review(codex): 固化 V2R1 最新发布审查结论

task(agent): 转入 provenance 后正式 Gate 复审
task(agent): 审查四项清障并保留 provenance 门禁
2026-07-21 12:34:00 +08:00 · 2026-07-21 11:23:44 +08:00 · 2026-07-20 18:18:36 +08:00 · 2026-07-20 17:05:10 +08:00 · 2026-07-20 17:03:08 +08:00 · 2026-07-20 16:51:25 +08:00
109 changed files with 10972 additions and 3482 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2.agent-blockers.v1",
+  "task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "updated_at": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "blockers": [
+    {
+      "blocker_id": "BLK-OPENCLAW-PLAINTEXT-SECRETS",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "resolved",
+      "root_cause": "OpenClaw 三处 managed plaintext。",
+      "fix": "迁移为单一 file Secret Provider 并轮换 Gateway Token。",
+      "verification": "最终 audit 四类计数均为 0，OneAPI 实际调用通过。",
+      "commit": "bf01a13f3aaf42a386232ed2f5409feb0f79fcf6",
+      "resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:18:36Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "blocker_id": "BLK-AIOS-V2-SIGNING-MATERIAL-MISSING",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "resolved",
+      "root_cause": "Ed25519 Key ID 与 HMAC 实现不一致且材料缺失。",
+      "fix": "真实 Ed25519 合同及受保护材料。",
+      "verification": "0600、sign/verify、篡改拒绝通过。",
+      "commit": "8a36f7832bc105e4b9d32ffbe018abed2ff1b1ab",
+      "resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:18:36Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "blocker_id": "BLK-CANDIDATE-NOT-MERGED",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "resolved",
+      "root_cause": "OpenClaw 任务未包含 Candidate。",
+      "fix": "--no-ff 合并最新 Candidate。",
+      "verification": "Candidate 为 OpenClaw HEAD 祖先且 OID 同步。",
+      "commit": "f55dfd975e9d716b690c7693742e7cf2beaa55e7",
+      "resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:18:36Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "blocker_id": "BLK-OPENCLAW-RUN-PROVENANCE-MISSING",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "resolved",
+      "root_cause": "旧插件只有进程内 runId/sender Map，缺少 Owner-signed Schema、持久 Store 和限定 Git Writer。",
+      "fix": "部署 aios-tenant-boundary rc2，增加 Ed25519 issuer/store、Run/Sender/OID/期限绑定、一次性 permit 与七路径专用 Writer。",
+      "verification": "Provenance openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z 完成 heartbeat 写入、Commit、普通 Push 和审计；README.md 越权写入被拒绝；Node 测试 9/9。",
+      "commit": "25c25abd3ed19091fe078d4d7a271c57f23e87fb",
+      "resolved_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:44Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "blocker_id": "BLK-CONTROLLER-LEGACY-GITEA-CHECK",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "status": "resolved",
+      "root_cause": "硬编码旧仓库。",
+      "fix": "配置化 V2R1 OID 健康检查并使用只读 Credential。",
+      "verification": "12 项测试、detached clean、fully_synced。",
+      "commit": "6188da26453505dacde9d6d298191437164c8d27",
+      "resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:18:36Z"
+    }
+  ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2.agent-claim.v1",
+  "task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "executor": "codex",
+  "executor_instance": "windows-chatgpt-owner-supervisor",
+  "task_branch": "task/codex/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "candidate_branch": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
+  "candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
+  "claimed_at": "2026-07-20T08:51:25Z",
+  "owner_observation": "五项 Blocker、Gate A/B、离线验收、OpenClaw 在线合同、双服务重启与回滚均通过；Hermes 完整在线 Worker 生命周期仍缺服务端点证据，Codex 维持 STOP_PREPRODUCTION。",
+  "owner_observation_at": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "reviewed_openclaw_commit_before_evidence": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.agent.credential-status.v1",
+  "task_id": "task/codex/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "last_updated": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "plaintext_findings_before": 3,
+  "plaintext_findings_after": 0,
+  "gateway_token_rotated": true,
+  "secret_values_recorded": false,
+  "signing_material_configured": true,
+  "signing_key_id": "openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519",
+  "runtime_sign_verify_test": "passed",
+  "controller_credential_scope": "read:repository",
+  "run_provenance_status": "resolved",
+  "provenance_id": "openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z",
+  "openclaw_runtime_plugin_version": "2.1.0-rc.3",
+  "runtime_public_key_only_hot_path": true,
+  "secret_values_recorded_in_evidence": false
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2.agent-heartbeat.v1",
+  "task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "executor": "codex",
+  "heartbeat_at": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "state": "reviewing",
+  "current_step": "FINAL_REVIEW_HERMES_ONLINE_GAP",
+  "reviewed_commit": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a",
+  "openclaw_evidence_commit": "0be3ba09e42b4f6db56461e3ca3a3fcc0a487f31"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2.agent-progress.v1",
+  "task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "updated_at": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "state": "reviewing",
+  "candidate_oid": "634f6b164f5b20372ab9ec8144bbf76df97de335",
+  "openclaw_task_oid_at_review": "0be3ba09e42b4f6db56461e3ca3a3fcc0a487f31",
+  "codex_task_oid_before_evidence": "be4726178aa8fa59321aafaabcff8a83653cc1b8",
+  "gitea_sync": {
+    "candidate_match": true,
+    "openclaw_task_match": true,
+    "codex_task_match_before_this_evidence": true
+  },
+  "completed_checks": [
+    "worktree",
+    "candidate_merge",
+    "secrets_audit_zero",
+    "ed25519_sign_verify",
+    "controller_fully_synced",
+    "owner_signed_provenance_writer",
+    "unauthorized_path_denied",
+    "provenance_audit_chain",
+    "gate_a",
+    "gate_b_10_of_10",
+    "offline_acceptance_8_0_1",
+    "openclaw_online_contract",
+    "aios_openclaw_restart_recovery",
+    "controlled_rollback_and_forward"
+  ],
+  "review_conclusion": "五项 Blocker、文档/代码 Gate、候选测试、离线验收、OpenClaw 在线合同、重启与回滚均通过；Hermes 完整在线 Worker 生命周期未形成服务端点证据，预发布仍停止。",
+  "check_time_window": {
+    "started_at": "2026-07-20T08:24:30Z",
+    "ended_at": "2026-07-20T09:03:08Z"
+  },
+  "operator": "windows-chatgpt-owner-supervisor",
+  "reviewer": "codex-supervisor + Spark architect/explorer/implementer/validator/docs_reporter",
+  "approver": "AIOS Owner gate recorded by Windows ChatGPT Owner Supervisor",
+  "evidence_artifacts": [
+    "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720@1aa71f233d2c2a6ed7290d0a3ddcb04dcd84febe",
+    "task/codex/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720:.agent/",
+    "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/backups/gitea-db-before-openclaw-token-rotation-20260720T084251Z.sqlite3",
+    "/home/aiman/.ssh/known_hosts.aios-v2r1-backup-20260720T083647Z",
+    "/var/log/aios-openclaw-v2r1-evidence-repair-20260720.json"
+  ],
+  "independent_reviews": {
+    "architect": "REJECT；只允许修复+复验，禁止生产放行。",
+    "explorer": "OpenClaw evidence OID 已重新闭环，但 Candidate 未合并、Secret 与预发布仍未确认。",
+    "implementer": "IMPLEMENTATION_SAFE_WITH_BLOCKERS；已实施动作无需立即回滚。",
+    "validator": "BLOCKED；Secret、环境、预发布门禁未通过。",
+    "docs_reporter": "已补齐时间窗、证据路径、operator/reviewer/approver、blocker 与 final_decision。"
+  },
+  "final_decision": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
+  "aios_v2_env_status": {
+    "exists": true,
+    "owner": "root",
+    "group": "gitops",
+    "mode": "0640",
+    "four_fields_nonempty": true,
+    "credential_ref_target_exists": true,
+    "signing_material_target_exists": true
+  },
+  "open_checks": [
+    "hermes_online_claim_start_heartbeat_complete_fail_cancel",
+    "hermes_online_lease_expiry_worker_crash_recovery",
+    "hermes_online_cell_profile_and_invalid_result_rejection"
+  ],
+  "gate_a": "passed",
+  "gate_b": "passed_10_of_10",
+  "offline_acceptance": "passed_8_failed_0_warning_1",
+  "online_openclaw": "passed",
+  "restart_recovery": "passed",
+  "rollback_drill": "passed"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2.agent-result.v1",
+  "task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "final_status": "PARTIAL",
+  "candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
+  "reviewed_commit": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a",
+  "gitea_sync": {
+    "candidate_match": true,
+    "openclaw_task_match": true,
+    "codex_task_match_before_this_evidence": true
+  },
+  "credential_rotation_status": "secretref_resolved",
+  "test_status": "Gate A 通过；Gate B 10/10；离线 8/0/1；OpenClaw 在线、重启恢复、回滚通过；Hermes 完整在线 Worker 生命周期未覆盖",
+  "deployment_status": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
+  "rollback_status": "Previous 2a2b702 与 Current b158041 双向演练通过且业务状态保留",
+  "documentation_sync_status": "updated",
+  "open_blockers": [],
+  "release_recommendation": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
+  "completed_at": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "openclaw_evidence_commit": "0be3ba09e42b4f6db56461e3ca3a3fcc0a487f31",
+  "independent_validation": "PASS_FOR_IMPLEMENTED_OPENCLAW_BOUNDARY",
+  "operator": "windows-chatgpt-owner-supervisor",
+  "reviewer": "codex-supervisor + Spark roles",
+  "approver": "AIOS Owner gate recorded",
+  "remaining_risk": "Hermes 完整在线 Worker 生命周期缺少可调用服务端点与实时证据",
+  "formal_online_acceptance": "partial"
+}
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-status: PASS
-integration_path: tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py
-tests: pytest tests/v2r1 = 29 passed in 0.98s; pytest tests/integration = 3 passed in 0.18s
-runtime_flow: PASS - signed public ingress -> IngressAuthenticator -> RuntimeIdentityResolver -> RuntimeWiring.ingest -> ChannelAdapter -> MessageLedger.append -> SessionPool
-commit: a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e
-gate1: BLOCKED
-risk: high
-
-# Result
-
-## Changed Files
-
- `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`
- `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`
-
-## RED Evidence
-
-The baseline integration entrypoint from `f11513e9d7326caa827e59f4f10f07681633dfc0` was inadequate: its successful flow replaced `MessageLedger.remember()` and its alleged duplicate conflict changed the message ID.  The quality checks failed before this update because neither test proved the required runtime contract.
-
-## Verification
-
- The success path sends a real signed public ingress request and uses a `sys.setprofile` observer against the real `MessageLedger.remember` code object.  It preserves the production object and all behavior, then asserts zero legacy calls.
- The duplicate path sends two authenticated requests under the same principal, tenant, cell, channel, account, peer, direction, session, and `message_id`; only `event_id` and body differ.  The second response must be `CONFLICT`, with exactly one ledger record and one session lease remaining.
-
-## Commands
-
-```text
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1 -q
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration -q
-```
-
-## Gate 1
-
-`BLOCKED`. This task makes the runtime integration entrypoint meaningful, but does not close the independent Gate 1 matrix, authenticated production OpenClaw registration, secret scanning, second clean-room review, or staging rollback rehearsal.
-
-## Recommendation
-
-Keep this isolated evidence commit for independent review. Do not merge, tag, or deploy until all Gate 1 requirements have independent evidence.
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-status: PASS
-commit: 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3
-tests:
-  v2r1: "29 passed, exit code 0"
-  integration: "3 passed, exit code 0"
-cleanup_scan:
-  status: PASS
-  findings: "No remaining conflict markers, unexplained worktree changes, unapproved temporary/cache/build artifacts, or scanner-detected secrets. Runtime SQLite was removed and its sidecars are ignored with exact root-anchored rules; tracked dist/ZIP artifacts are documented exceptions."
-risk: MEDIUM
-recommendation: "Push the controlled work branch, then request independent OpenClaw Gate Review; do not merge or release from this result alone."
-
-# V2R1 Gate 1 Codex Cleanup Result
-
-## Scope and Git Baseline
-
- Task: `V2R1-G1-CODEX-CLEANUP-20260713`
- Branch: `work/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`
- Cleanup implementation commit: `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`
- Integration commit: `a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e`
- Locked integration result baseline: `d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da`
- `git merge-base --is-ancestor a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e HEAD`: exit code `0`
- `git merge-base --is-ancestor d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da HEAD`: exit code `0`
- Tree before this result-only commit: `94146e05f700921b12ef023eb4d8be771bae4047`
-
-The locked integration artifacts were not modified by cleanup:
-
- `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`: blob `6b6732a4c73bbb7fb5273a05b897adce9da39a9a`
- `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`: blob `e2d6ce3b037339385831f51cb0db42c86b2ae827`
-
-## Cleanup Changes Verified
-
-Commit `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`:
-
- removed the tracked runtime database `data/webops.sqlite3`;
- added exact root-anchored ignore rules for `/data/webops.sqlite3`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-wal`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-shm`, and `/data/webops.sqlite3-journal`;
- resolved tracked merge-conflict residue in `agents/registry.yaml` and `docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md`;
- left the locked integration test and prior Codex result blobs unchanged.
-
-`git grep -n -E '^(<<<<<<<|=======|>>>>>>>)' -- . ':!source-baseline/*.zip'` returned no matches (exit code `1`, the expected no-match result).
-
-The repository scan found no unapproved `__pycache__`, `*.pyc`, `*.pyo`, `.pytest_cache`, `.mypy_cache`, `.ruff_cache`, `*.tmp`, `*.swp`, backup-suffix, or `.DS_Store` artifacts after verification cleanup. The following tracked artifacts are expected baseline exceptions, not unexplained generated files:
-
- `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/` (2 tracked plugin distribution files);
- `source-baseline/current_actual_deployment_source.zip`;
- `source-baseline/previous_current_actual_deployment_source_from_webops_delta.zip`.
-
-Before creating this result file, `git status --porcelain=v1 --untracked-files=all` was empty with exit code `0`.
-
-## Secret Scan
-
-Scanner: Gitleaks `8.30.1`, official Linux x64 release asset.
-
- Asset: `/tmp/gitleaks_8.30.1_linux_x64.tar.gz.codex`
- SHA-256: `551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb`
- `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks git --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-git.json --log-opts=7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3 /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported `312 commits scanned`, approximately `1,384,427 bytes (1.38 MB)` scanned, and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
- `git rev-list --count 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`: exit code `0`, `327` reachable commits. This Git reachability count is recorded separately and is not the Gitleaks scanned-commit count.
- `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks dir --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-tree.json /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported approximately `1,214,737 bytes (1.21 MB)` scanned and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
-
-No secret content is reproduced in this report.
-
-## Tests
-
-Command:
-
-```bash
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1
-```
-
-Output summary:
-
-```text
-collected 29 items
-29 passed in 0.97s
-exit code: 0
-```
-
-Command:
-
-```bash
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration
-```
-
-Output summary:
-
-```text
-collected 3 items
-3 passed in 0.18s
-exit code: 0
-```
-
-Environment: Linux, Python `3.12.3`, pytest `9.1.1`, pluggy `1.6.0`.
-
-## Disposition
-
-The cleanup and requested test verification pass at the stated implementation commit. Risk remains `MEDIUM` until the controlled branch is pushed and independently fetched and reviewed by OpenClaw. This result does not authorize merge, tag creation, baseline update, staging, or production deployment.
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# V2R1 Gate 1 — Clean-Room Final Evidence
+
+## Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Date | 2026-07-14 |
+| Source commit | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
+| Source branch | `origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000` |
+| Result branch | `fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714` |
+| Result commit reference | `HEAD` |
+| Gate | `G1` |
+| Variant | `openclaw-cleanroom` |
+| Status | `PASS` |
+
+The immutable report uses `HEAD` for post-commit verification. The resolved commit object ID is recorded by the external acceptance result after this file is committed; a Git commit cannot reliably embed its own object ID because changing the file changes the tree and commit identity.
+
+## Machine-Readable Result
+
+```yaml
+gate: G1
+variant: openclaw-cleanroom
+date: 2026-07-14
+status: PASS
+source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
+source_branch: origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000
+result_branch: fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714
+result_commit_ref: HEAD
+tests_total: 32
+tests_passed: 32
+tests_failed: 0
+cleanup_scan: PASS
+secret_scan: PASS
+rollback_status: PASS
+recovery_verified: true
+workspace_clean_at_test_completion: true
+merge_performed: false
+tag_created: false
+baseline_promoted: false
+deployment_performed: false
+```
+
+## Evidence Provenance
+
+The test, cleanup, secret-scan, rollback, and recovery results below are execution evidence supplied by OpenClaw for the Gate 1 run. This correction commit changes only the evidence report and does not claim that the GitOps API reran the suites.
+
+## HMAC Test-Key Length Verification
+
+| Test file | Variable | Test-only value | Length |
+|---|---|---|---:|
+| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:24` | `internal_key` | `b"runtime-internal-context-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
+| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:25` | `ingress_key` | `b"runtime-external-ingress-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
+
+Both values are test fixtures. The supplied evidence reports that no production secret was introduced.
+
+## Test Results Supplied by OpenClaw
+
+### V2R1 suite — 29 of 29 passed
+
+```shell
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest \
+  tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_message_ledger_append.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_router_isolation.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_runtime_identity_binding.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_tenant_context.py -v
+# Reported result: 29 passed, exit code 0
+```
+
+### Integration suite — 3 of 3 passed
+
+```shell
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py -v
+# Reported result: 3 passed, exit code 0
+```
+
+**Reported total: 32 of 32 passed.**
+
+## Cleanup, Security, and Recovery Evidence
+
+| Check | Supplied result |
+|---|---|
+| Conflict-marker scan | PASS |
+| Cleanup scan | PASS |
+| Secret scan | PASS |
+| Legitimate hardcoded test keys | Two 39-byte fixtures in `test_runtime_wiring.py` |
+| Rollback rehearsal | PASS; 13 of 13 core tests reported after rollback to `6077331` |
+| Recovery verification | PASS |
+
+## Deployment State
+
+| Operation | Performed |
+|---|---|
+| Merge | No |
+| Tag creation | No |
+| Baseline promotion | No |
+| Staging deployment | No |
+| Production deployment | No |
+
+## Post-Commit Verification
+
+Run from the repository root after the commit is created:
+
+```shell
+set -eu
+
+SOURCE=502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
+RESULT_FILE=.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
+
+git rev-parse HEAD
+
+test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" = "1"
+test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD)" = "$RESULT_FILE"
+
+git ls-tree -r HEAD -- "$RESULT_FILE"
+
+python3 - "$RESULT_FILE" <<'PY'
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sys
+
+path = Path(sys.argv[1])
+text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+encoded_tokens = [
+    [84, 66, 68],
+    [80, 69, 78, 68, 73, 78, 71],
+    [84, 79, 68, 79],
+    [70, 73, 88, 77, 69],
+    [91, 123, 99, 111, 109, 109, 105, 116, 125, 93],
+]
+tokens = ["".join(chr(value) for value in item) for item in encoded_tokens]
+angle_token = re.compile(chr(60) + r"[^>\n]+" + chr(62))
+
+hits = [token for token in tokens if token in text]
+if angle_token.search(text):
+    hits.append("angle-delimited-token")
+
+if hits:
+    print("TOKEN_SCAN=FAIL", hits)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+print("TOKEN_SCAN=PASS")
+PY
+```
+
+## Acceptance Conditions
+
+Gate 1 is eligible to proceed only when the external acceptance record confirms all of the following against the resolved `HEAD` commit:
+
+- the commit exists and has source commit `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` as its parent;
+- exactly this one report file changed;
+- the committed report contains no unresolved legacy token;
+- the result tree is not identical to rejected commit `71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390`;
+- no merge, tag, baseline promotion, or deployment occurred.
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2.agent-status.v1",
+  "task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "executor": "codex",
+  "state": "reviewing",
+  "claimed_at": "2026-07-20T08:51:25Z",
+  "running_at": "2026-07-20T08:51:25Z",
+  "updated_at": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "last_heartbeat": "2026-07-21T04:30:00Z",
+  "current_step": "FINAL_REVIEW_HERMES_ONLINE_GAP",
+  "candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
+  "reviewed_commit": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a",
+  "release_recommendation": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
+  "openclaw_evidence_commit": "0be3ba09e42b4f6db56461e3ca3a3fcc0a487f31",
+  "status": "reviewing"
+  ,"formal_online_acceptance": "partial"
+  ,"remaining_gap": "Hermes full online worker lifecycle"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2.agent-task.v1",
+  "task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "display_name": "AIOS V2R1 Codex 架构监督、阻塞处理与发布审查任务",
+  "language": "zh-CN",
+  "executor": "codex",
+  "role": "architecture-supervisor",
+  "state": "queued",
+  "candidate_branch": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
+  "candidate_commit": "634f6b164f5b20372ab9ec8144bbf76df97de335",
+  "canonical_task": "tasks/codex-production-supervisor-task.yaml",
+  "supervises": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
+  "claim_required": true,
+  "heartbeat_interval_seconds": 300,
+  "evidence_directory": ".agent/evidence",
+  "instructions": [
+    "领取前读取候选分支完整中文文档、ADR、追踪矩阵和候选报告",
+    "领取后写入 .agent/claim.json 并把状态改为 claimed",
+    "持续审阅 OpenClaw 的 claim、heartbeat、progress、blocker、commit 和 result",
+    "分析失败测试、架构偏移、多租户、安全和文档同步阻塞",
+    "需要修改时创建 Patch 分支、增加复现测试并同步文档",
+    "所有阻塞和审查结论必须提交到系统统一审视",
+    "禁止缺少证据时批准发布或削弱安全门禁"
+  ],
+  "acceptance_commands": [
+    "python3 tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py --base-ref integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
+    "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/aios_v2_candidate -p test_*.py -v",
+    "bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh"
+  ],
+  "created_at": "2026-07-20T00:00:00Z"
+}
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
---
-task_id: TASK-CODEX-V2R1-G1-FINAL-VERIFY-RETRY-20260715T010807UTC8
-owner: CODEX
-source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
-rejected_commits:
-  - 7a2f16ee72e944737a9f6995e511ef176413ae6b
-  - b1d3439ee9e66b5eed1c94595a22bc630d893b6e
-  - 38320044b54c172c28877a81f291478267dd7b9e
-  - 7fd63b55f27b23658ea26e2a39d949c7b1e91dda
-  - 71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390
-candidate:
-  branch: work/codex/v2r1-g1-recovery-candidate-20260715T010807UTC8
-  exact_parent: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
-  sole_added_file: .agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-RECOVERY-CANDIDATE-20260715T010807UTC8.md
-  gates:
-    tests: "29+3"
-    conflict_count: 0
-    tracked_sqlite_count: 0
-    exact_four_webops_ignores: true
-    gitleaks_version: 8.30.1
-    gitleaks_git_findings: 0
-    gitleaks_dir_findings: 0
-    hmac: "39+39"
-    placeholder_count: 0
-  mandatory_result_fields:
-    - status
-    - commit
-    - tests
-    - cleanup_scan
-    - risk
-    - recommendation
-final_verification:
-  branch: review/codex/v2r1-g1-final-verify-retry-20260715T010807UTC8
-  sole_added_file: .agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-G1-CODEX-FINAL-VERIFY-RETRY-20260713.md
-  required_fields:
-    - status
-    - source_commit
-    - candidate_commit
-    - qualifying_candidates
-    - placeholder_count
-    - mandatory_fields
-    - tests
-    - gitleaks
-    - hmac
-    - cleanup_scan
-    - rollback
-    - deployment
-    - workspace_clean
-    - risk
-    - recommendation
-prohibitions:
-  - force push
-  - code modification
-  - test modification
-  - configuration modification
-  - deployment modification
-  - merge
-  - tag
-  - baseline modification
-  - staging modification
-  - production modification
-failure_policy: fail_closed
---
-
-# CODEX V2R1 G1 final verification retry
-
-Select and verify only a qualifying recovery candidate rooted at the fixed source commit. Reject every commit listed in `rejected_commits`. The candidate commit must have the exact parent and sole added file declared above and must pass every candidate gate. The final verification branch must add only its declared result file and must contain every required field.
-
-Do not modify code, tests, configuration, deployment state, baselines, staging, or production. Do not merge, tag, or force-push. On any mismatch, ambiguity, missing field, nonzero finding, dirty workspace, or failed gate, stop and report failure without advancing.
-
-## Execution amendment: recovery candidate r2
-
- rejected_candidate: 78c22cbfb95cb252b671c5ffe3b34bf4944aee2d
- rejection_reason: placeholder_count=1; exact angle-placeholder hit from the documented conflict regex
- replacement_branch: work/codex/v2r1-g1-recovery-candidate-20260715T010807UTC8-r2
- replacement_parent: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
- sole_added_file: .agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-RECOVERY-CANDIDATE-20260715T010807UTC8.md
- history_policy: no force push and no history rewrite
- original_candidate_policy: retained and rejected
@@ -11,7 +11,3 @@ runtime/tmp/
 runtime/cache/
 logs/
 config/test_write_perms
-/data/webops.sqlite3
-/data/webops.sqlite3-wal
-/data/webops.sqlite3-shm
-/data/webops.sqlite3-journal
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+"""AIOS-managed Hermes runtime boundary."""
+
+from .adapter import (
+    HermesAdapter,
+    HermesConflict,
+    HermesNotFound,
+    HermesRuntimeError,
+    InMemoryHermesStore,
+)
+from .contract import HermesHealth, HermesJob, HermesJobState, HermesResult
+from .worker import HermesWorker, WorkerRunResult
+
+__all__ = [
+    "HermesAdapter",
+    "HermesConflict",
+    "HermesHealth",
+    "HermesJob",
+    "HermesJobState",
+    "HermesNotFound",
+    "HermesResult",
+    "HermesRuntimeError",
+    "HermesWorker",
+    "InMemoryHermesStore",
+    "WorkerRunResult",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes queue and worker lease boundary."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import threading
+from dataclasses import replace
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Iterable, Mapping
+
+from .contract import (
+    ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS,
+    TERMINAL_STATES,
+    HermesHealth,
+    HermesJob,
+    HermesJobState,
+    HermesResult,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+
+class HermesRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base Hermes runtime-boundary failure."""
+
+
+class HermesNotFound(HermesRuntimeError):
+    """A tenant-scoped job was not found."""
