapter; all mutating handlers are injected seams."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *, runtime_status: Mapping[str, Any] | Callable[[], Mapping[str, Any]], handlers: Mapping[str, Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any]] | None = None) -> None:
+        self._runtime_status_source = runtime_status if callable(runtime_status) else dict(runtime_status)
+        self.handlers = dict(handlers or {})
+
+    def _runtime_status(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = self._runtime_status_source() if callable(self._runtime_status_source) else self._runtime_status_source
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise BridgeV2Error("RUNTIME_STATUS_INVALID")
+        return dict(value)
+
+    def getRuntimeStatus(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"bridge_schema_version": BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION, **self._runtime_status()}
+
+    def getGovernedWriteCapabilities(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        runtime_status = self._runtime_status()
+        governed_writes_enabled = runtime_status.get("governed_writes_enabled") is True
+        return {
+            "bridge_schema_version": BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+            "legacy_writes_enabled": False,
+            "governed_writes_enabled": governed_writes_enabled,
+            "governed_write_blockers": list(
+                runtime_status.get("governed_write_blockers") or []
+            ),
+            "operations": [
+                *BRIDGE_OPERATIONS,
+                *(
+                    TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+                    if _has_complete_task_admission_handlers(self.handlers)
+                    else ()
+                ),
+            ],
+            "operation_contracts": operation_contracts(self.handlers),
+            "force_push": False,
+            "main_write": False,
+            "tag_write": False,
+            "baseline_write": False,
+            "production_write": False,
+            "approved_release_operations": True,
+            "approved_release_scope": {
+                "version": "V2R2C1",
+                "target_oid": "998d30304787e31e5ae607c0bd86b5edb2b0e5ad",
+                "evidence_closure_oid": "a8b906d1bc24088c19647e98de6a679268f6d0a2",
+                "approval_plan_id": "sha256:c0df52008ae7f64cec5ee2d28947aa7b892066c670ab8295e4549140b1a7500e",
+            },
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def legacy_write_disabled() -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {"error": "LEGACY_WRITE_DISABLED", "replacement": "createGovernedTask", "governed_writes_available": False}
+
+    def _call(self, operation: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any:
+        required = OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation]
+        if any(key not in request for key in required):
+            raise BridgeV2Error("BRIDGE_REQUEST_FIELDS_MISSING")
+        if operation in OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS:
+            allowed = set(required) | set(OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS[operation])
+            if set(request) - allowed:
+                raise BridgeV2Error("BRIDGE_REQUEST_FIELDS_UNKNOWN")
+        handler = self.handlers.get(operation)
+        if handler is None:
+            raise BridgeV2Error("GOVERNED_HANDLER_UNAVAILABLE")
+        return handler(dict(request))
+
+    def createGovernedTask(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createGovernedTask", request)
+    def projectOnlineAgentExecution(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("projectOnlineAgentExecution", request)
+    def acquireWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("acquireWriterLease", request)
+    def commitFileGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFileGoverned", request)
+    def commitFilesGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFilesGoverned", request)
+    def getGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getGitOpsJob", request)
+    def resumeGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("resumeGitOpsJob", request)
+    def reconcileGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("reconcileGitOpsJob", request)
+    def createTagApprovalRequest(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createTagApprovalRequest", request)
+    def requestOrCreateTag(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("requestOrCreateTag", request)
+    def getTagPublicationStatus(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getTagPublicationStatus", request)
+    def buildProductionArtifact(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("buildProductionArtifact", request)
+    def executeApprovedProductionRelease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("executeApprovedProductionRelease", request)
+    def getReleaseConsistency(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getReleaseConsistency", request)
+    def runReleaseAcceptance(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("runReleaseAcceptance", request)
+    def getTaskAdmissionEnvelope(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getTaskAdmissionEnvelope", request)
+    def submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization", request)
+    def getTaskAdmissionStatus(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getTaskAdmissionStatus", request)
+    def listRepositoryTree(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("listRepositoryTree", request)
+    def searchRepositorySource(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("searchRepositorySource", request)
+    def getDiffIndex(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getDiffIndex", request)
+    def readRepositoryFile(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("readRepositoryFile", request)
+
+    def getControlPlaneSnapshot(self, request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> Any: return self._call("getControlPlaneSnapshot", request or {})
@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+"""Governed continuation executor for exact existing task branches.
+
+The executor composes the existing continuation lease and durable Job store.
+All Git and Gitea side effects live behind injected narrow interfaces so the
+state machine can prove Authority, Git-network, API-branch, and commit-object
+agreement before it reports completion.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
+import re
+import subprocess
+from typing import Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor
+from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobState
+from aios_gitops_reconciliation_core import ReconciliationAction, RemoteObservation, decide_reconciliation
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import validate_writer_lease_request_v2
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SECRET_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(rb"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)(?:token|password|secret|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*[\"'][^\"'\s]{12,}[\"']"),
+    re.compile(rb"-----BEGIN " + rb"(?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+)
+
+
+class ContinuationExecutionError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed continuation execution error."""
+
+
+class DetachedWorkspace(Protocol):
+    def is_detached(self) -> bool: ...
+    def head_oid(self) -> str: ...
+    def commit_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes], message: str) -> str: ...
+
+
+class AuthorityPort(Protocol):
+    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
+
+
+class RemotePort(Protocol):
+    def repository_identity(self) -> str: ...
+    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str, *, allow_absent: bool = False) -> None: ...
+    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
+    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
+    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+class CredentialProjection(Protocol):
+    def project(self) -> None: ...
+    def revoke(self) -> None: ...
+
+
+def _run(argv: list[str], *, cwd: Path | None = None, environment: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        cwd=cwd,
+        env=None if environment is None else dict(environment),
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise ContinuationExecutionError("SUBPROCESS_FAILED")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class AuthorityGitAdapter:
+    """Branch-name adapter over the existing narrow AuthorityGitExecutor."""
+
+    executor: AuthorityGitExecutor
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ref(branch: str) -> str:
+        return f"refs/heads/{branch}"
+
+    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool:
+        return self.executor.read_ref(self._ref(branch)) is not None
+
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str:
+        value = self.executor.read_ref(self._ref(branch))
+        if value is None:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("EXISTING_BRANCH_MISSING")
+        return value
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
+        return self.executor.ancestry_check(older, newer)
+
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str:
+        return self.executor.advance_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected, new)
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class DetachedGitWorkspace:
+    path: Path
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.path.is_absolute() or self.path.is_symlink() or not self.path.is_dir():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_PATH_INVALID")
+        top = Path(_run(["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], cwd=self.path)).resolve()
+        if top != self.path.resolve():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_PATH_INVALID")
+
+    def is_detached(self) -> bool:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            cwd=self.path,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        return result.returncode == 1
+
+    def head_oid(self) -> str:
+        return _run(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=self.path)
+
+    def _dirty_paths(self) -> set[str]:
+        command = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "status", "--porcelain=v1", "--untracked-files=all"],
+            cwd=self.path,
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if command.returncode != 0:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("SUBPROCESS_FAILED")
+        output = command.stdout
+        result: set[str] = set()
+        for line in output.splitlines():
+            path = line[3:]
+            if " -> " in path:
+                path = path.split(" -> ", 1)[1]
+            result.add(path)
+        return result
+
+    def materialize_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes]) -> None:
+        dirty = self._dirty_paths()
+        expected_paths = set(files)
+        if dirty and dirty != expected_paths:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_DIRTY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+        for relative, content in files.items():
+            target = (self.path / relative).resolve()
+            try:
+                target.relative_to(self.path.resolve())
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED") from exc
+            if target.is_symlink():
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED")
+            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            target.write_bytes(content)
+
+    def commit_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes], message: str) -> str:
+        expected_paths = set(files)
+        if self._dirty_paths() != expected_paths:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_DIRTY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+        for relative, content in files.items():
+            target = (self.path / relative).resolve()
+            try:
+                target.relative_to(self.path.resolve())
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED") from exc
+            if not target.is_file() or target.is_symlink() or target.read_bytes() != content:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORING_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH")
+        _run(["git", "add", "--", *sorted(expected_paths)], cwd=self.path)
+        staged = set(_run(["git", "diff", "--cached", "--name-only"], cwd=self.path).splitlines())
+        if staged != expected_paths:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("STAGED_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+        environment = os.environ.copy()
+        environment.update(
+            {
+                "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "AIOS Governed Continuation",
+                "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "aios-governed-continuation@localhost",
+                "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "AIOS Governed Continuation",
+                "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "aios-governed-continuation@localhost",
+            }
+        )
+        _run(["git", "commit", "--no-gpg-sign", "-m", message, "--", *sorted(expected_paths)], cwd=self.path, environment=environment)
+        if not self.is_detached():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
+        return self.head_oid()
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class ServerSideCredentialProjection:
+    ssh_key_path: Path
+    api_token_path: Path
+    active: bool = False
+
+    def project(self) -> None:
+        for path in (self.ssh_key_path, self.api_token_path):
+            if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size < 32:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        self.active = True
+
+    def revoke(self) -> None:
+        self.active = False
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class GiteaContinuationRemote:
+    workspace: Path
+    credential: ServerSideCredentialProjection
+    remote_name: str = "gitea"
+    repository: str = "aios/aios"
+    api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1"
+    expected_host: str = "g.cnnetmkt.top"
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def validate_remote_url(value: str, expected_host: str = "g.cnnetmkt.top") -> None:
+        if value.startswith(("/", "file:")) or value.endswith("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if "://" in value:
+            parsed = urlsplit(value)
+            host, path = parsed.hostname, parsed.path
+        else:
+            location = value.split("@", 1)[-1]
+            host, separator, path = location.partition(":")
+            if not separator:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+            path = "/" + path
+        if host != expected_host or path.rstrip("/") not in {"/aios/aios.git", "/git/aios/aios.git"}:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+
+    def repository_identity(self) -> str:
+        url = _run(["git", "remote", "get-url", self.remote_name], cwd=self.workspace)
+        self.validate_remote_url(url, self.expected_host)
+        if self.repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("REMOTE_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+        return self.repository
+
+    def _require_projected(self) -> None:
+        if not self.credential.active:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+
+    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
+        self._require_projected()
+        output = _run(["git", "ls-remote", self.remote_name, f"refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
+        if not output:
+            return None
+        oid, ref = output.split(maxsplit=1)
+        if ref != f"refs/heads/{branch}" or not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_GIT_READBACK_INVALID")
+        return oid
+
+    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str, *, allow_absent: bool = False) -> None:
+        self._require_projected()
+        self.repository_identity()
+        current = self.read_git_ref(branch)
+        if current != expected and not (allow_absent and current is None):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        _run(["git", "push", self.remote_name, f"{new}:refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
+
+    def _api(self, path: str) -> object:
+        self._require_projected()
+        token = self.credential.api_token_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        request = Request(
+            self.api_base.rstrip("/") + path,
+            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"token {token}"},
+        )
+        try:
+            with urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response:
+                return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+        except HTTPError as exc:
+            if exc.code == 404:
+                return None
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError(f"GITEA_API_HTTP_{exc.code}") from exc
+        except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
+        owner, name = self.repository.split("/", 1)
+        page = 1
+        while page <= 100:
+            value = self._api(f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/branches?page={page}&limit=50")
+            if value is None:
+                return None
+            if not isinstance(value, list):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_COLLECTION_INVALID")
+            for item in value:
+                if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get("name") != branch:
+                    continue
+                oid = item.get("commit", {}).get("id")
+                if not isinstance(oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+                    raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_INVALID")
+                return oid
+            if len(value) < 50:
+                return None
+            page += 1
+        raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_PAGINATION_LIMIT")
+
+    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool:
+        owner, name = self.repository.split("/", 1)
+        value = self._api(f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/git/commits/{oid}")
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            return False
+        observed = value.get("sha") or value.get("id")
+        return observed == oid
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationPermissions:
+    create_target_branch: bool = False
+    force_push: bool = False
+    tag_write: bool = False
+    baseline_write: bool = False
+    production_write: bool = False
+    main_write: bool = False
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if any(asdict(self).values()):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("MUTATION_PERMISSION_DENIED")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationRuntimeBinding:
+    request: WriterLeaseRequestV2
+    workspace_path: Path
+    lease_not_before: datetime
+    lease_expires_at: datetime
+    original_receipt_valid: bool
+    original_grant_consumed: bool
+    permissions: ContinuationPermissions
+    remote_branch_create_allowed: bool = False
+    external_job_id: str | None = None
+    worker_principal: str = "aios-autonomy-agent"
+    worker_lineage: str = "governed-continuation"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationCommit:
+    idempotency_key: str
+    files: Mapping[str, bytes]
+    message: str
+
+    def payload(self) -> bytes:
+        if not self.idempotency_key or not self.message.strip() or not self.files:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        normalized: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for path, content in self.files.items():
+            pure = PurePosixPath(path)
+            if (
+                not isinstance(path, str)
+                or pure.is_absolute()
+                or ".." in pure.parts
+                or path.startswith((".git/", "baseline/", "production/"))
+                or not isinstance(content, bytes)
+            ):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED")
+            if any(pattern.search(content) for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("SECRET_LIKE_PAYLOAD_REJECTED")
+            normalized[path] = base64.b64encode(content).decode("ascii")
+        return json.dumps(
+            {"files_base64": normalized, "message": self.message},
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+class ContinuationExecutor:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        controller: GitOpsJobController,
+        authority: AuthorityPort,
+        workspace: DetachedWorkspace,
+        remote: RemotePort,
+        credential: CredentialProjection,
+        *,
+        now: Callable[[], datetime] = lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc),
+    ) -> None:
+        self.controller = controller
+        self.authority = authority
+        self.workspace = workspace
+        self.remote = remote
+        self.credential = credential
+        self.now = now
+        self._observed_generations: dict[str, int] = {}
+
+    def observe_generation(self, branch: str, generation: int) -> None:
+        self._observed_generations[branch] = max(generation, self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0))
+
+    def _max_generation(self, branch: str) -> int:
+        observed = self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0)
+        with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
+                (branch,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        durable = int(row["generation"] or 0)
+        return max(observed, durable)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _request_mapping(request: WriterLeaseRequestV2) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
+            "task_id": request.task_id,
+            "repository": request.repository,
+            "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
+            "base_oid": request.base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": request.expected_branch_oid,
+            "target_branch": request.target_branch,
+            "generation": request.generation,
+            "lease_seconds": request.lease_seconds,
+        }
+
+    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding) -> None:
+        request = binding.request
+        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(self._request_mapping(request), self.authority)
+        if normalized != {**self._request_mapping(request), "create_target_branch": False, "worktree_mode": "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True}:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("CONTINUATION_NORMALIZATION_INVALID")
+        if not binding.original_receipt_valid or not binding.original_grant_consumed:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("ORIGINAL_GRANT_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+        binding.permissions.validate()
+        now = self.now()
+        if now < binding.lease_not_before:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
+        if now >= binding.lease_expires_at:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_EXPIRED")
+        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
+        if not self.workspace.is_detached():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
+        if self.workspace.head_oid() != request.expected_branch_oid:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_HEAD_MISMATCH")
+        if self.remote.repository_identity() != request.repository:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("REMOTE_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+
+    def _job_request(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit, payload: bytes) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = binding.request
+        return {
+            "idempotency_key": commit.idempotency_key,
+            "campaign_id": request.task_id,
+            "task_id": request.task_id,
+            "repository": request.repository,
+            "operation": "CONTINUATION_COMMIT_FILES",
+            "branch": request.target_branch,
+            "expected_branch_oid": request.expected_branch_oid,
+            "base_oid": request.base_oid,
+            "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
+            "payload_digest": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(),
+            "lineage_anchor_oid": request.base_oid,
+            "generation": request.generation,
+            "remote_branch_create_allowed": binding.remote_branch_create_allowed,
+            "external_job_id": binding.external_job_id,
+            "files_digest": hashlib.sha256(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {path: hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() for path, content in sorted(commit.files.items())},
+                    sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"),
+                ).encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest(),
+            "message_digest": hashlib.sha256(commit.message.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
+            "worker_principal": binding.worker_principal,
+            "worker_lineage": binding.worker_lineage,
+        }
+
+    def execute(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit) -> dict[str, object]:
+        payload = commit.payload()
+        submitted = self.controller.submit(self._job_request(binding, commit, payload), payload=payload)
+        current = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
+        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
+            return self.controller.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True).as_dict()
+        self._validate_preflight(binding)
+        request = binding.request
+        projected = False
+        try:
+            self.credential.project()
+            projected = True
+            row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
+            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REQUESTED:
+                self.controller.advance(
+                    submitted.job_id,
+                    JobState.AUTHORIZED,
+                    side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED",
+                    receipt={"task_id": request.task_id, "original_grant_consumed": True},
+                )
+                row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
+            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
+                self.controller.lease_job(
+                    submitted.job_id,
+                    lease_id=f"lease-{submitted.job_id}",
+                    lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
+                    current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
+                    generation=request.generation,
+                    lease_expires_at=binding.lease_expires_at.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+                    expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+                )
+            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY")
+            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+            new_oid = self.workspace.commit_files(commit.files, commit.message)
+            if not OID_RE.fullmatch(new_oid) or not self.authority.is_ancestor(request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
+            authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
+            if authority_oid != new_oid:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+            self.controller.advance(
+                submitted.job_id,
+                JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
+                side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED",
+                receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "force_push": False},
+            )
+            try:
+                self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid, allow_absent=binding.remote_branch_create_allowed)
+            except Exception:
+                return self._remote_pending(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+            return self._finish_remote_verification(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+        finally:
+            if projected:
+                self.credential.revoke()
+
+    def _observe_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, bool]:
+        return self.remote.read_git_ref(branch), self.remote.read_api_branch(branch), self.remote.commit_visible(oid)
+
+    def _remote_pending(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+        receipt = {
+            "authority_oid": authority_oid,
+            "commit_oid": new_oid,
+            "desired_remote_oid": new_oid,
+            "remote_verified": False,
+            "force_push": False,
+        }
+        result = self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        )
+        return result.as_dict()
+
+    def _finish_remote_verification(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        branch = row["branch"]
+        request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
+        git_oid, api_oid, visible = self._observe_remote(branch, new_oid)
+        decision = decide_reconciliation(RemoteObservation("aios/aios", branch, new_oid, authority_oid, git_oid, api_oid, visible, datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), request.get("expected_branch_oid")))
+        if decision.action is not ReconciliationAction.MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED:
+            return self._remote_pending(job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+        receipt = {
+            "authority_oid": authority_oid,
+            "commit_oid": new_oid,
+            "git_remote_oid": git_oid,
+            "api_branch_oid": api_oid,
+            "commit_visible": True,
+            "remote_verified": True,
+            "reconciliation_decision": decision.action.value,
+            "force_push": False,
+        }
+        self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt)
+        return self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt).as_dict()
+
+    def reconcile(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.COMPLETED:
+            return self.controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
+        if state != JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("JOB_NOT_RECONCILABLE")
+        request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
+        receipt = json.loads(row["receipt_json"])
+        new_oid = receipt["desired_remote_oid"]
+        authority_oid = self.authority.branch_head(row["branch"])
+        try:
+            generation = int(request.get("generation") or 0)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("DURABLE_BINDING_GENERATION_INVALID") from exc
+        if generation > 0:
+            with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
+                earlier = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT 1 FROM jobs WHERE branch=? AND state=? "
+                    "AND CAST(json_extract(request_json, '$.binding.generation') AS INTEGER) < ? LIMIT 1",
+                    (row["branch"], JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED.value, generation),
+                ).fetchone()
+            if earlier is not None:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("EARLIER_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+        self.credential.project()
+        try:
+            git_oid, api_oid, visible = self._observe_remote(row["branch"], new_oid)
+            if authority_oid == git_oid == api_oid == new_oid and visible:
+                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST")
+                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
+            expected_oid = request["expected_branch_oid"]
+            if (
+                self.authority.is_ancestor(new_oid, authority_oid)
+                and git_oid is not None
+                and git_oid == api_oid
+                and self.authority.is_ancestor(git_oid, new_oid)
+            ):
+                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST_CHAIN")
+                self.remote.push_exact(row["branch"], git_oid, new_oid, allow_absent=bool(request.get("remote_branch_create_allowed")) or request.get("branch_mode") == "CREATE_NEW")
+                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
+            allow_remote_create = bool(request.get("remote_branch_create_allowed")) or request.get("branch_mode") == "CREATE_NEW" or (git_oid is None and api_oid is None)
+            remote_matches_expected = git_oid == api_oid == expected_oid
+            remote_absent_for_create = git_oid is None and api_oid is None
+            if authority_oid == new_oid and (remote_matches_expected or remote_absent_for_create):
+                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST_RETRY")
+                self.remote.push_exact(row["branch"], expected_oid, new_oid, allow_absent=allow_remote_create)
+                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
+            return self.controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
+        finally:
+            self.credential.revoke()
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+"""Campaign-aware continuation leases for an existing Git branch.
+
+This module is deliberately transport-neutral. It validates branch lineage
+and hands ref mutation to an injected compare-and-swap broker; it does not run
+Git, inspect credentials, or create a branch itself.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import re
+from typing import Protocol
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/autonomous-release-campaign-v1-20260807"
+LINEAGE_ANCHOR = "69b45e81dcd2c3707c367003b08c55fd361faae8"
+CAMPAIGN_HEAD = "bba675fab3b7e0c5fba7066720252b3c91b9f20d"
+
+
+class ContinuationError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed error for lease or branch binding violations."""
+
+
+class BranchProbe(Protocol):
+    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+class RefCAS(Protocol):
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
+
+
+def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise ContinuationError(f"{field}_invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    lease_seconds: int = 900
+
+    schema = "aios.task-writer-lease.v2"
+    accepted_schemas = frozenset({"aios.task-writer-lease.v2", "aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2"})
+
+    def validate(self, probe: BranchProbe) -> None:
+        if not self.task_id or self.repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ContinuationError("request_identity_invalid")
+        if self.branch_mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            raise ContinuationError("branch_mode_invalid")
+        _oid(self.base_oid, "base_oid")
+        _oid(self.expected_branch_oid, "expected_branch_oid")
+        if self.target_branch in {"main", "master"} or self.target_branch.startswith(("refs/", "tags/")):
+            raise ContinuationError("protected_branch_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(self.generation, int) or isinstance(self.generation, bool) or self.generation < 1:
+            raise ContinuationError("generation_invalid")
+        if not isinstance(self.lease_seconds, int) or not 1 <= self.lease_seconds <= 86_400:
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_duration_invalid")
+        if self.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING":
+            if not probe.branch_exists(self.target_branch):
+                raise ContinuationError("EXISTING_BRANCH_MISSING")
+            actual = _oid(probe.branch_head(self.target_branch), "actual_branch_oid")
+            if actual != self.expected_branch_oid:
+                raise ContinuationError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT")
+            if not probe.is_ancestor(self.base_oid, actual):
+                raise ContinuationError("BASE_NOT_ANCESTOR_OF_BRANCH")
+        elif hasattr(probe, "commit_exists") and not probe.commit_exists(self.base_oid):
+            raise ContinuationError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
+        elif self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" and probe.branch_exists(self.target_branch):
+            raise ContinuationError("TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        elif self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" and self.base_oid != self.expected_branch_oid:
+            raise ContinuationError("CREATE_NEW_BASE_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CampaignWriterLease:
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch: str
+    lineage_anchor_oid: str
+    current_head_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    lease_expires_at: datetime
+    append_only: bool = True
+    renewable: bool = True
+    multi_commit: bool = True
+    recoverable: bool = True
+    state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    branch_bound: bool = True
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _oid(self.lineage_anchor_oid, "lineage_anchor_oid")
+        _oid(self.current_head_oid, "current_head_oid")
+        if not all((self.append_only, self.renewable, self.multi_commit, self.recoverable, self.branch_bound)):
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_capability_downgrade")
+
+
+class ContinuationLeaseManager:
+    """State machine for a multi-commit lease with CAS-only ref updates."""
+
+    def __init__(self, probe: BranchProbe, refs: RefCAS, *, now=datetime.now) -> None:
+        self.probe = probe
+        self.refs = refs
+        self.now = now
+
+    def open(self, request: WriterLeaseRequestV2) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        request.validate(self.probe)
+        if request.branch_mode != "CONTINUE_EXISTING":
+            raise ContinuationError("CREATE_NEW_REQUIRES_SEPARATE_PROVISIONER")
+        return CampaignWriterLease(
+            task_id=request.task_id,
+            repository=request.repository,
+            branch=request.target_branch,
+            lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
+            current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
+            generation=request.generation,
+            lease_expires_at=self.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=request.lease_seconds),
+        )
+
+    def renew(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease, seconds: int) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE" or not lease.renewable or seconds < 1:
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_renewable")
+        return replace(lease, lease_expires_at=self.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=seconds))
+
+    def append_commit(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease, new_head_oid: str) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_active")
+        _oid(new_head_oid, "new_head_oid")
+        if not self.probe.is_ancestor(lease.current_head_oid, new_head_oid):
+            raise ContinuationError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
+        try:
+            actual = self.refs.compare_and_swap_branch(
+                lease.branch, lease.current_head_oid, new_head_oid
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise ContinuationError("BRANCH_LEASE_STALE") from exc
+        if actual != new_head_oid:
+            raise ContinuationError("BRANCH_LEASE_STALE")
+        return replace(lease, current_head_oid=new_head_oid)
+
+    def supersede(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        if lease.state not in {"ACTIVE", "RECOVERABLE_FAILURE", "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"}:
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_supersedable")
+        return replace(lease, generation=lease.generation + 1, state="SUPERSEDED")
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+"""Separate read, write, and release plane readiness evaluation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RuntimeStatus:
+    read_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
+    write_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
+    release_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
+
+    @property
+    def release_control_plane_ready(self) -> bool:
+        return all(self.read_plane.values()) and all(self.write_plane.values()) and all(self.release_plane.values())
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "READ_PLANE": dict(self.read_plane),
+            "WRITE_PLANE": dict(self.write_plane),
+            "RELEASE_PLANE": dict(self.release_plane),
+            "release_control_plane_ready": self.release_control_plane_ready,
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+"""Workspace-independent authority/network/Gitea ref sentinel."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+from typing import Callable, Mapping
+
+
+class SentinelError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SentinelInputs:
+    authority_git_dir: Path
+    gitea_remote: str
+    gitea_api: str
+    ref: str
+    expected_oid: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SentinelResult:
+    authority_oid: str | None
+    network_oid: str | None
+    gitea_oid: str | None
+    equal: bool
+    error: str | None = None
+
+
+def authority_oid(inputs: SentinelInputs) -> str:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "--git-dir", str(inputs.authority_git_dir), "rev-parse", inputs.ref],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise SentinelError("AUTHORITY_REF_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def evaluate(
+    inputs: SentinelInputs,
+    *,
+    network_reader: Callable[[str, str], str | None],
+    gitea_reader: Callable[[str, str], str | None],
+) -> SentinelResult:
+    try:
+        local = authority_oid(inputs)
+        network = network_reader(inputs.gitea_remote, inputs.ref)
+        gitea = gitea_reader(inputs.gitea_api, inputs.ref)
+        equal = local == network == gitea == inputs.expected_oid
+        return SentinelResult(local, network, gitea, equal, None if equal else "OID_MISMATCH")
+    except SentinelError as exc:
+        return SentinelResult(None, None, None, False, str(exc))
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Non-sensitive control-plane snapshot assembly."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+def _copy(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None, keys: tuple[str, ...]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    value = value or {}
+    return {key: value.get(key) for key in keys}
+
+
+def build_control_plane_snapshot(*, target_version: str, runtime: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, repository: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, production: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, task: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, capabilities: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, credential_broker: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    task_snapshot = _copy(task, ("task_id", "branch", "authority_branch_oid", "gitea_git_oid", "gitea_api_oid", "commit_visible", "generation", "reconciliation_state"))
+    for key in ("external_job_id", "commit_oid", "current_head_oid", "completed_replay_reconciliation_id", "receipt_authority_oid"):
+        if task is not None and key in task:
+            task_snapshot[key] = task[key]
+    return {
+        "version": {"target_release": target_version},
+        "runtime": _copy(runtime, ("bridge_schema_version", "control_plane_release_version", "runtime_release_commit", "runtime_path", "artifact_sha256", "drift_status")),
+        "repository": _copy(repository, ("identity", "authority_git_dir", "authority_main_oid")),
+        "production": _copy(production, ("baseline_version", "target_oid", "deployment_state")),
+        "task": task_snapshot,
+        "capabilities": _copy(capabilities, ("legacy_writes_enabled", "governed_writes_enabled", "force_push", "main_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "production_write")),
+        "credential_broker": _copy(credential_broker, ("status", "provider")),
+        "secret_material_exposed": False,
+    }
+
+
+def getControlPlaneSnapshot(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return build_control_plane_snapshot(**kwargs)
@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+"""Minimal convergence contracts for AIOS V2R2C2.
+
+This module deliberately contains no external side effects.  It provides the shared
+data contracts and pure evaluation rules used by domain controllers.  Domain
+controllers remain authoritative for their own final states.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+class ConvergenceContractError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when an invalid convergence contract is constructed."""
+
+
+class EvidenceState(str, Enum):
+    PASS = "PASS"
+    FAIL = "FAIL"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+    NOT_APPLICABLE = "NOT_APPLICABLE"
+
+
+class AcceptanceDecision(str, Enum):
+    ACCEPT = "ACCEPT"
+    REJECT = "REJECT"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+
+
+class ObservedHealth(str, Enum):
+    HEALTHY = "HEALTHY"
+    DEGRADED = "DEGRADED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+
+
+class ReconciliationState(str, Enum):
+    PENDING = "PENDING"
+    OBSERVING = "OBSERVING"
+    DIFF_FOUND = "DIFF_FOUND"
+    APPLYING = "APPLYING"
+    VERIFYING = "VERIFYING"
+    CONVERGED = "CONVERGED"
+    DEGRADED = "DEGRADED"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+
+
+class ContinuationStopReason(str, Enum):
+    CONTEXT_BOUNDARY = "context_boundary"
+    WORKER_RESTART = "worker_restart"
+    HANDOFF = "handoff"
+    AUTHORITY_GATE = "authority_gate"
+    WAIT_EXTERNAL = "wait_external"
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _canonical_json(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha256(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _nonempty(value: object, field_name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not text:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"{field_name}_required")
+    return text
+
+
+def _generation(value: object, field_name: str = "generation") -> int:
+    try:
+        parsed = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"{field_name}_invalid") from exc
+    if parsed < 1:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"{field_name}_invalid")
+    return parsed
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class StateOwnership:
+    object_type: str
+    authoritative_service: str
+    authoritative_store: str
+    final_writer: str | None = None
+    projections: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema_version: str = "aios.state-ownership.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.object_type, "object_type")
+        _nonempty(self.authoritative_service, "authoritative_service")
+        _nonempty(self.authoritative_store, "authoritative_store")
+        if self.final_writer is not None:
+            _nonempty(self.final_writer, "final_writer")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+DEFAULT_STATE_OWNERSHIP: tuple[StateOwnership, ...] = (
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="goal",
+        authoritative_service="goal-kernel",
+        authoritative_store="goal-store",
+        final_writer="goal-kernel",
+        projections=("admin-web", "context-pack"),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="task_run",
+        authoritative_service="task-plane-18940",
+        authoritative_store="durable-task-store",
+        final_writer="task-plane-18940",
+        projections=("admin-web", "context-pack"),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="release",
+        authoritative_service="release-controller",
+        authoritative_store="release-registry",
+        final_writer="release-controller",
+        projections=("baseline-authority", "admin-web"),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="git_branch",
+        authoritative_service="authority-git-executor",
+        authoritative_store="authoritative-git",
+        final_writer="authority-git-executor",
+        projections=("gitea",),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="external_projection",
+        authoritative_service="projection-controller",
+        authoritative_store="projection-store",
+        final_writer="projection-controller",
+        projections=("openapi", "gpt-action", "nginx"),
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def ownership_index(
+    ownership: Iterable[StateOwnership] = DEFAULT_STATE_OWNERSHIP,
+) -> dict[str, StateOwnership]:
+    result: dict[str, StateOwnership] = {}
+    for row in ownership:
+        if row.object_type in result:
+            raise ConvergenceContractError(f"duplicate_state_owner:{row.object_type}")
+        result[row.object_type] = row
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceCriterion:
+    criterion_id: str
+    required: bool
+    state: EvidenceState
+    verifier_id: str
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.criterion_id, "criterion_id")
+        _nonempty(self.verifier_id, "verifier_id")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceInvariant:
+    invariant_id: str
+    state: EvidenceState
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.invariant_id, "invariant_id")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceVector:
+    subject_type: str
+    subject_id: str
+    subject_revision: int
+    criteria: tuple[AcceptanceCriterion, ...]
+    invariants: tuple[AcceptanceInvariant, ...] = ()
+    unresolved_side_effects: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    unresolved_blockers: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    runtime_proofs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema: str = "aios.acceptance-vector.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.subject_type, "subject_type")
+        _nonempty(self.subject_id, "subject_id")
+        _generation(self.subject_revision, "subject_revision")
+        ids = [row.criterion_id for row in self.criteria]
+        if len(ids) != len(set(ids)):
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("duplicate_acceptance_criterion")
+        invariant_ids = [row.invariant_id for row in self.invariants]
+        if len(invariant_ids) != len(set(invariant_ids)):
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("duplicate_acceptance_invariant")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        for row in value["criteria"]:
+            row["state"] = row["state"].value
+        for row in value["invariants"]:
+            row["state"] = row["state"].value
+        return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceResult:
+    decision: AcceptanceDecision
+    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
+    vector_hash: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "decision": self.decision.value,
+            "reasons": list(self.reasons),
+            "vector_hash": self.vector_hash,
+        }
+
+
+def evaluate_acceptance(vector: AcceptanceVector) -> AcceptanceResult:
+    """Pure fail-closed acceptance evaluator.
+
+    The evaluator never writes a domain final state.  The domain owner consumes this
+    result and remains the only final writer for Goal/Release/Product state.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    required = [row for row in vector.criteria if row.required]
+
+    for row in required:
+        if row.state == EvidenceState.FAIL:
+            reasons.append(f"criterion_failed:{row.criterion_id}")
+        elif row.state == EvidenceState.BLOCKED:
+            reasons.append(f"criterion_blocked:{row.criterion_id}")
+        elif row.state == EvidenceState.UNKNOWN:
+            reasons.append(f"criterion_unknown:{row.criterion_id}")
+
+    for row in vector.invariants:
+        if row.state == EvidenceState.FAIL:
+            reasons.append(f"invariant_failed:{row.invariant_id}")
+        elif row.state in {EvidenceState.UNKNOWN, EvidenceState.BLOCKED}:
+            reasons.append(f"invariant_unknown:{row.invariant_id}")
+
+    if vector.unresolved_side_effects:
+        reasons.append("unresolved_side_effects")
+    if vector.unresolved_blockers:
+        reasons.append("unresolved_blockers")
+
+    digest = _sha256(vector.as_dict())
+
+    if any(reason.startswith(("criterion_failed:", "invariant_failed:")) for reason in reasons):
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.REJECT
+    elif any(reason.startswith("criterion_blocked:") for reason in reasons) or vector.unresolved_blockers:
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.BLOCKED
+    elif reasons:
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.UNKNOWN
+    else:
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.ACCEPT
+
+    return AcceptanceResult(decision=decision, reasons=tuple(reasons), vector_hash=digest)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class DesiredState:
+    resource_id: str
+    resource_type: str
+    desired_generation: int
+    desired_spec: Mapping[str, Any]
+    owner_goal_id: str | None = None
+    lifecycle: str = "active"
+    schema: str = "aios.desired-state.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.resource_id, "resource_id")
+        _nonempty(self.resource_type, "resource_type")
+        _generation(self.desired_generation, "desired_generation")
+        if self.lifecycle not in {"active", "suspended", "deleted"}:
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("desired_lifecycle_invalid")
+
+    def identity(self) -> tuple[str, int]:
+        return self.resource_id, self.desired_generation
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ObservedState:
+    resource_id: str
+    observed_generation: int | None
+    observed_spec: Mapping[str, Any]
+    health: ObservedHealth
+    source_identity: str
+    observed_at: str
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema: str = "aios.observed-state.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.resource_id, "resource_id")
+        _nonempty(self.source_identity, "source_identity")
+        _nonempty(self.observed_at, "observed_at")
+        if self.observed_generation is not None:
+            _generation(self.observed_generation, "observed_generation")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ReconciliationPlan:
+    resource_id: str
+    desired_generation: int
+    state: ReconciliationState
+    diff: Mapping[str, Any]
+    observation_required: bool
+    idempotency_key: str
+    reason: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["state"] = self.state.value
+        return value
+
+
+def plan_reconciliation(
+    desired: DesiredState,
+    observed: ObservedState | None,
+) -> ReconciliationPlan:
+    """Return a side-effect-free reconciliation decision.
+
+    UNKNOWN/missing observed state always requires observation and never converges.
+    """
+    identity = {
+        "resource_id": desired.resource_id,
+        "desired_generation": desired.desired_generation,
+        "desired_spec": desired.desired_spec,
+    }
+    key = _sha256(identity)
+
+    if observed is None:
+        return ReconciliationPlan(
+            desired.resource_id,
+            desired.desired_generation,
+            ReconciliationState.OBSERVING,
+            {"observed": None},
+            True,
+            key,
+            "observed_state_missing",
+        )
+    if observed.resource_id != desired.resource_id:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError("resource_identity_mismatch")
+    if observed.health == ObservedHealth.UNKNOWN:
+        return ReconciliationPlan(
+            desired.resource_id,
+            desired.desired_generation,
+            ReconciliationState.OBSERVING,
+            {"health": observed.health.value},
+            True,
+            key,
+            "observed_state_unknown",
+        )
+
+    same_generation = observed.observed_generation == desired.desired_generation
+    same_spec = dict(observed.observed_spec) == dict(desired.desired_spec)
+    if same_generation and same_spec and observed.health == ObservedHealth.HEALTHY:
+        return ReconciliationPlan(
+            desired.resource_id,
+            desired.desired_generation,
+            ReconciliationState.CONVERGED,
+            {},
+            False,
+            key,
+            "desired_equals_observed",
+        )
+
+    return ReconciliationPlan(
+        desired.resource_id,
+        desired.desired_generation,
+        ReconciliationState.DIFF_FOUND,
+        {
+            "desired_generation": desired.desired_generation,
+            "observed_generation": observed.observed_generation,
+            "desired_spec": dict(desired.desired_spec),
+            "observed_spec": dict(observed.observed_spec),
+            "observed_health": observed.health.value,
+        },
+        False,
+        key,
+        "desired_observed_drift",
+    )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SideEffectReceipt:
+    mutation_id: str
+    external_system: str
+    state: str
+    observed_at: str
+    external_request_id: str | None = None
+    external_object_id: str | None = None
+    observed_result_hash: str | None = None
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema: str = "aios.side-effect-receipt.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.mutation_id, "mutation_id")
+        _nonempty(self.external_system, "external_system")
+        _nonempty(self.observed_at, "observed_at")
+        if self.state not in {
+            "confirmed_applied",
+            "confirmed_not_applied",
+            "unknown",
+        }:
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("side_effect_receipt_state_invalid")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationManifest:
+    trace_id: str
+    goal_id: str
+    goal_revision: int
+    task_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    current_node_id: str
+    acceptance_vector_ref: str
+    next_action: str
+    stop_reason: ContinuationStopReason
+    checkpoint_ref: str | None = None
+    unresolved_blocker_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    authoritative_decision_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    resource_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    artifact_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    schema: str = "aios.continuation-manifest.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "trace_id",
+            "goal_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "run_id",
+            "current_node_id",
+            "acceptance_vector_ref",
+            "next_action",
+            "created_at",
+        ):
+            _nonempty(getattr(self, name), name)
+        _generation(self.goal_revision, "goal_revision")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["stop_reason"] = self.stop_reason.value
+        return value
+
+    @property
+    def content_hash(self) -> str:
+        return _sha256(self.as_dict())
+
+
+def validate_state_ownership(
+    object_type: str,
+    writer: str,
+    ownership: Iterable[StateOwnership] = DEFAULT_STATE_OWNERSHIP,
+    *,
+    final_state: bool = False,
+) -> None:
+    row = ownership_index(ownership).get(object_type)
+    if row is None:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"state_owner_missing:{object_type}")
+    expected = row.final_writer if final_state and row.final_writer else row.authoritative_service
+    if writer != expected:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(
+            f"STATE_OWNERSHIP_VIOLATION:{object_type}:{writer}:{expected}"
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"""Metadata-only, server-side credential lease broker."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import secrets
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CredentialLease:
+    lease_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    issued_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    scopes: tuple[str, ...]
+    provider: str
+    state: str = "ACTIVE"
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state}
+
+
+class FileCredentialProvider:
+    def __init__(self, token_path: str | os.PathLike[str], *, actor: str = "aios-autonomy-agent") -> None:
+        self.token_path = Path(token_path)
+        self.actor = actor
+
+    def environment(self, lease: CredentialLease) -> dict[str, str]:
+        if not self.token_path.is_file():
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE")
+        return {"CREDENTIAL_FILE": str(self.token_path), "GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR": self.actor}
+
+
+class CredentialBroker:
+    def __init__(self, provider: Any, *, now: Callable[[], datetime] | None = None) -> None:
+        self.provider = provider
+        self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+        self._leases: dict[str, CredentialLease] = {}
+
+    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if repository != "aios/aios" or not target_branch.startswith("agent/") or generation < 1 or not 1 <= lease_seconds <= 86400:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        now = self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__)
+        self._leases[lease.lease_id] = lease
+        return lease.as_dict()
+
+    def _get(self, lease_id: str) -> CredentialLease:
+        lease = self._leases.get(lease_id)
+        if lease is None:
+            raise KeyError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_FOUND")
+        if lease.state == "ACTIVE" and self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc) >= datetime.fromisoformat(lease.expires_at):
+            lease = CredentialLease(**{**lease.as_dict(), "scopes": tuple(lease.scopes), "state": "EXPIRED"})
+            self._leases[lease_id] = lease
+        return lease
+
+    def environment(self, lease_id: str) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
+        return self.provider.environment(lease)
+
+    def status(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._get(lease_id).as_dict()
+
+    def revoke(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state == "REVOKED":
+            return lease.as_dict()
+        updated = CredentialLease(**{**lease.as_dict(), "scopes": tuple(lease.scopes), "state": "REVOKED"})
+        self._leases[lease_id] = updated
+        return updated.as_dict()
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+"""Non-Owner Gitea machine capability and branch reconciliation boundary."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+
+class MachineBrokerError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class GiteaTransport(Protocol):
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str: ...
+    def create_or_update_pr(self, branch: str, target: str, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def publish_status(self, branch: str, state: str, description: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def protected_merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def read_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
+    def whoami(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def repository(self, owner: str, name: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class MachineCredentialProjection:
+    """Opaque systemd credential reference; the credential value is never accepted."""
+
+    reference: str
+    account: str
+    owner_account: str = "aiman"
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "MachineCredentialProjection":
+        if set(value) != {"scheme", "name", "account"}:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+        if value["scheme"] != "systemd-credential" or value["name"] != "gitea-machine-token":
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+        return cls(f"{value['scheme']}:{value['name']}", str(value["account"]))
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.reference != "systemd-credential:gitea-machine-token":
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+        if not self.account or self.account == self.owner_account:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("OWNER_MACHINE_IDENTITY_REJECTED")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CampaignCapabilityReceipt:
+    campaign_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch: str
+    expected_oid: str
+    capabilities: frozenset[str]
+    denied: frozenset[str]
+
+    def require(self, capability: str) -> None:
+        if capability in self.denied or capability not in self.capabilities:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CAPABILITY_DENIED")
+        if self.branch in {"main", "master"}:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_DENIED")
+
+
+class GiteaMachineBroker:
+    def __init__(self, transport: GiteaTransport, credential: MachineCredentialProjection, receipt: CampaignCapabilityReceipt) -> None:
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.credential = credential
+        self.receipt = receipt
+
+    def verify_identity(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        identity = dict(self.transport.whoami())
+        login = identity.get("login") or identity.get("username")
+        if not isinstance(login, str) or not login or login == self.credential.owner_account or login != self.credential.account:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("GITEA_MACHINE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        owner, name = self.receipt.repository.split("/", 1)
+        repo = dict(self.transport.repository(owner, name))
+        if repo.get("full_name") != self.receipt.repository:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("GITEA_REPOSITORY_MISMATCH")
+        return {"login": login, "repository": self.receipt.repository, "owner_account": self.credential.owner_account}
+
+    def push_branch(self, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        self.receipt.require("exact_task_branch_push")
+        return self.transport.compare_and_swap_branch(self.receipt.branch, self.receipt.expected_oid, new_oid)
+
+    def create_pr(self, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.receipt.require("pr_create_update")
+        return self.transport.create_or_update_pr(self.receipt.branch, "main", title, body)
+
+    def status(self, state: str, description: str, context: str = "aios/durable-release") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.receipt.require("status_publish")
+        return self.transport.publish_status(self.receipt.branch, state, description, context)
+
+    def merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.receipt.require("protected_merge")
+        return self.transport.protected_merge(pr_number)
+
+    def readback(self) -> str | None:
+        self.receipt.require("remote_readback")
+        return self.transport.read_branch(self.receipt.branch)
+
+
+def reconcile_exact_branch(authority_oid: str, gitea_oid: str | None, expected_oid: str) -> str:
+    if authority_oid != expected_oid:
+        return "AUTHORITY_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH"
+    if gitea_oid is None:
+        return "CREATE_REQUIRED"
+    if gitea_oid == expected_oid:
+        return "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
+    return "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+
+
+def reconcile_fast_forward(
+    remote_oid: str | None,
+    expected_old_oid: str,
+    new_oid: str,
+    *,
+    old_is_ancestor_of_new: bool,
+) -> str:
+    """Return a bounded action for an active Job/lease branch scope."""
+    if remote_oid is None:
+        return "CREATE_REQUIRED"
+    if remote_oid == new_oid:
+        return "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
+    if remote_oid == expected_old_oid and old_is_ancestor_of_new:
+        return "FAST_FORWARD_REQUIRED"
+    return "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+"""Gitea HTTP/Git transport using only a projected systemd credential."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import quote, urlencode
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+
+class GiteaTransportError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _safe_oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
+        raise GiteaTransportError(f"{field}_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class GiteaMachineTransport:
+    api_base: str
+    repository_id: str
+    remote_url: str
+    authority_git_dir: Path
+    credential_name: str = "gitea-machine-token"
+    actor: str = "aios-autonomy-agent"
+    timeout: int = 20
+    expected_merge_head: str | None = None
+    expected_merge_base: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.credential_name != "gitea-machine-token":
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_NAME_INVALID")
+        if "/" not in self.repository_id or self.repository_id.startswith("/"):
+            raise GiteaTransportError("REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if not self.api_base.startswith("https://") and not self.api_base.startswith("http://127.0.0.1"):
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_API_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not self.remote_url.startswith("https://"):
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_REMOTE_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+    @property
+    def _credential_path(self) -> Path:
+        directory = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "")
+        if not directory:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        path = Path(directory) / self.credential_name
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        return path
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        value = self._credential_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if not value:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_EMPTY")
+        return value
+
+    def _request(self, method: str, path: str, body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> tuple[int, Any]:
+        data = None if body is None else json.dumps(dict(body), separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+        headers = {"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"token {self._token()}"}
+        if data is not None:
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        request = Request(self.api_base.rstrip("/") + path, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
+        try:
+            with urlopen(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
+                raw = response.read()
+                return response.status, json.loads(raw.decode()) if raw else {}
+        except HTTPError as exc:
+            # Never include response bodies: Gitea may echo sensitive request context.
+            raise GiteaTransportError(f"GITEA_HTTP_{exc.code}") from exc
+        except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_NETWORK_ERROR") from exc
+
+    def whoami(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self._request("GET", "/user")[1]
+
+    def repository_info(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        return self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}")[1]
+
+    def repository(self, owner: str, name: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if f"{owner}/{name}" != self.repository_id:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("REPOSITORY_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        return self.repository_info()
+
+    def read_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        try:
+            value = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/branches/{quote(branch, safe='/')}")[1]
+        except GiteaTransportError as exc:
+            if str(exc) == "GITEA_HTTP_404":
+                return None
+            raise
+        sha = value.get("commit", {}).get("id") if isinstance(value, dict) else None
+        return _safe_oid(sha, "remote_branch_oid")
+
+    def _askpass(self) -> tuple[Path, dict[str, str]]:
+        credential = self._credential_path
+        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="aios-gitea-askpass-", dir="/tmp")
+        path = Path(name)
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o700)
+        script = "#!/bin/sh\ncase \"$1\" in *Username*) printf '%s\\n' \"$GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR\" ;; *) cat \"$CREDENTIAL_FILE\" ;; esac\n"
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+            stream.write(script)
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        return path, {
+            "GIT_ASKPASS": str(path),
+            "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
+            "GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR": self.actor,
+            "CREDENTIAL_FILE": str(credential),
+        }
+
+    def _push_branch_fast_forward(self, branch: str, new_oid: str) -> None:
+        askpass, additions = self._askpass()
+        environment = os.environ.copy()
+        environment.update(additions)
+        try:
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", f"--git-dir={self.authority_git_dir}", "push", self.remote_url, f"{new_oid}:refs/heads/{branch}"],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+                env=environment,
+                timeout=self.timeout,
+            )
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CREATE_FAILED")
+        finally:
+            askpass.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        _safe_oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _safe_oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        current = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if current == new_oid:
+            return new_oid
+        if current is None:
+            self._push_branch_fast_forward(branch, new_oid)
+            readback = self.read_branch(branch)
+            if readback != new_oid:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+            return readback
+        if current != expected_oid:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        # The preflight read binds the expected old tip. The Git receive-pack
+        # then enforces the actual fast-forward CAS while transferring the new
+        # objects; no force/lease override or arbitrary ref is permitted.
+        self._push_branch_fast_forward(branch, new_oid)
+        readback = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def _pulls(self) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        query = urlencode({"state": "all", "base_branch": "main", "limit": 100})
+        value = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls?{query}")[1]
+        return value if isinstance(value, list) else []
+
+    def create_or_update_pr(self, branch: str, target: str, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if target != "main":
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_BASE_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        head = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if head is None:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_MISSING")
+        matches = [p for p in self._pulls() if (p.get("head") or {}).get("ref") == branch and (p.get("base") or {}).get("ref") == target]
+        open_matches = [p for p in matches if p.get("state") == "open"]
+        if len(open_matches) > 1:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("MULTIPLE_MATCHING_PRS")
+        if open_matches:
+            if (open_matches[0].get("head") or {}).get("sha") != head:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_CONFLICT")
+            return open_matches[0]
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls", {"head": branch, "base": target, "title": title, "body": body, "allow_maintainer_edit": False})[1]
+
+    def publish_status(self, branch: str, state: str, description: str, context: str = "aios/durable-release") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        oid = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if oid is None:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("STATUS_BRANCH_MISSING")
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/statuses/{oid}", {"state": state, "context": context, "description": description})[1]
+
+    def protected_merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(pr_number, int) or pr_number < 1:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_NUMBER_INVALID")
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        pr = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls/{pr_number}")[1]
+        if pr.get("state") != "open" or (pr.get("base") or {}).get("ref") != "main":
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_MERGE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if pr.get("mergeable") is False:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_NOT_MERGEABLE")
+        head_oid = (pr.get("head") or {}).get("sha")
+        base_oid = (pr.get("base") or {}).get("sha")
+        if self.expected_merge_head is not None and head_oid != self.expected_merge_head:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        if self.expected_merge_base is not None and base_oid != self.expected_merge_base:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_BASE_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        body = {"do": "fast-forward-only", "force_merge": False, "merge_when_checks_succeed": False, "head_commit_id": head_oid}
+        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls/{pr_number}/merge", body)[1]
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+"""Canonical Gitea transport and slash-branch verification."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Optional
+from urllib.parse import quote
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+from aios_gitops_reconciliation_core import RemoteObservation
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GiteaPublisherConfig:
+    repository: str = "aios/aios"
+    api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1"
+    remote_name: str = "gitea-http"
+
+
+class GiteaPublisher:
+    def __init__(self, workspace: Path, *, config: GiteaPublisherConfig = GiteaPublisherConfig(), credential: Any = None, api_get: Callable[[str], Any] | None = None, git_ref: Callable[[str], Optional[str]] | None = None) -> None:
+        self.workspace = Path(workspace)
+        self.config = config
+        self.credential = credential
+        self._api_get = api_get
+        self._git_ref = git_ref
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def validate_repository(repository: str) -> None:
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ValueError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def validate_branch(branch: str) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(branch, str) or not branch.startswith("agent/") or branch in {"main", "master"}:
+            raise ValueError("BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+
+    def repository_identity(self) -> str:
+        self.validate_repository(self.config.repository)
+        return self.config.repository
+
+    def _environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        if self.credential is not None and hasattr(self.credential, "environment"):
+            return dict(self.credential.environment())
+        return {}
+
+    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> Optional[str]:
+        self.validate_branch(branch)
+        if self._git_ref is not None:
+            return self._git_ref(branch)
+        result = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.workspace), "ls-remote", self.config.remote_name, f"refs/heads/{branch}"], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False, env={**os.environ, **self._environment(), "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"})
+        if result.returncode != 0 or not result.stdout.strip():
+            return None
+        return result.stdout.split()[0]
+
+    def _api(self, path: str) -> Any:
+        if self._api_get is not None:
+            return self._api_get(path)
+        headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
+        env = self._environment()
+        if env.get("AIOS_GITEA_TOKEN"):
+            headers["Authorization"] = "token " + env["AIOS_GITEA_TOKEN"]
+        with urlopen(Request(self.config.api_base.rstrip("/") + path, headers=headers), timeout=20) as response:
+            return json.loads(response.read() or b"{}")
+
+    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> Optional[str]:
+        self.validate_branch(branch)
+        for page in range(1, 101):
+            value = self._api(f"/repos/aios/aios/branches?page={page}&limit=50")
+            if not isinstance(value, list):
+                return None
+            for item in value:
+                if isinstance(item, Mapping) and item.get("name") == branch:
+                    commit = item.get("commit")
+                    return commit.get("id") if isinstance(commit, Mapping) else None
+            if len(value) < 50:
+                return None
+        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_BRANCH_PAGINATION_LIMIT")
+
+    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool:
+        if not isinstance(oid, str) or len(oid) != 40:
+            return False
+        try:
+            value = self._api(f"/repos/aios/aios/git/commits/{quote(oid, safe='')}")
+            return isinstance(value, Mapping) and value.get("sha", oid) == oid
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    def observe(self, branch: str, desired_oid: str, authority_oid: Optional[str], *, expected_oid: Optional[str] = None, observed_at: str = "") -> RemoteObservation:
+        return RemoteObservation(self.repository_identity(), branch, desired_oid, authority_oid, self.read_git_ref(branch), self.read_api_branch(branch), self.commit_visible(desired_oid), observed_at, expected_oid)
@@ -0,0 +1,919 @@
+"""SQLite-backed durable GitOps Job Controller.
+
+The controller owns durable intent, idempotency, lease metadata, state
+transitions, receipts, and payload references. A worker owns Git side effects
+behind the campaign capability and branch-CAS boundaries.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from enum import Enum
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import tempfile
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+
+class JobError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class ServiceUnavailable(JobError):
+    pass
+
+
+class BindingConflict(JobError):
+    pass
+
+
+class JobState(str, Enum):
+    REQUESTED = "REQUESTED"
+    AUTHORIZED = "AUTHORIZED"
+    LEASED = "LEASED"
+    WORKTREE_READY = "WORKTREE_READY"
+    EXECUTING = "EXECUTING"
+    LOCAL_VERIFIED = "LOCAL_VERIFIED"
+    REMOTE_SYNCING = "REMOTE_SYNCING"
+    REMOTE_VERIFIED = "REMOTE_VERIFIED"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+    RECOVERABLE_FAILURE = "RECOVERABLE_FAILURE"
+    RECONCILING = "RECONCILING"
+    RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED = "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
+    MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+
+
+_ORDER = {
+    JobState.REQUESTED: 0,
+    JobState.AUTHORIZED: 1,
+    JobState.LEASED: 2,
+    JobState.WORKTREE_READY: 3,
+    JobState.EXECUTING: 4,
+    JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED: 5,
+    JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING: 6,
+    JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED: 7,
+    JobState.COMPLETED: 8,
+}
+_RECOVERABLE = {JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED}
+_TERMINAL = {
+    JobState.COMPLETED,
+    JobState.FAILED,
+    JobState.CANCELLED,
+    JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
+}
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+class PayloadStore:
+    """Content-addressed filesystem payloads; raw content never enters SQLite."""
+
+    def __init__(self, root: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        if not self.root.is_absolute() or self.root.is_symlink():
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_ROOT_INVALID")
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        os.chmod(self.root, 0o700)
+
+    def put(self, content: bytes, expected_digest: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
+        if digest != expected_digest:
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        if len(expected_digest) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in expected_digest):
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        target = self.root / expected_digest
+        if target.is_symlink():
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_PATH_SYMLINK")
+        if target.is_file():
+            if target.stat().st_size != len(content) or hashlib.sha256(target.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != digest:
+                raise JobError("PAYLOAD_EXISTING_MISMATCH")
+            return f"sha256/{digest}", len(content)
+        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".payload-", dir=self.root)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as stream:
+                stream.write(content)
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+            os.chmod(target, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temporary):
+                os.unlink(temporary)
+        return f"sha256/{digest}", len(content)
+
+    def read_verified(self, reference: str, expected_digest: str, expected_size: int) -> bytes:
+        if reference != f"sha256/{expected_digest}":
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_REFERENCE_MISMATCH")
+        path = self.root / expected_digest
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_MISSING")
+        content = path.read_bytes()
+        if len(content) != expected_size or hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() != expected_digest:
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_VERIFY_FAILED")
+        return content
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class JobReceipt:
+    job_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    state: JobState
+    side_effect_state: str
+    http_status: int
+    revision: int
+    receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "state": self.state.value,
+            "side_effect_state": self.side_effect_state,
+            "http_status": self.http_status,
+            "revision": self.revision,
+            "receipt": dict(self.receipt) if self.receipt else None,
+        }
+
+
+class JobStore:
+    SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+    def __init__(self, root: str | os.PathLike[str], *, payload_root: str | os.PathLike[str] | None = None) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        if not self.root.is_absolute() or self.root.is_symlink():
+            raise JobError("JOB_ROOT_INVALID")
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        os.chmod(self.root, 0o700)
+        self.db_path = self.root / "state.sqlite3"
+        self.payloads = PayloadStore(payload_root or self.root.parent / "payloads" / "sha256")
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        if self.db_path.is_symlink():
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_SYMLINK")
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @classmethod
+    def for_existing_append(cls, root: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> "JobStore":
+        """Open an existing job database without initialization side effects."""
+        path = Path(root)
+        if (
+            not path.is_absolute()
+            or path.is_symlink()
+            or not path.is_dir()
+            or not (path / "state.sqlite3").is_file()
+            or (path / "state.sqlite3").is_symlink()
+        ):
+            raise JobError("JOB_ROOT_NOT_FOUND")
+        instance = cls.__new__(cls)
+        instance.root = path
+        instance.db_path = path / "state.sqlite3"
+        return instance
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_completed_replay_schema(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.executescript(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_reconciliations (
+              reconciliation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              identity_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+              source_lease_epoch INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL, external_job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              internal_job_id TEXT NOT NULL, repository TEXT NOT NULL,
+              target_branch TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              branch_mode TEXT NOT NULL, payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              files_digest TEXT NOT NULL, message_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              commit_oid TEXT NOT NULL, authority_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+              current_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL, historical_lease_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+              worker_principal TEXT NOT NULL, worker_lineage TEXT NOT NULL,
+              durable_revision INTEGER NOT NULL, completion_identity TEXT NOT NULL,
+              reason TEXT NOT NULL, provenance_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL, FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
+            );
+            CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_job_idx
+              ON completed_replay_reconciliations(job_id);
+            CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_no_update
+              BEFORE UPDATE ON completed_replay_reconciliations
+              BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'COMPLETED_REPLAY_APPEND_ONLY'); END;
+            CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_no_delete
+              BEFORE DELETE ON completed_replay_reconciliations
+              BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'COMPLETED_REPLAY_APPEND_ONLY'); END;
+            """
+        )
+        columns = {
+            str(item[1]) for item in connection.execute(
+                "PRAGMA table_info(completed_replay_reconciliations)"
+            ).fetchall()
+        }
+        if columns and "historical_lease_head_oid" not in columns:
+            connection.execute(
+                "ALTER TABLE completed_replay_reconciliations ADD COLUMN historical_lease_head_oid TEXT"
+            )
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                connection.executescript(
+                    """
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS metadata (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL);
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS jobs (
+                      job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                      campaign_id TEXT NOT NULL, repository TEXT NOT NULL, operation TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      branch TEXT NOT NULL, expected_branch_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL, payload_ref TEXT, payload_size INTEGER,
+                      state TEXT NOT NULL, side_effect_state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      revision INTEGER NOT NULL, request_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      receipt_json TEXT, created_at TEXT NOT NULL, updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS idempotency_keys (
+                      key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                      binding_json TEXT NOT NULL, created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS branch_leases (
+                      lease_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                      branch TEXT NOT NULL, lineage_anchor_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      current_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                      lease_expires_at TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      revision INTEGER NOT NULL, FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS state_transitions (
+                      sequence INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      from_state TEXT, to_state TEXT NOT NULL, revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                      side_effect_state TEXT NOT NULL, created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS receipts (
+                      receipt_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      kind TEXT NOT NULL, digest TEXT NOT NULL, payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      created_at TEXT NOT NULL, FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_reconciliations (
+                      reconciliation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      identity_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                      source_lease_epoch INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                      task_id TEXT NOT NULL, external_job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      internal_job_id TEXT NOT NULL, repository TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      target_branch TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                      branch_mode TEXT NOT NULL, payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      files_digest TEXT NOT NULL, message_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      commit_oid TEXT NOT NULL, authority_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      current_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL, historical_lease_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      worker_principal TEXT NOT NULL, worker_lineage TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      durable_revision INTEGER NOT NULL, completion_identity TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      reason TEXT NOT NULL, provenance_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                      created_at TEXT NOT NULL, FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
+                    );
+                    CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_job_idx
+                      ON completed_replay_reconciliations(job_id);
+                    CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_no_update
+                      BEFORE UPDATE ON completed_replay_reconciliations
+                      BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'COMPLETED_REPLAY_APPEND_ONLY'); END;
+                    CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS completed_replay_no_delete
+                      BEFORE DELETE ON completed_replay_reconciliations
+                      BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'COMPLETED_REPLAY_APPEND_ONLY'); END;
+                    INSERT OR REPLACE INTO metadata(key, value) VALUES('schema_version', '1');
+                    """
+                )
+                columns = {
+                    str(item[1]) for item in connection.execute(
+                        "PRAGMA table_info(completed_replay_reconciliations)"
+                    ).fetchall()
+                }
+                if columns and "historical_lease_head_oid" not in columns:
+                    connection.execute(
+                        "ALTER TABLE completed_replay_reconciliations "
+                        "ADD COLUMN historical_lease_head_oid TEXT"
+                    )
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+    def _mirror(self, job: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        directory = self.root / str(job["job_id"])
+        directory.mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+        (directory / "receipts").mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+        (directory / "logs-digest").mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+        for name, value in (("request.json", job["request"]), ("state.json", job)):
+            target = directory / name
+            fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".mirror-", dir=directory)
+            try:
+                os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+                with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as stream:
+                    stream.write(canonical_json(value))
+                    stream.flush()
+                    os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+                os.replace(temporary, target)
+            finally:
+                if os.path.exists(temporary):
+                    os.unlink(temporary)
+
+    def read(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if row is None:
+            raise JobError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
+        return dict(row)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _completed_replay_identity(envelope: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        required = (
+            "task_id", "external_job_id", "internal_job_id", "repository",
+            "target_branch", "generation", "branch_mode", "payload_digest",
+            "files_digest", "message_digest", "commit_oid", "authority_head_oid",
+            "historical_lease_head_oid", "worker_principal", "worker_lineage", "source_lease_epoch",
+            "durable_revision", "completion_identity", "reason", "provenance",
+        )
+        if any(key not in envelope for key in required):
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_INCOMPLETE")
+        text_fields = (
+            "task_id", "external_job_id", "internal_job_id", "repository",
+            "target_branch", "branch_mode", "payload_digest", "files_digest",
+            "message_digest", "commit_oid", "authority_head_oid", "worker_principal",
+            "worker_lineage", "historical_lease_head_oid", "completion_identity", "reason",
+        )
+        result: dict[str, Any] = {}
+        for key in text_fields:
+            value = envelope[key]
+            if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+                raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_INVALID")
+            result[key] = value
+        for key in ("generation", "source_lease_epoch", "durable_revision"):
+            value = envelope[key]
+            if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or value < 1:
+                raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_INVALID")
+            result[key] = value
+        for key in ("commit_oid", "authority_head_oid", "historical_lease_head_oid"):
+            if len(result[key]) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in result[key]):
+                raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_INVALID")
+        for key in ("payload_digest", "files_digest", "message_digest"):
+            if len(result[key]) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in result[key]):
+                raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if result["repository"] != "aios/aios" or result["branch_mode"] not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if not result["target_branch"].startswith("agent/") or result["target_branch"] in {"main", "master"}:
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_INVALID")
+        provenance = envelope["provenance"]
+        if not isinstance(provenance, Mapping) or not provenance:
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_PROVENANCE_INVALID")
+        result["provenance"] = dict(provenance)
+        if result["commit_oid"] != result["authority_head_oid"]:
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_AUTHORITY_CONFLICT")
+        return result
+
+    def append_completed_replay_reconciliation(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        envelope: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        authority_head_oid: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Append exact completed-replay evidence without rewriting history."""
+        identity = self._completed_replay_identity(envelope)
+        if authority_head_oid != identity["authority_head_oid"]:
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_AUTHORITY_CONFLICT")
+        if identity["internal_job_id"] != job_id:
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_INTERNAL_JOB_CONFLICT")
+        identity_digest = sha256_json(identity)
+        reconciliation_id = "reconcile-" + identity_digest[:32]
+        now = utc_now()
+        try:
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                self._ensure_completed_replay_schema(connection)
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    raise JobError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
+                if JobState(row["state"]) != JobState.COMPLETED:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_JOB_NOT_COMPLETED")
+                durable_request = json.loads(row["request_json"])
+                binding = durable_request.get("binding", durable_request)
+                exact_binding = {
+                    "task_id": binding.get("task_id") or binding.get("campaign_id"),
+                    "external_job_id": binding.get("external_job_id"),
+                    "internal_job_id": job_id,
+                    "repository": binding.get("repository") or row["repository"],
+                    "target_branch": binding.get("target_branch") or binding.get("branch"),
+                    "generation": binding.get("generation"),
+                    "branch_mode": binding.get("branch_mode"),
+                    "payload_digest": binding.get("payload_digest") or row["payload_digest"],
+                    "files_digest": binding.get("files_digest"),
+                    "message_digest": binding.get("message_digest"),
+                    "worker_principal": binding.get("worker_principal"),
+                    "worker_lineage": binding.get("worker_lineage"),
+                }
+                for key, value in exact_binding.items():
+                    if str(value) != str(identity[key]):
+                        raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+                receipt = json.loads(row["receipt_json"]) if row["receipt_json"] else None
+                if not isinstance(receipt, Mapping):
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_RECEIPT_MISSING")
+                if receipt.get("commit_oid") != identity["commit_oid"] or receipt.get("authority_oid") != identity["authority_head_oid"]:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_RECEIPT_AUTHORITY_CONFLICT")
+                completion_identity = sha256_json({
+                    "job_id": row["job_id"],
+                    "revision": int(row["revision"]),
+                    "receipt": receipt,
+                })
+                if identity["completion_identity"] != completion_identity:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_COMPLETION_IDENTITY_CONFLICT")
+                lease_columns = {
+                    str(item[1]) for item in connection.execute("PRAGMA table_info(branch_leases)").fetchall()
+                }
+                if "epoch" in lease_columns:
+                    lease = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT lease_id, state, current_head_oid, generation FROM branch_leases WHERE job_id=? AND epoch=? ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT 1",
+                        (job_id, identity["source_lease_epoch"]),
+                    ).fetchone()
+                else:
+                    if identity["source_lease_epoch"] != 1:
+                        raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_LEASE_EPOCH_UNAVAILABLE")
+                    lease = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT lease_id, state, current_head_oid, generation FROM branch_leases WHERE job_id=? ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT 1",
+                        (job_id,),
+                    ).fetchone()
+                if lease is None:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_LEASE_MISSING")
+                lease_state = str(lease["state"])
+                lease_head = str(lease["current_head_oid"])
+                lease_generation = int(lease["generation"])
+                event_tables = {
+                    str(item[0]) for item in connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='branch_lease_events'"
+                    ).fetchall()
+                }
+                if "branch_lease_events" in event_tables:
+                    event = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT state, current_head_oid, generation FROM branch_lease_events WHERE lease_id=? ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT 1",
+                        (lease["lease_id"],),
+                    ).fetchone()
+                    if event is not None:
+                        lease_state = str(event["state"])
+                        lease_head = str(event["current_head_oid"])
+                        lease_generation = int(event["generation"])
+                if lease_state not in {"ACTIVE", "USED", "EXPIRED"}:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_LEASE_STATE_INVALID")
+                if lease_generation != identity["generation"]:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_LEASE_GENERATION_CONFLICT")
+                if len(lease_head) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in lease_head):
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_LEASE_HEAD_INVALID")
+                if lease_head != identity["historical_lease_head_oid"]:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_HISTORICAL_LEASE_CONFLICT")
+                if identity["commit_oid"] == identity["historical_lease_head_oid"]:
+                    raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_EVIDENCE_INCOHERENT")
+                existing = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM completed_replay_reconciliations WHERE job_id=? ORDER BY created_at ASC",
+                    (job_id,),
+                ).fetchall()
+                for prior in existing:
+                    if prior["identity_digest"] != identity_digest:
+                        raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_AMBIGUOUS")
+                if existing:
+                    result = dict(existing[0])
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return result
+                provenance_json = json.dumps(identity["provenance"], sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO completed_replay_reconciliations(reconciliation_id,job_id,identity_digest,source_lease_epoch,task_id,external_job_id,internal_job_id,repository,target_branch,generation,branch_mode,payload_digest,files_digest,message_digest,commit_oid,authority_head_oid,worker_principal,worker_lineage,current_head_oid,historical_lease_head_oid,durable_revision,completion_identity,reason,provenance_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (
+                        reconciliation_id, job_id, identity["identity_digest"] if "identity_digest" in identity else identity_digest, identity["source_lease_epoch"],
+                        identity["task_id"], identity["external_job_id"], identity["internal_job_id"],
+                        identity["repository"], identity["target_branch"], identity["generation"],
+                        identity["branch_mode"], identity["payload_digest"], identity["files_digest"],
+                        identity["message_digest"], identity["commit_oid"], identity["authority_head_oid"],
+                        identity["worker_principal"], identity["worker_lineage"], identity["authority_head_oid"], identity["historical_lease_head_oid"], identity["durable_revision"],
+                        identity["completion_identity"], identity["reason"], provenance_json, now,
+                    ),
+                )
+                result = dict(connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM completed_replay_reconciliations WHERE reconciliation_id=?",
+                    (reconciliation_id,),
+                ).fetchone())
+                connection.commit()
+                return result
+        except (JobError, BindingConflict):
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+            try:
+                with self._connect() as connection:
+                    existing = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT * FROM completed_replay_reconciliations WHERE identity_digest=?",
+                        (identity_digest,),
+                    ).fetchone()
+                if existing is not None:
+                    return dict(existing)
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT") from exc
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+    def completed_replay_evidence(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        try:
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                rows = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM completed_replay_reconciliations WHERE job_id=? ORDER BY created_at ASC",
+                    (job_id,),
+                ).fetchall()
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if not rows:
+            return None
+        if len({str(row["identity_digest"]) for row in rows}) != 1:
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_AMBIGUOUS")
+        first = dict(rows[0])
+        immutable_fields = tuple(
+            key for key in first
+            if key != "created_at"
+        )
+        for row in rows[1:]:
+            if any(row[key] != first[key] for key in immutable_fields):
+                raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_AMBIGUOUS")
+        if not (
+            first["commit_oid"] == first["authority_head_oid"] == first["current_head_oid"]
+            and first["commit_oid"] != first["historical_lease_head_oid"]
+        ):
+            raise BindingConflict("COMPLETED_REPLAY_EVIDENCE_INCOHERENT")
+        return first
+
+    def _receipt(self, row: Mapping[str, Any], *, duplicate: bool) -> JobReceipt:
+        state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.COMPLETED:
+            status, side = 200, "COMPLETED"
+        elif state in _RECOVERABLE:
+            status = 202
+            side = row["side_effect_state"] if row["side_effect_state"] == "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING" else "RESUME_SAME_JOB"
+        elif row["side_effect_state"] == "UNKNOWN":
+            status, side = 503, "UNKNOWN"
+        else:
+            status, side = 202, "SAME_JOB" if duplicate else "QUEUED"
+        receipt = json.loads(row["receipt_json"]) if row["receipt_json"] else None
+        return JobReceipt(row["job_id"], row["idempotency_key"], state, side, status, int(row["revision"]), receipt)
+
+
+class GitOpsJobController:
+    def __init__(self, store: JobStore) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _binding(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
+        fields = ("campaign_id", "repository", "operation", "branch", "expected_branch_oid", "payload_digest")
+        if any(not isinstance(request.get(field), str) or not request[field].strip() for field in fields):
+            raise JobError("JOB_BINDING_INVALID")
+        oid = request["expected_branch_oid"]
+        digest = request["payload_digest"]
+        if len(oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in oid):
+            raise JobError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        if len(digest) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in digest):
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        if request["branch"] in {"main", "master"} or request["branch"].startswith(("refs/", "tags/")):
+            raise JobError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_REJECTED")
+        binding = {field: str(request[field]) for field in fields}
+        # Operation-specific, non-secret binding inputs must survive the
+        # durable round trip and participate in idempotency. Arbitrary request
+        # fields are intentionally discarded rather than persisted.
