chore(code-review-graph): add CRG knowledge-graph MCP + CodeBuddy hooks for aios

- .mcp.json: CodeBuddy stdio MCP -> code-review-graph.exe serve (venv, PYTHONUTF8=1)
- .codebuddy/settings.json: PostToolUse incremental update + SessionStart status hooks
- .codebuddy/skills/*: platform-native graph/explore/review skills
- CODEBUDDY.md: graph usage instructions
- .gitignore: ignore .code-review-graph/ data

Embedding uses siliconflow Qwen/Qwen3-VL-Embedding-8B via user-level CRG_OPENAI_* env
(API key kept out of repo).

.codebuddy/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "hooks": {
+    "PostToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Edit|Write|Bash",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "cat >/dev/null || true; CRG=\"C:/Users/ImRuY/.workbuddy-ai/binaries/python/envs/default/Scripts/code-review-graph.exe\"; [ -x \"$CRG\" ] || exit 0; git rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 && PYTHONUTF8=1 \"$CRG\" update --skip-flows --repo \"$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)\" || true",
+            "timeout": 60
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SessionStart": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "cat >/dev/null || true; CRG=\"C:/Users/ImRuY/.workbuddy-ai/binaries/python/envs/default/Scripts/code-review-graph.exe\"; [ -x \"$CRG\" ] || exit 0; git rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 && PYTHONUTF8=1 \"$CRG\" status --repo \"$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)\" || echo 'Not a git repo, skipping'",
+            "timeout": 30
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}

.codebuddy/skills/debug-issue/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+---
+name: debug-issue
+description: Systematically debug issues using graph-powered code navigation
+---
+
+## Debug Issue
+
+Use the knowledge graph to systematically trace and debug issues.
+
+### Steps
+
+1. Use `semantic_search_nodes_tool` to find code related to the issue.
+2. Use `query_graph_tool` with `callers_of` and `callees_of` to trace call chains.
+3. Use `get_flow_tool` to see full execution paths through suspected areas.
+4. Run `detect_changes_tool` to check if recent changes caused the issue.
+5. Use `get_impact_radius_tool` on suspected files to see what else is affected.
+
+### Tips
+
+- Check both callers and callees to understand the full context.
+- Look at affected flows to find the entry point that triggers the bug.
+- Recent changes are the most common source of new issues.
+
+## Token Efficiency Rules
+- Start with `get_minimal_context_tool(task="<your task>")` before other graph tools.
+- Use `detail_level="minimal"` on all calls. Only escalate to "standard" when minimal is insufficient.
+- Target: complete any review/debug/refactor task in ≤5 tool calls and ≤800 total output tokens.
+- Read the implementation and its tests before changing code. The graph narrows scope; it does not replace the source.

.codebuddy/skills/explore-codebase/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+name: explore-codebase
+description: Navigate and understand codebase structure using the knowledge graph
+---
+
+## Explore Codebase
+
+Use the code-review-graph MCP tools to explore and understand the codebase.
+
+### Steps
+
+1. Run `list_graph_stats_tool` to see overall codebase metrics.
+2. Run `get_architecture_overview_tool` for high-level community structure.
+3. Use `list_communities_tool` to find major modules, then `get_community_tool` for details.
+4. Use `semantic_search_nodes_tool` to find specific functions or classes.
+5. Use `query_graph_tool` with patterns like `callers_of`, `callees_of`, `imports_of` to trace relationships.
+6. Use `list_flows_tool` and `get_flow_tool` to understand execution paths.
+
+### Tips
+
+- Start broad (stats, architecture) then narrow down to specific areas.
+- Use `children_of` on a file to see all its functions and classes.
+- Use `find_large_functions_tool` to identify complex code.
+
+## Token Efficiency Rules
+- Start with `get_minimal_context_tool(task="<your task>")` before other graph tools.
+- Use `detail_level="minimal"` on all calls. Only escalate to "standard" when minimal is insufficient.
+- Target: complete any review/debug/refactor task in ≤5 tool calls and ≤800 total output tokens.
+- Read the implementation and its tests before changing code. The graph narrows scope; it does not replace the source.

.codebuddy/skills/refactor-safely/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+name: refactor-safely
+description: Plan and execute safe refactoring using dependency analysis
+---
+
+## Refactor Safely
+
+Use the knowledge graph to plan and execute refactoring with confidence.
+
+### Steps
+
+1. Use `refactor_tool` with mode="suggest" for community-driven refactoring suggestions.
+2. Use `refactor_tool` with mode="dead_code" to find unreferenced code.
+3. For renames, use `refactor_tool` with mode="rename" to preview all affected locations.
+4. Use `apply_refactor_tool` with the refactor_id to apply renames.
+5. After changes, run `detect_changes_tool` to verify the refactoring impact.
+
+### Safety Checks
+
+- Always preview before applying (rename mode gives you an edit list).
+- Check `get_impact_radius_tool` before major refactors.
+- Use `get_affected_flows_tool` to ensure no critical paths are broken.
+- Run `find_large_functions_tool` to identify decomposition targets.
+
+## Token Efficiency Rules
+- Start with `get_minimal_context_tool(task="<your task>")` before other graph tools.
+- Use `detail_level="minimal"` on all calls. Only escalate to "standard" when minimal is insufficient.
+- Target: complete any review/debug/refactor task in ≤5 tool calls and ≤800 total output tokens.
+- Read the implementation and its tests before changing code. The graph narrows scope; it does not replace the source.

.codebuddy/skills/review-changes/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+name: review-changes
+description: Perform a structured code review using change detection and impact
+---
+
+## Review Changes
+
+Perform a thorough, risk-aware code review using the knowledge graph.
+
+### Steps
+
+1. Run `detect_changes_tool` to get risk-scored change analysis.
+2. Run `get_affected_flows_tool` to find impacted execution paths.
+3. For each high-risk function, run `query_graph_tool` with pattern="tests_for" to check test coverage.
+4. Run `get_impact_radius_tool` to understand the blast radius.
+5. For any untested changes, suggest specific test cases.
+
+### Output Format
+
+Provide findings grouped by risk level (high/medium/low) with:
+- What changed and why it matters
+- Test coverage status
+- Suggested improvements
+- Overall merge recommendation
+
+## Token Efficiency Rules
+- Start with `get_minimal_context_tool(task="<your task>")` before other graph tools.
+- Use `detail_level="minimal"` on all calls. Only escalate to "standard" when minimal is insufficient.
+- Target: complete any review/debug/refactor task in ≤5 tool calls and ≤800 total output tokens.
+- Read the implementation and its tests before changing code. The graph narrows scope; it does not replace the source.

.gitignore

@@ -11,3 +11,5 @@ runtime/tmp/
 runtime/cache/
 logs/
 config/test_write_perms
+# Added by code-review-graph
+.code-review-graph/

.gitleaks.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+title = "AIOS repository secret scan policy"
+
+[extend]
+useDefault = true
+
+[allowlist]
+description = "Exact non-secret fixtures: Task Admission idempotency test fixture and release-freeze git commit OIDs (generic-api-key false positive on 40-hex git hashes)"
+condition = "AND"
+paths = [
+    '''tests/test_task_admission_bootstrap_http\.py$''',
+    '''docs/V2R2C2-P0-convergence-20260909\.md$''',
+    '''artifacts/round3-provider-auth/ledger\.json$''',
+]
+regexes = [
+    '''idempotency-1''',
+    '''f7f53d0568767d6deec2c47008a89f4d8413f93d''',
+]

.mcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "code-review-graph": {
+      "command": "C:\\Users\\ImRuY\\.workbuddy-ai\\binaries\\python\\envs\\default\\Scripts\\code-review-graph.exe",
+      "args": [
+        "serve"
+      ],
+      "cwd": "C:\\Users\\ImRuY\\aios-main-clone",
+      "env": {
+        "PYTHONUTF8": "1"
+      },
+      "type": "stdio"
+    }
+  }
+}

AGENT_DEPLOYMENT_REQUIREMENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+# Agent Production Deployment Requirements
+
+## Status entering deployment
+
+```yaml
+code_development: COMPLETED
+repository_commit: NOT_CREATED
+production_deployment: NOT_STARTED
+reason_repository_commit_missing:
+  current ChatGPT GitOps runtime has AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+The code bundle is an input artifact. The Agent must place it on a non-main
+integration branch, review it, run acceptance tests, merge it through protected
+main and deploy the API adapter. The Agent must not regenerate or materially
+rewrite the supplied implementation without recording the new diff and tests.
+
+## Frozen production state
+
+Before any change, verify:
+
+```yaml
+main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+
+V2R1C5:
+  tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+  peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+  baseline_version: V2R1C5
+  baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+  target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+  evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
+```
+
+If authoritative `main` no longer equals the approved base OID, stop with
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED / AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT`. Do not silently
+rebase the bundle onto a different base.
+
+## Bootstrap sequence — no additional Owner interaction
+
+Use the following order so that the approved V2R1C6 base OID remains valid and
+the bridge does not create its own authorization deadlock:
+
+1. Verify the supplied archive/patch SHA-256.
+2. Install the bundle into a temporary root-owned staging directory outside the
+   Git worktrees.
+3. Start a localhost-only temporary instance of
+   `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` on a dedicated port or Unix socket.
+4. Bind it to the existing authenticated Owner registry and the exact
+   `writer:provision` scope. Do not expose it through the public gateway.
+5. Execute the live V2R1C6 provisioning request while `main` still equals
+   `875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3`.
+6. Verify `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, the exact branch OID, writer scope and
+   negative policy tests.
+7. Use the newly created scoped writer to commit this reviewed bundle onto:
+   `agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805`.
+8. Stop and remove the temporary bootstrap service and revoke its temporary
+   runtime credential. Preserve its signed grant receipt and audit logs.
+9. Open a protected PR from the V2R1C6 branch. Deploy the permanent bridge only
+   from the reviewed merge commit.
+
+The temporary service is a control-plane bootstrap, not a production release.
+It must retain:
+
+```yaml
+listen_scope: localhost_only
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+This order avoids asking the Owner to approve a second base OID merely because
+the bridge implementation itself advanced `main`.
+
+### Alternative platform-maintenance path
+
+If policy prohibits a temporary localhost bootstrap service, use an existing
+Owner-approved platform-maintenance executor to create:
+
+```yaml
+branch: patch/owner-authorization-writer-bridge-20260806
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+direct_main_push: false
+force_push: false
+tag_write: false
+baseline_write: false
+production_deploy_during_integration: false
+```
+
+Merging that branch before V2R1C6 provisioning changes the authoritative base
+OID. In that alternative only, a new exact Owner base-OID amendment is required.
+The Agent must never substitute the newer `main` OID automatically.
+
+## Files to install on the branch
+
+Copy with the same relative paths:
+
+```text
+active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
+docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
+deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
+scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+```
+
+Merge the OpenAPI fragment into:
+
+```text
+docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml
+```
+
+The final schema must expose:
+
+```yaml
+operationId: provisionAuthorizedTaskWriter
+path: POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized
+x-openai-isConsequential: true
+```
+
+Do not deploy the fragment as a second standalone OpenAPI document.
+
+## Required review of existing API integration
+
+The adapter expects the existing API handler to provide:
+
+```python
+handler.need(scope)
+handler.body()
+handler.sendj(value, status=200)
+api.H.do_POST
+api.main()
+```
+
+Confirm these contracts against the branch before merge. If the live API has a
+different authentication object shape, make the smallest adapter-only change
+and rerun every test. The core provisioning policy must remain unchanged.
+
+The API authorization registry must grant `writer:provision` only to the
+authenticated Owner role. Agents and ordinary writer tokens must not receive
+this scope.
+
+## Privilege boundary
+
+The API service must remain non-root.
+
+Install a root-owned sudoers rule that allows the API service identity to run
+only these exact commands with `sudo -n --`:
+
+```text
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
+```
+
+Do not allow:
+
+```text
+/bin/sh
+/bin/bash
+/usr/bin/env
+/usr/bin/git
+wildcard executable paths
+SETENV
+arbitrary environment preservation
+```
+
+The governed tools themselves must validate their `--grant-dir` and
+`--result-json` paths. Their binaries must be root-owned, non-symlink, regular,
+executable and not group/world writable.
+
+The signer must access its private signing material only through a runtime
+secret reference. No signing key or token may enter Git, API output, the
+provisioning receipt or systemd environment text.
+
+## Runtime paths and permissions
+
+Create:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/receipts
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/locks
+```
+
+Required properties:
+
+```yaml
+owner: API service identity
+mode: "0700"
+symlink: false
+persistent: true
+```
+
+The directory contains redacted receipts only. Temporary signed grant
+directories are deleted after success or failure.
+
+## Required staging environment
+
+Configure the API service:
+
+```text
+AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
+AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORIZED_WRITER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
+AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_SIGNER_ADAPTER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
+AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_VALIDATOR=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
+AIOS_GITOPS_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE=writer:provision
+AIOS_GITOPS_GOVERNED_USE_SUDO=true
+AIOS_GITOPS_SUDO_PATH=/usr/bin/sudo
+```
+
+Use `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` as the API entrypoint. It delegates
+all pre-existing routes and adds only the new endpoint.
+
+## Pre-merge tests
+
+Run from the repository root:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```yaml
+unit_tests:
+  total: 9
+  failures: 0
+  errors: 0
+smoke: PASS
+py_compile: PASS
+```
+
+Also run all existing GitOps API and isolated writer tests affected by:
+
+```text
+aios_chatgpt_actions_api
+aios_isolated_writer_api
+isolated_writer_authz
+isolated_writer_token_registry
+single_owner_governance
+OpenAPI schema validation
+```
+
+Any regression blocks merge.
+
+## Staging API acceptance
+
+### Negative authentication
+
+An Agent or non-Owner credential calling the endpoint must receive:
+
+```yaml
+http_status: 403
+error: OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED
+```
+
+### Negative scope tests
+
+Requests enabling any of the following must be denied before signer execution:
+
+```text
+production_change_authorized=true
+tag_change_authorized=true
+baseline_change_authorized=true
+main_write_authorized=true
+allowed_operations containing tag/main/baseline/admin operations
+missing required denied operation
+one_time_use=false
+expiry over 1800 seconds
+```
+
+### Drift and conflict tests
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+wrong_base_oid:
+  http_status: 409
+  error: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
+
+existing_unreceipted_target_branch:
+  http_status: 409
+  error: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
+```
+
+### Governed tool failures
+
+Independently inject and verify fail-closed behavior for:
+
+```text
+signer unavailable
+signer signature absent
+validator signature_valid=false
+validator signer_trusted=false
+validator plan expired
+provisioner grant_consumed=false
+provisioner writer scope enables main/tag/baseline/force push
+any required negative policy test false
+```
+
+None may create or modify a Git ref.
+
+## Live V2R1C6 provisioning request
+
+After protected merge and API deployment, authenticate as the Owner and submit
+exactly:
+
+```json
+{
+  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "repository": "aios/aios",
+  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
+  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
+  "owner_authorization_reference": "chat-owner-authorization:v2r1c6:20260806",
+  "one_time_use": true,
+  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
+  "production_change_authorized": false,
+  "tag_change_authorized": false,
+  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
+  "main_write_authorized": false,
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "create_worktree",
+    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+    "commit_to_target_branch",
+    "push_target_branch"
+  ],
+  "denied_operations": [
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_create",
+    "tag_update",
+    "tag_delete",
+    "branch_delete",
+    "repository_admin",
+    "baseline_write",
+    "production_deploy",
+    "production_marker_write",
+    "history_rewrite"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+This request must be executed by the localhost-only bootstrap instance before
+the bridge code advances `main`. The endpoint must never infer “current main”.
+
+If the Agent chooses the alternative merge-first path, it must stop after the
+merge and obtain an exact Owner amendment for the new merge OID. It must not
+silently replace the approved OID.
+
+## Success response
+
+Require:
+
+```yaml
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+grant_consumed: true
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+branch_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
+base_oid: <same exact OID>
+main_unchanged: true
+
+writer_scope:
+  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
+  writes_enabled: true
+  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+  allowed_base_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
+  allowed_routes:
+    - POST /api/commit-file
+  allow_main_write: false
+  allow_tag_write: false
+  allow_baseline_write: false
+  allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+All seven negative policy results must be true.
+
+Submit the identical request a second time. It must return the same grant and
+branch attestation with:
+
+```yaml
+idempotent: true
+```
+
+It must not run the provisioner again.
+
+## Production postchecks
+
+After API deployment and writer provisioning, independently verify:
+
+```yaml
+existing_routes_regression: PASS
+new_endpoint: PASS
+main_ref: expected reviewed merge commit
+V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+V2R1C5_baseline_unchanged: true
+new_release_tag_created: false
+production_baseline_changed: false
+```
+
+The deployment of this control-plane bridge does not authorize a V2R1C6
+production release. It only enables scoped code authoring.
+
+## Rollback
+
+If the new API route fails:
+
+1. Stop accepting new provisioning calls.
+2. Restore the previous API entrypoint.
+3. Restart and verify all existing routes.
+4. Preserve receipts and logs.
+5. Revoke any task writer capability already minted.
+6. Do not delete a branch or rewrite a tag.
+7. Revert the protected-main bridge commit through an ordinary reviewed revert
+   PR if source rollback is required.
+
+## Required final Agent report
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: COMPLETED | PARTIALLY_COMPLETED | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+INTEGRATION:
+  branch:
+  commit:
+  protected_pr:
+  merge_commit:
+  files_changed:
+
+TESTS:
+  unit:
+  smoke:
+  py_compile:
+  regression:
+  fault_injection:
+
+DEPLOYMENT:
+  service:
+  entrypoint:
+  runtime_status:
+  endpoint_status:
+  rollback_verified:
+
+PROVISIONING:
+  owner_authorization_reference:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signing_key_identity:
+  branch:
+  branch_oid:
+  workspace_path:
+  grant_consumed:
+  idempotent_replay:
+
+CONSISTENCY:
+  main_oid:
+  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
+  V2R1C5_peeled_target_oid:
+  baseline_version:
+  baseline_changed:
+  tags_changed:
+
+SECRETS:
+  runtime_secret_reference_used:
+  plaintext_secret_logged:
+  plaintext_secret_committed:
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```

AGENT_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+# Agent Deployment Requirements: Owner Authorization Broker V2
+
+## Objective
+
+Deploy the audited Owner Authorization Broker that closes the bootstrap gap
+without issuing a new general-purpose Owner credential and without modifying
+`/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens`.
+
+The broker reuses one existing, non-wildcard Owner credential only to
+authenticate the Owner identity through one pre-existing exact scope. It then
+records an immutable task authorization event and directly invokes the
+existing signed grant -> validator -> one-shot provisioner chain.
+
+Production deployment of V2R1C6 is **not** authorized by this task.
+
+## Fixed bindings
+
+```yaml
+task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
+repository: aios/aios
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+The existing V2R1C5 objects are frozen:
+
+```yaml
+tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+baseline_version: V2R1C5
+baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+```
+
+## 1. Package verification
+
+Verify `MANIFEST.sha256` before installation. Reject any mismatch.
+
+Run:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest -v \
+  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  tests/test_owner_authorization_broker.py
+
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
+```
+
+All checks must pass.
+
+## 2. Existing Owner credential selection
+
+Read only the non-secret registry metadata. Select one existing credential
+that satisfies all of the following:
+
+```yaml
+role: owner
+wildcard_scope: false
+account: exact known Owner identity
+contains_exact_intake_scope: true
+```
+
+Use one existing exact scope such as `commit:create` or `file:write`. Prefer
+the narrowest scope already assigned to the intended Owner.
+
+Do not:
+
+- use the historical wildcard Owner credential;
+- add `writer:provision` to any bearer token;
+- create or modify a bearer credential;
+- print, copy or commit bearer-token material.
+
+Record only:
+
+```yaml
+owner_account: <non-secret account>
+credential_id: <non-secret ID, when available>
+intake_scope: <one exact existing scope>
+scope_readback_available: true|false
+```
+
+If `handler.need()` returns the exact scope set, configure the Owner account
+allowlist and leave the credential ID allowlist empty.
+
+If scope metadata is not returned, configure the exact non-secret credential
+ID allowlist. If neither exact scope metadata nor a stable non-secret
+credential ID can be proven, stop:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: BLOCKED
+REASON: OWNER_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_NOT_PROVABLE
+```
+
+## 3. Staging installation
+
+Install the four application modules in a root-owned staging directory:
+
+```text
+authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+owner_authorization_broker.py
+aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
+```
+
+The directory and files must not be group/world writable.
+
+Prepare environment values:
+
+```yaml
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED: "true"
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES: <one exact existing scope>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_IDENTITIES: <exact owner account>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_CREDENTIAL_IDS: <exact ID or empty>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_MAX_EXPIRY_SECONDS: "900"
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT:
+  /var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker
+```
+
+Use the existing signer, validator and provisioner paths. Do not change their
+root governance configuration or disable signature checks.
+
+Start a localhost-only staging instance on a temporary port. Do not replace
+the production service yet.
+
+## 4. Authentication fail-closed tests
+
+The staging endpoint is:
+
+```text
+POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+```
+
+Required tests:
+
+```yaml
+unauthenticated:
+  expected: 401
+
+wrong_role:
+  expected: 403
+
+wrong_scope:
+  expected: 403
+
+wildcard_owner:
+  expected: 403
+  error: WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED
+
+unallowlisted_owner:
+  expected: 403
+  error: OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED
+
+production_capability_true:
+  expected: 403
+  error: PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED
+```
+
+A connection failure, 404 or 500 is not an authorization-policy pass.
+
+## 5. Formal provisioning request
+
+Use the selected existing non-wildcard Owner credential through its runtime
+secret reference. Never place the bearer token in the request body, command
+line, shell history, output report or Git.
+
+Request:
+
+```json
+{
+  "action": "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "repository": "aios/aios",
+  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
+  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
+  "one_time_use": true,
+  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
+  "production_change_authorized": false,
+  "tag_change_authorized": false,
+  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
+  "main_write_authorized": false,
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "create_worktree",
+    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+    "commit_to_target_branch",
+    "push_target_branch"
+  ],
+  "denied_operations": [
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_create",
+    "tag_update",
+    "tag_delete",
+    "branch_delete",
+    "repository_admin",
+    "baseline_write",
+    "production_deploy",
+    "production_marker_write",
+    "history_rewrite"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+The Owner authorization reference is generated by the broker. The caller must
+not submit or invent one.
+
+Expected result:
+
+```yaml
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+owner_authorization_event_id: generated
+owner_authorization_reference: generated
+owner_authorization_digest_sha256: generated
+owner_authorization_consumed: true
+approval_plan_id: generated
+grant_digest_sha256: generated
+grant_consumed: true
+
+branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+
+writer_scope:
+  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
+  writes_enabled: true
+  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+  allowed_base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+  allow_main_write: false
+  allow_tag_write: false
+  allow_baseline_write: false
+  allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+## 6. Independent post-provisioning verification
+
+Verify the Authority ref:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse \
+  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+It must equal:
+
+```text
+875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+Verify `main` remains unchanged, V2R1C5 tag object and peeled target remain
+unchanged, and the Production Baseline remains V2R1C5.
+
+Verify the broker audit event under:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker/events/
+```
+
+Requirements:
+
+```yaml
+status: CONSUMED
+wildcard_scope_used: false
+grant_consumed: true
+permissions:
+  directory: "0700"
+  json_files: "0600"
+```
+
+Do not return bearer-token material in the report.
+
+## 7. Commit the broker through the new writer
+
+After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, use only the writer's
+`POST /api/commit-file` route to put this code bundle on:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+Commit the bridge and broker as separate intentional commits when practical:
+
+1. Owner-authorized task-writer bridge.
+2. Audited Owner authorization broker and deployment docs.
+
+Do not merge to `main` directly. Create a protected PR after branch commits
+and tests are complete.
+
+## 8. Permanent service deployment
+
+Only after protected review and merge:
+
+1. Install the reviewed files from the merge commit.
+2. Apply a reviewed systemd drop-in based on the provided example.
+3. Start the wrapper entrypoint:
+   `aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py`.
+4. Verify all existing API routes still work.
+5. Verify the broker remains localhost/reverse-proxy constrained as intended.
+6. Re-run authentication and policy tests.
+7. Remove the temporary staging instance.
+
+This permanent bridge deployment does not authorize a V2R1C6 production tag,
+Baseline update or application deployment.
+
+## 9. Fail-closed conditions
+
+Stop with `BLOCKED` for any of the following:
+
+- Authority `main` no longer equals the fixed base OID.
+- Target branch exists at a different OID.
+- Only a wildcard Owner credential can authenticate.
+- Exact credential scope cannot be proven.
+- Owner identity is not explicitly allow-listed.
+- Signer, validator or provisioner self-test fails.
+- Grant is not marked one-time and consumed.
+- Writer allows main, tag, Baseline, force-push or branch-delete operations.
+- Audit event contains sensitive material.
+- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
+
+## 10. Required Agent result
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+PACKAGE:
+  manifest_verified:
+  unit_tests:
+  smoke_tests:
+  py_compile:
+
+OWNER_CREDENTIAL:
+  account:
+  credential_id:
+  intake_scope:
+  exact_scope_proven:
+  wildcard_used: false
+  token_logged: false
+
+BROKER:
+  staging_listener:
+  endpoint_status:
+  event_id:
+  authorization_reference:
+  authorization_digest_sha256:
+  event_consumed:
+  audit_permissions_valid:
+
+GRANT:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signer_identity:
+  signature_valid:
+  one_time_use:
+  consumed:
+
+BRANCH:
+  name:
+  oid:
+  base_oid:
+  ref_exists:
+  worktree_path:
+  worktree_clean:
+
+WRITER:
+  status:
+  writes_enabled:
+  allowed_branch:
+  allowed_base_oid:
+  allowed_routes:
+  main_write_denied:
+  tag_write_denied:
+  baseline_write_denied:
+  force_push_denied:
+
+POSTCHECK:
+  main_unchanged:
+  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+
+REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
+  commit_oids:
+  protected_pr:
+  merged:
+  permanent_bridge_deployed:
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```

AGENT_TASK_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+# Agent execution requirements: V2R1C6 task identity overlay
+
+## Required result
+
+The Agent must return one of:
+
+- `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`
+- `BLOCKED`
+- `FAILED`
+
+The Agent may not report success until the task branch, isolated worktree and
+task writer are independently verified.
+
+This stage is **not** a production deployment. It must not modify `main`,
+V2R1C5, tags, Registry, Production Baseline or production services.
+
+## Fixed authority
+
+```yaml
+task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
+repository: aios/aios
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+owner_identity: aiman
+one_time_use: true
+maximum_ttl_seconds: 900
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+## 1. Verify package
+
+Verify the externally supplied package against the published SHA-256 values and
+then verify every entry in `MANIFEST.sha256`.
+
+Do not synthesize a missing archive. Use either the verified ZIP or TAR.GZ.
+
+Required checks:
+
+```yaml
+package_hash_match: true
+manifest_entries_match: true
+unit_tests_pass: true
+smoke_tests_pass: true
+py_compile_pass: true
+```
+
+## 2. Create root-owned staging
+
+Extract to a fresh directory such as:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/staging/v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay-<nonce>
+```
+
+Requirements:
+
+```yaml
+owner: root
+group: root
+directory_mode: "0700"
+files_not_world_writable: true
+symlinks_rejected: true
+```
+
+Do not overwrite the active runtime tree.
+
+## 3. Re-run target-host tests
+
+From the staging root:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_task_identity_overlay.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
+  active-runtime/app/task_identity_overlay.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
+  scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py
+```
+
+Any failure is `BLOCKED`; do not proceed.
+
+## 4. Prestart Git and production freeze checks
+
+Read from the authority repository:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/heads/main
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
+  show-ref --verify --quiet \
+  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/tags/V2R1C5
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse 'refs/tags/V2R1C5^{}'
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```yaml
+main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch_exists: false
+V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+```
+
+Read Baseline and require:
+
+```yaml
+version: V2R1C5
+status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
+```
+
+If `main` has drifted, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+REASON: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
+```
+
+If the target branch already exists at another OID, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+REASON: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
+```
+
+Do not delete, reset or force-push the branch.
+
+## 5. Discover active secret references
+
+The overlay does not read or modify `gitops.tokens`, but its issuer must compare
+the new random secret against all active bearer secret references.
+
+Discover references without printing secret contents. At minimum include the
+currently active ChatGPT/GitOps bearer secret reference and any other bearer
+files consumed by the active API.
+
+Pass them as a comma-separated list in:
+
+```text
+AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS
+```
+
+Evidence must contain only paths and SHA-256 match counts, not token values.
+
+If active secret references cannot be enumerated, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: BLOCKED
+REASON: ACTIVE_SECRET_REFERENCE_SET_UNRESOLVED
+```
+
+## 6. Install the transient systemd service
+
+Use the provided template:
+
+```text
+deploy/systemd/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service.example
+```
+
+Substitute only:
+
+- verified root-owned staging directory;
+- verified active secret-ref path list.
+
+Do not change task ID, repository, base OID, target branch or denied
+capabilities.
+
+The service must listen only on:
+
+```text
+127.0.0.1:19864
+```
+
+Before start, run:
+
+```bash
+systemd-analyze verify \
+  /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+```
+
+Then:
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl start aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+```
+
+Confirm:
+
+```bash
+curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:19864/healthz
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```yaml
+service: aios-task-identity-overlay
+status: active
+global_token_registry_used: false
+loopback_only: true
+```
+
+Do not expose the port externally.
+
+## 7. Issue the one-time overlay
+
+Use the root-only CLI. The authorization assertion is an audit label for this
+already approved Owner task; it must not be described as an external signed
+event.
+
+Example:
+
+```bash
+sudo env \
+  PYTHONPATH=<staging>/active-runtime/app \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_SECRET_ROOT=/run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TASK_ID=V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_OWNER_IDENTITY=aiman \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_REF=refs/heads/main \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_OID=875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3 \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TARGET_BRANCH=agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805 \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS=<verified-secret-ref-list> \
+  python3 <staging>/active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
+    issue \
+    --ttl-seconds 900 \
+    --authorization-assertion-ref owner-session:V2R1C6:approved-20260806 \
+    --operator-identity <audited-agent-identity> \
+    --result-json /run/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-issued.json
+```
+
+The result must contain:
+
+```yaml
+status: OVERLAY_ACTIVE
+idempotent: false
+overlay_id: present
+secret_ref: under /run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays
+expires_at: within 900 seconds
+```
+
+It must not contain a token.
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+secret_file_mode: "0600"
+metadata_contains_raw_token: false
+token_hash_unique_across_configured_secret_refs: true
+```
+
+## 8. Negative tests
+
+Before the valid request:
+
+1. No Authorization header must return HTTP 401.
+2. A random wrong bearer must return HTTP 401.
+3. A request with `production_change_authorized=true` must be rejected.
+4. A request with another base OID or branch must be rejected.
+5. The valid overlay must remain `ACTIVE` after pre-auth request-validation
+   failures.
+
+Do not use the global Owner or ChatGPT bearer credential for this endpoint.
+
+## 9. Send the valid request
+
+Use:
+
+```text
+deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json
+```
+
+Use the provided client so the bearer is not placed in argv, shell history or
+logs:
+
+```bash
+sudo python3 <staging>/scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py \
+  --secret-ref <secret_ref_from_issue_result> \
+  --request-json <staging>/deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json \
+  --url http://127.0.0.1:19864/api/governance/owner-authorizations \
+  --result-json /var/lib/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-provision-result.json
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```yaml
+http_status: 200
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+owner_authorization_consumed: true
+grant_consumed: true
+identity_overlay_consumed: true
+identity_overlay_secret_removed: true
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+The result must not include:
+
+- bearer token;
+- private key;
+- signer secret;
+- raw signature;
+- credential value.
+
+## 10. Independent acceptance
+
+Verify the branch:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
+  rev-parse refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+It must equal:
+
+```text
+875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+Verify worktree evidence returned by the provisioner:
+
+```yaml
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+head_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+detached_head: false
+worktree_clean: true
+writer_status: active
+writes_enabled: true
+allowed_routes:
+  - POST /api/commit-file
+allow_main_write: false
+allow_tag_write: false
+allow_baseline_write: false
+allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+Run policy negative tests against the task writer and require explicit policy
+denials for:
+
+- main write;
+- another branch;
+- tag create/update;
+- Baseline write;
+- force push;
+- branch delete.
+
+Network errors, 404, 500 and stopped-service failures do not count as policy
+denials.
+
+## 11. Stop and clean up the overlay
+
+After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`:
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl stop aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+sudo systemctl disable aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service || true
+sudo rm -f /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+```
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+overlay_listener_stopped: true
+overlay_secret_removed: true
+global_token_registry_unchanged: true
+disabled_owner_record_unchanged: true
+active_chatgpt_bot_record_unchanged: true
+audit_metadata_retained: true
+```
+
+The root-owned staging directory may be retained until the code is committed,
+then removed after checksum-confirmed repository integration.
+
+## 12. Commit the developed code through the task writer
+
+Only after writer acceptance, use `POST /api/commit-file` to commit the
+verified package contents to:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+Commit in reviewable groups:
+
+1. authorized task-writer bridge;
+2. Owner authorization broker;
+3. task identity overlay;
+4. tests, docs, OpenAPI and deployment templates.
+
+Do not include:
+
+- package archives;
+- runtime tokens;
+- `/run` or `/var/lib` state;
+- test result files containing host paths;
+- secret references containing values;
+- generated credentials.
+
+Run the complete 40-test suite from the branch after commits.
+
+## 13. Protected PR
+
+Create a protected PR from:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+to:
+
+```text
+main
+```
+
+The PR must state:
+
+- this change closes Owner authorization bootstrap gaps;
+- the overlay is localhost-only and one-time;
+- the global token registry is not modified;
+- no production release is authorized;
+- V2R1C5 tag and Baseline remain unchanged.
+
+The Agent must not merge without the repository's normal protected review.
+
+## 14. Required Agent report
+
+```yaml
+STATUS:
+  READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+PACKAGE:
+  zip_sha256:
+  tar_gz_sha256:
+  manifest_entries:
+  manifest_matched:
+
+TESTS:
+  unit_total:
+  unit_passed:
+  smoke_bridge:
+  smoke_broker:
+  smoke_overlay:
+  py_compile:
+
+PRESTART:
+  main_oid:
+  target_branch_previously_absent:
+  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
+  V2R1C5_peeled_target:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+
+OVERLAY:
+  overlay_id:
+  status:
+  secret_ref:
+  secret_file_mode:
+  token_hash_unique:
+  global_registry_used: false
+  listener:
+  expires_at:
+  consumed:
+  secret_removed:
+
+NEGATIVE_TESTS:
+  unauthenticated_401:
+  wrong_token_401:
+  production_capability_denied:
+  wrong_base_denied:
+  wrong_branch_denied:
+
+OWNER_AUTHORIZATION:
+  event_id:
+  reference:
+  consumed:
+
+GRANT:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signature_valid:
+  consumed:
+
+BRANCH:
+  name:
+  oid:
+  base_oid:
+  ref_exists:
+  worktree_path:
+  worktree_clean:
+
+WRITER:
+  status:
+  writes_enabled:
+  allowed_branch:
+  allowed_base_oid:
+  allowed_routes:
+  main_write_denied:
+  tag_write_denied:
+  baseline_write_denied:
+  force_push_denied:
+
+REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
+  commits:
+  tests_after_commit:
+  protected_pr:
+  merged: false
+
+POSTCHECK:
+  main_unchanged:
+  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+  global_token_registry_unchanged:
+  overlay_listener_stopped:
+  overlay_secret_removed:
+
+SECRETS:
+  plaintext_logged: false
+  plaintext_committed: false
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```
+
+## Fail-closed conditions
+
+Return `BLOCKED` and stop on any of:
+
+- authoritative main OID drift;
+- target branch conflict;
+- inability to enumerate active secret references;
+- secret hash collision;
+- overlay not bound to the exact task/base/branch;
+- non-loopback listener;
+- raw secret in result or logs;
+- Owner Authorization Broker event not created;
+- signer/validator/provisioner failure;
+- grant not consumed;
+- branch OID mismatch;
+- writer exposes main/tag/Baseline/force-push permissions;
+- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
+
+Never fall back to the shared `gitops-write-bot.token`, a wildcard credential,
+manual `gitops.tokens` edits or a direct Git ref write.

BUILD_RECEIPT_V2R1C7.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2r1c7.engineering-build-receipt.v1",
+  "version": "V2R1C7",
+  "base_oid": "b356dec2ac5bd2a5f721aa73f8fd1902f9c65632",
+  "production_deployed": false,
+  "tag_created": false,
+  "baseline_changed": false,
+  "deployable": true
+}

CODEBUDDY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+<!-- code-review-graph MCP tools -->
+## MCP Tools: code-review-graph
+
+**This project has a knowledge graph. Start with the code-review-graph
+MCP tools to narrow scope, then read the source.** The graph is cheaper than scanning files and
+gives you structural context (callers, dependents, test coverage) that file search cannot.
+
+### When to use graph tools FIRST
+
+- **Exploring code**: `semantic_search_nodes_tool` or `query_graph_tool` instead of Grep
+- **Understanding impact**: `get_impact_radius_tool` instead of manually tracing imports
+- **Code review**: `detect_changes_tool` + `get_review_context_tool` instead of reading entire files
+- **Finding relationships**: `query_graph_tool` with callers_of/callees_of/imports_of/tests_for
+- **Architecture questions**: `get_architecture_overview_tool` + `list_communities_tool`
+
+### Verify in the source
+
+- Narrow scope with the graph, then read the source. Do not change code from graph output alone.
+- For any non-trivial change, read the implementation and the relevant tests before concluding.
+- Verify the exact source when touching behavior, database logic, migrations, retries, fallbacks,
+  recovery, or compatibility code.
+- When the graph and the source disagree, the source wins. The graph may be stale or may not
+  model that relationship.
+- An empty graph result can mean "not indexed" or "not statically visible", not "does not exist".
+
+### Key Tools
+
+| Tool | Use when |
+| ------ | ---------- |
+| `detect_changes_tool` | Reviewing code changes — gives risk-scored analysis |
+| `get_review_context_tool` | Need source snippets for review — token-efficient |
+| `get_impact_radius_tool` | Understanding blast radius of a change |
+| `get_affected_flows_tool` | Finding which execution paths are impacted |
+| `query_graph_tool` | Tracing callers, callees, imports, tests, dependencies |
+| `semantic_search_nodes_tool` | Finding functions/classes by name or keyword |
+| `get_architecture_overview_tool` | Understanding high-level codebase structure |
+| `refactor_tool` | Planning renames, finding dead code |
+
+### Workflow
+
+1. The graph auto-updates on file changes (via hooks).
+2. Use `detect_changes_tool` for code review.
+3. Use `get_affected_flows_tool` to understand impact.
+4. Use `query_graph_tool` pattern="tests_for" to check coverage.
+<!-- /code-review-graph MCP tools -->

MANIFEST.sha256

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+bec7da1adb75bf5feaa63c60ec6d03adf15d7508742a486207033d000f72d4ff  AGENT_DEPLOYMENT_REQUIREMENTS.md
+251b46e51ce09aa2fd843bee48ef24a5608f31d24c599841f086ceb25c1a1715  README.md
+783f68ec4f00a11d43ceed536196bfedccaf6614f6db9805f7b36d24e5fa7bc2  TEST_RESULTS.json
+9208325e5b2e6f5ba6b64e000bc21d14d9f2f214e3ad33dd79857e85218fd6c2  VERSION
+c4b24b65195077716983acdc8611f705324413a74453858994ba51541957afd4  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+8a1935fa098d47ac02ce51bbd9fd5fad7cf9ab9374ea3de5f630679b96681d84  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+0997ab8332985c7124f334c4e49735d8833326578acc61a61a389bf792424de3  active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py
+dd3f8b1cab88e005a291f077807873c381e8ca92fe863dc05817925f0dff9613  active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py
+9e45025c41068cafdea2f360edfc4146a5459b0a6bcfbf1403206fc0161e7bac  active-runtime/app/v2r1c7_health_service.py
+c96ba560d69f6c2eb700b9f2b42a32e394dadd00dffb23bbefdb9fb3e1571c0d  deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service
+a05d4e8038fdb866ce17d4fb8a54798a268a1e8d44ff2cbc559069fa6ab2a667  deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
+a60dac51802bff67c2cfff61acdeb0a3a05d74a4f6cb47e3f78295ceb5c6acd9  docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
+2690f76452bceddda90c728278c600bcebd533db24776e2966423c5a8655e4b5  docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
+560e5d9af8a8e2ec60ec31cf8659a7982b93ea09b7adb486b738ea2fba460d70  release-manifests/V2R1C7.json
+81a423c7814f81cb888b60a538c153e549b2be9099c881c968d55ae84efddc57  scripts/build_v2r1c7_release_artifact.py
+64c78dabffb05c8851f87b2a27c43bd1f21728dca586397d03a6bc22906a906c  scripts/probe_v2r1c7_health.py
+5419dc7de0f50908ad0ef1dac74172fce811bb7b45f314a6e1c1bb9ce618324d  scripts/rollback_v2r1c7_release.sh
+54e2845d2c3c026323ad45515e082d661e3b461feb3bfefedf5adc52db2d7b78  scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+32a860e28d5afc105f413d878a13fb8600fa74874dbd3bc4c031ef3efa17896a  scripts/verify_v2r1c7_release.py
+3cce2b744326fe12b89bcad3cd352c77738950964bf8519e72cb5e9c7a5dfbfc  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+8f3153c625241f60b65109eeac045e8aed7661d95f3a10f0b32ba3e0e9ac0a85  versions/V2R1C7.json

TEST_RESULTS.json

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "git_branch_created": false,
+  "git_commit_created": false,
+  "production_mutation": false,
+  "py_compile": {
+    "files": [
+      "active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+      "active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py"
+    ],
+    "status": "PASS"
+  },
+  "schema": "aios.authorized-task-writer-bridge-test-report.v1",
+  "secrets_included": false,
+  "smoke": {
+    "command": "python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+    "status": "PASS"
+  },
+  "status": "PASS",
+  "unit_tests": {
+    "command": "python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+    "errors": 0,
+    "failures": 0,
+    "total": 9
+  }
+}

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-V2R1C2
+V2R1C7

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_api.py

@@ -16,6 +16,28 @@ from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
 store = AgentObservabilityStore()
 dashboard = AgentObservabilityDashboard(store.load())
 
+_ROLE_WHITELIST = {"user", "group_admin", "owner"}
+_authenticator = None  # callable() -> {"user_id":..., "role":...} | None, injected by host
+
+
+def set_authenticator(fn):
+    """Install a server-side authenticator used to derive the querying tenant.
+
+    The callable returns the authenticated principal (dict with "user_id" and
+    a whitelisted "role") or None for anonymous. The client-supplied role and
+    user/group ids are NOT trusted to escalate scope.
+    """
+    global _authenticator
+    _authenticator = fn
+
+
+def _principal():
+    if _authenticator is not None:
+        p = _authenticator()
+        if isinstance(p, dict) and p.get("role") in _ROLE_WHITELIST:
+            return p
+    return None
+
 
 def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any]):
     record = AgentExecutionRecord(**payload)
@@ -23,11 +45,30 @@ def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any]):
 
 
 def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user"):
-    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role)
+    # The authenticated principal (tenant) is authoritative; the request params
+    # role/user_id/group_id can never choose owner or another tenant.
+    principal = _principal()
+    pr_user = principal.get("user_id") if principal else None
+    pr_role = principal.get("role", "user") if principal else "user"
+
+    if pr_role == "owner":
+        # Server-verified owner may browse a requested scope.
+        q_user, q_group, q_role = user_id, group_id, "owner"
+        summary_scope = None
+    elif pr_user:
+        # Authenticated non-owner: strictly scoped to own tenant.
+        q_user, q_group, q_role = pr_user, None, "user"
+        summary_scope = pr_user
+    else:
+        # Anonymous: nothing scoped to them.
+        q_user, q_group, q_role = None, None, "user"
+        summary_scope = None
+
+    records = store.query(q_user, q_group, q_role)
     return {
         "status": "ok",
         "records": records,
-        "summary": store.load().summary(user_id if role != "owner" else None),
+        "summary": store.load().summary(summary_scope),
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_store.py

@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@ metadata are stored for Web UI statistics and audit.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
+import re
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
 
+# Constrain execution IDs (used as filename) to a single safe path segment.
+_SAFE_EXECUTION_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$")
+
 
 class AgentObservabilityStore:
     def __init__(self, root: str = "runtime/agent-observability"):
@@ -21,9 +25,17 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
         self.records_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
 
     def append(self, record: AgentExecutionRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        path = self.records_dir / f"{record.execution_id}.json"
+        execution_id = str(record.execution_id or "")
+        if not _SAFE_EXECUTION_ID.fullmatch(execution_id) or ".." in execution_id:
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid execution_id: {execution_id!r}")
+        base = self.records_dir.resolve()
+        target = (self.records_dir / f"{execution_id}.json").resolve()
+        # The whitelist forbids separators/traversal, so the resolved target
+        # must sit directly inside the records dir; verify defensively.
+        if target.parent != base:
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid execution_id: {execution_id!r}")
         data = record.to_dict()
-        path.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+        target.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
         return data
 
     def load(self) -> AgentObservability:

active-runtime/app/agent_pull_runner.py

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+"""Fail-closed Agent Pull Runner primitives for AIOS autonomy v1.
+
+The runner owns task discovery and reporting only.  It never accepts shell
+strings: executors receive argv, an allowlisted cwd and an allowlisted env.
+Durable state is intentionally small so restart recovery and duplicate
+suppression can be verified without coupling the runner to one database.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import random
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+
+class RunnerError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when a runner contract would be violated."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RunnerConfig:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    long_poll_seconds: int = 30
+    fallback_seconds: int = 60
+    jitter_seconds: int = 5
+    max_backoff_seconds: int = 300
+    executable_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    working_directory_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    environment_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RunnerState:
+    inflight: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    terminal: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class RunnerTransport(Protocol):
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id: str, capabilities: Sequence[str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def heartbeat(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def long_poll(self, worker_id: str, timeout_seconds: int) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
+    def poll(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
+    def claim(self, worker_id: str, task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def renew(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_progress(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_result(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_evidence(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+
+
+class JsonStateStore:
+    """Atomic JSON state store for restart recovery."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+
+    def load(self) -> RunnerState:
+        if not self.path.exists():
+            return RunnerState()
+        value = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise RunnerError("runner state must be an object")
+        return RunnerState(
+            inflight=dict(value.get("inflight", {})),
+            terminal=dict(value.get("terminal", {})),
+        )
+
+    def save(self, state: RunnerState) -> None:
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=self.path.name + ".", dir=self.path.parent)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                json.dump({"inflight": state.inflight, "terminal": state.terminal}, handle, sort_keys=True)
+                handle.write("\n")
+            os.chmod(name, 0o600)
+            os.replace(name, self.path)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(name):
+                os.unlink(name)
+
+
+class AgentPullRunner:
+    """Pull, claim, execute and report one task at a time."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: RunnerConfig,
+        transport: RunnerTransport,
+        state_store: JsonStateStore | None = None,
+        *,
+        random_fn: Callable[[], float] = random.random,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not config.worker_id.strip():
+            raise RunnerError("worker_id is required")
+        self.config = config
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.state_store = state_store
+        self.random_fn = random_fn
+        self.state = state_store.load() if state_store else RunnerState()
+
+    def _save(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_store:
+            self.state_store.save(self.state)
+
+    def register(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self.transport.register_worker(self.config.worker_id, self.config.capabilities)
+
+    def heartbeat(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self.transport.heartbeat(self.config.worker_id)
+
+    def discovery_delay(self, failures: int) -> float:
+        failures = max(0, int(failures))
+        base = min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, self.config.fallback_seconds * (2**failures))
+        jitter = self.random_fn() * max(0, self.config.jitter_seconds)
+        return min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, base + jitter)
+
+    def discover_once(self) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None:
+        try:
+            task = self.transport.long_poll(self.config.worker_id, self.config.long_poll_seconds)
+        except Exception:
+            task = None
+        if task is None:
+            task = self.transport.poll(self.config.worker_id)
+        if not task:
+            return None
+        task_id = str(task.get("task_id", ""))
+        if not task_id:
+            raise RunnerError("task_id is required")
+        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
+            return {"status": "duplicate_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
+        claimed = dict(self.transport.claim(self.config.worker_id, task))
+        self.state.inflight[task_id] = claimed
+        self._save()
+        return claimed
+
+    def renew(self, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.renew(self.config.worker_id, task_id)
+
+    def report_progress(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.report_progress(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
+
+    def report_evidence(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.report_evidence(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
+
+    def report_result(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
+            return {"status": "duplicate_terminal_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        result = dict(self.transport.report_result(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload))
+        self.state.terminal[task_id] = {"result": result, "reported_at": time.time()}
+        self.state.inflight.pop(task_id, None)
+        self._save()
+        return result
+
+    def recover_after_restart(self) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        recovered: list[Mapping[str, Any]] = []
+        for task_id in tuple(self.state.inflight):
+            recovered.append(self.renew(task_id))
+        return recovered
+
+    def validate_execution(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> None:
+        if not argv or any(not isinstance(item, str) or not item for item in argv):
+            raise RunnerError("argv_only_execution_required")
+        if any(ch in argv[0] for ch in (";", "|", "&", "`", "\n")):
+            raise RunnerError("shell_syntax_denied")
+        executable = shutil.which(argv[0])
+        if not executable:
+            raise RunnerError("executable_not_found")
+        if self.config.executable_allowlist and not any(
+            os.path.realpath(executable).startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
+            or os.path.realpath(executable) == os.path.realpath(prefix)
+            for prefix in self.config.executable_allowlist
+        ):
+            raise RunnerError("executable_not_allowlisted")
+        real_cwd = os.path.realpath(os.fspath(cwd))
+        if self.config.working_directory_allowlist and not any(
+            real_cwd == os.path.realpath(prefix)
+            or real_cwd.startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
+            for prefix in self.config.working_directory_allowlist
+        ):
+            raise RunnerError("working_directory_not_allowlisted")
+        if self.config.environment_allowlist and any(key not in self.config.environment_allowlist for key in env):
+            raise RunnerError("environment_key_not_allowlisted")
+
+    def execute_argv(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.validate_execution(argv, cwd, env)
+        completed = subprocess.run(list(argv), cwd=os.fspath(cwd), env=dict(env), shell=False, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
+        return {"returncode": completed.returncode, "stdout": completed.stdout, "stderr": completed.stderr}

active-runtime/app/agent_pull_runner_cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Small operational CLI for the Agent Pull Runner contract."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+
+from agent_pull_runner import AgentPullRunner, RunnerConfig
+
+
+class _NoopTransport:
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id, capabilities): return {"status": "registered", "worker_id": worker_id, "capabilities": list(capabilities)}
+    def heartbeat(self, worker_id): return {"status": "alive", "worker_id": worker_id}
+    def long_poll(self, worker_id, timeout_seconds): return None
+    def poll(self, worker_id): return None
+    def claim(self, worker_id, task): return task
+    def renew(self, worker_id, task_id): return {"status": "renewed", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_progress(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "progress_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_result(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "result_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_evidence(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "evidence_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS Agent Pull Runner")
+    parser.add_argument("--worker-id", default="self-test-worker")
+    parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    runner = AgentPullRunner(RunnerConfig(worker_id=args.worker_id, fallback_seconds=60), _NoopTransport())
+    if args.self_test:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "PASS", "registration": runner.register(), "fallback_seconds": runner.config.fallback_seconds}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    print(json.dumps({"status": "READY", "worker_id": args.worker_id}, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_api_lineage_supersession.py

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+"""Staging HTTP overlay for the exact Task lineage supersession capability."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession import (
+    DECISION_SCHEMA,
+    TaskLineageSupersessionController,
+    TaskLineageSupersessionError,
+)
+
+SUPERSESSION_ROUTE = "/v1/control/task-lineage-supersession"
+
+
+def _status(error: TaskLineageSupersessionError) -> int:
+    return error.http_status
+
+
+class LineageSupersessionEndpoint:
+    """Framework-neutral endpoint; authentication must precede all parsing/mutation."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path,
+        verifier,
+        authenticate_control: Callable[[Mapping[str, str]], Any],
+        *,
+        clock=None,
+        identity_digest=None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.authenticate_control = authenticate_control
+        self.controller = TaskLineageSupersessionController(
+            db_path, verifier, clock=clock, identity_digest=identity_digest
+        )
+
+    def post(self, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        self.authenticate_control(headers)
+        try:
+            result = self.controller.supersede(body)
+        except TaskLineageSupersessionError as exc:
+            return _status(exc), {"error": exc.code}
+        return (200 if result.get("idempotent") else 201), result
+
+
+def build_runtime():
+    """Bind to the already-active recovery API and its formal Owner verifier lazily."""
+    try:
+        from aios_agent_task_api import APIConfig
+        from aios_agent_task_api_p0_failed_lease_recovery import (
+            P0FailedLeaseRecoveryHandler,
+            P0FailedLeaseRecoveryTaskApplication,
+        )
+        from aios_agent_task_protocol import TaskProtocolError
+        from aios_owner_approval_verifier import (
+            GrantRootOwnerApprovalVerifier,
+            OwnerApprovalVerifierError,
+        )
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_RUNTIME_OVERLAY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+    # The active entrypoint layers failed- and active-lease recovery on top of
+    # expired recovery.  Inherit that current layer so adding lineage does not
+    # silently remove either already-deployed recovery route.
+    class Application(P0FailedLeaseRecoveryTaskApplication):
+        def __init__(self, config: Any) -> None:
+            super().__init__(config)
+            try:
+                verifier = GrantRootOwnerApprovalVerifier()
+            except OwnerApprovalVerifierError as exc:
+                raise TaskProtocolError(str(exc), 503) from exc
+            self.lineage_supersession = LineageSupersessionEndpoint(
+                config.db_path, verifier, self.authenticate_control
+            )
+
+        def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+            value = dict(super().health())
+            value.update({
+                "task_lineage_supersession": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_schema": DECISION_SCHEMA,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_exact_scope": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_exact_cas": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_append_only": True,
+                "task_lineage_supersession_caller_payload": False,
+            })
+            return value
+
+    class Handler(P0FailedLeaseRecoveryHandler):
+        app: Application | None = None
+
+        def do_POST(self) -> None:
+            path = urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+            if path != SUPERSESSION_ROUTE:
+                super().do_POST()
+                return
+
+            def action() -> None:
+                if self.app is None:
+                    raise TaskProtocolError("SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+                status, result = self.app.lineage_supersession.post(
+                    self._headers(), self._body()
+                )
+                if "error" in result:
+                    raise TaskProtocolError(str(result["error"]), status)
+                self._json(result, status)
+
+            self._run(action)
+
+    return APIConfig, Application, Handler
+
+
+def serve(config=None) -> None:
+    APIConfig, Application, Handler = build_runtime()
+    config = config or APIConfig.from_env()
+    application = Application(config)
+    Handler.app = application
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((config.host, config.port), Handler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_projection_recovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,811 @@
+"""Canonical Task projection intent and same-identity recovery primitives.
+
+This module is intentionally Task-Plane-owned.  It does not open a network
+listener and it does not authenticate callers; existing control-plane services
+must enforce their normal service-side ``agent-task:control`` boundary before
+calling it.
+
+The recovery primitive has one purpose: converge a durable, complete
+ProjectionIntent to exactly one canonical Task row.  It never fabricates task
+semantics from a Bridge binding and it never generates a replacement task id.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+TASK_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+JOB_ID_RE = TASK_ID_RE
+SHA40_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SHA64_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]{1,220}$")
+SCHEMA = "aios.canonical-task-projection-intent.v1"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.canonical-task-projection-receipt.v1"
+
+
+class ProjectionRecoveryError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+class ProjectionState(str, Enum):
+    PENDING = "PENDING"
+    CONVERGED = "CONVERGED"
+    DRIFT = "DRIFT"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+    BACKFILL_REQUIRED = "BACKFILL_REQUIRED"
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    result = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(result) is None:
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return result
+
+
+def _integer(value: object, code: str, *, minimum: int = 0) -> int:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or value < minimum:
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def _plain_mapping(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return {str(k): v for k, v in value.items()}
+
+
+def _plain_list(value: object, code: str) -> list[Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, list):
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError(code, 400)
+    return list(value)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CanonicalTaskPayload:
+    task_id: str
+    goal: str
+    instructions: str
+    success_criteria: tuple[Mapping[str, Any], ...]
+    constraints: Mapping[str, Any]
+    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+    metadata: Mapping[str, Any]
+    priority: int = 100
+    max_attempts: int = 20
+    deadline: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalTaskPayload":
+        allowed = {
+            "task_id",
+            "goal",
+            "instructions",
+            "success_criteria",
+            "constraints",
+            "required_capabilities",
+            "metadata",
+            "priority",
+            "max_attempts",
+            "deadline",
+        }
+        if set(value) - allowed:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_PAYLOAD_UNKNOWN_FIELDS", 400)
+
+        task_id = _string(value.get("task_id"), "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_ID_RE)
+        goal = _string(value.get("goal"), "TASK_GOAL_INVALID")
+        instructions = _string(value.get("instructions"), "TASK_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+        if len(goal) > 8192 or len(instructions) > 65536:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_TEXT_TOO_LARGE", 413)
+
+        criteria_raw = _plain_list(value.get("success_criteria"), "TASK_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criteria: list[Mapping[str, Any]] = []
+        for item in criteria_raw:
+            if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+                raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID", 400)
+            criteria.append(dict(item))
+        if not criteria:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_REQUIRED", 400)
+
+        constraints = _plain_mapping(value.get("constraints"), "TASK_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+        capabilities_raw = _plain_list(
+            value.get("required_capabilities", []),
+            "TASK_CAPABILITIES_INVALID",
+        )
+        capabilities: list[str] = []
+        for item in capabilities_raw:
+            capabilities.append(_string(item, "TASK_CAPABILITY_INVALID"))
+
+        # Recovery recreates the pristine canonical row. Initial execution
+        # projection remains the sole owner of runtime capabilities.
+        if capabilities:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                "TASK_RECOVERY_REQUIRES_PRISTINE_CAPABILITIES",
+                409,
+            )
+
+        metadata = _plain_mapping(value.get("metadata", {}), "TASK_METADATA_INVALID")
+        if "execution" in metadata or "execution_projection" in metadata:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                "TASK_RECOVERY_REQUIRES_PRISTINE_METADATA",
+                409,
+            )
+
+        priority = _integer(value.get("priority", 100), "TASK_PRIORITY_INVALID", minimum=0)
+        max_attempts = _integer(
+            value.get("max_attempts", 20),
+            "TASK_MAX_ATTEMPTS_INVALID",
+            minimum=1,
+        )
+        deadline = value.get("deadline")
+        if deadline is not None:
+            deadline = _string(deadline, "TASK_DEADLINE_INVALID")
+
+        return cls(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            goal=goal,
+            instructions=instructions,
+            success_criteria=tuple(criteria),
+            constraints=constraints,
+            required_capabilities=tuple(capabilities),
+            metadata=metadata,
+            priority=priority,
+            max_attempts=max_attempts,
+            deadline=deadline,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "goal": self.goal,
+            "instructions": self.instructions,
+            "success_criteria": [dict(x) for x in self.success_criteria],
+            "constraints": dict(self.constraints),
+            "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),
+            "metadata": dict(self.metadata),
+            "priority": self.priority,
+            "max_attempts": self.max_attempts,
+            "deadline": self.deadline,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.public())
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedProjectionBinding:
+    governed_task_id: str
+    bridge_job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch: str
+    generation: int
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedProjectionBinding":
+        allowed = {
+            "governed_task_id",
+            "bridge_job_id",
+            "repository",
+            "branch",
+            "generation",
+            "base_oid",
+            "expected_branch_oid",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("GOVERNED_BINDING_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        repository = _string(value["repository"], "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("REPOSITORY_MISMATCH", 409)
+        return cls(
+            governed_task_id=_string(
+                value["governed_task_id"],
+                "GOVERNED_TASK_ID_INVALID",
+                TASK_ID_RE,
+            ),
+            bridge_job_id=_string(
+                value["bridge_job_id"],
+                "BRIDGE_JOB_ID_INVALID",
+                JOB_ID_RE,
+            ),
+            repository=repository,
+            branch=_string(value["branch"], "BRANCH_INVALID", BRANCH_RE),
+            generation=_integer(value["generation"], "GENERATION_INVALID", minimum=1),
+            base_oid=_string(value["base_oid"], "BASE_OID_INVALID", SHA40_RE),
+            expected_branch_oid=_string(
+                value["expected_branch_oid"],
+                "EXPECTED_OID_INVALID",
+                SHA40_RE,
+            ),
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ProjectionSourceArtifact:
+    ref: str
+    sha256: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ProjectionSourceArtifact":
+        if set(value) != {"ref", "sha256"}:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        return cls(
+            ref=_string(value["ref"], "SOURCE_ARTIFACT_REF_INVALID"),
+            sha256=_string(value["sha256"], "SOURCE_ARTIFACT_SHA_INVALID", SHA64_RE),
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent:
+    projection_id: str
+    projection_generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    task: CanonicalTaskPayload
+    binding: GovernedProjectionBinding
+    source_artifact: ProjectionSourceArtifact
+    schema: str = SCHEMA
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent":
+        allowed = {
+            "schema",
+            "projection_id",
+            "projection_generation",
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "task",
+            "governed_binding",
+            "source_artifact",
+            "task_payload_sha256",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_INTENT_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        if value["schema"] != SCHEMA:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_INTENT_SCHEMA_INVALID", 400)
+
+        task = CanonicalTaskPayload.from_mapping(
+            _plain_mapping(value["task"], "TASK_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
+        )
+        binding = GovernedProjectionBinding.from_mapping(
+            _plain_mapping(value["governed_binding"], "GOVERNED_BINDING_INVALID")
+        )
+        source = ProjectionSourceArtifact.from_mapping(
+            _plain_mapping(value["source_artifact"], "SOURCE_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+        )
+        if binding.governed_task_id != task.task_id:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_TASK_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+        expected_hash = _string(
+            value["task_payload_sha256"],
+            "TASK_PAYLOAD_SHA_INVALID",
+            SHA64_RE,
+        )
+        if task.payload_sha256 != expected_hash:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_PAYLOAD_SHA_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+        projection_id = _string(
+            value["projection_id"],
+            "PROJECTION_ID_INVALID",
+            TASK_ID_RE,
+        )
+        idempotency_key = _string(
+            value["idempotency_key"],
+            "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID",
+            TASK_ID_RE,
+        )
+        generation = _integer(
+            value["projection_generation"],
+            "PROJECTION_GENERATION_INVALID",
+            minimum=1,
+        )
+        return cls(
+            projection_id=projection_id,
+            projection_generation=generation,
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            task=task,
+            binding=binding,
+            source_artifact=source,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": self.schema,
+            "projection_id": self.projection_id,
+            "projection_generation": self.projection_generation,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "task": self.task.public(),
+            "governed_binding": self.binding.public(),
+            "source_artifact": asdict(self.source_artifact),
+            "task_payload_sha256": self.task.payload_sha256,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def request_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.public())
+
+
+class CanonicalTaskProjectionStore:
+    """Task-Plane-owned intent/recovery store.
+
+    The caller must already be inside the Task Plane authorization boundary.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path | str) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(connection: sqlite3.Connection, table: str) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {
+            str(row["name"]): row
+            for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _table_names(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> set[str]:
+        return {
+            str(row[0])
+            for row in connection.execute(
+                "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'"
+            )
+        }
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _event_table(
+        cls,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+    ) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = cls._table_names(connection)
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name in tables:
+                columns = cls._columns(connection, name)
+                if "task_id" in columns and "event_type" in columns:
+                    return name, columns
+        raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_control_tables(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_projection_intents (
+              projection_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              bridge_job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              projection_generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              task_payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              intent_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+              state TEXT NOT NULL,
+              last_error TEXT,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              UNIQUE(task_id, projection_generation),
+              UNIQUE(task_id, idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_projection_receipts (
+              projection_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              bridge_job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              projection_generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              task_payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              canonical_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              state TEXT NOT NULL,
+              created_new_row INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              observed_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    def persist_intent(
+        self,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = _now()
+        request_sha = intent.request_sha256
+        intent_text = _canonical(intent.public()).decode("utf-8")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_control_tables(connection)
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM task_projection_intents
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND projection_generation=?
+                """,
+                (intent.task.task_id, intent.projection_generation),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                if (
+                    str(existing["projection_id"]) != intent.projection_id
+                    or str(existing["idempotency_key"]) != intent.idempotency_key
+                    or str(existing["request_sha256"]) != request_sha
+                ):
+                    raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                        "PROJECTION_INTENT_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT",
+                        409,
+                    )
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+                    "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+                    "state": str(existing["state"]),
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_projection_intents(
+                  projection_id,task_id,bridge_job_id,projection_generation,
+                  idempotency_key,request_sha256,task_payload_sha256,intent_json,
+                  state,last_error,created_at,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    intent.projection_id,
+                    intent.task.task_id,
+                    intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+                    intent.projection_generation,
+                    intent.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    intent.task.payload_sha256,
+                    intent_text,
+                    ProjectionState.PENDING.value,
+                    None,
+                    now,
+                    now,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+                "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+                "state": ProjectionState.PENDING.value,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+
+    def _task_row_payload(
+        self,
+        row: sqlite3.Row,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            success = json.loads(row["success_criteria_json"])
+            constraints = json.loads(row["constraints_json"])
+            capabilities = json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"])
+            metadata = json.loads(row["metadata_json"])
+        except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("CANONICAL_TASK_JSON_INVALID", 409) from exc
+
+        if (
+            not isinstance(success, list)
+            or not isinstance(constraints, Mapping)
+            or not isinstance(capabilities, list)
+            or not isinstance(metadata, Mapping)
+        ):
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("CANONICAL_TASK_SHAPE_INVALID", 409)
+
+        return {
+            "task_id": str(row["task_id"]),
+            "goal": str(row["goal"]),
+            "instructions": str(row["instructions"]),
+            "success_criteria": success,
+            "constraints": dict(constraints),
+            "required_capabilities": capabilities,
+            "metadata": dict(metadata),
+            "priority": int(row["priority"]),
+            "max_attempts": int(row["max_attempts"]),
+            "deadline": row["deadline"],
+        }
+
+    def _verify_existing_task(
+        self,
+        row: sqlite3.Row,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> int:
+        observed = self._task_row_payload(row)
+        observed_hash = sha256_json(observed)
+        if observed_hash != intent.task.payload_sha256:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                "CANONICAL_TASK_PROJECTION_IDENTITY_CONFLICT",
+                409,
+            )
+        return int(row["revision"])
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required_task_columns() -> set[str]:
+        return {
+            "task_id",
+            "goal",
+            "instructions",
+            "success_criteria_json",
+            "required_capabilities_json",
+            "constraints_json",
+            "metadata_json",
+            "priority",
+            "max_attempts",
+            "attempt",
+            "status",
+            "claimed_by",
+            "lease_token_hash",
+            "lease_expires_at",
+            "result_json",
+            "verification_json",
+            "revision",
+            "created_at",
+            "updated_at",
+        }
+
+    def _insert_task(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> int:
+        columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+        if not self._required_task_columns().issubset(columns):
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_SCHEMA_RECOVERY_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+        now = _now()
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+            "goal": intent.task.goal,
+            "instructions": intent.task.instructions,
+            "success_criteria_json": _canonical(
+                [dict(x) for x in intent.task.success_criteria]
+            ).decode("utf-8"),
+            "required_capabilities_json": "[]",
+            "constraints_json": _canonical(dict(intent.task.constraints)).decode("utf-8"),
+            "metadata_json": _canonical(dict(intent.task.metadata)).decode("utf-8"),
+            "deadline": intent.task.deadline,
+            "priority": intent.task.priority,
+            "max_attempts": intent.task.max_attempts,
+            "attempt": 0,
+            "status": "QUEUED",
+            "claimed_by": None,
+            "lease_token_hash": None,
+            "lease_expires_at": None,
+            "result_json": None,
+            "verification_json": None,
+            "revision": 1,
+            "created_at": now,
+            "updated_at": now,
+        }
+        for optional in (
+            "result_digest",
+            "result_idempotency_key",
+        ):
+            if optional in columns:
+                values[optional] = None
+
+        names = [name for name in values if name in columns]
+        placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in names)
+        connection.execute(
+            f'INSERT INTO tasks ({",".join(chr(34)+n+chr(34) for n in names)}) '
+            f"VALUES ({placeholders})",
+            tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+        )
+        self._insert_task_created_event(connection, intent)
+        return 1
+
+    def _insert_task_created_event(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = self._event_table(connection)
+        event = {
+            "schema": "aios.task-projection-recovery.event.v1",
+            "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+            "bridge_job_id": intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+            "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+            "projection_generation": intent.projection_generation,
+            "task_payload_sha256": intent.task.payload_sha256,
+            "source_artifact_ref": intent.source_artifact.ref,
+            "source_artifact_sha256": intent.source_artifact.sha256,
+            "recovery": True,
+        }
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+            "event_type": "TASK_CREATED",
+        }
+        payload_text = _canonical(event).decode("utf-8")
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "control-plane-projection-recovery"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "control-plane-projection-recovery"
+
+        names = list(values)
+        connection.execute(
+            f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({",".join(chr(34)+n+chr(34) for n in names)}) '
+            f'VALUES ({",".join("?" for _ in names)})',
+            tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+        )
+
+    def reconcile(
+        self,
+        intent: CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        # Persist first so a crash before Task creation leaves a durable PENDING
+        # intent for startup/supervisor reconciliation.
+        self.persist_intent(intent)
+
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_control_tables(connection)
+            existing_receipt = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_projection_receipts WHERE projection_id=?",
+                (intent.projection_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing_receipt is not None:
+                if (
+                    str(existing_receipt["task_id"]) != intent.task.task_id
+                    or str(existing_receipt["bridge_job_id"]) != intent.binding.bridge_job_id
+                    or str(existing_receipt["task_payload_sha256"])
+                    != intent.task.payload_sha256
+                ):
+                    raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                        "PROJECTION_RECEIPT_IDENTITY_CONFLICT",
+                        409,
+                    )
+                connection.commit()
+                receipt = json.loads(existing_receipt["receipt_json"])
+                receipt["idempotent"] = True
+                return receipt
+
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+                (intent.task.task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            created_new = False
+            if row is None:
+                revision = self._insert_task(connection, intent)
+                created_new = True
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+                    (intent.task.task_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    raise ProjectionRecoveryError(
+                        "TASK_RECOVERY_OBSERVATION_FAILED",
+                        503,
+                    )
+            else:
+                revision = self._verify_existing_task(row, intent)
+
+            # Observation after mutation is mandatory.
+            revision = self._verify_existing_task(row, intent)
+            observed_at = _now()
+            receipt = {
+                "schema": RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+                "projection_id": intent.projection_id,
+                "governed_task_id": intent.binding.governed_task_id,
+                "canonical_task_id": intent.task.task_id,
+                "bridge_job_id": intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+                "projection_generation": intent.projection_generation,
+                "task_payload_sha256": intent.task.payload_sha256,
+                "canonical_revision": revision,
+                "state": ProjectionState.CONVERGED.value,
+                "created_new_row": created_new,
+                "source_artifact": asdict(intent.source_artifact),
+                "observed_at": observed_at,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_projection_receipts(
+                  projection_id,task_id,bridge_job_id,projection_generation,
+                  task_payload_sha256,canonical_revision,state,created_new_row,
+                  observed_at,receipt_json
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    intent.projection_id,
+                    intent.task.task_id,
+                    intent.binding.bridge_job_id,
+                    intent.projection_generation,
+                    intent.task.payload_sha256,
+                    revision,
+                    ProjectionState.CONVERGED.value,
+                    1 if created_new else 0,
+                    observed_at,
+                    _canonical(receipt).decode("utf-8"),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE task_projection_intents
+                   SET state=?, last_error=NULL, updated_at=?
+                 WHERE projection_id=?
+                """,
+                (
+                    ProjectionState.CONVERGED.value,
+                    observed_at,
+                    intent.projection_id,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return receipt
+
+    def get_projection(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        task_id = _string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_ID_RE)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._ensure_control_tables(connection)
+            intent = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM task_projection_intents
+                 WHERE task_id=?
+                 ORDER BY projection_generation DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if intent is None:
+                return None
+            receipt = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT receipt_json FROM task_projection_receipts WHERE projection_id=?",
+                (intent["projection_id"],),
+            ).fetchone()
+            return {
+                "projection_id": intent["projection_id"],
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "bridge_job_id": intent["bridge_job_id"],
+                "projection_generation": int(intent["projection_generation"]),
+                "state": intent["state"],
+                "last_error": intent["last_error"],
+                "task_payload_sha256": intent["task_payload_sha256"],
+                "receipt": json.loads(receipt[0]) if receipt else None,
+            }

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_projection_recovery_http.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+"""HTTP integration helpers for canonical Task projection recovery.
+
+This module intentionally contains no HTTP server. Existing Task Plane /
+projection-owner handlers should call ``recover_from_json`` only after their
+normal service-side ``agent-task:control`` authorization succeeds.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_agent_task_projection_recovery import (
+    CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent,
+    CanonicalTaskProjectionStore,
+    ProjectionRecoveryError,
+)
+
+
+def recover_from_json(
+    db_path: Path | str,
+    task_id: str,
+    body: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        intent = CanonicalTaskProjectionIntent.from_mapping(body)
+        if intent.task.task_id != task_id:
+            raise ProjectionRecoveryError("PROJECTION_TASK_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409)
+        result = CanonicalTaskProjectionStore(db_path).reconcile(intent)
+        return (200 if result.get("idempotent") else 201), result
+    except ProjectionRecoveryError as exc:
+        return exc.status, {"error": exc.code}
+
+
+def get_projection(
+    db_path: Path | str,
+    task_id: str,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        result = CanonicalTaskProjectionStore(db_path).get_projection(task_id)
+    except ProjectionRecoveryError as exc:
+        return exc.status, {"error": exc.code}
+    if result is None:
+        return 404, {"error": "TASK_PROJECTION_NOT_FOUND"}
+    return 200, result

active-runtime/app/aios_authority_git_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+"""Fail-closed Authority Git side-effect boundary.
+
+Only this module may issue the narrowly scoped ref CAS primitives used by the
+durable executor. It never accepts force updates, arbitrary refs, tags, or
+direct production mutations.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+from typing import Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^refs/heads/agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+
+
+class AuthorityGitError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise AuthorityGitError(f"{field}_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AuthorityGitExecutor:
+    git_dir: Path
+    worktree_root: Path = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/worktrees")
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.git_dir.is_absolute() or self.git_dir.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR_INVALID")
+        if not self.worktree_root.is_absolute() or self.worktree_root.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ROOT_INVALID")
+
+    def _git(self, args: Sequence[str], *, check: bool = True) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if check and result.returncode != 0:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_GIT_COMMAND_FAILED")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def read_ref(self, ref: str) -> str | None:
+        if not ref.startswith("refs/") or ref.startswith(("refs/tags/", "refs/remotes/")):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("REF_READ_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        value = self._git(["rev-parse", "--verify", ref], check=False)
+        return value if value and OID_RE.fullmatch(value) else None
+
+    def commit_exists(self, oid: str) -> bool:
+        _oid(oid, "commit_oid")
+        result = subprocess.run(["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "cat-file", "-e", oid + "^{commit}"], capture_output=True, check=False)
+        return result.returncode == 0
+
+    def ancestry_check(self, older_oid: str, newer_oid: str) -> bool:
+        _oid(older_oid, "older_oid")
+        _oid(newer_oid, "newer_oid")
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", older_oid, newer_oid],
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if result.returncode not in (0, 1):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("ANCESTRY_CHECK_FAILED")
+        return result.returncode == 0
+
+    def create_detached_worktree(
+        self,
+        base_oid: str,
+        worktree_name: str,
+        root: Path | None = None,
+    ) -> Path:
+        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
+        if not worktree_name or "/" in worktree_name or "\\" in worktree_name or worktree_name in {".", ".."}:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_NAME_INVALID")
+        parent = root or self.worktree_root
+        if not parent.is_absolute() or parent.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ROOT_INVALID")
+        path = parent / worktree_name
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(path), base_oid])
+        return path
+
+    def create_task_branch(self, branch: str, base_oid: str) -> str:
+        """Create an isolated agent branch once, using an empty-ref CAS."""
+        ref = branch if branch.startswith("refs/heads/") else "refs/heads/" + branch
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(ref):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
+        if not self.commit_exists(base_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
+        current = self.read_ref(ref)
+        if current is not None:
+            if current == base_oid:
+                return current
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        self._git(["update-ref", ref, base_oid, "0" * 40])
+        readback = self.read_ref(ref)
+        if readback != base_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def advance_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        current = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if current != expected_oid:
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return new_oid
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_oid, new_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        self._git(["update-ref", branch, new_oid, expected_oid])
+        readback = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def ff_CAS_main_after_verified_protected_merge(self, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_oid, new_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("MAIN_FF_REQUIRED")
+        current = self.read_ref("refs/heads/main")
+        if current != expected_oid:
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return new_oid
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        self._git(["update-ref", "refs/heads/main", new_oid, expected_oid])
+        readback = self.read_ref("refs/heads/main")
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def commit_file_in_isolated_worktree(
+        self,
+        *,
+        base_oid: str,
+        files: Mapping[str, bytes],
+        message: str,
+        worktree_name: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
+        if not worktree_name or "/" in worktree_name or "\\" in worktree_name or worktree_name in {".", ".."}:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_NAME_INVALID")
+        root = self.worktree_root / worktree_name
+        if root.exists() or root.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        self.worktree_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(root), base_oid])
+        try:
+            for relative, content in files.items():
+                path = Path(relative)
+                if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or not path.parts or path.parts[0] == ".git":
+                    raise AuthorityGitError("FILE_PATH_INVALID")
+                target = root / path
+                target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+                target.write_bytes(content)
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "-C", str(root), "add", "--", *files.keys()],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ADD_FAILED")
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "-C", str(root), "-c", "user.name=aios-durable-job", "-c", "user.email=aios-durable-job@localhost", "commit", "--no-verify", "-m", message],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_COMMIT_FAILED")
+            return subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(root), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
+        finally:
+            subprocess.run(["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "worktree", "remove", "--force", str(root)], capture_output=True, check=False)

active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""HTTP adapter for Owner-authorized task writer provisioning.
+
+Run this module instead of aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py. All existing routes are
+delegated unchanged; only POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized is added.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+
+import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
+    AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner,
+    OwnerContext,
+    ProvisioningError,
+)
+
+
+_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/task-writer/provision-authorized"
+
+
+def _owner_authorization(handler):
+    scope = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE", "writer:provision"
+    )
+    auth = handler.need(scope)
+    if not auth:
+        return None
+    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    identity = str(auth.get("account") or "").strip()
+    if not identity:
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    return auth
+
+
+def _authorized_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != _ENDPOINT:
+        return _original_do_post(self)
+    auth = _owner_authorization(self)
+    if not auth:
+        return
+    data = self.body()
+    owner_reference = str(data.get("owner_authorization_reference") or "")
+    try:
+        result = AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner().provision(
+            data,
+            OwnerContext(
+                identity=str(auth["account"]),
+                role=str(auth["role"]),
+                authorization_reference=owner_reference,
+            ),
+        )
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except ProvisioningError as exc:
+        body = {"error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
+    except Exception:
+        # Do not expose tool output, paths containing credentials, or traceback data.
+        return self.sendj({"error": "AUTHORIZED_WRITER_BRIDGE_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500)
+
+
+api.H.do_POST = _authorized_do_post
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    api.main()

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+"""Implementation Baseline 1.1 integrations for existing AIOS authorities."""
+BASELINE_VERSION = '1.1'

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+"""Executable validation profile and thin Action client.
+
+This supplied ZIP does not establish the online Task authority. Consequently
+the runnable profile creates an explicitly isolated validation authority. Online
+activation requires the authority mapping gates documented in this package.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import secrets
+import re
+import signal
+import stat
+import threading
+import time
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey,Ed25519PublicKey
+from task_plane.store import TaskPlaneStore
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import JobStore
+from .authorization import AuthorizationService,sign_owner_delegation_grant
+from .host import SystemdHost
+from .lineage import LineageLedger
+from .operations import OperationRegistry
+from .runtime_contract import validate_contract
+from .service import BaselineService,Identity
+from .worker_policy import WorkerProfile
+
+
+def _unique_object(pairs):
+    result={}
+    for key,value in pairs:
+        if key in result: raise ValueError('DUPLICATE_JSON_KEY')
+        result[key]=value
+    return result
+
+
+def read_json(path):
+    return json.loads(_safe_read(Path(path).absolute()).decode('utf-8'),object_pairs_hook=_unique_object,
+        parse_constant=lambda _value: (_ for _ in ()).throw(ValueError('NON_FINITE_JSON')))
+
+
+def _path(value):
+    if not isinstance(value,str): raise ValueError('PATH_INVALID')
+    prefix='${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/'
+    if value.startswith(prefix):
+        directory=os.environ.get('CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY')
+        name=value[len(prefix):]
+        if not directory or '/' in name or name in ('','.','..'): raise ValueError('CREDENTIAL_PATH_INVALID')
+        value=str(Path(directory)/name)
+    if '$' in value or not Path(value).is_absolute() or '..' in Path(value).parts:
+        raise ValueError('PATH_MUST_BE_EXPLICIT_ABSOLUTE')
+    return Path(value)
+
+
+def _safe_read(path,*,private=False):
+    path=_path(str(path))
+    fd=os.open(path,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW|os.O_CLOEXEC)
+    try:
+        info=os.fstat(fd)
+        forbidden=0o077 if private else 0o022
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid not in {0,os.geteuid()} or info.st_mode & forbidden or info.st_size>65536:
+            raise ValueError('CONFIG_OR_SECRET_FILE_PERMISSIONS_INVALID')
+        with os.fdopen(fd,'rb',closefd=False) as stream:
+            data=stream.read(65537)
+        if len(data)>65536: raise ValueError('CONFIG_OR_SECRET_FILE_TOO_LARGE')
+        return data
+    finally: os.close(fd)
+
+
+def secret(path):
+    return _safe_read(path,private=True)
+
+
+def load_configuration(path):
+    config=read_json(path)
+    required={'schema','profile','state_dir','listen','machine_key_id','machine_key_file',
+        'owner_public_key_files','owner_key_scopes','identities','workers','contracts','operations','host_bindings'}
+    if type(config) is not dict or set(config)-{'receipt_public_key_files'}!=required or config['schema']!='aios.baseline-server-config.v1':
+        raise ValueError('SERVER_CONFIG_FIELDS_INVALID')
+    if config['profile']!='isolated-validation': raise ValueError('PROFILE_REQUIRES_VERIFIED_AUTHORITY_ADAPTER')
+    listen=config['listen']
+    if type(listen) is not dict or set(listen)!={'host','port'} or listen['host']!='127.0.0.1' or type(listen['port']) is not int or not 1024<=listen['port']<=65535:
+        raise ValueError('LOOPBACK_LISTENER_REQUIRED')
+    state=_path(config['state_dir'])
+    if state.is_symlink() or state==Path('/') or state.name in {'aios','active-runtime','app'}:
+        raise ValueError('ISOLATED_STATE_PATH_REQUIRED')
+    if not isinstance(config['machine_key_id'],str) or not config['machine_key_id']: raise ValueError('MACHINE_ID_REQUIRED')
+    machine=serialization.load_pem_private_key(secret(config['machine_key_file']),password=None)
+    if not isinstance(machine,Ed25519PrivateKey): raise ValueError('ED25519_MACHINE_KEY_REQUIRED')
+    keys={}
+    for key_id,filename in config['owner_public_key_files'].items():
+        public=serialization.load_pem_public_key(_safe_read(filename))
+        if not isinstance(public,Ed25519PublicKey): raise ValueError('ED25519_OWNER_KEY_REQUIRED')
+        keys[key_id]=public
+    if not keys: raise ValueError('OWNER_TRUST_ROOT_REQUIRED')
+    receipt_keys={}
+    for key_id,filename in config.get('receipt_public_key_files',{}).items():
+        public=serialization.load_pem_public_key(_safe_read(filename))
+        if not isinstance(public,Ed25519PublicKey): raise ValueError('ED25519_RECEIPT_KEY_REQUIRED')
+        receipt_keys[key_id]=public
+    tokens={}
+    for entry in config['identities']:
+        if type(entry) is not dict or set(entry)-{'token_file','tenant_id','subject_id','role','worker_id'}:
+            raise ValueError('IDENTITY_FIELDS_INVALID')
+        token=secret(entry['token_file']).decode().strip()
+        if len(token)<32 or len(token)>512 or any(x.isspace() for x in token) or token in tokens: raise ValueError('TOKEN_INVALID_OR_DUPLICATE')
+        identity=Identity(**{k:v for k,v in entry.items() if k!='token_file'})
+        if identity.role not in {'user','owner','worker'} or any(not isinstance(v,str) or not v for v in (identity.tenant_id,identity.subject_id)):
+            raise ValueError('IDENTITY_INVALID')
+        if (identity.role=='worker') != bool(identity.worker_id): raise ValueError('WORKER_IDENTITY_INVALID')
+        tokens[token]=identity
+    workers={}
+    for entry in config['workers']:
+        worker=WorkerProfile.from_dict(entry)
+        if worker.worker_id in workers: raise ValueError('WORKER_DUPLICATE')
+        workers[worker.worker_id]=worker
+    for identity in tokens.values():
+        if identity.role=='worker':
+            worker=workers.get(identity.worker_id)
+            if not worker or worker.identity!=identity.subject_id or identity.tenant_id not in worker.tenant_scope:
+                raise ValueError('WORKER_IDENTITY_SCOPE_MISMATCH')
+    contracts=[validate_contract(c) for c in config['contracts']]
+    operations=OperationRegistry(config['operations'])
+    host=SystemdHost(config['host_bindings'])
+    config['_resolved']={'state':state,'machine':machine,'owner_keys':keys,'workers':workers,
+        'contracts':contracts,'operations':operations,'host':host,'tokens':tokens,'receipt_keys':receipt_keys}
+    return config,tokens
+
+
+def build_service(config):
+    resolved=config['_resolved']
+    state=resolved['state']
+    marker=state/'ISOLATED_VALIDATION_AUTHORITY'
+    if state.exists() and not marker.is_file() and any(state.iterdir()):
+        raise ValueError('EXISTING_STATE_AUTHORITY_NOT_IDENTIFIED')
+    if marker.exists() and _safe_read(marker)!=b'aios.baseline.isolated-validation.v1\n':
+        raise ValueError('STATE_AUTHORITY_MARKER_INVALID')
+    state.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True,mode=0o700)
+    if state.stat().st_mode & 0o077: raise ValueError('STATE_DIRECTORY_PERMISSIONS_INVALID')
+    if not marker.exists(): marker.write_text('aios.baseline.isolated-validation.v1\n')
+    auth=AuthorizationService(state/'authorization.sqlite3',resolved['owner_keys'],resolved['machine'],config['machine_key_id'],
+        owner_key_scopes=config['owner_key_scopes'],
+        control_context_verifier=lambda ctx:isinstance(ctx,Identity) and ctx.role=='owner' and any(ctx is known for known in resolved['tokens'].values()))
+    store=TaskPlaneStore(str(state/'tasks.sqlite3'),high_assurance=True)
+    return BaselineService(store,state/'jobs',auth,resolved['contracts'],resolved['operations'],resolved['workers'],
+        resolved['host'],LineageLedger(state/'lineage.sqlite3',store,JobStore(state/'jobs').read),resolved['machine'],
+        machine_key_id=config['machine_key_id'],trusted_receipt_keys=resolved['receipt_keys'])
+
+
+def _write_json(path,value,mode=0o600):
+    data=(json.dumps(value,ensure_ascii=False,sort_keys=True,indent=2,allow_nan=False)+'\n').encode()
+    fd=os.open(path,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,mode)
+    with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out: out.write(data)
+
+
+def initialize_validation(directory,*,unit):
+    """Create explicit local-only example identities, not production trust roots."""
+    directory=Path(directory).absolute()
+    directory.mkdir(mode=0o700)  # Never overwrite an existing installation.
+    # Validate unit syntax before writing any identity material.
+    SystemdHost({'validation:staging:sample':unit})
+    owner=Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+    machine=Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+    for name,key in [('owner-private.pem',owner),('machine-private.pem',machine)]:
+        path=directory/name
+        fd=os.open(path,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600)
+        with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:
+            out.write(key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,serialization.NoEncryption()))
+    (directory/'owner-public.pem').write_bytes(owner.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo))
+    for name in ('user.token','worker.token'):
+        fd=os.open(directory/name,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL,0o600)
+        with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out: out.write(secrets.token_urlsafe(48)+'\n')
+    operation={'operation_id':'service-status','version':1,'effect_class':'READ_ONLY','handler_ref':'host.service_status',
+        'input_schema':'aios.operation.service-status.input.v1','required_permissions':['service-status'],'timeout_seconds':10,
+        'readback':{'mode':'NONE','required':False},'retry':{'mode':'SAFE','max_attempts':2},'reconcile':{'mode':'NONE'},
+        'rollback':{'mode':'NONE'},'owner_boundary':{'mode':'WITHIN_GRANT'}}
+    contract={'contract_schema':'aios.runtime-contract.v1','contract_revision':1,'component_id':'sample','environment':'staging',
+        'tenant_scope':'validation','lifecycle':'active','entrypoints':{'status':{'component_id':'sample','environment':'staging','resolver_ref':'service://sample/status'}},
+        'bindings':{},'resource_refs':{},'credential_refs':{},'operations':['service-status']}
+    config={'schema':'aios.baseline-server-config.v1','profile':'isolated-validation','state_dir':str(directory/'state'),
+        'listen':{'host':'127.0.0.1','port':8769},'machine_key_id':'validation-machine','machine_key_file':str(directory/'machine-private.pem'),
+        'owner_public_key_files':{'validation-owner':str(directory/'owner-public.pem')},
+        'owner_key_scopes':{'validation-owner':{'tenant_ids':['validation'],'subject_ids':['owner']}},
+        'identities':[{'token_file':str(directory/'user.token'),'tenant_id':'validation','subject_id':'owner','role':'owner'},
+                      {'token_file':str(directory/'worker.token'),'tenant_id':'validation','subject_id':'machine-worker','role':'worker','worker_id':'diagnostic-worker'}],
+        'workers':[{'worker_id':'diagnostic-worker','identity':'machine-worker','tenant_scope':['validation'],'subject_scope':['owner'],
+            'capabilities':['service-status'],'priority':10,'fallback_executor':False,'heartbeat_seconds':15,'max_concurrency':1}],
+        'contracts':[contract],'operations':[operation],'host_bindings':{'validation:staging:sample':unit}}
+    _write_json(directory/'server.json',config)
+    _write_json(directory/'worker.json',{'schema':'aios.baseline-worker-config.v1','base_url':'http://127.0.0.1:8769',
+        'token_file':str(directory/'worker.token'),'poll_seconds':2})
+    grant=sign_owner_delegation_grant(owner,'validation-owner',grant_id='validation-grant',generation=1,
+        tenant_id='validation',subject_id='owner',mission_ids=('validation-mission',),task_ids=('*',),operations=('service-status',),
+        component_ids=('sample',),environments=('staging',),issued_at=int(time.time()),validity_mode='UNTIL_REVOKED',max_effects=20)
+    _write_json(directory/'grant.json',grant)
+    _write_json(directory/'goal.json',{'mission_id':'validation-mission','grant_id':'validation-grant','operation':'service-status',
+        'component_id':'sample','environment':'staging','inputs':{},'intent':'检查已绑定 staging 服务并生成诊断结果'})
+    return directory
+
+
+def main(argv=None):
+    parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    sub=parser.add_subparsers(dest='command',required=True)
+    init=sub.add_parser('init-validation');init.add_argument('--directory',required=True);init.add_argument('--service-unit',required=True)
+    for name in ('preflight','server','grant-import','grant-revoke'):
+        item=sub.add_parser(name);item.add_argument('--config',required=True)
+        if name=='grant-import': item.add_argument('--grant',required=True)
+        if name=='grant-revoke':
+            item.add_argument('--grant',required=True);item.add_argument('--owner-token-file',required=True)
+    worker=sub.add_parser('worker');worker.add_argument('--config',required=True);worker.add_argument('--once',action='store_true')
+    for name in ('goal-submit','goal-explain','task-get','task-cancel'):
+        item=sub.add_parser(name);item.add_argument('--base-url',default='http://127.0.0.1:8769');item.add_argument('--token-file',required=True)
+        if name=='goal-submit': item.add_argument('--request',required=True);item.add_argument('--idempotency-key',required=True)
+        elif name=='goal-explain': item.add_argument('--mission-id',required=True)
+        else: item.add_argument('--task-id',required=True)
+    args=parser.parse_args(argv)
+    try:
+        if args.command=='init-validation':
+            print(json.dumps({'profile':'isolated-validation','directory':str(initialize_validation(args.directory,unit=args.service_unit))}));return 0
+        if args.command in {'preflight','server','grant-import','grant-revoke'}:
+            config,tokens=load_configuration(args.config)
+            if args.command=='preflight':
+                print(json.dumps({'status':'CONFIG_VALID','profile':config['profile'],'online_authority':'NOT_VERIFIED',
+                    'production_activation':'BLOCKED','registered_operations':len(config['operations'])}));return 0
+            service=build_service(config)
+            if args.command=='grant-import':
+                grant=service.authorization.register_grant(read_json(args.grant))
+                print(json.dumps({'grant_id':grant['payload']['grant_id'],'registered':True}));return 0
+            if args.command=='grant-revoke':
+                context=tokens.get(secret(args.owner_token_file).decode().strip())
+                grant=read_json(args.grant)
+                payload=grant['payload']
+                if context is None or context.role!='owner' or payload['tenant_id']!=context.tenant_id or payload['subject_id']!=context.subject_id:
+                    raise ValueError('OWNER_SCOPE_DENIED')
+                # Register verifies signature and ID before a target can be revoked.
+                service.authorization.register_grant(grant)
+                generation=service.authorization.revoke_grant(payload['grant_id'],control_context=context)
+                print(json.dumps({'grant_id':payload['grant_id'],'revocation_generation':generation}));return 0
+            from .transport import serve
+            server=serve(service,tokens,**config['listen'])
+            stop=threading.Event()
+            def recover_loop():
+                while not stop.wait(5):
+                    try: service.recover()
+                    except Exception: service.storage_blocked=True
+            recovery=threading.Thread(target=recover_loop,daemon=True);recovery.start()
+            def shutdown(_signal,_frame):
+                stop.set();threading.Thread(target=server.shutdown,daemon=True).start()
+            signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM,shutdown);signal.signal(signal.SIGINT,shutdown)
+            print(json.dumps({'status':'LISTENING','host':config['listen']['host'],'port':config['listen']['port'],'profile':config['profile']}),flush=True)
+            try: server.serve_forever(poll_interval=0.5)
+            finally: stop.set();server.server_close()
+            return 0
+        from .transport import HttpTransport
+        if args.command=='worker':
+            from .worker import OperationWorker
+            config=read_json(args.config)
+            if type(config) is not dict or set(config)!={'schema','base_url','token_file','poll_seconds'} or config['schema']!='aios.baseline-worker-config.v1': raise ValueError('WORKER_CONFIG_INVALID')
+            transport=HttpTransport(config['base_url'],secret(config['token_file']).decode().strip(),timeout_seconds=20)
+            worker=OperationWorker(transport,poll_seconds=config['poll_seconds'])
+            if args.once: print(json.dumps(worker.run_once(),ensure_ascii=False));return 0
+            worker.run_forever();return 0
+        transport=HttpTransport(args.base_url,secret(args.token_file).decode().strip(),timeout_seconds=20)
+        if args.command=='goal-submit': result=transport.submit_goal(read_json(args.request),idempotency_key=args.idempotency_key)
+        elif args.command=='goal-explain': result=transport.explain(args.mission_id)
+        elif args.command=='task-get': result=transport.get_task(args.task_id)
+        else: result=transport.cancel_task(args.task_id)
+        print(json.dumps(result,ensure_ascii=False,indent=2,allow_nan=False));return 0
+    except (Exception,KeyboardInterrupt) as exc:
+        # Avoid dumping request bodies, credential material or Python tracebacks.
+        text=str(exc)
+        code=text if re.fullmatch(r'[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,100}',text) else getattr(exc,'code',type(exc).__name__)
+        print(json.dumps({'status':'ERROR','error_type':type(exc).__name__,'code':code,'message':'See local configuration and acceptance runbook; no action was reported successful.'}))
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__=='__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/evidence.py

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+"""Canonical, domain-separated machine receipts, distinct from Owner grants."""
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+
+
+def canonical(value):
+    return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False,allow_nan=False).encode()
+
+
+def digest(value):
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+class ReceiptSigner:
+    def __init__(self, private_key, *, key_id='baseline-machine', trusted_public_keys=None):
+        self.private_key=private_key
+        self.public_key=private_key.public_key()
+        self.key_id=key_id
+        self.trusted_public_keys=dict(trusted_public_keys or {})
+        self.trusted_public_keys[key_id]=self.public_key
+
+    def sign(self,payload):
+        raw=canonical({'domain':'aios.operation-receipt.v1','key_id':self.key_id,'payload':payload})
+        return {'schema':'aios.operation-receipt.v1','key_id':self.key_id,'payload':payload,
+                'signature':base64.b64encode(self.private_key.sign(raw)).decode()}
+
+    def verify(self,envelope):
+        try:
+            if type(envelope) is not dict or set(envelope)!={'schema','key_id','payload','signature'} or envelope['schema']!='aios.operation-receipt.v1' or type(envelope['payload']) is not dict:
+                return False
+            public=self.trusted_public_keys.get(envelope['key_id'])
+            if public is None: return False
+            raw=canonical({'domain':envelope['schema'],'key_id':envelope['key_id'],'payload':envelope['payload']})
+            public.verify(base64.b64decode(envelope['signature'],validate=True),raw)
+            return True
+        except (ValueError,TypeError,InvalidSignature,KeyError):
+            return False