+
+
+class HermesConflict(HermesRuntimeError):
+    """A state, lease, idempotency, or revision conflict occurred."""
+
+
+class InMemoryHermesStore:
+    """Thread-safe reference store; production backends implement this contract."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.jobs: dict[str, HermesJob] = {}
+        self.results: dict[str, HermesResult] = {}
+        self.idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
+        self.worker_heartbeats: dict[str, tuple[str, str | None]] = {}
+
+
+class HermesAdapter:
+    """Queue and reconcile Hermes jobs without owning AIOS policy."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: InMemoryHermesStore | None = None,
+        *,
+        runtime_id: str = "hermes-runtime",
+        runtime_version: str = "v1",
+        default_lease_seconds: int = 60,
+    ) -> None:
+        if default_lease_seconds < 5:
+            raise ValueError("default_lease_seconds must be >= 5")
+        self.store = store or InMemoryHermesStore()
+        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
+        self.runtime_version = runtime_version
+        self.default_lease_seconds = int(default_lease_seconds)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _digest(job: HermesJob) -> str:
+        raw = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "tenant_id": job.tenant_id,
+                "cell_id": job.cell_id,
+                "profile_id": job.profile_id,
+                "task_id": job.task_id,
+                "trace_id": job.trace_id,
+                "action": job.action,
+                "payload": dict(job.payload),
+                "priority": job.priority,
+            },
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+            default=str,
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _parse(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+        if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("timestamp must include timezone")
+        return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _format(value: datetime) -> str:
+        return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_tenant(job: HermesJob, tenant_id: str) -> None:
+        if job.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+            raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+
+    def enqueue(self, job: HermesJob) -> HermesJob:
+        if job.state != HermesJobState.QUEUED or job.revision != 1:
+            raise HermesConflict("new job must be QUEUED at revision 1")
+        digest = self._digest(job)
+        idem_ref = (job.tenant_id, job.idempotency_key)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            existing = self.store.jobs.get(job.job_id)
+            if existing is not None:
+                if self._digest(existing) != digest:
+                    raise HermesConflict("job_id reused with different content")
+                return existing
+            prior = self.store.idempotency.get(idem_ref)
+            if prior is not None:
+                prior_id, prior_digest = prior
+                if prior_digest != digest:
+                    raise HermesConflict("idempotency key reused with different content")
+                return self.store.jobs[prior_id]
+            self.store.jobs[job.job_id] = job
+            self.store.idempotency[idem_ref] = (job.job_id, digest)
+            return job
+
+    def get(self, job_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> HermesJob:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            job = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+            if job is None:
+                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+            self._assert_tenant(job, tenant_id)
+            return job
+
+    def list_jobs(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str | None = None,
+        profile_id: str | None = None,
+        states: Iterable[HermesJobState | str] | None = None,
+    ) -> list[HermesJob]:
+        state_filter = {HermesJobState(item) for item in states} if states else None
+        with self.store.lock:
+            self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            jobs = [
+                job
+                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.tenant_id == tenant_id
+                and (cell_id is None or job.cell_id == cell_id)
+                and (profile_id is None or job.profile_id == profile_id)
+                and (state_filter is None or job.state in state_filter)
+            ]
+        return sorted(jobs, key=lambda item: (item.priority, item.created_at, item.job_id))
+
+    def claim(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str,
+        profile_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        lease_seconds: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob | None:
+        worker_id = str(worker_id or "").strip()
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise ValueError("worker_id is required")
+        duration = int(lease_seconds or self.default_lease_seconds)
+        if duration < 5:
+            raise ValueError("lease_seconds must be >= 5")
+        with self.store.lock:
+            self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            candidates = [
+                job
+                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.tenant_id == tenant_id
+                and job.cell_id == cell_id
+                and job.profile_id == profile_id
+                and job.state == HermesJobState.QUEUED
+            ]
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), None)
+            if not candidates:
+                return None
+            current = sorted(
+                candidates,
+                key=lambda item: (item.priority, item.created_at, item.job_id),
+            )[0]
+            claimed = self._transition_locked(
+                current,
+                HermesJobState.CLAIMED,
+                assigned_worker_id=worker_id,
+                lease_expires_at=self._format(
+                    datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=duration)
+                ),
+            )
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), claimed.job_id)
+            return claimed
+
+    def start(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
+            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
+            return self._transition_locked(current, HermesJobState.RUNNING)
+
+    def heartbeat(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        lease_seconds: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob:
+        duration = int(lease_seconds or self.default_lease_seconds)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
+            if current.state not in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}:
+                raise HermesConflict("job does not accept heartbeat")
+            updated = replace(
+                current,
+                revision=current.revision + 1,
+                lease_expires_at=self._format(
+                    datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=duration)
+                ),
+                updated_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.jobs[job_id] = updated
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), job_id)
+            return updated
+
+    def complete(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        output: Mapping[str, object],
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        return self._finish(
+            job_id,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            state=HermesJobState.COMPLETED,
+            output=output,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def fail(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        error: Mapping[str, object],
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        return self._finish(
+            job_id,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            state=HermesJobState.FAILED,
+            error=error,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def cancel(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            current = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+            if current is None:
+                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+            self._assert_tenant(current, tenant_id)
+            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
+            if current.state in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                result = self.store.results.get(job_id)
+                if result is None:
+                    raise HermesConflict("terminal result missing")
+                return result
+            updated = self._transition_locked(current, HermesJobState.CANCELLED)
+            result = HermesResult(
+                job_id=updated.job_id,
+                tenant_id=updated.tenant_id,
+                task_id=updated.task_id,
+                trace_id=updated.trace_id,
+                state=HermesJobState.CANCELLED,
+                worker_id=updated.assigned_worker_id,
+                error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled by AIOS"},
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.results[job_id] = result
+            return result
+
+    def result(self, job_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> HermesResult:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            job = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+            if job is None:
+                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+            self._assert_tenant(job, tenant_id)
+            result = self.store.results.get(job_id)
+            if result is None:
+                raise HermesConflict("job has no terminal result")
+            return result
+
+    def health(self) -> HermesHealth:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            active_jobs = sum(
+                1 for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.state in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}
+            )
+            queued_jobs = sum(
+                1 for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.state == HermesJobState.QUEUED
+            )
+            partitions = {
+                (job.tenant_id, job.cell_id, job.profile_id)
+                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+            }
+            active_workers = sum(
+                1 for heartbeat, _ in self.store.worker_heartbeats.values()
+                if self._parse(heartbeat)
+                and self._parse(heartbeat) >= datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(seconds=120)
+            )
+        return HermesHealth(
+            runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
+            status="healthy",
+            version=self.runtime_version,
+            heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+            active_workers=active_workers,
+            active_jobs=active_jobs,
+            queued_jobs=queued_jobs,
+            tenant_partitions=len(partitions),
+            profile_isolation_enforced=True,
+            details={"store": type(self.store).__name__},
+        )
+
+    def _finish(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        state: HermesJobState,
+        output: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
+        error: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
+        expected_revision: int | None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
+            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
+            updated = self._transition_locked(current, state)
+            result = HermesResult(
+                job_id=updated.job_id,
+                tenant_id=updated.tenant_id,
+                task_id=updated.task_id,
+                trace_id=updated.trace_id,
+                state=state,
+                worker_id=worker_id,
+                output=output,
+                error=error,
+                started_at=current.updated_at,
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.results[job_id] = result
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), None)
+            return result
+
+    def _owned_job_locked(self, job_id: str, tenant_id: str, worker_id: str) -> HermesJob:
+        current = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+        if current is None:
+            raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+        self._assert_tenant(current, tenant_id)
+        if current.assigned_worker_id != worker_id:
+            raise HermesConflict("worker does not own job lease")
+        return current
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_revision(job: HermesJob, expected: int | None) -> None:
+        if expected is not None and job.revision != expected:
+            raise HermesConflict("job revision changed")
+
+    def _transition_locked(
+        self,
+        current: HermesJob,
+        target: HermesJobState,
+        *,
+        assigned_worker_id: str | None = None,
+        lease_expires_at: str | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob:
+        if target not in ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS[current.state]:
+            raise HermesConflict(
+                f"invalid transition {current.state.value} -> {target.value}"
+            )
+        updated = replace(
+            current,
+            state=target,
+            revision=current.revision + 1,
+            assigned_worker_id=(
+                assigned_worker_id
+                if assigned_worker_id is not None
+                else current.assigned_worker_id
+            ),
+            lease_expires_at=(
+                lease_expires_at
+                if lease_expires_at is not None
+                else (None if target in TERMINAL_STATES else current.lease_expires_at)
+            ),
+            updated_at=utc_now(),
+        )
+        self.store.jobs[current.job_id] = updated
+        return updated
+
+    def _requeue_expired_locked(self) -> None:
+        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        for current in list(self.store.jobs.values()):
+            expiry = self._parse(current.lease_expires_at)
+            if (
+                current.state in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}
+                and expiry is not None
+                and expiry <= now
+            ):
+                self.store.jobs[current.job_id] = replace(
+                    current,
+                    state=HermesJobState.QUEUED,
+                    revision=current.revision + 1,
+                    assigned_worker_id=None,
+                    lease_expires_at=None,
+                    updated_at=utc_now(),
+                )
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+"""Tenant-scoped Hermes runtime contracts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _safe_mapping(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return json.loads(json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, default=str))
+
+
+class HermesJobState(str, Enum):
+    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
+    CLAIMED = "CLAIMED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+
+
+ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS: Mapping[HermesJobState, frozenset[HermesJobState]] = {
+    HermesJobState.QUEUED: frozenset({HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}),
+    HermesJobState.CLAIMED: frozenset({HermesJobState.RUNNING, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}),
+    HermesJobState.RUNNING: frozenset(
+        {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}
+    ),
+    HermesJobState.COMPLETED: frozenset(),
+    HermesJobState.FAILED: frozenset(),
+    HermesJobState.CANCELLED: frozenset(),
+}
+TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset(
+    {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HermesJob:
+    job_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    profile_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    action: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    idempotency_key: str = ""
+    priority: int = 100
+    state: HermesJobState = HermesJobState.QUEUED
+    revision: int = 1
+    assigned_worker_id: str | None = None
+    lease_expires_at: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "job_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "task_id",
+            "trace_id", "action", "idempotency_key", "created_at", "updated_at",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "payload", _safe_mapping(self.payload))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "state", HermesJobState(self.state))
+        if not 0 <= int(self.priority) <= 1000:
+            raise ValueError("priority must be between 0 and 1000")
+        if self.revision < 1:
+            raise ValueError("revision must be >= 1")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str,
+        profile_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        trace_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+        priority: int = 100,
+    ) -> "HermesJob":
+        return cls(
+            job_id=f"hermes_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            cell_id=cell_id,
+            profile_id=profile_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            action=action,
+            payload=_safe_mapping(payload),
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            priority=priority,
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HermesResult:
+    job_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    state: HermesJobState
+    worker_id: str | None = None
+    output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    started_at: str | None = None
+    finished_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("job_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "state", HermesJobState(self.state))
+        if self.output is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "output", _safe_mapping(self.output))
+        if self.error is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "error", _safe_mapping(self.error))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HermesHealth:
+    runtime_id: str
+    status: str
+    version: str
+    heartbeat_at: str
+    active_workers: int = 0
+    active_jobs: int = 0
+    queued_jobs: int = 0
+    tenant_partitions: int = 0
+    profile_isolation_enforced: bool = True
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("runtime_id", "status", "version", "heartbeat_at"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        for name in ("active_workers", "active_jobs", "queued_jobs", "tenant_partitions"):
+            if int(getattr(self, name)) < 0:
+                raise ValueError(f"{name} must be >= 0")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "details", _safe_mapping(self.details))
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+"""Hermes worker loop with lease renewal and bounded recovery."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from .adapter import HermesAdapter, HermesConflict
+from .contract import HermesJob, HermesJobState
+
+
+JobHandler = Callable[[HermesJob], Mapping[str, Any]]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class WorkerRunResult:
+    claimed: bool
+    job_id: str | None = None
+    state: str | None = None
+    error: str | None = None
+
+
+class HermesWorker:
+    """Poll one tenant/cell/profile partition and execute jobs safely."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        adapter: HermesAdapter,
+        handler: JobHandler,
+        *,
+        worker_id: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str,
+        profile_id: str,
+        poll_seconds: float = 1.0,
+        heartbeat_seconds: float = 10.0,
+    ) -> None:
+        if poll_seconds <= 0 or heartbeat_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("poll_seconds and heartbeat_seconds must be positive")
+        for name, value in {
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+            "cell_id": cell_id,
+            "profile_id": profile_id,
+        }.items():
+            if not str(value or "").strip():
+                raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
+        self.adapter = adapter
+        self.handler = handler
+        self.worker_id = worker_id
+        self.tenant_id = tenant_id
+        self.cell_id = cell_id
+        self.profile_id = profile_id
+        self.poll_seconds = float(poll_seconds)
+        self.heartbeat_seconds = float(heartbeat_seconds)
+        self._stop = threading.Event()
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        self._stop.set()
+
+    def run_once(self) -> WorkerRunResult:
+        job = self.adapter.claim(
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+            cell_id=self.cell_id,
+            profile_id=self.profile_id,
+            worker_id=self.worker_id,
+        )
+        if job is None:
+            return WorkerRunResult(claimed=False)
+
+        running = self.adapter.start(
+            job.job_id,
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+            worker_id=self.worker_id,
+            expected_revision=job.revision,
+        )
+
+        heartbeat_stop = threading.Event()
+        heartbeat_thread = threading.Thread(
+            target=self._heartbeat_loop,
+            args=(running.job_id, heartbeat_stop),
+            name=f"hermes-heartbeat-{self.worker_id}",
+            daemon=True,
+        )
+        heartbeat_thread.start()
+
+        output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+        execution_error: Exception | None = None
+        try:
+            output = dict(self.handler(running))
+        except Exception as exc:  # runtime boundary: normalize below
+            execution_error = exc
+        finally:
+            # Stop the lease heartbeat before reading the final revision. This
+            # prevents a revision increment racing with complete/fail.
+            heartbeat_stop.set()
+            heartbeat_thread.join(timeout=max(self.heartbeat_seconds * 2, 1.0))
+
+        try:
+            current = self.adapter.get(running.job_id, tenant_id=self.tenant_id)
+            if execution_error is None:
+                result = self.adapter.complete(
+                    running.job_id,
+                    tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                    worker_id=self.worker_id,
+                    output=dict(output or {}),
+                    expected_revision=current.revision,
+                )
+                return WorkerRunResult(
+                    claimed=True,
+                    job_id=result.job_id,
+                    state=result.state.value,
+                )
+
+            result = self.adapter.fail(
+                running.job_id,
+                tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                worker_id=self.worker_id,
+                error={
+                    "code": "worker_error",
+                    "message": str(execution_error),
+                },
+                expected_revision=current.revision,
+            )
+            return WorkerRunResult(
+                claimed=True,
+                job_id=result.job_id,
+                state=result.state.value,
+                error=str(execution_error),
+            )
+        except HermesConflict as exc:
+            return WorkerRunResult(
+                claimed=True,
+                job_id=running.job_id,
+                state=HermesJobState.FAILED.value,
+                error=f"reconciliation_conflict: {exc}",
+            )
+
+    def run_forever(self) -> None:
+        while not self._stop.is_set():
+            result = self.run_once()
+            if not result.claimed:
+                self._stop.wait(self.poll_seconds)
+
+    def _heartbeat_loop(self, job_id: str, stop_event: threading.Event) -> None:
+        while not stop_event.wait(self.heartbeat_seconds):
+            try:
+                self.adapter.heartbeat(
+                    job_id,
+                    tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                    worker_id=self.worker_id,
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                stop_event.set()
+                return
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""AIOS-managed OpenClaw execution adapter."""
+
+from .adapter import (
+    AdapterError,
+    CommandConflict,
+    CommandNotFound,
+    CommandRejected,
+    InMemoryCallbackSink,
+    OpenClawAdapter,
+)
+from .contract import (
+    CommandState,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    RuntimeHealth,
+    sign_command,
+    verify_command_signature,
+)
+from .transport import HTTPRuntimeTransport, InProcessRuntimeTransport, RuntimeTransport
+
+__all__ = [
+    "AdapterError",
+    "CommandConflict",
+    "CommandNotFound",
+    "CommandRejected",
+    "CommandState",
+    "HTTPRuntimeTransport",
+    "InMemoryCallbackSink",
+    "InProcessRuntimeTransport",
+    "OpenClawAdapter",
+    "OpenClawCommand",
+    "OpenClawResult",
+    "RuntimeHealth",
+    "RuntimeTransport",
+    "sign_command",
+    "verify_command_signature",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+"""Signed, tenant-isolated execution adapter for OpenClaw runtimes."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+from dataclasses import replace
+from typing import Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .contract import (
+    CommandState,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    RuntimeHealth,
+    utc_now,
+    verify_command_signature,
+)
+
+
+class AdapterError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base adapter failure."""
+
+
+class CommandRejected(AdapterError):
+    """A command failed signature or contract validation."""
+
+
+class CommandNotFound(AdapterError):
+    """A tenant-scoped command is not visible."""
+
+
+class CommandConflict(AdapterError):
+    """A command or idempotency key conflicts with an existing execution."""
+
+
+class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ...
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
+
+
+class CallbackSink(Protocol):
+    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
+    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
+    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
+
+
+class InMemoryCallbackSink:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.started: list[OpenClawResult] = []
+        self.completed: list[OpenClawResult] = []
+        self.failed: list[OpenClawResult] = []
+
+    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.started.append(result)
+
+    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.completed.append(result)
+
+    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.failed.append(result)
+
+
+SigningMaterialResolver = Callable[[str, str], bytes | str]
+
+
+class OpenClawAdapter:
+    """Verify, de-duplicate, execute, cancel and reconcile commands."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        transport: RuntimeTransport,
+        signing_material_resolver: SigningMaterialResolver,
+        *,
+        callback_sink: CallbackSink | None = None,
+        default_timeout_seconds: float = 300.0,
+    ) -> None:
+        if default_timeout_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("default_timeout_seconds must be positive")
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.signing_material_resolver = signing_material_resolver
+        self.callback_sink = callback_sink or InMemoryCallbackSink()
+        self.default_timeout_seconds = float(default_timeout_seconds)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._commands: dict[str, OpenClawCommand] = {}
+        self._results: dict[str, OpenClawResult] = {}
+        self._idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
+
+    def _verify(self, command: OpenClawCommand) -> None:
+        try:
+            key_material = self.signing_material_resolver(command.tenant_id, command.key_id)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise CommandRejected("signing material unavailable") from exc
+        if not verify_command_signature(command, key_material):
+            raise CommandRejected("invalid or expired command signature")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_result(command: OpenClawCommand, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        if (
+            result.command_id != command.command_id
+            or result.tenant_id != command.tenant_id
+            or result.task_id != command.task_id
+            or result.trace_id != command.trace_id
+        ):
+            raise AdapterError("runtime returned mismatched command identity")
+        if result.state not in {
+            CommandState.COMPLETED,
+            CommandState.FAILED,
+            CommandState.CANCELLED,
+            CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+        }:
+            raise AdapterError("runtime returned a non-terminal result")
+
+    def execute(
+        self,
+        command: OpenClawCommand,
+        *,
+        timeout_seconds: float | None = None,
+    ) -> OpenClawResult:
+        timeout = self.default_timeout_seconds if timeout_seconds is None else float(timeout_seconds)
+        if timeout <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive")
+        self._verify(command)
+        digest = command.signature
+        idem_ref = (command.tenant_id, command.idempotency_key)
+
+        with self._lock:
+            prior_command = self._commands.get(command.command_id)
+            if prior_command is not None:
+                if prior_command.signature != command.signature:
+                    raise CommandConflict("command_id reused with different content")
+                return self._results[command.command_id]
+            prior_idem = self._idempotency.get(idem_ref)
+            if prior_idem is not None:
+                prior_id, prior_digest = prior_idem
+                if prior_digest != digest:
+                    raise CommandConflict("idempotency key reused with different content")
+                return self._results[prior_id]
+            running = OpenClawResult(
+                command_id=command.command_id,
+                tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
+                task_id=command.task_id,
+                trace_id=command.trace_id,
+                state=CommandState.RUNNING,
+                started_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self._commands[command.command_id] = command
+            self._results[command.command_id] = running
+            self._idempotency[idem_ref] = (command.command_id, digest)
+
+        self.callback_sink.on_started(running)
+        try:
+            result = self.transport.execute(command, timeout)
+            self._validate_result(command, result)
+        except TimeoutError as exc:
+            result = replace(
+                running,
+                state=CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+                error={"code": "runtime_timeout", "message": str(exc) or "runtime timeout"},
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            result = replace(
+                running,
+                state=CommandState.FAILED,
+                error={"code": "runtime_error", "message": str(exc)},
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+
+        if result.started_at is None:
+            result = replace(result, started_at=running.started_at)
+        if result.finished_at is None:
+            result = replace(result, finished_at=utc_now())
+        with self._lock:
+            self._results[command.command_id] = result
+        if result.state == CommandState.COMPLETED:
+            self.callback_sink.on_completed(result)
+        else:
+            self.callback_sink.on_failed(result)
+        return result
+
+    def status(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> OpenClawResult:
+        with self._lock:
+            command = self._commands.get(command_id)
+            result = self._results.get(command_id)
+            if command is None or result is None or command.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+                raise CommandNotFound("command not found")
+            return result
+
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> OpenClawResult:
+        with self._lock:
+            command = self._commands.get(command_id)
+            current = self._results.get(command_id)
+            if command is None or current is None or command.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+                raise CommandNotFound("command not found")
+            if current.state in {
+                CommandState.COMPLETED,
+                CommandState.FAILED,
+                CommandState.CANCELLED,
+                CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+                CommandState.REJECTED,
+            }:
+                return current
+        if not self.transport.cancel(command_id):
+            raise AdapterError("runtime rejected cancellation")
+        cancelled = replace(
+            current,
+            state=CommandState.CANCELLED,
+            error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled by AIOS"},
+            finished_at=utc_now(),
+        )
+        with self._lock:
+            self._results[command_id] = cancelled
+        self.callback_sink.on_failed(cancelled)
+        return cancelled
+
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
+        return self.transport.health()
+
+    def snapshot(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> Mapping[str, OpenClawResult]:
+        with self._lock:
+            return {
+                command_id: result
+                for command_id, result in self._results.items()
+                if self._commands[command_id].tenant_id == tenant_id
+            }
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+"""Audit-oriented lifecycle callbacks for OpenClaw execution."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import threading
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .contract import OpenClawResult, utc_now
+
+
+class EventPublisher(Protocol):
+    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionEvent:
+    event_type: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    command_id: str
+    state: str
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "event_type": self.event_type,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "command_id": self.command_id,
+            "state": self.state,
+            "created_at": self.created_at,
+            "details": json.loads(
+                json.dumps(dict(self.details), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+            ),
+        }
+
+
+class InMemoryEventPublisher:
+    """Thread-safe publisher used by tests and first integration slice."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.events.append(
+                json.loads(json.dumps(dict(event), ensure_ascii=False, default=str))
+            )
+
+
+class AuditCallbackSink:
+    """Convert runtime callbacks into tenant-scoped audit events."""
+
+    def __init__(self, publisher: EventPublisher) -> None:
+        self.publisher = publisher
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event(
+        event_type: str,
+        result: OpenClawResult,
+    ) -> ExecutionEvent:
+        details: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "runtime_id": result.runtime_id,
+            "attempts": result.attempts,
+        }
+        if result.error:
+            details["error"] = dict(result.error)
+        if result.output:
+            details["output_present"] = True
+        return ExecutionEvent(
+            event_type=event_type,
+            tenant_id=result.tenant_id,
+            task_id=result.task_id,
+            trace_id=result.trace_id,
+            command_id=result.command_id,
+            state=result.state.value,
+            details=details,
+        )
+
+    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        self.publisher.publish(self._event("OPENCLAW_STARTED", result).as_dict())
+
+    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        self.publisher.publish(self._event("OPENCLAW_COMPLETED", result).as_dict())
+
+    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        event_type = {
+            "CANCELLED": "OPENCLAW_CANCELLED",
+            "TIMED_OUT": "OPENCLAW_TIMED_OUT",
+            "REJECTED": "OPENCLAW_REJECTED",
+        }.get(result.state.value, "OPENCLAW_FAILED")
+        self.publisher.publish(self._event(event_type, result).as_dict())
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+"""Versioned AIOS to OpenClaw execution contracts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+CONTRACT_VERSION = "aios.openclaw.command.v1"
+DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _parse_timestamp(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError("timestamp is required")
+    if normalized.endswith("Z"):
+        normalized = normalized[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("timestamp must include a timezone")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _safe_mapping(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return json.loads(json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, default=str))
+
+
+class CommandState(str, Enum):
+    ACCEPTED = "ACCEPTED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+    TIMED_OUT = "TIMED_OUT"
+    REJECTED = "REJECTED"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OpenClawCommand:
+    command_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    action: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    idempotency_key: str = ""
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+    contract_version: str = CONTRACT_VERSION
+    key_id: str = "default"
+    signature: str = ""
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for field_name in (
+            "command_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id", "action",
+            "idempotency_key", "created_at", "contract_version", "key_id",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name))
+        if self.contract_version != CONTRACT_VERSION:
+            raise ValueError(f"unsupported contract_version: {self.contract_version}")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "payload", _safe_mapping(self.payload))
+        _parse_timestamp(self.created_at)
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "expires_at", _required(self.expires_at, "expires_at"))
+            _parse_timestamp(self.expires_at)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        trace_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+        expires_at: str | None = None,
+        key_id: str = "default",
+        command_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> "OpenClawCommand":
+        return cls(
+            command_id=command_id or f"cmd_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            action=action,
+            payload=_safe_mapping(payload),
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            expires_at=expires_at,
+            key_id=key_id,
+        )
+
+    def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "command_id": self.command_id,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "action": self.action,
+            "payload": _safe_mapping(self.payload),
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "created_at": self.created_at,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            "contract_version": self.contract_version,
+            "key_id": self.key_id,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OpenClawResult:
+    command_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    state: CommandState
+    output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    started_at: str | None = None
+    finished_at: str | None = None
+    runtime_id: str | None = None
+    attempts: int = 1
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for field_name in ("command_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "state", CommandState(self.state))
+        if self.output is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "output", _safe_mapping(self.output))
+        if self.error is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "error", _safe_mapping(self.error))
+        if self.started_at is not None:
+            _parse_timestamp(self.started_at)
+        if self.finished_at is not None:
+            _parse_timestamp(self.finished_at)
+        if self.attempts < 1:
+            raise ValueError("attempts must be >= 1")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RuntimeHealth:
+    runtime: str
+    runtime_id: str
+    status: str
+    version: str
+    heartbeat_at: str
+    active_tasks: int = 0
+    workspace_isolated: bool = False
+    credential_ref_configured: bool = False
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for field_name in ("runtime", "runtime_id", "status", "version", "heartbeat_at"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name))
+        _parse_timestamp(self.heartbeat_at)
+        if self.active_tasks < 0:
+            raise ValueError("active_tasks must be >= 0")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "details", _safe_mapping(self.details))
+
+
+def canonical_command_bytes(command: OpenClawCommand) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        command.unsigned_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sign_command(command: OpenClawCommand, key_material: bytes | str) -> OpenClawCommand:
+    key = key_material.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(key_material, str) else bytes(key_material)
+    if not key:
+        raise ValueError("signing material is required")
+    signature = hmac.new(key, canonical_command_bytes(command), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+    return replace(command, signature=signature)
+
+
+def verify_command_signature(
+    command: OpenClawCommand,
+    key_material: bytes | str,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    clock_skew_seconds: int = DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS,
+) -> bool:
+    if not command.signature:
+        return False
+    key = key_material.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(key_material, str) else bytes(key_material)
+    if not key:
+        return False
+    expected = hmac.new(key, canonical_command_bytes(command), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, command.signature):
+        return False
+    current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+    created = _parse_timestamp(command.created_at)
+    if created.timestamp() - current.timestamp() > clock_skew_seconds:
+        return False
+    if command.expires_at is not None:
+        expires = _parse_timestamp(command.expires_at)
+        if current.timestamp() - expires.timestamp() > clock_skew_seconds:
+            return False
+    return True
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+"""Health policy and self-healing decisions for OpenClaw runtimes."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Mapping
+
+from .contract import RuntimeHealth
+
+
+def _parse(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("heartbeat timestamp must include timezone")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HealthPolicy:
+    max_heartbeat_age_seconds: int = 90
+    require_workspace_isolation: bool = True
+    require_credential_ref: bool = True
+    accepted_statuses: frozenset[str] = field(
+        default_factory=lambda: frozenset({"healthy", "ready"})
+    )
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.max_heartbeat_age_seconds < 5:
+            raise ValueError("max_heartbeat_age_seconds must be >= 5")
+        if not self.accepted_statuses:
+            raise ValueError("accepted_statuses must not be empty")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HealthAssessment:
+    healthy: bool
+    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
+    recoverable: bool
+    recommended_action: str
+    details: Mapping[str, object] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class RuntimeHealthMonitor:
+    """Evaluate runtime health and recommend bounded recovery actions."""