+        optional = (
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "task_id",
+            "new_branch_oid",
+            "authorization_recovery_digest",
+            "lineage_anchor_oid",
+            "base_oid",
+            "branch_mode",
+            "generation",
+            "expected_main_oid",
+            "pr_number",
+            "target_branch",
+            "check_context",
+            "check_state",
+            "check_description",
+            "external_job_id",
+            "files_digest",
+            "message_digest",
+            "worker_principal",
+            "worker_lineage",
+        )
+        for field in optional:
+            value = request.get(field)
+            if value is None:
+                continue
+            if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (str, int)):
+                raise JobError("JOB_BINDING_OPTION_INVALID")
+            text = str(value).strip()
+            if not text or len(text) > 512:
+                raise JobError("JOB_BINDING_OPTION_INVALID")
+            binding[field] = text
+        return binding
+
+    def submit(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, payload: bytes | None = None) -> JobReceipt:
+        binding = self._binding(request)
+        payload_ref = request.get("payload_ref")
+        payload_size = request.get("payload_size")
+        if payload is not None:
+            payload_ref, payload_size = self.store.payloads.put(payload, binding["payload_digest"])
+        if payload_ref is not None and payload_ref != f"sha256/{binding['payload_digest']}":
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_REFERENCE_MISMATCH")
+        if payload_ref is not None and (not isinstance(payload_size, int) or payload_size < 0):
+            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_SIZE_INVALID")
+        client_idempotency_key = binding.get("idempotency_key")
+        if client_idempotency_key is not None:
+            if len(client_idempotency_key) > 128 or not all(
+                character.isalnum() or character in "._:-" for character in client_idempotency_key
+            ):
+                raise JobError("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+            key = sha256_json({"client_idempotency_key": client_idempotency_key})
+        else:
+            key = sha256_json(binding)
+        job_id = "job-" + key[:32]
+        durable_request = dict(binding)
+        if payload_ref is not None:
+            durable_request.update({"payload_ref": str(payload_ref), "payload_size": int(payload_size)})
+        now = utc_now()
+        try:
+            with self.store._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                existing = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)).fetchone()
+                if existing is not None:
+                    if json.loads(existing["request_json"]).get("binding") != binding:
+                        raise BindingConflict("BINDING_CONFLICT")
+                    row = dict(existing)
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return self.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True)
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO jobs(job_id,idempotency_key,campaign_id,repository,operation,branch,expected_branch_oid,payload_digest,payload_ref,payload_size,state,side_effect_state,revision,request_json,receipt_json,created_at,updated_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (job_id, key, binding["campaign_id"], binding["repository"], binding["operation"], binding["branch"], binding["expected_branch_oid"], binding["payload_digest"], payload_ref, payload_size, JobState.REQUESTED.value, "NONE", 0, json.dumps({"binding": binding, **durable_request}, sort_keys=True), None, now, now),
+                )
+                connection.execute("INSERT INTO idempotency_keys(key,job_id,binding_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?)", (key, job_id, json.dumps(binding, sort_keys=True), now))
+                connection.execute("INSERT INTO state_transitions(job_id,from_state,to_state,revision,side_effect_state,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (job_id, None, JobState.REQUESTED.value, 0, "NONE", now))
+                row = dict(connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone())
+                connection.commit()
+        except BindingConflict:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
+            row = self.store.read(job_id)
+            return self.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True)
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        row["request"] = json.loads(row["request_json"])
+        self.store._mirror(row)
+        return self.store._receipt(row, duplicate=False)
+
+    def lease_job(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        lease_id: str,
+        lineage_anchor_oid: str,
+        current_head_oid: str,
+        generation: int,
+        lease_expires_at: str,
+        expected_revision: int,
+    ) -> JobReceipt:
+        """Atomically create a branch lease and move its Job to LEASED."""
+        if generation < 1 or any(len(oid) != 40 for oid in (lineage_anchor_oid, current_head_oid)):
+            raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            with self.store._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    raise JobError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
+                if int(row["revision"]) != expected_revision:
+                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                if row["branch"] in {"main", "master"}:
+                    raise JobError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_REJECTED")
+                now = utc_now()
+                connection.execute("INSERT INTO branch_leases(lease_id,job_id,branch,lineage_anchor_oid,current_head_oid,generation,lease_expires_at,state,revision) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)", (lease_id, job_id, row["branch"], lineage_anchor_oid, current_head_oid, generation, lease_expires_at, "ACTIVE", 0))
+                next_revision = expected_revision + 1
+                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE jobs SET state=?,side_effect_state=?,revision=?,updated_at=? WHERE job_id=? AND revision=?", (JobState.LEASED.value, "LEASED", next_revision, now, job_id, expected_revision))
+                if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                connection.execute("INSERT INTO state_transitions(job_id,from_state,to_state,revision,side_effect_state,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (job_id, row["state"], JobState.LEASED.value, next_revision, "LEASED", now))
+                result = dict(connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone())
+                connection.commit()
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+            raise JobError("LEASE_CONFLICT") from exc
+        except (JobError, BindingConflict):
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        result["request"] = json.loads(result["request_json"])
+        self.store._mirror(result)
+        return self.store._receipt(result, duplicate=True)
+
+    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE") -> None:
+        if len(current_head_oid) != 40 or generation < 1:
+            raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            with self.store._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
+                if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                connection.commit()
+        except JobError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+    def advance(self, job_id: str, state: JobState, *, side_effect_state: str, receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, expected_revision: int | None = None) -> JobReceipt:
+        return self._advance(
+            job_id,
+            state,
+            side_effect_state=side_effect_state,
+            receipt=receipt,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def _advance(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        state: JobState,
+        *,
+        side_effect_state: str,
+        receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+        _allow_verified_external_recovery: bool = False,
+    ) -> JobReceipt:
+        try:
+            with self.store._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    raise JobError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
+                previous = JobState(row["state"])
+                revision = int(row["revision"])
+                if expected_revision is not None and expected_revision != revision:
+                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                recovery_transition = (
+                    _allow_verified_external_recovery
+                    and previous == JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+                    and state == JobState.COMPLETED
+                )
+                if previous in _TERMINAL and state != previous and not recovery_transition:
+                    raise JobError("JOB_TERMINAL")
+                if state not in _RECOVERABLE | {JobState.RECONCILING, JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED}:
+                    if previous in _RECOVERABLE:
+                        raise JobError("RECONCILE_REQUIRED")
+                    if previous != JobState.RECONCILING and _ORDER.get(state, -1) < _ORDER.get(previous, -1):
+                        raise JobError("JOB_STATE_REGRESSION")
+                next_revision = revision + 1
+                receipt_json = json.dumps(dict(receipt), sort_keys=True) if receipt is not None else row["receipt_json"]
+                now = utc_now()
+                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE jobs SET state=?,side_effect_state=?,revision=?,receipt_json=?,updated_at=? WHERE job_id=? AND revision=?", (state.value, side_effect_state, next_revision, receipt_json, now, job_id, revision))
+                if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                connection.execute("INSERT INTO state_transitions(job_id,from_state,to_state,revision,side_effect_state,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (job_id, previous.value, state.value, next_revision, side_effect_state, now))
+                if receipt is not None:
+                    digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(receipt)).hexdigest()
+                    connection.execute("INSERT INTO receipts(receipt_id,job_id,kind,digest,payload_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (f"receipt-{job_id}-{next_revision}", job_id, state.value, digest, json.dumps(dict(receipt), sort_keys=True), now))
+                result = dict(connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone())
+                connection.commit()
+        except (JobError, BindingConflict):
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        result["request"] = json.loads(result["request_json"])
+        self.store._mirror(result)
+        return self.store._receipt(result, duplicate=True)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_verified_external_merge_proof(
+        job_id: str,
+        binding: Mapping[str, Any],
+        proof: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(proof, Mapping):
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_INVALID")
+
+        def require_oid(field: str) -> str:
+            value = proof.get(field)
+            if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
+                raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_INVALID")
+            return value
+
+        if proof.get("proof_schema") != "aios.job-recovery.v1":
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_INVALID")
+        if proof.get("job_id") != job_id:
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+        if proof.get("operation") != "PROTECTED_MERGE" or binding.get("operation") != "PROTECTED_MERGE":
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_OPERATION_REJECTED")
+        if proof.get("pr_number") != 53 or str(binding.get("pr_number")) != "53":
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+        if proof.get("pr_merged") is not True or proof.get("protected_merge") is not True:
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+        if proof.get("force_push") is not False:
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+        if proof.get("machine_actor") != "aios-autonomy-agent":
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+
+        expected_head = str(binding.get("expected_branch_oid", ""))
+        expected_base = str(binding.get("expected_main_oid", ""))
+        head_oid = require_oid("head_oid")
+        base_oid = require_oid("base_oid")
+        merged_main = require_oid("main_oid_after_protected_merge")
+        gitea_merged_main = require_oid("gitea_main_oid_after_protected_merge")
+        authority_merged_main = require_oid("authority_main_oid_after_protected_merge")
+        current_gitea = require_oid("current_gitea_main_oid")
+        current_authority = require_oid("current_authority_main_oid")
+        if head_oid != expected_head or base_oid != expected_base:
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+        if not (merged_main == gitea_merged_main == authority_merged_main == head_oid):
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+        if current_gitea != current_authority or proof.get("current_main_descends_from_protected_merge") is not True:
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
+        return dict(proof)
+
+    def complete_verified_external_side_effect(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        proof: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> JobReceipt:
+        """Close one historical manual job from independently verified proof.
+
+        This is deliberately narrower than advance: it is only valid for the
+        known protected PR53 recovery shape and preserves the old receipt.
+        The actual state change still uses the normal revision-CAS path.
+        """
+        current = self.store.read(job_id)
+        revision = int(current["revision"])
+        if expected_revision is not None and expected_revision != revision:
+            raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+        request = json.loads(current["request_json"])
+        binding = request.get("binding", request)
+        normalized_proof = self._validate_verified_external_merge_proof(job_id, binding, proof)
+        existing_receipt = json.loads(current["receipt_json"]) if current["receipt_json"] else None
+        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
+            if (
+                existing_receipt
+                and existing_receipt.get("recovered_from_historical_manual") is True
+                and existing_receipt.get("proof") == normalized_proof
+            ):
+                return self.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True)
+            raise JobError("JOB_TERMINAL")
+        if JobState(current["state"]) != JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED:
+            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_RECOVERY_STATE_INVALID")
+        recovery_receipt = {
+            "recovered_from_historical_manual": True,
+            "recovery_kind": "VERIFIED_EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT",
+            "historical_receipt": existing_receipt,
+            "proof": normalized_proof,
+        }
+        return self._advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.COMPLETED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            receipt=recovery_receipt,
+            expected_revision=revision,
+            _allow_verified_external_recovery=True,
+        )
+
+    def reconcile(self, job_id: str, observer: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Mapping[str, Any]]) -> JobReceipt:
+        current = self.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(current["state"]) not in _RECOVERABLE:
+            return self.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True)
+        self.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+        try:
+            observed = dict(observer(current))
+            stable = JobState(observed.get("state", JobState.REQUESTED.value))
+            if stable in {JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILING}:
+                raise JobError("RECONCILIATION_UNSTABLE")
+            return self.advance(job_id, stable, side_effect_state=str(observed.get("side_effect_state", "NONE")), receipt=observed.get("receipt"))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            self.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, side_effect_state="UNKNOWN", receipt={"error_code": type(exc).__name__})
+            raise JobError("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED") from exc
+
+    def resume(self, job_id: str) -> JobReceipt:
+        current = self.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(current["state"]) in _TERMINAL:
+            raise JobError("JOB_TERMINAL")
+        return self.reconcile(job_id, lambda _current: {"state": JobState.REQUESTED.value, "side_effect_state": "RESUME_SAME_JOB"})
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+"""Durable Job side-effect executor for the AIOS campaign control plane."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor, AuthorityGitError
+from aios_campaign_recovery import RecoveryEvidenceError, load_recovered_authorization
+from aios_gitea_machine_broker import CampaignCapabilityReceipt, GiteaMachineBroker, MachineBrokerError
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, JobState, JobStore
+
+
+TASK_ID = "AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_RELEASE_CAMPAIGN_V1"
+CAMPAIGN_ID = "AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807"
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+BRANCH = "agent/autonomous-release-campaign-v1-20260807"
+EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID = "bba675fab3b7e0c5fba7066720252b3c91b9f20d"
+AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST = "6b0bf550eb702126e967eeff2d561fa808444b924d8a71f5399accad508ed3b2"
+LINEAGE_ANCHOR = "69b45e81dcd2c3707c367003b08c55fd361faae8"
+
+
+class JobExecutionError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class DurableJobExecutor:
+    controller: GitOpsJobController
+    authority: AuthorityGitExecutor
+    broker: GiteaMachineBroker
+    recovery_path: Path
+
+    def _request(self, job_id: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        try:
+            request = json.loads(row["request_json"])
+        except (KeyError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise JobExecutionError("JOB_REQUEST_INVALID") from exc
+        return row, dict(request.get("binding") or {})
+
+    def _validate_campaign(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+        operation = str(request.get("operation", ""))
+        expected_branch_oid = request.get("expected_branch_oid")
+        required = {
+            "task_id": TASK_ID,
+            "campaign_id": CAMPAIGN_ID,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "branch": BRANCH,
+            "authorization_recovery_digest": AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST,
+        }
+        for key, expected in required.items():
+            if request.get(key) != expected:
+                raise JobExecutionError(f"JOB_{key.upper()}_MISMATCH")
+        new_oid = request.get("new_branch_oid")
+        if not isinstance(new_oid, str) or len(new_oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in new_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(expected_branch_oid, str) or len(expected_branch_oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in expected_branch_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH" and expected_branch_oid == new_oid:
+            raise JobExecutionError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        if operation != "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH" and expected_branch_oid != new_oid:
+            raise JobExecutionError("POST_ADVANCE_HEAD_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            recovery = load_recovered_authorization(self.recovery_path)
+        except RecoveryEvidenceError as exc:
+            raise JobExecutionError(str(exc)) from exc
+        if recovery["digest"] != AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST:
+            raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        for key, expected in required.items():
+            if key == "campaign_id":
+                actual = recovery.get(key)
+            elif key == "authorization_recovery_digest":
+                continue
+            else:
+                actual = recovery.get({"expected_branch_oid": "expected_branch_oid"}.get(key, key))
+            if actual is not None and actual != expected:
+                raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+        if recovery.get("expected_branch_oid") != EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID:
+            raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_BRANCH_OID_MISMATCH")
+        authority_head = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
+        if authority_head not in {expected_branch_oid, new_oid}:
+            raise JobExecutionError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        if not self.authority.ancestry_check(expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        if not self.authority.ancestry_check(EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID, new_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_OID_OUTSIDE_AUTHORIZED_LINEAGE")
+        identity = self.broker.verify_identity()
+        if identity.get("repository") != REPOSITORY or identity.get("login") == "aiman":
+            raise JobExecutionError("MACHINE_IDENTITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        return new_oid
+
+    def dry_run(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        _row, request = self._request(job_id)
+        new_oid = self._validate_campaign(request)
+        remote = self.broker.readback()
+        if remote is None:
+            action = "CREATE_REQUIRED"
+        elif remote == new_oid:
+            action = "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
+        elif remote == request["expected_branch_oid"]:
+            action = "FAST_FORWARD_REQUIRED"
+        else:
+            action = "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+        if action == "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
+            raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_CONFLICT")
+        return {
+            "decision": "SAFE_TO_ADVANCE",
+            "authority_action": "CAS_REQUIRED",
+            "gitea_action": action,
+            "previous_branch_oid": request["expected_branch_oid"],
+            "final_branch_oid": new_oid,
+            "force_push": False,
+        }
+
+    def _recover_requested(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) in {JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED}:
+            self.controller.resume(job_id)
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        return row
+
+    def execute(self, job_id: str, *, dry_run: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            return self._execute_unprotected(job_id, dry_run=dry_run)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            try:
+                row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+                if state not in {JobState.COMPLETED, JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED, JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED}:
+                    self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, side_effect_state="UNKNOWN", receipt={"error_code": type(exc).__name__})
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            raise
+
+    def _execute_unprotected(self, job_id: str, *, dry_run: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row, request = self._request(job_id)
+        operation = request.get("operation")
+        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH":
+            if dry_run:
+                return self.dry_run(job_id)
+            return self._advance_campaign(job_id)
+        if operation == "COMMIT_FILE":
+            return self._commit_file(job_id, request)
+        if operation == "SYNC_TASK_BRANCH_TO_GITEA":
+            new_oid = self._validate_campaign(request)
+            final = self.broker.push_branch(new_oid)
+            return {"operation": operation, "remote_verified": final == new_oid, "final_network_oid": final}
+        if operation == "CREATE_PR":
+            self._validate_campaign(request)
+            return dict(self.broker.create_pr("AIOS autonomous release control plane", "Durable campaign continuation; exact head and recovery evidence are bound in the Job."))
+        if operation == "PUBLISH_CHECK":
+            self._validate_campaign(request)
+            context = request.get("check_context", "aios/durable-release")
+            state = request.get("check_state", "success")
+            description = request.get("check_description", "Durable campaign control-plane check passed")
+            return dict(self.broker.status(str(state), str(description), str(context)))
+        if operation == "PROTECTED_MERGE":
+            self._validate_campaign(request)
+            number = int(request.get("pr_number", "0"))
+            self.broker.transport.expected_merge_head = request["expected_branch_oid"]
+            expected_main = request.get("expected_main_oid")
+            if expected_main is not None:
+                self.broker.transport.expected_merge_base = expected_main
+            return dict(self.broker.merge(number))
+        if operation == "RECONCILE_AUTHORITY_MAIN":
+            self._validate_campaign(request)
+            old = request.get("expected_main_oid")
+            new = request.get("new_branch_oid")
+            if not isinstance(old, str) or not isinstance(new, str):
+                raise JobExecutionError("MAIN_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID")
+            gitea_main = self.broker.transport.read_branch("main")
+            if gitea_main != new:
+                raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+            if not self.authority.ancestry_check(old, new):
+                raise JobExecutionError("MAIN_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+            return {"authority_main": self.authority.ff_CAS_main_after_verified_protected_merge(old, new)}
+        raise JobExecutionError("OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED")
+
+    def _advance_campaign(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self._recover_requested(job_id)
+        row, request = self._request(job_id)
+        new_oid = self._validate_campaign(request)
+        expected_oid = request["expected_branch_oid"]
+        state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.REQUESTED:
+            receipt = self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.AUTHORIZED, side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED", receipt={"authorization_digest": AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST, "task_id": TASK_ID})
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
+            self.controller.lease_job(job_id, lease_id=f"lease-{job_id}", lineage_anchor_oid=LINEAGE_ANCHOR, current_head_oid=expected_oid, generation=1, lease_expires_at="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.LEASED:
+            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY", receipt={"branch": BRANCH, "expected_oid": expected_oid})
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.WORKTREE_READY:
+            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        authority_before = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
+        if authority_before == expected_oid:
+            authority_oid = self.authority.advance_task_branch_CAS(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}", expected_oid, new_oid)
+        elif authority_before == new_oid:
+            authority_oid = new_oid
+        else:
+            raise JobExecutionError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_CONFLICT")
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.EXECUTING:
+            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED", receipt={"authority": {"branch": BRANCH, "previous_oid": expected_oid, "new_oid": new_oid, "CAS_success": True, "readback_oid": authority_oid}})
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        remote_before = self.broker.readback()
+        if remote_before != new_oid:
+            if remote_before not in {None, expected_oid}:
+                raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_CONFLICT")
+            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED:
+                if hasattr(self.broker, "receipt"):
+                    self.broker.receipt = replace(self.broker.receipt, expected_oid=expected_oid)
+                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS", receipt={"gitea": {"previous_oid": remote_before, "desired_oid": new_oid, "force_push": False}})
+            final_network = self.broker.push_branch(new_oid)
+        else:
+            final_network = new_oid
+        final_api = self.broker.readback()
+        if final_api != new_oid:
+            raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) in {JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING}:
+            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt={"gitea": {"machine_actor": "aios-autonomy-agent", "previous_oid": remote_before, "desired_oid": new_oid, "final_network_oid": final_network, "final_API_oid": final_api, "force_push": False}})
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED:
+            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "network_oid": final_network, "gitea_api_oid": final_api, "force_push": False})
+        return self.controller.store._receipt(self.controller.store.read(job_id), duplicate=True).as_dict()
+
+    def _commit_file(self, job_id: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        payload_ref = request.get("payload_ref")
+        if not payload_ref:
+            raise JobExecutionError("PAYLOAD_REQUIRED")
+        payload = self.controller.store.payloads.read_verified(payload_ref, row["payload_digest"], int(request["payload_size"]))
+        try:
+            spec = json.loads(payload.decode())
+            path = str(spec["path"])
+            content = base64.b64decode(spec["content_base64"], validate=True)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise JobExecutionError("COMMIT_FILE_PAYLOAD_INVALID") from exc
+        new_oid = self.authority.commit_file_in_isolated_worktree(base_oid=row["expected_branch_oid"], files={path: content}, message="chore(gitops): durable commit-file", worktree_name=job_id)
+        return {"operation": "COMMIT_FILE", "new_oid": new_oid}
+
+
+def build_from_environment(job_root: Path) -> DurableJobExecutor:
+    from aios_gitea_machine_transport import GiteaMachineTransport
+    from aios_gitea_machine_broker import MachineCredentialProjection
+
+    account = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_MACHINE_ACCOUNT", "aios-autonomy-agent")
+    api = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_API", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1")
+    remote = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_REMOTE", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git")
+    authority_dir = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR", "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"))
+    worktree_root = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKTREE_ROOT", "/var/lib/aios-gitops/worktrees"))
+    recovery = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_RECOVERY_RECEIPT", "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-campaigns/AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807/authorization-recovery.json"))
+    transport = GiteaMachineTransport(api, REPOSITORY, remote, authority_dir)
+    credential = MachineCredentialProjection.from_mapping({"scheme": "systemd-credential", "name": "gitea-machine-token", "account": account})
+    receipt = CampaignCapabilityReceipt(CAMPAIGN_ID, TASK_ID, REPOSITORY, BRANCH, EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID, frozenset({"exact_task_branch_push", "pr_create_update", "status_publish", "protected_merge", "remote_readback"}), frozenset({"direct_main_push", "force_push", "tag_update", "tag_delete", "baseline_write", "production_deploy"}))
+    return DurableJobExecutor(GitOpsJobController(JobStore(job_root)), AuthorityGitExecutor(authority_dir, worktree_root), GiteaMachineBroker(transport, credential, receipt), recovery)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--job-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--job-id", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    result = build_from_environment(args.job_root).execute(args.job_id, dry_run=args.dry_run)
+    print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Collision-resistant storage keys for durable governed Task state."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import re
+
+
+class JobIdentityError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def legacy_task_storage_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    """Return the historical lossy key solely to detect migration conflicts."""
+    if not isinstance(task_id, str) or not task_id:
+        raise JobIdentityError("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", task_id).strip("-")[:120] or "task"
+
+
+def task_storage_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    """Return a canonical collision-resistant key for every Task state sink."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(task_id, str)
+        or not task_id
+        or task_id != task_id.strip()
+        or len(task_id) > 512
+    ):
+        raise JobIdentityError("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    readable = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", task_id).strip("-")[:48] or "task"
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(
+        ("aios-task-storage-v1\0" + task_id).encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()
+    return f"{readable}-{digest}"
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any

+from release_version import validate_release_version
+
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WORKSPACE = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
 DB_PATH = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DB', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitops_model.sqlite3')))
@@ -218,7 +220,11 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                a = self.require_write(['owner']);
                if not a: return
                ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
-                if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): self.send_json({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400); return
+                try:
+                    validate_release_version(ver)
+                except ValueError:
+                    self.send_json({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
+                    return
                msg=data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'; out=git_cmd(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',msg]);
                if data.get('push',False): git_cmd(['push','origin',ver])
                level='V' if re.match(r'^V[1-9]\d*R0C0', ver) else ('R' if re.match(r'^V\d+R[1-9]\d*C0', ver) else 'C'); exec_sql('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO gitops_versions(version,tag,level,summary,status,created_by,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',(ver,ver,level,msg,'ready',a['username'],now())); exec_sql('UPDATE gitops_baseline SET active_version=?,active_tag=?,updated_at=? WHERE id=?',(ver,ver,now(),'current')); audit(a['username'],'git_tag',ver,{'level':level}); self.send_json({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out}); return
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+"""Pure, observation-first decisions for governed GitOps reconciliation."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from enum import Enum
+import re
+from typing import Optional
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+
+
+class ReconciliationAction(str, Enum):
+    NOOP = "NOOP"
+    PUSH_EXACT = "PUSH_EXACT"
+    VERIFY_REMOTE = "VERIFY_REMOTE"
+    MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED = "MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED"
+    MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED = "MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
+    FAIL_CONFLICT = "FAIL_CONFLICT"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RemoteObservation:
+    repository_identity: str
+    branch: str
+    desired_oid: str
+    authority_oid: Optional[str]
+    remote_git_oid: Optional[str]
+    remote_api_oid: Optional[str]
+    commit_visible: bool
+    observed_at: str
+    expected_oid: Optional[str] = None
+
+    @property
+    def all_equal(self) -> bool:
+        values = (self.authority_oid, self.remote_git_oid, self.remote_api_oid, self.desired_oid)
+        return all(isinstance(value, str) for value in values) and len(set(values)) == 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ReconciliationDecision:
+    action: ReconciliationAction
+    state: str
+    reason: str
+    retry_safe: bool = False
+
+
+def _valid_oid(value: Optional[str]) -> bool:
+    return value is None or bool(OID_RE.fullmatch(value))
+
+
+def decide_reconciliation(observation: RemoteObservation) -> ReconciliationDecision:
+    """Decide from a fresh observation; never complete on a missing remote."""
+    if observation.repository_identity != "aios/aios":
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    if not observation.branch.startswith("agent/"):
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+    if not _valid_oid(observation.desired_oid) or not _valid_oid(observation.expected_oid):
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "OID_INVALID")
+    if observation.authority_oid is None:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    if observation.authority_oid != observation.desired_oid:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "AUTHORITY_CONFLICT")
+    present = [oid for oid in (observation.remote_git_oid, observation.remote_api_oid) if oid is not None]
+    if any(oid not in {observation.desired_oid, observation.expected_oid} for oid in present):
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "REMOTE_OID_CONFLICT")
+    if observation.all_equal and observation.commit_visible:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED, "REMOTE_VERIFIED", "ALL_OIDS_EQUAL_AND_VISIBLE")
+    if observation.remote_git_oid is None and observation.remote_api_oid is None:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", "AUTHORITY_DESIRED_REMOTE_MISSING")
+    if observation.remote_git_oid == observation.desired_oid or observation.remote_api_oid == observation.desired_oid:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.VERIFY_REMOTE, "REMOTE_VERIFY_PENDING", "REMOTE_PROOF_PARTIAL")
+    if observation.expected_oid is not None and observation.remote_git_oid == observation.expected_oid and observation.remote_api_oid == observation.expected_oid:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.PUSH_EXACT, "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", "SAFE_EXACT_FAST_FORWARD_RETRY", retry_safe=True)
+    if not observation.commit_visible:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.VERIFY_REMOTE, "COMMIT_VISIBILITY_PENDING", "COMMIT_VISIBILITY_LAG")
+    return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "PARTIAL_REMOTE_OBSERVATION")
+
+
+def reconcile_observation(**kwargs: object) -> ReconciliationDecision:
+    return decide_reconciliation(RemoteObservation(**kwargs))
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed policy for in-process Git mutation handlers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping
+
+_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitWriteDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    status_code: int
+    error: str
+    reason: str
+    workspace: str
+
+    def payload(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "status": "allowed" if self.allowed else "blocked",
+            "error": self.error,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "workspace": self.workspace,
+        }
+
+
+def _real(path: Path) -> Path:
+    return Path(os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path))))
+
+
+def evaluate_git_write(workspace: Path | str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> GitWriteDecision:
+    values = os.environ if env is None else env
+    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+    canonical = _real(lexical)
+    shown = str(lexical)
+    if str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false")).strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "gitops_writes_disabled", "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED is false", shown)
+    if lexical != canonical:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_symlink_forbidden", "workspace must be a canonical non-symlink path", shown)
+    controller = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_PATH", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller")))
+    role = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "")).strip().lower()
+    if canonical == controller or role == "runtime-anchor":
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "runtime_anchor_read_only", "controller/runtime-anchor is read-only", str(canonical))
+    writer_root = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees")))
+    try:
+        canonical.relative_to(writer_root)
+    except ValueError:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_not_approved_writer", "workspace is outside the approved writer root", str(canonical))
+    return GitWriteDecision(True, 200, "", "approved isolated writer", str(canonical))
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"""Single supervised socket-activated worker for durable GitOps Jobs.
+
+The worker consumes durable requests and reconciliation queries. Repository
+mutation is a separate injected executor and remains impossible while the
+legacy global write gate is false.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import signal
+import socket
+import threading
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, JobState, JobStore, ServiceUnavailable
+
+
+def runtime_policy(environment: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    env = environment or os.environ
+    legacy = env.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+    durable = env.get("AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED", "false").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+    # Legacy direct Git mutation remains disabled. Authorized durable Jobs use
+    # their own campaign/task capability and may mutate only through the
+    # worker's lease/CAS path while the legacy gate stays false.
+    return {"legacy_global_write": legacy, "durable_job_execution": durable, "repository_mutation_allowed": durable}
+
+
+def handle_request(controller: GitOpsJobController, request: Mapping[str, Any], executor: Any | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    job_id = str(request.get("job_id") or "")
+    if not job_id:
+        raise JobError("JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+    if request.get("action") == "execute":
+        if executor is None:
+            raise JobError("JOB_EXECUTOR_UNAVAILABLE")
+        result = executor.execute(job_id, dry_run=bool(request.get("dry_run", False)))
+        receipt = controller.store._receipt(controller.store.read(job_id), duplicate=True)
+        return {"job": result, **receipt.as_dict()}
+    if request.get("action") == "resume":
+        receipt = controller.resume(job_id)
+    else:
+        row = controller.store.read(job_id)
+        receipt = controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True)
+    return receipt.as_dict()
+
+
+def serve_socket(sock: socket.socket, controller: GitOpsJobController, stopping: threading.Event, executor: Any | None = None) -> None:
+    sock.listen(32)
+    sock.settimeout(1.0)
+    while not stopping.is_set():
+        try:
+            connection, _ = sock.accept()
+        except socket.timeout:
+            continue
+        with connection:
+            try:
+                raw = connection.makefile("rb").readline(1_048_576)
+                request = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+                response = {"status": "ok", **handle_request(controller, request, executor)}
+            except ServiceUnavailable as exc:
+                response = {"status": "error", "error": str(exc), "retryable": True, "side_effect_state": "UNKNOWN"}
+            except Exception as exc:
+                response = {"status": "error", "error": type(exc).__name__, "retryable": False}
+            connection.sendall((json.dumps(response, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+
+
+def socket_from_systemd() -> socket.socket:
+    if os.environ.get("LISTEN_FDS") != "1":
+        raise RuntimeError("SOCKET_ACTIVATION_REQUIRED")
+    return socket.fromfd(3, socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--job-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    policy = runtime_policy()
+    if policy["legacy_global_write"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("LEGACY_GLOBAL_WRITES_MUST_REMAIN_FALSE")
+    if not policy["durable_job_execution"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_GATE_CLOSED")
+    controller = GitOpsJobController(JobStore(args.job_root))
+    from aios_gitops_job_executor import build_from_environment
+    executor = build_from_environment(args.job_root)
+    stopping = threading.Event()
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: stopping.set())
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: stopping.set())
+    sock = socket_from_systemd()
+    try:
+        serve_socket(sock, controller, stopping, executor)
+    finally:
+        sock.close()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""CLI client for the governed local writer service."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+
+
+def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Send one governed-local-writer request")
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True, help="AF_UNIX socket path")
+    group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    group.add_argument("--request", help="Request JSON string")
+    group.add_argument("--request-file", help="Path to JSON request file")
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def _load_request_text(args: argparse.Namespace) -> str:
+    if args.request is not None:
+        return args.request
+    request_path = os.fspath(args.request_file)
+    with open(request_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as request_file:
+        return request_file.read()
+
+
+def send_request(socket_path: str, request_text: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Open one Unix socket, send one NDJSON request, and parse one NDJSON response."""
+    payload = json.loads(request_text)
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError("request must be a JSON object")
+
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as client:
+        client.connect(socket_path)
+        client.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+        response_chunks: list[str] = []
+        while True:
+            chunk = client.recv(1024 * 1024).decode("utf-8")
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            response_chunks.append(chunk)
+            if "\n" in chunk:
+                break
+        response_text = "".join(response_chunks)
+
+    response_line = response_text.split("\n", 1)[0].strip()
+    if not response_line:
+        raise RuntimeError("empty response")
+    response = json.loads(response_line)
+    if not isinstance(response, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("invalid response")
+    return response
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    args = _parse_args()
+    request_text = _load_request_text(args)
+    response = send_request(args.socket, request_text)
+    print(json.dumps(response, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        main()
+    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - CLI entrypoint behavior
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "error", "error": str(exc)}), file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(1)
@@ -0,0 +1,931 @@
+"""Unix-socket service for governed local writer operations."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import hashlib
+import argparse
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import re
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from governed_local_writer import (
+    AppendCommitRequest,
+    AuthorizationError,
+    BranchPolicy,
+    CreateBranchRequest,
+    GovernedAuthorization,
+    PeerIdentity,
+    PRINCIPAL,
+    TASK_ID,
+    extract_peer_identity,
+    contains_secret_like_content,
+    load_authorization_file,
+    validate_file_changes,
+)
+
+
+class ExistingGitOpsHandler:
+    """Delegate repository mutations to the installed GitOps handler seam."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        workspace_by_branch: Mapping[str, str | os.PathLike[str]],
+        bare_repo: str | os.PathLike[str],
+        api_source: str | os.PathLike[str],
+    ) -> None:
+        self.workspace_by_branch = {str(k): Path(v) for k, v in workspace_by_branch.items()}
+        self.bare_repo = Path(bare_repo)
+        self.api_source = Path(api_source)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _restore_env(previous: Mapping[str, str | None]) -> None:
+        for key, value in previous.items():
+            if value is None:
+                os.environ.pop(key, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[key] = value
+
+    def _load_api(self, workspace: Path):
+        if not self.api_source.is_file() or self.api_source.is_symlink():
+            raise RuntimeError("installed GitOps handler source is unavailable")
+        keys = (
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED",
+            "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1",
+        )
+        previous = {key: os.environ.get(key) for key in keys}
+        os.environ.update(
+            {
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE": str(workspace),
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO": str(self.bare_repo),
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED": "true",
+                "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "2",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "safe.directory",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": str(workspace),
+                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1": "safe.directory",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1": str(self.bare_repo),
+            }
+        )
+        module_name = f"_governed_gitops_api_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+        try:
+            spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, self.api_source)
+            if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("unable to load installed GitOps handler")
+            module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+            sys.modules[module_name] = module
+            spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+            decision = module.evaluate_git_write(module.WS)
+            if not decision.allowed:
+                raise RuntimeError("existing GitOps write gate denied bootstrap")
+            return module, previous, module_name
+        except Exception:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+            raise
+
+    def _workspace(self, branch: str) -> Path:
+        workspace = self.workspace_by_branch.get(branch)
+        if workspace is None or not workspace.is_dir():
+            raise RuntimeError("branch workspace is not authorized")
+        return workspace
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _git(workspace: Path, args: list[str]) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False
+        )
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("governed handler git probe failed")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
+        # A prior handler call may have completed the fast-forward sync before
+        # the process observed a post-commit error. Reconcile only an exact,
+        # metadata-only result; never overwrite or move an existing ref here.
+        try:
+            existing = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                [
+                    "--git-dir",
+                    str(self.bare_repo),
+                    "rev-parse",
+                    f"refs/heads/{request.branch}",
+                ],
+            )
+        except RuntimeError:
+            existing = ""
+        if existing:
+            parent = self._git(workspace, ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"{existing}^1"])
+            changed = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                [
+                    "--git-dir",
+                    str(self.bare_repo),
+                    "diff-tree",
+                    "--no-commit-id",
+                    "--name-only",
+                    "-r",
+                    existing,
+                ],
+            ).splitlines()
+            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
+            if parent != request.base_oid or changed != [f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"]:
+                raise RuntimeError("existing branch is not an exact metadata-only bootstrap")
+            return {"head_oid": existing, "parent_oid": parent, "handler_status": "reconciled"}
+        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
+        phase = "loaded"
+        try:
+            phase = "verify_base"
+            parent = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"],
+            )
+            if parent != request.base_oid:
+                raise RuntimeError("authorized base OID drift")
+            phase = "checkout"
+            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.base_oid, create=True)
+            phase = "write_metadata"
+            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
+            metadata_path = f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"
+            module.write_json(
+                metadata_path,
+                {
+                    "schema": "aios.governed-local-writer-bootstrap.v1",
+                    "task_id": TASK_ID,
+                    "principal": PRINCIPAL,
+                    "branch": request.branch,
+                    "parent_oid": request.base_oid,
+                    "authorization_sha256": request.authorization_digest,
+                },
+            )
+            phase = "commit_and_sync"
+            result = module.commit(
+                [metadata_path], "chore(governance): bootstrap repair lease branch"
+            )
+            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+            if first_parent != request.base_oid or (request.head_oid and head_oid != request.head_oid):
+                raise RuntimeError("bootstrap branch lineage check failed")
+            return {
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+                "parent_oid": first_parent,
+                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
+            }
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
+        finally:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+
+    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
+        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
+        phase = "loaded"
+        try:
+            phase = "verify_head"
+            current = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            if current != request.expected_head_oid:
+                raise RuntimeError("branch head advanced or is stale")
+            phase = "checkout"
+            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.expected_head_oid, create=False)
+            phase = "write_files"
+            paths: list[str] = []
+            for change in request.changes:
+                paths.append(module.write_file(change.path, change.content))
+            phase = "commit_and_sync"
+            result = module.commit(paths, request.commit_message)
+            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+            if first_parent != request.expected_head_oid or head_oid == first_parent:
+                raise RuntimeError("append commit lineage check failed")
+            return {
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+                "parent_oid": first_parent,
+                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
+            }
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
+        finally:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+
+
+class GovernedWriterHandler(Protocol):
+    """Small adapter interface for real writer backend handlers."""
+
+    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        """Create a branch using internal repo services."""
+
+    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        """Append a commit using internal repo services."""
+
+
+class AuditSink(Protocol):
+    """Pluggable sink for sanitized audit records."""
+
+    def append(self, record: "AuditRecord") -> None:
+        """Persist one audit record."""
+
+
+@dataclass
+class AuditRecord:
+    """Sanitized audit log entry."""
+
+    authorization_digest: str
+    peer_pid: int
+    peer_uid: int
+    peer_gid: int
+    peer_executable: str | None
+    timestamp: datetime
+    operation: str
+    branch: str
+    result: str
+
+
+class InMemoryAuditSink:
+    """Simple in-memory audit log used by tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.records: list[AuditRecord] = []
+
+    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
+        self.records.append(record)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _AuthorizationState:
+    """Tracks one-shot operation consumption."""
+
+    create_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    append_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    consumed: bool = False
+
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterService:
+    """Policy-aware AF_UNIX service that calls an injected handler."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        socket_path: str | os.PathLike[str],
+        authorization: GovernedAuthorization,
+        handler: GovernedWriterHandler,
+        *,
+        audit_sink: AuditSink | None = None,
+        peer_identity_fn: Callable[[socket.socket], PeerIdentity] | None = None,
+        state_path: str | os.PathLike[str] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path)
+        self.authorization = authorization
+        self.handler = handler
+        self.peer_identity_fn = peer_identity_fn or extract_peer_identity
+        self.state = _AuthorizationState()
+        self.audit_sink = audit_sink or InMemoryAuditSink()
+        self.state_path = Path(state_path) if state_path is not None else None
+        self._load_state()
+
+    def _load_state(self) -> None:
+        """Restore one-shot state without restoring request or secret material."""
+        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
+            return
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+                raise ValueError("state must be an object")
+            if raw.get("authorization_sha256") != self.authorization.authorization_sha256:
+                raise ValueError("state authorization digest mismatch")
+            self.state.create_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("create_done", [])}
+            self.state.append_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("append_done", [])}
+            self.state.consumed = bool(raw.get("consumed", False))
+        except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid") from exc
+
+    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_path is None:
+            return
+        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
+            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
+            "consumed": self.state.consumed,
+        }
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
+            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+
+    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> None:
+        self.audit_sink.append(
+            AuditRecord(
+                authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                peer_pid=peer.pid,
+                peer_uid=peer.uid,
+                peer_gid=peer.gid,
+                peer_executable=peer.executable,
+                timestamp=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc),
+                operation=operation,
+                branch=branch,
+                result=result,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def _require_request_field(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], field_name: str) -> str:
+        value = request.get(field_name)
+        if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+            raise AuthorizationError(f"{field_name} must be a non-empty string")
+        return value
+
+    def _branch_policy(self, branch: str) -> BranchPolicy:
+        policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
+        if policy is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch is not authorized")
+        return policy
+
+    def _ensure_not_consumed(self) -> None:
+        if self.state.consumed:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization consumed")
+        if datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) >= self.authorization.expires_at:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization expired")
+
+    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
+        if op == "create_branch":
+            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
+        elif op == "append_commit":
+            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
+
+        if self.state.create_done.issuperset(self.authorization.create_branches) and self.state.append_done.issuperset(
+            self.authorization.append_branches
+        ):
+            self.state.consumed = True
+        self._persist_state()
+
+    def _validate_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = self._require_request_field(request, "task_id")
+        if task_id != TASK_ID:
+            raise AuthorizationError("invalid task_id")
+
+        principal = self._require_request_field(request, "principal")
+        if principal != PRINCIPAL:
+            raise AuthorizationError("invalid principal")
+
+        operation = self._require_request_field(request, "op")
+        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit"}:
+            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
+        if operation in self.authorization.denied_operations:
+            raise AuthorizationError("operation denied by policy")
+
+        branch = self._require_request_field(request, "branch")
+        self._ensure_not_consumed()
+        policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
+
+        if operation == "create_branch":
+            if policy.create_branch is None:
+                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow create_branch")
+            if branch in self.state.create_done:
+                raise AuthorizationError("create_branch already used for this branch")
+
+            base_oid = self._require_request_field(request, "base_oid")
+            raw_head_oid = request.get("head_oid")
+            if raw_head_oid is not None and (not isinstance(raw_head_oid, str) or not raw_head_oid):
+                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid must be a non-empty string when supplied")
+            head_oid = str(raw_head_oid) if raw_head_oid is not None else None
+            if base_oid != policy.create_branch.base_oid:
+                raise AuthorizationError("base_oid mismatch")
+            if policy.create_branch.head_oid is not None and head_oid != policy.create_branch.head_oid:
+                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid mismatch")
+
+            return {
+                "operation": operation,
+                "branch": branch,
+                "base_oid": base_oid,
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+            }
+
+        if policy.append_commit is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow append_commit")
+        if policy.create_branch is not None and branch not in self.state.create_done:
+            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit requires prior successful create_branch")
+        if branch in self.state.append_done:
+            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit already used for this branch")
+
+        expected_head = policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
+        if "expected_head_oid" in request:
+            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "expected_head_oid")
+        elif "current_head_oid" in request:
+            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "current_head_oid")
+        else:
+            raise AuthorizationError("expected_head_oid or current_head_oid required")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", supplied_head):
+            raise AuthorizationError("head check must be a full commit OID")
+        if expected_head is not None and supplied_head != expected_head:
+            raise AuthorizationError("head check failed")
+
+        if request.get("force") is True or request.get("non_fast_forward") is True:
+            raise AuthorizationError("non-fast-forward operations are not allowed")
+        if request.get("history_rewrite") is True:
+            raise AuthorizationError("history rewrite is not allowed")
+        parent_oids = request.get("parent_oids")
+        if parent_oids is not None:
+            if not isinstance(parent_oids, list) or parent_oids != [supplied_head]:
+                raise AuthorizationError("parent_oids must contain exactly expected_head_oid")
+
+        changes = request.get("changes")
+        if not isinstance(changes, list):
+            raise AuthorizationError("changes must be a list")
+        validated_changes = validate_file_changes(changes, policy.append_commit.allowed_paths)
+        commit_message = request.get("commit_message", "chore(governance): append governed commit")
+        if not isinstance(commit_message, str) or not commit_message.strip() or len(commit_message) > 200:
+            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message must be a short non-empty string")
+        if "\n" in commit_message or "\r" in commit_message or contains_secret_like_content(commit_message):
+            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message failed policy")
+
+        return {
+            "operation": operation,
+            "branch": branch,
+            "expected_head_oid": supplied_head,
+            "changes": validated_changes,
+            "commit_message": commit_message.strip(),
+        }
+
+    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        """Run one request through policy checks and handler adapter."""
+        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
+        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
+        try:
+            details = self._validate_request(raw_request)
+            operation = str(details["operation"])
+            branch = str(details["branch"])
+
+            if operation == "create_branch":
+                self.handler.create_branch(
+                    CreateBranchRequest(
+                        branch=branch,
+                        base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]),
+                        head_oid=(
+                            str(details["head_oid"])
+                            if details.get("head_oid") is not None
+                            else None
+                        ),
+                        authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                    )
+                )
+                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
+                self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+                return {
+                    "status": "ok",
+                    "operation": operation,
+                    "branch": branch,
+                    "result": "applied",
+                }
+
+            self.handler.append_commit(
+                AppendCommitRequest(
+                    branch=branch,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]),
+                    changes=tuple(details["changes"]),
+                    authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                    commit_message=str(details["commit_message"]),
+                )
+            )
+            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+            return {
+                "status": "ok",
+                "operation": operation,
+                "branch": branch,
+                "result": "applied",
+            }
+        except Exception as error:
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation or "unknown", branch, f"error:{error.__class__.__name__}")
+            if isinstance(error, PermissionError):
+                code = "permission_denied"
+            elif isinstance(error, AuthorizationError):
+                code = "request_denied"
+            else:
+                code = "handler_failed"
+            if code == "handler_failed" and str(error).startswith("handler_phase="):
+                code = str(error)
+            return {
+                "status": "error",
+                "operation": operation or "unknown",
+                "branch": branch,
+                "error": code,
+            }
+
+    def _write_json(self, connection: socket.socket, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        connection.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _handle_client(self, connection: socket.socket) -> None:
+        with connection:
+            try:
+                peer = self.peer_identity_fn(connection)
+            except Exception:
+                self._write_json(
+                    connection,
+                    {
+                        "status": "error",
+                        "operation": "connection",
+                        "branch": "",
+                        "error": "peer identity validation failed",
+                    },
+                )
+                return
+
+            with connection.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                for raw_line in stream:
+                    line = raw_line.strip()
+                    if not line:
+                        continue
+                    try:
+                        request = json.loads(line)
+                    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                        self._write_json(
+                            connection,
+                            {
+                                "status": "error",
+                                "operation": "request",
+                                "branch": "",
+                                "error": "invalid json",
+                            },
+                        )
+                        continue
+                    if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+                        self._write_json(
+                            connection,
+                            {
+                                "status": "error",
+                                "operation": "request",
+                                "branch": "",
+                                "error": "request must be a JSON object",
+                            },
+                        )
+                        continue
+                    self._write_json(connection, self.process_request(request, peer))
+
+    def _bind_socket(self) -> socket.socket:
+        if self.socket_path.exists():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket already exists")
+        parent = self.socket_path.parent
+        if not parent.is_dir():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent is missing")
+        if parent.is_symlink():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent must not be a symlink")
+        server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        server.bind(str(self.socket_path))
+        os.chmod(self.socket_path, 0o600)
+        server.listen(16)
+        return server
+
+    def serve(self) -> None:
+        """Serve newline-delimited JSON over a filesystem AF_UNIX socket."""
+        server = self._bind_socket()
+        try:
+            while True:
+                connection, _ = server.accept()
+                self._handle_client(connection)
+        finally:
+            server.close()
+            if self.socket_path.exists():
+                self.socket_path.unlink()
+
+
+class JsonAuditSink:
+    """Append-only root-owned audit sink containing no request payloads."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": record.authorization_digest,
+            "peer_pid": record.peer_pid,
+            "peer_uid": record.peer_uid,
+            "peer_gid": record.peer_gid,
+            "peer_executable": record.peer_executable,
+            "timestamp": record.timestamp.isoformat(),
+            "operation": record.operation,
+            "branch": record.branch,
+            "result": record.result,
+        }
+        line = (json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+        fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            os.write(fd, line)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+
+
+
+# V2R1C6 durable receipt overlay.  This subclasses the original root-only
+# writer in-place so the existing AF_UNIX/SO_PEERCRED and handler policy remain
+# the only mutation path.
+_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService = GovernedLocalWriterService
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterService(_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService):
+    """Existing writer with durable request receipts and safe recovery."""
+
+    def _load_state(self) -> None:
+        super()._load_state()
+        self.state.receipts = {}
+        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
+            return
+        raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid")
+        receipts = raw.get("receipts", {})
+        if not isinstance(receipts, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization receipts are invalid")
+        self.state.receipts = {
+            str(key): dict(value)
+            for key, value in receipts.items()
+            if isinstance(value, dict)
+        }
+
+    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_path is None:
+            return
+        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
+            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
+            "consumed": bool(self.state.consumed),
+            "receipts": self.state.receipts,
+        }
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
+            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+
+    def _request_identity(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
+        canonical = json.dumps(dict(request), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True)
+        fallback = hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        request_id = request.get("request_id")
+        idempotency_key = request.get("idempotency_key")
+        request_id = request_id.strip() if isinstance(request_id, str) and request_id.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
+        idempotency_key = idempotency_key.strip() if isinstance(idempotency_key, str) and idempotency_key.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
+        for field_name, value in (("request_id", request_id), ("idempotency_key", idempotency_key)):
+            if len(value) > 200 or "\n" in value or "\r" in value:
+                raise AuthorizationError(field_name + " is invalid")
+        return {
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
+            "request_fingerprint": fallback,
+        }
+
+    def _find_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any], compare_fingerprint: bool = True):
+        request_id = str(details["request_id"])
+        idempotency_key = str(details["idempotency_key"])
+        fingerprint = str(details.get("request_fingerprint", ""))
+        for receipt in self.state.receipts.values():
+            if receipt.get("request_id") == request_id or receipt.get("idempotency_key") == idempotency_key:
+                if compare_fingerprint and receipt.get("request_fingerprint") != fingerprint:
+                    raise AuthorizationError("idempotency key reused with different request")
+                return receipt
+        return None
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _receipt_response(receipt: Mapping[str, object], status: str = "receipt") -> dict[str, object]:
+        response = {
+            "status": status,
+            "request_id": receipt.get("request_id"),
+            "idempotency_key": receipt.get("idempotency_key"),
+            "operation": receipt.get("operation"),
+            "branch": receipt.get("branch", ""),
+            "receipt_status": receipt.get("status"),
+        }
+        for field_name in ("commit_oid", "final_head", "parent_oid", "audit_sha256", "error_code", "safe_to_retry"):
+            if field_name in receipt:
+                response[field_name] = receipt[field_name]
+        return response
+
+    def _new_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "request_id": str(details["request_id"]),
+            "idempotency_key": str(details["idempotency_key"]),
+            "request_fingerprint": str(details["request_fingerprint"]),
+            "operation": str(details["operation"]),
+            "branch": str(details.get("branch", "")),
+            "expected_head_oid": str(details.get("expected_head_oid", "")),
+            "status": "accepted",
+            "created_at": datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "safe_to_retry": False,
+        }
+
+    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> str:
+        super()._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, result)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "peer_pid": peer.pid,
+            "peer_uid": peer.uid,
+            "peer_gid": peer.gid,
+            "peer_executable": peer.executable,
+            "operation": operation,
+            "branch": branch,
+            "result": result,
+        }
+        return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
+        if op == "create_branch":
+            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
+        elif op in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
+        # The provisioning grant is one-shot; the task writer lease itself must
+        # support multiple append receipts for the exact authorized branches.
+        self.state.consumed = False
+        self._persist_state()
+
+    def _validate_durable(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        operation = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "op")
+        identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
+        if operation == "query_receipt":
+            return {"operation": operation, **identity}
+        if operation == "recover_request":
+            branch = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "branch")
+            policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
+            if policy.append_commit is None:
+                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow recovery")
+            expected = raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
+            if not isinstance(expected, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", expected):
+                raise AuthorizationError("recovery requires expected_head_oid")
+            return {"operation": operation, "branch": branch, "expected_head_oid": expected.lower(), **identity}
+        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
+        request = dict(raw_request)
+        if operation in {"append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            request["op"] = "append_commit"
+        if operation in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            self.state.consumed = False
+        branch = request.get("branch")
+        removed = False
+        dynamic_expected = False
+        if isinstance(branch, str) and branch in self.state.append_done:
+            self.state.append_done.remove(branch)
+            removed = True
+            policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
+            if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None and policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid is not None:
+                from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
+                self.authorization.branch_operations[branch] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=None, allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
+                dynamic_expected = True
+        try:
+            details = super()._validate_request(request)
+        finally:
+            if dynamic_expected:
+                policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(str(branch))
+                if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None:
+                    from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
+                    self.authorization.branch_operations[str(branch)] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=str(branch), expected_head_oid=str(raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or ""), allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
+            if removed:
+                self.state.append_done.add(str(branch))
+        details.update(identity)
+        details["operation"] = operation
+        return details
+
+    def _recover_backend(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        if not hasattr(self.handler, "_workspace") or not hasattr(self.handler, "_git"):
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery backend unavailable")
+        workspace = self.handler._workspace(str(details["branch"]))
+        expected = str(details["expected_head_oid"])
+        current = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+        if current == expected:
+            return {"status": "not_started", "final_head": current}
+        parent = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+        if parent != expected:
+            raise RuntimeError("external branch advance during recovery")
+        return {"status": "applied", "commit_oid": current, "final_head": current, "parent_oid": parent}
+
+    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
+        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
+        try:
+            details = self._validate_durable(raw_request)
+            operation = str(details["operation"])
+            branch = str(details.get("branch", ""))
+            if operation == "query_receipt":
+                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt) if receipt is not None else {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"]}
+            if operation == "recover_request":
+                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
+                if receipt is None:
+                    return {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"], "safe_to_retry": True}
+                if receipt.get("status") == "applied":
+                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+                recovered = self._recover_backend(details)
+                if recovered.get("status") == "applied":
+                    receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": recovered.get("commit_oid"), "final_head": recovered.get("final_head"), "parent_oid": recovered.get("parent_oid"), "safe_to_retry": False})
+                    self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+                receipt["safe_to_retry"] = True
+                self._persist_state()
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+            receipt = self._find_receipt(details)
+            if receipt is not None:
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+            receipt = self._new_receipt(details)
+            self.state.receipts[str(details["request_id"])] = receipt
+            self._persist_state()
+            if operation == "create_branch":
+                result = self.handler.create_branch(CreateBranchRequest(branch=branch, base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]), head_oid=str(details["head_oid"]) if details.get("head_oid") is not None else None, authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256))
+                commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
+                parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
+                audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+                receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
+                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
+            result = self.handler.append_commit(AppendCommitRequest(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]), changes=tuple(details["changes"]), authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256, commit_message=str(details["commit_message"])))
+            commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
+            parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
+            audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+            receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
+            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+            return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
+        except Exception as error:
+            try:
+                identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
+                receipt = self.state.receipts.get(identity["request_id"])
+                if receipt is not None and receipt.get("status") == "accepted":
+                    receipt.update({"status": "failed", "error_code": error.__class__.__name__, "safe_to_retry": False})
+                    self._persist_state()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "error:" + error.__class__.__name__)
+            return {"status": "error", "operation": operation, "branch": branch, "error": "request_denied" if isinstance(error, AuthorizationError) else "handler_failed"}
+
+def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS governed local writer")
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--authorization", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--state", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--audit", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--repair-branch", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--repair-workspace", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--candidate-branch", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--candidate-workspace", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--api-source", required=True)
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
+        print("governed local writer requires uid 0", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    args = _parse_args()
+    authorization = load_authorization_file(args.authorization)
+    handler = ExistingGitOpsHandler(
+        workspace_by_branch={
+            args.repair_branch: args.repair_workspace,
+            args.candidate_branch: args.candidate_workspace,
+        },
+        bare_repo=args.bare_repo,
+        api_source=args.api_source,
+    )
+    service = GovernedLocalWriterService(
+        args.socket,
+        authorization,
+        handler,
+        audit_sink=JsonAuditSink(args.audit),
+        state_path=args.state,
+    )
+    service.serve()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - systemd entrypoint
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+"""Central fail-closed policy seam for governed task and continuation requests."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import re
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedPolicyInput:
+    identity: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    operation: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    risk: str = "engineering"
+    requested_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    previous_generation: int | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class PolicyDecision:
+    decision: str
+    reason: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {"decision": self.decision, "reason": self.reason}
+
+
+def evaluate_policy(value: GovernedPolicyInput | Mapping[str, Any]) -> PolicyDecision:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        value = GovernedPolicyInput(**value)
+    if value.repository != "aios/aios":
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(value.base_oid) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value.expected_branch_oid):
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "OID_INVALID")
+    if not value.target_branch.startswith("agent/") or value.target_branch in {"main", "master"}:
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+    if "force_push" in value.requested_capabilities or "force" in value.operation.lower():
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "FORCE_PUSH_DENIED")
+    if {"main_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "production_write", "production_deploy", "tag_mutation", "baseline_mutation"}.intersection(value.requested_capabilities):
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "MUTATION_SCOPE_DENIED")
+    if not isinstance(value.generation, int) or isinstance(value.generation, bool) or value.generation < 1:
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "GENERATION_INVALID")
+    if value.previous_generation is not None and value.generation <= value.previous_generation:
+        return PolicyDecision("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", "GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
+    if not value.task_id:
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return PolicyDecision("ALLOW", "GOVERNED_ENGINEERING_SCOPE")
+
+
+class GovernedPolicy:
+    def decide(self, request: GovernedPolicyInput | Mapping[str, Any]) -> PolicyDecision:
+        return evaluate_policy(request)
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+"""Durable governed task binding for CREATE_NEW and CONTINUE_EXISTING."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import stat
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobStore
+from aios_gitops_job_identity import legacy_task_storage_key, task_storage_key
+from aios_online_agent_execution import GovernedExecutionBinding, project_execution_envelope
+
+try:  # pragma: no cover - exercised on the Linux activation host
+    import fcntl
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - non-POSIX execution stays fail closed
+    fcntl = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+
+
+class BootstrapError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _lexists(path: Path) -> bool:
+    try:
+        path.lstat()
+        return True
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return False
+
+
+def _require_runtime_directory(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        metadata = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_PARENT_INVALID") from exc
+    expected_uid = getattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: metadata.st_uid)()
+    if (
+        stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode)
+        or not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode)
+        or metadata.st_mode & 0o022
+        or metadata.st_uid != expected_uid
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_PARENT_INVALID")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedTaskBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    risk: str
+    description: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    job_id: str | None = None
+
+    def response(self, *, idempotent: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "base_oid": self.base_oid, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid, "generation": self.generation, "branch_mode": self.branch_mode, "create_target_branch": self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW", "worktree_mode": "detached_at_base_oid" if self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" else "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True, "idempotent": idempotent, "state": "BOUND", "job_id": self.job_id}
+
+
+
+# ===== AIOS Formal Lineage producer-native reservation v12 =====
+import re as _fl_re
+
+_FL_PRODUCER_KEY = _fl_re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+def _formal_lineage_reservation_receipt(
+    value,
+    *,
+    request_idempotency_key: str,
+    expected_side_effect_state: str,
+):
+    if callable(getattr(value, "as_dict", None)):
+        raw=value.as_dict()
+    elif isinstance(value, dict):
+        raw=dict(value)
+    else:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_TYPE_INVALID")
+
+    producer_key=raw.get("idempotency_key")
+    job_id=raw.get("job_id")
+    if not isinstance(job_id,str) or not job_id:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_JOB_ID_INVALID")
+    if raw.get("state")!="REQUESTED":
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_STATE_INVALID")
+    if raw.get("side_effect_state")!=expected_side_effect_state:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_SIDE_EFFECT_STATE_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(producer_key,str) or not _FL_PRODUCER_KEY.fullmatch(producer_key):
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_PRODUCER_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+    if job_id!="job-"+producer_key[:32]:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_JOB_PRODUCER_KEY_CONFLICT")
+    if not isinstance(request_idempotency_key,str) or not request_idempotency_key:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_REQUEST_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+
+    return {
+        "job_id":job_id,
+        "state":"REQUESTED",
+        "side_effect_state":raw["side_effect_state"],
+        "producer_idempotency_key":producer_key,
+        "request_idempotency_key":request_idempotency_key,
+    }
+
+def _formal_lineage_attach_receipt(response, receipt):
+    if not isinstance(response, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_BINDING_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+    if response.get("state")!="BOUND":
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_BINDING_STATE_INVALID")
+    if response.get("job_id")!=receipt.get("job_id"):
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_BINDING_RECEIPT_JOB_CONFLICT")
+    result=dict(response)
+    result["reservation_receipt"]=dict(receipt)
+    return result
+
+class GovernedTaskBootstrap:
+    def __init__(self, authority: Any, root: Path, *, remote_name: str, token_path: Path, ssh_key_path: Path, api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1") -> None:
+        self.authority = authority; self.root = Path(root); self.remote_name = remote_name; self.token_path = Path(token_path); self.ssh_key_path = Path(ssh_key_path); self.api_base = api_base; self.task_meta_root = self.root / "task-bindings"; self.job_root = self.root / "jobs"; self.lock_root = self.root / "task-binding-locks"; self.task_meta_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700); self.job_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700); self.lock_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700); _require_runtime_directory(self.task_meta_root); _require_runtime_directory(self.job_root); _require_runtime_directory(self.lock_root)
+
+    def _store(self, task_id: str) -> tuple[JobStore, GitOpsJobController]:
+        root = self.job_root / task_storage_key(task_id)
+        legacy = self.job_root / legacy_task_storage_key(task_id)
+        if legacy != root and _lexists(legacy):
+            if _lexists(root):
+                raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_LEGACY_CONFLICT")
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_LEGACY_MIGRATION_REQUIRED")
+        store = JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads")
+        return store, GitOpsJobController(store)
+
+    def _metadata(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.task_meta_root / (task_storage_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    def _legacy_metadata(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.task_meta_root / (legacy_task_storage_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    def _read_existing(self, task_id: str) -> GovernedTaskBinding | None:
+        path = self._metadata(task_id)
+        legacy = self._legacy_metadata(task_id)
+        if legacy != path and _lexists(legacy):
+            if _lexists(path):
+                raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LEGACY_CONFLICT")
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LEGACY_MIGRATION_REQUIRED")
+        if not _lexists(path):
+            return None
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_PATH_INVALID")
+
+        binding = GovernedTaskBinding(**json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
+        if binding.task_id != task_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_IDENTITY_CONFLICT")
+        return binding
+    def get_binding(self, task_id: str) -> GovernedTaskBinding:
+        """Read the exact durable binding; never synthesize missing lineage."""
+        binding = self._read_existing(str(task_id))
+        if binding is None or not binding.job_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        return binding
+
+    def execution_binding(self, binding: GovernedTaskBinding) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+        return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+            {
+                "task_id": binding.task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "repository": binding.repository,
+                "base_oid": binding.base_oid,
+                "expected_branch_oid": binding.expected_branch_oid,
+                "target_branch": binding.target_branch,
+                "branch_mode": binding.branch_mode,
+                "generation": binding.generation,
+                "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+            }
+        )
+
+    def execution_envelope(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        *,
+        required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+        expected_job_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        binding = self.get_binding(task_id)
+        if expected_job_id and binding.job_id != expected_job_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        return project_execution_envelope(
+            self.execution_binding(binding),
+            execution_request,
+            required_capabilities=required_capabilities,
+        )
+
+    def _write(self, binding: GovernedTaskBinding) -> None:
+        path = self._metadata(binding.task_id)
+        descriptor, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix=".task-binding-", dir=self.task_meta_root,
+        )
+        temporary = Path(temporary_name)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as stream:
+                stream.write(json.dumps(asdict(binding), sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, path)
+            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+            parent = os.open(self.task_meta_root, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+            try:
+                os.fsync(parent)
+            finally:
+                os.close(parent)
+        except BaseException:
+            temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            raise
+
+    def _task_lock(self, task_id: str) -> int:
+        if fcntl is None:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LOCK_UNAVAILABLE")
+        path = self.lock_root / (task_storage_key(task_id) + ".lock")
+        descriptor = os.open(
+            path,
+            os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0),
+            0o600,
+        )
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        expected_uid = getattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: metadata.st_uid)()
+        if (
+            not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode)
+            or metadata.st_nlink != 1
+            or metadata.st_uid != expected_uid
+        ):
+            os.close(descriptor)
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LOCK_INVALID")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        try:
+            fcntl.flock(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            os.close(descriptor)
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_BUSY") from exc
+        return descriptor
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _unlock_task(descriptor: int) -> None:
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+        os.close(descriptor)
+
+    def create(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        values = {key: str(request[key]) for key in ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key")}
+        if values["repository"] != "aios/aios" or not OID_RE.fullmatch(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(values["target_branch"]): raise BootstrapError("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+        descriptor = self._task_lock(values["task_id"])
+        try:
+            existing = self._read_existing(values["task_id"])
+            if existing is not None:
+                if any(getattr(existing, key) != values[key] for key in ("repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key")): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+                expected = str(request.get('expected_branch_oid') or values['base_oid'])
+                payload = json.dumps(values, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()
+                _, controller = self._store(values['task_id'])
+                _fl_submit_receipt = controller.submit({'idempotency_key': values['idempotency_key'], 'campaign_id': values['task_id'], 'task_id': values['task_id'], 'repository': values['repository'], 'operation': 'GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE', 'branch': values['target_branch'], 'expected_branch_oid': expected, 'payload_digest': hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(), 'lineage_anchor_oid': values['base_oid']}, payload=payload)
+                _fl_receipt = _formal_lineage_reservation_receipt(
+                    _fl_submit_receipt, request_idempotency_key=request["idempotency_key"],
+                    expected_side_effect_state='SAME_JOB'
+                )
+                _fl_response = existing.response(idempotent=True)
+                return _formal_lineage_attach_receipt(_fl_response,_fl_receipt)
+            if not self.authority.commit_exists(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
+            current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + values["target_branch"])
+            expected = str(request.get("expected_branch_oid") or values["base_oid"])
+            if current is None:
+                mode, generation = "CREATE_NEW", 1
+                if expected != values["base_oid"]: raise BootstrapError("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+            else:
+                if expected != current: raise BootstrapError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT")
+                mode, generation = "CONTINUE_EXISTING", int(request.get("generation", 2))
+                if generation < 1: raise BootstrapError("GENERATION_INVALID")
+            payload = json.dumps(values, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+            _, controller = self._store(values["task_id"])
+            expected_job_id = controller.internal_job_id_for_idempotency_key(values["idempotency_key"])
+            with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+                bootstrap_jobs = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT job_id FROM jobs WHERE operation='GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE' ORDER BY job_id"
+                ).fetchall()
+            if bootstrap_jobs and [str(row[0]) for row in bootstrap_jobs] != [expected_job_id]:
+                raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_RECOVERY_CONFLICT")
+            receipt = controller.submit({"idempotency_key": values["idempotency_key"], "campaign_id": values["task_id"], "task_id": values["task_id"], "repository": values["repository"], "operation": "GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE", "branch": values["target_branch"], "expected_branch_oid": expected, "payload_digest": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(), "lineage_anchor_oid": values["base_oid"]}, payload=payload)
+            binding = GovernedTaskBinding(**values, expected_branch_oid=expected, branch_mode=mode, generation=generation, job_id=receipt.job_id)
+            self._write(binding)
+            _fl_receipt = _formal_lineage_reservation_receipt(
+                receipt, request_idempotency_key=request["idempotency_key"],
+                expected_side_effect_state="QUEUED"
+            )
+            _fl_response = binding.response()
+            return _formal_lineage_attach_receipt(_fl_response,_fl_receipt)
+        finally:
+            self._unlock_task(descriptor)
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+"""Task-scoped hardened wrapper around the existing Action API."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+import urllib.parse
+
+import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
+import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
+from isolated_writer_authz import AuthorizationError, authorize
+from isolated_writer_commit_file import AtomicCommitFile, CommitFileError, OperationLedger
+from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
+
+_reject = api.reject_non_read_http
+_write_file = api.write_file
+_sync_branch = api.sync_branch
+_original_do_get = api.H.do_GET
+api.OPENAPI = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_OPENAPI", str(api.OPENAPI)))
+
+
+def _registry() -> TokenRegistry:
+    return TokenRegistry(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2"]))
+
+
+def _atomic_writer() -> AtomicCommitFile:
+    return AtomicCommitFile(
+        workspace=api.WS,
+        bare_repo=api.BARE_REPO,
+        ledger=OperationLedger(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER"])),
+        remote=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", ""),
+        audit=policy.append_audit_record,
+    )
+
+
+def _bearer(handler) -> str:
+    value = handler.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+    return value[7:].strip() if value.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
+
+
+def _authorize(handler, *, method: str, path: str, branch=None, target_path=None):
+    grant = authorize(
+        _registry(),
+        _bearer(handler),
+        method=method,
+        path=path,
+        source_ip=str(handler.client_address[0]),
+        workspace=api.WS,
+        branch=branch,
+        target_path=target_path,
+    )
+    grant.record["_source_ip"] = str(handler.client_address[0])
+    return grant
+
+
+def _authorization_error(handler, exc: AuthorizationError):
+    return handler.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+
+
+def _isolated_runtime_status(handler):
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    return handler.sendj({
+        "service": os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
+            "aios-isolated-writer.service",
+        ),
+        "status": "active",
+        "runtime_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE"),
+        "workspace_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE"),
+        "writes_enabled": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").lower()
+        in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"},
+        "allowed_branch": policy.allowed_branch(),
+        "approved_base_oid": policy.allowed_base_oid(),
+        "workspace_branch": branch,
+        "workspace_head_oid": head,
+        "repository_identity": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY"),
+        "token_policy_version": 2,
+        "atomic_commit_file": True,
+        "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
+    })
+
+
+def _isolated_do_get(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path in {"/health", "/api/health"}:
+        return self.sendj({
+            "status": "ok",
+            "service": os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
+                "aios-isolated-writer.service",
+            ),
+        })
+    if path not in {"/api/runtime-status", "/api/baseline", "/api/patches"}:
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
+    try:
+        _authorize(self, method="GET", path=path)
+    except AuthorizationError as exc:
+        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
+    if path == "/api/runtime-status":
+        return _isolated_runtime_status(self)
+    return _original_do_get(self)
+
+
+def _read_commit_file_body(handler):
+    try:
+        length = int(handler.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+    except ValueError:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_content_length_rejected") from None
+    if length <= 0:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+    if length > 1_100_000:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_too_large", 413)
+    raw = handler.rfile.read(length)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_json_rejected") from None
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+    return value
+
+
+def _isolated_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != "/api/commit-file":
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
+    try:
+        data = _read_commit_file_body(self)
+        branch = str(data.get("branch") or "")
+        target_path = str(data.get("path") or "")
+        grant = _authorize(
+            self,
+            method="POST",
+            path=path,
+            branch=branch,
+            target_path=target_path,
+        )
+        if api.content_has_secret(str(data.get("content") or "")):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_secret_content_rejected", 403)
+        result = _atomic_writer().execute(grant, data)
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except AuthorizationError as exc:
+        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
+    except CommitFileError as exc:
+        return self.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+    except PermissionError:
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_policy_rejected"}, 403)
+
+
+def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if _reject(handler, method, path):
+        return True
+    try:
+        policy.validate_endpoint(method, path, api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+        return False
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        handler.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
+        return True
+
+
+def checkout(branch, base="main", create=False):
+    api.ensure_git()
+    target = api.branch_name(branch)
+    policy.validate_branch_request({"branch": target, "base": base})
+    exists = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--verify", target])["code"] == 0
+    if exists:
+        if api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"] != target:
+            api.sh(["checkout", target], True)
+    elif create:
+        api.sh(["checkout", "-b", target, base], True)
+    else:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_missing")
+    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+    return target
+
+
+def write_file(path, content):
+    policy.validate_path(path, api.WS)
+    return _write_file(path, content)
+
+
+def sync_branch(branch: str):
+    policy.validate_sync_branch(branch)
+    local = _sync_branch(branch)
+    remote = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", "").strip()
+    if remote != "gitea-http":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_gitea_remote_rejected")
+    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    pushed = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "push", "--porcelain", remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{branch}"],
+        cwd=api.WS,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    if pushed.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_push_failed")
+    verified = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+        cwd=api.WS,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    if verified.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_verification_failed")
+    fields = verified.stdout.strip().split()
+    if len(fields) != 2 or fields[0] != head or fields[1] != f"refs/heads/{branch}":
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_oid_mismatch")
+    return {
+        "status": "verified",
+        "target": "authoritative-bare+gitea",
+        "branch": branch,
+        "oid": head,
+        "local": local.get("status"),
+    }
+
+
+def commit(paths, msg):
+    policy.validate_commit_paths(paths, api.WS)
+    api.ensure_git()
+    selected = [api.relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ["."]