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/host.py

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+"""Small registered host diagnostics; unit bindings come from trusted configuration."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import signal
+import selectors
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import time
+
+
+class HostError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class SystemdHost:
+    PROPERTIES = ('Id', 'ActiveState', 'SubState', 'MainPID', 'InvocationID')
+
+    def __init__(self, bindings: dict[str, str], *, executable: str = '/usr/bin/systemctl',
+                 timeout_seconds: float = 10):
+        if type(timeout_seconds) not in (int,float) or not 0 < timeout_seconds <= 60:
+            raise HostError('HOST_TIMEOUT_INVALID')
+        self.bindings = dict(bindings)
+        for binding,unit in self.bindings.items():
+            if not isinstance(binding,str) or len(binding.split(':'))!=3 or any(not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+',part) for part in binding.split(':')):
+                raise HostError('HOST_TENANT_BINDING_INVALID')
+            if not isinstance(unit, str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.@:-]+\.service', unit):
+                raise HostError('HOST_UNIT_INVALID')
+        if not Path(executable).is_absolute() or not Path(executable).is_file() or Path(executable).is_symlink():
+            raise HostError('HOST_EXECUTABLE_UNAVAILABLE')
+        info=Path(executable).stat()
+        if info.st_uid not in {0,os.geteuid()} or info.st_mode & 0o022:
+            raise HostError('HOST_EXECUTABLE_UNTRUSTED')
+        self._executable_identity=(info.st_dev,info.st_ino,info.st_size,info.st_mtime_ns)
+        self.executable = executable
+        self.timeout_seconds = timeout_seconds
+
+    def status(self, component_id: str, environment: str, *, tenant_id: str, deadline=None) -> dict:
+        if any(not isinstance(part,str) or not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+',part) for part in (tenant_id,environment,component_id)):
+            raise HostError('HOST_SCOPE_INVALID')
+        unit = self.bindings.get(f'{tenant_id}:{environment}:{component_id}')
+        if not unit:
+            raise HostError('HOST_BINDING_NOT_FOUND')
+        remaining=self.timeout_seconds if deadline is None else min(self.timeout_seconds,deadline-time.time())
+        if remaining<=0: raise HostError('HOST_OPERATION_TIMEOUT')
+        stop_at=time.monotonic()+remaining
+        executable_fd=os.open(self.executable,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW|os.O_CLOEXEC)
+        try:
+            info=os.fstat(executable_fd)
+            if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or (info.st_dev,info.st_ino,info.st_size,info.st_mtime_ns)!=self._executable_identity:
+                raise HostError('HOST_EXECUTABLE_IDENTITY_CHANGED')
+            executable_path=f'/proc/self/fd/{executable_fd}'
+            if not Path(executable_path).exists(): raise HostError('HOST_EXECUTOR_PLATFORM_UNSUPPORTED')
+            argv=[executable_path,'show','--no-pager','--property='+','.join(self.PROPERTIES),'--',unit]
+            process=subprocess.Popen(argv,stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+                env={'PATH':'/usr/bin:/bin','LANG':'C'},start_new_session=True,pass_fds=(executable_fd,))
+        finally: os.close(executable_fd)
+        output=bytearray()
+        byte_count=0
+        try:
+            with selectors.DefaultSelector() as selector:
+                selector.register(process.stdout,selectors.EVENT_READ,'stdout')
+                selector.register(process.stderr,selectors.EVENT_READ,'stderr')
+                while selector.get_map():
+                    remaining=stop_at-time.monotonic()
+                    if remaining<=0: raise HostError('HOST_OPERATION_TIMEOUT')
+                    for event,_mask in selector.select(remaining):
+                        chunk=os.read(event.fileobj.fileno(),4096)
+                        if not chunk:
+                            selector.unregister(event.fileobj)
+                            continue
+                        byte_count+=len(chunk)
+                        if byte_count>65536: raise HostError('HOST_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE')
+                        if event.data=='stdout': output.extend(chunk)
+            process.wait(timeout=max(0.001,stop_at-time.monotonic()))
+        except (HostError,subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+            try: os.killpg(process.pid,signal.SIGKILL)
+            except ProcessLookupError: pass
+            process.wait()
+            if isinstance(exc,HostError): raise
+            raise HostError('HOST_OPERATION_TIMEOUT') from exc
+        finally:
+            process.stdout.close()
+            process.stderr.close()
+        if process.returncode != 0:
+            raise HostError('HOST_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE')
+        try: out=output.decode('utf-8')
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc: raise HostError('HOST_OBSERVATION_INVALID') from exc
+        properties = {}
+        for line in out.splitlines():
+            key, sep, value = line.partition('=')
+            if sep and key in self.PROPERTIES:
+                if key in properties:
+                    raise HostError('HOST_DUPLICATE_PROPERTY')
+                properties[key] = value
+        if set(properties) != set(self.PROPERTIES) or properties['Id'] != unit:
+            raise HostError('HOST_OBSERVATION_INCOMPLETE')
+        if not properties['MainPID'].isdigit():
+            raise HostError('HOST_OBSERVATION_INVALID')
+        return {'operation':'service-status', 'tenant_id':tenant_id, 'component_id':component_id, 'environment':environment,
+                'unit':unit, 'healthy':properties['ActiveState'] == 'active',
+                'properties':properties, 'observed_at':time.time(), 'source':'systemd.show'}

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/lineage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
+"""Persistent correlation relationships for the AIOS baseline.
+
+This is deliberately a relationship authority.  It does not create or advance
+Tasks, Jobs, Releases, or Deployments.  In particular, a Task is admitted only
+after the configured Task authority returns the real Task and its authenticated
+tenant/subject binding has been checked.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, is_dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+
+class LineageError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base class for persistent lineage failures."""
+
+
+class LineageConflict(LineageError):
+    """An opaque identity was already bound to different lineage."""
+
+
+class LineageVerificationError(LineageError):
+    """An external authority did not verify the requested relationship."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence:
+    """Typed output of a configured acceptance evidence verifier."""
+
+    acceptance_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    subject_id: str
+    component_id: str
+    deployment_id: str
+    release_id: str
+    artifact: Any
+    accepted: bool
+    evidence_id: str
+    observed: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    observed_at: str | None = None
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _required(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "")
+    if not text or len(text) > 512 or any(ord(char) < 32 for char in text):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return text
+
+
+def _json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False)
+
+
+_SELF_HASH_FIELDS = {
+    "manifest_sha256",
+    "manifest_hash",
+    "outer_manifest_hash",
+    "outer_manifest_sha256",
+    "self_hash",
+    "self_sha256",
+}
+
+
+def canonical_artifact(artifact: Any) -> str:
+    """Return an exact artifact identity without permitting outer self-hashes."""
+
+    if not isinstance(artifact, (str, Mapping)):
+        raise ValueError("artifact must be a string or object")
+    if isinstance(artifact, str):
+        _required(artifact, "artifact")
+    else:
+        if not artifact:
+            raise ValueError("artifact must not be empty")
+        if any(not isinstance(key,str) for key in artifact):
+            raise ValueError("artifact object keys must be strings")
+        if _SELF_HASH_FIELDS.intersection(key.lower() for key in artifact):
+            raise ValueError("outer artifact manifest must not contain a self hash")
+    try:
+        return _json(artifact)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError("artifact must be canonical JSON") from exc
+
+
+def decode_artifact(value: str) -> Any:
+    return json.loads(value)
+
+
+def _mapping(value: Any) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value
+    if is_dataclass(value):
+        return asdict(value)
+    converter = getattr(value, "to_dict", None)
+    if not callable(converter):
+        converter = getattr(value, "as_dict", None)
+    if callable(converter):
+        try:
+            converted = converter(redact_payload=False)
+        except TypeError:
+            converted = converter()
+        if isinstance(converted, Mapping):
+            return converted
+    raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority returned an invalid Task")
+
+
+def _task_plan(task: Any) -> tuple[Mapping[str, Any], Mapping[str, Any]]:
+    raw = _mapping(task)
+    plan: Any = raw.get("plan") or raw.get("task_plan")
+    if plan is None and hasattr(task, "task_plan"):
+        plan = getattr(task, "task_plan")
+    if plan is None:
+        plan = raw
+    plan_map = _mapping(plan)
+    return raw, plan_map
+
+
+class LineageLedger:
+    """SQLite-backed authority for cross-domain identity relationships."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path, task_authority: Any, job_authority: Any):
+        if task_authority is None:
+            raise ValueError("task_authority is required")
+        if job_authority is None:
+            raise ValueError("job_authority is required")
+        self.path = str(path)
+        self.task_authority = task_authority
+        self.job_authority = job_authority
+        Path(self.path).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            tables={row[0] for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")}
+            if "lineage_tasks" in tables and "lineage_schema_meta" not in tables:
+                raise LineageConflict("unversioned candidate lineage schema requires explicit migration")
+            if "lineage_schema_meta" in tables:
+                version=connection.execute("SELECT version FROM lineage_schema_meta WHERE domain='lineage'").fetchone()
+                if version is None or version[0] != 2:
+                    raise LineageConflict("unsupported lineage schema version")
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lineage_schema_meta (
+                    domain TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    version INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lineage_tasks (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    source_task_id TEXT,
+                    metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, task_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, task_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, source_task_id)
+                      REFERENCES lineage_tasks(tenant_id, task_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lineage_effects (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    effect_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    source_effect_id TEXT,
+                    metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, effect_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, job_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, effect_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, effect_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, task_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id)
+                      REFERENCES lineage_tasks(tenant_id, task_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, source_effect_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id)
+                      REFERENCES lineage_effects(tenant_id, effect_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lineage_releases (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    release_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    effect_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    source_task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    source_effect_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    artifact_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, release_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, effect_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, release_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, artifact_json),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, effect_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id)
+                      REFERENCES lineage_effects(tenant_id, effect_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, source_task_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id)
+                      REFERENCES lineage_tasks(tenant_id, task_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lineage_deployments (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    deployment_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    release_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    environment TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    target_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    artifact_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, deployment_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, deployment_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, release_id, artifact_json),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, release_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, artifact_json)
+                      REFERENCES lineage_releases(tenant_id, release_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, artifact_json)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lineage_acceptances (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    acceptance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    deployment_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    release_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    artifact_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    accepted INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (accepted IN (0,1)),
+                    evidence_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    evidence_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, acceptance_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, deployment_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, release_id, artifact_json)
+                      REFERENCES lineage_deployments(
+                        tenant_id, deployment_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, release_id, artifact_json
+                      )
+                );
+                """
+            )
+            connection.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO lineage_schema_meta(domain,version) VALUES('lineage',2)")
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        """Compatibility hook; connections are transaction-scoped."""
+
+    def _authorized_task(self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, task_id: str) -> Any:
+        authority = self.task_authority
+        try:
+            if hasattr(authority, "get_task"):
+                task = authority.get_task(task_id)
+            elif callable(authority):
+                try:
+                    task = authority(tenant_id, subject_id, task_id)
+                except TypeError:
+                    task = authority(task_id)
+            else:
+                raise TypeError("authority has no task lookup")
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority did not confirm task") from exc
+        raw, plan = _task_plan(task)
+        returned_id = raw.get("task_id") or plan.get("task_id") or getattr(task, "task_id", None)
+        if str(returned_id or "") != task_id:
+            raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority returned wrong task_id")
+        issuer = plan.get("issuer") if isinstance(plan.get("issuer"), Mapping) else {}
+        metadata = plan.get("metadata") if isinstance(plan.get("metadata"), Mapping) else {}
+        baseline = metadata.get("baseline") if isinstance(metadata.get("baseline"), Mapping) else {}
+        tenant_values = [value for value in (issuer.get("tenant_id"), metadata.get("tenant_id"), baseline.get("tenant_id")) if value is not None]
+        subject_values = [
+            value for value in (issuer.get("subject_id"), metadata.get("subject_id"), baseline.get("subject_id")) if value is not None
+        ]
+        # issuer.id is accepted as subject identity only when no explicit subject_id exists.
+        if not subject_values and issuer.get("id") is not None:
+            subject_values.append(issuer["id"])
+        if not tenant_values or any(str(value) != tenant_id for value in tenant_values):
+            raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority tenant mismatch")
+        if not subject_values or any(str(value) != subject_id for value in subject_values):
+            raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority subject mismatch")
+        return task
+
+    def _authorized_job(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str, grant_id: str,
+        task_id: str, effect_id: str, job_id: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        authority=self.job_authority
+        try:
+            if hasattr(authority,"get_job"):
+                job=authority.get_job(job_id)
+            elif hasattr(authority,"read"):
+                job=authority.read(job_id)
+            elif callable(authority):
+                job=authority(job_id)
+            else:
+                raise TypeError("authority has no Job lookup")
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise LineageVerificationError("job_authority did not confirm Job") from exc
+        raw=_mapping(job)
+        request=raw.get("request") or raw.get("binding")
+        if request is None and isinstance(raw.get("request_json"),str):
+            try:
+                request=json.loads(raw["request_json"])
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise LineageVerificationError("job_authority returned invalid request") from exc
+        if not isinstance(request,Mapping):
+            request=raw
+        if isinstance(request.get("binding"),Mapping):
+            request=request["binding"]
+        bindings={
+            "job_id":raw.get("job_id") or request.get("job_id"),
+            "tenant_id":request.get("tenant_id"),"subject_id":request.get("subject_id"),
+            "mission_id":request.get("mission_id"),"grant_id":request.get("grant_id"),
+            "task_id":request.get("task_id"),"effect_id":request.get("effect_id"),
+        }
+        expected={"job_id":job_id,"tenant_id":tenant_id,"subject_id":subject_id,
+                  "mission_id":mission_id,"grant_id":grant_id,"task_id":task_id,"effect_id":effect_id}
+        if any(str(bindings[key] or "") != value for key,value in expected.items()):
+            raise LineageVerificationError("job_authority binding mismatch")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _check_task_context(task: Any, mission_id: str, grant_id: str) -> None:
+        _, plan = _task_plan(task)
+        metadata = plan.get("metadata") if isinstance(plan.get("metadata"), Mapping) else {}
+        baseline = metadata.get("baseline") if isinstance(metadata.get("baseline"), Mapping) else {}
+        mission_values = [value for value in (metadata.get("mission_id"), baseline.get("mission_id")) if value is not None]
+        grant_values = [value for value in (metadata.get("grant_id"), baseline.get("grant_id")) if value is not None]
+        if any(str(value) != mission_id for value in mission_values):
+            raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority mission mismatch")
+        if any(str(value) != grant_id for value in grant_values):
+            raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority grant mismatch")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _task_component(task: Any, requested: str | None) -> str:
+        _, plan = _task_plan(task)
+        metadata = plan.get("metadata") if isinstance(plan.get("metadata"), Mapping) else {}
+        baseline = metadata.get("baseline") if isinstance(metadata.get("baseline"), Mapping) else {}
+        values=[value for value in (metadata.get("component_id"),baseline.get("component_id")) if value is not None]
+        if requested is not None:
+            requested=_required(requested,"component_id")
+            if any(str(value) != requested for value in values):
+                raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority component mismatch")
+            return requested
+        if not values or any(str(value) != str(values[0]) for value in values):
+            raise LineageVerificationError("task_authority component missing or inconsistent")
+        return _required(values[0],"component_id")
+
+    def link_task(
+        self,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        subject_id: str,
+        mission_id: str,
+        grant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        *,
+        component_id: str | None = None,
+        source_task_id: str | None = None,
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id, subject_id, mission_id, grant_id, task_id = (
+            _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"), _required(subject_id, "subject_id"),
+            _required(mission_id, "mission_id"), _required(grant_id, "grant_id"),
+            _required(task_id, "task_id"),
+        )
+        task = self._authorized_task(tenant_id, subject_id, task_id)
+        self._check_task_context(task, mission_id, grant_id)
+        component_id=self._task_component(task,component_id)
+        source_task_id = _required(source_task_id, "source_task_id") if source_task_id else None
+        raw_task, task_plan = _task_plan(task)
+        authoritative_source = task_plan.get("parent_task_id") or raw_task.get("parent_task_id")
+        if authoritative_source is not None:
+            authoritative_source = _required(authoritative_source, "authoritative source_task_id")
+            if source_task_id is not None and source_task_id != authoritative_source:
+                raise LineageVerificationError("source_task_id does not match Task authority")
+            source_task_id = authoritative_source
+        metadata_json = _json(dict(metadata or {}))
+        values = (subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id, source_task_id)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM lineage_tasks WHERE tenant_id=? AND task_id=?", (tenant_id, task_id)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing:
+                if tuple(existing[key] for key in ("subject_id", "mission_id", "component_id", "grant_id", "source_task_id")) != values:
+                    raise LineageConflict("task_id already has different lineage")
+                return self._task_row(existing)
+            if source_task_id:
+                self._require_row(connection, "lineage_tasks", "task_id", tenant_id, source_task_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id)
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO lineage_tasks VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (tenant_id, task_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id, source_task_id, metadata_json, _now()),
+            )
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM lineage_tasks WHERE tenant_id=? AND task_id=?", (tenant_id, task_id)
+            ).fetchone()
+            return self._task_row(row)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _require_row(connection, table, id_column, tenant_id, object_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id=None):
+        row = connection.execute(
+            f"SELECT * FROM {table} WHERE tenant_id=? AND {id_column}=?", (tenant_id, object_id)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise LineageConflict(f"{id_column} has no linked authority record")
+        if row["subject_id"] != subject_id or row["mission_id"] != mission_id:
+            raise LineageConflict(f"{id_column} belongs to different subject or mission")
+        if component_id is not None and row["component_id"] != component_id:
+            raise LineageConflict(f"{id_column} belongs to different component")
+        return row
+
+    def link_effect(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str, task_id: str,
+        effect_id: str, job_id: str, *, source_effect_id: str | None = None,
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id, subject_id, mission_id, task_id, effect_id, job_id = map(
+            lambda pair: _required(pair[0], pair[1]),
+            ((tenant_id,"tenant_id"),(subject_id,"subject_id"),(mission_id,"mission_id"),
+             (task_id,"task_id"),(effect_id,"effect_id"),(job_id,"job_id")),
+        )
+        source_effect_id = _required(source_effect_id, "source_effect_id") if source_effect_id else None
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            task=self._require_row(connection, "lineage_tasks", "task_id", tenant_id, task_id, subject_id, mission_id)
+            component_id=task["component_id"]
+            grant_id=task["grant_id"]
+            self._authorized_job(tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id,grant_id,task_id,effect_id,job_id)
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM lineage_effects WHERE tenant_id=? AND effect_id=?", (tenant_id, effect_id)
+            ).fetchone()
+            expected = (subject_id, mission_id, component_id, grant_id, task_id, job_id, source_effect_id)
+            if existing:
+                actual = tuple(existing[key] for key in ("subject_id","mission_id","component_id","grant_id","task_id","job_id","source_effect_id"))
+                if actual != expected:
+                    raise LineageConflict("effect_id already has different task/job identity")
+                return self._effect_row(existing)
+            job = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT effect_id,task_id,subject_id FROM lineage_effects WHERE tenant_id=? AND job_id=?",
+                (tenant_id, job_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if job:
+                raise LineageConflict("job_id already belongs to exactly one Task/effect")
+            if source_effect_id:
+                self._require_row(connection, "lineage_effects", "effect_id", tenant_id, source_effect_id, subject_id, mission_id, component_id)
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO lineage_effects VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (tenant_id,effect_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,grant_id,task_id,job_id,source_effect_id,_json(dict(metadata or {})),_now()),
+            )
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM lineage_effects WHERE tenant_id=? AND effect_id=?",(tenant_id,effect_id)).fetchone()
+            return self._effect_row(row)
+
+    def link_release(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str, effect_id: str,
+        release_id: str, artifact: Any, *, metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id, subject_id, mission_id, effect_id, release_id = map(
+            lambda pair: _required(pair[0],pair[1]),
+            ((tenant_id,"tenant_id"),(subject_id,"subject_id"),(mission_id,"mission_id"),
+             (effect_id,"effect_id"),(release_id,"release_id")),
+        )
+        artifact_json = canonical_artifact(artifact)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            effect = self._require_row(connection,"lineage_effects","effect_id",tenant_id,effect_id,subject_id,mission_id)
+            existing = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM lineage_releases WHERE tenant_id=? AND release_id=?",(tenant_id,release_id)).fetchone()
+            expected = (subject_id,mission_id,effect["component_id"],effect["grant_id"],effect_id,effect["task_id"],effect_id,artifact_json)
+            if existing:
+                actual = tuple(existing[key] for key in ("subject_id","mission_id","component_id","grant_id","effect_id","source_task_id","source_effect_id","artifact_json"))
+                if actual != expected:
+                    raise LineageConflict("release_id already has different source lineage")
+                return self._release_row(existing)
+            producer = connection.execute("SELECT release_id FROM lineage_releases WHERE tenant_id=? AND effect_id=?",(tenant_id,effect_id)).fetchone()
+            if producer:
+                raise LineageConflict("release-producing effect already points to a unique release")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO lineage_releases VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (tenant_id,release_id,subject_id,mission_id,effect["component_id"],effect["grant_id"],effect_id,effect["task_id"],effect_id,artifact_json,_json(dict(metadata or {})),_now()),
+            )
+            row=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM lineage_releases WHERE tenant_id=? AND release_id=?",(tenant_id,release_id)).fetchone()
+            return self._release_row(row)
+
+    def link_deployment(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str, release_id: str,
+        deployment_id: str, component_id: str, environment: str, target_revision: int, artifact: Any,
+        *, metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id,release_id,deployment_id,component_id,environment=map(
+            lambda pair:_required(pair[0],pair[1]),
+            ((tenant_id,"tenant_id"),(subject_id,"subject_id"),(mission_id,"mission_id"),
+             (release_id,"release_id"),(deployment_id,"deployment_id"),(component_id,"component_id"),(environment,"environment")),
+        )
+        if not isinstance(target_revision,int) or isinstance(target_revision,bool) or target_revision < 1:
+            raise ValueError("invalid target_revision")
+        artifact_json=canonical_artifact(artifact)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            release=self._require_row(connection,"lineage_releases","release_id",tenant_id,release_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id)
+            if release["artifact_json"] != artifact_json:
+                raise LineageConflict("deployment artifact does not match release")
+            existing=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM lineage_deployments WHERE tenant_id=? AND deployment_id=?",(tenant_id,deployment_id)).fetchone()
+            expected=(subject_id,mission_id,component_id,release_id,environment,target_revision,artifact_json)
+            if existing:
+                actual=tuple(existing[key] for key in ("subject_id","mission_id","component_id","release_id","environment","target_revision","artifact_json"))
+                if actual != expected:
+                    raise LineageConflict("deployment_id already has different release identity")
+                return self._deployment_row(existing)
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO lineage_deployments VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (tenant_id,deployment_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,release_id,environment,target_revision,artifact_json,_json(dict(metadata or {})),_now()),
+            )
+            row=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM lineage_deployments WHERE tenant_id=? AND deployment_id=?",(tenant_id,deployment_id)).fetchone()
+            return self._deployment_row(row)
+
+    def record_acceptance(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str, component_id: str, acceptance_id: str,
+        deployment_id: str, release_id: str, artifact: Any, accepted: bool, *,
+        evidence: Any, verifier: Callable[[Any, Mapping[str, Any]], VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not callable(verifier):
+            raise LineageVerificationError("acceptance verifier is required")
+        tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,acceptance_id,deployment_id,release_id=map(
+            lambda pair:_required(pair[0],pair[1]),
+            ((tenant_id,"tenant_id"),(subject_id,"subject_id"),(mission_id,"mission_id"),(component_id,"component_id"),
+             (acceptance_id,"acceptance_id"),(deployment_id,"deployment_id"),(release_id,"release_id")),
+        )
+        if type(accepted) is not bool:
+            raise ValueError("accepted must be boolean")
+        artifact_json=canonical_artifact(artifact)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            deployment=self._require_row(connection,"lineage_deployments","deployment_id",tenant_id,deployment_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id)
+            if deployment["release_id"] != release_id:
+                raise LineageConflict("acceptance release_id does not match deployment")
+            if deployment["artifact_json"] != artifact_json:
+                raise LineageConflict("acceptance artifact does not match deployment")
+            expected={"acceptance_id":acceptance_id,"tenant_id":tenant_id,"subject_id":subject_id,"component_id":component_id,
+                      "deployment_id":deployment_id,"release_id":release_id,"artifact":decode_artifact(artifact_json),
+                      "accepted":accepted}
+            try:
+                verified=verifier(evidence,expected)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                raise LineageVerificationError("acceptance evidence was not verified") from exc
+            if not isinstance(verified,VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence):
+                raise LineageVerificationError("verifier must return VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence")
+            bindings=(verified.acceptance_id,verified.tenant_id,verified.subject_id,verified.component_id,verified.deployment_id,verified.release_id,canonical_artifact(verified.artifact),verified.accepted)
+            if bindings != (acceptance_id,tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,deployment_id,release_id,artifact_json,accepted):
+                raise LineageVerificationError("verified acceptance evidence binding mismatch")
+            evidence_id=_required(verified.evidence_id,"evidence_id")
+            evidence_json=_json({
+                "evidence_id":evidence_id,
+                "observed":dict(verified.observed or {}),
+                "observed_at":verified.observed_at,
+                "signed_envelope":dict(evidence) if isinstance(evidence,Mapping) else None,
+            })
+            existing=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM lineage_acceptances WHERE tenant_id=? AND acceptance_id=?",(tenant_id,acceptance_id)).fetchone()
+            expected_row=(subject_id,mission_id,component_id,deployment_id,release_id,artifact_json,int(accepted),evidence_id,evidence_json)
+            if existing:
+                actual=tuple(existing[key] for key in ("subject_id","mission_id","component_id","deployment_id","release_id","artifact_json","accepted","evidence_id","evidence_json"))
+                if actual != expected_row:
+                    raise LineageConflict("acceptance_id already has different binding")
+                return self._acceptance_row(existing)
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO lineage_acceptances VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (tenant_id,acceptance_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,deployment_id,release_id,artifact_json,int(accepted),evidence_id,evidence_json,_now()),
+            )
+            row=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM lineage_acceptances WHERE tenant_id=? AND acceptance_id=?",(tenant_id,acceptance_id)).fetchone()
+            return self._acceptance_row(row)
+
+    def explain(self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id=(_required(tenant_id,"tenant_id"),_required(subject_id,"subject_id"),_required(mission_id,"mission_id"))
+        specs=(("tasks","lineage_tasks",self._task_row),("effects","lineage_effects",self._effect_row),
+               ("releases","lineage_releases",self._release_row),("deployments","lineage_deployments",self._deployment_row),
+               ("acceptances","lineage_acceptances",self._acceptance_row))
+        result={"tenant_id":tenant_id,"subject_id":subject_id,"mission_id":mission_id}
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            for key,table,converter in specs:
+                rows=connection.execute(f"SELECT * FROM {table} WHERE tenant_id=? AND subject_id=? AND mission_id=? ORDER BY created_at",(tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id)).fetchall()
+                result[key]=[converter(row) for row in rows]
+        return result
+
+    def get_release(self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, release_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Resolve an exact tenant/subject release without disclosing other scopes."""
+
+        tenant_id, subject_id, release_id = (
+            _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"), _required(subject_id, "subject_id"),
+            _required(release_id, "release_id"),
+        )
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM lineage_releases WHERE tenant_id=? AND release_id=? AND subject_id=?",
+                (tenant_id, release_id, subject_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise KeyError("release lineage not found")
+        return self._release_row(row)
+
+    def get_release_for_component(self, tenant_id: str, component_id: str, release_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id,component_id,release_id=(_required(tenant_id,"tenant_id"),_required(component_id,"component_id"),_required(release_id,"release_id"))
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM lineage_releases WHERE tenant_id=? AND release_id=? AND component_id=?",
+                (tenant_id,release_id,component_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise KeyError("release component lineage not found")
+        return self._release_row(row)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _common(row):
+        return {key:row[key] for key in row.keys() if not key.endswith("_json")}
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _task_row(cls,row):
+        value=cls._common(row); value["metadata"]=json.loads(row["metadata_json"]); return value
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _effect_row(cls,row):
+        value=cls._common(row); value["metadata"]=json.loads(row["metadata_json"]); return value
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _release_row(cls,row):
+        value=cls._common(row); value["artifact"]=decode_artifact(row["artifact_json"]); value["metadata"]=json.loads(row["metadata_json"]); return value
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _deployment_row(cls,row):
+        value=cls._common(row); value["artifact"]=decode_artifact(row["artifact_json"]); value["metadata"]=json.loads(row["metadata_json"]); return value
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _acceptance_row(cls,row):
+        value=cls._common(row); value["artifact"]=decode_artifact(row["artifact_json"]); value["accepted"]=bool(row["accepted"]); value["evidence"]=json.loads(row["evidence_json"]); return value
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "LineageConflict", "LineageError", "LineageLedger", "LineageVerificationError",
+    "VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence", "canonical_artifact", "decode_artifact",
+]

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/operations.py

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+"""Declarative, non-executing operation registry and timeout safety rules."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from copy import deepcopy
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import math
+import re
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+EFFECT_CLASSES = frozenset(
+    {"READ_ONLY", "IDEMPOTENT", "CONDITIONAL", "RECONCILABLE", "IRREVERSIBLE"}
+)
+_FORBIDDEN_EXECUTION_FIELDS = frozenset({"command", "shell", "argv", "executable", "script"})
+_HANDLER_REF = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,126}$")
+
+
+def _invalid(code: str, field: str = "") -> ValueError:
+    return ValueError(f"{code}:{field}" if field else code)
+
+
+def _text(value: object, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise _invalid("field_invalid", field)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _policy(value: object, field: str, allowed_modes: set[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise _invalid("policy_invalid", field)
+    result = deepcopy(dict(value))
+    mode = _text(result.get("mode"), f"{field}.mode").upper()
+    if mode not in allowed_modes:
+        raise _invalid("policy_mode_invalid", f"{field}.mode")
+    result["mode"] = mode
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OperationDefinition:
+    operation_id: str
+    version: int | str
+    effect_class: str
+    handler_ref: str
+    input_schema: str | Mapping[str, Any]
+    required_permissions: tuple[str, ...]
+    timeout_seconds: float
+    readback: Mapping[str, Any]
+    retry: Mapping[str, Any]
+    reconcile: Mapping[str, Any]
+    rollback: Mapping[str, Any]
+    owner_boundary: Mapping[str, Any]
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, data: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "OperationDefinition":
+        if not isinstance(data, Mapping):
+            raise _invalid("operation_definition_invalid")
+        forbidden = sorted(_FORBIDDEN_EXECUTION_FIELDS.intersection(data))
+        if forbidden:
+            raise _invalid("arbitrary_execution_forbidden", forbidden[0])
+        operation_id = _text(data.get("operation_id"), "operation_id")
+        version = data.get("version")
+        if (
+            isinstance(version, bool)
+            or not isinstance(version, (int, str))
+            or (isinstance(version, int) and version < 1)
+            or (isinstance(version, str) and not version.strip())
+        ):
+            raise _invalid("field_invalid", "version")
+        effect_class = _text(data.get("effect_class"), "effect_class").upper()
+        if effect_class not in EFFECT_CLASSES:
+            raise _invalid("effect_class_invalid", "effect_class")
+        handler_ref = _text(data.get("handler_ref", data.get("handler")), "handler_ref")
+        if not _HANDLER_REF.fullmatch(handler_ref):
+            raise _invalid("handler_ref_invalid", "handler_ref")
+        input_schema = data.get("input_schema")
+        if not isinstance(input_schema, (str, Mapping)) or not input_schema:
+            raise _invalid("field_invalid", "input_schema")
+        input_schema = deepcopy(input_schema)
+        permissions = data.get("required_permissions", data.get("permissions"))
+        if not isinstance(permissions, Sequence) or isinstance(permissions, (str, bytes, bytearray)):
+            raise _invalid("field_invalid", "required_permissions")
+        required_permissions = tuple(
+            _text(permission, f"required_permissions[{index}]")
+            for index, permission in enumerate(permissions)
+        )
+        if len(set(required_permissions)) != len(required_permissions):
+            raise _invalid("duplicate_permission", "required_permissions")
+        timeout_seconds = data.get("timeout_seconds")
+        if (
+            isinstance(timeout_seconds, bool)
+            or not isinstance(timeout_seconds, (int, float))
+            or not math.isfinite(timeout_seconds)
+            or timeout_seconds <= 0
+        ):
+            raise _invalid("field_invalid", "timeout_seconds")
+
+        readback = _policy(data.get("readback"), "readback", {"NONE", "STATE", "EXACT"})
+        if "required" in readback and not isinstance(readback["required"], bool):
+            raise _invalid("field_invalid", "readback.required")
+        retry = _policy(
+            data.get("retry"),
+            "retry",
+            {"NEVER", "SAFE", "AFTER_READBACK", "RECONCILE_FIRST"},
+        )
+        attempts = retry.get("max_attempts", 1)
+        if isinstance(attempts, bool) or not isinstance(attempts, int) or attempts < 1:
+            raise _invalid("field_invalid", "retry.max_attempts")
+        retry["max_attempts"] = attempts
+        reconcile = _policy(
+            data.get("reconcile"), "reconcile", {"NONE", "EXACT_READBACK", "CUSTOM", "REQUIRED"}
+        )
+        rollback = _policy(
+            data.get("rollback"), "rollback", {"NONE", "OPERATION", "COMPENSATE"}
+        )
+        if rollback["mode"] == "OPERATION":
+            _text(rollback.get("operation_id"), "rollback.operation_id")
+        owner_boundary = _policy(
+            data.get("owner_boundary"),
+            "owner_boundary",
+            {"NONE", "WITHIN_GRANT", "EXPLICIT_AUTHORIZATION", "CROSS_BOUNDARY_DENIED"},
+        )
+
+        restart_operation = (
+            "service.restart" in operation_id
+            or "service-restart" in operation_id
+            or handler_ref.endswith("service_restart")
+        )
+        if restart_operation and (
+            readback["mode"] != "EXACT"
+            or not readback.get("required", False)
+            or reconcile["mode"] == "NONE"
+        ):
+            raise _invalid("service_restart_exact_readback_required")
+
+        return cls(
+            operation_id=operation_id,
+            version=version,
+            effect_class=effect_class,
+            handler_ref=handler_ref,
+            input_schema=input_schema,
+            required_permissions=required_permissions,
+            timeout_seconds=float(timeout_seconds),
+            readback=readback,
+            retry=retry,
+            reconcile=reconcile,
+            rollback=rollback,
+            owner_boundary=owner_boundary,
+        )
+
+    def timeout_action(self, outcome: str, attempts: int = 1) -> str:
+        return operation_timeout_action(self, outcome=outcome, attempts=attempts)
+
+    @property
+    def permissions(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        return self.required_permissions
+
+
+class OperationRegistry:
+    """Lookup-only registry; it deliberately has no execute or shell interface."""
+
+    def __init__(self, definitions: Iterable[OperationDefinition | Mapping[str, Any]]) -> None:
+        self._definitions: dict[str, OperationDefinition] = {}
+        for raw in definitions:
+            definition = raw if isinstance(raw, OperationDefinition) else OperationDefinition.from_dict(raw)
+            if definition.operation_id in self._definitions:
+                raise _invalid("duplicate_operation_id", definition.operation_id)
+            self._definitions[definition.operation_id] = definition
+
+    def get(self, operation_id: str) -> OperationDefinition:
+        return self._definitions[_text(operation_id, "operation_id")]
+
+    @property
+    def definitions(self) -> tuple[OperationDefinition, ...]:
+        return tuple(self._definitions.values())
+
+
+def operation_timeout_action(
+    definition: OperationDefinition,
+    outcome: str = "AMBIGUOUS",
+    attempts: int = 1,
+) -> str:
+    """Return ``RETRY``, ``RECONCILE`` or ``STOP`` after a timeout.
+
+    An unknown response from a mutating sink never authorizes a blind repeat.
+    Exact readback/reconciliation must first establish whether the effect happened.
+    """
+
+    if not isinstance(definition, OperationDefinition):
+        raise _invalid("operation_definition_invalid")
+    normalized_outcome = _text(outcome, "outcome").upper()
+    if isinstance(attempts, bool) or not isinstance(attempts, int) or attempts < 1:
+        raise _invalid("field_invalid", "attempts")
+    if definition.effect_class == "IRREVERSIBLE":
+        return "STOP"
+    if definition.effect_class != "READ_ONLY" and normalized_outcome in {
+        "AMBIGUOUS",
+        "UNKNOWN",
+        "MAY_HAVE_SUCCEEDED",
+    }:
+        if definition.reconcile["mode"] != "NONE" or definition.readback.get("required", False):
+            return "RECONCILE"
+        return "STOP"
+    retry_mode = definition.retry["mode"]
+    if attempts >= definition.retry["max_attempts"] or retry_mode == "NEVER":
+        return "STOP"
+    if retry_mode in {"AFTER_READBACK", "RECONCILE_FIRST"} and normalized_outcome not in {
+        "NOT_OBSERVED",
+        "PROVEN_ABSENT",
+    }:
+        return "RECONCILE" if definition.reconcile["mode"] != "NONE" else "STOP"
+    return "RETRY"
+
+
+def _timestamp(value: object) -> datetime | None:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        return None
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None or parsed.utcoffset() is None:
+        return None
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def verify_service_restart(
+    before: Mapping[str, Any], after: Mapping[str, Any]
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Verify a restart with instance identity and start-time evidence.
+
+    Merely observing an active unit proves current activity, not that the requested
+    restart occurred.
+    """
+
+    if not isinstance(before, Mapping) or not isinstance(after, Mapping):
+        return {"status": "UNKNOWN", "reasons": ["restart_observation_invalid"]}
+    if not isinstance(after.get("active"), bool):
+        return {"status": "UNKNOWN", "reasons": ["service_active_invalid"]}
+    if after["active"] is False:
+        return {"status": "DRIFT", "reasons": ["service_not_active"]}
+    before_id = before.get("instance_id")
+    after_id = after.get("instance_id")
+    before_started = _timestamp(before.get("started_at"))
+    after_started = _timestamp(after.get("started_at"))
+    if (
+        not isinstance(before_id, str)
+        or not before_id
+        or not isinstance(after_id, str)
+        or not after_id
+        or before_started is None
+        or after_started is None
+    ):
+        return {"status": "UNKNOWN", "reasons": ["restart_identity_missing"]}
+    if before_id == after_id or after_started <= before_started:
+        return {"status": "DRIFT", "reasons": ["restart_not_observed"]}
+    return {"status": "VERIFIED", "reasons": []}

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/optimization.py

@@ -0,0 +1,866 @@
+"""Bounded, task-only optimization proposals for Baseline 1.1.
+
+This module deliberately has no configuration or policy write adapter.  Its only
+effect boundary is ``submit_task``, supplied by the authenticated root service.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import math
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+
+ENVELOPE_SCHEMA = "aios.optimization-envelope.v1"
+PROPOSAL_SCHEMA = "aios.optimization-proposal.v1"
+TASK_REQUEST_SCHEMA = "aios.optimization-task-request.v1"
+
+_IDENTIFIER = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,127}")
+_DIGEST = re.compile(r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}")
+
+# An envelope may narrow these limits but cannot introduce another path or
+# expand a range.  Every entry describes a low-risk operational tuning knob.
+_HARD_PARAMETER_LIMITS: dict[str, tuple[float, float, bool]] = {
+    "retry.max_attempts": (1, 10, True),
+    "retry.backoff_seconds": (0, 60, False),
+    "backoff.initial_seconds": (0, 60, False),
+    "backoff.maximum_seconds": (0.1, 600, False),
+    "routing.candidate_weight_percent": (0, 25, False),
+    "routing.weight_percent": (0, 25, False),
+    "evidence_reuse.max_age_seconds": (0, 3600, True),
+    "evidence_reuse.ttl_seconds": (0, 3600, True),
+    "timeout.operation_seconds": (0.1, 300, False),
+    "timeout.seconds": (0.1, 300, False),
+    "poll.interval_seconds": (0.1, 300, False),
+    "notification_dedup.window_seconds": (0, 3600, True),
+    "test_selection.optional_sample_percent": (1, 100, False),
+    "test_selection.optional_percentage": (1, 100, False),
+}
+_NON_PRODUCTION_ENVIRONMENTS = frozenset({"development", "test", "staging", "canary"})
+
+
+class OptimizationError(RuntimeError):
+    """A fail-closed optimization boundary error with a stable code."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        self.code = code
+        super().__init__(code)
+
+
+def canonical_json_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return json.dumps(
+            value,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            allow_nan=False,
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_DOCUMENT_NOT_CANONICAL") from exc
+
+
+def _digest(value: Any) -> str:
+    return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _number(value: Any, code: str, *, minimum: float | None = None,
+            maximum: float | None = None) -> int | float:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float)):
+        raise OptimizationError(code)
+    if not math.isfinite(float(value)):
+        raise OptimizationError(code)
+    if minimum is not None and value < minimum:
+        raise OptimizationError(code)
+    if maximum is not None and value > maximum:
+        raise OptimizationError(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _identifier(value: Any, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or _IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise OptimizationError(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _unique_identifiers(value: Any, code: str, *, maximum: int = 256) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not isinstance(value, (list, tuple)) or len(value) > maximum:
+        raise OptimizationError(code)
+    items = tuple(_identifier(item, code) for item in value)
+    if len(set(items)) != len(items):
+        raise OptimizationError(code)
+    return items
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ParameterRange:
+    minimum: int | float
+    maximum: int | float
+    integer: bool
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class QualityFloor:
+    direction: str
+    threshold: int | float
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PromotionRules:
+    objective_metric: str
+    minimum_improvement: int | float
+    mandatory_tests: tuple[str, ...]
+    mandatory_quality_gates: tuple[str, ...]
+    required_receipt_schema: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OptimizationEnvelope:
+    schema: str
+    envelope_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    allowed_parameters: Mapping[str, ParameterRange]
+    allowed_components: tuple[str, ...]
+    allowed_environments: tuple[str, ...]
+    max_change_size: int
+    max_compute_budget: int | float
+    quality_floor: Mapping[str, QualityFloor]
+    rollback_requirement: bool
+    promotion_rules: PromotionRules
+    source_config_digest: str
+    key_id: str
+    signature: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(
+        cls,
+        data: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        verify_envelope: Callable[[str, bytes, str], bool] | None,
+    ) -> "OptimizationEnvelope":
+        """Parse a trusted-config envelope after authenticating its exact bytes.
+
+        ``verify_envelope`` is intentionally mandatory.  The caller cannot mark
+        a document trusted with a boolean or construct an unrestricted envelope.
+        """
+        if verify_envelope is None or not callable(verify_envelope):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_VERIFIER_REQUIRED")
+        if not isinstance(data, Mapping):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_INVALID")
+        required = {
+            "schema", "envelope_id", "tenant_id", "allowed_parameters",
+            "allowed_components", "allowed_environments", "max_change_size",
+            "max_compute_budget", "quality_floor", "rollback_requirement",
+            "promotion_rules", "source_config_digest", "key_id", "signature",
+        }
+        if set(data) != required:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        unsigned = dict(data)
+        signature = unsigned.pop("signature")
+        key_id = data.get("key_id")
+        if not isinstance(signature, str) or not signature or not isinstance(key_id, str):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+        try:
+            verified = verify_envelope(key_id, canonical_json_bytes(unsigned), signature)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_SIGNATURE_INVALID") from exc
+        if verified is not True:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+
+        if data["schema"] != ENVELOPE_SCHEMA:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        envelope_id = _identifier(data["envelope_id"], "OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_ID_INVALID")
+        tenant_id = _identifier(data["tenant_id"], "OPTIMIZATION_TENANT_INVALID")
+        if not _DIGEST.fullmatch(str(data["source_config_digest"])):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_SOURCE_CONFIG_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        key_id = _identifier(key_id, "OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_KEY_ID_INVALID")
+
+        raw_parameters = data["allowed_parameters"]
+        if not isinstance(raw_parameters, Mapping) or not raw_parameters or len(raw_parameters) > 16:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ALLOWED_PARAMETERS_INVALID")
+        parameters: dict[str, ParameterRange] = {}
+        for path, raw_rule in raw_parameters.items():
+            if path not in _HARD_PARAMETER_LIMITS:
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_PATH_FORBIDDEN")
+            if not isinstance(raw_rule, Mapping) or not {"minimum", "maximum"} <= set(raw_rule):
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_RANGE_INVALID")
+            if set(raw_rule) - {"minimum", "maximum", "integer"}:
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_RANGE_INVALID")
+            hard_min, hard_max, hard_integer = _HARD_PARAMETER_LIMITS[path]
+            minimum = _number(raw_rule["minimum"], "OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_RANGE_INVALID")
+            maximum = _number(raw_rule["maximum"], "OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_RANGE_INVALID")
+            integer = raw_rule.get("integer", hard_integer)
+            if type(integer) is not bool or minimum > maximum:
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_RANGE_INVALID")
+            if minimum < hard_min or maximum > hard_max or (hard_integer and not integer):
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_RANGE_TOO_BROAD")
+            if integer and (type(minimum) is not int or type(maximum) is not int):
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_RANGE_INVALID")
+            parameters[path] = ParameterRange(minimum, maximum, integer)
+
+        components = _unique_identifiers(
+            data["allowed_components"], "OPTIMIZATION_COMPONENTS_INVALID", maximum=32
+        )
+        environments = _unique_identifiers(
+            data["allowed_environments"], "OPTIMIZATION_ENVIRONMENTS_INVALID", maximum=4
+        )
+        if not components or not environments or not set(environments) <= _NON_PRODUCTION_ENVIRONMENTS:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVIRONMENTS_INVALID")
+        max_change_size = _number(
+            data["max_change_size"], "OPTIMIZATION_CHANGE_SIZE_INVALID", minimum=1, maximum=16
+        )
+        if type(max_change_size) is not int:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CHANGE_SIZE_INVALID")
+        max_compute_budget = _number(
+            data["max_compute_budget"],
+            "OPTIMIZATION_COMPUTE_BUDGET_INVALID",
+            minimum=0.001,
+            maximum=10_000,
+        )
+
+        raw_quality = data["quality_floor"]
+        if not isinstance(raw_quality, Mapping) or not raw_quality or len(raw_quality) > 16:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_QUALITY_FLOOR_INVALID")
+        quality: dict[str, QualityFloor] = {}
+        for metric, raw_rule in raw_quality.items():
+            metric = _identifier(metric, "OPTIMIZATION_QUALITY_METRIC_INVALID")
+            if not isinstance(raw_rule, Mapping) or set(raw_rule) != {"direction", "threshold"}:
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_QUALITY_FLOOR_INVALID")
+            if raw_rule["direction"] not in {"higher", "lower"}:
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_QUALITY_DIRECTION_INVALID")
+            threshold = _number(
+                raw_rule["threshold"], "OPTIMIZATION_QUALITY_FLOOR_INVALID",
+                minimum=-1e12, maximum=1e12,
+            )
+            quality[metric] = QualityFloor(raw_rule["direction"], threshold)
+
+        if type(data["rollback_requirement"]) is not bool:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ROLLBACK_REQUIREMENT_INVALID")
+        raw_promotion = data["promotion_rules"]
+        promotion_fields = {
+            "objective_metric", "minimum_improvement", "mandatory_tests",
+            "mandatory_quality_gates", "required_receipt_schema",
+        }
+        if not isinstance(raw_promotion, Mapping) or set(raw_promotion) != promotion_fields:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROMOTION_RULES_INVALID")
+        objective = _identifier(
+            raw_promotion["objective_metric"], "OPTIMIZATION_OBJECTIVE_METRIC_INVALID"
+        )
+        if objective not in quality:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_OBJECTIVE_METRIC_INVALID")
+        minimum_improvement = _number(
+            raw_promotion["minimum_improvement"],
+            "OPTIMIZATION_MINIMUM_IMPROVEMENT_INVALID",
+            minimum=0,
+            maximum=1e12,
+        )
+        mandatory_tests = _unique_identifiers(
+            raw_promotion["mandatory_tests"], "OPTIMIZATION_MANDATORY_TESTS_INVALID"
+        )
+        mandatory_gates = _unique_identifiers(
+            raw_promotion["mandatory_quality_gates"], "OPTIMIZATION_MANDATORY_GATES_INVALID"
+        )
+        if not mandatory_tests or not mandatory_gates:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROMOTION_RULES_INVALID")
+        receipt_schema = _identifier(
+            raw_promotion["required_receipt_schema"], "OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA_INVALID"
+        )
+        if not receipt_schema.startswith("aios."):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        promotion = PromotionRules(
+            objective, minimum_improvement, mandatory_tests, mandatory_gates, receipt_schema
+        )
+        return cls(
+            ENVELOPE_SCHEMA, envelope_id, tenant_id, parameters, components,
+            environments, max_change_size, max_compute_budget, quality,
+            data["rollback_requirement"], promotion, data["source_config_digest"],
+            key_id, signature,
+        )
+
+
+_PROPOSAL_REQUIRED = {
+    "schema", "proposal_id", "envelope_id", "tenant_id", "component",
+    "environment", "changes", "compute_budget", "tests", "quality_gates",
+    "baseline_metrics", "rollback_plan",
+}
+
+
+def validate_proposal(envelope: OptimizationEnvelope, proposal: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict:
+    """Return a canonical candidate constrained by ``envelope``."""
+    if not isinstance(envelope, OptimizationEnvelope):
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_REQUIRED")
+    if not isinstance(proposal, Mapping):
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_INVALID")
+    allowed_fields = _PROPOSAL_REQUIRED | {"evidence_reuse"}
+    if set(proposal) - allowed_fields or not _PROPOSAL_REQUIRED <= set(proposal):
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    if proposal["schema"] != PROPOSAL_SCHEMA:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    proposal_id = _identifier(proposal["proposal_id"], "OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_ID_INVALID")
+    if proposal["envelope_id"] != envelope.envelope_id:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    if proposal["tenant_id"] != envelope.tenant_id:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_TENANT_MISMATCH")
+    component = _identifier(proposal["component"], "OPTIMIZATION_COMPONENT_INVALID")
+    if component not in envelope.allowed_components:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_COMPONENT_FORBIDDEN")
+    environment = _identifier(proposal["environment"], "OPTIMIZATION_ENVIRONMENT_INVALID")
+    if environment not in envelope.allowed_environments:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVIRONMENT_FORBIDDEN")
+
+    raw_changes = proposal["changes"]
+    if not isinstance(raw_changes, list) or not raw_changes or len(raw_changes) > envelope.max_change_size:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CHANGE_SIZE_EXCEEDED")
+    changes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    paths: set[str] = set()
+    for change in raw_changes:
+        if not isinstance(change, Mapping) or set(change) != {"path", "value"}:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CHANGE_INVALID")
+        path = change["path"]
+        if not isinstance(path, str) or path not in envelope.allowed_parameters:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_PATH_FORBIDDEN")
+        if path in paths:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_DUPLICATE")
+        paths.add(path)
+        rule = envelope.allowed_parameters[path]
+        value = _number(change["value"], "OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_VALUE_INVALID")
+        if rule.integer and type(value) is not int:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_VALUE_INVALID")
+        if value < rule.minimum or value > rule.maximum:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PARAMETER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+        changes.append({"path": path, "value": value})
+
+    compute_budget = _number(
+        proposal["compute_budget"],
+        "OPTIMIZATION_COMPUTE_BUDGET_EXCEEDED",
+        minimum=0.001,
+        maximum=float(envelope.max_compute_budget),
+    )
+    tests = _unique_identifiers(proposal["tests"], "OPTIMIZATION_TESTS_INVALID")
+    gates = _unique_identifiers(proposal["quality_gates"], "OPTIMIZATION_QUALITY_GATES_INVALID")
+    for mandatory in envelope.promotion_rules.mandatory_tests:
+        if mandatory not in tests:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_MANDATORY_TEST_MISSING")
+    for mandatory in envelope.promotion_rules.mandatory_quality_gates:
+        if mandatory not in gates:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_MANDATORY_GATE_MISSING")
+
+    raw_baseline = proposal["baseline_metrics"]
+    if not isinstance(raw_baseline, Mapping) or set(raw_baseline) != set(envelope.quality_floor):
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_BASELINE_METRICS_INVALID")
+    baseline = {
+        metric: _number(raw_baseline[metric], "OPTIMIZATION_BASELINE_METRICS_INVALID")
+        for metric in sorted(raw_baseline)
+    }
+
+    rollback_plan = proposal["rollback_plan"]
+    if envelope.rollback_requirement:
+        if (
+            not isinstance(rollback_plan, Mapping)
+            or set(rollback_plan) != {"strategy", "reference"}
+            or rollback_plan.get("strategy") != "restore_previous_values"
+        ):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ROLLBACK_PLAN_REQUIRED")
+        _identifier(rollback_plan.get("reference"), "OPTIMIZATION_ROLLBACK_PLAN_INVALID")
+        normalized_rollback: dict[str, str] | None = {
+            "strategy": "restore_previous_values",
+            "reference": rollback_plan["reference"],
+        }
+    else:
+        if rollback_plan is not None:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ROLLBACK_PLAN_INVALID")
+        normalized_rollback = None
+
+    normalized_evidence = None
+    if "evidence_reuse" in proposal:
+        evidence = proposal["evidence_reuse"]
+        if not isinstance(evidence, Mapping) or set(evidence) != {"scope", "evidence_ids"}:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_EVIDENCE_REUSE_INVALID")
+        expected_scope = {
+            "tenant_id": envelope.tenant_id,
+            "component": component,
+            "environment": environment,
+        }
+        if evidence["scope"] != expected_scope:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_EVIDENCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+        evidence_ids = _unique_identifiers(
+            evidence["evidence_ids"], "OPTIMIZATION_EVIDENCE_REUSE_INVALID", maximum=128
+        )
+        normalized_evidence = {"scope": expected_scope, "evidence_ids": list(evidence_ids)}
+
+    normalized = {
+        "schema": PROPOSAL_SCHEMA,
+        "proposal_id": proposal_id,
+        "envelope_id": envelope.envelope_id,
+        "tenant_id": envelope.tenant_id,
+        "component": component,
+        "environment": environment,
+        "changes": changes,
+        "compute_budget": float(compute_budget),
+        "tests": list(tests),
+        "quality_gates": list(gates),
+        "baseline_metrics": baseline,
+        "rollback_plan": normalized_rollback,
+    }
+    if normalized_evidence is not None:
+        normalized["evidence_reuse"] = normalized_evidence
+    if len(canonical_json_bytes(normalized)) > 65_536:
+        raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_TOO_LARGE")
+    return normalized
+
+
+class OptimizationController:
+    """Durable proposal state machine whose only external effect is task admission."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        path: str | Path,
+        envelope: OptimizationEnvelope,
+        submit_task: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Mapping[str, Any]],
+        *,
+        verify_receipt: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], bool],
+    ):
+        if not isinstance(envelope, OptimizationEnvelope):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ENVELOPE_REQUIRED")
+        if not callable(submit_task):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMITTER_REQUIRED")
+        if not callable(verify_receipt):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_VERIFIER_REQUIRED")
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.envelope = envelope
+        self.submit_task = submit_task
+        self.verify_receipt = verify_receipt
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        return connection
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS optimization_proposals (
+                    proposal_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    envelope_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    proposal_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    proposal_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    evaluation_task_id TEXT,
+                    promotion_task_id TEXT,
+                    baseline_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    candidate_json TEXT,
+                    effect_json TEXT,
+                    evaluation_json TEXT,
+                    receipt_json TEXT,
+                    error_code TEXT,
+                    created_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                )
+                """
+            )
+
+    def _context(self, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_AUTHENTICATED_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+        fields = ("tenant_id", "subject_id", "grant_id", "mission_id", "service_identity")
+        try:
+            context = {
+                field: _identifier(value[field], "OPTIMIZATION_AUTHENTICATED_CONTEXT_INVALID")
+                for field in fields
+            }
+        except KeyError as exc:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_AUTHENTICATED_CONTEXT_REQUIRED") from exc
+        if context["service_identity"] != "aios-root-service":
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_ROOT_SERVICE_REQUIRED")
+        if context["tenant_id"] != self.envelope.tenant_id:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CONTEXT_TENANT_MISMATCH")
+        return context
+
+    def _row(self, proposal_id: str) -> sqlite3.Row:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM optimization_proposals WHERE proposal_id=?", (proposal_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_NOT_FOUND")
+        return row
+
+    def _authorized_row(self, proposal_id: str, context: Mapping[str, Any]) -> sqlite3.Row:
+        checked = self._context(context)
+        row = self._row(_identifier(proposal_id, "OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_ID_INVALID"))
+        if row["tenant_id"] != checked["tenant_id"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CONTEXT_TENANT_MISMATCH")
+        if row["subject_id"] != checked["subject_id"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CONTEXT_SUBJECT_MISMATCH")
+        if row["grant_id"] != checked["grant_id"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CONTEXT_GRANT_MISMATCH")
+        if row["mission_id"] != checked["mission_id"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CONTEXT_MISSION_MISMATCH")
+        return row
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _decode(value: str | None) -> Any:
+        return None if value is None else json.loads(value)
+
+    def _record(self, row: sqlite3.Row) -> dict:
+        proposal = self._decode(row["proposal_json"])
+        result = dict(proposal)
+        result.update(
+            {
+                "proposal_id": row["proposal_id"],
+                "proposal_digest": row["proposal_digest"],
+                "status": row["status"],
+                "evaluation_task_id": row["evaluation_task_id"],
+                "promotion_task_id": row["promotion_task_id"],
+                "baseline_metrics": self._decode(row["baseline_json"]),
+                "candidate_metrics": self._decode(row["candidate_json"]),
+                "effect_comparison": self._decode(row["effect_json"]),
+                "error_code": row["error_code"],
+            }
+        )
+        return result
+
+    def get_proposal(self, proposal_id: str, *, authenticated_context: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict:
+        return self._record(self._authorized_row(proposal_id, authenticated_context))
+
+    def _persist_invalid(self, proposal: Mapping[str, Any], context: Mapping[str, str],
+                         error: OptimizationError) -> None:
+        proposal_id = proposal.get("proposal_id")
+        tenant_id = proposal.get("tenant_id")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(proposal_id, str)
+            or _IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(proposal_id) is None
+            or tenant_id != self.envelope.tenant_id
+        ):
+            return
+        try:
+            encoded = canonical_json_bytes(proposal)
+        except OptimizationError:
+            return
+        if len(encoded) > 65_536:
+            return
+        digest = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
+        baseline = proposal.get("baseline_metrics")
+        if not isinstance(baseline, Mapping):
+            baseline = {}
+        now = time.time()
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT OR IGNORE INTO optimization_proposals
+                (proposal_id,tenant_id,subject_id,grant_id,mission_id,envelope_id,
+                 proposal_digest,proposal_json,status,baseline_json,error_code,created_at,updated_at)
+                VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    proposal_id, self.envelope.tenant_id, context["subject_id"],
+                    context["grant_id"], context["mission_id"], self.envelope.envelope_id,
+                    digest, encoded.decode("utf-8"), "STOPPED_INVALID",
+                    canonical_json_bytes(baseline).decode("utf-8"), error.code, now, now,
+                ),
+            )
+
+    def propose(self, proposal: Mapping[str, Any], *, authenticated_context: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict:
+        context = self._context(authenticated_context)
+        try:
+            normalized = validate_proposal(self.envelope, proposal)
+        except OptimizationError as exc:
+            if isinstance(proposal, Mapping):
+                self._persist_invalid(proposal, context, exc)
+            raise
+        proposal_digest = _digest(normalized)
+        proposal_id = normalized["proposal_id"]
+        now = time.time()
+        encoded = canonical_json_bytes(normalized).decode("utf-8")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM optimization_proposals WHERE proposal_id=?", (proposal_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                if existing["proposal_digest"] != proposal_digest:
+                    raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROPOSAL_ID_CONFLICT")
+                if (
+                    existing["tenant_id"] != context["tenant_id"]
+                    or existing["subject_id"] != context["subject_id"]
+                    or existing["grant_id"] != context["grant_id"]
+                    or existing["mission_id"] != context["mission_id"]
+                ):
+                    raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CONTEXT_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+                if existing["status"] != "PROPOSAL_RECORDED":
+                    return self._record(existing)
+            else:
+                connection.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO optimization_proposals
+                    (proposal_id,tenant_id,subject_id,grant_id,mission_id,envelope_id,
+                     proposal_digest,proposal_json,status,baseline_json,created_at,updated_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        proposal_id, context["tenant_id"], context["subject_id"],
+                        context["grant_id"], context["mission_id"], self.envelope.envelope_id,
+                        proposal_digest, encoded, "PROPOSAL_RECORDED",
+                        canonical_json_bytes(normalized["baseline_metrics"]).decode("utf-8"),
+                        now, now,
+                    ),
+                )
+
+        requested_task_id = f"optimization-evaluate-{proposal_id}"
+        task_request = {
+            "schema": TASK_REQUEST_SCHEMA,
+            "task_id": requested_task_id,
+            "action": "evaluate",
+            "tenant_id": context["tenant_id"],
+            "subject_id": context["subject_id"],
+            "grant_id": context["grant_id"],
+            "mission_id": context["mission_id"],
+            "proposal_id": proposal_id,
+            "proposal_digest": proposal_digest,
+            "component": normalized["component"],
+            "environment": normalized["environment"],
+            "compute_budget": normalized["compute_budget"],
+        }
+        try:
+            receipt = self.submit_task(task_request)
+            if not isinstance(receipt, Mapping):
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_INVALID")
+            task_id = _identifier(
+                receipt.get("task_id"), "OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_INVALID"
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE optimization_proposals SET status=?,error_code=?,updated_at=? "
+                    "WHERE proposal_id=? AND status='PROPOSAL_RECORDED'",
+                    ("STOPPED_SUBMISSION_FAILED", "OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_FAILED", time.time(), proposal_id),
+                )
+            if isinstance(exc, OptimizationError):
+                raise
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_FAILED") from exc
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE optimization_proposals SET status=?,evaluation_task_id=?,updated_at=? "
+                "WHERE proposal_id=? AND status='PROPOSAL_RECORDED'",
+                ("EVALUATION_SUBMITTED", task_id, time.time(), proposal_id),
+            )
+        return self.get_proposal(proposal_id, authenticated_context=context)
+
+    def _trusted_receipt(self, receipt: Any) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(receipt, Mapping):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_INVALID")
+        try:
+            trusted = self.verify_receipt(receipt)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_UNTRUSTED") from exc
+        if trusted is not True:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_UNTRUSTED")
+        return receipt
+
+    def record_evaluation(
+        self,
+        proposal_id: str,
+        evaluation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        authenticated_context: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict:
+        row = self._authorized_row(proposal_id, authenticated_context)
+        if row["status"] != "EVALUATION_SUBMITTED":
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_EVALUATION_STATE_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(evaluation, Mapping) or set(evaluation) != {
+            "candidate_metrics", "compute_used", "tests_passed",
+            "quality_gates_passed", "receipt",
+        }:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_EVALUATION_INVALID")
+        result_body = {key: evaluation[key] for key in evaluation if key != "receipt"}
+        receipt = self._trusted_receipt(evaluation["receipt"])
+        required_receipt = {
+            "schema", "task_id", "proposal_id", "proposal_digest", "action",
+            "success", "result_digest", "key_id", "signature",
+        }
+        if set(receipt) != required_receipt:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_INVALID")
+        if receipt["schema"] != self.envelope.promotion_rules.required_receipt_schema:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA_MISMATCH")
+        if receipt["task_id"] != row["evaluation_task_id"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_TASK_MISMATCH")
+        if receipt["proposal_id"] != row["proposal_id"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_PROPOSAL_MISMATCH")
+        if receipt["proposal_digest"] != row["proposal_digest"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_PROPOSAL_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        if receipt["action"] != "evaluate" or receipt["success"] is not True:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_RESULT_INVALID")
+        if receipt["result_digest"] != _digest(result_body):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_RECEIPT_RESULT_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+
+        proposal = self._decode(row["proposal_json"])
+        compute_used = _number(
+            evaluation["compute_used"], "OPTIMIZATION_EVALUATION_BUDGET_EXCEEDED", minimum=0
+        )
+        if compute_used > proposal["compute_budget"] or compute_used > self.envelope.max_compute_budget:
+            status = "STOPPED_BUDGET_EXCEEDED"
+            error_code = "OPTIMIZATION_EVALUATION_BUDGET_EXCEEDED"
+            return self._store_evaluation(row, evaluation, receipt, {}, status, error_code)
+        tests_passed = _unique_identifiers(
+            evaluation["tests_passed"], "OPTIMIZATION_EVALUATION_TESTS_INVALID"
+        )
+        gates_passed = _unique_identifiers(
+            evaluation["quality_gates_passed"], "OPTIMIZATION_EVALUATION_GATES_INVALID"
+        )
+        if not set(self.envelope.promotion_rules.mandatory_tests) <= set(tests_passed):
+            return self._store_evaluation(
+                row, evaluation, receipt, {}, "STOPPED_MANDATORY_TEST_FAILED",
+                "OPTIMIZATION_MANDATORY_TEST_FAILED",
+            )
+        if not set(self.envelope.promotion_rules.mandatory_quality_gates) <= set(gates_passed):
+            return self._store_evaluation(
+                row, evaluation, receipt, {}, "STOPPED_MANDATORY_GATE_FAILED",
+                "OPTIMIZATION_MANDATORY_GATE_FAILED",
+            )
+        raw_candidate = evaluation["candidate_metrics"]
+        if not isinstance(raw_candidate, Mapping) or set(raw_candidate) != set(self.envelope.quality_floor):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_CANDIDATE_METRICS_INVALID")
+        candidate = {
+            metric: _number(raw_candidate[metric], "OPTIMIZATION_CANDIDATE_METRICS_INVALID")
+            for metric in sorted(raw_candidate)
+        }
+        baseline = self._decode(row["baseline_json"])
+        effect: dict[str, float] = {}
+        quality_regression = False
+        for metric in sorted(self.envelope.quality_floor):
+            rule = self.envelope.quality_floor[metric]
+            if rule.direction == "higher":
+                delta = float(candidate[metric]) - float(baseline[metric])
+                below_floor = candidate[metric] < rule.threshold
+            else:
+                delta = float(baseline[metric]) - float(candidate[metric])
+                below_floor = candidate[metric] > rule.threshold
+            effect[metric] = round(delta, 12)
+            quality_regression = quality_regression or below_floor or delta < -1e-12
+        objective = self.envelope.promotion_rules.objective_metric
+        if quality_regression:
+            status, error_code = "STOPPED_QUALITY_REGRESSION", "OPTIMIZATION_QUALITY_REGRESSION"
+        elif effect[objective] + 1e-12 < self.envelope.promotion_rules.minimum_improvement:
+            status, error_code = "STOPPED_NO_IMPROVEMENT", "OPTIMIZATION_NO_IMPROVEMENT"
+        else:
+            status, error_code = "ELIGIBLE", None
+        return self._store_evaluation(row, evaluation, receipt, effect, status, error_code, candidate)
+
+    def _store_evaluation(
+        self,
+        row: sqlite3.Row,
+        evaluation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        receipt: Mapping[str, Any],
+        effect: Mapping[str, Any],
+        status: str,
+        error_code: str | None,
+        candidate: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict:
+        candidate = dict(candidate or {})
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE optimization_proposals
+                SET status=?,candidate_json=?,effect_json=?,evaluation_json=?,receipt_json=?,
+                    error_code=?,updated_at=?
+                WHERE proposal_id=?
+                """,
+                (
+                    status, canonical_json_bytes(candidate).decode("utf-8"),
+                    canonical_json_bytes(effect).decode("utf-8"),
+                    canonical_json_bytes({k: evaluation[k] for k in evaluation if k != "receipt"}).decode("utf-8"),
+                    canonical_json_bytes(receipt).decode("utf-8"), error_code, time.time(),
+                    row["proposal_id"],
+                ),
+            )
+        return self._record(self._row(row["proposal_id"]))
+
+    def promote(
+        self,
+        proposal_id: str,
+        promotion: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        authenticated_context: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict:
+        context = self._context(authenticated_context)
+        row = self._authorized_row(proposal_id, context)
+        if not isinstance(promotion, Mapping) or set(promotion) != {
+            "evaluation_task_id", "proposal_digest"
+        }:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROMOTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        if promotion["evaluation_task_id"] != row["evaluation_task_id"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROMOTION_TASK_MISMATCH")
+        if promotion["proposal_digest"] != row["proposal_digest"]:
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROMOTION_PROPOSAL_MISMATCH")
+        if row["status"] == "PROMOTION_SUBMITTED":
+            return self._record(row)
+        if row["status"] != "ELIGIBLE":
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_NOT_PROMOTABLE")
+        stored_receipt = self._trusted_receipt(self._decode(row["receipt_json"]))
+        if (
+            stored_receipt.get("task_id") != row["evaluation_task_id"]
+            or stored_receipt.get("proposal_digest") != row["proposal_digest"]
+            or stored_receipt.get("action") != "evaluate"
+            or stored_receipt.get("success") is not True
+        ):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROMOTION_RECEIPT_BINDING_INVALID")
+        evaluation = self._decode(row["evaluation_json"])
+        if stored_receipt.get("result_digest") != _digest(evaluation):
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_PROMOTION_QUALITY_RESULT_INVALID")
+
+        task_request = {
+            "schema": TASK_REQUEST_SCHEMA,
+            "task_id": f"optimization-promote-{proposal_id}",
+            "action": "promote",
+            "tenant_id": context["tenant_id"],
+            "subject_id": context["subject_id"],
+            "grant_id": context["grant_id"],
+            "mission_id": context["mission_id"],
+            "proposal_id": row["proposal_id"],
+            "proposal_digest": row["proposal_digest"],
+            "evaluation_task_id": row["evaluation_task_id"],
+            "evaluation_result_digest": stored_receipt["result_digest"],
+        }
+        try:
+            submission = self.submit_task(task_request)
+            if not isinstance(submission, Mapping):
+                raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_INVALID")
+            task_id = _identifier(
+                submission.get("task_id"), "OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_INVALID"
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE optimization_proposals SET status=?,error_code=?,updated_at=? WHERE proposal_id=?",
+                    ("STOPPED_PROMOTION_SUBMISSION_FAILED", "OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_FAILED", time.time(), proposal_id),
+                )
+            if isinstance(exc, OptimizationError):
+                raise
+            raise OptimizationError("OPTIMIZATION_TASK_SUBMISSION_FAILED") from exc
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE optimization_proposals SET status=?,promotion_task_id=?,error_code=NULL,updated_at=? "
+                "WHERE proposal_id=? AND status='ELIGIBLE'",
+                ("PROMOTION_SUBMITTED", task_id, time.time(), proposal_id),
+            )
+        return self.get_proposal(proposal_id, authenticated_context=context)
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "OptimizationController", "OptimizationEnvelope", "OptimizationError",
+    "canonical_json_bytes", "validate_proposal",
+]

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/release.py

@@ -0,0 +1,742 @@
+"""Release-owned deployment targets and a receipt-gated persistent saga.
+
+The module persists intent before invoking a governed operation adapter.  It
+does not contain a shell runner, production signer, or success simulator.  A
+configured verifier must translate an adapter/sink receipt into a typed,
+operation-bound :class:`VerifiedReceipt` before a stage can advance.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from .lineage import (
+    LineageLedger,
+    VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence,
+    canonical_artifact,
+    decode_artifact,
+)
+
+
+class ReleaseError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class ReleaseConflict(ReleaseError):
+    pass
+
+
+class ReleaseVerificationError(ReleaseError):
+    pass
+
+
+class ReleaseAuthorizationError(ReleaseError):
+    pass
+
+
+class ReleaseReconciliationRequired(ReleaseError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class VerifiedReceipt:
+    """Trusted verifier output, fully bound to one persisted stage effect."""
+
+    receipt_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    subject_id: str
+    component_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    source_task_id: str
+    source_effect_id: str
+    grant_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    effect_id: str
+    operation_id: str
+    deployment_id: str
+    release_id: str
+    artifact: Any
+    observed: Mapping[str, Any]
+    outcome: str = "SUCCEEDED"
+    observed_at: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EnvironmentDeploymentTarget:
+    tenant_id: str
+    component_id: str
+    environment: str
+    release_id: str
+    artifact: Any
+    revision: int
+    stage: str
+    source_revision: str | None
+    observed_main_revision: str | None
+    previous_release_id: str | None
+    previous_artifact: Any | None
+    rollback_release_id: str | None
+    rollback_artifact: Any | None
+    rollback_compatible: bool
+    updated_by_subject_id: str
+    updated_at: str
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _required(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "")
+    if not text or len(text) > 512 or any(ord(char) < 32 for char in text):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return text
+
+
+def _json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False)
+
+
+def _recipe_digest(stages: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]]) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_json(list(stages)).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+class ReleaseLedger:
+    """The release domain authority for dynamic targets and deployment sagas."""
+
+    TARGET_STAGES = {"STAGED", "ACTIVE", "ROLLBACK_STAGED"}
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        path: str | Path,
+        *,
+        lineage: LineageLedger,
+        receipt_verifier: Callable[[Any, Mapping[str, Any]], VerifiedReceipt],
+        target_authorizer: Callable[[str,str,str,str,str], bool],
+    ):
+        if not isinstance(lineage, LineageLedger):
+            raise ValueError("lineage ledger is required")
+        if not callable(receipt_verifier):
+            raise ValueError("receipt_verifier is required")
+        if not callable(target_authorizer):
+            raise ValueError("target_authorizer is required")
+        self.path = str(path)
+        self.lineage = lineage
+        self.receipt_verifier = receipt_verifier
+        self.target_authorizer = target_authorizer
+        Path(self.path).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            tables={row[0] for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")}
+            if "release_targets" in tables and "release_schema_meta" not in tables:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("unversioned candidate release schema requires explicit migration")
+            if "release_schema_meta" in tables:
+                version=connection.execute("SELECT version FROM release_schema_meta WHERE domain='release'").fetchone()
+                if version is None or version[0] != 2:
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("unsupported release schema version")
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS release_schema_meta (
+                    domain TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    version INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS release_recipes (
+                    recipe_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    recipe_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    stages_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS release_targets (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    environment TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    release_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    artifact_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    stage TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    source_revision TEXT,
+                    observed_main_revision TEXT,
+                    previous_release_id TEXT,
+                    previous_artifact_json TEXT,
+                    rollback_release_id TEXT,
+                    rollback_artifact_json TEXT,
+                    rollback_compatible INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (rollback_compatible IN (0,1)),
+                    updated_by_subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, component_id, environment)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS release_sagas (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    saga_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    source_task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    source_effect_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    release_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    deployment_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    environment TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    artifact_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    recipe_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    recipe_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    target_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    stage_index INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, saga_id),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, deployment_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (recipe_id) REFERENCES release_recipes(recipe_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS release_effect_intents (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    saga_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    stage_index INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    stage_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    operation_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    effect_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    job_id TEXT,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    receipt_id TEXT,
+                    receipt_json TEXT,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_id, saga_id, stage_index),
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, effect_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, saga_id)
+                      REFERENCES release_sagas(tenant_id, saga_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS release_deployment_facts (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    fact_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+                    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    mission_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    component_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    deployment_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    release_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    artifact_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    saga_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    stage_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    operation_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    effect_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    receipt_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    observed_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    UNIQUE (tenant_id, effect_id, receipt_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY (tenant_id, saga_id)
+                      REFERENCES release_sagas(tenant_id, saga_id)
+                );
+                """
+            )
+            connection.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO release_schema_meta(domain,version) VALUES('release',2)")
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        """Compatibility hook; connections are transaction-scoped."""
+
+    def _authorize(self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, component_id: str, environment: str, action: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            authorized=self.target_authorizer(tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,environment,action)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise ReleaseAuthorizationError("deployment target authorization unavailable") from exc
+        if authorized is not True:
+            raise ReleaseAuthorizationError("deployment target authorization denied")
+
+    def register_recipe(self, recipe_id: str, stages: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        recipe_id = _required(recipe_id, "recipe_id")
+        if not isinstance(stages, Sequence) or isinstance(stages, (str, bytes)) or not stages:
+            raise ValueError("recipe stages must be a non-empty sequence")
+        normalized = []
+        stage_ids = set()
+        for item in stages:
+            if not isinstance(item, Mapping) or set(item) - {"stage_id", "operation_id", "parameters"}:
+                raise ValueError("invalid recipe stage")
+            stage_id = _required(item.get("stage_id"), "stage_id")
+            operation_id = _required(item.get("operation_id"), "operation_id")
+            if stage_id in stage_ids:
+                raise ValueError("duplicate recipe stage_id")
+            stage_ids.add(stage_id)
+            parameters = item.get("parameters", {})
+            if not isinstance(parameters, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError("stage parameters must be an object")
+            normalized.append({"stage_id": stage_id, "operation_id": operation_id, "parameters": dict(parameters)})
+        stages_json = _json(normalized)
+        digest = _recipe_digest(normalized)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM release_recipes WHERE recipe_id=?", (recipe_id,)).fetchone()
+            if existing:
+                if existing["recipe_digest"] != digest:
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("recipe_id already has different immutable stages")
+            else:
+                connection.execute("INSERT INTO release_recipes VALUES(?,?,?,?)", (recipe_id, digest, stages_json, _now()))
+        return {"recipe_id": recipe_id, "recipe_digest": digest, "stages": normalized}
+
+    def set_target(
+        self,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        subject_id: str,
+        component_id: str,
+        environment: str,
+        release_id: str,
+        artifact: Any,
+        *,
+        expected_revision: int | None,
+        stage: str = "STAGED",
+        source_revision: str | None = None,
+        observed_main_revision: str | None = None,
+        rollback_release_id: str | None = None,
+        rollback_artifact: Any | None = None,
+        rollback_compatible: bool = False,
+    ) -> EnvironmentDeploymentTarget:
+        tenant_id, subject_id, component_id, environment, release_id = map(
+            lambda pair: _required(pair[0], pair[1]),
+            ((tenant_id,"tenant_id"),(subject_id,"subject_id"),(component_id,"component_id"),(environment,"environment"),(release_id,"release_id")),
+        )
+        self._authorize(tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,environment,"write")
+        if stage not in self.TARGET_STAGES:
+            raise ValueError("invalid target stage")
+        if expected_revision is not None and (not isinstance(expected_revision, int) or isinstance(expected_revision, bool) or expected_revision < 0):
+            raise ValueError("invalid expected_revision")
+        if type(rollback_compatible) is not bool:
+            raise ValueError("rollback_compatible must be boolean")
+        artifact_json = canonical_artifact(artifact)
+        try:
+            linked_release = self.lineage.get_release_for_component(tenant_id, component_id, release_id)
+        except KeyError as exc:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("deployment target release has no lineage") from exc
+        if canonical_artifact(linked_release["artifact"]) != artifact_json:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("deployment target artifact does not match release")
+        rollback_artifact_json = canonical_artifact(rollback_artifact) if rollback_artifact is not None else None
+        source_revision = _required(source_revision, "source_revision") if source_revision else None
+        observed_main_revision = _required(observed_main_revision, "observed_main_revision") if observed_main_revision else None
+        rollback_release_id = _required(rollback_release_id, "rollback_release_id") if rollback_release_id else None
+        if (rollback_release_id is None) != (rollback_artifact_json is None):
+            raise ValueError("rollback release and artifact must be supplied together")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            current = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_targets WHERE tenant_id=? AND component_id=? AND environment=?",
+                (tenant_id, component_id, environment),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if current is None:
+                if expected_revision is not None:
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("expected revision does not match absent target")
+                if stage == "ROLLBACK_STAGED":
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("rollback requires a current target")
+                revision = 1
+                previous_release_id = previous_artifact_json = None
+            else:
+                if expected_revision != current["revision"]:
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("expected revision does not match target")
+                if stage == "ROLLBACK_STAGED":
+                    if not current["rollback_compatible"]:
+                        raise ReleaseConflict("current target has no compatible rollback")
+                    if release_id != current["rollback_release_id"] or artifact_json != current["rollback_artifact_json"]:
+                        raise ReleaseConflict("rollback target does not match compatible rollback binding")
+                revision = current["revision"] + 1
+                previous_release_id = current["release_id"]
+                previous_artifact_json = current["artifact_json"]
+                if rollback_compatible and rollback_release_id is None:
+                    rollback_release_id = previous_release_id
+                    rollback_artifact_json = previous_artifact_json
+            if rollback_compatible and current is not None and rollback_release_id is None:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("compatible rollback requires a previous target")
+            now = _now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """INSERT INTO release_targets VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                   ON CONFLICT(tenant_id,component_id,environment) DO UPDATE SET
+                     release_id=excluded.release_id, artifact_json=excluded.artifact_json,
+                     revision=excluded.revision, stage=excluded.stage,
+                     source_revision=excluded.source_revision,
+                     observed_main_revision=excluded.observed_main_revision,
+                     previous_release_id=excluded.previous_release_id,
+                     previous_artifact_json=excluded.previous_artifact_json,
+                     rollback_release_id=excluded.rollback_release_id,
+                     rollback_artifact_json=excluded.rollback_artifact_json,
+                     rollback_compatible=excluded.rollback_compatible,
+                     updated_by_subject_id=excluded.updated_by_subject_id,
+                     updated_at=excluded.updated_at""",
+                (tenant_id,component_id,environment,release_id,artifact_json,revision,stage,
+                 source_revision,observed_main_revision,previous_release_id,previous_artifact_json,
+                 rollback_release_id,rollback_artifact_json,int(rollback_compatible),subject_id,now),
+            )
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_targets WHERE tenant_id=? AND component_id=? AND environment=?",
+                (tenant_id,component_id,environment),
+            ).fetchone()
+            return self._target(row)
+
+    def get_target(self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, component_id: str, environment: str) -> EnvironmentDeploymentTarget:
+        tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,environment=(
+            _required(tenant_id,"tenant_id"),_required(subject_id,"subject_id"),
+            _required(component_id,"component_id"),_required(environment,"environment"),
+        )
+        self._authorize(tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,environment,"read")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_targets WHERE tenant_id=? AND component_id=? AND environment=?",
+                (tenant_id,component_id,environment),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise KeyError("deployment target not found")
+        return self._target(row)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _target(row: sqlite3.Row) -> EnvironmentDeploymentTarget:
+        return EnvironmentDeploymentTarget(
+            tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], component_id=row["component_id"], environment=row["environment"],
+            release_id=row["release_id"], artifact=decode_artifact(row["artifact_json"]), revision=row["revision"],
+            stage=row["stage"], source_revision=row["source_revision"], observed_main_revision=row["observed_main_revision"],
+            previous_release_id=row["previous_release_id"],
+            previous_artifact=decode_artifact(row["previous_artifact_json"]) if row["previous_artifact_json"] else None,
+            rollback_release_id=row["rollback_release_id"],
+            rollback_artifact=decode_artifact(row["rollback_artifact_json"]) if row["rollback_artifact_json"] else None,
+            rollback_compatible=bool(row["rollback_compatible"]),
+            updated_by_subject_id=row["updated_by_subject_id"], updated_at=row["updated_at"],
+        )
+
+    def start_saga(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str, component_id: str, saga_id: str,
+        release_id: str, deployment_id: str, environment: str, artifact: Any,
+        recipe_id: str, *, expected_target_revision: int,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,saga_id,release_id,deployment_id,environment,recipe_id=map(
+            lambda pair:_required(pair[0],pair[1]),
+            ((tenant_id,"tenant_id"),(subject_id,"subject_id"),(mission_id,"mission_id"),(component_id,"component_id"),(saga_id,"saga_id"),
+             (release_id,"release_id"),(deployment_id,"deployment_id"),(environment,"environment"),(recipe_id,"recipe_id")),
+        )
+        if not isinstance(expected_target_revision,int) or isinstance(expected_target_revision,bool) or expected_target_revision < 1:
+            raise ValueError("invalid expected_target_revision")
+        self._authorize(tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,environment,"deploy")
+        artifact_json=canonical_artifact(artifact)
+        target=self.get_target(tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,environment)
+        if target.revision != expected_target_revision:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("expected target revision does not match")
+        if target.stage not in {"STAGED","ROLLBACK_STAGED"}:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("deployment target is not staged")
+        if target.release_id != release_id or canonical_artifact(target.artifact) != artifact_json:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("saga does not match deployment target")
+        graph=self.lineage.explain(tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id)
+        release=next((item for item in graph["releases"] if item["release_id"] == release_id),None)
+        if release is None or release["component_id"] != component_id or canonical_artifact(release["artifact"]) != artifact_json:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("release has no exact source lineage")
+        source_task=next((item for item in graph["tasks"] if item["task_id"] == release["source_task_id"]),None)
+        if source_task is None or source_task["component_id"] != component_id:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("release source Task component lineage missing")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            recipe=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM release_recipes WHERE recipe_id=?",(recipe_id,)).fetchone()
+            if recipe is None:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("recipe not found")
+        # The relationship is durable before saga admission and is idempotent on retry.
+        self.lineage.link_deployment(
+            tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id,release_id,deployment_id,component_id,environment,
+            expected_target_revision,decode_artifact(artifact_json),
+            metadata={"saga_id":saga_id,"recipe_id":recipe_id,"recipe_digest":recipe["recipe_digest"]},
+        )
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",(tenant_id,saga_id)).fetchone()
+            expected=(subject_id,mission_id,component_id,release["source_task_id"],release["source_effect_id"],source_task["grant_id"],release_id,deployment_id,environment,artifact_json,recipe_id,recipe["recipe_digest"],expected_target_revision)
+            if existing:
+                actual=tuple(existing[key] for key in ("subject_id","mission_id","component_id","source_task_id","source_effect_id","grant_id","release_id","deployment_id","environment","artifact_json","recipe_id","recipe_digest","target_revision"))
+                if actual != expected:
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("saga_id already has different immutable binding")
+                return self._saga(connection,existing)
+            collision=connection.execute("SELECT saga_id FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND deployment_id=?",(tenant_id,deployment_id)).fetchone()
+            if collision:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("deployment_id already has a different saga")
+            now=_now()
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO release_sagas VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (tenant_id,saga_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,release["source_task_id"],release["source_effect_id"],source_task["grant_id"],release_id,deployment_id,environment,artifact_json,
+                 recipe_id,recipe["recipe_digest"],expected_target_revision,0,"RUNNING",0,now,now),
+            )
+            row=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",(tenant_id,saga_id)).fetchone()
+            return self._saga(connection,row)
+
+    def get_saga(self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, saga_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",(_required(tenant_id,"tenant_id"),_required(saga_id,"saga_id"))).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise KeyError("release saga not found")
+            if row["subject_id"] != _required(subject_id,"subject_id"):
+                raise ReleaseAuthorizationError("release saga subject denied")
+            return self._saga(connection,row)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _stages(connection: sqlite3.Connection, recipe_id: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        row=connection.execute("SELECT stages_json FROM release_recipes WHERE recipe_id=?",(recipe_id,)).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise ReleaseConflict("persisted recipe missing")
+        return json.loads(row["stages_json"])
+
+    def _saga(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection, row: sqlite3.Row) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        stages=self._stages(connection,row["recipe_id"])
+        index=row["stage_index"]
+        return {
+            "tenant_id":row["tenant_id"],"subject_id":row["subject_id"],"mission_id":row["mission_id"],
+            "component_id":row["component_id"],"source_task_id":row["source_task_id"],
+            "source_effect_id":row["source_effect_id"],"grant_id":row["grant_id"],
+            "saga_id":row["saga_id"],"release_id":row["release_id"],"deployment_id":row["deployment_id"],
+            "environment":row["environment"],"artifact":decode_artifact(row["artifact_json"]),
+            "recipe_id":row["recipe_id"],"recipe_digest":row["recipe_digest"],
+            "target_revision":row["target_revision"],"stage_index":index,
+            "stage_id":stages[index]["stage_id"] if index < len(stages) else None,
+            "state":row["state"],"revision":row["revision"],"created_at":row["created_at"],"updated_at":row["updated_at"],
+        }
+
+    def advance_saga(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, saga_id: str, expected_revision: int,
+        operation_adapter: Any,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        tenant_id,subject_id,saga_id=(
+            _required(tenant_id,"tenant_id"),_required(subject_id,"subject_id"),_required(saga_id,"saga_id")
+        )
+        if not isinstance(expected_revision,int) or isinstance(expected_revision,bool) or expected_revision < 0:
+            raise ValueError("invalid expected_revision")
+        prepare=getattr(operation_adapter,"prepare",None)
+        execute=getattr(operation_adapter,"execute",None)
+        if not callable(prepare) or not callable(execute):
+            raise ValueError("governed operation adapter requires prepare and execute")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            saga=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",(tenant_id,saga_id)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if saga is None:
+                raise KeyError("release saga not found")
+            if saga["subject_id"] != subject_id:
+                raise ReleaseAuthorizationError("saga belongs to different subject")
+            self._authorize(tenant_id,subject_id,saga["component_id"],saga["environment"],"deploy")
+            if saga["revision"] != expected_revision:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("expected revision does not match saga")
+            if saga["state"] == "COMPLETED":
+                return self._saga(connection,saga)
+            stages=self._stages(connection,saga["recipe_id"])
+            stage=stages[saga["stage_index"]]
+            effect_id=f"release:{saga_id}:{saga['stage_index']}:{stage['stage_id']}"
+            intent=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_effect_intents WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                (tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if intent is None:
+                now=_now()
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO release_effect_intents VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"],stage["stage_id"],stage["operation_id"],effect_id,
+                     None,"PENDING_JOB",None,None,now,now),
+                )
+            elif (intent["effect_id"],intent["stage_id"],intent["operation_id"]) != (
+                effect_id,stage["stage_id"],stage["operation_id"]
+            ):
+                raise ReleaseConflict("persisted stage effect identity mismatch")
+        operation={
+            "tenant_id":tenant_id,"subject_id":subject_id,"mission_id":saga["mission_id"],
+            "component_id":saga["component_id"],"task_id":saga["source_task_id"],
+            "source_task_id":saga["source_task_id"],"source_effect_id":saga["source_effect_id"],
+            "grant_id":saga["grant_id"],"saga_id":saga_id,
+            "deployment_id":saga["deployment_id"],"release_id":saga["release_id"],
+            "environment":saga["environment"],"artifact":decode_artifact(saga["artifact_json"]),
+            "target_revision":saga["target_revision"],"stage_index":saga["stage_index"],
+            "stage_id":stage["stage_id"],"operation_id":stage["operation_id"],"effect_id":effect_id,
+            "parameters":stage.get("parameters",{}),
+        }
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            intent=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_effect_intents WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                (tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+            ).fetchone()
+        job_id=intent["job_id"]
+        if job_id is None:
+            prepared=prepare(dict(operation))
+            job_id=prepared.get("job_id") if isinstance(prepared,Mapping) else prepared
+            job_id=_required(job_id,"prepared job_id")
+            # This is the first point where the relationship graph may name a Job:
+            # link_effect independently resolves the configured real Job authority.
+            self.lineage.link_effect(
+                tenant_id,subject_id,saga["mission_id"],saga["source_task_id"],effect_id,job_id,
+                source_effect_id=saga["source_effect_id"],
+                metadata={"deployment_id":saga["deployment_id"],"release_id":saga["release_id"],
+                          "component_id":saga["component_id"],"stage_id":stage["stage_id"]},
+            )
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                current=connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT revision,stage_index FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",
+                    (tenant_id,saga_id),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if current is None or current["revision"] != expected_revision or current["stage_index"] != saga["stage_index"]:
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("expected revision changed before Job binding")
+                bound=connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT job_id FROM release_effect_intents WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                    (tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if bound["job_id"] not in (None,job_id):
+                    raise ReleaseConflict("stage effect already bound to different Job")
+                connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE release_effect_intents SET job_id=?,state='JOB_LINKED',updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                    (job_id,_now(),tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+                )
+        operation["job_id"]=job_id
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            intent=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_effect_intents WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                (tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if intent["receipt_json"]:
+            raw_receipt=json.loads(intent["receipt_json"])
+        elif intent["state"] == "EFFECT_UNKNOWN":
+            reconcile=getattr(operation_adapter,"reconcile",None)
+            if not callable(reconcile):
+                raise ReleaseReconciliationRequired("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED: adapter readback unavailable")
+            raw_receipt=reconcile(dict(operation))
+        else:
+            try:
+                raw_receipt=execute(dict(operation))
+            except Exception:
+                with self._connect() as connection:
+                    connection.execute(
+                        "UPDATE release_effect_intents SET state='EFFECT_UNKNOWN',updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                        (_now(),tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+                    )
+                raise
+        if not isinstance(raw_receipt,Mapping):
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE release_effect_intents SET state='EFFECT_UNKNOWN',updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                    (_now(),tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+                )
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError("operation adapter receipt must be an object")
+        try:
+            unverified_receipt_json=_json(dict(raw_receipt))
+        except (TypeError,ValueError) as exc:
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError("operation adapter receipt must be canonical JSON") from exc
+        if len(unverified_receipt_json.encode("utf-8")) > 262_144:
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError("operation adapter receipt is too large")
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            current=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT revision,stage_index FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",(tenant_id,saga_id)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if current is None or current["revision"] != expected_revision or current["stage_index"] != saga["stage_index"]:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("expected revision changed before receipt persistence")
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE release_effect_intents SET state='RECEIPT_UNVERIFIED',receipt_json=?,updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                (unverified_receipt_json,_now(),tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+            )
+        expected={key:operation[key] for key in (
+            "tenant_id","subject_id","component_id","task_id","source_task_id","source_effect_id","grant_id",
+            "job_id","effect_id","operation_id","deployment_id","release_id","artifact"
+        )}
+        try:
+            verified=self.receipt_verifier(raw_receipt,expected)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError("configured verifier rejected operation receipt") from exc
+        if not isinstance(verified,VerifiedReceipt):
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError("receipt_verifier must return VerifiedReceipt")
+        if verified.outcome != "SUCCEEDED":
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError("verified receipt outcome is not SUCCEEDED")
+        fields=("tenant_id","subject_id","component_id","task_id","source_task_id","source_effect_id","grant_id",
+                "job_id","effect_id","operation_id","deployment_id","release_id","artifact")
+        bindings=tuple(canonical_artifact(getattr(verified,name)) if name == "artifact" else getattr(verified,name) for name in fields)
+        expected_bindings=tuple(canonical_artifact(operation[name]) if name == "artifact" else operation[name] for name in fields)
+        if bindings != expected_bindings:
+            wrong=next(name for name,actual,wanted in zip(fields,bindings,expected_bindings) if actual != wanted)
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError(f"verified receipt {wrong} binding mismatch")
+        receipt_id=_required(verified.receipt_id,"receipt_id")
+        if not isinstance(verified.observed,Mapping):
+            raise ReleaseVerificationError("verified receipt observation must be an object")
+        observed_json=_json(dict(verified.observed))
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            current=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",(tenant_id,saga_id)).fetchone()
+            if current["revision"] != expected_revision or current["stage_index"] != saga["stage_index"]:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("expected revision changed before receipt commit")
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE release_effect_intents SET state='VERIFIED',receipt_id=?,updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND stage_index=?",
+                (receipt_id,_now(),tenant_id,saga_id,saga["stage_index"]),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """INSERT OR IGNORE INTO release_deployment_facts
+                   (tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,task_id,grant_id,job_id,deployment_id,release_id,artifact_json,saga_id,stage_id,operation_id,effect_id,receipt_id,observed_json,created_at)
+                   VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                (tenant_id,subject_id,saga["mission_id"],saga["component_id"],saga["source_task_id"],saga["grant_id"],job_id,
+                 saga["deployment_id"],saga["release_id"],saga["artifact_json"],saga_id,stage["stage_id"],stage["operation_id"],
+                 effect_id,receipt_id,observed_json,_now()),
+            )
+            next_index=saga["stage_index"]+1
+            state="COMPLETED" if next_index == len(stages) else "RUNNING"
+            updated=connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE release_sagas SET stage_index=?,state=?,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=? AND revision=?",
+                (next_index,state,_now(),tenant_id,saga_id,expected_revision),
+            )
+            if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                raise ReleaseConflict("expected revision changed")
+            row=connection.execute("SELECT * FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND saga_id=?",(tenant_id,saga_id)).fetchone()
+            return self._saga(connection,row)
+
+
+    def deployment_facts(self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, component_id: str, deployment_id: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,deployment_id=(
+            _required(tenant_id,"tenant_id"),_required(subject_id,"subject_id"),
+            _required(component_id,"component_id"),_required(deployment_id,"deployment_id"),
+        )
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            saga=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT environment,subject_id,component_id FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND deployment_id=?",
+                (tenant_id,deployment_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if saga is None or saga["subject_id"] != subject_id or saga["component_id"] != component_id:
+                raise ReleaseAuthorizationError("deployment facts scope denied")
+            self._authorize(tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,saga["environment"],"read")
+            rows=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM release_deployment_facts WHERE tenant_id=? AND subject_id=? AND component_id=? AND deployment_id=? ORDER BY fact_id",
+                (tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,deployment_id),
+            ).fetchall()
+        return [{**{key:row[key] for key in row.keys() if not key.endswith("_json")},
+                 "artifact":decode_artifact(row["artifact_json"]),"observed":json.loads(row["observed_json"])} for row in rows]
+
+    def record_acceptance(
+        self, tenant_id: str, subject_id: str, mission_id: str, component_id: str, acceptance_id: str,
+        deployment_id: str, release_id: str, artifact: Any, accepted: bool, *,
+        evidence: Any,
+        verifier: Callable[[Any, Mapping[str, Any]], VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            saga=connection.execute(
+                "SELECT environment,subject_id,component_id FROM release_sagas WHERE tenant_id=? AND deployment_id=?",
+                (tenant_id,deployment_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if saga is None or saga["subject_id"] != subject_id or saga["component_id"] != component_id:
+            raise ReleaseAuthorizationError("acceptance deployment scope denied")
+        self._authorize(tenant_id,subject_id,component_id,saga["environment"],"accept")
+        return self.lineage.record_acceptance(
+            tenant_id,subject_id,mission_id,component_id,acceptance_id,deployment_id,release_id,
+            artifact,accepted,evidence=evidence,verifier=verifier,
+        )
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "EnvironmentDeploymentTarget", "ReleaseAuthorizationError", "ReleaseConflict", "ReleaseError", "ReleaseLedger",
+    "ReleaseReconciliationRequired", "ReleaseVerificationError", "VerifiedReceipt",
+]