+
+    def __init__(self, policy: HealthPolicy | None = None) -> None:
+        self.policy = policy or HealthPolicy()
+
+    def assess(
+        self,
+        health: RuntimeHealth,
+        *,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> HealthAssessment:
+        current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        heartbeat = _parse(health.heartbeat_at)
+        age = max(0.0, current.timestamp() - heartbeat.timestamp())
+        reasons: list[str] = []
+
+        if health.status.lower() not in self.policy.accepted_statuses:
+            reasons.append("runtime_status_unhealthy")
+        if age > self.policy.max_heartbeat_age_seconds:
+            reasons.append("heartbeat_stale")
+        if self.policy.require_workspace_isolation and not health.workspace_isolated:
+            reasons.append("workspace_not_isolated")
+        if self.policy.require_credential_ref and not health.credential_ref_configured:
+            reasons.append("credential_reference_missing")
+
+        if not reasons:
+            return HealthAssessment(
+                healthy=True,
+                reasons=(),
+                recoverable=True,
+                recommended_action="none",
+                details={"heartbeat_age_seconds": age},
+            )
+
+        non_recoverable = {
+            "workspace_not_isolated",
+            "credential_reference_missing",
+        }.intersection(reasons)
+        if non_recoverable:
+            action = "quarantine_runtime"
+            recoverable = False
+        elif "heartbeat_stale" in reasons:
+            action = "restart_runtime"
+            recoverable = True
+        else:
+            action = "drain_and_restart"
+            recoverable = True
+
+        return HealthAssessment(
+            healthy=False,
+            reasons=tuple(reasons),
+            recoverable=recoverable,
+            recommended_action=action,
+            details={
+                "heartbeat_age_seconds": age,
+                "runtime_id": health.runtime_id,
+                "active_tasks": health.active_tasks,
+            },
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+"""Runtime transport implementations for the OpenClaw adapter."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import threading
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .contract import (
+    CommandState,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    RuntimeHealth,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+
+class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ...
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
+
+
+class TransportError(RuntimeError):
+    """Runtime transport or protocol failure."""
+
+
+RuntimeHandler = Callable[[OpenClawCommand], Mapping[str, Any] | OpenClawResult]
+
+
+class InProcessRuntimeTransport:
+    """Deterministic runtime used by tests and controlled local integrations."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        handler: RuntimeHandler,
+        *,
+        runtime_id: str = "openclaw-in-process",
+        version: str = "v1",
+        workspace_isolated: bool = True,
+        credential_ref_configured: bool = True,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.handler = handler
+        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
+        self.version = version
+        self.workspace_isolated = workspace_isolated
+        self.credential_ref_configured = credential_ref_configured
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._running: set[str] = set()
+        self._cancelled: set[str] = set()
+
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult:
+        if timeout_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive")
+        with self._lock:
+            if command.command_id in self._cancelled:
+                return OpenClawResult(
+                    command_id=command.command_id,
+                    tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
+                    task_id=command.task_id,
+                    trace_id=command.trace_id,
+                    state=CommandState.CANCELLED,
+                    error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled before execution"},
+                    finished_at=utc_now(),
+                    runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
+                )
+            self._running.add(command.command_id)
+        try:
+            raw = self.handler(command)
+            if isinstance(raw, OpenClawResult):
+                return raw
+            if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+                raise TransportError("runtime handler must return a mapping or OpenClawResult")
+            return OpenClawResult(
+                command_id=command.command_id,
+                tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
+                task_id=command.task_id,
+                trace_id=command.trace_id,
+                state=CommandState(str(raw.get("state", "COMPLETED"))),
+                output=raw.get("output"),
+                error=raw.get("error"),
+                started_at=str(raw.get("started_at") or utc_now()),
+                finished_at=str(raw.get("finished_at") or utc_now()),
+                runtime_id=str(raw.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
+                attempts=int(raw.get("attempts", 1)),
+            )
+        finally:
+            with self._lock:
+                self._running.discard(command.command_id)
+
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._cancelled.add(command_id)
+            return command_id in self._running
+
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
+        with self._lock:
+            active = len(self._running)
+        return RuntimeHealth(
+            runtime="openclaw",
+            runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
+            status="healthy",
+            version=self.version,
+            heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+            active_tasks=active,
+            workspace_isolated=self.workspace_isolated,
+            credential_ref_configured=self.credential_ref_configured,
+            details={"transport": "in_process"},
+        )
+
+
+class HTTPRuntimeTransport:
+    """Private HTTP transport for an OpenClaw runtime service."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        base_url: str,
+        *,
+        runtime_id: str = "openclaw-http",
+        credential_ref: str | None = None,
+        max_response_bytes: int = 2_097_152,
+    ) -> None:
+        normalized = str(base_url).rstrip("/")
+        if not normalized.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
+            raise ValueError("base_url must use http or https")
+        self.base_url = normalized
+        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
+        self.credential_ref = credential_ref
+        self.max_response_bytes = int(max_response_bytes)
+
+    def _request(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        *,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+        timeout_seconds: float,
+    ) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        body = None
+        headers = {"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "AIOS-OpenClaw/1"}
+        if payload is not None:
+            body = json.dumps(dict(payload), separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        if self.credential_ref:
+            headers["X-AIOS-Credential-Ref"] = self.credential_ref
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            f"{self.base_url}{path}",
+            data=body,
+            method=method,
+            headers=headers,
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout_seconds) as response:
+                raw = response.read(self.max_response_bytes + 1)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raise TransportError(f"runtime returned HTTP {exc.code}") from exc
+        except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
+            raise TransportError(f"runtime unavailable: {exc.reason}") from exc
+        if len(raw) > self.max_response_bytes:
+            raise TransportError("runtime response exceeded size limit")
+        decoded = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(decoded, Mapping):
+            raise TransportError("runtime response must be a JSON object")
+        return decoded
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _command_payload(command: OpenClawCommand) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {**command.unsigned_dict(), "signature": command.signature}
+
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult:
+        value = self._request(
+            "POST",
+            "/v1/execute",
+            payload=self._command_payload(command),
+            timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
+        )
+        return OpenClawResult(
+            command_id=str(value["command_id"]),
+            tenant_id=str(value["tenant_id"]),
+            task_id=str(value["task_id"]),
+            trace_id=str(value["trace_id"]),
+            state=CommandState(str(value["state"])),
+            output=value.get("output"),
+            error=value.get("error"),
+            started_at=value.get("started_at"),
+            finished_at=value.get("finished_at"),
+            runtime_id=str(value.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
+            attempts=int(value.get("attempts", 1)),
+        )
+
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool:
+        value = self._request(
+            "POST",
+            f"/v1/commands/{urllib.parse.quote(command_id, safe='')}/cancel",
+            payload={},
+            timeout_seconds=10.0,
+        )
+        return bool(value.get("accepted"))
+
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
+        value = self._request("GET", "/v1/health", payload=None, timeout_seconds=5.0)
+        return RuntimeHealth(
+            runtime=str(value.get("runtime") or "openclaw"),
+            runtime_id=str(value.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
+            status=str(value.get("status") or "unknown"),
+            version=str(value.get("version") or "unknown"),
+            heartbeat_at=str(value.get("heartbeat_at") or utc_now()),
+            active_tasks=int(value.get("active_tasks", 0)),
+            workspace_isolated=bool(value.get("workspace_isolated", False)),
+            credential_ref_configured=bool(value.get("credential_ref_configured", False)),
+            details=value.get("details") if isinstance(value.get("details"), Mapping) else {},
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+"""AIOS V2 control plane and execution orchestration."""
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    AgentRecord,
+    AuditEvent,
+    ControlPlaneError,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    IdempotencyConflict,
+    InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
+    InvalidTransition,
+    NotFound,
+    PolicyDenied,
+    RequestContext,
+    RevisionConflict,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskState,
+    TenantIsolationError,
+    TenantRecord,
+    Unauthorized,
+)
+from .execution_tracking import ExecutionEvidence, ExecutionTracker
+from .orchestrator import DispatchRecord, ExecutionOrchestrator, OrchestrationError
+
+__all__ = [
+    "AgentRecord",
+    "AuditEvent",
+    "ControlPlaneError",
+    "ControlPlaneService",
+    "DispatchRecord",
+    "ExecutionEvidence",
+    "ExecutionOrchestrator",
+    "ExecutionTracker",
+    "IdempotencyConflict",
+    "InMemoryControlPlaneStore",
+    "InvalidTransition",
+    "NotFound",
+    "OrchestrationError",
+    "PolicyDenied",
+    "RequestContext",
+    "RevisionConflict",
+    "TaskRecord",
+    "TaskState",
+    "TenantIsolationError",
+    "TenantRecord",
+    "Unauthorized",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+"""Production-candidate AIOS V2 application entrypoint.
+
+This process owns the public control-plane API and read-only web console. It
+loads durable control-plane state, dispatches approved work through runtime
+adapters, exposes tenant-scoped execution evidence and sanitized GitOps status,
+and never exposes runtime credentials to the browser.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import json
+import os
+import stat
+import urllib.parse
+from enum import Enum
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJobState, HermesResult
+from aios_openclaw import HTTPRuntimeTransport, OpenClawAdapter
+from aios_openclaw.callback import AuditCallbackSink, EventPublisher
+
+from .console import CONSOLE_HTML
+from .control_plane import AuditEvent, RequestContext
+from .execution_tracking import ExecutionTracker
+from .gateway import GatewayApplication, error_response
+from .gitops_status import collect_gitops_status
+from .orchestrator import ExecutionOrchestrator
+from .persistence import DurableControlPlaneService, SQLiteSnapshotRepository
+
+
+def _json_value(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if dataclasses.is_dataclass(value):
+        return {
+            item.name: _json_value(getattr(value, item.name))
+            for item in dataclasses.fields(value)
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, Enum):
+        return value.value
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return {str(key): _json_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
+        return [_json_value(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+class FileSigningMaterialResolver:
+    """Resolve runtime signing material from a root-owned file reference."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+
+    def __call__(self, tenant_id: str, key_id: str) -> bytes:
+        del tenant_id, key_id
+        metadata = self.path.stat()
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+            raise RuntimeError("signing material reference is not a regular file")
+        if metadata.st_mode & 0o077:
+            raise RuntimeError("signing material file permissions must be 0600 or stricter")
+        value = self.path.read_bytes().strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            raise RuntimeError("signing material is too short")
+        return value
+
+
+class ControlPlaneEventPublisher(EventPublisher):
+    """Append OpenClaw runtime events to the tenant audit stream."""
+
+    def __init__(self, service: DurableControlPlaneService) -> None:
+        self.service = service
+
+    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        tenant_id = str(event.get("tenant_id") or "").strip()
+        trace_id = str(event.get("trace_id") or "").strip()
+        command_id = str(event.get("command_id") or "").strip()
+        event_type = str(event.get("event_type") or "OPENCLAW_EVENT").strip()
+        if not tenant_id or not trace_id or not command_id:
+            raise ValueError("runtime audit event is missing tenant identity")
+        state_value = str(event.get("state") or "unknown").lower()
+        outcome = "allowed" if state_value == "completed" else state_value
+        audit = AuditEvent(
+            event_id=f"runtime_{command_id}_{len(self.service.store.audit_events) + 1}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            principal_id="openclaw-runtime",
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            action=event_type,
+            resource_type="openclaw_command",
+            resource_id=command_id,
+            outcome=outcome,
+            policy_version="runtime-v1",
+            details=dict(event.get("details") or {}),
+        )
+        with self.service.store.lock:
+            self.service.store.audit_events.append(audit)
+            self.service.repository.save(self.service._snapshot())
+
+
+class CandidateApplication:
+    """Compose durable control plane, runtimes, evidence and console routes."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        gateway: GatewayApplication,
+        orchestrator: ExecutionOrchestrator,
+        tracker: ExecutionTracker,
+        hermes: HermesAdapter,
+        openclaw: OpenClawAdapter | None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.gateway = gateway
+        self.orchestrator = orchestrator
+        self.tracker = tracker
+        self.hermes = hermes
+        self.openclaw = openclaw
+
+    def context(self, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext:
+        return self.gateway.context_from_headers(headers)
+
+    def handle_json(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        raw_path: str,
+        headers: Mapping[str, str],
+        body: Any,
+    ) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw_path)
+        path = parsed.path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        method = method.upper()
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/gitops":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
+                "gitops": collect_gitops_status().as_dict(),
+            }
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/runtime":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            runtimes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+            if self.openclaw is None:
+                runtimes.append(
+                    {
+                        "name": "openclaw",
+                        "status": "disabled",
+                        "details": {"reason": "runtime_not_configured"},
+                    }
+                )
+            else:
+                try:
+                    health = self.openclaw.health()
+                    runtimes.append(
+                        {
+                            "name": "openclaw",
+                            "status": health.status,
+                            "details": _json_value(health),
+                        }
+                    )
+                except Exception as exc:
+                    runtimes.append(
+                        {
+                            "name": "openclaw",
+                            "status": "unavailable",
+                            "details": {"message": str(exc)},
+                        }
+                    )
+            hermes_health = self.hermes.health()
+            runtimes.append(
+                {
+                    "name": "hermes",
+                    "status": hermes_health.status,
+                    "details": _json_value(hermes_health),
+                }
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
+                "runtimes": runtimes,
+            }
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/executions":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "executions": _json_value(
+                    self.tracker.list(tenant_id=context.tenant_id)
+                )
+            }
+
+        dispatch_match = __import__("re").fullmatch(
+            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/dispatch",
+            path,
+        )
+        if method == "POST" and dispatch_match:
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            task_id = urllib.parse.unquote(dispatch_match.group(1))
+            payload = body if isinstance(body, Mapping) else {}
+            timeout = payload.get("timeout_seconds")
+            record = self.orchestrator.dispatch(
+                context,
+                task_id=task_id,
+                timeout_seconds=float(timeout) if timeout is not None else None,
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.ACCEPTED, {"dispatch": _json_value(record)}
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/hermes/results/reconcile":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            if not isinstance(body, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError("JSON body must be an object")
+            result = HermesResult(
+                job_id=str(body["job_id"]),
+                tenant_id=str(body["tenant_id"]),
+                task_id=str(body["task_id"]),
+                trace_id=str(body["trace_id"]),
+                state=HermesJobState(str(body["state"])),
+                worker_id=(
+                    str(body["worker_id"])
+                    if body.get("worker_id") is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+                output=body.get("output"),
+                error=body.get("error"),
+                started_at=body.get("started_at"),
+                finished_at=body.get("finished_at"),
+            )
+            task = self.orchestrator.reconcile_hermes(context, result)
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"task": _json_value(task)}
+
+        return self.gateway.handle(method, raw_path, headers, body)
+
+
+class CandidateRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "AIOSV2Candidate/1.0"
+    max_body_bytes = 1_048_576
+
+    @property
+    def application(self) -> CandidateApplication:
+        return self.server.application  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+    def _read_body(self) -> Any:
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or "0")
+        if length < 0 or length > self.max_body_bytes:
+            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
+        if length == 0:
+            return {}
+        content_type = self.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0].strip()
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise ValueError("Content-Type must be application/json")
+        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _security_headers(self) -> None:
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        self.send_header("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
+        self.send_header("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+        self.send_header(
+            "Content-Security-Policy",
+            "default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'",
+        )
+
+    def _send_json(self, status_code: int, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            _json_value(payload),
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(int(status_code))
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self._security_headers()
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _send_console(self) -> None:
+        encoded = CONSOLE_HTML.encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(HTTPStatus.OK)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self._security_headers()
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _dispatch(self, method: str) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if method == "GET" and path in {"/", "/console"}:
+            self._send_console()
+            return
+        try:
+            body = self._read_body() if method == "POST" else {}
+            status_code, payload = self.application.handle_json(
+                method,
+                self.path,
+                {key: value for key, value in self.headers.items()},
+                body,
+            )
+        except BaseException as exc:
+            status_code, payload = error_response(exc)
+        self._send_json(status_code, payload)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("POST")
+
+
+class CandidateHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    daemon_threads = True
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(self, address: tuple[str, int], application: CandidateApplication) -> None:
+        self.application = application
+        super().__init__(address, CandidateRequestHandler)
+
+
+def build_application() -> CandidateApplication:
+    state_dir = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR", "/var/lib/aios-v2")).resolve()
+    state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    repository = SQLiteSnapshotRepository(state_dir / "control-plane.sqlite3")
+    service = DurableControlPlaneService(repository)
+    tracker = ExecutionTracker(state_dir / "executions")
+    hermes = HermesAdapter()
+
+    openclaw_url = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL", "").strip()
+    material_file = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE", "").strip()
+    openclaw = None
+    resolver = None
+    if openclaw_url and material_file:
+        resolver = FileSigningMaterialResolver(material_file)
+        transport = HTTPRuntimeTransport(
+            openclaw_url,
+            credential_ref=os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF") or None,
+        )
+        openclaw = OpenClawAdapter(
+            transport,
+            resolver,
+            callback_sink=AuditCallbackSink(ControlPlaneEventPublisher(service)),
+        )
+
+    gateway = GatewayApplication(service)
+    orchestrator = ExecutionOrchestrator(
+        service,
+        openclaw=openclaw,
+        hermes=hermes,
+        openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver,
+    )
+    return CandidateApplication(gateway, orchestrator, tracker, hermes, openclaw)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    host = os.getenv("AIOS_V2_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_PORT", "18920"))
+    server = CandidateHTTPServer((host, port), build_application())
+    print(f"AIOS V2 candidate listening on {host}:{port}")
+    server.serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""Dependency-free AIOS V2 web console assets.
+
+Authentication and tenant identity are injected by the trusted reverse proxy.
+The browser never selects a tenant and never calls OpenClaw or Hermes directly.
+"""
+
+CONSOLE_HTML = r'''<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
+  <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
+  <title>AIOS V2 Console</title>
+  <style>
+    :root{font-family:Inter,ui-sans-serif,system-ui,sans-serif;color:#152033;background:#f4f7fb}
+    *{box-sizing:border-box} body{margin:0} header{background:#111827;color:white;padding:18px 24px;display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center}
+    header h1{font-size:20px;margin:0} header span{font-size:12px;color:#cbd5e1}
+    main{padding:24px;max-width:1440px;margin:auto}.notice{background:#fff7ed;border:1px solid #fed7aa;padding:12px 14px;border-radius:10px;margin-bottom:18px;font-size:13px}
+    .cards{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(190px,1fr));gap:14px;margin-bottom:20px}.card,.panel{background:white;border:1px solid #e5e7eb;border-radius:12px;box-shadow:0 1px 2px rgba(0,0,0,.04)}
+    .card{padding:16px}.card b{display:block;font-size:28px;margin-top:8px}.card small{color:#64748b}.grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(420px,1fr));gap:16px}.panel{padding:16px;overflow:auto}.panel h2{font-size:16px;margin:0 0 12px}
+    table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;font-size:12px}th,td{text-align:left;border-bottom:1px solid #edf0f4;padding:8px;vertical-align:top}th{color:#64748b;font-weight:600}.state{font-weight:700}.ok{color:#047857}.bad{color:#b91c1c}.muted{color:#64748b}
+    button{border:0;border-radius:8px;padding:9px 13px;background:#2563eb;color:white;cursor:pointer}button:disabled{opacity:.5}.toolbar{display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;margin-bottom:16px}.error{color:#b91c1c;white-space:pre-wrap}
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+<header><h1>AIOS V2 Control Plane</h1><span id="updated">Not loaded</span></header>
+<main>
+  <div class="notice">Read-only candidate console. Identity and tenant context must be injected by the trusted reverse proxy. The console never calls OpenClaw or Hermes directly.</div>
+  <div class="toolbar"><button id="refresh">Refresh</button><span id="error" class="error"></span></div>
+  <section class="cards">
+    <div class="card"><small>Agents</small><b id="agentCount">—</b></div>
+    <div class="card"><small>Tasks</small><b id="taskCount">—</b></div>
+    <div class="card"><small>Audit events</small><b id="auditCount">—</b></div>
+    <div class="card"><small>Executions</small><b id="executionCount">—</b></div>
+  </section>
+  <section class="grid">
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Runtime health</h2><div id="runtime"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Tasks</h2><div id="tasks"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Agents</h2><div id="agents"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Execution evidence</h2><div id="executions"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Audit</h2><div id="audit"></div></div>
+  </section>
+</main>
+<script>
+const esc=v=>String(v??'').replace(/[&<>"']/g,c=>({'&':'&amp;','<':'&lt;','>':'&gt;','"':'&quot;',"'":'&#39;'}[c]));
+const table=(cols,rows)=>`<table><thead><tr>${cols.map(c=>`<th>${esc(c[0])}</th>`).join('')}</tr></thead><tbody>${rows.map(r=>`<tr>${cols.map(c=>`<td>${esc(c[1](r))}</td>`).join('')}</tr>`).join('')}</tbody></table>`;
+async function api(path){const r=await fetch(path,{credentials:'same-origin',headers:{'Accept':'application/json'}});const data=await r.json().catch(()=>({}));if(!r.ok)throw new Error(`${r.status} ${data.message||data.error||path}`);return data}
+async function refresh(){
+  const btn=document.getElementById('refresh');btn.disabled=true;document.getElementById('error').textContent='';
+  try{
+    const [agents,tasks,audit,runtime,executions]=await Promise.all([
+      api('/api/v2/agents'),api('/api/v2/tasks'),api('/api/v2/audit'),api('/api/v2/runtime'),api('/api/v2/executions')
+    ]);
+    document.getElementById('agentCount').textContent=agents.agents.length;
+    document.getElementById('taskCount').textContent=tasks.tasks.length;
+    document.getElementById('auditCount').textContent=audit.events.length;
+    document.getElementById('executionCount').textContent=executions.executions.length;
+    document.getElementById('agents').innerHTML=table([['ID',x=>x.agent_id],['Runtime',x=>x.runtime],['Enabled',x=>x.enabled]],agents.agents);
+    document.getElementById('tasks').innerHTML=table([['Task',x=>x.task_id],['Action',x=>x.action],['State',x=>x.state],['Rev',x=>x.revision]],tasks.tasks);
+    document.getElementById('audit').innerHTML=table([['Time',x=>x.created_at],['Action',x=>x.action],['Outcome',x=>x.outcome],['Resource',x=>x.resource_id]],audit.events.slice(-100).reverse());
+    document.getElementById('executions').innerHTML=table([['Executor',x=>x.executor],['Task',x=>x.task_id],['Status',x=>x.status],['Progress',x=>`${x.progress_completed}/${x.progress_total}`],['Commit',x=>x.last_commit||'']],executions.executions);
+    document.getElementById('runtime').innerHTML=table([['Runtime',x=>x.name],['Status',x=>x.status],['Details',x=>JSON.stringify(x.details)]],runtime.runtimes);
+    document.getElementById('updated').textContent=`Updated ${new Date().toLocaleString()}`;
+  }catch(e){document.getElementById('error').textContent=e.message||String(e)}finally{btn.disabled=false}
+}
+document.getElementById('refresh').addEventListener('click',refresh);refresh();setInterval(refresh,30000);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>'''
@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
+"""Tenant-isolated AIOS V2 control-plane domain service.
+
+This module deliberately contains no OpenClaw or Hermes implementation details.
+It owns authoritative tenant, agent, task-lifecycle, idempotency and audit state.
+Runtime adapters consume approved tasks through a separate boundary.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import hashlib
+import json
+import threading
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable, Mapping
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _new_id(prefix: str) -> str:
+    return f"{prefix}_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+
+
+def _canonical_digest(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    encoded = json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+        default=str,
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
+
+
+class ControlPlaneError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base error returned by the control-plane domain."""
+
+
+class Unauthorized(ControlPlaneError):
+    """The caller is not authenticated or lacks the required role."""