+    api.sh(["add", *selected], True)
+    policy.validate_staged_paths(api.WS)
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    if not api.sh(["status", "--short"])["stdout"]:
+        return {"status": "no_changes", "branch": branch, "sync": sync_branch(branch)}
+    out = api.sh(["commit", "-m", msg], True)
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    return {
+        "status": "committed",
+        "branch": branch,
+        "rev": api.sh(["rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"],
+        "git": out,
+        "sync": sync_branch(branch),
+    }
+
+
+def audit(actor, action, target, payload):
+    policy.append_audit_record(
+        {
+            "at": api.now(),
+            "actor": actor,
+            "action": action,
+            "target": target,
+            "payload": api.sanitize(payload),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def _validate_request(self, data, validate):
+    try:
+        validate(data)
+        return True
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        self.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
+        return False
+
+
+def _checked_branch(self, data):
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _branch(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_file(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    if not _validate_request(
+        self,
+        {"path": data.get("path", "")},
+        lambda item: policy.validate_path(item["path"], api.WS),
+    ):
+        return
+    return _file(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_commit(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _commit(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_patch(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data["branch"] = policy.allowed_branch()
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _patch(self, data)
+
+
+_branch, _file, _commit, _patch = api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch
+api.reject_non_read_http = reject_non_read_http
+api.checkout, api.write_file, api.sync_branch, api.commit, api.audit = (
+    checkout,
+    write_file,
+    sync_branch,
+    commit,
+    audit,
+)
+api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch = (
+    _checked_branch,
+    _checked_file,
+    _checked_commit,
+    _checked_patch,
+)
+api.H.do_GET = _isolated_do_get
+api.H.do_POST = _isolated_do_post
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+    api.ThreadingHTTPServer((api.HOST, api.PORT), api.H).serve_forever()
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+"""Fail-closed policy used only by the task-scoped Action writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import json
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import re
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
+from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+import isolated_writer_path_policy as path_policy
+
+WRITE_ENDPOINTS = frozenset({"/api/commit-file"})
+ALLOWED_ROOTS = (
+    "active-runtime",
+    "docs",
+    "patches",
+    "reports",
+    "scripts",
+    "test",
+    "tests",
+)
+DENIED_ROOTS = ("baseline", "config", "deploy", "deployments", "ops", "runtime", "services")
+_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+_FALSE = frozenset({"0", "false", "no", "off"})
+_DENY_FLAGS = (
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_MAIN_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_TAG_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_BASELINE_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_REGISTRY_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_ROLLBACK",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_DEPLOYMENT",
+)
+
+
+def enforcement_required() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_ENFORCEMENT", "") == "required"
+
+
+def allowed_branch() -> str:
+    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_missing_allowed_branch")
+    return value
+
+
+def allowed_base_oid() -> str:
+    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BASE_OID", "").strip().lower()
+    if len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_invalid_allowed_base_oid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _git(workspace: Path, *args: str) -> str:
+    result = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_git_validation_failed")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def require_service_invariants(workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_write_gate_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_role_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_role_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_policy_v2_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_service_audience_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_registry_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_ledger_required")
+    path_policy.configured_path_policy()
+    for name in _DENY_FLAGS:
+        if os.getenv(name, "").strip().lower() not in _FALSE:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_forbidden_capability_flag")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "") != "aios/aios":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_repository_identity_rejected")
+    configured_bare_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "").strip()
+    if not configured_bare_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
+    configured_bare = Path(configured_bare_value)
+    if configured_bare.resolve(strict=True) != bare_repo.resolve(strict=True):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
+    writer_root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "").strip()
+    if not writer_root_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root")
+    writer_root = Path(writer_root_value).resolve(strict=True)
+    lexical_workspace = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+    canonical_workspace = lexical_workspace.resolve(strict=True)
+    if lexical_workspace != canonical_workspace:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
+    try:
+        canonical_workspace.relative_to(writer_root)
+    except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root") from None
+    if _git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_current_branch_rejected")
+    approved_base = allowed_base_oid()
+    try:
+        _git(workspace, "cat-file", "-e", f"{approved_base}^{{commit}}")
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", approved_base, "HEAD"],
+            cwd=workspace,
+            check=True,
+            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        )
+    except (PermissionError, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_approved_base_not_ancestor") from None
+    if _git(workspace, "merge-base", approved_base, "HEAD") != approved_base:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_merge_base_rejected")
+    common = Path(_git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"))
+    if not common.is_absolute():
+        common = (workspace / common).resolve()
+    if common.resolve() != bare_repo.resolve():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_common_repo_rejected")
+
+
+def approved_audit_log_path() -> Path:
+    root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_AUDIT_ROOT", "").strip()
+    log_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUDIT_LOG", "").strip()
+    if not root_value or not log_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_missing")
+    lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(root_value))
+    lexical_log = Path(os.path.abspath(log_value))
+    root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
+    if lexical_root != root or root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_root_rejected")
+    try:
+        lexical_log.relative_to(root)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_outside_approved_root") from None
+    if lexical_log.parent.resolve(strict=True) != lexical_log.parent:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_parent_symlink_rejected")
+    if lexical_log.exists() and lexical_log.is_symlink():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_symlink_rejected")
+    os.chmod(root, 0o750)
+    os.chmod(lexical_log.parent, 0o750)
+    return lexical_log
+
+
+def append_audit_record(record: dict) -> None:
+    path = approved_audit_log_path()
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        info = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_not_regular")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        line = json.dumps(
+            _audit_sanitize(record),
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
+        os.write(descriptor, line)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+    try:
+        os.fsync(parent_fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(parent_fd)
+
+
+def _audit_sanitize(value):
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {
+            key: (
+                "[REDACTED]"
+                if any(
+                    marker in str(key).lower()
+                    for marker in (
+                        "authorization",
+                        "credential",
+                        "password",
+                        "secret",
+                        "token",
+                        "private_key",
+                    )
+                )
+                and str(key).lower() != "token_id"
+                else _audit_sanitize(inner)
+            )
+            for key, inner in value.items()
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [_audit_sanitize(item) for item in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str) and re.search(
+        r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])",
+        value,
+    ):
+        return "[REDACTED]"
+    return value
+
+
+def validate_endpoint(method: str, path: str, workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    if method != "POST" or path not in WRITE_ENDPOINTS:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
+    require_service_invariants(workspace, bare_repo)
+
+
+def validate_branch_request(data: dict) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    branch = allowed_branch() if "branch" not in data else str(data.get("branch") or "").strip()
+    if branch != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected")
+    if str(data.get("base", "main")).strip() != "main":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_base_rejected")
+    if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_force_rejected")
+
+
+def validate_path(path: str, workspace: Path | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(path, str):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    value = path
+    if not value or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value or "\\" in value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        decoded = unquote(value, errors="strict")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
+    if decoded != value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    windows = PureWindowsPath(value)
+    posix = PurePosixPath(value)
+    parts = value.split("/")
+    if (
+        posix.is_absolute()
+        or windows.is_absolute()
+        or bool(windows.drive)
+        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+    ):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    first = parts[0]
+    service_exact_path = False
+    if first in DENIED_ROOTS:
+        try:
+            path_policy.require_service_path("commit_file.atomic", value)
+            service_exact_path = True
+        except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+            raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+    if value != "README.md" and first not in ALLOWED_ROOTS and not service_exact_path:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_outside_allowed_roots")
+    if workspace is not None:
+        lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+        root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
+        if lexical_root != root:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
+        current = root
+        for part in parts:
+            current = current / part
+            if current.is_symlink():
+                raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_symlink_rejected")
+        candidate = (root / value).resolve(strict=False)
+        try:
+            candidate.relative_to(root)
+        except ValueError:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_escapes_workspace") from None
+    return value
+
+
+def validate_content_for_path(path: str, content: str) -> None:
+    if path.split("/", 1)[0] not in DENIED_ROOTS:
+        return
+    try:
+        path_policy.validate_content("commit_file.atomic", path, content)
+    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+
+
+def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
+    try:
+        return path_policy.configured_path_policy_sha256()
+    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+
+
+def validate_commit_paths(paths: list[str], workspace: Path | None = None) -> None:
+    if enforcement_required():
+        for path in paths:
+            if str(path).strip() != ".":
+                validate_path(str(path), workspace)
+
+
+def validate_staged_paths(workspace: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    for path in _git(workspace, "diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines():
+        validate_path(path, workspace)
+
+
+def validate_sync_branch(branch: str) -> None:
+    if enforcement_required() and branch != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_sync_branch_rejected")
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+"""Canonical governed execution projection for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+The durable governed binding is authoritative.  Natural-language task fields and
+worker configuration are never allowed to invent repository, ref, generation, or
+idempotency coordinates.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+EXECUTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.execution.v2"
+PROJECTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = ("main", "master", "refs/", "tags/", "tag/", "release/", "baseline/", "production/")
+MUTATION_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic"})
+READ_ONLY_ACTIONS = frozenset({"source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+SUPPORTED_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic", "source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS = frozenset({"hermes", "openclaw"})
+MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+
+
+class ExecutionProjectionError(RuntimeError):
+    """A canonical fail-closed projection or validation error."""
+
+
+class OnlineTaskProjectionClient:
+    """Official HTTP projection client using only a control credential reference."""
+
+    def __init__(self, api_base: str, control_token_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.api_base = api_base.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token_path = Path(control_token_path)
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        path = self.control_token_path
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def create(
+        self,
+        projected_task: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding: "GovernedExecutionBinding",
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = dict(projected_task)
+        payload = _canonical(body).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.api_base + "/v1/tasks",
+            method="POST",
+            data=payload,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self._token(),
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read(8192).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+            try:
+                error = json.loads(raw).get("error")
+            except (AttributeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                error = "HTTP_ERROR"
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError(f"ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_FAILED:{exc.code}:{error}") from exc
+        except (OSError, urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if status not in {200, 201} or not isinstance(result, dict):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        if result.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or result.get("status") not in {"QUEUED", "VERIFYING", "SUCCEEDED"}:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        metadata = result.get("metadata")
+        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        returned_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        submitted_metadata = _object(body.get("metadata"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        submitted_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(submitted_metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        if _canonical(returned_execution) != _canonical(submitted_execution):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> None:
+    raise ExecutionProjectionError(code)
+
+
+def _object(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error(code)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        _error(code)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _task_id(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if TASK_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, code)
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _branch(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    if BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(value) is None or value.startswith(PROTECTED_PREFIXES):
+        _error("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _generation(value: object) -> int:
+    if not isinstance(value, int) or isinstance(value, bool) or value < 1:
+        _error("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _source_signals(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Normalize untrusted natural-language hints before they enter a signed envelope."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for item in value:
+        if not isinstance(item, str):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        text = " ".join(item.split()).strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        # Projection may accept long task prose, but execution envelopes stay bounded.
+        text = text[:512].rstrip()
+        if text not in result:
+            result.append(text)
+        if len(result) == 16:
+            break
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+def _agent_runtime_input(value: object) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_REQUIRED")
+    raw = dict(value)
+    allowed = {
+        "goal", "instructions", "success_criteria", "constraints",
+        "scope", "trace_id",
+    }
+    if set(raw) - allowed:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    goal = _string(raw.get("goal"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_GOAL_REQUIRED")
+    instructions = raw.get("instructions", "")
+    if not isinstance(instructions, str):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+    criteria = raw.get("success_criteria", [])
+    if not isinstance(criteria, list) or len(criteria) > 32:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+    normalized_criteria: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for item in criteria:
+        if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criterion_id = _string(item.get("id"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        description = _string(
+            item.get("description"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID"
+        )
+        normalized_criteria.append(
+            {"id": criterion_id[:120], "description": description[:1000]}
+        )
+    constraints = raw.get("constraints", {})
+    if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+    sensitive_markers = ("token", "secret", "password", "credential", "authorization", "api_key", "apikey")
+    for key in constraints:
+        lowered = str(key).lower()
+        if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SECRET_FIELD_DENY")
+
+    scope = raw.get("scope", {})
+    if not isinstance(scope, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    scope = {
+        "scope_type": str(scope.get("scope_type") or "legacy"),
+        "tenant_id": scope.get("tenant_id"),
+        "project_id": scope.get("project_id"),
+    }
+    if scope["scope_type"] not in {"legacy", "system", "tenant"}:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    if scope["scope_type"] == "tenant":
+        if not isinstance(scope["tenant_id"], str) or not scope["tenant_id"].strip():
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    elif scope["tenant_id"] not in (None, "") or scope["project_id"] not in (None, ""):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+    trace_id = str(raw.get("trace_id") or "").strip()
+    if not trace_id or len(trace_id) > 255:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_TRACE_ID_INVALID")
+
+    normalized = {
+        "goal": goal[:12000],
+        "instructions": instructions[:32000],
+        "success_criteria": normalized_criteria,
+        "constraints": dict(constraints),
+        "scope": scope,
+        "trace_id": trace_id,
+    }
+    if len(_canonical(normalized).encode("utf-8")) > MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_TOO_LARGE")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _capabilities(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    result = tuple(sorted({_string(item, "CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID") for item in value}))
+    if any(len(item) > 120 for item in result):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedExecutionBinding":
+        data = dict(value)
+        task_id = _task_id(data.get("task_id"))
+        job_id = _string(data.get("job_id"), "JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+        if TASK_RE.fullmatch(job_id) is None:
+            _error("JOB_ID_INVALID")
+        repository = _string(data.get("repository"), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            _error("WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY")
+        base_oid = _oid(data.get("base_oid"), "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        expected = _oid(data.get("expected_branch_oid"), "EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        target = _branch(data.get("target_branch"))
+        mode = _string(data.get("branch_mode"), "BRANCH_MODE_MISSING")
+        if mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            _error("BRANCH_MODE_INVALID")
+        generation = _generation(data.get("generation"))
+        if mode == "CREATE_NEW" and expected != base_oid:
+            _error("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+        key = _string(data.get("idempotency_key"), "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        if KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+            _error("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        return cls(task_id, job_id, repository, base_oid, expected, target, mode, generation, key)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def binding_from_bootstrap(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def validate_execution_envelope(
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding | None = None,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    envelope = dict(value)
+    if envelope.get("schema") != EXECUTION_SCHEMA:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA_VALIDATION")
+    candidate = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(envelope)
+    if binding is not None and candidate != binding:
+        comparisons = (
+            (candidate.task_id, binding.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.job_id, binding.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.repository, binding.repository, "WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.base_oid, binding.base_oid, "WRONG_BASE_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.expected_branch_oid, binding.expected_branch_oid, "WRONG_EXPECTED_HEAD_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.target_branch, binding.target_branch, "WRONG_BRANCH_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.generation, binding.generation, "WRONG_GENERATION_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.branch_mode, binding.branch_mode, "BRANCH_MODE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.idempotency_key, binding.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        )
+        for actual, expected, code in comparisons:
+            if actual != expected:
+                _error(code)
+    action = _string(envelope.get("action"), "EXECUTION_ACTION_MISSING")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capability_scope = _capabilities(envelope.get("capability_scope"))
+    if worker_capabilities is not None and not set(capability_scope).issubset(set(worker_capabilities)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    workspace = _object(envelope.get("workspace"), "WORKSPACE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    if workspace.get("authority_git_dir") != "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git" or workspace.get("read_only_repository") is not True:
+        _error("WORKSPACE_POLICY_DENY")
+    governance = _object(envelope.get("governance"), "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    governed_coordinates = (
+        (governance.get("task_id"), candidate.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("job_id"), candidate.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("idempotency_key"), candidate.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+    )
+    for actual_coordinate, expected_coordinate, code in governed_coordinates:
+        if actual_coordinate != expected_coordinate:
+            _error(code)
+    commit_key = _string(governance.get("commit_idempotency_key"), "COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(commit_key) is None:
+        _error("COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if governance.get("writer_lease") is not (action in MUTATION_ACTIONS):
+        _error("WRITER_LEASE_POLICY_DENY")
+    for field in ("main_write", "production_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "force_push", "protected_ref_bypass"):
+        if governance.get(field, False) is not False:
+            _error("POLICY_DENY")
+    changes = envelope.get("change_set")
+    verification = envelope.get("verification")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not isinstance(verification, list):
+        _error("EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_INVALID")
+    if action == "source_capture":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY")
+        signals = list(_source_signals(envelope.get("source_signals") or []))
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") != signals:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") not in (None, {}):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_RUNTIME_INPUT_DENY")
+    elif action == "agent_runtime":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_MUTATION_DENY")
+        adapter = str(envelope.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = _agent_runtime_input(envelope.get("runtime_input"))
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") != runtime_input:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_NOT_CANONICAL")
+        required_runtime_capability = f"agent.runtime.{adapter}"
+        if required_runtime_capability not in capability_scope:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_REQUIRED")
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") not in (None, []):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SOURCE_SIGNALS_DENY")
+    elif not changes:
+        _error("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    declared = str(envelope.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    material = {key: item for key, item in envelope.items() if key != "execution_digest"}
+    actual = _digest(material)
+    if declared != actual:
+        _error("EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    return {**material, "execution_digest": actual}
+
+
+def project_execution_envelope(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    *,
+    required_capabilities: Sequence[str] = (),
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(execution_request or {})
+    action = str(request.get("action") or "source_capture")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capabilities = _capabilities(request.get("capability_scope", required_capabilities))
+    governance = {
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+        "commit_idempotency_key": str(request.get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{binding.task_id}-commit-g{binding.generation}"),
+        "writer_lease": action in MUTATION_ACTIONS,
+        "main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "tag_write": False,
+        "baseline_write": False,
+        "force_push": False,
+        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
+    }
+    supplied_governance = request.get("governance")
+    if supplied_governance is not None:
+        governance.update(_object(supplied_governance, "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED"))
+    material: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema": EXECUTION_SCHEMA,
+        **binding.public(),
+        "action": action,
+        "adapter": str(
+            request.get("adapter")
+            or ("deterministic" if action == "deterministic" else "source_capture")
+        ),
+        "capability_scope": list(capabilities),
+        "change_set": list(request.get("change_set") or []),
+        "verification": list(request.get("verification") or []),
+        "source_signals": list(_source_signals(request.get("source_signals") or [])) if action == "source_capture" else [],
+        "runtime_input": _agent_runtime_input(request.get("runtime_input")) if action == "agent_runtime" else {},
+        "governance": governance,
+        "workspace": {
+            "authority_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+            "read_only_repository": True,
+            "cleanup_policy": "always",
+        },
+    }
+    envelope = {**material, "execution_digest": _digest(material)}
+    return validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding)
+
+
+def project_online_task(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    task_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(task_request)
+    required = _capabilities(request.get("required_capabilities"))
+    execution_value = dict(execution_request or {})
+    if str(execution_value.get("action") or "source_capture") == "agent_runtime":
+        adapter = str(execution_value.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = execution_value.get("runtime_input")
+        tenant_id = request.get("tenant_id")
+        project_id = request.get("project_id")
+        declared_scope = str(
+            request.get("scope_type")
+            or ("tenant" if isinstance(tenant_id, str) and tenant_id.strip() else "legacy")
+        )
+        if runtime_input is None:
+            runtime_input = {
+                "goal": request.get("goal"),
+                "instructions": request.get("instructions") or "",
+                "success_criteria": request.get("success_criteria") or [],
+                "constraints": request.get("constraints") or {},
+            }
+        elif not isinstance(runtime_input, Mapping):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_REQUIRED")
+        runtime_input = dict(runtime_input)
+        # Scope/trace are authoritative Task identity, never caller-selected runtime hints.
+        runtime_input["scope"] = {
+            "scope_type": declared_scope,
+            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+            "project_id": project_id,
+        }
+        runtime_input["trace_id"] = str(
+            request.get("trace_id")
+            or request.get("run_id")
+            or binding.task_id
+        )
+        execution_value["runtime_input"] = runtime_input
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        execution_value,
+        required_capabilities=required,
+    )
+    metadata = dict(request.get("metadata") or {})
+    if "execution" in metadata:
+        validate_execution_envelope(_object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"), binding=binding)
+        if metadata["execution"] != execution:
+            _error("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_CONFLICT")
+    metadata["execution"] = execution
+    metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+        "schema": PROJECTION_SCHEMA,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+    }
+    return {
+        **request,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "metadata": metadata,
+        "required_capabilities": list(required),
+        "idempotency_key": str(request.get("idempotency_key") or f"online-task:{binding.idempotency_key}"),
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_task_execution(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+    metadata = task.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) and "execution" in metadata:
+        value = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+            worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities,
+        )
+        return value, "persisted"
+    projected = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {"action": "source_capture", "capability_scope": task.get("required_capabilities") or []},
+        required_capabilities=task.get("required_capabilities") or [],
+    )
+    validate_execution_envelope(projected, binding=binding, worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities)
+    return projected, "recovered_projection"
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+"""HTTP adapter for audited Owner authorization and writer provisioning.
+
+This module layers on top of ``aios_authorized_task_writer_api`` so existing
+routes and the legacy exact ``writer:provision`` route remain available. The
+new endpoint does not mint or modify bearer credentials. It authenticates an
+existing, non-wildcard, explicitly allow-listed Owner credential and then
+invokes the audited broker.
+
+Endpoint:
+    POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+import aios_authorized_task_writer_api as bridge_api
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
+from owner_authorization_broker import (
+    OwnerAuthorizationBroker,
+    OwnerAuthorizationError,
+    OwnerPrincipal,
+)
+
+
+api = bridge_api.api
+_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
+
+
+def _enabled() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED", ""
+    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+def _configured_intake_scope() -> str:
+    scopes = [
+        item.strip()
+        for item in os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES", ""
+        ).split(",")
+        if item.strip()
+    ]
+    if len(scopes) != 1:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "EXACTLY_ONE_HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REQUIRED", 503
+        )
+    scope = scopes[0]
+    if scope == "writer:provision" or scope == "*" or scope.endswith(":*"):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 503)
+    return scope
+
+
+def _scope_set(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    raw = auth.get("scopes")
+    if raw is None:
+        raw = auth.get("scope")
+    if raw is None:
+        return frozenset()
+    if isinstance(raw, str):
+        candidates = raw.replace(",", " ").split()
+    elif isinstance(raw, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
+        candidates = [str(item) for item in raw]
+    else:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_SCOPE_EVIDENCE_INVALID", 403)
+    return frozenset(item.strip() for item in candidates if item.strip())
+
+
+def _credential_id(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    for name in (
+        "credential_id",
+        "token_id",
+        "key_id",
+        "auth_id",
+    ):
+        value = str(auth.get(name) or "").strip()
+        if value:
+            return value
+    return ""
+
+
+def _authenticate_existing_owner(handler) -> OwnerPrincipal | None:
+    scope = _configured_intake_scope()
+    auth = handler.need(scope)
+    if not auth:
+        return None
+    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_ROLE_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    identity = str(auth.get("account") or auth.get("identity") or "").strip()
+    if not identity:
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    scopes = _scope_set(auth)
+    if any(item == "*" or item.endswith(":*") for item in scopes):
+        handler.sendj(
+            {"error": "WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED"}, 403
+        )
+        return None
+    return OwnerPrincipal(
+        identity=identity,
+        role="owner",
+        authenticated_scope=scope,
+        token_scopes=scopes,
+        credential_id=_credential_id(auth),
+    )
+
+
+def _broker_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != _ENDPOINT:
+        return _original_do_post(self)
+    if not _enabled():
+        return self.sendj(
+            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_DISABLED"}, 503
+        )
+    try:
+        principal = _authenticate_existing_owner(self)
+        if principal is None:
+            return
+        data = self.body()
+        result = OwnerAuthorizationBroker().authorize_and_provision(
+            data, principal
+        )
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except (OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
+        body = {"error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
+    except Exception:
+        # Never expose registry data, bearer tokens, signer output or traceback.
+        return self.sendj(
+            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500
+        )
+
+
+api.H.do_POST = _broker_do_post
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    api.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+"""Owner-final, structured authorization for one governed pull-request merge.
+
+The Owner approval is the policy decision.  Signing and public verification
+prove that decision but cannot change its repository, pull request, CAS base,
+technical-gate contract, or lifetime.  This module deliberately exposes no
+generic sign-bytes API and does not publish or alter technical check results.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import secrets
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import (
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    LocalFileSigner,
+    SignedArtifact,
+    canonical_json_bytes,
+    sha256_json,
+)
+
+
+POLICY_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-merge-approval-policy.v2"
+APPROVAL_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-merge-approval.v2"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-merge-admission-receipt.v2"
+OPERATION = "merge.pull-request"
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+DIGEST_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+REPOSITORY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$")
+IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,255}$")
+CHECK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]{11,255}$")
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed error for the Owner merge approval contract."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def _fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OwnerMergeApprovalError(code)
+
+
+def _require_oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_digest(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or DIGEST_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy:
+    """Immutable policy input for one exact protected merge approval."""
+
+    repository: str
+    pr_number: int
+    pr_head_oid: str
+    expected_main_oid: str
+    operation: str
+    required_check_contract_digest: str
+    required_checks: tuple[str, ...]
+    owner_identity: str
+    audit_lineage_digest: str
+    maximum_ttl_seconds: int
+    policy_version: str = "v2"
+    schema: str = POLICY_SCHEMA
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if (
+            self.schema != POLICY_SCHEMA
+            or self.policy_version != "v2"
+            or not isinstance(self.repository, str)
+            or REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(self.repository) is None
+            or type(self.pr_number) is not int
+            or not 1 <= self.pr_number < 2**31
+            or self.operation != OPERATION
+            or not isinstance(self.owner_identity, str)
+            or IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(self.owner_identity) is None
+            or type(self.maximum_ttl_seconds) is not int
+            or not 60 <= self.maximum_ttl_seconds <= 900
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_INVALID")
+        _require_oid(self.pr_head_oid, "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_HEAD_INVALID")
+        _require_oid(self.expected_main_oid, "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_BASE_INVALID")
+        _require_digest(
+            self.required_check_contract_digest,
+            "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_CHECK_CONTRACT_INVALID",
+        )
+        _require_digest(self.audit_lineage_digest, "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(self.required_checks, tuple)
+            or not self.required_checks
+            or len(set(self.required_checks)) != len(self.required_checks)
+            or any(not isinstance(item, str) or CHECK_RE.fullmatch(item) is None for item in self.required_checks)
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_REQUIRED_CHECKS_INVALID")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.validate()
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["required_checks"] = list(self.required_checks)
+        return value
+
+    @property
+    def digest(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.as_dict())
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeLiveState:
+    """Read-only live evidence; this object has no status publication method."""
+
+    repository: str
+    pr_number: int
+    pr_head_oid: str
+    main_oid: str
+    required_check_contract_digest: str
+    check_statuses: Mapping[str, bool]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeOidReadback:
+    authority_main_oid: str
+    gitea_main_oid: str
+    api_main_oid: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeAdmissionReceipt:
+    approval_id: str
+    nonce: str
+    owner_identity: str
+    policy_digest: str
+    proof_path: str
+    merge_oid: str
+    schema: str = RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+
+
+class ApprovalProofVerifier(Protocol):
+    """Public proof verifier; it is intentionally unable to issue approvals."""
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        *,
+        namespace: str,
+        payload: bytes,
+        signature: str,
+        key_id: str,
+    ) -> bool:
+        ...
+
+
+class GovernedMergeExecutor(Protocol):
+    def execute(self, approval: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
+        ...
+
+
+class MergeOidReconciler(Protocol):
+    def readback(self, merge_oid: str) -> OwnerMergeOidReadback:
+        ...
+
+
+APPROVAL_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema",
+        "approval_id",
+        "nonce",
+        "repository",
+        "pr_number",
+        "pr_head_oid",
+        "expected_main_oid",
+        "operation",
+        "required_check_contract_digest",
+        "required_checks",
+        "owner_identity",
+        "audit_lineage_digest",
+        "policy_version",
+        "policy_digest",
+        "issued_at",
+        "not_before",
+        "expires_at",
+        "signature_namespace",
+        "signature_key_id",
+        "canonical_payload_digest",
+    }
+)
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalAuthority:
+    """Structured Owner signer for an immutable merge policy.
+
+    ``issue`` has no caller-controlled payload parameter.  The immutable policy
+    selects the complete authorization scope; only approval IDs and nonces are
+    generated inside the authority.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        key_path: Path,
+        policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+        *,
+        require_root_owner: bool = True,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+        token_urlsafe: Callable[[int], str] = secrets.token_urlsafe,
+    ) -> None:
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.signer = LocalFileSigner(
+            Path(key_path),
+            signer_id="local-owner-authority",
+            namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            require_root_owner=require_root_owner,
+        )
+        self.clock = clock
+        self.token_urlsafe = token_urlsafe
+
+    def _token(self, prefix: str) -> str:
+        value = prefix + self.token_urlsafe(24)
+        if TOKEN_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_AUTHORITY_GENERATED_TOKEN_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def issue(self) -> SignedArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        approval_id = self._token("owner-merge-approval-")
+        nonce = self._token("owner-merge-nonce-")
+        policy = self.policy
+        payload: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "schema": APPROVAL_SCHEMA,
+            "approval_id": approval_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "repository": policy.repository,
+            "pr_number": policy.pr_number,
+            "pr_head_oid": policy.pr_head_oid,
+            "expected_main_oid": policy.expected_main_oid,
+            "operation": policy.operation,
+            "required_check_contract_digest": policy.required_check_contract_digest,
+            "required_checks": list(policy.required_checks),
+            "owner_identity": policy.owner_identity,
+            "audit_lineage_digest": policy.audit_lineage_digest,
+            "policy_version": policy.policy_version,
+            "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + policy.maximum_ttl_seconds,
+            "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            "signature_key_id": self.signer.fingerprint,
+        }
+        payload["canonical_payload_digest"] = sha256_json(payload)
+        return self.signer._sign_canonical(payload)
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier:
+    """Verify Owner proof, preferring normal verification then recovery proof.
+
+    The recovery verifier validates a pre-existing approval with the registered
+    public Owner root.  It cannot issue an approval and is therefore not a
+    second policy principal.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        primary: ApprovalProofVerifier,
+        recovery: ApprovalProofVerifier | None = None,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.primary = primary
+        self.recovery = recovery
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _artifact(artifact: SignedArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str, str, str]:
+        if isinstance(artifact, SignedArtifact):
+            return dict(artifact.payload), artifact.signature, artifact.key_id, artifact.namespace
+        if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping) or set(artifact) != {"payload", "signature", "key_id", "namespace"}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+        payload = artifact.get("payload")
+        signature = artifact.get("signature")
+        key_id = artifact.get("key_id")
+        namespace = artifact.get("namespace")
+        if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or not all(isinstance(item, str) for item in (signature, key_id, namespace)):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+        return dict(payload), signature, key_id, namespace
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_scope(payload: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy, *, now: int, key_id: str, namespace: str) -> None:
+        if set(payload) != APPROVAL_FIELDS:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        expected = {
+            "schema": APPROVAL_SCHEMA,
+            "repository": policy.repository,
+            "pr_number": policy.pr_number,
+            "pr_head_oid": policy.pr_head_oid,
+            "expected_main_oid": policy.expected_main_oid,
+            "operation": policy.operation,
+            "required_check_contract_digest": policy.required_check_contract_digest,
+            "required_checks": list(policy.required_checks),
+            "owner_identity": policy.owner_identity,
+            "audit_lineage_digest": policy.audit_lineage_digest,
+            "policy_version": policy.policy_version,
+            "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+            "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            "signature_key_id": key_id,
+        }
+        if payload.get("pr_head_oid") != policy.pr_head_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_HEAD_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if payload.get("expected_main_oid") != policy.expected_main_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_BASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if payload.get("policy_digest") != policy.digest:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_DIGEST_DRIFT")
+        if namespace != OWNER_NAMESPACE or any(payload.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items()):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        for field in ("approval_id", "nonce"):
+            if not isinstance(payload.get(field), str) or TOKEN_RE.fullmatch(payload[field]) is None:
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_TOKEN_INVALID")
+        for field in ("issued_at", "not_before", "expires_at"):
+            if type(payload.get(field)) is not int:
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_TIME_INVALID")
+        if not payload["not_before"] <= now < payload["expires_at"]:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+        if payload["issued_at"] > now + 5 or payload["expires_at"] - payload["issued_at"] != policy.maximum_ttl_seconds:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_TIME_INVALID")
+        supplied = payload.get("canonical_payload_digest")
+        body = dict(payload)
+        body.pop("canonical_payload_digest", None)
+        if supplied != sha256_json(body):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_CANONICAL_DIGEST_INVALID")
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        artifact: SignedArtifact | Mapping[str, Any],
+        policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+    ) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+        policy.validate()
+        payload, signature, key_id, namespace = self._artifact(artifact)
+        canonical = canonical_json_bytes(payload)
+        proof_path: str | None = None
+        for path, verifier in (("primary", self.primary), ("recovery", self.recovery)):
+            if verifier is None:
+                continue
+            try:
+                verified = verifier.verify(
+                    namespace=namespace,
+                    payload=canonical,
+                    signature=signature,
+                    key_id=key_id,
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                verified = False
+            if verified is True:
+                proof_path = path
+                break
+        if proof_path is None:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+        self._validate_scope(payload, policy, now=int(self.clock()), key_id=key_id, namespace=namespace)
+        return payload, proof_path
+
+
+class SQLiteOwnerMergeNonceLedger:
+    """Durable one-shot fence.  Unknown effects are intentionally not retried."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+
+    def _connection(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        if self.path.is_symlink() or self.path.parent.is_symlink():
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_LEDGER_PATH_INVALID")
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS owner_merge_nonce ("
+            "nonce TEXT PRIMARY KEY, approval_digest TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL, claimed_at INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        return connection
+
+    def claim(self, *, nonce: str, approval_digest: str, now: int) -> None:
+        connection = self._connection()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT state FROM owner_merge_nonce WHERE nonce=?", (nonce,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_REPLAY")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO owner_merge_nonce(nonce,approval_digest,state,claimed_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?)",
+                (nonce, approval_digest, "PENDING", now),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_LEDGER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def mark(self, *, nonce: str, state: str) -> None:
+        if state not in {"COMPLETED", "UNKNOWN"}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_STATE_INVALID")
+        connection = self._connection()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            updated = connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE owner_merge_nonce SET state=? WHERE nonce=? AND state='PENDING'",
+                (state, nonce),
+            ).rowcount
+            if updated != 1:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_STATE_CONFLICT")
+            connection.commit()
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_LEDGER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+
+class GovernedOwnerMergeAdmission:
+    """Admit one protected merge without owning any policy or technical gate."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+        verifier: OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier,
+        live_state_reader: Callable[[], OwnerMergeLiveState],
+        executor: GovernedMergeExecutor,
+        reconciler: MergeOidReconciler,
+        nonce_ledger: SQLiteOwnerMergeNonceLedger,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+    ) -> None:
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.live_state_reader = live_state_reader
+        self.executor = executor
+        self.reconciler = reconciler
+        self.nonce_ledger = nonce_ledger
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    def _validate_live_state(self, live: OwnerMergeLiveState) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(live, OwnerMergeLiveState):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_LIVE_STATE_INVALID")
+        policy = self.policy
+        if live.repository != policy.repository:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REPOSITORY_DRIFT")
+        if live.pr_number != policy.pr_number:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_PR_BINDING_DRIFT")
+        if live.pr_head_oid != policy.pr_head_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_HEAD_DRIFT")
+        if live.main_oid != policy.expected_main_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_BASE_DRIFT")
+        if live.required_check_contract_digest != policy.required_check_contract_digest:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REQUIRED_CHECK_CONTRACT_DRIFT")
+        if not isinstance(live.check_statuses, Mapping) or set(live.check_statuses) != set(policy.required_checks):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REQUIRED_CHECK_CONTRACT_DRIFT")
+        if any(value is not True for value in live.check_statuses.values()):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REQUIRED_CHECKS_FAILED")
+
+    def admit(self, artifact: SignedArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> OwnerMergeAdmissionReceipt:
+        approval, proof_path = self.verifier.verify(artifact, self.policy)
+        self._validate_live_state(self.live_state_reader())
+        nonce = str(approval["nonce"])
+        approval_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(approval)).hexdigest()
+        self.nonce_ledger.claim(nonce=nonce, approval_digest=approval_digest, now=int(self.clock()))
+        try:
+            merge_oid = self.executor.execute(dict(approval))
+            _require_oid(merge_oid, "OWNER_MERGE_EXECUTOR_RESULT_INVALID")
+            readback = self.reconciler.readback(merge_oid)
+            if (
+                not isinstance(readback, OwnerMergeOidReadback)
+                or readback.authority_main_oid != merge_oid
+                or readback.gitea_main_oid != merge_oid
+                or readback.api_main_oid != merge_oid
+            ):
+                self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="UNKNOWN")
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_OID_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            # Every failure after a durable claim represents an operation that
+            # is either known failed or needs reconciliation.  Preserve the
+            # one-shot fence rather than exposing a retryable PENDING state.
+            try:
+                self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="UNKNOWN")
+            except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+                pass
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:
+            try:
+                self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="UNKNOWN")
+            except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_EXECUTION_UNKNOWN") from exc
+        self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="COMPLETED")
+        return OwnerMergeAdmissionReceipt(
+            approval_id=str(approval["approval_id"]),
+            nonce=nonce,
+            owner_identity=str(approval["owner_identity"]),
+            policy_digest=str(approval["policy_digest"]),
+            proof_path=proof_path,
+            merge_oid=merge_oid,
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+"""Restricted issuance service for ``aios.owner-merge-approval.v2``.
+
+The service has one Owner-only operation.  It accepts an empty request payload,
+loads one immutable policy, generates approval identifiers and nonces itself,
+and stores one exact issuance response.  It deliberately does not expose a
+generic signing, payload, or policy-selection API.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_owner_merge_authorization import (
+    OwnerMergeApprovalAuthority,
+    OwnerMergeApprovalError,
+    OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+    OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier,
+)
+from aios_single_host_authority import RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier, SignedArtifact
+
+
+ISSUE_OPERATION = "issue_owner_merge_approval"
+
+
+def _fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OwnerMergeApprovalError(code)
+
+
+def _secure_regular(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool) -> None:
+    try:
+        metadata = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_MISSING") from exc
+    if path.is_symlink() or not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_INVALID")
+    if stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) & 0o022:
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_WRITABLE")
+    if require_root_owner and metadata.st_uid != 0:
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_NOT_ROOT_OWNED")
+
+
+def _read_policy(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool) -> OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy:
+    _secure_regular(path, require_root_owner=require_root_owner)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID")
+    expected = set(OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy.__dataclass_fields__)
+    if set(value) != expected or not isinstance(value.get("required_checks"), list):
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID")
+    try:
+        policy = OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy(
+            repository=value["repository"],
+            pr_number=value["pr_number"],
+            pr_head_oid=value["pr_head_oid"],
+            expected_main_oid=value["expected_main_oid"],
+            operation=value["operation"],
+            required_check_contract_digest=value["required_check_contract_digest"],
+            required_checks=tuple(value["required_checks"]),
+            owner_identity=value["owner_identity"],
+            audit_lineage_digest=value["audit_lineage_digest"],
+            maximum_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_ttl_seconds"],
+            policy_version=value["policy_version"],
+            schema=value["schema"],
+        )
+        policy.validate()
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, OwnerMergeApprovalError) as exc:
+        if isinstance(exc, OwnerMergeApprovalError):
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+        raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+    return policy
+
+
+def _artifact_dict(artifact: SignedArtifact) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "payload": dict(artifact.payload),
+        "signature": artifact.signature,
+        "key_id": artifact.key_id,
+        "namespace": artifact.namespace,
+    }
+
+
+class SQLiteOwnerMergeIssuanceLedger:
+    """Durably replay a current approval and retain expired issuance history."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        if self.path.is_symlink() or self.path.parent.is_symlink():
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_PATH_INVALID")
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS owner_merge_issuance ("
+            "nonce TEXT PRIMARY KEY, policy_digest TEXT NOT NULL, response_json TEXT NOT NULL, "
+            "issued_at INTEGER NOT NULL, expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS owner_merge_issuance_policy_expiry "
+            "ON owner_merge_issuance(policy_digest, expires_at)"
+        )
+        return connection
+
+    def issue_once(
+        self,
+        *,
+        policy_digest: str,
+        now: int,
+        issuer: Callable[[], dict[str, Any]],
+        validate_current: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], None],
+        expiry_of: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], int],
+    ) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT response_json, expires_at FROM owner_merge_issuance "
+                "WHERE policy_digest=? AND expires_at>? ORDER BY issued_at DESC",
+                (policy_digest, now),
+            ).fetchall()
+            if len(rows) > 1:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            if rows:
+                try:
+                    response = json.loads(rows[0][0])
+                except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+                    connection.rollback()
+                    raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID") from exc
+                if not isinstance(response, dict):
+                    connection.rollback()
+                    _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+                if type(rows[0][1]) is not int or expiry_of(response) != rows[0][1]:
+                    connection.rollback()
+                    _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+                validate_current(response)
+                connection.rollback()
+                return response, True
+            response = issuer()
+            expires_at = expiry_of(response)
+            if expires_at <= now:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_RESPONSE_EXPIRED")
+            artifact = response.get("artifact")
+            if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            payload = artifact.get("payload")
+            if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or not isinstance(payload.get("nonce"), str):
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            encoded = json.dumps(
+                response,
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+                allow_nan=False,
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO owner_merge_issuance(nonce,policy_digest,response_json,issued_at,expires_at) "
+                "VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (payload["nonce"], policy_digest, encoded, now, expires_at),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return response, False
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_NONCE_CONFLICT") from exc
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalService:
+    """A formal structured adapter, not an arbitrary signing oracle."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        policy_path: Path,
+        registry_path: Path,
+        owner_key_path: Path,
+        issuance_ledger_path: Path,
+        allowed_uids: tuple[int, ...],
+        require_root_owner: bool = True,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+        token_urlsafe: Callable[[int], str] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not allowed_uids or any(type(uid) is not int or uid < 0 for uid in allowed_uids):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_ALLOWED_UIDS_INVALID")
+        self.policy_path = Path(policy_path)
+        self.registry_path = Path(registry_path)
+        self.owner_key_path = Path(owner_key_path)
+        self.allowed_uids = tuple(allowed_uids)
+        self.require_root_owner = require_root_owner
+        self.clock = clock
+        self.token_urlsafe = token_urlsafe
+        self.ledger = SQLiteOwnerMergeIssuanceLedger(issuance_ledger_path)
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if peer_uid not in self.allowed_uids:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_PEER_UID_FORBIDDEN")
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping) or set(request) != {"operation", "payload"}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        if request.get("operation") != ISSUE_OPERATION:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+        if request.get("payload") != {}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+
+        policy = _read_policy(
+            self.policy_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        _secure_regular(
+            self.owner_key_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        primary = RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier(
+            self.registry_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        verifier = OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier(primary=primary, clock=self.clock)
+
+        def expiry_of(response: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
+            if set(response) != {"status", "artifact"} or response.get("status") != "PASS":
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            artifact = response.get("artifact")
+            if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            payload = artifact.get("payload")
+            if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or type(payload.get("expires_at")) is not int:
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            return payload["expires_at"]
+
+        def validate_current(response: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+            expiry_of(response)
+            artifact = response["artifact"]
+            if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            try:
+                verifier.verify(artifact, policy)
+            except OwnerMergeApprovalError as exc:
+                raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID") from exc
+
+        def issue() -> dict[str, Any]:
+            kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
+            if self.token_urlsafe is not None:
+                kwargs["token_urlsafe"] = self.token_urlsafe
+            artifact = OwnerMergeApprovalAuthority(
+                self.owner_key_path,
+                policy,
+                require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+                clock=self.clock,
+                **kwargs,
+            ).issue()
+            value = _artifact_dict(artifact)
+            verifier.verify(value, policy)
+            return {"status": "PASS", "artifact": value}
+
+        response, idempotent = self.ledger.issue_once(
+            policy_digest=policy.digest,
+            now=int(self.clock()),
+            issuer=issue,
+            validate_current=validate_current,
+            expiry_of=expiry_of,
+        )
+        if set(response) != {"status", "artifact"} or response.get("status") != "PASS":
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+        return {**response, "idempotent": idempotent}
@@ -0,0 +1,967 @@
+"""Bounded, read-only discovery over a verified immutable Git repository.
+
+The module is deliberately independent from Task, lease, credential, worktree,
+and write code. Every public operation verifies the exact repository identity,
+resolves a floating ref once to a full commit OID, and then reads only that
+immutable snapshot.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from collections.abc import Iterable, Iterator, Mapping
+import fnmatch
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import subprocess
+import time
+
+from authoritative_git import AuthoritativeGitError, verify_repository
+
+
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
+_IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(
+    r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$"
+)
+_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS = frozenset({"cat-file", "diff", "ls-tree", "rev-parse"})
+_MAX_COMMAND_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
+_MAX_RECORD_BYTES = 1_048_576
+_MAX_LIMIT = 1_000
+_MAX_DEPTH = 32
+_MAX_BYTES = 1_048_576
+_MAX_GLOBS = 16
+_MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 512
+_MAX_CURSOR_LENGTH = 4_096
+_GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 8.0
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscoveryError(RuntimeError):
+    """A fail-closed repository discovery request error."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, *, status_code: int | None = None) -> None:
+        self.code = str(code)
+        self.status_code = (
+            status_code if status_code is not None else self._status_for(self.code)
+        )
+        super().__init__(self.code)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _status_for(code: str) -> int:
+        if "OUTPUT_LIMIT" in code:
+            return 413
+        if code.endswith("_NOT_FOUND"):
+            return 404
+        if code in {"REPOSITORY_NOT_ALLOWED", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH"}:
+            return 403
+        if code in {
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE",
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED",
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID",
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET_REQUIRED",
+        }:
+            return 503
+        return 400
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscoveryNotFound(RepositoryDiscoveryError):
+    """A validated immutable object or path was not found."""
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscoveryOutputTooLarge(RepositoryDiscoveryError):
+    """A fixed read-only Git query exceeded its collection boundary."""
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+    return RepositoryDiscoveryError(code)
+
+
+def _request_mapping(request: Mapping[str, object]) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+    if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+    return request
+
+
+def _required_request_value(request: Mapping[str, object], field: str) -> object:
+    value = request.get(field)
+    if value is None:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Mapping[str, object]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True
+    ).encode("ascii")
+
+
+def _positive_int(value: object, field: str, maximum: int) -> int:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or not 1 <= value <= maximum:
+        raise _error(f"REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_{field.upper()}")
+    return value
+
+
+def _safe_relative_path(
+    value: object,
+    field: str,
+    *,
+    allow_empty: bool,
+    allow_glob: bool = False,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if "\\" in value:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if value in ("", "."):
+        if allow_empty:
+            return ""
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if value.startswith(("/", "-")) or "//" in value or ":" in value:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if not allow_glob and any(character in value for character in "*?["):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    parts = value.split("/")
+    if any(part in ("", ".", "..") for part in parts):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if len(value) > 512:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _safe_glob(value: object) -> str:
+    return _safe_relative_path(value, "path_glob", allow_empty=False, allow_glob=True)
+
+
+def _safe_ref(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(
+        _REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
+        and ".." not in value
+        and "//" not in value
+        and "@{" not in value
+        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        and not any(part in ("", ".", "..") for part in value.split("/"))
+    )
+
+
+def _parse_tree_record(record: bytes) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    try:
+        header, raw_path = record.split(b"\t", 1)
+        mode, kind, oid = header.decode("ascii").split(" ", 2)
+        path = raw_path.decode("utf-8")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+    if kind not in {"blob", "tree", "commit"} or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+    try:
+        _safe_relative_path(path, "tree_path", allow_empty=False)
+    except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+        # Git permits filenames outside the public POSIX-relative contract.
+        # They are not exposed as usable discovery paths.
+        return None
+    return {"mode": mode, "type": kind, "object_oid": oid.lower(), "path": path}
+
+
+def _decode_output_path(raw: bytes) -> str:
+    try:
+        value = raw.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+    return _safe_relative_path(value, "git_output_path", allow_empty=False)
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscovery:
+    """Repository-scoped immutable Git discovery with signed cursors."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        allowed_repositories: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+        git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+        cursor_secret: str | bytes | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        configured = allowed_repositories
+        if configured is None:
+            configured = (os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""),)
+        identities = tuple(configured)
+        if not identities or any(
+            not isinstance(item, str) or not _IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(item)
+            for item in identities
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_ALLOWLIST_INVALID")
+        self._allowed_repositories = frozenset(identities)
+        self._git_dir = git_dir
+        secret = (
+            cursor_secret
+            if cursor_secret is not None
+            else os.getenv("AIOS_REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET", "")
+        )
+        if isinstance(secret, str):
+            secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
+        if not isinstance(secret, bytes) or len(secret) < 16:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET_REQUIRED")
+        self._cursor_secret = secret
+
+    def _repository_path(self, repository: object) -> Path:
+        if not isinstance(repository, str) or repository not in self._allowed_repositories:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_NOT_ALLOWED")
+        try:
+            path, actual_identity = verify_repository(
+                git_dir=self._git_dir,
+                repository_identity=repository,
+            )
+        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+            code = (
+                "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH"
+                if "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH" in str(exc)
+                else "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE"
+            )
+            raise _error(code) from exc
+        if actual_identity != repository:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+        return path
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _git_env() -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            **os.environ,
+            "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": "1",
+            "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _run(
+        path: Path,
+        args: list[str],
+        *,
+        max_output: int = _MAX_COMMAND_OUTPUT,
+    ) -> bytes:
+        if not args or args[0] not in _READ_ONLY_COMMANDS:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_COMMAND_REJECTED")
+        output_limit = min(max_output, _MAX_COMMAND_OUTPUT)
+        process: subprocess.Popen[bytes] | None = None
+        try:
+            process = subprocess.Popen(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), *args],
+                shell=False,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                env=RepositoryDiscovery._git_env(),
+            )
+            assert process.stdout is not None
+            output = process.stdout.read(output_limit + 1)
+            if len(output) > output_limit:
+                process.kill()
+                process.wait(timeout=1)
+                raise RepositoryDiscoveryOutputTooLarge(
+                    "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_OUTPUT_LIMIT"
+                )
+            returncode = process.wait(timeout=_GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+            raise
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+            if process is not None:
+                try:
+                    process.kill()
+                    process.wait(timeout=1)
+                except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+                    pass
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED") from exc
+        if returncode != 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+        return output
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _read_blob_prefix(path: Path, oid: str, maximum: int) -> tuple[bytes, bool]:
+        """Read at most maximum bytes plus one sentinel byte."""
+        process: subprocess.Popen[bytes] | None = None
+        try:
+            process = subprocess.Popen(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), "cat-file", "blob", oid],
+                shell=False,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                env=RepositoryDiscovery._git_env(),
+            )
+            assert process.stdout is not None
+            content = process.stdout.read(maximum + 1)
+            truncated = len(content) > maximum
+            if truncated:
+                process.kill()
+                process.wait(timeout=1)
+                return content[:maximum], True
+            if process.wait(timeout=_GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) != 0:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+            return content, False
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+            raise
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+            if process is not None:
+                try:
+                    process.kill()
+                    process.wait(timeout=1)
+                except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+                    pass
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED") from exc
+
+    def _iter_nul_records(self, path: Path, args: list[str]) -> Iterator[bytes]:
+        if not args or args[0] not in _READ_ONLY_COMMANDS:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_COMMAND_REJECTED")
+        process: subprocess.Popen[bytes] | None = None
+        buffer = b""
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        try:
+            process = subprocess.Popen(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), *args],
+                shell=False,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                env=self._git_env(),
+            )
+            assert process.stdout is not None
+            while True:
+                if time.monotonic() - started > _GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+                chunk = process.stdout.read(64 * 1024)
+                if not chunk:
+                    break
+                buffer += chunk
+                if len(buffer) > _MAX_RECORD_BYTES and b"\0" not in buffer:
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+                while b"\0" in buffer:
+                    record, buffer = buffer.split(b"\0", 1)
+                    if len(record) > _MAX_RECORD_BYTES:
+                        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+                    yield record
+            if buffer:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+            if process.wait(
+                timeout=max(0.1, _GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS - (time.monotonic() - started))
+            ) != 0:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+            raise
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED") from exc
+        finally:
+            if process is not None and process.poll() is None:
+                try:
+                    process.kill()
+                    process.wait(timeout=1)
+                except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+                    pass
+
+    def _resolve_at(self, path: Path, revision: object, field: str) -> str:
+        if (
+            not isinstance(revision, str)
+            or revision != revision.strip()
+            or not revision
+            or revision.startswith("-")
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_REVISION")
+        if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
+            candidates = [revision.lower()]
+        elif revision == "HEAD":
+            candidates = ["HEAD"]
+        elif _safe_ref(revision) and not any(
+            token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")
+        ):
+            if revision.startswith("refs/"):
+                if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_REVISION")
+                candidates = [revision]
+            else:
+                candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
+        else:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_REVISION")
+        resolved: list[str] = []
+        for candidate in candidates:
+            try:
+                output = self._run(
+                    path,
+                    ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
+                    max_output=256,
+                )
+            except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+                continue
+            oid = output.decode("ascii", errors="ignore").strip().lower()
+            if _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+                resolved.append(oid)
+        if not resolved:
+            raise RepositoryDiscoveryNotFound(
+                f"REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_{field.upper()}_NOT_FOUND"
+            )
+        if len(set(resolved)) != 1:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_AMBIGUOUS_REVISION")
+        return resolved[0]
+
+    def resolve_revision(self, repository: str, revision: str) -> str:
+        return self._resolve_at(self._repository_path(repository), revision, "revision")
+
+    def _cursor_offset(
+        self,
+        cursor: str | None,
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        repository: str,
+        resolved_oid: str,
+        query: Mapping[str, object],
+    ) -> int:
+        if cursor is None:
+            return 0
+        if (
+            not isinstance(cursor, str)
+            or not cursor
+            or len(cursor) > _MAX_CURSOR_LENGTH
+            or "." not in cursor
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        encoded, supplied_signature = cursor.split(".", 1)
+        try:
+            padded = encoded + "=" * (-len(encoded) % 4)
+            payload = json.loads(
+                base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded.encode("ascii")).decode("ascii")
+            )
+        except (UnicodeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID") from exc
+        expected_signature = hmac.new(
+            self._cursor_secret, encoded.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256
+        ).hexdigest()
+        if not hmac.compare_digest(supplied_signature, expected_signature):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        expected = {
+            "operation": operation,
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "query": dict(query),
+        }
+        if (
+            not isinstance(payload, dict)
+            or payload.get("v") != 1
+            or any(payload.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items())
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        offset = payload.get("offset")
+        if isinstance(offset, bool) or not isinstance(offset, int) or offset < 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        return offset
+
+    def _next_cursor(
+        self,
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        repository: str,
+        resolved_oid: str,
+        query: Mapping[str, object],
+        offset: int,
+    ) -> str:
+        payload = {
+            "v": 1,
+            "operation": operation,
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "query": dict(query),
+            "offset": offset,
+        }
+        encoded = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(_canonical(payload)).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+        signature = hmac.new(
+            self._cursor_secret, encoded.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256
+        ).hexdigest()
+        return f"{encoded}.{signature}"
+
+    def _iter_tree_entries(
+        self,
+        path: Path,
+        oid: str,
+        prefix: str,
+        *,
+        include_trees: bool,
+    ) -> Iterator[dict[str, str]]:
+        args = ["ls-tree", "-z", "-r", "--full-tree"]
+        if include_trees:
+            args.append("-t")
+        args.append(oid)
+        if prefix:
+            args.extend(["--", prefix])
+        for record in self._iter_nul_records(path, args):
+            entry = _parse_tree_record(record)
+            if entry is None:
+                continue
+            if not prefix or entry["path"] == prefix or entry["path"].startswith(prefix + "/"):
+                yield entry
+
+    def list_tree(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        revision: str,
+        prefix: str = "",
+        depth: int = 8,
+        limit: int = 100,
+        cursor: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        prefix = _safe_relative_path(prefix, "prefix", allow_empty=True)
+        depth = _positive_int(depth, "depth", _MAX_DEPTH)
+        limit = _positive_int(limit, "limit", _MAX_LIMIT)
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        resolved_oid = self._resolve_at(path, revision, "revision")
+        query = {"prefix": prefix, "depth": depth, "limit": limit}
+        offset = self._cursor_offset(
+            cursor,
+            operation="list_tree",
+            repository=repository,
+            resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+            query=query,
+        )
+        page: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        matched = 0
+        for entry in self._iter_tree_entries(path, resolved_oid, prefix, include_trees=True):
+            relative = entry["path"][len(prefix):].lstrip("/") if prefix else entry["path"]
+            if relative.count("/") + 1 > depth:
+                continue
+            if matched >= offset and len(page) < limit:
+                page.append(entry)
+            matched += 1
+        has_more = offset + len(page) < matched
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "entries": page,
+            "truncated": has_more,
+            "next_cursor": (
+                self._next_cursor(
+                    operation="list_tree",
+                    repository=repository,
+                    resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+                    query=query,
+                    offset=offset + len(page),
+                )
+                if has_more
+                else None
+            ),
+        }
+
+    def list_repository_tree(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        return self.list_tree(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            revision=request.get("revision", request.get("ref", "HEAD")),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            prefix=request.get("prefix", ""),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            depth=request.get("depth", 8),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            limit=request.get("limit", 100),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            cursor=request.get("cursor"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    def _blob_size(self, path: Path, oid: str) -> int:
+        output = self._run(path, ["cat-file", "-s", oid], max_output=128)
+        try:
+            size = int(output.decode("ascii").strip())
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+        if size < 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+        return size
+
+    def search_source(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        revision: str,
+        query: str,
+        path_globs: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+        max_matches: int = 100,
+        max_bytes: int = 262_144,
+        cursor: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        if (
+            not isinstance(query, str)
+            or not query
+            or "\x00" in query
+            or len(query) > _MAX_QUERY_LENGTH
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_QUERY_INVALID")
+        max_matches = _positive_int(max_matches, "max_matches", _MAX_LIMIT)
+        max_bytes = _positive_int(max_bytes, "max_bytes", _MAX_BYTES)
+        if path_globs is None:
+            globs = ("*",)
+        else:
+            if isinstance(path_globs, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(path_globs, Iterable):
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+            globs = tuple(_safe_glob(item) for item in path_globs)
+        if not globs or len(globs) > _MAX_GLOBS:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        resolved_oid = self._resolve_at(path, revision, "revision")
+        query_binding = {
+            "query": query,
+            "path_globs": list(globs),
+            "max_matches": max_matches,
+            "max_bytes": max_bytes,
+        }
+        offset = self._cursor_offset(
+            cursor,
+            operation="search_source",
+            repository=repository,
+            resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+            query=query_binding,
+        )
+        scanned_bytes = 0
+        skipped_for_bound = False
+        binary_blobs = 0
+        matched = 0
+        matches: list[dict[str, object]] = []
+        has_more = False
+        for entry in self._iter_tree_entries(path, resolved_oid, "", include_trees=False):
+            if entry["type"] != "blob" or not any(
+                fnmatch.fnmatchcase(entry["path"], pattern) for pattern in globs
+            ):
+                continue
+            blob_size = self._blob_size(path, entry["object_oid"])
+            remaining = max_bytes - scanned_bytes
+            if blob_size > remaining:
+                skipped_for_bound = True
+                continue
+            raw, clipped = self._read_blob_prefix(path, entry["object_oid"], blob_size)
+            if clipped:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+            scanned_bytes += len(raw)
+            if b"\0" in raw:
+                binary_blobs += 1
+                continue
+            text = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+            for number, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
+                if query not in line:
+                    continue
+                if matched < offset:
+                    matched += 1
+                    continue
+                if len(matches) >= max_matches:
+                    has_more = True
+                    break
+                matches.append(
+                    {
+                        "path": entry["path"],
+                        "line_start": number,
+                        "line_end": number,
+                        "blob_oid": entry["object_oid"],
+                        "snippet": line[:512],
+                    }
+                )
+                matched += 1
+            if has_more:
+                break
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "matches": matches,
+            "scanned_bytes": scanned_bytes,
+            "max_bytes": max_bytes,
+            "binary_blobs_skipped": binary_blobs,
+            "truncated": bool(has_more or skipped_for_bound),
+            "next_cursor": (
+                self._next_cursor(
+                    operation="search_source",
+                    repository=repository,
+                    resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+                    query=query_binding,
+                    offset=offset + len(matches),
+                )
+                if has_more
+                else None
+            ),
+        }
+
+    def search_repository_source(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        path_globs = request.get("path_globs")
+        if path_globs is not None and (
+            isinstance(path_globs, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(path_globs, Iterable)
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+        return self.search_source(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            revision=request.get("revision", request.get("ref", "HEAD")),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            query=_required_request_value(request, "query"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            path_globs=path_globs,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            max_matches=request.get("max_matches", 100),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            max_bytes=request.get("max_bytes", 262_144),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            cursor=request.get("cursor"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    def _iter_diff_name_entries(
+        self,
+        path: Path,
+        from_oid: str,
+        to_oid: str,
+        prefix: str,
+    ) -> Iterator[dict[str, object]]:
+        suffix = ["--", prefix] if prefix else []
+        records = self._iter_nul_records(
+            path,
+            [
+                "diff",
+                "--no-ext-diff",
+                "--no-textconv",
+                "--find-renames=50%",
+                "--name-status",
+                "-z",
+                from_oid,
+                to_oid,
+                *suffix,
+            ],
+        )
+        iterator = iter(records)
+        while True:
+            try:
+                status_raw = next(iterator)
+            except StopIteration:
+                return
+            try:
+                status = status_raw.decode("ascii")
+            except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+            if not status or status[0] not in {"A", "C", "D", "M", "R", "T", "U", "X"}:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+            try:
+                if status[0] in {"R", "C"}:
+                    old_path = _decode_output_path(next(iterator))
+                    new_path = _decode_output_path(next(iterator))
+                    yield {
+                        "status": status,
+                        "path": new_path,
+                        "old_path": old_path,
+                    }
+                else:
+                    yield {
+                        "status": status,
+                        "path": _decode_output_path(next(iterator)),
+                        "old_path": None,
+                    }
+            except StopIteration as exc:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _parse_numstat_count(value: bytes) -> int | None:
+        if value == b"-":
+            return None
+        try:
+            parsed = int(value.decode("ascii"), 10)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+        if parsed < 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+        return parsed
+
+    def _diff_stats(
+        self,
+        path: Path,
+        from_oid: str,
+        to_oid: str,
+        prefix: str,
+        wanted_paths: set[str],
+    ) -> dict[str, tuple[int | None, int | None]]:
+        suffix = ["--", prefix] if prefix else []
+        records = self._iter_nul_records(
+            path,
+            [
+                "diff",
+                "--no-ext-diff",
+                "--no-textconv",
+                "--find-renames=50%",
+                "--numstat",
+                "-z",
+                from_oid,
+                to_oid,
+                *suffix,
+            ],
+        )
+        iterator = iter(records)
+        stats: dict[str, tuple[int | None, int | None]] = {}
+        for row in iterator:
+            if not row:
+                continue
+            fields = row.split(b"\t", 2)
+            if len(fields) != 3:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+            additions = self._parse_numstat_count(fields[0])
+            deletions = self._parse_numstat_count(fields[1])
+            if fields[2]:
+                stat_path = _decode_output_path(fields[2])
+            else:
+                try:
+                    next(iterator)  # old path
+                    stat_path = _decode_output_path(next(iterator))
+                except StopIteration as exc:
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+            if stat_path in wanted_paths:
+                stats[stat_path] = (additions, deletions)
+                if wanted_paths <= set(stats):
+                    break
+        return stats
+
+    def diff_index(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        from_revision: str,
+        to_revision: str,
+        prefix: str = "",
+        limit: int = 100,
+        cursor: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        prefix = _safe_relative_path(prefix, "prefix", allow_empty=True)
+        limit = _positive_int(limit, "limit", _MAX_LIMIT)
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        from_oid = self._resolve_at(path, from_revision, "from")
+        to_oid = self._resolve_at(path, to_revision, "to")
+        query = {
+            "from_oid": from_oid,
+            "to_oid": to_oid,
+            "prefix": prefix,
+            "limit": limit,
+        }
+        offset = self._cursor_offset(
+            cursor,
+            operation="diff_index",
+            repository=repository,
+            resolved_oid=to_oid,
+            query=query,
+        )
+        page: list[dict[str, object]] = []
+        total = 0
+        for entry in self._iter_diff_name_entries(path, from_oid, to_oid, prefix):
+            if total >= offset and len(page) < limit:
+                page.append(entry)
+            total += 1
+        wanted_paths = {str(entry["path"]) for entry in page}
+        stat_by_path = (
+            self._diff_stats(path, from_oid, to_oid, prefix, wanted_paths)
+            if page
+            else {}
+        )
+        for entry in page:
+            additions, deletions = stat_by_path.get(
+                str(entry["path"]), (None, None)
+            )
+            entry["additions"] = additions
+            entry["deletions"] = deletions
+        has_more = offset + len(page) < total
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_from_oid": from_oid,
+            "resolved_to_oid": to_oid,
+            "entries": page,
+            "truncated": has_more,
+            "next_cursor": (
+                self._next_cursor(
+                    operation="diff_index",
+                    repository=repository,
+                    resolved_oid=to_oid,
+                    query=query,
+                    offset=offset + len(page),
+                )
+                if has_more
+                else None
+            ),
+        }
+
+    def get_diff_index(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        from_revision = request.get("from_revision", request.get("from"))
+        to_revision = request.get("to_revision", request.get("to"))
+        prefix = request.get("prefix", request.get("path_prefix", ""))
+        if from_revision is None or to_revision is None:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        return self.diff_index(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            from_revision=from_revision,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            to_revision=to_revision,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            prefix=prefix,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            limit=request.get("limit", 100),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            cursor=request.get("cursor"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    def read_file(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        revision: str,
+        file_path: str,
+        max_bytes: int = 262_144,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        file_path = _safe_relative_path(file_path, "file_path", allow_empty=False)
+        max_bytes = _positive_int(max_bytes, "max_bytes", _MAX_BYTES)
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        resolved_oid = self._resolve_at(path, revision, "revision")
+        exact: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        for entry in self._iter_tree_entries(
+            path, resolved_oid, file_path, include_trees=False
+        ):
+            if entry["path"] == file_path and entry["type"] == "blob":
+                exact.append(entry)
+        if len(exact) != 1:
+            raise RepositoryDiscoveryNotFound("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_FILE_NOT_FOUND")
+        blob_oid = exact[0]["object_oid"]
+        content, truncated = self._read_blob_prefix(path, blob_oid, max_bytes)
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "blob_oid": blob_oid,
+            "path": file_path,
+            "content": content.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
+            "content_base64": base64.b64encode(content).decode("ascii"),
+            "content_bytes": len(content),
+            "truncated": truncated,
+        }
+
+    def read_repository_file(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        file_path = request.get("file_path", request.get("path"))
+        if file_path is None:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        return self.read_file(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            revision=request.get("revision", request.get("ref", "HEAD")),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            file_path=file_path,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            max_bytes=request.get("max_bytes", 262_144),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+
+def create_repository_discovery(
+    *,
+    allowed_repositories: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    cursor_secret: str | bytes | None = None,
+) -> RepositoryDiscovery:
+    return RepositoryDiscovery(
+        allowed_repositories=allowed_repositories,
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+        cursor_secret=cursor_secret,
+    )
+
+
+def list_repository_tree(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).list_repository_tree(request)
+
+
+def search_repository_source(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).search_repository_source(request)
+
+
+def get_diff_index(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).get_diff_index(request)
+
+
+def read_repository_file(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).read_repository_file(request)
@@ -0,0 +1,707 @@
+"""Single-host operational delegation for AIOS migration.
+
+This module is deliberately narrow:
+* Owner signs only OperationalDelegation and ExpiredTaskRecoveryDecision.
+* Machine signer signs only WorkerRuntimeBinding and WorkerRuntimeProof.
+* Every object is bound to one immutable Task identity and a narrow capability set.
+* There is no arbitrary sign-bytes API.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import (
+    DEFAULT_MACHINE_SIGNER_ID,
+    DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID,
+    MACHINE_NAMESPACE,
+    OWNER_IDENTITY,
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    LocalFileSigner,
+    RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier,
+    SignerRegistry,
+    SingleHostAuthorityError,
+    canonical_json_bytes,
+    sha256_json,
+    verify_sshsig,
+)
+
+OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA = "aios.single-host-operational-policy.v1"
+OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-operational-delegation.v1"
+RECOVERY_DECISION_SCHEMA = "aios.expired-task-recovery-decision.v1"
+WORKER_BINDING_SCHEMA = "aios.worker-runtime-binding.v1"
+WORKER_PROOF_SCHEMA = "aios.worker-runtime-proof.v1"
+REVOCATION_SCHEMA = "aios.operational-revocations.v1"
+
+ALLOWED_OPERATIONAL_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({
+    "task.recovery",
+    "worker.runtime.bind",
+    "worker.runtime.proof",
+    "task.claim.guard",
+})
+ALLOWED_EXPECTED_STATE = "EXPIRED"
+HEX40 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+SAFE_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,511}$")
+CAP = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+
+
+class OperationalAuthorityError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OperationalAuthorityError(code)
+
+
+def _exact_fields(value: Mapping[str, Any], fields: set[str], code: str) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or set(value) != fields:
+        fail(code)
+
+
+def _safe_id(value: str, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(value):
+        fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _hex(value: str, n: int, code: str) -> str:
+    regex = HEX40 if n == 40 else HEX64
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not regex.fullmatch(value):
+        fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _caps(value: Sequence[str], code: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not isinstance(value, (list, tuple)) or not value:
+        fail(code)
+    out = tuple(sorted(set(value)))
+    if len(out) != len(value) or any(not isinstance(x, str) or not CAP.fullmatch(x) for x in out):
+        fail(code)
+    return out
+
+
+def task_identity_sha256(task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Digest only immutable recovery/claim identity fields.
+
+    Revision, state, attempt and deadline are intentionally excluded.
+    """
+    fields = (
+        "task_id", "repository", "target_branch", "base_oid", "generation",
+        "execution_plan_sha256", "external_job_identity",
+    )
+    try:
+        value = {name: task[name] for name in fields}
+    except KeyError as exc:
+        raise OperationalAuthorityError("TASK_IDENTITY_FIELD_MISSING") from exc
+    _safe_id(str(value["task_id"]), "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    _safe_id(str(value["repository"]), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+    _safe_id(str(value["target_branch"]), "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    _hex(str(value["base_oid"]), 40, "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+    if type(value["generation"]) is not int or value["generation"] < 1:
+        fail("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    _hex(str(value["execution_plan_sha256"]), 64, "EXECUTION_PLAN_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    _safe_id(str(value["external_job_identity"]), "EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OperationalPolicy:
+    repository: str
+    task_id: str
+    task_identity_sha256: str
+    target_branch: str
+    base_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    execution_plan_sha256: str
+    external_job_identity: str
+    allowed_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+    allowed_worker_ids: tuple[str, ...]