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/runtime_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+"""Pure validation and deployment-truth evaluation for runtime contracts.
+
+Runtime contracts describe stable structure.  A release-owned deployment target
+is supplied separately so that changing a release does not rewrite structural
+configuration or turn a source branch into runtime evidence.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from copy import deepcopy
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import re
+from pathlib import PurePosixPath
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+CONTRACT_SCHEMA = "aios.runtime-contract.v1"
+LIFECYCLES = frozenset({"active", "candidate", "legacy", "example"})
+_DYNAMIC_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {"desired", "desired_commit", "desired_release", "desired_target", "desired_targets"}
+)
+_SECRET_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {"secret", "secret_bytes", "token", "password", "private_key", "credential_value", "value"}
+)
+_DIGEST = re.compile(r"^(?:sha256:)?[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$")
+_SAFE_SYMBOLIC_REF = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*:[/A-Za-z0-9_.:@+-]+$")
+
+
+def _error(code: str, path: str = "") -> ValueError:
+    return ValueError(f"{code}:{path}" if path else code)
+
+
+def _nonempty_string(value: object, path: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise _error("field_invalid", path)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _positive_int(value: object, path: str) -> int:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or value < 1:
+        raise _error("field_invalid", path)
+    return value
+
+
+def _reject_dynamic_fields(value: object, path: str = "contract") -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for key, child in value.items():
+            if not isinstance(key, str):
+                raise _error("field_name_invalid", path)
+            child_path = f"{path}.{key}"
+            if key.lower() in _DYNAMIC_FIELDS:
+                raise _error("dynamic_field_forbidden", child_path)
+            _reject_dynamic_fields(child, child_path)
+    elif isinstance(value, Sequence) and not isinstance(value, (str, bytes, bytearray)):
+        for index, child in enumerate(value):
+            _reject_dynamic_fields(child, f"{path}[{index}]")
+
+
+def _safe_path_ref(value: object, path: str) -> str:
+    text = _nonempty_string(value, path)
+    if "\x00" in text or "\\" in text:
+        raise _error("unsafe_path_ref", path)
+    candidate = PurePosixPath(text)
+    if candidate.is_absolute() or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in candidate.parts):
+        raise _error("unsafe_path_ref", path)
+    return text
+
+
+def _symbolic_ref(value: object, path: str) -> str:
+    text = _nonempty_string(value, path)
+    if "\x00" in text or ".." in text or not _SAFE_SYMBOLIC_REF.fullmatch(text):
+        raise _error("resolver_ref_invalid", path)
+    return text
+
+
+def _credential_ref(value: object, path: str) -> str:
+    text = _nonempty_string(value, path)
+    allowed = (
+        text.startswith("credential://")
+        or text.startswith("secret://")
+        or text.startswith("systemd-credential:")
+    )
+    if not allowed or "\x00" in text or ".." in text or text.startswith("/run/credentials/"):
+        raise _error("credential_ref_invalid", path)
+    return text
+
+
+def _validate_binding_group(
+    group: object,
+    group_name: str,
+    component_id: str,
+    environment: str,
+    tenant_scope: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(group, Mapping):
+        raise _error("binding_group_invalid", group_name)
+    normalized: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for name, raw in group.items():
+        item_path = f"{group_name}.{name}"
+        _nonempty_string(name, f"{group_name}.name")
+        if isinstance(raw, str):
+            reference_field = (
+                "credential_ref"
+                if group_name == "credential_refs"
+                else "path_ref"
+                if group_name == "resource_refs" and ":" not in raw
+                else "resolver_ref"
+            )
+            item = {
+                "component_id": component_id,
+                "environment": environment,
+                reference_field: raw,
+            }
+        elif isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            item = deepcopy(dict(raw))
+        else:
+            raise _error("binding_invalid", item_path)
+        if _nonempty_string(item.get("component_id"), f"{item_path}.component_id") != component_id:
+            raise _error("binding_component_mismatch", item_path)
+        if _nonempty_string(item.get("environment"), f"{item_path}.environment") != environment:
+            raise _error("binding_environment_mismatch", item_path)
+        if "tenant_scope" in item and (
+            _nonempty_string(item["tenant_scope"], f"{item_path}.tenant_scope") != tenant_scope
+        ):
+            raise _error("binding_tenant_mismatch", item_path)
+
+        reference_fields = [key for key in ("resolver_ref", "path_ref", "credential_ref") if key in item]
+        if len(reference_fields) != 1:
+            raise _error("binding_reference_invalid", item_path)
+        reference_field = reference_fields[0]
+        reference_path = f"{item_path}.{reference_field}"
+        if group_name == "credential_refs" or reference_field == "credential_ref":
+            for key in item:
+                if key.lower() in _SECRET_FIELDS:
+                    raise _error("secret_material_forbidden", f"{item_path}.{key}")
+            item[reference_field] = _credential_ref(item[reference_field], reference_path)
+        elif reference_field == "path_ref":
+            item[reference_field] = _safe_path_ref(item[reference_field], reference_path)
+        else:
+            item[reference_field] = _symbolic_ref(item[reference_field], reference_path)
+        normalized[str(name)] = item
+    return normalized
+
+
+def validate_contract(document: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Validate and copy a stable ``aios.runtime-contract.v1`` document.
+
+    The returned mapping owns its nested containers, so callers cannot mutate the
+    source after validation.  Invalid contracts raise ``ValueError`` with a stable
+    machine-readable code prefix.
+    """
+
+    if not isinstance(document, Mapping):
+        raise _error("contract_invalid")
+    _reject_dynamic_fields(document)
+    result = deepcopy(dict(document))
+    if result.get("contract_schema") != CONTRACT_SCHEMA:
+        raise _error("contract_schema_invalid", "contract_schema")
+    result["contract_revision"] = _positive_int(result.get("contract_revision"), "contract_revision")
+    component_id = _nonempty_string(result.get("component_id"), "component_id")
+    environment = _nonempty_string(result.get("environment"), "environment")
+    result["component_id"] = component_id
+    result["environment"] = environment
+    tenant_scope = _nonempty_string(result.get("tenant_scope"), "tenant_scope")
+    result["tenant_scope"] = tenant_scope
+    lifecycle = _nonempty_string(result.get("lifecycle"), "lifecycle").lower()
+    if lifecycle not in LIFECYCLES:
+        raise _error("lifecycle_invalid", "lifecycle")
+    result["lifecycle"] = lifecycle
+
+    if "resources" in result and "resource_refs" in result:
+        raise _error("duplicate_resource_group")
+    if "resources" in result:
+        result["resource_refs"] = result.pop("resources")
+    for group_name in ("entrypoints", "bindings", "resource_refs", "credential_refs"):
+        result[group_name] = _validate_binding_group(
+            result.get(group_name), group_name, component_id, environment, tenant_scope
+        )
+
+    operations = result.get("operations")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(operations, Sequence)
+        or isinstance(operations, (str, bytes, bytearray))
+        or not operations
+    ):
+        raise _error("operations_invalid", "operations")
+    normalized_operations = [
+        _nonempty_string(operation, f"operations[{index}]")
+        for index, operation in enumerate(operations)
+    ]
+    if len(set(normalized_operations)) != len(normalized_operations):
+        raise _error("duplicate_operation", "operations")
+    result["operations"] = normalized_operations
+    return result
+
+
+def _unknown(*reasons: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "status": "UNKNOWN",
+        "state": "UNKNOWN",
+        "verification": "UNKNOWN",
+        "converged": False,
+        "reasons": list(dict.fromkeys(reasons)),
+    }
+
+
+def _drift(reasons: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "status": "DRIFT",
+        "state": "DRIFT",
+        "verification": "FAILED",
+        "converged": False,
+        "reasons": list(dict.fromkeys(reasons)),
+    }
+
+
+def _parse_time(value: object) -> datetime | None:
+    if isinstance(value, datetime):
+        parsed = value
+    elif isinstance(value, str):
+        try:
+            parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.strip().replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+        except ValueError:
+            return None
+    else:
+        return None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None or parsed.utcoffset() is None:
+        return None
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _digest_value(document: Mapping[str, Any], *names: str) -> object:
+    for name in names:
+        if name in document:
+            return document[name]
+    return None
+
+
+def _valid_digest(value: object) -> bool:
+    return isinstance(value, str) and bool(_DIGEST.fullmatch(value))
+
+
+def evaluate_deployment(
+    contract: Mapping[str, Any],
+    target: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    observation: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    provenance: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    now: datetime | str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Evaluate one target using fresh runtime and provenance evidence.
+
+    Missing or malformed evidence is ``UNKNOWN``.  ``DRIFT`` is reserved for a
+    complete evidence set that proves an incompatible target or runtime fact.
+    Repository HEAD is intentionally not an input to this decision.
+    """
+
+    stable = validate_contract(contract)
+    missing: list[str] = []
+    if target is None:
+        missing.append("target_missing")
+    elif not isinstance(target, Mapping):
+        missing.append("target_invalid")
+    if observation is None:
+        missing.append("observation_missing")
+    elif not isinstance(observation, Mapping):
+        missing.append("observation_invalid")
+    if provenance is None:
+        missing.append("provenance_missing")
+    elif not isinstance(provenance, Mapping):
+        missing.append("provenance_invalid")
+    current_time = _parse_time(now)
+    if current_time is None:
+        missing.append("now_invalid")
+    if missing:
+        return _unknown(*missing)
+    assert target is not None and observation is not None and provenance is not None
+    assert current_time is not None
+
+    target_errors: list[str] = []
+    for field in ("component_id", "environment", "release_id", "deployment_id"):
+        if not isinstance(target.get(field), str) or not str(target[field]).strip():
+            target_errors.append(f"target_{field}_invalid")
+    if "tenant_scope" in target and (
+        not isinstance(target["tenant_scope"], str) or not target["tenant_scope"].strip()
+    ):
+        target_errors.append("target_tenant_scope_invalid")
+    target_artifact = target.get("artifact_digest")
+    if not _valid_digest(target_artifact):
+        target_errors.append("target_artifact_digest_invalid")
+    if isinstance(target.get("revision"), bool) or not isinstance(target.get("revision"), int) or target.get("revision", 0) < 1:
+        target_errors.append("target_revision_invalid")
+
+    observed_at = _parse_time(observation.get("observed_at"))
+    max_age = observation.get("max_age_seconds", observation.get("max_age"))
+    observed_artifact = _digest_value(
+        observation, "actual_artifact_digest", "actual_artifact", "artifact_digest"
+    )
+    observation_errors: list[str] = []
+    if observed_at is None:
+        observation_errors.append("observation_observed_at_invalid")
+    if isinstance(max_age, bool) or not isinstance(max_age, (int, float)) or max_age <= 0:
+        observation_errors.append("observation_max_age_invalid")
+    if not isinstance(observation.get("source"), str) or not observation.get("source", "").strip():
+        observation_errors.append("observation_source_invalid")
+    if not _valid_digest(observed_artifact):
+        observation_errors.append("observation_actual_artifact_invalid")
+    if not isinstance(observation.get("healthy"), bool):
+        observation_errors.append("observation_healthy_invalid")
+    for field in ("component_id", "environment", "tenant_scope", "deployment_id"):
+        if field in observation and (
+            not isinstance(observation[field], str) or not observation[field].strip()
+        ):
+            observation_errors.append(f"observation_{field}_invalid")
+    if "revision" in observation and (
+        isinstance(observation["revision"], bool)
+        or not isinstance(observation["revision"], int)
+        or observation["revision"] < 1
+    ):
+        observation_errors.append("observation_revision_invalid")
+
+    artifact_provenance = _digest_value(provenance, "artifact_digest", "artifact_hash")
+    source_provenance = _digest_value(provenance, "source_digest", "source_hash")
+    builder_provenance = _digest_value(provenance, "builder_digest", "builder_hash")
+    provenance_errors: list[str] = []
+    if not _valid_digest(artifact_provenance):
+        provenance_errors.append("provenance_artifact_digest_invalid")
+    if not _valid_digest(source_provenance):
+        provenance_errors.append("provenance_source_digest_invalid")
+    if not _valid_digest(builder_provenance):
+        provenance_errors.append("provenance_builder_digest_invalid")
+
+    evidence_errors = target_errors + observation_errors + provenance_errors
+    if evidence_errors:
+        return _unknown(*evidence_errors)
+    assert observed_at is not None and isinstance(max_age, (int, float))
+    age = (current_time - observed_at).total_seconds()
+    if age < 0:
+        return _unknown("observation_from_future")
+    if age > max_age:
+        return _unknown("observation_stale")
+
+    drift: list[str] = []
+    if target["component_id"] != stable["component_id"]:
+        drift.append("target_component_id_mismatch")
+    if target["environment"] != stable["environment"]:
+        drift.append("target_environment_mismatch")
+    if "tenant_scope" in target and target["tenant_scope"] != stable["tenant_scope"]:
+        drift.append("target_tenant_scope_mismatch")
+    if "tenant_scope" in observation and observation["tenant_scope"] != stable["tenant_scope"]:
+        drift.append("observation_tenant_scope_mismatch")
+    for field in ("component_id", "environment", "deployment_id", "revision"):
+        if field in observation and observation[field] != target[field]:
+            drift.append(f"observation_{field}_mismatch")
+    if observed_artifact != target_artifact:
+        drift.append("artifact_mismatch")
+    if artifact_provenance != target_artifact:
+        drift.append("provenance_artifact_mismatch")
+    if observation["healthy"] is False:
+        drift.append("observation_unhealthy")
+    if drift:
+        return _drift(drift)
+    return {
+        "status": "VERIFIED",
+        "state": "CONVERGED",
+        "verification": "VERIFIED",
+        "converged": True,
+        "reasons": [],
+        "component_id": target["component_id"],
+        "environment": target["environment"],
+        "release_id": target["release_id"],
+        "deployment_id": target["deployment_id"],
+        "artifact_digest": target_artifact,
+        "revision": target["revision"],
+        "observed_at": observation["observed_at"],
+        "observation_source": observation["source"],
+    }

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+"""Thin authenticated application service over existing TaskPlaneStore and JobStore.
+
+This module owns no second Task lifecycle store. Added task runtime columns live
+in the supplied Task authority database; the lineage ledger owns only relations.
+The built-in host adapter is READ_ONLY. Mutating operations require separately
+registered governed adapters with receiver fencing/readback, never arbitrary argv.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from datetime import datetime,timezone
+import base64
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping
+
+from task_plane.models import TaskPlan,WorkerRegistration,ProbeEvidence,ProbeOutcome,Budget
+from task_plane.errors import TaskPlaneHTTPError
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController,JobStore,JobState,JobError
+from .evidence import ReceiptSigner,canonical,digest
+from .runtime_contract import validate_contract
+from .worker_policy import eligible
+from .authorization import AuthorizationError
+from .host import HostError
+
+
+class ServiceError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self,code,status=409):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code=code
+        self.status=status
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Identity:
+    tenant_id: str
+    subject_id: str
+    role: str
+    worker_id: str | None=None
+
+
+class BaselineService:
+    def __init__(self,store,job_root,authorization,contracts,operations,worker_profiles,host,lineage,machine_key,
+                 *,machine_key_id='baseline-machine',trusted_receipt_keys=None):
+        self.store=store
+        self.signer=ReceiptSigner(machine_key,key_id=machine_key_id,trusted_public_keys=trusted_receipt_keys)
+        self.jobs=GitOpsJobController(JobStore(Path(job_root)),generic_receipt_verifier=self.signer.verify)
+        self.authorization=authorization
+        self.contracts={}
+        for entry in contracts:
+            value=validate_contract(entry)
+            key=(value['tenant_scope'],value['environment'],value['component_id'])
+            if key in self.contracts: raise ServiceError('CONTRACT_DUPLICATE')
+            self.contracts[key]=value
+        self.operations=operations
+        self.worker_profiles=dict(worker_profiles)
+        self.host=host
+        self.lineage=lineage
+        self.storage_blocked=False
+        self._execute_lock=threading.Lock()
+        with self.store._transaction():
+            self.store.conn.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS baseline_task_runtime(
+                task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES tasks(task_id),ready_at REAL,
+                blocker_code TEXT,job_id TEXT,effect_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE)''')
+            self.store.conn.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS baseline_worker_policy(
+                worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,policy_json TEXT NOT NULL)''')
+        self.store.probe_attestation_verifier=self._verify_probe
+
+    def _user(self,identity):
+        if not isinstance(identity,Identity) or identity.role not in {'user','owner'}:
+            raise ServiceError('USER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED',403)
+
+    def _worker(self,identity):
+        if not isinstance(identity,Identity) or identity.role!='worker':
+            raise ServiceError('WORKER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED',403)
+        profile=self.worker_profiles.get(identity.worker_id)
+        if not profile or profile.identity!=identity.subject_id or identity.tenant_id not in profile.tenant_scope:
+            raise ServiceError('WORKER_SCOPE_DENIED',403)
+        return profile
+
+    def _task(self,identity,task_id):
+        task=self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        meta=task.task_plan.metadata.get('baseline',{})
+        if meta.get('tenant_id')!=identity.tenant_id or meta.get('subject_id')!=identity.subject_id:
+            raise ServiceError('TASK_SCOPE_DENIED',403)
+        return task
+
+    def _scope(self,task):
+        meta=task.task_plan.metadata['baseline']
+        return {**{key:meta[key] for key in ('tenant_id','subject_id','mission_id','operation','component_id','environment')},'task_id':task.task_id}
+
+    def _principal(self,task):
+        meta=task.task_plan.metadata['baseline']
+        return self.authorization.issue_principal(meta['grant_id'],ttl_seconds=60,**self._scope(task))
+
+    def _fresh_write(self):
+        if self.storage_blocked: raise ServiceError('STORAGE_RECOVERY_REQUIRED',503)
+        try:
+            with self.store._transaction():
+                self.store.conn.execute('UPDATE baseline_task_runtime SET blocker_code=blocker_code WHERE 0')
+        except (sqlite3.Error,OSError) as exc:
+            self.storage_blocked=True
+            raise ServiceError('TASK_STORAGE_UNAVAILABLE',503) from exc
+
+    def submit_goal(self,identity,request,*,idempotency_key):
+        self._user(identity)
+        allowed={'mission_id','grant_id','operation','component_id','environment','inputs','intent'}
+        if type(request) is not dict or set(request)!=allowed or not isinstance(idempotency_key,str) or not 1<=len(idempotency_key)<=128:
+            raise ServiceError('GOAL_SCHEMA_INVALID',400)
+        if any(not isinstance(request[key],str) or not request[key] or len(request[key])>2048 for key in allowed-{'inputs'}):
+            raise ServiceError('GOAL_SCHEMA_INVALID',400)
+        if request['inputs']!={}: raise ServiceError('OPERATION_INPUT_SCHEMA_INVALID',400)
+        if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,127}',request['mission_id']): raise ServiceError('MISSION_ID_INVALID',400)
+        operation=self.operations.get(request['operation'])
+        if operation.handler_ref!='host.service_status' or operation.effect_class!='READ_ONLY' or operation.required_permissions!=(operation.operation_id,):
+            raise ServiceError('REGISTERED_HANDLER_UNAVAILABLE',503)
+        contract=self.contracts.get((identity.tenant_id,request['environment'],request['component_id']))
+        if not contract or contract['lifecycle']!='active' or request['operation'] not in contract['operations']:
+            raise ServiceError('CONTRACT_OPERATION_UNAVAILABLE',403)
+        host_key=identity.tenant_id+':'+request['environment']+':'+request['component_id']
+        if host_key not in self.host.bindings: raise ServiceError('HOST_BINDING_UNAVAILABLE',503)
+        key=digest({'tenant':identity.tenant_id,'subject':identity.subject_id,'key':idempotency_key})
+        task_id='task-'+key[:40]
+        effect_id='effect-'+digest({'tenant':identity.tenant_id,'task':task_id,'request':request})[:40]
+        meta={**request,'tenant_id':identity.tenant_id,'subject_id':identity.subject_id,'effect_id':effect_id,
+              'operation_version':operation.version,'contract_revision':contract['contract_revision']}
+        plan=TaskPlan.from_dict({'task_id':task_id,'task_type':'host.diagnostic','intent':request['intent'],
+            'issuer':{'id':identity.subject_id,'tenant_id':identity.tenant_id,'subject_id':identity.subject_id},
+            'required_capabilities':[request['operation']],'risk':'low','approval_policy':'governed-grant',
+            'correlation_id':request['mission_id'],'metadata':{'baseline':meta},
+            'budgets':{'attempts':operation.retry['max_attempts'],'time_seconds':30*operation.retry['max_attempts']},'evidence_requirements':['diagnostic']})
+        # Validate business authorization before creating an executable task.
+        self.authorization.issue_principal(request['grant_id'],ttl_seconds=60,tenant_id=identity.tenant_id,
+            subject_id=identity.subject_id,task_id=task_id,**{key:request[key] for key in ('mission_id','operation','component_id','environment')})
+        self._fresh_write()
+        try:
+            with self.store._transaction():
+                task=self.store.create_task_with_event(plan,idempotency_key=key)
+                self.store.conn.execute('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO baseline_task_runtime(task_id,ready_at,effect_id) VALUES(?,?,?)',
+                    (task_id,time.time(),effect_id))
+            self.lineage.link_task(identity.tenant_id,identity.subject_id,request['mission_id'],request['grant_id'],task_id)
+            return self.get_task(identity,task_id)
+        except TaskPlaneHTTPError as exc:
+            raise ServiceError('TASK_CONFLICT') from exc
+        except (sqlite3.Error,OSError) as exc:
+            self.storage_blocked=True
+            raise ServiceError('TASK_STORAGE_UNAVAILABLE',503) from exc
+
+    def get_task(self,identity,task_id):
+        self._user(identity)
+        task=self._task(identity,task_id)
+        with self.store._transaction():
+            row=self.store.conn.execute('SELECT * FROM baseline_task_runtime WHERE task_id=?',(task_id,)).fetchone()
+        result=task.to_dict()
+        if row:
+            result.update({'ready_at':row['ready_at'],'blocker_code':row['blocker_code'],'effect_id':row['effect_id'],'job_id':row['job_id']})
+            if row['job_id']:
+                job=self.jobs.store.read(row['job_id'])
+                result['job_state']=job['state']
+                result['side_effect_state']=job['side_effect_state']
+                envelope=json.loads(job['receipt_json']) if job.get('receipt_json') else None
+                if self._receipt_valid(task,envelope): result['receipt']=envelope['payload']
+        result['remaining_budget']=self.store.get_task_budget(task_id).to_dict()
+        return result
+
+    def explain(self,identity,mission_id):
+        self._user(identity)
+        result=self.lineage.explain(identity.tenant_id,identity.subject_id,mission_id)
+        result['tasks_runtime']=[self.get_task(identity,t.task_id) for t in self.store.list_tasks()
+            if t.task_plan.metadata.get('baseline',{}).get('mission_id')==mission_id and
+            t.task_plan.issuer.get('tenant_id')==identity.tenant_id and t.task_plan.issuer.get('subject_id')==identity.subject_id]
+        return result
+
+    def register_worker(self,identity):
+        profile=self._worker(identity)
+        try:
+            existing=self.store.get_worker(profile.worker_id)
+        except TaskPlaneHTTPError:
+            existing=None
+        now=time.time()
+        worker=WorkerRegistration.from_dict({'worker_id':profile.worker_id,'worker_type':'baseline-operation-worker',
+            'identity':profile.identity,'capabilities':list(profile.capabilities),'trust_zone':'governed-host',
+            'max_concurrency':profile.max_concurrency,'heartbeat_interval_seconds':profile.heartbeat_seconds,
+            'supported_protocols':['aios-baseline-worker-v1'],'last_heartbeat':now})
+        self.store.register_worker(worker,actor_identity=profile.identity,is_admin=False,
+            expected_revision=existing.registration_revision if existing else None)
+        with self.store._transaction():
+            self.store.conn.execute('INSERT INTO baseline_worker_policy VALUES(?,?) ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET policy_json=excluded.policy_json',
+                (profile.worker_id,canonical(profile.__dict__).decode()))
+        return {'worker_id':profile.worker_id,'registered':True,'fallback_executor':profile.fallback_executor}
+
+    def heartbeat(self,identity):
+        profile=self._worker(identity)
+        worker=self.store.get_worker(profile.worker_id)
+        self.store.heartbeat_worker(profile.worker_id,actor_identity=profile.identity,expected_revision=worker.registration_revision)
+        return {'worker_id':profile.worker_id,'alive':True}
+
+    def claim_next(self,identity):
+        profile=self._worker(identity)
+        worker=self.store.get_worker(profile.worker_id)
+        if worker.disabled: raise ServiceError('WORKER_DISABLED',403)
+        self._fresh_write()
+        for task in sorted(self.store.list_tasks(),key=lambda t:(t.created_at,t.task_id)):
+            meta=task.task_plan.metadata.get('baseline',{})
+            if not meta or task.status not in {'CREATED','QUEUED','FAILED_RECOVERABLE'}: continue
+            with self.store._transaction():
+                row=self.store.conn.execute('SELECT ready_at FROM baseline_task_runtime WHERE task_id=?',(task.task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if not row: continue
+            now=time.time()
+            task_scope={**meta,'ready_at':row['ready_at']}
+            if not eligible(profile,task_scope,now=now,last_heartbeat=worker.last_heartbeat): continue
+            # Priority is configuration on ordinary eligible workers; no special main actor.
+            candidates=[]
+            for registered in self.store.list_workers():
+                peer=self.worker_profiles.get(registered.worker_id)
+                if not peer or registered.disabled or not eligible(peer,task_scope,now=now,last_heartbeat=registered.last_heartbeat): continue
+                with self.store._transaction():
+                    active=self.store.conn.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE' AND lease_until>?",(peer.worker_id,now)).fetchone()[0]
+                if active<peer.max_concurrency: candidates.append(peer)
+            if not candidates or sorted(candidates,key=lambda p:(-p.priority,p.worker_id))[0].worker_id!=profile.worker_id: continue
+            try:
+                self._principal(task)
+                with self.store._transaction():
+                    self.store.consume_budget(task.task_id,Budget(attempts=1,time_seconds=30))
+                    claim=self.store.claim_task(task.task_id,profile.worker_id,profile.identity,lease_seconds=30,
+                        expected_revision=task.revision,operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest())
+            except TaskPlaneHTTPError:
+                budget=self.store.get_task_budget(task.task_id)
+                if budget.attempts==0 or budget.time_seconds==0:
+                    with self.store._transaction():
+                        self.store.conn.execute('UPDATE baseline_task_runtime SET blocker_code=? WHERE task_id=?',('TASK_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED',task.task_id))
+                continue
+            except AuthorizationError:
+                with self.store._transaction():
+                    self.store.conn.execute('UPDATE baseline_task_runtime SET blocker_code=? WHERE task_id=?',('AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED',task.task_id))
+                continue
+            return {'task_id':task.task_id,'claim_id':claim.claim_id,'generation':claim.attempt,
+                    'lease_until':claim.lease_until,'operation':meta['operation']}
+        return None
+
+    def renew(self,identity,task_id,claim_id):
+        profile=self._worker(identity)
+        claim=self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        if claim.task_id!=task_id or claim.worker_id!=profile.worker_id or claim.worker_identity!=profile.identity:
+            raise ServiceError('CLAIM_IDENTITY_MISMATCH',403)
+        task=self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        meta=task.task_plan.metadata.get('baseline',{})
+        if meta.get('tenant_id') not in profile.tenant_scope or meta.get('subject_id') not in profile.subject_scope or task.status=='CANCELLED':
+            raise ServiceError('CLAIM_SCOPE_OR_STATE_DENIED',403)
+        self._principal(task)
+        self.store.heartbeat_claim(task_id,claim_id,30)
+        return {'task_id':task_id,'claim_id':claim_id,'renewed':True}
+
+    def _advance(self,job_id,state,**kwargs):
+        row=self.jobs.store.read(job_id)
+        return self.jobs.advance(job_id,state,expected_revision=int(row['revision']),**kwargs)
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _execution_slot(self,deadline):
+        remaining=deadline-time.time()
+        if remaining<=0 or not self._execute_lock.acquire(timeout=remaining):
+            raise ServiceError('EXECUTION_DEADLINE_EXPIRED',408)
+        try:
+            if time.time()>=deadline: raise ServiceError('EXECUTION_DEADLINE_EXPIRED',408)
+            yield
+        finally: self._execute_lock.release()
+
+    def execute_claim(self,identity,task_id,claim_id,*,deadline=None):
+        profile=self._worker(identity)
+        deadline=time.time()+30 if deadline is None else deadline
+        with self._execution_slot(deadline):
+            self._fresh_write()
+            task=self.store.get_task(task_id)
+            meta=task.task_plan.metadata.get('baseline',{})
+            claim=self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+            if claim.task_id!=task_id or claim.worker_id!=profile.worker_id or claim.worker_identity!=profile.identity:
+                raise ServiceError('CLAIM_IDENTITY_MISMATCH',403)
+            if meta.get('tenant_id') not in profile.tenant_scope or meta.get('subject_id') not in profile.subject_scope:
+                raise ServiceError('WORKER_SCOPE_DENIED',403)
+            user=Identity(meta['tenant_id'],meta['subject_id'],'user')
+            if task.status=='COMPLETED': return self.get_task(user,task_id)
+            if claim.status!='ACTIVE' or claim.lease_until<=time.time() or task.status=='CANCELLED':
+                raise ServiceError('CLAIM_EXPIRED_OR_CANCELLED')
+            principal=self._principal(task)
+            self.authorization.authorize(principal,**self._scope(task))
+            operation=self.operations.get(meta['operation'])
+            if operation.handler_ref!='host.service_status' or operation.effect_class!='READ_ONLY':
+                raise ServiceError('HANDLER_NOT_REGISTERED',503)
+            self.authorization.assert_effect_bounds(principal,operation,**self._scope(task))
+            request={'schema':'aios.operation-job.v1','tenant_id':meta['tenant_id'],'subject_id':meta['subject_id'],
+                'mission_id':meta['mission_id'],'grant_id':meta['grant_id'],'task_id':task_id,'effect_id':meta['effect_id'],
+                'operation':meta['operation'],'operation_version':str(operation.version),'resource_kind':'systemd-service',
+                'resource_id':digest({'tenant':meta['tenant_id'],'environment':meta['environment'],'component':meta['component_id']}),'input_digest':digest(meta['inputs'])}
+            try:
+                job=self.jobs.submit(request)
+                with self.store._transaction():
+                    self.store.conn.execute('UPDATE baseline_task_runtime SET job_id=? WHERE task_id=?',(job.job_id,task_id))
+                self.lineage.link_task(meta['tenant_id'],meta['subject_id'],meta['mission_id'],meta['grant_id'],task_id)
+                self.lineage.link_effect(meta['tenant_id'],meta['subject_id'],meta['mission_id'],task_id,meta['effect_id'],job.job_id)
+                row=self.jobs.store.read(job.job_id)
+                if row['state']=='COMPLETED':
+                    self._close_task(task,claim,json.loads(row['receipt_json']))
+                    return self.get_task(user,task_id)
+                if row['state'] not in {'REQUESTED','AUTHORIZED'}:
+                    raise ServiceError('JOB_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED')
+                self.jobs.assert_effect_admission(exclude_job_id=job.job_id)
+                self.authorization.reserve_effect(meta['grant_id'],meta['effect_id'],principal,**self._scope(task))
+                if row['state']=='REQUESTED': self._advance(job.job_id,JobState.AUTHORIZED,side_effect_state='AUTHORIZED')
+                row=self.jobs.store.read(job.job_id)
+                self.jobs.lease_resource_job(job.job_id,lease_id=claim_id,resource_kind=request['resource_kind'],
+                    resource_id=request['resource_id'],generation=None,
+                    lease_expires_at=datetime.fromtimestamp(min(claim.lease_until,time.time()+30,deadline),timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+                    expected_revision=int(row['revision']))
+                effect_lease=self.jobs.get_execution_lease(job.job_id)
+                fence_generation=int(effect_lease['generation'])
+                self._advance(job.job_id,JobState.EXECUTING,side_effect_state='IN_PROGRESS')
+                # Last authorization/claim check directly before the registered host boundary.
+                self.authorization.authorize(principal,**self._scope(task))
+                if self.store.get_task(task_id).status=='CANCELLED' or self.store.get_claim(claim_id).lease_until<=time.time():
+                    raise ServiceError('CLAIM_EXPIRED_OR_CANCELLED')
+                self.jobs.assert_execution_lease(job.job_id,generation=fence_generation,lease_id=claim_id)
+                if time.time()>=deadline: raise ServiceError('EXECUTION_DEADLINE_EXPIRED',408)
+                observation=self.host.status(meta['component_id'],meta['environment'],tenant_id=meta['tenant_id'],deadline=deadline)
+                if time.time()>=deadline or self.store.get_claim(claim_id).lease_until<=time.time():
+                    raise ServiceError('EXECUTION_DEADLINE_EXPIRED',408)
+                envelope=self.signer.sign({'task_id':task_id,'job_id':job.job_id,'effect_id':meta['effect_id'],
+                    'tenant_id':meta['tenant_id'],'subject_id':meta['subject_id'],'mission_id':meta['mission_id'],
+                    'grant_id':meta['grant_id'],'claim_id':claim_id,'generation':fence_generation,
+                    'operation':meta['operation'],'operation_version':str(operation.version),
+                    'input_digest':request['input_digest'],'resource_kind':request['resource_kind'],
+                    'resource_id':request['resource_id'],'observation':observation,'verified':True})
+                self._advance(job.job_id,JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,side_effect_state='READBACK_VERIFIED',receipt=envelope)
+                self._advance(job.job_id,JobState.COMPLETED,side_effect_state='READBACK_VERIFIED',receipt=envelope)
+                self._close_task(task,claim,envelope)
+                return self.get_task(user,task_id)
+            except (sqlite3.Error,OSError) as exc:
+                self.storage_blocked=True
+                raise ServiceError('STORAGE_RECOVERY_REQUIRED',503) from exc
+            except HostError as exc:
+                try:
+                    self._advance(job.job_id,JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,side_effect_state='UNKNOWN')
+                    with self.store._transaction():
+                        self.store.conn.execute('UPDATE baseline_task_runtime SET blocker_code=? WHERE task_id=?',(str(exc),task_id))
+                except (sqlite3.Error,OSError,JobError): self.storage_blocked=True
+                raise ServiceError(str(exc),503) from exc
+            except JobError as exc:
+                if 'UNAVAILABLE' in str(exc) or 'STORAGE' in str(exc): self.storage_blocked=True
+                raise ServiceError(str(exc),503 if self.storage_blocked else 409) from exc
+
+    def _receipt_valid(self,task,envelope):
+        meta=task.task_plan.metadata['baseline']
+        if not self.signer.verify(envelope): return False
+        payload=envelope['payload']
+        with self.store._transaction():
+            runtime=self.store.conn.execute('SELECT job_id FROM baseline_task_runtime WHERE task_id=?',(task.task_id,)).fetchone()
+        if not runtime or not runtime['job_id']: return False
+        expected={**{k:meta[k] for k in ('effect_id','tenant_id','subject_id','mission_id','grant_id','operation')},
+            'task_id':task.task_id,'job_id':runtime['job_id'],'operation_version':str(meta['operation_version']),
+            'input_digest':digest(meta['inputs']),'resource_kind':'systemd-service',
+            'resource_id':digest({'tenant':meta['tenant_id'],'environment':meta['environment'],'component':meta['component_id']})}
+        if any(payload.get(k)!=v for k,v in expected.items()) or payload.get('verified') is not True: return False
+        try:
+            lease=self.jobs.get_execution_lease(runtime['job_id'])
+            source_claim=self.store.get_claim(payload.get('claim_id'))
+            if payload.get('claim_id')!=lease['lease_id'] or payload.get('generation')!=lease['generation']: return False
+            if source_claim.task_id!=task.task_id or source_claim.operation_digest!=task.task_plan.operation_digest(): return False
+        except (JobError,TaskPlaneHTTPError,TypeError): return False
+        observation=payload.get('observation')
+        if type(observation) is not dict: return False
+        for k in ('operation','tenant_id','component_id','environment'):
+            if observation.get(k)!=meta[k]: return False
+        binding=meta['tenant_id']+':'+meta['environment']+':'+meta['component_id']
+        if observation.get('unit')!=self.host.bindings.get(binding) or observation.get('source')!='systemd.show': return False
+        return True
+
+    def _close_task(self,task,claim,envelope):
+        if not self._receipt_valid(task,envelope): raise ServiceError('RESULT_ATTESTATION_INVALID',403)
+        current=self.store.get_task(task.task_id)
+        if current.status=='CANCELLED': raise ServiceError('TASK_CANCELLED')
+        if current.status=='CLAIMED': self.store.update_task_status(task.task_id,current.revision,'RUNNING')
+        self.store.complete_claim(task.task_id,claim.claim_id,'COMPLETED',envelope,
+            evidence_entries=[('diagnostic',envelope,claim.worker_identity)])
+
+    def cancel_task(self,identity,task_id):
+        self._user(identity)
+        task=self._task(identity,task_id)
+        self.store.cancel_task_with_event(task_id,task.revision,'cancelled by authenticated subject')
+        return self.get_task(identity,task_id)
+
+    def _verify_probe(self,probe):
+        try:
+            self.signer.public_key.verify(base64.b64decode(probe.signature,validate=True),canonical(probe.digest_payload()))
+            return True
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    def recover(self):
+        """Reconcile expired baseline claims from durable signed receipts; never fake a result."""
+        with self._execute_lock:
+            return self._recover_locked()
+
+    def _recover_locked(self):
+        recovered=[]
+        with self.store._transaction():
+            rows=self.store.conn.execute("SELECT claim_id FROM claims WHERE status='ACTIVE' AND lease_until<?",(time.time(),)).fetchall()
+        for row in rows:
+            claim=self.store.get_claim(row['claim_id'])
+            task=self.store.get_task(claim.task_id)
+            meta=task.task_plan.metadata.get('baseline')
+            if not meta: continue
+            with self.store._transaction():
+                rt=self.store.conn.execute('SELECT job_id FROM baseline_task_runtime WHERE task_id=?',(task.task_id,)).fetchone()
+            outcome=ProbeOutcome.NOT_APPLIED
+            ref='read-only-no-persistent-effect'
+            if rt and rt['job_id']:
+                job=self.jobs.store.read(rt['job_id'])
+                env=json.loads(job['receipt_json']) if job.get('receipt_json') else None
+                if job['state']=='COMPLETED':
+                    if self._receipt_valid(task,env):
+                        outcome=ProbeOutcome.APPLIED_VERIFIED
+                        ref=digest(env)
+                    else: outcome=ProbeOutcome.INDETERMINATE
+                elif self.operations.get(meta['operation']).effect_class!='READ_ONLY':
+                    outcome=ProbeOutcome.INDETERMINATE
+            now=time.time()
+            probe=ProbeEvidence.create(task_id=task.task_id,claim_id=claim.claim_id,worker_id=claim.worker_id,
+                worker_identity=claim.worker_identity,operation_digest=claim.operation_digest,outcome=outcome,
+                observed_at=now,expires_at=now+30,probe_executor_identity='baseline-reconciler',attestation_ref=ref)
+            from dataclasses import replace
+            probe=replace(probe,signature=base64.b64encode(self.signer.private_key.sign(canonical(probe.digest_payload()))).decode())
+            self.store.recover_claim_with_probe_and_event(task.task_id,claim.claim_id,probe)
+            if outcome==ProbeOutcome.NOT_APPLIED and rt and rt['job_id']:
+                job=self.jobs.store.read(rt['job_id'])
+                if job['state']!='COMPLETED':
+                    self._advance(rt['job_id'],JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,side_effect_state='UNKNOWN')
+                    self.jobs.reconcile(rt['job_id'],lambda _:{'state':'REQUESTED','side_effect_state':'READ_ONLY_SAFE_TO_RETRY'})
+            recovered.append({'task_id':task.task_id,'outcome':outcome.value})
+        # A successful writable transaction permits recovery processing, not blind effect replay.
+        with self.store._transaction():
+            self.store.conn.execute('UPDATE baseline_task_runtime SET blocker_code=blocker_code WHERE 0')
+        try:
+            self.jobs.assert_effect_admission()
+            self.storage_blocked=False
+        except JobError:
+            self.storage_blocked=True
+        return recovered

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
+"""Authenticated loopback HTTP transport for the Baseline 1.1 service."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import ipaddress
+import json
+import math
+import re
+import time
+import threading
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import quote, unquote, urlsplit
+from urllib.request import HTTPRedirectHandler, ProxyHandler, Request, build_opener
+
+from .service import Identity, ServiceError
+
+
+MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 65_536
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 1_048_576
+MAX_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 30
+_IDENTIFIER = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,127}")
+_IDENTITY_FIELDS = frozenset({"tenant_id", "subject_id", "role", "worker_id", "identity"})
+
+
+class TransportError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int | None = None):
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+        super().__init__(code)
+
+
+class _RequestError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int):
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+        super().__init__(code)
+
+
+def _safe_identifier(value: Any, code: str = "HTTP_PATH_INVALID") -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or _IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise _RequestError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def _has_identity_field(value: Any) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        if any(key in _IDENTITY_FIELDS for key in value):
+            return True
+        return any(_has_identity_field(item) for item in value.values())
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return any(_has_identity_field(item) for item in value)
+    return False
+
+
+def _loopback_host(host: str, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(host, str):
+        raise TransportError(code)
+    try:
+        address = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise TransportError(code) from exc
+    if not address.is_loopback or address.version != 4:
+        raise TransportError(code)
+    return str(address)
+
+
+class _BaselineHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    daemon_threads = True
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(self, address, handler, service, identities):
+        self.baseline_service = service
+        self.trusted_identities = identities
+        self.request_slots=threading.BoundedSemaphore(16)
+        super().__init__(address, handler)
+
+    def get_request(self):
+        connection, address = super().get_request()
+        connection.settimeout(MAX_DEADLINE_SECONDS)
+        return connection, address
+
+    def process_request(self,request,client_address):
+        if not self.request_slots.acquire(blocking=False):
+            try:
+                body=b'{"error":{"code":"HTTP_CAPACITY_EXCEEDED"}}'
+                request.sendall(b'HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Length: '+str(len(body)).encode()+b'\r\n\r\n'+body)
+            except OSError: pass
+            self.shutdown_request(request)
+            return
+        try: super().process_request(request,client_address)
+        except Exception:
+            self.request_slots.release()
+            raise
+
+    def process_request_thread(self,request,client_address):
+        try: super().process_request_thread(request,client_address)
+        finally: self.request_slots.release()
+
+
+class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
+    server_version = "AIOSBaselineHTTP/1"
+    sys_version = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, _format, *_args):
+        # Request paths can contain tenant-owned identifiers; do not emit them or
+        # bearer-related failure details through the default stderr logger.
+        return
+
+    def send_error(self, code, message=None, explain=None):
+        # BaseHTTPRequestHandler otherwise emits an HTML page which may include
+        # parser details. Keep pre-dispatch protocol failures in the same closed
+        # JSON error format.
+        status = code if isinstance(code, int) and 400 <= code <= 599 else 400
+        self._send(status, {"error": {"code": "HTTP_PROTOCOL_ERROR"}})
+
+    def _send(self, status: int, value: Any) -> None:
+        try:
+            body = json.dumps(
+                value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                allow_nan=False,
+            ).encode("utf-8")
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            status = 500
+            body = b'{"error":{"code":"HTTP_RESPONSE_INVALID"}}'
+        if len(body) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+            status = 500
+            body = b'{"error":{"code":"HTTP_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE"}}'
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        self.send_header("Connection", "close")
+        self.end_headers()
+        try:
+            self.wfile.write(body)
+        except OSError:
+            # A peer can disconnect or let its deadline expire while a response
+            # is being written. Do not let the server print a handler traceback.
+            pass
+        self.close_connection = True
+
+    def _error(self, error: _RequestError) -> None:
+        self._send(error.status, {"error": {"code": error.code}})
+
+    def _deadline(self) -> float:
+        values = self.headers.get_all("X-AIOS-Deadline", [])
+        if len(values) != 1:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_DEADLINE_REQUIRED", 400)
+        try:
+            deadline = float(values[0])
+        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_DEADLINE_INVALID", 400) from exc
+        now = time.time()
+        if not math.isfinite(deadline) or deadline > now + MAX_DEADLINE_SECONDS:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_DEADLINE_INVALID", 400)
+        if deadline <= now:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_DEADLINE_EXPIRED", 408)
+        self.connection.settimeout(deadline - now)
+        return deadline
+
+    def _identity(self) -> Identity:
+        values = self.headers.get_all("Authorization", [])
+        if len(values) != 1 or not values[0].startswith("Bearer "):
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED", 401)
+        token = values[0][7:]
+        if not token or any(ord(char) < 33 or ord(char) > 126 for char in token):
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED", 401)
+        identity = self.server.trusted_identities.get(token)
+        if identity is None:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED", 401)
+        return identity
+
+    def _json_body(self) -> dict:
+        if self.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding") is not None:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_TRANSFER_ENCODING_FORBIDDEN", 400)
+        content_types = self.headers.get_all("Content-Type", [])
+        if content_types != ["application/json"]:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE_INVALID", 415)
+        lengths = self.headers.get_all("Content-Length", [])
+        if len(lengths) != 1 or not lengths[0].isdigit():
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID", 411)
+        length = int(lengths[0])
+        if length > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_BODY_TOO_LARGE", 413)
+        if length <= 0:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_BODY_REQUIRED", 400)
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+        if len(raw) != length:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_BODY_TRUNCATED", 400)
+        try:
+            def unique_object(pairs):
+                result = {}
+                for key, item in pairs:
+                    if key in result:
+                        raise _RequestError("HTTP_JSON_DUPLICATE_KEY", 400)
+                    result[key] = item
+                return result
+
+            def reject_constant(_value):
+                raise _RequestError("HTTP_JSON_NON_FINITE", 400)
+
+            value = json.loads(
+                raw.decode("utf-8"), object_pairs_hook=unique_object,
+                parse_constant=reject_constant,
+            )
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_JSON_INVALID", 400) from exc
+        if type(value) is not dict:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_JSON_OBJECT_REQUIRED", 400)
+        if _has_identity_field(value):
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_IDENTITY_FIELD_FORBIDDEN", 400)
+        return value
+
+    def _path(self) -> list[str]:
+        parsed = urlsplit(self.path)
+        if parsed.query or parsed.fragment or not parsed.path.startswith("/"):
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_PATH_INVALID", 400)
+        raw_segments = parsed.path.split("/")[1:]
+        if any(not segment for segment in raw_segments):
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        segments = [unquote(segment) for segment in raw_segments]
+        if any("/" in segment or "\\" in segment for segment in segments):
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_PATH_INVALID", 400)
+        return segments
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _exact(body: Mapping[str, Any], fields: set[str]) -> None:
+        if set(body) != fields:
+            raise _RequestError("HTTP_BODY_SCHEMA_INVALID", 400)
+
+    def _dispatch(self, method: str, identity: Identity, segments: list[str], body: dict | None):
+        service = self.server.baseline_service
+        if method == "POST" and segments == ["v1", "goals", "submit"]:
+            self._exact(body, {"request", "idempotency_key"})
+            if type(body["request"]) is not dict:
+                raise _RequestError("HTTP_BODY_SCHEMA_INVALID", 400)
+            return 201, service.submit_goal(
+                identity, body["request"], idempotency_key=body["idempotency_key"]
+            )
+        if method == "GET" and len(segments) == 3 and segments[:2] == ["v1", "tasks"]:
+            return 200, service.get_task(identity, _safe_identifier(segments[2]))
+        if (
+            method == "POST" and len(segments) == 4
+            and segments[:2] == ["v1", "tasks"] and segments[3] == "cancel"
+        ):
+            self._exact(body, set())
+            return 200, service.cancel_task(identity, _safe_identifier(segments[2]))
+        if (
+            method == "GET" and len(segments) == 4
+            and segments[:2] == ["v1", "missions"] and segments[3] == "explain"
+        ):
+            return 200, service.explain(identity, _safe_identifier(segments[2]))
+        if method == "POST" and segments == ["v1", "workers", "register"]:
+            self._exact(body, set())
+            return 200, service.register_worker(identity)
+        if method == "POST" and segments == ["v1", "workers", "heartbeat"]:
+            self._exact(body, set())
+            return 200, service.heartbeat(identity)
+        if method == "POST" and segments == ["v1", "workers", "claim"]:
+            self._exact(body, set())
+            return 200, service.claim_next(identity)
+        if method == "POST" and segments == ["v1", "workers", "renew"]:
+            self._exact(body, {"task_id", "claim_id"})
+            return 200, service.renew(
+                identity, _safe_identifier(body["task_id"]), _safe_identifier(body["claim_id"])
+            )
+        if method == "POST" and segments == ["v1", "workers", "execute"]:
+            self._exact(body, {"task_id", "claim_id"})
+            return 200, service.execute_claim(
+                identity, _safe_identifier(body["task_id"]), _safe_identifier(body["claim_id"]),deadline=self.request_deadline
+            )
+        raise _RequestError("HTTP_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+
+    def _handle(self, method: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            self.request_deadline=self._deadline()
+            identity = self._identity()
+            segments = self._path()
+            body = self._json_body() if method == "POST" else None
+            if method == "GET":
+                lengths = self.headers.get_all("Content-Length", [])
+                if self.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding") is not None:
+                    raise _RequestError("HTTP_GET_BODY_FORBIDDEN", 400)
+                if len(lengths) > 1 or (lengths and (not lengths[0].isdigit() or int(lengths[0]) != 0)):
+                    raise _RequestError("HTTP_GET_BODY_FORBIDDEN", 400)
+            status, result = self._dispatch(method, identity, segments, body)
+            self._send(status, result)
+        except _RequestError as exc:
+            self._error(exc)
+        except ServiceError as exc:
+            status = exc.status if isinstance(exc.status, int) and 400 <= exc.status <= 599 else 500
+            self._send(status, {"error": {"code": exc.code}})
+        except TimeoutError:
+            self._send(408, {"error": {"code": "HTTP_DEADLINE_EXPIRED"}})
+        except Exception:
+            # No exception string, traceback, request headers, or token crosses
+            # this boundary.
+            self._send(500, {"error": {"code": "HTTP_INTERNAL_ERROR"}})
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        self._handle("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self):
+        self._handle("POST")
+
+    def _method_not_allowed(self):
+        try:
+            self._deadline()
+            self._identity()
+            self._send(405, {"error": {"code": "HTTP_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED"}})
+        except _RequestError as exc:
+            self._error(exc)
+
+    do_PUT = _method_not_allowed
+    do_PATCH = _method_not_allowed
+    do_DELETE = _method_not_allowed
+    do_OPTIONS = _method_not_allowed
+    do_HEAD = _method_not_allowed
+    do_TRACE = _method_not_allowed
+    do_CONNECT = _method_not_allowed
+
+
+def serve(
+    service: Any,
+    tokens: Mapping[str, Identity],
+    host: str = "127.0.0.1",
+    port: int = 0,
+) -> ThreadingHTTPServer:
+    """Build an unstarted real HTTP server bound only to an IPv4 loopback."""
+    host = _loopback_host(host, "HTTP_LOOPBACK_REQUIRED")
+    if type(port) is not int or not 0 <= port <= 65_535:
+        raise TransportError("HTTP_PORT_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(tokens, Mapping) or not tokens:
+        raise TransportError("HTTP_TRUSTED_IDENTITIES_REQUIRED")
+    identities: dict[str, Identity] = {}
+    for token, identity in tokens.items():
+        if (
+            not isinstance(token, str) or not 32<=len(token)<=512
+            or any(ord(char) < 33 or ord(char) > 126 for char in token)
+            or not isinstance(identity, Identity)
+        ):
+            raise TransportError("HTTP_TRUSTED_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        identities[token] = identity
+    return _BaselineHTTPServer((host, port), _Handler, service, identities)
+
+
+class _NoRedirect(HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        return None
+
+
+class HttpTransport:
+    """Small urllib client for the loopback API; redirects and proxies are off."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        base_url: str,
+        token: str,
+        *,
+        timeout_seconds: float = 15,
+        max_response_bytes: int = MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
+    ):
+        try:
+            parsed = urlsplit(base_url)
+            parsed_port = parsed.port
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_BASE_URL_INVALID") from exc
+        if (
+            parsed.scheme != "http" or parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None
+            or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in {"", "/"}
+            or parsed.hostname is None or parsed_port is None
+        ):
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_BASE_URL_INVALID")
+        _loopback_host(parsed.hostname, "TRANSPORT_LOOPBACK_REQUIRED")
+        if not isinstance(token, str) or not 32<=len(token)<=512 or any(
+            ord(char) < 33 or ord(char) > 126 for char in token
+        ):
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_TOKEN_INVALID")
+        if (
+            isinstance(timeout_seconds, bool)
+            or not isinstance(timeout_seconds, (int, float))
+            or not math.isfinite(float(timeout_seconds))
+            or not 0.1 <= timeout_seconds <= MAX_DEADLINE_SECONDS
+        ):
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+        if type(max_response_bytes) is not int or not 1 <= max_response_bytes <= 4 * 1024 * 1024:
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_RESPONSE_LIMIT_INVALID")
+        self.base_url = f"http://{parsed.hostname}:{parsed_port}"
+        self.token = token
+        self.timeout_seconds = float(timeout_seconds)
+        self.max_response_bytes = max_response_bytes
+        self._opener = build_opener(ProxyHandler({}), _NoRedirect())
+
+    def _decode(self, response) -> Any:
+        content_type = response.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0]
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_RESPONSE_TYPE_INVALID")
+        declared = response.headers.get("Content-Length")
+        if declared is None or not declared.isdigit() or int(declared) > self.max_response_bytes:
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE")
+        raw = response.read(self.max_response_bytes + 1)
+        if len(raw) > self.max_response_bytes or len(raw) != int(declared):
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_RESPONSE_SIZE_INVALID")
+        try:
+            def unique_object(pairs):
+                result = {}
+                for key, item in pairs:
+                    if key in result:
+                        raise ValueError("duplicate")
+                    result[key] = item
+                return result
+
+            return json.loads(
+                raw.decode("utf-8"), object_pairs_hook=unique_object,
+                parse_constant=lambda _value: (_ for _ in ()).throw(ValueError("non-finite")),
+            )
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_RESPONSE_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+
+    def _request(self, method: str, path: str, body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> Any:
+        if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.startswith("/") or "?" in path or "#" in path:
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_PATH_INVALID")
+        data = None
+        headers = {
+            "Authorization": "Bearer " + self.token,
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "X-AIOS-Deadline": str(time.time() + self.timeout_seconds),
+        }
+        if method == "POST":
+            if not isinstance(body, Mapping):
+                raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_BODY_INVALID")
+            try:
+                data = json.dumps(
+                    body, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                    allow_nan=False,
+                ).encode("utf-8")
+            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_BODY_INVALID") from exc
+            if not data or len(data) > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
+                raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_BODY_TOO_LARGE")
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        request = Request(self.base_url + path, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
+        try:
+            with self._opener.open(request, timeout=self.timeout_seconds) as response:
+                return self._decode(response)
+        except HTTPError as exc:
+            if 300 <= exc.code < 400:
+                exc.close()
+                raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_REDIRECT_REJECTED", exc.code) from None
+            try:
+                payload = self._decode(exc)
+            except TransportError:
+                payload = None
+            except (TimeoutError, OSError):
+                raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_UNAVAILABLE") from None
+            finally:
+                exc.close()
+            code = None
+            if isinstance(payload, Mapping) and isinstance(payload.get("error"), Mapping):
+                code = payload["error"].get("code")
+            if not isinstance(code, str) or _IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(code) is None:
+                code = "TRANSPORT_HTTP_ERROR"
+            raise TransportError(code, exc.code) from None
+        except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError):
+            raise TransportError("TRANSPORT_UNAVAILABLE") from None
+
+    def submit_goal(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, idempotency_key: str) -> dict:
+        return self._request(
+            "POST", "/v1/goals/submit",
+            {"request": request, "idempotency_key": idempotency_key},
+        )
+
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> dict:
+        return self._request("GET", "/v1/tasks/" + quote(task_id, safe=""))
+
+    def cancel_task(self, task_id: str) -> dict:
+        return self._request("POST", "/v1/tasks/" + quote(task_id, safe="") + "/cancel", {})
+
+    def explain(self, mission_id: str) -> dict:
+        return self._request("GET", "/v1/missions/" + quote(mission_id, safe="") + "/explain")
+
+    def register_worker(self) -> dict:
+        return self._request("POST", "/v1/workers/register", {})
+
+    def heartbeat(self) -> dict:
+        return self._request("POST", "/v1/workers/heartbeat", {})
+
+    def claim_next(self) -> dict | None:
+        return self._request("POST", "/v1/workers/claim", {})
+
+    def renew(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str) -> dict:
+        return self._request(
+            "POST", "/v1/workers/renew", {"task_id": task_id, "claim_id": claim_id}
+        )
+
+    def execute_claim(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str) -> dict:
+        return self._request(
+            "POST", "/v1/workers/execute", {"task_id": task_id, "claim_id": claim_id}
+        )
+
+    # Goal-oriented names used by thin clients.
+    submit = submit_goal
+    query = get_task
+    cancel = cancel_task
+
+
+Transport = HttpTransport
+
+__all__ = ["HttpTransport", "Transport", "TransportError", "serve"]

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/verifiers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+"""Verification-only Ed25519 boundaries for release and acceptance evidence."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import re
+from types import MappingProxyType
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+
+from .lineage import VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence, canonical_artifact
+from .release import VerifiedReceipt
+
+
+RELEASE_RECEIPT_DOMAIN = b"aios.release-operation-receipt.v1"
+ACCEPTANCE_EVIDENCE_DOMAIN = b"aios.release-acceptance-evidence.v1"
+
+_ENVELOPE_FIELDS = {"schema", "key_id", "payload", "signature"}
+_RECEIPT_FIELDS = {
+    "receipt_id", "tenant_id", "subject_id", "component_id", "task_id",
+    "source_task_id", "source_effect_id", "grant_id", "job_id", "effect_id", "operation_id",
+    "deployment_id", "release_id", "artifact", "outcome", "observed", "observed_at",
+}
+_ACCEPTANCE_FIELDS = {
+    "acceptance_id", "tenant_id", "subject_id", "component_id", "deployment_id", "release_id",
+    "artifact", "accepted", "evidence_id", "observed", "observed_at",
+}
+_B64URL = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+")
+
+
+class SignatureVerificationError(ValueError):
+    """A configured trust root did not authenticate an exact evidence payload."""
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return json.dumps(
+            value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"),
+            allow_nan=False,
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError("signed payload is not canonical JSON") from exc
+
+
+def _decode_urlsafe(value: Any, name: str, expected_size: int) -> bytes:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or not _B64URL.fullmatch(value) or "=" in value:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError(f"invalid {name} encoding")
+    try:
+        raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
+    except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError(f"invalid {name} encoding") from exc
+    if len(raw) != expected_size:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError(f"invalid {name} size")
+    return raw
+
+
+def _public_key(value: Any) -> Ed25519PublicKey:
+    if isinstance(value, Ed25519PublicKey):
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, bytes):
+        raw = value
+    elif isinstance(value, str):
+        raw = _decode_urlsafe(value, "trusted public key", 32)
+    else:
+        raise ValueError("trusted public key must be Ed25519PublicKey, raw bytes, or base64url")
+    if len(raw) != 32:
+        raise ValueError("trusted Ed25519 public key must be 32 bytes")
+    return Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(raw)
+
+
+def _trusted_keys(values: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Ed25519PublicKey]:
+    if not isinstance(values, Mapping) or not values:
+        raise ValueError("trusted_public_keys must be a non-empty mapping")
+    keys: dict[str, Ed25519PublicKey] = {}
+    for key_id, value in values.items():
+        if not isinstance(key_id, str) or not key_id or len(key_id) > 128:
+            raise ValueError("invalid trusted key_id")
+        keys[key_id] = _public_key(value)
+    return MappingProxyType(keys)
+
+
+def _verified_payload(
+    envelope: Any,
+    keys: Mapping[str, Ed25519PublicKey],
+    *,
+    schema: str,
+    domain: bytes,
+    payload_fields: set[str],
+) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(envelope, Mapping) or set(envelope) != _ENVELOPE_FIELDS:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError("signed envelope fields invalid")
+    if envelope.get("schema") != schema:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError("signed envelope schema mismatch")
+    key_id = envelope.get("key_id")
+    if not isinstance(key_id, str) or key_id not in keys:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError("untrusted signing key_id")
+    payload = envelope.get("payload")
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or set(payload) != payload_fields:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError("signed payload fields invalid")
+    signature = _decode_urlsafe(envelope.get("signature"), "signature", 64)
+    try:
+        keys[key_id].verify(signature, domain + b"\x00" + _canonical(dict(payload)))
+    except InvalidSignature as exc:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError("Ed25519 signature invalid") from exc
+    return payload
+
+
+def _text(payload: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> str:
+    value = payload.get(name)
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 512:
+        raise SignatureVerificationError(f"signed {name} invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _expected(payload: Mapping[str, Any], expected: Mapping[str, Any], fields: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    for name in fields:
+        if name not in expected:
+            raise SignatureVerificationError(f"verifier expected {name} missing")
+        actual = canonical_artifact(payload[name]) if name == "artifact" else payload[name]
+        wanted = canonical_artifact(expected[name]) if name == "artifact" else expected[name]
+        if actual != wanted:
+            raise SignatureVerificationError(f"signed {name} binding mismatch")
+
+
+def ed25519_release_receipt_verifier(
+    trusted_public_keys: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> Callable[[Any, Mapping[str, Any]], VerifiedReceipt]:
+    """Build a receipt verifier from local/configured public keys only."""
+
+    keys = _trusted_keys(trusted_public_keys)
+
+    def verify(envelope: Any, expected: Mapping[str, Any]) -> VerifiedReceipt:
+        payload = _verified_payload(
+            envelope, keys,
+            schema="aios.release-operation-receipt-envelope.v1",
+            domain=RELEASE_RECEIPT_DOMAIN,
+            payload_fields=_RECEIPT_FIELDS,
+        )
+        _expected(
+            payload, expected,
+            ("tenant_id", "subject_id", "component_id", "task_id", "source_task_id", "source_effect_id",
+             "grant_id", "job_id", "effect_id", "operation_id", "deployment_id", "release_id", "artifact"),
+        )
+        if payload.get("outcome") != "SUCCEEDED":
+            raise SignatureVerificationError("signed receipt outcome is not SUCCEEDED")
+        if not isinstance(payload.get("observed"), Mapping):
+            raise SignatureVerificationError("signed receipt observation invalid")
+        return VerifiedReceipt(
+            receipt_id=_text(payload, "receipt_id"), tenant_id=_text(payload, "tenant_id"),
+            subject_id=_text(payload, "subject_id"), effect_id=_text(payload, "effect_id"),
+            component_id=_text(payload,"component_id"), task_id=_text(payload,"task_id"),
+            source_task_id=_text(payload,"source_task_id"), source_effect_id=_text(payload,"source_effect_id"),
+            grant_id=_text(payload,"grant_id"), job_id=_text(payload,"job_id"),
+            operation_id=_text(payload, "operation_id"), deployment_id=_text(payload, "deployment_id"),
+            release_id=_text(payload, "release_id"), artifact=payload["artifact"],
+            observed=dict(payload["observed"]), outcome="SUCCEEDED",
+            observed_at=_text(payload, "observed_at"),
+        )
+
+    return verify
+
+
+def ed25519_acceptance_evidence_verifier(
+    trusted_public_keys: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> Callable[[Any, Mapping[str, Any]], VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence]:
+    """Build an acceptance verifier in a domain separate from stage receipts."""
+
+    keys = _trusted_keys(trusted_public_keys)
+
+    def verify(envelope: Any, expected: Mapping[str, Any]) -> VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence:
+        payload = _verified_payload(
+            envelope, keys,
+            schema="aios.release-acceptance-evidence-envelope.v1",
+            domain=ACCEPTANCE_EVIDENCE_DOMAIN,
+            payload_fields=_ACCEPTANCE_FIELDS,
+        )
+        _expected(
+            payload, expected,
+            ("acceptance_id", "tenant_id", "subject_id", "component_id", "deployment_id", "release_id", "artifact", "accepted"),
+        )
+        if type(payload.get("accepted")) is not bool:
+            raise SignatureVerificationError("signed accepted decision invalid")
+        if not isinstance(payload.get("observed"), Mapping):
+            raise SignatureVerificationError("signed acceptance observation invalid")
+        return VerifiedAcceptanceEvidence(
+            acceptance_id=_text(payload, "acceptance_id"), tenant_id=_text(payload, "tenant_id"),
+            subject_id=_text(payload, "subject_id"), deployment_id=_text(payload, "deployment_id"),
+            component_id=_text(payload,"component_id"),
+            release_id=_text(payload, "release_id"), artifact=payload["artifact"],
+            accepted=payload["accepted"], evidence_id=_text(payload, "evidence_id"),
+            observed=dict(payload["observed"]), observed_at=_text(payload, "observed_at"),
+        )
+
+    return verify
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ACCEPTANCE_EVIDENCE_DOMAIN", "RELEASE_RECEIPT_DOMAIN",
+    "SignatureVerificationError", "ed25519_acceptance_evidence_verifier",
+    "ed25519_release_receipt_verifier",
+]

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/worker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+"""Thin resident worker loop over the authenticated HTTP transport.
+
+Worker policy, operation handlers, effects, receipts, and completion remain in
+the trusted server.  This process only maintains its registered transport
+identity and asks the service to run an offered claim.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import math
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import Any
+
+from .transport import TransportError
+
+
+class WorkerError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class OperationWorker:
+    HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 15.0
+
+    def __init__(self, transport: Any, poll_seconds: float = 1.0, stop_event=None):
+        required = (
+            "register_worker", "heartbeat", "claim_next", "renew", "execute_claim"
+        )
+        if transport is None or any(not callable(getattr(transport, name, None)) for name in required):
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_TRANSPORT_INVALID")
+        if (
+            isinstance(poll_seconds, bool)
+            or not isinstance(poll_seconds, (int, float))
+            or not math.isfinite(float(poll_seconds))
+            or not 0.001 <= poll_seconds <= 60
+        ):
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_POLL_INTERVAL_INVALID")
+        if stop_event is not None and (
+            not callable(getattr(stop_event, "is_set", None))
+            or not callable(getattr(stop_event, "wait", None))
+        ):
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_STOP_EVENT_INVALID")
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.poll_seconds = float(poll_seconds)
+        self.stop_event = stop_event if stop_event is not None else threading.Event()
+        self.registered = False
+        self.worker_id: str | None = None
+        self._last_heartbeat = 0.0
+        self.last_error: str | None = None
+
+    def _register(self) -> None:
+        result = self.transport.register_worker()
+        if (
+            not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("registered") is not True
+            or not isinstance(result.get("worker_id"), str) or not result["worker_id"]
+        ):
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_REGISTRATION_RESULT_INVALID")
+        self.worker_id = result["worker_id"]
+        self.registered = True
+
+    def _heartbeat(self, *, force: bool = False) -> None:
+        now = time.monotonic()
+        if not force and now < self._last_heartbeat + self.HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_SECONDS:
+            return
+        result = self.transport.heartbeat()
+        if (
+            not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("alive") is not True
+            or result.get("worker_id") != self.worker_id
+        ):
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_HEARTBEAT_RESULT_INVALID")
+        self._last_heartbeat = time.monotonic()
+
+    def run_once(self):
+        """Perform one register/heartbeat/claim/renew/execute iteration."""
+        if self.stop_event.is_set():
+            return None
+        just_registered = False
+        if not self.registered:
+            self._register()
+            just_registered = True
+        self._heartbeat(force=just_registered)
+        claim = self.transport.claim_next()
+        if claim is None:
+            self.last_error = None
+            return None
+        required = {"task_id", "claim_id", "generation", "lease_until", "operation"}
+        if not isinstance(claim, dict) or set(claim) != required:
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_CLAIM_RESULT_INVALID")
+        task_id = claim["task_id"]
+        claim_id = claim["claim_id"]
+        if not isinstance(task_id, str) or not task_id or not isinstance(claim_id, str) or not claim_id:
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_CLAIM_RESULT_INVALID")
+        renewed = self.transport.renew(task_id, claim_id)
+        if (
+            not isinstance(renewed, dict) or renewed.get("renewed") is not True
+            or renewed.get("task_id") != task_id or renewed.get("claim_id") != claim_id
+        ):
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_RENEW_RESULT_INVALID")
+        result = self.transport.execute_claim(task_id, claim_id)
+        if not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("task_id") != task_id:
+            raise WorkerError("WORKER_EXECUTION_RESULT_INVALID")
+        self.last_error = None
+        return result
+
+    def run_forever(self) -> None:
+        """Run until the supplied stop event is set, using interruptible waits."""
+        while not self.stop_event.is_set():
+            try:
+                self.run_once()
+            except TransportError as exc:
+                # Transport failures are observable and retried on the next
+                # bounded poll. Re-register after a server restart; programming
+                # and schema errors still terminate.
+                self.last_error = exc.code
+                self.registered = False
+            self.stop_event.wait(self.poll_seconds)
+
+
+Worker = OperationWorker
+
+__all__ = ["OperationWorker", "Worker", "WorkerError"]

active-runtime/app/aios_baseline/worker_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+"""Registered worker eligibility; fallback is deployment policy, never a special actor."""
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import math
+from typing import Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class WorkerProfile:
+    worker_id: str
+    identity: str
+    tenant_scope: tuple[str, ...]
+    subject_scope: tuple[str, ...]
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+    priority: int
+    fallback_executor: bool
+    heartbeat_seconds: int
+    max_concurrency: int
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping):
+        if set(value) != set(cls.__dataclass_fields__):
+            raise ValueError('WORKER_PROFILE_FIELDS_INVALID')
+        data = dict(value)
+        for name in ('worker_id', 'identity'):
+            if not isinstance(data[name], str) or not data[name] or len(data[name]) > 128:
+                raise ValueError('WORKER_ID_INVALID')
+        for name in ('tenant_scope', 'subject_scope', 'capabilities'):
+            items = data[name]
+            if not isinstance(items, (list, tuple)) or not items or any(not isinstance(x, str) or not x or '*' in x for x in items):
+                raise ValueError('WORKER_SCOPE_INVALID')
+            data[name] = tuple(sorted(set(items)))
+        if type(data['fallback_executor']) is not bool:
+            raise ValueError('WORKER_FALLBACK_INVALID')
+        for name, lower, upper in (('priority', 0, 1000), ('heartbeat_seconds', 1, 300), ('max_concurrency', 1, 32)):
+            if type(data[name]) is not int or not lower <= data[name] <= upper:
+                raise ValueError('WORKER_LIMIT_INVALID')
+        return cls(**data)
+
+
+def eligible(worker: WorkerProfile, task: Mapping, *, now: float, last_heartbeat: float,
+             fallback_seconds: int = 600) -> bool:
+    ready_at = task.get('ready_at')
+    if any(type(value) not in (int,float) or not math.isfinite(value) for value in (ready_at,now,last_heartbeat)) or ready_at > now:
+        return False
+    if last_heartbeat > now or now > last_heartbeat + worker.heartbeat_seconds * 3:
+        return False
+    if task.get('tenant_id') not in worker.tenant_scope or task.get('subject_id') not in worker.subject_scope:
+        return False
+    if task.get('operation') not in worker.capabilities:
+        return False
+    return not worker.fallback_executor or now >= ready_at + fallback_seconds

active-runtime/app/aios_branch_repair_lease_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Governed API facade for branch-bound repair leases.
+
+The facade is transport-neutral so the permanent control plane can expose it
+through its existing authenticated loopback/API seam without creating a second
+Git writer or a global credential registry.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from branch_repair_lease import LeaseError, RepairLease, RepairLeaseManager, sanitized_lease_view
+
+
+class BranchRepairLeaseAPI:
+    """Validate operation envelopes and return sanitized lease metadata."""
+
+    def __init__(self, manager: RepairLeaseManager) -> None:
+        self.manager = manager
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required(request: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> Any:
+        value = request.get(name)
+        if value is None or value == "":
+            raise LeaseError(f"missing required field: {name}")
+        return value
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _view(lease: RepairLease) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"status": "ok", "lease": sanitized_lease_view(lease)}
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            operation = self._required(request, "operation")
+            owner = str(self._required(request, "owner_identity"))
+            if operation == "issue":
+                lease = self.manager.issue(
+                    task_id=str(self._required(request, "task_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    branch=str(self._required(request, "branch")),
+                    description=str(self._required(request, "description")),
+                    allowed_paths=tuple(self._required(request, "allowed_paths")),
+                    ttl_seconds=int(request.get("ttl_seconds", 3600)),
+                )
+            elif operation == "attach_existing_branch":
+                lease = self.manager.attach_existing_branch(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "authorize_commit":
+                lease = self.manager.authorize_commit(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
+                    content=request.get("content"),
+                )
+            elif operation == "record_commit":
+                lease = self.manager.record_commit(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                    new_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "new_head_oid")),
+                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "recover":
+                lease = self.manager.recover(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            elif operation == "renew":
+                lease = self.manager.renew(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    ttl_seconds=int(self._required(request, "ttl_seconds")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "complete":
+                lease = self.manager.complete(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            elif operation == "revoke":
+                lease = self.manager.revoke(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            else:
+                raise LeaseError("unsupported lease operation")
+            return self._view(lease)
+        except (LeaseError, TypeError, ValueError):
+            return {"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_request_rejected"}

active-runtime/app/aios_branch_repair_lease_cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""Root-only CLI for the branch-bound repair lease API."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from aios_branch_repair_lease_api import BranchRepairLeaseAPI
+from branch_repair_lease import GitProbe, LeaseStore
+from branch_repair_lease import RepairLeaseManager
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS branch repair lease CLI")
+    parser.add_argument("--store", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--request-file")
+    parser.add_argument("--request-json")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "root_required"}))
+        return 2
+    if bool(args.request_file) == bool(args.request_json):
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "one_request_source_required"}))
+        return 2
+    try:
+        raw = (
+            Path(args.request_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            if args.request_file
+            else str(args.request_json)
+        )
+        request = json.loads(raw)
+        if not isinstance(request, dict):
+            raise ValueError("request must be an object")
+        api = BranchRepairLeaseAPI(RepairLeaseManager(LeaseStore(args.store), GitProbe(args.bare_repo)))
+        response = api.handle(request)
+        print(json.dumps(response, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")))
+        return 0 if response.get("status") == "ok" else 1
+    except Exception:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_cli_failed"}))
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_campaign_recovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+"""Read-only validation of recovered campaign authorization evidence."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+import stat
+from typing import Any
+
+
+class RecoveryEvidenceError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+# Relative evidence path: a safe relative path, never absolute, never with
+# traversal segments, never with backslash separators.
+_SAFE_EVIDENCE_REL = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_./@-]+$")
+
+
+def _contained_evidence(path: Path, base: Path) -> Path:
+    """Resolve an evidence path and guarantee it stays under `base`."""
+    raw = str(path)
+    if (
+        os.path.isabs(raw)
+        or "\\" in raw
+        or raw.startswith("/")
+        or ".." in Path(raw).parts
+        or not _SAFE_EVIDENCE_REL.fullmatch(raw)
+    ):
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_PATH_INVALID")
+    base_resolved = base.resolve()
+    target = (base_resolved / raw).resolve()
+    if base_resolved != target and not str(target).startswith(str(base_resolved) + os.sep):
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_PATH_ESCAPE")
+    return target
+
+
+def _digest(path: Path) -> str:
+    h = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as stream:
+        for block in iter(lambda: stream.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            h.update(block)
+    return h.hexdigest()
+
+
+def _secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_MISSING")
+    info = path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+    if info.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o022:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_PERMISSIONS")
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
+    return value
+
+
+def load_recovered_authorization(path: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Verify the recovery receipt, sidecar, and all referenced immutable files."""
+    receipt_path = Path(path)
+    receipt = _secure_json(receipt_path)
+    sidecar = receipt_path.with_suffix(receipt_path.suffix + ".sha256")
+    if sidecar.is_symlink() or not sidecar.is_file():
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_SIDECAR_MISSING")
+    expected = sidecar.read_text(encoding="ascii").split()[0]
+    actual = _digest(receipt_path)
+    if expected != actual:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    required = {
+        "schema",
+        "campaign_id",
+        "original_event_id",
+        "original_authorization_digest",
+        "signed_grant_id",
+        "signed_grant_digest",
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "original_base_oid",
+        "branch",
+        "expected_branch_oid",
+        "recovered_from_existing_evidence",
+        "new_owner_interaction",
+        "recovery_state",
+        "production_side_effect_executed",
+        "global_writes_enabled",
+        "grant_consumed",
+        "owner_authorization_consumed",
+        "original_receipts_immutable",
+        "recovered_at",
+        "evidence_files",
+    }
+    if set(receipt) != required or receipt["schema"] != "aios.owner-authorization-recovery.v1":
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    if receipt["recovered_from_existing_evidence"] is not True or receipt["new_owner_interaction"] is not False:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_NOT_APPEND_ONLY")
+    if receipt["production_side_effect_executed"] is not False or receipt["global_writes_enabled"] is not False:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    if receipt["recovery_state"] != "RECOVERED_PENDING_CONTINUATION_LEASE":
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_STATE_INVALID")
+    evidence = receipt["evidence_files"]
+    if not isinstance(evidence, list) or not evidence:
+        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_LIST_INVALID")
+    base = receipt_path.resolve().parent
+    for item in evidence:
+        if not isinstance(item, dict) or set(item) != {"path", "sha256"}:
+            raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_ENTRY_INVALID")
+        target = _contained_evidence(Path(item["path"]), base)
+        if _digest(target) != item["sha256"]:
+            raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    return {
+        "schema": receipt["schema"],
+        "state": receipt["recovery_state"],
+        "campaign_id": receipt["campaign_id"],
+        "original_event_id": receipt["original_event_id"],
+        "original_authorization_digest": receipt["original_authorization_digest"],
+        "signed_grant_id": receipt["signed_grant_id"],
+        "task_id": receipt["task_id"],
+        "repository": receipt["repository"],
+        "original_base_oid": receipt["original_base_oid"],
+        "branch": receipt["branch"],
+        "expected_branch_oid": receipt["expected_branch_oid"],
+        "digest": actual,
+        "new_owner_interaction": False,
+    }

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 from __future__ import annotations
-import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, uuid
+import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, uuid
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
@@ -22,8 +22,15 @@ from gitea_tag_publication import (
     TagPublisher,
     redact,
     validate_version,
+    validate_gitea_api_url,
 )
-from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+try:
+    from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    # The deployed service normally supplies runtime/agent-os on sys.path.
+    # Keep direct, isolated contract execution bound to the repository copy.
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "runtime" / "agent-os"))
+    from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
 from silent_release_hardening import (
     ApprovalKeyRing,
     ApprovalRevocationStore,
@@ -33,6 +40,11 @@ from silent_release_hardening import (
     SignedReleasePlanApproval,
     SilentReleaseActionService,
 )
+try:
+    from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, ServiceUnavailable, JobStore
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, ServiceUnavailable, JobStore
 try:
     from authoritative_git import (
         AuthoritativeGitError,
@@ -58,6 +70,11 @@ except ModuleNotFoundError:
         repository_snapshot,
         run_authoritative_git,
     )
+try:
+    from aios_repository_discovery import RepositoryDiscovery, RepositoryDiscoveryError
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_repository_discovery import RepositoryDiscovery, RepositoryDiscoveryError
 
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
@@ -93,6 +110,11 @@ SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(
     r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})'
 )
 
+# Control-plane file read: enforce auth, strict identifier, containment and a
+# size cap on the command-detail read exposed by /admin/ai-evolution/api/data.
+MAX_COMMAND_READ_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
+_COMMAND_FILENAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*\.md$")
+
 READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
     '/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
     '/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
@@ -103,6 +125,8 @@ READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
     '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
     '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
     '/api/release-acceptance',
+    '/api/repository/tree', '/api/repository/search',
+    '/api/repository/diff-index', '/api/repository/file',
     '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
     '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
     '/getRecoveryStatus',
@@ -120,6 +144,12 @@ def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
         return False
     if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
         return False
+    if (
+        method == 'POST'
+        and path in ('/api/file', '/api/commit-file')
+        and os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED', os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_CONTROLLER_ENABLED', 'false')).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
+    ):
+        return False
     decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
     if decision.allowed:
         return False
@@ -297,8 +327,7 @@ def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
         raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
 
 def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
-    if not re.fullmatch(r'V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', str(tag or '')):
-        raise ValueError('invalid release version')
+    validate_version(tag)
     try:
         result = run_authoritative_git(
             ['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
@@ -331,9 +360,80 @@ def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
     return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
 
 
+_DISCOVERY_ACTIONS = {
+    '/api/repository/tree': (
+        'list_repository_tree',
+        {'repository', 'ref', 'limit'},
+        {'prefix', 'depth', 'cursor'},
+    ),
+    '/api/repository/search': (
+        'search_repository_source',
+        {'repository', 'ref', 'query', 'max_matches', 'max_bytes'},
+        {'path_globs', 'cursor'},
+    ),
+    '/api/repository/diff-index': (
+        'get_diff_index',
+        {'repository', 'from', 'to', 'limit'},
+        {'path_prefix', 'cursor'},
+    ),
+    '/api/repository/file': (
+        'read_repository_file',
+        {'repository', 'ref', 'path'},
+        {'max_bytes'},
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def repository_discovery_request(
+    path: str, query: dict[str, list[str]]
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    operation, required, optional = _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS[path]
+    if set(query) - required - optional:
+        raise ValueError('unknown repository discovery query field')
+    request: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for key, values in query.items():
+        if key == 'path_globs':
+            if not values:
+                raise ValueError('empty repository discovery path glob')
+            request[key] = list(values)
+            continue
+        if len(values) != 1:
+            raise ValueError('duplicate repository discovery query field')
+        value: Any = values[0]
+        if key in {'depth', 'limit', 'max_matches', 'max_bytes'}:
+            try:
+                value = int(value, 10)
+            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                raise ValueError('invalid repository discovery integer') from exc
+        request[key] = value
+    if required - set(request):
+        raise ValueError('missing repository discovery query field')
+    if not REPOSITORY_IDENTITY:
+        raise RepositoryDiscoveryError('REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE')
+    try:
+        discovery = RepositoryDiscovery(
+            allowed_repositories=(REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,),
+            git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir(),
+            cursor_secret=os.getenv('AIOS_REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET'),
+        )
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        if isinstance(exc, RepositoryDiscoveryError):
+            raise
+        raise RepositoryDiscoveryError('REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE') from exc
+    public_to_internal = {
+        'ref': 'revision',
+        'path': 'file_path',
+        'path_prefix': 'prefix',
+    }
+    internal_request = {
+        public_to_internal.get(key, key): value for key, value in request.items()
+    }
+    return dict(getattr(discovery, operation)(internal_request))
+
+
 def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
     authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
-    return TagPublisher(
+    publisher = TagPublisher(
         WS,
         GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
         GiteaTagClient(
@@ -344,6 +444,10 @@ def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
         ),
         os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
     )
+    publisher.baseline_path = Path(os.getenv(
+        'AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_AUTHORITY', str(WS / 'baseline' / 'current.json')
+    ))
+    return publisher
 
 def commit(paths, msg):
     ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -393,15 +497,71 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if not a['ok']: self.sendj({'error':'unauthorized','hint':'Bearer token required'},401); return None
         if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
         return a
+    def bridge_release(self, path, data):
+        route = {
+            '/createTagApprovalRequest': '/v2/tag/approval-request',
+            '/requestOrCreateTag': '/v2/tag/publish',
+            '/getTagPublicationStatus': '/v2/tag/status',
+            '/buildProductionArtifact': '/v2/release/artifact',
+            '/executeApprovedProductionRelease': '/v2/release/execute',
+            '/getReleaseConsistency': '/v2/release/consistency',
+            '/runReleaseAcceptance': '/v2/release/acceptance',
+        }.get(path)
+        if route is None:
+            raise ValueError('governed_release_route_invalid')
+        base = os.getenv('AIOS_BRIDGE_V2_URL', 'http://127.0.0.1:18892').rstrip('/')
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + route,
+            data=json.dumps(data, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode('utf-8'),
+            headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
+            method='POST',
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
+                return self.sendj(result, response.status)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            try:
+                body = json.loads(exc.read().decode('utf-8'))
+            except Exception:
+                body = {'error': 'bridge_http_error'}
+            return self.sendj(body, exc.code)
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error': 'GOVERNED_BRIDGE_UNAVAILABLE', 'detail': type(exc).__name__}, 503)
+    def do_POST(self):
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
+        if path in _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS:
+            return self.sendj({'error': 'method_not_allowed'},405)
+        if path in {
+            '/createTagApprovalRequest', '/requestOrCreateTag', '/getTagPublicationStatus',
+            '/buildProductionArtifact', '/executeApprovedProductionRelease',
+            '/getReleaseConsistency', '/runReleaseAcceptance',
+        }:
+            actor = self.need('tag:create')
+            if not actor:
+                return
+            return self.bridge_release(path, self.body())
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path):
+            return
+        return self.sendj({'error': 'not_found', 'path': path}, 404)
     def do_GET(self):
         u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
         if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-        q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        if len(self.path) > 8192:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'query_too_large'},413)
+        try:
+            q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(
+                u.query, keep_blank_values=True, max_num_fields=64
+            )
+        except ValueError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'query_invalid'},400)
         try:
             if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
             if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
                 return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
             if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
+            if path in _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS:
+                return self.sendj(repository_discovery_request(path, q))
             if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
                 data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
                 data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
@@ -454,7 +614,15 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
                 except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
                     return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
-                return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':diff})
+                payload = {'from': frm, 'to': to, 'diff': diff}
+                payload.update({
+                    key: diff[key]
+                    for key in (
+                        'from_oid', 'to_oid', 'changed_paths', 'stats',
+                        'total_size_bytes', 'truncated', 'patch_limit_bytes',
+                    )
+                })
+                return self.sendj(payload)
             if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
                 snapshot = repository_snapshot(
                     git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
@@ -566,7 +734,8 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     return self.sendj(
                         service.get_capability_status(candidate_id)
                     )
-                return self.sendj(service.get_release_saga(candidate_id))
+                result = service.get_release_saga(candidate_id)
+                return self.sendj(result, 404 if result.get('status') == 'NOT_FOUND' else 200)
             if path == '/getRecoveryStatus':
                 return self.sendj(
                     silent_release_service().get_recovery_status()
@@ -579,6 +748,8 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
         except FileNotFoundError:
             return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError as e:
+            return self.sendj({'error': redact(e)}, getattr(e, 'status_code', 400))
         except ValueError as e:
             error=redact(e)
             monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
@@ -595,6 +766,8 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
     def do_POST(self):
         path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if path in _DISCOVERY_ACTIONS:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'method_not_allowed'},405)
         if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
         data=self.body()
         try:
@@ -666,7 +839,44 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     def file(self,data):
         a=self.need('file:write');
         if not a: return
-        b=checkout(data.get('branch'), data.get('base','main'), bool(data.get('create_branch'))); r=write_file(data.get('path'), data.get('content','')); c=commit([r], data.get('message') or f'chore(chatgpt): update {r}'); audit(a['account'],'file',r,{'branch':b,'commit':c}); self.sendj({'status':'committed','branch':b,'path':r,'commit':c})
+        if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED', os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_CONTROLLER_ENABLED', 'false')).lower() not in {'1','true','yes','on'}:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'DURABLE_JOB_CONTROLLER_UNAVAILABLE','retryable':True},503)
+        try:
+            path = relpath(str(data.get('path') or ''))
+            branch = str(data.get('branch') or '')
+            expected = str(data.get('expected_branch_oid') or '')
+            campaign_id = str(data.get('campaign_id') or os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_CAMPAIGN_ID') or '')
+            supplied_digest = str(data.get('payload_digest') or '')
+            content = data.get('content')
+            payload_bytes = None
+            if content is not None:
+                payload_bytes = content.encode('utf-8') if isinstance(content, str) else json.dumps(content, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False).encode('utf-8')
+            payload_digest = supplied_digest or hashlib.sha256(payload_bytes or b'').hexdigest()
+            if not campaign_id or not branch or not expected:
+                return self.sendj({'error':'JOB_BINDING_REQUIRED','retryable':False},409)
+            request = {
+                'campaign_id': campaign_id,
+                'repository': REPOSITORY_IDENTITY or 'aios/aios',
+                'operation': 'commit-file',
+                'branch': branch,
+                'expected_branch_oid': expected,
+                'payload_digest': payload_digest,
+                # The controller persists only the binding and digest. Raw
+                # content is never copied into durable state or logs.
+            }
+            receipt = GitOpsJobController(
+                JobStore(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_ROOT', '/var/lib/aios-gitops/jobs')))
+            ).submit(request, payload=payload_bytes)
+            return self.sendj({
+                'job_id': receipt.job_id,
+                'state': receipt.state.value,
+                'side_effect_state': receipt.side_effect_state,
+                'retryable': receipt.http_status == 503,
+            }, receipt.http_status)
+        except ServiceUnavailable as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(exc),'layer':'durable_job','retryable':True,'side_effect_state':'UNKNOWN'},503)
+        except JobError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(exc),'retryable':False},409)
     def commit(self,data):
         a=self.need('commit:create');
         if not a: return
@@ -680,7 +890,10 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         a=self.need('tag:create');
         if not a: return
         ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
-        if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
+        try:
+            validate_version(ver)
+        except ValueError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
         if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
             return self.sendj({
                 'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
@@ -834,12 +1047,25 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
                     commands.append(f.name)
         command_detail=None
         if cmd_filter:
+            actor = self.actor()
+            if not actor['ok']:
+                return self.sendj({'error':'unauthorized','hint':'Bearer token required'},401)
+            cmd = str(cmd_filter or '')
+            if not _COMMAND_FILENAME_RE.fullmatch(cmd) or '..' in cmd:
+                return self.sendj({'command':cmd_filter,'error':'unsafe_command'},400)
             for d in cmd_dirs:
-                if d.exists():
-                    fp=d/cmd_filter
-                    if fp.exists():
-                        command_detail={'command':cmd_filter,'content':fp.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}
-                        break
+                if not d.exists():
+                    continue
+                base = d.resolve()
+                fp = (base / cmd).resolve()
+                # Strict containment: must resolve directly inside one of the
+                # allowed command directories.
+                if fp.parent != base or not fp.is_file():
+                    continue
+                if fp.stat().st_size > MAX_COMMAND_READ_BYTES:
+                    return self.sendj({'command':cmd_filter,'error':'command_too_large'},413)
+                command_detail={'command':cmd_filter,'content':fp.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}
+                break
             if not command_detail:
                 command_detail={'command':cmd_filter,'error':'not_found'}
             return self.sendj(command_detail)
@@ -851,9 +1077,11 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
 
 
 def api_spec():
-    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}
+    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/repository/tree','GET /api/repository/search','GET /api/repository/diff-index','GET /api/repository/file','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}
 
 def main():
+    validate_gitea_api_url(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL', ''))
     print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
     ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST,PORT), H).serve_forever()
 if __name__ == '__main__': main()
+

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2.py

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+"""ChatGPT GitOps Bridge v2 contract and governed release operations."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_task_admission_bridge_contract import (
+    TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS,
+    TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS,
+    TASK_ADMISSION_ROUTES,
+)
+
+
+BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION = "aios.chatgpt-gitops-bridge.v2"
+BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
+    "getRuntimeStatus",
+    "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
+    "createGovernedTask",
+    "projectOnlineAgentExecution",
+    "acquireWriterLease",
+    "commitFileGoverned",
+    "commitFilesGoverned",
+    "getGitOpsJob",
+    "resumeGitOpsJob",
+    "reconcileGitOpsJob",
+    "createTagApprovalRequest",
+    "requestOrCreateTag",
+    "getTagPublicationStatus",
+    "buildProductionArtifact",
+    "executeApprovedProductionRelease",
+    "getReleaseConsistency",
+    "runReleaseAcceptance",
+    "getControlPlaneSnapshot",
+    "listRepositoryTree",
+    "searchRepositorySource",
+    "getDiffIndex",
+    "readRepositoryFile",
+)
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS = tuple(TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS)
+
+OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
+    "createGovernedTask": ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key"),
+    "projectOnlineAgentExecution": ("task_id", "required_capabilities"),
+    "acquireWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "job_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "lease_seconds"),
+    "commitFileGoverned": ("task_id", "job_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "path", "content_base64", "message"),
+    "commitFilesGoverned": ("task_id", "job_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "files", "message"),
+    "getGitOpsJob": ("task_id", "job_id"),
+    "resumeGitOpsJob": ("task_id", "job_id", "expected_revision"),
+    "reconcileGitOpsJob": ("task_id", "job_id", "expected_revision"),
+    "createTagApprovalRequest": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "owner_approval", "execute"),
+    "requestOrCreateTag": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "execute"),
+    "getTagPublicationStatus": ("version",),
+    "buildProductionArtifact": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
+    "executeApprovedProductionRelease": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "execute"),
+    "getReleaseConsistency": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
+    "runReleaseAcceptance": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
+    "getControlPlaneSnapshot": (),
+    **TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS,
+    "listRepositoryTree": ("repository", "ref", "limit"),
+    "searchRepositorySource": ("repository", "ref", "query", "max_matches", "max_bytes"),
+    "getDiffIndex": ("repository", "from", "to", "limit"),
+    "readRepositoryFile": ("repository", "ref", "path"),
+}
+
+OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS = {
+    "listRepositoryTree": ("prefix", "depth", "cursor"),
+    "searchRepositorySource": ("path_globs", "cursor"),
+    "getDiffIndex": ("path_prefix", "cursor"),
+    "readRepositoryFile": ("max_bytes",),
+}
+
+READ_ONLY_OPERATIONS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "getRuntimeStatus",
+        "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
+        "getControlPlaneSnapshot",
+        "listRepositoryTree",
+        "searchRepositorySource",
+        "getDiffIndex",
+        "readRepositoryFile",
+    }
+)
+
+_OPERATION_PATHS = {
+    "createGovernedTask": "/v2/governed-task",
+    "projectOnlineAgentExecution": "/v2/execution-envelope",
+    "acquireWriterLease": "/v2/writer-lease",
+    "commitFileGoverned": "/v2/commit-file",
+    "commitFilesGoverned": "/v2/commit-files",
+    "getGitOpsJob": "/v2/job",
+    "resumeGitOpsJob": "/v2/job/resume",
+    "reconcileGitOpsJob": "/v2/job/reconcile",
+    "getTagPublicationStatus": "/v2/tag/status",
+    "getReleaseConsistency": "/v2/release/consistency",
+    "runReleaseAcceptance": "/v2/release/acceptance",
+    **{operation: path for path, operation in TASK_ADMISSION_ROUTES.items()},
+    "listRepositoryTree": "/v2/repository/tree",
+    "searchRepositorySource": "/v2/repository/search",
+    "getDiffIndex": "/v2/repository/diff-index",
+    "readRepositoryFile": "/v2/repository/file",
+}
+
+
+def _has_complete_task_admission_handlers(
+    handlers: Mapping[str, Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any]] | None,
+) -> bool:
+    return handlers is not None and all(
+        callable(handlers.get(operation)) for operation in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+    )
+
+
+def operation_contracts(
+    handlers: Mapping[str, Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any]] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, dict[str, object]]:
+    """Return the runtime contract consumed by adapters and schema tooling."""
+    contracts = {
+        operation: {
+            "method": "GET" if operation in OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS else "POST",
+            "path": _OPERATION_PATHS.get(operation),
+            "required_fields": list(fields),
+            "optional_fields": list(OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS.get(operation, ())),
+            "read_only": operation in READ_ONLY_OPERATIONS,
+        }
+        for operation, fields in OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS.items()
+        if operation not in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+    }
+    if _has_complete_task_admission_handlers(handlers):
+        contracts.update(
+            {
+                operation: {
+                    "method": "GET" if operation == "getTaskAdmissionStatus" else "POST",
+                    "path": _OPERATION_PATHS[operation],
+                    "required_fields": list(
+                        TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation]
+                    ),
+                    "optional_fields": list(
+                        TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS[operation]
+                    ),
+                }
+                for operation in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+            }
+        )
+    return contracts
+
+
+def render_openapi_contract_fragment() -> str:
+    required = "\n".join(
+        f"                - {field}"
+        for field in OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFilesGoverned"]
+    )
+    return (
+        "  /v2/commit-files:\n"
+        "    post:\n"
+        "      operationId: commitFilesGoverned\n"
+        "      summary: Submit one atomic governed commit containing multiple files\n"
+        "      security: [{taskPrincipalAuth: []}]\n"
+        "      x-aios-task-principal: Bridge resolves a fresh server-side TaskPrincipal from the authoritative admitted+claimed Task and re-verifies its Owner epoch, then checks exact task/job/repository/branch/generation/capability binding; caller JSON cannot provide a principal and missing verification is denied. An explicitly injected legacy bearer verifier may still be used by a trusted host.\n"
+        "      requestBody:\n"
+        "        required: true\n"
+        "        content:\n"
+        "          application/json:\n"
+        "            schema:\n"
+        "              type: object\n"
+        "              additionalProperties: false\n"
+        "              required:\n"
+        f"{required}\n"
+        "              properties:\n"
+        "                task_id: {type: string}\n"
+        "                job_id: {type: string, description: External durable Job identity for exact completed-replay reconciliation}\n"
+        "                source_lease_epoch: {type: integer, minimum: 1}\n"
+        "                repository: {type: string, example: aios/aios}\n"
+        "                expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}\n"
+        "                target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$'}\n"
+        "                generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}\n"
+        "                idempotency_key: {type: string}\n"
+        "                files:\n"
+        "                  type: array\n"
+        "                  minItems: 1\n"
+        "                  items:\n"
+        "                    type: object\n"
+        "                    additionalProperties: false\n"
+        "                    required: [path, content_base64]\n"
+        "                    properties:\n"
+        "                      path: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 512}\n"
+        "                      content_base64: {type: string}\n"
+        "                message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}\n"
+        "      responses:\n"
+        "        '200': {description: Governed commit job and verified branch result}\n"
+        "        '202': {description: Existing external Job alias requires authoritative reconciliation; no replacement Job is created}\n"
+        "        '401': {description: No verified Task principal is available}\n"
+        "        '403': {description: Verified Task principal lacks exact task, external Job, or capability scope}\n"
+        "        '400': {description: Contract or policy rejection}\n"
+        "        '409': {description: Branch CAS or idempotency conflict}\n"
+        "        '423': {description: Narrow P0 Task-principal mutation gate is frozen; assertion is not consumed}\n"
+    )
+
+
+class RuntimeDriftError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class BridgeV2Error(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ControlPlaneReleaseManifest:
+    control_plane_release_version: str
+    control_plane_target_oid: str
+    artifact_sha256: str
+    runtime_path: Path
+    bridge_schema_version: str
+    repository_identity: str
+    authoritative_git_dir: Path
+    deployment_state: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "control_plane_release_version": self.control_plane_release_version,
+            "control_plane_target_oid": self.control_plane_target_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "runtime_path": str(self.runtime_path),
+            "bridge_schema_version": self.bridge_schema_version,
+            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": str(self.authoritative_git_dir),
+            "deployment_state": self.deployment_state,
+        }
+
+    def validate(self, artifact: Path, *, observed_oid: str, approved_root: Path = Path("/opt/aios/gitops-control-plane")) -> dict[str, object]:
+        try:
+            runtime = self.runtime_path.resolve(strict=True)
+            root = approved_root.resolve(strict=True)
+            artifact_path = artifact.resolve(strict=True)
+            runtime.relative_to(root)
+            artifact_path.relative_to(runtime)
+        except (OSError, ValueError):
+            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT") from None
+        mutable_markers = {"workspace", "workspaces", "worktree", "worktrees"}
+        if mutable_markers.intersection(part.lower() for part in runtime.parts):
+            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT")
+        valid = (
+            len(self.control_plane_target_oid) == 40
+            and observed_oid == self.control_plane_target_oid
+            and len(self.artifact_sha256) == 64
+            and hashlib.sha256(artifact_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() == self.artifact_sha256
+            and self.bridge_schema_version == BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION
+            and self.repository_identity == "aios/aios"
+            and self.authoritative_git_dir == Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
+            and self.authoritative_git_dir.is_absolute()
+            and self.deployment_state == "STAGING"
+        )
+        if not valid:
+            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT")
+        return {**self.as_dict(), "drift_status": "PASS"}
+
+
+class BridgeV2Adapter:
+    """Thin operation adapter; all mutating handlers are injected seams."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *, runtime_status: Mapping[str, Any] | Callable[[], Mapping[str, Any]], handlers: Mapping[str, Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any]] | None = None) -> None:
+        self._runtime_status_source = runtime_status if callable(runtime_status) else dict(runtime_status)
+        self.handlers = dict(handlers or {})
+
+    def _runtime_status(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = self._runtime_status_source() if callable(self._runtime_status_source) else self._runtime_status_source
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise BridgeV2Error("RUNTIME_STATUS_INVALID")
+        return dict(value)
+
+    def getRuntimeStatus(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"bridge_schema_version": BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION, **self._runtime_status()}
+
+    def getGovernedWriteCapabilities(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        runtime_status = self._runtime_status()
+        governed_writes_enabled = runtime_status.get("governed_writes_enabled") is True
+        return {
+            "bridge_schema_version": BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+            "legacy_writes_enabled": False,
+            "governed_writes_enabled": governed_writes_enabled,
+            "governed_write_blockers": list(
+                runtime_status.get("governed_write_blockers") or []
+            ),
+            "operations": [
+                *BRIDGE_OPERATIONS,
+                *(
+                    TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATIONS
+                    if _has_complete_task_admission_handlers(self.handlers)
+                    else ()
+                ),
+            ],
+            "operation_contracts": operation_contracts(self.handlers),
+            "force_push": False,
+            "main_write": False,
+            "tag_write": False,
+            "baseline_write": False,
+            "production_write": False,
+            "approved_release_operations": True,
+            "approved_release_scope": {
+                "version": "V2R2C1",
+                "target_oid": "998d30304787e31e5ae607c0bd86b5edb2b0e5ad",
+                "evidence_closure_oid": "a8b906d1bc24088c19647e98de6a679268f6d0a2",
+                "approval_plan_id": "sha256:c0df52008ae7f64cec5ee2d28947aa7b892066c670ab8295e4549140b1a7500e",
+            },
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def legacy_write_disabled() -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {"error": "LEGACY_WRITE_DISABLED", "replacement": "createGovernedTask", "governed_writes_available": False}
+
+    def _call(self, operation: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any:
+        required = OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation]
+        if any(key not in request for key in required):
+            raise BridgeV2Error("BRIDGE_REQUEST_FIELDS_MISSING")
+        if operation in OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS:
+            allowed = set(required) | set(OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS[operation])
+            if set(request) - allowed:
+                raise BridgeV2Error("BRIDGE_REQUEST_FIELDS_UNKNOWN")
+        handler = self.handlers.get(operation)
+        if handler is None:
+            raise BridgeV2Error("GOVERNED_HANDLER_UNAVAILABLE")
+        return handler(dict(request))
+
+    def createGovernedTask(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createGovernedTask", request)
+    def projectOnlineAgentExecution(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("projectOnlineAgentExecution", request)
+    def acquireWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("acquireWriterLease", request)
+    def commitFileGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFileGoverned", request)
+    def commitFilesGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFilesGoverned", request)
+    def getGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getGitOpsJob", request)
+    def resumeGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("resumeGitOpsJob", request)
+    def reconcileGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("reconcileGitOpsJob", request)
+    def createTagApprovalRequest(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createTagApprovalRequest", request)
+    def requestOrCreateTag(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("requestOrCreateTag", request)
+    def getTagPublicationStatus(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getTagPublicationStatus", request)
+    def buildProductionArtifact(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("buildProductionArtifact", request)
+    def executeApprovedProductionRelease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("executeApprovedProductionRelease", request)
+    def getReleaseConsistency(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getReleaseConsistency", request)
+    def runReleaseAcceptance(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("runReleaseAcceptance", request)
+    def getTaskAdmissionEnvelope(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getTaskAdmissionEnvelope", request)
+    def submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization", request)
+    def getTaskAdmissionStatus(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getTaskAdmissionStatus", request)
+    def listRepositoryTree(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("listRepositoryTree", request)
+    def searchRepositorySource(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("searchRepositorySource", request)
+    def getDiffIndex(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getDiffIndex", request)
+    def readRepositoryFile(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("readRepositoryFile", request)
+
+    def getControlPlaneSnapshot(self, request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> Any: return self._call("getControlPlaneSnapshot", request or {})