+
+
+class TenantIsolationError(ControlPlaneError):
+    """A request attempted to cross a tenant boundary."""
+
+
+class NotFound(ControlPlaneError):
+    """A tenant-scoped resource does not exist or is not visible."""
+
+
+class InvalidTransition(ControlPlaneError):
+    """A task state transition violates the lifecycle contract."""
+
+
+class IdempotencyConflict(ControlPlaneError):
+    """An idempotency key was reused for a different command."""
+
+
+class RevisionConflict(ControlPlaneError):
+    """Optimistic task revision does not match current state."""
+
+
+class PolicyDenied(ControlPlaneError):
+    """The policy gate denied a control-plane operation."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RequestContext:
+    """Authenticated request identity propagated across all AIOS layers."""
+
+    tenant_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    roles: frozenset[str] = field(default_factory=frozenset)
+    session_id: str | None = None
+    policy_version: str = "v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("tenant_id", "principal_id", "trace_id"):
+            if not str(getattr(self, name, "")).strip():
+                raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        roles: Iterable[str] = (),
+        trace_id: str | None = None,
+        session_id: str | None = None,
+        policy_version: str = "v1",
+    ) -> "RequestContext":
+        return cls(
+            tenant_id=tenant_id.strip(),
+            principal_id=principal_id.strip(),
+            trace_id=trace_id or _new_id("trace"),
+            roles=frozenset(str(role).strip() for role in roles if str(role).strip()),
+            session_id=session_id,
+            policy_version=policy_version,
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TenantRecord:
+    tenant_id: str
+    display_name: str
+    status: str = "active"
+    metadata: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AgentRecord:
+    agent_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    display_name: str
+    runtime: str
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+    enabled: bool = True
+    metadata: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+class TaskState(str, Enum):
+    CREATED = "CREATED"
+    APPROVED = "APPROVED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+
+
+TERMINAL_TASK_STATES = frozenset(
+    {TaskState.COMPLETED, TaskState.FAILED, TaskState.CANCELLED}
+)
+
+ALLOWED_TASK_TRANSITIONS: Mapping[TaskState, frozenset[TaskState]] = {
+    TaskState.CREATED: frozenset({TaskState.APPROVED, TaskState.CANCELLED}),
+    TaskState.APPROVED: frozenset({TaskState.RUNNING, TaskState.CANCELLED}),
+    TaskState.RUNNING: frozenset(
+        {TaskState.COMPLETED, TaskState.FAILED, TaskState.CANCELLED}
+    ),
+    TaskState.COMPLETED: frozenset(),
+    TaskState.FAILED: frozenset(),
+    TaskState.CANCELLED: frozenset(),
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    action: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    state: TaskState = TaskState.CREATED
+    revision: int = 1
+    idempotency_key: str | None = None
+    request_digest: str = ""
+    result: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    created_by: str = ""
+    approved_by: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuditEvent:
+    event_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    action: str
+    resource_type: str
+    resource_id: str
+    outcome: str
+    policy_version: str
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    reason: str
+    policy_version: str
+
+
+PolicyEvaluator = Callable[[RequestContext, str, Mapping[str, Any]], PolicyDecision]
+
+
+class InMemoryControlPlaneStore:
+    """Thread-safe reference store used by tests and the first gateway slice.
+
+    Production backends must preserve the same tenant-scoped interface and add
+    database row-level security, migrations, backup and HA evidence.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.tenants: dict[str, TenantRecord] = {}
+        self.agents: dict[str, AgentRecord] = {}
+        self.tasks: dict[str, TaskRecord] = {}
+        self.idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
+        self.audit_events: list[AuditEvent] = []
+
+
+class ControlPlaneService:
+    """Authoritative tenant, agent and task lifecycle service."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: InMemoryControlPlaneStore | None = None,
+        *,
+        policy_evaluator: PolicyEvaluator | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.store = store or InMemoryControlPlaneStore()
+        self.policy_evaluator = policy_evaluator or self._default_policy
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _default_policy(
+        context: RequestContext,
+        action: str,
+        resource: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> PolicyDecision:
+        del resource
+        role_requirements = {
+            "tenant.register": {"platform_admin"},
+            "tenant.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+            "agent.register": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "agent.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.create": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.approve": {"tenant_admin", "approver", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.start": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.complete": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.fail": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.cancel": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "approver", "platform_admin"},
+            "audit.read": {"tenant_admin", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+        }
+        required = role_requirements.get(action, {"platform_admin"})
+        allowed = bool(context.roles.intersection(required))
+        return PolicyDecision(
+            allowed=allowed,
+            reason="role_allowed" if allowed else "required_role_missing",
+            policy_version=context.policy_version,
+        )
+
+    def _require_context(self, context: RequestContext) -> None:
+        if not context.principal_id or not context.tenant_id or not context.trace_id:
+            raise Unauthorized("authenticated tenant context is required")
+
+    def _authorize(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        action: str,
+        resource: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> PolicyDecision:
+        self._require_context(context)
+        decision = self.policy_evaluator(context, action, resource)
+        if not decision.allowed:
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action=action,
+                resource_type=str(resource.get("resource_type", "policy")),
+                resource_id=str(resource.get("resource_id", "unknown")),
+                outcome="denied",
+                details={"reason": decision.reason},
+            )
+            raise PolicyDenied(f"{action} denied: {decision.reason}")
+        return decision
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_same_tenant(context: RequestContext, tenant_id: str) -> None:
+        if context.tenant_id != tenant_id and "platform_admin" not in context.roles:
+            raise TenantIsolationError("cross-tenant access denied")
+
+    def _audit(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        action: str,
+        resource_type: str,
+        resource_id: str,
+        outcome: str,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> AuditEvent:
+        event = AuditEvent(
+            event_id=_new_id("audit"),
+            tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+            principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+            action=action,
+            resource_type=resource_type,
+            resource_id=resource_id,
+            outcome=outcome,
+            policy_version=context.policy_version,
+            details=copy.deepcopy(dict(details or {})),
+        )
+        self.store.audit_events.append(event)
+        return event
+
+    def register_tenant(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        display_name: str,
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> TenantRecord:
+        tenant_id = tenant_id.strip()
+        if not tenant_id or not display_name.strip():
+            raise ValueError("tenant_id and display_name are required")
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "tenant.register",
+            {"resource_type": "tenant", "resource_id": tenant_id},
+        )
+        self._assert_same_tenant(context, tenant_id)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            if tenant_id in self.store.tenants:
+                raise ControlPlaneError(f"tenant already exists: {tenant_id}")
+            tenant = TenantRecord(
+                tenant_id=tenant_id,
+                display_name=display_name.strip(),
+                metadata=copy.deepcopy(dict(metadata or {})),
+            )
+            self.store.tenants[tenant_id] = tenant
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action="tenant.register",
+                resource_type="tenant",
+                resource_id=tenant_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+            )
+            return tenant
+
+    def get_tenant(self, context: RequestContext, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> TenantRecord:
+        tenant_id = tenant_id or context.tenant_id
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "tenant.read",
+            {"resource_type": "tenant", "resource_id": tenant_id},
+        )
+        self._assert_same_tenant(context, tenant_id)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            tenant = self.store.tenants.get(tenant_id)
+            if tenant is None:
+                raise NotFound("tenant not found")
+            return tenant
+
+    def register_agent(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        agent_id: str,
+        display_name: str,
+        runtime: str,
+        capabilities: Iterable[str] = (),
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> AgentRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "agent.register",
+            {"resource_type": "agent", "resource_id": agent_id},
+        )
+        tenant = self.get_tenant(context)
+        if tenant.status != "active":
+            raise ControlPlaneError("tenant is not active")
+        normalized_capabilities = tuple(
+            sorted({str(item).strip() for item in capabilities if str(item).strip()})
+        )
+        if not agent_id.strip() or not display_name.strip() or not runtime.strip():
+            raise ValueError("agent_id, display_name and runtime are required")
+        with self.store.lock:
+            existing = self.store.agents.get(agent_id)
+            if existing is not None and existing.tenant_id != context.tenant_id:
+                raise TenantIsolationError("agent id belongs to another tenant")
+            if existing is not None:
+                raise ControlPlaneError(f"agent already exists: {agent_id}")
+            agent = AgentRecord(
+                agent_id=agent_id.strip(),
+                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+                display_name=display_name.strip(),
+                runtime=runtime.strip(),
+                capabilities=normalized_capabilities,
+                metadata=copy.deepcopy(dict(metadata or {})),
+            )
+            self.store.agents[agent.agent_id] = agent
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action="agent.register",
+                resource_type="agent",
+                resource_id=agent.agent_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+                details={"runtime": agent.runtime},
+            )
+            return agent
+
+    def get_agent(self, context: RequestContext, agent_id: str) -> AgentRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "agent.read",
+            {"resource_type": "agent", "resource_id": agent_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            agent = self.store.agents.get(agent_id)
+            if agent is None:
+                raise NotFound("agent not found")
+            self._assert_same_tenant(context, agent.tenant_id)
+            return agent
+
+    def list_agents(self, context: RequestContext) -> list[AgentRecord]:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "agent.read",
+            {"resource_type": "agent_collection", "resource_id": context.tenant_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return [
+                agent
+                for agent in self.store.agents.values()
+                if agent.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
+            ]
+
+    def create_task(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        agent_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        idempotency_key: str | None = None,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "task.create",
+            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": idempotency_key or "new"},
+        )
+        agent = self.get_agent(context, agent_id)
+        if not agent.enabled:
+            raise ControlPlaneError("agent is disabled")
+        if action not in agent.capabilities and "*" not in agent.capabilities:
+            raise PolicyDenied(f"agent does not advertise capability: {action}")
+        normalized_payload = copy.deepcopy(dict(payload or {}))
+        request_digest = _canonical_digest(
+            {"agent_id": agent_id, "action": action, "payload": normalized_payload}
+        )
+        normalized_key = idempotency_key.strip() if idempotency_key else None
+        with self.store.lock:
+            if normalized_key:
+                idempotency_ref = (context.tenant_id, normalized_key)
+                existing = self.store.idempotency.get(idempotency_ref)
+                if existing is not None:
+                    existing_task_id, existing_digest = existing
+                    if existing_digest != request_digest:
+                        raise IdempotencyConflict(
+                            "idempotency key was reused with a different request"
+                        )
+                    return self.store.tasks[existing_task_id]
+            task = TaskRecord(
+                task_id=_new_id("task"),
+                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+                agent_id=agent_id,
+                action=action,
+                payload=normalized_payload,
+                idempotency_key=normalized_key,
+                request_digest=request_digest,
+                created_by=context.principal_id,
+            )
+            self.store.tasks[task.task_id] = task
+            if normalized_key:
+                self.store.idempotency[(context.tenant_id, normalized_key)] = (
+                    task.task_id,
+                    request_digest,
+                )
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action="task.create",
+                resource_type="task",
+                resource_id=task.task_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+                details={"agent_id": agent_id, "action": action},
+            )
+            return task
+
+    def get_task(self, context: RequestContext, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "task.read",
+            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": task_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            task = self.store.tasks.get(task_id)
+            if task is None:
+                raise NotFound("task not found")
+            self._assert_same_tenant(context, task.tenant_id)
+            return task
+
+    def list_tasks(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        states: Iterable[TaskState | str] | None = None,
+    ) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "task.read",
+            {"resource_type": "task_collection", "resource_id": context.tenant_id},
+        )
+        state_filter = (
+            {TaskState(item) for item in states}
+            if states is not None
+            else None
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return [
+                task
+                for task in self.store.tasks.values()
+                if task.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
+                and (state_filter is None or task.state in state_filter)
+            ]
+
+    def transition_task(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        target_state: TaskState | str,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+        result: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        target = TaskState(target_state)
+        action_name = {
+            TaskState.APPROVED: "task.approve",
+            TaskState.RUNNING: "task.start",
+            TaskState.COMPLETED: "task.complete",
+            TaskState.FAILED: "task.fail",
+            TaskState.CANCELLED: "task.cancel",
+        }.get(target)
+        if action_name is None:
+            raise InvalidTransition(f"cannot transition to {target.value}")
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            action_name,
+            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": task_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            current = self.store.tasks.get(task_id)
+            if current is None:
+                raise NotFound("task not found")
+            self._assert_same_tenant(context, current.tenant_id)
+            if expected_revision is not None and current.revision != expected_revision:
+                raise RevisionConflict(
+                    f"expected revision {expected_revision}, current {current.revision}"
+                )
+            if target not in ALLOWED_TASK_TRANSITIONS[current.state]:
+                raise InvalidTransition(
+                    f"invalid transition {current.state.value} -> {target.value}"
+                )
+            if target == TaskState.COMPLETED and result is None:
+                raise ValueError("completed task requires result")
+            if target == TaskState.FAILED and error is None:
+                raise ValueError("failed task requires error")
+            updated = TaskRecord(
+                task_id=current.task_id,
+                tenant_id=current.tenant_id,
+                agent_id=current.agent_id,
+                action=current.action,
+                payload=current.payload,
+                state=target,
+                revision=current.revision + 1,
+                idempotency_key=current.idempotency_key,
+                request_digest=current.request_digest,
+                result=copy.deepcopy(dict(result)) if result is not None else current.result,
+                error=copy.deepcopy(dict(error)) if error is not None else current.error,
+                created_by=current.created_by,
+                approved_by=(
+                    context.principal_id
+                    if target == TaskState.APPROVED
+                    else current.approved_by
+                ),
+                created_at=current.created_at,
+                updated_at=_utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.tasks[task_id] = updated
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action=action_name,
+                resource_type="task",
+                resource_id=task_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+                details={
+                    "from": current.state.value,
+                    "to": target.value,
+                    "revision": updated.revision,
+                },
+            )
+            return updated
+
+    def list_audit_events(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        resource_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> list[AuditEvent]:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "audit.read",
+            {"resource_type": "audit", "resource_id": resource_id or context.tenant_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return [
+                event
+                for event in self.store.audit_events
+                if event.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
+                and (resource_id is None or event.resource_id == resource_id)
+            ]
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+"""Git-backed agent execution evidence for AIOS V2.
+
+Evidence is tenant-scoped, append-friendly, and contains no runtime credentials.
+It provides a deterministic source for claim, heartbeat, progress, result and
+verification state across Codex, OpenClaw and Hermes executors.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import threading
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _safe(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return json.loads(json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, default=str))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionEvidence:
+    execution_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    executor: str
+    branch: str
+    status: str = "claimed"
+    progress_completed: int = 0
+    progress_total: int = 1
+    current_step: str = "claim"
+    last_commit: str | None = None
+    test_status: str = "not_run"
+    test_summary: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    result_summary: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    claimed_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    heartbeat_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    completed_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "execution_id",
+            "tenant_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "agent_id",
+            "executor",
+            "branch",
+            "status",
+            "current_step",
+            "claimed_at",
+            "heartbeat_at",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        if self.progress_completed < 0 or self.progress_total < 1:
+            raise ValueError("invalid progress values")
+        if self.progress_completed > self.progress_total:
+            raise ValueError("progress_completed cannot exceed progress_total")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "test_summary", _safe(self.test_summary))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "result_summary", _safe(self.result_summary))
+
+
+class ExecutionTracker:
+    """Persist one JSON evidence record per tenant and execution."""
+
+    def __init__(self, root: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root).resolve()
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _component(value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = _required(value, "path component")
+        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
+            raise ValueError("invalid evidence path component")
+        return normalized
+
+    def _path(self, tenant_id: str, execution_id: str) -> Path:
+        tenant = self._component(tenant_id)
+        execution = self._component(execution_id)
+        return self.root / tenant / f"{execution}.json"
+
+    def claim(self, evidence: ExecutionEvidence) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        path = self._path(evidence.tenant_id, evidence.execution_id)
+        with self._lock:
+            if path.exists():
+                current = self._read(path)
+                if current.task_id != evidence.task_id or current.agent_id != evidence.agent_id:
+                    raise RuntimeError("execution_id already belongs to another task")
+                return current
+            self._write(path, evidence)
+            return evidence
+
+    def heartbeat(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        execution_id: str,
+        status: str | None = None,
+        current_step: str | None = None,
+        progress_completed: int | None = None,
+        progress_total: int | None = None,
+        last_commit: str | None = None,
+    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        path = self._path(tenant_id, execution_id)
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self._read(path)
+            updated = replace(
+                current,
+                status=status or current.status,
+                current_step=current_step or current.current_step,
+                progress_completed=(
+                    progress_completed
+                    if progress_completed is not None
+                    else current.progress_completed
+                ),
+                progress_total=(
+                    progress_total if progress_total is not None else current.progress_total
+                ),
+                last_commit=last_commit or current.last_commit,
+                heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self._write(path, updated)
+            return updated
+
+    def complete(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        execution_id: str,
+        status: str,
+        test_status: str,
+        test_summary: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        result_summary: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        last_commit: str | None = None,
+    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        path = self._path(tenant_id, execution_id)
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self._read(path)
+            updated = replace(
+                current,
+                status=_required(status, "status"),
+                current_step="complete",
+                progress_completed=current.progress_total,
+                last_commit=last_commit or current.last_commit,
+                test_status=_required(test_status, "test_status"),
+                test_summary=_safe(test_summary),
+                result_summary=_safe(result_summary),
+                heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+                completed_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self._write(path, updated)
+            return updated
+
+    def get(self, *, tenant_id: str, execution_id: str) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        return self._read(self._path(tenant_id, execution_id))
+
+    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[ExecutionEvidence]:
+        tenant_dir = self.root / self._component(tenant_id)
+        if not tenant_dir.exists():
+            return []
+        records = [self._read(path) for path in tenant_dir.glob("*.json")]
+        return sorted(records, key=lambda item: (item.heartbeat_at, item.execution_id), reverse=True)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _read(path: Path) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+            raise KeyError("execution evidence not found") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise RuntimeError("invalid execution evidence file")
+        return ExecutionEvidence(**dict(value))
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _write(path: Path, evidence: ExecutionEvidence) -> None:
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        temporary = path.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
+        temporary.write_text(
+            json.dumps(asdict(evidence), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+"""HTTP/JSON gateway for the AIOS V2 control plane.
+
+The gateway is intentionally runtime-neutral: browsers and external clients
+call this API, while OpenClaw and Hermes remain behind authenticated adapters.
+Identity headers are accepted only from a trusted reverse proxy in v1; direct
+public exposure is prohibited until signed identity middleware is enabled.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import urllib.parse
+from enum import Enum
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    ControlPlaneError,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    IdempotencyConflict,
+    InvalidTransition,
+    NotFound,
+    PolicyDenied,
+    RequestContext,
+    RevisionConflict,
+    TaskState,
+    TenantIsolationError,
+    Unauthorized,
+)
+
+
+TENANT_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Tenant-ID"
+PRINCIPAL_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Principal-ID"
+ROLES_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Roles"
+TRACE_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Trace-ID"
+SESSION_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Session-ID"
+POLICY_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Policy-Version"
+AUTHENTICATED_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Authenticated"
+
+_RESOURCE_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,191}$")
+
+
+def _json_value(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if dataclasses.is_dataclass(value):
+        return {
+            field.name: _json_value(getattr(value, field.name))
+            for field in dataclasses.fields(value)
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, Enum):
+        return value.value
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return {str(key): _json_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
+        return [_json_value(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_mapping(value: Any, *, label: str = "JSON body") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_resource_id(value: Any, *, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not _RESOURCE_ID_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {label}")
+    return normalized
+
+
+class GatewayApplication:
+    """Pure request router that can be tested without a listening socket."""
+
+    def __init__(self, service: ControlPlaneService | None = None) -> None:
+        self.service = service or ControlPlaneService()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def context_from_headers(headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext:
+        authenticated = str(headers.get(AUTHENTICATED_HEADER, "")).strip().lower()
+        if authenticated not in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
+            raise Unauthorized("trusted authentication assertion is required")
+        roles = [
+            role.strip()
+            for role in str(headers.get(ROLES_HEADER, "")).split(",")
+            if role.strip()
+        ]
+        return RequestContext.create(
+            tenant_id=str(headers.get(TENANT_HEADER, "")),
+            principal_id=str(headers.get(PRINCIPAL_HEADER, "")),
+            trace_id=str(headers.get(TRACE_HEADER, "")).strip() or None,
+            session_id=str(headers.get(SESSION_HEADER, "")).strip() or None,
+            policy_version=str(headers.get(POLICY_HEADER, "v1")).strip() or "v1",
+            roles=roles,
+        )
+
+    def handle(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        raw_path: str,
+        headers: Mapping[str, str],
+        body: Any = None,
+    ) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw_path)
+        path = parsed.path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        query = urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=False)
+        method = method.upper()
+
+        if method == "GET" and path in {"/healthz", "/api/v2/health"}:
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "service": "aios-v2-control-plane",
+                "status": "ok",
+                "store": type(self.service.store).__name__,
+            }
+
+        context = self.context_from_headers(headers)
+        payload = _require_mapping(body or {})
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/tenants":
+            tenant = self.service.register_tenant(
+                context,
+                tenant_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("tenant_id"), label="tenant_id"),
+                display_name=str(payload.get("display_name", "")),
+                metadata=_require_mapping(payload.get("metadata", {}), label="metadata"),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"tenant": _json_value(tenant)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/tenants/current":
+            tenant = self.service.get_tenant(context)
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"tenant": _json_value(tenant)}
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/agents":
+            agent = self.service.register_agent(
+                context,
+                agent_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("agent_id"), label="agent_id"),
+                display_name=str(payload.get("display_name", "")),
+                runtime=str(payload.get("runtime", "")),
+                capabilities=payload.get("capabilities", ()),
+                metadata=_require_mapping(payload.get("metadata", {}), label="metadata"),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"agent": _json_value(agent)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/agents":
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "agents": _json_value(self.service.list_agents(context))
+            }
+
+        agent_match = re.fullmatch(r"/api/v2/agents/([^/]+)", path)
+        if method == "GET" and agent_match:
+            agent_id = _require_resource_id(
+                urllib.parse.unquote(agent_match.group(1)), label="agent_id"
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "agent": _json_value(self.service.get_agent(context, agent_id))
+            }
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/tasks":
+            task = self.service.create_task(
+                context,
+                agent_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("agent_id"), label="agent_id"),
+                action=str(payload.get("action", "")).strip(),
+                payload=_require_mapping(payload.get("payload", {}), label="payload"),
+                idempotency_key=(
+                    str(payload["idempotency_key"]).strip()
+                    if payload.get("idempotency_key") is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"task": _json_value(task)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/tasks":
+            requested_states = query.get("state")
+            tasks = self.service.list_tasks(context, states=requested_states)
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"tasks": _json_value(tasks)}
+
+        task_match = re.fullmatch(r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)", path)
+        if method == "GET" and task_match:
+            task_id = _require_resource_id(
+                urllib.parse.unquote(task_match.group(1)), label="task_id"
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "task": _json_value(self.service.get_task(context, task_id))
+            }
+
+        transition_match = re.fullmatch(
+            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/(approve|start|complete|fail|cancel)", path
+        )
+        if method == "POST" and transition_match:
+            task_id = _require_resource_id(
+                urllib.parse.unquote(transition_match.group(1)), label="task_id"
+            )
+            transition = transition_match.group(2)
+            target = {
+                "approve": TaskState.APPROVED,
+                "start": TaskState.RUNNING,
+                "complete": TaskState.COMPLETED,
+                "fail": TaskState.FAILED,
+                "cancel": TaskState.CANCELLED,
+            }[transition]
+            expected_revision = payload.get("expected_revision")
+            if expected_revision is not None:
+                expected_revision = int(expected_revision)
+            task = self.service.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task_id,
+                target_state=target,
+                expected_revision=expected_revision,
+                result=(
+                    _require_mapping(payload.get("result"), label="result")
+                    if payload.get("result") is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+                error=(
+                    _require_mapping(payload.get("error"), label="error")
+                    if payload.get("error") is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"task": _json_value(task)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/audit":
+            resource_id = query.get("resource_id", [None])[0]
+            events = self.service.list_audit_events(
+                context,
+                resource_id=(
+                    _require_resource_id(resource_id, label="resource_id")
+                    if resource_id
+                    else None
+                ),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"events": _json_value(events)}
+
+        return HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, {
+            "error": "not_found",
+            "message": "route not found",
+        }
+
+
+_ERROR_STATUS: tuple[tuple[type[BaseException], HTTPStatus], ...] = (
+    (Unauthorized, HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED),
+    (PolicyDenied, HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN),
+    (TenantIsolationError, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
+    (NotFound, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
+    (IdempotencyConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (RevisionConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (InvalidTransition, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (ValueError, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST),
+    (ControlPlaneError, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST),
+)
+
+
+def error_response(exc: BaseException) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
+    for error_type, status in _ERROR_STATUS:
+        if isinstance(exc, error_type):
+            return status, {
+                "error": error_type.__name__,
+                "message": str(exc),
+            }
+    return HTTPStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, {
+        "error": "InternalServerError",
+        "message": "internal server error",
+    }
+
+
+class GatewayRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "AIOSV2Gateway/1.0"
+    max_body_bytes = 1_048_576
+
+    @property
+    def application(self) -> GatewayApplication:
+        return self.server.application  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+    def _read_body(self) -> Any:
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or "0")
+        if length < 0 or length > self.max_body_bytes:
+            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
+        if length == 0:
+            return {}
+        content_type = self.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0].strip()
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise ValueError("Content-Type must be application/json")
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+        return json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _send_json(self, status: int, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            _json_value(payload), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(int(status))
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _dispatch(self, method: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            body = self._read_body() if method in {"POST", "PUT", "PATCH"} else {}
+            status, payload = self.application.handle(
+                method,
+                self.path,
+                {key: value for key, value in self.headers.items()},
+                body,
+            )
+        except BaseException as exc:  # handler boundary; sanitized below
+            status, payload = error_response(exc)
+        self._send_json(status, payload)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("POST")
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
+        # Production deployment routes structured access logs through the
+        # reverse proxy; do not log identity headers or request bodies here.