+    maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_binding_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_proof_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds: int
+    maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds: int
+    schema: str = OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if self.schema != OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.repository, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.task_id, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_TASK_ID_INVALID")
+        _hex(self.task_identity_sha256, 64, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_TASK_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.target_branch, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_BRANCH_INVALID")
+        _hex(self.base_oid, 40, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        if type(self.generation) is not int or self.generation < 1:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_GENERATION_INVALID")
+        _hex(self.execution_plan_sha256, 64, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_PLAN_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.external_job_identity, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_JOB_INVALID")
+        caps = _caps(self.allowed_capabilities, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+        if not set(caps).issubset(ALLOWED_OPERATIONAL_CAPABILITIES):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_CAPABILITY_WIDENING")
+        if not self.allowed_worker_ids or any(not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(x) for x in self.allowed_worker_ids):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_WORKERS_INVALID")
+        bounds = (
+            (self.maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds, 300, 7 * 24 * 3600),
+            (self.maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds, 30, 900),
+            (self.maximum_binding_ttl_seconds, 60, 24 * 3600),
+            (self.maximum_proof_ttl_seconds, 15, 900),
+            (self.maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds, 5, 300),
+            (self.maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds, 300, 24 * 3600),
+        )
+        if any(type(v) is not int or not lo <= v <= hi for v, lo, hi in bounds):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_TTL_INVALID")
+
+    @property
+    def digest(self) -> str:
+        self.validate()
+        return sha256_json(asdict(self))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "OperationalPolicy":
+        fields = set(cls.__dataclass_fields__)
+        _exact_fields(value, fields, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        try:
+            policy = cls(
+                repository=value["repository"],
+                task_id=value["task_id"],
+                task_identity_sha256=value["task_identity_sha256"],
+                target_branch=value["target_branch"],
+                base_oid=value["base_oid"],
+                generation=value["generation"],
+                execution_plan_sha256=value["execution_plan_sha256"],
+                external_job_identity=value["external_job_identity"],
+                allowed_capabilities=tuple(value["allowed_capabilities"]),
+                allowed_worker_ids=tuple(value["allowed_worker_ids"]),
+                maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_binding_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_binding_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_proof_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_proof_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds=value["maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds"],
+                maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds=value["maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds"],
+                schema=value["schema"],
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise OperationalAuthorityError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_FIELDS_INVALID") from exc
+        policy.validate()
+        return policy
+
+
+def build_exact_policy(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    worker_id: str,
+    allowed_capabilities: Sequence[str] = tuple(sorted(ALLOWED_OPERATIONAL_CAPABILITIES)),
+) -> OperationalPolicy:
+    identity = task_identity_sha256(task)
+    policy = OperationalPolicy(
+        repository=str(task["repository"]),
+        task_id=str(task["task_id"]),
+        task_identity_sha256=identity,
+        target_branch=str(task["target_branch"]),
+        base_oid=str(task["base_oid"]),
+        generation=int(task["generation"]),
+        execution_plan_sha256=str(task["execution_plan_sha256"]),
+        external_job_identity=str(task["external_job_identity"]),
+        allowed_capabilities=tuple(sorted(allowed_capabilities)),
+        allowed_worker_ids=(worker_id,),
+        maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds=24 * 3600,
+        maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds=300,
+        maximum_binding_ttl_seconds=4 * 3600,
+        maximum_proof_ttl_seconds=300,
+        maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds=30,
+        maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds=4 * 3600,
+    )
+    policy.validate()
+    return policy
+
+
+def _signed_payload_dict(payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, key_id: str, namespace: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    value = dict(payload)
+    value["signature_namespace"] = namespace
+    value["signature_key_id"] = key_id
+    value["canonical_payload_digest"] = sha256_json(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def _verify_digest_field(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or "canonical_payload_digest" not in payload:
+        return False
+    value = dict(payload)
+    supplied = value.pop("canonical_payload_digest", None)
+    return isinstance(supplied, str) and supplied == sha256_json(value)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SignedOperationalArtifact:
+    payload: dict[str, Any]
+    signature: str
+    key_id: str
+    namespace: str
+
+    @property
+    def canonical_payload(self) -> bytes:
+        return canonical_json_bytes(self.payload)
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return hashlib.sha256(self.canonical_payload).hexdigest()
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "payload": dict(self.payload),
+            "signature": self.signature,
+            "key_id": self.key_id,
+            "namespace": self.namespace,
+        }
+
+
+class OperationalOwnerAuthority:
+    def __init__(self, key_path: Path, policy: OperationalPolicy, *, require_root_owner: bool = True, clock: Any = time.time):
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.signer = LocalFileSigner(
+            Path(key_path),
+            signer_id=DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID,
+            namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            require_root_owner=require_root_owner,
+        )
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    @property
+    def fingerprint(self) -> str:
+        return self.signer.fingerprint
+
+    def _sign(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        full = _signed_payload_dict(payload, key_id=self.fingerprint, namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE)
+        art = self.signer._sign_canonical(full)
+        return SignedOperationalArtifact(dict(art.payload), art.signature, art.key_id, art.namespace)
+
+    def issue_operational_delegation(self, *, delegation_id: str, nonce: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        p = self.policy
+        if not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(delegation_id) or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(nonce):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_ID_INVALID")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= p.maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_TTL_INVALID")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCHEMA,
+            "delegation_id": delegation_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "owner_identity": OWNER_IDENTITY,
+            "repository": p.repository,
+            "task_id": p.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": p.task_identity_sha256,
+            "target_branch": p.target_branch,
+            "base_oid": p.base_oid,
+            "generation": p.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": p.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "external_job_identity": p.external_job_identity,
+            "allowed_capabilities": list(p.allowed_capabilities),
+            "allowed_worker_ids": list(p.allowed_worker_ids),
+            "policy_digest": p.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+            "revocation_epoch": 0,
+            "status": "ACTIVE",
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+    def issue_recovery_decision(
+        self,
+        delegation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        decision_id: str,
+        nonce: str,
+        expected_revision: int,
+        expected_attempt: int,
+        original_deadline: int,
+        new_deadline: int,
+        ttl_seconds: int,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        verify_delegation_scope(delegation, self.policy, now=now)
+        if "task.recovery" not in delegation["allowed_capabilities"]:
+            fail("RECOVERY_CAPABILITY_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        if not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(decision_id) or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(nonce):
+            fail("RECOVERY_DECISION_ID_INVALID")
+        if type(expected_revision) is not int or expected_revision < 0 or type(expected_attempt) is not int or expected_attempt < 0:
+            fail("RECOVERY_CAS_INVALID")
+        if type(original_deadline) is not int or type(new_deadline) is not int:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DEADLINE_INVALID")
+        if new_deadline <= now or new_deadline <= original_deadline:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DEADLINE_INVALID")
+        if new_deadline - now > self.policy.maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DEADLINE_WIDENING")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 15 <= ttl_seconds <= self.policy.maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DECISION_TTL_INVALID")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": RECOVERY_DECISION_SCHEMA,
+            "decision_id": decision_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "parent_delegation_id": delegation["delegation_id"],
+            "parent_delegation_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest(),
+            "task_id": self.policy.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": self.policy.task_identity_sha256,
+            "expected_state": ALLOWED_EXPECTED_STATE,
+            "expected_revision": expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": expected_attempt,
+            "original_deadline": original_deadline,
+            "new_deadline": new_deadline,
+            "repository": self.policy.repository,
+            "target_branch": self.policy.target_branch,
+            "base_oid": self.policy.base_oid,
+            "generation": self.policy.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": self.policy.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "external_job_identity": self.policy.external_job_identity,
+            "policy_digest": self.policy.digest,
+            "one_time_use": True,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+
+class OperationalMachineAuthority:
+    def __init__(self, key_path: Path, policy: OperationalPolicy, *, require_root_owner: bool = True, clock: Any = time.time):
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.signer = LocalFileSigner(
+            Path(key_path),
+            signer_id=DEFAULT_MACHINE_SIGNER_ID,
+            namespace=MACHINE_NAMESPACE,
+            require_root_owner=require_root_owner,
+        )
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    @property
+    def fingerprint(self) -> str:
+        return self.signer.fingerprint
+
+    def _sign(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        full = _signed_payload_dict(payload, key_id=self.fingerprint, namespace=MACHINE_NAMESPACE)
+        art = self.signer._sign_canonical(full)
+        return SignedOperationalArtifact(dict(art.payload), art.signature, art.key_id, art.namespace)
+
+    def issue_runtime_binding(
+        self,
+        delegation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding_id: str,
+        nonce: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        runtime_id: str,
+        runtime_sha256: str,
+        task_contract_version: str,
+        supported_contract_versions: Sequence[str],
+        required_capabilities: Sequence[str],
+        worker_capabilities: Sequence[str],
+        max_concurrency: int,
+        ttl_seconds: int,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        p = self.policy
+        verify_delegation_scope(delegation, p, now=now)
+        if "worker.runtime.bind" not in delegation["allowed_capabilities"]:
+            fail("RUNTIME_BIND_CAPABILITY_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        if worker_id not in p.allowed_worker_ids:
+            fail("WORKER_ID_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        for val, code in [(binding_id, "BINDING_ID_INVALID"), (nonce, "BINDING_NONCE_INVALID"), (worker_id, "WORKER_ID_INVALID"), (runtime_id, "RUNTIME_ID_INVALID"), (task_contract_version, "CONTRACT_VERSION_INVALID")]:
+            _safe_id(val, code)
+        _hex(runtime_sha256, 64, "RUNTIME_SHA256_INVALID")
+        supported = tuple(sorted(set(supported_contract_versions)))
+        if task_contract_version not in supported or not supported or any(not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(x) for x in supported):
+            fail("CONTRACT_INCOMPATIBLE")
+        required = _caps(required_capabilities, "REQUIRED_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+        worker_caps = _caps(worker_capabilities, "WORKER_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+        if not set(required).issubset(set(worker_caps)):
+            fail("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH")
+        if type(max_concurrency) is not int or not 1 <= max_concurrency <= 64:
+            fail("MAX_CONCURRENCY_INVALID")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 30 <= ttl_seconds <= p.maximum_binding_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("BINDING_TTL_INVALID")
+        if now + ttl_seconds > int(delegation["expires_at"]):
+            fail("BINDING_EXCEEDS_PARENT")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": WORKER_BINDING_SCHEMA,
+            "binding_id": binding_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "parent_delegation_id": delegation["delegation_id"],
+            "parent_delegation_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest(),
+            "repository": p.repository,
+            "task_id": p.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": p.task_identity_sha256,
+            "target_branch": p.target_branch,
+            "base_oid": p.base_oid,
+            "generation": p.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": p.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "external_job_identity": p.external_job_identity,
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "runtime_id": runtime_id,
+            "runtime_sha256": runtime_sha256,
+            "task_contract_version": task_contract_version,
+            "supported_contract_versions": list(supported),
+            "required_capabilities": list(required),
+            "worker_capabilities": list(worker_caps),
+            "max_concurrency": max_concurrency,
+            "policy_digest": p.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+    def issue_runtime_proof(
+        self,
+        delegation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        binding: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        proof_id: str,
+        nonce: str,
+        heartbeat_at: int,
+        adapter_readiness: bool,
+        resource_readiness: bool,
+        active_claim_count: int,
+        ttl_seconds: int,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        p = self.policy
+        verify_delegation_scope(delegation, p, now=now)
+        verify_binding_scope(binding, delegation, p, now=now)
+        if "worker.runtime.proof" not in delegation["allowed_capabilities"]:
+            fail("RUNTIME_PROOF_CAPABILITY_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        _safe_id(proof_id, "PROOF_ID_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(nonce, "PROOF_NONCE_INVALID")
+        if type(heartbeat_at) is not int or heartbeat_at > now + 5 or now - heartbeat_at > p.maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds:
+            fail("HEARTBEAT_STALE")
+        if adapter_readiness is not True or resource_readiness is not True:
+            fail("RUNTIME_NOT_READY")
+        if type(active_claim_count) is not int or active_claim_count < 0 or active_claim_count >= int(binding["max_concurrency"]):
+            fail("MAX_CONCURRENCY_REACHED")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 10 <= ttl_seconds <= p.maximum_proof_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("PROOF_TTL_INVALID")
+        if now + ttl_seconds > min(int(binding["expires_at"]), int(delegation["expires_at"])):
+            fail("PROOF_EXCEEDS_PARENT")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": WORKER_PROOF_SCHEMA,
+            "proof_id": proof_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "parent_delegation_id": delegation["delegation_id"],
+            "parent_delegation_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest(),
+            "binding_id": binding["binding_id"],
+            "binding_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(binding))).hexdigest(),
+            "repository": p.repository,
+            "task_id": p.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": p.task_identity_sha256,
+            "generation": p.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": p.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "worker_id": binding["worker_id"],
+            "runtime_id": binding["runtime_id"],
+            "runtime_sha256": binding["runtime_sha256"],
+            "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at,
+            "adapter_readiness": True,
+            "resource_readiness": True,
+            "active_claim_count": active_claim_count,
+            "max_concurrency": binding["max_concurrency"],
+            "policy_digest": p.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+
+DELEGATION_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","delegation_id","nonce","owner_identity","repository","task_id",
+    "task_identity_sha256","target_branch","base_oid","generation","execution_plan_sha256",
+    "external_job_identity","allowed_capabilities","allowed_worker_ids","policy_digest",
+    "issued_at","not_before","expires_at","revocation_epoch","status",
+    "signature_namespace","signature_key_id","canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+BINDING_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","binding_id","nonce","parent_delegation_id","parent_delegation_digest",
+    "repository","task_id","task_identity_sha256","target_branch","base_oid","generation",
+    "execution_plan_sha256","external_job_identity","worker_id","runtime_id","runtime_sha256",
+    "task_contract_version","supported_contract_versions","required_capabilities","worker_capabilities",
+    "max_concurrency","policy_digest","issued_at","not_before","expires_at",
+    "signature_namespace","signature_key_id","canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+PROOF_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","proof_id","nonce","parent_delegation_id","parent_delegation_digest",
+    "binding_id","binding_digest","repository","task_id","task_identity_sha256","generation",
+    "execution_plan_sha256","worker_id","runtime_id","runtime_sha256","heartbeat_at",
+    "adapter_readiness","resource_readiness","active_claim_count","max_concurrency",
+    "policy_digest","issued_at","expires_at","signature_namespace","signature_key_id",
+    "canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+RECOVERY_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","decision_id","nonce","parent_delegation_id","parent_delegation_digest",
+    "task_id","task_identity_sha256","expected_state","expected_revision","expected_attempt",
+    "original_deadline","new_deadline","repository","target_branch","base_oid","generation",
+    "execution_plan_sha256","external_job_identity","policy_digest","one_time_use",
+    "issued_at","not_before","expires_at","signature_namespace","signature_key_id",
+    "canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+
+
+def verify_delegation_scope(value: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    policy.validate()
+    _exact_fields(value, DELEGATION_FIELDS, "OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    if (
+        value["schema"] != OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCHEMA
+        or value["status"] != "ACTIVE"
+        or value["revocation_epoch"] != 0
+        or value["owner_identity"] != OWNER_IDENTITY
+        or value["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or value["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or value["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or value["target_branch"] != policy.target_branch
+        or value["base_oid"] != policy.base_oid
+        or value["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or value["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or value["external_job_identity"] != policy.external_job_identity
+        or value["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or not set(value["allowed_capabilities"]).issubset(set(policy.allowed_capabilities))
+        or not set(value["allowed_worker_ids"]).issubset(set(policy.allowed_worker_ids))
+        or value["signature_namespace"] != OWNER_NAMESPACE
+        or not _verify_digest_field(value)
+        or not int(value["not_before"]) <= now < int(value["expires_at"])
+    ):
+        fail("OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+
+def verify_binding_scope(binding: Mapping[str, Any], delegation: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    _exact_fields(binding, BINDING_FIELDS, "WORKER_BINDING_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    expected_parent = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest()
+    if (
+        binding["schema"] != WORKER_BINDING_SCHEMA
+        or binding["parent_delegation_id"] != delegation["delegation_id"]
+        or binding["parent_delegation_digest"] != expected_parent
+        or binding["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or binding["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or binding["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or binding["target_branch"] != policy.target_branch
+        or binding["base_oid"] != policy.base_oid
+        or binding["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or binding["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or binding["external_job_identity"] != policy.external_job_identity
+        or binding["worker_id"] not in policy.allowed_worker_ids
+        or binding["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or binding["signature_namespace"] != MACHINE_NAMESPACE
+        or not _verify_digest_field(binding)
+        or not int(binding["not_before"]) <= now < int(binding["expires_at"])
+    ):
+        fail("WORKER_BINDING_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    required = set(binding["required_capabilities"])
+    worker = set(binding["worker_capabilities"])
+    if not required.issubset(worker) or binding["task_contract_version"] not in binding["supported_contract_versions"]:
+        fail("WORKER_BINDING_COMPATIBILITY_INVALID")
+
+
+def verify_proof_scope(proof: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Mapping[str, Any], delegation: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    _exact_fields(proof, PROOF_FIELDS, "WORKER_PROOF_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    if (
+        proof["schema"] != WORKER_PROOF_SCHEMA
+        or proof["parent_delegation_id"] != delegation["delegation_id"]
+        or proof["parent_delegation_digest"] != hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest()
+        or proof["binding_id"] != binding["binding_id"]
+        or proof["binding_digest"] != hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(binding))).hexdigest()
+        or proof["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or proof["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or proof["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or proof["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or proof["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or proof["worker_id"] != binding["worker_id"]
+        or proof["runtime_id"] != binding["runtime_id"]
+        or proof["runtime_sha256"] != binding["runtime_sha256"]
+        or proof["max_concurrency"] != binding["max_concurrency"]
+        or proof["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or proof["signature_namespace"] != MACHINE_NAMESPACE
+        or proof["adapter_readiness"] is not True
+        or proof["resource_readiness"] is not True
+        or not _verify_digest_field(proof)
+        or not now < int(proof["expires_at"])
+        or now - int(proof["heartbeat_at"]) > policy.maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds
+        or int(proof["active_claim_count"]) >= int(proof["max_concurrency"])
+    ):
+        fail("WORKER_PROOF_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+
+def verify_recovery_scope(decision: Mapping[str, Any], delegation: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    _exact_fields(decision, RECOVERY_FIELDS, "RECOVERY_DECISION_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    if (
+        decision["schema"] != RECOVERY_DECISION_SCHEMA
+        or decision["parent_delegation_id"] != delegation["delegation_id"]
+        or decision["parent_delegation_digest"] != hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest()
+        or decision["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or decision["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or decision["expected_state"] != "EXPIRED"
+        or decision["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or decision["target_branch"] != policy.target_branch
+        or decision["base_oid"] != policy.base_oid
+        or decision["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or decision["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or decision["external_job_identity"] != policy.external_job_identity
+        or decision["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or decision["one_time_use"] is not True
+        or decision["signature_namespace"] != OWNER_NAMESPACE
+        or not _verify_digest_field(decision)
+        or not int(decision["not_before"]) <= now < int(decision["expires_at"])
+        or int(decision["new_deadline"]) <= now
+    ):
+        fail("RECOVERY_DECISION_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+
+class OperationalVerifier:
+    """Verify signatures through the public root-owned SignerRegistry."""
+
+    def __init__(self, registry_path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool = True):
+        self.registry_path = Path(registry_path)
+        self.require_root_owner = require_root_owner
+
+    def _verify(self, artifact: SignedOperationalArtifact | Mapping[str, Any], *, role: str, signer_id: str, namespace: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if isinstance(artifact, SignedOperationalArtifact):
+            payload, signature, key_id, artifact_namespace = artifact.payload, artifact.signature, artifact.key_id, artifact.namespace
+        else:
+            _exact_fields(artifact, {"payload","signature","key_id","namespace"}, "SIGNED_ARTIFACT_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            payload, signature, key_id, artifact_namespace = artifact["payload"], artifact["signature"], artifact["key_id"], artifact["namespace"]
+        if artifact_namespace != namespace:
+            fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_NAMESPACE_INVALID")
+        registry = SignerRegistry(self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner)
+        rec = registry.require(signer_id, role=role)
+        if rec.fingerprint != key_id:
+            fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_KEY_ID_INVALID")
+        if role == "MACHINE_OPERATIONAL":
+            owner_rec = registry.require(DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID, role="OWNER_AUTHORITY")
+            if rec.parent_signer_id != owner_rec.signer_id or rec.parent_fingerprint != owner_rec.fingerprint:
+                fail("MACHINE_PARENT_BINDING_INVALID")
+        # RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier handles Owner namespace; generic machine uses registry public key.
+        if role == "OWNER_AUTHORITY":
+            verifier = RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier(self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner, signer_id=signer_id)
+            ok = verifier.verify(namespace=namespace, payload=canonical_json_bytes(payload), signature=signature, key_id=key_id)
+        else:
+            from aios_single_host_authority import _load_public_key_line
+            pub = _load_public_key_line(rec.public_key)
+            ok = verify_sshsig(pub, canonical_json_bytes(payload), signature, namespace=namespace, expected_key_id=key_id)
+        if not ok:
+            fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+        return dict(payload)
+
+    def owner(self, artifact: SignedOperationalArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._verify(artifact, role="OWNER_AUTHORITY", signer_id=DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID, namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE)
+
+    def machine(self, artifact: SignedOperationalArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._verify(artifact, role="MACHINE_OPERATIONAL", signer_id=DEFAULT_MACHINE_SIGNER_ID, namespace=MACHINE_NAMESPACE)
@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+"""Unix-domain fixed-schema service for operational migration authority."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+import socket
+import sqlite3
+import struct
+import stat
+import sys
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import (
+    DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH,
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    MACHINE_NAMESPACE,
+    SingleHostAuthorityError,
+)
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority import (
+    OperationalAuthorityError,
+    OperationalMachineAuthority,
+    OperationalOwnerAuthority,
+    OperationalPolicy,
+    OperationalVerifier,
+    SignedOperationalArtifact,
+    verify_binding_scope,
+    verify_delegation_scope,
+)
+
+DEFAULT_POLICY = Path("/etc/aios/single-host-operational-policy.json")
+DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY = Path("/var/lib/aios-owner-authority/owner-authority.key")
+DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY = Path("/var/lib/aios-machine-signer/machine-operational.key")
+DEFAULT_OWNER_SOCKET = Path("/run/aios/owner-authority.sock")
+DEFAULT_MACHINE_SOCKET = Path("/run/aios/machine-signer.sock")
+DEFAULT_LEDGER = Path("/var/lib/aios-operational-authority/issuance-ledger.sqlite3")
+MAX_REQUEST = 128 * 1024
+READINESS_SCHEMA = "aios.signer-readiness-challenge.v1"
+
+
+class OperationalServiceError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OperationalServiceError(code)
+
+
+def _read_policy(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool = True) -> OperationalPolicy:
+    path=Path(path)
+    if not path.is_absolute():
+        fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_PATH_INVALID")
+    flags=os.O_RDONLY
+    if hasattr(os,"O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    try:
+        fd=os.open(path,flags)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise OperationalServiceError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    try:
+        st=os.fstat(fd)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_NOT_REGULAR")
+        mode=stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode)
+        if mode & 0o022:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_WRITABLE_BY_GROUP_OR_OTHER")
+        if require_root_owner and st.st_uid != 0:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_NOT_ROOT_OWNED")
+        raw=bytearray()
+        while len(raw) <= MAX_REQUEST:
+            chunk=os.read(fd,min(65536,MAX_REQUEST+1-len(raw)))
+            if not chunk: break
+            raw.extend(chunk)
+        if not raw or len(raw)>MAX_REQUEST:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+    try:
+        obj=json.loads(bytes(raw).decode("utf-8"))
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise OperationalServiceError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+    return OperationalPolicy.from_mapping(obj)
+
+
+def _artifact(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or set(value) != {"payload","signature","key_id","namespace"}:
+        fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(value["payload"], Mapping):
+        fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+    return SignedOperationalArtifact(
+        payload=dict(value["payload"]),
+        signature=str(value["signature"]),
+        key_id=str(value["key_id"]),
+        namespace=str(value["namespace"]),
+    )
+
+
+def _peer_uid(conn: socket.socket) -> int:
+    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
+        fail("PEER_CREDENTIALS_UNAVAILABLE")
+    pid, uid, gid = struct.unpack("3i", conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, struct.calcsize("3i")))
+    return uid
+
+
+
+class DurableIssuanceLedger:
+    """Root-owned exact-idempotent structured signing ledger."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if os.name == "posix": os.chmod(self.path.parent, 0o700)
+        if self.path.exists() and self.path.is_symlink():
+            fail("ISSUANCE_LEDGER_SYMLINK_FORBIDDEN")
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=DELETE")
+            conn.execute("""
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS issuance (
+                  role TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  operation TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  response_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  PRIMARY KEY(role, operation, nonce)
+                )
+            """)
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def issue(self, *, role: str, operation: str, nonce: str, request: Mapping[str, Any], issuer: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            json.dumps(request, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        try:
+            conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT request_sha256,response_json FROM issuance WHERE role=? AND operation=? AND nonce=?",
+                (role, operation, nonce),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None:
+                if row[0] != request_sha:
+                    conn.rollback()
+                    fail("NONCE_REUSE_WITH_DIFFERENT_REQUEST")
+                result = json.loads(row[1])
+                conn.commit()
+                return result
+            result = issuer()
+            encoded = json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":"), ensure_ascii=False)
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO issuance(role,operation,nonce,request_sha256,response_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (role, operation, nonce, request_sha, encoded, int(time.time())),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            return result
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
+            conn.rollback()
+            fail("ISSUANCE_LEDGER_RACE")
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+
+class OperationalAuthorityService:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        role: str,
+        policy_path: Path = DEFAULT_POLICY,
+        registry_path: Path = DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH,
+        owner_key_path: Path = DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY,
+        machine_key_path: Path = DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY,
+        socket_path: Path | None = None,
+        ledger_path: Path = DEFAULT_LEDGER,
+        allowed_uids: tuple[int, ...] = (0,),
+        clock: Any = time.time,
+        require_root_owner: bool = True,
+    ):
+        if role not in {"owner","machine"}:
+            fail("ROLE_INVALID")
+        self.role = role
+        self.policy_path = Path(policy_path)
+        self.registry_path = Path(registry_path)
+        self.owner_key_path = Path(owner_key_path)
+        self.machine_key_path = Path(machine_key_path)
+        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path or (DEFAULT_OWNER_SOCKET if role == "owner" else DEFAULT_MACHINE_SOCKET))
+        self.allowed_uids = tuple(allowed_uids)
+        self.ledger = DurableIssuanceLedger(ledger_path)
+        self.clock = clock
+        self.require_root_owner = require_root_owner
+
+    def _components(self):
+        policy = _read_policy(self.policy_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner)
+        verifier = OperationalVerifier(self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner)
+        if self.role == "owner":
+            signer = OperationalOwnerAuthority(self.owner_key_path, policy, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner, clock=self.clock)
+        else:
+            signer = OperationalMachineAuthority(self.machine_key_path, policy, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner, clock=self.clock)
+        return policy, verifier, signer
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if peer_uid not in self.allowed_uids:
+            fail("PEER_UID_FORBIDDEN")
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping) or set(request) != {"operation","payload"} or not isinstance(request["payload"], Mapping):
+            fail("REQUEST_INVALID")
+        op = request["operation"]
+        p = request["payload"]
+        policy, verifier, signer = self._components()
+
+        if op == "identity":
+            return {
+                "status":"PASS",
+                "role":self.role,
+                "policy_digest":policy.digest,
+                "key_id":signer.fingerprint,
+                "socket":str(self.socket_path),
+                "arbitrary_signing":False,
+            }
+
+        if op == "readiness_challenge":
+            if set(p) != {"challenge_id","challenge_sha256"}:
+                fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            challenge_id = str(p["challenge_id"])
+            challenge_sha256 = str(p["challenge_sha256"])
+            if not challenge_id or len(challenge_id) > 160:
+                fail("READINESS_CHALLENGE_ID_INVALID")
+            if not isinstance(challenge_sha256, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", challenge_sha256):
+                fail("READINESS_CHALLENGE_SHA256_INVALID")
+            namespace = OWNER_NAMESPACE if self.role == "owner" else MACHINE_NAMESPACE
+            def issue():
+                art = signer._sign({
+                    "schema": READINESS_SCHEMA,
+                    "role": self.role,
+                    "challenge_id": challenge_id,
+                    "challenge_sha256": challenge_sha256,
+                    "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+                    "issued_at": int(self.clock()),
+                })
+                return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+            return self.ledger.issue(
+                role=self.role,
+                operation=op,
+                nonce=challenge_id,
+                request=p,
+                issuer=issue,
+            )
+
+        if self.role == "owner":
+            if op == "issue_operational_delegation":
+                if set(p) != {"delegation_id","nonce","ttl_seconds"}:
+                    fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+                def issue():
+                    art = signer.issue_operational_delegation(
+                        delegation_id=str(p["delegation_id"]),
+                        nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                        ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                    )
+                    return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+                return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+            if op == "issue_expired_task_recovery":
+                if set(p) != {"delegation","decision_id","nonce","expected_revision","expected_attempt","original_deadline","new_deadline","ttl_seconds"}:
+                    fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+                parent_art = _artifact(p["delegation"])
+                parent = verifier.owner(parent_art)
+                verify_delegation_scope(parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+                def issue():
+                    art = signer.issue_recovery_decision(
+                        parent,
+                        decision_id=str(p["decision_id"]),
+                        nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                        expected_revision=p["expected_revision"],
+                        expected_attempt=p["expected_attempt"],
+                        original_deadline=p["original_deadline"],
+                        new_deadline=p["new_deadline"],
+                        ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                    )
+                    return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+                return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+            fail("OWNER_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+
+        if op == "issue_worker_runtime_binding":
+            if set(p) != {
+                "delegation","binding_id","nonce","worker_id","runtime_id","runtime_sha256",
+                "task_contract_version","supported_contract_versions","required_capabilities",
+                "worker_capabilities","max_concurrency","ttl_seconds"
+            }:
+                fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            parent_art = _artifact(p["delegation"])
+            parent = verifier.owner(parent_art)
+            verify_delegation_scope(parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+            def issue():
+                art = signer.issue_runtime_binding(
+                    parent,
+                    binding_id=str(p["binding_id"]), nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                    worker_id=str(p["worker_id"]), runtime_id=str(p["runtime_id"]),
+                    runtime_sha256=str(p["runtime_sha256"]),
+                    task_contract_version=str(p["task_contract_version"]),
+                    supported_contract_versions=tuple(p["supported_contract_versions"]),
+                    required_capabilities=tuple(p["required_capabilities"]),
+                    worker_capabilities=tuple(p["worker_capabilities"]),
+                    max_concurrency=p["max_concurrency"], ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                )
+                return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+            return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+
+        if op == "issue_worker_runtime_proof":
+            if set(p) != {
+                "delegation","binding","proof_id","nonce","heartbeat_at","adapter_readiness",
+                "resource_readiness","active_claim_count","ttl_seconds"
+            }:
+                fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            parent_art = _artifact(p["delegation"])
+            binding_art = _artifact(p["binding"])
+            parent = verifier.owner(parent_art)
+            binding = verifier.machine(binding_art)
+            verify_delegation_scope(parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+            verify_binding_scope(binding, parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+            def issue():
+                art = signer.issue_runtime_proof(
+                    parent, binding,
+                    proof_id=str(p["proof_id"]), nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                    heartbeat_at=p["heartbeat_at"],
+                    adapter_readiness=p["adapter_readiness"],
+                    resource_readiness=p["resource_readiness"],
+                    active_claim_count=p["active_claim_count"],
+                    ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                )
+                return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+            return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+
+        fail("MACHINE_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+
+    def serve_forever(self) -> None:
+        path = self.socket_path
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            if path.is_socket():
+                path.unlink()
+            else:
+                fail("SOCKET_PATH_OCCUPIED")
+        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        try:
+            sock.bind(str(path))
+            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+            sock.listen(16)
+            while True:
+                conn, _ = sock.accept()
+                with conn:
+                    try:
+                        uid = _peer_uid(conn)
+                        chunks = []
+                        total = 0
+                        while True:
+                            data = conn.recv(65536)
+                            if not data:
+                                break
+                            total += len(data)
+                            if total > MAX_REQUEST:
+                                fail("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
+                            chunks.append(data)
+                            if b"\n" in data:
+                                break
+                        raw = b"".join(chunks)
+                        line = raw.split(b"\n",1)[0]
+                        req = json.loads(line.decode("utf-8"))
+                        result = self.handle(req, peer_uid=uid)
+                        out = {"ok":True,"result":result}
+                    except (OperationalServiceError, OperationalAuthorityError, SingleHostAuthorityError) as exc:
+                        out = {"ok":False,"error":getattr(exc,"code",str(exc))}
+                    except Exception:
+                        out = {"ok":False,"error":"INTERNAL_FAIL_CLOSED"}
+                    conn.sendall(json.dumps(out, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":")).encode("utf-8")+b"\n")
+        finally:
+            sock.close()
+            try:
+                path.unlink()
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("--role", choices=("owner","machine"), required=True)
+    ap.add_argument("--policy", default=str(DEFAULT_POLICY))
+    ap.add_argument("--registry", default=str(DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH))
+    ap.add_argument("--owner-key", default=str(DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY))
+    ap.add_argument("--machine-key", default=str(DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY))
+    ap.add_argument("--socket")
+    ns = ap.parse_args()
+    service = OperationalAuthorityService(
+        role=ns.role,
+        policy_path=Path(ns.policy),
+        registry_path=Path(ns.registry),
+        owner_key_path=Path(ns.owner_key),
+        machine_key_path=Path(ns.machine_key),
+        socket_path=Path(ns.socket) if ns.socket else None,
+    )
+    service.serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,945 @@
+"""Fail-closed bootstrap for narrow Owner-delegated Agent Task admission.
+
+This module solves the authorization bootstrap problem without turning the
+runtime anchor into a writer and without weakening TaskPrincipal semantics.
+
+Security model:
+
+* A task-admission envelope is created from a server-normalized request.
+* The envelope is authorized either by an already-valid OwnerDelegationEpoch
+  or by an Owner signature verified by an injected trust backend.
+* The derived TaskAdmissionGrant can only narrow the parent authorization.
+* The grant is handed to the existing Agent Task control plane through an
+  injected TaskAdmissionPort. This module never writes the Task database.
+* TaskPrincipal issuance remains downstream of a real Task claim/TaskLease.
+* Exact idempotent replay returns the same admitted Task; conflicting reuse is
+  rejected.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from contextlib import closing, contextmanager
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
+import re
+import secrets
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+
+SCHEMA_ENVELOPE = "aios.task-admission-envelope.v1"
+SCHEMA_GRANT = "aios.task-admission-grant.v1"
+SCHEMA_EPOCH = "aios.owner-delegation-epoch.v1"
+SCHEMA_RECEIPT = "aios.task-admission-receipt.v1"
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/-]{7,255}$")
+CAPABILITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+KEY_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@+-]{2,255}$")
+
+PROHIBITED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
+    {
+        "git.global_write",
+        "git.main_write",
+        "git.force_push",
+        "tag.publish",
+        "baseline.finalize",
+        "production.write",
+        "production.switch",
+        "runtime_anchor.write",
+        "shell.arbitrary",
+        "credential.export",
+    }
+)
+
+
+class TaskAdmissionError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed task-admission error."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        code: str,
+        status: int = 400,
+        *,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+        self.details = dict(details or {})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class TaskAdmissionPolicy:
+    repository: str = "aios/aios"
+    trust_domain: str = "aios.owner"
+    branch_prefix: str = "agent/"
+    allowed_capabilities: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+        {
+            "governed.task.create",
+            "agent-task:control",
+            "task.principal.issue",
+            "writer.lease",
+            "governed.write.files",
+            "git.read",
+            "git.test",
+            "governed.write.branch",
+            "governed.write.file",
+            "testing",
+            "verification",
+        }
+    )
+    max_file_count: int = 64
+    max_task_ttl_seconds: int = 3600
+    max_envelope_ttl_seconds: int = 900
+    max_risk: str = "medium"
+    policy_digest: str = ""
+
+    def normalized_policy_digest(self) -> str:
+        if self.policy_digest:
+            return self.policy_digest
+        return sha256_json(
+            {
+                "repository": self.repository,
+                "trust_domain": self.trust_domain,
+                "branch_prefix": self.branch_prefix,
+                "allowed_capabilities": sorted(self.allowed_capabilities),
+                "max_file_count": self.max_file_count,
+                "max_task_ttl_seconds": self.max_task_ttl_seconds,
+                "max_envelope_ttl_seconds": self.max_envelope_ttl_seconds,
+                "max_risk": self.max_risk,
+                "prohibited_capabilities": sorted(PROHIBITED_CAPABILITIES),
+            }
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerDelegationEpoch:
+    """Already-verified durable Owner authorization.
+
+    The verifier/backend is responsible for authenticating the epoch before
+    returning it to this service.
+    """
+
+    epoch_id: str
+    owner_identity: str
+    trust_domain: str
+    repository: str
+    allowed_branch_prefixes: tuple[str, ...]
+    allowed_capabilities: frozenset[str]
+    allowed_file_prefixes: tuple[str, ...]
+    risk_ceiling: str
+    issued_at: int
+    not_before: int
+    expires_at: int
+    revocation_epoch: int
+    policy_digest: str
+    schema: str = SCHEMA_EPOCH
+
+    def as_public_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["allowed_capabilities"] = sorted(self.allowed_capabilities)
+        value["allowed_branch_prefixes"] = list(self.allowed_branch_prefixes)
+        value["allowed_file_prefixes"] = list(self.allowed_file_prefixes)
+        return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class TaskAdmissionEnvelope:
+    envelope_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    authority_base_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    execution_digest: str
+    requested_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+    file_allowlist: tuple[str, ...]
+    risk: str
+    trust_domain: str
+    policy_digest: str
+    issued_at: int
+    not_before: int
+    expires_at: int
+    nonce: str
+    request_digest: str
+    schema: str = SCHEMA_ENVELOPE
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["requested_capabilities"] = list(self.requested_capabilities)
+        value["file_allowlist"] = list(self.file_allowlist)
+        return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class TaskAdmissionGrant:
+    grant_id: str
+    envelope_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    authority_base_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    execution_digest: str
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+    file_allowlist: tuple[str, ...]
+    risk: str
+    trust_domain: str
+    policy_digest: str
+    authorization_kind: str
+    owner_identity: str
+    parent_epoch_id: str | None
+    issued_at: int
+    expires_at: int
+    one_time_use: bool = True
+    schema: str = SCHEMA_GRANT
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["capabilities"] = list(self.capabilities)
+        value["file_allowlist"] = list(self.file_allowlist)
+        return value
+
+
+class OwnerAuthorizationBackend(Protocol):
+    """Bridge to existing trusted Owner authorization.
+
+    No permissive default implementation is provided.
+    """
+
+    def verify_delegation_epoch(self, epoch_id: str) -> OwnerDelegationEpoch:
+        ...
+
+    def verify_owner_signature(
+        self,
+        *,
+        key_id: str,
+        canonical_payload: bytes,
+        signature_b64: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        """Return the verified Owner identity or raise."""
+        ...
+
+
+class TaskAdmissionPort(Protocol):
+    """Existing Agent Task control-plane port."""
+
+    def admit(self, grant: TaskAdmissionGrant) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        ...
+
+
+def utc_seconds() -> int:
+    return int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp())
+
+
+def canonical_json_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _normalize_files(raw: Sequence[object], *, maximum: int) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
+        raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_FILE_ALLOWLIST_REJECTED", 403)
+    if not raw or len(raw) > maximum:
+        raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_FILE_ALLOWLIST_REJECTED", 403)
+    normalized: list[str] = []
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+    for item in raw:
+        if (
+            not isinstance(item, str)
+            or not item
+            or "\\" in item
+            or any(ord(char) < 32 or ord(char) == 127 for char in item)
+        ):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_FILE_PATH_INVALID", 403)
+        path = PurePosixPath(item)
+        if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or "." in path.parts:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_FILE_PATH_INVALID", 403)
+        text = path.as_posix()
+        # Do not normalize a caller supplied path.  A signature must bind the
+        # exact spelling, not a convenient equivalent such as ``a//b``.
+        if text != item:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_FILE_PATH_INVALID", 403)
+        if text.startswith(".git/") or text == ".git":
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_FILE_PATH_INVALID", 403)
+        if text not in seen:
+            normalized.append(text)
+            seen.add(text)
+    if not normalized:
+        raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_FILE_ALLOWLIST_REJECTED", 403)
+    return tuple(sorted(normalized))
+
+
+def _normalize_capabilities(
+    raw: Sequence[object],
+    *,
+    policy: TaskAdmissionPolicy,
+) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not raw:
+        raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_CAPABILITIES_REQUIRED", 403)
+    values: set[str] = set()
+    for item in raw:
+        if not isinstance(item, str) or not CAPABILITY_RE.fullmatch(item):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_CAPABILITY_INVALID", 403)
+        if "*" in item:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_WILDCARD_CAPABILITY_REJECTED", 403)
+        values.add(item)
+    if values & PROHIBITED_CAPABILITIES:
+        raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_PROHIBITED_CAPABILITY", 403)
+    if not values.issubset(policy.allowed_capabilities):
+        raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_CAPABILITY_OUT_OF_POLICY", 403)
+    return tuple(sorted(values))
+
+
+def _risk_rank(value: str) -> int:
+    ranks = {"low": 0, "medium": 1, "high": 2}
+    try:
+        return ranks[value]
+    except KeyError:
+        raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_RISK_INVALID", 403) from None
+
+
+def _request_for_digest(
+    *,
+    task_id: str,
+    repository: str,
+    authority_base_oid: str,
+    target_branch: str,
+    generation: int,
+    execution_digest: str,
+    requested_capabilities: tuple[str, ...],
+    file_allowlist: tuple[str, ...],
+    risk: str,
+    trust_domain: str,
+    policy_digest: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "repository": repository,
+        "authority_base_oid": authority_base_oid,
+        "target_branch": target_branch,
+        "generation": generation,
+        "execution_digest": execution_digest,
+        "requested_capabilities": list(requested_capabilities),
+        "file_allowlist": list(file_allowlist),
+        "risk": risk,
+        "trust_domain": trust_domain,
+        "policy_digest": policy_digest,
+    }
+
+
+class TaskAdmissionStore:
+    """Portable durable state; all replay decisions are transactionally stored."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.lock_root = Path(str(self.path) + ".locks")
+        self.lock_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        with self._connection() as con:
+            con.executescript(
+                """
+                PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL;
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_admission_envelopes(
+                    idempotency_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    envelope_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    request_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    envelope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_admission_grants(
+                    envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    grant_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    authorization_digest TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+                    created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_admission_receipts(
+                    envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                """
+            )
+            columns = {
+                row["name"] for row in con.execute("PRAGMA table_info(task_admission_grants)")
+            }
+            if "authorization_digest" not in columns:
+                con.execute(
+                    "ALTER TABLE task_admission_grants ADD COLUMN authorization_digest TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''"
+                )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        con = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
+        con.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        return con
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _connection(self):
+        """Yield an owned main-store connection and close it deterministically."""
+        with closing(self._connect()) as con:
+            try:
+                yield con
+            finally:
+                if con.in_transaction:
+                    con.rollback()
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def admission_lock(self, envelope_id: str, *, timeout_seconds: float = 5.0):
+        """Hold a crash-releasing lock for one envelope, outside the main DB."""
+        lock_name = hashlib.sha256(envelope_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() + ".sqlite3"
+        lock_path = self.lock_root / lock_name
+        with closing(sqlite3.connect(lock_path, timeout=timeout_seconds, isolation_level=None)) as con:
+            try:
+                con.execute("BEGIN EXCLUSIVE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_IN_PROGRESS", 503) from exc
+            try:
+                yield
+                con.execute("COMMIT")
+            finally:
+                if con.in_transaction:
+                    con.rollback()
+
+    def get_by_idempotency(self, key: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connection() as con:
+            row = con.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_admission_envelopes WHERE idempotency_key=?",
+                (key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return dict(row) if row else None
+
+    def get_envelope(self, envelope_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connection() as con:
+            row = con.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_admission_envelopes WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (envelope_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return dict(row) if row else None
+
+    def save_envelope(
+        self,
+        *,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+        envelope_id: str,
+        request_digest: str,
+        envelope_json: str,
+        created_at: int,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock, self._connection() as con:
+            con.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = con.execute(
+                "SELECT request_digest,envelope_id FROM task_admission_envelopes WHERE idempotency_key=?",
+                (idempotency_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None:
+                con.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                if row["request_digest"] != request_digest:
+                    raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                return json.loads(
+                    con.execute(
+                        "SELECT envelope_json FROM task_admission_envelopes WHERE idempotency_key=?",
+                        (idempotency_key,),
+                    ).fetchone()["envelope_json"]
+                )
+            con.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_admission_envelopes(
+                    idempotency_key,envelope_id,request_digest,envelope_json,status,created_at
+                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    idempotency_key,
+                    envelope_id,
+                    request_digest,
+                    envelope_json,
+                    "PENDING_AUTHORIZATION",
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            con.execute("COMMIT")
+        return json.loads(envelope_json)
+
+    def claim_grant(
+        self,
+        *,
+        envelope_id: str,
+        grant: TaskAdmissionGrant,
+        authorization_digest: str,
+        created_at: int,
+    ) -> tuple[TaskAdmissionGrant, bool]:
+        """Persist the immutable grant before the external Task side effect.
+
+        ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes only this SQLite writer transaction;
+        it does not serialize unrelated envelopes.  A second proof cannot
+        replace the winning proof/grant for the same envelope.
+        """
+        grant_json = canonical_json_bytes(grant.as_dict()).decode("utf-8")
+        grant_digest = hashlib.sha256(grant_json.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        with self._lock, self._connection() as con:
+            con.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = con.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_json,authorization_digest FROM task_admission_grants WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (envelope_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None:
+                con.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                if row["authorization_digest"] != authorization_digest:
+                    raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_AUTHORIZATION_CONFLICT", 409)
+                raw = json.loads(row["grant_json"])
+                return (
+                    TaskAdmissionGrant(
+                        **{
+                            **raw,
+                            "capabilities": tuple(raw["capabilities"]),
+                            "file_allowlist": tuple(raw["file_allowlist"]),
+                        }
+                    ),
+                    False,
+                )
+            con.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO task_admission_grants(envelope_id,grant_id,grant_digest,grant_json,authorization_digest,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (envelope_id, grant.grant_id, grant_digest, grant_json, authorization_digest, created_at),
+            )
+            con.execute(
+                "UPDATE task_admission_envelopes SET status='ADMITTING' WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (envelope_id,),
+            )
+            con.execute("COMMIT")
+        return grant, True
+
+    def receipt(self, envelope_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connection() as con:
+            row = con.execute(
+                "SELECT receipt_json FROM task_admission_receipts WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (envelope_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return json.loads(row["receipt_json"]) if row else None
+
+    def save_grant_and_receipt(
+        self,
+        *,
+        envelope_id: str,
+        grant: TaskAdmissionGrant,
+        receipt: Mapping[str, Any],
+        created_at: int,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        grant_json = canonical_json_bytes(grant.as_dict()).decode("utf-8")
+        grant_digest = hashlib.sha256(grant_json.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        receipt_json = canonical_json_bytes(dict(receipt)).decode("utf-8")
+        with self._lock, self._connection() as con:
+            con.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = con.execute(
+                "SELECT receipt_json FROM task_admission_receipts WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (envelope_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                con.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                return json.loads(existing["receipt_json"])
+            stored = con.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id,grant_digest FROM task_admission_grants WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (envelope_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if stored is None:
+                con.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO task_admission_grants(envelope_id,grant_id,grant_digest,grant_json,authorization_digest,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (envelope_id, grant.grant_id, grant_digest, grant_json, "", created_at),
+                )
+            elif stored["grant_id"] != grant.grant_id or stored["grant_digest"] != grant_digest:
+                con.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_GRANT_CONFLICT", 409)
+            con.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_admission_receipts(
+                    envelope_id,task_id,receipt_json,created_at
+                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    envelope_id,
+                    grant.task_id,
+                    receipt_json,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            con.execute(
+                "UPDATE task_admission_envelopes SET status='ADMITTED' WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (envelope_id,),
+            )
+            con.execute("COMMIT")
+        return dict(receipt)
+
+    def status(self, envelope_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row = self.get_envelope(envelope_id)
+        if row is None:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_ENVELOPE_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        receipt = self.receipt(envelope_id)
+        return {
+            "envelope_id": envelope_id,
+            "status": row["status"],
+            "task": receipt,
+        }
+
+
+class TaskAdmissionBootstrapService:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        store: TaskAdmissionStore,
+        authorization: OwnerAuthorizationBackend,
+        task_port: TaskAdmissionPort,
+        policy: TaskAdmissionPolicy | None = None,
+        clock=utc_seconds,
+        post_admission: Callable[[TaskAdmissionGrant, Mapping[str, Any]], Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self.authorization = authorization
+        self.task_port = task_port
+        self.policy = policy or TaskAdmissionPolicy()
+        self.clock = clock
+        # This is a narrow server-side projection boundary. The official
+        # Agent Task port remains the admission authority; a projection may
+        # only establish local execution state after its exact Task readback.
+        self.post_admission = post_admission
+        self._admit_lock = threading.RLock()
+
+    def create_envelope(self, raw: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        required = {
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "task_id",
+            "repository",
+            "authority_base_oid",
+            "target_branch",
+            "generation",
+            "execution_digest",
+            "requested_capabilities",
+            "file_allowlist",
+            "risk",
+        }
+        optional = {"expires_in_seconds"}
+        if set(raw) - (required | optional) or not required.issubset(raw):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        idempotency_key = str(raw["idempotency_key"])
+        task_id = str(raw["task_id"])
+        repository = str(raw["repository"])
+        authority_base_oid = str(raw["authority_base_oid"])
+        target_branch = str(raw["target_branch"])
+        execution_digest = str(raw["execution_digest"])
+        if not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(idempotency_key):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not TASK_RE.fullmatch(task_id):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_TASK_ID_INVALID")
+        if repository != self.policy.repository:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_REPOSITORY_REJECTED", 403)
+        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(authority_base_oid):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        if (
+            not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(target_branch)
+            or not target_branch.startswith(self.policy.branch_prefix)
+            or "//" in target_branch
+            or ".." in target_branch
+            or "@{" in target_branch
+            or target_branch.endswith(("/", "."))
+            or any(
+                not component
+                or component.startswith(".")
+                or component.endswith(".lock")
+                for component in target_branch.split("/")
+            )
+        ):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRANCH_REJECTED", 403)
+        generation = raw["generation"]
+        if not isinstance(generation, int) or isinstance(generation, bool):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_GENERATION_INVALID")
+        if generation < 1:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_GENERATION_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$", execution_digest):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        requested_capabilities = _normalize_capabilities(
+            raw["requested_capabilities"],
+            policy=self.policy,
+        )
+        file_allowlist = _normalize_files(
+            raw["file_allowlist"],
+            maximum=self.policy.max_file_count,
+        )
+        risk = str(raw["risk"])
+        if _risk_rank(risk) > _risk_rank(self.policy.max_risk):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_RISK_OUT_OF_POLICY", 403)
+        ttl = raw.get("expires_in_seconds", self.policy.max_envelope_ttl_seconds)
+        if (
+            not isinstance(ttl, int)
+            or isinstance(ttl, bool)
+            or ttl < 60
+            or ttl > self.policy.max_envelope_ttl_seconds
+        ):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_ENVELOPE_TTL_INVALID")
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        policy_digest = self.policy.normalized_policy_digest()
+        request_value = _request_for_digest(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            repository=repository,
+            authority_base_oid=authority_base_oid,
+            target_branch=target_branch,
+            generation=generation,
+            execution_digest=execution_digest,
+            requested_capabilities=requested_capabilities,
+            file_allowlist=file_allowlist,
+            risk=risk,
+            trust_domain=self.policy.trust_domain,
+            policy_digest=policy_digest,
+        )
+        request_digest = sha256_json(request_value)
+        nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
+        envelope_id = "task-admission-" + hashlib.sha256(
+            (idempotency_key + "\0" + request_digest + "\0" + nonce).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()[:32]
+        envelope = TaskAdmissionEnvelope(
+            envelope_id=envelope_id,
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            repository=repository,
+            authority_base_oid=authority_base_oid,
+            target_branch=target_branch,
+            generation=generation,
+            execution_digest=execution_digest,
+            requested_capabilities=requested_capabilities,
+            file_allowlist=file_allowlist,
+            risk=risk,
+            trust_domain=self.policy.trust_domain,
+            policy_digest=policy_digest,
+            issued_at=now,
+            not_before=now,
+            expires_at=now + ttl,
+            nonce=nonce,
+            request_digest=request_digest,
+        )
+        envelope_dict = envelope.as_dict()
+        persisted = self.store.save_envelope(
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            envelope_id=envelope_id,
+            request_digest=request_digest,
+            envelope_json=canonical_json_bytes(envelope_dict).decode("utf-8"),
+            created_at=now,
+        )
+        won = persisted["envelope_id"] == envelope_id
+        return {
+            "schema": SCHEMA_ENVELOPE,
+            "envelope": persisted,
+            "canonical_payload_base64": base64.b64encode(
+                canonical_json_bytes(persisted)
+            ).decode("ascii"),
+            "idempotent": not won,
+        }
+
+    def _load_envelope(self, envelope_id: str) -> TaskAdmissionEnvelope:
+        row = self.store.get_envelope(envelope_id)
+        if row is None:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_ENVELOPE_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        raw = json.loads(row["envelope_json"])
+        return TaskAdmissionEnvelope(
+            **{
+                **raw,
+                "requested_capabilities": tuple(raw["requested_capabilities"]),
+                "file_allowlist": tuple(raw["file_allowlist"]),
+            }
+        )
+
+    def _verify_epoch(
+        self,
+        *,
+        epoch_id: str,
+        envelope: TaskAdmissionEnvelope,
+        now: int,
+    ) -> OwnerDelegationEpoch:
+        epoch = self.authorization.verify_delegation_epoch(epoch_id)
+        if epoch.schema != SCHEMA_EPOCH:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_SCHEMA_INVALID", 403)
+        if epoch.epoch_id != epoch_id:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        if (
+            epoch.trust_domain != envelope.trust_domain
+            or epoch.repository != envelope.repository
+            or epoch.policy_digest != envelope.policy_digest
+        ):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_BINDING_MISMATCH", 403)
+        if epoch.revocation_epoch != 0:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_REVOKED", 403)
+        if not epoch.not_before <= now < epoch.expires_at:
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_EXPIRED", 403)
+        if not any(
+            envelope.target_branch.startswith(prefix)
+            for prefix in epoch.allowed_branch_prefixes
+        ):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_BRANCH_REJECTED", 403)
+        caps = set(envelope.requested_capabilities)
+        if not caps.issubset(epoch.allowed_capabilities):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_CAPABILITY_WIDENING", 403)
+        if _risk_rank(envelope.risk) > _risk_rank(epoch.risk_ceiling):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_RISK_WIDENING", 403)
+        for path in envelope.file_allowlist:
+            if not any(
+                path == prefix.rstrip("/")
+                or path.startswith(prefix.rstrip("/") + "/")
+                for prefix in epoch.allowed_file_prefixes
+            ):
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_FILE_WIDENING", 403)
+        return epoch
+
+    def authorize_and_admit(self, raw: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        required = {"envelope_id", "authorization_kind"}
+        allowed = required | {
+            "delegation_epoch_id",
+            "owner_key_id",
+            "signature_base64",
+        }
+        if set(raw) - allowed or not required.issubset(raw):
+            raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_AUTH_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        envelope_id = str(raw["envelope_id"])
+        with self.store.admission_lock(envelope_id):
+            # Every replay revalidates policy, temporal bounds, revocation and
+            # proof after the crash-releasing lock is owned.
+            envelope = self._load_envelope(envelope_id)
+            now = int(self.clock())
+            if envelope.policy_digest != self.policy.normalized_policy_digest():
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_POLICY_DIGEST_DRIFT", 403)
+            if now < envelope.not_before or now >= envelope.expires_at:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_ENVELOPE_EXPIRED", 403)
+
+            kind = str(raw["authorization_kind"])
+            parent_epoch: OwnerDelegationEpoch | None = None
+            if kind == "delegation_epoch":
+                epoch_id = str(raw.get("delegation_epoch_id") or "")
+                if not epoch_id:
+                    raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_EPOCH_REQUIRED")
+                parent_epoch = self._verify_epoch(epoch_id=epoch_id, envelope=envelope, now=now)
+                owner_identity = parent_epoch.owner_identity
+                parent_epoch_id: str | None = parent_epoch.epoch_id
+            elif kind == "owner_signature":
+                key_id = str(raw.get("owner_key_id") or "")
+                signature = str(raw.get("signature_base64") or "")
+                if not KEY_ID_RE.fullmatch(key_id) or not signature:
+                    raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_OWNER_SIGNATURE_REQUIRED")
+                owner_identity = self.authorization.verify_owner_signature(
+                    key_id=key_id,
+                    canonical_payload=canonical_json_bytes(envelope.as_dict()),
+                    signature_b64=signature,
+                )
+                if not isinstance(owner_identity, str) or not owner_identity:
+                    raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_OWNER_SIGNATURE_INVALID", 403)
+                parent_epoch_id = None
+            else:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_AUTHORIZATION_KIND_REJECTED", 403)
+
+            authorization_digest = sha256_json(dict(raw))
+            grant_id = "task-grant-" + hashlib.sha256(
+                (envelope.envelope_id + "\0" + kind + "\0" + owner_identity + "\0" + (parent_epoch_id or "")).encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest()[:32]
+            grant = TaskAdmissionGrant(
+                grant_id=grant_id, envelope_id=envelope.envelope_id, task_id=envelope.task_id,
+                repository=envelope.repository, authority_base_oid=envelope.authority_base_oid,
+                target_branch=envelope.target_branch, generation=envelope.generation,
+                execution_digest=envelope.execution_digest, capabilities=envelope.requested_capabilities,
+                file_allowlist=envelope.file_allowlist, risk=envelope.risk,
+                trust_domain=envelope.trust_domain, policy_digest=envelope.policy_digest,
+                authorization_kind=kind, owner_identity=owner_identity,
+                parent_epoch_id=parent_epoch_id, issued_at=now,
+                expires_at=min(
+                    envelope.expires_at,
+                    now + self.policy.max_task_ttl_seconds,
+                    parent_epoch.expires_at if parent_epoch is not None else envelope.expires_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            persisted_grant, _ = self.store.claim_grant(
+                envelope_id=envelope_id, grant=grant,
+                authorization_digest=authorization_digest, created_at=now,
+            )
+            if now >= persisted_grant.expires_at:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_GRANT_EXPIRED", 403)
+            if parent_epoch is not None and persisted_grant.expires_at > parent_epoch.expires_at:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_GRANT_PARENT_EXPIRY_CONFLICT", 409)
+            existing_receipt = self.store.receipt(envelope_id)
+            if existing_receipt is not None:
+                return {**existing_receipt, "idempotent": True}
+
+            try:
+                result = self.task_port.admit(persisted_grant)
+            except TaskAdmissionError:
+                raise
+            except Exception as exc:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_TASK_STATE_UNKNOWN", 503) from exc
+            if not isinstance(result, Mapping):
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_PORT_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502)
+            state = str(result.get("state") or result.get("status") or "")
+            if str(result.get("task_id") or "") != persisted_grant.task_id:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_PORT_TASK_MISMATCH", 502)
+            if state not in {"QUEUED", "CLAIMED", "RUNNING"}:
+                raise TaskAdmissionError("TASK_ADMISSION_PORT_STATE_INVALID", 502, details={"state": state})
+            if self.post_admission is not None:
+                projection_result: Mapping[str, Any] = result
+                projection_reader = getattr(self.task_port, "projection_result", None)
+                if callable(projection_reader):
+                    try:
+                        candidate = projection_reader(persisted_grant, result)
+                    except TaskAdmissionError:
+                        raise
+                    except Exception as exc:
+                        raise TaskAdmissionError(
+                            "TASK_ADMISSION_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_FAILED", 503
+                        ) from exc
+                    if not isinstance(candidate, Mapping):
+                        raise TaskAdmissionError(
+                            "TASK_ADMISSION_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_INVALID", 503
+                        )
+                    projection_result = candidate
+                try:
+                    projection = self.post_admission(
+                        persisted_grant, projection_result
+                    )
+                except TaskAdmissionError:
+                    raise
+                except Exception as exc:
+                    raise TaskAdmissionError(
+                        "TASK_ADMISSION_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_FAILED", 503
+                    ) from exc
+                if projection is not None and not isinstance(projection, Mapping):
+                    raise TaskAdmissionError(
+                        "TASK_ADMISSION_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_INVALID", 503
+                    )
+            receipt = {
+                "schema": SCHEMA_RECEIPT, "envelope_id": persisted_grant.envelope_id,
+                "grant_id": persisted_grant.grant_id, "task_id": persisted_grant.task_id,
+                "task_state": state, "authorization_kind": persisted_grant.authorization_kind,
+                "owner_identity": persisted_grant.owner_identity, "parent_epoch_id": persisted_grant.parent_epoch_id,
+                "authority_base_oid": persisted_grant.authority_base_oid,
+                "target_branch": persisted_grant.target_branch, "generation": persisted_grant.generation,
+                "execution_digest": persisted_grant.execution_digest,
+                "grant_digest_sha256": sha256_json(persisted_grant.as_dict()),
+                "admitted_at": now, "idempotent": False,
+            }
+            return self.store.save_grant_and_receipt(
+                envelope_id=envelope_id, grant=persisted_grant, receipt=receipt, created_at=now,
+            )
+
+    def status(self, envelope_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self.store.status(envelope_id)
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""Bridge contract surface for Task Admission Bootstrap.
+
+This module is intentionally transport-agnostic. The live Bridge may merge
+these routes/operations into its existing authenticated/HTTPS surface, but the
+authorization proof for the authorize operation is the verified delegation
+epoch or Owner signature carried by the request itself.
+
+No handler here can issue TaskPrincipal assertions or WriterLeases. Those remain
+strictly downstream of a real admitted/claimed Agent Task.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_task_admission_bootstrap import TaskAdmissionBootstrapService
+
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_ROUTES = {
+    "/v2/task-admission/envelope": "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope",
+    "/v2/task-admission/authorize": "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization",
+    "/v2/task-admission/status": "getTaskAdmissionStatus",
+}
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
+    "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope": (
+        "idempotency_key",
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "authority_base_oid",
+        "target_branch",
+        "generation",
+        "execution_digest",
+        "requested_capabilities",
+        "file_allowlist",
+        "risk",
+    ),
+    "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization": (
+        "envelope_id",
+        "authorization_kind",
+    ),
+    "getTaskAdmissionStatus": ("envelope_id",),
+}
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS = {
+    "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope": ("expires_in_seconds",),
+    "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization": (
+        "delegation_epoch_id",
+        "owner_key_id",
+        "signature_base64",
+    ),
+    "getTaskAdmissionStatus": (),
+}
+
+
+class TaskAdmissionBridgeContract:
+    def __init__(self, service: TaskAdmissionBootstrapService) -> None:
+        self.service = service
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_fields(operation: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        required = set(TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation])
+        allowed = required | set(TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS[operation])
+        if not required.issubset(request):
+            raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_REQUIRED_FIELDS_MISSING")
+        if set(request) - allowed:
+            raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_UNKNOWN_FIELDS")
+
+    def dispatch(self, operation: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if operation not in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS:
+            raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_OPERATION_NOT_FOUND")
+        self._validate_fields(operation, request)
+        if operation == "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope":
+            return self.service.create_envelope(request)
+        if operation == "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization":
+            return self.service.authorize_and_admit(request)
+        if operation == "getTaskAdmissionStatus":
+            return self.service.status(str(request["envelope_id"]))
+        raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_OPERATION_NOT_FOUND")
+
+    def handlers(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            operation: (
+                lambda request, operation=operation: self.dispatch(operation, request)
+            )
+            for operation in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+"""Append-only ClaimGuard binding for the superseded Single-Host child Task."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession_initial_projection import (
+    PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+    PROJECTION_TABLE,
+    SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+)
+
+SOURCE_TASK_ID = "TASK-SINGLEHOST-TRUSTROOT-P0-20260904"
+CHILD_TASK_ID = SOURCE_TASK_ID + "-S1"
+WORKER_ID = "p0-task-principal-v15-20260830"
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/single-host-trust-root-p0-20260904"
+GENERATION = 1
+EXTERNAL_JOB_ID = "job-4e10f92a6a5742518a9f1d8745c845ab"
+BINDING_SCHEMA = "aios.task-claim-guard-binding.v2"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-claim-guard-binding-receipt.v2"
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+
+class ClaimGuardBindingError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, http_status: int = 409):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.http_status = int(http_status)
+
+
+def _fail(code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+    raise ClaimGuardBindingError(code, status)
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False)
+
+
+def _sha_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _sha_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return _sha_text(canonical_json(value))
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _row_dict(row: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if row is None:
+        return {}
+    if hasattr(row, "keys"):
+        return {str(key): row[key] for key in row.keys()}
+    _fail("TASK_ROW_MAPPING_UNAVAILABLE", 500)
+
+
+def _json(raw: Any, code: str) -> Any:
+    if not isinstance(raw, str):
+        _fail(code)
+    try:
+        return json.loads(raw)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError(code) from exc
+
+
+def _default_policy_factory(value: Mapping[str, Any]):
+    try:
+        from aios_single_host_operational_authority import OperationalPolicy
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+    return OperationalPolicy.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def _policy_value(policy: Any, name: str) -> Any:
+    try:
+        return getattr(policy, name)
+    except AttributeError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_FIELDS_INVALID") from exc
+
+
+def _load_projection_evidence(connection, relation) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            f"SELECT * FROM {PROJECTION_TABLE} WHERE task_id=? AND source_task_id=? "
+            "AND supersession_ordinal=?",
+            (CHILD_TASK_ID, SOURCE_TASK_ID, 1),
+        ).fetchone()
+    except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError(
+            "FORMAL_CHILD_INITIAL_PROJECTION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503
+        ) from exc
+    if row is None:
+        _fail("FORMAL_CHILD_INITIAL_PROJECTION_REQUIRED")
+    value = _row_dict(row)
+    receipt = _json(value.get("receipt_json"), "CHILD_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_INVALID")
+    canonical_digest = value.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+    source_digest = value.get("source_business_execution_digest")
+    exact = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": 1,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "owner_decision_sha256": relation["owner_decision_sha256"],
+    }
+    if any(value.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact.items()):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_LINEAGE_MISMATCH")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(canonical_digest, str)
+        or HEX64.fullmatch(canonical_digest) is None
+        or canonical_digest == SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or source_digest != SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or _sha_text(value["receipt_json"]) != value.get("receipt_sha256")
+        or not isinstance(receipt, Mapping)
+        or receipt.get("schema") != PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+        or receipt.get("canonical_child_execution_digest") != canonical_digest
+        or receipt.get("source_business_execution_digest") != source_digest
+        or receipt.get("owner_supersession_decision_sha256")
+        != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_MISMATCH")
+    return {
+        **value,
+        "canonical_child_execution_digest": canonical_digest,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": source_digest,
+    }
+
+
+def install_child_binding(
+    connection,
+    *,
+    policy: Mapping[str, Any],
+    runtime_id: str,
+    runtime_observation_digest: str,
+    task_contract_version: str,
+    policy_factory: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any] = _default_policy_factory,
+    now: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Generate and persist the only permitted child binding from current DB state."""
+    if not isinstance(policy, Mapping):
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(runtime_id, str) or not runtime_id or len(runtime_id) > 512:
+        _fail("RUNTIME_ID_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(runtime_observation_digest, str) or HEX64.fullmatch(runtime_observation_digest) is None:
+        _fail("RUNTIME_OBSERVATION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(task_contract_version, str) or not task_contract_version or len(task_contract_version) > 128:
+        _fail("TASK_CONTRACT_VERSION_INVALID")
+    relation = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersessions WHERE source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=1 AND child_task_id=?",
+        (SOURCE_TASK_ID, CHILD_TASK_ID),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if relation is None:
+        _fail("FORMAL_SUPERSESSION_REQUIRED")
+    projection = _load_projection_evidence(connection, relation)
+    canonical_execution_digest = projection["canonical_child_execution_digest"]
+    task_row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)).fetchone()
+    if task_row is None:
+        _fail("CHILD_TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+    task = _row_dict(task_row)
+    if (
+        task.get("status") != "QUEUED" or int(task.get("revision", -1)) < 2
+        or int(task.get("attempt", -1)) != 0 or task.get("claimed_by") is not None
+        or task.get("lease_token_hash") is not None or task.get("lease_expires_at") is not None
+        or task.get("result_json") is not None or task.get("verification_json") is not None
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTED_CLAIMABLE_STATE_REQUIRED")
+    event_rows = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT event_type,payload_json FROM events WHERE task_id=? ORDER BY event_id",
+        (CHILD_TASK_ID,),
+    ).fetchall()
+    if [row[0] for row in event_rows] != [
+        "TASK_CREATED",
+        "TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZED",
+    ]:
+        _fail("CANONICAL_INITIAL_PROJECTION_REQUIRED")
+    projection_event = _json(
+        event_rows[-1][1], "CANONICAL_INITIAL_PROJECTION_EVENT_INVALID"
+    )
+    if (
+        projection_event.get("source_business_execution_digest")
+        != SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or projection_event.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+        != canonical_execution_digest
+        or projection_event.get("owner_supersession_decision_sha256")
+        != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or _sha_json(projection_event) != projection["projection_event_sha256"]
+    ):
+        _fail("CANONICAL_INITIAL_PROJECTION_EVENT_MISMATCH")
+    metadata_raw = task.get("metadata_json")
+    capabilities_raw = task.get("required_capabilities_json")
+    metadata = _json(metadata_raw, "CHILD_METADATA_INVALID")
+    capabilities = _json(capabilities_raw, "CHILD_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+    if (
+        _sha_text(metadata_raw) != projection["metadata_sha256"]
+        or _sha_text(capabilities_raw)
+        != projection["required_capabilities_sha256"]
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_TASK_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping) or not isinstance(capabilities, list) or not capabilities:
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_INVALID")
+    if any(not isinstance(value, str) or not value for value in capabilities) or len(set(capabilities)) != len(capabilities):
+        _fail("CHILD_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+    execution = metadata.get("execution")
+    if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+        _fail("CHILD_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+    exact_execution = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest, "job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+    }
+    if any(execution.get(key) != value for key, value in exact_execution.items()):
+        _fail("CHILD_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    parsed_policy = policy_factory(dict(policy))
+    if hasattr(parsed_policy, "validate"):
+        parsed_policy.validate()
+    policy_exact = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_plan_sha256": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+    }
+    if any(_policy_value(parsed_policy, key) != value for key, value in policy_exact.items()):
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+    if tuple(_policy_value(parsed_policy, "allowed_worker_ids")) != (WORKER_ID,):
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_WORKER_MISMATCH")
+    expected_oid = execution.get("expected_branch_oid", execution.get("base_oid"))
+    if expected_oid is not None and _policy_value(parsed_policy, "base_oid") != expected_oid:
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_BASE_OID_MISMATCH")
+    policy_json = canonical_json(dict(policy))
+    policy_sha = _sha_text(policy_json)
+    policy_digest = str(_policy_value(parsed_policy, "digest"))
+    if policy_digest != policy_sha:
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    binding = {
+        "schema": BINDING_SCHEMA, "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID, "supersession_ordinal": 1,
+        "expected_revision": int(task["revision"]),
+        "metadata_sha256": _sha_text(metadata_raw),
+        "required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_json(sorted(capabilities)),
+        "worker_id": WORKER_ID,
+        "execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "canonical_child_execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY, "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID, "policy_sha256": policy_sha,
+        "policy_digest": policy_digest, "runtime_id": runtime_id,
+        "runtime_observation_digest": runtime_observation_digest,
+        "task_contract_version": task_contract_version,
+        "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": relation["owner_decision_sha256"],
+    }
+    binding_json = canonical_json(binding)
+    binding_sha = _sha_text(binding_json)
+    binding_id = "sha256:" + binding_sha
+    existing = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT binding_sha256 FROM task_claim_guard_bindings_v2 WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+    ).fetchone()
+    if existing is not None:
+        if existing[0] != binding_sha:
+            _fail("CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        receipt = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT receipt_json FROM task_claim_guard_binding_receipts_v2 WHERE binding_id=?", (binding_id,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if receipt is None:
+            _fail("CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_RECEIPT_MISSING", 500)
+        return {**json.loads(receipt[0]), "idempotent": True}
+    created_at = now or _now()
+    connection.execute(
+        """INSERT INTO task_claim_guard_bindings_v2(
+        binding_id,task_id,source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,expected_revision,
+        metadata_sha256,required_capabilities_sha256,worker_id,execution_digest,
+        repository,target_branch,generation,policy_json,policy_sha256,binding_json,
+        binding_sha256,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+        (binding_id, CHILD_TASK_ID, SOURCE_TASK_ID, 1, binding["expected_revision"],
+         binding["metadata_sha256"], binding["required_capabilities_sha256"], WORKER_ID,
+         canonical_execution_digest, REPOSITORY, TARGET_BRANCH, GENERATION, policy_json, policy_sha,
+         binding_json, binding_sha, created_at),
+    )
+    receipt = {
+        "schema": RECEIPT_SCHEMA, "status": "BOUND", "binding_id": binding_id,
+        "binding_sha256": binding_sha, "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "expected_revision": binding["expected_revision"],
+        "metadata_sha256": binding["metadata_sha256"], "worker_id": WORKER_ID,
+        "execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "canonical_child_execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": relation["owner_decision_sha256"],
+    }
+    receipt_sha = _sha_json(receipt)
+    receipt_id = "sha256:" + receipt_sha
+    connection.execute(
+        "INSERT INTO task_claim_guard_binding_receipts_v2 VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+        (receipt_id, binding_id, CHILD_TASK_ID, canonical_json(receipt), receipt_sha, created_at),
+    )
+    return {**receipt, "receipt_id": receipt_id, "receipt_sha256": receipt_sha, "idempotent": False}
+
+
+def _load_child_binding(connection) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+    row = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_claim_guard_bindings_v2 WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+    ).fetchone()
+    if row is None:
+        _fail("CHILD_CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_MISSING")
+    value = _row_dict(row)
+    binding = _json(value["binding_json"], "CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_INVALID")
+    policy = _json(value["policy_json"], "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_INVALID")
+    relation = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersessions WHERE source_task_id=? "
+        "AND supersession_ordinal=1 AND child_task_id=?",
+        (SOURCE_TASK_ID, CHILD_TASK_ID),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if relation is None:
+        _fail("FORMAL_SUPERSESSION_REQUIRED")
+    projection = _load_projection_evidence(connection, relation)
+    canonical_execution_digest = projection["canonical_child_execution_digest"]
+    if (
+        _sha_text(value["binding_json"]) != value["binding_sha256"]
+        or binding.get("schema") != BINDING_SCHEMA
+        or value.get("execution_digest") != canonical_execution_digest
+        or binding.get("execution_digest") != canonical_execution_digest
+        or binding.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+        != canonical_execution_digest
+        or binding.get("source_business_execution_digest")
+        != SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or binding.get("owner_supersession_decision_sha256")
+        != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or policy.get("execution_plan_sha256") != canonical_execution_digest
+    ):
+        _fail("CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    task = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)).fetchone()
+    task = _row_dict(task)
+    if (
+        task.get("status") != "QUEUED" or int(task.get("revision", -1)) != int(binding["expected_revision"])
+        or int(task.get("attempt", -1)) != 0 or task.get("claimed_by") is not None
+        or task.get("lease_token_hash") is not None or task.get("lease_expires_at") is not None
+        or _sha_text(task.get("metadata_json", "")) != binding["metadata_sha256"]
+        or task.get("result_json") is not None or task.get("verification_json") is not None
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_CLAIM_GUARD_TASK_CAS_MISMATCH")
+    return binding, policy
+
+
+def _run_child_guard(connection, binding, policy_value, agent_id):
+    try:
+        from aios_single_host_operational_authority import OperationalPolicy, OperationalVerifier
+        from aios_singlehost_claim_guard_stage1 import _LiveReader, REGISTRY_PATH
+        from aios_task_claim_guard import ClaimGuard, ClaimGuardError as CoreError
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError("CLAIM_GUARD_RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+    policy = OperationalPolicy.from_mapping(policy_value)
+    cfg = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "expected_claim_revision": binding["expected_revision"],
+        "task_metadata_sha256": binding["metadata_sha256"],
+        "required_capabilities_sha256": binding["required_capabilities_sha256"],
+        "task_contract_version": binding["task_contract_version"], "worker_id": WORKER_ID,
+        "policy_digest": binding["policy_digest"], "runtime_id": binding["runtime_id"],
+        "runtime_observation_digest": binding["runtime_observation_digest"],
+    }
+    reader = _LiveReader(connection, policy, cfg, now=int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp()))
+    try:
+        ClaimGuard(policy, OperationalVerifier(REGISTRY_PATH, require_root_owner=True)).validate_in_transaction(
+            reader, task_id=CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            expected_revision=int(binding["expected_revision"]), worker_id=agent_id,
+        )
+    except CoreError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError(exc.code) from exc
+
+
+def enforce_claim_guard(connection, *, task_id: str, agent_id: str) -> None:
+    """Exact two-lineage dispatcher; unrelated Tasks retain their prior behavior."""