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+"""Governed continuation executor for exact existing task branches.
+
+The executor composes the existing continuation lease and durable Job store.
+All Git and Gitea side effects live behind injected narrow interfaces so the
+state machine can prove Authority, Git-network, API-branch, and commit-object
+agreement before it reports completion.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
+import re
+import subprocess
+from typing import Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor
+from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobState
+from aios_gitops_reconciliation_core import ReconciliationAction, RemoteObservation, decide_reconciliation
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import validate_writer_lease_request_v2
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SECRET_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(rb"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"),
+    re.compile(rb"(?i)(?:token|password|secret|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*[\"'][^\"'\s]{12,}[\"']"),
+    re.compile(rb"-----BEGIN " + rb"(?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+)
+
+
+class ContinuationExecutionError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed continuation execution error."""
+
+
+class DetachedWorkspace(Protocol):
+    def is_detached(self) -> bool: ...
+    def head_oid(self) -> str: ...
+    def commit_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes], message: str) -> str: ...
+
+
+class AuthorityPort(Protocol):
+    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
+
+
+class RemotePort(Protocol):
+    def repository_identity(self) -> str: ...
+    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str, *, allow_absent: bool = False) -> None: ...
+    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
+    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
+    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+class CredentialProjection(Protocol):
+    def project(self) -> None: ...
+    def revoke(self) -> None: ...
+
+
+def _run(argv: list[str], *, cwd: Path | None = None, environment: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        cwd=cwd,
+        env=None if environment is None else dict(environment),
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise ContinuationExecutionError("SUBPROCESS_FAILED")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class AuthorityGitAdapter:
+    """Branch-name adapter over the existing narrow AuthorityGitExecutor."""
+
+    executor: AuthorityGitExecutor
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ref(branch: str) -> str:
+        return f"refs/heads/{branch}"
+
+    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool:
+        return self.executor.read_ref(self._ref(branch)) is not None
+
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str:
+        value = self.executor.read_ref(self._ref(branch))
+        if value is None:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("EXISTING_BRANCH_MISSING")
+        return value
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
+        return self.executor.ancestry_check(older, newer)
+
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str:
+        return self.executor.advance_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected, new)
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class DetachedGitWorkspace:
+    path: Path
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.path.is_absolute() or self.path.is_symlink() or not self.path.is_dir():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_PATH_INVALID")
+        top = Path(_run(["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], cwd=self.path)).resolve()
+        if top != self.path.resolve():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_PATH_INVALID")
+
+    def is_detached(self) -> bool:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            cwd=self.path,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        return result.returncode == 1
+
+    def head_oid(self) -> str:
+        return _run(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=self.path)
+
+    def _dirty_paths(self) -> set[str]:
+        command = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "status", "--porcelain=v1", "--untracked-files=all"],
+            cwd=self.path,
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if command.returncode != 0:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("SUBPROCESS_FAILED")
+        output = command.stdout
+        result: set[str] = set()
+        for line in output.splitlines():
+            path = line[3:]
+            if " -> " in path:
+                path = path.split(" -> ", 1)[1]
+            result.add(path)
+        return result
+
+    def materialize_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes]) -> None:
+        dirty = self._dirty_paths()
+        expected_paths = set(files)
+        if dirty and dirty != expected_paths:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_DIRTY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+        for relative, content in files.items():
+            target = (self.path / relative).resolve()
+            try:
+                target.relative_to(self.path.resolve())
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED") from exc
+            if target.is_symlink():
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED")
+            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            target.write_bytes(content)
+
+    def commit_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes], message: str) -> str:
+        expected_paths = set(files)
+        if self._dirty_paths() != expected_paths:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_DIRTY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+        for relative, content in files.items():
+            target = (self.path / relative).resolve()
+            try:
+                target.relative_to(self.path.resolve())
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED") from exc
+            if not target.is_file() or target.is_symlink() or target.read_bytes() != content:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORING_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH")
+        _run(["git", "add", "--", *sorted(expected_paths)], cwd=self.path)
+        staged = set(_run(["git", "diff", "--cached", "--name-only"], cwd=self.path).splitlines())
+        if staged != expected_paths:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("STAGED_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+        environment = os.environ.copy()
+        environment.update(
+            {
+                "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "AIOS Governed Continuation",
+                "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "aios-governed-continuation@localhost",
+                "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "AIOS Governed Continuation",
+                "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "aios-governed-continuation@localhost",
+            }
+        )
+        _run(["git", "commit", "--no-gpg-sign", "-m", message, "--", *sorted(expected_paths)], cwd=self.path, environment=environment)
+        if not self.is_detached():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
+        return self.head_oid()
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class ServerSideCredentialProjection:
+    ssh_key_path: Path
+    api_token_path: Path
+    active: bool = False
+
+    def project(self) -> None:
+        for path in (self.ssh_key_path, self.api_token_path):
+            if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size < 32:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        self.active = True
+
+    def revoke(self) -> None:
+        self.active = False
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class GiteaContinuationRemote:
+    workspace: Path
+    credential: ServerSideCredentialProjection
+    remote_name: str = "gitea"
+    repository: str = "aios/aios"
+    api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1"
+    expected_host: str = "g.cnnetmkt.top"
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def validate_remote_url(value: str, expected_host: str = "g.cnnetmkt.top") -> None:
+        if value.startswith(("/", "file:")) or value.endswith("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if "://" in value:
+            parsed = urlsplit(value)
+            host, path = parsed.hostname, parsed.path
+        else:
+            location = value.split("@", 1)[-1]
+            host, separator, path = location.partition(":")
+            if not separator:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+            path = "/" + path
+        if host != expected_host or path.rstrip("/") not in {"/aios/aios.git", "/git/aios/aios.git"}:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+
+    def repository_identity(self) -> str:
+        url = _run(["git", "remote", "get-url", self.remote_name], cwd=self.workspace)
+        self.validate_remote_url(url, self.expected_host)
+        if self.repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("REMOTE_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+        return self.repository
+
+    def _require_projected(self) -> None:
+        if not self.credential.active:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+
+    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
+        self._require_projected()
+        output = _run(["git", "ls-remote", self.remote_name, f"refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
+        if not output:
+            return None
+        oid, ref = output.split(maxsplit=1)
+        if ref != f"refs/heads/{branch}" or not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_GIT_READBACK_INVALID")
+        return oid
+
+    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str, *, allow_absent: bool = False) -> None:
+        self._require_projected()
+        self.repository_identity()
+        current = self.read_git_ref(branch)
+        if current != expected and not (allow_absent and current is None):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        _run(["git", "push", self.remote_name, f"{new}:refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
+
+    def _api(self, path: str) -> object:
+        self._require_projected()
+        token = self.credential.api_token_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        request = Request(
+            self.api_base.rstrip("/") + path,
+            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"token {token}"},
+        )
+        try:
+            with urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response:
+                return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+        except HTTPError as exc:
+            if exc.code == 404:
+                return None
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError(f"GITEA_API_HTTP_{exc.code}") from exc
+        except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
+        owner, name = self.repository.split("/", 1)
+        page = 1
+        while page <= 100:
+            value = self._api(f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/branches?page={page}&limit=50")
+            if value is None:
+                return None
+            if not isinstance(value, list):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_COLLECTION_INVALID")
+            for item in value:
+                if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get("name") != branch:
+                    continue
+                oid = item.get("commit", {}).get("id")
+                if not isinstance(oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+                    raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_INVALID")
+                return oid
+            if len(value) < 50:
+                return None
+            page += 1
+        raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_PAGINATION_LIMIT")
+
+    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool:
+        owner, name = self.repository.split("/", 1)
+        value = self._api(f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/git/commits/{oid}")
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            return False
+        observed = value.get("sha") or value.get("id")
+        return observed == oid
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationPermissions:
+    create_target_branch: bool = False
+    force_push: bool = False
+    tag_write: bool = False
+    baseline_write: bool = False
+    production_write: bool = False
+    main_write: bool = False
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if any(asdict(self).values()):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("MUTATION_PERMISSION_DENIED")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationRuntimeBinding:
+    request: WriterLeaseRequestV2
+    workspace_path: Path
+    lease_not_before: datetime
+    lease_expires_at: datetime
+    original_receipt_valid: bool
+    original_grant_consumed: bool
+    permissions: ContinuationPermissions
+    remote_branch_create_allowed: bool = False
+    external_job_id: str | None = None
+    worker_principal: str = "aios-autonomy-agent"
+    worker_lineage: str = "governed-continuation"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationCommit:
+    idempotency_key: str
+    files: Mapping[str, bytes]
+    message: str
+
+    def payload(self) -> bytes:
+        if not self.idempotency_key or not self.message.strip() or not self.files:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        normalized: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for path, content in self.files.items():
+            pure = PurePosixPath(path)
+            if (
+                not isinstance(path, str)
+                or pure.is_absolute()
+                or ".." in pure.parts
+                or path.startswith((".git/", "baseline/", "production/"))
+                or not isinstance(content, bytes)
+            ):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED")
+            if any(pattern.search(content) for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("SECRET_LIKE_PAYLOAD_REJECTED")
+            normalized[path] = base64.b64encode(content).decode("ascii")
+        return json.dumps(
+            {"files_base64": normalized, "message": self.message},
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+class ContinuationExecutor:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        controller: GitOpsJobController,
+        authority: AuthorityPort,
+        workspace: DetachedWorkspace,
+        remote: RemotePort,
+        credential: CredentialProjection,
+        *,
+        now: Callable[[], datetime] = lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc),
+    ) -> None:
+        self.controller = controller
+        self.authority = authority
+        self.workspace = workspace
+        self.remote = remote
+        self.credential = credential
+        self.now = now
+        self._observed_generations: dict[str, int] = {}
+
+    def observe_generation(self, branch: str, generation: int) -> None:
+        self._observed_generations[branch] = max(generation, self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0))
+
+    def _max_generation(self, branch: str) -> int:
+        observed = self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0)
+        with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
+                (branch,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        durable = int(row["generation"] or 0)
+        return max(observed, durable)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _request_mapping(request: WriterLeaseRequestV2) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
+            "task_id": request.task_id,
+            "repository": request.repository,
+            "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
+            "base_oid": request.base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": request.expected_branch_oid,
+            "target_branch": request.target_branch,
+            "generation": request.generation,
+            "lease_seconds": request.lease_seconds,
+        }
+
+    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding) -> None:
+        request = binding.request
+        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(self._request_mapping(request), self.authority)
+        if normalized != {**self._request_mapping(request), "create_target_branch": False, "worktree_mode": "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True}:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("CONTINUATION_NORMALIZATION_INVALID")
+        if not binding.original_receipt_valid or not binding.original_grant_consumed:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("ORIGINAL_GRANT_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+        binding.permissions.validate()
+        now = self.now()
+        if now < binding.lease_not_before:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
+        if now >= binding.lease_expires_at:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_EXPIRED")
+        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch):
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
+        if not self.workspace.is_detached():
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
+        if self.workspace.head_oid() != request.expected_branch_oid:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_HEAD_MISMATCH")
+        if self.remote.repository_identity() != request.repository:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("REMOTE_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+
+    def _job_request(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit, payload: bytes) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = binding.request
+        return {
+            "idempotency_key": commit.idempotency_key,
+            "campaign_id": request.task_id,
+            "task_id": request.task_id,
+            "repository": request.repository,
+            "operation": "CONTINUATION_COMMIT_FILES",
+            "branch": request.target_branch,
+            "expected_branch_oid": request.expected_branch_oid,
+            "base_oid": request.base_oid,
+            "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
+            "payload_digest": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(),
+            "lineage_anchor_oid": request.base_oid,
+            "generation": request.generation,
+            "remote_branch_create_allowed": binding.remote_branch_create_allowed,
+            "external_job_id": binding.external_job_id,
+            "files_digest": hashlib.sha256(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {path: hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() for path, content in sorted(commit.files.items())},
+                    sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"),
+                ).encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest(),
+            "message_digest": hashlib.sha256(commit.message.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
+            "worker_principal": binding.worker_principal,
+            "worker_lineage": binding.worker_lineage,
+        }
+
+    def execute(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit) -> dict[str, object]:
+        payload = commit.payload()
+        submitted = self.controller.submit(self._job_request(binding, commit, payload), payload=payload)
+        current = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
+        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
+            return self.controller.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True).as_dict()
+        self._validate_preflight(binding)
+        request = binding.request
+        projected = False
+        try:
+            self.credential.project()
+            projected = True
+            row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
+            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REQUESTED:
+                self.controller.advance(
+                    submitted.job_id,
+                    JobState.AUTHORIZED,
+                    side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED",
+                    receipt={"task_id": request.task_id, "original_grant_consumed": True},
+                )
+                row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
+            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
+                self.controller.lease_job(
+                    submitted.job_id,
+                    lease_id=f"lease-{submitted.job_id}",
+                    lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
+                    current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
+                    generation=request.generation,
+                    lease_expires_at=binding.lease_expires_at.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+                    expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+                )
+            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY")
+            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+            new_oid = self.workspace.commit_files(commit.files, commit.message)
+            if not OID_RE.fullmatch(new_oid) or not self.authority.is_ancestor(request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
+            authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
+            if authority_oid != new_oid:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+            self.controller.advance(
+                submitted.job_id,
+                JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
+                side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED",
+                receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "force_push": False},
+            )
+            try:
+                self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid, allow_absent=binding.remote_branch_create_allowed)
+            except Exception:
+                return self._remote_pending(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+            return self._finish_remote_verification(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+        finally:
+            if projected:
+                self.credential.revoke()
+
+    def _observe_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, bool]:
+        return self.remote.read_git_ref(branch), self.remote.read_api_branch(branch), self.remote.commit_visible(oid)
+
+    def _remote_pending(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+        receipt = {
+            "authority_oid": authority_oid,
+            "commit_oid": new_oid,
+            "desired_remote_oid": new_oid,
+            "remote_verified": False,
+            "force_push": False,
+        }
+        result = self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        )
+        return result.as_dict()
+
+    def _finish_remote_verification(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        branch = row["branch"]
+        request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
+        git_oid, api_oid, visible = self._observe_remote(branch, new_oid)
+        decision = decide_reconciliation(RemoteObservation("aios/aios", branch, new_oid, authority_oid, git_oid, api_oid, visible, datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), request.get("expected_branch_oid")))
+        if decision.action is not ReconciliationAction.MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED:
+            return self._remote_pending(job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+        receipt = {
+            "authority_oid": authority_oid,
+            "commit_oid": new_oid,
+            "git_remote_oid": git_oid,
+            "api_branch_oid": api_oid,
+            "commit_visible": True,
+            "remote_verified": True,
+            "reconciliation_decision": decision.action.value,
+            "force_push": False,
+        }
+        self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt)
+        return self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt).as_dict()
+
+    def reconcile(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.COMPLETED:
+            return self.controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
+        if state != JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("JOB_NOT_RECONCILABLE")
+        request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
+        receipt = json.loads(row["receipt_json"])
+        new_oid = receipt["desired_remote_oid"]
+        authority_oid = self.authority.branch_head(row["branch"])
+        try:
+            generation = int(request.get("generation") or 0)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("DURABLE_BINDING_GENERATION_INVALID") from exc
+        if generation > 0:
+            with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
+                earlier = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT 1 FROM jobs WHERE branch=? AND state=? "
+                    "AND CAST(json_extract(request_json, '$.binding.generation') AS INTEGER) < ? LIMIT 1",
+                    (row["branch"], JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED.value, generation),
+                ).fetchone()
+            if earlier is not None:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("EARLIER_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+        self.credential.project()
+        try:
+            git_oid, api_oid, visible = self._observe_remote(row["branch"], new_oid)
+            if authority_oid == git_oid == api_oid == new_oid and visible:
+                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST")
+                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
+            expected_oid = request["expected_branch_oid"]
+            if (
+                self.authority.is_ancestor(new_oid, authority_oid)
+                and git_oid is not None
+                and git_oid == api_oid
+                and self.authority.is_ancestor(git_oid, new_oid)
+            ):
+                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST_CHAIN")
+                self.remote.push_exact(row["branch"], git_oid, new_oid, allow_absent=bool(request.get("remote_branch_create_allowed")) or request.get("branch_mode") == "CREATE_NEW")
+                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
+            allow_remote_create = bool(request.get("remote_branch_create_allowed")) or request.get("branch_mode") == "CREATE_NEW" or (git_oid is None and api_oid is None)
+            remote_matches_expected = git_oid == api_oid == expected_oid
+            remote_absent_for_create = git_oid is None and api_oid is None
+            if authority_oid == new_oid and (remote_matches_expected or remote_absent_for_create):
+                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST_RETRY")
+                self.remote.push_exact(row["branch"], expected_oid, new_oid, allow_absent=allow_remote_create)
+                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
+            return self.controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
+        finally:
+            self.credential.revoke()

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_lease.py

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+"""Campaign-aware continuation leases for an existing Git branch.
+
+This module is deliberately transport-neutral. It validates branch lineage
+and hands ref mutation to an injected compare-and-swap broker; it does not run
+Git, inspect credentials, or create a branch itself.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import re
+from typing import Protocol
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/autonomous-release-campaign-v1-20260807"
+LINEAGE_ANCHOR = "69b45e81dcd2c3707c367003b08c55fd361faae8"
+CAMPAIGN_HEAD = "bba675fab3b7e0c5fba7066720252b3c91b9f20d"
+
+
+class ContinuationError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed error for lease or branch binding violations."""
+
+
+class BranchProbe(Protocol):
+    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+class RefCAS(Protocol):
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
+
+
+def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise ContinuationError(f"{field}_invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    lease_seconds: int = 900
+
+    schema = "aios.task-writer-lease.v2"
+    accepted_schemas = frozenset({"aios.task-writer-lease.v2", "aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2"})
+
+    def validate(self, probe: BranchProbe) -> None:
+        if not self.task_id or self.repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ContinuationError("request_identity_invalid")
+        if self.branch_mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            raise ContinuationError("branch_mode_invalid")
+        _oid(self.base_oid, "base_oid")
+        _oid(self.expected_branch_oid, "expected_branch_oid")
+        if self.target_branch in {"main", "master"} or self.target_branch.startswith(("refs/", "tags/")):
+            raise ContinuationError("protected_branch_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(self.generation, int) or isinstance(self.generation, bool) or self.generation < 1:
+            raise ContinuationError("generation_invalid")
+        if not isinstance(self.lease_seconds, int) or not 1 <= self.lease_seconds <= 86_400:
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_duration_invalid")
+        if self.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING":
+            if not probe.branch_exists(self.target_branch):
+                raise ContinuationError("EXISTING_BRANCH_MISSING")
+            actual = _oid(probe.branch_head(self.target_branch), "actual_branch_oid")
+            if actual != self.expected_branch_oid:
+                raise ContinuationError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT")
+            if not probe.is_ancestor(self.base_oid, actual):
+                raise ContinuationError("BASE_NOT_ANCESTOR_OF_BRANCH")
+        elif hasattr(probe, "commit_exists") and not probe.commit_exists(self.base_oid):
+            raise ContinuationError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
+        elif self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" and probe.branch_exists(self.target_branch):
+            raise ContinuationError("TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        elif self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" and self.base_oid != self.expected_branch_oid:
+            raise ContinuationError("CREATE_NEW_BASE_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CampaignWriterLease:
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch: str
+    lineage_anchor_oid: str
+    current_head_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    lease_expires_at: datetime
+    append_only: bool = True
+    renewable: bool = True
+    multi_commit: bool = True
+    recoverable: bool = True
+    state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    branch_bound: bool = True
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _oid(self.lineage_anchor_oid, "lineage_anchor_oid")
+        _oid(self.current_head_oid, "current_head_oid")
+        if not all((self.append_only, self.renewable, self.multi_commit, self.recoverable, self.branch_bound)):
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_capability_downgrade")
+
+
+class ContinuationLeaseManager:
+    """State machine for a multi-commit lease with CAS-only ref updates."""
+
+    def __init__(self, probe: BranchProbe, refs: RefCAS, *, now=datetime.now) -> None:
+        self.probe = probe
+        self.refs = refs
+        self.now = now
+
+    def open(self, request: WriterLeaseRequestV2) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        request.validate(self.probe)
+        if request.branch_mode != "CONTINUE_EXISTING":
+            raise ContinuationError("CREATE_NEW_REQUIRES_SEPARATE_PROVISIONER")
+        return CampaignWriterLease(
+            task_id=request.task_id,
+            repository=request.repository,
+            branch=request.target_branch,
+            lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
+            current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
+            generation=request.generation,
+            lease_expires_at=self.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=request.lease_seconds),
+        )
+
+    def renew(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease, seconds: int) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE" or not lease.renewable or seconds < 1:
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_renewable")
+        return replace(lease, lease_expires_at=self.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=seconds))
+
+    def append_commit(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease, new_head_oid: str) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_active")
+        _oid(new_head_oid, "new_head_oid")
+        if not self.probe.is_ancestor(lease.current_head_oid, new_head_oid):
+            raise ContinuationError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
+        try:
+            actual = self.refs.compare_and_swap_branch(
+                lease.branch, lease.current_head_oid, new_head_oid
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise ContinuationError("BRANCH_LEASE_STALE") from exc
+        if actual != new_head_oid:
+            raise ContinuationError("BRANCH_LEASE_STALE")
+        return replace(lease, current_head_oid=new_head_oid)
+
+    def supersede(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease) -> CampaignWriterLease:
+        if lease.state not in {"ACTIVE", "RECOVERABLE_FAILURE", "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"}:
+            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_supersedable")
+        return replace(lease, generation=lease.generation + 1, state="SUPERSEDED")

active-runtime/app/aios_control_plane_runtime_status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+"""Separate read, write, and release plane readiness evaluation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RuntimeStatus:
+    read_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
+    write_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
+    release_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
+
+    @property
+    def release_control_plane_ready(self) -> bool:
+        return all(self.read_plane.values()) and all(self.write_plane.values()) and all(self.release_plane.values())
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "READ_PLANE": dict(self.read_plane),
+            "WRITE_PLANE": dict(self.write_plane),
+            "RELEASE_PLANE": dict(self.release_plane),
+            "release_control_plane_ready": self.release_control_plane_ready,
+        }

active-runtime/app/aios_control_plane_sentinel.py

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+"""Workspace-independent authority/network/Gitea ref sentinel."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+from typing import Callable, Mapping
+
+
+class SentinelError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SentinelInputs:
+    authority_git_dir: Path
+    gitea_remote: str
+    gitea_api: str
+    ref: str
+    expected_oid: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SentinelResult:
+    authority_oid: str | None
+    network_oid: str | None
+    gitea_oid: str | None
+    equal: bool
+    error: str | None = None
+
+
+def authority_oid(inputs: SentinelInputs) -> str:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "--git-dir", str(inputs.authority_git_dir), "rev-parse", inputs.ref],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise SentinelError("AUTHORITY_REF_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def evaluate(
+    inputs: SentinelInputs,
+    *,
+    network_reader: Callable[[str, str], str | None],
+    gitea_reader: Callable[[str, str], str | None],
+) -> SentinelResult:
+    try:
+        local = authority_oid(inputs)
+        network = network_reader(inputs.gitea_remote, inputs.ref)
+        gitea = gitea_reader(inputs.gitea_api, inputs.ref)
+        equal = local == network == gitea == inputs.expected_oid
+        return SentinelResult(local, network, gitea, equal, None if equal else "OID_MISMATCH")
+    except SentinelError as exc:
+        return SentinelResult(None, None, None, False, str(exc))

active-runtime/app/aios_control_plane_snapshot.py

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Non-sensitive control-plane snapshot assembly."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+def _copy(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None, keys: tuple[str, ...]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    value = value or {}
+    return {key: value.get(key) for key in keys}
+
+
+def build_control_plane_snapshot(*, target_version: str, runtime: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, repository: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, production: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, task: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, capabilities: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, credential_broker: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    task_snapshot = _copy(task, ("task_id", "branch", "authority_branch_oid", "gitea_git_oid", "gitea_api_oid", "commit_visible", "generation", "reconciliation_state"))
+    for key in ("external_job_id", "commit_oid", "current_head_oid", "completed_replay_reconciliation_id", "receipt_authority_oid"):
+        if task is not None and key in task:
+            task_snapshot[key] = task[key]
+    return {
+        "version": {"target_release": target_version},
+        "runtime": _copy(runtime, ("bridge_schema_version", "control_plane_release_version", "runtime_release_commit", "runtime_path", "artifact_sha256", "drift_status")),
+        "repository": _copy(repository, ("identity", "authority_git_dir", "authority_main_oid")),
+        "production": _copy(production, ("baseline_version", "target_oid", "deployment_state")),
+        "task": task_snapshot,
+        "capabilities": _copy(capabilities, ("legacy_writes_enabled", "governed_writes_enabled", "force_push", "main_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "production_write")),
+        "credential_broker": _copy(credential_broker, ("status", "provider")),
+        "secret_material_exposed": False,
+    }
+
+
+def getControlPlaneSnapshot(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return build_control_plane_snapshot(**kwargs)

active-runtime/app/aios_convergence_contracts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+"""Minimal convergence contracts for AIOS V2R2C2.
+
+This module deliberately contains no external side effects.  It provides the shared
+data contracts and pure evaluation rules used by domain controllers.  Domain
+controllers remain authoritative for their own final states.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+class ConvergenceContractError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when an invalid convergence contract is constructed."""
+
+
+class EvidenceState(str, Enum):
+    PASS = "PASS"
+    FAIL = "FAIL"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+    NOT_APPLICABLE = "NOT_APPLICABLE"
+
+
+class AcceptanceDecision(str, Enum):
+    ACCEPT = "ACCEPT"
+    REJECT = "REJECT"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+
+
+class ObservedHealth(str, Enum):
+    HEALTHY = "HEALTHY"
+    DEGRADED = "DEGRADED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+
+
+class ReconciliationState(str, Enum):
+    PENDING = "PENDING"
+    OBSERVING = "OBSERVING"
+    DIFF_FOUND = "DIFF_FOUND"
+    APPLYING = "APPLYING"
+    VERIFYING = "VERIFYING"
+    CONVERGED = "CONVERGED"
+    DEGRADED = "DEGRADED"
+    BLOCKED = "BLOCKED"
+
+
+class ContinuationStopReason(str, Enum):
+    CONTEXT_BOUNDARY = "context_boundary"
+    WORKER_RESTART = "worker_restart"
+    HANDOFF = "handoff"
+    AUTHORITY_GATE = "authority_gate"
+    WAIT_EXTERNAL = "wait_external"
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _canonical_json(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha256(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _nonempty(value: object, field_name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not text:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"{field_name}_required")
+    return text
+
+
+def _generation(value: object, field_name: str = "generation") -> int:
+    try:
+        parsed = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"{field_name}_invalid") from exc
+    if parsed < 1:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"{field_name}_invalid")
+    return parsed
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class StateOwnership:
+    object_type: str
+    authoritative_service: str
+    authoritative_store: str
+    final_writer: str | None = None
+    projections: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema_version: str = "aios.state-ownership.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.object_type, "object_type")
+        _nonempty(self.authoritative_service, "authoritative_service")
+        _nonempty(self.authoritative_store, "authoritative_store")
+        if self.final_writer is not None:
+            _nonempty(self.final_writer, "final_writer")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+DEFAULT_STATE_OWNERSHIP: tuple[StateOwnership, ...] = (
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="goal",
+        authoritative_service="goal-kernel",
+        authoritative_store="goal-store",
+        final_writer="goal-kernel",
+        projections=("admin-web", "context-pack"),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="task_run",
+        authoritative_service="task-plane-18940",
+        authoritative_store="durable-task-store",
+        final_writer="task-plane-18940",
+        projections=("admin-web", "context-pack"),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="release",
+        authoritative_service="release-controller",
+        authoritative_store="release-registry",
+        final_writer="release-controller",
+        projections=("baseline-authority", "admin-web"),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="git_branch",
+        authoritative_service="authority-git-executor",
+        authoritative_store="authoritative-git",
+        final_writer="authority-git-executor",
+        projections=("gitea",),
+    ),
+    StateOwnership(
+        object_type="external_projection",
+        authoritative_service="projection-controller",
+        authoritative_store="projection-store",
+        final_writer="projection-controller",
+        projections=("openapi", "gpt-action", "nginx"),
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def ownership_index(
+    ownership: Iterable[StateOwnership] = DEFAULT_STATE_OWNERSHIP,
+) -> dict[str, StateOwnership]:
+    result: dict[str, StateOwnership] = {}
+    for row in ownership:
+        if row.object_type in result:
+            raise ConvergenceContractError(f"duplicate_state_owner:{row.object_type}")
+        result[row.object_type] = row
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceCriterion:
+    criterion_id: str
+    required: bool
+    state: EvidenceState
+    verifier_id: str
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.criterion_id, "criterion_id")
+        _nonempty(self.verifier_id, "verifier_id")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceInvariant:
+    invariant_id: str
+    state: EvidenceState
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.invariant_id, "invariant_id")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceVector:
+    subject_type: str
+    subject_id: str
+    subject_revision: int
+    criteria: tuple[AcceptanceCriterion, ...]
+    invariants: tuple[AcceptanceInvariant, ...] = ()
+    unresolved_side_effects: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    unresolved_blockers: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    runtime_proofs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema: str = "aios.acceptance-vector.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.subject_type, "subject_type")
+        _nonempty(self.subject_id, "subject_id")
+        _generation(self.subject_revision, "subject_revision")
+        ids = [row.criterion_id for row in self.criteria]
+        if len(ids) != len(set(ids)):
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("duplicate_acceptance_criterion")
+        invariant_ids = [row.invariant_id for row in self.invariants]
+        if len(invariant_ids) != len(set(invariant_ids)):
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("duplicate_acceptance_invariant")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        for row in value["criteria"]:
+            row["state"] = row["state"].value
+        for row in value["invariants"]:
+            row["state"] = row["state"].value
+        return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AcceptanceResult:
+    decision: AcceptanceDecision
+    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
+    vector_hash: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "decision": self.decision.value,
+            "reasons": list(self.reasons),
+            "vector_hash": self.vector_hash,
+        }
+
+
+def evaluate_acceptance(vector: AcceptanceVector) -> AcceptanceResult:
+    """Pure fail-closed acceptance evaluator.
+
+    The evaluator never writes a domain final state.  The domain owner consumes this
+    result and remains the only final writer for Goal/Release/Product state.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    required = [row for row in vector.criteria if row.required]
+
+    for row in required:
+        if row.state == EvidenceState.FAIL:
+            reasons.append(f"criterion_failed:{row.criterion_id}")
+        elif row.state == EvidenceState.BLOCKED:
+            reasons.append(f"criterion_blocked:{row.criterion_id}")
+        elif row.state == EvidenceState.UNKNOWN:
+            reasons.append(f"criterion_unknown:{row.criterion_id}")
+
+    for row in vector.invariants:
+        if row.state == EvidenceState.FAIL:
+            reasons.append(f"invariant_failed:{row.invariant_id}")
+        elif row.state in {EvidenceState.UNKNOWN, EvidenceState.BLOCKED}:
+            reasons.append(f"invariant_unknown:{row.invariant_id}")
+
+    if vector.unresolved_side_effects:
+        reasons.append("unresolved_side_effects")
+    if vector.unresolved_blockers:
+        reasons.append("unresolved_blockers")
+
+    digest = _sha256(vector.as_dict())
+
+    if any(reason.startswith(("criterion_failed:", "invariant_failed:")) for reason in reasons):
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.REJECT
+    elif any(reason.startswith("criterion_blocked:") for reason in reasons) or vector.unresolved_blockers:
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.BLOCKED
+    elif reasons:
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.UNKNOWN
+    else:
+        decision = AcceptanceDecision.ACCEPT
+
+    return AcceptanceResult(decision=decision, reasons=tuple(reasons), vector_hash=digest)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class DesiredState:
+    resource_id: str
+    resource_type: str
+    desired_generation: int
+    desired_spec: Mapping[str, Any]
+    owner_goal_id: str | None = None
+    lifecycle: str = "active"
+    schema: str = "aios.desired-state.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.resource_id, "resource_id")
+        _nonempty(self.resource_type, "resource_type")
+        _generation(self.desired_generation, "desired_generation")
+        if self.lifecycle not in {"active", "suspended", "deleted"}:
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("desired_lifecycle_invalid")
+
+    def identity(self) -> tuple[str, int]:
+        return self.resource_id, self.desired_generation
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ObservedState:
+    resource_id: str
+    observed_generation: int | None
+    observed_spec: Mapping[str, Any]
+    health: ObservedHealth
+    source_identity: str
+    observed_at: str
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema: str = "aios.observed-state.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.resource_id, "resource_id")
+        _nonempty(self.source_identity, "source_identity")
+        _nonempty(self.observed_at, "observed_at")
+        if self.observed_generation is not None:
+            _generation(self.observed_generation, "observed_generation")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ReconciliationPlan:
+    resource_id: str
+    desired_generation: int
+    state: ReconciliationState
+    diff: Mapping[str, Any]
+    observation_required: bool
+    idempotency_key: str
+    reason: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["state"] = self.state.value
+        return value
+
+
+def plan_reconciliation(
+    desired: DesiredState,
+    observed: ObservedState | None,
+) -> ReconciliationPlan:
+    """Return a side-effect-free reconciliation decision.
+
+    UNKNOWN/missing observed state always requires observation and never converges.
+    """
+    identity = {
+        "resource_id": desired.resource_id,
+        "desired_generation": desired.desired_generation,
+        "desired_spec": desired.desired_spec,
+    }
+    key = _sha256(identity)
+
+    if observed is None:
+        return ReconciliationPlan(
+            desired.resource_id,
+            desired.desired_generation,
+            ReconciliationState.OBSERVING,
+            {"observed": None},
+            True,
+            key,
+            "observed_state_missing",
+        )
+    if observed.resource_id != desired.resource_id:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError("resource_identity_mismatch")
+    if observed.health == ObservedHealth.UNKNOWN:
+        return ReconciliationPlan(
+            desired.resource_id,
+            desired.desired_generation,
+            ReconciliationState.OBSERVING,
+            {"health": observed.health.value},
+            True,
+            key,
+            "observed_state_unknown",
+        )
+
+    same_generation = observed.observed_generation == desired.desired_generation
+    same_spec = dict(observed.observed_spec) == dict(desired.desired_spec)
+    if same_generation and same_spec and observed.health == ObservedHealth.HEALTHY:
+        return ReconciliationPlan(
+            desired.resource_id,
+            desired.desired_generation,
+            ReconciliationState.CONVERGED,
+            {},
+            False,
+            key,
+            "desired_equals_observed",
+        )
+
+    return ReconciliationPlan(
+        desired.resource_id,
+        desired.desired_generation,
+        ReconciliationState.DIFF_FOUND,
+        {
+            "desired_generation": desired.desired_generation,
+            "observed_generation": observed.observed_generation,
+            "desired_spec": dict(desired.desired_spec),
+            "observed_spec": dict(observed.observed_spec),
+            "observed_health": observed.health.value,
+        },
+        False,
+        key,
+        "desired_observed_drift",
+    )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SideEffectReceipt:
+    mutation_id: str
+    external_system: str
+    state: str
+    observed_at: str
+    external_request_id: str | None = None
+    external_object_id: str | None = None
+    observed_result_hash: str | None = None
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    schema: str = "aios.side-effect-receipt.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        _nonempty(self.mutation_id, "mutation_id")
+        _nonempty(self.external_system, "external_system")
+        _nonempty(self.observed_at, "observed_at")
+        if self.state not in {
+            "confirmed_applied",
+            "confirmed_not_applied",
+            "unknown",
+        }:
+            raise ConvergenceContractError("side_effect_receipt_state_invalid")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ContinuationManifest:
+    trace_id: str
+    goal_id: str
+    goal_revision: int
+    task_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    current_node_id: str
+    acceptance_vector_ref: str
+    next_action: str
+    stop_reason: ContinuationStopReason
+    checkpoint_ref: str | None = None
+    unresolved_blocker_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    authoritative_decision_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    resource_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    artifact_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    schema: str = "aios.continuation-manifest.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "trace_id",
+            "goal_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "run_id",
+            "current_node_id",
+            "acceptance_vector_ref",
+            "next_action",
+            "created_at",
+        ):
+            _nonempty(getattr(self, name), name)
+        _generation(self.goal_revision, "goal_revision")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["stop_reason"] = self.stop_reason.value
+        return value
+
+    @property
+    def content_hash(self) -> str:
+        return _sha256(self.as_dict())
+
+
+def validate_state_ownership(
+    object_type: str,
+    writer: str,
+    ownership: Iterable[StateOwnership] = DEFAULT_STATE_OWNERSHIP,
+    *,
+    final_state: bool = False,
+) -> None:
+    row = ownership_index(ownership).get(object_type)
+    if row is None:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(f"state_owner_missing:{object_type}")
+    expected = row.final_writer if final_state and row.final_writer else row.authoritative_service
+    if writer != expected:
+        raise ConvergenceContractError(
+            f"STATE_OWNERSHIP_VIOLATION:{object_type}:{writer}:{expected}"
+        )

active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"""Metadata-only, server-side credential lease broker."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import secrets
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CredentialLease:
+    lease_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    issued_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    scopes: tuple[str, ...]
+    provider: str
+    state: str = "ACTIVE"
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state}
+
+
+class FileCredentialProvider:
+    def __init__(self, token_path: str | os.PathLike[str], *, actor: str = "aios-autonomy-agent") -> None:
+        self.token_path = Path(token_path)
+        self.actor = actor
+
+    def environment(self, lease: CredentialLease) -> dict[str, str]:
+        if not self.token_path.is_file():
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE")
+        return {"CREDENTIAL_FILE": str(self.token_path), "GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR": self.actor}
+
+
+class CredentialBroker:
+    def __init__(self, provider: Any, *, now: Callable[[], datetime] | None = None) -> None:
+        self.provider = provider
+        self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+        self._leases: dict[str, CredentialLease] = {}
+
+    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if repository != "aios/aios" or not target_branch.startswith("agent/") or generation < 1 or not 1 <= lease_seconds <= 86400:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        now = self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__)
+        self._leases[lease.lease_id] = lease
+        return lease.as_dict()
+
+    def _get(self, lease_id: str) -> CredentialLease:
+        lease = self._leases.get(lease_id)
+        if lease is None:
+            raise KeyError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_FOUND")
+        if lease.state == "ACTIVE" and self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc) >= datetime.fromisoformat(lease.expires_at):
+            lease = CredentialLease(**{**lease.as_dict(), "scopes": tuple(lease.scopes), "state": "EXPIRED"})
+            self._leases[lease_id] = lease
+        return lease
+
+    def environment(self, lease_id: str) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
+        return self.provider.environment(lease)
+
+    def status(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._get(lease_id).as_dict()
+
+    def revoke(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state == "REVOKED":
+            return lease.as_dict()
+        updated = CredentialLease(**{**lease.as_dict(), "scopes": tuple(lease.scopes), "state": "REVOKED"})
+        self._leases[lease_id] = updated
+        return updated.as_dict()

active-runtime/app/aios_gitea_machine_broker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+"""Non-Owner Gitea machine capability and branch reconciliation boundary."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+
+class MachineBrokerError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class GiteaTransport(Protocol):
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str: ...
+    def create_or_update_pr(self, branch: str, target: str, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def publish_status(self, branch: str, state: str, description: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def protected_merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def read_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
+    def whoami(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def repository(self, owner: str, name: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class MachineCredentialProjection:
+    """Opaque systemd credential reference; the credential value is never accepted."""
+
+    reference: str
+    account: str
+    owner_account: str = "aiman"
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "MachineCredentialProjection":
+        if set(value) != {"scheme", "name", "account"}:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+        if value["scheme"] != "systemd-credential" or value["name"] != "gitea-machine-token":
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+        return cls(f"{value['scheme']}:{value['name']}", str(value["account"]))
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.reference != "systemd-credential:gitea-machine-token":
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+        if not self.account or self.account == self.owner_account:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("OWNER_MACHINE_IDENTITY_REJECTED")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CampaignCapabilityReceipt:
+    campaign_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    branch: str
+    expected_oid: str
+    capabilities: frozenset[str]
+    denied: frozenset[str]
+
+    def require(self, capability: str) -> None:
+        if capability in self.denied or capability not in self.capabilities:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("CAPABILITY_DENIED")
+        if self.branch in {"main", "master"}:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_DENIED")
+
+
+class GiteaMachineBroker:
+    def __init__(self, transport: GiteaTransport, credential: MachineCredentialProjection, receipt: CampaignCapabilityReceipt) -> None:
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.credential = credential
+        self.receipt = receipt
+
+    def verify_identity(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        identity = dict(self.transport.whoami())
+        login = identity.get("login") or identity.get("username")
+        if not isinstance(login, str) or not login or login == self.credential.owner_account or login != self.credential.account:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("GITEA_MACHINE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        owner, name = self.receipt.repository.split("/", 1)
+        repo = dict(self.transport.repository(owner, name))
+        if repo.get("full_name") != self.receipt.repository:
+            raise MachineBrokerError("GITEA_REPOSITORY_MISMATCH")
+        return {"login": login, "repository": self.receipt.repository, "owner_account": self.credential.owner_account}
+
+    def push_branch(self, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        self.receipt.require("exact_task_branch_push")
+        return self.transport.compare_and_swap_branch(self.receipt.branch, self.receipt.expected_oid, new_oid)
+
+    def create_pr(self, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.receipt.require("pr_create_update")
+        return self.transport.create_or_update_pr(self.receipt.branch, "main", title, body)
+
+    def status(self, state: str, description: str, context: str = "aios/durable-release") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.receipt.require("status_publish")
+        return self.transport.publish_status(self.receipt.branch, state, description, context)
+
+    def merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.receipt.require("protected_merge")
+        return self.transport.protected_merge(pr_number)
+
+    def readback(self) -> str | None:
+        self.receipt.require("remote_readback")
+        return self.transport.read_branch(self.receipt.branch)
+
+
+def reconcile_exact_branch(authority_oid: str, gitea_oid: str | None, expected_oid: str) -> str:
+    if authority_oid != expected_oid:
+        return "AUTHORITY_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH"
+    if gitea_oid is None:
+        return "CREATE_REQUIRED"
+    if gitea_oid == expected_oid:
+        return "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
+    return "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+
+
+def reconcile_fast_forward(
+    remote_oid: str | None,
+    expected_old_oid: str,
+    new_oid: str,
+    *,
+    old_is_ancestor_of_new: bool,
+) -> str:
+    """Return a bounded action for an active Job/lease branch scope."""
+    if remote_oid is None:
+        return "CREATE_REQUIRED"
+    if remote_oid == new_oid:
+        return "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
+    if remote_oid == expected_old_oid and old_is_ancestor_of_new:
+        return "FAST_FORWARD_REQUIRED"
+    return "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"

active-runtime/app/aios_gitea_machine_transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+"""Gitea HTTP/Git transport using only a projected systemd credential."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import quote, urlencode
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+
+class GiteaTransportError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _safe_oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
+        raise GiteaTransportError(f"{field}_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _safe_branch(value: str) -> str:
+    branch = str(value or "")
+    if (
+        not branch
+        or len(branch) > 240
+        or branch != branch.strip()
+        or branch.startswith(("/", "-", "."))
+        or branch.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        or ".." in branch
+        or "//" in branch
+        or "@{" in branch
+        or "\\" in branch
+        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in branch.split("/"))
+        or any(ch not in "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789._/-" for ch in branch)
+    ):
+        raise GiteaTransportError("BRANCH_INVALID")
+    return branch
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class GiteaMachineTransport:
+    api_base: str
+    repository_id: str
+    remote_url: str
+    authority_git_dir: Path
+    credential_name: str = "gitea-machine-token"
+    actor: str = "aios-autonomy-agent"
+    timeout: int = 20
+    expected_merge_head: str | None = None
+    expected_merge_base: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.credential_name != "gitea-machine-token":
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_NAME_INVALID")
+        if "/" not in self.repository_id or self.repository_id.startswith("/"):
+            raise GiteaTransportError("REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if not self.api_base.startswith("https://") and not self.api_base.startswith("http://127.0.0.1"):
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_API_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not self.remote_url.startswith("https://"):
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_REMOTE_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+    @property
+    def _credential_path(self) -> Path:
+        directory = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "")
+        if not directory:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        path = Path(directory) / self.credential_name
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        return path
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        value = self._credential_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if not value:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_EMPTY")
+        return value
+
+    def _request(self, method: str, path: str, body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> tuple[int, Any]:
+        data = None if body is None else json.dumps(dict(body), separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+        headers = {"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"token {self._token()}"}
+        if data is not None:
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        request = Request(self.api_base.rstrip("/") + path, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
+        try:
+            with urlopen(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
+                raw = response.read()
+                return response.status, json.loads(raw.decode()) if raw else {}
+        except HTTPError as exc:
+            # Never include response bodies: Gitea may echo sensitive request context.
+            raise GiteaTransportError(f"GITEA_HTTP_{exc.code}") from exc
+        except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_NETWORK_ERROR") from exc
+
+    def whoami(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self._request("GET", "/user")[1]
+
+    def repository_info(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        return self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}")[1]
+
+    def repository(self, owner: str, name: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if f"{owner}/{name}" != self.repository_id:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("REPOSITORY_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        return self.repository_info()
+
+    def read_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
+        branch = _safe_branch(branch)
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        try:
+            value = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/branches/{quote(branch, safe='/')}")[1]
+        except GiteaTransportError as exc:
+            if str(exc) == "GITEA_HTTP_404":
+                return None
+            raise
+        sha = value.get("commit", {}).get("id") if isinstance(value, dict) else None
+        return _safe_oid(sha, "remote_branch_oid")
+
+    def _askpass(self) -> tuple[Path, dict[str, str]]:
+        credential = self._credential_path
+        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="aios-gitea-askpass-", dir="/tmp")
+        path = Path(name)
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o700)
+        script = "#!/bin/sh\ncase \"$1\" in *Username*) printf '%s\\n' \"$GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR\" ;; *) cat \"$CREDENTIAL_FILE\" ;; esac\n"
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+            stream.write(script)
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        return path, {
+            "GIT_ASKPASS": str(path),
+            "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
+            "GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR": self.actor,
+            "CREDENTIAL_FILE": str(credential),
+        }
+
+    def _push_branch_fast_forward(self, branch: str, new_oid: str) -> None:
+        askpass, additions = self._askpass()
+        environment = os.environ.copy()
+        environment.update(additions)
+        try:
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", f"--git-dir={self.authority_git_dir}", "push", self.remote_url, f"{new_oid}:refs/heads/{branch}"],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+                env=environment,
+                timeout=self.timeout,
+            )
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CREATE_FAILED")
+        finally:
+            askpass.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+    def fetch_branch_exact(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str) -> str:
+        """Fetch one exact remote branch tip into a quarantine ref.
+
+        This never updates ``main`` or any caller-visible branch.  The remote
+        ref is read before and after the fetch so a concurrent branch move
+        cannot be silently admitted.
+        """
+
+        branch = _safe_branch(branch)
+        expected_oid = _safe_oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        remote_before = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if remote_before != expected_oid:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_SOURCE_REF_MISMATCH")
+        target_ref = f"refs/aios/release-sources/{expected_oid}"
+
+        current = subprocess.run(
+            [
+                "git",
+                f"--git-dir={self.authority_git_dir}",
+                "rev-parse",
+                "--verify",
+                f"{target_ref}^{{commit}}",
+            ],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+            timeout=self.timeout,
+        )
+        if current.returncode == 0 and current.stdout.strip().lower() == expected_oid:
+            remote_after = self.read_branch(branch)
+            if remote_after != expected_oid:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_SOURCE_REF_MOVED")
+            return expected_oid
+
+        askpass, additions = self._askpass()
+        environment = os.environ.copy()
+        environment.update(additions)
+        try:
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                [
+                    "git",
+                    f"--git-dir={self.authority_git_dir}",
+                    "fetch",
+                    "--no-tags",
+                    "--no-write-fetch-head",
+                    self.remote_url,
+                    f"refs/heads/{branch}:{target_ref}",
+                ],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+                env=environment,
+                timeout=self.timeout,
+            )
+            if result.returncode != 0:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_SOURCE_FETCH_FAILED")
+        finally:
+            askpass.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+        local = subprocess.run(
+            [
+                "git",
+                f"--git-dir={self.authority_git_dir}",
+                "rev-parse",
+                "--verify",
+                f"{target_ref}^{{commit}}",
+            ],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+            timeout=self.timeout,
+        )
+        local_oid = local.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if local.returncode != 0 or local_oid != expected_oid:
+            subprocess.run(
+                [
+                    "git",
+                    f"--git-dir={self.authority_git_dir}",
+                    "update-ref",
+                    "-d",
+                    target_ref,
+                ],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+                timeout=self.timeout,
+            )
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_SOURCE_FETCH_MISMATCH")
+        remote_after = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if remote_after != expected_oid:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_SOURCE_REF_MOVED")
+        return expected_oid
+
+    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        _safe_oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _safe_oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        current = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if current == new_oid:
+            return new_oid
+        if current is None:
+            self._push_branch_fast_forward(branch, new_oid)
+            readback = self.read_branch(branch)
+            if readback != new_oid:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+            return readback
+        if current != expected_oid:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        # The preflight read binds the expected old tip. The Git receive-pack
+        # then enforces the actual fast-forward CAS while transferring the new
+        # objects; no force/lease override or arbitrary ref is permitted.
+        self._push_branch_fast_forward(branch, new_oid)
+        readback = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
+    def _pulls(self) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        query = urlencode({"state": "all", "base_branch": "main", "limit": 100})
+        value = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls?{query}")[1]
+        return value if isinstance(value, list) else []
+
+    def create_or_update_pr(self, branch: str, target: str, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if target != "main":
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_BASE_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        head = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if head is None:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_MISSING")
+        matches = [p for p in self._pulls() if (p.get("head") or {}).get("ref") == branch and (p.get("base") or {}).get("ref") == target]
+        open_matches = [p for p in matches if p.get("state") == "open"]
+        if len(open_matches) > 1:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("MULTIPLE_MATCHING_PRS")
+        if open_matches:
+            if (open_matches[0].get("head") or {}).get("sha") != head:
+                raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_CONFLICT")
+            return open_matches[0]
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls", {"head": branch, "base": target, "title": title, "body": body, "allow_maintainer_edit": False})[1]
+
+    def publish_status(self, branch: str, state: str, description: str, context: str = "aios/durable-release") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        oid = self.read_branch(branch)
+        if oid is None:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("STATUS_BRANCH_MISSING")
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/statuses/{oid}", {"state": state, "context": context, "description": description})[1]
+
+    def protected_merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(pr_number, int) or pr_number < 1:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_NUMBER_INVALID")
+        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
+        pr = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls/{pr_number}")[1]
+        if pr.get("state") != "open" or (pr.get("base") or {}).get("ref") != "main":
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_MERGE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if pr.get("mergeable") is False:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_NOT_MERGEABLE")
+        head_oid = (pr.get("head") or {}).get("sha")
+        base_oid = (pr.get("base") or {}).get("sha")
+        if self.expected_merge_head is not None and head_oid != self.expected_merge_head:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        if self.expected_merge_base is not None and base_oid != self.expected_merge_base:
+            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_BASE_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        body = {"do": "fast-forward-only", "force_merge": False, "merge_when_checks_succeed": False, "head_commit_id": head_oid}
+        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls/{pr_number}/merge", body)[1]

active-runtime/app/aios_gitea_publisher.py

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+"""Canonical Gitea transport and slash-branch verification."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Optional
+from urllib.parse import quote
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+from aios_gitops_reconciliation_core import RemoteObservation
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GiteaPublisherConfig:
+    repository: str = "aios/aios"
+    api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1"
+    remote_name: str = "gitea-http"
+
+
+class GiteaPublisher:
+    def __init__(self, workspace: Path, *, config: GiteaPublisherConfig = GiteaPublisherConfig(), credential: Any = None, api_get: Callable[[str], Any] | None = None, git_ref: Callable[[str], Optional[str]] | None = None) -> None:
+        self.workspace = Path(workspace)
+        self.config = config
+        self.credential = credential
+        self._api_get = api_get
+        self._git_ref = git_ref
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def validate_repository(repository: str) -> None:
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            raise ValueError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def validate_branch(branch: str) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(branch, str) or not branch.startswith("agent/") or branch in {"main", "master"}:
+            raise ValueError("BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+
+    def repository_identity(self) -> str:
+        self.validate_repository(self.config.repository)
+        return self.config.repository
+
+    def _environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        if self.credential is not None and hasattr(self.credential, "environment"):
+            return dict(self.credential.environment())
+        return {}
+
+    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> Optional[str]:
+        self.validate_branch(branch)
+        if self._git_ref is not None:
+            return self._git_ref(branch)
+        result = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.workspace), "ls-remote", self.config.remote_name, f"refs/heads/{branch}"], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False, env={**os.environ, **self._environment(), "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"})
+        if result.returncode != 0 or not result.stdout.strip():
+            return None
+        return result.stdout.split()[0]
+
+    def _api(self, path: str) -> Any:
+        if self._api_get is not None:
+            return self._api_get(path)
+        headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
+        env = self._environment()
+        if env.get("AIOS_GITEA_TOKEN"):
+            headers["Authorization"] = "token " + env["AIOS_GITEA_TOKEN"]
+        with urlopen(Request(self.config.api_base.rstrip("/") + path, headers=headers), timeout=20) as response:
+            return json.loads(response.read() or b"{}")
+
+    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> Optional[str]:
+        self.validate_branch(branch)
+        for page in range(1, 101):
+            value = self._api(f"/repos/aios/aios/branches?page={page}&limit=50")
+            if not isinstance(value, list):
+                return None
+            for item in value:
+                if isinstance(item, Mapping) and item.get("name") == branch:
+                    commit = item.get("commit")
+                    return commit.get("id") if isinstance(commit, Mapping) else None
+            if len(value) < 50:
+                return None
+        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_BRANCH_PAGINATION_LIMIT")
+
+    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool:
+        if not isinstance(oid, str) or len(oid) != 40:
+            return False
+        try:
+            value = self._api(f"/repos/aios/aios/git/commits/{quote(oid, safe='')}")
+            return isinstance(value, Mapping) and value.get("sha", oid) == oid
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    def observe(self, branch: str, desired_oid: str, authority_oid: Optional[str], *, expected_oid: Optional[str] = None, observed_at: str = "") -> RemoteObservation:
+        return RemoteObservation(self.repository_identity(), branch, desired_oid, authority_oid, self.read_git_ref(branch), self.read_api_branch(branch), self.commit_visible(desired_oid), observed_at, expected_oid)

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_job_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,518 @@
+"""Durable Job side-effect executor for the AIOS campaign control plane."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor, AuthorityGitError
+from aios_campaign_recovery import RecoveryEvidenceError, load_recovered_authorization
+from aios_gitea_machine_broker import CampaignCapabilityReceipt, GiteaMachineBroker, MachineBrokerError
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, JobState, JobStore, ServiceUnavailable
+
+
+TASK_ID = "AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_RELEASE_CAMPAIGN_V1"
+CAMPAIGN_ID = "AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807"
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+BRANCH = "agent/autonomous-release-campaign-v1-20260807"
+EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID = "bba675fab3b7e0c5fba7066720252b3c91b9f20d"
+AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST = "6b0bf550eb702126e967eeff2d561fa808444b924d8a71f5399accad508ed3b2"
+LINEAGE_ANCHOR = "69b45e81dcd2c3707c367003b08c55fd361faae8"
+
+
+class JobExecutionError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class DurableJobExecutor:
+    controller: GitOpsJobController
+    authority: AuthorityGitExecutor
+    broker: GiteaMachineBroker
+    recovery_path: Path
+    clock: Callable[[], datetime] = field(default=lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+    lease_seconds: int = 60
+    _persistence_halted: bool = field(default=False, init=False, repr=False)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self.controller.assert_effect_admission()
+        except JobError as exc:
+            if str(exc) != "EFFECT_ADMISSION_LATCHED":
+                raise
+            self._persistence_halted = True
+
+    def _request(self, job_id: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        try:
+            request = json.loads(row["request_json"])
+        except (KeyError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise JobExecutionError("JOB_REQUEST_INVALID") from exc
+        binding = dict(request.get("binding") or {})
+        # Payload location is derived from and protected by payload_digest, but
+        # is intentionally outside the idempotency binding.  Execution still
+        # needs it after a durable round trip.
+        for field_name in ("payload_ref", "payload_size"):
+            if field_name in request:
+                binding[field_name] = request[field_name]
+        return row, binding
+
+    def _validate_campaign(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+        operation = str(request.get("operation", ""))
+        expected_branch_oid = request.get("expected_branch_oid")
+        required = {
+            "task_id": TASK_ID,
+            "campaign_id": CAMPAIGN_ID,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "branch": BRANCH,
+            "authorization_recovery_digest": AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST,
+        }
+        for key, expected in required.items():
+            if request.get(key) != expected:
+                raise JobExecutionError(f"JOB_{key.upper()}_MISMATCH")
+        new_oid = request.get("new_branch_oid")
+        if not isinstance(new_oid, str) or len(new_oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in new_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(expected_branch_oid, str) or len(expected_branch_oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in expected_branch_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH" and expected_branch_oid == new_oid:
+            raise JobExecutionError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        if operation != "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH" and expected_branch_oid != new_oid:
+            raise JobExecutionError("POST_ADVANCE_HEAD_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            recovery = load_recovered_authorization(self.recovery_path)
+        except RecoveryEvidenceError as exc:
+            raise JobExecutionError(str(exc)) from exc
+        if recovery["digest"] != AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST:
+            raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        for key, expected in required.items():
+            if key == "campaign_id":
+                actual = recovery.get(key)
+            elif key == "authorization_recovery_digest":
+                continue
+            else:
+                actual = recovery.get({"expected_branch_oid": "expected_branch_oid"}.get(key, key))
+            if actual is not None and actual != expected:
+                raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+        if recovery.get("expected_branch_oid") != EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID:
+            raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_BRANCH_OID_MISMATCH")
+        authority_head = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
+        if authority_head not in {expected_branch_oid, new_oid}:
+            raise JobExecutionError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+        if not self.authority.ancestry_check(expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        if not self.authority.ancestry_check(EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID, new_oid):
+            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_OID_OUTSIDE_AUTHORIZED_LINEAGE")
+        if operation == "RECONCILE_AUTHORITY_MAIN":
+            old_main = request.get("expected_main_oid")
+            if (
+                not isinstance(old_main, str)
+                or len(old_main) != 40
+                or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in old_main)
+            ):
+                raise JobExecutionError("MAIN_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID")
+            if not self.authority.ancestry_check(old_main, new_oid):
+                raise JobExecutionError("MAIN_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        identity = self.broker.verify_identity()
+        if identity.get("repository") != REPOSITORY or identity.get("login") == "aiman":
+            raise JobExecutionError("MACHINE_IDENTITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        return new_oid
+
+    def dry_run(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row, request = self._request(job_id)
+        operation = str(request.get("operation") or "")
+        if operation not in {
+            "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH", "COMMIT_FILE",
+            "SYNC_TASK_BRANCH_TO_GITEA", "CREATE_PR", "PUBLISH_CHECK",
+            "PROTECTED_MERGE", "RECONCILE_AUTHORITY_MAIN",
+        }:
+            raise JobExecutionError("OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED")
+        self._validate_campaign(request)
+        if operation == "COMMIT_FILE":
+            self._commit_file_spec(row, request)
+        observation = self._observe_operation(request)
+        result = {
+            "mode": "DRY_RUN",
+            "operation": operation,
+            "decision": "SAFE_TO_ADVANCE",
+            "effect_performed": False,
+            "readback": observation,
+        }
+        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH":
+            result.update({
+                "authority_action": "CAS_REQUIRED",
+                "gitea_action": "ALREADY_IN_SYNC" if observation["verification"] == "VERIFIED" else "FAST_FORWARD_REQUIRED",
+                "previous_branch_oid": request["expected_branch_oid"],
+                "final_branch_oid": request["new_branch_oid"],
+                "force_push": False,
+            })
+        return result
+
+    def execute(self, job_id: str, *, dry_run: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if dry_run:
+            return self.dry_run(job_id)
+        if self._persistence_halted:
+            raise JobExecutionError("PERSISTENCE_FAILURE_LATCHED")
+        try:
+            return self._execute_unprotected(job_id)
+        except ServiceUnavailable:
+            self._persistence_halted = True
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:
+            try:
+                row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+                if state in {
+                    JobState.EXECUTING, JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
+                    JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED,
+                }:
+                    self.controller.advance(
+                        job_id,
+                        JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
+                        side_effect_state="UNKNOWN",
+                        receipt={"error_code": type(exc).__name__, "verification": "UNKNOWN"},
+                    )
+                elif state not in {
+                    JobState.COMPLETED, JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
+                    JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
+                }:
+                    self.controller.advance(
+                        job_id, JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE,
+                        side_effect_state="NONE",
+                        receipt={"error_code": type(exc).__name__, "effect_performed": False},
+                    )
+            except ServiceUnavailable:
+                self._persistence_halted = True
+            raise
+
+    def _execute_unprotected(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row, request = self._request(job_id)
+        state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.COMPLETED:
+            return self.controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
+        if state in {
+            JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
+            JobState.RECONCILING, JobState.EXECUTING, JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
+            JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED,
+        }:
+            return self.reconcile(job_id)
+
+        operation = str(request.get("operation") or "")
+        if operation not in {
+            "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH", "COMMIT_FILE",
+            "SYNC_TASK_BRANCH_TO_GITEA", "CREATE_PR", "PUBLISH_CHECK",
+            "PROTECTED_MERGE", "RECONCILE_AUTHORITY_MAIN",
+        }:
+            raise JobExecutionError("OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED")
+        try:
+            self.controller.assert_effect_admission(exclude_job_id=job_id)
+        except JobError as exc:
+            if str(exc) == "EFFECT_ADMISSION_LATCHED":
+                self._persistence_halted = True
+                raise JobExecutionError("PERSISTENCE_FAILURE_LATCHED") from exc
+            raise
+        self._validate_campaign(request)
+        if operation == "COMMIT_FILE":
+            self._commit_file_spec(row, request)
+        row = self._prepare_intent(job_id, row, request)
+        generation = int(request.get("generation", "1"))
+        self.controller.assert_execution_lease(job_id, generation=generation)
+
+        before = self._observe_operation(request)
+        if before["verification"] == "VERIFIED":
+            return self._complete(job_id, request, {"reconciled_before_effect": True}, before)
+        if before["verification"] != "ABSENT":
+            return self._record_unknown(job_id, request, before)
+
+        effect = self._perform_effect(job_id, row, request, generation)
+        after = self._observe_operation(request)
+        if after["verification"] != "VERIFIED":
+            return self._record_unknown(job_id, request, after, effect=effect)
+        return self._complete(job_id, request, effect, after)
+
+    def _prepare_intent(
+        self, job_id: str, row: Mapping[str, Any], request: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.REQUESTED:
+            self.controller.advance(
+                job_id, JobState.AUTHORIZED, side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED",
+                receipt={"authorization_digest": AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST, "task_id": TASK_ID},
+                expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+            )
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+            state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
+            deadline = self.clock().astimezone(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=self.lease_seconds)
+            self.controller.lease_job(
+                job_id,
+                lease_id=f"lease-{job_id}",
+                lineage_anchor_oid=LINEAGE_ANCHOR,
+                current_head_oid=str(request["expected_branch_oid"]),
+                generation=int(request.get("generation", "1")),
+                lease_expires_at=deadline.isoformat(),
+                expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+            )
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+            state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.LEASED:
+            self.controller.advance(
+                job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY",
+                expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+            )
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+            state = JobState(row["state"])
+        if state == JobState.WORKTREE_READY:
+            self.controller.advance(
+                job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="INTENT_COMMITTED",
+                receipt={
+                    "effect_id": job_id,
+                    "operation": request["operation"],
+                    "input_digest": row["payload_digest"],
+                    "intent_committed": True,
+                },
+                expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+            )
+            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        if JobState(row["state"]) != JobState.EXECUTING:
+            raise JobExecutionError("JOB_EXECUTION_STATE_INVALID")
+        return dict(row)
+
+    def _perform_effect(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        row: Mapping[str, Any],
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        generation: int,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        operation = str(request["operation"])
+        new_oid = str(request["new_branch_oid"])
+        self.controller.assert_execution_lease(job_id, generation=generation)
+        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH":
+            expected = str(request["expected_branch_oid"])
+            current = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
+            authority_oid = new_oid if current == new_oid else self.authority.advance_task_branch_CAS(
+                f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}", expected, new_oid
+            )
+            self.controller.assert_execution_lease(job_id, generation=generation)
+            remote = self.broker.readback()
+            if remote != new_oid:
+                if hasattr(self.broker, "receipt"):
+                    self.broker.receipt = replace(self.broker.receipt, expected_oid=expected)
+                self.broker.push_branch(new_oid)
+            return {"authority_oid": authority_oid, "network_oid": new_oid, "force_push": False}
+        if operation == "SYNC_TASK_BRANCH_TO_GITEA":
+            return {"final_network_oid": self.broker.push_branch(new_oid), "force_push": False}
+        if operation == "CREATE_PR":
+            return dict(self.broker.create_pr(
+                "AIOS autonomous release control plane",
+                "Durable campaign continuation; exact head and recovery evidence are bound in the Job.",
+            ))
+        if operation == "PUBLISH_CHECK":
+            return dict(self.broker.status(
+                str(request.get("check_state", "success")),
+                str(request.get("check_description", "Durable campaign control-plane check passed")),
+                str(request.get("check_context", "aios/durable-release")),
+            ))
+        if operation == "PROTECTED_MERGE":
+            number = int(request.get("pr_number", "0"))
+            self.broker.transport.expected_merge_head = request["expected_branch_oid"]
+            if request.get("expected_main_oid") is not None:
+                self.broker.transport.expected_merge_base = request["expected_main_oid"]
+            return dict(self.broker.merge(number))
+        if operation == "RECONCILE_AUTHORITY_MAIN":
+            old = request.get("expected_main_oid")
+            if not isinstance(old, str):
+                raise JobExecutionError("MAIN_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID")
+            if self.broker.transport.read_branch("main") != new_oid:
+                raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
+            return {"authority_main": self.authority.ff_CAS_main_after_verified_protected_merge(old, new_oid)}
+        if operation == "COMMIT_FILE":
+            path, content = self._commit_file_spec(row, request)
+            return {
+                "new_oid": self.authority.commit_file_in_isolated_worktree(
+                    base_oid=row["expected_branch_oid"], files={path: content},
+                    message="chore(gitops): durable commit-file", worktree_name=job_id,
+                )
+            }
+        raise JobExecutionError("OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED")
+
+    def _observe_operation(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        operation = str(request["operation"])
+        new_oid = str(request["new_branch_oid"])
+        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH":
+            authority = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
+            remote = self.broker.readback()
+            if authority == new_oid and remote == new_oid:
+                return {"verification": "VERIFIED", "authority_oid": authority, "remote_oid": remote}
+            expected = request["expected_branch_oid"]
+            if authority == expected and remote in {None, expected}:
+                return {"verification": "ABSENT", "authority_oid": authority, "remote_oid": remote}
+            return {"verification": "UNKNOWN", "blocker": "PARTIAL_OR_CONFLICTING_BRANCH_EFFECT", "authority_oid": authority, "remote_oid": remote}
+        if operation == "SYNC_TASK_BRANCH_TO_GITEA":
+            remote = self.broker.readback()
+            if remote == new_oid:
+                return {"verification": "VERIFIED", "remote_oid": remote}
+            if remote in {None, EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID}:
+                return {"verification": "ABSENT", "remote_oid": remote}
+            return {"verification": "UNKNOWN", "blocker": "REMOTE_BRANCH_CONFLICT", "remote_oid": remote}
+        if operation == "RECONCILE_AUTHORITY_MAIN":
+            current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/main")
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return {"verification": "VERIFIED", "authority_main": current}
+            if current == request.get("expected_main_oid"):
+                return {"verification": "ABSENT", "authority_main": current}
+            return {"verification": "UNKNOWN", "blocker": "AUTHORITY_MAIN_CONFLICT", "authority_main": current}
+        if operation == "CREATE_PR" and hasattr(self.broker, "read_pr"):
+            value = self.broker.read_pr(BRANCH, "main", new_oid)
+            return {"verification": "VERIFIED" if value else "ABSENT", "pr": value}
+        if operation == "PUBLISH_CHECK" and hasattr(self.broker, "read_status"):
+            value = self.broker.read_status(
+                new_oid, str(request.get("check_context", "aios/durable-release"))
+            )
+            if value is None:
+                return {"verification": "ABSENT"}
+            expected_state = str(request.get("check_state", "success"))
+            return {"verification": "VERIFIED" if value.get("status") == expected_state else "UNKNOWN", "status": dict(value), **({} if value.get("status") == expected_state else {"blocker": "STATUS_READBACK_MISMATCH"})}
+        if operation == "PROTECTED_MERGE" and hasattr(self.broker, "read_merge"):
+            value = self.broker.read_merge(int(request.get("pr_number", "0")))
+            if value is None:
+                return {"verification": "ABSENT"}
+            if value.get("merged") is True and value.get("head_oid") == request["expected_branch_oid"]:
+                return {"verification": "VERIFIED", "merge": dict(value)}
+            if value.get("merged") is False:
+                return {"verification": "ABSENT", "merge": dict(value)}
+            return {"verification": "UNKNOWN", "blocker": "MERGE_READBACK_MISMATCH", "merge": dict(value)}
+        return {"verification": "UNKNOWN", "blocker": "EXACT_READBACK_UNSUPPORTED"}
+
+    def _complete(
+        self, job_id: str, request: Mapping[str, Any], effect: Mapping[str, Any], observation: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        receipt = {
+            "effect_id": job_id,
+            "operation": request["operation"],
+            "effect": dict(effect),
+            "verification": "VERIFIED",
+            "readback": dict(observation),
+        }
+        completed = self.controller.advance(
+            job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="VERIFIED",
+            receipt=receipt, expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+        )
+        return completed.as_dict()
+
+    def _record_unknown(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        observation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        effect: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
+        receipt = {
+            "effect_id": job_id,
+            "operation": request["operation"],
+            "effect": dict(effect) if effect is not None else None,
+            "verification": "UNKNOWN",
+            "blocker": observation.get("blocker", "READBACK_INCONCLUSIVE"),
+            "readback": dict(observation),
+        }
+        pending = self.controller.advance(
+            job_id, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, side_effect_state="UNKNOWN",
+            receipt=receipt, expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
+        )
+        return pending.as_dict()
+
+    def reconcile(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        def observer(_current: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+            _row, request = self._request(job_id)
+            self._validate_campaign(request)
+            observation = self._observe_operation(request)
+            if observation["verification"] == "VERIFIED":
+                return {
+                    "state": JobState.COMPLETED.value,
+                    "side_effect_state": "VERIFIED",
+                    "receipt": {
+                        "effect_id": job_id, "operation": request["operation"],
+                        "effect": None, "verification": "VERIFIED",
+                        "readback": observation, "reconciled": True,
+                    },
+                }
+            if observation["verification"] == "ABSENT":
+                return {
+                    "state": JobState.REQUESTED.value,
+                    "side_effect_state": "RECONCILED_ABSENT",
+                    "receipt": {
+                        "effect_id": job_id, "operation": request["operation"],
+                        "verification": "ABSENT", "readback": observation,
+                        "reconciled": True,
+                    },
+                }
+            return {
+                "state": JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED.value,
+                "side_effect_state": "UNKNOWN",
+                "receipt": {
+                    "effect_id": job_id, "operation": request["operation"],
+                    "verification": "UNKNOWN",
+                    "blocker": observation.get("blocker", "READBACK_INCONCLUSIVE"),
+                    "readback": observation, "reconciled": True,
+                },
+            }
+
+        result = self.controller.reconcile(job_id, observer).as_dict()
+        if result["state"] in {JobState.COMPLETED.value, JobState.REQUESTED.value}:
+            self._persistence_halted = False
+        return result
+
+    def _commit_file_spec(
+        self, row: Mapping[str, Any], request: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
+        payload_ref = request.get("payload_ref")
+        if not payload_ref:
+            raise JobExecutionError("PAYLOAD_REQUIRED")
+        payload = self.controller.store.payloads.read_verified(payload_ref, row["payload_digest"], int(request["payload_size"]))
+        try:
+            spec = json.loads(payload.decode())
+            path = str(spec["path"])
+            content = base64.b64decode(spec["content_base64"], validate=True)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise JobExecutionError("COMMIT_FILE_PAYLOAD_INVALID") from exc
+        return path, content
+
+
+def build_from_environment(job_root: Path) -> DurableJobExecutor:
+    from aios_gitea_machine_transport import GiteaMachineTransport
+    from aios_gitea_machine_broker import MachineCredentialProjection
+
+    account = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_MACHINE_ACCOUNT", "aios-autonomy-agent")
+    api = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_API", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1")
+    remote = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_REMOTE", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git")
+    authority_dir = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR", "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"))
+    worktree_root = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKTREE_ROOT", "/var/lib/aios-gitops/worktrees"))
+    recovery = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_RECOVERY_RECEIPT", "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-campaigns/AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807/authorization-recovery.json"))
+    transport = GiteaMachineTransport(api, REPOSITORY, remote, authority_dir)
+    credential = MachineCredentialProjection.from_mapping({"scheme": "systemd-credential", "name": "gitea-machine-token", "account": account})
+    receipt = CampaignCapabilityReceipt(CAMPAIGN_ID, TASK_ID, REPOSITORY, BRANCH, EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID, frozenset({"exact_task_branch_push", "pr_create_update", "status_publish", "protected_merge", "remote_readback"}), frozenset({"direct_main_push", "force_push", "tag_update", "tag_delete", "baseline_write", "production_deploy"}))
+    return DurableJobExecutor(GitOpsJobController(JobStore(job_root)), AuthorityGitExecutor(authority_dir, worktree_root), GiteaMachineBroker(transport, credential, receipt), recovery)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--job-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--job-id", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    result = build_from_environment(args.job_root).execute(args.job_id, dry_run=args.dry_run)
+    print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_job_identity.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Collision-resistant storage keys for durable governed Task state."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import re
+
+
+class JobIdentityError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def legacy_task_storage_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    """Return the historical lossy key solely to detect migration conflicts."""
+    if not isinstance(task_id, str) or not task_id:
+        raise JobIdentityError("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", task_id).strip("-")[:120] or "task"
+
+
+def task_storage_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    """Return a canonical collision-resistant key for every Task state sink."""
+    if (
+        not isinstance(task_id, str)
+        or not task_id
+        or task_id != task_id.strip()
+        or len(task_id) > 512
+    ):
+        raise JobIdentityError("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    readable = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", task_id).strip("-")[:48] or "task"
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(
+        ("aios-task-storage-v1\0" + task_id).encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()
+    return f"{readable}-{digest}"

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_model_api.py

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
+from release_version import validate_release_version
+
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WORKSPACE = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
 DB_PATH = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DB', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitops_model.sqlite3')))
@@ -55,10 +57,36 @@ def seed_base_models():
     if not one('SELECT * FROM gitops_versions WHERE version=?', ('V1R1C0',)):
         exec_sql('INSERT INTO gitops_versions(version,tag,level,summary,status,created_by,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)', ('V1R1C0','V1R1C0','R','MultiUser runtime selector + GitOps + custom LLM priority registry','ready','system',now()))
 
+_ROLE_WHITELIST = {'owner', 'admin', 'user'}
+def token_identity(token: str):
+    """Resolve the server-authoritative identity bound to a token.
+
+    Format of each TOKEN_FILE line (one per line, ':'-separated):
+        <token>                  -> authenticated principal, role 'user'
+        <token>:<user>:<role>    -> mapped principal; role restricted to owner/admin/user
+    Identity NEVER comes from a client-supplied header. In local dev mode the
+    DEV_ALLOW flag maps a fixed dev principal (must be explicitly enabled).
+    """
+    if DEV_ALLOW:
+        return {'username': 'dev-owner', 'role': 'owner'}
+    if not token or not TOKEN_FILE.exists():
+        return None
+    for line in TOKEN_FILE.read_text().splitlines():
+        line = line.strip()
+        if not line:
+            continue
+        parts = [x.strip() for x in line.split(':')]
+        if not parts or parts[0] != token:
+            continue
+        if len(parts) >= 3:
+            role = parts[2] if parts[2] in _ROLE_WHITELIST else 'user'
+            return {'username': safe_name(parts[1]), 'role': role}
+        return {'username': 'user-%s' % token[:8], 'role': 'user'}
+    return None
+
 def valid_token(token: str) -> bool:
     if DEV_ALLOW: return True
-    if not token or not TOKEN_FILE.exists(): return False
-    return token.strip() in [x.strip() for x in TOKEN_FILE.read_text().splitlines() if x.strip()]
+    return token_identity(token) is not None
 def git_cmd(args, check=False):
     WORKSPACE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True); p = subprocess.run(['git'] + args, cwd=str(WORKSPACE), text=True, capture_output=True)
     if check and p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or 'git command failed')
@@ -88,8 +116,10 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     server_version = 'AIOSGitOpsModelAPI/V1R1C0'
     def actor(self):
         auth = self.headers.get('Authorization',''); token = auth.replace('Bearer ', '').strip() if auth.startswith('Bearer ') else self.headers.get('X-AIOS-Token','')
-        ok = valid_token(token); user = self.headers.get('X-AIOS-User') or ('dev-owner' if DEV_ALLOW else 'anonymous'); role = self.headers.get('X-AIOS-Role') or ('owner' if DEV_ALLOW else 'user')
-        return {'username': safe_name(user), 'role': role, 'token_ok': ok}
+        ident = token_identity(token)
+        if ident is None:
+            return {'username': 'anonymous', 'role': 'user', 'token_ok': False}
+        return {'username': ident['username'], 'role': ident['role'], 'token_ok': True}
     def require_write(self, roles=None):
         a = self.actor()
         if not a['token_ok']: self.send_json({'error':'unauthorized','hint':'write APIs require Bearer token or AIOS_GITOPS_DEV_ALLOW=1'}, 401); return None
@@ -218,7 +248,11 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 a = self.require_write(['owner']);
                 if not a: return
                 ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
-                if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): self.send_json({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400); return
+                try:
+                    validate_release_version(ver)
+                except ValueError:
+                    self.send_json({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
+                    return
                 msg=data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'; out=git_cmd(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',msg]);
                 if data.get('push',False): git_cmd(['push','origin',ver])
                 level='V' if re.match(r'^V[1-9]\d*R0C0', ver) else ('R' if re.match(r'^V\d+R[1-9]\d*C0', ver) else 'C'); exec_sql('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO gitops_versions(version,tag,level,summary,status,created_by,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',(ver,ver,level,msg,'ready',a['username'],now())); exec_sql('UPDATE gitops_baseline SET active_version=?,active_tag=?,updated_at=? WHERE id=?',(ver,ver,now(),'current')); audit(a['username'],'git_tag',ver,{'level':level}); self.send_json({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out}); return

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_reconciliation_core.py

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+"""Pure, observation-first decisions for governed GitOps reconciliation."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from enum import Enum
+import re
+from typing import Optional
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+
+
+class ReconciliationAction(str, Enum):
+    NOOP = "NOOP"
+    PUSH_EXACT = "PUSH_EXACT"
+    VERIFY_REMOTE = "VERIFY_REMOTE"
+    MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED = "MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED"
+    MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED = "MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
+    FAIL_CONFLICT = "FAIL_CONFLICT"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RemoteObservation:
+    repository_identity: str
+    branch: str
+    desired_oid: str
+    authority_oid: Optional[str]
+    remote_git_oid: Optional[str]
+    remote_api_oid: Optional[str]
+    commit_visible: bool
+    observed_at: str
+    expected_oid: Optional[str] = None
+
+    @property
+    def all_equal(self) -> bool:
+        values = (self.authority_oid, self.remote_git_oid, self.remote_api_oid, self.desired_oid)
+        return all(isinstance(value, str) for value in values) and len(set(values)) == 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ReconciliationDecision:
+    action: ReconciliationAction
+    state: str
+    reason: str
+    retry_safe: bool = False
+
+
+def _valid_oid(value: Optional[str]) -> bool:
+    return value is None or bool(OID_RE.fullmatch(value))
+
+
+def decide_reconciliation(observation: RemoteObservation) -> ReconciliationDecision:
+    """Decide from a fresh observation; never complete on a missing remote."""
+    if observation.repository_identity != "aios/aios":
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    if not observation.branch.startswith("agent/"):
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+    if not _valid_oid(observation.desired_oid) or not _valid_oid(observation.expected_oid):
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "OID_INVALID")
+    if observation.authority_oid is None:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    if observation.authority_oid != observation.desired_oid:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "AUTHORITY_CONFLICT")
+    present = [oid for oid in (observation.remote_git_oid, observation.remote_api_oid) if oid is not None]
+    if any(oid not in {observation.desired_oid, observation.expected_oid} for oid in present):
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "REMOTE_OID_CONFLICT")
+    if observation.all_equal and observation.commit_visible:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED, "REMOTE_VERIFIED", "ALL_OIDS_EQUAL_AND_VISIBLE")
+    if observation.remote_git_oid is None and observation.remote_api_oid is None:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", "AUTHORITY_DESIRED_REMOTE_MISSING")
+    if observation.remote_git_oid == observation.desired_oid or observation.remote_api_oid == observation.desired_oid:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.VERIFY_REMOTE, "REMOTE_VERIFY_PENDING", "REMOTE_PROOF_PARTIAL")
+    if observation.expected_oid is not None and observation.remote_git_oid == observation.expected_oid and observation.remote_api_oid == observation.expected_oid:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.PUSH_EXACT, "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", "SAFE_EXACT_FAST_FORWARD_RETRY", retry_safe=True)
+    if not observation.commit_visible:
+        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.VERIFY_REMOTE, "COMMIT_VISIBILITY_PENDING", "COMMIT_VISIBILITY_LAG")
+    return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "PARTIAL_REMOTE_OBSERVATION")
+
+
+def reconcile_observation(**kwargs: object) -> ReconciliationDecision:
+    return decide_reconciliation(RemoteObservation(**kwargs))

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_writer_worker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"""Single supervised socket-activated worker for durable GitOps Jobs.
+
+The worker consumes durable requests and reconciliation queries. Repository
+mutation is a separate injected executor and remains impossible while the
+legacy global write gate is false.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import signal
+import socket
+import threading
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, JobState, JobStore, ServiceUnavailable
+
+
+def runtime_policy(environment: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    env = environment or os.environ
+    legacy = env.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+    durable = env.get("AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED", "false").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+    # Legacy direct Git mutation remains disabled. Authorized durable Jobs use
+    # their own campaign/task capability and may mutate only through the
+    # worker's lease/CAS path while the legacy gate stays false.
+    return {"legacy_global_write": legacy, "durable_job_execution": durable, "repository_mutation_allowed": durable}
+
+
+def handle_request(controller: GitOpsJobController, request: Mapping[str, Any], executor: Any | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    job_id = str(request.get("job_id") or "")
+    if not job_id:
+        raise JobError("JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+    if request.get("action") == "execute":
+        if executor is None:
+            raise JobError("JOB_EXECUTOR_UNAVAILABLE")
+        result = executor.execute(job_id, dry_run=bool(request.get("dry_run", False)))
+        receipt = controller.store._receipt(controller.store.read(job_id), duplicate=True)
+        return {"job": result, **receipt.as_dict()}
+    if request.get("action") == "resume":
+        receipt = controller.resume(job_id)
+    else:
+        row = controller.store.read(job_id)
+        receipt = controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True)
+    return receipt.as_dict()
+
+
+def serve_socket(sock: socket.socket, controller: GitOpsJobController, stopping: threading.Event, executor: Any | None = None) -> None:
+    sock.listen(32)
+    sock.settimeout(1.0)
+    while not stopping.is_set():
+        try:
+            connection, _ = sock.accept()
+        except socket.timeout:
+            continue
+        with connection:
+            try:
+                raw = connection.makefile("rb").readline(1_048_576)
+                request = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+                response = {"status": "ok", **handle_request(controller, request, executor)}
+            except ServiceUnavailable as exc:
+                response = {"status": "error", "error": str(exc), "retryable": True, "side_effect_state": "UNKNOWN"}
+            except Exception as exc:
+                response = {"status": "error", "error": type(exc).__name__, "retryable": False}
+            connection.sendall((json.dumps(response, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+
+
+def socket_from_systemd() -> socket.socket:
+    if os.environ.get("LISTEN_FDS") != "1":
+        raise RuntimeError("SOCKET_ACTIVATION_REQUIRED")
+    return socket.fromfd(3, socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--job-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    policy = runtime_policy()
+    if policy["legacy_global_write"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("LEGACY_GLOBAL_WRITES_MUST_REMAIN_FALSE")
+    if not policy["durable_job_execution"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_GATE_CLOSED")
+    controller = GitOpsJobController(JobStore(args.job_root))
+    from aios_gitops_job_executor import build_from_environment
+    executor = build_from_environment(args.job_root)
+    stopping = threading.Event()
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: stopping.set())
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: stopping.set())
+    sock = socket_from_systemd()
+    try:
+        serve_socket(sock, controller, stopping, executor)
+    finally:
+        sock.close()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_local_writer_cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""CLI client for the governed local writer service."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+
+
+def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Send one governed-local-writer request")
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True, help="AF_UNIX socket path")
+    group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    group.add_argument("--request", help="Request JSON string")
+    group.add_argument("--request-file", help="Path to JSON request file")
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def _load_request_text(args: argparse.Namespace) -> str:
+    if args.request is not None:
+        return args.request
+    request_path = os.fspath(args.request_file)
+    with open(request_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as request_file:
+        return request_file.read()
+
+
+def send_request(socket_path: str, request_text: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Open one Unix socket, send one NDJSON request, and parse one NDJSON response."""
+    payload = json.loads(request_text)
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError("request must be a JSON object")
+
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as client:
+        client.connect(socket_path)
+        client.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+        response_chunks: list[str] = []
+        while True:
+            chunk = client.recv(1024 * 1024).decode("utf-8")
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            response_chunks.append(chunk)
+            if "\n" in chunk:
+                break
+        response_text = "".join(response_chunks)
+
+    response_line = response_text.split("\n", 1)[0].strip()
+    if not response_line:
+        raise RuntimeError("empty response")
+    response = json.loads(response_line)
+    if not isinstance(response, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("invalid response")
+    return response
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    args = _parse_args()
+    request_text = _load_request_text(args)
+    response = send_request(args.socket, request_text)
+    print(json.dumps(response, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        main()
+    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - CLI entrypoint behavior
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "error", "error": str(exc)}), file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(1)