+        super().log_message(format, *args)
+
+
+class GatewayHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    daemon_threads = True
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        server_address: tuple[str, int],
+        application: GatewayApplication,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.application = application
+        super().__init__(server_address, GatewayRequestHandler)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    host = os.getenv("AIOS_V2_GATEWAY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_GATEWAY_PORT", "18920"))
+    server = GatewayHTTPServer((host, port), GatewayApplication())
+    print(f"AIOS V2 control-plane gateway listening on {host}:{port}")
+    server.serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+"""Sanitized GitOps runtime status for the AIOS Web control plane."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitOpsStatus:
+    available: bool
+    service_status: str
+    workspace_mode: str
+    workspace_branch: str | None
+    workspace_ref: str | None
+    workspace_dirty: bool | None
+    candidate_branch: str
+    release_channel: str
+    release_version: str
+    sync_status: str
+    details: Mapping[str, Any]
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def _run_git(worktree: Path, *args: str) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
+    process = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", str(worktree), *args],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=5,
+    )
+    return process.returncode, process.stdout.strip(), process.stderr.strip()
+
+
+def collect_gitops_status() -> GitOpsStatus:
+    """Return only non-sensitive Git/workspace metadata.
+
+    Remote URLs, environment values, credentials, filesystem contents and
+    command stderr are deliberately excluded from the Web response.
+    """
+
+    candidate_branch = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_CANDIDATE_BRANCH",
+        "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
+    )
+    release_channel = os.getenv("AIOS_RELEASE_CHANNEL", "candidate")
+    release_version = os.getenv("AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION", "V2R1C0-candidate")
+    sync_status = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SYNC_STATUS", "unknown")
+    worktree = Path(
+        os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_WORKTREE",
+            "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller",
+        )
+    )
+
+    if not worktree.is_dir():
+        return GitOpsStatus(
+            available=False,
+            service_status="unknown",
+            workspace_mode="unavailable",
+            workspace_branch=None,
+            workspace_ref=None,
+            workspace_dirty=None,
+            candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
+            release_channel=release_channel,
+            release_version=release_version,
+            sync_status=sync_status,
+            details={"reason": "controller_worktree_unavailable"},
+        )
+
+    inside_code, inside, _ = _run_git(worktree, "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree")
+    if inside_code != 0 or inside != "true":
+        return GitOpsStatus(
+            available=False,
+            service_status="unknown",
+            workspace_mode="invalid",
+            workspace_branch=None,
+            workspace_ref=None,
+            workspace_dirty=None,
+            candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
+            release_channel=release_channel,
+            release_version=release_version,
+            sync_status=sync_status,
+            details={"reason": "controller_worktree_invalid"},
+        )
+
+    branch_code, branch, _ = _run_git(worktree, "branch", "--show-current")
+    ref_code, ref_value, _ = _run_git(worktree, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+    dirty_code, dirty_value, _ = _run_git(worktree, "status", "--porcelain=v1")
+
+    service_status = "unknown"
+    try:
+        process = subprocess.run(
+            ["systemctl", "is-active", "aios-gitops-model-api"],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=3,
+        )
+        service_status = process.stdout.strip() or "inactive"
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        service_status = "unavailable"
+
+    branch_value = branch if branch_code == 0 and branch else None
+    return GitOpsStatus(
+        available=True,
+        service_status=service_status,
+        workspace_mode="branch" if branch_value else "detached",
+        workspace_branch=branch_value,
+        workspace_ref=ref_value if ref_code == 0 else None,
+        workspace_dirty=bool(dirty_value) if dirty_code == 0 else None,
+        candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
+        release_channel=release_channel,
+        release_version=release_version,
+        sync_status=sync_status,
+        details={
+            "controller_clean": dirty_code == 0 and not dirty_value,
+            "controller_detached": branch_code == 0 and not branch,
+        },
+    )
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+"""AIOS V2 execution orchestrator.
+
+The orchestrator is the only component allowed to translate an approved AIOS
+task into an OpenClaw command or Hermes job. OpenClaw and Hermes remain pure
+execution runtimes and never own tenant policy or task lifecycle.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJob, HermesResult
+from aios_openclaw import (
+    CommandState,
+    OpenClawAdapter,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    sign_command,
+)
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    AgentRecord,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    RequestContext,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskState,
+)
+
+
+class OrchestrationError(RuntimeError):
+    """AIOS failed to dispatch or reconcile a runtime execution."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DispatchRecord:
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    runtime: str
+    runtime_execution_id: str
+    state: str
+    trace_id: str
+
+
+class ExecutionOrchestrator:
+    """Dispatch approved AIOS tasks to runtime adapters and reconcile results."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        control_plane: ControlPlaneService,
+        *,
+        openclaw: OpenClawAdapter | None = None,
+        hermes: HermesAdapter | None = None,
+        openclaw_signing_material_resolver=None,
+        openclaw_key_id: str = "default",
+        default_cell_id: str = "default",
+        default_profile_id: str = "default",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.control_plane = control_plane
+        self.openclaw = openclaw
+        self.hermes = hermes
+        self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver = openclaw_signing_material_resolver
+        self.openclaw_key_id = openclaw_key_id
+        self.default_cell_id = default_cell_id
+        self.default_profile_id = default_profile_id
+        self._dispatches: dict[tuple[str, str], DispatchRecord] = {}
+
+    def dispatch(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        timeout_seconds: float | None = None,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord:
+        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, task_id)
+        if task.state != TaskState.APPROVED:
+            raise OrchestrationError("only APPROVED tasks may be dispatched")
+        agent = self.control_plane.get_agent(context, task.agent_id)
+        existing = self._dispatches.get((task.tenant_id, task.task_id))
+        if existing is not None:
+            return existing
+
+        running = self.control_plane.transition_task(
+            context,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            target_state=TaskState.RUNNING,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+        )
+
+        runtime = agent.runtime.strip().lower()
+        try:
+            if runtime == "openclaw":
+                record = self._dispatch_openclaw(
+                    context,
+                    agent,
+                    running,
+                    timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
+                )
+            elif runtime == "hermes":
+                record = self._dispatch_hermes(context, agent, running)
+            else:
+                raise OrchestrationError(f"unsupported runtime: {agent.runtime}")
+        except Exception as exc:
+            current = self.control_plane.get_task(context, task.task_id)
+            if current.state == TaskState.RUNNING:
+                self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                    context,
+                    task_id=task.task_id,
+                    target_state=TaskState.FAILED,
+                    expected_revision=current.revision,
+                    error={"code": "dispatch_failed", "message": str(exc)},
+                )
+            raise
+
+        self._dispatches[(task.tenant_id, task.task_id)] = record
+        return record
+
+    def _dispatch_openclaw(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        agent: AgentRecord,
+        task: TaskRecord,
+        *,
+        timeout_seconds: float | None,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord:
+        if self.openclaw is None or self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver is None:
+            raise OrchestrationError("OpenClaw runtime is not configured")
+        key_material = self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver(
+            task.tenant_id,
+            self.openclaw_key_id,
+        )
+        command = OpenClawCommand.create(
+            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+            action=task.action,
+            payload=task.payload,
+            idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id,
+            key_id=self.openclaw_key_id,
+        )
+        command = sign_command(command, key_material)
+        result = self.openclaw.execute(command, timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds)
+        self.reconcile_openclaw(context, result)
+        return DispatchRecord(
+            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+            runtime="openclaw",
+            runtime_execution_id=command.command_id,
+            state=result.state.value,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+        )
+
+    def _dispatch_hermes(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        agent: AgentRecord,
+        task: TaskRecord,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord:
+        if self.hermes is None:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes runtime is not configured")
+        metadata = dict(agent.metadata)
+        job = HermesJob.create(
+            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+            cell_id=str(metadata.get("cell_id") or self.default_cell_id),
+            profile_id=str(metadata.get("profile_id") or self.default_profile_id),
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+            action=task.action,
+            payload=task.payload,
+            idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id,
+            priority=int(metadata.get("priority", 100)),
+        )
+        queued = self.hermes.enqueue(job)
+        return DispatchRecord(
+            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+            runtime="hermes",
+            runtime_execution_id=queued.job_id,
+            state=queued.state.value,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+        )
+
+    def reconcile_openclaw(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        result: OpenClawResult,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, result.task_id)
+        if result.tenant_id != task.tenant_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError("OpenClaw result tenant mismatch")
+        if task.state != TaskState.RUNNING:
+            return task
+        if result.state == CommandState.COMPLETED:
+            return self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task.task_id,
+                target_state=TaskState.COMPLETED,
+                expected_revision=task.revision,
+                result=result.output or {},
+            )
+        if result.state in {
+            CommandState.FAILED,
+            CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+            CommandState.REJECTED,
+        }:
+            return self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task.task_id,
+                target_state=TaskState.FAILED,
+                expected_revision=task.revision,
+                error=result.error or {"code": result.state.value.lower()},
+            )
+        if result.state == CommandState.CANCELLED:
+            return self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task.task_id,
+                target_state=TaskState.CANCELLED,
+                expected_revision=task.revision,
+            )
+        return task
+
+    def reconcile_hermes(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        result: HermesResult,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, result.task_id)
+        if result.tenant_id != task.tenant_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes result tenant mismatch")
+        if task.state != TaskState.RUNNING:
+            return task
+        if result.state.value == "COMPLETED":
+            return self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task.task_id,
+                target_state=TaskState.COMPLETED,
+                expected_revision=task.revision,
+                result=result.output or {},
+            )
+        if result.state.value == "FAILED":
+            return self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task.task_id,
+                target_state=TaskState.FAILED,
+                expected_revision=task.revision,
+                error=result.error or {"code": "hermes_failed"},
+            )
+        if result.state.value == "CANCELLED":
+            return self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task.task_id,
+                target_state=TaskState.CANCELLED,
+                expected_revision=task.revision,
+            )
+        return task
+
+    def dispatch_snapshot(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> Mapping[str, DispatchRecord]:
+        return {
+            task_id: record
+            for (record_tenant, task_id), record in self._dispatches.items()
+            if record_tenant == tenant_id
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Durable single-process persistence for the AIOS V2 control plane.
+
+The candidate uses an atomic SQLite snapshot so a gateway restart does not lose
+tenants, agents, task state, idempotency records, or audit events.  The domain
+service remains storage-agnostic; a later HA backend can replace this module
+without changing API or runtime-adapter contracts.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from dataclasses import asdict
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    AgentRecord,
+    AuditEvent,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskState,
+    TenantRecord,
+)
+
+
+class SQLiteSnapshotRepository:
+    """Store one versioned control-plane snapshot in SQLite."""
+
+    SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        return connection
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS control_plane_snapshot (
+                    singleton_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (singleton_id = 1),
+                    schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+                )
+                """
+            )
+
+    def load(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT schema_version, payload_json FROM control_plane_snapshot WHERE singleton_id = 1"
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return None
+        schema_version, payload_json = row
+        if int(schema_version) != self.SCHEMA_VERSION:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"unsupported control-plane snapshot version: {schema_version}"
+            )
+        decoded = json.loads(str(payload_json))
+        if not isinstance(decoded, dict):
+            raise RuntimeError("invalid control-plane snapshot")
+        return decoded
+
+    def save(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            payload,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+            default=str,
+        )
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO control_plane_snapshot (
+                    singleton_id, schema_version, payload_json, updated_at
+                ) VALUES (1, ?, ?, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP)
+                ON CONFLICT(singleton_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    schema_version = excluded.schema_version,
+                    payload_json = excluded.payload_json,
+                    updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+                """,
+                (self.SCHEMA_VERSION, encoded),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+
+
+class DurableControlPlaneService(ControlPlaneService):
+    """Control-plane service that persists after every successful mutation."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        repository: SQLiteSnapshotRepository,
+        *,
+        policy_evaluator=None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.repository = repository
+        store = InMemoryControlPlaneStore()
+        self._restore(store, repository.load())
+        super().__init__(store, policy_evaluator=policy_evaluator)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _restore(
+        store: InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
+        snapshot: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not snapshot:
+            return
+        for item in snapshot.get("tenants", []):
+            record = TenantRecord(**item)
+            store.tenants[record.tenant_id] = record
+        for item in snapshot.get("agents", []):
+            normalized = dict(item)
+            normalized["capabilities"] = tuple(normalized.get("capabilities", ()))
+            record = AgentRecord(**normalized)
+            store.agents[record.agent_id] = record
+        for item in snapshot.get("tasks", []):
+            normalized = dict(item)
+            normalized["state"] = TaskState(normalized["state"])
+            record = TaskRecord(**normalized)
+            store.tasks[record.task_id] = record
+        store.audit_events.extend(AuditEvent(**item) for item in snapshot.get("audit", []))
+        for item in snapshot.get("idempotency", []):
+            store.idempotency[(item["tenant_id"], item["key"])] = (
+                item["task_id"],
+                item["digest"],
+            )
+
+    def _snapshot(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return {
+                "schema_version": self.repository.SCHEMA_VERSION,
+                "tenants": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.tenants.values()],
+                "agents": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.agents.values()],
+                "tasks": [
+                    {**asdict(item), "state": item.state.value}
+                    for item in self.store.tasks.values()
+                ],
+                "audit": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.audit_events],
+                "idempotency": [
+                    {
+                        "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+                        "key": key,
+                        "task_id": task_id,
+                        "digest": digest,
+                    }
+                    for (tenant_id, key), (task_id, digest)
+                    in self.store.idempotency.items()
+                ],
+            }
+
+    def _mutate(self, operation: Callable[[], Any]) -> Any:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            result = operation()
+            self.repository.save(self._snapshot())
+            return result
+
+    def register_tenant(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).register_tenant(*args, **kwargs))
+
+    def register_agent(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).register_agent(*args, **kwargs))
+
+    def create_task(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).create_task(*args, **kwargs))
+
+    def transition_task(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).transition_task(*args, **kwargs))
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-"""Append-only audit chain for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import sqlite3
-from typing import Any
-
-from .tenant_context import canonical_json, isoformat, require_ident
-
-
-class AuditLog:
-    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.database = str(database)
-        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
-            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-            db.execute(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
-                    seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    payload TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    previous_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                )
-                """
-            )
-
-    def append(self, *, tenant_id: str, trace_id: str, event_type: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        trace_id = require_ident("trace_id", trace_id)
-        event_type = require_ident("event_type", event_type)
-        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
-            previous = db.execute(
-                "SELECT event_hash FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1"
-            ).fetchone()
-            previous_hash = previous[0] if previous else "GENESIS"
-            body = {
-                "tenant_id": tenant_id,
-                "trace_id": trace_id,
-                "event_type": event_type,
-                "payload": payload,
-                "previous_hash": previous_hash,
-                "created_at": isoformat(),
-            }
-            digest = hashlib.sha256(
-                canonical_json(body)
-            ).hexdigest()
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO audit_events VALUES(NULL,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (
-                    tenant_id,
-                    trace_id,
-                    event_type,
-                    json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False),
-                    previous_hash,
-                    digest,
-                    body["created_at"],
-                ),
-            )
-            return digest
-
-    def verify(self) -> bool:
-        previous = "GENESIS"
-        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
-            rows = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id,trace_id,event_type,payload,previous_hash,event_hash,created_at "
-                "FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq"
-            )
-            for row in rows:
-                body = {
-                    "tenant_id": row[0],
-                    "trace_id": row[1],
-                    "event_type": row[2],
-                    "payload": json.loads(row[3]),
-                    "previous_hash": row[4],
-                    "created_at": row[6],
-                }
-                if row[4] != previous:
-                    return False
-                digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(body)).hexdigest()
-                if digest != row[5]:
-                    return False
-                previous = digest
-        return True
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell lifecycle CLI primitives."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CellRecord:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    version: str
-    state: str
-    config_digest: str
-    created_at: str
-
-
-class CellManager:
-    def __init__(self, registry: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.registry = Path(registry)
-        self.registry.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if not self.registry.exists():
-            self.registry.write_text("{\"cells\":{}}\n", encoding="utf-8")
-
-    def _load(self) -> dict:
-        return json.loads(self.registry.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-
-    def _save(self, value: dict) -> None:
-        self.registry.write_text(
-            json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n",
-            encoding="utf-8",
-        )
-
-    def create(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, version: str, digest: str) -> CellRecord:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        data = self._load()
-        if tenant_id in data["cells"]:
-            raise ValidationError("tenant already has a cell")
-        record = CellRecord(
-            tenant_id,
-            cell_id,
-            version,
-            "created",
-            digest,
-            datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        )
-        data["cells"][tenant_id] = record.__dict__
-        self._save(data)
-        return record
-
-    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> CellRecord:
-        data = self._load()
-        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
-        if not item:
-            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
-        return CellRecord(**item)
-
-    def transition(self, tenant_id: str, state: str) -> CellRecord:
-        allowed = {"created", "starting", "healthy", "upgrading", "rollback", "failed"}
-        if state not in allowed:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid cell state")
-        data = self._load()
-        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
-        if not item:
-            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
-        item["state"] = state
-        self._save(data)
-        return CellRecord(**item)
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-"""The only V2R1 ingress adapter: verified context to routed ledger record."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime
-from threading import RLock
-from typing import Callable, Mapping, Any
-
-from .message_ledger import LedgerRecord, MessageLedger
-from .router import Route, TenantRouter
-from .session_pool import SessionLease, SessionPool
-from .tenant_context import CanonicalMessage, TenantContext, utc_now
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class IngressResult:
-    record: LedgerRecord
-    route: Route
-    session: SessionLease
-
-
-class ChannelAdapter:
-    """Fail-closed runtime ingress composition.
-
-    The adapter intentionally accepts no tenant or Cell authority outside the
-    signed context and TenantRouter.  A process lock keeps rollback handling
-    deterministic for a single runtime while SQLite protects cross-process
-    ledger writes.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        router: TenantRouter,
-        ledger: MessageLedger,
-        session_pool: SessionPool,
-        signing_key: bytes,
-        clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
-    ) -> None:
-        self._router = router
-        self._ledger = ledger
-        self._session_pool = session_pool
-        self._signing_key = signing_key
-        self._clock = clock
-        self._lock = RLock()
-
-    def ingest(self, *, token: str, message: Mapping[str, Any]) -> IngressResult:
-        with self._lock:
-            context = TenantContext.verify(token, self._signing_key, now=self._clock())
-            canonical = CanonicalMessage.from_mapping(message)
-            canonical.assert_context(context)
-            route = self._router.assert_context_route(context)
-            self._router.assert_message_route(canonical)
-            self._session_pool.assert_available(context, route)
-
-            existed = self._ledger.matches(canonical)
-            record = self._ledger.append(canonical)
-            try:
-                lease = self._session_pool.acquire(context, route)
-            except Exception:
-                if not existed:
-                    self._ledger.remove(record)
-                raise
-            return IngressResult(record=record, route=route, session=lease)
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-"""aios-cell command implementation for V2R1 Cell lifecycle."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import sys
-
-from .cell_manager import CellManager
-
-
-def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="aios-cell")
-    parser.add_argument("registry")
-    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
-
-    create = sub.add_parser("create")
-    create.add_argument("tenant_id")
-    create.add_argument("cell_id")
-    create.add_argument("version")
-    create.add_argument("digest")
-
-    status = sub.add_parser("status")
-    status.add_argument("tenant_id")
-
-    transition = sub.add_parser("transition")
-    transition.add_argument("tenant_id")
-    transition.add_argument("state")
-
-    return parser
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
-    manager = CellManager(args.registry)
-    if args.command == "create":
-        result = manager.create(args.tenant_id, args.cell_id, args.version, args.digest)
-    elif args.command == "status":
-        result = manager.status(args.tenant_id)
-    elif args.command == "transition":
-        result = manager.transition(args.tenant_id, args.state)
-    else:
-        return 2
-    print(json.dumps(result.__dict__, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    sys.exit(main())
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-"""OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, V2R1Error, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CellSpec:
-    tenant_id: str
-    image: str
-    runtime: str = "docker"
-    port: int | None = None
-    memory: str = "2g"
-    cpus: str = "2"
-    pids_limit: int = 512
-    network: str = "bridge"
-    env: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if self.runtime not in {"docker", "podman"}:
-            raise ValidationError("unsupported runtime")
-        if not self.image:
-            raise ValidationError("image required")
-
-
-class OpenClawFleet:
-    def __init__(self, binary: str = "openclaw") -> None:
-        self.binary = binary
-
-    def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        proc = subprocess.run(
-            [self.binary, *args],
-            check=False,
-            text=True,
-            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
-            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
-        )
-        if proc.returncode:
-            raise V2R1Error(proc.stderr.strip() or "openclaw command failed")
-        data = json.loads(proc.stdout or "{}")
-        if isinstance(data, dict):
-            return data
-        return {"result": data}
-
-    def create(self, spec: CellSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run([
-            "fleet", "create", spec.tenant_id,
-            "--image", spec.image,
-            "--runtime", spec.runtime,
-            "--json",
-        ])
-
-    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        return self._run(["fleet", "status", tenant_id, "--json"])
-
-    def doctor(self, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        args = ["fleet", "doctor"]
-        if tenant_id:
-            require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-            args.append(tenant_id)
-        args.append("--json")
-        return self._run(args)
-
-    def backup(self, tenant_id: str, output: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run(["fleet", "backup", tenant_id, "--out", str(output), "--json"])
-
-    def restore(self, tenant_id: str, archive: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run(["fleet", "restore", tenant_id, "--from", str(archive), "--json"])
-
-    def upgrade(self, tenant_id: str, image: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run(["fleet", "upgrade", tenant_id, "--image", image, "--json"])
-
-
-def load_inventory(path: str | Path) -> list[CellSpec]:
-    raw = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if raw.get("schema_version") != "aios.cells.v1":
-        raise ValidationError("invalid inventory schema")
-    result: list[CellSpec] = []
-    seen: set[str] = set()
-    for item in raw.get("cells", []):
-        spec = CellSpec(
-            tenant_id=item["tenant_id"],
-            image=item["image"],
-            runtime=item.get("runtime", "docker"),
-            port=item.get("port"),
-            env=tuple(item.get("env", [])),
-        )
-        if spec.tenant_id in seen:
-            raise ValidationError("duplicate tenant")
-        seen.add(spec.tenant_id)
-        result.append(spec)
-    if not result:
-        raise ValidationError("no cells")
-    return result
-
-
-def inventory_as_dict(items: list[CellSpec]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {"schema_version": "aios.cells.v1", "cells": [asdict(x) for x in items]}
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes shared agent fabric primitives."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from contextlib import closing
-from pathlib import Path
-import sqlite3
-from typing import Any
-
-from .tenant_context import (
-    CanonicalMessage,
-    ConflictError,
-    ScopeError,
-    ValidationError,
-    isoformat,
-    require_ident,
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class FabricJob:
-    job_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    profile_id: str
-    session_id: str
-    event_id: str
-    status: str = "queued"
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in (
-            "job_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "session_id", "event_id"
-        ):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if self.status not in {"queued", "running", "completed", "failed", "cancelled"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid job status")
-
-
-class HermesFabric:
-    """Shared scheduler storage with mandatory tenant partition keys."""
-
-    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.database = str(database)
-        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-            db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-            db.execute(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fabric_jobs (
-                    job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    profile_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                )
-                """
-            )
-            db.execute(
-                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fabric_tenant_queue "
-                "ON fabric_jobs(tenant_id, cell_id, status)"
-            )
-
-    def enqueue(
-        self,
-        *,
-        message: CanonicalMessage,
-        profile_id: str,
-    ) -> FabricJob:
-        profile_id = require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
-        if not message.command_capable:
-            raise ScopeError("non-command events cannot create execution jobs")
-        if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
-            raise ScopeError("only authenticated human commands can create jobs")
-        job = FabricJob(
-            job_id=f"job-{message.event_id}",
-            tenant_id=message.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=message.cell_id,
-            profile_id=profile_id,
-            session_id=message.session_id,
-            event_id=message.event_id,
-        )
-        now = isoformat()
-        conflict: ConflictError | None = None
-        try:
-            with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-                db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-                db.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO fabric_jobs VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                    (
-                        job.job_id,
-                        job.tenant_id,
-                        job.cell_id,
-                        job.profile_id,
-                        job.session_id,
-                        job.event_id,
-                        job.status,
-                        now,
-                        now,
-                    ),
-                )
-        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
-            conflict = ConflictError(
-                "fabric event already exists or violates queue uniqueness"
-            )
-        if conflict is not None:
-            raise conflict
-        return job
-
-    def claim(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, profile_id: str) -> FabricJob | None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
-        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM fabric_jobs WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? "
-                "AND profile_id=? AND status='queued' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1",
-                (tenant_id, cell_id, profile_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if not row:
-                db.commit()
-                return None
-            db.execute(
-                "UPDATE fabric_jobs SET status='running', updated_at=? WHERE job_id=?",
-                (isoformat(), row[0]),
-            )
-            db.commit()
-        return FabricJob(*row[:7])
-
-    def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-            count = db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM fabric_jobs").fetchone()[0]
-        return {
-            "component": "hermes_fabric",
-            "jobs": count,
-            "checked_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        }
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-"""Hermes shared fabric profile isolation primitives."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-import os
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class HermesProfile:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    profile_id: str
-    hermes_home: Path
-    workspace: Path
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if not self.hermes_home.is_absolute() or not self.workspace.is_absolute():
-            raise ValidationError("profile paths must be absolute")
-
-    @property
-    def environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        return {
-            "HERMES_HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
-            "HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
-            "AIOS_TENANT_ID": self.tenant_id,
-            "AIOS_CELL_ID": self.cell_id,
-            "AIOS_PROFILE_ID": self.profile_id,
-        }
-
-    def prepare(self) -> None:
-        self.hermes_home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        os.chmod(self.hermes_home, 0o700)
-        os.chmod(self.workspace, 0o700)
-
-    def assert_path_allowed(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        target = Path(path).resolve()
-        for root in (self.hermes_home.resolve(), self.workspace.resolve()):
-            if target == root or root in target.parents:
-                return
-        raise ValidationError("path escapes profile isolation boundary")
@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed identity binding for authenticated external ingress.
-
-External payload claims are not authority.  An HMAC-authenticated envelope is
-the sole factory for :class:`AuthenticatedPrincipal`; the resolver then checks
-every claim against the authoritative ``TenantRouter`` before the runtime signs
-an internal ``TenantContext``.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import re
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from .router import Route, TenantRouter
-from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, canonical_json, require_ident
-
-
-_PROVENANCE = object()
-_SIGNATURE_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-_SCOPE_FIELDS = (
-    "principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
-    "channel_account_id", "session_id", "message",
-)
-
-
-class AuthenticationError(ValidationError):
-    """Authentication or identity resolution failed without disclosing scope."""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, init=False)
-class AuthenticatedPrincipal:
-    """A principal which only the verified envelope factory can create."""