+    if task_id == SOURCE_TASK_ID:
+        try:
+            from aios_singlehost_claim_guard_stage1 import enforce_claim_guard as frozen_guard
+        except ImportError as exc:
+            raise ClaimGuardBindingError("FROZEN_SOURCE_CLAIM_GUARD_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+        frozen_guard(connection, task_id=task_id, agent_id=agent_id)
+        return
+    if task_id != CHILD_TASK_ID:
+        return
+    if agent_id != WORKER_ID:
+        _fail("WORKER_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+    binding, policy = _load_child_binding(connection)
+    _run_child_guard(connection, binding, policy, agent_id)
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+"""Fail-closed signed deterministic execution amendment for R7."""
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib, json, sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping
+from aios_task_terminal_recovery import DeterministicPlan, RecoveryError, canonical_json
+
+AMENDMENT_SCHEMA="aios.deterministic-execution-amendment.v1"
+APPLY_SCHEMA="aios.deterministic-execution-amendment-apply.v1"
+NAMESPACE="aios-owner-approval-v1"
+EVENT="TASK_RECOVERY_EXECUTION_AMENDMENT_APPLIED"
+APPLY_STATES=frozenset({"FAILED", "QUEUED"})
+
+
+def _err(code): raise RecoveryError(code)
+def _sha(v): return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(v).encode()).hexdigest()
+def amendment_body(x):
+    return {k:v for k,v in x.items() if k not in {"signature","amendment_id"}}
+def amendment_id(x): return "sha256:"+_sha(amendment_body(x))
+def signed_payload(x):
+    return canonical_json({"amendment_id":x["amendment_id"],**amendment_body(x)}).encode()
+
+
+def parse_amendment(raw):
+    x=dict(raw)
+    required={"schema","amendment_id","nonce","task_id","job_id","generation",
+      "repository","branch","expected_branch_oid","recovery_epoch","decision_id",
+      "plan_id","plan_sha256","expected_apply_status","expected_apply_revision",
+      "expected_apply_attempt","expected_current_capabilities","envelope",
+      "owner_identity","key_id","issued_at","not_before","expires_at",
+      "one_time_use","signature"}
+    if set(x)<required or x.get("schema")!=AMENDMENT_SCHEMA: _err("AMENDMENT_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    if x["expected_apply_status"] not in APPLY_STATES: _err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_STATUS_INVALID")
+    if x.get("one_time_use") is not True: _err("AMENDMENT_ONE_TIME_REQUIRED")
+    if not isinstance(x["envelope"],Mapping): _err("AMENDMENT_ENVELOPE_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(x["expected_current_capabilities"],list): _err("AMENDMENT_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+    for k in ("generation","expected_apply_revision","expected_apply_attempt"):
+        if isinstance(x[k],bool) or not isinstance(x[k],int) or x[k]<0: _err("AMENDMENT_CAS_INVALID")
+    for k in ("issued_at","not_before","expires_at"):
+        try:d=datetime.fromisoformat(str(x[k]).replace("Z","+00:00"))
+        except ValueError as e: raise RecoveryError("AMENDMENT_TIME_INVALID") from e
+        if d.tzinfo is None:_err("AMENDMENT_TIME_INVALID")
+        x[k]=d.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00","Z")
+    x["expected_current_capabilities"]=sorted(set(x["expected_current_capabilities"]))
+    x["envelope"]=dict(x["envelope"])
+    return x
+
+
+def _validate_envelope(env,plan,x):
+    try:
+        from aios_online_agent_execution import GovernedExecutionBinding,validate_execution_envelope
+        binding=GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(env)
+        e=dict(validate_execution_envelope(env,binding=binding,worker_capabilities=plan.required_capabilities))
+    except Exception as z: raise RecoveryError("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID") from z
+    if e.get("action")!="deterministic" or e.get("adapter")!="deterministic":_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_ACTION_INVALID")
+    if tuple(sorted(e.get("capability_scope") or ()))!=plan.required_capabilities:_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_CAPABILITIES_MISMATCH")
+    if not e.get("change_set") or not e.get("verification"):_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_REQUIRED")
+    if e.get("runtime_input") not in (None,{}) or e.get("source_signals") not in (None,[]):_err("AMENDMENT_STALE_RUNTIME_FIELDS_FORBIDDEN")
+    for k,w in (("task_id",x["task_id"]),("job_id",x["job_id"]),("repository",x["repository"]),
+      ("generation",x["generation"]),("target_branch",x["branch"]),
+      ("expected_branch_oid",x["expected_branch_oid"]),("base_oid",x["expected_branch_oid"]),
+      ("plan_id",x["plan_id"]),("plan_sha256",x["plan_sha256"]),("recovery_epoch",x["recovery_epoch"])):
+        if e.get(k)!=w:_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    g=e.get("governance") or {}
+    if g.get("writer_lease") is not True:_err("AMENDMENT_WRITER_LEASE_REQUIRED")
+    if any(g.get(k,False) for k in ("main_write","production_write","tag_write","baseline_write","force_push","protected_ref_bypass")):_err("AMENDMENT_PROTECTED_WRITE_FORBIDDEN")
+    return e
+
+
+class DeterministicExecutionAmendmentController:
+    def __init__(self,db_path,verifier,*,clock=None,envelope_validator=None):
+        self.db_path=Path(db_path); self.verifier=verifier
+        self.clock=clock or (lambda:datetime.now(timezone.utc)); self._init()
+
+    def _db(self):
+        c=sqlite3.connect(self.db_path,timeout=10,isolation_level=None); c.row_factory=sqlite3.Row
+        c.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=10000"); return c
+
+    def _now(self): return self.clock().astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00","Z")
+
+    def _init(self):
+        with self._db() as c:
+            c.execute("DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS aios_r7_recovery_capability_projection")
+            c.executescript("""
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS deterministic_execution_amendments(
+ amendment_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,nonce TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+ decision_id TEXT NOT NULL,plan_id TEXT NOT NULL,plan_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+ envelope_digest TEXT NOT NULL,envelope_json TEXT NOT NULL,payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+ created_at TEXT NOT NULL,UNIQUE(task_id,decision_id));
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS aios_r7_recovery_requires_executable_amendment;
+CREATE TRIGGER aios_r7_recovery_requires_executable_amendment
+BEFORE UPDATE OF status ON tasks
+WHEN OLD.status='FAILED' AND NEW.status='QUEUED' BEGIN
+ SELECT CASE WHEN NOT EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM deterministic_execution_amendments a
+  WHERE a.task_id=OLD.task_id
+   AND a.decision_id=json_extract(NEW.metadata_json,'$.recovery.decision_id')
+   AND a.amendment_id=json_extract(OLD.metadata_json,'$.recovery.execution_amendment_id')
+   AND a.envelope_digest=json_extract(OLD.metadata_json,'$.execution.execution_digest')
+ ) THEN RAISE(ABORT,'SIGNED_EXECUTION_AMENDMENT_REQUIRED') END;
+END;""")
+
+    def _plan(self,c,x):
+        r=c.execute("SELECT * FROM deterministic_plans WHERE plan_id=?",(x["plan_id"],)).fetchone()
+        if r is None or r["plan_sha256"]!=x["plan_sha256"]:_err("AMENDMENT_PLAN_NOT_FOUND_OR_MISMATCH")
+        p=DeterministicPlan.from_dict(json.loads(r["payload_json"]))
+        if (p.task_id,p.job_id,p.generation,p.repository,p.branch,p.expected_branch_oid,p.recovery_epoch)!=(x["task_id"],x["job_id"],x["generation"],x["repository"],x["branch"],x["expected_branch_oid"],x["recovery_epoch"]):_err("AMENDMENT_PLAN_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+        return p
+
+    def persist(self,raw):
+        x=parse_amendment(raw)
+        if x["amendment_id"]!=amendment_id(x):_err("AMENDMENT_ID_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        now=self._now()
+        if now<x["not_before"] or now>=x["expires_at"]:_err("AMENDMENT_EXPIRED_OR_NOT_YET_VALID")
+        if not self.verifier.verify(namespace=NAMESPACE,payload=signed_payload(x),signature=x["signature"],key_id=x["key_id"]):_err("AMENDMENT_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+        with self._db() as c:
+            c.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"); e=_validate_envelope(x["envelope"],self._plan(c,x),x)
+            ej=canonical_json(e); ed=e["execution_digest"]; stored=dict(x); stored["signature"]="<present>"
+            old=c.execute("SELECT * FROM deterministic_execution_amendments WHERE amendment_id=?",(x["amendment_id"],)).fetchone()
+            if old:
+                if old["envelope_json"]!=ej:_err("AMENDMENT_ID_REUSE_MISMATCH")
+                c.commit(); return {"status":"PRESENT","amendment_id":x["amendment_id"],"task_id":x["task_id"],"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":ed}
+            if c.execute("SELECT 1 FROM deterministic_execution_amendments WHERE nonce=? OR (task_id=? AND decision_id=?)",(x["nonce"],x["task_id"],x["decision_id"])).fetchone():_err("AMENDMENT_REPLAY_OR_DECISION_REUSE")
+            c.execute("INSERT INTO deterministic_execution_amendments VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",(x["amendment_id"],x["nonce"],x["task_id"],x["decision_id"],x["plan_id"],x["plan_sha256"],ed,ej,canonical_json(stored),now)); c.commit()
+        return {"status":"PERSISTED","amendment_id":x["amendment_id"],"task_id":x["task_id"],"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":ed}
+
+    def apply(self,raw):
+        if raw.get("schema")!=APPLY_SCHEMA:_err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        aid=raw.get("amendment_id"); tid=raw.get("task_id")
+        with self._db() as c:
+            c.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"); a=c.execute("SELECT * FROM deterministic_execution_amendments WHERE amendment_id=? AND task_id=?",(aid,tid)).fetchone()
+            if a is None:_err("AMENDMENT_NOT_FOUND")
+            x=json.loads(a["payload_json"]); d=json.loads(a["envelope_json"])
+            t=c.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",(tid,)).fetchone()
+            if t is None:_err("TASK_NOT_FOUND")
+            m=json.loads(t["metadata_json"] or "{}"); cp=tuple(sorted(json.loads(t["required_capabilities_json"] or "[]"))); dc=tuple(sorted(d.get("capability_scope") or ()))
+            rec=m.get("recovery"); rec=dict(rec) if isinstance(rec,Mapping) else {}
+            old=m.get("execution")
+            if isinstance(old,Mapping) and old.get("execution_digest")==a["envelope_digest"] and cp==dc and rec.get("execution_amendment_id")==aid:
+                c.commit(); return {"status":"PRESENT","task_id":tid,"amendment_id":aid,"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"],"revision":int(t["revision"]),"attempt":int(t["attempt"])}
+            if t["status"]!=x["expected_apply_status"] or int(t["revision"])!=x["expected_apply_revision"] or int(t["attempt"])!=x["expected_apply_attempt"] or cp!=tuple(x["expected_current_capabilities"]) or t["claimed_by"] is not None or t["lease_token_hash"] is not None:_err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_TASK_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            if t["status"]=="QUEUED" and rec.get("decision_id")!=x["decision_id"]:_err("AMENDMENT_DECISION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+            m["execution"]=d; m["execution_projection"]={"schema":"aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1","task_id":tid,"job_id":d.get("job_id"),"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"]}
+            rec["execution_amendment_id"]=aid; m["recovery"]=rec; now=self._now()
+            q=c.execute("""UPDATE tasks SET required_capabilities_json=?,metadata_json=?,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=? AND claimed_by IS NULL AND lease_token_hash IS NULL""",(canonical_json(list(dc)),canonical_json(m),now,tid,x["expected_apply_status"],x["expected_apply_revision"],x["expected_apply_attempt"]))
+            if q.rowcount!=1:_err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_TASK_CAS_FAILED")
+            c.execute("INSERT INTO events(task_id,agent_id,event_type,payload_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",(tid,None,EVENT,canonical_json({"amendment_id":aid,"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"],"required_capabilities":list(dc)}),now)); c.commit()
+        return {"status":"APPLIED","task_id":tid,"amendment_id":aid,"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"],"required_capabilities":list(dc),"revision":x["expected_apply_revision"]+1,"attempt":x["expected_apply_attempt"]}
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Loopback-only HTTP API for the task identity overlay.
+
+Endpoints:
+  GET  /healthz
+  POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+
+The API authenticates only the short-lived overlay credential. It does not read
+or modify the global bearer-token registry.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any
+
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
+from owner_authorization_broker import OwnerAuthorizationError
+from task_identity_overlay import (
+    MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+    IdentityOverlayConfig,
+    IdentityOverlayError,
+    TaskIdentityOverlayService,
+)
+
+
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
+
+
+def _enabled() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_ENABLED", ""
+    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+def _bearer(header: str) -> str:
+    prefix = "Bearer "
+    if not header.startswith(prefix):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+    token = header[len(prefix):].strip()
+    if not token or len(token) > 4096:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+    return token
+
+
+class OverlayHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "aios-task-identity-overlay/1"
+    sys_version = ""
+
+    @property
+    def overlay(self) -> TaskIdentityOverlayService:
+        return self.server.overlay  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
+        # Never log Authorization or request bodies.
+        return
+
+    def _send(self, status: int, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        payload = (
+            json.dumps(
+                value,
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+            )
+            + "\n"
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(payload)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(payload)
+
+    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID") from None
+        if length <= 0 or length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_SIZE_REJECTED", 413)
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_JSON_INVALID") from None
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
+        return value
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if path != "/healthz":
+            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
+            return
+        self._send(
+            200,
+            {
+                "service": "aios-task-identity-overlay",
+                "status": "active" if _enabled() else "disabled",
+                "global_token_registry_used": False,
+                "loopback_only": True,
+            },
+        )
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if path != _ENDPOINT:
+            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
+            return
+        if not _enabled():
+            self._send(503, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_DISABLED"})
+            return
+        try:
+            token = _bearer(self.headers.get("Authorization", ""))
+            result = self.overlay.provision(self._body(), token)
+            self._send(200, result)
+        except (IdentityOverlayError, OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
+            body: dict[str, Any] = {"error": exc.code}
+            if getattr(exc, "details", None):
+                body["details"] = exc.details
+            self._send(exc.status, body)
+        except Exception:
+            self._send(500, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_API_INTERNAL_ERROR"})
+
+
+class OverlayServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        address: tuple[str, int],
+        overlay: TaskIdentityOverlayService,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(address, OverlayHandler)
+        self.overlay = overlay
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    host = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    if host not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}:
+        raise SystemExit("identity overlay must listen on loopback")
+    try:
+        port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_PORT", "19864"))
+    except ValueError:
+        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port") from None
+    if not 1024 <= port <= 65535:
+        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port")
+    config = IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
+    server = OverlayServer(
+        (host, port),
+        TaskIdentityOverlayService(config),
+    )
+    server.serve_forever(poll_interval=0.25)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Root-governed CLI for issuing and revoking task identity overlays.
+
+The CLI never prints the bearer token. It returns only the root-owned secret
+reference and non-secret metadata.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from task_identity_overlay import (
+    IdentityOverlayConfig,
+    IdentityOverlayError,
+    TaskIdentityOverlayStore,
+)
+
+
+def _write_result(path: str, value: dict) -> None:
+    data = json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n"
+    if path == "-":
+        sys.stdout.write(data)
+        return
+    target = Path(path)
+    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    target.write_text(data, encoding="utf-8")
+    os.chmod(target, 0o600)
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    value = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Issue/status/revoke a task-scoped identity overlay"
+    )
+    sub = value.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+
+    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
+    issue.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=900)
+    issue.add_argument("--authorization-assertion-ref", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument(
+        "--operator-identity",
+        default=os.getenv("SUDO_USER") or os.getenv("USER") or "root",
+    )
+    issue.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+
+    status = sub.add_parser("status")
+    status.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
+    status.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+
+    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
+    revoke.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+    return value
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parser().parse_args()
+    try:
+        store = TaskIdentityOverlayStore(
+            IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
+        )
+        if args.command == "issue":
+            result = store.issue(
+                ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
+                authorization_assertion_ref=args.authorization_assertion_ref,
+                operator_identity=args.operator_identity,
+            )
+        elif args.command == "status":
+            result = store.status(args.overlay_id)
+        else:
+            result = store.revoke(args.overlay_id, reason=args.reason)
+        _write_result(args.result_json, result)
+        return 0
+    except IdentityOverlayError as exc:
+        body = {"status": "BLOCKED", "error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        _write_result(getattr(args, "result_json", "-"), body)
+        return 2
+    except Exception:
+        _write_result(
+            getattr(args, "result_json", "-"),
+            {"status": "FAILED", "error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_CLI_INTERNAL_ERROR"},
+        )
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+"""One-time, Owner-signed, append-only supersession for one exact Task lineage."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import closing
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+DECISION_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-decision.v1"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-receipt.v1"
+OWNER_NAMESPACE = "aios-owner-approval-v1"
+OWNER_PRINCIPAL = "aios-task-grant-signer"
+OWNER_KEY_ID = "SHA256:rPqpxfPHtaZPM3zSWojX8Q7VxzCknsYqOokyo/aAM3A"
+SOURCE_TASK_ID = "TASK-SINGLEHOST-TRUSTROOT-P0-20260904"
+CHILD_TASK_ID = SOURCE_TASK_ID + "-S1"
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/single-host-trust-root-p0-20260904"
+GENERATION = 1
+EXECUTION_DIGEST = "e99bda6a251832eb3865271eb5687af7eea44dd261144cdcdfa57104c0780536"
+EXTERNAL_JOB_ID = "job-4e10f92a6a5742518a9f1d8745c845ab"
+SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL = 1
+CANONICAL_PROFILE = "aios.task-initial-execution.v1"
+CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION = 1
+SUPERSESSION_REASON = "formal-lineage-supersession-after-expired-unclaimed-source"
+MAX_TTL = timedelta(minutes=5)
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+SAFE_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,511}$")
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, http_status: int = 409):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.http_status = int(http_status)
+
+
+class SignatureVerifier(Protocol):
+    def verify(self, *, namespace: str, payload: bytes, signature: str, key_id: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False)
+
+
+def sha256_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _fail(code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+    raise TaskLineageSupersessionError(code, status)
+
+
+def _utc(value: Any, field: str) -> datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 80:
+        _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    try:
+        result = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise TaskLineageSupersessionError(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400) from exc
+    if result.tzinfo is None:
+        _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    return result.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _text(value: Any, field: str, *, maximum: int = 1024) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > maximum:
+        _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def decision_payload(raw: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {key: raw[key] for key in raw if key != "signature"}
+
+
+DECISION_FIELDS = {
+    "schema", "decision_id", "nonce", "source_task_id",
+    "source_task_identity_sha256", "source_metadata_sha256",
+    "source_expected_status", "source_expected_revision", "source_expected_attempt",
+    "source_expected_claimed_by", "source_expected_lease_token_hash",
+    "source_expected_lease_expires_at", "repository", "target_branch", "generation",
+    "execution_digest", "external_job_id", "child_task_id", "supersession_ordinal",
+    "canonical_projection_profile", "canonical_projection_version", "supersession_reason",
+    "owner_identity", "signature_namespace", "signature_principal", "key_id",
+    "issued_at", "not_before", "expires_at", "one_time_use", "signature",
+}
+
+
+def validate_decision(raw: Mapping[str, Any], *, now: datetime) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, Mapping) or set(raw) != DECISION_FIELDS:
+        _fail("DECISION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+    exact = {
+        "schema": DECISION_SCHEMA,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "source_expected_status": "EXPIRED",
+        "source_expected_attempt": 0,
+        "source_expected_claimed_by": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_token_hash": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_expires_at": None,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+        "supersession_reason": SUPERSESSION_REASON,
+        "owner_identity": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+        "signature_principal": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "key_id": OWNER_KEY_ID,
+        "one_time_use": True,
+    }
+    for field, expected in exact.items():
+        if raw[field] != expected:
+            _fail(field.upper() + "_MISMATCH", 403 if field.startswith(("owner", "signature", "key")) else 409)
+    for field in ("decision_id", "nonce"):
+        value = _text(raw[field], field, maximum=256)
+        if SAFE_ID.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    for field in ("source_task_identity_sha256", "source_metadata_sha256"):
+        if not isinstance(raw[field], str) or HEX64.fullmatch(raw[field]) is None:
+            _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    if type(raw["source_expected_revision"]) is not int or raw["source_expected_revision"] < 1:
+        _fail("SOURCE_EXPECTED_REVISION_INVALID", 400)
+    _text(raw["signature"], "signature", maximum=32768)
+    issued_at = _utc(raw["issued_at"], "issued_at")
+    not_before = _utc(raw["not_before"], "not_before")
+    expires_at = _utc(raw["expires_at"], "expires_at")
+    if issued_at > expires_at or not_before > expires_at:
+        _fail("DECISION_TIME_ORDER_INVALID", 403)
+    if expires_at - issued_at > MAX_TTL or expires_at <= issued_at:
+        _fail("DECISION_TTL_INVALID", 403)
+    now = now.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+    if now < not_before or now >= expires_at:
+        _fail("DECISION_EXPIRED_OR_NOT_YET_VALID", 403)
+    if issued_at > now + timedelta(seconds=5) or now - issued_at > MAX_TTL:
+        _fail("DECISION_ISSUED_AT_INVALID", 403)
+    return {**dict(raw), "issued_at_dt": issued_at, "not_before_dt": not_before, "expires_at_dt": expires_at}
+
+
+def _default_identity_digest(row: sqlite3.Row) -> str:
+    try:
+        from aios_expired_task_recovery import task_identity_digest
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise TaskLineageSupersessionError("FORMAL_TASK_IDENTITY_HELPER_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+    return str(task_identity_digest(row))
+
+
+def _json_object(row: sqlite3.Row, field: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(row[field])
+    except (TypeError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
+        raise TaskLineageSupersessionError("SOURCE_TASK_JSON_INVALID", 409) from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_JSON_INVALID")
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _verify_source(row: sqlite3.Row, d: Mapping[str, Any], identity_digest: Callable[[sqlite3.Row], str]) -> None:
+    if row["task_id"] != SOURCE_TASK_ID:
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_ID_MISMATCH")
+    cas = (
+        row["status"] == "EXPIRED"
+        and int(row["revision"]) == d["source_expected_revision"]
+        and int(row["attempt"]) == 0
+        and row["claimed_by"] is None
+        and row["lease_token_hash"] is None
+        and row["lease_expires_at"] is None
+    )
+    if not cas:
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_EXACT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+    metadata_raw = row["metadata_json"]
+    if not isinstance(metadata_raw, str) or sha256_text(metadata_raw) != d["source_metadata_sha256"]:
+        _fail("SOURCE_METADATA_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if identity_digest(row) != d["source_task_identity_sha256"]:
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_IDENTITY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    metadata = _json_object(row, "metadata_json")
+    execution = metadata.get("execution")
+    constraints = _json_object(row, "constraints_json")
+    if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+        _fail("SOURCE_EXECUTION_BINDING_INVALID")
+    expected = {
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+    }
+    if any(execution.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items()):
+        _fail("SOURCE_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    if constraints.get("generation") != GENERATION:
+        _fail("SOURCE_GENERATION_CONSTRAINT_MISMATCH")
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionController:
+    def __init__(self, db_path: str | Path, verifier: SignatureVerifier, *, clock=None, identity_digest=None):
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.clock = clock or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+        self.identity_digest = identity_digest or _default_identity_digest
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    def _now(self) -> datetime:
+        value = self.clock()
+        if value.tzinfo is None:
+            value = value.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        return value.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_schema(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        required = {"tasks", "events", "task_lineage_supersessions", "task_lineage_supersession_receipts"}
+        actual = {row[0] for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")}
+        if not required.issubset(actual):
+            _fail("SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+        columns = {row[1] for row in connection.execute("PRAGMA table_info(tasks)")}
+        task_columns = {
+            "task_id", "goal", "instructions", "success_criteria_json",
+            "required_capabilities_json", "constraints_json", "metadata_json", "deadline",
+            "priority", "max_attempts", "attempt", "status", "claimed_by",
+            "lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at", "result_json", "result_digest",
+            "result_idempotency_key", "verification_json", "revision", "created_at", "updated_at",
+        }
+        if not task_columns.issubset(columns):
+            _fail("TASK_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    def supersede(self, raw: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = self._now()
+        decision = validate_decision(raw, now=now)
+        payload_bytes = canonical_json(decision_payload(raw)).encode("utf-8")
+        if not self.verifier.verify(
+            namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE, payload=payload_bytes,
+            signature=decision["signature"], key_id=decision["key_id"],
+        ):
+            _fail("DECISION_SIGNATURE_INVALID", 403)
+        decision_sha = hashlib.sha256(payload_bytes).hexdigest()
+        now_text = now.isoformat()
+        with closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                self._assert_schema(connection)
+                replay = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT owner_decision_sha256,receipt_json FROM task_lineage_supersession_receipts WHERE decision_id=? OR nonce=?",
+                    (decision["decision_id"], decision["nonce"]),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if replay is not None:
+                    if replay["owner_decision_sha256"] != decision_sha:
+                        _fail("DECISION_REPLAY_MISMATCH")
+                    result = json.loads(replay["receipt_json"])
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return {**result, "idempotent": True}
+                source = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (SOURCE_TASK_ID,)).fetchone()
+                if source is None:
+                    _fail("SOURCE_TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+                _verify_source(source, decision, self.identity_digest)
+                if connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT 1 FROM task_lineage_supersessions WHERE source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=?",
+                    (SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL),
+                ).fetchone():
+                    _fail("SUPERSESSION_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+                if connection.execute("SELECT 1 FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)).fetchone():
+                    _fail("CHILD_TASK_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+                connection.execute(
+                    """INSERT INTO tasks(
+                    task_id,goal,instructions,success_criteria_json,required_capabilities_json,
+                    constraints_json,metadata_json,deadline,priority,max_attempts,attempt,status,
+                    claimed_by,lease_token_hash,lease_expires_at,result_json,result_digest,
+                    result_idempotency_key,verification_json,revision,created_at,updated_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                    (
+                        CHILD_TASK_ID, source["goal"], source["instructions"], source["success_criteria_json"],
+                        "[]", source["constraints_json"], "{}", None, source["priority"], source["max_attempts"],
+                        0, "QUEUED", None, None, None, None, None, None, None, 1, now_text, now_text,
+                    ),
+                )
+                connection.execute(
+                    """INSERT INTO task_lineage_supersessions(
+                    source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,child_task_id,source_task_identity_sha256,
+                    source_metadata_sha256,owner_decision_sha256,decision_id,created_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                    (SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL, CHILD_TASK_ID,
+                     decision["source_task_identity_sha256"], decision["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                     decision_sha, decision["decision_id"], now_text),
+                )
+                event_payload = {
+                    "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "supersedes_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+                    "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                    "source_task_identity_sha256": decision["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                    "source_metadata_sha256": decision["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                    "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": decision_sha,
+                    "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+                    "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+                }
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO events(task_id,agent_id,event_type,payload_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (CHILD_TASK_ID, None, "TASK_CREATED", canonical_json(event_payload), now_text),
+                )
+                receipt = {
+                    "schema": RECEIPT_SCHEMA, "status": "SUPERSEDED",
+                    "decision_id": decision["decision_id"], "owner_decision_sha256": decision_sha,
+                    "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID, "source_task_identity_sha256": decision["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                    "source_metadata_sha256": decision["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                    "source_status": "EXPIRED", "source_revision": decision["source_expected_revision"],
+                    "source_attempt": 0, "source_history_preserved": True,
+                    "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                    "child_status": "QUEUED", "child_revision": 1, "child_attempt": 0,
+                    "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+                    "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+                    "exact_identity_cas": True, "one_time_use": True,
+                    "owner_signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+                    "owner_signature_principal": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+                    "owner_signature_key_id": OWNER_KEY_ID,
+                    "owner_signature_sha256": sha256_text(decision["signature"]),
+                }
+                connection.execute(
+                    """INSERT INTO task_lineage_supersession_receipts(
+                    decision_id,nonce,source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,child_task_id,
+                    owner_decision_sha256,decision_json,receipt_json,consumed_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                    (decision["decision_id"], decision["nonce"], SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                     CHILD_TASK_ID, decision_sha, canonical_json(dict(raw)), canonical_json(receipt), now_text),
+                )
+                connection.commit()
+                return {**receipt, "idempotent": False}
+            except Exception:
+                connection.rollback()
+                raise
@@ -0,0 +1,548 @@
+"""Canonical initial projection for the exact Single-Host supersession child.
+
+The source business execution digest is lineage evidence.  It is deliberately
+not used as the child execution-envelope digest: the canonical envelope binds
+the child Task id and therefore has its own server-derived digest.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_agent_task_initial_execution_projection import (
+    InitialExecutionProjectionError,
+    InitialExecutionProjectionRequest,
+    InitialExecutionProjectionStore,
+    RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_RE,
+    _now,
+    _require_string,
+    _required_authorization_id,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    ExecutionProjectionError,
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession import (
+    CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+    CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+    CHILD_TASK_ID,
+    DECISION_SCHEMA,
+    EXECUTION_DIGEST as SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+    EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+    GENERATION,
+    OWNER_KEY_ID,
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+    RECEIPT_SCHEMA as SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+    REPOSITORY,
+    SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+    SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+    TARGET_BRANCH,
+    canonical_json,
+    decision_payload,
+)
+
+
+PROJECTION_INTENT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-initial-projection-intent.v1"
+PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-initial-projection-receipt.v1"
+PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY = "task-lineage-supersession-s1-initial-projection-v1"
+PROJECTION_REASON = "canonical-initial-projection-for-formal-supersession-child"
+PROJECTION_TABLE = "task_lineage_supersession_initial_projections"
+
+
+def _sha_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _sha_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return _sha_text(canonical_json(value))
+
+
+def _json_object(raw: Any, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, str):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(code, 409)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(raw)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(code, 409) from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(code, 409)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SupersessionChildProjectionIntent:
+    """Caller-selectable portion of the exact child projection.
+
+    Task identity, CAS values, Job identity, projection profile, reason and
+    idempotency are intentionally absent from the request and server-owned.
+    """
+
+    adapter: str
+    required_capability: str
+    authorization_id: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(
+        cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> "SupersessionChildProjectionIntent":
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or set(value) != {
+            "adapter",
+            "required_capability",
+            "authorization_id",
+        }:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400
+            )
+        adapter = _require_string(value["adapter"], "RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        capability = _require_string(
+            value["required_capability"],
+            "RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_INVALID",
+            RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_RE,
+        )
+        if adapter not in {"hermes", "openclaw"} or capability != f"agent.runtime.{adapter}":
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_MISMATCH", 400)
+        authorization_id = _require_string(
+            value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID"
+        )
+        return cls(adapter, capability, authorization_id)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": PROJECTION_INTENT_SCHEMA,
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+            "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+            "expected_status": "QUEUED",
+            "expected_revision": 1,
+            "expected_attempt": 0,
+            "expected_metadata_sha256": _sha_json({}),
+            "expected_required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_json([]),
+            "expected_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+            "adapter": self.adapter,
+            "required_capability": self.required_capability,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY,
+            "reason": PROJECTION_REASON,
+        }
+
+    def initial_request(self, canonical_execution_digest: str) -> InitialExecutionProjectionRequest:
+        return InitialExecutionProjectionRequest.from_mapping(
+            {
+                "expected_status": "QUEUED",
+                "expected_revision": 1,
+                "expected_attempt": 0,
+                "expected_metadata_sha256": _sha_json({}),
+                "expected_required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_json([]),
+                "expected_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+                "expected_execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+                "required_capability": self.required_capability,
+                "adapter": self.adapter,
+                "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY,
+                "reason": PROJECTION_REASON,
+            }
+        )
+
+
+def _table_names(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> set[str]:
+    return {
+        str(row[0])
+        for row in connection.execute(
+            "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'"
+        )
+    }
+
+
+def _load_lineage_context(
+    connection: sqlite3.Connection, *, expect_projected: bool
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    required_tables = {
+        "tasks",
+        "events",
+        "task_lineage_supersessions",
+        "task_lineage_supersession_receipts",
+        PROJECTION_TABLE,
+    }
+    if not required_tables.issubset(_table_names(connection)):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503
+        )
+    relation = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersessions "
+        "WHERE source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=? AND child_task_id=?",
+        (SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL, CHILD_TASK_ID),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if relation is None:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("FORMAL_SUPERSESSION_REQUIRED", 409)
+    receipt_row = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersession_receipts "
+        "WHERE decision_id=? AND source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=? "
+        "AND child_task_id=?",
+        (
+            relation["decision_id"],
+            SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        ),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if receipt_row is None:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_REQUIRED", 409)
+    decision = _json_object(receipt_row["decision_json"], "SUPERSESSION_DECISION_INVALID")
+    receipt = _json_object(receipt_row["receipt_json"], "SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_INVALID")
+    decision_sha256 = _sha_text(canonical_json(decision_payload(decision)))
+    exact_decision = {
+        "schema": DECISION_SCHEMA,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+        "owner_identity": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+        "signature_principal": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "key_id": OWNER_KEY_ID,
+        "one_time_use": True,
+    }
+    if any(decision.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact_decision.items()):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_DECISION_SCOPE_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    if (
+        decision_sha256 != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or decision_sha256 != receipt_row["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or decision.get("source_task_identity_sha256")
+        != relation["source_task_identity_sha256"]
+        or decision.get("source_metadata_sha256") != relation["source_metadata_sha256"]
+        or receipt.get("schema") != SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+        or receipt.get("owner_decision_sha256") != decision_sha256
+        or receipt.get("source_task_id") != SOURCE_TASK_ID
+        or receipt.get("child_task_id") != CHILD_TASK_ID
+        or receipt.get("supersession_ordinal") != SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL
+    ):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_LINEAGE_EVIDENCE_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    events = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT event_type,payload_json FROM events WHERE task_id=? ORDER BY event_id",
+        (CHILD_TASK_ID,),
+    ).fetchall()
+    expected_events = ["TASK_CREATED"]
+    if expect_projected:
+        expected_events.append("TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZED")
+    if [str(row["event_type"]) for row in events] != expected_events:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CHILD_EVENT_CHAIN_INVALID", 409
+        )
+    created = _json_object(events[0]["payload_json"], "SUPERSESSION_CREATED_EVENT_INVALID")
+    exact_created = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersedes_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "source_task_identity_sha256": relation["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+        "source_metadata_sha256": relation["source_metadata_sha256"],
+        "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": decision_sha256,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+    }
+    if any(created.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact_created.items()):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CREATED_EVENT_SCOPE_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    return {
+        "source_task_identity_sha256": relation["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+        "source_metadata_sha256": relation["source_metadata_sha256"],
+        "owner_decision_sha256": decision_sha256,
+    }
+
+
+def _validate_canonical_child_execution(
+    resolved: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    intent: SupersessionChildProjectionIntent,
+    runtime_input: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(resolved)
+        execution = validate_execution_envelope(resolved, binding=binding)
+    except ExecutionProjectionError as exc:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CANONICAL_EXECUTION_INVALID", 409
+        ) from exc
+    exact_binding = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+    }
+    if any(execution.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact_binding.items()):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CANONICAL_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    if (
+        execution.get("action") != "agent_runtime"
+        or execution.get("adapter") != intent.adapter
+        or execution.get("capability_scope") != [intent.required_capability]
+        or execution.get("runtime_input") != dict(runtime_input)
+        or execution.get("change_set") != []
+        or execution.get("verification") != []
+        or execution.get("governance", {}).get("writer_lease") is not False
+    ):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_AGENT_RUNTIME_ENVELOPE_INVALID", 409
+        )
+    if execution["execution_digest"] == SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "CHILD_CANONICAL_DIGEST_COLLIDES_WITH_SOURCE_BUSINESS_DIGEST", 409
+        )
+    return execution
+
+
+class _SupersessionProjectionTransactionStore(InitialExecutionProjectionStore):
+    """Per-invocation store that adds immutable lineage evidence atomically."""
+
+    allows_supersession_child = True
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path, resolved: Mapping[str, Any], intent):
+        self._resolved = dict(resolved)
+        self.intent = intent
+        super().__init__(db_path, self._resolve_once)
+
+    def _resolve_once(self, *_args):
+        return dict(self._resolved)
+
+    def _projection_event_extension(
+        self, connection, task_id, request, execution, applied_revision
+    ):
+        if task_id != CHILD_TASK_ID:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_CHILD_TASK_ID_MISMATCH", 409
+            )
+        context = _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=False)
+        return {
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "source_task_identity_sha256": context["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+            "source_metadata_sha256": context["source_metadata_sha256"],
+            "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": context["owner_decision_sha256"],
+            "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+            "canonical_child_execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+            "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+            "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+        }
+
+    def _insert_projection_extension(
+        self,
+        connection,
+        task_id,
+        request,
+        execution,
+        event_payload,
+        applied_revision,
+    ):
+        context = _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=True)
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT metadata_json,required_capabilities_json FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+            (CHILD_TASK_ID,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if task is None:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        intent_json = canonical_json(self.intent.public())
+        intent_sha256 = _sha_text(intent_json)
+        receipt = {
+            "schema": PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+            "projection_id": "sha256:" + intent_sha256,
+            "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "source_task_identity_sha256": context["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+            "source_metadata_sha256": context["source_metadata_sha256"],
+            "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": context["owner_decision_sha256"],
+            "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+            "canonical_child_execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+            "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+            "generation": GENERATION,
+            "adapter": self.intent.adapter,
+            "required_capability": self.intent.required_capability,
+            "expected_revision": 1,
+            "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+            "attempt": 0,
+            "metadata_sha256": _sha_text(task["metadata_json"]),
+            "required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_text(
+                task["required_capabilities_json"]
+            ),
+            "projection_event_sha256": _sha_json(dict(event_payload)),
+        }
+        receipt_json = canonical_json(receipt)
+        receipt_sha256 = _sha_text(receipt_json)
+        connection.execute(
+            f"""INSERT INTO {PROJECTION_TABLE}(
+            projection_id,task_id,source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,
+            intent_sha256,intent_json,owner_decision_sha256,
+            source_task_identity_sha256,source_metadata_sha256,
+            source_business_execution_digest,canonical_child_execution_digest,
+            external_job_id,repository,target_branch,generation,adapter,
+            required_capability,expected_revision,applied_revision,metadata_sha256,
+            required_capabilities_sha256,projection_event_sha256,receipt_json,
+            receipt_sha256,created_at)
+            VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+            (
+                receipt["projection_id"],
+                CHILD_TASK_ID,
+                SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+                SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                intent_sha256,
+                intent_json,
+                context["owner_decision_sha256"],
+                context["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                context["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+                execution["execution_digest"],
+                EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+                REPOSITORY,
+                TARGET_BRANCH,
+                GENERATION,
+                self.intent.adapter,
+                self.intent.required_capability,
+                1,
+                applied_revision,
+                receipt["metadata_sha256"],
+                receipt["required_capabilities_sha256"],
+                receipt["projection_event_sha256"],
+                receipt_json,
+                receipt_sha256,
+                _now(),
+            ),
+        )
+
+
+class SupersessionChildInitialProjectionStore:
+    """Server-owned adapter from exact supersession lineage to current ABI."""
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path, resolver):
+        self.db_path = db_path
+        self.resolver = resolver
+
+    def _connect(self):
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _replay(connection, intent: SupersessionChildProjectionIntent):
+        if PROJECTION_TABLE not in _table_names(connection):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503
+            )
+        row = connection.execute(
+            f"SELECT * FROM {PROJECTION_TABLE} WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            tables = _table_names(connection)
+            if "task_initial_execution_projections" in tables:
+                generic = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT 1 FROM task_initial_execution_projections "
+                    "WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                    (CHILD_TASK_ID, PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if generic is not None:
+                    raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                        "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_MISSING", 500
+                    )
+            return None
+        intent_sha256 = _sha_json(intent.public())
+        if row["intent_sha256"] != intent_sha256:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_INTENT_CONFLICT", 409
+            )
+        receipt = _json_object(
+            row["receipt_json"], "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_INVALID"
+        )
+        if (
+            _sha_text(row["receipt_json"]) != row["receipt_sha256"]
+            or receipt.get("schema") != PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+            or receipt.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+            != row["canonical_child_execution_digest"]
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_DIGEST_MISMATCH", 500
+            )
+        _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=True)
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if (
+            task is None
+            or task["status"] != "QUEUED"
+            or int(task["revision"]) != int(row["applied_revision"])
+            or int(task["attempt"]) != 0
+            or task["claimed_by"] is not None
+            or task["lease_token_hash"] is not None
+            or task["lease_expires_at"] is not None
+            or _sha_text(task["metadata_json"]) != row["metadata_sha256"]
+            or _sha_text(task["required_capabilities_json"])
+            != row["required_capabilities_sha256"]
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTED_TASK_CAS_MISMATCH", 409
+            )
+        return {**receipt, "idempotent": True}
+
+    def project(self, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        intent = SupersessionChildProjectionIntent.from_mapping(value)
+        if intent.authorization_id != _required_authorization_id():
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            replay = self._replay(connection, intent)
+            if replay is not None:
+                return replay
+            probe_request = intent.initial_request("0" * 64)
+            probe_store = _SupersessionProjectionTransactionStore(
+                self.db_path, {}, intent
+            )
+            task, _, _, _ = probe_store._load_and_validate(
+                connection, CHILD_TASK_ID, probe_request
+            )
+            _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=False)
+            runtime_input = probe_store._runtime_input(task)
+        resolved = dict(
+            self.resolver(
+                CHILD_TASK_ID,
+                EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+                intent.required_capability,
+                intent.adapter,
+                runtime_input,
+            )
+        )
+        execution = _validate_canonical_child_execution(
+            resolved, intent=intent, runtime_input=runtime_input
+        )
+        store = _SupersessionProjectionTransactionStore(
+            self.db_path, resolved, intent
+        )
+        result = store.project(
+            CHILD_TASK_ID, intent.initial_request(execution["execution_digest"])
+        )
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            receipt = self._replay(connection, intent)
+            if receipt is None:
+                raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                    "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_MISSING", 500
+                )
+        return {**receipt, "idempotent": bool(result["idempotent"])}
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+"""Fixed Owner operation for one exact Task-lineage supersession.
+
+This staging overlay deliberately extends the installed single-host operational
+authority instead of exposing a generic signing primitive.  The caller can
+only provide the three live CAS values which cannot be known at build time.
+Every authority, lineage and execution field is constructed server-side.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import secrets
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import OWNER_IDENTITY, OWNER_NAMESPACE, sha256_json
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority import (
+    OperationalAuthorityError,
+    OperationalOwnerAuthority,
+    OperationalPolicy,
+    SignedOperationalArtifact,
+)
+
+TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION = "issue_task_lineage_supersession"
+TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-decision.v1"
+SOURCE_TASK_ID = "TASK-SINGLEHOST-TRUSTROOT-P0-20260904"
+CHILD_TASK_ID = SOURCE_TASK_ID + "-S1"
+SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL = 1
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/single-host-trust-root-p0-20260904"
+GENERATION = 1
+SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST = (
+    "e99bda6a251832eb3865271eb5687af7eea44dd261144cdcdfa57104c0780536"
+)
+EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY = "job-4e10f92a6a5742518a9f1d8745c845ab"
+CANONICAL_PROJECTION_PROFILE = "aios.task-initial-execution.v1"
+CANONICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION = 1
+SUPERSESSION_REASON = "formal-lineage-supersession-after-expired-unclaimed-source"
+DECISION_TTL_SECONDS = 300
+
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+SAFE_TOKEN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,511}$")
+
+
+def _fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OperationalAuthorityError(code)
+
+
+def _assert_fixed_policy(policy: OperationalPolicy) -> None:
+    """Refuse issuance if the live policy is not the approved source scope."""
+    policy.validate()
+    exact = {
+        "task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_plan_sha256": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY,
+    }
+    if any(getattr(policy, field) != expected for field, expected in exact.items()):
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_POLICY_MISMATCH")
+    if policy.maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds < DECISION_TTL_SECONDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_POLICY_TTL_TOO_NARROW")
+
+
+TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_FIELDS = {
+    "schema",
+    "decision_id",
+    "nonce",
+    "source_task_id",
+    "source_task_identity_sha256",
+    "source_metadata_sha256",
+    "source_expected_status",
+    "source_expected_revision",
+    "source_expected_attempt",
+    "source_expected_claimed_by",
+    "source_expected_lease_token_hash",
+    "source_expected_lease_expires_at",
+    "repository",
+    "target_branch",
+    "generation",
+    "source_business_execution_digest",
+    "external_job_identity",
+    "child_task_id",
+    "supersession_ordinal",
+    "canonical_projection_profile",
+    "canonical_projection_version",
+    "supersession_reason",
+    "owner_identity",
+    "policy_digest",
+    "one_time_use",
+    "issued_at",
+    "not_before",
+    "expires_at",
+    "signature_namespace",
+    "signature_key_id",
+    "canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+
+
+def verify_task_lineage_supersession_scope(
+    decision: Mapping[str, Any],
+    policy: OperationalPolicy,
+    *,
+    now: int,
+) -> None:
+    """Validate a signature-verified decision against the fixed source scope."""
+    _assert_fixed_policy(policy)
+    if not isinstance(decision, Mapping) or set(decision) != TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_FIELDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    exact = {
+        "schema": TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "source_expected_status": "EXPIRED",
+        "source_expected_attempt": 0,
+        "source_expected_claimed_by": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_token_hash": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_expires_at": None,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY,
+        "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION,
+        "supersession_reason": SUPERSESSION_REASON,
+        "owner_identity": OWNER_IDENTITY,
+        "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+        "one_time_use": True,
+        "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    }
+    if any(decision.get(field) != expected for field, expected in exact.items()):
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    if decision.get("source_task_identity_sha256") != policy.task_identity_sha256:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SOURCE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+    for field in ("source_task_identity_sha256", "source_metadata_sha256"):
+        if not isinstance(decision.get(field), str) or HEX64.fullmatch(decision[field]) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    if type(decision.get("source_expected_revision")) is not int or not 1 <= decision["source_expected_revision"] < 2**63:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_REVISION_INVALID")
+    for field in ("decision_id", "nonce"):
+        if not isinstance(decision.get(field), str) or SAFE_TOKEN.fullmatch(decision[field]) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_GENERATED_ID_INVALID")
+    for field in ("issued_at", "not_before", "expires_at"):
+        if type(decision.get(field)) is not int:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    if not decision["not_before"] <= now < decision["expires_at"]:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    if decision["issued_at"] > now + 5 or now - decision["issued_at"] > DECISION_TTL_SECONDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    if decision["expires_at"] - decision["issued_at"] != DECISION_TTL_SECONDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    digest_value = dict(decision)
+    supplied_digest = digest_value.pop("canonical_payload_digest", None)
+    if supplied_digest != sha256_json(digest_value):
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_CANONICAL_DIGEST_INVALID")
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionOwnerAuthority(OperationalOwnerAuthority):
+    """Owner signer with one bounded constructor and no caller-defined message."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *args: Any,
+        token_hex: Callable[[int], str] = secrets.token_hex,
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self._token_hex = token_hex
+
+    def issue_task_lineage_supersession(
+        self,
+        *,
+        source_expected_revision: int,
+        source_task_identity_sha256: str,
+        source_metadata_sha256: str,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        _assert_fixed_policy(self.policy)
+        if type(source_expected_revision) is not int or not 1 <= source_expected_revision < 2**63:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_REVISION_INVALID")
+        if source_task_identity_sha256 != self.policy.task_identity_sha256:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SOURCE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(source_metadata_sha256, str) or HEX64.fullmatch(source_metadata_sha256) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_METADATA_DIGEST_INVALID")
+
+        decision_id = "task-lineage-supersession-" + self._token_hex(16)
+        nonce = "task-lineage-supersession-nonce-" + self._token_hex(16)
+        if SAFE_TOKEN.fullmatch(decision_id) is None or SAFE_TOKEN.fullmatch(nonce) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_GENERATED_ID_INVALID")
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        payload = {
+            "schema": TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA,
+            "decision_id": decision_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "source_task_identity_sha256": source_task_identity_sha256,
+            "source_metadata_sha256": source_metadata_sha256,
+            "source_expected_status": "EXPIRED",
+            "source_expected_revision": source_expected_revision,
+            "source_expected_attempt": 0,
+            "source_expected_claimed_by": None,
+            "source_expected_lease_token_hash": None,
+            "source_expected_lease_expires_at": None,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+            "generation": GENERATION,
+            "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+            "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY,
+            "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_PROFILE,
+            "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION,
+            "supersession_reason": SUPERSESSION_REASON,
+            "owner_identity": OWNER_IDENTITY,
+            "policy_digest": self.policy.digest,
+            "one_time_use": True,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + DECISION_TTL_SECONDS,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+"""Staging-only server overlay for the fixed lineage Owner operation."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority import (
+    OperationalMachineAuthority,
+    OperationalVerifier,
+)
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority_server import (
+    DEFAULT_LEDGER,
+    DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY,
+    DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY,
+    DEFAULT_POLICY,
+    DurableIssuanceLedger,
+    OperationalAuthorityService as BaseOperationalAuthorityService,
+    _read_policy,
+    fail,
+)
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession_owner_authority import (
+    TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION,
+    TaskLineageSupersessionOwnerAuthority,
+)
+
+REQUEST_FIELDS = {
+    "source_expected_revision",
+    "source_task_identity_sha256",
+    "source_metadata_sha256",
+}
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionIssuanceLedger(DurableIssuanceLedger):
+    """Operation-scoped one-time fence layered on the existing durable ledger."""
+
+    def issue_once(
+        self,
+        *,
+        role: str,
+        operation: str,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        issuer: Callable[[], dict[str, Any]],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            json.dumps(
+                request,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                allow_nan=False,
+            ).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT 1 FROM issuance WHERE role=? AND operation=? LIMIT 1",
+                (role, operation),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                connection.rollback()
+                fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_ALREADY_ISSUED")
+            result = issuer()
+            artifact = result.get("artifact")
+            nonce = artifact.get("payload", {}).get("nonce") if isinstance(artifact, Mapping) else None
+            if not isinstance(nonce, str) or not nonce:
+                connection.rollback()
+                fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_ISSUER_RESULT_INVALID")
+            encoded = json.dumps(
+                result,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                allow_nan=False,
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO issuance(role,operation,nonce,request_sha256,response_json,created_at) "
+                "VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (role, operation, nonce, request_sha, encoded, int(time.time())),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return result
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
+            connection.rollback()
+            fail("ISSUANCE_LEDGER_RACE")
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+
+class OperationalAuthorityService(BaseOperationalAuthorityService):
+    """Preserve all existing operations and add one exact Owner-only operation."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *args: Any, token_hex=None, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self.ledger = TaskLineageSupersessionIssuanceLedger(self.ledger.path)
+        self._token_hex = token_hex
+
+    def _components(self):
+        policy = _read_policy(
+            self.policy_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        verifier = OperationalVerifier(
+            self.registry_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        if self.role == "owner":
+            kwargs = {}
+            if self._token_hex is not None:
+                kwargs["token_hex"] = self._token_hex
+            signer = TaskLineageSupersessionOwnerAuthority(
+                self.owner_key_path,
+                policy,
+                require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+                clock=self.clock,
+                **kwargs,
+            )
+        else:
+            signer = OperationalMachineAuthority(
+                self.machine_key_path,
+                policy,
+                require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+                clock=self.clock,
+            )
+        return policy, verifier, signer
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if peer_uid not in self.allowed_uids:
+            fail("PEER_UID_FORBIDDEN")
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping) or set(request) != {"operation", "payload"}:
+            fail("REQUEST_INVALID")
+        if request.get("operation") != TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION:
+            return super().handle(request, peer_uid=peer_uid)
+        if self.role != "owner":
+            fail("MACHINE_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+        payload = request.get("payload")
+        if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or set(payload) != REQUEST_FIELDS:
+            fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        _policy, _verifier, signer = self._components()
+
+        def issue() -> dict[str, Any]:
+            artifact = signer.issue_task_lineage_supersession(
+                source_expected_revision=payload["source_expected_revision"],
+                source_task_identity_sha256=payload["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                source_metadata_sha256=payload["source_metadata_sha256"],
+            )
+            return {"status": "PASS", "artifact": artifact.to_dict()}
+
+        return self.ledger.issue_once(
+            role=self.role,
+            operation=TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION,
+            request=payload,
+            issuer=issue,
+        )
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--role", choices=("owner", "machine"), required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--policy", default=str(DEFAULT_POLICY))
+    parser.add_argument("--registry", default=str(DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH))
+    parser.add_argument("--owner-key", default=str(DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY))
+    parser.add_argument("--machine-key", default=str(DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY))
+    parser.add_argument("--socket")
+    parser.add_argument("--ledger", default=str(DEFAULT_LEDGER))
+    arguments = parser.parse_args()
+    service = OperationalAuthorityService(
+        role=arguments.role,
+        policy_path=Path(arguments.policy),
+        registry_path=Path(arguments.registry),
+        owner_key_path=Path(arguments.owner_key),
+        machine_key_path=Path(arguments.machine_key),
+        socket_path=Path(arguments.socket) if arguments.socket else None,
+        ledger_path=Path(arguments.ledger),
+    )
+    service.serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,798 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed AF_UNIX builder for server-owned trusted candidate evidence."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import socket
+import stat
+import struct
+import subprocess
+import time
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+
+class BuilderError(RuntimeError):
+    """A stable, non-sensitive error code returned by the builder boundary."""
+
+
+def _canonical_json(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha256(*parts: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256("\0".join(parts).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PeerIdentity:
+    pid: int
+    uid: int
+    gid: int
+
+
+class DomainPurposeSigner(Protocol):
+    """A signer deliberately limited to the builder's one domain purpose."""
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        ...
+
+    @property
+    def key_generation(self) -> int:
+        ...
+
+    def sign_for_purpose(self, purpose: str, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        ...
+
+
+class CredentialPathEd25519Signer:
+    """Reads a systemd-mounted credential path; never exports or logs key bytes."""
+
+    def __init__(self, credential_path: Path, *, key_id: str, key_generation: int, allowed_purpose: str):
+        self._credential_path = Path(credential_path)
+        self._key_id = str(key_id)
+        self._key_generation = key_generation
+        self._allowed_purpose = str(allowed_purpose)
+        if not self._key_id or not isinstance(key_generation, int) or key_generation < 1:
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if not self._credential_path.is_file():
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        try:
+            from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_pem_private_key
+            from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+            self._private_key = load_pem_private_key(self._credential_path.read_bytes(), password=None)
+            if not isinstance(self._private_key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+                raise TypeError("signing key is not Ed25519")
+        except Exception as exc:  # do not expose parse/key material details
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_INVALID") from exc
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        return self._key_id
+
+    @property
+    def key_generation(self) -> int:
+        return self._key_generation
+
+    def sign_for_purpose(self, purpose: str, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        if purpose != self._allowed_purpose:
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_PURPOSE_DENIED")
+        return self._private_key.sign(payload)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BuilderKeyring:
+    builder_hmac: bytes
+    signing_private_key_path: Path | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if len(self.builder_hmac) < 32:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_HMAC_INVALID")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_credentials_directory(cls, credentials_directory: Path) -> "BuilderKeyring":
+        root = Path(credentials_directory)
+        hmac_path = root / "builder_hmac"
+        signing_path = root / "signing_private_key"
+        try:
+            secret = hmac_path.read_bytes().strip()
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_HMAC_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if not signing_path.is_file():
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        return cls(builder_hmac=secret, signing_private_key_path=signing_path)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig:
+    policy_schema: str
+    repository: str
+    request_schema: str
+    response_schema: str
+    operation: str
+    readiness_operation: str
+    maximum_request_age_seconds: int
+    request_timeout_seconds: int
+    allowed_peer_uid: int
+    allowed_peer_cgroups: tuple[str, ...]
+    allowed_peer_executable_prefix: str
+    allowed_peer_runtime_prefix: str
+    allowed_peer_runtime_suffix: str
+    required_checks: tuple[str, ...]
+    evidence_layout: Mapping[str, str]
+    recipes: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, str]]
+    governed_recipes: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, str]]
+    policy_sha256: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_policy(cls, policy: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig":
+        required = {
+            "schema", "repository", "request_schema", "response_schema", "operation",
+            "readiness_operation", "maximum_request_age_seconds", "request_timeout_seconds",
+            "allowed_peer_uid", "allowed_peer_cgroups", "allowed_peer_executable_prefix",
+            "allowed_peer_runtime_prefix", "allowed_peer_runtime_suffix",
+            "required_checks", "evidence_layout", "recipes", "governed_recipes",
+        }
+        if set(policy) != required or policy.get("schema") != "aios.trusted-candidate-builder-policy.v1":
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        recipes = policy.get("recipes")
+        if not isinstance(recipes, Mapping) or set(recipes) != {"V2R2C2", "V2R2C3"}:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_RECIPES_INVALID")
+        c2, c3 = recipes["V2R2C2"], recipes["V2R2C3"]
+        if not isinstance(c2, Mapping) or set(c2) != {"mode", "task_id", "candidate_id", "base_oid", "source_commit", "version", "purpose"} or c2.get("mode") != "fixed":
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_V2R2C2_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(c3, Mapping) or set(c3) != {"mode", "derives_from", "version", "purpose"} or c3.get("mode") != "governed-derived-only" or c3.get("derives_from") != "V2R2C2":
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_V2R2C3_INVALID")
+        if (
+            policy["repository"] != "aios/aios"
+            or policy["operation"] != "BuildTrustedCandidateV1"
+            or policy["readiness_operation"] != "ProbeTrustedCandidateBuilderV1"
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(policy["maximum_request_age_seconds"], int) or not 1 <= policy["maximum_request_age_seconds"] <= 300:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_FRESHNESS_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(policy["request_timeout_seconds"], int) or not 1 <= policy["request_timeout_seconds"] <= 120:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(policy["allowed_peer_uid"], int) or policy["allowed_peer_uid"] != 1000:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_PEER_UID_INVALID")
+        cgroups, checks = policy["allowed_peer_cgroups"], policy["required_checks"]
+        if not isinstance(cgroups, list) or not cgroups or not all(isinstance(value, str) and value.startswith("/") for value in cgroups):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_CGROUPS_INVALID")
+        for field in (
+            "allowed_peer_executable_prefix",
+            "allowed_peer_runtime_prefix",
+            "allowed_peer_runtime_suffix",
+        ):
+            if not isinstance(policy[field], str) or not policy[field].startswith("/"):
+                raise BuilderError("POLICY_PROCESS_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(checks, list) or not checks or len(set(checks)) != len(checks) or not all(isinstance(value, str) for value in checks):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_CHECKS_INVALID")
+        layout = policy["evidence_layout"]
+        evidence_names = {
+            "artifact", "manifest", "package_closure", "tests", "canary",
+            "gitea", "rollback", "policy", "secret_scan",
+        }
+        if (
+            not isinstance(layout, Mapping)
+            or set(layout) != evidence_names
+            or not all(
+                isinstance(value, str)
+                and value.startswith("{version}/")
+                and ".." not in Path(value).parts
+                and not Path(value).is_absolute()
+                for value in layout.values()
+            )
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_EVIDENCE_LAYOUT_INVALID")
+        return cls(
+            policy_schema=str(policy["schema"]), repository=str(policy["repository"]),
+            request_schema=str(policy["request_schema"]), response_schema=str(policy["response_schema"]),
+            operation=str(policy["operation"]), readiness_operation=str(policy["readiness_operation"]),
+            maximum_request_age_seconds=policy["maximum_request_age_seconds"],
+            request_timeout_seconds=policy["request_timeout_seconds"],
+            allowed_peer_uid=policy["allowed_peer_uid"], allowed_peer_cgroups=tuple(cgroups),
+            allowed_peer_executable_prefix=policy["allowed_peer_executable_prefix"],
+            allowed_peer_runtime_prefix=policy["allowed_peer_runtime_prefix"],
+            allowed_peer_runtime_suffix=policy["allowed_peer_runtime_suffix"],
+            required_checks=tuple(checks), evidence_layout=dict(layout),
+            recipes={name: dict(value) for name, value in recipes.items()},
+            governed_recipes={name: dict(value) for name, value in policy["governed_recipes"].items()} if isinstance(policy["governed_recipes"], Mapping) else _invalid_governed_recipes(),
+            policy_sha256=hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(policy))).hexdigest(),
+        )
+
+    def fixed_recipe(self, name: str) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        recipe = self.recipes.get(name)
+        if recipe is None:
+            raise BuilderError("RECIPE_UNKNOWN")
+        if recipe["mode"] == "governed-derived-only":
+            derived = self.governed_recipes.get(name)
+            required = {"mode", "task_id", "candidate_id", "base_oid", "source_commit", "version", "purpose", "derived_from_v2r2c2_attestation", "builder_engineering_oid"}
+            if not isinstance(derived, Mapping) or set(derived) != required or derived.get("mode") != "governed-derived" or derived.get("version") != name or derived.get("purpose") != recipe.get("purpose"):
+                raise BuilderError("GOVERNED_V2R2C3_DERIVATION_REQUIRED")
+            for name in ("base_oid", "source_commit", "builder_engineering_oid"):
+                value = derived.get(name)
+                if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in value.lower()):
+                    raise BuilderError("GOVERNED_V2R2C3_DERIVATION_REQUIRED")
+            return dict(derived)
+        return recipe
+
+    def resolve_recipe(self, version: str, candidate_id: str | None, source_commit: str) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        recipe = self.fixed_recipe(version)
+        # Intent-only callers do not choose a candidate identity.  The
+        # policy-owned recipe supplies it; explicit worker requests are
+        # still checked against the same immutable recipe.
+        effective_candidate_id = str(candidate_id or recipe.get("candidate_id") or "")
+        if {"version": recipe.get("version"), "candidate_id": recipe.get("candidate_id"), "source_commit": recipe.get("source_commit")} != {"version": version, "candidate_id": effective_candidate_id, "source_commit": source_commit}:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        return recipe
+
+
+def _invalid_governed_recipes() -> Mapping[str, Mapping[str, str]]:
+    raise BuilderError("POLICY_GOVERNED_RECIPES_INVALID")
+
+
+def load_builder_policy(path: Path) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise BuilderError("POLICY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not isinstance(decoded, Mapping):
+        raise BuilderError("POLICY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig.from_policy(decoded)
+    return decoded
+
+
+class ServerOwnedEvidenceSource:
+    """Recomputes a fixed on-host evidence closure without caller-owned paths."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig,
+        authority_git_dir: Path,
+        evidence_root: Path,
+        *,
+        expected_owner_uid: int | None = 0,
+        git_runner: Callable[..., Any] = subprocess.run,
+    ):
+        self._config = config
+        self._authority_git_dir = Path(authority_git_dir)
+        self._evidence_root = Path(evidence_root)
+        self._expected_owner_uid = expected_owner_uid
+        self._git_runner = git_runner
+
+    def _regular_path(self, relative: str) -> Path:
+        root = self._evidence_root.resolve(strict=True)
+        candidate = self._evidence_root / relative
+        current = self._evidence_root
+        for part in Path(relative).parts:
+            current = current / part
+            if current.is_symlink():
+                raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SYMLINK_DENIED")
+        try:
+            resolved = candidate.resolve(strict=True)
+            resolved.relative_to(root)
+            metadata = resolved.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+        except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SPECIAL_FILE_DENIED")
+        if os.name != "nt" and metadata.st_mode & 0o022:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_MODE_DENIED")
+        if (
+            os.name != "nt"
+            and
+            self._expected_owner_uid is not None
+            and metadata.st_uid != self._expected_owner_uid
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_OWNER_DENIED")
+        return resolved
+
+    def _digest(self, path: Path) -> str:
+        digest = hashlib.sha256()
+        with path.open("rb") as handle:
+            for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+                digest.update(chunk)
+        return digest.hexdigest()
+
+    def _json(self, path: Path) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            if path.stat().st_size > 2 * 1024 * 1024:
+                raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_SIZE_INVALID")
+            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def __call__(self, recipe_name: str, recipe: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            tree_result = self._git_runner(
+                ["git", f"--git-dir={self._authority_git_dir}", "rev-parse", f"{recipe['source_commit']}^{{tree}}"],
+                check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15,
+                env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+            )
+            ancestry_result = self._git_runner(
+                ["git", f"--git-dir={self._authority_git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", recipe["base_oid"], recipe["source_commit"]],
+                check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15,
+                env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+            )
+            tree_oid = tree_result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if getattr(ancestry_result, "returncode", 1) != 0:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GIT_MISMATCH")
+
+        receipt = self._json(self._regular_path(f"{recipe_name}/receipt.json"))
+        if set(receipt) != {"schema", "version", "candidate", "release_plan"}:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        if (
+            receipt.get("schema") != "aios.trusted-candidate-builder.evidence.v1"
+            or receipt.get("version") != recipe_name
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        candidate = receipt.get("candidate")
+        release_plan = receipt.get("release_plan")
+        if not isinstance(candidate, Mapping) or not isinstance(release_plan, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        if (
+            candidate.get("candidate_id") != recipe["candidate_id"]
+            or candidate.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or candidate.get("tree_oid") != tree_oid
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GIT_MISMATCH")
+        git_consistency = candidate.get("git_consistency")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(git_consistency, Mapping)
+            or git_consistency.get("consistent") is not True
+            or git_consistency.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or git_consistency.get("tree_oid") != tree_oid
+            or git_consistency.get("repository") != self._config.repository
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GIT_MISMATCH")
+
+        paths = {
+            name: self._regular_path(template.format(version=recipe_name))
+            for name, template in self._config.evidence_layout.items()
+        }
+        deployment = release_plan.get("deployment")
+        if not isinstance(deployment, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        digests = {name: self._digest(path) for name, path in paths.items()}
+        if (
+            digests["artifact"] != candidate.get("artifact_sha256")
+            or digests["manifest"] != candidate.get("manifest_sha256")
+            or digests["package_closure"] != deployment.get("package_closure_sha256")
+            or digests["policy"] != release_plan.get("policy_sha256")
+            or digests["policy"] != deployment.get("policy_sha256")
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+
+        tests = self._json(paths["tests"])
+        canary = self._json(paths["canary"])
+        gitea = self._json(paths["gitea"])
+        rollback = self._json(paths["rollback"])
+        secret_scan = self._json(paths["secret_scan"])
+        if tests != candidate.get("tests") or tests.get("passed") is not True:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_TESTS_MISMATCH")
+        if canary != candidate.get("canary") or canary.get("passed") is not True:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_CANARY_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            digests["tests"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(tests))).hexdigest()
+            or digests["canary"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(canary))).hexdigest()
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_CANONICALIZATION_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            gitea != candidate.get("gitea_consistency")
+            or gitea.get("consistent") is not True
+            or gitea.get("repository") != self._config.repository
+            or gitea.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or gitea.get("tree_oid") != tree_oid
+            or gitea.get("remote_ref_oid") != recipe["source_commit"]
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GITEA_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            candidate.get("rollback_ready") is not True
+            or rollback.get("ready") is not True
+            or rollback.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or rollback.get("rollback_sha256") != deployment.get("rollback_sha256")
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_ROLLBACK_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            digests["gitea"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(gitea))).hexdigest()
+            or digests["rollback"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(rollback))).hexdigest()
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_CANONICALIZATION_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            secret_scan.get("passed") is not True
+            or secret_scan.get("artifact_sha256") != candidate.get("artifact_sha256")
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SECRET_SCAN_MISMATCH")
+        checks = {name: True for name in self._config.required_checks}
+        return {
+            "candidate": dict(candidate),
+            "release_plan": dict(release_plan),
+            "checks": checks,
+            "evidence_digests": digests,
+        }
+
+
+class DeterministicEvidenceCollector:
+    """Validates a server-owned source; request fields never influence collection."""