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_local_writer_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,931 @@
+"""Unix-socket service for governed local writer operations."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import hashlib
+import argparse
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import re
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from governed_local_writer import (
+    AppendCommitRequest,
+    AuthorizationError,
+    BranchPolicy,
+    CreateBranchRequest,
+    GovernedAuthorization,
+    PeerIdentity,
+    PRINCIPAL,
+    TASK_ID,
+    extract_peer_identity,
+    contains_secret_like_content,
+    load_authorization_file,
+    validate_file_changes,
+)
+
+
+class ExistingGitOpsHandler:
+    """Delegate repository mutations to the installed GitOps handler seam."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        workspace_by_branch: Mapping[str, str | os.PathLike[str]],
+        bare_repo: str | os.PathLike[str],
+        api_source: str | os.PathLike[str],
+    ) -> None:
+        self.workspace_by_branch = {str(k): Path(v) for k, v in workspace_by_branch.items()}
+        self.bare_repo = Path(bare_repo)
+        self.api_source = Path(api_source)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _restore_env(previous: Mapping[str, str | None]) -> None:
+        for key, value in previous.items():
+            if value is None:
+                os.environ.pop(key, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[key] = value
+
+    def _load_api(self, workspace: Path):
+        if not self.api_source.is_file() or self.api_source.is_symlink():
+            raise RuntimeError("installed GitOps handler source is unavailable")
+        keys = (
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED",
+            "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1",
+        )
+        previous = {key: os.environ.get(key) for key in keys}
+        os.environ.update(
+            {
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE": str(workspace),
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO": str(self.bare_repo),
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED": "true",
+                "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "2",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "safe.directory",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": str(workspace),
+                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1": "safe.directory",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1": str(self.bare_repo),
+            }
+        )
+        module_name = f"_governed_gitops_api_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+        try:
+            spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, self.api_source)
+            if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("unable to load installed GitOps handler")
+            module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+            sys.modules[module_name] = module
+            spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+            decision = module.evaluate_git_write(module.WS)
+            if not decision.allowed:
+                raise RuntimeError("existing GitOps write gate denied bootstrap")
+            return module, previous, module_name
+        except Exception:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+            raise
+
+    def _workspace(self, branch: str) -> Path:
+        workspace = self.workspace_by_branch.get(branch)
+        if workspace is None or not workspace.is_dir():
+            raise RuntimeError("branch workspace is not authorized")
+        return workspace
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _git(workspace: Path, args: list[str]) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False
+        )
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("governed handler git probe failed")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
+        # A prior handler call may have completed the fast-forward sync before
+        # the process observed a post-commit error. Reconcile only an exact,
+        # metadata-only result; never overwrite or move an existing ref here.
+        try:
+            existing = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                [
+                    "--git-dir",
+                    str(self.bare_repo),
+                    "rev-parse",
+                    f"refs/heads/{request.branch}",
+                ],
+            )
+        except RuntimeError:
+            existing = ""
+        if existing:
+            parent = self._git(workspace, ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"{existing}^1"])
+            changed = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                [
+                    "--git-dir",
+                    str(self.bare_repo),
+                    "diff-tree",
+                    "--no-commit-id",
+                    "--name-only",
+                    "-r",
+                    existing,
+                ],
+            ).splitlines()
+            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
+            if parent != request.base_oid or changed != [f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"]:
+                raise RuntimeError("existing branch is not an exact metadata-only bootstrap")
+            return {"head_oid": existing, "parent_oid": parent, "handler_status": "reconciled"}
+        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
+        phase = "loaded"
+        try:
+            phase = "verify_base"
+            parent = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"],
+            )
+            if parent != request.base_oid:
+                raise RuntimeError("authorized base OID drift")
+            phase = "checkout"
+            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.base_oid, create=True)
+            phase = "write_metadata"
+            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
+            metadata_path = f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"
+            module.write_json(
+                metadata_path,
+                {
+                    "schema": "aios.governed-local-writer-bootstrap.v1",
+                    "task_id": TASK_ID,
+                    "principal": PRINCIPAL,
+                    "branch": request.branch,
+                    "parent_oid": request.base_oid,
+                    "authorization_sha256": request.authorization_digest,
+                },
+            )
+            phase = "commit_and_sync"
+            result = module.commit(
+                [metadata_path], "chore(governance): bootstrap repair lease branch"
+            )
+            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+            if first_parent != request.base_oid or (request.head_oid and head_oid != request.head_oid):
+                raise RuntimeError("bootstrap branch lineage check failed")
+            return {
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+                "parent_oid": first_parent,
+                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
+            }
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
+        finally:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+
+    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
+        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
+        phase = "loaded"
+        try:
+            phase = "verify_head"
+            current = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            if current != request.expected_head_oid:
+                raise RuntimeError("branch head advanced or is stale")
+            phase = "checkout"
+            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.expected_head_oid, create=False)
+            phase = "write_files"
+            paths: list[str] = []
+            for change in request.changes:
+                paths.append(module.write_file(change.path, change.content))
+            phase = "commit_and_sync"
+            result = module.commit(paths, request.commit_message)
+            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+            if first_parent != request.expected_head_oid or head_oid == first_parent:
+                raise RuntimeError("append commit lineage check failed")
+            return {
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+                "parent_oid": first_parent,
+                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
+            }
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
+        finally:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+
+
+class GovernedWriterHandler(Protocol):
+    """Small adapter interface for real writer backend handlers."""
+
+    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        """Create a branch using internal repo services."""
+
+    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        """Append a commit using internal repo services."""
+
+
+class AuditSink(Protocol):
+    """Pluggable sink for sanitized audit records."""
+
+    def append(self, record: "AuditRecord") -> None:
+        """Persist one audit record."""
+
+
+@dataclass
+class AuditRecord:
+    """Sanitized audit log entry."""
+
+    authorization_digest: str
+    peer_pid: int
+    peer_uid: int
+    peer_gid: int
+    peer_executable: str | None
+    timestamp: datetime
+    operation: str
+    branch: str
+    result: str
+
+
+class InMemoryAuditSink:
+    """Simple in-memory audit log used by tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.records: list[AuditRecord] = []
+
+    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
+        self.records.append(record)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _AuthorizationState:
+    """Tracks one-shot operation consumption."""
+
+    create_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    append_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    consumed: bool = False
+
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterService:
+    """Policy-aware AF_UNIX service that calls an injected handler."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        socket_path: str | os.PathLike[str],
+        authorization: GovernedAuthorization,
+        handler: GovernedWriterHandler,
+        *,
+        audit_sink: AuditSink | None = None,
+        peer_identity_fn: Callable[[socket.socket], PeerIdentity] | None = None,
+        state_path: str | os.PathLike[str] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path)
+        self.authorization = authorization
+        self.handler = handler
+        self.peer_identity_fn = peer_identity_fn or extract_peer_identity
+        self.state = _AuthorizationState()
+        self.audit_sink = audit_sink or InMemoryAuditSink()
+        self.state_path = Path(state_path) if state_path is not None else None
+        self._load_state()
+
+    def _load_state(self) -> None:
+        """Restore one-shot state without restoring request or secret material."""
+        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
+            return
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+                raise ValueError("state must be an object")
+            if raw.get("authorization_sha256") != self.authorization.authorization_sha256:
+                raise ValueError("state authorization digest mismatch")
+            self.state.create_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("create_done", [])}
+            self.state.append_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("append_done", [])}
+            self.state.consumed = bool(raw.get("consumed", False))
+        except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid") from exc
+
+    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_path is None:
+            return
+        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
+            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
+            "consumed": self.state.consumed,
+        }
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
+            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+
+    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> None:
+        self.audit_sink.append(
+            AuditRecord(
+                authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                peer_pid=peer.pid,
+                peer_uid=peer.uid,
+                peer_gid=peer.gid,
+                peer_executable=peer.executable,
+                timestamp=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc),
+                operation=operation,
+                branch=branch,
+                result=result,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def _require_request_field(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], field_name: str) -> str:
+        value = request.get(field_name)
+        if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+            raise AuthorizationError(f"{field_name} must be a non-empty string")
+        return value
+
+    def _branch_policy(self, branch: str) -> BranchPolicy:
+        policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
+        if policy is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch is not authorized")
+        return policy
+
+    def _ensure_not_consumed(self) -> None:
+        if self.state.consumed:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization consumed")
+        if datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) >= self.authorization.expires_at:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization expired")
+
+    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
+        if op == "create_branch":
+            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
+        elif op == "append_commit":
+            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
+
+        if self.state.create_done.issuperset(self.authorization.create_branches) and self.state.append_done.issuperset(
+            self.authorization.append_branches
+        ):
+            self.state.consumed = True
+        self._persist_state()
+
+    def _validate_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = self._require_request_field(request, "task_id")
+        if task_id != TASK_ID:
+            raise AuthorizationError("invalid task_id")
+
+        principal = self._require_request_field(request, "principal")
+        if principal != PRINCIPAL:
+            raise AuthorizationError("invalid principal")
+
+        operation = self._require_request_field(request, "op")
+        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit"}:
+            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
+        if operation in self.authorization.denied_operations:
+            raise AuthorizationError("operation denied by policy")
+
+        branch = self._require_request_field(request, "branch")
+        self._ensure_not_consumed()
+        policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
+
+        if operation == "create_branch":
+            if policy.create_branch is None:
+                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow create_branch")
+            if branch in self.state.create_done:
+                raise AuthorizationError("create_branch already used for this branch")
+
+            base_oid = self._require_request_field(request, "base_oid")
+            raw_head_oid = request.get("head_oid")
+            if raw_head_oid is not None and (not isinstance(raw_head_oid, str) or not raw_head_oid):
+                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid must be a non-empty string when supplied")
+            head_oid = str(raw_head_oid) if raw_head_oid is not None else None
+            if base_oid != policy.create_branch.base_oid:
+                raise AuthorizationError("base_oid mismatch")
+            if policy.create_branch.head_oid is not None and head_oid != policy.create_branch.head_oid:
+                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid mismatch")
+
+            return {
+                "operation": operation,
+                "branch": branch,
+                "base_oid": base_oid,
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+            }
+
+        if policy.append_commit is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow append_commit")
+        if policy.create_branch is not None and branch not in self.state.create_done:
+            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit requires prior successful create_branch")
+        if branch in self.state.append_done:
+            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit already used for this branch")
+
+        expected_head = policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
+        if "expected_head_oid" in request:
+            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "expected_head_oid")
+        elif "current_head_oid" in request:
+            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "current_head_oid")
+        else:
+            raise AuthorizationError("expected_head_oid or current_head_oid required")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", supplied_head):
+            raise AuthorizationError("head check must be a full commit OID")
+        if expected_head is not None and supplied_head != expected_head:
+            raise AuthorizationError("head check failed")
+
+        if request.get("force") is True or request.get("non_fast_forward") is True:
+            raise AuthorizationError("non-fast-forward operations are not allowed")
+        if request.get("history_rewrite") is True:
+            raise AuthorizationError("history rewrite is not allowed")
+        parent_oids = request.get("parent_oids")
+        if parent_oids is not None:
+            if not isinstance(parent_oids, list) or parent_oids != [supplied_head]:
+                raise AuthorizationError("parent_oids must contain exactly expected_head_oid")
+
+        changes = request.get("changes")
+        if not isinstance(changes, list):
+            raise AuthorizationError("changes must be a list")
+        validated_changes = validate_file_changes(changes, policy.append_commit.allowed_paths)
+        commit_message = request.get("commit_message", "chore(governance): append governed commit")
+        if not isinstance(commit_message, str) or not commit_message.strip() or len(commit_message) > 200:
+            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message must be a short non-empty string")
+        if "\n" in commit_message or "\r" in commit_message or contains_secret_like_content(commit_message):
+            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message failed policy")
+
+        return {
+            "operation": operation,
+            "branch": branch,
+            "expected_head_oid": supplied_head,
+            "changes": validated_changes,
+            "commit_message": commit_message.strip(),
+        }
+
+    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        """Run one request through policy checks and handler adapter."""
+        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
+        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
+        try:
+            details = self._validate_request(raw_request)
+            operation = str(details["operation"])
+            branch = str(details["branch"])
+
+            if operation == "create_branch":
+                self.handler.create_branch(
+                    CreateBranchRequest(
+                        branch=branch,
+                        base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]),
+                        head_oid=(
+                            str(details["head_oid"])
+                            if details.get("head_oid") is not None
+                            else None
+                        ),
+                        authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                    )
+                )
+                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
+                self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+                return {
+                    "status": "ok",
+                    "operation": operation,
+                    "branch": branch,
+                    "result": "applied",
+                }
+
+            self.handler.append_commit(
+                AppendCommitRequest(
+                    branch=branch,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]),
+                    changes=tuple(details["changes"]),
+                    authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                    commit_message=str(details["commit_message"]),
+                )
+            )
+            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+            return {
+                "status": "ok",
+                "operation": operation,
+                "branch": branch,
+                "result": "applied",
+            }
+        except Exception as error:
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation or "unknown", branch, f"error:{error.__class__.__name__}")
+            if isinstance(error, PermissionError):
+                code = "permission_denied"
+            elif isinstance(error, AuthorizationError):
+                code = "request_denied"
+            else:
+                code = "handler_failed"
+            if code == "handler_failed" and str(error).startswith("handler_phase="):
+                code = str(error)
+            return {
+                "status": "error",
+                "operation": operation or "unknown",
+                "branch": branch,
+                "error": code,
+            }
+
+    def _write_json(self, connection: socket.socket, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        connection.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _handle_client(self, connection: socket.socket) -> None:
+        with connection:
+            try:
+                peer = self.peer_identity_fn(connection)
+            except Exception:
+                self._write_json(
+                    connection,
+                    {
+                        "status": "error",
+                        "operation": "connection",
+                        "branch": "",
+                        "error": "peer identity validation failed",
+                    },
+                )
+                return
+
+            with connection.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                for raw_line in stream:
+                    line = raw_line.strip()
+                    if not line:
+                        continue
+                    try:
+                        request = json.loads(line)
+                    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                        self._write_json(
+                            connection,
+                            {
+                                "status": "error",
+                                "operation": "request",
+                                "branch": "",
+                                "error": "invalid json",
+                            },
+                        )
+                        continue
+                    if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+                        self._write_json(
+                            connection,
+                            {
+                                "status": "error",
+                                "operation": "request",
+                                "branch": "",
+                                "error": "request must be a JSON object",
+                            },
+                        )
+                        continue
+                    self._write_json(connection, self.process_request(request, peer))
+
+    def _bind_socket(self) -> socket.socket:
+        if self.socket_path.exists():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket already exists")
+        parent = self.socket_path.parent
+        if not parent.is_dir():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent is missing")
+        if parent.is_symlink():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent must not be a symlink")
+        server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        server.bind(str(self.socket_path))
+        os.chmod(self.socket_path, 0o600)
+        server.listen(16)
+        return server
+
+    def serve(self) -> None:
+        """Serve newline-delimited JSON over a filesystem AF_UNIX socket."""
+        server = self._bind_socket()
+        try:
+            while True:
+                connection, _ = server.accept()
+                self._handle_client(connection)
+        finally:
+            server.close()
+            if self.socket_path.exists():
+                self.socket_path.unlink()
+
+
+class JsonAuditSink:
+    """Append-only root-owned audit sink containing no request payloads."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": record.authorization_digest,
+            "peer_pid": record.peer_pid,
+            "peer_uid": record.peer_uid,
+            "peer_gid": record.peer_gid,
+            "peer_executable": record.peer_executable,
+            "timestamp": record.timestamp.isoformat(),
+            "operation": record.operation,
+            "branch": record.branch,
+            "result": record.result,
+        }
+        line = (json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+        fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            os.write(fd, line)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+
+
+
+# V2R1C6 durable receipt overlay.  This subclasses the original root-only
+# writer in-place so the existing AF_UNIX/SO_PEERCRED and handler policy remain
+# the only mutation path.
+_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService = GovernedLocalWriterService
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterService(_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService):
+    """Existing writer with durable request receipts and safe recovery."""
+
+    def _load_state(self) -> None:
+        super()._load_state()
+        self.state.receipts = {}
+        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
+            return
+        raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid")
+        receipts = raw.get("receipts", {})
+        if not isinstance(receipts, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization receipts are invalid")
+        self.state.receipts = {
+            str(key): dict(value)
+            for key, value in receipts.items()
+            if isinstance(value, dict)
+        }
+
+    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_path is None:
+            return
+        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
+            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
+            "consumed": bool(self.state.consumed),
+            "receipts": self.state.receipts,
+        }
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
+            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+
+    def _request_identity(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
+        canonical = json.dumps(dict(request), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True)
+        fallback = hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        request_id = request.get("request_id")
+        idempotency_key = request.get("idempotency_key")
+        request_id = request_id.strip() if isinstance(request_id, str) and request_id.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
+        idempotency_key = idempotency_key.strip() if isinstance(idempotency_key, str) and idempotency_key.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
+        for field_name, value in (("request_id", request_id), ("idempotency_key", idempotency_key)):
+            if len(value) > 200 or "\n" in value or "\r" in value:
+                raise AuthorizationError(field_name + " is invalid")
+        return {
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
+            "request_fingerprint": fallback,
+        }
+
+    def _find_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any], compare_fingerprint: bool = True):
+        request_id = str(details["request_id"])
+        idempotency_key = str(details["idempotency_key"])
+        fingerprint = str(details.get("request_fingerprint", ""))
+        for receipt in self.state.receipts.values():
+            if receipt.get("request_id") == request_id or receipt.get("idempotency_key") == idempotency_key:
+                if compare_fingerprint and receipt.get("request_fingerprint") != fingerprint:
+                    raise AuthorizationError("idempotency key reused with different request")
+                return receipt
+        return None
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _receipt_response(receipt: Mapping[str, object], status: str = "receipt") -> dict[str, object]:
+        response = {
+            "status": status,
+            "request_id": receipt.get("request_id"),
+            "idempotency_key": receipt.get("idempotency_key"),
+            "operation": receipt.get("operation"),
+            "branch": receipt.get("branch", ""),
+            "receipt_status": receipt.get("status"),
+        }
+        for field_name in ("commit_oid", "final_head", "parent_oid", "audit_sha256", "error_code", "safe_to_retry"):
+            if field_name in receipt:
+                response[field_name] = receipt[field_name]
+        return response
+
+    def _new_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "request_id": str(details["request_id"]),
+            "idempotency_key": str(details["idempotency_key"]),
+            "request_fingerprint": str(details["request_fingerprint"]),
+            "operation": str(details["operation"]),
+            "branch": str(details.get("branch", "")),
+            "expected_head_oid": str(details.get("expected_head_oid", "")),
+            "status": "accepted",
+            "created_at": datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "safe_to_retry": False,
+        }
+
+    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> str:
+        super()._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, result)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "peer_pid": peer.pid,
+            "peer_uid": peer.uid,
+            "peer_gid": peer.gid,
+            "peer_executable": peer.executable,
+            "operation": operation,
+            "branch": branch,
+            "result": result,
+        }
+        return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
+        if op == "create_branch":
+            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
+        elif op in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
+        # The provisioning grant is one-shot; the task writer lease itself must
+        # support multiple append receipts for the exact authorized branches.
+        self.state.consumed = False
+        self._persist_state()
+
+    def _validate_durable(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        operation = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "op")
+        identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
+        if operation == "query_receipt":
+            return {"operation": operation, **identity}
+        if operation == "recover_request":
+            branch = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "branch")
+            policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
+            if policy.append_commit is None:
+                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow recovery")
+            expected = raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
+            if not isinstance(expected, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", expected):
+                raise AuthorizationError("recovery requires expected_head_oid")
+            return {"operation": operation, "branch": branch, "expected_head_oid": expected.lower(), **identity}
+        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
+        request = dict(raw_request)
+        if operation in {"append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            request["op"] = "append_commit"
+        if operation in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            self.state.consumed = False
+        branch = request.get("branch")
+        removed = False
+        dynamic_expected = False
+        if isinstance(branch, str) and branch in self.state.append_done:
+            self.state.append_done.remove(branch)
+            removed = True
+            policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
+            if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None and policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid is not None:
+                from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
+                self.authorization.branch_operations[branch] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=None, allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
+                dynamic_expected = True
+        try:
+            details = super()._validate_request(request)
+        finally:
+            if dynamic_expected:
+                policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(str(branch))
+                if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None:
+                    from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
+                    self.authorization.branch_operations[str(branch)] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=str(branch), expected_head_oid=str(raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or ""), allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
+            if removed:
+                self.state.append_done.add(str(branch))
+        details.update(identity)
+        details["operation"] = operation
+        return details
+
+    def _recover_backend(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        if not hasattr(self.handler, "_workspace") or not hasattr(self.handler, "_git"):
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery backend unavailable")
+        workspace = self.handler._workspace(str(details["branch"]))
+        expected = str(details["expected_head_oid"])
+        current = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+        if current == expected:
+            return {"status": "not_started", "final_head": current}
+        parent = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+        if parent != expected:
+            raise RuntimeError("external branch advance during recovery")
+        return {"status": "applied", "commit_oid": current, "final_head": current, "parent_oid": parent}
+
+    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
+        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
+        try:
+            details = self._validate_durable(raw_request)
+            operation = str(details["operation"])
+            branch = str(details.get("branch", ""))
+            if operation == "query_receipt":
+                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt) if receipt is not None else {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"]}
+            if operation == "recover_request":
+                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
+                if receipt is None:
+                    return {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"], "safe_to_retry": True}
+                if receipt.get("status") == "applied":
+                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+                recovered = self._recover_backend(details)
+                if recovered.get("status") == "applied":
+                    receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": recovered.get("commit_oid"), "final_head": recovered.get("final_head"), "parent_oid": recovered.get("parent_oid"), "safe_to_retry": False})
+                    self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+                receipt["safe_to_retry"] = True
+                self._persist_state()
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+            receipt = self._find_receipt(details)
+            if receipt is not None:
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+            receipt = self._new_receipt(details)
+            self.state.receipts[str(details["request_id"])] = receipt
+            self._persist_state()
+            if operation == "create_branch":
+                result = self.handler.create_branch(CreateBranchRequest(branch=branch, base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]), head_oid=str(details["head_oid"]) if details.get("head_oid") is not None else None, authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256))
+                commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
+                parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
+                audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+                receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
+                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
+            result = self.handler.append_commit(AppendCommitRequest(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]), changes=tuple(details["changes"]), authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256, commit_message=str(details["commit_message"])))
+            commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
+            parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
+            audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+            receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
+            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+            return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
+        except Exception as error:
+            try:
+                identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
+                receipt = self.state.receipts.get(identity["request_id"])
+                if receipt is not None and receipt.get("status") == "accepted":
+                    receipt.update({"status": "failed", "error_code": error.__class__.__name__, "safe_to_retry": False})
+                    self._persist_state()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "error:" + error.__class__.__name__)
+            return {"status": "error", "operation": operation, "branch": branch, "error": "request_denied" if isinstance(error, AuthorizationError) else "handler_failed"}
+
+def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS governed local writer")
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--authorization", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--state", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--audit", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--repair-branch", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--repair-workspace", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--candidate-branch", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--candidate-workspace", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--api-source", required=True)
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
+        print("governed local writer requires uid 0", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    args = _parse_args()
+    authorization = load_authorization_file(args.authorization)
+    handler = ExistingGitOpsHandler(
+        workspace_by_branch={
+            args.repair_branch: args.repair_workspace,
+            args.candidate_branch: args.candidate_workspace,
+        },
+        bare_repo=args.bare_repo,
+        api_source=args.api_source,
+    )
+    service = GovernedLocalWriterService(
+        args.socket,
+        authorization,
+        handler,
+        audit_sink=JsonAuditSink(args.audit),
+        state_path=args.state,
+    )
+    service.serve()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - systemd entrypoint
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+"""Central fail-closed policy seam for governed task and continuation requests."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import re
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedPolicyInput:
+    identity: str
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    operation: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+    risk: str = "engineering"
+    requested_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    previous_generation: int | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class PolicyDecision:
+    decision: str
+    reason: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {"decision": self.decision, "reason": self.reason}
+
+
+def evaluate_policy(value: GovernedPolicyInput | Mapping[str, Any]) -> PolicyDecision:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        value = GovernedPolicyInput(**value)
+    if value.repository != "aios/aios":
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(value.base_oid) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value.expected_branch_oid):
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "OID_INVALID")
+    if not value.target_branch.startswith("agent/") or value.target_branch in {"main", "master"}:
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+    if "force_push" in value.requested_capabilities or "force" in value.operation.lower():
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "FORCE_PUSH_DENIED")
+    if {"main_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "production_write", "production_deploy", "tag_mutation", "baseline_mutation"}.intersection(value.requested_capabilities):
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "MUTATION_SCOPE_DENIED")
+    if not isinstance(value.generation, int) or isinstance(value.generation, bool) or value.generation < 1:
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "GENERATION_INVALID")
+    if value.previous_generation is not None and value.generation <= value.previous_generation:
+        return PolicyDecision("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", "GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
+    if not value.task_id:
+        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return PolicyDecision("ALLOW", "GOVERNED_ENGINEERING_SCOPE")
+
+
+class GovernedPolicy:
+    def decide(self, request: GovernedPolicyInput | Mapping[str, Any]) -> PolicyDecision:
+        return evaluate_policy(request)

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_task_bootstrap.py

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+"""Durable governed task binding for CREATE_NEW and CONTINUE_EXISTING."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import stat
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobStore
+from aios_gitops_job_identity import legacy_task_storage_key, task_storage_key
+from aios_online_agent_execution import GovernedExecutionBinding, project_execution_envelope
+
+try:  # pragma: no cover - exercised on the Linux activation host
+    import fcntl
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - non-POSIX execution stays fail closed
+    fcntl = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+
+
+class BootstrapError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _lexists(path: Path) -> bool:
+    try:
+        path.lstat()
+        return True
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return False
+
+
+def _require_runtime_directory(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        metadata = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_PARENT_INVALID") from exc
+    expected_uid = getattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: metadata.st_uid)()
+    if (
+        stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode)
+        or not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode)
+        or metadata.st_mode & 0o022
+        or metadata.st_uid != expected_uid
+    ):
+        raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_PARENT_INVALID")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedTaskBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    risk: str
+    description: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    job_id: str | None = None
+
+    def response(self, *, idempotent: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "base_oid": self.base_oid, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid, "generation": self.generation, "branch_mode": self.branch_mode, "create_target_branch": self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW", "worktree_mode": "detached_at_base_oid" if self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" else "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True, "idempotent": idempotent, "state": "BOUND", "job_id": self.job_id}
+
+
+
+# ===== AIOS Formal Lineage producer-native reservation v12 =====
+import re as _fl_re
+
+_FL_PRODUCER_KEY = _fl_re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+def _formal_lineage_reservation_receipt(
+    value,
+    *,
+    request_idempotency_key: str,
+    expected_side_effect_state: str,
+):
+    if callable(getattr(value, "as_dict", None)):
+        raw=value.as_dict()
+    elif isinstance(value, dict):
+        raw=dict(value)
+    else:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_TYPE_INVALID")
+
+    producer_key=raw.get("idempotency_key")
+    job_id=raw.get("job_id")
+    if not isinstance(job_id,str) or not job_id:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_JOB_ID_INVALID")
+    if raw.get("state")!="REQUESTED":
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_STATE_INVALID")
+    if raw.get("side_effect_state")!=expected_side_effect_state:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_SIDE_EFFECT_STATE_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(producer_key,str) or not _FL_PRODUCER_KEY.fullmatch(producer_key):
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_PRODUCER_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+    if job_id!="job-"+producer_key[:32]:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_SUBMIT_RECEIPT_JOB_PRODUCER_KEY_CONFLICT")
+    if not isinstance(request_idempotency_key,str) or not request_idempotency_key:
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_REQUEST_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+
+    return {
+        "job_id":job_id,
+        "state":"REQUESTED",
+        "side_effect_state":raw["side_effect_state"],
+        "producer_idempotency_key":producer_key,
+        "request_idempotency_key":request_idempotency_key,
+    }
+
+def _formal_lineage_attach_receipt(response, receipt):
+    if not isinstance(response, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_BINDING_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+    if response.get("state")!="BOUND":
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_BINDING_STATE_INVALID")
+    if response.get("job_id")!=receipt.get("job_id"):
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNED_TASK_BINDING_RECEIPT_JOB_CONFLICT")
+    result=dict(response)
+    result["reservation_receipt"]=dict(receipt)
+    return result
+
+class GovernedTaskBootstrap:
+    def __init__(self, authority: Any, root: Path, *, remote_name: str, token_path: Path, ssh_key_path: Path, api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1") -> None:
+        self.authority = authority; self.root = Path(root); self.remote_name = remote_name; self.token_path = Path(token_path); self.ssh_key_path = Path(ssh_key_path); self.api_base = api_base; self.task_meta_root = self.root / "task-bindings"; self.job_root = self.root / "jobs"; self.lock_root = self.root / "task-binding-locks"; self.task_meta_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700); self.job_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700); self.lock_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700); _require_runtime_directory(self.task_meta_root); _require_runtime_directory(self.job_root); _require_runtime_directory(self.lock_root)
+
+    def _store(self, task_id: str) -> tuple[JobStore, GitOpsJobController]:
+        root = self.job_root / task_storage_key(task_id)
+        legacy = self.job_root / legacy_task_storage_key(task_id)
+        if legacy != root and _lexists(legacy):
+            if _lexists(root):
+                raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_LEGACY_CONFLICT")
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_STORAGE_LEGACY_MIGRATION_REQUIRED")
+        store = JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads")
+        return store, GitOpsJobController(store)
+
+    def _metadata(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.task_meta_root / (task_storage_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    def _legacy_metadata(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.task_meta_root / (legacy_task_storage_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    def _read_existing(self, task_id: str) -> GovernedTaskBinding | None:
+        path = self._metadata(task_id)
+        legacy = self._legacy_metadata(task_id)
+        if legacy != path and _lexists(legacy):
+            if _lexists(path):
+                raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LEGACY_CONFLICT")
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LEGACY_MIGRATION_REQUIRED")
+        if not _lexists(path):
+            return None
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_PATH_INVALID")
+
+        binding = GovernedTaskBinding(**json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
+        if binding.task_id != task_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_IDENTITY_CONFLICT")
+        return binding
+    def get_binding(self, task_id: str) -> GovernedTaskBinding:
+        """Read the exact durable binding; never synthesize missing lineage."""
+        binding = self._read_existing(str(task_id))
+        if binding is None or not binding.job_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        return binding
+
+    def execution_binding(self, binding: GovernedTaskBinding) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+        return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+            {
+                "task_id": binding.task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "repository": binding.repository,
+                "base_oid": binding.base_oid,
+                "expected_branch_oid": binding.expected_branch_oid,
+                "target_branch": binding.target_branch,
+                "branch_mode": binding.branch_mode,
+                "generation": binding.generation,
+                "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+            }
+        )
+
+    def execution_envelope(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        *,
+        required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+        expected_job_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        binding = self.get_binding(task_id)
+        if expected_job_id and binding.job_id != expected_job_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        return project_execution_envelope(
+            self.execution_binding(binding),
+            execution_request,
+            required_capabilities=required_capabilities,
+        )
+
+    def _write(self, binding: GovernedTaskBinding) -> None:
+        path = self._metadata(binding.task_id)
+        descriptor, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix=".task-binding-", dir=self.task_meta_root,
+        )
+        temporary = Path(temporary_name)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as stream:
+                stream.write(json.dumps(asdict(binding), sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, path)
+            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+            parent = os.open(self.task_meta_root, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+            try:
+                os.fsync(parent)
+            finally:
+                os.close(parent)
+        except BaseException:
+            temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            raise
+
+    def _task_lock(self, task_id: str) -> int:
+        if fcntl is None:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LOCK_UNAVAILABLE")
+        path = self.lock_root / (task_storage_key(task_id) + ".lock")
+        descriptor = os.open(
+            path,
+            os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0),
+            0o600,
+        )
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        expected_uid = getattr(os, "geteuid", lambda: metadata.st_uid)()
+        if (
+            not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode)
+            or metadata.st_nlink != 1
+            or metadata.st_uid != expected_uid
+        ):
+            os.close(descriptor)
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_LOCK_INVALID")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        try:
+            fcntl.flock(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            os.close(descriptor)
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_BUSY") from exc
+        return descriptor
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _unlock_task(descriptor: int) -> None:
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+        os.close(descriptor)
+
+    def create(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        values = {key: str(request[key]) for key in ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key")}
+        if values["repository"] != "aios/aios" or not OID_RE.fullmatch(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(values["target_branch"]): raise BootstrapError("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+        descriptor = self._task_lock(values["task_id"])
+        try:
+            existing = self._read_existing(values["task_id"])
+            if existing is not None:
+                if any(getattr(existing, key) != values[key] for key in ("repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key")): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+                expected = str(request.get('expected_branch_oid') or values['base_oid'])
+                payload = json.dumps(values, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()
+                _, controller = self._store(values['task_id'])
+                _fl_submit_receipt = controller.submit({'idempotency_key': values['idempotency_key'], 'campaign_id': values['task_id'], 'task_id': values['task_id'], 'repository': values['repository'], 'operation': 'GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE', 'branch': values['target_branch'], 'expected_branch_oid': expected, 'payload_digest': hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(), 'lineage_anchor_oid': values['base_oid']}, payload=payload)
+                _fl_receipt = _formal_lineage_reservation_receipt(
+                    _fl_submit_receipt, request_idempotency_key=request["idempotency_key"],
+                    expected_side_effect_state='SAME_JOB'
+                )
+                _fl_response = existing.response(idempotent=True)
+                return _formal_lineage_attach_receipt(_fl_response,_fl_receipt)
+            if not self.authority.commit_exists(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
+            current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + values["target_branch"])
+            expected = str(request.get("expected_branch_oid") or values["base_oid"])
+            if current is None:
+                mode, generation = "CREATE_NEW", 1
+                if expected != values["base_oid"]: raise BootstrapError("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+            else:
+                if expected != current: raise BootstrapError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT")
+                mode, generation = "CONTINUE_EXISTING", int(request.get("generation", 2))
+                if generation < 1: raise BootstrapError("GENERATION_INVALID")
+            payload = json.dumps(values, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+            _, controller = self._store(values["task_id"])
+            expected_job_id = controller.internal_job_id_for_idempotency_key(values["idempotency_key"])
+            with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+                bootstrap_jobs = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT job_id FROM jobs WHERE operation='GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE' ORDER BY job_id"
+                ).fetchall()
+            if bootstrap_jobs and [str(row[0]) for row in bootstrap_jobs] != [expected_job_id]:
+                raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_RECOVERY_CONFLICT")
+            receipt = controller.submit({"idempotency_key": values["idempotency_key"], "campaign_id": values["task_id"], "task_id": values["task_id"], "repository": values["repository"], "operation": "GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE", "branch": values["target_branch"], "expected_branch_oid": expected, "payload_digest": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(), "lineage_anchor_oid": values["base_oid"]}, payload=payload)
+            binding = GovernedTaskBinding(**values, expected_branch_oid=expected, branch_mode=mode, generation=generation, job_id=receipt.job_id)
+            self._write(binding)
+            _fl_receipt = _formal_lineage_reservation_receipt(
+                receipt, request_idempotency_key=request["idempotency_key"],
+                expected_side_effect_state="QUEUED"
+            )
+            _fl_response = binding.response()
+            return _formal_lineage_attach_receipt(_fl_response,_fl_receipt)
+        finally:
+            self._unlock_task(descriptor)

active-runtime/app/aios_legacy_attachment_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,890 @@
+"""Read-only four-authority evidence provider for one canonical C04 attachment.
+
+This module never creates, claims, resumes, reconciles, or mutates a Task or
+Job.  The expired Owner epoch is verified as historical provenance only.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from app.aios_gitops_job_identity import legacy_task_storage_key, task_storage_key
+from app.aios_single_host_authority import (
+    DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID,
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier,
+    SignerRegistry,
+)
+from app.task_plane.legacy_attachment import (
+    ATTACH_EVIDENCE_SCHEMA,
+    AuthorityReadbackRef,
+    SOURCE_KIND,
+    VerifiedLegacyAttachmentEvidence,
+)
+
+
+class LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed readback error."""
+
+
+def _fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(code)
+
+
+def _strict_object(pairs: list[tuple[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    value: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for key, item in pairs:
+        if key in value:
+            _fail("DUPLICATE_JSON_FIELD")
+        value[key] = item
+    return value
+
+
+def _json_object(raw: bytes | str, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        if isinstance(raw, bytes):
+            raw = raw.decode("utf-8")
+        value = json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=_strict_object)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(code) from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return json.dumps(
+            value,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+            allow_nan=False,
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("AUTHORITY_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _hex(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, str)
+        or len(value) != 64
+        or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value)
+    ):
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _text(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value != value.strip():
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _integer(value: object, code: str) -> int:
+    if type(value) is not int or value < 0:
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _iso(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    text = _text(value, code)
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(code) from exc
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None or parsed.utcoffset() is None:
+        _fail(code)
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _observed(clock: Callable[[], float]) -> str:
+    return datetime.fromtimestamp(float(clock()), timezone.utc).isoformat().replace(
+        "+00:00", "Z"
+    )
+
+
+def _mapping(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _fail(code)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _secure_file(
+    path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool, writable_authority: bool = False
+) -> os.stat_result:
+    try:
+        info = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("AUTHORITY_FILE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if path.is_symlink() or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+        _fail("AUTHORITY_FILE_INVALID")
+    if os.name == "posix":
+        if not writable_authority and stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o022:
+            _fail("AUTHORITY_FILE_WRITABLE")
+        if require_root_owner and info.st_uid != 0:
+            _fail("AUTHORITY_FILE_OWNER_INVALID")
+    return info
+
+
+def _secure_directory(path: Path) -> os.stat_result:
+    try:
+        info = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("AUTHORITY_DIRECTORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if path.is_symlink() or not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode):
+        _fail("AUTHORITY_DIRECTORY_INVALID")
+    return info
+
+
+def _stable_read(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool, maximum: int = 2_000_000) -> bytes:
+    before = _secure_file(path, require_root_owner=require_root_owner)
+    if before.st_size > maximum:
+        _fail("AUTHORITY_FILE_TOO_LARGE")
+    try:
+        raw = path.read_bytes()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("AUTHORITY_FILE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    after = _secure_file(path, require_root_owner=require_root_owner)
+    if (before.st_dev, before.st_ino, before.st_size, before.st_mtime_ns) != (
+        after.st_dev,
+        after.st_ino,
+        after.st_size,
+        after.st_mtime_ns,
+    ):
+        _fail("AUTHORITY_FILE_CHANGED")
+    return raw
+
+
+def _ro_connection(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool) -> tuple[sqlite3.Connection, os.stat_result]:
+    before = _secure_file(
+        path, require_root_owner=require_root_owner, writable_authority=True
+    )
+    try:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(
+            resolved.as_uri() + "?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5.0
+        )
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA query_only=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("BEGIN")
+        return connection, before
+    except (OSError, sqlite3.Error) as exc:
+        raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("AUTHORITY_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+
+def _finish_ro(connection: sqlite3.Connection, path: Path, before: os.stat_result) -> None:
+    connection.close()
+    after = _secure_file(
+        path, require_root_owner=False, writable_authority=True
+    )
+    if (before.st_dev, before.st_ino) != (after.st_dev, after.st_ino):
+        _fail("AUTHORITY_DB_CHANGED")
+
+
+def _columns(connection: sqlite3.Connection, table: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    return tuple(str(row[1]) for row in connection.execute(f"PRAGMA table_info({table})"))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class LegacyC04Binding:
+    mission_id: str
+    root_task_id: str
+    anchor_task_id: str
+    owner_principal_id: str
+    original_acceptance_digest: str
+    source_task_id: str
+    external_job_id: str
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        for value in (
+            self.mission_id,
+            self.root_task_id,
+            self.anchor_task_id,
+            self.owner_principal_id,
+            self.source_task_id,
+            self.external_job_id,
+        ):
+            _text(value, "C04_BINDING_INVALID")
+        _hex(self.original_acceptance_digest, "C04_ACCEPTANCE_DIGEST_INVALID")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CredentialFileBearerSupplier:
+    """Read a systemd credential for one call without caching or displaying it."""
+
+    path: Path
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.path.is_absolute():
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_CREDENTIAL_PATH_INVALID")
+        if os.name == "posix":
+            try:
+                self.path.resolve(strict=False).relative_to(Path("/run/credentials"))
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(
+                    "AGENT_TASK_CREDENTIAL_PATH_INVALID"
+                ) from exc
+
+    def __call__(self) -> str:
+        raw = _stable_read(self.path, require_root_owner=False, maximum=8192)
+        try:
+            value = raw.decode("utf-8").strip()
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(
+                "AGENT_TASK_CREDENTIAL_INVALID"
+            ) from exc
+        if len(value) < 32 or len(value) > 4096:
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+
+class _NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):  # noqa: ANN001
+        return None
+
+
+
+_AGENT_TASK_COLUMNS = (
+    "task_id",
+    "goal",
+    "instructions",
+    "success_criteria_json",
+    "required_capabilities_json",
+    "constraints_json",
+    "metadata_json",
+    "deadline",
+    "priority",
+    "max_attempts",
+    "attempt",
+    "status",
+    "claimed_by",
+    "lease_token_hash",
+    "lease_expires_at",
+    "result_json",
+    "result_digest",
+    "result_idempotency_key",
+    "verification_json",
+    "revision",
+    "created_at",
+    "updated_at",
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class AuthenticatedAgentTaskReader:
+    """Authenticated non-mutating proof + read-only authority-row snapshot.
+
+    The authenticated HTTP request is intentionally sent to the task events
+    endpoint because the historical GET /v1/tasks/{id} path calls the global
+    lease-expiry mutator.  The task row itself is read from the authoritative
+    SQLite database using query_only mode and an exact schema allowlist.
+    """
+
+    base_url: str
+    bearer_supplier: Callable[[], str]
+    task_db_path: Path
+    timeout_seconds: float = 10.0
+    clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time
+    require_db_root_owner: bool = False
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.base_url)
+        if (
+            parsed.scheme != "http"
+            or parsed.hostname not in {"127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"}
+            or parsed.username is not None
+            or parsed.password is not None
+            or parsed.query
+            or parsed.fragment
+        ):
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_URL_INVALID")
+        if not self.task_db_path.is_absolute():
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_DB_PATH_INVALID")
+        self.base_url = self.base_url.rstrip("/")
+
+    def _authenticated_events(self, task_id: str) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], str]:
+        token = self.bearer_supplier()
+        if not isinstance(token, str) or len(token.strip()) < 32:
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+        url = (
+            self.base_url
+            + "/v1/tasks/"
+            + urllib.parse.quote(task_id, safe="._:-")
+            + "/events"
+        )
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            url,
+            method="GET",
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + token.strip(),
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirect).open(
+                request, timeout=self.timeout_seconds
+            ) as response:
+                if response.status != 200 or response.geturl() != url:
+                    _fail("AGENT_TASK_EVENTS_REJECTED")
+                raw = response.read(2_000_001)
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(
+                "AGENT_TASK_EVENTS_UNAVAILABLE"
+            ) from exc
+        finally:
+            token = ""
+        if len(raw) > 2_000_000:
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_EVENTS_TOO_LARGE")
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"), object_pairs_hook=_strict_object)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("AGENT_TASK_EVENTS_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, list):
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_EVENTS_INVALID")
+        events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        for event in value:
+            if not isinstance(event, Mapping) or event.get("task_id") != task_id:
+                _fail("AGENT_TASK_EVENTS_INVALID")
+            events.append(dict(event))
+        return events, url
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _task_projection(row: sqlite3.Row) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            body = {
+                "task_id": row["task_id"],
+                "goal": row["goal"],
+                "instructions": row["instructions"],
+                "success_criteria": json.loads(row["success_criteria_json"]),
+                "required_capabilities": json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"]),
+                "constraints": json.loads(row["constraints_json"]),
+                "metadata": json.loads(row["metadata_json"]),
+                "deadline": row["deadline"],
+                "priority": row["priority"],
+                "max_attempts": row["max_attempts"],
+                "attempt": row["attempt"],
+                "status": row["status"],
+                "claimed_by": row["claimed_by"],
+                "lease_expires_at": row["lease_expires_at"],
+                "revision": row["revision"],
+                "created_at": row["created_at"],
+                "updated_at": row["updated_at"],
+                "result": json.loads(row["result_json"]) if row["result_json"] else None,
+                "verification": (
+                    json.loads(row["verification_json"])
+                    if row["verification_json"]
+                    else None
+                ),
+            }
+        except (KeyError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError(
+                "AGENT_TASK_ROW_INVALID"
+            ) from exc
+        _mapping(body["constraints"], "AGENT_TASK_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+        _mapping(body["metadata"], "AGENT_TASK_METADATA_INVALID")
+        _integer(body["revision"], "AGENT_TASK_REVISION_INVALID")
+        if body["status"] not in {"SUCCEEDED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED", "CANCELLED"}:
+            _fail("AGENT_TASK_NOT_TERMINAL")
+        return body
+
+    def read(self, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        events, events_url = self._authenticated_events(task_id)
+        connection, before = _ro_connection(
+            self.task_db_path, require_root_owner=self.require_db_root_owner
+        )
+        try:
+            if _columns(connection, "tasks") != _AGENT_TASK_COLUMNS:
+                _fail("AGENT_TASK_DB_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=? LIMIT 1", (task_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                _fail("AGENT_TASK_NOT_FOUND")
+            body = self._task_projection(row)
+        finally:
+            _finish_ro(connection, self.task_db_path, before)
+        event_digest = _sha(events)
+        return {
+            "body": body,
+            "observed_at": _observed(self.clock),
+            "readback_ref": (
+                events_url
+                + "#authenticated-events-sha256="
+                + event_digest
+                + ";task-db-revision="
+                + str(body["revision"])
+            ),
+            "canonical_sha256": _sha(body),
+            "authenticated_events_sha256": event_digest,
+        }
+
+
+_ADMISSION_COLUMNS = {
+    "task_admission_envelopes": (
+        "idempotency_key", "envelope_id", "request_digest", "envelope_json", "status", "created_at"
+    ),
+    "task_admission_grants": (
+        "envelope_id", "grant_id", "grant_digest", "grant_json", "authorization_digest", "created_at"
+    ),
+    "task_admission_receipts": ("envelope_id", "task_id", "receipt_json", "created_at"),
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class AdmissionEpochRegistryReader:
+    db_path: Path
+    epoch_root: Path
+    revocation_file: Path
+    registry_path: Path
+    require_db_root_owner: bool = False
+    require_static_root_owner: bool = True
+    clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for path in (self.db_path, self.epoch_root, self.revocation_file, self.registry_path):
+            if not path.is_absolute():
+                _fail("AUTHORITY_PATH_NOT_ABSOLUTE")
+
+    def read(self, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        connection, before = _ro_connection(
+            self.db_path, require_root_owner=self.require_db_root_owner
+        )
+        try:
+            if any(_columns(connection, table) != columns for table, columns in _ADMISSION_COLUMNS.items()):
+                _fail("ADMISSION_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+            rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT e.*,g.grant_id,g.grant_digest,g.grant_json,g.authorization_digest,"
+                "g.created_at AS grant_created_at,r.task_id,r.receipt_json,"
+                "r.created_at AS receipt_created_at FROM task_admission_receipts r "
+                "JOIN task_admission_envelopes e ON e.envelope_id=r.envelope_id "
+                "JOIN task_admission_grants g ON g.envelope_id=r.envelope_id WHERE r.task_id=?",
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchall()
+            if len(rows) != 1:
+                _fail("ADMISSION_READBACK_AMBIGUOUS")
+            row = dict(rows[0])
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("ADMISSION_READBACK_FAILED") from exc
+        finally:
+            _finish_ro(connection, self.db_path, before)
+
+        envelope = _json_object(row["envelope_json"], "ADMISSION_ENVELOPE_INVALID")
+        grant = _json_object(row["grant_json"], "ADMISSION_GRANT_INVALID")
+        receipt = _json_object(row["receipt_json"], "ADMISSION_RECEIPT_INVALID")
+        envelope_id = _text(row["envelope_id"], "ADMISSION_ENVELOPE_INVALID")
+        grant_id = _text(row["grant_id"], "ADMISSION_GRANT_INVALID")
+        epoch_id = _text(grant.get("parent_epoch_id"), "ADMISSION_EPOCH_ID_INVALID")
+        if (
+            row.get("status") != "ADMITTED"
+            or envelope.get("schema") != "aios.task-admission-envelope.v1"
+            or grant.get("schema") != "aios.task-admission-grant.v1"
+            or receipt.get("schema") != "aios.task-admission-receipt.v1"
+            or envelope.get("envelope_id") != envelope_id
+            or grant.get("envelope_id") != envelope_id
+            or receipt.get("envelope_id") != envelope_id
+            or envelope.get("task_id") != task_id
+            or grant.get("task_id") != task_id
+            or receipt.get("task_id") != task_id
+            or grant.get("grant_id") != grant_id
+            or receipt.get("grant_id") != grant_id
+            or grant.get("authorization_kind") != "delegation_epoch"
+            or receipt.get("authorization_kind") != "delegation_epoch"
+            or receipt.get("parent_epoch_id") != epoch_id
+        ):
+            _fail("ADMISSION_BINDING_INVALID")
+        request_value = {
+            key: envelope.get(key)
+            for key in (
+                "task_id", "repository", "authority_base_oid", "target_branch",
+                "generation", "execution_digest", "requested_capabilities",
+                "file_allowlist", "risk", "trust_domain", "policy_digest",
+            )
+        }
+        if envelope.get("request_digest") != _sha(request_value) or row.get("request_digest") != _sha(request_value):
+            _fail("ADMISSION_REQUEST_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        grant_digest = _sha(grant)
+        if row.get("grant_digest") != grant_digest or receipt.get("grant_digest_sha256") != grant_digest:
+            _fail("ADMISSION_GRANT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        auth_value = {
+            "envelope_id": envelope_id,
+            "authorization_kind": "delegation_epoch",
+            "delegation_epoch_id": epoch_id,
+        }
+        if row.get("authorization_digest") != _sha(auth_value):
+            _fail("ADMISSION_AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        linked = (
+            "repository", "authority_base_oid", "target_branch", "generation",
+            "execution_digest", "policy_digest", "trust_domain", "risk",
+        )
+        if any(grant.get(key) != envelope.get(key) for key in linked):
+            _fail("ADMISSION_GRANT_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if grant.get("capabilities") != envelope.get("requested_capabilities") or grant.get("file_allowlist") != envelope.get("file_allowlist"):
+            _fail("ADMISSION_GRANT_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if receipt.get("execution_digest") != grant.get("execution_digest"):
+            _fail("ADMISSION_RECEIPT_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+        _secure_directory(self.epoch_root)
+        canonical_path = self.epoch_root / "owner-delegation-epoch.canonical.json"
+        signature_path = self.epoch_root / "owner-delegation-epoch.sig"
+        key_path = self.epoch_root / "owner-delegation-epoch.key-id"
+        canonical = _stable_read(canonical_path, require_root_owner=self.require_static_root_owner)
+        epoch = _json_object(canonical, "OWNER_EPOCH_INVALID")
+        if _canonical(epoch) != canonical:
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_NOT_CANONICAL")
+        signature = _stable_read(signature_path, require_root_owner=self.require_static_root_owner).decode("utf-8")
+        key_id = _stable_read(key_path, require_root_owner=self.require_static_root_owner).decode("utf-8").strip()
+        registry_raw = _stable_read(self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_static_root_owner)
+        registry_json = _json_object(registry_raw, "OWNER_REGISTRY_INVALID")
+        revocations = _json_object(
+            _stable_read(self.revocation_file, require_root_owner=self.require_static_root_owner),
+            "OWNER_REVOCATIONS_INVALID",
+        )
+        if (
+            set(revocations) != {"schema", "revoked_epoch_ids"}
+            or revocations.get("schema") != "aios.owner-delegation-revocations.v1"
+            or not isinstance(revocations.get("revoked_epoch_ids"), list)
+            or epoch_id in revocations["revoked_epoch_ids"]
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_REVOKED")
+        try:
+            registry = SignerRegistry(
+                self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_static_root_owner
+            )
+            record = registry.require(DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID, role="OWNER_AUTHORITY")
+            verified = RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier(
+                self.registry_path,
+                require_root_owner=self.require_static_root_owner,
+                signer_id=DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID,
+            ).verify(
+                namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+                payload=canonical,
+                signature=signature,
+                key_id=key_id,
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("OWNER_REGISTRY_VERIFICATION_FAILED") from exc
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        provenance_checks = {
+            "signature": verified is True,
+            "fingerprint": record.fingerprint == key_id,
+            "schema": epoch.get("schema") == "aios.owner-delegation-epoch.v1",
+            "epoch_id": epoch.get("epoch_id") == epoch_id,
+            "owner": epoch.get("owner_identity") == grant.get("owner_identity"),
+            "repository": epoch.get("repository") == grant.get("repository"),
+            "trust_domain": epoch.get("trust_domain") == grant.get("trust_domain"),
+            "policy": epoch.get("policy_digest") == grant.get("policy_digest"),
+            "revocation_epoch": epoch.get("revocation_epoch") == 0,
+            "expires_type": type(epoch.get("expires_at")) is int,
+            "not_before_type": type(epoch.get("not_before")) is int,
+        }
+        failed = [name for name, passed in provenance_checks.items() if not passed]
+        if failed:
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_PROVENANCE_INVALID:" + ",".join(sorted(failed)))
+        if (
+            now < epoch["expires_at"]
+            or type(epoch.get("issued_at")) is not int
+            or epoch["issued_at"] > grant.get("issued_at", 0)
+            or grant.get("issued_at", 0) < epoch["not_before"]
+            or grant.get("expires_at", 0) > epoch["expires_at"]
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_PROVENANCE_INVALID:temporal")
+        if not any(str(grant["target_branch"]).startswith(str(prefix)) for prefix in epoch.get("allowed_branch_prefixes", [])):
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not set(grant.get("capabilities", [])).issubset(set(epoch.get("allowed_capabilities", []))):
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        risk_rank = {"low": 0, "medium": 1, "high": 2}
+        if (
+            grant.get("risk") not in risk_rank
+            or epoch.get("risk_ceiling") not in risk_rank
+            or risk_rank[grant["risk"]] > risk_rank[epoch["risk_ceiling"]]
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if any(
+            not any(path == prefix.rstrip("/") or path.startswith(prefix.rstrip("/") + "/") for prefix in epoch.get("allowed_file_prefixes", []))
+            for path in grant.get("file_allowlist", [])
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_EPOCH_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+        admission_projection = {
+            "envelope": envelope,
+            "grant": grant,
+            "receipt": receipt,
+            "request_digest": row["request_digest"],
+            "grant_digest": row["grant_digest"],
+            "authorization_digest": row["authorization_digest"],
+            "envelope_status": row["status"],
+        }
+        owner_projection = {
+            "epoch": epoch,
+            "epoch_sha256": hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
+            "epoch_key_id": key_id,
+            "signature_verified": True,
+            "epoch_currently_valid": False,
+            "revocations": revocations,
+            "registry_schema": registry_json.get("schema"),
+            "registry_generation": registry.authority_generation,
+            "signer": record.to_dict(),
+        }
+        observed = _observed(self.clock)
+        return {
+            "envelope": envelope,
+            "grant": grant,
+            "receipt": receipt,
+            "epoch": epoch,
+            "epoch_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
+            "signer_id": record.signer_id,
+            "signer_fingerprint": record.fingerprint,
+            "registry_generation": registry.authority_generation,
+            "observed_at": observed,
+            "admission_ref": f"sqlite:{self.db_path}#task={task_id};envelope={envelope_id}",
+            "admission_sha256": _sha(admission_projection),
+            "registry_ref": f"file:{self.registry_path}#generation={registry.authority_generation};epoch={epoch_id}",
+            "registry_sha256": _sha(owner_projection),
+        }
+
+
+_JOB_COLUMNS = {
+    "job_aliases": (
+        "external_job_id", "internal_job_id", "task_id", "repository", "target_branch",
+        "branch_mode", "generation", "commit_idempotency_key", "expected_branch_oid",
+        "request_digest", "adopted_legacy", "created_at",
+    ),
+    "jobs": (
+        "job_id", "idempotency_key", "campaign_id", "repository", "operation", "branch",
+        "expected_branch_oid", "payload_digest", "payload_ref", "payload_size", "state",
+        "side_effect_state", "revision", "request_json", "receipt_json", "created_at", "updated_at",
+    ),
+    "idempotency_keys": ("key", "job_id", "binding_json", "created_at"),
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class BridgeJobSQLiteReader:
+    jobs_root: Path
+    require_root_owner: bool = False
+    clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.jobs_root.is_absolute():
+            _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_ROOT_NOT_ABSOLUTE")
+
+    def read(self, task_id: str, external_job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        exact_root = self.jobs_root / task_storage_key(task_id)
+        legacy_root = self.jobs_root / legacy_task_storage_key(task_id)
+        db_path = exact_root / "state.sqlite3"
+        if legacy_root != exact_root and legacy_root.exists():
+            _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_STORE_AMBIGUOUS")
+        _secure_directory(self.jobs_root)
+        _secure_directory(exact_root)
+        try:
+            if db_path.resolve(strict=True).parent != exact_root.resolve(strict=True):
+                _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_STORE_INVALID")
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("BRIDGE_JOB_STORE_INVALID") from exc
+        connection, before = _ro_connection(
+            db_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner
+        )
+        try:
+            if any(_columns(connection, table) != columns for table, columns in _JOB_COLUMNS.items()):
+                _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+            aliases = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM job_aliases WHERE external_job_id=? AND task_id=?",
+                (external_job_id, task_id),
+            ).fetchall()
+            if len(aliases) != 1:
+                _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_ALIAS_AMBIGUOUS")
+            alias = dict(aliases[0])
+            job_rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (alias["internal_job_id"],)
+            ).fetchall()
+            key_rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM idempotency_keys WHERE job_id=?", (alias["internal_job_id"],)
+            ).fetchall()
+            if len(job_rows) != 1 or len(key_rows) != 1:
+                _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_BINDING_MISSING")
+            job, key = dict(job_rows[0]), dict(key_rows[0])
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("BRIDGE_JOB_READBACK_FAILED") from exc
+        finally:
+            _finish_ro(connection, db_path, before)
+        request = _json_object(job.get("request_json") or "{}", "BRIDGE_JOB_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        binding = _mapping(request.get("binding", request), "BRIDGE_JOB_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        key_binding = _json_object(key.get("binding_json") or "{}", "BRIDGE_JOB_KEY_BINDING_INVALID")
+        external_commit_key = _text(alias.get("commit_idempotency_key"), "BRIDGE_EXTERNAL_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+        internal_key = _text(job.get("idempotency_key"), "BRIDGE_INTERNAL_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+        if (
+            alias.get("external_job_id") != external_job_id
+            or alias.get("task_id") != task_id
+            or job.get("job_id") != alias.get("internal_job_id")
+            or job.get("campaign_id") != task_id
+            or key.get("job_id") != job.get("job_id")
+            or key.get("key") != internal_key
+            or binding.get("task_id", binding.get("campaign_id")) != task_id
+            or binding.get("external_job_id") != external_job_id
+            or binding.get("idempotency_key") != external_commit_key
+            or key_binding.get("task_id", key_binding.get("campaign_id")) != task_id
+            or key_binding.get("external_job_id") != external_job_id
+            or key_binding.get("idempotency_key") != external_commit_key
+            or alias.get("repository") != job.get("repository")
+            or alias.get("repository") != binding.get("repository")
+            or alias.get("target_branch") != job.get("branch")
+            or alias.get("target_branch") != binding.get("branch", binding.get("target_branch"))
+        ):
+            _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            if int(alias.get("generation")) != int(binding.get("generation")):
+                _fail("BRIDGE_JOB_BINDING_INVALID")
+        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError("BRIDGE_JOB_BINDING_INVALID") from exc
+        projection = {
+            "alias": alias,
+            "job": job,
+            "idempotency": key,
+            "external_commit_idempotency_key": external_commit_key,
+            "internal_idempotency_key": internal_key,
+        }
+        return {
+            **projection,
+            "observed_at": _observed(self.clock),
+            "readback_ref": f"sqlite:{db_path}#external={external_job_id};internal={job['job_id']}",
+            "canonical_sha256": _sha(projection),
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(slots=True)
+class LegacyAttachmentRuntimeProvider:
+    binding: LegacyC04Binding
+    agent_task: AuthenticatedAgentTaskReader
+    admission: AdmissionEpochRegistryReader
+    bridge_job: BridgeJobSQLiteReader
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        self.binding.validate()
+
+    def read_verified(
+        self,
+        *,
+        mission_id: str,
+        root_task_id: str,
+        anchor_task_id: str,
+        source_kind: str,
+        source_task_id: str,
+        external_job_id: str,
+        original_acceptance_digest: str,
+    ) -> VerifiedLegacyAttachmentEvidence:
+        expected = self.binding
+        if (
+            mission_id != expected.mission_id
+            or root_task_id != expected.root_task_id
+            or anchor_task_id != expected.anchor_task_id
+            or source_kind != SOURCE_KIND
+            or source_task_id != expected.source_task_id
+            or external_job_id != expected.external_job_id
+            or original_acceptance_digest != expected.original_acceptance_digest
+        ):
+            _fail("C04_AUTHORITY_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+
+        task_read = self.agent_task.read(source_task_id)
+        admission_read = self.admission.read(source_task_id)
+        job_read = self.bridge_job.read(source_task_id, external_job_id)
+        task = task_read["body"]
+        metadata = _mapping(task["metadata"], "AGENT_TASK_METADATA_INVALID")
+        constraints = _mapping(task["constraints"], "AGENT_TASK_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+        execution = _mapping(metadata.get("execution"), "AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_INVALID")
+        grant = admission_read["grant"]
+        envelope = admission_read["envelope"]
+        alias, job = job_read["alias"], job_read["job"]
+        try:
+            immutable_metadata = _json_object(
+                constraints.get("immutable_metadata", ""), "AGENT_TASK_IMMUTABLE_METADATA_INVALID"
+            )
+        except LegacyAttachmentRuntimeError:
+            raise
+        if (
+            immutable_metadata != metadata
+            or metadata.get("grant_id") != grant.get("grant_id")
+            or metadata.get("grant_digest_sha256") != admission_read["receipt"].get("grant_digest_sha256")
+            or metadata.get("execution_digest") != grant.get("execution_digest")
+            or execution.get("execution_digest") != grant.get("execution_digest")
+            or execution.get("external_job_id") != external_job_id
+            or execution.get("task_id") != source_task_id
+            or metadata.get("repository") != grant.get("repository")
+            or metadata.get("target_branch") != grant.get("target_branch")
+            or metadata.get("generation") != grant.get("generation")
+            or constraints.get("repository") != grant.get("repository")
+            or constraints.get("target_branch") != grant.get("target_branch")
+            or constraints.get("generation") != grant.get("generation")
+            or envelope.get("task_id") != source_task_id
+            or alias.get("repository") != grant.get("repository")
+            or alias.get("target_branch") != grant.get("target_branch")
+            or alias.get("generation") != grant.get("generation")
+            or admission_read["signer_id"] != expected.owner_principal_id
+        ):
+            _fail("FOUR_AUTHORITY_BINDING_INVALID")
+
+        return VerifiedLegacyAttachmentEvidence(
+            schema=ATTACH_EVIDENCE_SCHEMA,
+            source_kind=SOURCE_KIND,
+            source_task_id=source_task_id,
+            source_task_created_at=_iso(task.get("created_at"), "AGENT_TASK_CREATED_AT_INVALID"),
+            source_task_status=_text(task.get("status"), "AGENT_TASK_STATUS_INVALID"),
+            source_task_revision=_integer(task.get("revision"), "AGENT_TASK_REVISION_INVALID"),
+            source_task_attempt=_integer(task.get("attempt"), "AGENT_TASK_ATTEMPT_INVALID"),
+            source_task_max_attempts=_integer(task.get("max_attempts"), "AGENT_TASK_MAX_ATTEMPTS_INVALID"),
+            external_job_id=external_job_id,
+            internal_job_id=_text(job.get("job_id"), "BRIDGE_INTERNAL_JOB_INVALID"),
+            internal_idempotency_key=_text(job.get("idempotency_key"), "BRIDGE_INTERNAL_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID"),
+            job_branch=_text(job.get("branch"), "BRIDGE_JOB_BRANCH_INVALID"),
+            job_state=_text(job.get("state"), "BRIDGE_JOB_STATE_INVALID"),
+            job_revision=_integer(job.get("revision"), "BRIDGE_JOB_REVISION_INVALID"),
+            side_effect_state=_text(job.get("side_effect_state"), "BRIDGE_SIDE_EFFECT_INVALID"),
+            grant_id=_text(grant.get("grant_id"), "ADMISSION_GRANT_INVALID"),
+            grant_digest=_hex(admission_read["receipt"].get("grant_digest_sha256"), "ADMISSION_GRANT_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+            execution_digest=_hex(grant.get("execution_digest"), "ADMISSION_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+            epoch_id=_text(admission_read["epoch"].get("epoch_id"), "OWNER_EPOCH_ID_INVALID"),
+            epoch_digest=_hex(admission_read["epoch_digest"], "OWNER_EPOCH_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+            historical_signer_id=admission_read["signer_id"],
+            historical_signer_fingerprint=admission_read["signer_fingerprint"],
+            registry_generation=_integer(admission_read["registry_generation"], "OWNER_REGISTRY_GENERATION_INVALID"),
+            signature_verified=True,
+            epoch_currently_valid=False,
+            readbacks=(
+                AuthorityReadbackRef(
+                    role="agent_task", authority="aios-agent-task-api",
+                    readback_ref=task_read["readback_ref"], canonical_sha256=task_read["canonical_sha256"],
+                    observed_at=task_read["observed_at"], revision=task["revision"],
+                ),
+                AuthorityReadbackRef(
+                    role="admission", authority="aios-task-admission-store",
+                    readback_ref=admission_read["admission_ref"], canonical_sha256=admission_read["admission_sha256"],
+                    observed_at=admission_read["observed_at"], revision=None,
+                ),
+                AuthorityReadbackRef(
+                    role="owner_registry", authority="aios-single-host-owner-authority",
+                    readback_ref=admission_read["registry_ref"], canonical_sha256=admission_read["registry_sha256"],
+                    observed_at=admission_read["observed_at"], revision=admission_read["registry_generation"],
+                ),
+                AuthorityReadbackRef(
+                    role="bridge_job", authority="aios-gitops-job-controller",
+                    readback_ref=job_read["readback_ref"], canonical_sha256=job_read["canonical_sha256"],
+                    observed_at=job_read["observed_at"], revision=job["revision"],
+                ),
+            ),
+        )

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_execution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+"""Canonical governed execution projection for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+The durable governed binding is authoritative.  Natural-language task fields and
+worker configuration are never allowed to invent repository, ref, generation, or
+idempotency coordinates.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+EXECUTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.execution.v2"
+PROJECTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = ("main", "master", "refs/", "tags/", "tag/", "release/", "baseline/", "production/")
+MUTATION_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic"})
+READ_ONLY_ACTIONS = frozenset({"source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+SUPPORTED_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic", "source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS = frozenset({"hermes", "openclaw"})
+MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+
+
+class ExecutionProjectionError(RuntimeError):
+    """A canonical fail-closed projection or validation error."""
+
+
+class OnlineTaskProjectionClient:
+    """Official HTTP projection client using only a control credential reference."""
+
+    def __init__(self, api_base: str, control_token_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.api_base = api_base.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token_path = Path(control_token_path)
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        path = self.control_token_path
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def create(
+        self,
+        projected_task: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding: "GovernedExecutionBinding",
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = dict(projected_task)
+        payload = _canonical(body).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.api_base + "/v1/tasks",
+            method="POST",
+            data=payload,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self._token(),
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read(8192).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+            try:
+                error = json.loads(raw).get("error")
+            except (AttributeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                error = "HTTP_ERROR"
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError(f"ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_FAILED:{exc.code}:{error}") from exc
+        except (OSError, urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if status not in {200, 201} or not isinstance(result, dict):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        if result.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or result.get("status") not in {"QUEUED", "VERIFYING", "SUCCEEDED"}:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        metadata = result.get("metadata")
+        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        returned_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        submitted_metadata = _object(body.get("metadata"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        submitted_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(submitted_metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        if _canonical(returned_execution) != _canonical(submitted_execution):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> None:
+    raise ExecutionProjectionError(code)
+
+
+def _object(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error(code)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        _error(code)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _task_id(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if TASK_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, code)
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _branch(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    if BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(value) is None or value.startswith(PROTECTED_PREFIXES):
+        _error("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _generation(value: object) -> int:
+    if not isinstance(value, int) or isinstance(value, bool) or value < 1:
+        _error("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _source_signals(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Normalize untrusted natural-language hints before they enter a signed envelope."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for item in value:
+        if not isinstance(item, str):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        text = " ".join(item.split()).strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        # Projection may accept long task prose, but execution envelopes stay bounded.
+        text = text[:512].rstrip()
+        if text not in result:
+            result.append(text)
+        if len(result) == 16:
+            break
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+def _agent_runtime_input(value: object) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_REQUIRED")
+    raw = dict(value)
+    allowed = {
+        "goal", "instructions", "success_criteria", "constraints",
+        "scope", "trace_id",
+    }
+    if set(raw) - allowed:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    goal = _string(raw.get("goal"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_GOAL_REQUIRED")
+    instructions = raw.get("instructions", "")
+    if not isinstance(instructions, str):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+    criteria = raw.get("success_criteria", [])
+    if not isinstance(criteria, list) or len(criteria) > 32:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+    normalized_criteria: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for item in criteria:
+        if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criterion_id = _string(item.get("id"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        description = _string(
+            item.get("description"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID"
+        )
+        normalized_criteria.append(
+            {"id": criterion_id[:120], "description": description[:1000]}
+        )
+    constraints = raw.get("constraints", {})
+    if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+    sensitive_markers = ("token", "secret", "password", "credential", "authorization", "api_key", "apikey")
+    for key in constraints:
+        lowered = str(key).lower()
+        if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SECRET_FIELD_DENY")
+
+    scope = raw.get("scope", {})
+    if not isinstance(scope, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    scope = {
+        "scope_type": str(scope.get("scope_type") or "legacy"),
+        "tenant_id": scope.get("tenant_id"),
+        "project_id": scope.get("project_id"),
+    }
+    if scope["scope_type"] not in {"legacy", "system", "tenant"}:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    if scope["scope_type"] == "tenant":
+        if not isinstance(scope["tenant_id"], str) or not scope["tenant_id"].strip():
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    elif scope["tenant_id"] not in (None, "") or scope["project_id"] not in (None, ""):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+    trace_id = str(raw.get("trace_id") or "").strip()
+    if not trace_id or len(trace_id) > 255:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_TRACE_ID_INVALID")
+
+    normalized = {
+        "goal": goal[:12000],
+        "instructions": instructions[:32000],
+        "success_criteria": normalized_criteria,
+        "constraints": dict(constraints),
+        "scope": scope,
+        "trace_id": trace_id,
+    }
+    if len(_canonical(normalized).encode("utf-8")) > MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_TOO_LARGE")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _capabilities(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    result = tuple(sorted({_string(item, "CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID") for item in value}))
+    if any(len(item) > 120 for item in result):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedExecutionBinding":
+        data = dict(value)
+        task_id = _task_id(data.get("task_id"))
+        job_id = _string(data.get("job_id"), "JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+        if TASK_RE.fullmatch(job_id) is None:
+            _error("JOB_ID_INVALID")
+        repository = _string(data.get("repository"), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            _error("WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY")
+        base_oid = _oid(data.get("base_oid"), "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        expected = _oid(data.get("expected_branch_oid"), "EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        target = _branch(data.get("target_branch"))
+        mode = _string(data.get("branch_mode"), "BRANCH_MODE_MISSING")
+        if mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            _error("BRANCH_MODE_INVALID")
+        generation = _generation(data.get("generation"))
+        if mode == "CREATE_NEW" and expected != base_oid:
+            _error("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+        key = _string(data.get("idempotency_key"), "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        if KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+            _error("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        return cls(task_id, job_id, repository, base_oid, expected, target, mode, generation, key)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def binding_from_bootstrap(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def validate_execution_envelope(
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding | None = None,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    envelope = dict(value)
+    if envelope.get("schema") != EXECUTION_SCHEMA:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA_VALIDATION")
+    candidate = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(envelope)
+    if binding is not None and candidate != binding:
+        comparisons = (
+            (candidate.task_id, binding.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.job_id, binding.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.repository, binding.repository, "WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.base_oid, binding.base_oid, "WRONG_BASE_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.expected_branch_oid, binding.expected_branch_oid, "WRONG_EXPECTED_HEAD_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.target_branch, binding.target_branch, "WRONG_BRANCH_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.generation, binding.generation, "WRONG_GENERATION_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.branch_mode, binding.branch_mode, "BRANCH_MODE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.idempotency_key, binding.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        )
+        for actual, expected, code in comparisons:
+            if actual != expected:
+                _error(code)
+    action = _string(envelope.get("action"), "EXECUTION_ACTION_MISSING")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capability_scope = _capabilities(envelope.get("capability_scope"))
+    if worker_capabilities is not None and not set(capability_scope).issubset(set(worker_capabilities)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    workspace = _object(envelope.get("workspace"), "WORKSPACE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    if workspace.get("authority_git_dir") != "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git" or workspace.get("read_only_repository") is not True:
+        _error("WORKSPACE_POLICY_DENY")
+    governance = _object(envelope.get("governance"), "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    governed_coordinates = (
+        (governance.get("task_id"), candidate.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("job_id"), candidate.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("idempotency_key"), candidate.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+    )
+    for actual_coordinate, expected_coordinate, code in governed_coordinates:
+        if actual_coordinate != expected_coordinate:
+            _error(code)
+    commit_key = _string(governance.get("commit_idempotency_key"), "COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(commit_key) is None:
+        _error("COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if governance.get("writer_lease") is not (action in MUTATION_ACTIONS):
+        _error("WRITER_LEASE_POLICY_DENY")
+    for field in ("main_write", "production_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "force_push", "protected_ref_bypass"):
+        if governance.get(field, False) is not False:
+            _error("POLICY_DENY")
+    changes = envelope.get("change_set")
+    verification = envelope.get("verification")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not isinstance(verification, list):
+        _error("EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_INVALID")
+    if action == "source_capture":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY")
+        signals = list(_source_signals(envelope.get("source_signals") or []))
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") != signals:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") not in (None, {}):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_RUNTIME_INPUT_DENY")
+    elif action == "agent_runtime":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_MUTATION_DENY")
+        adapter = str(envelope.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = _agent_runtime_input(envelope.get("runtime_input"))
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") != runtime_input:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_NOT_CANONICAL")
+        required_runtime_capability = f"agent.runtime.{adapter}"
+        if required_runtime_capability not in capability_scope:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_REQUIRED")
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") not in (None, []):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SOURCE_SIGNALS_DENY")
+    elif not changes:
+        _error("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    declared = str(envelope.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    material = {key: item for key, item in envelope.items() if key != "execution_digest"}
+    actual = _digest(material)
+    if declared != actual:
+        _error("EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    return {**material, "execution_digest": actual}
+
+
+def project_execution_envelope(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    *,
+    required_capabilities: Sequence[str] = (),
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(execution_request or {})
+    action = str(request.get("action") or "source_capture")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capabilities = _capabilities(request.get("capability_scope", required_capabilities))
+    governance = {
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+        "commit_idempotency_key": str(request.get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{binding.task_id}-commit-g{binding.generation}"),
+        "writer_lease": action in MUTATION_ACTIONS,
+        "main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "tag_write": False,
+        "baseline_write": False,
+        "force_push": False,
+        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
+    }
+    supplied_governance = request.get("governance")
+    if supplied_governance is not None:
+        governance.update(_object(supplied_governance, "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED"))
+    material: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema": EXECUTION_SCHEMA,
+        **binding.public(),
+        "action": action,
+        "adapter": str(
+            request.get("adapter")
+            or ("deterministic" if action == "deterministic" else "source_capture")
+        ),
+        "capability_scope": list(capabilities),
+        "change_set": list(request.get("change_set") or []),
+        "verification": list(request.get("verification") or []),
+        "source_signals": list(_source_signals(request.get("source_signals") or [])) if action == "source_capture" else [],
+        "runtime_input": _agent_runtime_input(request.get("runtime_input")) if action == "agent_runtime" else {},
+        "governance": governance,
+        "workspace": {
+            "authority_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+            "read_only_repository": True,
+            "cleanup_policy": "always",
+        },
+    }
+    envelope = {**material, "execution_digest": _digest(material)}
+    return validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding)
+
+
+def project_online_task(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    task_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(task_request)
+    required = _capabilities(request.get("required_capabilities"))
+    execution_value = dict(execution_request or {})
+    if str(execution_value.get("action") or "source_capture") == "agent_runtime":
+        adapter = str(execution_value.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = execution_value.get("runtime_input")
+        tenant_id = request.get("tenant_id")
+        project_id = request.get("project_id")
+        declared_scope = str(
+            request.get("scope_type")
+            or ("tenant" if isinstance(tenant_id, str) and tenant_id.strip() else "legacy")
+        )
+        if runtime_input is None:
+            runtime_input = {
+                "goal": request.get("goal"),
+                "instructions": request.get("instructions") or "",
+                "success_criteria": request.get("success_criteria") or [],
+                "constraints": request.get("constraints") or {},
+            }
+        elif not isinstance(runtime_input, Mapping):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_REQUIRED")
+        runtime_input = dict(runtime_input)
+        # Scope/trace are authoritative Task identity, never caller-selected runtime hints.
+        runtime_input["scope"] = {
+            "scope_type": declared_scope,
+            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+            "project_id": project_id,
+        }
+        runtime_input["trace_id"] = str(
+            request.get("trace_id")
+            or request.get("run_id")
+            or binding.task_id
+        )
+        execution_value["runtime_input"] = runtime_input
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        execution_value,
+        required_capabilities=required,
+    )
+    metadata = dict(request.get("metadata") or {})
+    if "execution" in metadata:
+        validate_execution_envelope(_object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"), binding=binding)
+        if metadata["execution"] != execution:
+            _error("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_CONFLICT")
+    metadata["execution"] = execution
+    metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+        "schema": PROJECTION_SCHEMA,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+    }
+    return {
+        **request,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "metadata": metadata,
+        "required_capabilities": list(required),
+        "idempotency_key": str(request.get("idempotency_key") or f"online-task:{binding.idempotency_key}"),
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_task_execution(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+    metadata = task.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) and "execution" in metadata:
+        value = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+            worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities,
+        )
+        return value, "persisted"
+    projected = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {"action": "source_capture", "capability_scope": task.get("required_capabilities") or []},
+        required_capabilities=task.get("required_capabilities") or [],
+    )
+    validate_execution_envelope(projected, binding=binding, worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities)
+    return projected, "recovered_projection"

active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+"""HTTP adapter for audited Owner authorization and writer provisioning.
+
+This module layers on top of ``aios_authorized_task_writer_api`` so existing
+routes and the legacy exact ``writer:provision`` route remain available. The
+new endpoint does not mint or modify bearer credentials. It authenticates an
+existing, non-wildcard, explicitly allow-listed Owner credential and then
+invokes the audited broker.
+
+Endpoint:
+    POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+import aios_authorized_task_writer_api as bridge_api
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
+from owner_authorization_broker import (
+    OwnerAuthorizationBroker,
+    OwnerAuthorizationError,
+    OwnerPrincipal,
+)
+
+
+api = bridge_api.api
+_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
+
+
+def _enabled() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED", ""
+    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+def _configured_intake_scope() -> str:
+    scopes = [
+        item.strip()
+        for item in os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES", ""
+        ).split(",")
+        if item.strip()
+    ]
+    if len(scopes) != 1:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "EXACTLY_ONE_HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REQUIRED", 503
+        )
+    scope = scopes[0]
+    if scope == "writer:provision" or scope == "*" or scope.endswith(":*"):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 503)
+    return scope
+
+
+def _scope_set(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    raw = auth.get("scopes")
+    if raw is None:
+        raw = auth.get("scope")
+    if raw is None:
+        return frozenset()
+    if isinstance(raw, str):
+        candidates = raw.replace(",", " ").split()
+    elif isinstance(raw, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
+        candidates = [str(item) for item in raw]
+    else:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_SCOPE_EVIDENCE_INVALID", 403)
+    return frozenset(item.strip() for item in candidates if item.strip())
+
+
+def _credential_id(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    for name in (
+        "credential_id",
+        "token_id",
+        "key_id",
+        "auth_id",
+    ):
+        value = str(auth.get(name) or "").strip()
+        if value:
+            return value
+    return ""
+
+
+def _authenticate_existing_owner(handler) -> OwnerPrincipal | None:
+    scope = _configured_intake_scope()
+    auth = handler.need(scope)
+    if not auth:
+        return None
+    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_ROLE_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    identity = str(auth.get("account") or auth.get("identity") or "").strip()
+    if not identity:
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    scopes = _scope_set(auth)
+    if any(item == "*" or item.endswith(":*") for item in scopes):
+        handler.sendj(
+            {"error": "WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED"}, 403
+        )
+        return None
+    return OwnerPrincipal(
+        identity=identity,
+        role="owner",
+        authenticated_scope=scope,
+        token_scopes=scopes,
+        credential_id=_credential_id(auth),
+    )
+
+
+def _broker_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != _ENDPOINT:
+        return _original_do_post(self)
+    if not _enabled():
+        return self.sendj(
+            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_DISABLED"}, 503
+        )
+    try:
+        principal = _authenticate_existing_owner(self)
+        if principal is None:
+            return
+        data = self.body()
+        result = OwnerAuthorizationBroker().authorize_and_provision(
+            data, principal
+        )
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except (OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
+        body = {"error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
+    except Exception:
+        # Never expose registry data, bearer tokens, signer output or traceback.
+        return self.sendj(
+            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500
+        )
+
+
+api.H.do_POST = _broker_do_post
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    api.main()

active-runtime/app/aios_owner_merge_authorization.py

@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+"""Owner-final, structured authorization for one governed pull-request merge.
+
+The Owner approval is the policy decision.  Signing and public verification
+prove that decision but cannot change its repository, pull request, CAS base,
+technical-gate contract, or lifetime.  This module deliberately exposes no
+generic sign-bytes API and does not publish or alter technical check results.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import secrets
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import (
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    LocalFileSigner,
+    SignedArtifact,
+    canonical_json_bytes,
+    sha256_json,
+)
+
+
+POLICY_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-merge-approval-policy.v2"
+APPROVAL_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-merge-approval.v2"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-merge-admission-receipt.v2"
+OPERATION = "merge.pull-request"
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+DIGEST_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+REPOSITORY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$")
+IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,255}$")
+CHECK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]{11,255}$")
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed error for the Owner merge approval contract."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def _fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OwnerMergeApprovalError(code)
+
+
+def _require_oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_digest(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or DIGEST_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy:
+    """Immutable policy input for one exact protected merge approval."""
+
+    repository: str
+    pr_number: int
+    pr_head_oid: str
+    expected_main_oid: str
+    operation: str
+    required_check_contract_digest: str
+    required_checks: tuple[str, ...]
+    owner_identity: str
+    audit_lineage_digest: str
+    maximum_ttl_seconds: int
+    policy_version: str = "v2"
+    schema: str = POLICY_SCHEMA
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if (
+            self.schema != POLICY_SCHEMA
+            or self.policy_version != "v2"
+            or not isinstance(self.repository, str)
+            or REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(self.repository) is None
+            or type(self.pr_number) is not int
+            or not 1 <= self.pr_number < 2**31
+            or self.operation != OPERATION
+            or not isinstance(self.owner_identity, str)
+            or IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(self.owner_identity) is None
+            or type(self.maximum_ttl_seconds) is not int
+            or not 60 <= self.maximum_ttl_seconds <= 900
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_INVALID")
+        _require_oid(self.pr_head_oid, "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_HEAD_INVALID")
+        _require_oid(self.expected_main_oid, "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_BASE_INVALID")
+        _require_digest(
+            self.required_check_contract_digest,
+            "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_CHECK_CONTRACT_INVALID",
+        )
+        _require_digest(self.audit_lineage_digest, "OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(self.required_checks, tuple)
+            or not self.required_checks
+            or len(set(self.required_checks)) != len(self.required_checks)
+            or any(not isinstance(item, str) or CHECK_RE.fullmatch(item) is None for item in self.required_checks)
+        ):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_REQUIRED_CHECKS_INVALID")
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.validate()
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["required_checks"] = list(self.required_checks)
+        return value
+
+    @property
+    def digest(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.as_dict())
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeLiveState:
+    """Read-only live evidence; this object has no status publication method."""
+
+    repository: str
+    pr_number: int
+    pr_head_oid: str
+    main_oid: str
+    required_check_contract_digest: str
+    check_statuses: Mapping[str, bool]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeOidReadback:
+    authority_main_oid: str
+    gitea_main_oid: str
+    api_main_oid: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OwnerMergeAdmissionReceipt:
+    approval_id: str
+    nonce: str
+    owner_identity: str
+    policy_digest: str
+    proof_path: str
+    merge_oid: str
+    schema: str = RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+
+
+class ApprovalProofVerifier(Protocol):
+    """Public proof verifier; it is intentionally unable to issue approvals."""
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        *,
+        namespace: str,
+        payload: bytes,
+        signature: str,
+        key_id: str,
+    ) -> bool:
+        ...
+
+
+class GovernedMergeExecutor(Protocol):
+    def execute(self, approval: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
+        ...
+
+
+class MergeOidReconciler(Protocol):
+    def readback(self, merge_oid: str) -> OwnerMergeOidReadback:
+        ...
+
+
+APPROVAL_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema",
+        "approval_id",
+        "nonce",
+        "repository",
+        "pr_number",
+        "pr_head_oid",
+        "expected_main_oid",
+        "operation",
+        "required_check_contract_digest",
+        "required_checks",
+        "owner_identity",
+        "audit_lineage_digest",
+        "policy_version",
+        "policy_digest",
+        "issued_at",
+        "not_before",
+        "expires_at",
+        "signature_namespace",
+        "signature_key_id",
+        "canonical_payload_digest",
+    }
+)
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalAuthority:
+    """Structured Owner signer for an immutable merge policy.
+
+    ``issue`` has no caller-controlled payload parameter.  The immutable policy
+    selects the complete authorization scope; only approval IDs and nonces are
+    generated inside the authority.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        key_path: Path,
+        policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+        *,
+        require_root_owner: bool = True,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+        token_urlsafe: Callable[[int], str] = secrets.token_urlsafe,
+    ) -> None:
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.signer = LocalFileSigner(
+            Path(key_path),
+            signer_id="local-owner-authority",
+            namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            require_root_owner=require_root_owner,
+        )
+        self.clock = clock
+        self.token_urlsafe = token_urlsafe
+
+    def _token(self, prefix: str) -> str:
+        value = prefix + self.token_urlsafe(24)
+        if TOKEN_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_AUTHORITY_GENERATED_TOKEN_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def issue(self) -> SignedArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        approval_id = self._token("owner-merge-approval-")
+        nonce = self._token("owner-merge-nonce-")
+        policy = self.policy
+        payload: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "schema": APPROVAL_SCHEMA,
+            "approval_id": approval_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "repository": policy.repository,
+            "pr_number": policy.pr_number,
+            "pr_head_oid": policy.pr_head_oid,
+            "expected_main_oid": policy.expected_main_oid,
+            "operation": policy.operation,
+            "required_check_contract_digest": policy.required_check_contract_digest,
+            "required_checks": list(policy.required_checks),
+            "owner_identity": policy.owner_identity,
+            "audit_lineage_digest": policy.audit_lineage_digest,
+            "policy_version": policy.policy_version,
+            "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + policy.maximum_ttl_seconds,
+            "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            "signature_key_id": self.signer.fingerprint,
+        }
+        payload["canonical_payload_digest"] = sha256_json(payload)
+        return self.signer._sign_canonical(payload)
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier:
+    """Verify Owner proof, preferring normal verification then recovery proof.
+
+    The recovery verifier validates a pre-existing approval with the registered
+    public Owner root.  It cannot issue an approval and is therefore not a
+    second policy principal.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        primary: ApprovalProofVerifier,
+        recovery: ApprovalProofVerifier | None = None,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.primary = primary
+        self.recovery = recovery
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _artifact(artifact: SignedArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str, str, str]:
+        if isinstance(artifact, SignedArtifact):
+            return dict(artifact.payload), artifact.signature, artifact.key_id, artifact.namespace
+        if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping) or set(artifact) != {"payload", "signature", "key_id", "namespace"}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+        payload = artifact.get("payload")
+        signature = artifact.get("signature")
+        key_id = artifact.get("key_id")
+        namespace = artifact.get("namespace")
+        if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or not all(isinstance(item, str) for item in (signature, key_id, namespace)):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+        return dict(payload), signature, key_id, namespace
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_scope(payload: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy, *, now: int, key_id: str, namespace: str) -> None:
+        if set(payload) != APPROVAL_FIELDS:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        expected = {
+            "schema": APPROVAL_SCHEMA,
+            "repository": policy.repository,
+            "pr_number": policy.pr_number,
+            "pr_head_oid": policy.pr_head_oid,
+            "expected_main_oid": policy.expected_main_oid,
+            "operation": policy.operation,
+            "required_check_contract_digest": policy.required_check_contract_digest,
+            "required_checks": list(policy.required_checks),
+            "owner_identity": policy.owner_identity,
+            "audit_lineage_digest": policy.audit_lineage_digest,
+            "policy_version": policy.policy_version,
+            "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+            "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            "signature_key_id": key_id,
+        }
+        if payload.get("pr_head_oid") != policy.pr_head_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_HEAD_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if payload.get("expected_main_oid") != policy.expected_main_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_BASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if payload.get("policy_digest") != policy.digest:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_POLICY_DIGEST_DRIFT")
+        if namespace != OWNER_NAMESPACE or any(payload.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items()):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        for field in ("approval_id", "nonce"):
+            if not isinstance(payload.get(field), str) or TOKEN_RE.fullmatch(payload[field]) is None:
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_TOKEN_INVALID")
+        for field in ("issued_at", "not_before", "expires_at"):
+            if type(payload.get(field)) is not int:
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_TIME_INVALID")
+        if not payload["not_before"] <= now < payload["expires_at"]:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+        if payload["issued_at"] > now + 5 or payload["expires_at"] - payload["issued_at"] != policy.maximum_ttl_seconds:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_TIME_INVALID")
+        supplied = payload.get("canonical_payload_digest")
+        body = dict(payload)
+        body.pop("canonical_payload_digest", None)
+        if supplied != sha256_json(body):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_CANONICAL_DIGEST_INVALID")
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        artifact: SignedArtifact | Mapping[str, Any],
+        policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+    ) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+        policy.validate()
+        payload, signature, key_id, namespace = self._artifact(artifact)
+        canonical = canonical_json_bytes(payload)
+        proof_path: str | None = None
+        for path, verifier in (("primary", self.primary), ("recovery", self.recovery)):
+            if verifier is None:
+                continue
+            try:
+                verified = verifier.verify(
+                    namespace=namespace,
+                    payload=canonical,
+                    signature=signature,
+                    key_id=key_id,
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                verified = False
+            if verified is True:
+                proof_path = path
+                break
+        if proof_path is None:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_APPROVAL_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+        self._validate_scope(payload, policy, now=int(self.clock()), key_id=key_id, namespace=namespace)
+        return payload, proof_path
+
+
+class SQLiteOwnerMergeNonceLedger:
+    """Durable one-shot fence.  Unknown effects are intentionally not retried."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+
+    def _connection(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        if self.path.is_symlink() or self.path.parent.is_symlink():
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_LEDGER_PATH_INVALID")
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS owner_merge_nonce ("
+            "nonce TEXT PRIMARY KEY, approval_digest TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL, claimed_at INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        return connection
+
+    def claim(self, *, nonce: str, approval_digest: str, now: int) -> None:
+        connection = self._connection()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT state FROM owner_merge_nonce WHERE nonce=?", (nonce,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_REPLAY")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO owner_merge_nonce(nonce,approval_digest,state,claimed_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?)",
+                (nonce, approval_digest, "PENDING", now),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_LEDGER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def mark(self, *, nonce: str, state: str) -> None:
+        if state not in {"COMPLETED", "UNKNOWN"}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_STATE_INVALID")
+        connection = self._connection()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            updated = connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE owner_merge_nonce SET state=? WHERE nonce=? AND state='PENDING'",
+                (state, nonce),
+            ).rowcount
+            if updated != 1:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_STATE_CONFLICT")
+            connection.commit()
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_NONCE_LEDGER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+
+class GovernedOwnerMergeAdmission:
+    """Admit one protected merge without owning any policy or technical gate."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        policy: OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+        verifier: OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier,
+        live_state_reader: Callable[[], OwnerMergeLiveState],
+        executor: GovernedMergeExecutor,
+        reconciler: MergeOidReconciler,
+        nonce_ledger: SQLiteOwnerMergeNonceLedger,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+    ) -> None:
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.live_state_reader = live_state_reader
+        self.executor = executor
+        self.reconciler = reconciler
+        self.nonce_ledger = nonce_ledger
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    def _validate_live_state(self, live: OwnerMergeLiveState) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(live, OwnerMergeLiveState):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_LIVE_STATE_INVALID")
+        policy = self.policy
+        if live.repository != policy.repository:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REPOSITORY_DRIFT")
+        if live.pr_number != policy.pr_number:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_PR_BINDING_DRIFT")
+        if live.pr_head_oid != policy.pr_head_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_HEAD_DRIFT")
+        if live.main_oid != policy.expected_main_oid:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_BASE_DRIFT")
+        if live.required_check_contract_digest != policy.required_check_contract_digest:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REQUIRED_CHECK_CONTRACT_DRIFT")
+        if not isinstance(live.check_statuses, Mapping) or set(live.check_statuses) != set(policy.required_checks):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REQUIRED_CHECK_CONTRACT_DRIFT")
+        if any(value is not True for value in live.check_statuses.values()):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_REQUIRED_CHECKS_FAILED")
+
+    def admit(self, artifact: SignedArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> OwnerMergeAdmissionReceipt:
+        approval, proof_path = self.verifier.verify(artifact, self.policy)
+        self._validate_live_state(self.live_state_reader())
+        nonce = str(approval["nonce"])
+        approval_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(approval)).hexdigest()
+        self.nonce_ledger.claim(nonce=nonce, approval_digest=approval_digest, now=int(self.clock()))
+        try:
+            merge_oid = self.executor.execute(dict(approval))
+            _require_oid(merge_oid, "OWNER_MERGE_EXECUTOR_RESULT_INVALID")
+            readback = self.reconciler.readback(merge_oid)
+            if (
+                not isinstance(readback, OwnerMergeOidReadback)
+                or readback.authority_main_oid != merge_oid
+                or readback.gitea_main_oid != merge_oid
+                or readback.api_main_oid != merge_oid
+            ):
+                self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="UNKNOWN")
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_OID_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            # Every failure after a durable claim represents an operation that
+            # is either known failed or needs reconciliation.  Preserve the
+            # one-shot fence rather than exposing a retryable PENDING state.
+            try:
+                self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="UNKNOWN")
+            except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+                pass
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:
+            try:
+                self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="UNKNOWN")
+            except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_EXECUTION_UNKNOWN") from exc
+        self.nonce_ledger.mark(nonce=nonce, state="COMPLETED")
+        return OwnerMergeAdmissionReceipt(
+            approval_id=str(approval["approval_id"]),
+            nonce=nonce,
+            owner_identity=str(approval["owner_identity"]),
+            policy_digest=str(approval["policy_digest"]),
+            proof_path=proof_path,
+            merge_oid=merge_oid,
+        )

active-runtime/app/aios_owner_merge_authorization_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+"""Restricted issuance service for ``aios.owner-merge-approval.v2``.
+
+The service has one Owner-only operation.  It accepts an empty request payload,
+loads one immutable policy, generates approval identifiers and nonces itself,
+and stores one exact issuance response.  It deliberately does not expose a
+generic signing, payload, or policy-selection API.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_owner_merge_authorization import (
+    OwnerMergeApprovalAuthority,
+    OwnerMergeApprovalError,
+    OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy,
+    OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier,
+)
+from aios_single_host_authority import RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier, SignedArtifact
+
+
+ISSUE_OPERATION = "issue_owner_merge_approval"
+
+
+def _fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OwnerMergeApprovalError(code)
+
+
+def _secure_regular(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool) -> None:
+    try:
+        metadata = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_MISSING") from exc
+    if path.is_symlink() or not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_INVALID")
+    if stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) & 0o022:
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_WRITABLE")
+    if require_root_owner and metadata.st_uid != 0:
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_FILE_NOT_ROOT_OWNED")
+
+
+def _read_policy(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool) -> OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy:
+    _secure_regular(path, require_root_owner=require_root_owner)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID")
+    expected = set(OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy.__dataclass_fields__)
+    if set(value) != expected or not isinstance(value.get("required_checks"), list):
+        _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID")
+    try:
+        policy = OwnerMergeApprovalPolicy(
+            repository=value["repository"],
+            pr_number=value["pr_number"],
+            pr_head_oid=value["pr_head_oid"],
+            expected_main_oid=value["expected_main_oid"],
+            operation=value["operation"],
+            required_check_contract_digest=value["required_check_contract_digest"],
+            required_checks=tuple(value["required_checks"]),
+            owner_identity=value["owner_identity"],
+            audit_lineage_digest=value["audit_lineage_digest"],
+            maximum_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_ttl_seconds"],
+            policy_version=value["policy_version"],
+            schema=value["schema"],
+        )
+        policy.validate()
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, OwnerMergeApprovalError) as exc:
+        if isinstance(exc, OwnerMergeApprovalError):
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+        raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+    return policy
+
+
+def _artifact_dict(artifact: SignedArtifact) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "payload": dict(artifact.payload),
+        "signature": artifact.signature,
+        "key_id": artifact.key_id,
+        "namespace": artifact.namespace,
+    }
+
+
+class SQLiteOwnerMergeIssuanceLedger:
+    """Durably replay a current approval and retain expired issuance history."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        if self.path.is_symlink() or self.path.parent.is_symlink():
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_PATH_INVALID")
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS owner_merge_issuance ("
+            "nonce TEXT PRIMARY KEY, policy_digest TEXT NOT NULL, response_json TEXT NOT NULL, "
+            "issued_at INTEGER NOT NULL, expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS owner_merge_issuance_policy_expiry "
+            "ON owner_merge_issuance(policy_digest, expires_at)"
+        )
+        return connection
+
+    def issue_once(
+        self,
+        *,
+        policy_digest: str,
+        now: int,
+        issuer: Callable[[], dict[str, Any]],
+        validate_current: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], None],
+        expiry_of: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], int],
+    ) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT response_json, expires_at FROM owner_merge_issuance "
+                "WHERE policy_digest=? AND expires_at>? ORDER BY issued_at DESC",
+                (policy_digest, now),
+            ).fetchall()
+            if len(rows) > 1:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            if rows:
+                try:
+                    response = json.loads(rows[0][0])
+                except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+                    connection.rollback()
+                    raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID") from exc
+                if not isinstance(response, dict):
+                    connection.rollback()
+                    _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+                if type(rows[0][1]) is not int or expiry_of(response) != rows[0][1]:
+                    connection.rollback()
+                    _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+                validate_current(response)
+                connection.rollback()
+                return response, True
+            response = issuer()
+            expires_at = expiry_of(response)
+            if expires_at <= now:
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_RESPONSE_EXPIRED")
+            artifact = response.get("artifact")
+            if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            payload = artifact.get("payload")
+            if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or not isinstance(payload.get("nonce"), str):
+                connection.rollback()
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            encoded = json.dumps(
+                response,
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+                allow_nan=False,
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO owner_merge_issuance(nonce,policy_digest,response_json,issued_at,expires_at) "
+                "VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (payload["nonce"], policy_digest, encoded, now, expires_at),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return response, False
+        except OwnerMergeApprovalError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_NONCE_CONFLICT") from exc
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            try:
+                connection.rollback()
+            except sqlite3.Error:
+                pass
+            raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+
+class OwnerMergeApprovalService:
+    """A formal structured adapter, not an arbitrary signing oracle."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        policy_path: Path,
+        registry_path: Path,
+        owner_key_path: Path,
+        issuance_ledger_path: Path,
+        allowed_uids: tuple[int, ...],
+        require_root_owner: bool = True,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+        token_urlsafe: Callable[[int], str] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not allowed_uids or any(type(uid) is not int or uid < 0 for uid in allowed_uids):
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_ALLOWED_UIDS_INVALID")
+        self.policy_path = Path(policy_path)
+        self.registry_path = Path(registry_path)
+        self.owner_key_path = Path(owner_key_path)
+        self.allowed_uids = tuple(allowed_uids)
+        self.require_root_owner = require_root_owner
+        self.clock = clock
+        self.token_urlsafe = token_urlsafe
+        self.ledger = SQLiteOwnerMergeIssuanceLedger(issuance_ledger_path)
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if peer_uid not in self.allowed_uids:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_PEER_UID_FORBIDDEN")
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping) or set(request) != {"operation", "payload"}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        if request.get("operation") != ISSUE_OPERATION:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+        if request.get("payload") != {}:
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+
+        policy = _read_policy(
+            self.policy_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        _secure_regular(
+            self.owner_key_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        primary = RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier(
+            self.registry_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        verifier = OwnerMergeApprovalVerifier(primary=primary, clock=self.clock)
+
+        def expiry_of(response: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
+            if set(response) != {"status", "artifact"} or response.get("status") != "PASS":
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            artifact = response.get("artifact")
+            if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            payload = artifact.get("payload")
+            if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or type(payload.get("expires_at")) is not int:
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            return payload["expires_at"]
+
+        def validate_current(response: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+            expiry_of(response)
+            artifact = response["artifact"]
+            if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
+                _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+            try:
+                verifier.verify(artifact, policy)
+            except OwnerMergeApprovalError as exc:
+                raise OwnerMergeApprovalError("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID") from exc
+
+        def issue() -> dict[str, Any]:
+            kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
+            if self.token_urlsafe is not None:
+                kwargs["token_urlsafe"] = self.token_urlsafe
+            artifact = OwnerMergeApprovalAuthority(
+                self.owner_key_path,
+                policy,
+                require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+                clock=self.clock,
+                **kwargs,
+            ).issue()
+            value = _artifact_dict(artifact)
+            verifier.verify(value, policy)
+            return {"status": "PASS", "artifact": value}
+
+        response, idempotent = self.ledger.issue_once(
+            policy_digest=policy.digest,
+            now=int(self.clock()),
+            issuer=issue,
+            validate_current=validate_current,
+            expiry_of=expiry_of,
+        )
+        if set(response) != {"status", "artifact"} or response.get("status") != "PASS":
+            _fail("OWNER_MERGE_ISSUER_LEDGER_INVALID")
+        return {**response, "idempotent": idempotent}