-
-    principal_id: str
-
-    def __init__(self, principal_id: str, *, _provenance: object) -> None:
-        if _provenance is not _PROVENANCE:
-            raise TypeError("AuthenticatedPrincipal is created by authenticated ingress only")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "principal_id", require_ident("principal_id", principal_id))
-
-    @classmethod
-    def _verified(cls, principal_id: str) -> "AuthenticatedPrincipal":
-        return cls(principal_id, _provenance=_PROVENANCE)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class IdentityClaims:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    session_id: str
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
-            require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuthenticatedIngress:
-    principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
-    claims: IdentityClaims
-    message: Mapping[str, Any]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RuntimeIdentity:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    session_id: str
-
-
-class IngressAuthenticator:
-    """Verify a canonical HMAC envelope before any identity lookup occurs."""
-
-    def __init__(self, hmac_key: bytes) -> None:
-        if not isinstance(hmac_key, bytes) or len(hmac_key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("ingress HMAC key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        self._hmac_key = hmac_key
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
-            raise ValidationError("ingress request must be an object")
-        if set(request) != {*_SCOPE_FIELDS, "signature"}:
-            raise ValidationError("ingress request fields are invalid")
-        values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS}
-        if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
-            raise ValidationError("ingress message must be an object")
-        return values
-
-    def authenticate(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> AuthenticatedIngress:
-        values = self._signed_payload(request)
-        signature = request["signature"]
-        if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
-            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
-        expected = hmac.new(
-            self._hmac_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
-        ).hexdigest()
-        if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature):
-            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
-        return AuthenticatedIngress(
-            principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
-            claims=IdentityClaims(
-                tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
-                cell_id=values["cell_id"],
-                channel=values["channel"],
-                channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
-                session_id=values["session_id"],
-            ),
-            message=dict(values["message"]),
-        )
-
-
-class RuntimeIdentityResolver:
-    """Resolve authenticated ingress identity through ``TenantRouter`` only."""
-
-    def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
-        self._router = router
-
-    def resolve(
-        self, principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal, claims: IdentityClaims
-    ) -> RuntimeIdentity:
-        if not isinstance(principal, AuthenticatedPrincipal):
-            raise AuthenticationError("untrusted principal type")
-        try:
-            route: Route = self._router.resolve(
-                channel=claims.channel,
-                channel_account_id=claims.channel_account_id,
-                principal_id=principal.principal_id,
-                session_id=claims.session_id,
-            )
-        except (ScopeError, ValidationError) as exc:
-            raise AuthenticationError("identity is not registered") from None
-        expected = (
-            claims.tenant_id, claims.cell_id, claims.channel,
-            claims.channel_account_id, principal.principal_id, claims.session_id,
-        )
-        actual = (
-            route.tenant_id, route.cell_id, route.channel,
-            route.channel_account_id, route.principal_id, route.session_id,
-        )
-        if actual != expected:
-            raise AuthenticationError("identity claims do not match authoritative route")
-        return RuntimeIdentity(
-            tenant_id=route.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=route.cell_id,
-            principal_id=route.principal_id,
-            channel=route.channel,
-            channel_account_id=route.channel_account_id,
-            session_id=route.session_id or "",
-        )
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-scoped memory namespace and access policy for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import PurePosixPath
-from typing import Literal
-
-from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-MemoryKind = Literal["session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class MemoryScope:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    profile_id: str
-    session_id: str | None
-    kind: MemoryKind
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if self.session_id is not None:
-            require_ident("session_id", self.session_id)
-        if self.kind not in {"session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid memory kind")
-        if self.kind == "session" and self.session_id is None:
-            raise ValidationError("session memory requires session_id")
-
-    @property
-    def namespace(self) -> str:
-        parts = ["tenant", self.tenant_id, "cell", self.cell_id]
-        if self.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
-            parts.extend(["profile", self.profile_id])
-        if self.kind == "session":
-            parts.extend(["session", str(self.session_id)])
-        parts.extend(["memory", self.kind])
-        return str(PurePosixPath(*parts))
-
-    def assert_access(self, requested: "MemoryScope", *, write: bool = False) -> None:
-        if self.tenant_id != requested.tenant_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-tenant memory access denied")
-        if self.cell_id != requested.cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-cell memory access denied")
-        if requested.kind == "shared_artifact":
-            if write:
-                raise ScopeError("shared artifacts are immutable")
-            return
-        if self.profile_id != requested.profile_id and requested.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-profile memory access denied")
-        if requested.kind == "session" and self.session_id != requested.session_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-session memory access denied")
-
-
-def qualify_memory_key(scope: MemoryScope, key: str) -> str:
-    key = require_ident("memory_key", key)
-    return f"{scope.namespace}/{key}"
@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-scoped append-only message ledger and exact quote resolver."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import timedelta
-from contextlib import closing
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import sqlite3
-from typing import Iterable
-
-from .tenant_context import (
-    CanonicalMessage,
-    ConflictError,
-    ScopeError,
-    ValidationError,
-    isoformat,
-    normalize_message_id,
-    parse_time,
-    utc_now,
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class LedgerRecord:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    peer_id: str
-    direction: str
-    message_id: str
-    event_id: str
-    body: str
-    occurred_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-
-
-class MessageLedger:
-    """Exact-ID ledger.
-
-    The resolver never uses time windows, prefixes, similarity, or nearest-message
-    fallbacks. Ambiguity and absence fail closed.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, database: str | Path, *, ttl_days: int = 7) -> None:
-        if not 1 <= ttl_days <= 365:
-            raise ValidationError("ttl_days must be between 1 and 365")
-        self.database = Path(database)
-        self.ttl_days = ttl_days
-        self.database.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._initialize()
-        try:
-            os.chmod(self.database, 0o600)
-        except OSError:
-            pass
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        db = sqlite3.connect(str(self.database), timeout=30)
-        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
-        return db
-
-    def _initialize(self) -> None:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.executescript(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_ledger (
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    direction TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(direction IN ('inbound','outbound','internal')),
-                    message_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    body TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    occurred_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(
-                      tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
-                      peer_id, direction, message_id
-                    ),
-                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, cell_id, event_id)
-                );
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_reply_lookup ON message_ledger(
-                    tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
-                    peer_id, message_id, expires_at
-                );
-                """
-            )
-
-    def append(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
-        """Append one exact message through the runtime write path.
-
-        This is intentionally the owner of validation, idempotency, and the
-        immediate SQLite transaction.  Runtime callers must not depend on the
-        legacy ``remember`` compatibility name.
-        """
-        message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
-        now = utc_now()
-        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(days=self.ttl_days))
-        key = (
-            message.tenant_id,
-            message.cell_id,
-            message.channel,
-            message.channel_account_id,
-            message.peer_id,
-            message.direction,
-            message_id,
-        )
-        storage_error: ConflictError | None = None
-        try:
-            with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-                db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                existing = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT event_id, body, occurred_at, expires_at FROM message_ledger "
-                    "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
-                    "AND peer_id=? AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
-                    key,
-                ).fetchone()
-                if existing:
-                    if existing["body"] != message.body:
-                        db.rollback()
-                        raise ConflictError("message ID collision with different content")
-                    db.commit()
-                    return LedgerRecord(
-                        *key, existing["event_id"], existing["body"],
-                        existing["occurred_at"], existing["expires_at"],
-                    )
-                db.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO message_ledger VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                    (*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires, isoformat(now)),
-                )
-                db.commit()
-        except sqlite3.Error:
-            storage_error = ConflictError("ledger storage unavailable")
-        if storage_error is not None:
-            # Raise outside the sqlite exception handler so callers cannot inspect
-            # a driver exception through __cause__ or __context__.
-            raise storage_error
-        return LedgerRecord(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires)
-
-    def remember(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
-        """Backward-compatible API wrapper for callers outside the runtime path."""
-        return self.append(message)
-
-    def matches(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> bool:
-        """Whether this exact message is already durably represented."""
-        message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT event_id, body FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND "
-                "cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? "
-                "AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
-                (
-                    message.tenant_id, message.cell_id, message.channel,
-                    message.channel_account_id, message.peer_id, message.direction,
-                    message_id,
-                ),
-            ).fetchone()
-        return bool(row and row["event_id"] == message.event_id and row["body"] == message.body)
-
-    def remove(self, record: LedgerRecord) -> None:
-        """Compensate a newly appended record if a later ingress step fails."""
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.execute(
-                "DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND "
-                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? AND direction=? "
-                "AND message_id=? AND event_id=?",
-                (
-                    record.tenant_id, record.cell_id, record.channel,
-                    record.channel_account_id, record.peer_id, record.direction,
-                    record.message_id, record.event_id,
-                ),
-            )
-
-    def resolve_quote(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> str:
-        if message.quoted_body is not None:
-            return message.quoted_body
-        if message.reply_to_message_id is None:
-            raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
-        reply_id = normalize_message_id(
-            message.reply_to_message_id,
-            field_name="reply_to_message_id",
-        )
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            rows = db.execute(
-                "SELECT direction, body, event_id FROM message_ledger "
-                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
-                "AND peer_id=? AND message_id=? AND expires_at>?",
-                (
-                    message.tenant_id,
-                    message.cell_id,
-                    message.channel,
-                    message.channel_account_id,
-                    message.peer_id,
-                    reply_id,
-                    isoformat(),
-                ),
-            ).fetchall()
-        if len(rows) == 1:
-            return str(rows[0]["body"])
-        if len(rows) > 1:
-            raise ConflictError("ambiguous reply ID across message directions")
-        raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
-
-    def purge_expired(self) -> int:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            cursor = db.execute(
-                "DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE expires_at<=?", (isoformat(),)
-            )
-            return cursor.rowcount
-
-    def integrity_check(self) -> str:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            return str(db.execute("PRAGMA integrity_check").fetchone()[0])
-
-    def count(self) -> int:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            return int(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_ledger").fetchone()[0])
@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
-"""Authoritative tenant registry and fail-closed message router."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from contextlib import contextmanager
-from contextlib import closing
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta
-import sqlite3
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Callable, Iterator
-
-from .tenant_context import (
-    CanonicalMessage,
-    ConflictError,
-    ScopeError,
-    TenantContext,
-    ValidationError,
-    isoformat,
-    parse_time,
-    require_ident,
-    utc_now,
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Route:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    session_id: str | None
-
-
-class TenantRouter:
-    """SQLite-backed routing registry.
-
-    Channel accounts are authoritative tenant ownership boundaries. Principal and
-    session bindings may narrow a route, but can never move traffic to another
-    tenant or Cell.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self, database: str | Path, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now
-    ) -> None:
-        self.database = str(database)
-        self._clock = clock
-        self._initialize()
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.database, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
-        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
-        return connection
-
-    @contextmanager
-    def _transaction(self) -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
-        connection = self._connect()
-        try:
-            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            yield connection
-            connection.execute("COMMIT")
-        except Exception:
-            connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
-            raise
-        finally:
-            connection.close()
-
-    def _initialize(self) -> None:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.executescript(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants (
-                    tenant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                    status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(status IN ('active','suspended','retired')),
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channel_routes (
-                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_routes (
-                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(channel, channel_account_id)
-                      REFERENCES channel_routes(channel, channel_account_id)
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_bindings (
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(tenant_id, session_id),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
-                );
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_session_expiry
-                  ON session_bindings(expires_at);
-                """
-            )
-
-    def register_tenant(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        now = isoformat(self._clock())
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if row:
-                if row["cell_id"] != cell_id:
-                    raise ConflictError("tenant already bound to another cell")
-                db.execute(
-                    "UPDATE tenants SET status='active', updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
-                    (now, tenant_id),
-                )
-                return
-            conflict = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id FROM tenants WHERE cell_id=?", (cell_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if conflict:
-                raise ConflictError("cell already belongs to another tenant")
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO tenants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (tenant_id, cell_id, "active", now, now),
-            )
-
-    def set_tenant_status(self, tenant_id: str, status: str) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if status not in {"active", "suspended", "retired"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant status")
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            cursor = db.execute(
-                "UPDATE tenants SET status=?, updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
-                (status, isoformat(self._clock()), tenant_id),
-            )
-            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
-                raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
-
-    def bind_channel(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        channel: str,
-        channel_account_id: str,
-    ) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
-        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            tenant = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active":
-                raise ValidationError("tenant is not active")
-            existing = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM channel_routes "
-                "WHERE channel=? AND channel_account_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if existing:
-                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != tenant["cell_id"]:
-                    raise ConflictError("channel account already belongs to another tenant")
-                return
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO channel_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (channel, channel_account_id, tenant_id, tenant["cell_id"], isoformat(self._clock())),
-            )
-
-    def bind_principal(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        channel: str,
-        channel_account_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-    ) -> None:
-        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
-        route = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
-        if route.tenant_id != tenant_id:
-            raise ScopeError("principal cannot cross tenant boundary")
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            existing = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
-                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if existing:
-                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != route.cell_id:
-                    raise ConflictError("principal route conflict")
-                return
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (
-                    channel,
-                    channel_account_id,
-                    principal_id,
-                    tenant_id,
-                    route.cell_id,
-                    isoformat(self._clock()),
-                ),
-            )
-
-    def bind_session(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        session_id: str,
-        cell_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        ttl_seconds: int = 86400,
-    ) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
-        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
-        if not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= 31 * 86400:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid session TTL")
-        now = self._clock()
-        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            tenant = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active" or tenant["cell_id"] != cell_id:
-                raise ScopeError("session cell does not match tenant")
-            existing = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, principal_id FROM session_bindings "
-                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
-                (tenant_id, session_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if existing and (
-                existing["cell_id"] != cell_id or existing["principal_id"] != principal_id
-            ):
-                raise ConflictError("session is already bound to another principal or cell")
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO session_bindings VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?) "
-                "ON CONFLICT(tenant_id,session_id) DO UPDATE SET expires_at=excluded.expires_at",
-                (tenant_id, session_id, cell_id, principal_id, expires, isoformat(now)),
-            )
-
-    def resolve_channel(self, channel: str, channel_account_id: str) -> Route:
-        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
-        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT r.tenant_id, r.cell_id, t.status FROM channel_routes r "
-                "JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=r.tenant_id "
-                "WHERE r.channel=? AND r.channel_account_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-        if not row:
-            raise ScopeError("unknown channel account")
-        if row["status"] != "active":
-            raise ScopeError("tenant is not active")
-        return Route(row["tenant_id"], row["cell_id"], channel, channel_account_id, "", None)
-
-    def resolve(
-        self,
-        *,
-        channel: str,
-        channel_account_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        session_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> Route:
-        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
-        base = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            principal = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
-                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if principal and (
-                principal["tenant_id"] != base.tenant_id or principal["cell_id"] != base.cell_id
-            ):
-                raise ScopeError("principal route violates channel ownership")
-            if session_id is not None:
-                session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
-                session = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT cell_id, principal_id, expires_at FROM session_bindings "
-                    "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
-                    (base.tenant_id, session_id),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if not session:
-                    raise ScopeError("unknown session")
-                if parse_time(session["expires_at"]) <= self._clock():
-                    raise ScopeError("session expired")
-                if session["cell_id"] != base.cell_id or session["principal_id"] != principal_id:
-                    raise ScopeError("session scope mismatch")
-        return Route(
-            base.tenant_id,
-            base.cell_id,
-            channel,
-            channel_account_id,
-            principal_id,
-            session_id,
-        )
-
-    def assert_message_route(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> Route:
-        route = self.resolve(
-            channel=message.channel,
-            channel_account_id=message.channel_account_id,
-            principal_id=message.principal_id,
-            session_id=message.session_id,
-        )
-        if message.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or message.cell_id != route.cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("message claims do not match authoritative route")
-        return route
-
-    def assert_context_route(self, context: TenantContext) -> Route:
-        route = self.resolve(
-            channel=context.channel,
-            channel_account_id=context.channel_account_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            session_id=context.session_id,
-        )
-        if context.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or context.cell_id != route.cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("context claims do not match authoritative route")
-        return route
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-"""V2R1 runtime composition root for authenticated channel ingress."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
-
-from .channel_adapter import ChannelAdapter, IngressResult
-from .identity import (
-    AuthenticationError,
-    IngressAuthenticator,
-    RuntimeIdentity,
-    RuntimeIdentityResolver,
-)
-from .message_ledger import MessageLedger
-from .router import TenantRouter
-from .session_pool import SessionPool
-from .tenant_context import ConflictError, ScopeError, TenantContext, ValidationError, utc_now
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RuntimeIngressResponse:
-    """Sanitised boundary response; no exception text crosses external ingress."""
-
-    status: str
-    result: IngressResult | None = None
-
-
-class RuntimeWiring:
-    """Own the only external-to-runtime identity binding and message path.
-
-    The request accepted by :meth:`ingest` is an HMAC-authenticated envelope;
-    tenant, cell, channel, account, session, principal, and message claims are
-    signed together.  The envelope is then resolved against ``TenantRouter``.
-    Only that resolved identity can mint the short-lived internal context passed
-    to ``ChannelAdapter``.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        router: TenantRouter,
-        ledger: MessageLedger,
-        session_pool: SessionPool,
-        channel_adapter: ChannelAdapter,
-        identity_resolver: RuntimeIdentityResolver,
-        ingress_authenticator: IngressAuthenticator,
-        internal_signing_key: bytes,
-        clock: Callable[[], datetime],
-    ) -> None:
-        self.router = router
-        self.ledger = ledger
-        self.session_pool = session_pool
-        self.channel_adapter = channel_adapter
-        self.identity_resolver = identity_resolver
-        self._ingress_authenticator = ingress_authenticator
-        self._internal_signing_key = internal_signing_key
-        self._clock = clock
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(
-        cls,
-        root: str | Path,
-        *,
-        signing_key: bytes,
-        ingress_hmac_key: bytes | None = None,
-        clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
-    ) -> "RuntimeWiring":
-        if not isinstance(signing_key, bytes) or len(signing_key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("internal signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        # Kept optional for one controlled migration release; the external
-        # request path still cannot supply a TenantContext token.
-        hmac_key = ingress_hmac_key if ingress_hmac_key is not None else signing_key
-        root_path = Path(root)
-        root_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        router = TenantRouter(root_path / "router.sqlite3", clock=clock)
-        ledger = MessageLedger(root_path / "message_ledger.sqlite3")
-        session_pool = SessionPool(router)
-        adapter = ChannelAdapter(
-            router=router,
-            ledger=ledger,
-            session_pool=session_pool,
-            signing_key=signing_key,
-            clock=clock,
-        )
-        return cls(
-            router=router,
-            ledger=ledger,
-            session_pool=session_pool,
-            channel_adapter=adapter,
-            identity_resolver=RuntimeIdentityResolver(router),
-            ingress_authenticator=IngressAuthenticator(hmac_key),
-            internal_signing_key=signing_key,
-            clock=clock,
-        )
-
-    def _issue_internal_context(self, identity: RuntimeIdentity) -> TenantContext:
-        """Mint internal scope only after all claims matched the router route."""
-        return TenantContext.issue(
-            lifetime_seconds=300,
-            now=self._clock(),
-            tenant_id=identity.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=identity.cell_id,
-            principal_id=identity.principal_id,
-            principal_type="authenticated_user",
-            session_id=identity.session_id,
-            task_id=None,
-            channel=identity.channel,
-            channel_account_id=identity.channel_account_id,
-        )
-
-    def ingest(self, *, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> RuntimeIngressResponse:
-        """Authenticate, resolve, issue internal context, then append and lease.
-
-        The only successful route is ``IngressAuthenticator`` ->
-        ``RuntimeIdentityResolver`` -> ``ChannelAdapter`` ->
-        ``MessageLedger.append`` + ``SessionPool``.  The legacy caller-supplied
-        TenantContext token interface is intentionally not accepted.
-        """
-        try:
-            ingress = self._ingress_authenticator.authenticate(request)
-            identity = self.identity_resolver.resolve(ingress.principal, ingress.claims)
-            context = self._issue_internal_context(identity)
-            result = self.channel_adapter.ingest(
-                token=context.sign(self._internal_signing_key), message=ingress.message
-            )
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="ACCEPTED", result=result)
-        except (AuthenticationError, ScopeError):
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="AUTH_FAILED")
-        except ValidationError:
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="VALIDATION_FAILED")
-        except ConflictError:
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="CONFLICT")
-        except Exception:
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="INTERNAL_ERROR")
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant and Cell scoped secret reference model.
-
-This module never stores secret values. It stores ownership and retrieval scope
-metadata for integration with a real secret broker.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Literal
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SecretRef:
-    secret_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    kind: Literal["channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"]
-    version: str
-    broker_path: str
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in ("secret_id", "cell_id", "version"):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if self.kind not in {"channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid secret kind")
-        if not self.broker_path.startswith("secret://"):
-            raise ValidationError("secret broker path required")
-
-    def can_be_used_by(self, *, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> bool:
-        return self.tenant_id == tenant_id and self.cell_id == cell_id
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-"""Process-local session lease pool backed by TenantRouter authority."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from threading import RLock
-
-from .router import Route, TenantRouter
-from .tenant_context import ScopeError, TenantContext
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SessionLease:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    session_id: str
-
-
-class SessionPool:
-    """Tracks active leases without creating a second session authority store."""
-
-    def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
-        self._router = router
-        self._leases: dict[tuple[str, str], SessionLease] = {}
-        self._lock = RLock()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _assert_route(context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
-        if (
-            route.tenant_id != context.tenant_id
-            or route.cell_id != context.cell_id
-            or route.principal_id != context.principal_id
-            or route.session_id != context.session_id
-        ):
-            raise ScopeError("session lease does not match authoritative route")
-
-    def assert_available(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
-        """Re-resolve the context from the router before a ledger mutation."""