+
+    _BUNDLE_FIELDS = {"candidate", "release_plan", "checks", "evidence_digests"}
+
+    def __init__(self, config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig, *, evidence_source: Callable[[str, Mapping[str, str]], Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None):
+        self._config = config
+        self._evidence_source = evidence_source
+
+    def collect(self, recipe_name: str, recipe: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if self._evidence_source is None:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_UNCONFIGURED")
+        bundle = self._evidence_source(recipe_name, recipe)
+        if not isinstance(bundle, Mapping) or set(bundle) != self._BUNDLE_FIELDS:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        raw_checks = bundle.get("checks")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(raw_checks, Mapping)
+            or set(raw_checks) != set(self._config.required_checks)
+            or any(raw_checks.get(name) is not True for name in self._config.required_checks)
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_CHECKS_INCOMPLETE")
+        evidence_digests = bundle.get("evidence_digests")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(evidence_digests, Mapping)
+            or set(evidence_digests) != set(self._config.evidence_layout)
+            or any(
+                not isinstance(value, str)
+                or len(value) != 64
+                or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in value.lower())
+                for value in evidence_digests.values()
+            )
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_DIGESTS_INVALID")
+        try:
+            from silent_release_controller import ReleaseCandidate
+            from silent_release_hardening import ReleasePlan, TrustedCandidateBundle
+
+            candidate = ReleaseCandidate.from_dict(dict(bundle["candidate"]))
+            release_plan = ReleasePlan.from_dict(dict(bundle["release_plan"]))
+            checks = dict(raw_checks)
+            TrustedCandidateBundle(candidate, release_plan, checks).validate()
+        except (ImportError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID") from exc
+        if candidate.source_commit != recipe["source_commit"] or candidate.candidate_id != recipe["candidate_id"]:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SOURCE_MISMATCH")
+        return {
+            "candidate": candidate.to_dict(),
+            "release_plan": release_plan.to_dict(),
+            "checks": checks,
+            "evidence_digests": dict(evidence_digests),
+        }
+
+
+def _extract_peer_identity(connection: socket.socket) -> PeerIdentity:
+    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
+        raise BuilderError("SO_PEERCRED_UNAVAILABLE")
+    raw = connection.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, struct.calcsize("3i"))
+    if len(raw) != struct.calcsize("3i"):
+        raise BuilderError("SO_PEERCRED_INVALID")
+    return PeerIdentity(*struct.unpack("3i", raw))
+
+
+def _resolve_cgroups(pid: int) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    try:
+        return tuple(
+            line.rsplit(":", 1)[1].strip()
+            for line in Path(f"/proc/{pid}/cgroup").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
+            if ":" in line and line.rsplit(":", 1)[1].strip().startswith("/")
+        )
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise BuilderError("PEER_CGROUP_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+
+def _resolve_process_identity(pid: int) -> tuple[str, tuple[str, ...]]:
+    try:
+        executable = os.path.realpath(f"/proc/{pid}/exe")
+        argv = tuple(
+            item.decode("utf-8", "strict")
+            for item in Path(f"/proc/{pid}/cmdline").read_bytes().split(b"\0")
+            if item
+        )
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not executable or not argv:
+        raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return executable, argv
+
+
+class TrustedCandidateBuilder:
+    def __init__(
+        self, config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig, keyring: BuilderKeyring, *,
+        collector: DeterministicEvidenceCollector, signer: DomainPurposeSigner,
+        peer_identity_resolver: Callable[[socket.socket], PeerIdentity] = _extract_peer_identity,
+        cgroup_resolver: Callable[[int], tuple[str, ...] | str] = _resolve_cgroups,
+        process_identity_resolver: Callable[[int], tuple[str, tuple[str, ...]]] = _resolve_process_identity,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time, nonce_ledger_path: Path | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.config, self.keyring, self.collector, self.signer = config, keyring, collector, signer
+        self.peer_identity_resolver, self.cgroup_resolver, self.clock = peer_identity_resolver, cgroup_resolver, clock
+        self.process_identity_resolver = process_identity_resolver
+        self._nonce_ledger_path = Path(nonce_ledger_path) if nonce_ledger_path else None
+        self._nonce_ledger: dict[str, tuple[bytes, dict[str, Any]]] = self._load_nonce_ledger()
+
+    def _load_nonce_ledger(self) -> dict[str, tuple[bytes, dict[str, Any]]]:
+        if self._nonce_ledger_path is None or not self._nonce_ledger_path.exists():
+            return {}
+        if self._nonce_ledger_path.is_symlink():
+            raise BuilderError("NONCE_LEDGER_INVALID")
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(self._nonce_ledger_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            return {nonce: (bytes.fromhex(value["request_sha256"]), dict(value["result"])) for nonce, value in raw.items()}
+        except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("NONCE_LEDGER_INVALID") from exc
+
+    def _persist_nonce_ledger(self) -> None:
+        if self._nonce_ledger_path is None:
+            return
+        try:
+            self._nonce_ledger_path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            temporary = self._nonce_ledger_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+            payload = {nonce: {"request_sha256": digest.hex(), "result": result} for nonce, (digest, result) in self._nonce_ledger.items()}
+            with temporary.open("wb") as handle:
+                handle.write(_canonical_json(payload))
+                handle.flush()
+                os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+            os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
+            os.replace(temporary, self._nonce_ledger_path)
+            if os.name != "nt":
+                descriptor = os.open(self._nonce_ledger_path.parent, os.O_RDONLY)
+                try:
+                    os.fsync(descriptor)
+                finally:
+                    os.close(descriptor)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("NONCE_LEDGER_PERSIST_FAILED") from exc
+
+    def _verify_peer(self, connection: socket.socket) -> None:
+        peer = self.peer_identity_resolver(connection)
+        if peer.uid != self.config.allowed_peer_uid or peer.pid <= 0:
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_IDENTITY_DENIED")
+        resolved = self.cgroup_resolver(peer.pid)
+        cgroups = (resolved,) if isinstance(resolved, str) else tuple(resolved)
+        if not cgroups or not any(item in self.config.allowed_peer_cgroups for item in cgroups):
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_CGROUP_DENIED")
+        executable, argv = self.process_identity_resolver(peer.pid)
+        if not executable.startswith(self.config.allowed_peer_executable_prefix):
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_DENIED")
+        runtime_arguments = [
+            value
+            for value in argv
+            if value.startswith(self.config.allowed_peer_runtime_prefix)
+            and value.endswith(self.config.allowed_peer_runtime_suffix)
+        ]
+        if len(runtime_arguments) != 1:
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_DENIED")
+
+    def handle_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, connection: socket.socket) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        expected_keys = {"schema", "operation", "recipe", "repository", "task_id", "candidate_id", "base_oid", "source_commit", "version", "purpose", "issued_at", "nonce", "hmac"}
+        if (
+            set(request) != expected_keys
+            or request.get("schema") != self.config.request_schema
+            or request.get("operation") not in {
+                self.config.operation,
+                self.config.readiness_operation,
+            }
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        supplied_mac = request.get("hmac")
+        unsigned = {key: value for key, value in request.items() if key != "hmac"}
+        if not isinstance(supplied_mac, str) or not hmac.compare_digest(hmac.new(self.keyring.builder_hmac, _canonical_json(unsigned), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest(), supplied_mac):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_HMAC_INVALID")
+        issued_at, nonce = request.get("issued_at"), request.get("nonce")
+        if not isinstance(issued_at, int) or not isinstance(nonce, str) or len(nonce) < 16 or len(nonce) > 256:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        self._verify_peer(connection)
+        request_bytes = _canonical_json(dict(request))
+        replay = self._nonce_ledger.get(nonce)
+        if replay is not None:
+            if hmac.compare_digest(replay[0], hashlib.sha256(request_bytes).digest()):
+                return dict(replay[1])
+            raise BuilderError("REPLAY_CONFLICT")
+        if abs(int(self.clock()) - issued_at) > self.config.maximum_request_age_seconds:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_STALE")
+        recipe_name = request.get("recipe")
+        if not isinstance(recipe_name, str):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        recipe = self.config.resolve_recipe(str(request.get("version") or ""), str(request.get("candidate_id") or ""), str(request.get("source_commit") or ""))
+        if recipe_name != recipe.get("version"):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        bound = {"repository": self.config.repository, "task_id": recipe["task_id"], "candidate_id": recipe["candidate_id"], "base_oid": recipe["base_oid"], "source_commit": recipe["source_commit"], "version": recipe["version"], "purpose": recipe["purpose"]}
+        if {key: request.get(key) for key in bound} != bound:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        bundle = dict(self.collector.collect(recipe_name, recipe))
+        candidate = bundle["candidate"]
+        release_plan = bundle["release_plan"]
+        checks = bundle.get("checks")
+        evidence_digests = bundle["evidence_digests"]
+        if not isinstance(checks, Mapping) or set(checks) != set(self.config.required_checks) or not all(value is True for value in checks.values()):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_CHECKS_INCOMPLETE")
+        if request["operation"] == self.config.readiness_operation:
+            result = {
+                "schema": self.config.response_schema,
+                "status": "READY",
+                "repository": self.config.repository,
+                "recipe": recipe_name,
+                "candidate_id": recipe["candidate_id"],
+                "source_commit": recipe["source_commit"],
+                "builder_key_id": self.signer.key_id,
+                "builder_key_generation": self.signer.key_generation,
+                "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519",
+                "signature_purpose": "AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER",
+                "policy_sha256": self.config.policy_sha256,
+                "collector_ready": True,
+                "signer_ready": True,
+            }
+            if len(self._nonce_ledger) >= 2048:
+                self._nonce_ledger.pop(next(iter(self._nonce_ledger)))
+            self._nonce_ledger[nonce] = (
+                hashlib.sha256(request_bytes).digest(),
+                dict(result),
+            )
+            self._persist_nonce_ledger()
+            return result
+        issued = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        attestation = {
+            "builder_attestation_id": "builder-attestation-" + _sha256(recipe_name, recipe["task_id"], candidate["artifact_sha256"])[:24],
+            "builder_key_id": self.signer.key_id,
+            "builder_key_generation": self.signer.key_generation,
+            "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519",
+            "signature_purpose": "AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER",
+            "source_commit": candidate["source_commit"], "tree_oid": candidate["tree_oid"],
+            "artifact_sha256": candidate["artifact_sha256"], "manifest_sha256": candidate["manifest_sha256"],
+            "package_closure_sha256": release_plan["deployment"]["package_closure_sha256"],
+            "test_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["tests"],
+            "canary_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["canary"],
+            "gitea_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["gitea"],
+            "rollback_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["rollback"],
+            "policy_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["policy"],
+            "secret_scan_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["secret_scan"],
+            "issued_at": issued, "trust_domain": "aios.trusted-builder.attestation.v1",
+        }
+        canonical_attestation = _canonical_json(attestation)
+        fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(canonical_attestation).hexdigest()
+        signature = base64.b64encode(self.signer.sign_for_purpose("AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER", canonical_attestation)).decode("ascii")
+        result = {
+            "schema": self.config.response_schema, "status": "BUILT", "recipe": recipe_name,
+            "repository": self.config.repository, "task_id": recipe["task_id"], "base_oid": recipe["base_oid"],
+            "purpose": recipe["purpose"], "checks": dict(checks),
+            "evidence": {"candidate_id": candidate["candidate_id"], "source_commit": candidate["source_commit"], "tree_oid": candidate["tree_oid"], "artifact_sha256": candidate["artifact_sha256"], "manifest_sha256": candidate["manifest_sha256"], "package_closure_sha256": release_plan["deployment"]["package_closure_sha256"], "test_evidence_sha256": attestation["test_evidence_sha256"], "canary_evidence_sha256": attestation["canary_evidence_sha256"]},
+            "attestation": {**attestation, "fingerprint": fingerprint, "signature": signature},
+        }
+        result["silent_release_bundle"] = {"candidate": candidate, "release_plan": release_plan, "checks": dict(checks), "attestation": result["attestation"]}
+        if len(self._nonce_ledger) >= 2048:
+            self._nonce_ledger.pop(next(iter(self._nonce_ledger)))
+        self._nonce_ledger[nonce] = (hashlib.sha256(request_bytes).digest(), dict(result))
+        self._persist_nonce_ledger()
+        return result
+
+    def serve_forever(self, listener: socket.socket) -> None:
+        while True:
+            connection, _ = listener.accept()
+            with connection:
+                try:
+                    raw = connection.makefile("rb").readline(65537)
+                    if not raw or len(raw) > 65536:
+                        raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID")
+                    result = self.handle_request(json.loads(raw), connection=connection)
+                except (BuilderError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                    result = {"schema": self.config.response_schema, "status": "REJECTED", "error_code": "REQUEST_REJECTED"}
+                connection.sendall(_canonical_json(result) + b"\n")
+
+
+class UnixTrustedCandidateBuilderClient:
+    def __init__(self, config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig, keyring: BuilderKeyring, *, socket_path: Path | None = None, clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time) -> None:
+        self.config, self.keyring, self.socket_path, self.clock = config, keyring, socket_path, clock
+
+    def create_request(self, version: str, candidate_id: str | None, source_commit: str, *, nonce: str, operation: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        selected = self.config.resolve_recipe(version, candidate_id, source_commit)
+        selected_operation = operation or self.config.operation
+        if selected_operation not in {self.config.operation, self.config.readiness_operation}:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_OPERATION_INVALID")
+        request = {"schema": self.config.request_schema, "operation": selected_operation, "recipe": version, "repository": self.config.repository, "task_id": selected["task_id"], "candidate_id": selected["candidate_id"], "base_oid": selected["base_oid"], "source_commit": selected["source_commit"], "version": selected["version"], "purpose": selected["purpose"], "issued_at": int(self.clock()), "nonce": nonce}
+        request["hmac"] = hmac.new(self.keyring.builder_hmac, _canonical_json(request), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+        return request
+
+    def _exchange(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if self.socket_path is None:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_SOCKET_UNCONFIGURED")
+        try:
+            with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as connection:
+                connection.settimeout(self.config.request_timeout_seconds)
+                connection.connect(os.fspath(self.socket_path))
+                connection.sendall(_canonical_json(dict(request)) + b"\n")
+                raw = connection.makefile("rb").readline(65537)
+        except (OSError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_TRANSPORT_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        try:
+            result = json.loads(raw)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_RESPONSE_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(result, Mapping) or result.get("schema") != self.config.response_schema:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+    def build(self, version: str, candidate_id: str | None, source_commit: str, *, nonce: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        result = self._exchange(
+            self.create_request(version, candidate_id, source_commit, nonce=nonce)
+        )
+        if result.get("status") != "BUILT":
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_REQUEST_REJECTED")
+        return result
+
+    def probe(self, *, nonce: str | None = None) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        recipe = self.config.fixed_recipe("V2R2C2")
+        result = self._exchange(
+            self.create_request(
+                "V2R2C2",
+                recipe["candidate_id"],
+                recipe["source_commit"],
+                nonce=nonce or secrets.token_hex(32),
+                operation=self.config.readiness_operation,
+            )
+        )
+        if result.get("status") != "READY":
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_NOT_READY")
+        return result
+
+
+def readiness_probe(client: UnixTrustedCandidateBuilderClient) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    result = dict(client.probe())
+    required_true = {"collector_ready", "signer_ready"}
+    if any(result.get(name) is not True for name in required_true):
+        raise BuilderError("BUILDER_NOT_READY")
+    return result
+
+
+def _main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--socket-fd", required=True, type=int)
+    parser.add_argument("--policy", required=True, type=Path)
+    arguments = parser.parse_args()
+    config = TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig.from_policy(load_builder_policy(arguments.policy))
+    credentials = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
+    if not credentials:
+        raise SystemExit("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY is required")
+    keyring = BuilderKeyring.from_credentials_directory(Path(credentials))
+    signer = CredentialPathEd25519Signer(
+        keyring.signing_private_key_path,
+        key_id=os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_KEY_ID"],
+        key_generation=int(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_KEY_GENERATION"]),
+        allowed_purpose="AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER",
+    )
+    listener = socket.fromfd(arguments.socket_fd, socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    collector = DeterministicEvidenceCollector(
+        config,
+        evidence_source=ServerOwnedEvidenceSource(
+            config,
+            Path(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_GIT_DIR"]),
+            Path(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_EVIDENCE_ROOT"]),
+        ),
+    )
+    TrustedCandidateBuilder(config, keyring, collector=collector, signer=signer, nonce_ledger_path=Path(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_NONCE_LEDGER"])).serve_forever(listener)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    _main()
@@ -0,0 +1,687 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""One-shot governed executor for an already approved exact release binding.
+
+This module deliberately does not build release artifacts. The build/staging
+evidence is completed before Owner production approval. Production execution
+consumes that immutable binding, revalidates it, and performs narrow
+side-effects through adapters in a durable fail-closed order.
+
+Adapter protocol:
+  stdin: JSON request with operation = "probe" | "apply" | "rollback"
+  stdout: one JSON object on the final non-empty line
+  shell: never used
+
+The executor never rewrites tags, never writes refs/heads/main, and records
+Baseline last.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import dataclasses
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from trusted_release_execution_plan import PlanError, TrustedReleasePlan
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+PLAN_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS = {
+    "payload/VERSION",
+    "payload/active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py",
+    "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py",
+    "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r1c7_health_service.py",
+    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service",
+    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/v2r1c7-runtime-config.json",
+    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/v2r1c7-rollback.json",
+    "payload/scripts/probe_v2r1c7_health.py",
+    "payload/scripts/rollback_v2r1c7_release.sh",
+    "payload/BUILD-METADATA.json",
+    "payload/ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json",
+    "payload/ROLLBACK-METADATA.json",
+}
+
+class ReleaseBlocked(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+class ManualOwnerReviewRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
+    pass
+
+class ReconciliationRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Binding:
+    version: str
+    target_oid: str
+    evidence_closure_oid: str
+    artifact_sha256: str
+    approval_plan_id: str
+    artifact_path: str
+    artifact_size: int
+    production_service: str
+    production_port: int
+    repository_identity: str = "aios/aios"
+
+    candidate_id: str | None = None
+    release_plan_sha256: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_trusted_plan(cls, plan: TrustedReleasePlan) -> "Binding":
+        value = plan.value
+        adapter = value["adapter_policy"]
+        binding = cls(
+            version=str(value["version"]), target_oid=str(value["source_commit"]),
+            evidence_closure_oid=str(value["evidence_closure_oid"]), artifact_sha256=str(value["artifact_sha256"]),
+            approval_plan_id=str(value["approval_plan_id"]), artifact_path=str(value["artifact"]["path"]),
+            artifact_size=int(value["artifact"]["size"]), production_service=str(adapter["service"]),
+            production_port=int(adapter["port"]), candidate_id=str(value["candidate_id"]),
+            release_plan_sha256=plan.release_plan_sha256,
+        )
+        plan.assert_binding(dataclasses.asdict(binding))
+        return binding
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.version or not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.target_oid):
+            raise ValueError("invalid release target binding")
+        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.evidence_closure_oid):
+            raise ValueError("invalid evidence closure OID")
+        if not SHA_RE.fullmatch(self.artifact_sha256):
+            raise ValueError("invalid artifact SHA-256")
+        if not PLAN_RE.fullmatch(self.approval_plan_id):
+            raise ValueError("invalid approval plan id")
+        if self.artifact_size <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("invalid artifact size")
+        if not self.production_service:
+            raise ValueError("production service is required")
+        if not 1024 <= self.production_port <= 65535:
+            raise ValueError("invalid production port")
+        if self.repository_identity != "aios/aios":
+            raise ValueError("unexpected repository identity")
+
+    @property
+    def tag(self) -> str:
+        return self.version
+
+    @property
+    def fingerprint(self) -> str:
+        payload = {
+            "version": self.version,
+            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
+            "artifact_size": self.artifact_size,
+            "production_service": self.production_service,
+            "production_port": self.production_port,
+            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
+            "candidate_id": self.candidate_id,
+            "release_plan_sha256": self.release_plan_sha256,
+        }
+        return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(payload)).hexdigest()
+
+    def request(self, operation: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.production-executor-request.v1",
+            "operation": operation,
+            "binding_fingerprint": self.fingerprint,
+            "version": self.version,
+            "tag": self.tag,
+            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "artifact_path": self.artifact_path,
+            "artifact_size": self.artifact_size,
+            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
+            "production_service": self.production_service,
+            "production_port": self.production_port,
+            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
+            "candidate_id": self.candidate_id,
+            "release_plan_sha256": self.release_plan_sha256,
+        }
+
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    st = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode) or path.is_symlink():
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"non-regular authorization file: {path}")
+    if st.st_uid != 0:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"authorization file must be root-owned: {path}")
+    if st.st_mode & 0o022:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"authorization file is group/world writable: {path}")
+    data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("authorization receipt must be a JSON object")
+    return data
+
+
+def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact must be a regular non-symlink file")
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as source:
+        for block in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            digest.update(block)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def run_git(git_dir: Path, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
+        check=check,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=30,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+
+
+def verify_git_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    authority_main = run_git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main").stdout.strip()
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(authority_main):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("Authority main OID is invalid")
+
+    target_type = run_git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.target_oid).stdout.strip()
+    if target_type != "commit":
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("target_oid is not a commit")
+
+    evidence_type = run_git(
+        git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.evidence_closure_oid
+    ).stdout.strip()
+    if evidence_type != "commit":
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("evidence_closure_oid is not a commit")
+
+    # A control-plane-only patch may advance main after release approval.
+    # The approved release target remains valid only while it is still on main.
+    target_on_main = run_git(
+        git_dir,
+        "merge-base",
+        "--is-ancestor",
+        binding.target_oid,
+        authority_main,
+        check=False,
+    ).returncode == 0
+    if not target_on_main:
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
+            "approved target is no longer an ancestor of Authority main"
+        )
+
+    target_in_evidence = run_git(
+        git_dir,
+        "merge-base",
+        "--is-ancestor",
+        binding.target_oid,
+        binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        check=False,
+    ).returncode == 0
+    if not target_in_evidence:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("approved target is not an ancestor of evidence closure")
+
+    return {
+        "authority_main_oid": authority_main,
+        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "target_is_ancestor_of_main": True,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "evidence_object_type": evidence_type,
+        "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
+    }
+
+
+def verify_artifact(binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    path = Path(binding.artifact_path)
+    if path.stat().st_size != binding.artifact_size:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact size mismatch")
+    actual = sha256_file(path)
+    if actual != binding.artifact_sha256:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact SHA-256 mismatch")
+
+    if binding.version == "V2R1C7":
+        # Python tarfile may not have zstd support on the target host, so
+        # decompress into a private temporary tar and inspect it there.
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-artifact-verify-") as temp_dir:
+            tar_path = Path(temp_dir) / "release.tar"
+            with tar_path.open("wb") as output:
+                completed = subprocess.run(
+                    ["zstd", "-dc", str(path)],
+                    check=False,
+                    stdout=output,
+                    stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+                    timeout=60,
+                    env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+                )
+            if completed.returncode != 0:
+                raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact zstd decompression failed")
+            import tarfile
+            with tarfile.open(tar_path, "r:") as archive:
+                names: set[str] = set()
+                for member in archive.getmembers():
+                    candidate = Path(member.name)
+                    if (
+                        candidate.is_absolute()
+                        or ".." in candidate.parts
+                        or member.issym()
+                        or member.islnk()
+                        or not (member.isfile() or member.isdir())
+                    ):
+                        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"unsafe artifact member: {member.name}")
+                    names.add(member.name)
+            missing = sorted(REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS - names)
+            if missing:
+                raise ReleaseBlocked(
+                    "artifact missing required members: " + ",".join(missing)
+                )
+    return {
+        "artifact_path": str(path),
+        "artifact_sha256": actual,
+        "artifact_size": binding.artifact_size,
+        "verified": True,
+    }
+
+
+def verify_authorization(receipt: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if receipt.get("accepted") is not True:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("Owner production authorization is not accepted")
+    if receipt.get("binding_replaced") not in (None, False):
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("Owner binding was replaced")
+    expected = {
+        "version": binding.version,
+        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
+        "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
+    }
+    if binding.candidate_id is not None:
+        expected["candidate_id"] = binding.candidate_id
+    if binding.release_plan_sha256 is not None:
+        expected["release_plan_sha256"] = binding.release_plan_sha256
+        if receipt.get("candidate_binding_sha256") is None:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("Owner authorization missing candidate binding")
+    for key, value in expected.items():
+        if receipt.get(key) != value:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"Owner authorization mismatch: {key}")
+    return {"accepted": True, **expected}
+
+
+class DurableState:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path, binding: Binding):
+        self.root = root
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(self.root, 0o700)
+        self.path = self.root / "execution.json"
+        self.binding = binding
+        self.value: dict[str, Any]
+        if self.path.exists():
+            existing = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if existing.get("binding_fingerprint") != binding.fingerprint:
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
+                    "state root contains a different production binding"
+                )
+            self.value = existing
+        else:
+            self.value = {
+                "schema": "aios.production-execution-state.v1",
+                "binding_fingerprint": binding.fingerprint,
+                "version": binding.version,
+                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+                "state": "AUTHORIZED",
+                "completed": {},
+                "history": [],
+            }
+            self.save()
+
+    def save(self) -> None:
+        temporary = self.path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary.write_bytes(canonical_json(self.value))
+        os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
+        os.replace(temporary, self.path)
+
+    def record(self, state: str, step: str, result: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        now = time.time()
+        sanitized = json.loads(json.dumps(result))
+        self.value["state"] = state
+        self.value["completed"][step] = sanitized
+        self.value["history"].append(
+            {"at": now, "state": state, "step": step, "result": sanitized}
+        )
+        self.save()
+
+    def fail(self, state: str, reason: str) -> None:
+        self.value["state"] = state
+        self.value["history"].append(
+            {"at": time.time(), "state": state, "reason": reason}
+        )
+        self.save()
+
+
+class FileLock:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = path
+        self.handle = None
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> "FileLock":
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+        try:
+            fcntl.flock(
+                self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB
+            )
+        except BlockingIOError as exc:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("production executor is already running") from exc
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
+        if self.handle is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+            self.handle.close()
+
+
+def parse_command(values: Sequence[str]) -> list[str]:
+    command = [str(x) for x in values if str(x)]
+    if not command:
+        raise ValueError("adapter command is required")
+    if not os.path.isabs(command[0]):
+        raise ValueError("adapter executable must be an absolute path")
+    return command
+
+
+def run_adapter(command: Sequence[str], request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        list(command),
+        input=canonical_json(request),
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=180,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(
+            f"adapter failed: {Path(command[0]).name} rc={completed.returncode}"
+        )
+    lines = [line for line in completed.stdout.decode("utf-8").splitlines() if line.strip()]
+    if not lines:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter returned no JSON result")
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(lines[-1])
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter returned invalid JSON") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter result must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def require_exact_response(result: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Binding) -> None:
+    for key, expected in {
+        "version": binding.version,
+        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
+        "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
+    }.items():
+        if key in result and result[key] != expected:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"adapter binding mismatch: {key}")
+
+
+def tag_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = binding.request("probe")
+    probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    state = probe.get("status")
+    if state == "CONFLICT":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("same-name tag conflicts with approved binding")
+    if state == "INDETERMINATE":
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("tag publication state is indeterminate")
+    if state not in {"APPLIED_VERIFIED", "NOT_APPLIED", "PARTIAL_LOCAL"}:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"unsupported tag probe status: {state}")
+    if state != "APPLIED_VERIFIED":
+        applied = run_adapter(command, binding.request("apply"))
+        require_exact_response(applied, binding)
+        if applied.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("tag conflict during publication")
+        probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+        require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") != "APPLIED_VERIFIED":
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("tag was not independently verified")
+    if probe.get("peeled_target_oid") != binding.target_oid:
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("published tag peeled target mismatch")
+    tag_oid = probe.get("tag_oid")
+    if not isinstance(tag_oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(tag_oid):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("verified annotated tag object OID missing")
+    return dict(probe)
+
+
+def deploy_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    probe = run_adapter(command, binding.request("probe"))
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") == "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
+        return dict(probe)
+    if probe.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("production runtime has conflicting binding")
+    applied = run_adapter(command, binding.request("apply"))
+    require_exact_response(applied, binding)
+    probe = run_adapter(command, binding.request("probe"))
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
+        try:
+            run_adapter(command, binding.request("rollback"))
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("production runtime did not verify after apply")
+    if (
+        probe.get("deployment_state") != "ACTIVE"
+        or probe.get("production_deployed") is not True
+    ):
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("production health contract is not ACTIVE")
+    return dict(probe)
+
+
+def finalize_step(
+    command: Sequence[str],
+    binding: Binding,
+    *,
+    name: str,
+    tag_oid: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = binding.request("probe")
+    request["tag_oid"] = tag_oid
+    probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"{name} has conflicting release binding")
+    if probe.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+        apply_request = binding.request("apply")
+        apply_request["tag_oid"] = tag_oid
+        applied = run_adapter(command, apply_request)
+        require_exact_response(applied, binding)
+        probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+        require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+        raise ReconciliationRequired(f"{name} did not verify after apply")
+    if probe.get("tag_oid") not in (None, tag_oid):
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"{name} tag object mismatch")
+    return dict(probe)
+
+
+def execute(
+    *,
+    binding: Binding,
+    authorization_path: Path,
+    repository: Path,
+    state_root: Path,
+    tag_command: Sequence[str],
+    deploy_command: Sequence[str],
+    registry_command: Sequence[str],
+    baseline_command: Sequence[str],
+    release_plan_path: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    plan = TrustedReleasePlan.load(release_plan_path) if release_plan_path is not None else None
+    if plan is not None:
+        try:
+            plan.assert_binding(dataclasses.asdict(binding))
+        except PlanError as exc:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked(f"trusted release plan mismatch: {exc}") from exc
+    authorization = verify_authorization(secure_json(authorization_path), binding)
+    lineage = verify_git_lineage(repository, binding)
+    artifact = verify_artifact(binding)
+    state = DurableState(state_root, binding)
+    with FileLock(state_root / "executor.lock"):
+        state.record(
+            "PREFLIGHT_VERIFIED",
+            "preflight",
+            {"authorization": authorization, "lineage": lineage, "artifact": artifact},
+        )
+        tag: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+        runtime: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+        try:
+            tag = tag_step(tag_command, binding)
+            state.record("TAG_VERIFIED", "tag", tag)
+
+            runtime = deploy_step(deploy_command, binding)
+            state.record("RUNTIME_VERIFIED", "runtime", runtime)
+
+            registry = finalize_step(
+                registry_command,
+                binding,
+                name="registry",
+                tag_oid=tag["tag_oid"],
+            )
+            state.record("REGISTRY_VERIFIED", "registry", registry)
+
+            baseline = finalize_step(
+                baseline_command,
+                binding,
+                name="baseline",
+                tag_oid=tag["tag_oid"],
+            )
+            state.record("BASELINE_VERIFIED", "baseline", baseline)
+
+            # Final readback: no mutation, all four planes must still agree.
+            final_tag = tag_step(tag_command, binding)
+            final_runtime = run_adapter(deploy_command, binding.request("probe"))
+            final_registry_request = binding.request("probe")
+            final_registry_request["tag_oid"] = tag["tag_oid"]
+            final_registry = run_adapter(registry_command, final_registry_request)
+            final_baseline_request = binding.request("probe")
+            final_baseline_request["tag_oid"] = tag["tag_oid"]
+            final_baseline = run_adapter(baseline_command, final_baseline_request)
+            for value in (final_runtime, final_registry, final_baseline):
+                require_exact_response(value, binding)
+            if final_runtime.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
+                raise ReconciliationRequired("final runtime readback failed")
+            if final_registry.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+                raise ReconciliationRequired("final Registry readback failed")
+            if final_baseline.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+                raise ReconciliationRequired("final Baseline readback failed")
+            final = {
+                "status": "PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED",
+                "version": binding.version,
+                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+                "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+                "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
+                "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
+                "tag_oid": tag["tag_oid"],
+                "tag": final_tag,
+                "runtime": final_runtime,
+                "registry": final_registry,
+                "baseline": final_baseline,
+                "force_push_used": False,
+                "tag_rewritten": False,
+                "direct_main_push": False,
+                "secrets_committed": False,
+            }
+            state.record("COMPLETED", "final_consistency", final)
+            return final
+        except ManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+            state.fail("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", str(exc))
+            raise
+        except ReconciliationRequired as exc:
+            state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", str(exc))
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:
+            # Once a formal tag has been verified, no later error is a clean
+            # pre-side-effect failure. Preserve the tag and require idempotent
+            # reconciliation rather than pretending the release never started.
+            if tag is not None:
+                reason = f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
+                state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", reason)
+                raise ReconciliationRequired(reason) from exc
+            state.fail("FAIL_CLOSED", f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")
+            raise
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    p.add_argument("--authorization", required=True, type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--release-plan", type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--artifact", type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--artifact-size", type=int)
+    p.add_argument("--version")
+    p.add_argument("--target-oid")
+    p.add_argument("--evidence-closure-oid")
+    p.add_argument("--artifact-sha256")
+    p.add_argument("--approval-plan-id")
+    p.add_argument("--production-service")
+    p.add_argument("--production-port", type=int)
+    p.add_argument("--repository-identity", default="aios/aios")
+    p.add_argument("--tag-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    p.add_argument("--deploy-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    p.add_argument("--registry-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    p.add_argument("--baseline-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    return p
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parser().parse_args()
+    plan = TrustedReleasePlan.load(args.release_plan) if args.release_plan else None
+    if plan is not None:
+        binding = Binding.from_trusted_plan(plan)
+    else:
+        legacy=(args.artifact,args.artifact_size,args.version,args.target_oid,args.evidence_closure_oid,args.artifact_sha256,args.approval_plan_id,args.production_service,args.production_port)
+        if any(value is None for value in legacy): raise SystemExit("legacy binding is incomplete")
+        binding = Binding(version=args.version,target_oid=args.target_oid,evidence_closure_oid=args.evidence_closure_oid,artifact_sha256=args.artifact_sha256,approval_plan_id=args.approval_plan_id,artifact_path=str(args.artifact),artifact_size=args.artifact_size,production_service=args.production_service,production_port=args.production_port,repository_identity=args.repository_identity)
+    try:
+        result = execute(
+            binding=binding,
+            authorization_path=args.authorization,
+            repository=args.repository,
+            state_root=args.state_root,
+            tag_command=parse_command(args.tag_adapter),
+            deploy_command=parse_command(args.deploy_adapter),
+            registry_command=parse_command(args.registry_adapter),
+            baseline_command=parse_command(args.baseline_adapter),
+            release_plan_path=args.release_plan,
+        )
+        print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    except ManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 20
+    except ReconciliationRequired as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 21
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAIL_CLOSED", "error": type(exc).__name__, "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 22
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+"""Fail-closed access to the authoritative bare Git repository."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import time
+import urllib.parse
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Iterable
+
+_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "cat-file",
+        "config",
+        "diff",
+        "for-each-ref",
+        "ls-remote",
+        "merge-base",
+        "push",
+        "remote",
+        "rev-parse",
+        "show-ref",
+        "tag",
+    }
+)
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_MAX_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
+_TIMEOUT = 8.0
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitError(RuntimeError):
+    """A fail-closed authoritative repository or ref query error."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitNotFound(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A validated revision does not exist in the authoritative repository."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A controlled Git query exceeded the response-size boundary."""
+
+
+def _redact(text: str) -> str:
+    value = str(text or "")
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:bearer|token)\s+\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)((?:access_)?token\s*[:=]\s*)\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(https?://[^/\s:@]+:)[^@\s/]+@", r"\1REDACTED@", value)
+    return value
+
+
+def _configured_path(git_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
+    raw = str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    if not raw:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    path = Path(raw)
+    if not path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    try:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not resolved.is_dir():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def _run(
+    git_dir: Path,
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    if not args or args[0] not in _ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
+    if len(result.stdout) + len(result.stderr) > _MAX_OUTPUT:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
+    if check and result.returncode != 0:
+        detail = _redact(result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip())
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError(
+            "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED" + (f": {detail[:160]}" if detail else "")
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def _repository_identity_from_remote(url: str) -> str:
+    value = str(url or "").strip().split("?", 1)[0].rstrip("/")
+    if not value:
+        return ""
+    if "://" in value:
+        value = urllib.parse.urlparse(value).path
+    elif ":" in value:
+        value = value.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
+    value = value.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].strip("/")
+    value = re.sub(r"\.git$", "", value, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
+    parts = [part for part in value.split("/") if part]
+    if len(parts) >= 2:
+        value = "/".join(parts[-2:])
+    return value.strip("/").lower()
+
+
+def verify_repository(
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[Path, str]:
+    path = _configured_path(git_dir)
+    expected = str(
+        repository_identity
+        or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+    ).strip().strip("/")
+    if not expected or expected.count("/") != 1:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    bare = _run(path, ["rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository"], check=True)
+    if bare.stdout.strip().lower() != "true":
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    remote = _run(path, ["config", "--get", "remote.gitea.url"], check=False)
+    actual = _repository_identity_from_remote(remote.stdout)
+    if actual != expected.lower():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    return path, expected
+
+
+def run_authoritative_git(
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool = True,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    return _run(path, list(args), check=check, timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def authoritative_head_oid(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main"], git_dir=git_dir)
+    oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return oid
+
+
+def authoritative_tags(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str | None]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/tags",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)\t%(objecttype)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    tags: list[dict[str, str | None]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid, object_type = (line.split("\t", 2) + ["", ""])[:3]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        peeled_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{name}^{{commit}}"],
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        peeled = peeled_result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(peeled):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        tags.append(
+            {
+                "name": name,
+                "tag_oid": oid.lower(),
+                "object_type": object_type,
+                "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
+            }
+        )
+    return tags
+
+
+def authoritative_branches(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/heads",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    branches: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid = (line.split("\t", 1) + [""])[:2]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        branches.append({"name": name, "oid": oid.lower()})
+    return branches
+
+
+def authoritative_commit(
+    oid: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    value = str(oid or "").strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise ValueError("commit OID must be a full 40-character value")
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{value}^{{commit}}"],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    resolved = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if resolved != value:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def authoritative_lineage(
+    ancestor: str,
+    descendant: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    authoritative_commit(ancestor, git_dir=git_dir)
+    authoritative_commit(descendant, git_dir=git_dir)
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
+        check=False,
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("evidence lineage mismatch")
+
+
+_SAFE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
+
+
+def _safe_ref_name(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(
+        _SAFE_REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
+        and ".." not in value
+        and "//" not in value
+        and "@{" not in value
+        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        and not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
+    )
+
+
+def validate_git_revision(
+    value: str,
+    field: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    revision = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not revision or revision != str(value or "") or revision.startswith("-"):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
+        try:
+            return authoritative_commit(revision.lower(), git_dir=git_dir)
+        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+            raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found") from exc
+    if not _safe_ref_name(revision) or any(token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if revision.startswith("refs/"):
+        if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+        candidates = [revision]
+    else:
+        candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
+    matches: list[str] = []
+    for candidate in candidates:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if result.returncode == 0 and _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+            matches.append(oid)
+    if not matches:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found")
+    if len(set(matches)) != 1 or len(matches) != 1:
+        raise ValueError(f"ambiguous {field} revision")
+    return matches[0]
+
+
+def authoritative_diff(
+    from_revision: str,
+    to_revision: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
+    to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
+    args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
+    patch_limit = max(1, min(_MAX_OUTPUT, 256 * 1024))
+    process = subprocess.Popen(
+        ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), *args],
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+        env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
+    )
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    stored_bytes = 0
+    total_bytes = 0
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    try:
+        while process.stdout is not None:
+            chunk = process.stdout.read(64 * 1024)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            total_bytes += len(chunk)
+            if stored_bytes < patch_limit:
+                remaining = patch_limit - stored_bytes
+                selected = chunk[:remaining]
+                chunks.append(selected)
+                stored_bytes += len(selected)
+            if time.monotonic() - started > _TIMEOUT:
+                process.kill()
+                raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_TIMEOUT")
+        stderr = (
+            process.stderr.read(8192).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+            if process.stderr is not None
+            else ""
+        )
+        returncode = process.wait(timeout=max(0.1, _TIMEOUT - (time.monotonic() - started)))
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+        process.kill()
+        process.wait()
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
+    if returncode != 0:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError(_redact(stderr.strip() or "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")[:200])
+    try:
+        names_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", "--name-status", from_oid, to_oid],
+            git_dir=path,
+        )
+        changed_paths = [
+            line.split("\t", 1)[-1]
+            for line in names_result.stdout.splitlines()
+            if line.strip()
+        ]
+    except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge:
+        changed_paths = []
+    try:
+        stats_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", "--stat", from_oid, to_oid],
+            git_dir=path,
+        )
+        stats = stats_result.stdout.strip()
+    except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge:
+        stats = "GIT_STAT_OUTPUT_TRUNCATED"
+    patch = b"".join(chunks).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    return {
+        "code": 0,
+        "stdout": patch,
+        "stderr": "",
+        "cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
+        "from_oid": from_oid,
+        "to_oid": to_oid,
+        "changed_paths": changed_paths,
+        "stats": stats,
+        "total_size_bytes": total_bytes,
+        "truncated": total_bytes > patch_limit,
+        "patch_limit_bytes": patch_limit,
+    }
+
+
+def repository_snapshot(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    configured = bool(
+        str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    )
+    try:
+        path, identity = verify_repository(
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+            repository_identity=repository_identity,
+        )
+        head = authoritative_head_oid(git_dir=path)
+        return {
+            "repository_available": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": str(path),
+            "authoritative_head_oid": head,
+            "repository_identity": identity,
+            "query_error": None,
+        }
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        return {
+            "repository_available": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": None,
+            "authoritative_head_oid": None,
+            "repository_identity": str(
+                repository_identity
+                or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+            ).strip() or None,
+            "query_error": _redact(str(exc)),
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Durable Owner/GPT notification outbox with retry and acknowledgement."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import time
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OutboxEvent:
+    event_id: str
+    recipient: str
+    kind: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    attempts: int
+    available_at: float
+    acknowledged: bool
+
+
+class DurableOutbox:
+    RECIPIENTS = ("owner", "gpt")
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = str(path)
+        self.db = sqlite3.connect(self.path)
+        self.db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        self.db.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS outbox (event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, recipient TEXT NOT NULL, kind TEXT NOT NULL, payload TEXT NOT NULL, attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, available_at REAL NOT NULL, delivered_at REAL, acknowledged INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, last_error TEXT)")
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def enqueue(self, kind: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, event_id: str | None = None, recipients: tuple[str, ...] = RECIPIENTS) -> list[str]:
+        ids: list[str] = []
+        for recipient in recipients:
+            if recipient not in self.RECIPIENTS:
+                raise ValueError("recipient is outside the governed notification plane")
+            eid = event_id or str(uuid.uuid4())
+            if event_id is not None and len(recipients) > 1:
+                eid = f"{event_id}:{recipient}"
+            self.db.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO outbox(event_id,recipient,kind,payload,available_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)", (eid, recipient, kind, json.dumps(dict(payload), sort_keys=True), time.time()))
+            ids.append(eid)
+        self.db.commit()
+        return ids
+
+    def due(self, *, now: float | None = None, limit: int = 20) -> list[OutboxEvent]:
+        now = time.time() if now is None else now
+        rows = self.db.execute("SELECT event_id,recipient,kind,payload,attempts,available_at,acknowledged FROM outbox WHERE delivered_at IS NULL AND available_at<=? ORDER BY available_at,event_id LIMIT ?", (now, limit)).fetchall()
+        return [OutboxEvent(r[0], r[1], r[2], json.loads(r[3]), r[4], r[5], bool(r[6])) for r in rows]
+
+    def delivered(self, event_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET delivered_at=? WHERE event_id=?", (time.time() if now is None else now, event_id))
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def failed(self, event_id: str, error: str, *, now: float | None = None, max_backoff: float = 300.0) -> None:
+        now = time.time() if now is None else now
+        row = self.db.execute("SELECT attempts FROM outbox WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,)).fetchone()
+        attempts = int(row[0]) + 1 if row else 1
+        delay = min(max_backoff, 2 ** min(attempts, 8))
+        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET attempts=?,available_at=?,last_error=? WHERE event_id=?", (attempts, now + delay, error[:200], event_id))
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def acknowledge(self, event_id: str) -> None:
+        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET acknowledged=1 WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,))
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self.db.close()
+
+
+class NotificationPlane:
+    def __init__(self, outbox: DurableOutbox) -> None:
+        self.outbox = outbox
+
+    def emit(self, kind: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, event_id: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
+        return self.outbox.enqueue(kind, payload, event_id=event_id)
+
+    def deliver_once(self, send: Callable[[OutboxEvent], None], *, now: float | None = None) -> list[str]:
+        delivered: list[str] = []
+        for event in self.outbox.due(now=now):
+            try:
+                send(event)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                self.outbox.failed(event.event_id, type(exc).__name__, now=now)
+            else:
+                self.outbox.delivered(event.event_id, now=now)
+                delivered.append(event.event_id)
+        return delivered
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Single canonical Production Baseline authority for the GitOps reader.
+
+The API and the one-shot writer import this module.  Workspace and release
+copies are projections only; they are never selected as a fallback source.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+AUTHORITY_PATH = Path(os.getenv(
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_AUTHORITY",
+    "/var/lib/aios-gitops-runtime-anchor/baseline/current.json",
+))
+AUTHORITY_SHA_PATH = AUTHORITY_PATH.with_suffix(".sha256")
+
+
+class BaselineAuthorityError(RuntimeError):
+    """Fail-closed error raised for an unavailable or inconsistent authority."""
+
+
+class BaselineAuthority:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path | str = AUTHORITY_PATH):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.sha_path = self.path.with_suffix(".sha256")
+
+    def _raw(self) -> bytes:
+        try:
+            raw = self.path.read_bytes()
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise BaselineAuthorityError(f"authority_unavailable:{exc}") from exc
+        if not raw:
+            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_empty")
+        return raw
+
+    def read(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        raw = self._raw()
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_invalid_json") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_not_object")
+        expected = str(value.get("authority_sha256", ""))
+        if expected and expected != digest:
+            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_embedded_digest_mismatch")
+        if self.sha_path.exists():
+            sidecar = self.sha_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip().split()[0]
+            if sidecar != digest:
+                raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_sidecar_digest_mismatch")
+        required = {
+            "current_baseline", "previous_baseline", "target_oid", "tag_oid",
+            "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "status", "generation",
+            "source_identity",
+        }
+        missing = sorted(required.difference(value))
+        if missing:
+            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_missing:" + ",".join(missing))
+        value = dict(value)
+        value["authority_sha256"] = digest
+        value["authority_path"] = str(self.path)
+        return value
+
+    def read_consistent(self, policy: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = self.read()
+        if policy:
+            expected = policy.get("release_binding", policy)
+            for key, field in (("version", "current_baseline"),
+                               ("previous_version", "previous_baseline"),
+                               ("target_oid", "target_oid"),
+                               ("tag_oid", "tag_oid"),
+                               ("evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_closure_oid"),
+                               ("approval_plan_id", "approval_plan_id")):
+                wanted = expected.get(key)
+                if wanted is not None and value.get(field) != wanted:
+                    raise BaselineAuthorityError(f"authority_binding_mismatch:{field}")
+        return value
+
@@ -0,0 +1,491 @@
+"""Fail-closed, branch-bound repair leases for governed AIOS GitOps work."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import posixpath
+import re
+import secrets
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+
+TASK_ID = "V2R1C6_GOVERNED_LOCAL_BOOTSTRAP"
+MAX_LEASE_SECONDS = 86_400
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$")
+DENIED_BRANCHES = {"main", "master", "HEAD"}
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = (
+    ".git",
+    "VERSION",
+    "versions/V2R1C5.json",
+    "artifacts/V2R1C5",
+    "baseline",
+    "config/gitops.tokens",
+    "gitops.tokens",
+    "secrets",
+    "credentials",
+)
+SECRET_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(r"(?i)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"\b(?:sk|HPUA|SDC)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b"),
+)
+
+
+class LeaseError(Exception):
+    """Raised for any invalid, stale, expired, or prohibited lease action."""
+
+
+class GitProbeProtocol(Protocol):
+    """Read-only Git seam used by the lease manager."""
+
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
+
+    def parent(self, commit: str) -> str: ...
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+
+    def changed_paths(self, commit: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: ...
+
+    def commits_between(self, older: str, newer: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: ...
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _ts(value: datetime) -> str:
+    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _parse_ts(value: str) -> datetime:
+    if value.endswith("Z"):
+        value = value[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value)
+    return parsed if parsed.tzinfo else parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _oid(value: str, field: str = "oid") -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise LeaseError(f"{field} must be a full commit OID")
+    return value.lower()
+
+
+def normalize_path(path: str) -> str:
+    """Normalize a repository-relative path without resolving through the FS."""
+    if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip():
+        raise LeaseError("path must be a non-empty string")
+    value = path.replace("\\", "/").strip()
+    if value.startswith("/") or "\x00" in value:
+        raise LeaseError("path must be relative")
+    parts = value.split("/")
+    if any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts):
+        raise LeaseError("path contains a prohibited component")
+    normalized = posixpath.normpath(value)
+    if normalized == "." or normalized.startswith("../"):
+        raise LeaseError("path is not normalized")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def path_is_protected(path: str) -> bool:
+    normalized = normalize_path(path)
+    lower = normalized.lower()
+    return any(
+        lower == prefix.lower() or lower.startswith(prefix.lower().rstrip("/") + "/")
+        for prefix in PROTECTED_PREFIXES
+    ) or lower.startswith("refs/")
+
+
+def contains_secret_like_content(content: str) -> bool:
+    return any(pattern.search(content or "") for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS)
+
+
+def validate_paths(paths: Iterable[str], allowed_paths: Sequence[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    allowed = tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in allowed_paths)
+    if not allowed:
+        raise LeaseError("allowed_paths must not be empty")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for raw in paths:
+        path = normalize_path(raw)
+        if path_is_protected(path):
+            raise LeaseError("protected path is not lease-writable")
+        if not any(path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix + "/") for prefix in allowed):
+            raise LeaseError("path is outside the lease allowlist")
+        if path not in result:
+            result.append(path)
+    if not result:
+        raise LeaseError("at least one changed path is required")
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class CommitEntry:
+    commit_oid: str
+    parent_oid: str
+    paths: tuple[str, ...]
+    recorded_at: str
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RepairLease:
+    lease_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    owner_identity: str
+    branch: str
+    description: str
+    allowed_paths: tuple[str, ...]
+    initial_head_oid: str
+    current_head_oid: str
+    created_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    max_expires_at: str
+    state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    revision: int = 0
+    commits: list[CommitEntry] = field(default_factory=list)
+    attached: bool = False
+
+    def to_json(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = asdict(self)
+        payload["allowed_paths"] = list(self.allowed_paths)
+        payload["commits"] = [asdict(entry) for entry in self.commits]
+        return payload
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_json(cls, raw: dict[str, Any]) -> "RepairLease":
+        commits = tuple(
+            CommitEntry(
+                commit_oid=_oid(item["commit_oid"], "commit_oid"),
+                parent_oid=_oid(item["parent_oid"], "parent_oid"),
+                paths=tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in item["paths"]),
+                recorded_at=str(item["recorded_at"]),
+            )
+            for item in raw.get("commits", [])
+        )
+        return cls(
+            lease_id=str(raw["lease_id"]),
+            task_id=str(raw["task_id"]),
+            owner_identity=str(raw["owner_identity"]),
+            branch=str(raw["branch"]),
+            description=str(raw["description"]),
+            allowed_paths=tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in raw["allowed_paths"]),
+            initial_head_oid=_oid(raw["initial_head_oid"], "initial_head_oid"),
+            current_head_oid=_oid(raw["current_head_oid"], "current_head_oid"),
+            created_at=str(raw["created_at"]),
+            expires_at=str(raw["expires_at"]),
+            max_expires_at=str(raw["max_expires_at"]),
+            state=str(raw.get("state", "ACTIVE")),
+            revision=int(raw.get("revision", 0)),
+            commits=list(commits),
+            attached=bool(raw.get("attached", False)),
+        )
+
+
+class LeaseStore:
+    """Atomic JSON store for restart-recoverable lease state."""
+
+    def __init__(self, directory: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.directory = Path(directory)
+        self.directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.directory.is_symlink():
+            raise LeaseError("lease store must not be a symlink")
+        os.chmod(self.directory, 0o700)
+
+    def _path(self, lease_id: str) -> Path:
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"lease-[0-9a-f]{32}", lease_id):
+            raise LeaseError("invalid lease id")
+        return self.directory / f"{lease_id}.json"
+
+    def create(self, lease: RepairLease) -> None:
+        path = self._path(lease.lease_id)
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise LeaseError("lease already exists")
+        self._write(path, lease.to_json(), exclusive=True)
+
+    def load(self, lease_id: str) -> RepairLease:
+        path = self._path(lease_id)
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as exc:
+            raise LeaseError("lease state is unavailable or invalid") from exc
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise LeaseError("lease state must be an object")
+        return RepairLease.from_json(raw)
+
+    def save(self, lease: RepairLease) -> None:
+        self._write(self._path(lease.lease_id), lease.to_json())
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _write(path: Path, payload: dict[str, Any], *, exclusive: bool = False) -> None:
+        flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | (os.O_EXCL if exclusive else 0)
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".lease-", dir=path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            if exclusive:
+                os.link(temp_name, path)
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+            else:
+                os.replace(temp_name, path)
+            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+        except Exception:
+            try:
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
+            raise
+
+
+class GitProbe:
+    """Read-only Git implementation; it never changes a ref or working tree."""
+
+    def __init__(self, bare_repo: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.bare_repo = Path(bare_repo)
+
+    def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise LeaseError("read-only Git probe failed")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str:
+        return _oid(self._run(["rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"]), "branch_head")
+
+    def parent(self, commit: str) -> str:
+        return _oid(self._run(["rev-parse", f"{_oid(commit)}^1"]), "parent")
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
+        old, new = _oid(older), _oid(newer)
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", old, new],
+            check=False,
+        )
+        return result.returncode == 0
+
+    def changed_paths(self, commit: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        raw = self._run(["diff-tree", "--no-commit-id", "--name-only", "-r", _oid(commit)])
+        return tuple(normalize_path(line) for line in raw.splitlines() if line.strip())
+
+    def commits_between(self, older: str, newer: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        raw = self._run(["rev-list", "--reverse", f"{_oid(older)}..{_oid(newer)}"])
+        return tuple(_oid(line, "commit") for line in raw.splitlines() if line.strip())
+
+
+class RepairLeaseManager:
+    """Issue, recover, renew, and close branch-bound repair leases."""
+
+    def __init__(self, store: LeaseStore, git: GitProbeProtocol, *, clock=_now) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self.git = git
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    def _require_owner(self, lease: RepairLease, owner_identity: str) -> None:
+        if owner_identity != lease.owner_identity:
+            raise LeaseError("lease identity mismatch")
+
+    def _active(self, lease: RepairLease) -> RepairLease:
+        now = self.clock()
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
+            raise LeaseError(f"lease is {lease.state.lower()}")
+        if now >= _parse_ts(lease.expires_at):
+            lease.state = "EXPIRED"
+            self.store.save(lease)
+            raise LeaseError("lease expired")
+        return lease
+
+    def issue(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        owner_identity: str,
+        branch: str,
+        description: str,
+        allowed_paths: Sequence[str],
+        ttl_seconds: int = 3600,
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        if task_id != TASK_ID:
+            raise LeaseError("unexpected task id")
+        if not owner_identity or not description or len(description) > 240:
+            raise LeaseError("owner identity and description are required")
+        if "\n" in description or "\r" in description:
+            raise LeaseError("description must be a single line")
+        if branch in DENIED_BRANCHES or branch.startswith(("main/", "refs/", "tags/")):
+            raise LeaseError("protected branch cannot receive a repair lease")
+        if not isinstance(ttl_seconds, int) or not 0 < ttl_seconds <= MAX_LEASE_SECONDS:
+            raise LeaseError("lease TTL exceeds the maximum")
+        allowed = tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in allowed_paths)
+        if any(path_is_protected(path) for path in allowed):
+            raise LeaseError("protected path in lease allowlist")
+        head = self.git.branch_head(branch)
+        created = self.clock()
+        expires = created + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
+        max_expires = created + timedelta(seconds=MAX_LEASE_SECONDS)
+        lease_id = "lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16)
+        lease = RepairLease(
+            lease_id=lease_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            owner_identity=owner_identity,
+            branch=branch,
+            description=description,
+            allowed_paths=allowed,
+            initial_head_oid=head,
+            current_head_oid=head,
+            created_at=_ts(created),
+            expires_at=_ts(expires),
+            max_expires_at=_ts(max_expires),
+        )
+        self.store.create(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def attach_existing_branch(
+        self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str, expected_head_oid: str
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
+        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
+        if current != expected or current != lease.current_head_oid:
+            raise LeaseError("branch head does not match the lease")
+        lease.attached = True
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def authorize_commit(
+        self,
+        lease_id: str,
+        *,
+        owner_identity: str,
+        expected_head_oid: str,
+        paths: Sequence[str],
+        content: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
+        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
+        if current != expected or current != lease.current_head_oid:
+            raise LeaseError("stale or externally advanced branch head")
+        if not lease.attached:
+            raise LeaseError("lease is not attached")
+        validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths)
+        if content and any(contains_secret_like_content(value) for value in content.values()):
+            raise LeaseError("secret-like content rejected")
+        return lease
+
+    def record_commit(
+        self,
+        lease_id: str,
+        *,
+        owner_identity: str,
+        expected_head_oid: str,
+        new_head_oid: str,
+        paths: Sequence[str],
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        new_head = _oid(new_head_oid, "new_head_oid")
+        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
+        if not lease.attached or lease.current_head_oid != expected:
+            raise LeaseError("stale lease head")
+        if self.git.branch_head(lease.branch) != new_head:
+            raise LeaseError("branch head does not match committed head")
+        validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths)
+        if self.git.parent(new_head) != expected or not self.git.is_ancestor(expected, new_head):
+            raise LeaseError("commit is not a fast-forward child of the expected head")
+        actual_paths = self.git.changed_paths(new_head)
+        allowed = validate_paths(actual_paths, lease.allowed_paths)
+        requested = set(validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths))
+        if not set(allowed).issubset(requested):
+            raise LeaseError("commit changed an unrequested path")
+        lease.current_head_oid = new_head
+        lease.revision += 1
+        lease.commits.append(
+            CommitEntry(
+                commit_oid=new_head,
+                parent_oid=expected,
+                paths=allowed,
+                recorded_at=_ts(self.clock()),
+            )
+        )
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def recover(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
+        if current == lease.current_head_oid:
+            return lease
+        if not self.git.is_ancestor(lease.current_head_oid, current):
+            raise LeaseError("branch moved non-fast-forward")
+        commits = self.git.commits_between(lease.current_head_oid, current)
+        for commit in commits:
+            actual = self.git.changed_paths(commit)
+            validate_paths(actual, lease.allowed_paths)
+        lease.current_head_oid = current
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def renew(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        if not isinstance(ttl_seconds, int) or ttl_seconds <= 0:
+            raise LeaseError("renewal TTL must be positive")
+        candidate = self.clock() + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
+        maximum = _parse_ts(lease.max_expires_at)
+        if candidate > maximum:
+            raise LeaseError("renewal exceeds maximum lease lifetime")
+        lease.expires_at = _ts(candidate)
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def complete(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        lease.state = "COMPLETED"
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def revoke(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        lease.state = "REVOKED"
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+
+def sanitized_lease_view(lease: RepairLease) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return lease metadata only; no content, token, or credential values."""
+    return {
+        "lease_id": lease.lease_id,
+        "task_id": lease.task_id,
+        "owner_identity": lease.owner_identity,
+        "branch": lease.branch,
+        "description": lease.description,
+        "initial_head_oid": lease.initial_head_oid,
+        "current_head_oid": lease.current_head_oid,
+        "created_at": lease.created_at,
+        "expires_at": lease.expires_at,
+        "state": lease.state,
+        "revision": lease.revision,
+        "commit_count": len(lease.commits),
+        "attached": lease.attached,
+    }
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+"""Atomic, predicate-bound activation of the durable release campaign."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from release_campaign_authorization import CampaignError, validate_policy
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+CAMPAIGN_ID = "AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807"
+
+
+class CampaignActivationError(CampaignError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def digest_bytes(value: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest()
+
+
+def build_active_policy(current: Mapping[str, Any], facts: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    policy = validate_policy(dict(current))
+    required = {
+        "campaign_id",
+        "repository",
+        "source_main_oid",
+        "gitea_main_oid",
+        "authority_main_oid",
+        "runtime_source_oid",
+        "durable_job_state",
+        "writer_ready",
+        "gitea_machine_authenticated",
+        "governance_executor_ready",
+        "preapproval_publisher_ready",
+        "runtime_exact_main",
+        "main_lineage_verified",
+        "campaign_revoked",
+    }
+    if set(facts) != required:
+        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_FACTS_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    if policy["activation_state"] != "PENDING_CONTROL_PLANE_MERGE" or policy["active"] is not False:
+        raise CampaignActivationError("CAMPAIGN_NOT_PENDING")
+    if policy["campaign_id"] != CAMPAIGN_ID or facts["campaign_id"] != CAMPAIGN_ID:
+        raise CampaignActivationError("CAMPAIGN_ID_MISMATCH")
+    if facts["repository"] != "aios/aios" or policy["repository"] != facts["repository"]:
+        raise CampaignActivationError("REPOSITORY_MISMATCH")
+    for name in ("source_main_oid", "gitea_main_oid", "authority_main_oid", "runtime_source_oid"):
+        if not isinstance(facts[name], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(facts[name]):
+            raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_OID_INVALID")
+    if not (
+        facts["source_main_oid"]
+        == facts["gitea_main_oid"]
+        == facts["authority_main_oid"]
+        == facts["runtime_source_oid"]
+    ):
+        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_MAIN_DIVERGENCE")
+    if facts["durable_job_state"] != "COMPLETED":
+        raise CampaignActivationError("DURABLE_JOB_NOT_COMPLETED")
+    boolean_fields = (
+        "writer_ready",
+        "gitea_machine_authenticated",
+        "governance_executor_ready",
+        "preapproval_publisher_ready",
+        "runtime_exact_main",
+        "main_lineage_verified",
+    )
+    if any(facts[name] is not True for name in boolean_fields) or facts["campaign_revoked"] is not False:
+        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_PREDICATE_FAILED")
+    activated = dict(policy)
+    activated["activation_state"] = "ACTIVE"
+    activated["active"] = True
+    return validate_policy(activated)
+
+
+def atomic_write_policy(path: Path, sidecar: Path, receipt_path: Path, policy: Mapping[str, Any], receipt: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or sidecar.is_symlink() or receipt_path.exists() or receipt_path.is_symlink():
+        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_PATH_INVALID")
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    raw = canonical_json(dict(policy))
+    digest = digest_bytes(raw)
+    for target, data, mode in (
+        (path, raw, "wb"),
+        (sidecar, f"{digest}  {path.name}\n".encode("ascii"), "wb"),
+        (receipt_path, canonical_json(dict(receipt)), "wb"),
+    ):
+        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{target.name}.", dir=target.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, mode) as stream:
+                stream.write(data)
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+            os.chmod(target, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temporary):
+                os.unlink(temporary)
+    return digest
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Machine campaign approval gate for protected engineering PRs."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from release_campaign_authorization import CampaignAuthorization, CampaignError
+
+
+class GateError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def git_is_ancestor(repository: Path, ancestor: str, descendant: str) -> bool:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            "git",
+            f"--git-dir={repository}",
+            "merge-base",
+            "--is-ancestor",
+            ancestor,
+            descendant,
+        ],
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    if result.returncode == 0:
+        return True
+    if result.returncode == 1:
+        return False
+    raise GateError("git_ancestor_check_failed")
+
+
+def evaluate(
+    campaign: CampaignAuthorization,
+    facts: Mapping[str, Any],
+    repository: Path,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    required = {
+        "repository",
+        "pr_number",
+        "base_ref",
+        "base_oid",
+        "head_oid",
+        "required_checks_all_success",
+        "required_checks_same_head",
+        "unresolved_conversations",
+        "mergeable",
+        "protected_target",
+    }
+    if set(facts) != required:
+        raise GateError("pr_facts_fields_invalid")
+    if facts["repository"] != "aios/aios":
+        raise GateError("repository_mismatch")
+    if facts["base_ref"] != "refs/heads/main" or facts["protected_target"] != "main":
+        raise GateError("protected_main_required")
+    if facts["required_checks_all_success"] is not True:
+        raise GateError("required_checks_not_success")
+    if facts["required_checks_same_head"] is not True:
+        raise GateError("required_checks_stale")
+    if facts["unresolved_conversations"] != 0:
+        raise GateError("unresolved_conversations")
+    if facts["mergeable"] is not True:
+        raise GateError("pr_not_mergeable")
+    if not git_is_ancestor(repository, campaign.anchor_oid, str(facts["base_oid"])):
+        raise GateError("base_outside_campaign_lineage")
+    if not git_is_ancestor(repository, str(facts["base_oid"]), str(facts["head_oid"])):
+        raise GateError("head_outside_pr_lineage")
+    campaign.assert_operation("protected_merge")
+    return {
+        "schema": "aios.campaign-approval-gate-result.v1",
+        "status": "SUCCESS",
+        "campaign_id": campaign.campaign_id,
+        "pr_number": facts["pr_number"],
+        "head_oid": facts["head_oid"],
+        "owner_ui_interaction_required": False,
+    }
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    p.add_argument("--campaign", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--revocation", type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--pr-facts", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--repository", type=Path, required=True)
+    a = p.parse_args()
+    campaign = CampaignAuthorization.load(
+        a.campaign,
+        revocation=a.revocation,
+        require_active=True,
+    )
+    facts = json.loads(a.pr_facts.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    print(json.dumps(evaluate(campaign, facts, a.repository), sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        raise SystemExit(main())
+    except (CampaignError, GateError) as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAILURE", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        raise SystemExit(2)
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Automatically accept an exact release binding under an ACTIVE campaign."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import stat
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from release_campaign_authorization import CampaignAuthorization, CampaignError
+from trusted_release_execution_plan import PlanError, TrustedReleasePlan
+
+
+class AcceptanceError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise AcceptanceError(f"invalid_file:{path}")
+    st = path.lstat()
+    if st.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode) & 0o022:
+        raise AcceptanceError(f"unsafe_file:{path}")
+    value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise AcceptanceError(f"json_object_required:{path}")
+    return value
+
+
+def atomic_new(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise AcceptanceError("acceptance_receipt_exists")
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+        if os.geteuid() == 0:
+            os.fchown(fd, 0, 0)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8", closefd=True) as stream:
+            json.dump(dict(value), stream, sort_keys=True, indent=2)
+            stream.write("\n")
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        os.replace(name, path)
+        os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+    finally:
+        try:
+            os.unlink(name)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            pass
+
+
+def evaluate(
+    campaign: CampaignAuthorization,
+    binding: Mapping[str, Any],
+    evidence: Mapping[str, Any],
+    artifact: Mapping[str, Any],
+    staging: Mapping[str, Any],
+    main: Mapping[str, Any],
+    tag: Mapping[str, Any],
+    release_plan: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    required_binding = {
+        "version",
+        "target_oid",
+        "evidence_closure_oid",
+        "artifact_sha256",
+        "artifact_size",
+        "approval_plan_id",
+    }
+    if set(binding) != required_binding:
+        raise AcceptanceError("binding_fields_invalid")
+    if main.get("repository") != "aios/aios":
+        raise AcceptanceError("repository_identity_mismatch")
+    if main.get("target_in_main_lineage") is not True:
+        raise AcceptanceError("target_outside_main_lineage")
+    if evidence.get("object_type") != "commit":
+        raise AcceptanceError("evidence_not_commit")
+    if evidence.get("target_is_ancestor") is not True:
+        raise AcceptanceError("target_not_evidence_ancestor")
+    if evidence.get("closure_oid") != binding["evidence_closure_oid"]:
+        raise AcceptanceError("evidence_oid_mismatch")
+    if artifact.get("sha256") != binding["artifact_sha256"]:
+        raise AcceptanceError("artifact_digest_mismatch")
+    if artifact.get("size") != binding["artifact_size"]:
+        raise AcceptanceError("artifact_size_mismatch")
+    if artifact.get("retained") is not True:
+        raise AcceptanceError("artifact_not_retained")
+    if staging.get("install") != "PASS":
+        raise AcceptanceError("staging_install_failed")
+    if staging.get("health") != "PASS":
+        raise AcceptanceError("staging_health_failed")
+    if staging.get("restart") != "PASS":
+        raise AcceptanceError("staging_restart_failed")
+    if staging.get("rollback_readiness") != "PASS":
+        raise AcceptanceError("rollback_readiness_failed")
+    if tag.get("conflict") is not False:
+        raise AcceptanceError("tag_conflict")
+    trusted_plan: TrustedReleasePlan | None = None
+    if release_plan is not None:
+        try:
+            trusted_plan = TrustedReleasePlan.from_mapping(release_plan)
+            trusted_plan.assert_binding(binding)
+        except PlanError as exc:
+            raise AcceptanceError(f"trusted_release_plan_invalid:{exc}") from exc
+        if trusted_plan.value["campaign_authorization_sha256"] != campaign.digest:
+            raise AcceptanceError("campaign_authorization_digest_mismatch")
+        if int(trusted_plan.value["campaign_generation"]) != int(campaign.data["generation"]):
+            raise AcceptanceError("campaign_generation_mismatch")
+        if main.get("tree_oid") not in (None, trusted_plan.value["tree_oid"]):
+            raise AcceptanceError("tree_oid_mismatch")
+        if evidence.get("release_plan_sha256") not in (None, trusted_plan.release_plan_sha256):
+            raise AcceptanceError("evidence_release_plan_mismatch")
+        if artifact.get("manifest_sha256") not in (None, trusted_plan.value["manifest_sha256"]):
+            raise AcceptanceError("manifest_digest_mismatch")
+        if artifact.get("package_closure_sha256") not in (None, trusted_plan.value["package_closure_sha256"]):
+            raise AcceptanceError("package_closure_digest_mismatch")
+    campaign.assert_operation("derive_campaign_acceptance")
+    result = {
+        "schema": "aios.campaign-release-acceptance.v1",
+        "accepted": True,
+        "binding_replaced": False,
+        "campaign_id": campaign.campaign_id,
+        "campaign_generation": campaign.data["generation"],
+        **dict(binding),
+        "owner_interaction_required": False,
+    }
+    if trusted_plan is not None:
+        result.update({
+            "candidate_id": trusted_plan.value["candidate_id"],
+            "release_plan_sha256": trusted_plan.release_plan_sha256,
+            "candidate_binding_sha256": trusted_plan.candidate_binding_sha256,
+            "campaign_authorization_sha256": trusted_plan.value["campaign_authorization_sha256"],
+            "campaign_generation": trusted_plan.value["campaign_generation"],
+            "tree_oid": trusted_plan.value["tree_oid"],
+            "manifest_sha256": trusted_plan.value["manifest_sha256"],
+            "package_closure_sha256": trusted_plan.value["package_closure_sha256"],
+            "deployment_plan_sha256": trusted_plan.value["deployment_plan_sha256"],
+            "policy_sha256": trusted_plan.value["policy_sha256"],
+            "rollback": trusted_plan.value["rollback"],
+            "baseline": trusted_plan.value["baseline"],
+        })
+    return result
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    p.add_argument("--campaign", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--revocation", type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--binding", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--evidence", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--artifact", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--staging", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--main-facts", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--tag-facts", type=Path, required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--release-plan", type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--output", type=Path, required=True)
+    a = p.parse_args()
+
+    campaign = CampaignAuthorization.load(
+        a.campaign,
+        revocation=a.revocation,
+        require_active=True,
+    )
+    receipt = evaluate(
+        campaign,
+        secure_json(a.binding),
+        secure_json(a.evidence),
+        secure_json(a.artifact),
+        secure_json(a.staging),
+        secure_json(a.main_facts),
+        secure_json(a.tag_facts),
+        secure_json(a.release_plan) if a.release_plan else None,
+    )
+    atomic_new(a.output, receipt)
+    print(json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        raise SystemExit(main())
+    except (CampaignError, AcceptanceError) as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "BLOCKED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        raise SystemExit(2)
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"""Runtime deployment-state provider for governed health contracts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime as dt
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+_OID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_SHA = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+_STATES = {"STAGED", "ACTIVE", "ROLLED_BACK"}
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RuntimeDeploymentState:
+    version: str
+    commit_oid: str
+    artifact_sha256: str
+    deployment_state: str
+
+    @property
+    def production_deployed(self) -> bool:
+        return self.deployment_state == "ACTIVE"
+
+    def health_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "status": "ok",
+            "version": self.version,
+            "commit_oid": self.commit_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "deployment_state": self.deployment_state,
+            "production_deployed": self.production_deployed,
+            "health_timestamp": dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        }
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_environment(cls, environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> "RuntimeDeploymentState":
+        env = dict(environ or os.environ)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {}
+        state_file = env.get("DEPLOYMENT_STATE_FILE", "").strip()
+        if state_file:
+            path = Path(state_file)
+            if path.is_file() and not path.is_symlink():
+                loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+                if not isinstance(loaded, dict):
+                    raise ValueError("deployment_state_file_object_required")
+                values.update(loaded)
+        file_deployment_state = values.get("deployment_state")
+        values.update({k: v for k, v in {
+            "version": env.get("RELEASE_VERSION", values.get("version", "")),
+            "commit_oid": env.get("TARGET_OID", values.get("commit_oid", "")),
+            "artifact_sha256": env.get("ARTIFACT_SHA256", values.get("artifact_sha256", "")),
+            "deployment_state": env.get("DEPLOYMENT_STATE", values.get("deployment_state", "")),
+        }.items() if v != ""})
+        if file_deployment_state not in (None, ""):
+            values["deployment_state"] = file_deployment_state
+        version = str(values.get("version", ""))
+        commit_oid = str(values.get("commit_oid", ""))
+        artifact_sha256 = str(values.get("artifact_sha256", ""))
+        deployment_state = str(values.get("deployment_state", ""))
+        if not version or not _OID.fullmatch(commit_oid) or not _SHA.fullmatch(artifact_sha256):
+            raise ValueError("deployment_binding_invalid")
+        if deployment_state not in _STATES:
+            raise ValueError("deployment_state_invalid")
+        return cls(version, commit_oid, artifact_sha256, deployment_state)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"""Permanent AIOS governance source components."""