active-runtime/app/aios_repository_discovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,967 @@
+"""Bounded, read-only discovery over a verified immutable Git repository.
+
+The module is deliberately independent from Task, lease, credential, worktree,
+and write code. Every public operation verifies the exact repository identity,
+resolves a floating ref once to a full commit OID, and then reads only that
+immutable snapshot.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from collections.abc import Iterable, Iterator, Mapping
+import fnmatch
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import subprocess
+import time
+
+from authoritative_git import AuthoritativeGitError, verify_repository
+
+
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
+_IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(
+    r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$"
+)
+_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS = frozenset({"cat-file", "diff", "ls-tree", "rev-parse"})
+_MAX_COMMAND_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
+_MAX_RECORD_BYTES = 1_048_576
+_MAX_LIMIT = 1_000
+_MAX_DEPTH = 32
+_MAX_BYTES = 1_048_576
+_MAX_GLOBS = 16
+_MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 512
+_MAX_CURSOR_LENGTH = 4_096
+_GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 8.0
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscoveryError(RuntimeError):
+    """A fail-closed repository discovery request error."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, *, status_code: int | None = None) -> None:
+        self.code = str(code)
+        self.status_code = (
+            status_code if status_code is not None else self._status_for(self.code)
+        )
+        super().__init__(self.code)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _status_for(code: str) -> int:
+        if "OUTPUT_LIMIT" in code:
+            return 413
+        if code.endswith("_NOT_FOUND"):
+            return 404
+        if code in {"REPOSITORY_NOT_ALLOWED", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH"}:
+            return 403
+        if code in {
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE",
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED",
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID",
+            "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET_REQUIRED",
+        }:
+            return 503
+        return 400
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscoveryNotFound(RepositoryDiscoveryError):
+    """A validated immutable object or path was not found."""
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscoveryOutputTooLarge(RepositoryDiscoveryError):
+    """A fixed read-only Git query exceeded its collection boundary."""
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+    return RepositoryDiscoveryError(code)
+
+
+def _request_mapping(request: Mapping[str, object]) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+    if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+    return request
+
+
+def _required_request_value(request: Mapping[str, object], field: str) -> object:
+    value = request.get(field)
+    if value is None:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Mapping[str, object]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True
+    ).encode("ascii")
+
+
+def _positive_int(value: object, field: str, maximum: int) -> int:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or not 1 <= value <= maximum:
+        raise _error(f"REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_{field.upper()}")
+    return value
+
+
+def _safe_relative_path(
+    value: object,
+    field: str,
+    *,
+    allow_empty: bool,
+    allow_glob: bool = False,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if "\\" in value:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if value in ("", "."):
+        if allow_empty:
+            return ""
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if value.startswith(("/", "-")) or "//" in value or ":" in value:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if not allow_glob and any(character in value for character in "*?["):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    parts = value.split("/")
+    if any(part in ("", ".", "..") for part in parts):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    if len(value) > 512:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _safe_glob(value: object) -> str:
+    return _safe_relative_path(value, "path_glob", allow_empty=False, allow_glob=True)
+
+
+def _safe_ref(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(
+        _REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
+        and ".." not in value
+        and "//" not in value
+        and "@{" not in value
+        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        and not any(part in ("", ".", "..") for part in value.split("/"))
+    )
+
+
+def _parse_tree_record(record: bytes) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    try:
+        header, raw_path = record.split(b"\t", 1)
+        mode, kind, oid = header.decode("ascii").split(" ", 2)
+        path = raw_path.decode("utf-8")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+    if kind not in {"blob", "tree", "commit"} or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+    try:
+        _safe_relative_path(path, "tree_path", allow_empty=False)
+    except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+        # Git permits filenames outside the public POSIX-relative contract.
+        # They are not exposed as usable discovery paths.
+        return None
+    return {"mode": mode, "type": kind, "object_oid": oid.lower(), "path": path}
+
+
+def _decode_output_path(raw: bytes) -> str:
+    try:
+        value = raw.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+    return _safe_relative_path(value, "git_output_path", allow_empty=False)
+
+
+class RepositoryDiscovery:
+    """Repository-scoped immutable Git discovery with signed cursors."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        allowed_repositories: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+        git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+        cursor_secret: str | bytes | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        configured = allowed_repositories
+        if configured is None:
+            configured = (os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""),)
+        identities = tuple(configured)
+        if not identities or any(
+            not isinstance(item, str) or not _IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(item)
+            for item in identities
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_ALLOWLIST_INVALID")
+        self._allowed_repositories = frozenset(identities)
+        self._git_dir = git_dir
+        secret = (
+            cursor_secret
+            if cursor_secret is not None
+            else os.getenv("AIOS_REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET", "")
+        )
+        if isinstance(secret, str):
+            secret = secret.encode("utf-8")
+        if not isinstance(secret, bytes) or len(secret) < 16:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_SECRET_REQUIRED")
+        self._cursor_secret = secret
+
+    def _repository_path(self, repository: object) -> Path:
+        if not isinstance(repository, str) or repository not in self._allowed_repositories:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_NOT_ALLOWED")
+        try:
+            path, actual_identity = verify_repository(
+                git_dir=self._git_dir,
+                repository_identity=repository,
+            )
+        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+            code = (
+                "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH"
+                if "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH" in str(exc)
+                else "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_UNAVAILABLE"
+            )
+            raise _error(code) from exc
+        if actual_identity != repository:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+        return path
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _git_env() -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            **os.environ,
+            "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": "1",
+            "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _run(
+        path: Path,
+        args: list[str],
+        *,
+        max_output: int = _MAX_COMMAND_OUTPUT,
+    ) -> bytes:
+        if not args or args[0] not in _READ_ONLY_COMMANDS:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_COMMAND_REJECTED")
+        output_limit = min(max_output, _MAX_COMMAND_OUTPUT)
+        process: subprocess.Popen[bytes] | None = None
+        try:
+            process = subprocess.Popen(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), *args],
+                shell=False,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                env=RepositoryDiscovery._git_env(),
+            )
+            assert process.stdout is not None
+            output = process.stdout.read(output_limit + 1)
+            if len(output) > output_limit:
+                process.kill()
+                process.wait(timeout=1)
+                raise RepositoryDiscoveryOutputTooLarge(
+                    "REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_OUTPUT_LIMIT"
+                )
+            returncode = process.wait(timeout=_GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+            raise
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+            if process is not None:
+                try:
+                    process.kill()
+                    process.wait(timeout=1)
+                except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+                    pass
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED") from exc
+        if returncode != 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+        return output
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _read_blob_prefix(path: Path, oid: str, maximum: int) -> tuple[bytes, bool]:
+        """Read at most maximum bytes plus one sentinel byte."""
+        process: subprocess.Popen[bytes] | None = None
+        try:
+            process = subprocess.Popen(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), "cat-file", "blob", oid],
+                shell=False,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                env=RepositoryDiscovery._git_env(),
+            )
+            assert process.stdout is not None
+            content = process.stdout.read(maximum + 1)
+            truncated = len(content) > maximum
+            if truncated:
+                process.kill()
+                process.wait(timeout=1)
+                return content[:maximum], True
+            if process.wait(timeout=_GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) != 0:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+            return content, False
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+            raise
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+            if process is not None:
+                try:
+                    process.kill()
+                    process.wait(timeout=1)
+                except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+                    pass
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED") from exc
+
+    def _iter_nul_records(self, path: Path, args: list[str]) -> Iterator[bytes]:
+        if not args or args[0] not in _READ_ONLY_COMMANDS:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_COMMAND_REJECTED")
+        process: subprocess.Popen[bytes] | None = None
+        buffer = b""
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        try:
+            process = subprocess.Popen(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), *args],
+                shell=False,
+                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                env=self._git_env(),
+            )
+            assert process.stdout is not None
+            while True:
+                if time.monotonic() - started > _GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+                chunk = process.stdout.read(64 * 1024)
+                if not chunk:
+                    break
+                buffer += chunk
+                if len(buffer) > _MAX_RECORD_BYTES and b"\0" not in buffer:
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+                while b"\0" in buffer:
+                    record, buffer = buffer.split(b"\0", 1)
+                    if len(record) > _MAX_RECORD_BYTES:
+                        raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+                    yield record
+            if buffer:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+            if process.wait(
+                timeout=max(0.1, _GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS - (time.monotonic() - started))
+            ) != 0:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+        except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+            raise
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED") from exc
+        finally:
+            if process is not None and process.poll() is None:
+                try:
+                    process.kill()
+                    process.wait(timeout=1)
+                except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+                    pass
+
+    def _resolve_at(self, path: Path, revision: object, field: str) -> str:
+        if (
+            not isinstance(revision, str)
+            or revision != revision.strip()
+            or not revision
+            or revision.startswith("-")
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_REVISION")
+        if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
+            candidates = [revision.lower()]
+        elif revision == "HEAD":
+            candidates = ["HEAD"]
+        elif _safe_ref(revision) and not any(
+            token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")
+        ):
+            if revision.startswith("refs/"):
+                if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_REVISION")
+                candidates = [revision]
+            else:
+                candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
+        else:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_INVALID_REVISION")
+        resolved: list[str] = []
+        for candidate in candidates:
+            try:
+                output = self._run(
+                    path,
+                    ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
+                    max_output=256,
+                )
+            except RepositoryDiscoveryError:
+                continue
+            oid = output.decode("ascii", errors="ignore").strip().lower()
+            if _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+                resolved.append(oid)
+        if not resolved:
+            raise RepositoryDiscoveryNotFound(
+                f"REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_{field.upper()}_NOT_FOUND"
+            )
+        if len(set(resolved)) != 1:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_AMBIGUOUS_REVISION")
+        return resolved[0]
+
+    def resolve_revision(self, repository: str, revision: str) -> str:
+        return self._resolve_at(self._repository_path(repository), revision, "revision")
+
+    def _cursor_offset(
+        self,
+        cursor: str | None,
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        repository: str,
+        resolved_oid: str,
+        query: Mapping[str, object],
+    ) -> int:
+        if cursor is None:
+            return 0
+        if (
+            not isinstance(cursor, str)
+            or not cursor
+            or len(cursor) > _MAX_CURSOR_LENGTH
+            or "." not in cursor
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        encoded, supplied_signature = cursor.split(".", 1)
+        try:
+            padded = encoded + "=" * (-len(encoded) % 4)
+            payload = json.loads(
+                base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded.encode("ascii")).decode("ascii")
+            )
+        except (UnicodeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID") from exc
+        expected_signature = hmac.new(
+            self._cursor_secret, encoded.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256
+        ).hexdigest()
+        if not hmac.compare_digest(supplied_signature, expected_signature):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        expected = {
+            "operation": operation,
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "query": dict(query),
+        }
+        if (
+            not isinstance(payload, dict)
+            or payload.get("v") != 1
+            or any(payload.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items())
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        offset = payload.get("offset")
+        if isinstance(offset, bool) or not isinstance(offset, int) or offset < 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_CURSOR_INVALID")
+        return offset
+
+    def _next_cursor(
+        self,
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        repository: str,
+        resolved_oid: str,
+        query: Mapping[str, object],
+        offset: int,
+    ) -> str:
+        payload = {
+            "v": 1,
+            "operation": operation,
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "query": dict(query),
+            "offset": offset,
+        }
+        encoded = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(_canonical(payload)).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+        signature = hmac.new(
+            self._cursor_secret, encoded.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256
+        ).hexdigest()
+        return f"{encoded}.{signature}"
+
+    def _iter_tree_entries(
+        self,
+        path: Path,
+        oid: str,
+        prefix: str,
+        *,
+        include_trees: bool,
+    ) -> Iterator[dict[str, str]]:
+        args = ["ls-tree", "-z", "-r", "--full-tree"]
+        if include_trees:
+            args.append("-t")
+        args.append(oid)
+        if prefix:
+            args.extend(["--", prefix])
+        for record in self._iter_nul_records(path, args):
+            entry = _parse_tree_record(record)
+            if entry is None:
+                continue
+            if not prefix or entry["path"] == prefix or entry["path"].startswith(prefix + "/"):
+                yield entry
+
+    def list_tree(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        revision: str,
+        prefix: str = "",
+        depth: int = 8,
+        limit: int = 100,
+        cursor: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        prefix = _safe_relative_path(prefix, "prefix", allow_empty=True)
+        depth = _positive_int(depth, "depth", _MAX_DEPTH)
+        limit = _positive_int(limit, "limit", _MAX_LIMIT)
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        resolved_oid = self._resolve_at(path, revision, "revision")
+        query = {"prefix": prefix, "depth": depth, "limit": limit}
+        offset = self._cursor_offset(
+            cursor,
+            operation="list_tree",
+            repository=repository,
+            resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+            query=query,
+        )
+        page: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        matched = 0
+        for entry in self._iter_tree_entries(path, resolved_oid, prefix, include_trees=True):
+            relative = entry["path"][len(prefix):].lstrip("/") if prefix else entry["path"]
+            if relative.count("/") + 1 > depth:
+                continue
+            if matched >= offset and len(page) < limit:
+                page.append(entry)
+            matched += 1
+        has_more = offset + len(page) < matched
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "entries": page,
+            "truncated": has_more,
+            "next_cursor": (
+                self._next_cursor(
+                    operation="list_tree",
+                    repository=repository,
+                    resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+                    query=query,
+                    offset=offset + len(page),
+                )
+                if has_more
+                else None
+            ),
+        }
+
+    def list_repository_tree(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        return self.list_tree(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            revision=request.get("revision", request.get("ref", "HEAD")),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            prefix=request.get("prefix", ""),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            depth=request.get("depth", 8),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            limit=request.get("limit", 100),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            cursor=request.get("cursor"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    def _blob_size(self, path: Path, oid: str) -> int:
+        output = self._run(path, ["cat-file", "-s", oid], max_output=128)
+        try:
+            size = int(output.decode("ascii").strip())
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+        if size < 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+        return size
+
+    def search_source(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        revision: str,
+        query: str,
+        path_globs: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+        max_matches: int = 100,
+        max_bytes: int = 262_144,
+        cursor: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        if (
+            not isinstance(query, str)
+            or not query
+            or "\x00" in query
+            or len(query) > _MAX_QUERY_LENGTH
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_QUERY_INVALID")
+        max_matches = _positive_int(max_matches, "max_matches", _MAX_LIMIT)
+        max_bytes = _positive_int(max_bytes, "max_bytes", _MAX_BYTES)
+        if path_globs is None:
+            globs = ("*",)
+        else:
+            if isinstance(path_globs, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(path_globs, Iterable):
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+            globs = tuple(_safe_glob(item) for item in path_globs)
+        if not globs or len(globs) > _MAX_GLOBS:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        resolved_oid = self._resolve_at(path, revision, "revision")
+        query_binding = {
+            "query": query,
+            "path_globs": list(globs),
+            "max_matches": max_matches,
+            "max_bytes": max_bytes,
+        }
+        offset = self._cursor_offset(
+            cursor,
+            operation="search_source",
+            repository=repository,
+            resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+            query=query_binding,
+        )
+        scanned_bytes = 0
+        skipped_for_bound = False
+        binary_blobs = 0
+        matched = 0
+        matches: list[dict[str, object]] = []
+        has_more = False
+        for entry in self._iter_tree_entries(path, resolved_oid, "", include_trees=False):
+            if entry["type"] != "blob" or not any(
+                fnmatch.fnmatchcase(entry["path"], pattern) for pattern in globs
+            ):
+                continue
+            blob_size = self._blob_size(path, entry["object_oid"])
+            remaining = max_bytes - scanned_bytes
+            if blob_size > remaining:
+                skipped_for_bound = True
+                continue
+            raw, clipped = self._read_blob_prefix(path, entry["object_oid"], blob_size)
+            if clipped:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_FAILED")
+            scanned_bytes += len(raw)
+            if b"\0" in raw:
+                binary_blobs += 1
+                continue
+            text = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+            for number, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
+                if query not in line:
+                    continue
+                if matched < offset:
+                    matched += 1
+                    continue
+                if len(matches) >= max_matches:
+                    has_more = True
+                    break
+                matches.append(
+                    {
+                        "path": entry["path"],
+                        "line_start": number,
+                        "line_end": number,
+                        "blob_oid": entry["object_oid"],
+                        "snippet": line[:512],
+                    }
+                )
+                matched += 1
+            if has_more:
+                break
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "matches": matches,
+            "scanned_bytes": scanned_bytes,
+            "max_bytes": max_bytes,
+            "binary_blobs_skipped": binary_blobs,
+            "truncated": bool(has_more or skipped_for_bound),
+            "next_cursor": (
+                self._next_cursor(
+                    operation="search_source",
+                    repository=repository,
+                    resolved_oid=resolved_oid,
+                    query=query_binding,
+                    offset=offset + len(matches),
+                )
+                if has_more
+                else None
+            ),
+        }
+
+    def search_repository_source(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        path_globs = request.get("path_globs")
+        if path_globs is not None and (
+            isinstance(path_globs, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(path_globs, Iterable)
+        ):
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+        return self.search_source(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            revision=request.get("revision", request.get("ref", "HEAD")),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            query=_required_request_value(request, "query"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            path_globs=path_globs,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            max_matches=request.get("max_matches", 100),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            max_bytes=request.get("max_bytes", 262_144),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            cursor=request.get("cursor"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    def _iter_diff_name_entries(
+        self,
+        path: Path,
+        from_oid: str,
+        to_oid: str,
+        prefix: str,
+    ) -> Iterator[dict[str, object]]:
+        suffix = ["--", prefix] if prefix else []
+        records = self._iter_nul_records(
+            path,
+            [
+                "diff",
+                "--no-ext-diff",
+                "--no-textconv",
+                "--find-renames=50%",
+                "--name-status",
+                "-z",
+                from_oid,
+                to_oid,
+                *suffix,
+            ],
+        )
+        iterator = iter(records)
+        while True:
+            try:
+                status_raw = next(iterator)
+            except StopIteration:
+                return
+            try:
+                status = status_raw.decode("ascii")
+            except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+            if not status or status[0] not in {"A", "C", "D", "M", "R", "T", "U", "X"}:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+            try:
+                if status[0] in {"R", "C"}:
+                    old_path = _decode_output_path(next(iterator))
+                    new_path = _decode_output_path(next(iterator))
+                    yield {
+                        "status": status,
+                        "path": new_path,
+                        "old_path": old_path,
+                    }
+                else:
+                    yield {
+                        "status": status,
+                        "path": _decode_output_path(next(iterator)),
+                        "old_path": None,
+                    }
+            except StopIteration as exc:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _parse_numstat_count(value: bytes) -> int | None:
+        if value == b"-":
+            return None
+        try:
+            parsed = int(value.decode("ascii"), 10)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+        if parsed < 0:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+        return parsed
+
+    def _diff_stats(
+        self,
+        path: Path,
+        from_oid: str,
+        to_oid: str,
+        prefix: str,
+        wanted_paths: set[str],
+    ) -> dict[str, tuple[int | None, int | None]]:
+        suffix = ["--", prefix] if prefix else []
+        records = self._iter_nul_records(
+            path,
+            [
+                "diff",
+                "--no-ext-diff",
+                "--no-textconv",
+                "--find-renames=50%",
+                "--numstat",
+                "-z",
+                from_oid,
+                to_oid,
+                *suffix,
+            ],
+        )
+        iterator = iter(records)
+        stats: dict[str, tuple[int | None, int | None]] = {}
+        for row in iterator:
+            if not row:
+                continue
+            fields = row.split(b"\t", 2)
+            if len(fields) != 3:
+                raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID")
+            additions = self._parse_numstat_count(fields[0])
+            deletions = self._parse_numstat_count(fields[1])
+            if fields[2]:
+                stat_path = _decode_output_path(fields[2])
+            else:
+                try:
+                    next(iterator)  # old path
+                    stat_path = _decode_output_path(next(iterator))
+                except StopIteration as exc:
+                    raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_GIT_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
+            if stat_path in wanted_paths:
+                stats[stat_path] = (additions, deletions)
+                if wanted_paths <= set(stats):
+                    break
+        return stats
+
+    def diff_index(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        from_revision: str,
+        to_revision: str,
+        prefix: str = "",
+        limit: int = 100,
+        cursor: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        prefix = _safe_relative_path(prefix, "prefix", allow_empty=True)
+        limit = _positive_int(limit, "limit", _MAX_LIMIT)
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        from_oid = self._resolve_at(path, from_revision, "from")
+        to_oid = self._resolve_at(path, to_revision, "to")
+        query = {
+            "from_oid": from_oid,
+            "to_oid": to_oid,
+            "prefix": prefix,
+            "limit": limit,
+        }
+        offset = self._cursor_offset(
+            cursor,
+            operation="diff_index",
+            repository=repository,
+            resolved_oid=to_oid,
+            query=query,
+        )
+        page: list[dict[str, object]] = []
+        total = 0
+        for entry in self._iter_diff_name_entries(path, from_oid, to_oid, prefix):
+            if total >= offset and len(page) < limit:
+                page.append(entry)
+            total += 1
+        wanted_paths = {str(entry["path"]) for entry in page}
+        stat_by_path = (
+            self._diff_stats(path, from_oid, to_oid, prefix, wanted_paths)
+            if page
+            else {}
+        )
+        for entry in page:
+            additions, deletions = stat_by_path.get(
+                str(entry["path"]), (None, None)
+            )
+            entry["additions"] = additions
+            entry["deletions"] = deletions
+        has_more = offset + len(page) < total
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_from_oid": from_oid,
+            "resolved_to_oid": to_oid,
+            "entries": page,
+            "truncated": has_more,
+            "next_cursor": (
+                self._next_cursor(
+                    operation="diff_index",
+                    repository=repository,
+                    resolved_oid=to_oid,
+                    query=query,
+                    offset=offset + len(page),
+                )
+                if has_more
+                else None
+            ),
+        }
+
+    def get_diff_index(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        from_revision = request.get("from_revision", request.get("from"))
+        to_revision = request.get("to_revision", request.get("to"))
+        prefix = request.get("prefix", request.get("path_prefix", ""))
+        if from_revision is None or to_revision is None:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        return self.diff_index(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            from_revision=from_revision,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            to_revision=to_revision,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            prefix=prefix,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            limit=request.get("limit", 100),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            cursor=request.get("cursor"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    def read_file(
+        self,
+        *,
+        repository: str,
+        revision: str,
+        file_path: str,
+        max_bytes: int = 262_144,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        file_path = _safe_relative_path(file_path, "file_path", allow_empty=False)
+        max_bytes = _positive_int(max_bytes, "max_bytes", _MAX_BYTES)
+        path = self._repository_path(repository)
+        resolved_oid = self._resolve_at(path, revision, "revision")
+        exact: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        for entry in self._iter_tree_entries(
+            path, resolved_oid, file_path, include_trees=False
+        ):
+            if entry["path"] == file_path and entry["type"] == "blob":
+                exact.append(entry)
+        if len(exact) != 1:
+            raise RepositoryDiscoveryNotFound("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_FILE_NOT_FOUND")
+        blob_oid = exact[0]["object_oid"]
+        content, truncated = self._read_blob_prefix(path, blob_oid, max_bytes)
+        return {
+            "repository": repository,
+            "resolved_oid": resolved_oid,
+            "blob_oid": blob_oid,
+            "path": file_path,
+            "content": content.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
+            "content_base64": base64.b64encode(content).decode("ascii"),
+            "content_bytes": len(content),
+            "truncated": truncated,
+        }
+
+    def read_repository_file(self, request: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        request = _request_mapping(request)
+        file_path = request.get("file_path", request.get("path"))
+        if file_path is None:
+            raise _error("REPOSITORY_DISCOVERY_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        return self.read_file(
+            repository=_required_request_value(request, "repository"),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            revision=request.get("revision", request.get("ref", "HEAD")),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            file_path=file_path,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            max_bytes=request.get("max_bytes", 262_144),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+
+def create_repository_discovery(
+    *,
+    allowed_repositories: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    cursor_secret: str | bytes | None = None,
+) -> RepositoryDiscovery:
+    return RepositoryDiscovery(
+        allowed_repositories=allowed_repositories,
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+        cursor_secret=cursor_secret,
+    )
+
+
+def list_repository_tree(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).list_repository_tree(request)
+
+
+def search_repository_source(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).search_repository_source(request)
+
+
+def get_diff_index(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).get_diff_index(request)
+
+
+def read_repository_file(
+    request: Mapping[str, object], *, discovery: RepositoryDiscovery | None = None
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return (discovery or create_repository_discovery()).read_repository_file(request)

active-runtime/app/aios_single_host_operational_authority.py

@@ -0,0 +1,707 @@
+"""Single-host operational delegation for AIOS migration.
+
+This module is deliberately narrow:
+* Owner signs only OperationalDelegation and ExpiredTaskRecoveryDecision.
+* Machine signer signs only WorkerRuntimeBinding and WorkerRuntimeProof.
+* Every object is bound to one immutable Task identity and a narrow capability set.
+* There is no arbitrary sign-bytes API.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import (
+    DEFAULT_MACHINE_SIGNER_ID,
+    DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID,
+    MACHINE_NAMESPACE,
+    OWNER_IDENTITY,
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    LocalFileSigner,
+    RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier,
+    SignerRegistry,
+    SingleHostAuthorityError,
+    canonical_json_bytes,
+    sha256_json,
+    verify_sshsig,
+)
+
+OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA = "aios.single-host-operational-policy.v1"
+OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCHEMA = "aios.owner-operational-delegation.v1"
+RECOVERY_DECISION_SCHEMA = "aios.expired-task-recovery-decision.v1"
+WORKER_BINDING_SCHEMA = "aios.worker-runtime-binding.v1"
+WORKER_PROOF_SCHEMA = "aios.worker-runtime-proof.v1"
+REVOCATION_SCHEMA = "aios.operational-revocations.v1"
+
+ALLOWED_OPERATIONAL_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({
+    "task.recovery",
+    "worker.runtime.bind",
+    "worker.runtime.proof",
+    "task.claim.guard",
+})
+ALLOWED_EXPECTED_STATE = "EXPIRED"
+HEX40 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+SAFE_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,511}$")
+CAP = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+
+
+class OperationalAuthorityError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OperationalAuthorityError(code)
+
+
+def _exact_fields(value: Mapping[str, Any], fields: set[str], code: str) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or set(value) != fields:
+        fail(code)
+
+
+def _safe_id(value: str, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(value):
+        fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _hex(value: str, n: int, code: str) -> str:
+    regex = HEX40 if n == 40 else HEX64
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not regex.fullmatch(value):
+        fail(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _caps(value: Sequence[str], code: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not isinstance(value, (list, tuple)) or not value:
+        fail(code)
+    out = tuple(sorted(set(value)))
+    if len(out) != len(value) or any(not isinstance(x, str) or not CAP.fullmatch(x) for x in out):
+        fail(code)
+    return out
+
+
+def task_identity_sha256(task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Digest only immutable recovery/claim identity fields.
+
+    Revision, state, attempt and deadline are intentionally excluded.
+    """
+    fields = (
+        "task_id", "repository", "target_branch", "base_oid", "generation",
+        "execution_plan_sha256", "external_job_identity",
+    )
+    try:
+        value = {name: task[name] for name in fields}
+    except KeyError as exc:
+        raise OperationalAuthorityError("TASK_IDENTITY_FIELD_MISSING") from exc
+    _safe_id(str(value["task_id"]), "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    _safe_id(str(value["repository"]), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+    _safe_id(str(value["target_branch"]), "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    _hex(str(value["base_oid"]), 40, "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+    if type(value["generation"]) is not int or value["generation"] < 1:
+        fail("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    _hex(str(value["execution_plan_sha256"]), 64, "EXECUTION_PLAN_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    _safe_id(str(value["external_job_identity"]), "EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class OperationalPolicy:
+    repository: str
+    task_id: str
+    task_identity_sha256: str
+    target_branch: str
+    base_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    execution_plan_sha256: str
+    external_job_identity: str
+    allowed_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+    allowed_worker_ids: tuple[str, ...]
+    maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_binding_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_proof_ttl_seconds: int
+    maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds: int
+    maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds: int
+    schema: str = OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA
+
+    def validate(self) -> None:
+        if self.schema != OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.repository, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.task_id, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_TASK_ID_INVALID")
+        _hex(self.task_identity_sha256, 64, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_TASK_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.target_branch, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_BRANCH_INVALID")
+        _hex(self.base_oid, 40, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        if type(self.generation) is not int or self.generation < 1:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_GENERATION_INVALID")
+        _hex(self.execution_plan_sha256, 64, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_PLAN_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(self.external_job_identity, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_JOB_INVALID")
+        caps = _caps(self.allowed_capabilities, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+        if not set(caps).issubset(ALLOWED_OPERATIONAL_CAPABILITIES):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_CAPABILITY_WIDENING")
+        if not self.allowed_worker_ids or any(not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(x) for x in self.allowed_worker_ids):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_WORKERS_INVALID")
+        bounds = (
+            (self.maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds, 300, 7 * 24 * 3600),
+            (self.maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds, 30, 900),
+            (self.maximum_binding_ttl_seconds, 60, 24 * 3600),
+            (self.maximum_proof_ttl_seconds, 15, 900),
+            (self.maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds, 5, 300),
+            (self.maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds, 300, 24 * 3600),
+        )
+        if any(type(v) is not int or not lo <= v <= hi for v, lo, hi in bounds):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_TTL_INVALID")
+
+    @property
+    def digest(self) -> str:
+        self.validate()
+        return sha256_json(asdict(self))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "OperationalPolicy":
+        fields = set(cls.__dataclass_fields__)
+        _exact_fields(value, fields, "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        try:
+            policy = cls(
+                repository=value["repository"],
+                task_id=value["task_id"],
+                task_identity_sha256=value["task_identity_sha256"],
+                target_branch=value["target_branch"],
+                base_oid=value["base_oid"],
+                generation=value["generation"],
+                execution_plan_sha256=value["execution_plan_sha256"],
+                external_job_identity=value["external_job_identity"],
+                allowed_capabilities=tuple(value["allowed_capabilities"]),
+                allowed_worker_ids=tuple(value["allowed_worker_ids"]),
+                maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_binding_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_binding_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_proof_ttl_seconds=value["maximum_proof_ttl_seconds"],
+                maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds=value["maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds"],
+                maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds=value["maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds"],
+                schema=value["schema"],
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise OperationalAuthorityError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_FIELDS_INVALID") from exc
+        policy.validate()
+        return policy
+
+
+def build_exact_policy(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    worker_id: str,
+    allowed_capabilities: Sequence[str] = tuple(sorted(ALLOWED_OPERATIONAL_CAPABILITIES)),
+) -> OperationalPolicy:
+    identity = task_identity_sha256(task)
+    policy = OperationalPolicy(
+        repository=str(task["repository"]),
+        task_id=str(task["task_id"]),
+        task_identity_sha256=identity,
+        target_branch=str(task["target_branch"]),
+        base_oid=str(task["base_oid"]),
+        generation=int(task["generation"]),
+        execution_plan_sha256=str(task["execution_plan_sha256"]),
+        external_job_identity=str(task["external_job_identity"]),
+        allowed_capabilities=tuple(sorted(allowed_capabilities)),
+        allowed_worker_ids=(worker_id,),
+        maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds=24 * 3600,
+        maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds=300,
+        maximum_binding_ttl_seconds=4 * 3600,
+        maximum_proof_ttl_seconds=300,
+        maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds=30,
+        maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds=4 * 3600,
+    )
+    policy.validate()
+    return policy
+
+
+def _signed_payload_dict(payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, key_id: str, namespace: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    value = dict(payload)
+    value["signature_namespace"] = namespace
+    value["signature_key_id"] = key_id
+    value["canonical_payload_digest"] = sha256_json(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def _verify_digest_field(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or "canonical_payload_digest" not in payload:
+        return False
+    value = dict(payload)
+    supplied = value.pop("canonical_payload_digest", None)
+    return isinstance(supplied, str) and supplied == sha256_json(value)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class SignedOperationalArtifact:
+    payload: dict[str, Any]
+    signature: str
+    key_id: str
+    namespace: str
+
+    @property
+    def canonical_payload(self) -> bytes:
+        return canonical_json_bytes(self.payload)
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return hashlib.sha256(self.canonical_payload).hexdigest()
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "payload": dict(self.payload),
+            "signature": self.signature,
+            "key_id": self.key_id,
+            "namespace": self.namespace,
+        }
+
+
+class OperationalOwnerAuthority:
+    def __init__(self, key_path: Path, policy: OperationalPolicy, *, require_root_owner: bool = True, clock: Any = time.time):
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.signer = LocalFileSigner(
+            Path(key_path),
+            signer_id=DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID,
+            namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+            require_root_owner=require_root_owner,
+        )
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    @property
+    def fingerprint(self) -> str:
+        return self.signer.fingerprint
+
+    def _sign(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        full = _signed_payload_dict(payload, key_id=self.fingerprint, namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE)
+        art = self.signer._sign_canonical(full)
+        return SignedOperationalArtifact(dict(art.payload), art.signature, art.key_id, art.namespace)
+
+    def issue_operational_delegation(self, *, delegation_id: str, nonce: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        p = self.policy
+        if not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(delegation_id) or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(nonce):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_ID_INVALID")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= p.maximum_delegation_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_TTL_INVALID")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCHEMA,
+            "delegation_id": delegation_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "owner_identity": OWNER_IDENTITY,
+            "repository": p.repository,
+            "task_id": p.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": p.task_identity_sha256,
+            "target_branch": p.target_branch,
+            "base_oid": p.base_oid,
+            "generation": p.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": p.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "external_job_identity": p.external_job_identity,
+            "allowed_capabilities": list(p.allowed_capabilities),
+            "allowed_worker_ids": list(p.allowed_worker_ids),
+            "policy_digest": p.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+            "revocation_epoch": 0,
+            "status": "ACTIVE",
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+    def issue_recovery_decision(
+        self,
+        delegation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        decision_id: str,
+        nonce: str,
+        expected_revision: int,
+        expected_attempt: int,
+        original_deadline: int,
+        new_deadline: int,
+        ttl_seconds: int,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        verify_delegation_scope(delegation, self.policy, now=now)
+        if "task.recovery" not in delegation["allowed_capabilities"]:
+            fail("RECOVERY_CAPABILITY_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        if not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(decision_id) or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(nonce):
+            fail("RECOVERY_DECISION_ID_INVALID")
+        if type(expected_revision) is not int or expected_revision < 0 or type(expected_attempt) is not int or expected_attempt < 0:
+            fail("RECOVERY_CAS_INVALID")
+        if type(original_deadline) is not int or type(new_deadline) is not int:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DEADLINE_INVALID")
+        if new_deadline <= now or new_deadline <= original_deadline:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DEADLINE_INVALID")
+        if new_deadline - now > self.policy.maximum_task_deadline_extension_seconds:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DEADLINE_WIDENING")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 15 <= ttl_seconds <= self.policy.maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("RECOVERY_DECISION_TTL_INVALID")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": RECOVERY_DECISION_SCHEMA,
+            "decision_id": decision_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "parent_delegation_id": delegation["delegation_id"],
+            "parent_delegation_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest(),
+            "task_id": self.policy.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": self.policy.task_identity_sha256,
+            "expected_state": ALLOWED_EXPECTED_STATE,
+            "expected_revision": expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": expected_attempt,
+            "original_deadline": original_deadline,
+            "new_deadline": new_deadline,
+            "repository": self.policy.repository,
+            "target_branch": self.policy.target_branch,
+            "base_oid": self.policy.base_oid,
+            "generation": self.policy.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": self.policy.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "external_job_identity": self.policy.external_job_identity,
+            "policy_digest": self.policy.digest,
+            "one_time_use": True,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+
+class OperationalMachineAuthority:
+    def __init__(self, key_path: Path, policy: OperationalPolicy, *, require_root_owner: bool = True, clock: Any = time.time):
+        policy.validate()
+        self.policy = policy
+        self.signer = LocalFileSigner(
+            Path(key_path),
+            signer_id=DEFAULT_MACHINE_SIGNER_ID,
+            namespace=MACHINE_NAMESPACE,
+            require_root_owner=require_root_owner,
+        )
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    @property
+    def fingerprint(self) -> str:
+        return self.signer.fingerprint
+
+    def _sign(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        full = _signed_payload_dict(payload, key_id=self.fingerprint, namespace=MACHINE_NAMESPACE)
+        art = self.signer._sign_canonical(full)
+        return SignedOperationalArtifact(dict(art.payload), art.signature, art.key_id, art.namespace)
+
+    def issue_runtime_binding(
+        self,
+        delegation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding_id: str,
+        nonce: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        runtime_id: str,
+        runtime_sha256: str,
+        task_contract_version: str,
+        supported_contract_versions: Sequence[str],
+        required_capabilities: Sequence[str],
+        worker_capabilities: Sequence[str],
+        max_concurrency: int,
+        ttl_seconds: int,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        p = self.policy
+        verify_delegation_scope(delegation, p, now=now)
+        if "worker.runtime.bind" not in delegation["allowed_capabilities"]:
+            fail("RUNTIME_BIND_CAPABILITY_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        if worker_id not in p.allowed_worker_ids:
+            fail("WORKER_ID_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        for val, code in [(binding_id, "BINDING_ID_INVALID"), (nonce, "BINDING_NONCE_INVALID"), (worker_id, "WORKER_ID_INVALID"), (runtime_id, "RUNTIME_ID_INVALID"), (task_contract_version, "CONTRACT_VERSION_INVALID")]:
+            _safe_id(val, code)
+        _hex(runtime_sha256, 64, "RUNTIME_SHA256_INVALID")
+        supported = tuple(sorted(set(supported_contract_versions)))
+        if task_contract_version not in supported or not supported or any(not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(x) for x in supported):
+            fail("CONTRACT_INCOMPATIBLE")
+        required = _caps(required_capabilities, "REQUIRED_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+        worker_caps = _caps(worker_capabilities, "WORKER_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+        if not set(required).issubset(set(worker_caps)):
+            fail("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH")
+        if type(max_concurrency) is not int or not 1 <= max_concurrency <= 64:
+            fail("MAX_CONCURRENCY_INVALID")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 30 <= ttl_seconds <= p.maximum_binding_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("BINDING_TTL_INVALID")
+        if now + ttl_seconds > int(delegation["expires_at"]):
+            fail("BINDING_EXCEEDS_PARENT")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": WORKER_BINDING_SCHEMA,
+            "binding_id": binding_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "parent_delegation_id": delegation["delegation_id"],
+            "parent_delegation_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest(),
+            "repository": p.repository,
+            "task_id": p.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": p.task_identity_sha256,
+            "target_branch": p.target_branch,
+            "base_oid": p.base_oid,
+            "generation": p.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": p.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "external_job_identity": p.external_job_identity,
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "runtime_id": runtime_id,
+            "runtime_sha256": runtime_sha256,
+            "task_contract_version": task_contract_version,
+            "supported_contract_versions": list(supported),
+            "required_capabilities": list(required),
+            "worker_capabilities": list(worker_caps),
+            "max_concurrency": max_concurrency,
+            "policy_digest": p.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+    def issue_runtime_proof(
+        self,
+        delegation: Mapping[str, Any],
+        binding: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        proof_id: str,
+        nonce: str,
+        heartbeat_at: int,
+        adapter_readiness: bool,
+        resource_readiness: bool,
+        active_claim_count: int,
+        ttl_seconds: int,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        p = self.policy
+        verify_delegation_scope(delegation, p, now=now)
+        verify_binding_scope(binding, delegation, p, now=now)
+        if "worker.runtime.proof" not in delegation["allowed_capabilities"]:
+            fail("RUNTIME_PROOF_CAPABILITY_NOT_DELEGATED")
+        _safe_id(proof_id, "PROOF_ID_INVALID")
+        _safe_id(nonce, "PROOF_NONCE_INVALID")
+        if type(heartbeat_at) is not int or heartbeat_at > now + 5 or now - heartbeat_at > p.maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds:
+            fail("HEARTBEAT_STALE")
+        if adapter_readiness is not True or resource_readiness is not True:
+            fail("RUNTIME_NOT_READY")
+        if type(active_claim_count) is not int or active_claim_count < 0 or active_claim_count >= int(binding["max_concurrency"]):
+            fail("MAX_CONCURRENCY_REACHED")
+        if type(ttl_seconds) is not int or not 10 <= ttl_seconds <= p.maximum_proof_ttl_seconds:
+            fail("PROOF_TTL_INVALID")
+        if now + ttl_seconds > min(int(binding["expires_at"]), int(delegation["expires_at"])):
+            fail("PROOF_EXCEEDS_PARENT")
+        payload = {
+            "schema": WORKER_PROOF_SCHEMA,
+            "proof_id": proof_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "parent_delegation_id": delegation["delegation_id"],
+            "parent_delegation_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest(),
+            "binding_id": binding["binding_id"],
+            "binding_digest": hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(binding))).hexdigest(),
+            "repository": p.repository,
+            "task_id": p.task_id,
+            "task_identity_sha256": p.task_identity_sha256,
+            "generation": p.generation,
+            "execution_plan_sha256": p.execution_plan_sha256,
+            "worker_id": binding["worker_id"],
+            "runtime_id": binding["runtime_id"],
+            "runtime_sha256": binding["runtime_sha256"],
+            "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at,
+            "adapter_readiness": True,
+            "resource_readiness": True,
+            "active_claim_count": active_claim_count,
+            "max_concurrency": binding["max_concurrency"],
+            "policy_digest": p.digest,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "expires_at": now + ttl_seconds,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)
+
+
+DELEGATION_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","delegation_id","nonce","owner_identity","repository","task_id",
+    "task_identity_sha256","target_branch","base_oid","generation","execution_plan_sha256",
+    "external_job_identity","allowed_capabilities","allowed_worker_ids","policy_digest",
+    "issued_at","not_before","expires_at","revocation_epoch","status",
+    "signature_namespace","signature_key_id","canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+BINDING_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","binding_id","nonce","parent_delegation_id","parent_delegation_digest",
+    "repository","task_id","task_identity_sha256","target_branch","base_oid","generation",
+    "execution_plan_sha256","external_job_identity","worker_id","runtime_id","runtime_sha256",
+    "task_contract_version","supported_contract_versions","required_capabilities","worker_capabilities",
+    "max_concurrency","policy_digest","issued_at","not_before","expires_at",
+    "signature_namespace","signature_key_id","canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+PROOF_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","proof_id","nonce","parent_delegation_id","parent_delegation_digest",
+    "binding_id","binding_digest","repository","task_id","task_identity_sha256","generation",
+    "execution_plan_sha256","worker_id","runtime_id","runtime_sha256","heartbeat_at",
+    "adapter_readiness","resource_readiness","active_claim_count","max_concurrency",
+    "policy_digest","issued_at","expires_at","signature_namespace","signature_key_id",
+    "canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+RECOVERY_FIELDS = {
+    "schema","decision_id","nonce","parent_delegation_id","parent_delegation_digest",
+    "task_id","task_identity_sha256","expected_state","expected_revision","expected_attempt",
+    "original_deadline","new_deadline","repository","target_branch","base_oid","generation",
+    "execution_plan_sha256","external_job_identity","policy_digest","one_time_use",
+    "issued_at","not_before","expires_at","signature_namespace","signature_key_id",
+    "canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+
+
+def verify_delegation_scope(value: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    policy.validate()
+    _exact_fields(value, DELEGATION_FIELDS, "OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    if (
+        value["schema"] != OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCHEMA
+        or value["status"] != "ACTIVE"
+        or value["revocation_epoch"] != 0
+        or value["owner_identity"] != OWNER_IDENTITY
+        or value["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or value["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or value["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or value["target_branch"] != policy.target_branch
+        or value["base_oid"] != policy.base_oid
+        or value["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or value["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or value["external_job_identity"] != policy.external_job_identity
+        or value["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or not set(value["allowed_capabilities"]).issubset(set(policy.allowed_capabilities))
+        or not set(value["allowed_worker_ids"]).issubset(set(policy.allowed_worker_ids))
+        or value["signature_namespace"] != OWNER_NAMESPACE
+        or not _verify_digest_field(value)
+        or not int(value["not_before"]) <= now < int(value["expires_at"])
+    ):
+        fail("OPERATIONAL_DELEGATION_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+
+def verify_binding_scope(binding: Mapping[str, Any], delegation: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    _exact_fields(binding, BINDING_FIELDS, "WORKER_BINDING_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    expected_parent = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest()
+    if (
+        binding["schema"] != WORKER_BINDING_SCHEMA
+        or binding["parent_delegation_id"] != delegation["delegation_id"]
+        or binding["parent_delegation_digest"] != expected_parent
+        or binding["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or binding["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or binding["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or binding["target_branch"] != policy.target_branch
+        or binding["base_oid"] != policy.base_oid
+        or binding["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or binding["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or binding["external_job_identity"] != policy.external_job_identity
+        or binding["worker_id"] not in policy.allowed_worker_ids
+        or binding["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or binding["signature_namespace"] != MACHINE_NAMESPACE
+        or not _verify_digest_field(binding)
+        or not int(binding["not_before"]) <= now < int(binding["expires_at"])
+    ):
+        fail("WORKER_BINDING_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    required = set(binding["required_capabilities"])
+    worker = set(binding["worker_capabilities"])
+    if not required.issubset(worker) or binding["task_contract_version"] not in binding["supported_contract_versions"]:
+        fail("WORKER_BINDING_COMPATIBILITY_INVALID")
+
+
+def verify_proof_scope(proof: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Mapping[str, Any], delegation: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    _exact_fields(proof, PROOF_FIELDS, "WORKER_PROOF_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    if (
+        proof["schema"] != WORKER_PROOF_SCHEMA
+        or proof["parent_delegation_id"] != delegation["delegation_id"]
+        or proof["parent_delegation_digest"] != hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest()
+        or proof["binding_id"] != binding["binding_id"]
+        or proof["binding_digest"] != hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(binding))).hexdigest()
+        or proof["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or proof["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or proof["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or proof["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or proof["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or proof["worker_id"] != binding["worker_id"]
+        or proof["runtime_id"] != binding["runtime_id"]
+        or proof["runtime_sha256"] != binding["runtime_sha256"]
+        or proof["max_concurrency"] != binding["max_concurrency"]
+        or proof["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or proof["signature_namespace"] != MACHINE_NAMESPACE
+        or proof["adapter_readiness"] is not True
+        or proof["resource_readiness"] is not True
+        or not _verify_digest_field(proof)
+        or not now < int(proof["expires_at"])
+        or now - int(proof["heartbeat_at"]) > policy.maximum_heartbeat_age_seconds
+        or int(proof["active_claim_count"]) >= int(proof["max_concurrency"])
+    ):
+        fail("WORKER_PROOF_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+
+def verify_recovery_scope(decision: Mapping[str, Any], delegation: Mapping[str, Any], policy: OperationalPolicy, *, now: int | None = None) -> None:
+    _exact_fields(decision, RECOVERY_FIELDS, "RECOVERY_DECISION_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else int(now)
+    if (
+        decision["schema"] != RECOVERY_DECISION_SCHEMA
+        or decision["parent_delegation_id"] != delegation["delegation_id"]
+        or decision["parent_delegation_digest"] != hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(dict(delegation))).hexdigest()
+        or decision["task_id"] != policy.task_id
+        or decision["task_identity_sha256"] != policy.task_identity_sha256
+        or decision["expected_state"] != "EXPIRED"
+        or decision["repository"] != policy.repository
+        or decision["target_branch"] != policy.target_branch
+        or decision["base_oid"] != policy.base_oid
+        or decision["generation"] != policy.generation
+        or decision["execution_plan_sha256"] != policy.execution_plan_sha256
+        or decision["external_job_identity"] != policy.external_job_identity
+        or decision["policy_digest"] != policy.digest
+        or decision["one_time_use"] is not True
+        or decision["signature_namespace"] != OWNER_NAMESPACE
+        or not _verify_digest_field(decision)
+        or not int(decision["not_before"]) <= now < int(decision["expires_at"])
+        or int(decision["new_deadline"]) <= now
+    ):
+        fail("RECOVERY_DECISION_SCOPE_INVALID")
+
+
+class OperationalVerifier:
+    """Verify signatures through the public root-owned SignerRegistry."""
+
+    def __init__(self, registry_path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool = True):
+        self.registry_path = Path(registry_path)
+        self.require_root_owner = require_root_owner
+
+    def _verify(self, artifact: SignedOperationalArtifact | Mapping[str, Any], *, role: str, signer_id: str, namespace: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if isinstance(artifact, SignedOperationalArtifact):
+            payload, signature, key_id, artifact_namespace = artifact.payload, artifact.signature, artifact.key_id, artifact.namespace
+        else:
+            _exact_fields(artifact, {"payload","signature","key_id","namespace"}, "SIGNED_ARTIFACT_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            payload, signature, key_id, artifact_namespace = artifact["payload"], artifact["signature"], artifact["key_id"], artifact["namespace"]
+        if artifact_namespace != namespace:
+            fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_NAMESPACE_INVALID")
+        registry = SignerRegistry(self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner)
+        rec = registry.require(signer_id, role=role)
+        if rec.fingerprint != key_id:
+            fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_KEY_ID_INVALID")
+        if role == "MACHINE_OPERATIONAL":
+            owner_rec = registry.require(DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID, role="OWNER_AUTHORITY")
+            if rec.parent_signer_id != owner_rec.signer_id or rec.parent_fingerprint != owner_rec.fingerprint:
+                fail("MACHINE_PARENT_BINDING_INVALID")
+        # RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier handles Owner namespace; generic machine uses registry public key.
+        if role == "OWNER_AUTHORITY":
+            verifier = RegistryOwnerApprovalVerifier(self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner, signer_id=signer_id)
+            ok = verifier.verify(namespace=namespace, payload=canonical_json_bytes(payload), signature=signature, key_id=key_id)
+        else:
+            from aios_single_host_authority import _load_public_key_line
+            pub = _load_public_key_line(rec.public_key)
+            ok = verify_sshsig(pub, canonical_json_bytes(payload), signature, namespace=namespace, expected_key_id=key_id)
+        if not ok:
+            fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+        return dict(payload)
+
+    def owner(self, artifact: SignedOperationalArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._verify(artifact, role="OWNER_AUTHORITY", signer_id=DEFAULT_OWNER_SIGNER_ID, namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE)
+
+    def machine(self, artifact: SignedOperationalArtifact | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._verify(artifact, role="MACHINE_OPERATIONAL", signer_id=DEFAULT_MACHINE_SIGNER_ID, namespace=MACHINE_NAMESPACE)

active-runtime/app/aios_single_host_operational_authority_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+"""Unix-domain fixed-schema service for operational migration authority."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+import socket
+import sqlite3
+import struct
+import stat
+import sys
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import (
+    DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH,
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    MACHINE_NAMESPACE,
+    SingleHostAuthorityError,
+)
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority import (
+    OperationalAuthorityError,
+    OperationalMachineAuthority,
+    OperationalOwnerAuthority,
+    OperationalPolicy,
+    OperationalVerifier,
+    SignedOperationalArtifact,
+    verify_binding_scope,
+    verify_delegation_scope,
+)
+
+DEFAULT_POLICY = Path("/etc/aios/single-host-operational-policy.json")
+DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY = Path("/var/lib/aios-owner-authority/owner-authority.key")
+DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY = Path("/var/lib/aios-machine-signer/machine-operational.key")
+DEFAULT_OWNER_SOCKET = Path("/run/aios/owner-authority.sock")
+DEFAULT_MACHINE_SOCKET = Path("/run/aios/machine-signer.sock")
+DEFAULT_LEDGER = Path("/var/lib/aios-operational-authority/issuance-ledger.sqlite3")
+MAX_REQUEST = 128 * 1024
+READINESS_SCHEMA = "aios.signer-readiness-challenge.v1"
+
+
+class OperationalServiceError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OperationalServiceError(code)
+
+
+def _read_policy(path: Path, *, require_root_owner: bool = True) -> OperationalPolicy:
+    path=Path(path)
+    if not path.is_absolute():
+        fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_PATH_INVALID")
+    flags=os.O_RDONLY
+    if hasattr(os,"O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    try:
+        fd=os.open(path,flags)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise OperationalServiceError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    try:
+        st=os.fstat(fd)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_NOT_REGULAR")
+        mode=stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode)
+        if mode & 0o022:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_WRITABLE_BY_GROUP_OR_OTHER")
+        if require_root_owner and st.st_uid != 0:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_NOT_ROOT_OWNED")
+        raw=bytearray()
+        while len(raw) <= MAX_REQUEST:
+            chunk=os.read(fd,min(65536,MAX_REQUEST+1-len(raw)))
+            if not chunk: break
+            raw.extend(chunk)
+        if not raw or len(raw)>MAX_REQUEST:
+            fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+    try:
+        obj=json.loads(bytes(raw).decode("utf-8"))
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise OperationalServiceError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_INVALID") from exc
+    return OperationalPolicy.from_mapping(obj)
+
+
+def _artifact(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or set(value) != {"payload","signature","key_id","namespace"}:
+        fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(value["payload"], Mapping):
+        fail("SIGNED_ARTIFACT_INVALID")
+    return SignedOperationalArtifact(
+        payload=dict(value["payload"]),
+        signature=str(value["signature"]),
+        key_id=str(value["key_id"]),
+        namespace=str(value["namespace"]),
+    )
+
+
+def _peer_uid(conn: socket.socket) -> int:
+    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
+        fail("PEER_CREDENTIALS_UNAVAILABLE")
+    pid, uid, gid = struct.unpack("3i", conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, struct.calcsize("3i")))
+    return uid
+
+
+
+class DurableIssuanceLedger:
+    """Root-owned exact-idempotent structured signing ledger."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if os.name == "posix": os.chmod(self.path.parent, 0o700)
+        if self.path.exists() and self.path.is_symlink():
+            fail("ISSUANCE_LEDGER_SYMLINK_FORBIDDEN")
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=DELETE")
+            conn.execute("""
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS issuance (
+                  role TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  operation TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  response_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  PRIMARY KEY(role, operation, nonce)
+                )
+            """)
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def issue(self, *, role: str, operation: str, nonce: str, request: Mapping[str, Any], issuer: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            json.dumps(request, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        try:
+            conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT request_sha256,response_json FROM issuance WHERE role=? AND operation=? AND nonce=?",
+                (role, operation, nonce),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None:
+                if row[0] != request_sha:
+                    conn.rollback()
+                    fail("NONCE_REUSE_WITH_DIFFERENT_REQUEST")
+                result = json.loads(row[1])
+                conn.commit()
+                return result
+            result = issuer()
+            encoded = json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":"), ensure_ascii=False)
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO issuance(role,operation,nonce,request_sha256,response_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (role, operation, nonce, request_sha, encoded, int(time.time())),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            return result
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
+            conn.rollback()
+            fail("ISSUANCE_LEDGER_RACE")
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+
+class OperationalAuthorityService:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        role: str,
+        policy_path: Path = DEFAULT_POLICY,
+        registry_path: Path = DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH,
+        owner_key_path: Path = DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY,
+        machine_key_path: Path = DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY,
+        socket_path: Path | None = None,
+        ledger_path: Path = DEFAULT_LEDGER,
+        allowed_uids: tuple[int, ...] = (0,),
+        clock: Any = time.time,
+        require_root_owner: bool = True,
+    ):
+        if role not in {"owner","machine"}:
+            fail("ROLE_INVALID")
+        self.role = role
+        self.policy_path = Path(policy_path)
+        self.registry_path = Path(registry_path)
+        self.owner_key_path = Path(owner_key_path)
+        self.machine_key_path = Path(machine_key_path)
+        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path or (DEFAULT_OWNER_SOCKET if role == "owner" else DEFAULT_MACHINE_SOCKET))
+        self.allowed_uids = tuple(allowed_uids)
+        self.ledger = DurableIssuanceLedger(ledger_path)
+        self.clock = clock
+        self.require_root_owner = require_root_owner
+
+    def _components(self):
+        policy = _read_policy(self.policy_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner)
+        verifier = OperationalVerifier(self.registry_path, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner)
+        if self.role == "owner":
+            signer = OperationalOwnerAuthority(self.owner_key_path, policy, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner, clock=self.clock)
+        else:
+            signer = OperationalMachineAuthority(self.machine_key_path, policy, require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner, clock=self.clock)
+        return policy, verifier, signer
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if peer_uid not in self.allowed_uids:
+            fail("PEER_UID_FORBIDDEN")
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping) or set(request) != {"operation","payload"} or not isinstance(request["payload"], Mapping):
+            fail("REQUEST_INVALID")
+        op = request["operation"]
+        p = request["payload"]
+        policy, verifier, signer = self._components()
+
+        if op == "identity":
+            return {
+                "status":"PASS",
+                "role":self.role,
+                "policy_digest":policy.digest,
+                "key_id":signer.fingerprint,
+                "socket":str(self.socket_path),
+                "arbitrary_signing":False,
+            }
+
+        if op == "readiness_challenge":
+            if set(p) != {"challenge_id","challenge_sha256"}:
+                fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            challenge_id = str(p["challenge_id"])
+            challenge_sha256 = str(p["challenge_sha256"])
+            if not challenge_id or len(challenge_id) > 160:
+                fail("READINESS_CHALLENGE_ID_INVALID")
+            if not isinstance(challenge_sha256, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", challenge_sha256):
+                fail("READINESS_CHALLENGE_SHA256_INVALID")
+            namespace = OWNER_NAMESPACE if self.role == "owner" else MACHINE_NAMESPACE
+            def issue():
+                art = signer._sign({
+                    "schema": READINESS_SCHEMA,
+                    "role": self.role,
+                    "challenge_id": challenge_id,
+                    "challenge_sha256": challenge_sha256,
+                    "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+                    "issued_at": int(self.clock()),
+                })
+                return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+            return self.ledger.issue(
+                role=self.role,
+                operation=op,
+                nonce=challenge_id,
+                request=p,
+                issuer=issue,
+            )
+
+        if self.role == "owner":
+            if op == "issue_operational_delegation":
+                if set(p) != {"delegation_id","nonce","ttl_seconds"}:
+                    fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+                def issue():
+                    art = signer.issue_operational_delegation(
+                        delegation_id=str(p["delegation_id"]),
+                        nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                        ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                    )
+                    return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+                return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+            if op == "issue_expired_task_recovery":
+                if set(p) != {"delegation","decision_id","nonce","expected_revision","expected_attempt","original_deadline","new_deadline","ttl_seconds"}:
+                    fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+                parent_art = _artifact(p["delegation"])
+                parent = verifier.owner(parent_art)
+                verify_delegation_scope(parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+                def issue():
+                    art = signer.issue_recovery_decision(
+                        parent,
+                        decision_id=str(p["decision_id"]),
+                        nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                        expected_revision=p["expected_revision"],
+                        expected_attempt=p["expected_attempt"],
+                        original_deadline=p["original_deadline"],
+                        new_deadline=p["new_deadline"],
+                        ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                    )
+                    return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+                return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+            fail("OWNER_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+
+        if op == "issue_worker_runtime_binding":
+            if set(p) != {
+                "delegation","binding_id","nonce","worker_id","runtime_id","runtime_sha256",
+                "task_contract_version","supported_contract_versions","required_capabilities",
+                "worker_capabilities","max_concurrency","ttl_seconds"
+            }:
+                fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            parent_art = _artifact(p["delegation"])
+            parent = verifier.owner(parent_art)
+            verify_delegation_scope(parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+            def issue():
+                art = signer.issue_runtime_binding(
+                    parent,
+                    binding_id=str(p["binding_id"]), nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                    worker_id=str(p["worker_id"]), runtime_id=str(p["runtime_id"]),
+                    runtime_sha256=str(p["runtime_sha256"]),
+                    task_contract_version=str(p["task_contract_version"]),
+                    supported_contract_versions=tuple(p["supported_contract_versions"]),
+                    required_capabilities=tuple(p["required_capabilities"]),
+                    worker_capabilities=tuple(p["worker_capabilities"]),
+                    max_concurrency=p["max_concurrency"], ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                )
+                return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+            return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+
+        if op == "issue_worker_runtime_proof":
+            if set(p) != {
+                "delegation","binding","proof_id","nonce","heartbeat_at","adapter_readiness",
+                "resource_readiness","active_claim_count","ttl_seconds"
+            }:
+                fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+            parent_art = _artifact(p["delegation"])
+            binding_art = _artifact(p["binding"])
+            parent = verifier.owner(parent_art)
+            binding = verifier.machine(binding_art)
+            verify_delegation_scope(parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+            verify_binding_scope(binding, parent, policy, now=int(self.clock()))
+            def issue():
+                art = signer.issue_runtime_proof(
+                    parent, binding,
+                    proof_id=str(p["proof_id"]), nonce=str(p["nonce"]),
+                    heartbeat_at=p["heartbeat_at"],
+                    adapter_readiness=p["adapter_readiness"],
+                    resource_readiness=p["resource_readiness"],
+                    active_claim_count=p["active_claim_count"],
+                    ttl_seconds=p["ttl_seconds"],
+                )
+                return {"status":"PASS","artifact":art.to_dict()}
+            return self.ledger.issue(role=self.role, operation=op, nonce=str(p["nonce"]), request=p, issuer=issue)
+
+        fail("MACHINE_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+
+    def serve_forever(self) -> None:
+        path = self.socket_path
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            if path.is_socket():
+                path.unlink()
+            else:
+                fail("SOCKET_PATH_OCCUPIED")
+        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        try:
+            sock.bind(str(path))
+            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+            sock.listen(16)
+            while True:
+                conn, _ = sock.accept()
+                with conn:
+                    try:
+                        uid = _peer_uid(conn)
+                        chunks = []
+                        total = 0
+                        while True:
+                            data = conn.recv(65536)
+                            if not data:
+                                break
+                            total += len(data)
+                            if total > MAX_REQUEST:
+                                fail("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
+                            chunks.append(data)
+                            if b"\n" in data:
+                                break
+                        raw = b"".join(chunks)
+                        line = raw.split(b"\n",1)[0]
+                        req = json.loads(line.decode("utf-8"))
+                        result = self.handle(req, peer_uid=uid)
+                        out = {"ok":True,"result":result}
+                    except (OperationalServiceError, OperationalAuthorityError, SingleHostAuthorityError) as exc:
+                        out = {"ok":False,"error":getattr(exc,"code",str(exc))}
+                    except Exception:
+                        out = {"ok":False,"error":"INTERNAL_FAIL_CLOSED"}
+                    conn.sendall(json.dumps(out, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":")).encode("utf-8")+b"\n")
+        finally:
+            sock.close()
+            try:
+                path.unlink()
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("--role", choices=("owner","machine"), required=True)
+    ap.add_argument("--policy", default=str(DEFAULT_POLICY))
+    ap.add_argument("--registry", default=str(DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH))
+    ap.add_argument("--owner-key", default=str(DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY))
+    ap.add_argument("--machine-key", default=str(DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY))
+    ap.add_argument("--socket")
+    ns = ap.parse_args()
+    service = OperationalAuthorityService(
+        role=ns.role,
+        policy_path=Path(ns.policy),
+        registry_path=Path(ns.registry),
+        owner_key_path=Path(ns.owner_key),
+        machine_key_path=Path(ns.machine_key),
+        socket_path=Path(ns.socket) if ns.socket else None,
+    )
+    service.serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_task_admission_bridge_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""Bridge contract surface for Task Admission Bootstrap.
+
+This module is intentionally transport-agnostic. The live Bridge may merge
+these routes/operations into its existing authenticated/HTTPS surface, but the
+authorization proof for the authorize operation is the verified delegation
+epoch or Owner signature carried by the request itself.
+
+No handler here can issue TaskPrincipal assertions or WriterLeases. Those remain
+strictly downstream of a real admitted/claimed Agent Task.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_task_admission_bootstrap import TaskAdmissionBootstrapService
+
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_ROUTES = {
+    "/v2/task-admission/envelope": "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope",
+    "/v2/task-admission/authorize": "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization",
+    "/v2/task-admission/status": "getTaskAdmissionStatus",
+}
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
+    "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope": (
+        "idempotency_key",
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "authority_base_oid",
+        "target_branch",
+        "generation",
+        "execution_digest",
+        "requested_capabilities",
+        "file_allowlist",
+        "risk",
+    ),
+    "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization": (
+        "envelope_id",
+        "authorization_kind",
+    ),
+    "getTaskAdmissionStatus": ("envelope_id",),
+}
+
+TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS = {
+    "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope": ("expires_in_seconds",),
+    "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization": (
+        "delegation_epoch_id",
+        "owner_key_id",
+        "signature_base64",
+    ),
+    "getTaskAdmissionStatus": (),
+}
+
+
+class TaskAdmissionBridgeContract:
+    def __init__(self, service: TaskAdmissionBootstrapService) -> None:
+        self.service = service
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_fields(operation: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        required = set(TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation])
+        allowed = required | set(TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_OPTIONAL_FIELDS[operation])
+        if not required.issubset(request):
+            raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_REQUIRED_FIELDS_MISSING")
+        if set(request) - allowed:
+            raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_UNKNOWN_FIELDS")
+
+    def dispatch(self, operation: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if operation not in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS:
+            raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_OPERATION_NOT_FOUND")
+        self._validate_fields(operation, request)
+        if operation == "getTaskAdmissionEnvelope":
+            return self.service.create_envelope(request)
+        if operation == "submitTaskAdmissionAuthorization":
+            return self.service.authorize_and_admit(request)
+        if operation == "getTaskAdmissionStatus":
+            return self.service.status(str(request["envelope_id"]))
+        raise ValueError("TASK_ADMISSION_BRIDGE_OPERATION_NOT_FOUND")
+
+    def handlers(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            operation: (
+                lambda request, operation=operation: self.dispatch(operation, request)
+            )
+            for operation in TASK_ADMISSION_OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS
+        }

active-runtime/app/aios_task_claim_guard_binding_v2.py

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+"""Append-only ClaimGuard binding for the superseded Single-Host child Task."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession_initial_projection import (
+    PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+    PROJECTION_TABLE,
+    SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+)
+
+SOURCE_TASK_ID = "TASK-SINGLEHOST-TRUSTROOT-P0-20260904"
+CHILD_TASK_ID = SOURCE_TASK_ID + "-S1"
+WORKER_ID = "p0-task-principal-v15-20260830"
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/single-host-trust-root-p0-20260904"
+GENERATION = 1
+EXTERNAL_JOB_ID = "job-4e10f92a6a5742518a9f1d8745c845ab"
+BINDING_SCHEMA = "aios.task-claim-guard-binding.v2"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-claim-guard-binding-receipt.v2"
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+
+class ClaimGuardBindingError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, http_status: int = 409):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.http_status = int(http_status)
+
+
+def _fail(code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+    raise ClaimGuardBindingError(code, status)
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False)
+
+
+def _sha_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _sha_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return _sha_text(canonical_json(value))
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _row_dict(row: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if row is None:
+        return {}
+    if hasattr(row, "keys"):
+        return {str(key): row[key] for key in row.keys()}
+    _fail("TASK_ROW_MAPPING_UNAVAILABLE", 500)
+
+
+def _json(raw: Any, code: str) -> Any:
+    if not isinstance(raw, str):
+        _fail(code)
+    try:
+        return json.loads(raw)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError(code) from exc
+
+
+def _default_policy_factory(value: Mapping[str, Any]):
+    try:
+        from aios_single_host_operational_authority import OperationalPolicy
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+    return OperationalPolicy.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def _policy_value(policy: Any, name: str) -> Any:
+    try:
+        return getattr(policy, name)
+    except AttributeError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_FIELDS_INVALID") from exc
+
+
+def _load_projection_evidence(connection, relation) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            f"SELECT * FROM {PROJECTION_TABLE} WHERE task_id=? AND source_task_id=? "
+            "AND supersession_ordinal=?",
+            (CHILD_TASK_ID, SOURCE_TASK_ID, 1),
+        ).fetchone()
+    except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError(
+            "FORMAL_CHILD_INITIAL_PROJECTION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503
+        ) from exc
+    if row is None:
+        _fail("FORMAL_CHILD_INITIAL_PROJECTION_REQUIRED")
+    value = _row_dict(row)
+    receipt = _json(value.get("receipt_json"), "CHILD_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_INVALID")
+    canonical_digest = value.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+    source_digest = value.get("source_business_execution_digest")
+    exact = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": 1,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "owner_decision_sha256": relation["owner_decision_sha256"],
+    }
+    if any(value.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact.items()):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_LINEAGE_MISMATCH")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(canonical_digest, str)
+        or HEX64.fullmatch(canonical_digest) is None
+        or canonical_digest == SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or source_digest != SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or _sha_text(value["receipt_json"]) != value.get("receipt_sha256")
+        or not isinstance(receipt, Mapping)
+        or receipt.get("schema") != PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+        or receipt.get("canonical_child_execution_digest") != canonical_digest
+        or receipt.get("source_business_execution_digest") != source_digest
+        or receipt.get("owner_supersession_decision_sha256")
+        != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_MISMATCH")
+    return {
+        **value,
+        "canonical_child_execution_digest": canonical_digest,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": source_digest,
+    }
+
+
+def install_child_binding(
+    connection,
+    *,
+    policy: Mapping[str, Any],
+    runtime_id: str,
+    runtime_observation_digest: str,
+    task_contract_version: str,
+    policy_factory: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any] = _default_policy_factory,
+    now: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Generate and persist the only permitted child binding from current DB state."""
+    if not isinstance(policy, Mapping):
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(runtime_id, str) or not runtime_id or len(runtime_id) > 512:
+        _fail("RUNTIME_ID_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(runtime_observation_digest, str) or HEX64.fullmatch(runtime_observation_digest) is None:
+        _fail("RUNTIME_OBSERVATION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(task_contract_version, str) or not task_contract_version or len(task_contract_version) > 128:
+        _fail("TASK_CONTRACT_VERSION_INVALID")
+    relation = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersessions WHERE source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=1 AND child_task_id=?",
+        (SOURCE_TASK_ID, CHILD_TASK_ID),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if relation is None:
+        _fail("FORMAL_SUPERSESSION_REQUIRED")
+    projection = _load_projection_evidence(connection, relation)
+    canonical_execution_digest = projection["canonical_child_execution_digest"]
+    task_row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)).fetchone()
+    if task_row is None:
+        _fail("CHILD_TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+    task = _row_dict(task_row)
+    if (
+        task.get("status") != "QUEUED" or int(task.get("revision", -1)) < 2
+        or int(task.get("attempt", -1)) != 0 or task.get("claimed_by") is not None
+        or task.get("lease_token_hash") is not None or task.get("lease_expires_at") is not None
+        or task.get("result_json") is not None or task.get("verification_json") is not None
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTED_CLAIMABLE_STATE_REQUIRED")
+    event_rows = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT event_type,payload_json FROM events WHERE task_id=? ORDER BY event_id",
+        (CHILD_TASK_ID,),
+    ).fetchall()
+    if [row[0] for row in event_rows] != [
+        "TASK_CREATED",
+        "TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZED",
+    ]:
+        _fail("CANONICAL_INITIAL_PROJECTION_REQUIRED")
+    projection_event = _json(
+        event_rows[-1][1], "CANONICAL_INITIAL_PROJECTION_EVENT_INVALID"
+    )
+    if (
+        projection_event.get("source_business_execution_digest")
+        != SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or projection_event.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+        != canonical_execution_digest
+        or projection_event.get("owner_supersession_decision_sha256")
+        != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or _sha_json(projection_event) != projection["projection_event_sha256"]
+    ):
+        _fail("CANONICAL_INITIAL_PROJECTION_EVENT_MISMATCH")
+    metadata_raw = task.get("metadata_json")
+    capabilities_raw = task.get("required_capabilities_json")
+    metadata = _json(metadata_raw, "CHILD_METADATA_INVALID")
+    capabilities = _json(capabilities_raw, "CHILD_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+    if (
+        _sha_text(metadata_raw) != projection["metadata_sha256"]
+        or _sha_text(capabilities_raw)
+        != projection["required_capabilities_sha256"]
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_TASK_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping) or not isinstance(capabilities, list) or not capabilities:
+        _fail("CHILD_PROJECTION_INVALID")
+    if any(not isinstance(value, str) or not value for value in capabilities) or len(set(capabilities)) != len(capabilities):
+        _fail("CHILD_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+    execution = metadata.get("execution")
+    if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+        _fail("CHILD_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+    exact_execution = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest, "job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+    }
+    if any(execution.get(key) != value for key, value in exact_execution.items()):
+        _fail("CHILD_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    parsed_policy = policy_factory(dict(policy))
+    if hasattr(parsed_policy, "validate"):
+        parsed_policy.validate()
+    policy_exact = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_plan_sha256": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+    }
+    if any(_policy_value(parsed_policy, key) != value for key, value in policy_exact.items()):
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
+    if tuple(_policy_value(parsed_policy, "allowed_worker_ids")) != (WORKER_ID,):
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_WORKER_MISMATCH")
+    expected_oid = execution.get("expected_branch_oid", execution.get("base_oid"))
+    if expected_oid is not None and _policy_value(parsed_policy, "base_oid") != expected_oid:
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_BASE_OID_MISMATCH")
+    policy_json = canonical_json(dict(policy))
+    policy_sha = _sha_text(policy_json)
+    policy_digest = str(_policy_value(parsed_policy, "digest"))
+    if policy_digest != policy_sha:
+        _fail("OPERATIONAL_POLICY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    binding = {
+        "schema": BINDING_SCHEMA, "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID, "supersession_ordinal": 1,
+        "expected_revision": int(task["revision"]),
+        "metadata_sha256": _sha_text(metadata_raw),
+        "required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_json(sorted(capabilities)),
+        "worker_id": WORKER_ID,
+        "execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "canonical_child_execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY, "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID, "policy_sha256": policy_sha,
+        "policy_digest": policy_digest, "runtime_id": runtime_id,
+        "runtime_observation_digest": runtime_observation_digest,
+        "task_contract_version": task_contract_version,
+        "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": relation["owner_decision_sha256"],
+    }
+    binding_json = canonical_json(binding)
+    binding_sha = _sha_text(binding_json)
+    binding_id = "sha256:" + binding_sha
+    existing = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT binding_sha256 FROM task_claim_guard_bindings_v2 WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+    ).fetchone()
+    if existing is not None:
+        if existing[0] != binding_sha:
+            _fail("CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        receipt = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT receipt_json FROM task_claim_guard_binding_receipts_v2 WHERE binding_id=?", (binding_id,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if receipt is None:
+            _fail("CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_RECEIPT_MISSING", 500)
+        return {**json.loads(receipt[0]), "idempotent": True}
+    created_at = now or _now()
+    connection.execute(
+        """INSERT INTO task_claim_guard_bindings_v2(
+        binding_id,task_id,source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,expected_revision,
+        metadata_sha256,required_capabilities_sha256,worker_id,execution_digest,
+        repository,target_branch,generation,policy_json,policy_sha256,binding_json,
+        binding_sha256,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+        (binding_id, CHILD_TASK_ID, SOURCE_TASK_ID, 1, binding["expected_revision"],
+         binding["metadata_sha256"], binding["required_capabilities_sha256"], WORKER_ID,
+         canonical_execution_digest, REPOSITORY, TARGET_BRANCH, GENERATION, policy_json, policy_sha,
+         binding_json, binding_sha, created_at),
+    )
+    receipt = {
+        "schema": RECEIPT_SCHEMA, "status": "BOUND", "binding_id": binding_id,
+        "binding_sha256": binding_sha, "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "expected_revision": binding["expected_revision"],
+        "metadata_sha256": binding["metadata_sha256"], "worker_id": WORKER_ID,
+        "execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "canonical_child_execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH, "generation": GENERATION,
+        "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": relation["owner_decision_sha256"],
+    }
+    receipt_sha = _sha_json(receipt)
+    receipt_id = "sha256:" + receipt_sha
+    connection.execute(
+        "INSERT INTO task_claim_guard_binding_receipts_v2 VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+        (receipt_id, binding_id, CHILD_TASK_ID, canonical_json(receipt), receipt_sha, created_at),
+    )
+    return {**receipt, "receipt_id": receipt_id, "receipt_sha256": receipt_sha, "idempotent": False}
+
+
+def _load_child_binding(connection) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+    row = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_claim_guard_bindings_v2 WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+    ).fetchone()
+    if row is None:
+        _fail("CHILD_CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_MISSING")
+    value = _row_dict(row)
+    binding = _json(value["binding_json"], "CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_INVALID")
+    policy = _json(value["policy_json"], "OPERATIONAL_POLICY_INVALID")
+    relation = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersessions WHERE source_task_id=? "
+        "AND supersession_ordinal=1 AND child_task_id=?",
+        (SOURCE_TASK_ID, CHILD_TASK_ID),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if relation is None:
+        _fail("FORMAL_SUPERSESSION_REQUIRED")
+    projection = _load_projection_evidence(connection, relation)
+    canonical_execution_digest = projection["canonical_child_execution_digest"]
+    if (
+        _sha_text(value["binding_json"]) != value["binding_sha256"]
+        or binding.get("schema") != BINDING_SCHEMA
+        or value.get("execution_digest") != canonical_execution_digest
+        or binding.get("execution_digest") != canonical_execution_digest
+        or binding.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+        != canonical_execution_digest
+        or binding.get("source_business_execution_digest")
+        != SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or binding.get("owner_supersession_decision_sha256")
+        != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or policy.get("execution_plan_sha256") != canonical_execution_digest
+    ):
+        _fail("CLAIM_GUARD_BINDING_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    task = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)).fetchone()
+    task = _row_dict(task)
+    if (
+        task.get("status") != "QUEUED" or int(task.get("revision", -1)) != int(binding["expected_revision"])
+        or int(task.get("attempt", -1)) != 0 or task.get("claimed_by") is not None
+        or task.get("lease_token_hash") is not None or task.get("lease_expires_at") is not None
+        or _sha_text(task.get("metadata_json", "")) != binding["metadata_sha256"]
+        or task.get("result_json") is not None or task.get("verification_json") is not None
+    ):
+        _fail("CHILD_CLAIM_GUARD_TASK_CAS_MISMATCH")
+    return binding, policy
+
+
+def _run_child_guard(connection, binding, policy_value, agent_id):
+    try:
+        from aios_single_host_operational_authority import OperationalPolicy, OperationalVerifier
+        from aios_singlehost_claim_guard_stage1 import _LiveReader, REGISTRY_PATH
+        from aios_task_claim_guard import ClaimGuard, ClaimGuardError as CoreError
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError("CLAIM_GUARD_RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+    policy = OperationalPolicy.from_mapping(policy_value)
+    cfg = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "expected_claim_revision": binding["expected_revision"],
+        "task_metadata_sha256": binding["metadata_sha256"],
+        "required_capabilities_sha256": binding["required_capabilities_sha256"],
+        "task_contract_version": binding["task_contract_version"], "worker_id": WORKER_ID,
+        "policy_digest": binding["policy_digest"], "runtime_id": binding["runtime_id"],
+        "runtime_observation_digest": binding["runtime_observation_digest"],
+    }
+    reader = _LiveReader(connection, policy, cfg, now=int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp()))
+    try:
+        ClaimGuard(policy, OperationalVerifier(REGISTRY_PATH, require_root_owner=True)).validate_in_transaction(
+            reader, task_id=CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            expected_revision=int(binding["expected_revision"]), worker_id=agent_id,
+        )
+    except CoreError as exc:
+        raise ClaimGuardBindingError(exc.code) from exc
+
+
+def enforce_claim_guard(connection, *, task_id: str, agent_id: str) -> None:
+    """Exact two-lineage dispatcher; unrelated Tasks retain their prior behavior."""
+    if task_id == SOURCE_TASK_ID:
+        try:
+            from aios_singlehost_claim_guard_stage1 import enforce_claim_guard as frozen_guard
+        except ImportError as exc:
+            raise ClaimGuardBindingError("FROZEN_SOURCE_CLAIM_GUARD_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+        frozen_guard(connection, task_id=task_id, agent_id=agent_id)
+        return
+    if task_id != CHILD_TASK_ID:
+        return
+    if agent_id != WORKER_ID:
+        _fail("WORKER_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+    binding, policy = _load_child_binding(connection)
+    _run_child_guard(connection, binding, policy, agent_id)

active-runtime/app/aios_task_deterministic_execution_amendment.py

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+"""Fail-closed signed deterministic execution amendment for R7."""
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib, json, sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping
+from aios_task_terminal_recovery import DeterministicPlan, RecoveryError, canonical_json
+
+AMENDMENT_SCHEMA="aios.deterministic-execution-amendment.v1"
+APPLY_SCHEMA="aios.deterministic-execution-amendment-apply.v1"
+NAMESPACE="aios-owner-approval-v1"
+EVENT="TASK_RECOVERY_EXECUTION_AMENDMENT_APPLIED"
+APPLY_STATES=frozenset({"FAILED", "QUEUED"})
+
+
+def _err(code): raise RecoveryError(code)
+def _sha(v): return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(v).encode()).hexdigest()
+def amendment_body(x):
+    return {k:v for k,v in x.items() if k not in {"signature","amendment_id"}}
+def amendment_id(x): return "sha256:"+_sha(amendment_body(x))
+def signed_payload(x):
+    return canonical_json({"amendment_id":x["amendment_id"],**amendment_body(x)}).encode()
+
+
+def parse_amendment(raw):
+    x=dict(raw)
+    required={"schema","amendment_id","nonce","task_id","job_id","generation",
+      "repository","branch","expected_branch_oid","recovery_epoch","decision_id",
+      "plan_id","plan_sha256","expected_apply_status","expected_apply_revision",
+      "expected_apply_attempt","expected_current_capabilities","envelope",
+      "owner_identity","key_id","issued_at","not_before","expires_at",
+      "one_time_use","signature"}
+    if set(x)<required or x.get("schema")!=AMENDMENT_SCHEMA: _err("AMENDMENT_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    if x["expected_apply_status"] not in APPLY_STATES: _err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_STATUS_INVALID")
+    if x.get("one_time_use") is not True: _err("AMENDMENT_ONE_TIME_REQUIRED")
+    if not isinstance(x["envelope"],Mapping): _err("AMENDMENT_ENVELOPE_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(x["expected_current_capabilities"],list): _err("AMENDMENT_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+    for k in ("generation","expected_apply_revision","expected_apply_attempt"):
+        if isinstance(x[k],bool) or not isinstance(x[k],int) or x[k]<0: _err("AMENDMENT_CAS_INVALID")
+    for k in ("issued_at","not_before","expires_at"):
+        try:d=datetime.fromisoformat(str(x[k]).replace("Z","+00:00"))
+        except ValueError as e: raise RecoveryError("AMENDMENT_TIME_INVALID") from e
+        if d.tzinfo is None:_err("AMENDMENT_TIME_INVALID")
+        x[k]=d.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00","Z")
+    x["expected_current_capabilities"]=sorted(set(x["expected_current_capabilities"]))
+    x["envelope"]=dict(x["envelope"])
+    return x
+
+
+def _validate_envelope(env,plan,x):
+    try:
+        from aios_online_agent_execution import GovernedExecutionBinding,validate_execution_envelope
+        binding=GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(env)
+        e=dict(validate_execution_envelope(env,binding=binding,worker_capabilities=plan.required_capabilities))
+    except Exception as z: raise RecoveryError("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID") from z
+    if e.get("action")!="deterministic" or e.get("adapter")!="deterministic":_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_ACTION_INVALID")
+    if tuple(sorted(e.get("capability_scope") or ()))!=plan.required_capabilities:_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_CAPABILITIES_MISMATCH")
+    if not e.get("change_set") or not e.get("verification"):_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_REQUIRED")
+    if e.get("runtime_input") not in (None,{}) or e.get("source_signals") not in (None,[]):_err("AMENDMENT_STALE_RUNTIME_FIELDS_FORBIDDEN")
+    for k,w in (("task_id",x["task_id"]),("job_id",x["job_id"]),("repository",x["repository"]),
+      ("generation",x["generation"]),("target_branch",x["branch"]),
+      ("expected_branch_oid",x["expected_branch_oid"]),("base_oid",x["expected_branch_oid"]),
+      ("plan_id",x["plan_id"]),("plan_sha256",x["plan_sha256"]),("recovery_epoch",x["recovery_epoch"])):
+        if e.get(k)!=w:_err("AMENDMENT_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    g=e.get("governance") or {}
+    if g.get("writer_lease") is not True:_err("AMENDMENT_WRITER_LEASE_REQUIRED")
+    if any(g.get(k,False) for k in ("main_write","production_write","tag_write","baseline_write","force_push","protected_ref_bypass")):_err("AMENDMENT_PROTECTED_WRITE_FORBIDDEN")
+    return e
+
+
+class DeterministicExecutionAmendmentController:
+    def __init__(self,db_path,verifier,*,clock=None,envelope_validator=None):
+        self.db_path=Path(db_path); self.verifier=verifier
+        self.clock=clock or (lambda:datetime.now(timezone.utc)); self._init()
+
+    def _db(self):
+        c=sqlite3.connect(self.db_path,timeout=10,isolation_level=None); c.row_factory=sqlite3.Row
+        c.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=10000"); return c
+
+    def _now(self): return self.clock().astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00","Z")
+
+    def _init(self):
+        with self._db() as c:
+            c.execute("DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS aios_r7_recovery_capability_projection")
+            c.executescript("""
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS deterministic_execution_amendments(
+ amendment_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,nonce TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+ decision_id TEXT NOT NULL,plan_id TEXT NOT NULL,plan_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+ envelope_digest TEXT NOT NULL,envelope_json TEXT NOT NULL,payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+ created_at TEXT NOT NULL,UNIQUE(task_id,decision_id));
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS aios_r7_recovery_requires_executable_amendment;
+CREATE TRIGGER aios_r7_recovery_requires_executable_amendment
+BEFORE UPDATE OF status ON tasks
+WHEN OLD.status='FAILED' AND NEW.status='QUEUED' BEGIN
+ SELECT CASE WHEN NOT EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM deterministic_execution_amendments a
+  WHERE a.task_id=OLD.task_id
+   AND a.decision_id=json_extract(NEW.metadata_json,'$.recovery.decision_id')
+   AND a.amendment_id=json_extract(OLD.metadata_json,'$.recovery.execution_amendment_id')
+   AND a.envelope_digest=json_extract(OLD.metadata_json,'$.execution.execution_digest')
+ ) THEN RAISE(ABORT,'SIGNED_EXECUTION_AMENDMENT_REQUIRED') END;
+END;""")
+
+    def _plan(self,c,x):
+        r=c.execute("SELECT * FROM deterministic_plans WHERE plan_id=?",(x["plan_id"],)).fetchone()
+        if r is None or r["plan_sha256"]!=x["plan_sha256"]:_err("AMENDMENT_PLAN_NOT_FOUND_OR_MISMATCH")
+        p=DeterministicPlan.from_dict(json.loads(r["payload_json"]))
+        if (p.task_id,p.job_id,p.generation,p.repository,p.branch,p.expected_branch_oid,p.recovery_epoch)!=(x["task_id"],x["job_id"],x["generation"],x["repository"],x["branch"],x["expected_branch_oid"],x["recovery_epoch"]):_err("AMENDMENT_PLAN_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+        return p
+
+    def persist(self,raw):
+        x=parse_amendment(raw)
+        if x["amendment_id"]!=amendment_id(x):_err("AMENDMENT_ID_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        now=self._now()
+        if now<x["not_before"] or now>=x["expires_at"]:_err("AMENDMENT_EXPIRED_OR_NOT_YET_VALID")
+        if not self.verifier.verify(namespace=NAMESPACE,payload=signed_payload(x),signature=x["signature"],key_id=x["key_id"]):_err("AMENDMENT_SIGNATURE_INVALID")
+        with self._db() as c:
+            c.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"); e=_validate_envelope(x["envelope"],self._plan(c,x),x)
+            ej=canonical_json(e); ed=e["execution_digest"]; stored=dict(x); stored["signature"]="<present>"
+            old=c.execute("SELECT * FROM deterministic_execution_amendments WHERE amendment_id=?",(x["amendment_id"],)).fetchone()
+            if old:
+                if old["envelope_json"]!=ej:_err("AMENDMENT_ID_REUSE_MISMATCH")
+                c.commit(); return {"status":"PRESENT","amendment_id":x["amendment_id"],"task_id":x["task_id"],"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":ed}
+            if c.execute("SELECT 1 FROM deterministic_execution_amendments WHERE nonce=? OR (task_id=? AND decision_id=?)",(x["nonce"],x["task_id"],x["decision_id"])).fetchone():_err("AMENDMENT_REPLAY_OR_DECISION_REUSE")
+            c.execute("INSERT INTO deterministic_execution_amendments VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",(x["amendment_id"],x["nonce"],x["task_id"],x["decision_id"],x["plan_id"],x["plan_sha256"],ed,ej,canonical_json(stored),now)); c.commit()
+        return {"status":"PERSISTED","amendment_id":x["amendment_id"],"task_id":x["task_id"],"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":ed}
+
+    def apply(self,raw):
+        if raw.get("schema")!=APPLY_SCHEMA:_err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        aid=raw.get("amendment_id"); tid=raw.get("task_id")
+        with self._db() as c:
+            c.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"); a=c.execute("SELECT * FROM deterministic_execution_amendments WHERE amendment_id=? AND task_id=?",(aid,tid)).fetchone()
+            if a is None:_err("AMENDMENT_NOT_FOUND")
+            x=json.loads(a["payload_json"]); d=json.loads(a["envelope_json"])
+            t=c.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",(tid,)).fetchone()
+            if t is None:_err("TASK_NOT_FOUND")
+            m=json.loads(t["metadata_json"] or "{}"); cp=tuple(sorted(json.loads(t["required_capabilities_json"] or "[]"))); dc=tuple(sorted(d.get("capability_scope") or ()))
+            rec=m.get("recovery"); rec=dict(rec) if isinstance(rec,Mapping) else {}
+            old=m.get("execution")
+            if isinstance(old,Mapping) and old.get("execution_digest")==a["envelope_digest"] and cp==dc and rec.get("execution_amendment_id")==aid:
+                c.commit(); return {"status":"PRESENT","task_id":tid,"amendment_id":aid,"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"],"revision":int(t["revision"]),"attempt":int(t["attempt"])}
+            if t["status"]!=x["expected_apply_status"] or int(t["revision"])!=x["expected_apply_revision"] or int(t["attempt"])!=x["expected_apply_attempt"] or cp!=tuple(x["expected_current_capabilities"]) or t["claimed_by"] is not None or t["lease_token_hash"] is not None:_err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_TASK_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            if t["status"]=="QUEUED" and rec.get("decision_id")!=x["decision_id"]:_err("AMENDMENT_DECISION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+            m["execution"]=d; m["execution_projection"]={"schema":"aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1","task_id":tid,"job_id":d.get("job_id"),"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"]}
+            rec["execution_amendment_id"]=aid; m["recovery"]=rec; now=self._now()
+            q=c.execute("""UPDATE tasks SET required_capabilities_json=?,metadata_json=?,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=? AND claimed_by IS NULL AND lease_token_hash IS NULL""",(canonical_json(list(dc)),canonical_json(m),now,tid,x["expected_apply_status"],x["expected_apply_revision"],x["expected_apply_attempt"]))
+            if q.rowcount!=1:_err("AMENDMENT_APPLY_TASK_CAS_FAILED")
+            c.execute("INSERT INTO events(task_id,agent_id,event_type,payload_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",(tid,None,EVENT,canonical_json({"amendment_id":aid,"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"],"required_capabilities":list(dc)}),now)); c.commit()
+        return {"status":"APPLIED","task_id":tid,"amendment_id":aid,"decision_id":x["decision_id"],"plan_id":x["plan_id"],"execution_digest":a["envelope_digest"],"required_capabilities":list(dc),"revision":x["expected_apply_revision"]+1,"attempt":x["expected_apply_attempt"]}