-        self._assert_route(context, route)
-        self._assert_route(context, self._router.assert_context_route(context))
-
-    def acquire(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> SessionLease:
-        self._assert_route(context, route)
-        lease = SessionLease(
-            tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=context.cell_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            session_id=context.session_id,
-        )
-        with self._lock:
-            return self._leases.setdefault((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), lease)
-
-    def release(self, lease: SessionLease) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._leases.pop((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), None)
-
-    def active_count(self) -> int:
-        with self._lock:
-            return len(self._leases)
@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-"""Signed tenant context and canonical message contract for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import json
-import re
-import secrets
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-VERSION = "V2R1C0"
-MAX_SAFE_INTEGER = 9_007_199_254_740_991
-TENANT_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,38}[a-z0-9])?$")
-IDENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,126}[A-Za-z0-9])?$")
-
-
-class V2R1Error(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-class ValidationError(V2R1Error):
-    pass
-
-
-class ScopeError(V2R1Error):
-    pass
-
-
-class ConflictError(V2R1Error):
-    pass
-
-
-def utc_now() -> datetime:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def isoformat(value: datetime | None = None) -> str:
-    return (value or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def parse_time(value: str) -> datetime:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
-        raise ValidationError("timestamp must be a non-empty string")
-    text = value.strip()
-    if text.endswith("Z"):
-        text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
-    try:
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise ValidationError(f"invalid timestamp: {value!r}") from exc
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        raise ValidationError("timestamp must include timezone")
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def require_ident(name: str, value: Any, *, tenant: bool = False) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        raise ValidationError(f"{name} must be a string")
-    value = value.strip()
-    pattern = TENANT_RE if tenant else IDENT_RE
-    if not pattern.fullmatch(value):
-        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}: {value!r}")
-    return value
-
-
-def normalize_message_id(value: Any, *, field_name: str = "message_id") -> str:
-    if isinstance(value, bool):
-        raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} cannot be boolean")
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        value = value.strip()
-        if not value or len(value) > 256 or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in value):
-            raise ValidationError(f"invalid {field_name}")
-        return value
-    if isinstance(value, int):
-        if abs(value) > MAX_SAFE_INTEGER:
-            raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} is an unsafe numeric ID")
-        return str(value)
-    raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} must be a lossless string or safe integer")
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return json.dumps(
-        value, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def _b64(data: bytes) -> str:
-    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
-
-
-def _unb64(value: str) -> bytes:
-    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TenantContext:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    principal_type: str
-    session_id: str
-    task_id: str | None
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    issued_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-    nonce: str
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in (
-            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "session_id",
-            "channel", "channel_account_id", "nonce",
-        ):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if self.task_id is not None:
-            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
-        issued = parse_time(self.issued_at)
-        expires = parse_time(self.expires_at)
-        if expires <= issued or expires - issued > timedelta(hours=1):
-            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant context lifetime")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def issue(cls, *, lifetime_seconds: int = 300, now: datetime | None = None, **scope: Any) -> "TenantContext":
-        if not 1 <= lifetime_seconds <= 3600:
-            raise ValidationError("lifetime_seconds must be between 1 and 3600")
-        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        return cls(
-            **scope,
-            issued_at=isoformat(current),
-            expires_at=isoformat(current + timedelta(seconds=lifetime_seconds)),
-            nonce=secrets.token_hex(16),
-        )
-
-    def sign(self, key: bytes) -> str:
-        if len(key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        payload = _b64(canonical_json(asdict(self)))
-        signature = _b64(hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest())
-        return f"{payload}.{signature}"
-
-    @classmethod
-    def verify(
-        cls,
-        token: str,
-        key: bytes,
-        *,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-        expected_tenant_id: str | None = None,
-        expected_cell_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> "TenantContext":
-        if len(key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        try:
-            payload, encoded_signature = token.split(".", 1)
-            actual = _unb64(encoded_signature)
-            if encoded_signature != _b64(actual):
-                raise ValidationError("non-canonical tenant context signature")
-            data = json.loads(_unb64(payload))
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise ValidationError("malformed tenant context token") from exc
-        expected = hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
-        if not hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected):
-            raise ValidationError("tenant context signature mismatch")
-        context = cls(**data)
-        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        if current < parse_time(context.issued_at) - timedelta(seconds=60):
-            raise ValidationError("tenant context issued in future")
-        if current >= parse_time(context.expires_at):
-            raise ValidationError("tenant context expired")
-        if expected_tenant_id and context.tenant_id != expected_tenant_id:
-            raise ScopeError("tenant mismatch")
-        if expected_cell_id and context.cell_id != expected_cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cell mismatch")
-        return context
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CanonicalMessage:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    principal_type: str
-    origin_type: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    peer_id: str
-    conversation_id: str
-    session_id: str
-    task_id: str | None
-    event_id: str
-    message_id: str
-    reply_to_message_id: str | None
-    direction: str
-    command_capable: bool
-    occurred_at: str
-    received_at: str
-    body: str
-    quoted_body: str | None
-    adapter_name: str
-    adapter_version: str
-    schema_version: str = "aios.message.v1"
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if self.schema_version != "aios.message.v1":
-            raise ValidationError("unsupported message schema version")
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in (
-            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "origin_type", "channel",
-            "channel_account_id", "peer_id", "conversation_id", "session_id",
-            "event_id", "adapter_name", "adapter_version",
-        ):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if self.task_id is not None:
-            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
-        normalize_message_id(self.message_id)
-        if self.reply_to_message_id is not None:
-            normalize_message_id(self.reply_to_message_id, field_name="reply_to_message_id")
-        if self.direction not in {"inbound", "outbound", "internal"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid direction")
-        if not isinstance(self.command_capable, bool):
-            raise ValidationError("command_capable must be boolean")
-        parse_time(self.occurred_at)
-        parse_time(self.received_at)
-        if not isinstance(self.body, str):
-            raise ValidationError("body must be a string")
-        if self.quoted_body is not None and not isinstance(self.quoted_body, str):
-            raise ValidationError("quoted_body must be a string or null")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_mapping(cls, data: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalMessage":
-        content = data.get("content") or {}
-        adapter = data.get("adapter") or {}
-        if not isinstance(content, Mapping) or not isinstance(adapter, Mapping):
-            raise ValidationError("content and adapter must be objects")
-        values = dict(data)
-        return cls(
-            schema_version=values.get("schema_version", "aios.message.v1"),
-            tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
-            cell_id=values["cell_id"],
-            principal_id=values["principal_id"],
-            principal_type=values["principal_type"],
-            origin_type=values["origin_type"],
-            channel=values["channel"],
-            channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
-            peer_id=values["peer_id"],
-            conversation_id=values["conversation_id"],
-            session_id=values["session_id"],
-            task_id=values.get("task_id"),
-            event_id=values["event_id"],
-            message_id=normalize_message_id(values["message_id"]),
-            reply_to_message_id=(
-                normalize_message_id(values["reply_to_message_id"], field_name="reply_to_message_id")
-                if values.get("reply_to_message_id") is not None else None
-            ),
-            direction=values["direction"],
-            command_capable=values["command_capable"],
-            occurred_at=values["occurred_at"],
-            received_at=values["received_at"],
-            body=content.get("body", ""),
-            quoted_body=content.get("quoted_body"),
-            adapter_name=adapter["name"],
-            adapter_version=adapter["version"],
-        )
-
-    def assert_context(self, context: TenantContext) -> None:
-        fields = (
-            "tenant_id", "cell_id", "principal_id", "session_id", "task_id",
-            "channel", "channel_account_id",
-        )
-        mismatches = [name for name in fields if getattr(self, name) != getattr(context, name)]
-        if mismatches:
-            raise ScopeError("message/context mismatch: " + ", ".join(mismatches))
-
-    @property
-    def is_authenticated_human_command(self) -> bool:
-        return (
-            self.direction == "inbound"
-            and self.command_capable
-            and self.principal_type == "authenticated_user"
-            and self.origin_type == "channel_user"
-        )
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class PolicyDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    approval_required: bool
-    code: str
-    reason: str
-
-
-READ_ONLY_TOOLS = frozenset({
-    "read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
-    "memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
-})
-
-
-def evaluate_tool_call(tool_name: str, message: CanonicalMessage) -> PolicyDecision:
-    normalized = tool_name.strip().lower() if isinstance(tool_name, str) else ""
-    if not normalized:
-        return PolicyDecision(False, False, "invalid_tool", "tool name missing")
-    if normalized in READ_ONLY_TOOLS:
-        return PolicyDecision(True, False, "read_only", "read-only operation")
-    if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
-        return PolicyDecision(
-            False, False, "origin_denied",
-            "side effects require an authenticated current human command",
-        )
-    return PolicyDecision(
-        True, True, "approval_required",
-        "authenticated human side effect requires explicit approval",
-    )
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 # AIOS Agent Command Plane Registry
 # Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
 version: 1.0.0
-created_at: "2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00"
+created_at: 2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00
 baseline: V1R3C1

 commands:
@@ -11,22 +12,6 @@ commands:
  completed_path: "agents/commands/completed/"
  failed_path: "agents/commands/failed/"

-directories:
-  commands/active: "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
-  commands/running: "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
-  commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
-  commands/failed: "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
-
-lifecycle:
-  new: active/
-  running: running/
-  success: completed/
-  failure: failed/
-
-# Command lifecycle state machine:
-# active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
-#                                                          → failure → failed/
-
 policies:
  path: "agents/policies/"
  source: "git"
@@ -53,4 +38,30 @@ audit:
  agent_runs: "audit/agent-runs/"
  version_history: "audit/version-history/"
  command_history: "audit/command-history/"
-  interaction_history: "audit/interaction-history/"
+=======
+# AIOS Agent Command Registry
+# Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
+
+registry_version: 1.0.0
+created_at: "2026-07-08T15:44:00+08:00"
+baseline: V1R3C1
+
+directories:
+  commands/active:    "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
+  commands/running:   "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
+  commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
+  commands/failed:    "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
+
+state: agents/state/
+policies: agents/policies/
+
+lifecycle:
+  new:     active/
+  running: running/
+  success: completed/
+  failure: failed/
+
+# Command lifecycle state machine:
+# active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
+#                                                          → failure → failed/
+>>>>>>> 4d18ee0 (feat(cmd): enable Agent Command Plane, audit plane, and Web UI dashboard)
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+FROM python:3.12-slim
+
+ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
+    PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
+    PYTHONPATH=/opt/aios/app \
+    AIOS_V2_HOST=0.0.0.0 \
+    AIOS_V2_PORT=18920 \
+    AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-v2
+
+RUN groupadd --system --gid 12001 aios \
+    && useradd --system --uid 12001 --gid aios --home-dir /nonexistent --shell /usr/sbin/nologin aios \
+    && install -d -o aios -g aios -m 0750 /opt/aios/app /var/lib/aios-v2
+
+WORKDIR /opt/aios/app
+COPY --chown=aios:aios active-runtime/app/ /opt/aios/app/
+
+USER aios:aios
+EXPOSE 18920
+
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=15s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=4 \
+  CMD python3 -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:18920/api/v2/health', timeout=3).read()"
+
+CMD ["python3", "-m", "aios_v2.app"]
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+services:
+  aios-v2:
+    build:
+      context: ../../..
+      dockerfile: deploy/aios-v2/docker/Dockerfile
+    image: aios-v2:V2R1C0-candidate
+    init: true
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    ports:
+      - "127.0.0.1:${AIOS_V2_PORT:-18920}:18920"
+    environment:
+      AIOS_V2_HOST: 0.0.0.0
+      AIOS_V2_PORT: 18920
+      AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR: /var/lib/aios-v2
+      AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL: ${AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL:-}
+      AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF: ${AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF:-}
+      AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE: ${AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE:-}
+      AIOS_RELEASE_CHANNEL: candidate
+      AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION: V2R1C0-candidate
+    volumes:
+      - aios-v2-state:/var/lib/aios-v2
+      # Mount runtime signing material explicitly when OpenClaw is enabled.
+      # The host file must be mode 0600; never store it in this repository.
+      # - /etc/aios-v2/openclaw-signing-material:/run/secrets/openclaw-signing-material:ro
+    read_only: true
+    tmpfs:
+      - /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64m
+    cap_drop:
+      - ALL
+    security_opt:
+      - no-new-privileges:true
+    healthcheck:
+      test:
+        - CMD
+        - python3
+        - -c
+        - "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:18920/api/v2/health', timeout=3).read()"
+      interval: 15s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 4
+      start_period: 10s
+
+volumes:
+  aios-v2-state:
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# AIOS V2 candidate runtime configuration.
+# Copy to /etc/aios-v2/aios-v2.env and keep ownership root:aios, mode 0640.
+
+AIOS_V2_HOST=127.0.0.1
+AIOS_V2_PORT=18920
+AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-v2
+
+# Optional OpenClaw runtime. Leave blank to run with OpenClaw disabled.
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL=
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF=
+
+# File path only. The referenced file must be mode 0600 or stricter and contain
+# at least 32 bytes. Never place signing material in this env file or Git.
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE=
+
+# Reverse proxy must authenticate users and inject X-AIOS-* identity headers.
+AIOS_TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true
+
+# Candidate deployment metadata exposed through health tooling.
+AIOS_RELEASE_CHANNEL=candidate
+AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION=V2R1C0-candidate
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+BASE_URL="${AIOS_V2_BASE_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:18920}"
+STATE_DIR="${AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR:-/var/lib/aios-v2}"
+CONTROLLER_WT="${AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_WORKTREE:-/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller}"
+SERVICE="${AIOS_V2_SERVICE:-aios-v2}"
+
+fail() {
+  echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+pass() {
+  echo "PASS: $*"
+}
+
+command -v python3 >/dev/null || fail "python3 not installed"
+
+if command -v systemctl >/dev/null && systemctl list-unit-files "$SERVICE.service" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$SERVICE" || fail "$SERVICE is not active"
+  pass "$SERVICE is active"
+fi
+
+python3 - "$BASE_URL" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+import urllib.request
+
+base_url = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
+with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{base_url}/api/v2/health", timeout=5) as response:
+    payload = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+if payload.get("status") not in {"ok", "healthy", "ready"}:
+    raise SystemExit(f"unexpected health payload: {payload}")
+print(f"PASS: HTTP health status={payload.get('status')}")
+PY
+
+[[ -d "$STATE_DIR" ]] || fail "state directory missing: $STATE_DIR"
+[[ -w "$STATE_DIR" ]] || fail "state directory not writable: $STATE_DIR"
+pass "state directory writable"
+
+if [[ -e "$STATE_DIR/control-plane.sqlite3" ]]; then
+  python3 - "$STATE_DIR/control-plane.sqlite3" <<'PY'
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+
+path = sys.argv[1]
+connection = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
+try:
+    row = connection.execute("PRAGMA quick_check").fetchone()
+finally:
+    connection.close()
+if not row or row[0] != "ok":
+    raise SystemExit(f"SQLite quick_check failed: {row}")
+print("PASS: SQLite quick_check=ok")
+PY
+else
+  echo "WARN: control-plane.sqlite3 not created yet"
+fi
+
+if [[ -d "$CONTROLLER_WT" ]] && git -C "$CONTROLLER_WT" rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  branch="$(git -C "$CONTROLLER_WT" branch --show-current)"
+  dirty="$(git -C "$CONTROLLER_WT" status --porcelain=v1)"
+  [[ -z "$branch" ]] || fail "GitOps controller attached to branch: $branch"
+  [[ -z "$dirty" ]] || fail "GitOps controller workspace is dirty"
+  pass "GitOps controller detached and clean"
+fi
+
+python3 - "$STATE_DIR/executions" <<'PY'
+import json
+import pathlib
+import sys
+
+root = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1])
+if not root.exists():
+    print("WARN: execution evidence directory not created yet")
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+for path in root.glob("*/*.json"):
+    value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    for key in ("execution_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "executor", "status"):
+        if not value.get(key):
+            raise SystemExit(f"invalid execution evidence {path}: missing {key}")
+print("PASS: execution evidence files valid")
+PY
+
+pass "AIOS V2 candidate healthcheck complete"
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+SERVICE="${AIOS_V2_SERVICE:-aios-v2}"
+RELEASE_ROOT="${AIOS_V2_RELEASE_ROOT:-/opt/aios/releases}"
+CURRENT_LINK="${AIOS_V2_CURRENT_LINK:-/opt/aios/current}"
+STATE_DIR="${AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR:-/var/lib/aios-v2}"
+BACKUP_ROOT="${AIOS_V2_BACKUP_ROOT:-/var/backups/aios-v2}"
+TARGET_RELEASE="${1:-}"
+RESTORE_STATE="${AIOS_V2_RESTORE_STATE:-0}"
+
+fail() {
+  echo "ERROR: $*" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+[[ "${EUID}" -eq 0 ]] || fail "rollback must run as root"
+[[ -n "$TARGET_RELEASE" ]] || fail "usage: $0 <release-name-or-absolute-path>"
+
+if [[ "$TARGET_RELEASE" = /* ]]; then
+  TARGET_PATH="$(readlink -f "$TARGET_RELEASE")"
+else
+  [[ "$TARGET_RELEASE" != *"/"* && "$TARGET_RELEASE" != "." && "$TARGET_RELEASE" != ".." ]] \
+    || fail "invalid release name"
+  TARGET_PATH="$(readlink -f "$RELEASE_ROOT/$TARGET_RELEASE")"
+fi
+
+[[ -d "$TARGET_PATH/active-runtime/app" ]] || fail "target release is invalid: $TARGET_PATH"
+[[ -f "$TARGET_PATH/deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh" ]] \
+  || fail "target release has no healthcheck"
+
+PREVIOUS_PATH=""
+if [[ -L "$CURRENT_LINK" ]]; then
+  PREVIOUS_PATH="$(readlink -f "$CURRENT_LINK")"
+fi
+
+STAMP="$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
+BACKUP_DIR="$BACKUP_ROOT/rollback-$STAMP"
+install -d -m 0750 "$BACKUP_DIR"
+
+if [[ -d "$STATE_DIR" ]]; then
+  tar --xattrs --acls -C "$(dirname "$STATE_DIR")" \
+    -czf "$BACKUP_DIR/state-before-rollback.tar.gz" \
+    "$(basename "$STATE_DIR")"
+fi
+
+printf '%s\n' "$PREVIOUS_PATH" > "$BACKUP_DIR/previous-release.txt"
+printf '%s\n' "$TARGET_PATH" > "$BACKUP_DIR/target-release.txt"
+
+systemctl stop "$SERVICE"
+ln -sfn "$TARGET_PATH" "${CURRENT_LINK}.next"
+mv -Tf "${CURRENT_LINK}.next" "$CURRENT_LINK"
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl start "$SERVICE"
+
+if AIOS_V2_SERVICE="$SERVICE" \
+   AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR="$STATE_DIR" \
+   "$TARGET_PATH/deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh"; then
+  echo "ROLLBACK_COMPLETE target=$TARGET_PATH backup=$BACKUP_DIR"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+echo "Target release failed healthcheck; restoring previous release." >&2
+systemctl stop "$SERVICE" || true
+
+if [[ -n "$PREVIOUS_PATH" && -d "$PREVIOUS_PATH" ]]; then
+  ln -sfn "$PREVIOUS_PATH" "${CURRENT_LINK}.previous"
+  mv -Tf "${CURRENT_LINK}.previous" "$CURRENT_LINK"
+fi
+
+if [[ "$RESTORE_STATE" == "1" && -f "$BACKUP_DIR/state-before-rollback.tar.gz" ]]; then
+  rm -rf "$STATE_DIR"
+  tar --xattrs --acls -C "$(dirname "$STATE_DIR")" \
+    -xzf "$BACKUP_DIR/state-before-rollback.tar.gz"
+fi
+
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl start "$SERVICE" || true
+
+if [[ -n "$PREVIOUS_PATH" && -x "$PREVIOUS_PATH/deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh" ]]; then
+  AIOS_V2_SERVICE="$SERVICE" \
+  AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR="$STATE_DIR" \
+  "$PREVIOUS_PATH/deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh" || true
+fi
+
+fail "rollback target failed; previous release restored; evidence=$BACKUP_DIR"
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS V2 Control Plane Candidate
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios
+Group=aios
+WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2.env
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_v2.app
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=3
+TimeoutStartSec=30
+TimeoutStopSec=30
+KillSignal=SIGTERM
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-v2
+StateDirectory=aios-v2
+StateDirectoryMode=0750
+UMask=0027
+LimitNOFILE=65536
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-printf 'AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 health check\n'
-
-python3 - <<'PY'
-from pathlib import Path
-required = [
- 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py',
- 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py',
- 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py',
- 'openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/openclaw.plugin.json',
-]
-missing=[p for p in required if not Path(p).exists()]
-if missing:
-    raise SystemExit('missing: '+','.join(missing))
-print('artifact presence PASS')
-PY
-
-echo 'runtime health requires OpenClaw environment probe'
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-ROOT=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)
-EXPECTED_BRANCH="release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712"
-
-if [[ "$(git -C "$ROOT" branch --show-current)" != "$EXPECTED_BRANCH" ]]; then
-  echo "wrong release branch"
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-COMMIT=$(git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse HEAD)
-echo "Installing AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 commit=$COMMIT"
-
-python3 - <<'PY'
-import compileall
-if not compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1):
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-print('python compile PASS')
-PY
-
-if [[ -f openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/package.json ]]; then
-  echo "plugin package PASS"
-else
-  echo "plugin package missing"
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-echo "Installation preflight PASS"
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-MODE=${1:---check}
-
-case "$MODE" in
-  --check)
-    echo "V2R1C0 RC1 validation mode"
-    ;;
-  --install)
-    echo "Install requires approved OpenClaw Cell target"
-    ;;
-  --rollback)
-    echo "Rollback requires recorded Cell backup"
-    ;;
-  *)
-    echo "Usage: $0 [--check|--install|--rollback]"
-    exit 2
-    ;;
-esac
-
-python3 - <<'PY'
-import compileall
-raise SystemExit(0 if compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1) else 1)
-PY
-
-echo "python runtime syntax: PASS"
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# V1R4C6 Backup Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- status: NOT_STARTED
+- reason: No confirmed production Stack, persistent volume, database migration target, or V1R4C5 image digest is bound to this source release. A backup cannot be claimed or executed safely without an identified target datastore.
+- prohibited_actions_not_performed: production database deletion; persistent-volume deletion; docker system prune --volumes; direct copy of live database files.
+- required_before_resume: confirmed Stack identity and its documented backup/restore command.
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# V1R4C6 Deployment Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
+- tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
+- image_repository: UNRESOLVED
+- image_digest: UNRESOLVED
+- previous_image_digest: UNRESOLVED
+- portainer_environment: UNRESOLVED
+- portainer_stack: UNRESOLVED
+- deployment_action: NOT_EXECUTED
+- reason: No source-to-image-to-Portainer-Stack mapping exists. Existing Portainer containers and known Docker workloads do not expose a V1R4C6/e204 deployment target or Portainer stack labels. The active GitOps API is a direct systemd Python process, not a Portainer-managed Docker Stack.
+- rollback_status: NOT_APPLICABLE_NO_CHANGE
+- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# V1R4C6 Production Preflight Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- started_at_utc: 2026-07-11T16:57:04.0596039Z
+- source_tag_object: 356a8a8c1860b94b7d61a456c29228c88e57d963
+- source_tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
+- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
+- tag_to_source_relation: tag commit is direct parent of source commit (verified)
+- production_host_identifier: cn-network-mkt (hw / 1.95.164.183)
+- host_preflight: Docker 29.5.3; root filesystem 29 percent used; memory available approximately 56 GiB
+- GitOps_runtime: active at /data/aios-gitops/workspace via aios-gitops-model-api.service
+- runtime_base: current_baseline V1R4C6; previous_baseline V1R4C5; git e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd; service status ok
+- Portainer discovery: Portainer instances are reachable on ubuntu-admin and ubuntu-aihost, but no confirmed Portainer Environment/Stack maps to V1R4C6 or e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd.
+- source_build_contract: target source contains only deploy/gitea/docker-compose.yml and no application Dockerfile/Containerfile or V1R4C6 image repository declaration.
+- status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# V1R4C6 Rollback Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- rollback_required: No
+- rollback_executed: No
+- reason: No container, Stack, database, image, or production configuration was changed during this run.
+- captured_v1r4c5_digest: UNRESOLVED because no matching current production Stack was confirmed.
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# V1R4C6 Verification Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- healthcheck_result: GitOps adapter /health = 200 and /api/base = 200; this verifies the control-plane API only, not a V1R4C6 production deployment.
+- gate_a_result: NOT_RUN (production admin workbench target and authenticated test path unresolved)
+- gate_b_result: NOT_RUN (production Search Gateway target/provider binding unresolved)
+- gate_c_result: NOT_RUN (production Agent Platform target/runtime request path unresolved)
+- runtime_acceptance_result: NOT_RUN (0/8; cannot reuse non-production results)
+- critical_control_plane_finding: gitea-branch-consistency-sentinel is failed with five Git-ref-to-Gitea-metadata drift entries and autonomous safe mode emitted. This is a hard safety gate failure.