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+import json
+import pathlib
+import socket
+import time
+
+SOCKET = '/run/aios-governance-executor/executor.sock'
+STATE = pathlib.Path('/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-executor/drift-monitor.json')
+APPROVED = pathlib.Path('/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-PROTECTION-SNAPSHOT-DRIFT-FORENSICS-V1/protection-drift/semantic-analysis.json')
+
+
+def call():
+    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    sock.settimeout(20)
+    sock.connect(SOCKET)
+    request = {'operation': 'GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION', 'payload': {'repository': 'aios/aios', 'branch': 'main'}}
+    sock.sendall((json.dumps(request, separators=(',', ':')) + '\n').encode())
+    chunks = []
+    while True:
+        part = sock.recv(1024 * 1024)
+        if not part:
+            break
+        chunks.append(part)
+        if b'\n' in part:
+            break
+    sock.close()
+    return json.loads(b''.join(chunks).splitlines()[0])
+
+
+def main():
+    try:
+        result = call()
+        if result.get('status') != 'PASS':
+            raise RuntimeError(str(result.get('code') or 'EXECUTOR_GET_FAILED'))
+        approved = json.loads(APPROVED.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
+        approved_transport = approved['approved_transport_digest_from_evidence']
+        approved_semantic = approved['approved_semantic_digest']
+        transport = result['transport_digest']
+        semantic = result['semantic_digest']
+        if semantic != approved_semantic:
+            state = 'GOVERNANCE_POLICY_DRIFT'
+        elif transport != approved_transport:
+            state = 'GOVERNANCE_TRANSPORT_METADATA_CHANGED'
+        else:
+            state = 'NO_DRIFT'
+        payload = {
+            'schema': 'aios.governance-drift-monitor.v1',
+            'observed_at_unix': int(time.time()),
+            'status': state,
+            'release_blocking': False,
+            'approved_transport_digest': approved_transport,
+            'observed_transport_digest': transport,
+            'approved_semantic_digest': approved_semantic,
+            'observed_semantic_digest': semantic,
+            'semantic_schema': result.get('semantic_schema'),
+            'source': 'Dedicated Governance Executor GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION',
+        }
+    except Exception as exc:
+        payload = {
+            'schema': 'aios.governance-drift-monitor.v1',
+            'observed_at_unix': int(time.time()),
+            'status': 'MONITOR_UNAVAILABLE',
+            'release_blocking': False,
+            'error_code': str(exc),
+        }
+    STATE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    temporary = STATE.with_suffix('.tmp')
+    temporary.write_text(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False) + '\n', encoding='utf-8')
+    temporary.replace(STATE)
+    STATE.chmod(0o640)
+    print(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False))
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+import base64
+import copy
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import socket
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+
+SOURCE_GOVERNANCE = "/opt/aios/aios-control-plane/current/active-runtime/app/governance"
+if SOURCE_GOVERNANCE not in __import__("sys").path:
+    __import__("sys").path.insert(0, SOURCE_GOVERNANCE)
+from stage2_gate_migration import (
+    CAMPAIGN_GATE,
+    CAMPAIGN_ID,
+    OWNER_GATE,
+    STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA,
+    Stage2GateError,
+    build_target,
+    semantic_digest as stage2_semantic_digest,
+    validate_stage2_facts,
+)
+
+API = "http://127.0.0.1:3000"
+REPO = "aios/aios"
+SOCKET = "/run/aios-governance-executor/executor.sock"
+JOURNAL = pathlib.Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-executor/executor-journal.jsonl")
+RECONCILIATION_BINDING_PATH = pathlib.Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-executor/reconciliation-binding.json")
+PR54_HEAD = "015185d7e5191d18c5c1596160807ac228782a0a"
+PR54_REVIEW = 104
+PR54_MANIFEST_SHA = "1b11ee42d53a9f6c1646e5f5ddd8ce5b7ecf301483b9f3d47a068290d541ba4b"
+PR54_PREVIOUS_PROTECTION_SHA = "8b3370add21cd23c2b4f41d8d84d3eaaa09ddf0451549b72c7941bbd92d5d60a"
+SEMANTIC_SCHEMA = "aios.semantic-protection.v1"
+APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA = "ba15d512ed8c1f43e5f72c84125a3a71a7347ef59e18000bbfca24d6e69f1b19"
+STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA = "d911e856f71de6105b8efa08e13338a448e0b6d37536332decd80c9f409ecf27"
+USER_IDS = {"owner": 2, "aios-autonomy-agent": 153}
+
+
+def canon(value):
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
+
+
+def sha(value):
+    return hashlib.sha256(canon(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def token():
+    value = (pathlib.Path(os.environ["CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"]) / "gitea-governance-executor-token").read_text().strip()
+    if len(value) < 16:
+        raise RuntimeError("EXECUTOR_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def api(method, path, value, body=None, expected=(200,)):
+    raw = None if body is None else json.dumps(body, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+    req = urllib.request.Request(API + path, data=raw, method=method)
+    req.add_header("Authorization", "token " + value)
+    req.add_header("Accept", "application/json")
+    if raw is not None:
+        req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as response:
+            status = response.status
+            payload = response.read()
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        if exc.code in expected:
+            payload = exc.read()
+            return exc.code, json.loads(payload) if payload else None
+        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_HTTP_" + str(exc.code))
+    if status not in expected:
+        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_HTTP_" + str(status))
+    if not payload or not payload.strip():
+        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_EMPTY_JSON:" + path)
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(payload)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_INVALID_JSON:" + path) from exc
+    return status, decoded
+
+
+def journal(event, **fields):
+    JOURNAL.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    record = {"schema": "aios.governance-executor-journal.v2", "event": event, "unix": int(time.time()), **fields}
+    with JOURNAL.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+        stream.write(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
+        stream.flush()
+        os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+
+
+def typed_json(value):
+    if value in (None, "null"):
+        return []
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return json.loads(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def user_ids(names):
+    result = []
+    for name in names or []:
+        if name not in USER_IDS:
+            raise RuntimeError("UNKNOWN_GOVERNANCE_USER:" + str(name))
+        result.append(USER_IDS[name])
+    return sorted(result)
+
+
+def semantic_policy(value):
+    policy = {
+        "schema_version": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA,
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "protection_id": 2,
+        "branch_name": value.get("branch_name"),
+        "can_push": value.get("enable_push"),
+        "can_force_push": value.get("enable_force_push"),
+        "enable_merge_whitelist": value.get("enable_merge_whitelist"),
+        "merge_whitelist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")),
+        "merge_whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "required_approvals": value.get("required_approvals"),
+        "enable_status_check": value.get("enable_status_check"),
+        "status_check_contexts": sorted(value.get("status_check_contexts") or []),
+        "block_admin_merge_override": value.get("block_admin_merge_override"),
+        "block_on_official_review_requests": value.get("block_on_official_review_requests"),
+        "block_on_outdated_branch": value.get("block_on_outdated_branch"),
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews": value.get("block_on_rejected_reviews"),
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals": value.get("dismiss_stale_approvals"),
+        "ignore_stale_approvals": value.get("ignore_stale_approvals"),
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist": value.get("enable_approvals_whitelist"),
+        "approvals_whitelist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("approvals_whitelist_username")),
+        "approvals_whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_bypass_allowlist": value.get("enable_bypass_allowlist"),
+        "bypass_allowlist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("bypass_allowlist_usernames")),
+        "bypass_allowlist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_force_push_allowlist": value.get("enable_force_push_allowlist"),
+        "force_push_allowlist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("force_push_allowlist_usernames")),
+        "force_push_allowlist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_whitelist": value.get("enable_push_whitelist"),
+        "whitelist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("push_whitelist_usernames")),
+        "whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys": value.get("force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys"),
+        "whitelist_deploy_keys": value.get("push_whitelist_deploy_keys"),
+        "require_signed_commits": value.get("require_signed_commits"),
+        "priority": value.get("priority"),
+        "protected_file_patterns": value.get("protected_file_patterns"),
+        "unprotected_file_patterns": value.get("unprotected_file_patterns"),
+    }
+    return policy
+
+
+def semantic_sha(value):
+    return sha(semantic_policy(value))
+
+
+def verify_binding(binding, value):
+    required = {
+        "governance_request_PR", "exact_request_head", "Owner_review_id", "Owner_review_exact_head",
+        "manifest_sha256", "expected_previous_snapshot_sha256", "approved_delta",
+        "semantic_reconciliation_request_id", "semantic_reconciliation_head",
+        "semantic_reconciliation_review_id", "semantic_reconciliation_review_head",
+        "approved_semantic_digest",
+    }
+    if set(binding) != required:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    if binding["governance_request_PR"] != 54 or binding["exact_request_head"] != PR54_HEAD:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_PR54_MISMATCH")
+    if binding["Owner_review_id"] != PR54_REVIEW or binding["Owner_review_exact_head"] != PR54_HEAD:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_REVIEW_MISMATCH")
+    if binding["manifest_sha256"] != PR54_MANIFEST_SHA:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_MANIFEST_MISMATCH")
+    if binding["expected_previous_snapshot_sha256"] != PR54_PREVIOUS_PROTECTION_SHA:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_SNAPSHOT_MISMATCH")
+    if binding["approved_delta"] != {"add_merge_whitelist_user_id": 153}:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_DELTA_DENIED")
+    if binding["approved_semantic_digest"] != APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_SEMANTIC_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if not RECONCILIATION_BINDING_PATH.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_REQUIRED")
+    try:
+        reconciliation = json.loads(RECONCILIATION_BINDING_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID") from None
+    required_reconciliation = {
+        "schema", "request_id", "pr_number", "request_head", "owner_review_id",
+        "owner_review_head", "approved_semantic_digest", "approved_delta",
+    }
+    if set(reconciliation) != required_reconciliation or reconciliation.get("schema") != "aios.semantic-reconciliation-binding.v1":
+        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID")
+    if reconciliation["approved_semantic_digest"] != APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA or reconciliation["approved_delta"] != binding["approved_delta"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    if (
+        reconciliation["request_id"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_request_id"]
+        or reconciliation["request_head"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_head"]
+        or reconciliation["owner_review_id"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_review_id"]
+        or reconciliation["owner_review_head"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_review_head"]
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    _, reconciliation_pr = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/{reconciliation['pr_number']}", value)
+    if (
+        reconciliation_pr.get("state") != "open"
+        or reconciliation_pr.get("merged")
+        or reconciliation_pr.get("head", {}).get("sha") != reconciliation["request_head"]
+        or reconciliation_pr.get("base", {}).get("ref") != "governance/approvals"
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_REQUEST_STALE")
+    _, reconciliation_reviews = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/{reconciliation['pr_number']}/reviews", value)
+    reconciliation_review = next((x for x in reconciliation_reviews if x.get("id") == reconciliation["owner_review_id"]), None)
+    if (
+        not reconciliation_review
+        or reconciliation_review.get("user", {}).get("id") != 2
+        or reconciliation_review.get("state") != "APPROVED"
+        or reconciliation_review.get("commit_id") != reconciliation["owner_review_head"]
+        or reconciliation_review.get("dismissed") is not False
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_OWNER_REVIEW_STALE")
+    _, pr = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/54", value)
+    if pr.get("state") != "open" or pr.get("merged") or pr.get("head", {}).get("sha") != PR54_HEAD:
+        raise RuntimeError("PR54_APPROVAL_STALE")
+    _, reviews = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/54/reviews", value)
+    review = next((x for x in reviews if x.get("id") == PR54_REVIEW), None)
+    if not review or review.get("user", {}).get("id") != 2 or review.get("state") != "APPROVED" or review.get("commit_id") != PR54_HEAD or review.get("dismissed") is not False:
+        raise RuntimeError("PR54_APPROVAL_STALE")
+    manifest_path = "approvals/governance-policy/AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-MERGE-GOVERNANCE-SCOPE-EXTENSION-V1.json"
+    _, content = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/contents/{urllib.parse.quote(manifest_path, safe='/')}?ref={PR54_HEAD}", value)
+    raw = base64.b64decode("".join(content.get("content", "").split()))
+    if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() != PR54_MANIFEST_SHA:
+        raise RuntimeError("PR54_MANIFEST_STALE")
+
+
+def get_protection(value, branch):
+    if branch not in {"main", "governance/approvals"}:
+        raise RuntimeError("BRANCH_DENIED")
+    _, protection = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/branch_protections/{urllib.parse.quote(branch, safe='')}", value)
+    return protection
+
+
+def mutation_receipt(before, after, binding, target_semantic):
+    return {
+        "before": {"transport_digest": sha(before), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(before)},
+        "approved": {
+            "mutation_predicate_digest": sha({"operation": "ADD_MERGE_EXECUTOR", "subject_user_id": 153, "preserve_all_unmodified_security_fields": True}),
+            "Owner_review_id": binding["Owner_review_id"],
+            "semantic_policy_digest": APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA,
+        },
+        "after": {"transport_digest": sha(after), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(after)},
+        "delta": {"add_merge_whitelist_user_id": 153},
+        "target_semantic_digest": sha(target_semantic),
+        "unmodified_security_fields": {"verified": True},
+    }
+
+
+def apply_stage1(binding, value):
+    verify_binding(binding, value)
+    before = get_protection(value, "main")
+    before_semantic = semantic_policy(before)
+    before_semantic_sha = sha(before_semantic)
+    names = list(before.get("merge_whitelist_usernames") or [])
+    name_ids = user_ids(names)
+    if name_ids not in ([2], [2, 153]):
+        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_WHITELIST_PRESTATE_INVALID")
+    target_names = ["owner", "aios-autonomy-agent"]
+    target_semantic = copy.deepcopy(before_semantic)
+    target_semantic["merge_whitelist_user_ids"] = [2, 153]
+    if name_ids == [2, 153]:
+        if before_semantic_sha != STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA:
+            journal("APPLY_BLOCKED_STAGE1_IDEMPOTENCY_SEMANTIC_CONFLICT", transport_digest=sha(before), semantic_digest=before_semantic_sha, expected_semantic_digest=STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA)
+            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_STAGE1_SEMANTIC_CONFLICT")
+        receipt = mutation_receipt(before, before, binding, target_semantic)
+        journal("APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA_IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS", receipt=receipt)
+        return {"status": "IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS", "protection": before, "transport_digest": sha(before), "semantic_digest": before_semantic_sha, "target_semantic_digest": sha(target_semantic)}
+    if before_semantic_sha != APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA:
+        journal("APPLY_BLOCKED_SEMANTIC_CAS", transport_digest=sha(before), semantic_digest=before_semantic_sha, expected_semantic_digest=APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA)
+        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_SEMANTIC_CAS_CONFLICT")
+    after_api = api("PATCH", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/branch_protections/main", value, {"merge_whitelist_usernames": target_names})[1]
+    after = get_protection(value, "main")
+    for key in before:
+        if key in {"updated_at", "merge_whitelist_usernames"}:
+            continue
+        if after.get(key) != before.get(key):
+            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_UNAPPROVED_FIELD_CHANGED:" + key)
+    if user_ids(after.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")) != [2, 153]:
+        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
+    after_semantic = semantic_policy(after)
+    if after_semantic != target_semantic:
+        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_SEMANTIC_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
+    receipt = mutation_receipt(before, after, binding, target_semantic)
+    journal("APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA_COMPLETED", receipt=receipt)
+    return {"status": "APPLIED", "protection": after, "previous_transport_digest": sha(before), "previous_semantic_digest": before_semantic_sha, "transport_digest": sha(after), "semantic_digest": sha(after_semantic), "receipt": receipt}
+
+
+def apply_stage2(binding, facts, value):
+    verify_binding(binding, value)
+    validate_stage2_facts(facts)
+    before = get_protection(value, "main")
+    if OWNER_GATE in (before.get("status_check_contexts") or []) and stage2_semantic_digest(before) != STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA:
+        raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_SEMANTIC_PRECONDITION_INVALID")
+    try:
+        status, target = build_target(before)
+    except Stage2GateError as exc:
+        journal("MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE_BLOCKED", reason=str(exc), semantic_digest=stage2_semantic_digest(before))
+        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
+    target_digest = stage2_semantic_digest(target)
+    if status == "IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS":
+        journal(
+            "MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE_IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS",
+            before_semantic_digest=stage2_semantic_digest(before),
+            target_semantic_digest=target_digest,
+            campaign_id=CAMPAIGN_ID,
+        )
+        return {
+            "status": status,
+            "protection": before,
+            "transport_digest": sha(before),
+            "semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(before),
+            "target_semantic_digest": target_digest,
+            "gate_transition": {"removed": OWNER_GATE, "required": CAMPAIGN_GATE},
+        }
+    after_api = api(
+        "PATCH",
+        f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/branch_protections/main",
+        value,
+        {"status_check_contexts": target["status_check_contexts"]},
+    )[1]
+    after = get_protection(value, "main")
+    for key in before:
+        if key in {"updated_at", "status_check_contexts"}:
+            continue
+        if after.get(key) != before.get(key):
+            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_UNAPPROVED_FIELD_CHANGED:" + key)
+    if after.get("status_check_contexts") != target["status_check_contexts"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_GATE_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
+    if stage2_semantic_digest(after) != target_digest:
+        raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_SEMANTIC_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
+    receipt = {
+        "before_transport_digest": sha(before),
+        "before_semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(before),
+        "after_transport_digest": sha(after),
+        "after_semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(after),
+        "target_semantic_digest": target_digest,
+        "campaign_id": CAMPAIGN_ID,
+        "gate_transition": {"removed": OWNER_GATE, "required": CAMPAIGN_GATE},
+        "preserved_security_fields": True,
+        "facts_digest": sha(facts),
+    }
+    journal("MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE_COMPLETED", receipt=receipt)
+    return {
+        "status": "APPLIED",
+        "protection": after,
+        "previous_transport_digest": sha(before),
+        "previous_semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(before),
+        "transport_digest": sha(after),
+        "semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(after),
+        "target_semantic_digest": target_digest,
+        "receipt": receipt,
+    }
+
+
+def handle(request, value):
+    if not isinstance(request, dict) or set(request) != {"operation", "payload"}:
+        raise RuntimeError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    operation = request["operation"]
+    payload = request["payload"]
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict) or payload.get("repository") != REPO:
+        raise RuntimeError("REPOSITORY_DENIED")
+    if operation == "GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION":
+        protection = get_protection(value, payload.get("branch"))
+        journal("GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION", branch=payload.get("branch"), transport_digest=sha(protection), semantic_digest=semantic_sha(protection))
+        return {"status": "PASS", "protection": protection, "snapshot_sha256": sha(protection), "transport_digest": sha(protection), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(protection), "semantic_schema": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA}
+    if operation == "READBACK_BRANCH_PROTECTION":
+        protection = get_protection(value, payload.get("branch"))
+        return {"status": "PASS", "protection": protection, "snapshot_sha256": sha(protection), "transport_digest": sha(protection), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(protection), "semantic_schema": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA}
+    if operation == "APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA":
+        binding = payload.get("GovernanceExecutionBinding")
+        if not isinstance(binding, dict):
+            raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_REQUIRED")
+        return apply_stage1(binding, value)
+    if operation == "MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE":
+        binding = payload.get("GovernanceExecutionBinding")
+        facts = payload.get("Stage2Facts")
+        if not isinstance(binding, dict) or not isinstance(facts, dict):
+            raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_BINDING_OR_FACTS_REQUIRED")
+        return apply_stage2(binding, facts, value)
+    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_DENIED")
+
+
+def main():
+    value = token()
+    sock_path = pathlib.Path(SOCKET)
+    sock_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    server.bind(SOCKET)
+    os.chmod(SOCKET, 0o660)
+    server.listen(16)
+    journal("EXECUTOR_STARTED", api_surface=["GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION", "APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA", "MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE", "READBACK_BRANCH_PROTECTION"], semantic_schema=SEMANTIC_SCHEMA, approved_semantic_digest=APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA, stage1_semantic_digest=STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA, campaign_gate=CAMPAIGN_GATE)
+    try:
+        while True:
+            conn, _ = server.accept()
+            with conn:
+                data = conn.recv(1024 * 1024 + 1)
+                if len(data) > 1024 * 1024:
+                    result = {"status": "FAIL", "code": "REQUEST_TOO_LARGE"}
+                else:
+                    try:
+                        request = json.loads(data.decode())
+                        result = handle(request, value)
+                    except Exception as exc:
+                        result = {"status": "FAIL", "code": str(exc)}
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n").encode())
+    finally:
+        server.close()
+        sock_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+
+LOCAL_API = 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1'
+NETWORK_API = 'https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1'
+NETWORK_REMOTE = 'https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git'
+REPO = 'aios/aios'
+BASE_BRANCH = 'governance/approvals'
+REQUEST_BRANCH = 'governance/request/protection-semantic-reconciliation-v1-20260808'
+SOCKET_PATH = '/run/aios-governance-preapproval-publisher/publisher.sock'
+CREDENTIAL_NAME = 'gitea-machine-token'
+AUTHORITY_REPO = '/data/aios-gitops/repo.git'
+TASK_ROOT = pathlib.Path('/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-PROTECTION-SNAPSHOT-DRIFT-FORENSICS-V1')
+INPUT_ROOT = TASK_ROOT / 'publication-input'
+RECEIPT = TASK_ROOT / 'publication-receipt.json'
+MANIFEST_REL = 'approvals/governance-policy/AIOS-PROTECTION-SEMANTIC-SNAPSHOT-RECONCILIATION-V1.json'
+EVIDENCE_REL = 'approvals/governance-policy/AIOS-PROTECTION-SEMANTIC-SNAPSHOT-RECONCILIATION-V1.evidence.json'
+
+
+def digest_bytes(data):
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def digest_json(value):
+    return digest_bytes(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode())
+
+
+def load_token():
+    path = pathlib.Path(os.environ['CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY']) / CREDENTIAL_NAME
+    value = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8').strip()
+    if len(value) < 16:
+        raise RuntimeError('MACHINE_CREDENTIAL_INVALID')
+    return value
+
+
+def api(base, method, path, token, body=None, expected=(200,)):
+    raw = None if body is None else json.dumps(body, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
+    request = urllib.request.Request(base + path, data=raw, method=method)
+    request.add_header('Authorization', 'token ' + token)
+    request.add_header('Accept', 'application/json')
+    if raw is not None:
+        request.add_header('Content-Type', 'application/json')
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response:
+            payload = response.read()
+            if response.status not in expected:
+                raise RuntimeError('GITEA_HTTP_' + str(response.status))
+            return response.status, json.loads(payload) if payload else None
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        payload = exc.read()
+        if exc.code in expected:
+            return exc.code, json.loads(payload) if payload else None
+        raise RuntimeError('GITEA_HTTP_' + str(exc.code) + ':' + method + ':' + path) from None
+
+
+def authority_head():
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ['git', '--git-dir=' + AUTHORITY_REPO, 'rev-parse', 'refs/heads/' + BASE_BRANCH],
+        text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError('AUTHORITY_BASE_UNAVAILABLE')
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def branch_api(base, token, branch, expected=(200,)):
+    return api(base, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/branches/' + urllib.parse.quote(branch, safe=''), token, expected=expected)
+
+
+def verify_base(token):
+    authority = authority_head()
+    _, local = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, BASE_BRANCH)
+    _, network = branch_api(NETWORK_API, token, BASE_BRANCH)
+    local_oid = local.get('commit', {}).get('id')
+    network_oid = network.get('commit', {}).get('id')
+    if not authority or authority != local_oid or authority != network_oid:
+        raise RuntimeError('RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED')
+    return authority
+
+
+def verify_identity(token):
+    _, user = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/user', token)
+    if user.get('login') != 'aios-autonomy-agent' or user.get('id') != 153 or user.get('is_admin') is not False:
+        raise RuntimeError('MACHINE_IDENTITY_REJECTED')
+    return {'login': user['login'], 'id': user['id'], 'owner': user.get('is_admin')}
+
+
+def load_inputs():
+    manifest = json.dumps(json.loads((INPUT_ROOT / 'manifest.json').read_text(encoding='utf-8')), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
+    evidence = json.dumps(json.loads((INPUT_ROOT / 'evidence.json').read_text(encoding='utf-8')), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
+    for data in (manifest, evidence):
+        if any(secret in data.lower() for secret in (b'authorization:', b'ghp_', b'github_pat_', b'secret=', b'token=')):
+            raise RuntimeError('SECRET_CONTENT_REJECTED')
+    return manifest, evidence
+
+
+def publication_key(base_oid, manifest_sha, evidence_sha):
+    payload = REPO + base_oid + REQUEST_BRANCH + manifest_sha + evidence_sha
+    return hashlib.sha256(payload.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def write_receipt(state, **fields):
+    record = {
+        'schema': 'aios.governance-preapproval-publication.v1',
+        'operation': 'SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_REQUEST',
+        'state': state,
+        'recorded_unix': int(time.time()),
+        'request_branch': REQUEST_BRANCH,
+        'manifest_path': MANIFEST_REL,
+        'evidence_path': EVIDENCE_REL,
+        'machine_actor': 'aios-autonomy-agent',
+        'owner': False,
+        'credential_ref': {'scheme': 'systemd-credential', 'name': CREDENTIAL_NAME},
+        'governance_capability_executed': False,
+        'protection_mutation': False,
+        'force_push': False,
+        **fields,
+    }
+    RECEIPT.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    temporary = RECEIPT.with_suffix('.tmp')
+    temporary.write_text(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False) + '\n', encoding='utf-8')
+    temporary.replace(RECEIPT)
+    RECEIPT.chmod(0o640)
+    return record
+
+
+def existing_prs(token):
+    _, prs = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls?state=all&base=' + urllib.parse.quote(BASE_BRANCH, safe='') + '&limit=100', token)
+    return [pr for pr in prs if pr.get('head', {}).get('ref') == REQUEST_BRANCH and pr.get('base', {}).get('ref') == BASE_BRANCH]
+
+
+def verify_existing_branch(token, branch_oid, manifest, evidence):
+    _, commit = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/git/commits/' + branch_oid, token)
+    if commit.get('parents', [{}])[0].get('sha') is None:
+        raise RuntimeError('REQUEST_BRANCH_COMMIT_INVALID')
+    for relative, expected in ((MANIFEST_REL, manifest), (EVIDENCE_REL, evidence)):
+        _, content = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/contents/' + urllib.parse.quote(relative, safe='/') + '?ref=' + branch_oid, token)
+        actual = base64.b64decode(''.join(content.get('content', '').split()))
+        if actual != expected:
+            raise RuntimeError('GOVERNANCE_REQUEST_BRANCH_CONFLICT')
+
+
+def push_one_commit(token, base_oid, manifest, evidence):
+    work_root = TASK_ROOT / 'publisher-work'
+    work_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    temporary = pathlib.Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='semantic-reconciliation-', dir=work_root))
+    askpass = temporary / 'askpass.sh'
+    clone = temporary / 'repo'
+    credential_path = pathlib.Path(os.environ['CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY']) / CREDENTIAL_NAME
+    askpass.write_text(
+        '#!/bin/sh\ncase "$1" in *Username*) printf "%s\\n" "$GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR";; *) cat "$CREDENTIAL_FILE";; esac\n',
+        encoding='utf-8',
+    )
+    askpass.chmod(0o700)
+    env = os.environ.copy()
+    env.update({
+        'GIT_ASKPASS': str(askpass),
+        'GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT': '0',
+        'GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR': 'aios-autonomy-agent',
+        'CREDENTIAL_FILE': str(credential_path),
+        'GIT_CONFIG_COUNT': '1',
+        'GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0': 'safe.directory',
+        'GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0': AUTHORITY_REPO,
+    })
+    try:
+        run = subprocess.run(
+            ['git', 'clone', '--branch', BASE_BRANCH, '--single-branch', '--quiet', NETWORK_REMOTE, str(clone)],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, env=env, check=False,
+        )
+        if run.returncode != 0:
+            detail = ' '.join(run.stderr.strip().split())[:240]
+            raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_CLONE_FAILED:' + detail)
+        def git(*args, push_env=None):
+            result = subprocess.run(['git', *args], cwd=clone, text=True, capture_output=True, env=push_env or env, check=False)
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_GIT_OPERATION_FAILED')
+            return result.stdout.strip()
+        git('checkout', '--detach', base_oid)
+        git('switch', '--create', REQUEST_BRANCH)
+        manifest_path = clone / MANIFEST_REL
+        evidence_path = clone / EVIDENCE_REL
+        manifest_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        evidence_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        manifest_path.write_bytes(manifest)
+        evidence_path.write_bytes(evidence)
+        git('add', '--', MANIFEST_REL, EVIDENCE_REL)
+        staged = git('diff', '--cached', '--name-only').splitlines()
+        if staged != sorted([MANIFEST_REL, EVIDENCE_REL]):
+            raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_PATH_ALLOWLIST_FAILED')
+        git('-c', 'user.name=aios-autonomy-agent', '-c', 'user.email=aios-autonomy-agent@aios.invalid', 'commit', '--quiet', '-m', '[governance] publish semantic reconciliation evidence')
+        if git('rev-list', '--count', base_oid + '..HEAD') != '1':
+            raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_COMMIT_COUNT_FAILED')
+        git('push', '--porcelain', NETWORK_REMOTE, 'HEAD:refs/heads/' + REQUEST_BRANCH, push_env=env)
+        head = git('rev-parse', 'HEAD')
+        return head
+    finally:
+        shutil.rmtree(temporary, ignore_errors=True)
+
+
+def publish():
+    token = load_token()
+    identity = verify_identity(token)
+    base_oid = verify_base(token)
+    manifest, evidence = load_inputs()
+    manifest_sha = digest_bytes(manifest)
+    evidence_sha = digest_bytes(evidence)
+    key = publication_key(base_oid, manifest_sha, evidence_sha)
+    write_receipt('REQUESTED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, machine_identity=identity)
+    write_receipt('LOCAL_CANDIDATE_VERIFIED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, machine_identity=identity)
+
+    branch_status, branch = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH, expected=(200, 404))
+    if branch_status == 200:
+        branch_oid = branch.get('commit', {}).get('id')
+        verify_existing_branch(token, branch_oid, manifest, evidence)
+    else:
+        branch_oid = push_one_commit(token, base_oid, manifest, evidence)
+        verify_existing_branch(token, branch_oid, manifest, evidence)
+    write_receipt('BRANCH_PUSHED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, request_head_oid=branch_oid, machine_identity=identity)
+
+    prs = existing_prs(token)
+    if len(prs) > 1:
+        raise RuntimeError('MULTIPLE_MATCHING_APPROVAL_PRS')
+    if prs:
+        pr = prs[0]
+        if pr.get('head', {}).get('sha') != branch_oid:
+            raise RuntimeError('APPROVAL_PR_HEAD_MISMATCH')
+        pr_number = pr.get('number')
+    else:
+        _, pr = api(LOCAL_API, 'POST', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls', token, {
+            'title': '[GOVERNANCE RECONCILIATION] Semantic protection snapshot schema migration',
+            'head': REQUEST_BRANCH,
+            'base': BASE_BRANCH,
+            'body': 'Schema-only reconciliation for the existing PR54 Stage-1 and Stage-2 predicates. No new governance capability; Owner exact-head re-attestation required.',
+        }, expected=(201,))
+        pr_number = pr.get('number')
+    write_receipt('PR_CREATED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, request_head_oid=branch_oid, pr_number=pr_number, machine_identity=identity)
+
+    _, remote_branch = branch_api(NETWORK_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH)
+    if remote_branch.get('commit', {}).get('id') != branch_oid:
+        raise RuntimeError('NETWORK_BRANCH_READBACK_MISMATCH')
+    _, read_pr = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls/' + str(pr_number), token)
+    if read_pr.get('head', {}).get('sha') != branch_oid or read_pr.get('base', {}).get('ref') != BASE_BRANCH:
+        raise RuntimeError('PR_READBACK_MISMATCH')
+    result = write_receipt('COMPLETED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, request_head_oid=branch_oid, pr_number=pr_number, pr_head_oid=read_pr.get('head', {}).get('sha'), machine_identity=identity)
+    return result
+
+
+def self_test():
+    token = load_token()
+    identity = verify_identity(token)
+    base_oid = verify_base(token)
+    branch_status, _ = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH, expected=(200, 404))
+    return {
+        'status': 'PASS',
+        'governance_base_oid': base_oid,
+        'machine_identity': identity,
+        'credential_ref': {'scheme': 'systemd-credential', 'name': CREDENTIAL_NAME},
+        'branch_namespace': 'refs/heads/governance/request/*',
+        'target_base': BASE_BRANCH,
+        'request_branch_status': 'EXISTS' if branch_status == 200 else 'ABSENT',
+        'operation_allowlist': ['READ_BASE', 'CREATE_ONE_REQUEST_BRANCH', 'WRITE_TWO_EVIDENCE_PATHS_ONE_COMMIT', 'CREATE_OR_READ_ONE_APPROVAL_PR', 'READBACK'],
+        'denied': ['MAIN_WRITE', 'DIRECT_APPROVALS_WRITE', 'BRANCH_PROTECTION', 'MERGE', 'FORCE_PUSH', 'TAG', 'PRODUCTION', 'CREDENTIAL_MUTATION'],
+        'governance_capability_executed': False,
+    }
+
+
+def read_publication_status():
+    token = load_token()
+    receipt = json.loads(RECEIPT.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
+    pr_number = receipt.get('pr_number')
+    if not pr_number:
+        raise RuntimeError('PUBLICATION_RECEIPT_PR_MISSING')
+    _, pr = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls/' + str(pr_number), token)
+    _, reviews = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls/' + str(pr_number) + '/reviews', token)
+    _, branch = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH)
+    _, network_branch = branch_api(NETWORK_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH)
+    return {
+        'status': 'PASS',
+        'request_branch': REQUEST_BRANCH,
+        'branch_head': branch.get('commit', {}).get('id'),
+        'network_branch_head': network_branch.get('commit', {}).get('id'),
+        'pr_number': pr.get('number'),
+        'pr_state': pr.get('state'),
+        'pr_merged': pr.get('merged'),
+        'pr_head': pr.get('head', {}).get('sha'),
+        'pr_base': pr.get('base', {}).get('ref'),
+        'reviews': [
+            {
+                'id': item.get('id'),
+                'reviewer_id': item.get('user', {}).get('id'),
+                'state': item.get('state'),
+                'commit_id': item.get('commit_id'),
+                'dismissed': item.get('dismissed'),
+            }
+            for item in reviews
+        ],
+        'governance_capability_executed': False,
+        'protection_mutation': False,
+    }
+
+
+def handle(request):
+    if not isinstance(request, dict) or set(request) != {'operation'}:
+        raise RuntimeError('REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID')
+    if request['operation'] == 'DRY_RUN_SELF_TEST':
+        return self_test()
+    if request['operation'] == 'PUBLISH_SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION':
+        return publish()
+    if request['operation'] == 'READ_SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_STATUS':
+        return read_publication_status()
+    raise RuntimeError('OPERATION_DENIED')
+
+
+def serve(listener):
+    conn, _ = listener.accept()
+    with conn:
+        try:
+            data = conn.recv(1024 * 1024 + 1)
+            if len(data) > 1024 * 1024:
+                raise RuntimeError('REQUEST_TOO_LARGE')
+            result = handle(json.loads(data.decode()))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            result = {'status': 'FAIL', 'code': str(exc)}
+        conn.sendall((json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False) + '\n').encode())
+
+
+def main():
+    if os.environ.get('LISTEN_FDS') != '1':
+        raise SystemExit('SOCKET_ACTIVATION_REQUIRED')
+    listener = socket.fromfd(3, socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    serve(listener)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""Fail-closed Authority/Gitea ref reconciliation after protected merge."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+
+
+class RefReconciliationError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in value):
+        raise RefReconciliationError(field + "_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RefReconciler:
+    git_dir: Path
+
+    def read(self, ref: str) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "rev-parse", "--verify", ref],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_REF_UNAVAILABLE")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, ancestor: str, descendant: str) -> bool:
+        _oid(ancestor, "ancestor")
+        _oid(descendant, "descendant")
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if result.returncode == 0:
+            return True
+        if result.returncode == 1:
+            return False
+        raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_ANCESTRY_CHECK_FAILED")
+
+    def reconcile_main(self, *, expected_oid: str, merged_oid: str, gitea_main_oid: str) -> str:
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(merged_oid, "merged_oid")
+        _oid(gitea_main_oid, "gitea_main_oid")
+        if gitea_main_oid != merged_oid:
+            raise RefReconciliationError("GITEA_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        if not self.is_ancestor(expected_oid, merged_oid):
+            raise RefReconciliationError("MAIN_FF_REQUIRED")
+        current = self.read("refs/heads/main")
+        if current == merged_oid:
+            return merged_oid
+        if current != expected_oid:
+            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "update-ref", "refs/heads/main", merged_oid, expected_oid],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_CAS_FAILED")
+        if self.read("refs/heads/main") != merged_oid:
+            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return merged_oid
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+"""Canonical semantic branch-protection model used by AIOS governance gates."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.semantic-protection.v1"
+USER_IDS = {"owner": 2, "aios-autonomy-agent": 153}
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _typed_json(value: Any) -> list[Any]:
+    if value in (None, "null"):
+        return []
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return json.loads(value)
+    return list(value)
+
+
+def _user_ids(names: Any) -> list[int]:
+    result = []
+    for name in names or []:
+        if name not in USER_IDS:
+            raise ValueError("UNKNOWN_GOVERNANCE_USER:" + str(name))
+        result.append(USER_IDS[name])
+    return sorted(result)
+
+
+def semantic_policy(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Drop transport metadata and canonicalize semantic security fields."""
+    return {
+        "schema_version": SCHEMA,
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "protection_id": 2,
+        "branch_name": protection.get("branch_name"),
+        "can_push": protection.get("enable_push"),
+        "can_force_push": protection.get("enable_force_push"),
+        "enable_merge_whitelist": protection.get("enable_merge_whitelist"),
+        "merge_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")),
+        "merge_whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "required_approvals": protection.get("required_approvals"),
+        "enable_status_check": protection.get("enable_status_check"),
+        "status_check_contexts": sorted(protection.get("status_check_contexts") or []),
+        "block_admin_merge_override": protection.get("block_admin_merge_override"),
+        "block_on_official_review_requests": protection.get("block_on_official_review_requests"),
+        "block_on_outdated_branch": protection.get("block_on_outdated_branch"),
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews": protection.get("block_on_rejected_reviews"),
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals": protection.get("dismiss_stale_approvals"),
+        "ignore_stale_approvals": protection.get("ignore_stale_approvals"),
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist": protection.get("enable_approvals_whitelist"),
+        "approvals_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("approvals_whitelist_username")),
+        "approvals_whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_bypass_allowlist": protection.get("enable_bypass_allowlist"),
+        "bypass_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("bypass_allowlist_usernames")),
+        "bypass_allowlist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_force_push_allowlist": protection.get("enable_force_push_allowlist"),
+        "force_push_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("force_push_allowlist_usernames")),
+        "enable_whitelist": protection.get("enable_push_whitelist"),
+        "whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("push_whitelist_usernames")),
+        "whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys": protection.get("force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys"),
+        "whitelist_deploy_keys": protection.get("push_whitelist_deploy_keys"),
+        "require_signed_commits": protection.get("require_signed_commits"),
+        "priority": protection.get("priority"),
+        "protected_file_patterns": _typed_json(protection.get("protected_file_patterns")),
+        "unprotected_file_patterns": _typed_json(protection.get("unprotected_file_patterns")),
+    }
+
+
+def semantic_digest(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(semantic_policy(protection))).hexdigest()
+
+
+def transport_digest(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(protection)).hexdigest()
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+"""Fail-closed Stage-2 campaign gate migration predicates."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+SEMANTIC_SCHEMA = "aios.semantic-protection.v1"
+STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA = "d911e856f71de6105b8efa08e13338a448e0b6d37536332decd80c9f409ecf27"
+CAMPAIGN_ID = "AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807"
+OWNER_GATE = "owner-approval-gate"
+CAMPAIGN_GATE = "campaign-approval-gate"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+
+
+class Stage2GateError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _typed_json(value: Any) -> list[Any]:
+    if value in (None, "", "null"):
+        return []
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return json.loads(value)
+    return list(value)
+
+
+def _user_ids(names: Any) -> list[int]:
+    mapping = {"owner": 2, "aios-autonomy-agent": 153}
+    result = []
+    for name in names or []:
+        if name not in mapping:
+            raise Stage2GateError("UNKNOWN_GOVERNANCE_USER")
+        result.append(mapping[name])
+    return sorted(result)
+
+
+def semantic_policy(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "schema_version": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA,
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "protection_id": 2,
+        "branch_name": protection.get("branch_name"),
+        "can_push": protection.get("enable_push"),
+        "can_force_push": protection.get("enable_force_push"),
+        "enable_merge_whitelist": protection.get("enable_merge_whitelist"),
+        "merge_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")),
+        "merge_whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "required_approvals": protection.get("required_approvals"),
+        "enable_status_check": protection.get("enable_status_check"),
+        "status_check_contexts": sorted(protection.get("status_check_contexts") or []),
+        "block_admin_merge_override": protection.get("block_admin_merge_override"),
+        "block_on_official_review_requests": protection.get("block_on_official_review_requests"),
+        "block_on_outdated_branch": protection.get("block_on_outdated_branch"),
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews": protection.get("block_on_rejected_reviews"),
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals": protection.get("dismiss_stale_approvals"),
+        "ignore_stale_approvals": protection.get("ignore_stale_approvals"),
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist": protection.get("enable_approvals_whitelist"),
+        "approvals_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("approvals_whitelist_username")),
+        "approvals_whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_bypass_allowlist": protection.get("enable_bypass_allowlist"),
+        "bypass_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("bypass_allowlist_usernames")),
+        "bypass_allowlist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_force_push_allowlist": protection.get("enable_force_push_allowlist"),
+        "force_push_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("force_push_allowlist_usernames")),
+        "force_push_allowlist_team_ids": [],
+        "enable_whitelist": protection.get("enable_push_whitelist"),
+        "whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("push_whitelist_usernames")),
+        "whitelist_team_ids": [],
+        "force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys": protection.get("force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys"),
+        "whitelist_deploy_keys": protection.get("push_whitelist_deploy_keys"),
+        "require_signed_commits": protection.get("require_signed_commits"),
+        "priority": protection.get("priority"),
+        "protected_file_patterns": protection.get("protected_file_patterns"),
+        "unprotected_file_patterns": protection.get("unprotected_file_patterns"),
+    }
+
+
+def semantic_digest(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(semantic_policy(protection))).hexdigest()
+
+
+def build_target(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+    current = list(protection.get("status_check_contexts") or [])
+    has_owner = OWNER_GATE in current
+    has_campaign = CAMPAIGN_GATE in current
+    if has_owner and has_campaign:
+        raise Stage2GateError("GATE_PRESTATE_CONFLICT")
+    if not has_owner and not has_campaign:
+        raise Stage2GateError("OWNER_GATE_MISSING")
+    if has_campaign:
+        return "IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS", copy.deepcopy(dict(protection))
+    if semantic_digest(protection) != STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA:
+        raise Stage2GateError("SEMANTIC_PRECONDITION_INVALID")
+    target = copy.deepcopy(dict(protection))
+    target["status_check_contexts"] = sorted(
+        [gate for gate in current if gate != OWNER_GATE] + [CAMPAIGN_GATE]
+    )
+    return "READY", target
+
+
+def validate_stage2_facts(facts: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    required = {
+        "campaign_id",
+        "campaign_active",
+        "campaign_revoked",
+        "machine_actor",
+        "required_checks_all_success",
+        "required_checks_same_head",
+        "unresolved_conversations",
+        "mergeable",
+        "protected_target",
+        "current_main_oid",
+        "gitea_main_oid",
+        "current_main_lineage_verified",
+    }
+    if set(facts) != required:
+        raise Stage2GateError("STAGE2_FACTS_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    if facts["campaign_id"] != CAMPAIGN_ID or facts["campaign_active"] is not True or facts["campaign_revoked"] is not False:
+        raise Stage2GateError("CAMPAIGN_NOT_ACTIVE")
+    if facts["machine_actor"] != "aios-autonomy-agent":
+        raise Stage2GateError("MACHINE_ACTOR_MISMATCH")
+    if facts["required_checks_all_success"] is not True or facts["required_checks_same_head"] is not True:
+        raise Stage2GateError("REQUIRED_CHECKS_NOT_CURRENT")
+    if facts["unresolved_conversations"] != 0 or facts["mergeable"] is not True:
+        raise Stage2GateError("CAMPAIGN_GATE_FACTS_INVALID")
+    if facts["protected_target"] != "main" or facts["current_main_lineage_verified"] is not True:
+        raise Stage2GateError("PROTECTED_TARGET_OR_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(facts["current_main_oid"], str)
+        or not OID_RE.fullmatch(facts["current_main_oid"])
+        or facts["gitea_main_oid"] != facts["current_main_oid"]
+    ):
+        raise Stage2GateError("MAIN_READBACK_MISMATCH")
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+"""Shared primitives for the V2R1C6 governed local writer contract."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import posixpath
+import re
+import socket
+import stat
+import struct
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+TASK_ID = "V2R1C6_GOVERNED_LOCAL_BOOTSTRAP"
+REPO = "aios/aios"
+PRINCIPAL = "governed-local-bootstrap"
+OIDSIZ = 40
+AUTHORIZATION_TTL = timedelta(hours=2)
+
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterError(Exception):
+    """Base error for governed-local-writer validation and runtime failures."""
+
+
+class AuthorizationError(GovernedLocalWriterError):
+    """Raised when authorization input is invalid, expired, or tampered."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BranchCreatePolicy:
+    """Exact branch creation contract."""
+
+    branch: str
+    base_oid: str
+    head_oid: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BranchAppendPolicy:
+    """Exact append-commit contract for candidate branch updates."""
+
+    branch: str
+    expected_head_oid: str | None
+    allowed_paths: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BranchPolicy:
+    """Per-branch operation policies loaded from authorization."""
+
+    create_branch: BranchCreatePolicy | None
+    append_commit: BranchAppendPolicy | None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernedAuthorization:
+    """Parsed and validated authorization object."""
+
+    task_id: str
+    repo: str
+    created_at: datetime
+    expires_at: datetime
+    authorization_sha256: str
+    one_time_use: bool
+    branch_operations: dict[str, BranchPolicy]
+    denied_operations: tuple[str, ...]
+
+    @property
+    def create_branches(self) -> set[str]:
+        """Branches that are allowed for branch-creation operations."""
+        return {
+            branch
+            for branch, policy in self.branch_operations.items()
+            if policy.create_branch is not None
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def append_branches(self) -> set[str]:
+        """Branches that are allowed for commit-append operations."""
+        return {
+            branch
+            for branch, policy in self.branch_operations.items()
+            if policy.append_commit is not None
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PeerIdentity:
+    """Verified peer identity from SO_PEERCRED."""
+
+    pid: int
+    uid: int
+    gid: int
+    executable: str | None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FileChange:
+    """Single file modification payload."""
+
+    path: str
+    content: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CreateBranchRequest:
+    """Validated create-branch request payload."""
+
+    branch: str
+    base_oid: str
+    head_oid: str | None
+    authorization_digest: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AppendCommitRequest:
+    """Validated append-commit request payload."""
+
+    branch: str
+    expected_head_oid: str
+    changes: tuple[FileChange, ...]
+    authorization_digest: str
+    commit_message: str = "chore(governance): append governed commit"
+
+
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$")
+_DENIED_PATH_SEGMENTS = (
+    "main",
+    "tag",
+    "baseline",
+    "credential",
+    "credentials",
+    "secret",
+    "registry",
+)
+_SECRET_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(r"(?i)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)secret\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)password\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)token\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+)
+_SAFE_SECRET_MARKERS = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*(?:REDACTED|TEST_FIXTURE|NOT_A_SECRET)"
+)
+
+
+def canonicalize_authorization_payload(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Serialize authorization payload without the signature hash, in canonical form."""
+    canonical = dict(payload)
+    canonical.pop("authorization_sha256", None)
+    return json.dumps(
+        canonical, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True
+    )
+
+
+def compute_authorization_sha256(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Compute canonical sha256 over authorization payload."""
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    digest.update(canonicalize_authorization_payload(payload).encode("utf-8"))
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def _assert_authorization_file_permissions(path: Path) -> None:
+    """Fail-closed checks for root-only secret-like authorization files."""
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization path must not be a symlink")
+
+    st = path.stat()
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization path must be a regular file")
+
+    if (st.st_mode & 0o777) != 0o600:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization file mode must be exactly 0600")
+
+    if hasattr(st, "st_uid") and os.name != "nt" and st.st_uid != 0:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization file owner must be uid 0")
+
+
+def _parse_iso8601(value: str) -> datetime:
+    """Parse ISO 8601 timestamps used by authorization payloads."""
+    try:
+        if value.endswith("Z"):
+            value = value[:-1] + "+00:00"
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise AuthorizationError("created_at must be an ISO 8601 timestamp") from exc
+
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return parsed
+
+
+def _require_type(value: Any, expected: type, *, key: str) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(value, expected):
+        raise AuthorizationError(f"{key} must be {expected.__name__}")
+
+
+def _parse_oid(value: Any, *, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise AuthorizationError(f"{field} must be a string")
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise AuthorizationError(f"{field} must be a 40-char hex object id")
+    return value.lower()
+
+
+def _parse_allowed_paths(paths: Any) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not isinstance(paths, list) or not paths:
+        raise AuthorizationError("allowed_paths must be a non-empty list")
+    normalized: list[str] = []
+    for path in paths:
+        if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip():
+            raise AuthorizationError("allowed_paths entries must be non-empty strings")
+        normalized.append(path.strip())
+    return tuple(normalized)
+
+
+def parse_authorization(
+    raw: Mapping[str, Any], *, now: datetime | None = None
+) -> GovernedAuthorization:
+    """Validate an authorization payload and return a typed object."""
+    _require_type(raw.get("task_id"), str, key="task_id")
+    if raw["task_id"] != TASK_ID:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unexpected task_id")
+
+    _require_type(raw.get("repo"), str, key="repo")
+    if raw["repo"] != REPO:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unexpected repo value")
+
+    created_at = _parse_iso8601(raw.get("created_at"))
+    check_time = now or datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
+    if created_at.tzinfo is None:
+        created_at = created_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    if created_at - check_time > timedelta(seconds=30):
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization created_at is in the future")
+    if check_time - created_at > AUTHORIZATION_TTL:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expired")
+    raw_expires_at = raw.get("expires_at")
+    expires_at = (
+        _parse_iso8601(raw_expires_at)
+        if raw_expires_at is not None
+        else created_at + AUTHORIZATION_TTL
+    )
+    if expires_at <= check_time:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expiry is in the past")
+    if expires_at > created_at + AUTHORIZATION_TTL:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expiry exceeds two-hour maximum")
+
+    _require_type(raw.get("one_time_use"), bool, key="one_time_use")
+    if raw["one_time_use"] is not True:
+        raise AuthorizationError("one_time_use must be true")
+
+    _require_type(raw.get("authorization_sha256"), str, key="authorization_sha256")
+    expected_hash = compute_authorization_sha256(raw)
+    provided_hash = str(raw["authorization_sha256"]).lower()
+    if provided_hash != expected_hash:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization_sha256 mismatch")
+
+    op_map = raw.get("allowed_branch_operations")
+    if not isinstance(op_map, dict) or not op_map:
+        raise AuthorizationError("allowed_branch_operations must be a non-empty object")
+
+    branch_operations: dict[str, BranchPolicy] = {}
+    for branch, operation in op_map.items():
+        if not isinstance(branch, str) or not branch.strip():
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch names must be non-empty strings")
+
+        if not isinstance(operation, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("operation policy must be an object")
+
+        create_block = operation.get("create_branch")
+        append_block = operation.get("append_commit")
+
+        create_policy: BranchCreatePolicy | None = None
+        append_policy: BranchAppendPolicy | None = None
+
+        if create_block is not None:
+            if not isinstance(create_block, dict):
+                raise AuthorizationError("create_branch block must be an object")
+            raw_head_oid = create_block.get("head_oid")
+            create_policy = BranchCreatePolicy(
+                branch=branch,
+                base_oid=_parse_oid(create_block.get("base_oid"), field="create_branch.base_oid"),
+                head_oid=(
+                    _parse_oid(raw_head_oid, field="create_branch.head_oid")
+                    if raw_head_oid is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+            )
+
+        if append_block is not None:
+            if not isinstance(append_block, dict):
+                raise AuthorizationError("append_commit block must be an object")
+            raw_expected_head_oid = append_block.get("expected_head_oid")
+            append_policy = BranchAppendPolicy(
+                branch=branch,
+                expected_head_oid=(
+                    _parse_oid(
+                        raw_expected_head_oid,
+                        field="append_commit.expected_head_oid",
+                    )
+                    if raw_expected_head_oid is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+                allowed_paths=_parse_allowed_paths(append_block.get("allowed_paths")),
+            )
+
+        if create_policy is None and append_policy is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch policy must define at least one operation")
+
+        branch_operations[branch] = BranchPolicy(
+            create_branch=create_policy, append_commit=append_policy
+        )
+
+    denied_raw = raw.get("denied_operations", ())
+    if not isinstance(denied_raw, list):
+        raise AuthorizationError("denied_operations must be a list")
+    denied_operations: list[str] = []
+    for value in denied_raw:
+        if not isinstance(value, str):
+            raise AuthorizationError("denied operations must be strings")
+        denied_operations.append(value.lower())
+
+    return GovernedAuthorization(
+        task_id=raw["task_id"],
+        repo=raw["repo"],
+        created_at=created_at,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        authorization_sha256=provided_hash,
+        one_time_use=True,
+        branch_operations=branch_operations,
+        denied_operations=tuple(denied_operations),
+    )
+
+
+def load_authorization_file(
+    path: str | os.PathLike[str], *, now: datetime | None = None
+) -> GovernedAuthorization:
+    """Load and validate the root-only authorization file."""
+    auth_path = Path(path)
+    _assert_authorization_file_permissions(auth_path)
+    try:
+        raw_text = auth_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unable to read authorization file") from exc
+
+    try:
+        raw_obj = json.loads(raw_text)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization must be JSON") from exc
+
+    if not isinstance(raw_obj, dict):
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization top-level must be an object")
+
+    return parse_authorization(raw_obj, now=now)
+
+
+def _resolve_peer_executable(pid: int) -> str | None:
+    """Resolve peer executable from /proc/<pid>/exe when available."""
+    if pid <= 0:
+        return None
+    exe_path = f"/proc/{pid}/exe"
+    try:
+        return os.readlink(exe_path)
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+
+
+def extract_peer_identity(
+    connection: socket.socket, *, require_root_uid: bool = True
+) -> PeerIdentity:
+    """Validate SO_PEERCRED and return peer identity."""
+    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
+        raise AuthorizationError("SO_PEERCRED not available on this platform")
+
+    data = connection.getsockopt(
+        socket.SOL_SOCKET,
+        socket.SO_PEERCRED,
+        struct.calcsize("3i"),
+    )
+    if len(data) != struct.calcsize("3i"):
+        raise AuthorizationError("SO_PEERCRED payload size mismatch")
+
+    pid, uid, gid = struct.unpack("3i", data)
+    if require_root_uid and uid != 0:
+        raise PermissionError("peer uid must be 0")
+
+    return PeerIdentity(
+        pid=pid,
+        uid=uid,
+        gid=gid,
+        executable=_resolve_peer_executable(pid),
+    )
+
+
+def _normalize_file_path(path: str) -> str:
+    normalized = posixpath.normpath(path.replace("\\", "/").strip())
+    return normalized.lstrip("/")
+
+
+def _path_has_disallowed_segment(path: str) -> bool:
+    lowered = path.lower()
+    if ".." in path.split("/"):
+        return True
+    parts = [p for p in lowered.split("/") if p]
+    for part in parts:
+        for segment in _DENIED_PATH_SEGMENTS:
+            if part == segment or part.startswith(f"{segment}.") or segment in part:
+                return True
+    return False
+
+
+def _is_allowed_path(path: str, allowed_paths: Sequence[str]) -> bool:
+    normalized = _normalize_file_path(path)
+    for prefix in allowed_paths:
+        normalized_prefix = _normalize_file_path(prefix)
+        if normalized == normalized_prefix:
+            return True
+        if normalized.startswith(normalized_prefix + "/"):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def contains_secret_like_content(content: str) -> bool:
+    """Heuristic detector for obvious secret-like strings."""
+    content = _SAFE_SECRET_MARKERS.sub("", content or "")
+    for pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS:
+        if pattern.search(content):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def validate_file_changes(
+    changes: Any, allowed_paths: Sequence[str]
+) -> tuple[FileChange, ...]:
+    """Validate append-commit file changes against path and content policy."""
+    if not isinstance(changes, list):
+        raise AuthorizationError("changes must be a list")
+    result: list[FileChange] = []
+
+    for change in changes:
+        if not isinstance(change, Mapping):
+            raise AuthorizationError("each file change must be an object")
+        raw_path = change.get("path")
+        raw_content = change.get("content")
+        if not isinstance(raw_path, str) or not raw_path.strip():
+            raise AuthorizationError("file change path must be a non-empty string")
+        if raw_path.startswith(("/", "\\")):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file change path must be relative")
+        if not isinstance(raw_content, str):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file change content must be a string")
+
+        normalized = _normalize_file_path(raw_path)
+        if not normalized or normalized.startswith("../") or normalized == "..":
+            raise AuthorizationError("file paths must be normalized relative paths")
+
+        if not _is_allowed_path(normalized, allowed_paths):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file path outside allowed_paths")
+
+        if _path_has_disallowed_segment(normalized):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file path uses denied segment")
+
+        if contains_secret_like_content(raw_content):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file content failed secret-like scan")
+
+        result.append(FileChange(path=normalized, content=raw_content))
+
+    return tuple(result)
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""Supplement Gitea native protection when review identity is not expressible."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+class MergeGateDenied(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MergeGateDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    owner_review_id: int
+    required_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+def validate_protected_merge(
+    pull_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    reviews: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    statuses: Mapping[str, str],
+    *,
+    required_contexts: Sequence[str],
+    unresolved_conversations: int,
+    owner_login: str = "owner",
+    owner_id: int = 2,
+) -> MergeGateDecision:
+    if pull_request.get("state") != "open" or pull_request.get("mergeable") is not True:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("pull_request_not_mergeable")
+    author = (pull_request.get("user") or {}).get("login")
+    owner_review = None
+    for review in reviews:
+        user = review.get("user") or {}
+        if review.get("state") == "APPROVED" and user.get("login") == owner_login and user.get("id") == owner_id:
+            if author == owner_login or (pull_request.get("author_id") == owner_id):
+                raise MergeGateDenied("pr_author_self_approval_denied")
+            owner_review = review
+    if owner_review is None:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("owner_review_required")
+    if unresolved_conversations != 0:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("unresolved_conversations_block_merge")
+    missing = [context for context in required_contexts if statuses.get(context) != "success"]
+    if missing:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("required_checks_missing:" + ",".join(missing))
+    return MergeGateDecision(True, int(owner_review.get("id", 0)), tuple(required_contexts))
+
@@ -0,0 +1,713 @@
+"""Governed release orchestration with a trusted-plan V2R2C2 path.
+
+The legacy V2R2C1 implementation remains available only for compatibility;
+new release requests are dispatched to the plan-driven executor below.
+
+This module is deliberately scoped to the Owner-approved V2R2C1 binding.  It
+uses the existing TagPublisher and metadata adapters; it does not introduce a
+second Git writer, a second durable job store, or an alternate baseline.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import tarfile
+import tempfile
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from trusted_release_execution_plan import PlanError, TrustedReleasePlan
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
+    PublicationPending,
+    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
+    PublicationRequest,
+    TagPublisher,
+)
+
+
+VERSION = "V2R2C1"
+TARGET_OID = "998d30304787e31e5ae607c0bd86b5edb2b0e5ad"
+EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID = "a8b906d1bc24088c19647e98de6a679268f6d0a2"
+APPROVAL_PLAN_ID = "sha256:c0df52008ae7f64cec5ee2d28947aa7b892066c670ab8295e4549140b1a7500e"
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+SERVICE = "aios-v2r1c7-production.service"
+PORT = 18927
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+
+class ReleaseBlocked(RuntimeError):
+    """A release gate failed and no unsafe recovery is permitted."""
+
+
+class ManualOwnerReviewRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
+    pass
+
+
+class ReconciliationRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode()
+
+
+def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact must be a regular file")
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as stream:
+        for block in iter(lambda: stream.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            digest.update(block)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any], mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    temporary = path.with_name(path.name + ".tmp")
+    temporary.write_bytes(canonical(dict(value)))
+    os.chmod(temporary, mode)
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ReleaseBinding:
+    version: str = VERSION
+    target_oid: str = TARGET_OID
+    evidence_closure_oid: str = EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID
+    approval_plan_id: str = APPROVAL_PLAN_ID
+    repository: str = REPOSITORY
+    production_service: str = SERVICE
+    production_port: int = PORT
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if self.version != VERSION or self.repository != REPOSITORY:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("release binding is outside V2R2C1 scope")
+        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.target_oid) or self.target_oid != TARGET_OID:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 target_oid mismatch")
+        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.evidence_closure_oid) or self.evidence_closure_oid != EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 evidence closure mismatch")
+        if self.approval_plan_id != APPROVAL_PLAN_ID:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 approval plan mismatch")
+        if self.production_service != SERVICE or int(self.production_port) != PORT:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("production service binding mismatch")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "version": self.version,
+            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
+            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
+            "repository": self.repository,
+            "production_service": self.production_service,
+            "production_port": self.production_port,
+        }
+
+
+class StateLock:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = path
+        self.handle = None
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> "StateLock":
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
+        fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
+        if self.handle is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+            self.handle.close()
+
+
+class ReleaseState:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path, binding: ReleaseBinding):
+        self.root = root
+        self.path = root / "release-state.json"
+        self.binding = binding
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.path.exists():
+            value = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if value.get("binding") != binding.as_dict():
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("persisted release binding conflict")
+            self.value = value
+        else:
+            self.value = {
+                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.governed-production-release-state.v1",
+                "binding": binding.as_dict(),
+                "state": "INITIAL",
+                "completed": {},
+                "history": [],
+            }
+            self.save()
+
+    def save(self) -> None:
+        atomic_json(self.path, self.value)
+
+    def record(self, state: str, step: str, result: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        safe = json.loads(json.dumps(dict(result)))
+        self.value["state"] = state
+        self.value.setdefault("completed", {})[step] = safe
+        self.value.setdefault("history", []).append(
+            {"at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()), "state": state, "step": step, "result": safe}
+        )
+        self.save()
+
+    def fail(self, state: str, reason: str) -> None:
+        self.value["state"] = state
+        self.value.setdefault("history", []).append(
+            {"at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()), "state": state, "reason": str(reason)[:500]}
+        )
+        self.save()
+
+
+def _git(git_dir: Path, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=45,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+    if check and completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise ReconciliationRequired(completed.stderr.strip() or "authoritative git query failed")
+    return completed.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def _ancestor(git_dir: Path, ancestor: str, descendant: str) -> bool:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=45,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    ).returncode == 0
+
+
+def verify_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: ReleaseBinding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    binding.validate()
+    if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.target_oid) != "commit":
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("approved target_oid is not a commit")
+    if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.evidence_closure_oid) != "commit":
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("evidence closure is not a commit")
+    if not _ancestor(git_dir, binding.target_oid, binding.evidence_closure_oid):
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("approved target is not an ancestor of evidence closure")
+    return {
+        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
+        "main_oid": _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"),
+    }
+
+
+def verify_owner_approval(value: Mapping[str, Any], binding: ReleaseBinding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    approval = value.get("owner_approval")
+    if not isinstance(approval, Mapping):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_APPROVAL_RECEIPT_REQUIRED")
+    if approval.get("approved") is not True or approval.get("status") != "APPROVED":
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_APPROVAL_NOT_ACCEPTED")
+    if approval.get("approved_by") != "aiman":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_ACTOR_MISMATCH")
+    if approval.get("approval_source") != "explicit_owner_approval_in_chat":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_SOURCE_MISMATCH")
+    for key, expected in binding.as_dict().items():
+        if key in {"repository", "production_service", "production_port"}:
+            continue
+        if approval.get(key) != expected:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_BINDING_MISMATCH:" + key)
+    return dict(approval)
+
+
+def _payload_file(git_dir: Path, oid: str, path: str) -> bytes:
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", "show", f"{oid}:{path}"],
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=45,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("required release source missing:" + path)
+    return completed.stdout
+
+
+def _commit_epoch(git_dir: Path, oid: str) -> int:
+    return int(_git(git_dir, "show", "-s", "--format=%ct", oid))
+
+
+def build_production_artifact(
+    git_dir: Path,
+    binding: ReleaseBinding,
+    output_root: Path,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build a deterministic executable V2R2C1 health artifact from target_oid."""
+    binding.validate()
+    verify_lineage(git_dir, binding)
+    epoch = _commit_epoch(git_dir, binding.target_oid)
+    output_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    stem = f"aios-{VERSION}-{binding.target_oid[:12]}"
+    output = output_root / (stem + ".tar.zst")
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="v2r2c1-artifact-") as temp:
+        root = Path(temp) / "payload"
+        root.mkdir(parents=True)
+        source_paths = {
+            "active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py": "active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py",
+            "active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py": "active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py",
+        }
+        for destination, source in source_paths.items():
+            target = root / destination
+            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            target.write_bytes(_payload_file(git_dir, binding.target_oid, source))
+        generated: dict[str, str] = {
+            "VERSION": VERSION + "\n",
+            "active-runtime/app/v2r2c1_health_service.py": (
+                "from v2r1c6_privacy_tools import main\n\n"
+                "if __name__ == '__main__':\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n"
+            ),
+            "deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service": (
+                "[Unit]\nDescription=AIOS V2R2C1 governed health contract service\n"
+                "After=network.target\n\n[Service]\nType=simple\n"
+                "User=aios-v2r1c7\nGroup=aios-v2r1c7\n"
+                "WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios/v2r2c1\n"
+                "EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios/aios-v2r2c1.env\n"
+                "ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/aios/v2r2c1/active-runtime/app/v2r2c1_health_service.py --serve --host 127.0.0.1 --port ${AIOS_V2R1C7_PORT}\n"
+                "Restart=on-failure\nRestartSec=5\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\n"
+                "ProtectHome=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectKernelLogs=true\n"
+                "ProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\n"
+                "RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nIPAddressDeny=any\n"
+                "IPAddressAllow=localhost\nUMask=0077\n\n[Install]\nWantedBy=multi-user.target\n"
+            ),
+            "deploy/aios-v2/v2r2c1-runtime-config.json": json.dumps({
+                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.production-runtime.v1",
+                "version": VERSION,
+                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+                "service": SERVICE,
+                "port": PORT,
+                "health_path": "/health",
+                "deployment_state_source": "environment_and_state_file",
+            }, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n",
+            "deploy/aios-v2/v2r2c1-rollback.json": json.dumps({
+                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.rollback-metadata.v1",
+                "rollback_version": "V2R1C7",
+                "rollback_service": SERVICE,
+                "rollback_target_is_previous_production": True,
+                "automatic_rollback": False,
+            }, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n",
+            "scripts/probe_v2r2c1_health.py": (
+                "import json,sys,urllib.request\n"
+                "url=sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv)>1 else 'http://127.0.0.1:18927/health'\n"
+                "with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as r: print(json.dumps(json.load(r), sort_keys=True))\n"
+            ),
+            "scripts/rollback_v2r2c1_release.sh": "#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\nprintf '%s\\n' 'rollback requires governed owner-approved executor'\nexit 2\n",
+            "release-manifests/V2R2C1.json": json.dumps({
+                "schema": "aios.release-source.v2",
+                "version": VERSION,
+                "repository": REPOSITORY,
+                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+                "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+                "production_deployed": False,
+                "deployment_state": "STAGING",
+                "artifact_kind": "executable-production-health",
+            }, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n",
+        }
+        for rel, text in generated.items():
+            target = root / rel
+            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            target.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
+            if rel.startswith("scripts/"):
+                target.chmod(0o755)
+        metadata = {
+            "schema": "aios.release-artifact-build.v3",
+            "version": VERSION,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+            "source_date_epoch": epoch,
+            "clean_source": True,
+            "executable_payload": True,
+            "production_deployed": False,
+            "tag_created": False,
+            "baseline_changed": False,
+            "secrets_included": False,
+        }
+        (root / "BUILD-METADATA.json").write_bytes(canonical(metadata))
+        (root / "ROLLBACK-METADATA.json").write_bytes(canonical(json.loads((root / "deploy/aios-v2/v2r2c1-rollback.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))))
+        names = sorted("payload/" + str(path.relative_to(root)).replace(os.sep, "/") for path in root.rglob("*") if path.is_file())
+        (root / "ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json").write_bytes(canonical({
+            "schema": "aios.release-artifact-manifest.v3",
+            "version": VERSION,
+            "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "files": names + ["payload/ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json"],
+            "deployable": True,
+            "executable_payload": True,
+            "production_deployed": False,
+            "tag_created": False,
+            "baseline_changed": False,
+        }))
+        tar_path = Path(temp) / "release.tar"
+        with tarfile.open(tar_path, "w") as archive:
+            for path in sorted(root.rglob("*")):
+                relative = str(path.relative_to(root)).replace(os.sep, "/")
+                info = archive.gettarinfo(str(path), arcname="payload/" + relative)
+                info.uid = info.gid = 0
+                info.uname = "root"
+                info.gname = "root"
+                info.mtime = epoch
+                info.mode = 0o755 if path.is_dir() or path.suffix == ".sh" else 0o644
+                if path.is_file():
+                    with path.open("rb") as stream:
+                        archive.addfile(info, stream)
+                else:
+                    archive.addfile(info)
+        subprocess.run(["zstd", "-T1", "-19", "--no-progress", "-q", "-f", str(tar_path), "-o", str(output)], check=True, timeout=120)
+    digest = sha256_file(output)
+    receipt = {
+        "schema": "aios.release-artifact-receipt.v3",
+        "version": VERSION,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "artifact": str(output),
+        "artifact_sha256": digest,
+        "artifact_size": output.stat().st_size,
+        "deployable": True,
+        "executable_payload": True,
+        "production_deployed": False,
+        "tag_created": False,
+        "baseline_changed": False,
+    }
+    atomic_json(output.with_suffix(output.suffix + ".receipt.json"), receipt, mode=0o640)
+    return receipt
+
+
+class GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor:
+    def __init__(self, config: Any):
+        self.config = config
+        self.binding = ReleaseBinding()
+        self.binding.validate()
+        self.root = Path(config.state_root) / "v2r2c1-governed-production-release"
+        self.state = ReleaseState(self.root, self.binding)
+        workspace = self.root / "publication-workspace"
+        workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.publisher = TagPublisher(
+            workspace,
+            GitTagBackend(workspace, authoritative_repo=Path(config.authoritative_git_dir)),
+            GiteaTagClient(config.api_base, REPOSITORY, Path(config.token_path)),
+            config.remote_name,
+            state_root=self.root / "tag-publication",
+        )
+        # Release checks must use the same explicitly configured staging baseline
+        # as the Action/model runtime; do not fall back to the publication workspace.
+        self.publisher.baseline_path = Path(
+            os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_AUTHORITY", str(config.baseline_path))
+        )
+        # The immutable runtime package is the source of the version projection;
+        # the mutable state workspace only stores publication state.
+        self.publisher.versions_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "versions"
+
+    def _request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> PublicationRequest:
+        binding = self.binding
+        for key, expected in binding.as_dict().items():
+            if key in request and request[key] != expected:
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("release request binding mismatch:" + key)
+        return PublicationRequest(binding.version, binding.target_oid, binding.evidence_closure_oid, binding.approval_plan_id)
+
+    def approval_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("execute") is not False:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("TAG_APPROVAL_REQUEST_MUST_BE_DRY_RUN")
+        owner = verify_owner_approval(request, self.binding)
+        with StateLock(self.root / "release.lock"):
+            current = self.state.value.get("approval")
+            approval_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical(owner)).hexdigest()
+            record = {
+                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.tag-approval-request.v1",
+                "binding": self.binding.as_dict(),
+                "owner_approval": owner,
+                "owner_approval_digest_sha256": approval_digest,
+                "execute": False,
+                "recorded_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()),
+            }
+            if current and current != record:
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("persisted Owner approval differs")
+            self.state.value["approval"] = record
+            self.state.record("APPROVAL_REQUEST_RECORDED", "tag_approval_request", record)
+            return {"status": "RECORDED", "execute": False, "binding": self.binding.as_dict(), "owner_approval_digest_sha256": approval_digest}
+
+    def _require_approval(self) -> None:
+        approval = self.state.value.get("approval")
+        if not isinstance(approval, Mapping) or approval.get("binding") != self.binding.as_dict():
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUEST_NOT_RECORDED")
+
+    def publish_tag(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("execute") is not True:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("TAG_PUBLICATION_REQUIRES_EXECUTE_TRUE")
+        self._require_approval()
+        publication = self._request(request)
+        with StateLock(self.root / "release.lock"):
+            try:
+                verified = self.publisher._verify_publication(publication, allow_push=True, previously_deployed=False)
+            except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+                self.state.fail("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", str(exc))
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(str(exc)) from exc
+            except PublicationPending as exc:
+                self.state.fail("REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", str(exc))
+                raise ReconciliationRequired(str(exc)) from exc
+            except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
+                self.state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", str(exc))
+                raise ReconciliationRequired(str(exc)) from exc
+            result = dict(verified)
+            self.state.record("TAG_VERIFIED", "tag", result)
+            return {"status": "REMOTE_VERIFIED", **result}
+
+    def tag_status(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self._request(request)
+        return self.publisher.get_tag_publication_status(VERSION)
+
+    def build_artifact(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self._require_approval()
+        self._request(request)
+        receipt = build_production_artifact(Path(self.config.authoritative_git_dir), self.binding, self.root / "artifacts")
+        self.state.record("ARTIFACT_VERIFIED", "production_artifact", receipt)
+        return {"status": "VERIFIED", **receipt}
+
+    def execute_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self._require_approval()
+        publication = self._request(request)
+        tag_state = self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("tag")
+        if not isinstance(tag_state, Mapping) or tag_state.get("state") not in {"GITEA_API_CONFIRMED", "REMOTE_VERIFIED"}:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("REMOTE_TAG_PROOF_REQUIRED")
+        artifact = self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("production_artifact")
+        if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
+            artifact = self.build_artifact(request)
+        value = {
+            **self.binding.as_dict(),
+            "tag_oid": tag_state.get("tag_oid") or tag_state.get("gitea_tag_oid"),
+            "artifact_path": artifact["artifact"],
+            "artifact_size": int(artifact["artifact_size"]),
+            "artifact_sha256": artifact["artifact_sha256"],
+        }
+        # The production adapter is privileged and is run through the root
+        # approved-release service boundary by the caller.  This handler is
+        # still useful for a root-owned staging invocation and remains
+        # fail-closed when the adapter is not available.
+        import v2r2c1_production_adapter
+        runtime = v2r2c1_production_adapter.execute_request({"schema": "aios.production-executor-request.v1", "operation": "apply", **value})
+        if runtime.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
+            self.state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "production health did not verify")
+            raise ReconciliationRequired("production health did not verify")
+        self.state.record("PRODUCTION_VERIFIED", "production", runtime)
+        return {"status": "PRODUCTION_VERIFIED", "runtime": runtime, "artifact": artifact, "tag_oid": value["tag_oid"]}
+
+    def consistency(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        publication = self._request(request)
+        result = self.publisher.get_release_consistency(publication)
+        result["release_binding"] = self.binding.as_dict()
+        result["production_health"] = _health(self.config.health_url, self.binding, self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("production_artifact", {}))
+        result["registry"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.registry_root) / f"{VERSION}.json")
+        result["baseline"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.baseline_path))
+        return result
+
+    def acceptance(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        result = self.consistency(request)
+        result["accepted"] = result.get("status") == "PASS" and result.get("production_health", {}).get("status") == "ACTIVE_VERIFIED"
+        self.state.record("ACCEPTED" if result["accepted"] else "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "acceptance", result)
+        return result
+
+
+def _read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return {"status": "MISSING", "path": str(path)}
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {"status": "INVALID", "path": str(path)}
+    return {"status": "PRESENT", "path": str(path), **value}
+
+
+def _health(url: str, binding: ReleaseBinding, artifact: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    import urllib.request
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as response:
+            body = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+            status = response.status
+    except Exception as exc:
+        return {"status": "UNAVAILABLE", "error": type(exc).__name__}
+    expected_artifact = artifact.get("artifact_sha256")
+    exact = (
+        status == 200
+        and body.get("version") == binding.version
+        and body.get("commit_oid") == binding.target_oid
+        and (not expected_artifact or body.get("artifact_sha256") == expected_artifact)
+        and body.get("deployment_state") == "ACTIVE"
+        and body.get("production_deployed") is True
+    )
+    return {"status": "ACTIVE_VERIFIED" if exact else "CONFLICT", "http_status": status, **body}
+
+
+
+class TrustedPlanReleaseExecutor:
+    """Release handler whose identity comes only from an immutable trusted plan.