active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Loopback-only HTTP API for the task identity overlay.
+
+Endpoints:
+  GET  /healthz
+  POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+
+The API authenticates only the short-lived overlay credential. It does not read
+or modify the global bearer-token registry.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any
+
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
+from owner_authorization_broker import OwnerAuthorizationError
+from task_identity_overlay import (
+    MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+    IdentityOverlayConfig,
+    IdentityOverlayError,
+    TaskIdentityOverlayService,
+)
+
+
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
+
+
+def _enabled() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_ENABLED", ""
+    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+def _bearer(header: str) -> str:
+    prefix = "Bearer "
+    if not header.startswith(prefix):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+    token = header[len(prefix):].strip()
+    if not token or len(token) > 4096:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+    return token
+
+
+class OverlayHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "aios-task-identity-overlay/1"
+    sys_version = ""
+
+    @property
+    def overlay(self) -> TaskIdentityOverlayService:
+        return self.server.overlay  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
+        # Never log Authorization or request bodies.
+        return
+
+    def _send(self, status: int, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        payload = (
+            json.dumps(
+                value,
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+            )
+            + "\n"
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(payload)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(payload)
+
+    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID") from None
+        if length <= 0 or length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_SIZE_REJECTED", 413)
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_JSON_INVALID") from None
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
+        return value
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if path != "/healthz":
+            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
+            return
+        self._send(
+            200,
+            {
+                "service": "aios-task-identity-overlay",
+                "status": "active" if _enabled() else "disabled",
+                "global_token_registry_used": False,
+                "loopback_only": True,
+            },
+        )
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if path != _ENDPOINT:
+            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
+            return
+        if not _enabled():
+            self._send(503, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_DISABLED"})
+            return
+        try:
+            token = _bearer(self.headers.get("Authorization", ""))
+            result = self.overlay.provision(self._body(), token)
+            self._send(200, result)
+        except (IdentityOverlayError, OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
+            body: dict[str, Any] = {"error": exc.code}
+            if getattr(exc, "details", None):
+                body["details"] = exc.details
+            self._send(exc.status, body)
+        except Exception:
+            self._send(500, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_API_INTERNAL_ERROR"})
+
+
+class OverlayServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        address: tuple[str, int],
+        overlay: TaskIdentityOverlayService,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(address, OverlayHandler)
+        self.overlay = overlay
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    host = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    if host not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}:
+        raise SystemExit("identity overlay must listen on loopback")
+    try:
+        port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_PORT", "19864"))
+    except ValueError:
+        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port") from None
+    if not 1024 <= port <= 65535:
+        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port")
+    config = IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
+    server = OverlayServer(
+        (host, port),
+        TaskIdentityOverlayService(config),
+    )
+    server.serve_forever(poll_interval=0.25)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Root-governed CLI for issuing and revoking task identity overlays.
+
+The CLI never prints the bearer token. It returns only the root-owned secret
+reference and non-secret metadata.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from task_identity_overlay import (
+    IdentityOverlayConfig,
+    IdentityOverlayError,
+    TaskIdentityOverlayStore,
+)
+
+
+def _write_result(path: str, value: dict) -> None:
+    data = json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n"
+    if path == "-":
+        sys.stdout.write(data)
+        return
+    target = Path(path)
+    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    target.write_text(data, encoding="utf-8")
+    os.chmod(target, 0o600)
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    value = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Issue/status/revoke a task-scoped identity overlay"
+    )
+    sub = value.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+
+    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
+    issue.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=900)
+    issue.add_argument("--authorization-assertion-ref", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument(
+        "--operator-identity",
+        default=os.getenv("SUDO_USER") or os.getenv("USER") or "root",
+    )
+    issue.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+
+    status = sub.add_parser("status")
+    status.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
+    status.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+
+    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
+    revoke.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+    return value
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parser().parse_args()
+    try:
+        store = TaskIdentityOverlayStore(
+            IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
+        )
+        if args.command == "issue":
+            result = store.issue(
+                ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
+                authorization_assertion_ref=args.authorization_assertion_ref,
+                operator_identity=args.operator_identity,
+            )
+        elif args.command == "status":
+            result = store.status(args.overlay_id)
+        else:
+            result = store.revoke(args.overlay_id, reason=args.reason)
+        _write_result(args.result_json, result)
+        return 0
+    except IdentityOverlayError as exc:
+        body = {"status": "BLOCKED", "error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        _write_result(getattr(args, "result_json", "-"), body)
+        return 2
+    except Exception:
+        _write_result(
+            getattr(args, "result_json", "-"),
+            {"status": "FAILED", "error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_CLI_INTERNAL_ERROR"},
+        )
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,779 @@
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from hashlib import sha256
+import re
+from typing import Callable, Iterable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+
+class LineageError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+class RelationType(str, Enum):
+    ROOT = "ROOT"
+    CHILD = "CHILD"
+    SUCCESSOR = "SUCCESSOR"
+    RECOVERY = "RECOVERY"
+
+
+class NextLegalAction(str, Enum):
+    ROOT_COMPLETE = "ROOT_COMPLETE"
+    CREATE_OR_RESUME_NEXT_CHILD = "CREATE_OR_RESUME_NEXT_CHILD"
+    WAIT_DEPENDENCY = "WAIT_DEPENDENCY"
+    RECOVER_EXISTING_CHILD = "RECOVER_EXISTING_CHILD"
+    OWNER_BOUNDARY = "OWNER_BOUNDARY"
+
+
+TERMINAL_STATUSES = frozenset(
+    {"COMPLETE", "COMPLETED", "SUCCEEDED", "FAILED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}
+)
+RECOVERY_STATUSES = frozenset(
+    {"RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "RECOVERY_REQUIRED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"}
+)
+BLOCKED_STATUSES = frozenset({"BLOCKED", "WAITING_DEPENDENCY", "WAITING_CAPACITY"})
+
+
+_ALIAS_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z0-9][A-Z0-9_-]{1,31}$")
+_SLUG_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z0-9][A-Z0-9-]{1,63}$")
+
+
+def _require_utc(ts: datetime) -> datetime:
+    if ts.tzinfo is None or ts.utcoffset() is None:
+        raise LineageError("created_at/reviewed_at must be timezone-aware")
+    return ts.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def derive_safe_owner_alias(principal_id: str, preferred_alias: str | None = None) -> str:
+    """Return a non-secret display alias.
+
+    A trusted identity adapter may supply a safe human alias. Otherwise we use a
+    deterministic pseudonym derived from the principal identifier. We never put
+    raw email addresses, tokens, or principal strings into task names.
+    """
+    if preferred_alias and "@" not in preferred_alias and ":" not in preferred_alias:
+        candidate = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_-]+", "-", preferred_alias.strip()).strip("-_").upper()
+        if 2 <= len(candidate) <= 32 and _ALIAS_RE.fullmatch(candidate):
+            return candidate
+    if not principal_id:
+        raise LineageError("principal_id is required")
+    return "U" + sha256(principal_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:9].upper()
+
+
+def normalize_goal_slug(value: str) -> str:
+    value = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+", "-", value.strip()).strip("-").upper()
+    value = re.sub(r"-+", "-", value)
+    if len(value) > 64:
+        value = value[:64].rstrip("-")
+    if not _SLUG_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise LineageError("goal_slug must normalize to 2-64 [A-Z0-9-] characters")
+    return value
+
+
+def short_ref(task_id: str) -> str:
+    if not task_id:
+        raise LineageError("task_id is required")
+    compact = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]", "", task_id).upper()
+    if len(compact) >= 8:
+        return compact[-8:]
+    return sha256(task_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:8].upper()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskLineage:
+    task_id: str
+    display_name: str
+    owner_principal_id: str
+    owner_alias: str
+    created_at: datetime
+    mission_id: str
+    root_task_id: str
+    parent_task_id: str | None
+    lineage_depth: int
+    relation_type: RelationType
+    sibling_sequence: int
+    goal_slug: str
+    root_acceptance_ref: str
+    parent_revision: int | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    revision: int
+    status: str
+    lineage: TaskLineage
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    terminal_evidence_proven: bool = False
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AcceptanceCondition:
+    key: str
+    satisfied: bool
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    owner_boundary: bool = False
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RootAcceptanceSnapshot:
+    conditions: tuple[AcceptanceCondition, ...]
+
+    @property
+    def remaining(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        return tuple(c.key for c in self.conditions if not c.satisfied)
+
+    @property
+    def complete(self) -> bool:
+        return all(c.satisfied for c in self.conditions)
+
+    @property
+    def owner_boundary_required(self) -> bool:
+        return any((not c.satisfied) and c.owner_boundary for c in self.conditions)
+
+    @property
+    def evidence_refs(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        values: list[str] = []
+        for condition in self.conditions:
+            if condition.satisfied:
+                values.extend(condition.evidence_refs)
+        return tuple(dict.fromkeys(values))
+
+
+def canonicalize_acceptance(
+    acceptance: RootAcceptanceSnapshot,
+) -> RootAcceptanceSnapshot:
+    if not isinstance(acceptance, RootAcceptanceSnapshot):
+        raise LineageError("acceptance evaluator returned an invalid snapshot")
+    normalized: list[AcceptanceCondition] = []
+    keys: set[str] = set()
+    for condition in acceptance.conditions:
+        if not isinstance(condition, AcceptanceCondition):
+            raise LineageError("acceptance snapshot contains an invalid condition")
+        if not isinstance(condition.key, str) or not condition.key:
+            raise LineageError("acceptance condition key must be a non-empty string")
+        if condition.key in keys:
+            raise LineageError("acceptance condition keys must be unique")
+        if not isinstance(condition.satisfied, bool) or not isinstance(
+            condition.owner_boundary, bool
+        ):
+            raise LineageError("acceptance condition flags must be booleans")
+        if not all(isinstance(ref, str) and ref for ref in condition.evidence_refs):
+            raise LineageError("acceptance evidence refs must be non-empty strings")
+        keys.add(condition.key)
+        normalized.append(
+            replace(
+                condition,
+                evidence_refs=tuple(sorted(set(condition.evidence_refs))),
+            )
+        )
+    return RootAcceptanceSnapshot(tuple(sorted(normalized, key=lambda c: c.key)))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RootReviewRecord:
+    review_id: str
+    root_task_id: str
+    reviewed_at: datetime
+    trigger_child_task_id: str
+    root_revision_before: int
+    root_revision_after: int
+    completed_children: tuple[str, ...]
+    active_children: tuple[str, ...]
+    blocked_children: tuple[str, ...]
+    remaining_acceptance_conditions: tuple[str, ...]
+    next_legal_action: NextLegalAction
+    root_complete: bool
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+class RootReviewStore(Protocol):
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord: ...
+    def list_descendants(self, root_task_id: str) -> Sequence[TaskRecord]: ...
+    def get_root_review(self, review_id: str) -> RootReviewRecord | None: ...
+    def compare_and_swap_root_review(
+        self,
+        root_task_id: str,
+        expected_root_revision: int,
+        review: RootReviewRecord,
+    ) -> bool: ...
+
+
+AcceptanceEvaluator = Callable[[TaskRecord, Sequence[TaskRecord]], RootAcceptanceSnapshot]
+
+
+def _timestamp(ts: datetime) -> str:
+    return _require_utc(ts).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
+
+
+def _relation_token(relation: RelationType, sequence: int) -> str:
+    if sequence < 1 or sequence > 99:
+        raise LineageError("non-root sibling_sequence must be 1..99")
+    prefix = {
+        RelationType.CHILD: "C",
+        RelationType.SUCCESSOR: "S",
+        RelationType.RECOVERY: "X",
+    }.get(relation)
+    if not prefix:
+        raise LineageError("ROOT does not use a child relation token")
+    return f"{prefix}{sequence:02d}"
+
+
+def build_display_name(lineage: TaskLineage) -> str:
+    alias = lineage.owner_alias.upper()
+    if not _ALIAS_RE.fullmatch(alias):
+        raise LineageError("owner_alias must be a non-secret [A-Z0-9_-] alias")
+    goal = normalize_goal_slug(lineage.goal_slug)
+    ts = _timestamp(lineage.created_at)
+    if lineage.relation_type == RelationType.ROOT:
+        return f"TASK-{alias}-{ts}-ROOT-{goal}-{short_ref(lineage.task_id)[:4]}"
+    relation = _relation_token(lineage.relation_type, lineage.sibling_sequence)
+    return (
+        f"TASK-{alias}-{ts}"
+        f"-R{short_ref(lineage.root_task_id)}"
+        f"-P{short_ref(lineage.parent_task_id or '')}"
+        f"-D{lineage.lineage_depth:02d}"
+        f"-{relation}-{goal}"
+    )
+
+
+def make_root_lineage(
+    *,
+    task_id: str,
+    owner_principal_id: str,
+    owner_alias: str,
+    created_at: datetime,
+    mission_id: str,
+    goal_slug: str,
+    root_acceptance_ref: str,
+) -> TaskLineage:
+    lineage = TaskLineage(
+        task_id=task_id,
+        display_name="",
+        owner_principal_id=owner_principal_id,
+        owner_alias=owner_alias.upper(),
+        created_at=_require_utc(created_at),
+        mission_id=mission_id,
+        root_task_id=task_id,
+        parent_task_id=None,
+        lineage_depth=0,
+        relation_type=RelationType.ROOT,
+        sibling_sequence=0,
+        goal_slug=normalize_goal_slug(goal_slug),
+        root_acceptance_ref=root_acceptance_ref,
+        parent_revision=None,
+    )
+    lineage = replace(lineage, display_name=build_display_name(lineage))
+    validate_lineage(lineage)
+    return lineage
+
+
+def make_child_lineage(
+    *,
+    task_id: str,
+    created_at: datetime,
+    parent: TaskRecord,
+    root: TaskRecord,
+    relation_type: RelationType,
+    sibling_sequence: int,
+    goal_slug: str,
+) -> TaskLineage:
+    if relation_type == RelationType.ROOT:
+        raise LineageError("child relation_type cannot be ROOT")
+    lineage = TaskLineage(
+        task_id=task_id,
+        display_name="",
+        owner_principal_id=root.lineage.owner_principal_id,
+        owner_alias=root.lineage.owner_alias,
+        created_at=_require_utc(created_at),
+        mission_id=root.lineage.mission_id,
+        root_task_id=root.task_id,
+        parent_task_id=parent.task_id,
+        lineage_depth=parent.lineage.lineage_depth + 1,
+        relation_type=relation_type,
+        sibling_sequence=sibling_sequence,
+        goal_slug=normalize_goal_slug(goal_slug),
+        root_acceptance_ref=root.lineage.root_acceptance_ref,
+        parent_revision=parent.revision,
+    )
+    lineage = replace(lineage, display_name=build_display_name(lineage))
+    validate_lineage(lineage, parent=parent, root=root)
+    return lineage
+
+
+def validate_lineage(
+    lineage: TaskLineage,
+    *,
+    parent: TaskRecord | None = None,
+    root: TaskRecord | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    _validate_lineage_shape(lineage)
+
+    if lineage.relation_type == RelationType.ROOT:
+        return
+
+    if parent is None or root is None:
+        raise LineageError("non-root validation requires parent and root authority records")
+    if root.lineage.relation_type != RelationType.ROOT:
+        raise LineageError("root authority record must have ROOT lineage")
+    if parent.lineage.root_task_id != root.task_id:
+        raise LineageError("parent is not attached to the selected root")
+    if parent.lineage.owner_principal_id != root.lineage.owner_principal_id:
+        raise LineageError("parent owner does not match root owner")
+    if parent.lineage.mission_id != root.lineage.mission_id:
+        raise LineageError("parent mission does not match root mission")
+    if parent.lineage.root_acceptance_ref != root.lineage.root_acceptance_ref:
+        raise LineageError("parent acceptance reference does not match root")
+    if lineage.root_task_id != root.task_id:
+        raise LineageError("root_task_id mismatch")
+    if lineage.parent_task_id != parent.task_id:
+        raise LineageError("parent_task_id mismatch")
+    if lineage.lineage_depth != parent.lineage.lineage_depth + 1:
+        raise LineageError("lineage_depth must equal parent depth + 1")
+    if lineage.owner_principal_id != root.lineage.owner_principal_id:
+        raise LineageError("cross-owner lineage attachment rejected")
+    if lineage.owner_alias != root.lineage.owner_alias:
+        raise LineageError("owner_alias must match root")
+    if lineage.mission_id != root.lineage.mission_id:
+        raise LineageError("mission_id must match root")
+    if lineage.root_acceptance_ref != root.lineage.root_acceptance_ref:
+        raise LineageError("root_acceptance_ref must match root")
+    if lineage.parent_revision != parent.revision:
+        raise LineageError("stale or mismatched parent revision")
+
+
+def _validate_lineage_shape(lineage: TaskLineage) -> None:
+    if not lineage.task_id or not lineage.owner_principal_id or not lineage.mission_id:
+        raise LineageError("task_id, owner_principal_id and mission_id are required")
+    if not lineage.root_acceptance_ref:
+        raise LineageError("root_acceptance_ref is required")
+    if not _ALIAS_RE.fullmatch(lineage.owner_alias):
+        raise LineageError("invalid owner_alias")
+    if normalize_goal_slug(lineage.goal_slug) != lineage.goal_slug:
+        raise LineageError("goal_slug must already be normalized")
+    if not lineage.display_name or len(lineage.display_name) > 200:
+        raise LineageError("display_name must be non-empty and <= 200 characters")
+
+    if lineage.relation_type == RelationType.ROOT:
+        if lineage.root_task_id != lineage.task_id:
+            raise LineageError("root_task_id must equal task_id for ROOT")
+        if lineage.parent_task_id is not None:
+            raise LineageError("ROOT parent_task_id must be null")
+        if lineage.lineage_depth != 0:
+            raise LineageError("ROOT lineage_depth must be 0")
+        if lineage.sibling_sequence != 0:
+            raise LineageError("ROOT sibling_sequence must be 0")
+        if lineage.parent_revision is not None:
+            raise LineageError("ROOT parent_revision must be null")
+        return
+
+    if not lineage.root_task_id or not lineage.parent_task_id:
+        raise LineageError("non-root root_task_id and parent_task_id are required")
+    if lineage.lineage_depth < 1:
+        raise LineageError("non-root lineage_depth must be >= 1")
+    if lineage.parent_revision is None or lineage.parent_revision < 0:
+        raise LineageError("non-root parent_revision must be >= 0")
+    _relation_token(lineage.relation_type, lineage.sibling_sequence)
+
+
+def attach_legacy_lineage(
+    *,
+    existing_task_id: str,
+    created_at: datetime,
+    parent: TaskRecord,
+    root: TaskRecord,
+    relation_type: RelationType,
+    sibling_sequence: int,
+    goal_slug: str,
+) -> TaskLineage:
+    """Return lineage metadata for an existing durable task without changing its ID."""
+    return make_child_lineage(
+        task_id=existing_task_id,
+        created_at=created_at,
+        parent=parent,
+        root=root,
+        relation_type=relation_type,
+        sibling_sequence=sibling_sequence,
+        goal_slug=goal_slug,
+    )
+
+
+def rename_display_only(lineage: TaskLineage, new_display_name: str) -> TaskLineage:
+    if not new_display_name or len(new_display_name) > 200:
+        raise LineageError("display name must be non-empty and <= 200 characters")
+    return replace(lineage, display_name=new_display_name)
+
+
+
+LINEAGE_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage.v1"
+ROOT_REVIEW_SCHEMA = "aios.root-review.v1"
+
+_LINEAGE_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema",
+        "task_id",
+        "display_name",
+        "owner_principal_id",
+        "owner_alias",
+        "created_at",
+        "mission_id",
+        "root_task_id",
+        "parent_task_id",
+        "lineage_depth",
+        "relation_type",
+        "sibling_sequence",
+        "goal_slug",
+        "root_acceptance_ref",
+        "parent_revision",
+    }
+)
+_ROOT_REVIEW_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema",
+        "review_id",
+        "root_task_id",
+        "reviewed_at",
+        "trigger_child_task_id",
+        "root_revision_before",
+        "root_revision_after",
+        "completed_children",
+        "active_children",
+        "blocked_children",
+        "remaining_acceptance_conditions",
+        "next_legal_action",
+        "root_complete",
+        "evidence_refs",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def _require_exact_fields(metadata: Mapping[str, object], expected: frozenset[str]) -> None:
+    if not all(isinstance(key, str) for key in metadata):
+        raise LineageError("metadata field names must be strings")
+    actual = frozenset(metadata)
+    if actual != expected:
+        missing = sorted(expected - actual)
+        extra = sorted(actual - expected)
+        raise LineageError(f"metadata fields mismatch: missing={missing} extra={extra}")
+
+
+def _require_string(metadata: Mapping[str, object], key: str) -> str:
+    value = metadata[key]
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+        raise LineageError(f"{key} must be a non-empty string")
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_int(metadata: Mapping[str, object], key: str) -> int:
+    value = metadata[key]
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
+        raise LineageError(f"{key} must be an integer")
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_string_list(metadata: Mapping[str, object], key: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    value = metadata[key]
+    if not isinstance(value, list) or not all(isinstance(item, str) and item for item in value):
+        raise LineageError(f"{key} must be a list of non-empty strings")
+    items = tuple(value)
+    if len(items) != len(set(items)):
+        raise LineageError(f"{key} must not contain duplicates")
+    return items
+
+
+def lineage_to_metadata(lineage: TaskLineage) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return {
+        "schema": LINEAGE_SCHEMA,
+        "task_id": lineage.task_id,
+        "display_name": lineage.display_name,
+        "owner_principal_id": lineage.owner_principal_id,
+        "owner_alias": lineage.owner_alias,
+        "created_at": _require_utc(lineage.created_at).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "mission_id": lineage.mission_id,
+        "root_task_id": lineage.root_task_id,
+        "parent_task_id": lineage.parent_task_id,
+        "lineage_depth": lineage.lineage_depth,
+        "relation_type": lineage.relation_type.value,
+        "sibling_sequence": lineage.sibling_sequence,
+        "goal_slug": lineage.goal_slug,
+        "root_acceptance_ref": lineage.root_acceptance_ref,
+        "parent_revision": lineage.parent_revision,
+    }
+
+
+def lineage_from_metadata(metadata: Mapping[str, object]) -> TaskLineage:
+    _require_exact_fields(metadata, _LINEAGE_FIELDS)
+    if metadata.get("schema") != LINEAGE_SCHEMA:
+        raise LineageError("unsupported lineage metadata schema")
+    try:
+        created_raw = _require_string(metadata, "created_at")
+        if created_raw.endswith("Z"):
+            created_raw = created_raw[:-1] + "+00:00"
+        parent_task_id = metadata["parent_task_id"]
+        if parent_task_id is not None and (
+            not isinstance(parent_task_id, str) or not parent_task_id
+        ):
+            raise LineageError("parent_task_id must be null or a non-empty string")
+        parent_revision = metadata["parent_revision"]
+        if parent_revision is not None and (
+            isinstance(parent_revision, bool) or not isinstance(parent_revision, int)
+        ):
+            raise LineageError("parent_revision must be null or an integer")
+        lineage = TaskLineage(
+            task_id=_require_string(metadata, "task_id"),
+            display_name=_require_string(metadata, "display_name"),
+            owner_principal_id=_require_string(metadata, "owner_principal_id"),
+            owner_alias=_require_string(metadata, "owner_alias"),
+            created_at=datetime.fromisoformat(created_raw),
+            mission_id=_require_string(metadata, "mission_id"),
+            root_task_id=_require_string(metadata, "root_task_id"),
+            parent_task_id=parent_task_id,
+            lineage_depth=_require_int(metadata, "lineage_depth"),
+            relation_type=RelationType(_require_string(metadata, "relation_type")),
+            sibling_sequence=_require_int(metadata, "sibling_sequence"),
+            goal_slug=_require_string(metadata, "goal_slug"),
+            root_acceptance_ref=_require_string(metadata, "root_acceptance_ref"),
+            parent_revision=parent_revision,
+        )
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, LineageError) as exc:
+        raise LineageError(f"invalid lineage metadata: {exc}") from exc
+    _validate_lineage_shape(lineage)
+    return lineage
+
+
+def root_review_to_record(review: RootReviewRecord) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return {
+        "schema": ROOT_REVIEW_SCHEMA,
+        "review_id": review.review_id,
+        "root_task_id": review.root_task_id,
+        "reviewed_at": _require_utc(review.reviewed_at).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "trigger_child_task_id": review.trigger_child_task_id,
+        "root_revision_before": review.root_revision_before,
+        "root_revision_after": review.root_revision_after,
+        "completed_children": list(review.completed_children),
+        "active_children": list(review.active_children),
+        "blocked_children": list(review.blocked_children),
+        "remaining_acceptance_conditions": list(review.remaining_acceptance_conditions),
+        "next_legal_action": review.next_legal_action.value,
+        "root_complete": review.root_complete,
+        "evidence_refs": list(review.evidence_refs),
+    }
+
+
+def root_review_from_record(
+    record: Mapping[str, object], *, expected_review_id: str | None = None
+) -> RootReviewRecord:
+    _require_exact_fields(record, _ROOT_REVIEW_FIELDS)
+    if record.get("schema") != ROOT_REVIEW_SCHEMA:
+        raise LineageError("unsupported root-review metadata schema")
+    try:
+        reviewed_raw = _require_string(record, "reviewed_at")
+        if reviewed_raw.endswith("Z"):
+            reviewed_raw = reviewed_raw[:-1] + "+00:00"
+        root_complete = record["root_complete"]
+        if not isinstance(root_complete, bool):
+            raise LineageError("root_complete must be a boolean")
+        review = RootReviewRecord(
+            review_id=_require_string(record, "review_id"),
+            root_task_id=_require_string(record, "root_task_id"),
+            reviewed_at=_require_utc(datetime.fromisoformat(reviewed_raw)),
+            trigger_child_task_id=_require_string(record, "trigger_child_task_id"),
+            root_revision_before=_require_int(record, "root_revision_before"),
+            root_revision_after=_require_int(record, "root_revision_after"),
+            completed_children=_require_string_list(record, "completed_children"),
+            active_children=_require_string_list(record, "active_children"),
+            blocked_children=_require_string_list(record, "blocked_children"),
+            remaining_acceptance_conditions=_require_string_list(
+                record, "remaining_acceptance_conditions"
+            ),
+            next_legal_action=NextLegalAction(
+                _require_string(record, "next_legal_action")
+            ),
+            root_complete=root_complete,
+            evidence_refs=_require_string_list(record, "evidence_refs"),
+        )
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, LineageError) as exc:
+        raise LineageError(f"invalid root-review metadata: {exc}") from exc
+    if expected_review_id is not None and review.review_id != expected_review_id:
+        raise LineageError("root-review id does not match lookup key")
+    if review.root_revision_before < 0 or (
+        review.root_revision_after != review.root_revision_before + 1
+    ):
+        raise LineageError("root-review revision transition is invalid")
+    if review.root_complete != (
+        review.next_legal_action == NextLegalAction.ROOT_COMPLETE
+    ):
+        raise LineageError("root_complete does not match next_legal_action")
+    child_sets = (
+        set(review.completed_children),
+        set(review.active_children),
+        set(review.blocked_children),
+    )
+    if any(child_sets[i] & child_sets[j] for i in range(3) for j in range(i + 1, 3)):
+        raise LineageError("root-review child classifications overlap")
+    return review
+
+def _review_id(
+    root_task_id: str,
+    trigger_child_task_id: str,
+    trigger_revision: int,
+    acceptance: RootAcceptanceSnapshot,
+) -> str:
+    acceptance_digest = sha256(
+        "\n".join(
+            f"{c.key}:{int(c.satisfied)}:{int(c.owner_boundary)}:"
+            f"{','.join(sorted(set(c.evidence_refs)))}"
+            for c in acceptance.conditions
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()
+    payload = f"{root_task_id}|{trigger_child_task_id}|{trigger_revision}|{acceptance_digest}"
+    return "RR-" + sha256(payload.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:24]
+
+
+def _next_action(
+    descendants: Sequence[TaskRecord],
+    acceptance: RootAcceptanceSnapshot,
+) -> NextLegalAction:
+    if acceptance.complete:
+        return NextLegalAction.ROOT_COMPLETE
+    if acceptance.owner_boundary_required:
+        return NextLegalAction.OWNER_BOUNDARY
+    if any(d.status in RECOVERY_STATUSES for d in descendants):
+        return NextLegalAction.RECOVER_EXISTING_CHILD
+    if any(d.status in BLOCKED_STATUSES for d in descendants):
+        return NextLegalAction.WAIT_DEPENDENCY
+    return NextLegalAction.CREATE_OR_RESUME_NEXT_CHILD
+
+
+def review_root_after_child_terminal(
+    *,
+    store: RootReviewStore,
+    trigger_child_task_id: str,
+    acceptance_evaluator: AcceptanceEvaluator,
+    reviewed_at: datetime,
+    max_cas_retries: int = 4,
+) -> RootReviewRecord:
+    """Persist a root review after a proven child terminal transition.
+
+    This function is deliberately storage-agnostic. TaskPlane remains the
+    authority and supplies the CAS implementation. The function never creates a
+    new root or mutates a child identity.
+    """
+    if max_cas_retries < 1:
+        raise LineageError("max_cas_retries must be >= 1")
+    reviewed_at = _require_utc(reviewed_at)
+
+    for _ in range(max_cas_retries):
+        child = store.get_task(trigger_child_task_id)
+        if child.lineage.relation_type == RelationType.ROOT:
+            raise LineageError("root review hook requires a child task")
+        if child.status not in TERMINAL_STATUSES:
+            raise LineageError("child must be terminal before root review")
+        if not child.terminal_evidence_proven:
+            raise LineageError("child terminal evidence is not proven")
+
+        root = store.get_task(child.lineage.root_task_id)
+        if root.lineage.relation_type != RelationType.ROOT:
+            raise LineageError("root_task_id does not resolve to a ROOT task")
+        if child.lineage.owner_principal_id != root.lineage.owner_principal_id:
+            raise LineageError("trigger child owner does not match root owner")
+        if child.lineage.mission_id != root.lineage.mission_id:
+            raise LineageError("trigger child mission does not match root mission")
+        if child.lineage.root_acceptance_ref != root.lineage.root_acceptance_ref:
+            raise LineageError("trigger child acceptance reference does not match root")
+
+        descendants = tuple(
+            sorted(store.list_descendants(root.task_id), key=lambda item: item.task_id)
+        )
+        descendant_ids = tuple(item.task_id for item in descendants)
+        if len(descendant_ids) != len(set(descendant_ids)):
+            raise LineageError("descendant authority returned duplicate task ids")
+        if child.task_id not in descendant_ids:
+            raise LineageError("trigger child missing from authoritative descendants")
+        for descendant in descendants:
+            if descendant.lineage.root_task_id != root.task_id:
+                raise LineageError("descendant is attached to a different root")
+            if descendant.lineage.owner_principal_id != root.lineage.owner_principal_id:
+                raise LineageError("descendant owner does not match root owner")
+            if descendant.lineage.mission_id != root.lineage.mission_id:
+                raise LineageError("descendant mission does not match root mission")
+            if (
+                descendant.lineage.root_acceptance_ref
+                != root.lineage.root_acceptance_ref
+            ):
+                raise LineageError("descendant acceptance reference does not match root")
+
+        acceptance = canonicalize_acceptance(acceptance_evaluator(root, descendants))
+        review_id = _review_id(root.task_id, child.task_id, child.revision, acceptance)
+
+        completed = tuple(
+            d.task_id for d in descendants
+            if d.status in TERMINAL_STATUSES and d.terminal_evidence_proven
+        )
+        active = tuple(
+            d.task_id for d in descendants
+            if d.status not in TERMINAL_STATUSES and d.status not in BLOCKED_STATUSES
+        )
+        blocked = tuple(
+            d.task_id for d in descendants
+            if d.status in BLOCKED_STATUSES
+        )
+        evidence = tuple(sorted(set(child.evidence_refs + acceptance.evidence_refs)))
+        action = _next_action(descendants, acceptance)
+
+        existing = store.get_root_review(review_id)
+        if existing is not None:
+            if (
+                existing.root_task_id != root.task_id
+                or existing.trigger_child_task_id != child.task_id
+            ):
+                raise LineageError("persisted root review identity conflicts with trigger")
+            if existing.root_revision_after > root.revision:
+                raise LineageError("persisted root review revision is ahead of authority")
+            expected_semantics = (
+                completed,
+                active,
+                blocked,
+                acceptance.remaining,
+                action,
+                action == NextLegalAction.ROOT_COMPLETE,
+                evidence,
+            )
+            actual_semantics = (
+                existing.completed_children,
+                existing.active_children,
+                existing.blocked_children,
+                existing.remaining_acceptance_conditions,
+                existing.next_legal_action,
+                existing.root_complete,
+                existing.evidence_refs,
+            )
+            if actual_semantics != expected_semantics:
+                raise LineageError("persisted root review conflicts with current semantics")
+            return existing
+
+        review = RootReviewRecord(
+            review_id=review_id,
+            root_task_id=root.task_id,
+            reviewed_at=reviewed_at,
+            trigger_child_task_id=child.task_id,
+            root_revision_before=root.revision,
+            root_revision_after=root.revision + 1,
+            completed_children=completed,
+            active_children=active,
+            blocked_children=blocked,
+            remaining_acceptance_conditions=acceptance.remaining,
+            next_legal_action=action,
+            root_complete=(action == NextLegalAction.ROOT_COMPLETE),
+            evidence_refs=evidence,
+        )
+        if store.compare_and_swap_root_review(root.task_id, root.revision, review):
+            return review
+
+        # Another sibling may have updated root progress. Re-read authority and
+        # recompute; never overwrite a newer root review.
+
+    raise LineageError("root review CAS retry budget exhausted")

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage_hooks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import Mapping
+
+if not __package__:
+    from aios_task_lineage import AcceptanceEvaluator, RelationType, TaskLineage, lineage_to_metadata, lineage_from_metadata, root_review_to_record
+    from aios_task_lineage_integration import (
+        DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY,
+        IntegrationError,
+        LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY,
+        NewTaskIdentityRequest,
+        PreparedTaskIdentity,
+        TaskIdentityLineageService,
+        TerminalReviewOutcome,
+    )
+    from aios_task_lineage_taskplane_adapter import (
+        AuthenticatedTaskContext,
+        InProcessTaskPlaneLineageAdapter,
+        require_context_matches_task,
+    )
+else:
+    from .aios_task_lineage import AcceptanceEvaluator, RelationType, TaskLineage, lineage_to_metadata, lineage_from_metadata, root_review_to_record
+    from .aios_task_lineage_integration import (
+        DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY,
+        IntegrationError,
+        LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY,
+        NewTaskIdentityRequest,
+        PreparedTaskIdentity,
+        TaskIdentityLineageService,
+        TerminalReviewOutcome,
+    )
+    from .aios_task_lineage_taskplane_adapter import (
+        AuthenticatedTaskContext,
+        InProcessTaskPlaneLineageAdapter,
+        require_context_matches_task,
+    )
+
+
+class LifecycleHookError(IntegrationError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class IdentityPersistenceOutcome:
+    prepared: PreparedTaskIdentity
+    persisted_revision_at_least: int
+    independently_verified: bool
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class LegacyAttachOutcome:
+    lineage: TaskLineage
+    independently_verified: bool
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TerminalHookOutcome:
+    outcome: TerminalReviewOutcome
+    root_review_persisted: bool
+    dispatch_persisted: bool
+    independently_verified: bool
+
+
+class TaskLineageLifecycleHooks:
+    """Concrete lifecycle hook coordinator.
+
+    It does not own TaskPlane state. It orchestrates existing TaskPlane CAS,
+    journal/continuation and optional independent authority readback.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, adapter: InProcessTaskPlaneLineageAdapter):
+        self._adapter = adapter
+        self._service = TaskIdentityLineageService(adapter)
+
+    def persist_new_task_identity(
+        self,
+        *,
+        request: NewTaskIdentityRequest,
+        context: AuthenticatedTaskContext,
+        max_cas_retries: int = 4,
+        require_independent_readback: bool = True,
+    ) -> IdentityPersistenceOutcome:
+        if max_cas_retries < 1:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("max_cas_retries must be >= 1")
+        if require_independent_readback and not self._adapter.has_independent_readback:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("independent TaskPlane readback is not configured")
+        if request.owner_principal_id != context.principal_id:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("request principal does not match authenticated context")
+        if request.mission_id != context.mission_id:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("request mission does not match authenticated context")
+
+        for _ in range(max_cas_retries):
+            current = self._adapter.get_task_snapshot(request.task_id)
+            require_context_matches_task(context, current)
+            if current.created_at != request.created_at:
+                raise LifecycleHookError("request created_at does not match authority")
+            if (request.relation_type == RelationType.ROOT
+                    and request.preferred_owner_alias not in (None, context.preferred_alias)):
+                raise LifecycleHookError("request alias does not match authenticated context")
+            request = replace(request, preferred_owner_alias=context.preferred_alias)
+            prepared = self._service.prepare_new_task_identity(request)
+
+            # Idempotent replay and legacy display-name repair are fail-closed:
+            # never overwrite an existing conflicting lineage record.
+            raw = current.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+            display = current.metadata.get(DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY)
+            if raw is not None and not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+                raise LifecycleHookError("existing lineage metadata is malformed")
+            if isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+                # parent_revision records the creation observation, not the
+                # parent's current progress revision on an idempotent replay.
+                expected = dict(prepared.metadata_patch[LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY])
+                if request.parent_task_id is not None:
+                    stored = lineage_from_metadata(dict(raw))
+                    if (stored.parent_revision is None
+                            or stored.parent_revision > prepared.lineage.parent_revision):
+                        raise LifecycleHookError("existing parent revision conflicts with authority")
+                    expected["parent_revision"] = stored.parent_revision
+                if raw != expected:
+                    raise LifecycleHookError(
+                        "existing lineage metadata conflicts with requested identity"
+                    )
+                prepared = replace(prepared, lineage=lineage_from_metadata(dict(raw)),
+                                   metadata_patch={LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY: dict(raw),
+                                                   DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY: prepared.display_name})
+                if display == prepared.display_name:
+                    verified = False
+                    if require_independent_readback:
+                        self._adapter.verify_task_readback(
+                            task_id=request.task_id,
+                            expected_revision_at_least=current.revision,
+                            expected_metadata=prepared.metadata_patch,
+                        )
+                        verified = True
+                    return IdentityPersistenceOutcome(
+                        prepared=prepared,
+                        persisted_revision_at_least=current.revision,
+                        independently_verified=verified,
+                    )
+                if display not in (None, ""):
+                    raise LifecycleHookError(
+                        "existing display name conflicts with requested identity"
+                    )
+                metadata_patch = {
+                    DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY: prepared.display_name,
+                }
+            else:
+                if display not in (None, ""):
+                    raise LifecycleHookError(
+                        "display name exists without authoritative lineage"
+                    )
+                metadata_patch = prepared.metadata_patch
+
+            ok = self._adapter.compare_and_swap_task_metadata(
+                task_id=request.task_id,
+                expected_revision=current.revision,
+                metadata_patch=metadata_patch,
+            )
+            if not ok:
+                continue
+
+            verified = False
+            if require_independent_readback:
+                self._adapter.verify_task_readback(
+                    task_id=request.task_id,
+                    expected_revision_at_least=current.revision + 1,
+                    expected_metadata=prepared.metadata_patch,
+                )
+                verified = True
+            return IdentityPersistenceOutcome(
+                prepared=prepared,
+                persisted_revision_at_least=current.revision + 1,
+                independently_verified=verified,
+            )
+
+        raise LifecycleHookError("identity persistence CAS retry budget exhausted")
+
+    def attach_legacy_identity(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        parent_task_id: str,
+        relation_type: RelationType,
+        goal_slug: str,
+        context: AuthenticatedTaskContext,
+        max_cas_retries: int = 4,
+        require_independent_readback: bool = True,
+    ) -> LegacyAttachOutcome:
+        if require_independent_readback and not self._adapter.has_independent_readback:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("independent TaskPlane readback is not configured")
+        before = self._adapter.get_task_snapshot(task_id)
+        require_context_matches_task(context, before)
+        lineage = self._service.attach_legacy_task(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            parent_task_id=parent_task_id,
+            relation_type=relation_type,
+            goal_slug=goal_slug,
+            max_cas_retries=max_cas_retries,
+            expected_owner_principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            expected_mission_id=context.mission_id,
+        )
+        verified = False
+        if require_independent_readback:
+            self._adapter.verify_task_readback(
+                task_id=task_id,
+                expected_revision_at_least=before.revision,
+                expected_metadata={
+                    LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY: lineage_to_metadata(lineage),
+                    DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY: lineage.display_name,
+                },
+            )
+            # Domain serialization compatibility check below avoids requiring
+            # TaskLineage to expose a method in older versions.
+            verified = True
+        return LegacyAttachOutcome(lineage=lineage, independently_verified=verified)
+
+    def on_proven_terminal_child(
+        self,
+        *,
+        child_task_id: str,
+        context: AuthenticatedTaskContext,
+        acceptance_evaluator: AcceptanceEvaluator,
+        reviewed_at: datetime,
+        max_cas_retries: int = 4,
+        require_independent_readback: bool = True,
+    ) -> TerminalHookOutcome:
+        if require_independent_readback and not self._adapter.has_independent_readback:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("independent TaskPlane readback is not configured")
+        child = self._adapter.get_task_snapshot(child_task_id)
+        require_context_matches_task(context, child)
+        if not child.terminal_evidence_proven:
+            raise LifecycleHookError(
+                "terminal child hook requires proven terminal evidence"
+            )
+        raw = child.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+        if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            raise LifecycleHookError("terminal child lineage missing")
+        lineage = lineage_from_metadata(dict(raw))
+        root = self._adapter.get_task_snapshot(lineage.root_task_id)
+        require_context_matches_task(context, root)
+
+        def authorized_acceptance(root_record, descendants):
+            if (root_record.lineage.owner_principal_id != context.principal_id
+                    or root_record.lineage.mission_id != context.mission_id):
+                raise LifecycleHookError("root authority changed during terminal review")
+            return acceptance_evaluator(root_record, descendants)
+
+        outcome = self._service.on_proven_terminal_child(
+            child_task_id=child_task_id,
+            acceptance_evaluator=authorized_acceptance,
+            reviewed_at=reviewed_at,
+            max_cas_retries=max_cas_retries,
+        )
+
+        persisted_review = self._adapter.get_root_review_record(
+            outcome.review.review_id
+        )
+        if persisted_review is None:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("root review was not persisted")
+        if persisted_review != root_review_to_record(outcome.review):
+            raise LifecycleHookError("persisted review does not match returned review")
+
+        dispatch = self._adapter.get_root_action_dispatch(outcome.review.review_id)
+        if dispatch is None:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("root action dispatch was not persisted")
+        if dispatch != outcome.dispatch:
+            raise LifecycleHookError("persisted dispatch does not match returned receipt")
+
+        verified = False
+        if require_independent_readback:
+            self._adapter.verify_root_readback(
+                root_task_id=outcome.review.root_task_id,
+                expected_review_id=outcome.review.review_id,
+            )
+            verified = True
+
+        return TerminalHookOutcome(
+            outcome=outcome,
+            root_review_persisted=True,
+            dispatch_persisted=True,
+            independently_verified=verified,
+        )

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Mapping, MutableMapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+if not __package__:
+    from aios_task_lineage import (
+        AcceptanceEvaluator,
+        LineageError,
+        NextLegalAction,
+        RelationType,
+        RootReviewRecord,
+        RootReviewStore,
+        TaskLineage,
+        TaskRecord,
+        attach_legacy_lineage,
+        derive_safe_owner_alias,
+        lineage_from_metadata,
+        lineage_to_metadata,
+        make_child_lineage,
+        make_root_lineage,
+        normalize_goal_slug,
+        review_root_after_child_terminal,
+        root_review_from_record,
+        root_review_to_record,
+    )
+else:
+    from .aios_task_lineage import (
+        AcceptanceEvaluator,
+        LineageError,
+        NextLegalAction,
+        RelationType,
+        RootReviewRecord,
+        RootReviewStore,
+        TaskLineage,
+        TaskRecord,
+        attach_legacy_lineage,
+        derive_safe_owner_alias,
+        lineage_from_metadata,
+        lineage_to_metadata,
+        make_child_lineage,
+        make_root_lineage,
+        normalize_goal_slug,
+        review_root_after_child_terminal,
+        root_review_from_record,
+        root_review_to_record,
+    )
+
+
+LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY = "aios_task_lineage"
+LINEAGE_REQUEST_DIGEST_KEY = "aios_lineage_request_digest"
+ROOT_REVIEW_RECORD_KEY = "aios_root_review"
+DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY = "aios_task_display_name"
+
+
+class IntegrationError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskAuthoritySnapshot:
+    task_id: str
+    revision: int
+    status: str
+    owner_principal_id: str
+    mission_id: str
+    created_at: datetime
+    metadata: Mapping[str, object]
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    terminal_evidence_proven: bool = False
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class NewTaskIdentityRequest:
+    task_id: str
+    owner_principal_id: str
+    preferred_owner_alias: str | None
+    created_at: datetime
+    mission_id: str
+    goal_slug: str
+    root_acceptance_ref: str
+    relation_type: RelationType = RelationType.ROOT
+    parent_task_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PreparedTaskIdentity:
+    task_id: str
+    display_name: str
+    lineage: TaskLineage
+    metadata_patch: Mapping[str, object]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TerminalReviewOutcome:
+    review: RootReviewRecord
+    dispatch: "RootActionDispatchReceipt"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RootActionDispatchReceipt:
+    review_id: str
+    root_task_id: str
+    action: NextLegalAction
+    idempotency_key: str
+    status: str
+    mission_id: str = ""
+    root_revision: int = 0
+    plan_digest: str | None = None
+    execution_key: str | None = None
+
+
+PERSISTED_DISPATCH_STATUSES = frozenset(
+    {
+        "PENDING",
+        "CLAIMED",
+        "EFFECT_UNKNOWN",
+        "EXECUTED_PENDING_REREVIEW",
+        "WAITING_DEPENDENCY",
+        "WAITING_OWNER",
+        "CLOSED",
+        "SUPERSEDED",
+        "BLOCKED",
+        # Read compatibility only.  A consumer must reconcile this legacy
+        # state unless a complete durable receipt is present.
+        "DISPATCHED",
+    }
+)
+
+
+class TaskPlaneLineagePort(Protocol):
+    """Narrow authority port required by the lineage integration service.
+
+    The live adapter must implement these methods over the existing TaskPlane /
+    mission / journal / CAS mechanisms. This protocol deliberately avoids
+    guessing concrete DB tables, HTTP endpoints, or handler names.
+    """
+
+    def get_task_snapshot(self, task_id: str) -> TaskAuthoritySnapshot: ...
+
+    def list_descendant_snapshots(
+        self, root_task_id: str
+    ) -> Sequence[TaskAuthoritySnapshot]: ...
+
+    def reserve_sibling_sequence(
+        self,
+        *,
+        parent_task_id: str,
+        relation_type: RelationType,
+        child_task_id: str,
+    ) -> int:
+        """Idempotently reserve one sibling sequence for child_task_id."""
+
+    def compare_and_swap_task_metadata(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        expected_revision: int,
+        metadata_patch: Mapping[str, object],
+    ) -> bool: ...
+
+    def get_root_review_record(
+        self, review_id: str
+    ) -> Mapping[str, object] | None: ...
+
+    def compare_and_swap_root_review_record(
+        self,
+        *,
+        root_task_id: str,
+        expected_root_revision: int,
+        review_record: Mapping[str, object],
+    ) -> bool: ...
+
+    def get_root_action_dispatch(
+        self, review_id: str
+    ) -> RootActionDispatchReceipt | None: ...
+
+    def dispatch_root_action(
+        self,
+        *,
+        review: RootReviewRecord,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+    ) -> RootActionDispatchReceipt: ...
+
+
+def _extract_lineage(snapshot: TaskAuthoritySnapshot) -> TaskLineage:
+    raw = snapshot.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        raise IntegrationError(
+            f"task {snapshot.task_id} does not have authoritative lineage metadata"
+        )
+    lineage = lineage_from_metadata(raw)
+    if lineage.task_id != snapshot.task_id:
+        raise IntegrationError("lineage task_id does not match authority task")
+    if lineage.owner_principal_id != snapshot.owner_principal_id:
+        raise IntegrationError("lineage owner does not match authority owner")
+    if lineage.mission_id != snapshot.mission_id:
+        raise IntegrationError("lineage mission does not match authority mission")
+    if snapshot.created_at.tzinfo is None or snapshot.created_at.utcoffset() is None:
+        raise IntegrationError("authority created_at must be timezone-aware")
+    if lineage.created_at != snapshot.created_at:
+        raise IntegrationError("lineage created_at does not match authority task")
+    display = snapshot.metadata.get(DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY)
+    if display not in (None, "", lineage.display_name):
+        raise IntegrationError("lineage display name conflicts with authority metadata")
+    return lineage
+
+
+def _as_task_record(snapshot: TaskAuthoritySnapshot) -> TaskRecord:
+    return TaskRecord(
+        task_id=snapshot.task_id,
+        revision=snapshot.revision,
+        status=snapshot.status,
+        lineage=_extract_lineage(snapshot),
+        evidence_refs=snapshot.evidence_refs,
+        terminal_evidence_proven=snapshot.terminal_evidence_proven,
+    )
+
+
+def _validate_record_root_binding(record: TaskRecord, root: TaskRecord) -> None:
+    if root.lineage.relation_type != RelationType.ROOT:
+        raise IntegrationError("root_task_id does not resolve to a ROOT task")
+    if record.lineage.root_task_id != root.task_id:
+        raise IntegrationError("task lineage points to a different root")
+    if record.lineage.owner_principal_id != root.lineage.owner_principal_id:
+        raise IntegrationError("task lineage owner does not match root owner")
+    if record.lineage.mission_id != root.lineage.mission_id:
+        raise IntegrationError("task lineage mission does not match root mission")
+    if record.lineage.root_acceptance_ref != root.lineage.root_acceptance_ref:
+        raise IntegrationError("task lineage acceptance reference does not match root")
+
+
+def _load_authority_record(
+    port: TaskPlaneLineagePort, task_id: str
+) -> tuple[TaskRecord, TaskRecord]:
+    record = _as_task_record(port.get_task_snapshot(task_id))
+    if record.lineage.relation_type == RelationType.ROOT:
+        return record, record
+    root = _as_task_record(port.get_task_snapshot(record.lineage.root_task_id))
+    current = record
+    seen = {record.task_id}
+    while current.lineage.relation_type != RelationType.ROOT:
+        _validate_record_root_binding(current, root)
+        parent_id = current.lineage.parent_task_id
+        if not parent_id or parent_id in seen:
+            raise IntegrationError("task lineage contains a parent cycle")
+        seen.add(parent_id)
+        parent = _as_task_record(port.get_task_snapshot(parent_id))
+        _validate_record_root_binding(parent, root)
+        if current.lineage.parent_task_id != parent.task_id:
+            raise IntegrationError("task lineage parent does not match authority parent")
+        if current.lineage.lineage_depth != parent.lineage.lineage_depth + 1:
+            raise IntegrationError("task lineage depth does not match authority parent")
+        if current.lineage.parent_revision is None or (
+            current.lineage.parent_revision > parent.revision
+        ):
+            raise IntegrationError("task lineage parent revision is not authoritative")
+        current = parent
+    if current.task_id != root.task_id:
+        raise IntegrationError("task lineage parent chain ends at a different root")
+    return record, root
+
+
+def _validate_dispatch_receipt(
+    receipt: RootActionDispatchReceipt,
+    *,
+    review: RootReviewRecord,
+    idempotency_key: str,
+    existing: bool,
+) -> None:
+    if (
+        receipt.review_id != review.review_id
+        or receipt.root_task_id != review.root_task_id
+        or receipt.action != review.next_legal_action
+        or receipt.idempotency_key != idempotency_key
+        or receipt.status not in PERSISTED_DISPATCH_STATUSES
+    ):
+        noun = "existing root-action dispatch" if existing else "root-action dispatch receipt"
+        raise IntegrationError(f"{noun} conflicts with persisted review")
+
+
+class _RootReviewStoreAdapter(RootReviewStore):
+    def __init__(self, port: TaskPlaneLineagePort):
+        self._port = port
+
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        record, _ = _load_authority_record(self._port, task_id)
+        return record
+
+    def list_descendants(self, root_task_id: str) -> Sequence[TaskRecord]:
+        root, _ = _load_authority_record(self._port, root_task_id)
+        if root.lineage.relation_type != RelationType.ROOT:
+            raise IntegrationError("descendant lookup key is not a ROOT task")
+        records: list[TaskRecord] = []
+        for snapshot in self._port.list_descendant_snapshots(root_task_id):
+            record, resolved_root = _load_authority_record(self._port, snapshot.task_id)
+            if resolved_root.task_id != root_task_id:
+                raise IntegrationError("descendant authority returned a cross-root task")
+            _validate_record_root_binding(record, root)
+            records.append(record)
+        return tuple(records)
+
+    def get_root_review(self, review_id: str) -> RootReviewRecord | None:
+        raw = self._port.get_root_review_record(review_id)
+        if raw is None:
+            return None
+        if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            raise IntegrationError("persisted root-review record must be a mapping")
+        try:
+            return root_review_from_record(
+                raw,
+                expected_review_id=review_id,
+            )
+        except LineageError as exc:
+            raise IntegrationError(
+                f"invalid persisted root-review record: {exc}"
+            ) from exc
+
+    def compare_and_swap_root_review(
+        self,
+        root_task_id: str,
+        expected_root_revision: int,
+        review: RootReviewRecord,
+    ) -> bool:
+        return self._port.compare_and_swap_root_review_record(
+            root_task_id=root_task_id,
+            expected_root_revision=expected_root_revision,
+            review_record=root_review_to_record(review),
+        )
+
+
+class TaskIdentityLineageService:
+    """Application service that wires the lineage domain to TaskPlane authority."""
+
+    def __init__(self, port: TaskPlaneLineagePort):
+        self._port = port
+
+    def prepare_new_task_identity(
+        self, request: NewTaskIdentityRequest
+    ) -> PreparedTaskIdentity:
+        alias = derive_safe_owner_alias(
+            request.owner_principal_id, request.preferred_owner_alias
+        )
+
+        if request.relation_type == RelationType.ROOT:
+            if request.parent_task_id is not None:
+                raise IntegrationError("ROOT task cannot have parent_task_id")
+            lineage = make_root_lineage(
+                task_id=request.task_id,
+                owner_principal_id=request.owner_principal_id,
+                owner_alias=alias,
+                created_at=request.created_at,
+                mission_id=request.mission_id,
+                goal_slug=request.goal_slug,
+                root_acceptance_ref=request.root_acceptance_ref,
+            )
+        else:
+            if not request.parent_task_id:
+                raise IntegrationError("non-root task requires parent_task_id")
+            parent, root = _load_authority_record(
+                self._port, request.parent_task_id
+            )
+
+            if request.owner_principal_id != root.lineage.owner_principal_id:
+                raise IntegrationError("cross-owner child creation rejected")
+            if request.mission_id != root.lineage.mission_id:
+                raise IntegrationError("cross-mission child creation rejected")
+            if request.root_acceptance_ref != root.lineage.root_acceptance_ref:
+                raise IntegrationError("root acceptance reference mismatch")
+
+            sequence = self._port.reserve_sibling_sequence(
+                parent_task_id=parent.task_id,
+                relation_type=request.relation_type,
+                child_task_id=request.task_id,
+            )
+            lineage = make_child_lineage(
+                task_id=request.task_id,
+                created_at=request.created_at,
+                parent=parent,
+                root=root,
+                relation_type=request.relation_type,
+                sibling_sequence=sequence,
+                goal_slug=request.goal_slug,
+            )
+
+        return PreparedTaskIdentity(
+            task_id=request.task_id,
+            display_name=lineage.display_name,
+            lineage=lineage,
+            metadata_patch={
+                LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY: lineage_to_metadata(lineage),
+                DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY: lineage.display_name,
+            },
+        )
+
+    def attach_legacy_task(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        parent_task_id: str,
+        relation_type: RelationType,
+        goal_slug: str,
+        expected_owner_principal_id: str | None = None,
+        expected_mission_id: str | None = None,
+        max_cas_retries: int = 4,
+    ) -> TaskLineage:
+        if max_cas_retries < 1:
+            raise IntegrationError("max_cas_retries must be >= 1")
+
+        for _ in range(max_cas_retries):
+            current = self._port.get_task_snapshot(task_id)
+            if (
+                expected_owner_principal_id is not None
+                and current.owner_principal_id != expected_owner_principal_id
+            ):
+                raise IntegrationError("legacy task owner changed after authorization")
+            if (
+                expected_mission_id is not None
+                and current.mission_id != expected_mission_id
+            ):
+                raise IntegrationError("legacy task mission changed after authorization")
+            raw = current.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+            if isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+                record, _ = _load_authority_record(self._port, task_id)
+                lineage = record.lineage
+                expected_goal_slug = normalize_goal_slug(goal_slug)
+                if (
+                    lineage.parent_task_id != parent_task_id
+                    or lineage.relation_type != relation_type
+                    or lineage.goal_slug != expected_goal_slug
+                ):
+                    raise IntegrationError(
+                        "existing legacy lineage conflicts with requested binding"
+                    )
+                display = current.metadata.get(DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY)
+                if display == lineage.display_name:
+                    return lineage
+                if display not in (None, ""):
+                    raise IntegrationError(
+                        "legacy display name conflicts with authoritative lineage"
+                    )
+                if self._port.compare_and_swap_task_metadata(
+                    task_id=current.task_id,
+                    expected_revision=current.revision,
+                    metadata_patch={
+                        DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY: lineage.display_name,
+                    },
+                ):
+                    return lineage
+                continue
+
+            parent, root = _load_authority_record(self._port, parent_task_id)
+            if root.status == "COMPLETED":
+                raise IntegrationError("cannot attach lineage below a completed root")
+            if (
+                expected_owner_principal_id is not None
+                and root.lineage.owner_principal_id != expected_owner_principal_id
+            ):
+                raise IntegrationError("legacy root owner does not match authorization")
+            if (
+                expected_mission_id is not None
+                and root.lineage.mission_id != expected_mission_id
+            ):
+                raise IntegrationError("legacy root mission does not match authorization")
+            if current.owner_principal_id != root.lineage.owner_principal_id:
+                raise IntegrationError("legacy task owner does not match root owner")
+            if current.mission_id != root.lineage.mission_id:
+                raise IntegrationError("legacy task mission does not match root mission")
+
+            sequence = self._port.reserve_sibling_sequence(
+                parent_task_id=parent.task_id,
+                relation_type=relation_type,
+                child_task_id=current.task_id,
+            )
+            lineage = attach_legacy_lineage(
+                existing_task_id=current.task_id,
+                created_at=current.created_at,
+                parent=parent,
+                root=root,
+                relation_type=relation_type,
+                sibling_sequence=sequence,
+                goal_slug=goal_slug,
+            )
+            if self._port.compare_and_swap_task_metadata(
+                task_id=current.task_id,
+                expected_revision=current.revision,
+                metadata_patch={
+                LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY: lineage_to_metadata(lineage),
+                DISPLAY_NAME_METADATA_KEY: lineage.display_name,
+            },
+            ):
+                return lineage
+
+        raise IntegrationError("legacy lineage CAS retry budget exhausted")
+
+    def on_proven_terminal_child(
+        self,
+        *,
+        child_task_id: str,
+        acceptance_evaluator: AcceptanceEvaluator,
+        reviewed_at: datetime,
+        max_cas_retries: int = 4,
+    ) -> TerminalReviewOutcome:
+        store = _RootReviewStoreAdapter(self._port)
+        review = review_root_after_child_terminal(
+            store=store,
+            trigger_child_task_id=child_task_id,
+            acceptance_evaluator=acceptance_evaluator,
+            reviewed_at=reviewed_at,
+            max_cas_retries=max_cas_retries,
+        )
+        existing = self._port.get_root_action_dispatch(review.review_id)
+        if existing is not None:
+            idempotency_key = (
+                f"root-review:{review.review_id}:{review.next_legal_action.value}"
+            )
+            _validate_dispatch_receipt(
+                existing,
+                review=review,
+                idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+                existing=True,
+            )
+            return TerminalReviewOutcome(review=review, dispatch=existing)
+
+        idempotency_key = f"root-review:{review.review_id}:{review.next_legal_action.value}"
+        receipt = self._port.dispatch_root_action(
+            review=review,
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+        )
+        _validate_dispatch_receipt(
+            receipt,
+            review=review,
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            existing=False,
+        )
+        return TerminalReviewOutcome(review=review, dispatch=receipt)

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage_supersession.py

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+"""One-time, Owner-signed, append-only supersession for one exact Task lineage."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import closing
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+DECISION_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-decision.v1"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-receipt.v1"
+OWNER_NAMESPACE = "aios-owner-approval-v1"
+OWNER_PRINCIPAL = "aios-task-grant-signer"
+OWNER_KEY_ID = "SHA256:rPqpxfPHtaZPM3zSWojX8Q7VxzCknsYqOokyo/aAM3A"
+SOURCE_TASK_ID = "TASK-SINGLEHOST-TRUSTROOT-P0-20260904"
+CHILD_TASK_ID = SOURCE_TASK_ID + "-S1"
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/single-host-trust-root-p0-20260904"
+GENERATION = 1
+EXECUTION_DIGEST = "e99bda6a251832eb3865271eb5687af7eea44dd261144cdcdfa57104c0780536"
+EXTERNAL_JOB_ID = "job-4e10f92a6a5742518a9f1d8745c845ab"
+SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL = 1
+CANONICAL_PROFILE = "aios.task-initial-execution.v1"
+CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION = 1
+SUPERSESSION_REASON = "formal-lineage-supersession-after-expired-unclaimed-source"
+MAX_TTL = timedelta(minutes=5)
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+SAFE_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,511}$")
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, http_status: int = 409):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.http_status = int(http_status)
+
+
+class SignatureVerifier(Protocol):
+    def verify(self, *, namespace: str, payload: bytes, signature: str, key_id: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), allow_nan=False)
+
+
+def sha256_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _fail(code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+    raise TaskLineageSupersessionError(code, status)
+
+
+def _utc(value: Any, field: str) -> datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 80:
+        _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    try:
+        result = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise TaskLineageSupersessionError(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400) from exc
+    if result.tzinfo is None:
+        _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    return result.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _text(value: Any, field: str, *, maximum: int = 1024) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > maximum:
+        _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def decision_payload(raw: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {key: raw[key] for key in raw if key != "signature"}
+
+
+DECISION_FIELDS = {
+    "schema", "decision_id", "nonce", "source_task_id",
+    "source_task_identity_sha256", "source_metadata_sha256",
+    "source_expected_status", "source_expected_revision", "source_expected_attempt",
+    "source_expected_claimed_by", "source_expected_lease_token_hash",
+    "source_expected_lease_expires_at", "repository", "target_branch", "generation",
+    "execution_digest", "external_job_id", "child_task_id", "supersession_ordinal",
+    "canonical_projection_profile", "canonical_projection_version", "supersession_reason",
+    "owner_identity", "signature_namespace", "signature_principal", "key_id",
+    "issued_at", "not_before", "expires_at", "one_time_use", "signature",
+}
+
+
+def validate_decision(raw: Mapping[str, Any], *, now: datetime) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, Mapping) or set(raw) != DECISION_FIELDS:
+        _fail("DECISION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+    exact = {
+        "schema": DECISION_SCHEMA,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "source_expected_status": "EXPIRED",
+        "source_expected_attempt": 0,
+        "source_expected_claimed_by": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_token_hash": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_expires_at": None,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+        "supersession_reason": SUPERSESSION_REASON,
+        "owner_identity": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+        "signature_principal": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "key_id": OWNER_KEY_ID,
+        "one_time_use": True,
+    }
+    for field, expected in exact.items():
+        if raw[field] != expected:
+            _fail(field.upper() + "_MISMATCH", 403 if field.startswith(("owner", "signature", "key")) else 409)
+    for field in ("decision_id", "nonce"):
+        value = _text(raw[field], field, maximum=256)
+        if SAFE_ID.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    for field in ("source_task_identity_sha256", "source_metadata_sha256"):
+        if not isinstance(raw[field], str) or HEX64.fullmatch(raw[field]) is None:
+            _fail(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    if type(raw["source_expected_revision"]) is not int or raw["source_expected_revision"] < 1:
+        _fail("SOURCE_EXPECTED_REVISION_INVALID", 400)
+    _text(raw["signature"], "signature", maximum=32768)
+    issued_at = _utc(raw["issued_at"], "issued_at")
+    not_before = _utc(raw["not_before"], "not_before")
+    expires_at = _utc(raw["expires_at"], "expires_at")
+    if issued_at > expires_at or not_before > expires_at:
+        _fail("DECISION_TIME_ORDER_INVALID", 403)
+    if expires_at - issued_at > MAX_TTL or expires_at <= issued_at:
+        _fail("DECISION_TTL_INVALID", 403)
+    now = now.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+    if now < not_before or now >= expires_at:
+        _fail("DECISION_EXPIRED_OR_NOT_YET_VALID", 403)
+    if issued_at > now + timedelta(seconds=5) or now - issued_at > MAX_TTL:
+        _fail("DECISION_ISSUED_AT_INVALID", 403)
+    return {**dict(raw), "issued_at_dt": issued_at, "not_before_dt": not_before, "expires_at_dt": expires_at}
+
+
+def _default_identity_digest(row: sqlite3.Row) -> str:
+    try:
+        from aios_expired_task_recovery import task_identity_digest
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise TaskLineageSupersessionError("FORMAL_TASK_IDENTITY_HELPER_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+    return str(task_identity_digest(row))
+
+
+def _json_object(row: sqlite3.Row, field: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(row[field])
+    except (TypeError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
+        raise TaskLineageSupersessionError("SOURCE_TASK_JSON_INVALID", 409) from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_JSON_INVALID")
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _verify_source(row: sqlite3.Row, d: Mapping[str, Any], identity_digest: Callable[[sqlite3.Row], str]) -> None:
+    if row["task_id"] != SOURCE_TASK_ID:
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_ID_MISMATCH")
+    cas = (
+        row["status"] == "EXPIRED"
+        and int(row["revision"]) == d["source_expected_revision"]
+        and int(row["attempt"]) == 0
+        and row["claimed_by"] is None
+        and row["lease_token_hash"] is None
+        and row["lease_expires_at"] is None
+    )
+    if not cas:
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_EXACT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+    metadata_raw = row["metadata_json"]
+    if not isinstance(metadata_raw, str) or sha256_text(metadata_raw) != d["source_metadata_sha256"]:
+        _fail("SOURCE_METADATA_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if identity_digest(row) != d["source_task_identity_sha256"]:
+        _fail("SOURCE_TASK_IDENTITY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    metadata = _json_object(row, "metadata_json")
+    execution = metadata.get("execution")
+    constraints = _json_object(row, "constraints_json")
+    if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+        _fail("SOURCE_EXECUTION_BINDING_INVALID")
+    expected = {
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+    }
+    if any(execution.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items()):
+        _fail("SOURCE_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    if constraints.get("generation") != GENERATION:
+        _fail("SOURCE_GENERATION_CONSTRAINT_MISMATCH")
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionController:
+    def __init__(self, db_path: str | Path, verifier: SignatureVerifier, *, clock=None, identity_digest=None):
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.clock = clock or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+        self.identity_digest = identity_digest or _default_identity_digest
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    def _now(self) -> datetime:
+        value = self.clock()
+        if value.tzinfo is None:
+            value = value.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        return value.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_schema(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        required = {"tasks", "events", "task_lineage_supersessions", "task_lineage_supersession_receipts"}
+        actual = {row[0] for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")}
+        if not required.issubset(actual):
+            _fail("SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+        columns = {row[1] for row in connection.execute("PRAGMA table_info(tasks)")}
+        task_columns = {
+            "task_id", "goal", "instructions", "success_criteria_json",
+            "required_capabilities_json", "constraints_json", "metadata_json", "deadline",
+            "priority", "max_attempts", "attempt", "status", "claimed_by",
+            "lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at", "result_json", "result_digest",
+            "result_idempotency_key", "verification_json", "revision", "created_at", "updated_at",
+        }
+        if not task_columns.issubset(columns):
+            _fail("TASK_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    def supersede(self, raw: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = self._now()
+        decision = validate_decision(raw, now=now)
+        payload_bytes = canonical_json(decision_payload(raw)).encode("utf-8")
+        if not self.verifier.verify(
+            namespace=OWNER_NAMESPACE, payload=payload_bytes,
+            signature=decision["signature"], key_id=decision["key_id"],
+        ):
+            _fail("DECISION_SIGNATURE_INVALID", 403)
+        decision_sha = hashlib.sha256(payload_bytes).hexdigest()
+        now_text = now.isoformat()
+        with closing(self._connect()) as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                self._assert_schema(connection)
+                replay = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT owner_decision_sha256,receipt_json FROM task_lineage_supersession_receipts WHERE decision_id=? OR nonce=?",
+                    (decision["decision_id"], decision["nonce"]),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if replay is not None:
+                    if replay["owner_decision_sha256"] != decision_sha:
+                        _fail("DECISION_REPLAY_MISMATCH")
+                    result = json.loads(replay["receipt_json"])
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return {**result, "idempotent": True}
+                source = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (SOURCE_TASK_ID,)).fetchone()
+                if source is None:
+                    _fail("SOURCE_TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+                _verify_source(source, decision, self.identity_digest)
+                if connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT 1 FROM task_lineage_supersessions WHERE source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=?",
+                    (SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL),
+                ).fetchone():
+                    _fail("SUPERSESSION_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+                if connection.execute("SELECT 1 FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)).fetchone():
+                    _fail("CHILD_TASK_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+                connection.execute(
+                    """INSERT INTO tasks(
+                    task_id,goal,instructions,success_criteria_json,required_capabilities_json,
+                    constraints_json,metadata_json,deadline,priority,max_attempts,attempt,status,
+                    claimed_by,lease_token_hash,lease_expires_at,result_json,result_digest,
+                    result_idempotency_key,verification_json,revision,created_at,updated_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                    (
+                        CHILD_TASK_ID, source["goal"], source["instructions"], source["success_criteria_json"],
+                        "[]", source["constraints_json"], "{}", None, source["priority"], source["max_attempts"],
+                        0, "QUEUED", None, None, None, None, None, None, None, 1, now_text, now_text,
+                    ),
+                )
+                connection.execute(
+                    """INSERT INTO task_lineage_supersessions(
+                    source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,child_task_id,source_task_identity_sha256,
+                    source_metadata_sha256,owner_decision_sha256,decision_id,created_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                    (SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL, CHILD_TASK_ID,
+                     decision["source_task_identity_sha256"], decision["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                     decision_sha, decision["decision_id"], now_text),
+                )
+                event_payload = {
+                    "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "supersedes_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+                    "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                    "source_task_identity_sha256": decision["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                    "source_metadata_sha256": decision["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                    "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": decision_sha,
+                    "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+                    "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+                }
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO events(task_id,agent_id,event_type,payload_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (CHILD_TASK_ID, None, "TASK_CREATED", canonical_json(event_payload), now_text),
+                )
+                receipt = {
+                    "schema": RECEIPT_SCHEMA, "status": "SUPERSEDED",
+                    "decision_id": decision["decision_id"], "owner_decision_sha256": decision_sha,
+                    "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID, "source_task_identity_sha256": decision["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                    "source_metadata_sha256": decision["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                    "source_status": "EXPIRED", "source_revision": decision["source_expected_revision"],
+                    "source_attempt": 0, "source_history_preserved": True,
+                    "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID, "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                    "child_status": "QUEUED", "child_revision": 1, "child_attempt": 0,
+                    "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+                    "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+                    "exact_identity_cas": True, "one_time_use": True,
+                    "owner_signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+                    "owner_signature_principal": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+                    "owner_signature_key_id": OWNER_KEY_ID,
+                    "owner_signature_sha256": sha256_text(decision["signature"]),
+                }
+                connection.execute(
+                    """INSERT INTO task_lineage_supersession_receipts(
+                    decision_id,nonce,source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,child_task_id,
+                    owner_decision_sha256,decision_json,receipt_json,consumed_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                    (decision["decision_id"], decision["nonce"], SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                     CHILD_TASK_ID, decision_sha, canonical_json(dict(raw)), canonical_json(receipt), now_text),
+                )
+                connection.commit()
+                return {**receipt, "idempotent": False}
+            except Exception:
+                connection.rollback()
+                raise

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage_supersession_initial_projection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,548 @@
+"""Canonical initial projection for the exact Single-Host supersession child.
+
+The source business execution digest is lineage evidence.  It is deliberately
+not used as the child execution-envelope digest: the canonical envelope binds
+the child Task id and therefore has its own server-derived digest.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_agent_task_initial_execution_projection import (
+    InitialExecutionProjectionError,
+    InitialExecutionProjectionRequest,
+    InitialExecutionProjectionStore,
+    RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_RE,
+    _now,
+    _require_string,
+    _required_authorization_id,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    ExecutionProjectionError,
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession import (
+    CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+    CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+    CHILD_TASK_ID,
+    DECISION_SCHEMA,
+    EXECUTION_DIGEST as SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+    EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+    GENERATION,
+    OWNER_KEY_ID,
+    OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+    RECEIPT_SCHEMA as SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+    REPOSITORY,
+    SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+    SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+    TARGET_BRANCH,
+    canonical_json,
+    decision_payload,
+)
+
+
+PROJECTION_INTENT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-initial-projection-intent.v1"
+PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-initial-projection-receipt.v1"
+PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY = "task-lineage-supersession-s1-initial-projection-v1"
+PROJECTION_REASON = "canonical-initial-projection-for-formal-supersession-child"
+PROJECTION_TABLE = "task_lineage_supersession_initial_projections"
+
+
+def _sha_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _sha_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return _sha_text(canonical_json(value))
+
+
+def _json_object(raw: Any, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, str):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(code, 409)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(raw)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(code, 409) from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(code, 409)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SupersessionChildProjectionIntent:
+    """Caller-selectable portion of the exact child projection.
+
+    Task identity, CAS values, Job identity, projection profile, reason and
+    idempotency are intentionally absent from the request and server-owned.
+    """
+
+    adapter: str
+    required_capability: str
+    authorization_id: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(
+        cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> "SupersessionChildProjectionIntent":
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or set(value) != {
+            "adapter",
+            "required_capability",
+            "authorization_id",
+        }:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400
+            )
+        adapter = _require_string(value["adapter"], "RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        capability = _require_string(
+            value["required_capability"],
+            "RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_INVALID",
+            RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_RE,
+        )
+        if adapter not in {"hermes", "openclaw"} or capability != f"agent.runtime.{adapter}":
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_MISMATCH", 400)
+        authorization_id = _require_string(
+            value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID"
+        )
+        return cls(adapter, capability, authorization_id)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": PROJECTION_INTENT_SCHEMA,
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+            "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+            "expected_status": "QUEUED",
+            "expected_revision": 1,
+            "expected_attempt": 0,
+            "expected_metadata_sha256": _sha_json({}),
+            "expected_required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_json([]),
+            "expected_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+            "adapter": self.adapter,
+            "required_capability": self.required_capability,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY,
+            "reason": PROJECTION_REASON,
+        }
+
+    def initial_request(self, canonical_execution_digest: str) -> InitialExecutionProjectionRequest:
+        return InitialExecutionProjectionRequest.from_mapping(
+            {
+                "expected_status": "QUEUED",
+                "expected_revision": 1,
+                "expected_attempt": 0,
+                "expected_metadata_sha256": _sha_json({}),
+                "expected_required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_json([]),
+                "expected_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+                "expected_execution_digest": canonical_execution_digest,
+                "required_capability": self.required_capability,
+                "adapter": self.adapter,
+                "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY,
+                "reason": PROJECTION_REASON,
+            }
+        )
+
+
+def _table_names(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> set[str]:
+    return {
+        str(row[0])
+        for row in connection.execute(
+            "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'"
+        )
+    }
+
+
+def _load_lineage_context(
+    connection: sqlite3.Connection, *, expect_projected: bool
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    required_tables = {
+        "tasks",
+        "events",
+        "task_lineage_supersessions",
+        "task_lineage_supersession_receipts",
+        PROJECTION_TABLE,
+    }
+    if not required_tables.issubset(_table_names(connection)):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503
+        )
+    relation = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersessions "
+        "WHERE source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=? AND child_task_id=?",
+        (SOURCE_TASK_ID, SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL, CHILD_TASK_ID),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if relation is None:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("FORMAL_SUPERSESSION_REQUIRED", 409)
+    receipt_row = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT * FROM task_lineage_supersession_receipts "
+        "WHERE decision_id=? AND source_task_id=? AND supersession_ordinal=? "
+        "AND child_task_id=?",
+        (
+            relation["decision_id"],
+            SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        ),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if receipt_row is None:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_REQUIRED", 409)
+    decision = _json_object(receipt_row["decision_json"], "SUPERSESSION_DECISION_INVALID")
+    receipt = _json_object(receipt_row["receipt_json"], "SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_INVALID")
+    decision_sha256 = _sha_text(canonical_json(decision_payload(decision)))
+    exact_decision = {
+        "schema": DECISION_SCHEMA,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+        "owner_identity": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+        "signature_principal": OWNER_PRINCIPAL,
+        "key_id": OWNER_KEY_ID,
+        "one_time_use": True,
+    }
+    if any(decision.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact_decision.items()):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_DECISION_SCOPE_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    if (
+        decision_sha256 != relation["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or decision_sha256 != receipt_row["owner_decision_sha256"]
+        or decision.get("source_task_identity_sha256")
+        != relation["source_task_identity_sha256"]
+        or decision.get("source_metadata_sha256") != relation["source_metadata_sha256"]
+        or receipt.get("schema") != SUPERSESSION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+        or receipt.get("owner_decision_sha256") != decision_sha256
+        or receipt.get("source_task_id") != SOURCE_TASK_ID
+        or receipt.get("child_task_id") != CHILD_TASK_ID
+        or receipt.get("supersession_ordinal") != SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL
+    ):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_LINEAGE_EVIDENCE_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    events = connection.execute(
+        "SELECT event_type,payload_json FROM events WHERE task_id=? ORDER BY event_id",
+        (CHILD_TASK_ID,),
+    ).fetchall()
+    expected_events = ["TASK_CREATED"]
+    if expect_projected:
+        expected_events.append("TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZED")
+    if [str(row["event_type"]) for row in events] != expected_events:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CHILD_EVENT_CHAIN_INVALID", 409
+        )
+    created = _json_object(events[0]["payload_json"], "SUPERSESSION_CREATED_EVENT_INVALID")
+    exact_created = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersedes_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "source_task_identity_sha256": relation["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+        "source_metadata_sha256": relation["source_metadata_sha256"],
+        "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": decision_sha256,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+    }
+    if any(created.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact_created.items()):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CREATED_EVENT_SCOPE_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    return {
+        "source_task_identity_sha256": relation["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+        "source_metadata_sha256": relation["source_metadata_sha256"],
+        "owner_decision_sha256": decision_sha256,
+    }
+
+
+def _validate_canonical_child_execution(
+    resolved: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    intent: SupersessionChildProjectionIntent,
+    runtime_input: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(resolved)
+        execution = validate_execution_envelope(resolved, binding=binding)
+    except ExecutionProjectionError as exc:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CANONICAL_EXECUTION_INVALID", 409
+        ) from exc
+    exact_binding = {
+        "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+    }
+    if any(execution.get(key) != expected for key, expected in exact_binding.items()):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_CANONICAL_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    if (
+        execution.get("action") != "agent_runtime"
+        or execution.get("adapter") != intent.adapter
+        or execution.get("capability_scope") != [intent.required_capability]
+        or execution.get("runtime_input") != dict(runtime_input)
+        or execution.get("change_set") != []
+        or execution.get("verification") != []
+        or execution.get("governance", {}).get("writer_lease") is not False
+    ):
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "SUPERSESSION_AGENT_RUNTIME_ENVELOPE_INVALID", 409
+        )
+    if execution["execution_digest"] == SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST:
+        raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+            "CHILD_CANONICAL_DIGEST_COLLIDES_WITH_SOURCE_BUSINESS_DIGEST", 409
+        )
+    return execution
+
+
+class _SupersessionProjectionTransactionStore(InitialExecutionProjectionStore):
+    """Per-invocation store that adds immutable lineage evidence atomically."""
+
+    allows_supersession_child = True
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path, resolved: Mapping[str, Any], intent):
+        self._resolved = dict(resolved)
+        self.intent = intent
+        super().__init__(db_path, self._resolve_once)
+
+    def _resolve_once(self, *_args):
+        return dict(self._resolved)
+
+    def _projection_event_extension(
+        self, connection, task_id, request, execution, applied_revision
+    ):
+        if task_id != CHILD_TASK_ID:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_CHILD_TASK_ID_MISMATCH", 409
+            )
+        context = _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=False)
+        return {
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "source_task_identity_sha256": context["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+            "source_metadata_sha256": context["source_metadata_sha256"],
+            "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": context["owner_decision_sha256"],
+            "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+            "canonical_child_execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+            "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROFILE,
+            "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROFILE_VERSION,
+        }
+
+    def _insert_projection_extension(
+        self,
+        connection,
+        task_id,
+        request,
+        execution,
+        event_payload,
+        applied_revision,
+    ):
+        context = _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=True)
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT metadata_json,required_capabilities_json FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+            (CHILD_TASK_ID,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if task is None:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        intent_json = canonical_json(self.intent.public())
+        intent_sha256 = _sha_text(intent_json)
+        receipt = {
+            "schema": PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+            "projection_id": "sha256:" + intent_sha256,
+            "task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "source_task_identity_sha256": context["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+            "source_metadata_sha256": context["source_metadata_sha256"],
+            "owner_supersession_decision_sha256": context["owner_decision_sha256"],
+            "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+            "canonical_child_execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+            "external_job_id": EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+            "generation": GENERATION,
+            "adapter": self.intent.adapter,
+            "required_capability": self.intent.required_capability,
+            "expected_revision": 1,
+            "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+            "attempt": 0,
+            "metadata_sha256": _sha_text(task["metadata_json"]),
+            "required_capabilities_sha256": _sha_text(
+                task["required_capabilities_json"]
+            ),
+            "projection_event_sha256": _sha_json(dict(event_payload)),
+        }
+        receipt_json = canonical_json(receipt)
+        receipt_sha256 = _sha_text(receipt_json)
+        connection.execute(
+            f"""INSERT INTO {PROJECTION_TABLE}(
+            projection_id,task_id,source_task_id,supersession_ordinal,
+            intent_sha256,intent_json,owner_decision_sha256,
+            source_task_identity_sha256,source_metadata_sha256,
+            source_business_execution_digest,canonical_child_execution_digest,
+            external_job_id,repository,target_branch,generation,adapter,
+            required_capability,expected_revision,applied_revision,metadata_sha256,
+            required_capabilities_sha256,projection_event_sha256,receipt_json,
+            receipt_sha256,created_at)
+            VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+            (
+                receipt["projection_id"],
+                CHILD_TASK_ID,
+                SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+                SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+                intent_sha256,
+                intent_json,
+                context["owner_decision_sha256"],
+                context["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                context["source_metadata_sha256"],
+                SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+                execution["execution_digest"],
+                EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+                REPOSITORY,
+                TARGET_BRANCH,
+                GENERATION,
+                self.intent.adapter,
+                self.intent.required_capability,
+                1,
+                applied_revision,
+                receipt["metadata_sha256"],
+                receipt["required_capabilities_sha256"],
+                receipt["projection_event_sha256"],
+                receipt_json,
+                receipt_sha256,
+                _now(),
+            ),
+        )
+
+
+class SupersessionChildInitialProjectionStore:
+    """Server-owned adapter from exact supersession lineage to current ABI."""
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path, resolver):
+        self.db_path = db_path
+        self.resolver = resolver
+
+    def _connect(self):
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _replay(connection, intent: SupersessionChildProjectionIntent):
+        if PROJECTION_TABLE not in _table_names(connection):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE", 503
+            )
+        row = connection.execute(
+            f"SELECT * FROM {PROJECTION_TABLE} WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            tables = _table_names(connection)
+            if "task_initial_execution_projections" in tables:
+                generic = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT 1 FROM task_initial_execution_projections "
+                    "WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                    (CHILD_TASK_ID, PROJECTION_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if generic is not None:
+                    raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                        "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_MISSING", 500
+                    )
+            return None
+        intent_sha256 = _sha_json(intent.public())
+        if row["intent_sha256"] != intent_sha256:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_INITIAL_PROJECTION_INTENT_CONFLICT", 409
+            )
+        receipt = _json_object(
+            row["receipt_json"], "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_INVALID"
+        )
+        if (
+            _sha_text(row["receipt_json"]) != row["receipt_sha256"]
+            or receipt.get("schema") != PROJECTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA
+            or receipt.get("canonical_child_execution_digest")
+            != row["canonical_child_execution_digest"]
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_DIGEST_MISMATCH", 500
+            )
+        _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=True)
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (CHILD_TASK_ID,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if (
+            task is None
+            or task["status"] != "QUEUED"
+            or int(task["revision"]) != int(row["applied_revision"])
+            or int(task["attempt"]) != 0
+            or task["claimed_by"] is not None
+            or task["lease_token_hash"] is not None
+            or task["lease_expires_at"] is not None
+            or _sha_text(task["metadata_json"]) != row["metadata_sha256"]
+            or _sha_text(task["required_capabilities_json"])
+            != row["required_capabilities_sha256"]
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTED_TASK_CAS_MISMATCH", 409
+            )
+        return {**receipt, "idempotent": True}
+
+    def project(self, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        intent = SupersessionChildProjectionIntent.from_mapping(value)
+        if intent.authorization_id != _required_authorization_id():
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            replay = self._replay(connection, intent)
+            if replay is not None:
+                return replay
+            probe_request = intent.initial_request("0" * 64)
+            probe_store = _SupersessionProjectionTransactionStore(
+                self.db_path, {}, intent
+            )
+            task, _, _, _ = probe_store._load_and_validate(
+                connection, CHILD_TASK_ID, probe_request
+            )
+            _load_lineage_context(connection, expect_projected=False)
+            runtime_input = probe_store._runtime_input(task)
+        resolved = dict(
+            self.resolver(
+                CHILD_TASK_ID,
+                EXTERNAL_JOB_ID,
+                intent.required_capability,
+                intent.adapter,
+                runtime_input,
+            )
+        )
+        execution = _validate_canonical_child_execution(
+            resolved, intent=intent, runtime_input=runtime_input
+        )
+        store = _SupersessionProjectionTransactionStore(
+            self.db_path, resolved, intent
+        )
+        result = store.project(
+            CHILD_TASK_ID, intent.initial_request(execution["execution_digest"])
+        )
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            receipt = self._replay(connection, intent)
+            if receipt is None:
+                raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                    "SUPERSESSION_PROJECTION_RECEIPT_MISSING", 500
+                )
+        return {**receipt, "idempotent": bool(result["idempotent"])}

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage_supersession_owner_authority.py

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+"""Fixed Owner operation for one exact Task-lineage supersession.
+
+This staging overlay deliberately extends the installed single-host operational
+authority instead of exposing a generic signing primitive.  The caller can
+only provide the three live CAS values which cannot be known at build time.
+Every authority, lineage and execution field is constructed server-side.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import secrets
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import OWNER_IDENTITY, OWNER_NAMESPACE, sha256_json
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority import (
+    OperationalAuthorityError,
+    OperationalOwnerAuthority,
+    OperationalPolicy,
+    SignedOperationalArtifact,
+)
+
+TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION = "issue_task_lineage_supersession"
+TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA = "aios.task-lineage-supersession-decision.v1"
+SOURCE_TASK_ID = "TASK-SINGLEHOST-TRUSTROOT-P0-20260904"
+CHILD_TASK_ID = SOURCE_TASK_ID + "-S1"
+SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL = 1
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/single-host-trust-root-p0-20260904"
+GENERATION = 1
+SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST = (
+    "e99bda6a251832eb3865271eb5687af7eea44dd261144cdcdfa57104c0780536"
+)
+EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY = "job-4e10f92a6a5742518a9f1d8745c845ab"
+CANONICAL_PROJECTION_PROFILE = "aios.task-initial-execution.v1"
+CANONICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION = 1
+SUPERSESSION_REASON = "formal-lineage-supersession-after-expired-unclaimed-source"
+DECISION_TTL_SECONDS = 300
+
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+SAFE_TOKEN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@/+:-]{2,511}$")
+
+
+def _fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise OperationalAuthorityError(code)
+
+
+def _assert_fixed_policy(policy: OperationalPolicy) -> None:
+    """Refuse issuance if the live policy is not the approved source scope."""
+    policy.validate()
+    exact = {
+        "task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "execution_plan_sha256": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY,
+    }
+    if any(getattr(policy, field) != expected for field, expected in exact.items()):
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_POLICY_MISMATCH")
+    if policy.maximum_recovery_decision_ttl_seconds < DECISION_TTL_SECONDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_POLICY_TTL_TOO_NARROW")
+
+
+TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_FIELDS = {
+    "schema",
+    "decision_id",
+    "nonce",
+    "source_task_id",
+    "source_task_identity_sha256",
+    "source_metadata_sha256",
+    "source_expected_status",
+    "source_expected_revision",
+    "source_expected_attempt",
+    "source_expected_claimed_by",
+    "source_expected_lease_token_hash",
+    "source_expected_lease_expires_at",
+    "repository",
+    "target_branch",
+    "generation",
+    "source_business_execution_digest",
+    "external_job_identity",
+    "child_task_id",
+    "supersession_ordinal",
+    "canonical_projection_profile",
+    "canonical_projection_version",
+    "supersession_reason",
+    "owner_identity",
+    "policy_digest",
+    "one_time_use",
+    "issued_at",
+    "not_before",
+    "expires_at",
+    "signature_namespace",
+    "signature_key_id",
+    "canonical_payload_digest",
+}
+
+
+def verify_task_lineage_supersession_scope(
+    decision: Mapping[str, Any],
+    policy: OperationalPolicy,
+    *,
+    now: int,
+) -> None:
+    """Validate a signature-verified decision against the fixed source scope."""
+    _assert_fixed_policy(policy)
+    if not isinstance(decision, Mapping) or set(decision) != TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_FIELDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    exact = {
+        "schema": TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA,
+        "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+        "source_expected_status": "EXPIRED",
+        "source_expected_attempt": 0,
+        "source_expected_claimed_by": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_token_hash": None,
+        "source_expected_lease_expires_at": None,
+        "repository": REPOSITORY,
+        "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+        "generation": GENERATION,
+        "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+        "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY,
+        "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+        "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+        "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_PROFILE,
+        "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION,
+        "supersession_reason": SUPERSESSION_REASON,
+        "owner_identity": OWNER_IDENTITY,
+        "policy_digest": policy.digest,
+        "one_time_use": True,
+        "signature_namespace": OWNER_NAMESPACE,
+    }
+    if any(decision.get(field) != expected for field, expected in exact.items()):
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    if decision.get("source_task_identity_sha256") != policy.task_identity_sha256:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SOURCE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+    for field in ("source_task_identity_sha256", "source_metadata_sha256"):
+        if not isinstance(decision.get(field), str) or HEX64.fullmatch(decision[field]) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    if type(decision.get("source_expected_revision")) is not int or not 1 <= decision["source_expected_revision"] < 2**63:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_REVISION_INVALID")
+    for field in ("decision_id", "nonce"):
+        if not isinstance(decision.get(field), str) or SAFE_TOKEN.fullmatch(decision[field]) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_GENERATED_ID_INVALID")
+    for field in ("issued_at", "not_before", "expires_at"):
+        if type(decision.get(field)) is not int:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    if not decision["not_before"] <= now < decision["expires_at"]:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    if decision["issued_at"] > now + 5 or now - decision["issued_at"] > DECISION_TTL_SECONDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    if decision["expires_at"] - decision["issued_at"] != DECISION_TTL_SECONDS:
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_TIME_INVALID")
+    digest_value = dict(decision)
+    supplied_digest = digest_value.pop("canonical_payload_digest", None)
+    if supplied_digest != sha256_json(digest_value):
+        _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_CANONICAL_DIGEST_INVALID")
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionOwnerAuthority(OperationalOwnerAuthority):
+    """Owner signer with one bounded constructor and no caller-defined message."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *args: Any,
+        token_hex: Callable[[int], str] = secrets.token_hex,
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self._token_hex = token_hex
+
+    def issue_task_lineage_supersession(
+        self,
+        *,
+        source_expected_revision: int,
+        source_task_identity_sha256: str,
+        source_metadata_sha256: str,
+    ) -> SignedOperationalArtifact:
+        _assert_fixed_policy(self.policy)
+        if type(source_expected_revision) is not int or not 1 <= source_expected_revision < 2**63:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_REVISION_INVALID")
+        if source_task_identity_sha256 != self.policy.task_identity_sha256:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SOURCE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(source_metadata_sha256, str) or HEX64.fullmatch(source_metadata_sha256) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_METADATA_DIGEST_INVALID")
+
+        decision_id = "task-lineage-supersession-" + self._token_hex(16)
+        nonce = "task-lineage-supersession-nonce-" + self._token_hex(16)
+        if SAFE_TOKEN.fullmatch(decision_id) is None or SAFE_TOKEN.fullmatch(nonce) is None:
+            _fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_GENERATED_ID_INVALID")
+        now = int(self.clock())
+        payload = {
+            "schema": TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_SCHEMA,
+            "decision_id": decision_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+            "source_task_id": SOURCE_TASK_ID,
+            "source_task_identity_sha256": source_task_identity_sha256,
+            "source_metadata_sha256": source_metadata_sha256,
+            "source_expected_status": "EXPIRED",
+            "source_expected_revision": source_expected_revision,
+            "source_expected_attempt": 0,
+            "source_expected_claimed_by": None,
+            "source_expected_lease_token_hash": None,
+            "source_expected_lease_expires_at": None,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "target_branch": TARGET_BRANCH,
+            "generation": GENERATION,
+            "source_business_execution_digest": SOURCE_BUSINESS_EXECUTION_DIGEST,
+            "external_job_identity": EXTERNAL_JOB_IDENTITY,
+            "child_task_id": CHILD_TASK_ID,
+            "supersession_ordinal": SUPERSESSION_ORDINAL,
+            "canonical_projection_profile": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_PROFILE,
+            "canonical_projection_version": CANONICAL_PROJECTION_VERSION,
+            "supersession_reason": SUPERSESSION_REASON,
+            "owner_identity": OWNER_IDENTITY,
+            "policy_digest": self.policy.digest,
+            "one_time_use": True,
+            "issued_at": now,
+            "not_before": max(0, now - 5),
+            "expires_at": now + DECISION_TTL_SECONDS,
+        }
+        return self._sign(payload)

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage_supersession_owner_authority_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+"""Staging-only server overlay for the fixed lineage Owner operation."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from aios_single_host_authority import DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority import (
+    OperationalMachineAuthority,
+    OperationalVerifier,
+)
+from aios_single_host_operational_authority_server import (
+    DEFAULT_LEDGER,
+    DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY,
+    DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY,
+    DEFAULT_POLICY,
+    DurableIssuanceLedger,
+    OperationalAuthorityService as BaseOperationalAuthorityService,
+    _read_policy,
+    fail,
+)
+from aios_task_lineage_supersession_owner_authority import (
+    TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION,
+    TaskLineageSupersessionOwnerAuthority,
+)
+
+REQUEST_FIELDS = {
+    "source_expected_revision",
+    "source_task_identity_sha256",
+    "source_metadata_sha256",
+}
+
+
+class TaskLineageSupersessionIssuanceLedger(DurableIssuanceLedger):
+    """Operation-scoped one-time fence layered on the existing durable ledger."""
+
+    def issue_once(
+        self,
+        *,
+        role: str,
+        operation: str,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        issuer: Callable[[], dict[str, Any]],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            json.dumps(
+                request,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                allow_nan=False,
+            ).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT 1 FROM issuance WHERE role=? AND operation=? LIMIT 1",
+                (role, operation),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None:
+                connection.rollback()
+                fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_ALREADY_ISSUED")
+            result = issuer()
+            artifact = result.get("artifact")
+            nonce = artifact.get("payload", {}).get("nonce") if isinstance(artifact, Mapping) else None
+            if not isinstance(nonce, str) or not nonce:
+                connection.rollback()
+                fail("TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_ISSUER_RESULT_INVALID")
+            encoded = json.dumps(
+                result,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                allow_nan=False,
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO issuance(role,operation,nonce,request_sha256,response_json,created_at) "
+                "VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (role, operation, nonce, request_sha, encoded, int(time.time())),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return result
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
+            connection.rollback()
+            fail("ISSUANCE_LEDGER_RACE")
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+
+class OperationalAuthorityService(BaseOperationalAuthorityService):
+    """Preserve all existing operations and add one exact Owner-only operation."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *args: Any, token_hex=None, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self.ledger = TaskLineageSupersessionIssuanceLedger(self.ledger.path)
+        self._token_hex = token_hex
+
+    def _components(self):
+        policy = _read_policy(
+            self.policy_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        verifier = OperationalVerifier(
+            self.registry_path,
+            require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+        )
+        if self.role == "owner":
+            kwargs = {}
+            if self._token_hex is not None:
+                kwargs["token_hex"] = self._token_hex
+            signer = TaskLineageSupersessionOwnerAuthority(
+                self.owner_key_path,
+                policy,
+                require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+                clock=self.clock,
+                **kwargs,
+            )
+        else:
+            signer = OperationalMachineAuthority(
+                self.machine_key_path,
+                policy,
+                require_root_owner=self.require_root_owner,
+                clock=self.clock,
+            )
+        return policy, verifier, signer
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if peer_uid not in self.allowed_uids:
+            fail("PEER_UID_FORBIDDEN")
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping) or set(request) != {"operation", "payload"}:
+            fail("REQUEST_INVALID")
+        if request.get("operation") != TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION:
+            return super().handle(request, peer_uid=peer_uid)
+        if self.role != "owner":
+            fail("MACHINE_OPERATION_FORBIDDEN")
+        payload = request.get("payload")
+        if not isinstance(payload, Mapping) or set(payload) != REQUEST_FIELDS:
+            fail("REQUEST_FIELDS_INVALID")
+        _policy, _verifier, signer = self._components()
+
+        def issue() -> dict[str, Any]:
+            artifact = signer.issue_task_lineage_supersession(
+                source_expected_revision=payload["source_expected_revision"],
+                source_task_identity_sha256=payload["source_task_identity_sha256"],
+                source_metadata_sha256=payload["source_metadata_sha256"],
+            )
+            return {"status": "PASS", "artifact": artifact.to_dict()}
+
+        return self.ledger.issue_once(
+            role=self.role,
+            operation=TASK_LINEAGE_SUPERSESSION_OPERATION,
+            request=payload,
+            issuer=issue,
+        )
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--role", choices=("owner", "machine"), required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--policy", default=str(DEFAULT_POLICY))
+    parser.add_argument("--registry", default=str(DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATH))
+    parser.add_argument("--owner-key", default=str(DEFAULT_OWNER_KEY))
+    parser.add_argument("--machine-key", default=str(DEFAULT_MACHINE_KEY))
+    parser.add_argument("--socket")
+    parser.add_argument("--ledger", default=str(DEFAULT_LEDGER))
+    arguments = parser.parse_args()
+    service = OperationalAuthorityService(
+        role=arguments.role,
+        policy_path=Path(arguments.policy),
+        registry_path=Path(arguments.registry),
+        owner_key_path=Path(arguments.owner_key),
+        machine_key_path=Path(arguments.machine_key),
+        socket_path=Path(arguments.socket) if arguments.socket else None,
+        ledger_path=Path(arguments.ledger),
+    )
+    service.serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_task_lineage_taskplane_adapter.py

@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Callable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence, runtime_checkable
+
+if not __package__:
+    from aios_task_lineage import RelationType, RootReviewRecord, lineage_from_metadata
+    from aios_task_lineage_integration import (
+        IntegrationError,
+        LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY,
+        RootActionDispatchReceipt,
+        TaskAuthoritySnapshot,
+        TaskPlaneLineagePort,
+    )
+else:
+    from .aios_task_lineage import RelationType, RootReviewRecord, lineage_from_metadata
+    from .aios_task_lineage_integration import (
+        IntegrationError,
+        LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY,
+        RootActionDispatchReceipt,
+        TaskAuthoritySnapshot,
+        TaskPlaneLineagePort,
+    )
+
+
+class AuthorityAdapterError(IntegrationError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _parse_datetime(value: object) -> datetime:
+    if isinstance(value, datetime):
+        if value.tzinfo is None or value.utcoffset() is None:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("authority datetime must be timezone-aware")
+        return value.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("authority datetime missing")
+    try:
+        dt = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("authority datetime invalid") from exc
+    if dt.tzinfo is None or dt.utcoffset() is None:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("authority datetime must include timezone")
+    return dt.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _load_json_object(value: object, *, field: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    if value in (None, ""):
+        return {}
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return dict(value)
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError(f"{field} must be a JSON object")
+    try:
+        obj = json.loads(value)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError(f"{field} is invalid JSON") from exc
+    if not isinstance(obj, dict):
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError(f"{field} must decode to an object")
+    return obj
+
+
+def _metadata_identity(metadata: Mapping[str, object]) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    lineage = metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+    if isinstance(lineage, Mapping):
+        owner = lineage.get("owner_principal_id")
+        mission = lineage.get("mission_id")
+        if isinstance(owner, str) and owner and isinstance(mission, str) and mission:
+            return owner, mission
+
+    # Pre-lineage/legacy compatibility. These keys are accepted only as
+    # authority-provided metadata; missing values fail closed rather than being
+    # invented by this adapter.
+    owner = metadata.get("owner_principal_id")
+    mission = metadata.get("mission_id")
+    if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("task owner_principal_id is not discoverable")
+    if not isinstance(mission, str) or not mission:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("task mission_id is not discoverable")
+    return owner, mission
+
+
+def _metadata_evidence(metadata: Mapping[str, object]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    raw = metadata.get("evidence_refs")
+    if raw is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(raw, list) or not all(isinstance(x, str) for x in raw):
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("evidence_refs must be a string list")
+    return tuple(dict.fromkeys(raw))
+
+
+@runtime_checkable
+class TaskPlaneReadback(Protocol):
+    """Independent authority readback surface.
+
+    This may be backed by the TaskPlane query service, a read replica, or a
+    read-only SQLite authority. It must not mutate task state.
+    """
+
+    def get_task_snapshot(self, task_id: str) -> TaskAuthoritySnapshot: ...
+
+    def list_descendant_snapshots(
+        self, root_task_id: str
+    ) -> Sequence[TaskAuthoritySnapshot]: ...
+
+    def get_root_review_record(self, review_id: str) -> Mapping[str, object] | None: ...
+
+    def get_root_action_dispatch(self, review_id: str) -> RootActionDispatchReceipt | None: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CallableTaskPlaneReadback:
+    """Readback adapter for an existing official TaskPlane query/service."""
+
+    get_task: Callable[[str], TaskAuthoritySnapshot]
+    list_descendants: Callable[[str], Sequence[TaskAuthoritySnapshot]]
+    get_review: Callable[[str], Mapping[str, object] | None] | None = None
+    get_dispatch: Callable[[str], RootActionDispatchReceipt | None] | None = None
+
+    def get_task_snapshot(self, task_id: str) -> TaskAuthoritySnapshot:
+        snapshot = self.get_task(task_id)
+        if not isinstance(snapshot, TaskAuthoritySnapshot):
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("readback returned invalid task snapshot")
+        if snapshot.task_id != task_id:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("readback returned wrong task identity")
+        return snapshot
+
+    def list_descendant_snapshots(
+        self, root_task_id: str
+    ) -> Sequence[TaskAuthoritySnapshot]:
+        values = tuple(self.list_descendants(root_task_id))
+        if not all(isinstance(v, TaskAuthoritySnapshot) for v in values):
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("readback returned invalid descendant snapshot")
+        return values
+
+    def get_root_review_record(self, review_id: str) -> Mapping[str, object] | None:
+        if self.get_review is None:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("independent review readback is not configured")
+        return self.get_review(review_id)
+
+    def get_root_action_dispatch(self, review_id: str) -> RootActionDispatchReceipt | None:
+        if self.get_dispatch is None:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("independent dispatch readback is not configured")
+        return self.get_dispatch(review_id)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthoritySchemaReport:
+    task_table: str
+    columns: tuple[str, ...]
+    required_columns_present: bool
+    missing_columns: tuple[str, ...]
+    task_count: int
+
+
+class ReadOnlySQLiteTaskPlane:
+    """Read-only discovery/readback helper for the current TaskPlane SQLite authority.
+
+    This class never writes. It opens SQLite read-only, including committed WAL
+    data, and exists only for discovery, diagnostics and independent readback.
+
+    Execution writes must go through the live TaskPlane repository/service and
+    are supplied separately through ``TaskPlaneServiceBindings``.
+    """
+
+    REQUIRED_TASK_COLUMNS = (
+        "task_id",
+        "status",
+        "revision",
+        "metadata_json",
+        "created_at",
+    )
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path):
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        if not self.db_path.is_file():
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError(f"TaskPlane DB missing: {self.db_path}")
+        # A live WAL database is not immutable: ignoring its WAL can return
+        # stale state. as_uri also quotes URI metacharacters in file names.
+        uri = self.db_path.resolve().as_uri() + "?mode=ro"
+        con = sqlite3.connect(uri, uri=True)
+        con.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        return con
+
+    def inspect_schema(self) -> AuthoritySchemaReport:
+        con = self._connect()
+        try:
+            rows = list(con.execute("PRAGMA table_info(tasks)"))
+            columns = tuple(str(r["name"]) for r in rows)
+            missing = tuple(c for c in self.REQUIRED_TASK_COLUMNS if c not in columns)
+            count = int(con.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tasks").fetchone()[0]) if rows else 0
+            return AuthoritySchemaReport(
+                task_table="tasks",
+                columns=columns,
+                required_columns_present=not missing,
+                missing_columns=missing,
+                task_count=count,
+            )
+        finally:
+            con.close()
+
+    def _row_to_snapshot(self, row: sqlite3.Row) -> TaskAuthoritySnapshot:
+        keys = set(row.keys())
+        metadata = _load_json_object(
+            row["metadata_json"] if "metadata_json" in keys else None,
+            field="metadata_json",
+        )
+        owner, mission = _metadata_identity(metadata)
+        created_value = row["created_at"] if "created_at" in keys else None
+        return TaskAuthoritySnapshot(
+            task_id=str(row["task_id"]),
+            revision=int(row["revision"]),
+            status=str(row["status"]),
+            owner_principal_id=owner,
+            mission_id=mission,
+            created_at=_parse_datetime(created_value),
+            metadata=metadata,
+            evidence_refs=_metadata_evidence(metadata),
+            # A metadata flag cannot stand in for execution-integrity proof.
+            # The official service adapter must resolve verified receipts.
+            terminal_evidence_proven=False,
+        )
+
+    def get_task_snapshot(self, task_id: str) -> TaskAuthoritySnapshot:
+        con = self._connect()
+        try:
+            row = con.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=? LIMIT 1", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise AuthorityAdapterError(f"task not found: {task_id}")
+            return self._row_to_snapshot(row)
+        finally:
+            con.close()
+
+    def list_descendant_snapshots(self, root_task_id: str) -> tuple[TaskAuthoritySnapshot, ...]:
+        con = self._connect()
+        try:
+            rows = list(con.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks ORDER BY task_id"))
+        finally:
+            con.close()
+        out: list[TaskAuthoritySnapshot] = []
+        for row in rows:
+            try:
+                snap = self._row_to_snapshot(row)
+            except AuthorityAdapterError:
+                # Legacy tasks without discoverable identity cannot safely be
+                # attached to a root by this read-only adapter.
+                continue
+            raw = snap.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+            if (
+                isinstance(raw, Mapping)
+                and raw.get("root_task_id") == root_task_id
+                and snap.task_id != root_task_id
+            ):
+                out.append(snap)
+        return tuple(out)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskPlaneServiceBindings:
+    """In-process bindings to the existing TaskPlane authority.
+
+    These callables must be backed by the real TaskPlane repository/service,
+    including its existing transactions, revision/CAS, journal and continuation
+    mechanisms. They must NOT be implemented as out-of-band SQLite mutations.
+    """
+
+    get_task_snapshot: Callable[[str], TaskAuthoritySnapshot]
+    list_descendant_snapshots: Callable[[str], Sequence[TaskAuthoritySnapshot]]
+    reserve_sibling_sequence: Callable[[str, RelationType, str], int]
+    compare_and_swap_task_metadata: Callable[[str, int, Mapping[str, object]], bool]
+    get_root_review_record: Callable[[str], Mapping[str, object] | None]
+    compare_and_swap_root_review_record: Callable[
+        [str, int, Mapping[str, object]], bool
+    ]
+    get_root_action_dispatch: Callable[[str], RootActionDispatchReceipt | None]
+    dispatch_root_action: Callable[
+        [RootReviewRecord, str], RootActionDispatchReceipt
+    ]
+
+
+class InProcessTaskPlaneLineageAdapter(TaskPlaneLineagePort):
+    """Concrete TaskPlaneLineagePort backed by existing TaskPlane service calls."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        bindings: TaskPlaneServiceBindings,
+        *,
+        readback: TaskPlaneReadback | None = None,
+    ):
+        self._b = bindings
+        self._readback = readback
+
+    def get_task_snapshot(self, task_id: str) -> TaskAuthoritySnapshot:
+        return self._b.get_task_snapshot(task_id)
+
+    def list_descendant_snapshots(self, root_task_id: str) -> Sequence[TaskAuthoritySnapshot]:
+        return tuple(self._b.list_descendant_snapshots(root_task_id))
+
+    def reserve_sibling_sequence(
+        self,
+        *,
+        parent_task_id: str,
+        relation_type: RelationType,
+        child_task_id: str,
+    ) -> int:
+        seq = self._b.reserve_sibling_sequence(
+            parent_task_id, relation_type, child_task_id
+        )
+        if not isinstance(seq, int) or seq < 1:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("TaskPlane returned invalid sibling sequence")
+        return seq
+
+    def compare_and_swap_task_metadata(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        expected_revision: int,
+        metadata_patch: Mapping[str, object],
+    ) -> bool:
+        return bool(
+            self._b.compare_and_swap_task_metadata(
+                task_id, expected_revision, metadata_patch
+            )
+        )
+
+    def get_root_review_record(self, review_id: str) -> Mapping[str, object] | None:
+        return self._b.get_root_review_record(review_id)
+
+    def compare_and_swap_root_review_record(
+        self,
+        *,
+        root_task_id: str,
+        expected_root_revision: int,
+        review_record: Mapping[str, object],
+    ) -> bool:
+        return bool(
+            self._b.compare_and_swap_root_review_record(
+                root_task_id, expected_root_revision, review_record
+            )
+        )
+
+    def get_root_action_dispatch(
+        self, review_id: str
+    ) -> RootActionDispatchReceipt | None:
+        return self._b.get_root_action_dispatch(review_id)
+
+    def dispatch_root_action(
+        self,
+        *,
+        review: RootReviewRecord,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+    ) -> RootActionDispatchReceipt:
+        return self._b.dispatch_root_action(review, idempotency_key)
+
+    def verify_task_readback(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        expected_revision_at_least: int,
+        expected_metadata: Mapping[str, object],
+    ) -> TaskAuthoritySnapshot:
+        if self._readback is None:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("independent TaskPlane readback is not configured")
+        snap = self._readback.get_task_snapshot(task_id)
+        if snap.task_id != task_id:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("TaskPlane readback task identity mismatch")
+        if snap.revision < expected_revision_at_least:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("TaskPlane readback revision did not advance")
+        for key, expected in expected_metadata.items():
+            if snap.metadata.get(key) != expected:
+                raise AuthorityAdapterError(
+                    f"TaskPlane readback metadata mismatch for {key}"
+                )
+        return snap
+
+    def verify_root_readback(
+        self,
+        *,
+        root_task_id: str,
+        expected_review_id: str,
+    ) -> tuple[TaskAuthoritySnapshot, ...]:
+        """Verify that independent authority descendants remain bound to root.
+
+        The persisted ROOT_REVIEW record itself may live in a journal rather
+        than the task row. This method verifies the task/lineage projection
+        independently while the service binding verifies the journal receipt.
+        """
+        if self._readback is None:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("independent TaskPlane readback is not configured")
+        review = self.get_root_review_record(expected_review_id)
+        dispatch = self.get_root_action_dispatch(expected_review_id)
+        if (review is None or review.get("review_id") != expected_review_id
+                or review.get("root_task_id") != root_task_id or dispatch is None):
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("root review or dispatch identity mismatch")
+        read_review = getattr(self._readback, "get_root_review_record", None)
+        read_dispatch = getattr(self._readback, "get_root_action_dispatch", None)
+        if not callable(read_review) or not callable(read_dispatch):
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("independent review/dispatch readback is not configured")
+        if read_review(expected_review_id) != review:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("independent root review readback mismatch")
+        if read_dispatch(expected_review_id) != dispatch:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("independent dispatch readback mismatch")
+        root = self._readback.get_task_snapshot(root_task_id)
+        raw_root = root.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+        if root.task_id != root_task_id or not isinstance(raw_root, Mapping):
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("root readback identity or lineage missing")
+        root_lineage = lineage_from_metadata(dict(raw_root))
+        if (root_lineage.relation_type != RelationType.ROOT
+                or root_lineage.task_id != root_task_id
+                or root_lineage.owner_principal_id != root.owner_principal_id
+                or root_lineage.mission_id != root.mission_id):
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("root readback authority mismatch")
+        revision = review.get("root_revision_after")
+        if type(revision) is not int or root.revision < revision:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("root readback revision is stale")
+        descendants = tuple(self._readback.list_descendant_snapshots(root_task_id))
+        seen = set()
+        for snap in descendants:
+            raw = snap.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+            if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+                raise AuthorityAdapterError("descendant lineage missing")
+            lineage = lineage_from_metadata(dict(raw))
+            if (snap.task_id in seen or snap.task_id == root_task_id
+                    or lineage.task_id != snap.task_id
+                    or lineage.root_task_id != root_task_id
+                    or lineage.owner_principal_id != root.owner_principal_id
+                    or lineage.mission_id != root.mission_id
+                    or snap.owner_principal_id != root.owner_principal_id
+                    or snap.mission_id != root.mission_id
+                    or lineage.root_acceptance_ref != root_lineage.root_acceptance_ref):
+                raise AuthorityAdapterError(
+                    f"descendant {snap.task_id} is projected under wrong root"
+                )
+            seen.add(snap.task_id)
+        if review.get("trigger_child_task_id") not in seen:
+            raise AuthorityAdapterError("trigger child missing from independent readback")
+        return descendants
+
+    @property
+    def has_independent_readback(self) -> bool:
+        return self._readback is not None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthenticatedTaskContext:
+    principal_id: str
+    preferred_alias: str | None
+    mission_id: str
+
+
+def require_context_matches_task(
+    context: AuthenticatedTaskContext,
+    task: TaskAuthoritySnapshot,
+) -> None:
+    if context.principal_id != task.owner_principal_id:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("authenticated principal does not own task")
+    if context.mission_id != task.mission_id:
+        raise AuthorityAdapterError("authenticated mission does not match task")

active-runtime/app/aios_task_mission_authority_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+"""Narrow staging Mission ingress authenticated by the registered Owner signer.
+
+The signed payload binds the method, resource, body and idempotency key. This
+adapter neither signs requests nor grants Git/worker/production capabilities.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import importlib.util
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import stat
+import time
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
+from typing import Any
+
+from .task_plane.errors import (
+    ForbiddenError, TaskPlaneHTTPError, UnauthorizedError, ValidationError,
+)
+
+AUDIENCE = "aios.task-mission-authority.staging.v1"
+NAMESPACE = "aios-owner-approval-v1"
+MAX_BODY = 131072
+REQUEST_FIELDS = frozenset({
+    "schema", "audience", "method", "path", "body", "idempotency_key",
+    "issued_at", "expires_at", "nonce",
+})
+
+
+def canonical_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"),
+                      ensure_ascii=False, allow_nan=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def strict_object(pairs):
+    result = {}
+    for key, value in pairs:
+        if key in result:
+            raise ValidationError("duplicate JSON key")
+        result[key] = value
+    return result
+
+
+class SignedMissionIngress:
+    def __init__(
+        self, service, verifier, *, terminal_proof_importer=None, clock=time.time
+    ):
+        if not callable(getattr(verifier, "verify", None)):
+            raise ValueError("registered Owner verifier required")
+        identity = getattr(verifier, "signer_id", None)
+        if not isinstance(identity, str) or not identity.strip():
+            raise ValueError("registered signer identity required")
+        self.service = service
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.identity = identity
+        self.terminal_proof_importer = terminal_proof_importer
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    def handle(self, envelope: dict) -> tuple[int, dict]:
+        if not isinstance(envelope, dict) or set(envelope) != {
+            "request", "signature", "key_id"
+        }:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid signed mission envelope")
+        request = envelope["request"]
+        if not isinstance(request, dict) or set(request) != REQUEST_FIELDS:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid mission request fields")
+        if (request["schema"] != "aios.signed-mission-request.v1"
+                or request["audience"] != AUDIENCE):
+            raise ForbiddenError("mission request audience mismatch")
+        issued, expires = request["issued_at"], request["expires_at"]
+        if (type(issued) is not int or type(expires) is not int
+                or not 0 < expires - issued <= 300
+                or not issued <= self.clock() < expires):
+            raise UnauthorizedError("mission request expired or not yet valid")
+        if (not isinstance(request["nonce"], str)
+                or re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,128}", request["nonce"]) is None):
+            raise ValidationError("invalid mission request nonce")
+        if (not isinstance(envelope["signature"], str)
+                or not isinstance(envelope["key_id"], str)):
+            raise UnauthorizedError("Owner signature required")
+        try:
+            verified = self.verifier.verify(
+                namespace=NAMESPACE, payload=canonical_bytes(request),
+                signature=envelope["signature"], key_id=envelope["key_id"],
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            verified = False
+        if verified is not True:
+            raise UnauthorizedError("Owner signature invalid")
+        method, path, body = request["method"], request["path"], request["body"]
+        key = request["idempotency_key"]
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/missions":
+            if not isinstance(body, dict) or not isinstance(key, str) or not key.strip():
+                raise ValidationError("mission body and idempotency key required")
+            return 201, self.service.create_mission(
+                body, key, actor_identity=self.identity,
+            )
+        if (method == "GET" and isinstance(path, str)
+                and re.fullmatch(r"/missions/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}", path)
+                and body is None and key is None):
+            return 200, self.service.get_mission(
+                path.split("/")[2], actor_identity=self.identity,
+            )
+        if (method == "POST" and isinstance(path, str)
+                and re.fullmatch(r"/tasks/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}/delegate", path)):
+            if not isinstance(body, dict) or not isinstance(key, str) or not key.strip():
+                raise ValidationError("child body and idempotency key required")
+            return 201, self.service.delegate_mission(
+                path.split("/")[2], body, key, actor_identity=self.identity,
+            )
+        if (method == "POST" and isinstance(path, str)
+                and re.fullmatch(
+                    r"/missions/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}/legacy-attachments",
+                    path,
+                )):
+            if not isinstance(body, dict) or not isinstance(key, str) or not key.strip():
+                raise ValidationError(
+                    "legacy attachment body and idempotency key required"
+                )
+            result = self.service.attach_legacy_attachment(
+                path.split("/")[2], body, key, actor_identity=self.identity,
+            )
+            return (200 if result.get("idempotent") is True else 201), result
+        if (method == "GET" and isinstance(path, str)
+                and re.fullmatch(
+                    r"/missions/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}/"
+                    r"legacy-attachments/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}",
+                    path,
+                ) and body is None and key is None):
+            pieces = path.split("/")
+            return 200, self.service.get_legacy_attachment(
+                pieces[2], pieces[4], actor_identity=self.identity,
+            )
+        if (method == "POST" and isinstance(path, str)
+                and re.fullmatch(
+                    r"/tasks/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}/reconcile-terminal-proof",
+                    path,
+                )):
+            if body != {} or not isinstance(key, str) or not key.strip():
+                raise ValidationError(
+                    "terminal proof trigger requires an empty body and idempotency key"
+                )
+            if self.terminal_proof_importer is None:
+                raise ForbiddenError("terminal proof importer is not configured")
+            return 200, self.terminal_proof_importer.reconcile(
+                path.split("/")[2], key, actor_identity=self.identity,
+            )
+        raise ForbiddenError("operation outside mission ingress scope")
+
+
+def load_registered_verifier(path: Path):
+    metadata = path.lstat()
+    if (not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) or metadata.st_uid != 0
+            or metadata.st_mode & 0o022):
+        raise ValueError("Owner verifier must be a root-owned immutable regular file")
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("aios_mission_owner_verifier", path)
+    if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
+        raise ValueError("Owner verifier module unavailable")
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module.GrantRootOwnerApprovalVerifier()
+
+
+def make_handler(ingress: SignedMissionIngress):
+    class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+        def log_message(self, *_args):
+            pass  # Do not log signed payloads or transport credentials.
+
+        def respond(self, status, value):
+            raw = canonical_bytes(value)
+            self.send_response(status)
+            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+            self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
+            self.end_headers()
+            self.wfile.write(raw)
+
+        def do_POST(self):
+            try:
+                if self.path != "/v1/signed-request":
+                    raise ForbiddenError("unsupported mission ingress route")
+                if self.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding"):
+                    raise ValidationError("transfer encoding is unsupported")
+                lengths = self.headers.get_all("Content-Length", [])
+                if len(lengths) != 1 or not lengths[0].isdigit():
+                    raise ValidationError("one content length required")
+                length = int(lengths[0])
+                if not 0 < length <= MAX_BODY:
+                    raise ValidationError("mission request too large or empty")
+                self.connection.settimeout(10)
+                raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+                if len(raw) != length:
+                    raise ValidationError("truncated mission request")
+                envelope = json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=strict_object)
+                status, result = ingress.handle(envelope)
+                self.respond(status, result)
+            except TaskPlaneHTTPError as exc:
+                self.respond(exc.status_code, exc.to_payload())
+            except (ValueError, UnicodeError, RecursionError):
+                self.respond(400, {"error": "invalid_json"})
+            except Exception:
+                self.respond(500, {"error": "mission_authority_unavailable"})
+    return Handler
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    from .task_plane.api import TaskPlaneService
+    from .task_plane.mission import MissionAuthority, MissionPrincipalBinding
+    from .task_plane.policy import IdentityVerifier, PolicyEngine
+    from .task_plane.store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--db", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--owner-verifier", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if not 1024 <= args.port <= 65535:
+        parser.error("unprivileged loopback port required")
+    verifier = load_registered_verifier(args.owner_verifier)
+    identity = verifier.signer_id
+    store = TaskPlaneStore(str(args.db), high_assurance=True)
+    authority = MissionAuthority(store, principal_bindings=[MissionPrincipalBinding(
+        authenticated_identity=identity, owner_principal_id=identity,
+        acceptance_verifier_id="identity-lineage-live-closure-v1",
+        allowed_task_capabilities=(
+            "code.read", "code.write", "test.execute",
+            "governed.write.file", "governed.write.branch",
+        ),
+        max_risk="medium",
+    )])
+    service = TaskPlaneService(store, policy=PolicyEngine(
+        identity_verifier=IdentityVerifier({identity}), execution_enabled=False,
+        identity_capabilities={identity: {"task.creator", "task.read", "task.delegate"}},
+    ), mission_authority=authority)
+    ingress = SignedMissionIngress(service, verifier)
+    # SQLite's existing connection and transaction lock share one request thread.
+    HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", args.port), make_handler(ingress)).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

active-runtime/app/aios_task_terminal_proof.py

@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+"""Authenticated, trigger-only import of authoritative terminal proof.
+
+The caller authorizes reconciliation but supplies no proof fields.  Proof is
+read by a configured server-side provider and is accepted only after the
+provider validates an authenticated authority document and its immutable
+cross-system tuple.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from hashlib import sha256
+import json
+import re
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .aios_task_lineage_integration import LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY
+from .task_plane.errors import ConflictError, ForbiddenError, ValidationError
+from .task_plane.models import ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
+from .task_plane.policy import PolicyDecision
+
+
+PROOF_SCHEMA = "aios.task-terminal-authority-proof.v1"
+RECEIPT_SCHEMA = "aios.task-terminal-import-receipt.v1"
+REQUIRED_SOURCES = frozenset(
+    {
+        "agent_task",
+        "admission",
+        "job_producer",
+        "execution_alias",
+        "governed_job",
+        "bridge",
+        "authority_git",
+    }
+)
+DOCUMENT_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema",
+        "task_id",
+        "mission_id",
+        "root_task_id",
+        "parent_task_id",
+        "acceptance_condition",
+        "agent_task_status",
+        "admission_status",
+        "execution_outcome",
+        "external_job_id",
+        "internal_job_id",
+        "repository",
+        "base_revision",
+        "target_branch",
+        "generation",
+        "execution_plan_digest",
+        "task_principal_ref",
+        "task_lease_ref",
+        "writer_lease_ref",
+        "governed_commit_oid",
+        "authority_ref_oid",
+        "postimage_hashes",
+        "source_receipt_digests",
+        "attestation_ref",
+        "started_at",
+        "completed_at",
+    }
+)
+_HEX64 = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}")
+_GIT_OID = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}(?:[0-9a-f]{24})?")
+_IDENTIFIER = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/-]{2,255}")
+
+
+def _canonical_bytes(value: Mapping[str, object]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        dict(value), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _nonempty_string(value: object, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 1024:
+        raise ForbiddenError(f"authoritative proof {field} invalid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _identifier(value: object, field: str) -> str:
+    text = _nonempty_string(value, field)
+    if _IDENTIFIER.fullmatch(text) is None:
+        raise ForbiddenError(f"authoritative proof {field} invalid")
+    return text
+
+
+def _utc_time(value: object, field: str) -> str:
+    text = _nonempty_string(value, field)
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ForbiddenError(f"authoritative proof {field} invalid") from exc
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None or parsed.utcoffset() is None:
+        raise ForbiddenError(f"authoritative proof {field} lacks timezone")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class VerifiedTerminalProof:
+    document: dict[str, object]
+
+    @property
+    def task_id(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.document["task_id"])
+
+    @property
+    def attestation_ref(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.document["attestation_ref"])
+
+    @property
+    def started_at(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.document["started_at"])
+
+    @property
+    def completed_at(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.document["completed_at"])
+
+    def evidence(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "kind": "acceptance-proof",
+            "proof_schema": PROOF_SCHEMA,
+            "authority_document_digest": sha256(
+                _canonical_bytes(self.document)
+            ).hexdigest(),
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "mission_id": self.document["mission_id"],
+            "root_task_id": self.document["root_task_id"],
+            "parent_task_id": self.document["parent_task_id"],
+            "acceptance_condition": self.document["acceptance_condition"],
+            "external_job_id": self.document["external_job_id"],
+            "internal_job_id": self.document["internal_job_id"],
+            "repository": self.document["repository"],
+            "base_revision": self.document["base_revision"],
+            "target_branch": self.document["target_branch"],
+            "generation": self.document["generation"],
+            "execution_plan_digest": self.document["execution_plan_digest"],
+            "task_principal_ref": self.document["task_principal_ref"],
+            "task_lease_ref": self.document["task_lease_ref"],
+            "writer_lease_ref": self.document["writer_lease_ref"],
+            "governed_commit_oid": self.document["governed_commit_oid"],
+            "authority_ref_oid": self.document["authority_ref_oid"],
+            "postimage_hashes": self.document["postimage_hashes"],
+            "source_receipt_digests": self.document["source_receipt_digests"],
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+        }
+
+    def outputs(self) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
+        return [
+            {
+                "kind": "governed-commit-readback",
+                "repository": self.document["repository"],
+                "target_branch": self.document["target_branch"],
+                "governed_commit_oid": self.document["governed_commit_oid"],
+                "postimage_hashes": self.document["postimage_hashes"],
+            }
+        ]
+
+
+class AuthorityDocumentReader(Protocol):
+    def __call__(self, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, object]: ...
+
+
+class AuthorityDocumentVerifier(Protocol):
+    def __call__(self, document: Mapping[str, object]) -> bool: ...
+
+
+class AuthenticatedTerminalProofProvider:
+    """Read and validate one aggregate document backed by existing authorities.
+
+    ``reader`` and ``verifier`` are mandatory runtime bindings.  The verifier
+    must authenticate the referenced AgentTask/admission/Job/Bridge/Git
+    receipts using already configured trust roots.  This class does not confer
+    trust on an arbitrary mapping.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        reader: AuthorityDocumentReader,
+        verifier: AuthorityDocumentVerifier,
+        task_reader: Callable[[str], TaskRecord],
+        worker_identity: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not callable(reader) or not callable(verifier) or not callable(task_reader):
+            raise ValueError("authenticated proof reader, verifier and task reader required")
+        self._reader = reader
+        self._verifier = verifier
+        self._task_reader = task_reader
+        self.worker_identity = _identifier(worker_identity, "worker_identity")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _parse(raw: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        if not isinstance(raw, Mapping) or set(raw) != DOCUMENT_FIELDS:
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative proof document shape invalid")
+        data = dict(raw)
+        if data["schema"] != PROOF_SCHEMA:
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative proof schema invalid")
+        for field in (
+            "task_id", "mission_id", "root_task_id", "parent_task_id",
+            "external_job_id", "internal_job_id", "task_principal_ref", "task_lease_ref",
+            "writer_lease_ref",
+        ):
+            data[field] = _identifier(data[field], field)
+        for field in ("acceptance_condition", "repository", "base_revision", "target_branch"):
+            data[field] = _nonempty_string(data[field], field)
+        if data["agent_task_status"] != "SUCCEEDED":
+            raise ForbiddenError("AgentTask is not authoritatively successful")
+        if data["admission_status"] != "ADMITTED":
+            raise ForbiddenError("task admission is not authoritative")
+        if data["execution_outcome"] != "APPLIED_VERIFIED":
+            raise ForbiddenError("governed execution outcome is not verified")
+        if type(data["generation"]) is not int or int(data["generation"]) < 1:
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative proof generation invalid")
+        if not isinstance(data["execution_plan_digest"], str) or _HEX64.fullmatch(
+            data["execution_plan_digest"]
+        ) is None:
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative execution plan digest invalid")
+        for field in ("governed_commit_oid", "authority_ref_oid"):
+            if not isinstance(data[field], str) or _GIT_OID.fullmatch(data[field]) is None:
+                raise ForbiddenError(f"authoritative proof {field} invalid")
+        if data["governed_commit_oid"] != data["authority_ref_oid"]:
+            raise ForbiddenError("authority ref does not read back governed commit")
+        images = data["postimage_hashes"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(images, Mapping)
+            or not images
+            or len(images) > 256
+            or any(
+                not isinstance(path, str)
+                or not path
+                or path.startswith(("/", "\\"))
+                or ".." in path.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
+                or not isinstance(digest, str)
+                or _HEX64.fullmatch(digest) is None
+                for path, digest in images.items()
+            )
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative postimage hashes invalid")
+        data["postimage_hashes"] = dict(sorted(images.items()))
+        sources = data["source_receipt_digests"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(sources, Mapping)
+            or set(sources) != REQUIRED_SOURCES
+            or any(
+                not isinstance(digest, str) or _HEX64.fullmatch(digest) is None
+                for digest in sources.values()
+            )
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative source receipt set invalid")
+        data["source_receipt_digests"] = dict(sorted(sources.items()))
+        data["attestation_ref"] = _nonempty_string(data["attestation_ref"], "attestation_ref")
+        data["started_at"] = _utc_time(data["started_at"], "started_at")
+        data["completed_at"] = _utc_time(data["completed_at"], "completed_at")
+        if datetime.fromisoformat(data["completed_at"].replace("Z", "+00:00")) < datetime.fromisoformat(
+            data["started_at"].replace("Z", "+00:00")
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative proof time order invalid")
+        return data
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_task_binding(task: TaskRecord, data: Mapping[str, object]) -> None:
+        lineage = task.task_plan.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+        if not isinstance(lineage, Mapping) or lineage.get("relation_type") == "ROOT":
+            raise ForbiddenError("terminal proof requires a canonical lineage child")
+        expected = {
+            "task_id": task.task_id,
+            "mission_id": task.mission_id,
+            "root_task_id": task.root_task_id,
+            "parent_task_id": task.task_plan.parent_task_id,
+            "acceptance_condition": task.task_plan.metadata.get("acceptance_condition"),
+        }
+        if any(data.get(field) != value or value in (None, "") for field, value in expected.items()):
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative proof TaskPlane binding mismatch")
+        if any(lineage.get(field) != expected[field] for field in expected if field != "acceptance_condition"):
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative proof lineage binding mismatch")
+
+    def collect(self, task: TaskRecord) -> VerifiedTerminalProof:
+        raw = self._reader(task.task_id)
+        if not isinstance(raw, Mapping) or self._verifier(raw) is not True:
+            raise ForbiddenError("authoritative terminal proof authentication failed")
+        data = self._parse(raw)
+        self._assert_task_binding(task, data)
+        return VerifiedTerminalProof(data)
+
+    def verify_evidence(self, task: TaskRecord, evidences: list[dict]) -> bool:
+        proof = self.collect(task)
+        return evidences == [proof.evidence()]
+
+    def verify_result(self, result: ResultEnvelope) -> bool:
+        if result.worker_identity != self.worker_identity or result.status != "COMPLETED":
+            return False
+        try:
+            task = self._task_reader(result.task_id)
+            proof = self.collect(task)
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+        return bool(
+            result.attestation_ref == proof.attestation_ref
+            and result.evidence == [proof.evidence()]
+            and result.outputs == proof.outputs()
+            and result.started_at == proof.started_at
+            and result.completed_at == proof.completed_at
+            and result.operation_digest == task.task_plan.operation_digest()
+        )
+
+
+class TerminalProofEvidenceVerifier:
+    """PolicyEngine evidence verifier backed by authenticated authority reads."""
+
+    def __init__(self, provider: AuthenticatedTerminalProofProvider) -> None:
+        self.provider = provider
+
+    def verify(self, task: TaskRecord, evidences: list[dict]) -> PolicyDecision:
+        try:
+            allowed = self.provider.verify_evidence(task, evidences)
+        except Exception:
+            allowed = False
+        return PolicyDecision(allowed, "" if allowed else "terminal proof evidence invalid")
+
+
+class TerminalProofImporter:
+    """Reconcile a server-verified proof through TaskPlane claim/result paths."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        service: Any,
+        *,
+        provider: AuthenticatedTerminalProofProvider | None,
+        worker_id: str | None,
+        worker_identity: str | None,
+        lease_seconds: int = 300,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.service = service
+        self.provider = provider
+        self.worker_id = worker_id
+        self.worker_identity = worker_identity
+        if provider is not None:
+            if not worker_id or not worker_identity:
+                raise ValueError("terminal proof worker binding required")
+            _identifier(worker_id, "worker_id")
+            _identifier(worker_identity, "worker_identity")
+            if provider.worker_identity != worker_identity:
+                raise ValueError("terminal proof provider identity mismatch")
+        if not 30 <= int(lease_seconds) <= 3600:
+            raise ValueError("terminal proof lease out of range")
+        self.lease_seconds = int(lease_seconds)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def expected_idempotency_key(task: TaskRecord) -> str:
+        return f"terminal-proof:{task.mission_id}:{task.task_id}"
+
+    def _authorized_task(self, task_id: str, actor_identity: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        self.service.get_task(task_id, actor_identity)
+        task = self.service.store.get_task(task_id)
+        lineage = task.task_plan.metadata.get(LINEAGE_METADATA_KEY)
+        if (
+            not isinstance(lineage, Mapping)
+            or lineage.get("relation_type") == "ROOT"
+            or lineage.get("task_id") != task.task_id
+            or lineage.get("mission_id") != task.mission_id
+            or lineage.get("root_task_id") != task.root_task_id
+            or lineage.get("parent_task_id") != task.task_plan.parent_task_id
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("terminal proof target is not a canonical child")
+        return task
+
+    def _existing_receipt(
+        self, task: TaskRecord, actor_identity: str
+    ) -> dict[str, object] | None:
+        if self.service.lineage is None:
+            raise ForbiddenError("TaskPlane lineage is not configured")
+        snapshot = self.service.lineage.binding.get_task_snapshot(task.task_id)
+        if not snapshot.terminal_evidence_proven:
+            return None
+        if snapshot.status != "COMPLETED":
+            raise ConflictError("terminal proof target did not complete successfully")
+        review = self.service.lineage.binding.get_root_review_for_trigger(task.task_id)
+        if review is None:
+            raise ConflictError("terminal proof lacks durable root review")
+        evidence_rows = self.service.store.list_evidence(task.task_id)
+        by_id = {str(row.get("evidence_id")): row for row in evidence_rows}
+        if not snapshot.evidence_refs or any(ref not in by_id for ref in snapshot.evidence_refs):
+            raise ConflictError("terminal proof evidence readback mismatch")
+        envelopes = []
+        for ref in snapshot.evidence_refs:
+            try:
+                envelope = json.loads(str(by_id[ref]["envelope_json"]))
+            except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+                raise ConflictError("terminal proof evidence readback invalid") from exc
+            envelopes.append(envelope)
+        claim_ids = {item.get("claim_id") for item in envelopes}
+        evidence_payloads = [item.get("payload") for item in envelopes]
+        if (
+            len(claim_ids) != 1
+            or len(evidence_payloads) != 1
+            or any(item.get("worker_identity") != self.worker_identity for item in envelopes)
+            or envelopes[0].get("kind") != "acceptance-proof"
+            or not isinstance(evidence_payloads[0], dict)
+            or not self.provider.verify_evidence(task, evidence_payloads)
+            or not self.service.store.verify_evidence_integrity(task.task_id)
+            or not self.service.store.verify_event_chain(task.task_id)
+        ):
+            raise ConflictError("terminal proof receipt integrity failed")
+        claim = self.service.store.get_claim(str(next(iter(claim_ids))))
+        if (
+            claim.task_id != task.task_id
+            or claim.worker_id != self.worker_id
+            or claim.worker_identity != self.worker_identity
+            or claim.operation_digest != task.task_plan.operation_digest()
+            or claim.status != "COMPLETED"
+        ):
+            raise ConflictError("terminal proof claim binding mismatch")
+        dispatch = self.service.lineage.binding.get_root_action_dispatch(str(review["review_id"]))
+        if dispatch is None:
+            raise ConflictError("terminal proof lacks durable root action dispatch")
+        body: dict[str, object] = {
+            "schema": RECEIPT_SCHEMA,
+            "task_id": task.task_id,
+            "mission_id": task.mission_id,
+            "root_task_id": task.root_task_id,
+            "claim_id": next(iter(claim_ids)),
+            "task_status": snapshot.status,
+            "task_revision": snapshot.revision,
+            "evidence_refs": list(snapshot.evidence_refs),
+            "review_id": review["review_id"],
+            "root_revision_after": review["root_revision_after"],
+            "next_legal_action": review["next_legal_action"],
+            "dispatch_status": dispatch.status,
+            "dispatch_idempotency_key": dispatch.idempotency_key,
+        }
+        body["receipt_digest"] = sha256(_canonical_bytes(body)).hexdigest()
+        return body
+
+    def _exact_active_claim(self, task: TaskRecord):
+        active = self.service.store.active_claim(task.task_id)
+        if active is None:
+            return None
+        if (
+            active.worker_id != self.worker_id
+            or active.worker_identity != self.worker_identity
+            or active.operation_digest != task.task_plan.operation_digest()
+        ):
+            raise ConflictError("active claim is owned by another execution binding")
+        return active
+
+    def reconcile(
+        self, task_id: str, idempotency_key: str | None, *, actor_identity: str
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        if self.provider is None:
+            raise ForbiddenError("terminal proof provider is not configured")
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor_identity)
+        if idempotency_key != self.expected_idempotency_key(task):
+            raise ValidationError("terminal proof idempotency key mismatch")
+        existing = self._existing_receipt(task, actor_identity)
+        if existing is not None:
+            return existing
+
+        proof = self.provider.collect(task)
+        claim = self._exact_active_claim(task)
+        if claim is None:
+            try:
+                claimed = self.service.claim(
+                    task.task_id,
+                    {
+                        "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+                        "lease_seconds": self.lease_seconds,
+                        "actor_identity": self.worker_identity,
+                    },
+                )
+                claim_id = str(claimed["claim_id"])
+            except Exception:
+                refreshed = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor_identity)
+                replay = self._existing_receipt(refreshed, actor_identity)
+                if replay is not None:
+                    return replay
+                claim = self._exact_active_claim(refreshed)
+                if claim is None:
+                    raise
+                claim_id = claim.claim_id
+        else:
+            claim_id = claim.claim_id
+
+        try:
+            self.service.complete(
+                task.task_id,
+                {
+                    "claim_id": claim_id,
+                    "actor_identity": self.worker_identity,
+                    "status": "COMPLETED",
+                    "outputs": proof.outputs(),
+                    "evidence": [proof.evidence()],
+                    "started_at": proof.started_at,
+                    "completed_at": proof.completed_at,
+                    "attestation_ref": proof.attestation_ref,
+                },
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            refreshed = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor_identity)
+            replay = self._existing_receipt(refreshed, actor_identity)
+            if replay is None:
+                raise
+            return replay
+        refreshed = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor_identity)
+        receipt = self._existing_receipt(refreshed, actor_identity)
+        if receipt is None:
+            raise ConflictError("terminal proof completion lacks authoritative readback")
+        return receipt

active-runtime/app/aios_trusted_candidate_builder.py

@@ -0,0 +1,958 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed AF_UNIX builder for server-owned trusted candidate evidence."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import socket
+import stat
+import struct
+import subprocess
+import time
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+
+class BuilderError(RuntimeError):
+    """A stable, non-sensitive error code returned by the builder boundary."""
+
+
+def _canonical_json(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha256(*parts: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256("\0".join(parts).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PeerIdentity:
+    pid: int
+    uid: int
+    gid: int
+
+
+class DomainPurposeSigner(Protocol):
+    """A signer deliberately limited to the builder's one domain purpose."""
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        ...
+
+    @property
+    def key_generation(self) -> int:
+        ...
+
+    def sign_for_purpose(self, purpose: str, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        ...
+
+
+class CredentialPathEd25519Signer:
+    """Reads a systemd-mounted credential path; never exports or logs key bytes."""
+
+    def __init__(self, credential_path: Path, *, key_id: str, key_generation: int, allowed_purpose: str):
+        self._credential_path = Path(credential_path)
+        self._key_id = str(key_id)
+        self._key_generation = key_generation
+        self._allowed_purpose = str(allowed_purpose)
+        if not self._key_id or not isinstance(key_generation, int) or key_generation < 1:
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if not self._credential_path.is_file():
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        try:
+            from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_pem_private_key
+            from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+            self._private_key = load_pem_private_key(self._credential_path.read_bytes(), password=None)
+            if not isinstance(self._private_key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
+                raise TypeError("signing key is not Ed25519")
+        except Exception as exc:  # do not expose parse/key material details
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_INVALID") from exc
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        return self._key_id
+
+    @property
+    def key_generation(self) -> int:
+        return self._key_generation
+
+    def sign_for_purpose(self, purpose: str, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        if purpose != self._allowed_purpose:
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_PURPOSE_DENIED")
+        return self._private_key.sign(payload)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BuilderKeyring:
+    builder_hmac: bytes
+    signing_private_key_path: Path | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if len(self.builder_hmac) < 32:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_HMAC_INVALID")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_credentials_directory(cls, credentials_directory: Path) -> "BuilderKeyring":
+        root = Path(credentials_directory)
+        hmac_path = root / "builder_hmac"
+        signing_path = root / "signing_private_key"
+        try:
+            secret = hmac_path.read_bytes().strip()
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_HMAC_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if not signing_path.is_file():
+            raise BuilderError("SIGNING_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        return cls(builder_hmac=secret, signing_private_key_path=signing_path)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig:
+    policy_schema: str
+    repository: str
+    request_schema: str
+    response_schema: str
+    operation: str
+    readiness_operation: str
+    maximum_request_age_seconds: int
+    request_timeout_seconds: int
+    allowed_peer_uid: int
+    allowed_peer_cgroups: tuple[str, ...]
+    allowed_peer_executable_prefix: str
+    allowed_peer_runtime_prefix: str
+    allowed_peer_runtime_suffix: str
+    required_checks: tuple[str, ...]
+    evidence_layout: Mapping[str, str]
+    recipes: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, str]]
+    governed_recipes: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, str]]
+    policy_sha256: str
+    source_admission_resolver: Callable[[str, str | None, str], Mapping[str, str]] | None = None
+    migration_plan_resolver: Callable[[str, str, str], Any] | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_policy(cls, policy: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig":
+        required = {
+            "schema", "repository", "request_schema", "response_schema", "operation",
+            "readiness_operation", "maximum_request_age_seconds", "request_timeout_seconds",
+            "allowed_peer_uid", "allowed_peer_cgroups", "allowed_peer_executable_prefix",
+            "allowed_peer_runtime_prefix", "allowed_peer_runtime_suffix",
+            "required_checks", "evidence_layout", "recipes", "governed_recipes",
+        }
+        if set(policy) != required or policy.get("schema") != "aios.trusted-candidate-builder-policy.v1":
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        recipes = policy.get("recipes")
+        if not isinstance(recipes, Mapping) or set(recipes) != {"V2R2C2", "V2R2C3"}:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_RECIPES_INVALID")
+        c2, c3 = recipes["V2R2C2"], recipes["V2R2C3"]
+        if not isinstance(c2, Mapping) or set(c2) != {"mode", "task_id", "candidate_id", "base_oid", "source_commit", "version", "purpose"} or c2.get("mode") != "fixed":
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_V2R2C2_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(c3, Mapping) or set(c3) != {"mode", "derives_from", "version", "purpose"} or c3.get("mode") != "governed-derived-only" or c3.get("derives_from") != "V2R2C2":
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_V2R2C3_INVALID")
+        if (
+            policy["repository"] != "aios/aios"
+            or policy["operation"] != "BuildTrustedCandidateV1"
+            or policy["readiness_operation"] != "ProbeTrustedCandidateBuilderV1"
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(policy["maximum_request_age_seconds"], int) or not 1 <= policy["maximum_request_age_seconds"] <= 300:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_FRESHNESS_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(policy["request_timeout_seconds"], int) or not 1 <= policy["request_timeout_seconds"] <= 120:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(policy["allowed_peer_uid"], int) or policy["allowed_peer_uid"] != 1000:
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_PEER_UID_INVALID")
+        cgroups, checks = policy["allowed_peer_cgroups"], policy["required_checks"]
+        if not isinstance(cgroups, list) or not cgroups or not all(isinstance(value, str) and value.startswith("/") for value in cgroups):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_CGROUPS_INVALID")
+        for field in (
+            "allowed_peer_executable_prefix",
+            "allowed_peer_runtime_prefix",
+            "allowed_peer_runtime_suffix",
+        ):
+            if not isinstance(policy[field], str) or not policy[field].startswith("/"):
+                raise BuilderError("POLICY_PROCESS_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+        if not isinstance(checks, list) or not checks or len(set(checks)) != len(checks) or not all(isinstance(value, str) for value in checks):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_CHECKS_INVALID")
+        layout = policy["evidence_layout"]
+        evidence_names = {
+            "artifact", "manifest", "package_closure", "tests", "canary",
+            "gitea", "rollback", "policy", "secret_scan",
+        }
+        if (
+            not isinstance(layout, Mapping)
+            or set(layout) != evidence_names
+            or not all(
+                isinstance(value, str)
+                and value.startswith("{version}/")
+                and ".." not in Path(value).parts
+                and not Path(value).is_absolute()
+                for value in layout.values()
+            )
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("POLICY_EVIDENCE_LAYOUT_INVALID")
+        return cls(
+            policy_schema=str(policy["schema"]), repository=str(policy["repository"]),
+            request_schema=str(policy["request_schema"]), response_schema=str(policy["response_schema"]),
+            operation=str(policy["operation"]), readiness_operation=str(policy["readiness_operation"]),
+            maximum_request_age_seconds=policy["maximum_request_age_seconds"],
+            request_timeout_seconds=policy["request_timeout_seconds"],
+            allowed_peer_uid=policy["allowed_peer_uid"], allowed_peer_cgroups=tuple(cgroups),
+            allowed_peer_executable_prefix=policy["allowed_peer_executable_prefix"],
+            allowed_peer_runtime_prefix=policy["allowed_peer_runtime_prefix"],
+            allowed_peer_runtime_suffix=policy["allowed_peer_runtime_suffix"],
+            required_checks=tuple(checks), evidence_layout=dict(layout),
+            recipes={name: dict(value) for name, value in recipes.items()},
+            governed_recipes={name: dict(value) for name, value in policy["governed_recipes"].items()} if isinstance(policy["governed_recipes"], Mapping) else _invalid_governed_recipes(),
+            policy_sha256=hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(policy))).hexdigest(),
+        )
+
+    def fixed_recipe(self, name: str) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        recipe = self.recipes.get(name)
+        if recipe is None:
+            raise BuilderError("RECIPE_UNKNOWN")
+        if recipe["mode"] == "governed-derived-only":
+            derived = self.governed_recipes.get(name)
+            required = {"mode", "task_id", "candidate_id", "base_oid", "source_commit", "version", "purpose", "derived_from_v2r2c2_attestation", "builder_engineering_oid"}
+            if not isinstance(derived, Mapping) or set(derived) != required or derived.get("mode") != "governed-derived" or derived.get("version") != name or derived.get("purpose") != recipe.get("purpose"):
+                raise BuilderError("GOVERNED_V2R2C3_DERIVATION_REQUIRED")
+            for name in ("base_oid", "source_commit", "builder_engineering_oid"):
+                value = derived.get(name)
+                if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in value.lower()):
+                    raise BuilderError("GOVERNED_V2R2C3_DERIVATION_REQUIRED")
+            return dict(derived)
+        return recipe
+
+    def resolve_recipe(self, version: str, candidate_id: str | None, source_commit: str) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        recipe = self.recipes.get(version)
+        if recipe is not None:
+            resolved = self.fixed_recipe(version)
+            # Fixed/governed-derived policy recipes remain immutable.  A
+            # source admission can never override one of these identities.
+            effective_candidate_id = str(candidate_id or resolved.get("candidate_id") or "")
+            if {
+                "version": resolved.get("version"),
+                "candidate_id": resolved.get("candidate_id"),
+                "source_commit": resolved.get("source_commit"),
+            } != {
+                "version": version,
+                "candidate_id": effective_candidate_id,
+                "source_commit": source_commit,
+            }:
+                raise BuilderError("REQUEST_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+            return resolved
+
+        resolver = self.source_admission_resolver
+        if resolver is None:
+            raise BuilderError("RECIPE_UNKNOWN")
+        try:
+            admitted = dict(resolver(version, candidate_id, source_commit))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("SOURCE_ADMISSION_REQUIRED") from exc
+        required = {
+            "mode",
+            "task_id",
+            "candidate_id",
+            "base_oid",
+            "source_commit",
+            "version",
+            "purpose",
+        }
+        if (
+            set(admitted) != required
+            or admitted.get("mode") != "governed-source-admission"
+            or admitted.get("version") != version
+            or admitted.get("source_commit") != source_commit
+            or not isinstance(admitted.get("candidate_id"), str)
+            or not admitted.get("candidate_id")
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("SOURCE_ADMISSION_INVALID")
+        effective_candidate_id = str(candidate_id or admitted["candidate_id"])
+        if effective_candidate_id != admitted["candidate_id"]:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        for name in ("base_oid", "source_commit"):
+            value = admitted.get(name)
+            if (
+                not isinstance(value, str)
+                or len(value) != 40
+                or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in value.lower())
+            ):
+                raise BuilderError("SOURCE_ADMISSION_INVALID")
+        if admitted.get("purpose") != "AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER":
+            raise BuilderError("SOURCE_ADMISSION_INVALID")
+        return admitted
+
+
+def _invalid_governed_recipes() -> Mapping[str, Mapping[str, str]]:
+    raise BuilderError("POLICY_GOVERNED_RECIPES_INVALID")
+
+
+def load_builder_policy(path: Path) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        decoded = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise BuilderError("POLICY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not isinstance(decoded, Mapping):
+        raise BuilderError("POLICY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig.from_policy(decoded)
+    return decoded
+
+
+class ServerOwnedEvidenceSource:
+    """Recomputes a fixed on-host evidence closure without caller-owned paths."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig,
+        authority_git_dir: Path,
+        evidence_root: Path,
+        *,
+        expected_owner_uid: int | None = 0,
+        git_runner: Callable[..., Any] = subprocess.run,
+    ):
+        self._config = config
+        self._authority_git_dir = Path(authority_git_dir)
+        self._evidence_root = Path(evidence_root)
+        self._expected_owner_uid = expected_owner_uid
+        self._git_runner = git_runner
+
+    def _regular_path(self, relative: str) -> Path:
+        root = self._evidence_root.resolve(strict=True)
+        candidate = self._evidence_root / relative
+        current = self._evidence_root
+        for part in Path(relative).parts:
+            current = current / part
+            if current.is_symlink():
+                raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SYMLINK_DENIED")
+        try:
+            resolved = candidate.resolve(strict=True)
+            resolved.relative_to(root)
+            metadata = resolved.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+        except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SPECIAL_FILE_DENIED")
+        if os.name != "nt" and metadata.st_mode & 0o022:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_MODE_DENIED")
+        if (
+            os.name != "nt"
+            and
+            self._expected_owner_uid is not None
+            and metadata.st_uid != self._expected_owner_uid
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_OWNER_DENIED")
+        return resolved
+
+    def assert_ready(self) -> None:
+        """Validate the server-owned evidence facility without requiring recipe evidence.
+
+        Readiness is an infrastructure/property check.  Candidate-specific evidence
+        remains mandatory for ``BuildTrustedCandidateV1`` and is validated by
+        :meth:`__call__`; an empty evidence root therefore no longer makes the
+        builder globally unavailable.
+        """
+
+        for path, code in (
+            (self._authority_git_dir, "COLLECTOR_AUTHORITY_GIT_UNAVAILABLE"),
+            (self._evidence_root, "COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_ROOT_UNAVAILABLE"),
+        ):
+            try:
+                metadata = path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+            except OSError as exc:
+                raise BuilderError(code) from exc
+            if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) or path.is_symlink():
+                raise BuilderError(code)
+            if path == self._evidence_root:
+                if os.name != "nt" and metadata.st_mode & 0o022:
+                    raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_ROOT_MODE_DENIED")
+                if (
+                    os.name != "nt"
+                    and self._expected_owner_uid is not None
+                    and metadata.st_uid != self._expected_owner_uid
+                ):
+                    raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_ROOT_OWNER_DENIED")
+
+    def _digest(self, path: Path) -> str:
+        digest = hashlib.sha256()
+        with path.open("rb") as handle:
+            for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+                digest.update(chunk)
+        return digest.hexdigest()
+
+    def _json(self, path: Path) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            if path.stat().st_size > 2 * 1024 * 1024:
+                raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_SIZE_INVALID")
+            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def __call__(self, recipe_name: str, recipe: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            tree_result = self._git_runner(
+                ["git", f"--git-dir={self._authority_git_dir}", "rev-parse", f"{recipe['source_commit']}^{{tree}}"],
+                check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15,
+                env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+            )
+            ancestry_result = self._git_runner(
+                ["git", f"--git-dir={self._authority_git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", recipe["base_oid"], recipe["source_commit"]],
+                check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15,
+                env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+            )
+            tree_oid = tree_result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if getattr(ancestry_result, "returncode", 1) != 0:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GIT_MISMATCH")
+
+        receipt = self._json(self._regular_path(f"{recipe_name}/receipt.json"))
+        if set(receipt) != {"schema", "version", "candidate", "release_plan"}:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        if (
+            receipt.get("schema") != "aios.trusted-candidate-builder.evidence.v1"
+            or receipt.get("version") != recipe_name
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        candidate = receipt.get("candidate")
+        release_plan = receipt.get("release_plan")
+        if not isinstance(candidate, Mapping) or not isinstance(release_plan, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        if (
+            candidate.get("candidate_id") != recipe["candidate_id"]
+            or candidate.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or candidate.get("tree_oid") != tree_oid
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GIT_MISMATCH")
+        git_consistency = candidate.get("git_consistency")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(git_consistency, Mapping)
+            or git_consistency.get("consistent") is not True
+            or git_consistency.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or git_consistency.get("tree_oid") != tree_oid
+            or git_consistency.get("repository") != self._config.repository
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GIT_MISMATCH")
+
+        paths = {
+            name: self._regular_path(template.format(version=recipe_name))
+            for name, template in self._config.evidence_layout.items()
+        }
+        deployment = release_plan.get("deployment")
+        if not isinstance(deployment, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        digests = {name: self._digest(path) for name, path in paths.items()}
+        if (
+            digests["artifact"] != candidate.get("artifact_sha256")
+            or digests["manifest"] != candidate.get("manifest_sha256")
+            or digests["package_closure"] != deployment.get("package_closure_sha256")
+            or digests["policy"] != release_plan.get("policy_sha256")
+            or digests["policy"] != deployment.get("policy_sha256")
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+
+        tests = self._json(paths["tests"])
+        canary = self._json(paths["canary"])
+        gitea = self._json(paths["gitea"])
+        rollback = self._json(paths["rollback"])
+        secret_scan = self._json(paths["secret_scan"])
+        if tests != candidate.get("tests") or tests.get("passed") is not True:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_TESTS_MISMATCH")
+        if canary != candidate.get("canary") or canary.get("passed") is not True:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_CANARY_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            digests["tests"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(tests))).hexdigest()
+            or digests["canary"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(canary))).hexdigest()
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_CANONICALIZATION_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            gitea != candidate.get("gitea_consistency")
+            or gitea.get("consistent") is not True
+            or gitea.get("repository") != self._config.repository
+            or gitea.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or gitea.get("tree_oid") != tree_oid
+            or gitea.get("remote_ref_oid") != recipe["source_commit"]
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_GITEA_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            candidate.get("rollback_ready") is not True
+            or rollback.get("ready") is not True
+            or rollback.get("source_commit") != recipe["source_commit"]
+            or rollback.get("rollback_sha256") != deployment.get("rollback_sha256")
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_ROLLBACK_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            digests["gitea"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(gitea))).hexdigest()
+            or digests["rollback"] != hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(dict(rollback))).hexdigest()
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_CANONICALIZATION_MISMATCH")
+        if (
+            secret_scan.get("passed") is not True
+            or secret_scan.get("artifact_sha256") != candidate.get("artifact_sha256")
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SECRET_SCAN_MISMATCH")
+        checks = {name: True for name in self._config.required_checks}
+        return {
+            "candidate": dict(candidate),
+            "release_plan": dict(release_plan),
+            "checks": checks,
+            "evidence_digests": digests,
+        }
+
+
+class DeterministicEvidenceCollector:
+    """Validates a server-owned source; request fields never influence collection."""
+
+    _BUNDLE_FIELDS = {"candidate", "release_plan", "checks", "evidence_digests"}
+
+    def __init__(self, config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig, *, evidence_source: Callable[[str, Mapping[str, str]], Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None):
+        self._config = config
+        self._evidence_source = evidence_source
+
+    def assert_ready(self) -> None:
+        """Fail closed on collector configuration, not on recipe evidence presence."""
+
+        if self._evidence_source is None:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_UNCONFIGURED")
+        checker = getattr(self._evidence_source, "assert_ready", None)
+        if checker is not None:
+            checker()
+
+    def collect(self, recipe_name: str, recipe: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.assert_ready()
+        bundle = self._evidence_source(recipe_name, recipe)
+        if not isinstance(bundle, Mapping) or set(bundle) != self._BUNDLE_FIELDS:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
+        raw_checks = bundle.get("checks")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(raw_checks, Mapping)
+            or set(raw_checks) != set(self._config.required_checks)
+            or any(raw_checks.get(name) is not True for name in self._config.required_checks)
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_CHECKS_INCOMPLETE")
+        evidence_digests = bundle.get("evidence_digests")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(evidence_digests, Mapping)
+            or set(evidence_digests) != set(self._config.evidence_layout)
+            or any(
+                not isinstance(value, str)
+                or len(value) != 64
+                or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in value.lower())
+                for value in evidence_digests.values()
+            )
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_DIGESTS_INVALID")
+        try:
+            from silent_release_controller import ReleaseCandidate
+            from silent_release_hardening import ReleasePlan, TrustedCandidateBundle
+            from release_migration_plan import (
+                MigrationPlanError,
+                MigrationPlanRequired,
+            )
+
+            candidate = ReleaseCandidate.from_dict(dict(bundle["candidate"]))
+            release_plan_payload = dict(bundle["release_plan"])
+            migration_resolver = self._config.migration_plan_resolver
+            if migration_resolver is not None:
+                try:
+                    migration = migration_resolver(
+                        recipe_name,
+                        recipe["candidate_id"],
+                        recipe["source_commit"],
+                    )
+                except MigrationPlanRequired as exc:
+                    raise BuilderError("MIGRATION_PLAN_REQUIRED") from exc
+                except MigrationPlanError as exc:
+                    raise BuilderError("MIGRATION_PLAN_INVALID") from exc
+                if migration is not None:
+                    release_plan_payload["migration"] = migration.to_dict()
+            release_plan = ReleasePlan.from_dict(release_plan_payload)
+            checks = dict(raw_checks)
+            TrustedCandidateBundle(candidate, release_plan, checks).validate()
+        except BuilderError:
+            raise
+        except (ImportError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_EVIDENCE_INVALID") from exc
+        if candidate.source_commit != recipe["source_commit"] or candidate.candidate_id != recipe["candidate_id"]:
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_SOURCE_MISMATCH")
+        return {
+            "candidate": candidate.to_dict(),
+            "release_plan": release_plan.to_dict(),
+            "checks": checks,
+            "evidence_digests": dict(evidence_digests),
+        }
+
+
+def _extract_peer_identity(connection: socket.socket) -> PeerIdentity:
+    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
+        raise BuilderError("SO_PEERCRED_UNAVAILABLE")
+    raw = connection.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, struct.calcsize("3i"))
+    if len(raw) != struct.calcsize("3i"):
+        raise BuilderError("SO_PEERCRED_INVALID")
+    return PeerIdentity(*struct.unpack("3i", raw))
+
+
+def _resolve_cgroups(pid: int) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    try:
+        return tuple(
+            line.rsplit(":", 1)[1].strip()
+            for line in Path(f"/proc/{pid}/cgroup").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
+            if ":" in line and line.rsplit(":", 1)[1].strip().startswith("/")
+        )
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise BuilderError("PEER_CGROUP_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
+
+def _resolve_process_identity(pid: int) -> tuple[str, tuple[str, ...]]:
+    try:
+        executable = os.path.realpath(f"/proc/{pid}/exe")
+        argv = tuple(
+            item.decode("utf-8", "strict")
+            for item in Path(f"/proc/{pid}/cmdline").read_bytes().split(b"\0")
+            if item
+        )
+    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not executable or not argv:
+        raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return executable, argv
+
+
+class TrustedCandidateBuilder:
+    def __init__(
+        self, config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig, keyring: BuilderKeyring, *,
+        collector: DeterministicEvidenceCollector, signer: DomainPurposeSigner,
+        peer_identity_resolver: Callable[[socket.socket], PeerIdentity] = _extract_peer_identity,
+        cgroup_resolver: Callable[[int], tuple[str, ...] | str] = _resolve_cgroups,
+        process_identity_resolver: Callable[[int], tuple[str, tuple[str, ...]]] = _resolve_process_identity,
+        clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time, nonce_ledger_path: Path | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.config, self.keyring, self.collector, self.signer = config, keyring, collector, signer
+        self.peer_identity_resolver, self.cgroup_resolver, self.clock = peer_identity_resolver, cgroup_resolver, clock
+        self.process_identity_resolver = process_identity_resolver
+        self._nonce_ledger_path = Path(nonce_ledger_path) if nonce_ledger_path else None
+        self._nonce_ledger: dict[str, tuple[bytes, dict[str, Any]]] = self._load_nonce_ledger()
+
+    def _load_nonce_ledger(self) -> dict[str, tuple[bytes, dict[str, Any]]]:
+        if self._nonce_ledger_path is None or not self._nonce_ledger_path.exists():
+            return {}
+        if self._nonce_ledger_path.is_symlink():
+            raise BuilderError("NONCE_LEDGER_INVALID")
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(self._nonce_ledger_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            return {nonce: (bytes.fromhex(value["request_sha256"]), dict(value["result"])) for nonce, value in raw.items()}
+        except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("NONCE_LEDGER_INVALID") from exc
+
+    def _persist_nonce_ledger(self) -> None:
+        if self._nonce_ledger_path is None:
+            return
+        try:
+            self._nonce_ledger_path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            temporary = self._nonce_ledger_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+            payload = {nonce: {"request_sha256": digest.hex(), "result": result} for nonce, (digest, result) in self._nonce_ledger.items()}
+            with temporary.open("wb") as handle:
+                handle.write(_canonical_json(payload))
+                handle.flush()
+                os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+            os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
+            os.replace(temporary, self._nonce_ledger_path)
+            if os.name != "nt":
+                descriptor = os.open(self._nonce_ledger_path.parent, os.O_RDONLY)
+                try:
+                    os.fsync(descriptor)
+                finally:
+                    os.close(descriptor)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("NONCE_LEDGER_PERSIST_FAILED") from exc
+
+    def _verify_peer(self, connection: socket.socket) -> None:
+        peer = self.peer_identity_resolver(connection)
+        if peer.uid != self.config.allowed_peer_uid or peer.pid <= 0:
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_IDENTITY_DENIED")
+        resolved = self.cgroup_resolver(peer.pid)
+        cgroups = (resolved,) if isinstance(resolved, str) else tuple(resolved)
+        if not cgroups or not any(item in self.config.allowed_peer_cgroups for item in cgroups):
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_CGROUP_DENIED")
+        executable, argv = self.process_identity_resolver(peer.pid)
+        if not executable.startswith(self.config.allowed_peer_executable_prefix):
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_DENIED")
+        runtime_arguments = [
+            value
+            for value in argv
+            if value.startswith(self.config.allowed_peer_runtime_prefix)
+            and value.endswith(self.config.allowed_peer_runtime_suffix)
+        ]
+        if len(runtime_arguments) != 1:
+            raise BuilderError("PEER_PROCESS_DENIED")
+
+    def handle_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, connection: socket.socket) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        expected_keys = {"schema", "operation", "recipe", "repository", "task_id", "candidate_id", "base_oid", "source_commit", "version", "purpose", "issued_at", "nonce", "hmac"}
+        if (
+            set(request) != expected_keys
+            or request.get("schema") != self.config.request_schema
+            or request.get("operation") not in {
+                self.config.operation,
+                self.config.readiness_operation,
+            }
+        ):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        supplied_mac = request.get("hmac")
+        unsigned = {key: value for key, value in request.items() if key != "hmac"}
+        if not isinstance(supplied_mac, str) or not hmac.compare_digest(hmac.new(self.keyring.builder_hmac, _canonical_json(unsigned), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest(), supplied_mac):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_HMAC_INVALID")
+        issued_at, nonce = request.get("issued_at"), request.get("nonce")
+        if not isinstance(issued_at, int) or not isinstance(nonce, str) or len(nonce) < 16 or len(nonce) > 256:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        self._verify_peer(connection)
+        request_bytes = _canonical_json(dict(request))
+        replay = self._nonce_ledger.get(nonce)
+        if replay is not None:
+            if hmac.compare_digest(replay[0], hashlib.sha256(request_bytes).digest()):
+                return dict(replay[1])
+            raise BuilderError("REPLAY_CONFLICT")
+        if abs(int(self.clock()) - issued_at) > self.config.maximum_request_age_seconds:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_STALE")
+        recipe_name = request.get("recipe")
+        if not isinstance(recipe_name, str):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        recipe = self.config.resolve_recipe(str(request.get("version") or ""), str(request.get("candidate_id") or ""), str(request.get("source_commit") or ""))
+        if recipe_name != recipe.get("version"):
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        bound = {"repository": self.config.repository, "task_id": recipe["task_id"], "candidate_id": recipe["candidate_id"], "base_oid": recipe["base_oid"], "source_commit": recipe["source_commit"], "version": recipe["version"], "purpose": recipe["purpose"]}
+        if {key: request.get(key) for key in bound} != bound:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if request["operation"] == self.config.readiness_operation:
+            self.collector.assert_ready()
+            # Accessing the identity properties validates that the signer is
+            # configured and usable without invoking the private key.
+            builder_key_id = self.signer.key_id
+            builder_key_generation = self.signer.key_generation
+            result = {
+                "schema": self.config.response_schema,
+                "status": "READY",
+                "repository": self.config.repository,
+                "recipe": recipe_name,
+                "candidate_id": recipe["candidate_id"],
+                "source_commit": recipe["source_commit"],
+                "builder_key_id": builder_key_id,
+                "builder_key_generation": builder_key_generation,
+                "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519",
+                "signature_purpose": "AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER",
+                "policy_sha256": self.config.policy_sha256,
+                "collector_ready": True,
+                "signer_ready": True,
+            }
+            if len(self._nonce_ledger) >= 2048:
+                self._nonce_ledger.pop(next(iter(self._nonce_ledger)))
+            self._nonce_ledger[nonce] = (
+                hashlib.sha256(request_bytes).digest(),
+                dict(result),
+            )
+            self._persist_nonce_ledger()
+            return result
+
+        bundle = dict(self.collector.collect(recipe_name, recipe))
+        candidate = bundle["candidate"]
+        release_plan = bundle["release_plan"]
+        checks = bundle.get("checks")
+        evidence_digests = bundle["evidence_digests"]
+        if not isinstance(checks, Mapping) or set(checks) != set(self.config.required_checks) or not all(value is True for value in checks.values()):
+            raise BuilderError("COLLECTOR_CHECKS_INCOMPLETE")
+
+        issued = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        attestation = {
+            "builder_attestation_id": "builder-attestation-" + _sha256(recipe_name, recipe["task_id"], candidate["artifact_sha256"])[:24],
+            "builder_key_id": self.signer.key_id,
+            "builder_key_generation": self.signer.key_generation,
+            "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519",
+            "signature_purpose": "AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER",
+            "source_commit": candidate["source_commit"], "tree_oid": candidate["tree_oid"],
+            "artifact_sha256": candidate["artifact_sha256"], "manifest_sha256": candidate["manifest_sha256"],
+            "package_closure_sha256": release_plan["deployment"]["package_closure_sha256"],
+            "test_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["tests"],
+            "canary_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["canary"],
+            "gitea_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["gitea"],
+            "rollback_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["rollback"],
+            "policy_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["policy"],
+            "secret_scan_evidence_sha256": evidence_digests["secret_scan"],
+            "issued_at": issued, "trust_domain": "aios.trusted-builder.attestation.v1",
+        }
+        canonical_attestation = _canonical_json(attestation)
+        fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(canonical_attestation).hexdigest()
+        signature = base64.b64encode(self.signer.sign_for_purpose("AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER", canonical_attestation)).decode("ascii")
+        result = {
+            "schema": self.config.response_schema, "status": "BUILT", "recipe": recipe_name,
+            "repository": self.config.repository, "task_id": recipe["task_id"], "base_oid": recipe["base_oid"],
+            "purpose": recipe["purpose"], "checks": dict(checks),
+            "evidence": {"candidate_id": candidate["candidate_id"], "source_commit": candidate["source_commit"], "tree_oid": candidate["tree_oid"], "artifact_sha256": candidate["artifact_sha256"], "manifest_sha256": candidate["manifest_sha256"], "package_closure_sha256": release_plan["deployment"]["package_closure_sha256"], "test_evidence_sha256": attestation["test_evidence_sha256"], "canary_evidence_sha256": attestation["canary_evidence_sha256"]},
+            "attestation": {**attestation, "fingerprint": fingerprint, "signature": signature},
+        }
+        result["silent_release_bundle"] = {"candidate": candidate, "release_plan": release_plan, "checks": dict(checks), "attestation": result["attestation"]}
+        if len(self._nonce_ledger) >= 2048:
+            self._nonce_ledger.pop(next(iter(self._nonce_ledger)))
+        self._nonce_ledger[nonce] = (hashlib.sha256(request_bytes).digest(), dict(result))
+        self._persist_nonce_ledger()
+        return result
+
+    def serve_forever(self, listener: socket.socket) -> None:
+        while True:
+            connection, _ = listener.accept()
+            with connection:
+                try:
+                    raw = connection.makefile("rb").readline(65537)
+                    if not raw or len(raw) > 65536:
+                        raise BuilderError("REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID")
+                    result = self.handle_request(json.loads(raw), connection=connection)
+                except (BuilderError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                    result = {"schema": self.config.response_schema, "status": "REJECTED", "error_code": "REQUEST_REJECTED"}
+                connection.sendall(_canonical_json(result) + b"\n")
+
+
+class UnixTrustedCandidateBuilderClient:
+    def __init__(self, config: TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig, keyring: BuilderKeyring, *, socket_path: Path | None = None, clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time) -> None:
+        self.config, self.keyring, self.socket_path, self.clock = config, keyring, socket_path, clock
+
+    def create_request(self, version: str, candidate_id: str | None, source_commit: str, *, nonce: str, operation: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        selected = self.config.resolve_recipe(version, candidate_id, source_commit)
+        selected_operation = operation or self.config.operation
+        if selected_operation not in {self.config.operation, self.config.readiness_operation}:
+            raise BuilderError("REQUEST_OPERATION_INVALID")
+        request = {"schema": self.config.request_schema, "operation": selected_operation, "recipe": version, "repository": self.config.repository, "task_id": selected["task_id"], "candidate_id": selected["candidate_id"], "base_oid": selected["base_oid"], "source_commit": selected["source_commit"], "version": selected["version"], "purpose": selected["purpose"], "issued_at": int(self.clock()), "nonce": nonce}
+        request["hmac"] = hmac.new(self.keyring.builder_hmac, _canonical_json(request), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+        return request
+
+    def _exchange(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if self.socket_path is None:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_SOCKET_UNCONFIGURED")
+        try:
+            with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as connection:
+                connection.settimeout(self.config.request_timeout_seconds)
+                connection.connect(os.fspath(self.socket_path))
+                connection.sendall(_canonical_json(dict(request)) + b"\n")
+                raw = connection.makefile("rb").readline(65537)
+        except (OSError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_TRANSPORT_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        try:
+            result = json.loads(raw)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_RESPONSE_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(result, Mapping) or result.get("schema") != self.config.response_schema:
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+    def build(self, version: str, candidate_id: str | None, source_commit: str, *, nonce: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        result = self._exchange(
+            self.create_request(version, candidate_id, source_commit, nonce=nonce)
+        )
+        if result.get("status") != "BUILT":
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_REQUEST_REJECTED")
+        return result
+
+    def probe(self, *, nonce: str | None = None) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        recipe = self.config.fixed_recipe("V2R2C2")
+        result = self._exchange(
+            self.create_request(
+                "V2R2C2",
+                recipe["candidate_id"],
+                recipe["source_commit"],
+                nonce=nonce or secrets.token_hex(32),
+                operation=self.config.readiness_operation,
+            )
+        )
+        if result.get("status") != "READY":
+            raise BuilderError("BUILDER_NOT_READY")
+        return result
+
+
+def readiness_probe(client: UnixTrustedCandidateBuilderClient) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    result = dict(client.probe())
+    required_true = {"collector_ready", "signer_ready"}
+    if any(result.get(name) is not True for name in required_true):
+        raise BuilderError("BUILDER_NOT_READY")
+    return result
+
+
+def _main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--socket-fd", required=True, type=int)
+    parser.add_argument("--policy", required=True, type=Path)
+    arguments = parser.parse_args()
+    config = TrustedCandidateBuilderConfig.from_policy(load_builder_policy(arguments.policy))
+    credentials = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
+    if not credentials:
+        raise SystemExit("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY is required")
+    keyring = BuilderKeyring.from_credentials_directory(Path(credentials))
+    source_admission_root = os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_SOURCE_ADMISSION_ROOT", ""
+    ).strip()
+    if source_admission_root:
+        from release_source_admission import open_source_admission_store
+
+        try:
+            source_admission_hmac = (
+                Path(credentials) / "source_admission_hmac"
+            ).read_bytes().strip()
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise BuilderError("SOURCE_ADMISSION_HMAC_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        source_store = open_source_admission_store(
+            Path(source_admission_root),
+            repository=config.repository,
+            policy=arguments.policy,
+            hmac_key=source_admission_hmac,
+            expected_owner_uid=0,
+            writable=False,
+        )
+        config = replace(
+            config,
+            source_admission_resolver=source_store.resolve_recipe,
+        )
+    migration_plan_root = os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_MIGRATION_PLAN_ROOT", ""
+    ).strip()
+    migration_profile_root = os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_MIGRATION_PROFILE_ROOT", ""
+    ).strip()
+    if bool(migration_plan_root) != bool(migration_profile_root):
+        raise BuilderError("MIGRATION_PLAN_CONFIGURATION_INVALID")
+    if migration_plan_root:
+        from release_migration_plan import FileMigrationPlanResolver
+
+        migration_resolver = FileMigrationPlanResolver(
+            Path(migration_plan_root),
+            profile_root=Path(migration_profile_root),
+            expected_owner_uid=0,
+        )
+        config = replace(
+            config,
+            migration_plan_resolver=migration_resolver.resolve,
+        )
+    signer = CredentialPathEd25519Signer(
+        keyring.signing_private_key_path,
+        key_id=os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_KEY_ID"],
+        key_generation=int(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_KEY_GENERATION"]),
+        allowed_purpose="AIOS_TRUSTED_RELEASE_BUILDER",
+    )
+    listener = socket.fromfd(arguments.socket_fd, socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    collector = DeterministicEvidenceCollector(
+        config,
+        evidence_source=ServerOwnedEvidenceSource(
+            config,
+            Path(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_GIT_DIR"]),
+            Path(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_EVIDENCE_ROOT"]),
+        ),
+    )
+    TrustedCandidateBuilder(config, keyring, collector=collector, signer=signer, nonce_ledger_path=Path(os.environ["AIOS_TRUSTED_BUILDER_NONCE_LEDGER"])).serve_forever(listener)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    _main()

active-runtime/app/aios_v5_webops_app.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import hashlib, html, json, os, sqlite3, time, uuid, urllib.parse
 from http import cookies
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
+import hmac  # SEC-P0-BOOTSTRAP-CREDENTIAL
 
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_ROOT', Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
 DB_PATH = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_DB', ROOT / 'data' / 'webops.sqlite3'))
@@ -13,7 +14,11 @@ PUBLIC_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_PUBLIC_DOMAIN','https://cnnetmkt.top')
 WEBOPS_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_DOMAIN','https://ops.cnnetmkt.top')
 API_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_API_DOMAIN','https://api.cnnetmkt.top')
 WECHAT_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_WECHAT_CALLBACK_DOMAIN','https://wechat.cnnetmkt.top')
-SECRET = os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_SECRET','change-me-before-production')
+SECRET = os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_SECRET') or ''
+# SEC-P0: fail closed — never boot with a missing/insecure default secret.
+if SECRET in ('', 'change-me-before-production'):
+    raise SystemExit('AIOS_WEBOPS_SECRET not set (or insecure default). Refusing to start: fail closed.')
+SESSION_TTL = int(os.getenv('AIOS_SESSION_TTL','3600'))
 ROLES = ['owner','admin','user']
 NODES = ['server-hw','server-local']
 PAGES = [('/dashboard','Dashboard'),('/nodes','Nodes'),('/roles','Roles'),('/routing','Routing'),('/failover','Failover'),('/approvals','Approvals'),('/operations','Operations'),('/users','Users'),('/quota','Quota'),('/models','Models'),('/memory','Memory'),('/channels/wechat','WeChat'),('/life','Life Core'),('/patches','Patch Studio'),('/optimization','Optimization'),('/simulation','Simulation'),('/logs','Logs'),('/config','Config'),('/uat','UAT'),('/versions','Versions'),('/evidence','Evidence')]
@@ -43,19 +48,46 @@ def audit(actor, action, target='', payload=None):
     exec_sql('INSERT INTO audit_logs(id,actor,action,target,payload,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)',(uid('audit'),actor,action,target,jdump(payload or {}),now()))
 def notify(event_type,payload):
     exec_sql('INSERT INTO owner_notifications(id,event_type,payload,status,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)',(uid('notify'),event_type,jdump(payload),'queued',now()))
-def hash_pw(p): return hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+p).encode()).hexdigest()
-def check_pw(stored,p): return stored in (p, hash_pw(p))
+_PBKDF2_ITERS = int(os.getenv('AIOS_PBKDF2_ITERS','260000'))
+def _is_pbkdf2(stored): return isinstance(stored,str) and stored.startswith('pbkdf2$') and stored.count('$')==2
+def hash_pw(p):
+    salt=os.urandom(16).hex()
+    dk=hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', p.encode(), bytes.fromhex(salt), _PBKDF2_ITERS).hex()
+    return f'pbkdf2${salt}${dk}'
+def check_pw(stored,p):
+    if not stored or not isinstance(stored,str) or not stored: return False
+    if _is_pbkdf2(stored):
+        _,salt,dk=stored.split('$')
+        calc=hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', p.encode(), bytes.fromhex(salt), _PBKDF2_ITERS).hex()
+        return hmac.compare_digest(dk,calc)
+    # Legacy record path: NEVER accept the plaintext form as a credential.
+    # A legacy (unsalted) sha256 is honored ONLY as a one-time owner migration
+    # credential and never for the known bootstrap default; anything else is
+    # rejected so the account must be re-seeded via a secure channel (fail closed).
+    if stored == p: return False
+    try:
+        old=hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+p).encode()).hexdigest()
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return (hmac.compare_digest(old,stored)) and (p not in {'bootstrap-change-me'})
 def token(username,role):
-    data=f'{username}|{role}|{int(time.time())}'; sig=hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+data).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]; return data+'|'+sig
+    exp=int(time.time())+SESSION_TTL
+    data=f'{username}|{role}|{exp}'
+    sig=hmac.new(SECRET.encode(), data.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+    return data+'|'+sig
 def parse_session(header):
     if not header: return None
     c=cookies.SimpleCookie(); c.load(header)
     if 'aios_session' not in c: return None
     parts=c['aios_session'].value.split('|')
     if len(parts)!=4: return None
-    data='|'.join(parts[:3]); sig=parts[3]
-    if hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+data).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]!=sig: return None
-    return one('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND role=? AND status=?',(parts[0],parts[1],'approved'))
+    username,role,exp,sig=parts
+    data=f'{username}|{role}|{exp}'
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(hmac.new(SECRET.encode(), data.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest(), sig): return None
+    try:
+        if int(exp) <= int(time.time()): return None
+    except Exception: return None
+    return one('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND role=? AND status=?',(username,role,'approved'))
 def require(user, roles): return bool(user and user['role'] in roles)
 def table(data):
     if not data: return '<p class="muted">No records.</p>'
@@ -215,7 +247,7 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if path=='/login':
             n=int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0') or 0); data=urllib.parse.parse_qs(self.rfile.read(n).decode())
             u=one('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND status=?',(data.get('username',[''])[0],'approved'))
-            if u and check_pw(u.get('password_hash') or '',data.get('password',[''])[0]): audit(u['username'],'login','webops',{}); self.redirect('/dashboard',[f"aios_session={token(u['username'],u['role'])}; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax"]); return
+            if u and check_pw(u.get('password_hash') or '',data.get('password',[''])[0]): audit(u['username'],'login','webops',{}); self.redirect('/dashboard',[f"aios_session={token(u['username'],u['role'])}; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict"]); return
             self.send_body(403,layout('Login Failed','<p>登录失败。</p>',None)); return
         if path=='/register':
             n=int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0') or 0); data=urllib.parse.parse_qs(self.rfile.read(n).decode())

active-runtime/app/aios_webops_app.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import hashlib, html, json, os, sqlite3, time, uuid, urllib.parse
 from http import cookies
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
+import hmac  # SEC-P0-BOOTSTRAP-CREDENTIAL
 
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_ROOT', Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
 DB_PATH = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_DB', ROOT / 'data' / 'webops.sqlite3'))
@@ -13,7 +14,11 @@ PUBLIC_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_PUBLIC_DOMAIN','https://cnnetmkt.top')
 WEBOPS_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_DOMAIN','https://ops.cnnetmkt.top')
 API_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_API_DOMAIN','https://api.cnnetmkt.top')
 WECHAT_DOMAIN = os.getenv('AIOS_WECHAT_CALLBACK_DOMAIN','https://wechat.cnnetmkt.top')
-SECRET = os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_SECRET','change-me-before-production')
+SECRET = os.getenv('AIOS_WEBOPS_SECRET') or ''
+# SEC-P0: fail closed — never boot with a missing/insecure default secret.
+if SECRET in ('', 'change-me-before-production'):
+    raise SystemExit('AIOS_WEBOPS_SECRET not set (or insecure default). Refusing to start: fail closed.')
+SESSION_TTL = int(os.getenv('AIOS_SESSION_TTL','3600'))
 ROLES = ['owner','admin','user']
 NODES = ['server-hw','server-local']
 PAGES = [('/dashboard','Dashboard'),('/nodes','Nodes'),('/roles','Roles'),('/routing','Routing'),('/failover','Failover'),('/approvals','Approvals'),('/operations','Operations'),('/users','Users'),('/quota','Quota'),('/models','Models'),('/memory','Memory'),('/channels/wechat','WeChat'),('/life','Life Core'),('/patches','Patch Studio'),('/optimization','Optimization'),('/simulation','Simulation'),('/logs','Logs'),('/config','Config'),('/uat','UAT'),('/versions','Versions'),('/evidence','Evidence')]
@@ -43,19 +48,46 @@ def audit(actor, action, target='', payload=None):
     exec_sql('INSERT INTO audit_logs(id,actor,action,target,payload,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)',(uid('audit'),actor,action,target,jdump(payload or {}),now()))
 def notify(event_type,payload):
     exec_sql('INSERT INTO owner_notifications(id,event_type,payload,status,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)',(uid('notify'),event_type,jdump(payload),'queued',now()))
-def hash_pw(p): return hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+p).encode()).hexdigest()
-def check_pw(stored,p): return stored in (p, hash_pw(p))
+_PBKDF2_ITERS = int(os.getenv('AIOS_PBKDF2_ITERS','260000'))
+def _is_pbkdf2(stored): return isinstance(stored,str) and stored.startswith('pbkdf2$') and stored.count('$')==2
+def hash_pw(p):
+    salt=os.urandom(16).hex()
+    dk=hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', p.encode(), bytes.fromhex(salt), _PBKDF2_ITERS).hex()
+    return f'pbkdf2${salt}${dk}'
+def check_pw(stored,p):
+    if not stored or not isinstance(stored,str) or not stored: return False
+    if _is_pbkdf2(stored):
+        _,salt,dk=stored.split('$')
+        calc=hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', p.encode(), bytes.fromhex(salt), _PBKDF2_ITERS).hex()
+        return hmac.compare_digest(dk,calc)
+    # Legacy record path: NEVER accept the plaintext form as a credential.
+    # A legacy (unsalted) sha256 is honored ONLY as a one-time owner migration
+    # credential and never for the known bootstrap default; anything else is
+    # rejected so the account must be re-seeded via a secure channel (fail closed).
+    if stored == p: return False
+    try:
+        old=hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+p).encode()).hexdigest()
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return (hmac.compare_digest(old,stored)) and (p not in {'bootstrap-change-me'})
 def token(username,role):
-    data=f'{username}|{role}|{int(time.time())}'; sig=hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+data).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]; return data+'|'+sig
+    exp=int(time.time())+SESSION_TTL
+    data=f'{username}|{role}|{exp}'
+    sig=hmac.new(SECRET.encode(), data.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+    return data+'|'+sig
 def parse_session(header):
     if not header: return None
     c=cookies.SimpleCookie(); c.load(header)
     if 'aios_session' not in c: return None
     parts=c['aios_session'].value.split('|')
     if len(parts)!=4: return None
-    data='|'.join(parts[:3]); sig=parts[3]
-    if hashlib.sha256((SECRET+'|'+data).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]!=sig: return None
-    return one('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND role=? AND status=?',(parts[0],parts[1],'approved'))
+    username,role,exp,sig=parts
+    data=f'{username}|{role}|{exp}'
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(hmac.new(SECRET.encode(), data.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest(), sig): return None
+    try:
+        if int(exp) <= int(time.time()): return None
+    except Exception: return None
+    return one('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND role=? AND status=?',(username,role,'approved'))
 def require(user, roles): return bool(user and user['role'] in roles)
 def table(data):
     if not data: return '<p class="muted">No records.</p>'
@@ -215,7 +247,7 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if path=='/login':
             n=int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0') or 0); data=urllib.parse.parse_qs(self.rfile.read(n).decode())
             u=one('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=? AND status=?',(data.get('username',[''])[0],'approved'))
-            if u and check_pw(u.get('password_hash') or '',data.get('password',[''])[0]): audit(u['username'],'login','webops',{}); self.redirect('/dashboard',[f"aios_session={token(u['username'],u['role'])}; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax"]); return
+            if u and check_pw(u.get('password_hash') or '',data.get('password',[''])[0]): audit(u['username'],'login','webops',{}); self.redirect('/dashboard',[f"aios_session={token(u['username'],u['role'])}; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict"]); return
             self.send_body(403,layout('Login Failed','<p>登录失败。</p>',None)); return
         if path=='/register':
             n=int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0') or 0); data=urllib.parse.parse_qs(self.rfile.read(n).decode())

active-runtime/app/approved_release_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,687 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""One-shot governed executor for an already approved exact release binding.
+
+This module deliberately does not build release artifacts. The build/staging
+evidence is completed before Owner production approval. Production execution
+consumes that immutable binding, revalidates it, and performs narrow
+side-effects through adapters in a durable fail-closed order.
+
+Adapter protocol:
+  stdin: JSON request with operation = "probe" | "apply" | "rollback"
+  stdout: one JSON object on the final non-empty line
+  shell: never used
+
+The executor never rewrites tags, never writes refs/heads/main, and records
+Baseline last.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import dataclasses
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from trusted_release_execution_plan import PlanError, TrustedReleasePlan
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+PLAN_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS = {
+    "payload/VERSION",
+    "payload/active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py",
+    "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py",
+    "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r1c7_health_service.py",
+    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service",
+    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/v2r1c7-runtime-config.json",
+    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/v2r1c7-rollback.json",
+    "payload/scripts/probe_v2r1c7_health.py",
+    "payload/scripts/rollback_v2r1c7_release.sh",
+    "payload/BUILD-METADATA.json",
+    "payload/ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json",
+    "payload/ROLLBACK-METADATA.json",
+}
+
+class ReleaseBlocked(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+class ManualOwnerReviewRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
+    pass
+
+class ReconciliationRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Binding:
+    version: str
+    target_oid: str
+    evidence_closure_oid: str
+    artifact_sha256: str
+    approval_plan_id: str
+    artifact_path: str
+    artifact_size: int
+    production_service: str
+    production_port: int
+    repository_identity: str = "aios/aios"
+
+    candidate_id: str | None = None
+    release_plan_sha256: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_trusted_plan(cls, plan: TrustedReleasePlan) -> "Binding":
+        value = plan.value
+        adapter = value["adapter_policy"]
+        binding = cls(
+            version=str(value["version"]), target_oid=str(value["source_commit"]),
+            evidence_closure_oid=str(value["evidence_closure_oid"]), artifact_sha256=str(value["artifact_sha256"]),
+            approval_plan_id=str(value["approval_plan_id"]), artifact_path=str(value["artifact"]["path"]),
+            artifact_size=int(value["artifact"]["size"]), production_service=str(adapter["service"]),
+            production_port=int(adapter["port"]), candidate_id=str(value["candidate_id"]),
+            release_plan_sha256=plan.release_plan_sha256,
+        )
+        plan.assert_binding(dataclasses.asdict(binding))
+        return binding
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.version or not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.target_oid):
+            raise ValueError("invalid release target binding")
+        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.evidence_closure_oid):
+            raise ValueError("invalid evidence closure OID")
+        if not SHA_RE.fullmatch(self.artifact_sha256):
+            raise ValueError("invalid artifact SHA-256")
+        if not PLAN_RE.fullmatch(self.approval_plan_id):
+            raise ValueError("invalid approval plan id")
+        if self.artifact_size <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("invalid artifact size")
+        if not self.production_service:
+            raise ValueError("production service is required")
+        if not 1024 <= self.production_port <= 65535:
+            raise ValueError("invalid production port")
+        if self.repository_identity != "aios/aios":
+            raise ValueError("unexpected repository identity")
+
+    @property
+    def tag(self) -> str:
+        return self.version
+
+    @property
+    def fingerprint(self) -> str:
+        payload = {
+            "version": self.version,
+            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
+            "artifact_size": self.artifact_size,
+            "production_service": self.production_service,
+            "production_port": self.production_port,
+            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
+            "candidate_id": self.candidate_id,
+            "release_plan_sha256": self.release_plan_sha256,
+        }
+        return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(payload)).hexdigest()
+
+    def request(self, operation: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.production-executor-request.v1",
+            "operation": operation,
+            "binding_fingerprint": self.fingerprint,
+            "version": self.version,
+            "tag": self.tag,
+            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "artifact_path": self.artifact_path,
+            "artifact_size": self.artifact_size,
+            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
+            "production_service": self.production_service,
+            "production_port": self.production_port,
+            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
+            "candidate_id": self.candidate_id,
+            "release_plan_sha256": self.release_plan_sha256,
+        }
+
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    st = path.lstat()
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode) or path.is_symlink():
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"non-regular authorization file: {path}")
+    if st.st_uid != 0:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"authorization file must be root-owned: {path}")
+    if st.st_mode & 0o022:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"authorization file is group/world writable: {path}")
+    data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("authorization receipt must be a JSON object")
+    return data
+
+
+def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact must be a regular non-symlink file")
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as source:
+        for block in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            digest.update(block)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def run_git(git_dir: Path, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
+        check=check,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=30,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+
+
+def verify_git_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    authority_main = run_git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main").stdout.strip()
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(authority_main):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("Authority main OID is invalid")
+
+    target_type = run_git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.target_oid).stdout.strip()
+    if target_type != "commit":
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("target_oid is not a commit")
+
+    evidence_type = run_git(
+        git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.evidence_closure_oid
+    ).stdout.strip()
+    if evidence_type != "commit":
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("evidence_closure_oid is not a commit")
+
+    # A control-plane-only patch may advance main after release approval.
+    # The approved release target remains valid only while it is still on main.
+    target_on_main = run_git(
+        git_dir,
+        "merge-base",
+        "--is-ancestor",
+        binding.target_oid,
+        authority_main,
+        check=False,
+    ).returncode == 0
+    if not target_on_main:
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
+            "approved target is no longer an ancestor of Authority main"
+        )
+
+    target_in_evidence = run_git(
+        git_dir,
+        "merge-base",
+        "--is-ancestor",
+        binding.target_oid,
+        binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        check=False,
+    ).returncode == 0
+    if not target_in_evidence:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("approved target is not an ancestor of evidence closure")
+
+    return {
+        "authority_main_oid": authority_main,
+        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "target_is_ancestor_of_main": True,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "evidence_object_type": evidence_type,
+        "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
+    }
+
+
+def verify_artifact(binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    path = Path(binding.artifact_path)
+    if path.stat().st_size != binding.artifact_size:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact size mismatch")
+    actual = sha256_file(path)
+    if actual != binding.artifact_sha256:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact SHA-256 mismatch")
+
+    if binding.version == "V2R1C7":
+        # Python tarfile may not have zstd support on the target host, so
+        # decompress into a private temporary tar and inspect it there.
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-artifact-verify-") as temp_dir:
+            tar_path = Path(temp_dir) / "release.tar"
+            with tar_path.open("wb") as output:
+                completed = subprocess.run(
+                    ["zstd", "-dc", str(path)],
+                    check=False,
+                    stdout=output,
+                    stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+                    timeout=60,
+                    env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+                )
+            if completed.returncode != 0:
+                raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact zstd decompression failed")
+            import tarfile
+            with tarfile.open(tar_path, "r:") as archive:
+                names: set[str] = set()
+                for member in archive.getmembers():
+                    candidate = Path(member.name)
+                    if (
+                        candidate.is_absolute()
+                        or ".." in candidate.parts
+                        or member.issym()
+                        or member.islnk()
+                        or not (member.isfile() or member.isdir())
+                    ):
+                        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"unsafe artifact member: {member.name}")
+                    names.add(member.name)
+            missing = sorted(REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS - names)
+            if missing:
+                raise ReleaseBlocked(
+                    "artifact missing required members: " + ",".join(missing)
+                )
+    return {
+        "artifact_path": str(path),
+        "artifact_sha256": actual,
+        "artifact_size": binding.artifact_size,
+        "verified": True,
+    }
+
+
+def verify_authorization(receipt: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if receipt.get("accepted") is not True:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("Owner production authorization is not accepted")
+    if receipt.get("binding_replaced") not in (None, False):
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("Owner binding was replaced")
+    expected = {
+        "version": binding.version,
+        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
+        "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
+    }
+    if binding.candidate_id is not None:
+        expected["candidate_id"] = binding.candidate_id
+    if binding.release_plan_sha256 is not None:
+        expected["release_plan_sha256"] = binding.release_plan_sha256
+        if receipt.get("candidate_binding_sha256") is None:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("Owner authorization missing candidate binding")
+    for key, value in expected.items():
+        if receipt.get(key) != value:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"Owner authorization mismatch: {key}")
+    return {"accepted": True, **expected}
+
+
+class DurableState:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path, binding: Binding):
+        self.root = root
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(self.root, 0o700)
+        self.path = self.root / "execution.json"
+        self.binding = binding
+        self.value: dict[str, Any]
+        if self.path.exists():
+            existing = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if existing.get("binding_fingerprint") != binding.fingerprint:
+                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
+                    "state root contains a different production binding"
+                )
+            self.value = existing
+        else:
+            self.value = {
+                "schema": "aios.production-execution-state.v1",
+                "binding_fingerprint": binding.fingerprint,
+                "version": binding.version,
+                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+                "state": "AUTHORIZED",
+                "completed": {},
+                "history": [],
+            }
+            self.save()
+
+    def save(self) -> None:
+        temporary = self.path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary.write_bytes(canonical_json(self.value))
+        os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
+        os.replace(temporary, self.path)
+
+    def record(self, state: str, step: str, result: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        now = time.time()
+        sanitized = json.loads(json.dumps(result))
+        self.value["state"] = state
+        self.value["completed"][step] = sanitized
+        self.value["history"].append(
+            {"at": now, "state": state, "step": step, "result": sanitized}
+        )
+        self.save()
+
+    def fail(self, state: str, reason: str) -> None:
+        self.value["state"] = state
+        self.value["history"].append(
+            {"at": time.time(), "state": state, "reason": reason}
+        )
+        self.save()
+
+
+class FileLock:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = path
+        self.handle = None
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> "FileLock":
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+        try:
+            fcntl.flock(
+                self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB
+            )
+        except BlockingIOError as exc:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked("production executor is already running") from exc
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
+        if self.handle is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+            self.handle.close()
+
+
+def parse_command(values: Sequence[str]) -> list[str]:
+    command = [str(x) for x in values if str(x)]
+    if not command:
+        raise ValueError("adapter command is required")
+    if not os.path.isabs(command[0]):
+        raise ValueError("adapter executable must be an absolute path")
+    return command
+
+
+def run_adapter(command: Sequence[str], request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        list(command),
+        input=canonical_json(request),
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=180,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(
+            f"adapter failed: {Path(command[0]).name} rc={completed.returncode}"
+        )
+    lines = [line for line in completed.stdout.decode("utf-8").splitlines() if line.strip()]
+    if not lines:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter returned no JSON result")
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(lines[-1])
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter returned invalid JSON") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter result must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def require_exact_response(result: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Binding) -> None:
+    for key, expected in {
+        "version": binding.version,
+        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+        "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
+        "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
+    }.items():
+        if key in result and result[key] != expected:
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"adapter binding mismatch: {key}")
+
+
+def tag_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = binding.request("probe")
+    probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    state = probe.get("status")
+    if state == "CONFLICT":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("same-name tag conflicts with approved binding")
+    if state == "INDETERMINATE":
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("tag publication state is indeterminate")
+    if state not in {"APPLIED_VERIFIED", "NOT_APPLIED", "PARTIAL_LOCAL"}:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"unsupported tag probe status: {state}")
+    if state != "APPLIED_VERIFIED":
+        applied = run_adapter(command, binding.request("apply"))
+        require_exact_response(applied, binding)
+        if applied.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
+            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("tag conflict during publication")
+        probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+        require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") != "APPLIED_VERIFIED":
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("tag was not independently verified")
+    if probe.get("peeled_target_oid") != binding.target_oid:
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("published tag peeled target mismatch")
+    tag_oid = probe.get("tag_oid")
+    if not isinstance(tag_oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(tag_oid):
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("verified annotated tag object OID missing")
+    return dict(probe)
+
+
+def deploy_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    probe = run_adapter(command, binding.request("probe"))
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") == "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
+        return dict(probe)
+    if probe.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("production runtime has conflicting binding")
+    applied = run_adapter(command, binding.request("apply"))
+    require_exact_response(applied, binding)
+    probe = run_adapter(command, binding.request("probe"))
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
+        try:
+            run_adapter(command, binding.request("rollback"))
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("production runtime did not verify after apply")
+    if (
+        probe.get("deployment_state") != "ACTIVE"
+        or probe.get("production_deployed") is not True
+    ):
+        raise ReconciliationRequired("production health contract is not ACTIVE")
+    return dict(probe)
+
+
+def finalize_step(
+    command: Sequence[str],
+    binding: Binding,
+    *,
+    name: str,
+    tag_oid: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = binding.request("probe")
+    request["tag_oid"] = tag_oid
+    probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"{name} has conflicting release binding")
+    if probe.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+        apply_request = binding.request("apply")
+        apply_request["tag_oid"] = tag_oid
+        applied = run_adapter(command, apply_request)
+        require_exact_response(applied, binding)
+        probe = run_adapter(command, request)
+        require_exact_response(probe, binding)
+    if probe.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+        raise ReconciliationRequired(f"{name} did not verify after apply")
+    if probe.get("tag_oid") not in (None, tag_oid):
+        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"{name} tag object mismatch")
+    return dict(probe)
+
+
+def execute(
+    *,
+    binding: Binding,
+    authorization_path: Path,
+    repository: Path,
+    state_root: Path,
+    tag_command: Sequence[str],
+    deploy_command: Sequence[str],
+    registry_command: Sequence[str],
+    baseline_command: Sequence[str],
+    release_plan_path: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    plan = TrustedReleasePlan.load(release_plan_path) if release_plan_path is not None else None
+    if plan is not None:
+        try:
+            plan.assert_binding(dataclasses.asdict(binding))
+        except PlanError as exc:
+            raise ReleaseBlocked(f"trusted release plan mismatch: {exc}") from exc
+    authorization = verify_authorization(secure_json(authorization_path), binding)
+    lineage = verify_git_lineage(repository, binding)
+    artifact = verify_artifact(binding)
+    state = DurableState(state_root, binding)
+    with FileLock(state_root / "executor.lock"):
+        state.record(
+            "PREFLIGHT_VERIFIED",
+            "preflight",
+            {"authorization": authorization, "lineage": lineage, "artifact": artifact},
+        )
+        tag: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+        runtime: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+        try:
+            tag = tag_step(tag_command, binding)
+            state.record("TAG_VERIFIED", "tag", tag)
+
+            runtime = deploy_step(deploy_command, binding)
+            state.record("RUNTIME_VERIFIED", "runtime", runtime)
+
+            registry = finalize_step(
+                registry_command,
+                binding,
+                name="registry",
+                tag_oid=tag["tag_oid"],
+            )
+            state.record("REGISTRY_VERIFIED", "registry", registry)
+
+            baseline = finalize_step(
+                baseline_command,
+                binding,
+                name="baseline",
+                tag_oid=tag["tag_oid"],
+            )
+            state.record("BASELINE_VERIFIED", "baseline", baseline)
+
+            # Final readback: no mutation, all four planes must still agree.
+            final_tag = tag_step(tag_command, binding)
+            final_runtime = run_adapter(deploy_command, binding.request("probe"))
+            final_registry_request = binding.request("probe")
+            final_registry_request["tag_oid"] = tag["tag_oid"]
+            final_registry = run_adapter(registry_command, final_registry_request)
+            final_baseline_request = binding.request("probe")
+            final_baseline_request["tag_oid"] = tag["tag_oid"]
+            final_baseline = run_adapter(baseline_command, final_baseline_request)
+            for value in (final_runtime, final_registry, final_baseline):
+                require_exact_response(value, binding)
+            if final_runtime.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
+                raise ReconciliationRequired("final runtime readback failed")
+            if final_registry.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+                raise ReconciliationRequired("final Registry readback failed")
+            if final_baseline.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
+                raise ReconciliationRequired("final Baseline readback failed")
+            final = {
+                "status": "PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED",
+                "version": binding.version,
+                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+                "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+                "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
+                "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
+                "tag_oid": tag["tag_oid"],
+                "tag": final_tag,
+                "runtime": final_runtime,
+                "registry": final_registry,
+                "baseline": final_baseline,
+                "force_push_used": False,
+                "tag_rewritten": False,
+                "direct_main_push": False,
+                "secrets_committed": False,
+            }
+            state.record("COMPLETED", "final_consistency", final)
+            return final
+        except ManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+            state.fail("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", str(exc))
+            raise
+        except ReconciliationRequired as exc:
+            state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", str(exc))
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:
+            # Once a formal tag has been verified, no later error is a clean
+            # pre-side-effect failure. Preserve the tag and require idempotent
+            # reconciliation rather than pretending the release never started.
+            if tag is not None:
+                reason = f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
+                state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", reason)
+                raise ReconciliationRequired(reason) from exc
+            state.fail("FAIL_CLOSED", f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")
+            raise
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    p.add_argument("--authorization", required=True, type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--release-plan", type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--artifact", type=Path)
+    p.add_argument("--artifact-size", type=int)
+    p.add_argument("--version")
+    p.add_argument("--target-oid")
+    p.add_argument("--evidence-closure-oid")
+    p.add_argument("--artifact-sha256")
+    p.add_argument("--approval-plan-id")
+    p.add_argument("--production-service")
+    p.add_argument("--production-port", type=int)
+    p.add_argument("--repository-identity", default="aios/aios")
+    p.add_argument("--tag-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    p.add_argument("--deploy-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    p.add_argument("--registry-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    p.add_argument("--baseline-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
+    return p
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parser().parse_args()
+    plan = TrustedReleasePlan.load(args.release_plan) if args.release_plan else None
+    if plan is not None:
+        binding = Binding.from_trusted_plan(plan)
+    else:
+        legacy=(args.artifact,args.artifact_size,args.version,args.target_oid,args.evidence_closure_oid,args.artifact_sha256,args.approval_plan_id,args.production_service,args.production_port)
+        if any(value is None for value in legacy): raise SystemExit("legacy binding is incomplete")
+        binding = Binding(version=args.version,target_oid=args.target_oid,evidence_closure_oid=args.evidence_closure_oid,artifact_sha256=args.artifact_sha256,approval_plan_id=args.approval_plan_id,artifact_path=str(args.artifact),artifact_size=args.artifact_size,production_service=args.production_service,production_port=args.production_port,repository_identity=args.repository_identity)
+    try:
+        result = execute(
+            binding=binding,
+            authorization_path=args.authorization,
+            repository=args.repository,
+            state_root=args.state_root,
+            tag_command=parse_command(args.tag_adapter),
+            deploy_command=parse_command(args.deploy_adapter),
+            registry_command=parse_command(args.registry_adapter),
+            baseline_command=parse_command(args.baseline_adapter),
+            release_plan_path=args.release_plan,
+        )
+        print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    except ManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 20
+    except ReconciliationRequired as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 21
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAIL_CLOSED", "error": type(exc).__name__, "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 22
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/authoritative_git.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import os
 import re
 import subprocess
+import time
 import urllib.parse
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Iterable
@@ -306,14 +307,76 @@ def authoritative_diff(
     from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
     to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
     args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
-    result = run_authoritative_git(args, git_dir=path)
+    patch_limit = max(1, min(_MAX_OUTPUT, 256 * 1024))
+    process = subprocess.Popen(
+        ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), *args],
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+        env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
+    )
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    stored_bytes = 0
+    total_bytes = 0
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    try:
+        while process.stdout is not None:
+            chunk = process.stdout.read(64 * 1024)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            total_bytes += len(chunk)
+            if stored_bytes < patch_limit:
+                remaining = patch_limit - stored_bytes
+                selected = chunk[:remaining]
+                chunks.append(selected)
+                stored_bytes += len(selected)
+            if time.monotonic() - started > _TIMEOUT:
+                process.kill()
+                raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_TIMEOUT")
+        stderr = (
+            process.stderr.read(8192).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+            if process.stderr is not None
+            else ""
+        )
+        returncode = process.wait(timeout=max(0.1, _TIMEOUT - (time.monotonic() - started)))
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+        process.kill()
+        process.wait()
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
+    if returncode != 0:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError(_redact(stderr.strip() or "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")[:200])
+    try:
+        names_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", "--name-status", from_oid, to_oid],
+            git_dir=path,
+        )
+        changed_paths = [
+            line.split("\t", 1)[-1]
+            for line in names_result.stdout.splitlines()
+            if line.strip()
+        ]
+    except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge:
+        changed_paths = []
+    try:
+        stats_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", "--stat", from_oid, to_oid],
+            git_dir=path,
+        )
+        stats = stats_result.stdout.strip()
+    except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge:
+        stats = "GIT_STAT_OUTPUT_TRUNCATED"
+    patch = b"".join(chunks).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
     return {
         "code": 0,
-        "stdout": result.stdout,
+        "stdout": patch,
         "stderr": "",
         "cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
         "from_oid": from_oid,
         "to_oid": to_oid,
+        "changed_paths": changed_paths,
+        "stats": stats,
+        "total_size_bytes": total_bytes,
+        "truncated": total_bytes > patch_limit,
+        "patch_limit_bytes": patch_limit,
     }