+
+    The bridge may prepare/read evidence and request tag publication, but it does
+    not perform production side effects.  The privileged approved-release
+    service consumes the same plan and exact Owner approval envelope.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, config: Any):
+        self.config = config
+        configured = getattr(config, "release_plan_path", None)
+        self.plan_path = Path(configured) if configured else None
+        self.state_root = Path(config.state_root) / "trusted-release"
+        self.state_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._approval: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+        self._tag: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+
+    def _plan(self) -> TrustedReleasePlan:
+        path = self.plan_path
+        if path is None:
+            env_path = os.environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_PLAN_PATH", "")
+            path = Path(env_path) if env_path else None
+        if path is None:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("TRUSTED_RELEASE_PLAN_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            return TrustedReleasePlan.load(path)
+        except PlanError as exc:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked(f"TRUSTED_RELEASE_PLAN_INVALID:{exc}") from exc
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _binding(plan: TrustedReleasePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = plan.value
+        return {
+            "version": value["version"],
+            "target_oid": value["source_commit"],
+            "evidence_closure_oid": value["evidence_closure_oid"],
+            "artifact_sha256": value["artifact_sha256"],
+            "artifact_size": value["artifact"]["size"],
+            "approval_plan_id": value["approval_plan_id"],
+            "candidate_id": value["candidate_id"],
+            "release_plan_sha256": plan.release_plan_sha256,
+        }
+
+    def _request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[TrustedReleasePlan, dict[str, Any]]:
+        plan = self._plan()
+        binding = self._binding(plan)
+        for key, expected in binding.items():
+            if key in request and request[key] != expected:
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("trusted release request binding mismatch:" + key)
+        return plan, binding
+
+    def approval_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("execute") is not False:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("TAG_APPROVAL_REQUEST_MUST_BE_DRY_RUN")
+        plan, binding = self._request(request)
+        approval = request.get("owner_approval")
+        if not isinstance(approval, Mapping) or approval.get("approved") is not True:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_RELEASE_APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
+        for key in ("candidate_id", "release_plan_sha256", "approval_plan_id"):
+            if approval.get(key) != binding[key]:
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_BINDING_MISMATCH:" + key)
+        record = {"plan": plan.as_dict(), "owner_approval": dict(approval)}
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical(record)).hexdigest()
+        if self._approval is not None and self._approval != record:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_REPLAY_CONFLICT")
+        self._approval = record
+        return {"status": "RECORDED", "execute": False, "release_plan_sha256": plan.release_plan_sha256, "approval_digest_sha256": digest}
+
+    def _require_approval(self, plan: TrustedReleasePlan) -> None:
+        if self._approval is None or self._approval.get("plan") != plan.as_dict():
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_RELEASE_APPROVAL_NOT_RECORDED")
+
+    def build_artifact(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        plan, _ = self._request(request)
+        artifact = dict(plan.value["artifact"])
+        path = Path(str(artifact["path"]))
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size != artifact["size"]:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("TRUSTED_ARTIFACT_NOT_PRESENT")
+        actual = hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+        if actual != plan.value["artifact_sha256"]:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("TRUSTED_ARTIFACT_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        return {"status": "VERIFIED", "version": plan.value["version"], "source_commit": plan.value["source_commit"], "tree_oid": plan.value["tree_oid"], "artifact": str(path), "artifact_size": artifact["size"], "artifact_sha256": actual, "manifest_sha256": plan.value["manifest_sha256"], "package_closure_sha256": plan.value["package_closure_sha256"], "release_plan_sha256": plan.release_plan_sha256}
+
+    def _publisher(self, plan: TrustedReleasePlan) -> TagPublisher:
+        root = self.state_root / plan.value["candidate_id"]
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        publisher = TagPublisher(root / "publication-workspace", GitTagBackend(root / "publication-workspace", authoritative_repo=Path(self.config.authoritative_git_dir)), GiteaTagClient(self.config.api_base, "aios/aios", Path(self.config.token_path)), self.config.remote_name, state_root=root / "tag-publication")
+        publisher.baseline_path = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_AUTHORITY", str(self.config.baseline_path)))
+        publisher.versions_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "versions"
+        return publisher
+
+    def publish_tag(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("execute") is not True:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("TAG_PUBLICATION_REQUIRES_EXECUTE_TRUE")
+        plan, _ = self._request(request)
+        self._require_approval(plan)
+        publication = PublicationRequest(plan.value["version"], plan.value["source_commit"], plan.value["evidence_closure_oid"], plan.value["approval_plan_id"])
+        try:
+            result = self._publisher(plan)._verify_publication(publication, allow_push=True, previously_deployed=False)
+        except (PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired, PublicationPending, PublicationReconciliationRequired) as exc:
+            raise ReconciliationRequired(str(exc)) from exc
+        self._tag = dict(result)
+        return {"status": "REMOTE_VERIFIED", **result, "release_plan_sha256": plan.release_plan_sha256}
+
+    def tag_status(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        plan, _ = self._request(request)
+        return self._publisher(plan).get_tag_publication_status(plan.value["version"])
+
+    def execute_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        plan, _ = self._request(request)
+        self._require_approval(plan)
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("PRODUCTION_EXECUTION_REQUIRES_APPROVED_RELEASE_EXECUTOR")
+
+    def consistency(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        plan, binding = self._request(request)
+        result = {"status": "PASS", "release_binding": binding, "trusted_plan": plan.as_dict(), "production_mutation": False}
+        result["baseline"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.baseline_path))
+        result["registry"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.registry_root) / f"{plan.value['version']}.json")
+        return result
+
+    def acceptance(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        result = self.consistency(request)
+        result["accepted"] = result["status"] == "PASS"
+        return result
+
+
+def build_executor_config(config: Any) -> Any:
+    """Select legacy compatibility only when no trusted new-release plan exists."""
+    plan_path = getattr(config, "release_plan_path", None) or os.environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_PLAN_PATH", "")
+    target_version = getattr(config, "target_version", "")
+    if plan_path or target_version != VERSION:
+        return TrustedPlanReleaseExecutor(config)
+    return GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor(config)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("operation", choices=("build-artifact", "status"))
+    parser.add_argument("--git-dir", type=Path, default=Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"))
+    parser.add_argument("--output-root", type=Path, default=Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/approved-artifacts/V2R2C1"))
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    binding = ReleaseBinding()
+    if args.operation == "build-artifact":
+        print(json.dumps(build_production_artifact(args.git_dir, binding, args.output_root), sort_keys=True))
+    else:
+        print(json.dumps({"binding": binding.as_dict(), "status": "READY"}, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Thin production tag adapter over AIOS's existing mature TagPublisher.
+
+This adapter deliberately does not call TagPublisher.publish(), because that
+legacy method also mutates Registry/Baseline. The production executor requires:
+Tag -> runtime ACTIVE -> Registry -> Baseline.
+
+`apply` reuses TagPublisher._verify_publication() under the publisher's durable
+per-version lock. That method performs the existing fail-closed annotated-tag,
+network remote, Gitea API, peeled-target and listing verification, but stops
+before Registry/Baseline mutation.
+
+`probe` is read-only.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    PublicationConflict,
+    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
+    PublicationPending,
+    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
+    PublicationRequest,
+    PublicationState,
+    TagPublisher,
+)
+
+from release_version import validate_release_version
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+PLAN_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+
+def load_request() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    value = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ValueError("request_object_required")
+    if value.get("schema") != "aios.production-executor-request.v1":
+        raise ValueError("request_schema_invalid")
+    try:
+        validate_release_version(value.get("version", ""))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ValueError("version_invalid") from exc
+    for name in ("target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid"):
+        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(value.get(name, ""))):
+            raise ValueError(f"{name}_invalid")
+    if not PLAN_RE.fullmatch(str(value.get("approval_plan_id", ""))):
+        raise ValueError("approval_plan_id_invalid")
+    if value.get("repository_identity") != "aios/aios":
+        raise ValueError("repository_identity_invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+def publication_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> PublicationRequest:
+    return PublicationRequest(
+        str(value["version"]),
+        str(value["target_oid"]),
+        str(value["evidence_closure_oid"]),
+        str(value["approval_plan_id"]),
+    )
+
+
+def response(value: Mapping[str, Any], status: str, **extra: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "status": status,
+        "version": value["version"],
+        "target_oid": value["target_oid"],
+        "evidence_closure_oid": value["evidence_closure_oid"],
+        "artifact_sha256": value["artifact_sha256"],
+        "approval_plan_id": value["approval_plan_id"],
+        **extra,
+    }
+
+
+def build(args: argparse.Namespace) -> tuple[TagPublisher, GitTagBackend, GiteaTagClient]:
+    git = GitTagBackend(args.workspace, authoritative_repo=args.repository)
+    gitea = GiteaTagClient(
+        args.gitea_api,
+        args.gitea_repo,
+        args.gitea_token_file,
+        token_line=args.gitea_token_line,
+    )
+    publisher = TagPublisher(
+        args.workspace,
+        git,
+        gitea,
+        args.remote,
+        state_root=args.state_root,
+    )
+    return publisher, git, gitea
+
+
+def _gitea_lookup(gitea: GiteaTagClient, version: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
+    try:
+        return gitea.lookup_tag(version)
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        if "HTTP 404" in str(exc):
+            return None
+        raise
+
+
+def probe(
+    args: argparse.Namespace,
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    publisher: TagPublisher,
+    git: GitTagBackend,
+    gitea: GiteaTagClient,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = publication_request(value)
+    request.validate()
+    git.validate_evidence_lineage(request)
+
+    local_oid = git._rev(f"refs/tags/{request.version}")
+    local_target = git._rev(f"refs/tags/{request.version}^{{commit}}")
+    remote = git.remote_tag(args.remote, request.version)
+    api = _gitea_lookup(gitea, request.version)
+    listing = False
+    if api is not None:
+        listing = gitea.tag_visible_in_listing(request.version, request.target_oid)
+
+    if local_oid is None and remote is None and api is None:
+        return response(value, "NOT_APPLIED")
+
+    if local_oid is not None:
+        if local_target is None or local_oid == local_target:
+            return response(value, "CONFLICT", reason="local_tag_not_annotated")
+        if local_target != request.target_oid:
+            return response(
+                value,
+                "CONFLICT",
+                reason="local_peeled_target_mismatch",
+                tag_oid=local_oid,
+                peeled_target_oid=local_target,
+            )
+
+    # A remote/Gitea tag without the Authority tag object is not safe to
+    # recreate, because a new annotated tag would have a different object OID.
+    if local_oid is None and (remote is not None or api is not None):
+        return response(
+            value,
+            "INDETERMINATE",
+            reason="remote_or_gitea_tag_exists_without_authority_tag_object",
+        )
+
+    if remote is not None:
+        if remote[0] != local_oid or remote[1] != request.target_oid:
+            return response(
+                value,
+                "CONFLICT",
+                reason="network_remote_tag_mismatch",
+                tag_oid=local_oid,
+                peeled_target_oid=local_target,
+                remote_tag_oid=remote[0],
+                remote_peeled_target_oid=remote[1],
+            )
+
+    if api is not None:
+        if api[0] != local_oid or api[1] != request.target_oid:
+            return response(
+                value,
+                "CONFLICT",
+                reason="gitea_api_tag_mismatch",
+                tag_oid=local_oid,
+                peeled_target_oid=local_target,
+                gitea_tag_oid=api[0],
+                gitea_peeled_target_oid=api[1],
+            )
+
+    if (
+        local_oid is not None
+        and remote is not None
+        and api is not None
+        and listing
+    ):
+        return response(
+            value,
+            "APPLIED_VERIFIED",
+            tag_oid=local_oid,
+            peeled_target_oid=local_target,
+            remote_tag_oid=remote[0],
+            remote_peeled_target_oid=remote[1],
+            gitea_tag_oid=api[0],
+            gitea_peeled_target_oid=api[1],
+            gitea_listing_visible=True,
+        )
+
+    if local_oid is not None and remote is None and api is None:
+        return response(
+            value,
+            "PARTIAL_LOCAL",
+            tag_oid=local_oid,
+            peeled_target_oid=local_target,
+        )
+
+    return response(
+        value,
+        "INDETERMINATE",
+        reason="tag_visibility_partial",
+        tag_oid=local_oid,
+        peeled_target_oid=local_target,
+    )
+
+
+def apply(
+    args: argparse.Namespace,
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    publisher: TagPublisher,
+    git: GitTagBackend,
+    gitea: GiteaTagClient,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    before = probe(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
+    if before["status"] in {"APPLIED_VERIFIED", "CONFLICT", "INDETERMINATE"}:
+        return before
+
+    request = publication_request(value)
+    with publisher.store.lock(request.version):
+        request.validate()
+        publisher._assert_fingerprint(request)
+        publisher.store.record(request, PublicationState.PENDING)
+        publisher._verify_publication(
+            request,
+            allow_push=True,
+            previously_deployed=False,
+        )
+    return probe(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--workspace", type=Path, default=Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_WORKSPACE"]))
+    parser.add_argument("--repository", type=Path, default=Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR"]))
+    parser.add_argument("--remote", default=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE", "gitea"))
+    parser.add_argument("--gitea-api", default=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL", ""))
+    parser.add_argument("--gitea-repo", default=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY", ""))
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--gitea-token-file",
+        type=Path,
+        default=Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", "")),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--gitea-token-line",
+        type=int,
+        default=int(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE", "1")),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--state-root",
+        type=Path,
+        default=Path(
+            os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_PUBLICATION_STATE_DIR",
+                "/var/lib/aios-gitops/tag-publications",
+            )
+        ),
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    value = load_request()
+    publisher, git, gitea = build(args)
+    operation = value.get("operation")
+    if operation == "probe":
+        result = probe(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
+    elif operation == "apply":
+        result = apply(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
+    else:
+        raise ValueError("unsupported_operation")
+    print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        raise SystemExit(main())
+    except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "CONFLICT", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        raise SystemExit(20)
+    except PublicationConflict as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "CONFLICT", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        raise SystemExit(20)
+    except (PublicationPending, PublicationReconciliationRequired) as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "INDETERMINATE", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        raise SystemExit(21)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(
+            json.dumps(
+                {"status": "INDETERMINATE", "error": type(exc).__name__, "reason": str(exc)},
+                sort_keys=True,
+            )
+        )
+        raise SystemExit(22)
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+"""Fail-closed operation authorization for an isolated Git writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
+
+
+ROUTE_OPERATIONS = {
+    ("GET", "/api/runtime-status"): "runtime.status.read",
+    ("GET", "/api/baseline"): "baseline.read",
+    ("GET", "/api/patches"): "patches.read",
+    ("POST", "/api/commit-file"): "commit_file.atomic",
+}
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
+
+
+class AuthorizationError(PermissionError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthorizedGrant:
+    record: dict[str, Any]
+    operation: str
+    use_count: int
+
+    @property
+    def token_id(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.record["token_id"])
+
+    @property
+    def task_id(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.record["task_id"])
+
+
+def operation_for(method: str, path: str) -> str:
+    operation = ROUTE_OPERATIONS.get((method.upper(), path))
+    if not operation:
+        raise AuthorizationError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
+    return operation
+
+
+def _parse_time(value: Any) -> datetime:
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(str(value).replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid") from None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _git_is_ancestor(workspace: Path, base: str, branch: str) -> bool:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", base, branch],
+        cwd=workspace,
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    )
+    return result.returncode == 0
+
+
+def _validate_grant(
+    grant: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    audience: str,
+    source_ip: str,
+    operation: str,
+    branch: str | None,
+    path: str | None,
+    workspace: Path,
+    current_time: datetime,
+) -> None:
+    if int(grant.get("schema_version", 0)) != 2:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_required", 401)
+    if str(grant.get("audience") or "") != audience:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_audience_rejected")
+    try:
+        peer = ipaddress.ip_address(source_ip)
+        networks = [ipaddress.ip_network(str(value), strict=True) for value in grant.get("source_cidrs", [])]
+    except ValueError:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected") from None
+    if not networks or not any(peer in network for network in networks):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected")
+    created = _parse_time(grant.get("created_at"))
+    not_before = _parse_time(grant.get("not_before"))
+    expires = _parse_time(grant.get("expires_at"))
+    if expires <= not_before or (expires - created).total_seconds() > 1800:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_lifetime_rejected")
+    if current_time < not_before:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_not_yet_valid", 401)
+    if current_time >= expires:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_expired", 401)
+    if bool(grant.get("revoked")):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_revoked", 401)
+    operations = grant.get("allowed_operations")
+    if not isinstance(operations, list) or operation not in operations:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_operation_rejected")
+    expected_branch = str(grant.get("allowed_branch") or "")
+    configured_branch = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "")
+    if expected_branch != configured_branch:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
+    if branch is not None and branch != expected_branch:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
+    if path is not None:
+        paths = grant.get("allowed_paths")
+        if not isinstance(paths, list) or path not in paths:
+            raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_path_rejected")
+    base = str(grant.get("approved_base_oid") or "").lower()
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_rejected")
+    if not _git_is_ancestor(workspace, base, expected_branch):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_not_ancestor")
+
+
+def authorize(
+    registry: TokenRegistry,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    source_ip: str,
+    workspace: Path,
+    branch: str | None = None,
+    target_path: str | None = None,
+    current_time: datetime | None = None,
+) -> AuthorizedGrant:
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_not_required")
+    if not token:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
+    grant = registry.find(token)
+    if grant is None:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
+    operation = operation_for(method, path)
+    _validate_grant(
+        grant,
+        audience=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""),
+        source_ip=source_ip,
+        operation=operation,
+        branch=branch,
+        path=target_path,
+        workspace=workspace,
+        current_time=current_time or datetime.now(timezone.utc),
+    )
+    limits = grant.get("max_uses")
+    if not isinstance(limits, dict):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing")
+    try:
+        used = registry.consume(str(grant["token_id"]), operation, int(limits[operation]))
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing") from None
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        code = str(exc)
+        raise AuthorizationError(code, 401 if code == "writer_token_revoked" else 403) from None
+    return AuthorizedGrant(grant, operation, used)
@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+"""Atomic, idempotent commit-file Saga for the isolated writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
+IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}")
+STATES = frozenset({
+    "PENDING", "FILE_WRITTEN", "COMMITTED", "PUSHED", "VERIFIED", "COMPLETED",
+    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
+})
+_LOCKS: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {}
+_LOCKS_GUARD = threading.Lock()
+_LEDGER_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+class CommitFileError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+class SimulatedCrash(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical_digest(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    payload = {
+        "branch": data["branch"],
+        "path": data["path"],
+        "content_sha256": hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
+        "message": data["message"],
+        "expected_head_oid": data["expected_head_oid"],
+    }
+    encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
+
+
+class OperationLedger:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
+            raise PermissionError("writer_operation_ledger_symlink_rejected")
+        with _LEDGER_INIT_LOCK:
+            with self.connect() as db:
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS writer_operations (
+                        operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                        operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        branch TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        path TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        content_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        pre_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        commit_oid TEXT,
+                        push_status TEXT,
+                        verification_status TEXT,
+                        state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+                        updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+                        error_code TEXT
+                    )
+                    """
+                )
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
+        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        return db
+
+    def get_or_create(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        key = data["idempotency_key"]
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row:
+                db.commit()
+                record = dict(row)
+                if record["operation_digest"] != digest:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_conflict", 409)
+                if (
+                    record["token_id"] != grant.token_id
+                    or record["task_id"] != grant.task_id
+                ):
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_owner_conflict", 409)
+                return record
+            operation_id = hashlib.sha256(
+                f"{grant.task_id}\0{key}".encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest()
+            content_sha = hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+            db.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO writer_operations(
+                    operation_id,token_id,task_id,idempotency_key,operation_digest,
+                    branch,path,content_sha256,pre_head_oid,state
+                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    operation_id, grant.token_id, grant.task_id, key, digest,
+                    data["branch"], data["path"], content_sha,
+                    data["expected_head_oid"], "PENDING",
+                ),
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return self.get(key)
+
+    def get(self, key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise KeyError(key)
+        return dict(row)
+
+    def update(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if state not in STATES:
+            raise ValueError("invalid writer operation state")
+        allowed = {"commit_oid", "push_status", "verification_status", "error_code"}
+        assignments = ["state=?", "updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"]
+        values: list[Any] = [state]
+        for name, value in fields.items():
+            if name not in allowed:
+                raise ValueError("invalid ledger field")
+            assignments.append(f"{name}=?")
+            values.append(value)
+        values.append(key)
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            db.execute(
+                f"UPDATE writer_operations SET {','.join(assignments)} WHERE idempotency_key=?",
+                values,
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return self.get(key)
+
+
+class AtomicCommitFile:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        workspace: Path,
+        bare_repo: Path,
+        ledger: OperationLedger,
+        remote: str,
+        audit,
+        crash_after_state: str | None = None,
+    ):
+        self.workspace = workspace
+        self.bare_repo = bare_repo
+        self.ledger = ledger
+        self.remote = remote
+        self.audit = audit
+        self.crash_after_state = crash_after_state
+
+    def _git(self, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True
+        )
+        if check and result.returncode != 0:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_git_operation_failed", 500)
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def _transition(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        record = self.ledger.update(key, state, **fields)
+        if self.crash_after_state == state:
+            raise SimulatedCrash(state)
+        return record
+
+    def _validate(self, data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+        required = ("branch", "path", "content", "message", "expected_head_oid", "idempotency_key")
+        if any(field not in data for field in required):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_incomplete")
+        if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
+            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_force_rejected", 403)
+        if set(data) != set(required):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_fields_rejected")
+        item = {field: data[field] for field in required}
+        if item["branch"] != policy.allowed_branch():
+            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected", 403)
+        try:
+            item["path"] = policy.validate_path(item["path"], self.workspace)
+        except PermissionError as exc:
+            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
+        if not isinstance(item["content"], str) or "\x00" in item["content"]:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_rejected")
+        try:
+            policy.validate_content_for_path(item["path"], item["content"])
+        except PermissionError as exc:
+            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
+        if len(item["content"].encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_too_large", 413)
+        message = item["message"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(message, str)
+            or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200
+            or "\x00" in message
+            or "\n" in message
+            or "\r" in message
+        ):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_message_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(item["expected_head_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(item["expected_head_oid"]):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_expected_head_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(item["idempotency_key"], str) or not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(item["idempotency_key"]):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_key_rejected")
+        return item
+
+    def _atomic_write(self, relative: str, content: str) -> None:
+        target = self.workspace / relative
+        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-", dir=target.parent)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+                stream.write(content.encode("utf-8"))
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+            parent_fd = os.open(target.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+            try:
+                os.fsync(parent_fd)
+            finally:
+                os.close(parent_fd)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temporary):
+                os.unlink(temporary)
+
+    def _verify_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> None:
+        bare = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True,
+        )
+        if bare.returncode != 0 or bare.stdout.strip() != oid:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_authoritative_bare_oid_mismatch", 500)
+        remote = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", self.remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+            cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
+        )
+        if remote.returncode != 0:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_verification_failed", 503)
+        fields = remote.stdout.strip().split()
+        if len(fields) != 2:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_ref_missing", 503)
+        if fields[0] != oid:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_oid_conflict", 409)
+
+    def execute(self, grant: Any, raw_data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        data = self._validate(raw_data)
+        digest = canonical_digest(data)
+        branch = data["branch"]
+        with _LOCKS_GUARD:
+            lock = _LOCKS.setdefault(branch, threading.Lock())
+        lock_path = self.ledger.path.parent / f"{hashlib.sha256(branch.encode()).hexdigest()}.lock"
+        with lock, open(lock_path, "a+b") as branch_lock:
+            fcntl.flock(branch_lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            return self._execute_locked(grant, data, digest)
+
+    def _execute_locked(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        key = data["idempotency_key"]
+        record = self.ledger.get_or_create(grant, data, digest)
+        if record["state"] == "COMPLETED":
+            return self._result(record, idempotent=True)
+        if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != data["branch"]:
+            record = self._transition(
+                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_current_branch_conflict"
+            )
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_current_branch_conflict", 409)
+        head = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        commit_oid = record.get("commit_oid")
+        if head != record["pre_head_oid"] and head != commit_oid:
+            record = self._transition(
+                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_branch_head_conflict"
+            )
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_branch_head_conflict", 409)
+        try:
+            state = record["state"]
+            if state == "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
+                raise CommitFileError("writer_manual_review_required", 409)
+            if state == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE":
+                if record.get("push_status") == "confirmed":
+                    state = "PUSHED"
+                else:
+                    state = "COMMITTED" if commit_oid else "FILE_WRITTEN"
+            if state == "PENDING":
+                self._atomic_write(data["path"], data["content"])
+                record = self._transition(key, "FILE_WRITTEN")
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "FILE_WRITTEN":
+                actual_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+                    (self.workspace / data["path"]).read_bytes()
+                ).hexdigest()
+                if actual_sha != record["content_sha256"]:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_file_content_conflict", 409)
+                staged_before = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only", check=False).splitlines()
+                if staged_before:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
+                self._git("add", "--", data["path"])
+                staged = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines()
+                if staged != [data["path"]]:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
+                self._git("commit", "-m", data["message"])
+                commit_oid = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
+                record = self._transition(key, "COMMITTED", commit_oid=commit_oid)
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "COMMITTED":
+                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
+                pushed = subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{data['branch']}"],
+                    cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
+                )
+                if pushed.returncode != 0:
+                    self._transition(
+                        key, "FAILED_RECOVERABLE",
+                        push_status="failed", error_code="writer_gitea_push_failed",
+                    )
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_push_failed", 503)
+                record = self._transition(key, "PUSHED", push_status="confirmed")
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "PUSHED":
+                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
+                self._verify_remote(data["branch"], commit_oid)
+                record = self._transition(
+                    key, "VERIFIED", verification_status="bare+gitea"
+                )
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "VERIFIED":
+                record = self._transition(key, "COMPLETED", error_code=None)
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "completed")
+            return self._result(record, idempotent=False)
+        except SimulatedCrash:
+            raise
+        except CommitFileError as exc:
+            latest = self.ledger.get(key)
+            if latest["state"] not in {"FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"}:
+                failure_state = (
+                    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+                    if exc.code in {
+                        "writer_gitea_oid_conflict",
+                        "writer_file_content_conflict",
+                        "writer_current_branch_conflict",
+                    }
+                    else "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
+                )
+                latest = self._transition(key, failure_state, error_code=exc.code)
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, latest, "failed")
+            raise
+
+    def _audit(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str, record: dict[str, Any], result: str) -> None:
+        self.audit({
+            "token_id": grant.token_id,
+            "task_id": grant.task_id,
+            "audience": grant.record["audience"],
+            "source_ip": grant.record.get("_source_ip", "socket-peer"),
+            "operation": grant.operation,
+            "branch": data["branch"],
+            "path": data["path"],
+            "idempotency_key": data["idempotency_key"],
+            "operation_digest": digest,
+            "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
+            "pre_head_oid": record["pre_head_oid"],
+            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
+            "result": result,
+        })
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _result(record: dict[str, Any], *, idempotent: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "status": "completed",
+            "state": record["state"],
+            "operation_id": record["operation_id"],
+            "branch": record["branch"],
+            "path": record["path"],
+            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
+            "push_status": record.get("push_status"),
+            "verification_status": record.get("verification_status"),
+            "idempotent": idempotent,
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+"""Strict service-level exact-path policy for isolated Git writers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import grp
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from functools import lru_cache
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+
+MAX_POLICY_BYTES = 65_536
+POLICY_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema_version",
+        "policy_id",
+        "audience",
+        "repository_identity",
+        "allowed_branch",
+        "allowed_operations",
+    }
+)
+OPERATION_FIELDS = frozenset({"exact_paths", "max_content_bytes", "content_profile"})
+SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS = frozenset({"commit_file.atomic"})
+SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES = frozenset({"systemd-codex-review-worker-v1"})
+_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:|bearer\s+|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])"
+)
+_SYSTEMD_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*\Z")
+_SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096
+_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES = {
+    "Unit": frozenset({"Description", "After", "Wants"}),
+    "Service": frozenset(
+        {
+            "Type",
+            "User",
+            "Group",
+            "WorkingDirectory",
+            "Environment",
+            "ExecStart",
+            "Restart",
+            "RestartSec",
+            "NoNewPrivileges",
+            "PrivateTmp",
+            "PrivateDevices",
+            "ProtectSystem",
+            "ProtectHome",
+            "ProtectKernelTunables",
+            "ProtectKernelModules",
+            "ProtectControlGroups",
+            "LockPersonality",
+            "RestrictSUIDSGID",
+            "RestrictRealtime",
+            "MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
+            "RuntimeDirectory",
+            "StateDirectory",
+            "CacheDirectory",
+            "ReadOnlyPaths",
+            "ReadWritePaths",
+            "UMask",
+        }
+    ),
+    "Install": frozenset({"WantedBy"}),
+}
+_SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES = frozenset(
+    {
+        ("Service", "Environment"),
+        ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"),
+        ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"),
+    }
+)
+_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES = {
+    ("Unit", "Description"): "AIOS Codex Review/Test Worker",
+    ("Unit", "After"): "network-online.target",
+    ("Unit", "Wants"): "network-online.target",
+    ("Service", "Type"): "simple",
+    ("Service", "User"): "aiman",
+    ("Service", "Group"): "gitops",
+    (
+        "Service",
+        "WorkingDirectory",
+    ): "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker/current",
+    (
+        "Service",
+        "ExecStart",
+    ): "/usr/bin/python3 -m task_plane.workers.codex_review_test",
+    ("Service", "Restart"): "on-failure",
+    ("Service", "RestartSec"): "2",
+    ("Service", "NoNewPrivileges"): "true",
+    ("Service", "PrivateTmp"): "true",
+    ("Service", "PrivateDevices"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectSystem"): "strict",
+    ("Service", "ProtectHome"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectKernelTunables"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectKernelModules"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectControlGroups"): "true",
+    ("Service", "LockPersonality"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RestrictSUIDSGID"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RestrictRealtime"): "true",
+    ("Service", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RuntimeDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "StateDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "CacheDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "UMask"): "0077",
+    ("Install", "WantedBy"): "multi-user.target",
+}
+_SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES = {
+    ("Service", "Environment"): (
+        "AIOS_CODEX_WORKER_MODE=shadow",
+        "AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false",
+        "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1",
+    ),
+    ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"): (
+        "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+        "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ),
+    ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"): (
+        "/run/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+        "/var/lib/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+        "/var/cache/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ),
+}
+
+
+class PathPolicyError(PermissionError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationPolicy:
+    exact_paths: tuple[str, ...]
+    max_content_bytes: int
+    content_profile: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ServicePathPolicy:
+    schema_version: int
+    policy_id: str
+    audience: str
+    repository_identity: str
+    allowed_branch: str
+    allowed_operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy]
+    sha256: str
+
+    def operation(self, name: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+        try:
+            return self.allowed_operations[name]
+        except KeyError:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_operation_rejected") from None
+
+    def require_exact_path(self, operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+        selected = self.operation(operation)
+        if path not in selected.exact_paths:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_rejected")
+        return selected
+
+
+def _canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def validate_relative_path_syntax(path: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(path, str):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    if not path or path != path.strip() or "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        decoded = unquote(path, errors="strict")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
+    if decoded != path:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    posix = PurePosixPath(path)
+    windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
+    parts = path.split("/")
+    if (
+        posix.is_absolute()
+        or windows.is_absolute()
+        or bool(windows.drive)
+        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    return path
+
+
+def _require_fields(value: dict[str, Any], allowed: frozenset[str], code: str) -> None:
+    if set(value) != allowed:
+        raise PathPolicyError(code)
+
+
+def _parse_policy(document: Any, canonical: bytes) -> ServicePathPolicy:
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_object_required")
+    _require_fields(document, POLICY_FIELDS, "isolated_writer_path_policy_fields_rejected")
+    if document["schema_version"] != 1:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_schema_rejected")
+    text_fields = (
+        "policy_id",
+        "audience",
+        "repository_identity",
+        "allowed_branch",
+    )
+    if any(
+        not isinstance(document[field], str) or not document[field].strip()
+        for field in text_fields
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_value_rejected")
+    raw_operations = document["allowed_operations"]
+    if not isinstance(raw_operations, dict) or not raw_operations:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
+    if not set(raw_operations).issubset(SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
+    operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy] = {}
+    for name, raw in raw_operations.items():
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_rejected")
+        _require_fields(
+            raw,
+            OPERATION_FIELDS,
+            "isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_fields_rejected",
+        )
+        paths = raw["exact_paths"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(paths, list)
+            or not paths
+            or any(not isinstance(item, str) for item in paths)
+        ):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
+        validated = tuple(validate_relative_path_syntax(item) for item in paths)
+        if len(set(validated)) != len(validated):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
+        maximum = raw["max_content_bytes"]
+        if not isinstance(maximum, int) or isinstance(maximum, bool) or not 1 <= maximum <= 1_048_576:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_size_rejected")
+        profile = raw["content_profile"]
+        if profile not in SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
+        operations[name] = OperationPolicy(validated, maximum, profile)
+    return ServicePathPolicy(
+        schema_version=1,
+        policy_id=document["policy_id"],
+        audience=document["audience"],
+        repository_identity=document["repository_identity"],
+        allowed_branch=document["allowed_branch"],
+        allowed_operations=operations,
+        sha256=hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
+    )
+
+
+def load_path_policy(
+    path: Path,
+    *,
+    expected_owner_uid: int = 0,
+    expected_group_gid: int | None = None,
+    expected_parent_mode: int = 0o750,
+    expected_file_mode: int = 0o640,
+) -> ServicePathPolicy:
+    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(path)))
+    if lexical.is_symlink():
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
+    try:
+        parent_info = lexical.parent.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+        file_info = lexical.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_missing") from None
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(parent_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_info.st_mode):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_rejected")
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(file_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(file_info.st_mode):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_rejected")
+    if lexical.resolve(strict=True) != lexical:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
+    if (
+        parent_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
+        or stat.S_IMODE(parent_info.st_mode) != expected_parent_mode
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_permissions_rejected")
+    if (
+        file_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
+        or stat.S_IMODE(file_info.st_mode) != expected_file_mode
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_permissions_rejected")
+    if expected_group_gid is not None and (
+        parent_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid or file_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected")
+    if file_info.st_size <= 0 or file_info.st_size > MAX_POLICY_BYTES:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_size_rejected")
+    raw = lexical.read_bytes()
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_json_rejected") from None
+    canonical = _canonical_json(document)
+    if raw != canonical:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_not_canonical")
+    return _parse_policy(document, canonical)
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
+def configured_path_policy() -> ServicePathPolicy | None:
+    configured = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_PATH_POLICY_FILE", "").strip()
+    if not configured:
+        return None
+    if not Path(configured).is_absolute():
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        gitops_gid = grp.getgrnam("gitops").gr_gid
+    except KeyError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected") from None
+    loaded = load_path_policy(Path(configured), expected_group_gid=gitops_gid)
+    if loaded.audience != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_audience_rejected")
+    if loaded.repository_identity != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_repository_rejected")
+    if loaded.allowed_branch != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_branch_rejected")
+    return loaded
+
+
+def clear_path_policy_cache() -> None:
+    configured_path_policy.cache_clear()
+
+
+def require_service_path(operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+    loaded = configured_path_policy()
+    if loaded is None:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_policy_required")
+    return loaded.require_exact_path(operation, path)
+
+
+def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
+    loaded = configured_path_policy()
+    return None if loaded is None else loaded.sha256
+
+
+def validate_content(operation: str, path: str, content: str) -> None:
+    selected = require_service_path(operation, path)
+    try:
+        encoded = content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except (AttributeError, UnicodeEncodeError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
+    if len(encoded) > selected.max_content_bytes:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_content_too_large")
+    if selected.content_profile == "systemd-codex-review-worker-v1":
+        _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content)
+        return
+    raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
+
+
+def _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content: str) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(content, str):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    try:
+        content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
+    if (
+        "\x00" in content
+        or "\r" in content
+        or _SECRET_RE.search(content)
+        or not content.endswith("\n")
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+
+    sections: set[str] = set()
+    values: dict[tuple[str, str], list[str]] = {}
+    section: str | None = None
+    for line in content.splitlines():
+        if len(line.encode("utf-8")) > _SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        if not line:
+            continue
+        if line[0].isspace() or line.startswith(("#", ";")):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        if line.startswith("[") and line.endswith("]"):
+            candidate = line[1:-1]
+            if (
+                not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(candidate)
+                or candidate not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES
+                or candidate in sections
+            ):
+                raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+            sections.add(candidate)
+            section = candidate
+            continue
+        if section is None or "=" not in line:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        directive, value = line.split("=", 1)
+        if (
+            not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(directive)
+            or directive not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES[section]
+            or not value
+            or value != value.strip()
+        ):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        key = (section, directive)
+        if key in values and key not in _SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        values.setdefault(key, []).append(value)
+
+    if sections != set(_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    if set(values) != set(_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES) | set(
+        _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES.items():
+        if values.get(key) != [expected]:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES.items():
+        observed = values.get(key, [])
+        if len(observed) != len(set(observed)) or tuple(observed) != expected:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+"""Digest-only, task-scoped token registry for isolated writers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+import grp
+import pwd
+import secrets
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+_REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+
+def token_digest(token: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+class TokenRegistry:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self._prepare()
+
+    def _prepare(self) -> None:
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_registry_symlink_rejected")
+        with _REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK:
+            with self._connect() as db:
+                db.executescript(
+                    """
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_grants (
+                        token_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                        token_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                        grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_uses (
+                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        operation TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                        PRIMARY KEY(token_id, operation),
+                        FOREIGN KEY(token_id) REFERENCES token_grants(token_id)
+                    );
+                    """
+                )
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
+        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        return db
+
+    def issue(self, grant: dict[str, Any], token: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+        value = token or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        if len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
+            raise ValueError("writer_token_entropy_insufficient")
+        record = dict(grant)
+        record["schema_version"] = 2
+        record["token_digest"] = token_digest(value)
+        record["revoked"] = False
+        record.setdefault("created_at", utc_now())
+        required = (
+            "token_id",
+            "audience",
+            "task_id",
+            "source_cidrs",
+            "allowed_branch",
+            "approved_base_oid",
+            "allowed_operations",
+            "allowed_paths",
+            "not_before",
+            "expires_at",
+            "max_uses",
+            "issued_by",
+        )
+        if any(not record.get(field) for field in required):
+            raise ValueError("writer_token_grant_incomplete")
+        encoded = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO token_grants(token_id, token_digest, grant_json, revoked, created_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        str(record["token_id"]),
+                        str(record["token_digest"]),
+                        encoded,
+                        0,
+                        str(record["created_at"]),
+                    ),
+                )
+                db.execute("COMMIT")
+            except Exception:
+                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                raise
+        return value, record
+
+    def find(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        candidate = token_digest(token)
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            rows = db.execute(
+                "SELECT token_digest, grant_json, revoked FROM token_grants"
+            ).fetchall()
+        match = None
+        for row in rows:
+            if hmac.compare_digest(str(row["token_digest"]), candidate):
+                match = dict(json.loads(str(row["grant_json"])))
+                match["revoked"] = bool(row["revoked"])
+        return match
+
+    def consume(self, token_id: str, operation: str, maximum: int) -> int:
+        if maximum < 1:
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                row = db.execute(
+                    "SELECT revoked FROM token_grants WHERE token_id=?",
+                    (token_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None or bool(row["revoked"]):
+                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_revoked")
+                used_row = db.execute(
+                    "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
+                    (token_id, operation),
+                ).fetchone()
+                used = int(used_row["use_count"]) if used_row else 0
+                if used >= maximum:
+                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
+                current = used + 1
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO token_uses(token_id, operation, use_count)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?)
+                    ON CONFLICT(token_id, operation)
+                    DO UPDATE SET use_count=excluded.use_count
+                    """,
+                    (token_id, operation, current),
+                )
+                db.execute("COMMIT")
+                return current
+            except Exception:
+                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                raise
+
+    def revoke(self, token_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            changed = db.execute(
+                "UPDATE token_grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_id=? AND revoked=0",
+                (token_id,),
+            ).rowcount
+            db.execute("COMMIT")
+        return bool(changed)
+
+    def usage(self, token_id: str, operation: str) -> int:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
+                (token_id, operation),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row["use_count"]) if row else 0
+
+
+def _write_secret_file(
+    path: Path,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    owner: str | None = None,
+    group: str | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_symlink_rejected")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_not_regular")
+        if owner is not None or group is not None:
+            uid = pwd.getpwnam(owner).pw_uid if owner is not None else -1
+            gid = grp.getgrnam(group).gr_gid if group is not None else -1
+            os.fchown(fd, uid, gid)
+        os.write(fd, token.encode("utf-8"))
+        os.fsync(fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--registry", required=True)
+    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
+    issue.add_argument("--grant-file", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument("--token-file", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument("--owner")
+    issue.add_argument("--group")
+    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
+    revoke.add_argument("--token-id", required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    registry = TokenRegistry(args.registry)
+    if args.command == "issue":
+        grant = json.loads(Path(args.grant_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        token, record = registry.issue(grant)
+        _write_secret_file(
+            Path(args.token_file),
+            token,
+            owner=args.owner,
+            group=args.group,
+        )
+        print(json.dumps({"token_id": record["token_id"], "created": True}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    changed = registry.revoke(args.token_id)
+    print(json.dumps({"token_id": args.token_id, "revoked": changed}, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+"""Audited Owner authorization broker for task-scoped writer provisioning.
+
+The broker closes the bootstrap gap without minting a new general-purpose
+Owner token and without modifying the bearer-token registry. It accepts an
+already-authenticated, explicitly allow-listed Owner principal, records a
+tamper-evident authorization event, and invokes the existing
+AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner with a generated authorization reference.
+
+The broker never writes Git refs itself. The governed signer, validator and
+one-shot provisioner remain the only components allowed to create the task
+branch/worktree/writer.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import tempfile
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
+    AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner,
+    BRANCH_RE,
+    OID_RE,
+    OwnerContext,
+    ProvisioningError,
+    REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS,
+    REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS,
+    TASK_RE,
+)
+
+
+ACTION = "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING"
+SCHEMA = "aios.owner-authorization-event.v1"
+BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "action",
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "base_ref",
+        "base_oid",
+        "target_branch",
+        "one_time_use",
+        "expires_in_seconds",
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+        "allowed_operations",
+        "denied_operations",
+    }
+)
+IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+/-]{1,254}$")
+SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+CREDENTIAL_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@+-]{1,255}$")
+WILDCARD_SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"(^\*$)|(^.+:\*$)")
+
+
+class OwnerAuthorizationError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed broker error."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        code: str,
+        status: int = 400,
+        *,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+        self.details = dict(details or {})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OwnerPrincipal:
+    """Non-secret authentication evidence returned by the existing API."""
+
+    identity: str
+    role: str
+    authenticated_scope: str
+    token_scopes: frozenset[str]
+    credential_id: str = ""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig:
+    repository_identity: str
+    state_root: Path
+    allowed_owner_identities: frozenset[str]
+    allowed_intake_scopes: frozenset[str]
+    allowed_credential_ids: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
+    max_expiry_seconds: int = 900
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_environment(cls) -> "OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig":
+        identities = _csv_set(
+            os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_IDENTITIES", "")
+        )
+        scopes = _csv_set(
+            os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES", "")
+        )
+        credential_ids = _csv_set(
+            os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_CREDENTIAL_IDS", "")
+        )
+        if not identities:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_IDENTITY_ALLOWLIST_REQUIRED", 503
+            )
+        if not scopes:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_INTAKE_SCOPE_ALLOWLIST_REQUIRED", 503
+            )
+        if any(_is_wildcard_scope(item) for item in scopes):
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "WILDCARD_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 503
+            )
+        if "writer:provision" in scopes:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "WRITER_PROVISION_SCOPE_BOOTSTRAP_REJECTED", 503
+            )
+        try:
+            maximum = int(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_MAX_EXPIRY_SECONDS", "900"
+                )
+            )
+        except ValueError:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "BROKER_MAX_EXPIRY_INVALID", 503
+            ) from None
+        if maximum < 60 or maximum > 1800:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_MAX_EXPIRY_INVALID", 503)
+        return cls(
+            repository_identity=os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "aios/aios"
+            ).strip(),
+            state_root=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT",
+                    "/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker",
+                )
+            ),
+            allowed_owner_identities=identities,
+            allowed_intake_scopes=scopes,
+            allowed_credential_ids=credential_ids,
+            max_expiry_seconds=maximum,
+        )
+
+
+class TaskWriterProvisioner(Protocol):
+    def provision(
+        self, raw: Mapping[str, Any], owner: OwnerContext
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        ...
+
+
+def utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def iso_utc(value: datetime) -> str:
+    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def canonical_json_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(
+            value,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        )
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _csv_set(value: str) -> frozenset[str]:
+    return frozenset(
+        item.strip() for item in value.split(",") if item.strip()
+    )
+
+
+def _is_wildcard_scope(scope: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(WILDCARD_SCOPE_RE.fullmatch(scope.strip()))
+
+
+def _atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: Any, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".tmp-", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+            stream.write(canonical_json_bytes(value))
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+        os.chmod(path, mode)
+        parent_fd = os.open(
+            path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0)
+        )
+        try:
+            os.fsync(parent_fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(parent_fd)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def _read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
+    if path.stat().st_size <= 0 or path.stat().st_size > 1_048_576:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "BROKER_RECEIPT_JSON_INVALID", 500
+        ) from None
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
+    return value
+
+
+def _prepare_state_root(root: Path) -> None:
+    if root.is_symlink():
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+    root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+    os.chmod(root, 0o700)
+    if root.stat().st_mode & 0o077:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "BROKER_STATE_PERMISSIONS_REJECTED", 500
+        )
+
+
+def _event_id(
+    principal: OwnerPrincipal, request_digest: str
+) -> str:
+    material = (
+        f"{principal.identity}\0{principal.authenticated_scope}\0"
+        f"{request_digest}"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+    return "owner-auth-" + hashlib.sha256(material).hexdigest()[:32]
+
+
+def _authorization_reference(event_id: str, request_digest: str) -> str:
+    return f"owner-auth:{event_id}:{request_digest[:16]}"
+
+
+def _validate_principal(
+    principal: OwnerPrincipal,
+    config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
+) -> None:
+    if principal.role != "owner":
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_ROLE_REQUIRED", 403)
+    if (
+        not principal.identity
+        or not IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(principal.identity)
+        or principal.identity not in config.allowed_owner_identities
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED", 403)
+    if (
+        not principal.authenticated_scope
+        or not SCOPE_RE.fullmatch(principal.authenticated_scope)
+        or principal.authenticated_scope
+        not in config.allowed_intake_scopes
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 403)
+    if principal.authenticated_scope == "writer:provision":
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "WRITER_PROVISION_SCOPE_BOOTSTRAP_REJECTED", 403
+        )
+
+    scopes = principal.token_scopes
+    if any(_is_wildcard_scope(scope) for scope in scopes):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED", 403
+        )
+    if scopes:
+        if principal.authenticated_scope not in scopes:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_SCOPE_EVIDENCE_MISMATCH", 403
+            )
+    elif (
+        not principal.credential_id
+        or principal.credential_id not in config.allowed_credential_ids
+    ):
+        # handler.need(scope) proves authorization but may hide whether the
+        # credential was wildcard. When scope metadata is absent, require an
+        # exact non-secret credential ID allowlist as the alternative proof.
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "OWNER_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_NOT_PROVABLE", 403
+        )
+    if principal.credential_id:
+        if not CREDENTIAL_ID_RE.fullmatch(principal.credential_id):
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_CREDENTIAL_ID_INVALID", 403)
+        if (
+            config.allowed_credential_ids
+            and principal.credential_id not in config.allowed_credential_ids
+        ):
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_CREDENTIAL_ID_NOT_ALLOWED", 403
+            )
+
+
+def _validate_request(
+    raw: Mapping[str, Any],
+    config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if set(raw) != BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
+    if raw["action"] != ACTION:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_ACTION_REJECTED")
+    if raw["repository"] != config.repository_identity:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    if raw["base_ref"] != "refs/heads/main":
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BASE_REF_REJECTED", 409)
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["base_oid"], str)
+        or not OID_RE.fullmatch(raw["base_oid"])
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BASE_OID_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["target_branch"], str)
+        or not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(raw["target_branch"])
+        or raw["target_branch"] in {"main", "master"}
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("TARGET_BRANCH_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["task_id"], str)
+        or not TASK_RE.fullmatch(raw["task_id"])
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("TASK_ID_REJECTED")
+    if raw["one_time_use"] is not True:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("ONE_TIME_USE_REQUIRED")
+    expiry = raw["expires_in_seconds"]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(expiry, int)
+        or isinstance(expiry, bool)
+        or not 60 <= expiry <= config.max_expiry_seconds
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("GRANT_LIFETIME_REJECTED")
+    for field in (
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+    ):
+        if raw[field] is not False:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED", 403
+            )
+    allowed = raw["allowed_operations"]
+    denied = raw["denied_operations"]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(allowed, list)
+        or frozenset(allowed) != REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("ALLOWED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    if (
+        not isinstance(denied, list)
+        or frozenset(denied) != REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("DENIED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    return dict(raw)
+
+
+def _response_is_safe(value: Any) -> bool:
+    """Reject accidental credential material before writing a receipt."""
+
+    sensitive_markers = (
+        "access_token",
+        "bearer",
+        "client_secret",
+        "private_key",
+        "raw_token",
+        "secret_value",
+    )
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for key, inner in value.items():
+            lowered = str(key).lower()
+            if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
+                return False
+            if not _response_is_safe(inner):
+                return False
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        return all(_response_is_safe(item) for item in value)
+    return True
+
+
+class OwnerAuthorizationBroker:
+    """Create an audited Owner event and invoke the governed bridge."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig | None = None,
+        provisioner: TaskWriterProvisioner | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.config = (
+            config or OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig.from_environment()
+        )
+        self.provisioner = provisioner or AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner()
+
+    def authorize_and_provision(
+        self,
+        raw: Mapping[str, Any],
+        principal: OwnerPrincipal,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        config = self.config
+        _validate_principal(principal, config)
+        request = _validate_request(raw, config)
+        _prepare_state_root(config.state_root)
+
+        request_digest = sha256_json(request)
+        event_id = _event_id(principal, request_digest)
+        reference = _authorization_reference(event_id, request_digest)
+        event_dir = config.state_root / "events" / event_id
+        event_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        os.chmod(event_dir, 0o700)
+
+        lock_path = event_dir / "event.lock"
+        lock_path.touch(mode=0o600, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(lock_path, 0o600)
+        with lock_path.open("r+b") as lock:
+            fcntl.flock(lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            response_path = event_dir / "response.json"
+            event_path = event_dir / "event.json"
+
+            if response_path.exists():
+                response = _read_json(response_path)
+                response["owner_authorization_idempotent"] = True
+                return response
+
+            issued_at = utc_now()
+            expires_at = issued_at + timedelta(
+                seconds=int(request["expires_in_seconds"])
+            )
+            event: dict[str, Any] = {
+                "schema": SCHEMA,
+                "event_id": event_id,
+                "authorization_reference": reference,
+                "status": "AUTHORIZED",
+                "owner": {
+                    "identity": principal.identity,
+                    "role": principal.role,
+                    "authenticated_scope": principal.authenticated_scope,
+                    "credential_id": principal.credential_id or None,
+                    "token_scope_digest_sha256": sha256_json(
+                        sorted(principal.token_scopes)
+                    ),
+                    "wildcard_scope_used": False,
+                },
+                "request": {
+                    "task_id": request["task_id"],
+                    "repository": request["repository"],
+                    "base_ref": request["base_ref"],
+                    "base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+                    "target_branch": request["target_branch"],
+                    "one_time_use": True,
+                    "production_change_authorized": False,
+                    "tag_change_authorized": False,
+                    "baseline_change_authorized": False,
+                    "main_write_authorized": False,
+                    "allowed_operations": sorted(
+                        REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
+                    ),
+                    "denied_operations": sorted(
+                        REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
+                    ),
+                },
+                "request_digest_sha256": request_digest,
+                "issued_at": iso_utc(issued_at),
+                "expires_at": iso_utc(expires_at),
+            }
+            event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(event)
+            _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+
+            bridge_request = dict(request)
+            bridge_request.pop("action")
+            bridge_request["owner_authorization_reference"] = reference
+            try:
+                result = self.provisioner.provision(
+                    bridge_request,
+                    OwnerContext(
+                        identity=principal.identity,
+                        role=principal.role,
+                        authorization_reference=reference,
+                    ),
+                )
+                if not isinstance(result, dict):
+                    raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                        "PROVISIONER_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502
+                    )
+                if result.get("status") != "READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING":
+                    raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                        "PROVISIONER_NOT_READY",
+                        409,
+                        details={"status": result.get("status")},
+                    )
+                if not _response_is_safe(result):
+                    raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                        "PROVISIONER_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_SENSITIVE_DATA", 500
+                    )
+            except ProvisioningError as exc:
+                event.update(
+                    {
+                        "status": "PROVISIONING_BLOCKED",
+                        "failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
+                        "error": exc.code,
+                        "error_status": exc.status,
+                    }
+                )
+                event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                    {
+                        key: value
+                        for key, value in event.items()
+                        if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                    }
+                )
+                _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+                raise
+            except OwnerAuthorizationError as exc:
+                event.update(
+                    {
+                        "status": "PROVISIONING_BLOCKED",
+                        "failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
+                        "error": exc.code,
+                        "error_status": exc.status,
+                    }
+                )
+                event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                    {
+                        key: value
+                        for key, value in event.items()
+                        if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                    }
+                )
+                _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+                raise
+            except Exception as exc:
+                event.update(
+                    {
+                        "status": "PROVISIONING_FAILED",
+                        "failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
+                        "error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR",
+                    }
+                )
+                event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                    {
+                        key: value
+                        for key, value in event.items()
+                        if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                    }
+                )
+                _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+                raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                    "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR", 500
+                ) from exc
+
+            completed_at = utc_now()
+            event.update(
+                {
+                    "status": "CONSUMED",
+                    "consumed_at": iso_utc(completed_at),
+                    "approval_plan_id": result.get("approval_plan_id"),
+                    "grant_id": result.get("grant_id"),
+                    "grant_digest_sha256": result.get(
+                        "grant_digest_sha256"
+                    ),
+                    "branch_oid": result.get("branch_oid"),
+                    "grant_consumed": result.get("grant_consumed") is True,
+                }
+            )
+            event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                {
+                    key: value
+                    for key, value in event.items()
+                    if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                }
+            )
+            _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+
+            response = dict(result)
+            response.update(
+                {
+                    "owner_authorization_event_id": event_id,
+                    "owner_authorization_reference": reference,
+                    "owner_authorization_digest_sha256": event[
+                        "event_digest_sha256"
+                    ],
+                    "owner_authorization_consumed": True,
+                    "owner_authorization_idempotent": False,
+                }
+            )
+            _atomic_write_json(response_path, response)
+            return response
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""One-shot local Owner authentication ingress for AIOS.
+
+This module deliberately does not mint a reusable Owner token.
+
+Authentication is based on a real local login session:
+- a root-run one-shot server owns a Unix socket;
+- the client must run as the configured Owner OS account;
+- the server validates SO_PEERCRED, Linux audit loginuid and the controlling TTY;
+- the Owner must interactively confirm the exact task/branch/base request;
+- the server constructs a narrow OwnerPrincipal and invokes the existing
+  OwnerAuthorizationBroker;
+- one successful authorization consumes the service lifetime.
+
+The resulting principal is fixed to one non-wildcard intake scope
+(`commit:create` for the current deployment) and cannot carry production,
+tag, baseline, main or history-rewrite capability.
+
+This is a trust-root ingress, not a Git writer and not a production executor.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import pwd
+import re
+import secrets
+import socket
+import stat
+import struct
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+BINDING_SCHEMA = "aios.local-owner-auth-ingress.v1"
+CLIENT_BEGIN_SCHEMA = "aios.local-owner-auth-client-begin.v1"
+CHALLENGE_SCHEMA = "aios.local-owner-auth-challenge.v1"
+CLIENT_CONFIRM_SCHEMA = "aios.local-owner-auth-client-confirm.v1"
+RESULT_SCHEMA = "aios.local-owner-auth-result.v1"
+
+ACTION = "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+/-]{1,254}$")
+SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,255}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]{1,220}$")
+
+MAX_FRAME = 64 * 1024
+CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 120
+
+EXPECTED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "create_worktree",
+        "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+        "commit_to_target_branch",
+        "push_target_branch",
+    }
+)
+EXPECTED_DENIED_OPERATIONS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "direct_main_push",
+        "force_push",
+        "tag_create",
+        "tag_update",
+        "tag_delete",
+        "branch_delete",
+        "repository_admin",
+        "baseline_write",
+        "production_deploy",
+        "production_marker_write",
+        "history_rewrite",
+    }
+)
+
+SENSITIVE_FRAGMENTS = (
+    "authorization_header",
+    "bearer",
+    "client_secret",
+    "password",
+    "private_key",
+    "raw_secret",
+    "raw_token",
+    "secret_value",
+)
+
+
+class BootstrapError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 1) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any], mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise BootstrapError("STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED")
+    fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=str(path.parent))
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+            stream.write(canonical_json(dict(value)))
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        os.replace(name, path)
+        os.chmod(path, mode)
+        dfd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+        try:
+            os.fsync(dfd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(dfd)
+    finally:
+        try:
+            os.unlink(name)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            pass
+
+
+def secure_root_file(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_FILE_INVALID")
+    st = path.lstat()
+    if st.st_uid != 0:
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_FILE_ROOT_OWNER_REQUIRED")
+    if stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode) & 0o077:
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_FILE_PERMISSIONS_INVALID")
+    if st.st_size <= 0 or st.st_size > 1_048_576:
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_FILE_SIZE_INVALID")
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_JSON_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def validate_binding(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if set(value) != {
+        "schema",
+        "owner_identity",
+        "owner_role",
+        "authenticated_scope",
+        "request",
+    }:
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_FIELDS_REJECTED")
+    if value["schema"] != BINDING_SCHEMA:
+        raise BootstrapError("BINDING_SCHEMA_REJECTED")
+    identity = value["owner_identity"]
+    if not isinstance(identity, str) or not IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(identity):
+        raise BootstrapError("OWNER_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+    if value["owner_role"] != "owner":
+        raise BootstrapError("OWNER_ROLE_INVALID")
+    scope = value["authenticated_scope"]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(scope, str)
+        or not SCOPE_RE.fullmatch(scope)
+        or scope == "writer:provision"
+        or scope == "*"
+        or scope.endswith(":*")
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("OWNER_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+    request = value["request"]
+    if not isinstance(request, dict):
+        raise BootstrapError("REQUEST_INVALID")
+    expected_fields = {
+        "action",
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "base_ref",
+        "base_oid",
+        "target_branch",
+        "one_time_use",
+        "expires_in_seconds",
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+        "allowed_operations",
+        "denied_operations",
+    }
+    if set(request) != expected_fields:
+        raise BootstrapError("REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
+    if request["action"] != ACTION:
+        raise BootstrapError("REQUEST_ACTION_REJECTED")
+    if request["repository"] != "aios/aios":
+        raise BootstrapError("REPOSITORY_REJECTED")
+    if request["base_ref"] != "refs/heads/main":
+        raise BootstrapError("BASE_REF_REJECTED")
+    if not isinstance(request["base_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(request["base_oid"]):
+        raise BootstrapError("BASE_OID_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(request["target_branch"], str)
+        or not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(request["target_branch"])
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("TARGET_BRANCH_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(request["task_id"], str)
+        or not TASK_RE.fullmatch(request["task_id"])
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("TASK_ID_REJECTED")
+    if request["one_time_use"] is not True:
+        raise BootstrapError("ONE_TIME_USE_REQUIRED")
+    expiry = request["expires_in_seconds"]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(expiry, int)
+        or isinstance(expiry, bool)
+        or not 60 <= expiry <= 900
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("EXPIRY_REJECTED")
+    for field in (
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+    ):
+        if request[field] is not False:
+            raise BootstrapError("CONSEQUENTIAL_CAPABILITY_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(request["allowed_operations"], list)
+        or frozenset(request["allowed_operations"]) != EXPECTED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("ALLOWED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(request["denied_operations"], list)
+        or frozenset(request["denied_operations"]) != EXPECTED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("DENIED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH")
+    return {
+        "schema": BINDING_SCHEMA,
+        "owner_identity": identity,
+        "owner_role": "owner",
+        "authenticated_scope": scope,
+        "request": dict(request),
+    }
+
+
+def _status_uids(pid: int) -> tuple[int, int, int, int]:
+    try:
+        lines = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/status").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    for line in lines:
+        if line.startswith("Uid:"):
+            fields = line.split()[1:]
+            if len(fields) != 4:
+                break
+            return tuple(int(item) for item in fields)  # type: ignore[return-value]
+    raise BootstrapError("PEER_UID_STATUS_INVALID")
+
+
+def _loginuid(pid: int) -> int:
+    try:
+        raw = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/loginuid").read_text(encoding="ascii").strip()
+        value = int(raw)
+    except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_LOGINUID_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if value == 4294967295:
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_LOGIN_SESSION_REQUIRED")
+    return value
+
+
+def _tty_path(pid: int) -> Path:
+    try:
+        value = os.readlink(f"/proc/{pid}/fd/0")
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_INTERACTIVE_TTY_REQUIRED") from exc
+    if not (value.startswith("/dev/pts/") or value.startswith("/dev/tty")):
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_INTERACTIVE_TTY_REQUIRED")
+    path = Path(value)
+    try:
+        if not stat.S_ISCHR(path.stat().st_mode):
+            raise BootstrapError("PEER_INTERACTIVE_TTY_REQUIRED")
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_INTERACTIVE_TTY_REQUIRED") from exc
+    return path
+
+
+def verify_peer_session(pid: int, uid: int, gid: int, owner_identity: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        owner = pwd.getpwnam(owner_identity)
+    except KeyError as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("OWNER_OS_ACCOUNT_MISSING") from exc
+    if uid != owner.pw_uid:
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_OWNER_UID_MISMATCH")
+    uids = _status_uids(pid)
+    if any(item != owner.pw_uid for item in uids):
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_UID_TRANSITION_REJECTED")
+    loginuid = _loginuid(pid)
+    if loginuid != owner.pw_uid:
+        # This deliberately rejects sudo/runuser from another authenticated
+        # account; the session itself must have logged in as the Owner.
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_LOGINUID_OWNER_MISMATCH")
+    tty = _tty_path(pid)
+    if tty.stat().st_uid != owner.pw_uid:
+        raise BootstrapError("PEER_TTY_OWNER_MISMATCH")
+    return {
+        "pid": pid,
+        "uid": uid,
+        "gid": gid,
+        "loginuid": loginuid,
+        "tty": str(tty),
+        "owner_identity": owner_identity,
+    }
+
+
+def read_frame(connection: socket.socket) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    data = bytearray()
+    while len(data) <= MAX_FRAME:
+        block = connection.recv(4096)
+        if not block:
+            break
+        data.extend(block)
+        if b"\n" in block:
+            break
+    if not data or len(data) > MAX_FRAME:
+        raise BootstrapError("PROTOCOL_FRAME_INVALID")
+    raw = bytes(data).split(b"\n", 1)[0]
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(raw)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("PROTOCOL_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise BootstrapError("PROTOCOL_JSON_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def write_frame(connection: socket.socket, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    connection.sendall(canonical_json(dict(value)))
+
+
+def safe_result(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    for key in value:
+        lowered = str(key).lower()
+        if any(fragment in lowered for fragment in SENSITIVE_FRAGMENTS):
+            raise BootstrapError("BROKER_RESPONSE_SENSITIVE_DATA_REJECTED")
+    allowed = {
+        "status",
+        "approval_plan_id",
+        "grant_id",
+        "grant_digest_sha256",
+        "branch_oid",
+        "branch_ref_created",
+        "grant_consumed",
+        "owner_authorization_event_id",
+        "owner_authorization_reference",
+        "owner_authorization_digest_sha256",
+        "owner_authorization_consumed",
+        "owner_authorization_idempotent",
+    }
+    return {key: value.get(key) for key in sorted(allowed) if key in value}
+
+
+def request_summary(binding: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = binding["request"]
+    return {
+        "owner_identity": binding["owner_identity"],
+        "authenticated_scope": binding["authenticated_scope"],
+        "task_id": request["task_id"],
+        "repository": request["repository"],
+        "base_ref": request["base_ref"],
+        "base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+        "target_branch": request["target_branch"],
+        "expires_in_seconds": request["expires_in_seconds"],
+        "allowed_operations": sorted(request["allowed_operations"]),
+        "denied_operations": sorted(request["denied_operations"]),
+        "production_change_authorized": False,
+        "tag_change_authorized": False,
+        "baseline_change_authorized": False,
+        "main_write_authorized": False,
+    }
+
+
+def _ensure_runtime_paths(socket_path: Path, state_root: Path, owner_identity: str) -> None:
+    if os.geteuid() != 0:
+        raise BootstrapError("SERVER_ROOT_REQUIRED")
+    owner = pwd.getpwnam(owner_identity)
+    for directory, mode, uid, gid in (
+        (socket_path.parent, 0o750, 0, owner.pw_gid),
+        (state_root, 0o700, 0, 0),
+    ):
+        if directory.is_symlink():
+            raise BootstrapError("RUNTIME_DIRECTORY_SYMLINK_REJECTED")
+        directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chown(directory, uid, gid)
+        os.chmod(directory, mode)
+    if socket_path.exists() or socket_path.is_symlink():
+        raise BootstrapError("SOCKET_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+
+
+def _lock(path: Path):
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0), 0o600)
+    os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+    fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+    return fd
+
+
+def invoke_broker(binding: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    # Import only on the root server side. The bootstrap package does not carry
+    # a second broker/provisioner implementation; it reuses current main.
+    from owner_authorization_broker import (  # type: ignore
+        OwnerAuthorizationBroker,
+        OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
+        OwnerPrincipal,
+    )
+
+    config = OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig.from_environment()
+    identity = str(binding["owner_identity"])
+    scope = str(binding["authenticated_scope"])
+    if identity not in config.allowed_owner_identities:
+        raise BootstrapError("OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED_BY_LIVE_BROKER")
+    if scope not in config.allowed_intake_scopes:
+        raise BootstrapError("OWNER_SCOPE_NOT_ALLOWED_BY_LIVE_BROKER")
+    if config.max_expiry_seconds < int(binding["request"]["expires_in_seconds"]):
+        raise BootstrapError("LIVE_BROKER_EXPIRY_TOO_SMALL")
+    principal = OwnerPrincipal(
+        identity=identity,
+        role="owner",
+        authenticated_scope=scope,
+        token_scopes=frozenset({scope}),
+        credential_id="",
+    )
+    return OwnerAuthorizationBroker(config=config).authorize_and_provision(
+        binding["request"], principal
+    )
+
+
+def serve(binding_path: Path, socket_path: Path, state_root: Path, timeout: int) -> int:
+    binding = validate_binding(secure_root_file(binding_path))
+    identity = str(binding["owner_identity"])
+    _ensure_runtime_paths(socket_path, state_root, identity)
+    lock_fd = _lock(state_root / "bootstrap.lock")
+    listener = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    try:
+        listener.bind(str(socket_path))
+        owner = pwd.getpwnam(identity)
+        os.chown(socket_path, 0, owner.pw_gid)
+        os.chmod(socket_path, 0o660)
+        listener.listen(1)
+        listener.settimeout(timeout)
+
+        connection, _ = listener.accept()
+        with connection:
+            raw_peer = connection.getsockopt(
+                socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, struct.calcsize("3i")
+            )
+            pid, uid, gid = struct.unpack("3i", raw_peer)
+            session = verify_peer_session(pid, uid, gid, identity)
+
+            begin = read_frame(connection)
+            if begin != {"schema": CLIENT_BEGIN_SCHEMA, "action": "BEGIN"}:
+                raise BootstrapError("CLIENT_BEGIN_REJECTED")
+
+            challenge = secrets.token_hex(12)
+            challenge_issued = time.monotonic()
+            summary = request_summary(binding)
+            write_frame(
+                connection,
+                {
+                    "schema": CHALLENGE_SCHEMA,
+                    "challenge": challenge,
+                    "expires_in_seconds": CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS,
+                    "request_digest_sha256": sha256_json(binding["request"]),
+                    "summary": summary,
+                },
+            )
+
+            confirm = read_frame(connection)
+            expected_confirmation = f"AUTHORIZE {challenge}"
+            if (
+                confirm.get("schema") != CLIENT_CONFIRM_SCHEMA
+                or confirm.get("challenge") != challenge
+                or confirm.get("confirmation") != expected_confirmation
+            ):
+                raise BootstrapError("OWNER_INTERACTIVE_CONFIRMATION_REJECTED")
+            if time.monotonic() - challenge_issued > CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS:
+                raise BootstrapError("OWNER_CONFIRMATION_EXPIRED")
+
+            result = safe_result(invoke_broker(binding))
+            receipt = {
+                "schema": "aios.local-owner-auth-ingress-receipt.v1",
+                "status": "CONSUMED",
+                "owner_identity": identity,
+                "owner_role": "owner",
+                "authenticated_scope": binding["authenticated_scope"],
+                "peer": session,
+                "request_digest_sha256": sha256_json(binding["request"]),
+                "binding_digest_sha256": sha256_json(binding),
+                "challenge_digest_sha256": hashlib.sha256(
+                    challenge.encode("ascii")
+                ).hexdigest(),
+                "broker": result,
+                "completed_at_unix": int(time.time()),
+            }
+            event_id = str(
+                result.get("owner_authorization_event_id")
+                or hashlib.sha256(
+                    canonical_json(
+                        {
+                            "peer": session,
+                            "request": sha256_json(binding["request"]),
+                        }
+                    )
+                ).hexdigest()[:32]
+            )
+            atomic_json(state_root / "events" / f"{event_id}.json", receipt)
+            write_frame(
+                connection,
+                {
+                    "schema": RESULT_SCHEMA,
+                    "ok": True,
+                    "result": result,
+                },
+            )
+            return 0
+    except (BootstrapError, TimeoutError, socket.timeout) as exc:
+        code = exc.code if isinstance(exc, BootstrapError) else "OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT"
+        try:
+            if "connection" in locals():
+                write_frame(
+                    connection,
+                    {
+                        "schema": RESULT_SCHEMA,
+                        "ok": False,
+                        "error": code,
+                    },
+                )
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        atomic_json(
+            state_root / "last-failure.json",
+            {
+                "schema": "aios.local-owner-auth-ingress-failure.v1",
+                "status": "FAILED",
+                "error": code,
+                "binding_digest_sha256": sha256_json(binding),
+                "failed_at_unix": int(time.time()),
+            },
+        )
+        return 2
+    finally:
+        listener.close()
+        try:
+            socket_path.unlink()
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            pass
+        try:
+            fcntl.flock(lock_fd, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+        finally:
+            os.close(lock_fd)
+
+
+def client(socket_path: Path) -> int:
+    # The server performs the authoritative peer/session checks. The client
+    # also refuses non-interactive execution to make accidental automation hard.
+    if not sys.stdin.isatty() or not sys.stdout.isatty():
+        raise BootstrapError("CLIENT_INTERACTIVE_TTY_REQUIRED")
+    connection = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    connection.connect(str(socket_path))
+    with connection:
+        write_frame(connection, {"schema": CLIENT_BEGIN_SCHEMA, "action": "BEGIN"})
+        challenge = read_frame(connection)
+        if challenge.get("schema") != CHALLENGE_SCHEMA:
+            raise BootstrapError("CHALLENGE_INVALID")
+        summary = challenge.get("summary")
+        if not isinstance(summary, dict):
+            raise BootstrapError("CHALLENGE_INVALID")
+
+        print("\nAIOS one-shot Owner authorization request:")
+        print(json.dumps(summary, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+        print("\nThis authorizes only the task writer shown above.")
+        phrase = f"AUTHORIZE {challenge['challenge']}"
+        typed = input(f"Type exactly:\n{phrase}\n> ").strip()
+        if typed != phrase:
+            raise BootstrapError("OWNER_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH")
+        write_frame(
+            connection,
+            {
+                "schema": CLIENT_CONFIRM_SCHEMA,
+                "challenge": challenge["challenge"],
+                "confirmation": typed,
+            },
+        )
+        result = read_frame(connection)
+        print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0 if result.get("ok") is True else 3
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    value = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    mode = value.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    mode.add_argument("--serve", action="store_true")
+    mode.add_argument("--client", action="store_true")
+    value.add_argument("--binding", type=Path)
+    value.add_argument(
+        "--socket",
+        type=Path,
+        default=Path("/run/aios-owner-bootstrap/owner.sock"),
+    )
+    value.add_argument(
+        "--state-root",
+        type=Path,
+        default=Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-local-auth-ingress"),
+    )
+    value.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=300)
+    return value
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    args = parser().parse_args(argv)
+    if args.serve:
+        if args.binding is None:
+            raise SystemExit("--binding is required with --serve")
+        return serve(args.binding, args.socket, args.state_root, args.timeout)
+    return client(args.socket)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        raise SystemExit(main())
+    except BootstrapError as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "BLOCKED", "error": exc.code}), file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(exc.status)
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Read-only release reconciliation and durable follow-up intent."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ReconciliationReport:
+    healthy: bool
+    drift: tuple[str, ...]
+    actions: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+class ReconciliationController:
+    CHECKS = (
+        ("authority_main", "gitea_main", "main_drift"),
+        ("local_tag_oid", "remote_tag_oid", "tag_drift"),
+        ("remote_peeled_target", "approved_target_oid", "peeled_target_drift"),
+        ("registry_version", "baseline_version", "registry_baseline_drift"),
+        ("approved_artifact_digest", "deployed_artifact_digest", "artifact_drift"),
+        ("declared_production_state", "service_healthy", "service_health_drift"),
+    )
+
+    def reconcile(self, actual: Mapping[str, Any]) -> ReconciliationReport:
+        drift: list[str] = []
+        for left, right, label in self.CHECKS:
+            if actual.get(left) != actual.get(right):
+                drift.append(label)
+        actions = () if not drift else ("open_reconciliation_task", "open_reconciliation_pr", "attach_evidence", "notify_owner")
+        return ReconciliationReport(not drift, tuple(drift), actions)
+
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`"""Permanent AIOS governance source components."""`