+- no_unresolved_critical_errors: false
+- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+# AIOS V2 用户需求规格
+
+- 文档版本：`V2R1C0-candidate`
+- 状态：候选版本需求基线
+- 适用范围：AIOS Control Plane、Agent Router、OpenClaw Adapter、Hermes Runtime、Web Console、GitOps、审计与部署
+
+## 1. 背景与目标
+
+现有系统已经具备 OpenClaw、Hermes、Agent Router、GitOps、局部 WebUI、审计和多租户候选能力。AIOS V2 的目标不是推倒重写，而是将这些分散能力收敛到统一、可审计、可 Web 化、可多租户隔离的控制面。
+
+AIOS V2 必须成为唯一控制面，负责租户、身份、Agent、策略、任务生命周期、审批、审计、Runtime 目录和执行证据。OpenClaw 与 Hermes 只承担执行职责，不得持有第二套控制面状态。
+
+## 2. 用户角色
+
+| 角色 | 主要诉求 |
+|---|---|
+| 平台管理员 | 管理租户、运行时、发布、GitOps 状态和全局策略 |
+| 租户管理员 | 管理本租户 Agent、任务、审批、审计和成员权限 |
+| 操作员 | 创建任务、发起执行、取消任务、查看运行状态 |
+| 审批人 | 审批高风险任务，查看策略判定依据 |
+| 审计员 | 查询本租户完整审计链和执行证据 |
+| Runtime Worker | 领取已批准任务、心跳、返回执行结果 |
+| 开发与运维人员 | 通过 GitOps 提交、测试、部署、回滚和修复 Bug |
+
+## 3. 核心用户需求
+
+### UR-001 唯一控制面
+
+所有任务创建、审批、取消、状态变化、策略判定和审计必须由 AIOS Control Plane 统一处理。
+
+验收：
+
+- Web Console、API、Codex、OpenClaw 和 Hermes 均不得绕过 AIOS 创建或修改任务生命周期。
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 的公开接口仅限执行、状态、取消、心跳和结果回传。
+
+### UR-002 复用现有能力
+
+系统不得重写已经稳定的 OpenClaw 执行能力、Hermes Runtime、Agent Router 或 GitOps 基础设施。
+
+验收：
+
+- 通过 Adapter/Boundary 接入现有能力。
+- 替换控制逻辑时保留原执行接口和可迁移数据。
+
+### UR-003 OpenClaw 与 Hermes 解耦
+
+OpenClaw 与 Hermes 必须从策略、租户、审批和任务生命周期中逐步解耦。
+
+验收：
+
+- OpenClaw 仅接收已签名、已批准、带租户上下文的命令。
+- Hermes 仅接收已批准的租户分区 Job。
+- 二者均不得直接写 Control Plane 权威状态。
+
+### UR-004 全面 Web 化
+
+所有面向用户和运维的能力必须通过 Web Console 或稳定 API 访问。
+
+Web Console 至少展示：
+
+- Tenant、Agent、Task、Approval、Runtime、Audit、Execution Evidence、GitOps Status。
+- 所有写操作由 AIOS API 完成，浏览器不得直接调用 OpenClaw/Hermes。
+
+### UR-005 多租户隔离
+
+所有模块必须支持租户隔离，且默认拒绝跨租户访问。
+
+隔离范围：
+
+- API 与会话
+- Tenant/Agent/Task 数据
+- OpenClaw 命令
+- Hermes Queue、Cell、Profile、Worker Lease
+- Memory、Cache、Artifact、SecretRef
+- Audit、Execution Evidence、日志和指标
+
+验收：
+
+- 资源记录的 `tenant_id` 不可为空。
+- 跨租户访问返回拒绝或“资源不存在”，不得泄露存在性。
+- 必须有跨租户负向测试。
+
+### UR-006 权威任务生命周期
+
+任务必须遵循统一状态机：
+
+```text
+CREATED -> APPROVED -> RUNNING -> COMPLETED
+    |          |          |
+    +----------+----------+-> CANCELLED
+                           +-> FAILED
+```
+
+验收：
+
+- 禁止越级变化，例如 `CREATED -> COMPLETED`。
+- 每次变化包含 revision、principal、trace、时间和审计事件。
+
+### UR-007 策略与审批
+
+所有有副作用任务必须经过策略判定；高风险任务必须支持人工审批。
+
+验收：
+
+- Policy Decision 包含 allow/deny、reason 和 policy version。
+- 拒绝事件进入审计。
+- Runtime 不得自行放宽策略。
+
+### UR-008 幂等与并发安全
+
+任务和 Runtime 执行必须支持幂等与乐观并发控制。
+
+验收：
+
+- 相同租户与幂等键、相同内容返回同一任务/执行。
+- 相同幂等键不同内容返回冲突。
+- revision 或 branch lease 冲突不得静默覆盖。
+
+### UR-009 可观测与执行证据
+
+平台必须能够确认 Codex、OpenClaw、Hermes 等执行器是否领取任务、当前进度、最近提交、测试结果和完成状态。
+
+验收：
+
+- 存在 claim、heartbeat、progress、result 和 evidence 记录。
+- Web/API 可按租户查询。
+- 执行证据不得包含明文密钥。
+
+### UR-010 GitOps 唯一变更流程
+
+所有代码、配置、文档和部署资产修改必须进入非 `main` 分支，通过 commit、测试、审查和受控提升。
+
+验收：
+
+- Controller worktree 必须 detached 且 clean。
+- 本地 bare repo 与 Gitea 目标分支 OID 一致。
+- 不允许直接 push `main`、直接创建生产 Tag 或绕过审批部署。
+
+### UR-011 持久化与恢复
+
+租户、Agent、Task、Audit、Idempotency 和 Execution Evidence 必须在服务重启后恢复。
+
+验收：
+
+- 候选版支持 SQLite WAL 原子快照。
+- 有 restart recovery 测试。
+- 生产版需进一步提供迁移、备份、恢复、HA 和容量证据。
+
+### UR-012 审计与合规
+
+所有控制与执行动作必须生成不可混租户的审计事件。
+
+至少记录：
+
+- tenant、principal、trace、action、resource、outcome、policy version、timestamp。
+- OpenClaw/Hermes Runtime 生命周期。
+- GitOps、部署和回滚动作。
+
+### UR-013 密钥安全
+
+Git、日志、Web、任务 payload 和审计记录中不得出现明文 API Key、密码、Token 或私钥。
+
+验收：
+
+- Git 只存 `secret_ref`、`credential_ref`、`key_id` 或受保护文件路径。
+- Secret 文件权限为 `0600` 或更严格。
+- Secret Scanner 默认拒绝可疑提交。
+
+### UR-014 部署与回滚
+
+系统必须提供 systemd、Docker/Compose、健康检查和受保护回滚入口。
+
+验收：
+
+- 服务以非 root 权限运行。
+- 状态目录独立持久化。
+- 回滚前自动备份状态。
+- 默认只回滚代码，状态恢复需要显式授权。
+
+### UR-015 文档与代码同步
+
+任何影响用户行为、架构边界、API、数据模型、状态机、安全策略、部署或运维方式的变更，必须在同一分支同步更新 `docs/aios-v2/`。
+
+验收：
+
+- 架构/功能代码变化但无文档变化时，文档同步门禁失败。
+- Traceability Matrix 必须指向当前代码和测试。
+- 新架构决策必须增加或更新 ADR。
+
+## 4. 非功能需求
+
+### NFR-001 安全
+
+- 默认拒绝、最小权限、租户隔离、身份可信链、SecretRef、审计。
+
+### NFR-002 可靠性
+
+- 幂等、revision、worker lease、heartbeat、重试边界、原子持久化、健康检查和回滚。
+
+### NFR-003 可维护性
+
+- 模块边界稳定，Control Plane 与 Runtime 解耦；代码、文档、测试和部署可追踪。
+
+### NFR-004 可扩展性
+
+- Store、Transport、Policy、EventPublisher、Runtime Adapter 均通过接口扩展。
+
+### NFR-005 可运维性
+
+- Web/API 状态、systemd/Docker、健康检查、日志、GitOps 状态、候选报告。
+
+### NFR-006 性能候选指标
+
+候选版上线前至少验证：
+
+- API P95、任务调度延迟、队列等待、Worker 心跳、SQLite 锁等待、审计写入时间。
+- 具体 SLO 在预发布基准测试后固化，禁止无证据承诺。
+
+## 5. 本候选版本范围
+
+### 已纳入代码
+
+- Control Plane、持久化、Gateway、Orchestrator、OpenClaw Adapter、Hermes Boundary、Execution Tracking、Web Console、GitOps Status、部署和回滚。
+
+### 尚需环境验证
+
+- 精确测试执行证据。
+- OpenClaw 真实 Runtime 联调。
+- 生产数据库/队列替换或容量验证。
+- 预发布性能、安全、重启和回滚演练。
+- Owner 对 merge、Tag 和生产部署的批准。
+
+## 6. 用户验收场景
+
+1. 平台管理员创建租户并注册 OpenClaw/Hermes Agent。
+2. 操作员创建任务，审批人批准。
+3. AIOS Orchestrator 选择 Runtime，并创建签名命令或租户分区 Job。
+4. Runtime 执行并返回结果。
+5. AIOS 更新 Task、Audit 和 Execution Evidence。
+6. 租户用户在 Web Console 查看完整链路。
+7. 跨租户访问被拒绝。
+8. 服务重启后状态恢复。
+9. 候选部署健康检查通过，回滚演练成功。
@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+# AIOS V2 目标架构
+
+- 文档版本：`V2R1C0-candidate`
+- 架构状态：目标架构已实现为候选代码，待预发布验证
+- 适用范围：Control Plane、Agent Router、OpenClaw、Hermes、Web Console、GitOps、审计、部署与运维
+
+## 1. 架构目标
+
+AIOS V2 的核心目标是把分散在 OpenClaw、Hermes、Agent Router、局部 WebUI 和 GitOps 中的控制能力收敛为一个权威控制面，同时保留现有执行能力，避免推倒重写。
+
+目标状态：
+
+```text
+用户 / Web Console / Public API
+                 |
+                 v
+          AIOS Control Plane
+ Tenant | Identity | Agent | Task | Policy | Approval | Audit
+                 |
+                 v
+      Execution Orchestrator / Agent Router
+             /                      \
+            v                        v
+   OpenClaw Adapter            Hermes Boundary
+            |                        |
+            v                        v
+   OpenClaw Runtime            Hermes Workers
+             \                      /
+              v                    v
+       Result Reconciliation + Execution Evidence
+```
+
+设计结论：
+
+- AIOS 是唯一控制面。
+- Agent Router 是调度平面，不是第二控制面。
+- OpenClaw 是执行适配与 Runtime。
+- Hermes 是队列、Worker、Profile 与执行 Runtime。
+- Web Console 只调用 AIOS API。
+- GitOps 是代码、配置、文档和发布变更的唯一入口。
+
+## 2. 从现有架构到目标架构
+
+### 2.1 现有能力
+
+现有系统已经具备：
+
+- OpenClaw 执行与 Fleet 能力。
+- Hermes Worker、Profile、队列和工作区能力。
+- Agent Router 路由经验和部分调度接口。
+- GitOps 分支、提交、审批、回滚和审计能力。
+- Tenant Context、Tenant Router、Memory Scope、SecretRef、Message Ledger 和审计候选实现。
+- 局部 WebUI、Gateway 和自动任务领取能力。
+
+### 2.2 现有问题
+
+- 控制逻辑分散，可能存在多个任务事实源。
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 内部仍可能保存租户、策略或任务状态。
+- 候选能力分散在多个分支，主线缺少权威实现。
+- WebUI 与 API 入口不统一。
+- 分支名称、代码、测试和部署证据之间缺少映射。
+- 多租户隔离多为逻辑约束，尚缺全链路生产证据。
+
+### 2.3 演进原则
+
+- 先加边界和适配器，再迁移控制权。
+- 先复用接口，再替换内部实现。
+- 先在候选分支验证，再受控提升。
+- 不允许同时存在两套权威任务生命周期。
+- 不以“大分支存在”代替验收证据。
+
+## 3. 逻辑分层
+
+### 3.1 Web 与 API 层
+
+职责：
+
+- 提供 Tenant、Agent、Task、Approval、Runtime、Audit、Execution Evidence 和 GitOps 页面/API。
+- 依赖可信身份代理注入 `X-AIOS-*` 身份头。
+- 不允许浏览器直接访问 OpenClaw 或 Hermes。
+- 不允许客户端自行选择或覆盖 `tenant_id`。
+
+候选实现：
+
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/app.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gateway.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/console.py`
+
+### 3.2 AIOS Control Plane
+
+权威职责：
+
+- Tenant Registry
+- Agent Registry
+- Task Lifecycle
+- Policy Decision
+- Approval
+- Audit Event
+- Runtime Inventory
+- Execution Evidence
+- Deployment/GitOps Status
+
+不负责：
+
+- OpenClaw 内部执行细节。
+- Hermes Worker 内部执行细节。
+- 直接持有 Runtime 凭据明文。
+
+候选实现：
+
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/control_plane.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/persistence.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/execution_tracking.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gitops_status.py`
+
+### 3.3 Execution Orchestrator / Agent Router
+
+职责：
+
+- 只接受 `APPROVED` 任务。
+- 根据 Agent Registry 和 Policy Result 选择 Runtime。
+- 生成 OpenClawCommand 或 HermesJob。
+- 传播 tenant、task、trace、idempotency 和 policy version。
+- 将 Runtime Result 回写 AIOS Task。
+
+不负责：
+
+- 创建租户。
+- 修改策略。
+- 绕过审批。
+- 保存第二套任务状态机。
+
+候选实现：
+
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/orchestrator.py`
+
+### 3.4 OpenClaw Adapter
+
+职责：
+
+- 验证签名命令。
+- 执行、查询、取消、健康检查和回调。
+- 支持幂等、超时和租户隔离。
+- 把 Runtime 生命周期转换为 AIOS 审计事件。
+
+不负责：
+
+- Tenant、Policy、Approval、Task Lifecycle。
+- 向浏览器暴露公网控制接口。
+
+候选实现：
+
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/contract.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/adapter.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/transport.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/health.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/callback.py`
+
+### 3.5 Hermes Runtime Boundary
+
+职责：
+
+- Tenant/Cell/Profile 分区队列。
+- Worker claim、start、heartbeat、complete、fail、cancel。
+- Lease 超时和自动回队列。
+- Result 回传和 Runtime Health。
+
+不负责：
+
+- Policy、Approval、Tenant Registry、权威 Task Lifecycle。
+
+候选实现：
+
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/contract.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/adapter.py`
+- `active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/worker.py`
+
+### 3.6 Persistence
+
+候选实现使用 SQLite WAL 原子快照，持久化：
+
+- Tenant
+- Agent
+- Task
+- Audit
+- Idempotency
+- Execution Evidence 文件
+
+生产演进：
+
+- Store 接口保持稳定。
+- 可替换为 PostgreSQL、对象存储或分布式事件存储。
+- 生产替换必须提供迁移、备份、恢复、HA、容量和租户隔离证据。
+
+## 4. 多租户架构
+
+### 4.1 权威租户上下文
+
+每次请求和执行至少传播：
+
+```text
+tenant_id
+principal_id
+session_id
+trace_id
+task_id
+policy_version
+```
+
+Runtime 还传播：
+
+```text
+command_id / job_id
+cell_id
+profile_id
+idempotency_key
+worker_id
+```
+
+### 4.2 隔离层级
+
+| 层级 | 隔离要求 |
+|---|---|
+| HTTP/API | 可信身份头、租户不可由浏览器覆盖 |
+| Control Plane | 所有资源带 `tenant_id`，跨租户默认拒绝 |
+| OpenClaw | 签名命令绑定 tenant/task/trace |
+| Hermes | tenant/cell/profile 三层分区 |
+| Storage | 候选为显式租户字段；生产需 RLS 或物理隔离策略 |
+| Evidence/Audit | 仅按当前租户查询 |
+| Cache/Memory | key 必须包含 tenant namespace |
+| Secret | 只保存引用，不保存明文 |
+| Logs/Metrics | 必须包含 tenant/task/trace 标签，并限制查询范围 |
+
+### 4.3 失败行为
+
+- 跨租户资源访问返回拒绝或“未找到”。
+- 不泄露其他租户资源存在性。
+- 缺少 tenant context 时 fail closed。
+- Runtime 返回的 tenant/task/trace 不匹配时拒绝回写。
+
+## 5. 任务与执行数据流
+
+### 5.1 任务创建与审批
+
+```text
+User/API
+   |
+   v
+Trusted Identity
+   |
+   v
+AIOS Gateway
+   |
+   v
+Policy Gate
+   |
+   v
+Task CREATED
+   |
+   v
+Approval
+   |
+   v
+Task APPROVED
+```
+
+### 5.2 OpenClaw 执行
+
+```text
+APPROVED Task
+   |
+   v
+Execution Orchestrator
+   |
+   v
+Signed OpenClawCommand
+   |
+   v
+OpenClaw Adapter
+   |
+   v
+Runtime Result
+   |
+   v
+Task Reconciliation + Audit + Evidence
+```
+
+### 5.3 Hermes 执行
+
+```text
+APPROVED Task
+   |
+   v
+Execution Orchestrator
+   |
+   v
+Tenant/Cell/Profile HermesJob
+   |
+   v
+Worker Claim + Lease + Heartbeat
+   |
+   v
+HermesResult
+   |
+   v
+Task Reconciliation + Audit + Evidence
+```
+
+## 6. 安全架构
+
+### 6.1 身份边界
+
+- Public API 位于可信反向代理之后。
+- 反向代理完成登录、会话、MFA 和身份头注入。
+- 候选应用拒绝未认证身份断言。
+- 生产不得允许客户端直接伪造 `X-AIOS-*`。
+
+### 6.2 Runtime 命令完整性
+
+OpenClawCommand 使用规范化序列化和 HMAC-SHA256：
+
+- 签名覆盖 tenant、task、trace、action、payload、idempotency 和时间。
+- 支持 key ID、到期时间和时钟偏差。
+- Runtime 密钥通过受保护文件或外部 Secret Provider 解析。
+
+### 6.3 Secret 边界
+
+Git 允许：
+
+```text
+secret_ref
+credential_ref
+key_id
+受保护文件路径
+```
+
+Git 禁止：
+
+```text
+API Key
+密码
+Token
+私钥
+签名材料
+```
+
+### 6.4 Web 安全
+
+候选应用设置：
+
+- no-store
+- nosniff
+- DENY frame
+- no-referrer
+- CSP
+- 请求体大小限制
+
+生产还需验证：
+
+- CSRF/CORS
+- Rate Limit
+- Session Timeout
+- CSP Nonce/Hash
+- WAF 和反向代理访问策略
+
+## 7. 可靠性架构
+
+### 7.1 幂等
+
+- Control Plane：`tenant_id + idempotency_key + request_digest`。
+- OpenClaw：`tenant_id + idempotency_key + signature`。
+- Hermes：`tenant_id + idempotency_key + job_digest`。
+
+### 7.2 并发
+
+- Task 使用 revision。
+- Hermes 使用 revision + worker lease。
+- GitOps 使用 detached controller + branch lease。
+- 持久化使用 SQLite `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` 和原子快照。
+
+### 7.3 恢复
+
+- Controller restart：detached guard。
+- AIOS restart：SQLite restore。
+- Worker crash：lease 到期后 Job 回到 QUEUED。
+- Release failure：健康检查失败自动恢复 previous release。
+
+## 8. 可观测架构
+
+统一关联键：
+
+```text
+tenant_id
+principal_id
+trace_id
+task_id
+agent_id
+command_id / job_id
+worker_id
+commit
+```
+
+Web Console 展示：
+
+- Tasks
+- Agents
+- Runtime Health
+- Audit
+- Execution Evidence
+- GitOps Status
+
+生产还需接入：
+
+- 结构化日志
+- Metrics
+- Distributed Tracing
+- Alerting
+- SLO Dashboard
+
+## 9. 部署架构
+
+支持两种候选部署：
+
+### systemd
+
+- 非 root `aios` 用户。
+- `ProtectSystem=strict`、`NoNewPrivileges` 等安全选项。
+- 状态目录 `/var/lib/aios-v2`。
+
+### Docker/Compose
+
+- 非 root UID/GID。
+- Read-only root filesystem。
+- Drop all capabilities。
+- State volume。
+- HTTP healthcheck。
+
+## 10. 架构约束
+
+以下行为视为架构违规：
+
+1. OpenClaw/Hermes 直接创建或批准 AIOS Task。
+2. Web Console 直接调用 Runtime。
+3. 新模块不携带 `tenant_id`。
+4. 新增第二套任务状态机或租户事实源。
+5. 在 Git 中提交明文凭据。
+6. 绕过 GitOps 修改生产代码/配置。
+7. 架构或功能变化未同步更新 `docs/aios-v2/`。
+8. 未通过测试和预发布门禁直接提升候选版本。
+
+## 11. 目标架构完成判定
+
+目标架构只有在以下证据齐全时才视为完成：
+
+- 文档与代码映射完整。
+- Candidate tests 对精确 commit 执行通过。
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 实际 Runtime 联调通过。
+- 多租户负向测试通过。
+- 重启恢复和回滚演练通过。
+- GitOps 本地/Gitea OID 一致。
+- Owner 批准 merge、Tag 和生产部署。
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+# AIOS V2 迁移与交付策略
+
+- 文档版本：`V2R1C0-candidate`
+- 交付原则：增量迁移、能力复用、控制权收敛、GitOps 唯一变更入口
+
+## 1. 迁移目标
+
+AIOS V2 不通过一次性重写替换现有系统，而是在保留 OpenClaw、Hermes、Agent Router、GitOps 和既有运行能力的前提下，将租户、策略、任务、审批、审计和发布治理收敛到 AIOS Control Plane。
+
+迁移完成的标志不是“新代码存在”，而是：
+
+- AIOS 成为唯一权威控制面；
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 不再保存第二套控制状态；
+- 所有控制功能 Web/API 化；
+- 所有模块通过租户隔离、测试和预发布门禁；
+- 本地 Git、Gitea、测试、部署和回滚证据可追踪。
+
+## 2. 为什么采用增量迁移
+
+### 2.1 避免能力回退
+
+OpenClaw、Hermes 和 Agent Router 已经包含大量运行经验、边界处理和执行能力。整体重写会扩大风险面，并导致业务能力、操作流程和历史数据回退。
+
+### 2.2 保持可回滚
+
+每个迁移步骤必须：
+
+- 独立分支；
+- 小范围提交；
+- 独立测试；
+- 可单独回滚；
+- 不要求立即关闭旧执行路径。
+
+### 2.3 先收敛控制权，再优化内部实现
+
+迁移优先级：
+
+```text
+唯一入口
+  -> 权威租户/任务/策略
+  -> Runtime Adapter
+  -> 数据层生产化
+  -> Web 与可观测
+  -> 性能与 HA
+```
+
+## 3. 分阶段迁移路线
+
+### Phase 0：GitOps 与架构事实源
+
+目标：建立可靠变更链和权威设计基线。
+
+已完成候选能力：
+
+- Controller detached guard；
+- 避免 fetch 到已检出本地分支；
+- Gitea SSH 镜像；
+- `docs/aios-v2/` 架构事实源；
+- 候选分支、部署和回滚资产。
+
+退出条件：
+
+- Controller detached 且 clean；
+- 本地/Gitea OID 一致；
+- 架构与需求文档纳入版本。
+
+### Phase 1：Control Plane 权威化
+
+目标：将 Tenant、Agent、Task、Policy、Approval 和 Audit 收敛到 AIOS。
+
+候选实现：
+
+- `aios_v2/control_plane.py`
+- `aios_v2/persistence.py`
+- `aios_v2/gateway.py`
+- `aios_v2/app.py`
+
+退出条件：
+
+- 任务状态机统一；
+- 幂等、revision、审计和跨租户拒绝通过测试；
+- 服务重启后权威状态恢复。
+
+### Phase 2：OpenClaw 解耦
+
+目标：OpenClaw 从控制逻辑转为执行适配器。
+
+步骤：
+
+1. 定义签名命令合同；
+2. 引入 Adapter；
+3. 将直接调用迁移到 AIOS Orchestrator；
+4. Runtime 只返回执行结果和健康状态；
+5. 关闭或网络隔离旧公共控制入口。
+
+退出条件：
+
+- 未批准任务无法生成有效命令；
+- 命令绑定 tenant/task/trace/idempotency；
+- 旧控制接口冻结并记录替代路径。
+
+### Phase 3：Hermes 解耦
+
+目标：Hermes 只承担租户分区队列和 Worker Runtime。
+
+步骤：
+
+1. 定义 HermesJob/HermesResult；
+2. 强制 tenant/cell/profile 分区；
+3. 引入 claim/lease/heartbeat；
+4. 将结果统一回写 AIOS；
+5. 移除 Hermes 内部策略和任务事实源。
+
+退出条件：
+
+- Worker 无权创建 AIOS Task；
+- 租约过期后 Job 可恢复；
+- 跨租户 claim/read/result 被拒绝。
+
+### Phase 4：Web 与运维统一
+
+目标：所有用户与运维功能通过 AIOS Web/API。
+
+范围：
+
+- Tenant、Agent、Task、Runtime、Audit、Execution Evidence、GitOps；
+- systemd/Docker/Compose；
+- healthcheck、rollback、release report。
+
+退出条件：
+
+- 浏览器不直接调用 Runtime；
+- 生产身份代理和权限模型通过验证；
+- 部署、重启和回滚演练通过。
+
+### Phase 5：生产数据层与 HA
+
+目标：将候选 SQLite/内存运行状态替换或强化为生产级后端。
+
+要求：
+
+- 数据迁移；
+- RLS 或物理隔离；
+- 备份恢复；
+- HA 与容量；
+- 多实例并发；
+- 灾难恢复目标。
+
+该阶段不得改变上层合同，避免 Runtime 和 Web 再次耦合存储实现。
+
+## 4. 分支与提交策略
+
+### 4.1 分支类型
+
+| 类型 | 用途 |
+|---|---|
+| `task/*` | 可执行任务合同与主体实现 |
+| `patch/*` | 独立修复或窄范围增强 |
+| `integration/*` | 多模块候选收敛 |
+| `result/*` | 自动执行结果与证据 |
+| `release/*` | 受控发布候选 |
+
+### 4.2 规则
+
+- 禁止直接修改 `main`；
+- 一个提交应可独立审阅和回滚；
+- 大文件和大范围变更应拆分；
+- 所有行为变化必须同步文档和测试；
+- 生产 Tag、部署和回滚需要 Owner 批准。
+
+## 5. GitOps 交付流程
+
+```text
+需求/架构更新
+      |
+      v
+任务分支 + 文档 + 测试
+      |
+      v
+代码提交 + Secret Gate
+      |
+      v
+本地 bare repo 同步
+      |
+      v
+Gitea 镜像与 OID 校验
+      |
+      v
+Candidate 集成
+      |
+      v
+自动测试与预发布
+      |
+      v
+Owner 审批
+      |
+      v
+Merge / Tag / Production Deploy
+```
+
+### 5.1 同步状态
+
+GitOps 返回必须区分：
+
+- local sync；
+- Gitea sync；
+- branch OID；
+- workspace mode；
+- dirty state。
+
+仅返回 `common_git_dir synced` 不足以证明 Web 远端可见。
+
+## 6. 发布门禁
+
+### Gate A：设计完整性
+
+- 用户需求、目标架构、模块契约、ADR 和追踪矩阵同步；
+- 无冲突标记、断链或过期路径。
+
+### Gate B：代码质量
+
+- 包可导入；
+- 静态编译通过；
+- Secret Scanner 通过；
+- 无已知越权旁路。
+
+### Gate C：测试
+
+- 单元、集成、多租户负向、重启恢复、Runtime 边界测试通过；
+- 记录 commit、命令、exit code、pass/fail 和 artifact digest。
+
+### Gate D：预发布
+
+- systemd 或 Compose 启动成功；
+- 健康检查通过；
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 真实联调通过；
+- 备份、重启和回滚演练通过；
+- 日志中无敏感信息。
+
+### Gate E：生产批准
+
+- Owner 批准 merge、Tag 和生产部署；
+- 发布窗口、回滚负责人和观察指标明确；
+- 生产变更通过 GitOps 记录。
+
+## 7. 回滚策略
+
+### 7.1 代码回滚
+
+- 使用 `/opt/aios/current` 原子 symlink 切换；
+- 回滚前备份状态；
+- 健康检查失败自动恢复 previous release。
+
+### 7.2 状态回滚
+
+默认不自动回滚状态，避免覆盖候选运行期间新增的 Task、Audit 和 Evidence。
+
+状态恢复只有在：
+
+- 明确确认 schema 不兼容；
+- 数据备份可验证；
+- Owner 显式授权；
+
+时启用。
+
+### 7.3 Runtime 回滚
+
+OpenClaw/Hermes Adapter 采用稳定合同。若候选执行层失败，可恢复旧 Runtime 版本，但不得恢复旧控制权旁路。
+
+## 8. Bug 修复流程
+
+生产或预发布 Bug：
+
+1. 创建 `patch/bugfix/*`；
+2. 添加可复现测试；
+3. 修复代码；
+4. 更新相关需求/架构/契约/ADR；
+5. 运行候选验收；
+6. 进入新的 release candidate；
+7. Owner 批准部署。
+
+禁止在生产目录直接编辑文件后不回写 Git。
+
+## 9. 文档同步规则
+
+以下变化必须更新文档：
+
+- 用户行为或页面；
+- API 路径、Header、请求/响应；
+- 数据模型、状态机、策略；
+- OpenClaw/Hermes/Router 边界；
+- 多租户与安全模型；
+- 部署、健康检查、回滚；
+- 测试或发布门禁。
+
+对应关系：
+
+- 需求变化：更新 `01-USER-REQUIREMENTS.md`；
+- 架构变化：更新 `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` 和 ADR；
+- 迁移/发布变化：更新本文件；
+- 合同变化：更新 `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md`；
+- 代码/测试路径变化：更新 `05-TRACEABILITY-MATRIX.md`。
+
+## 10. 当前候选后续步骤
+
+1. 完成文档同步门禁和 Acceptance Runner；
+2. 在精确 Candidate commit 执行测试；
+3. 推送 Gitea 并校验 OID；
+4. 部署隔离预发布环境；
+5. 联调真实 OpenClaw/Hermes；
+6. 执行重启、性能、安全和回滚演练；
+7. 生成最终 evidence；
+8. 请求 Owner 的 merge/Tag/production approval。
@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+# AIOS V2 模块契约
+
+- 文档版本：`V2R1C0-candidate`
+- 状态：候选实现契约基线
+- 原则：Control Plane 权威、Runtime 执行、全链路租户隔离、所有状态可审计
+
+## 1. 通用上下文契约
+
+所有控制与执行请求必须携带以下上下文：
+
+| 字段 | 必填 | 说明 |
+|---|---:|---|
+| `tenant_id` | 是 | 权威租户标识 |
+| `principal_id` | 控制请求是 | 已认证主体 |
+| `trace_id` | 是 | 全链路追踪 |
+| `task_id` | 执行阶段是 | AIOS 权威任务 |
+| `session_id` | Web/交互请求建议 | 用户会话 |
+| `policy_version` | 控制请求是 | 策略版本 |
+| `idempotency_key` | 创建/执行是 | 幂等键 |
+
+规则：
+
+- 缺少必填字段时 fail closed。
+- 客户端不得覆盖由可信代理或 AIOS 生成的 `tenant_id`。
+- Runtime 返回的 tenant/task/trace 必须与请求完全匹配。
+- 所有持久化键、缓存键和队列分区必须包含租户命名空间。
+
+## 2. Tenant Contract
+
+### 2.1 TenantRecord
+
+```text
+tenant_id
+display_name
+status
+metadata
+created_at
+updated_at
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- `tenant_id` 不可为空且不可变。
+- `status` 至少支持 `active` 和受控停用状态。
+- Tenant 只由 AIOS Control Plane 创建和维护。
+- Runtime 不得创建租户。
+
+实现：`active-runtime/app/aios_v2/control_plane.py`
+
+## 3. Agent Contract
+
+### 3.1 AgentRecord
+
+```text
+agent_id
+tenant_id
+display_name
+runtime
+capabilities
+enabled
+metadata
+created_at
+updated_at
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- Agent 属于唯一租户。
+- `runtime` 由 Registry 决定，可取 `openclaw`、`hermes` 或后续注册 Runtime。
+- `capabilities` 是允许调度的动作集合。
+- `metadata` 可存 `cell_id`、`profile_id`、priority 等非敏感引用。
+- 不得在 Agent metadata 中保存明文凭据。
+
+## 4. Task Contract
+
+### 4.1 TaskRecord
+
+```text
+task_id
+tenant_id
+agent_id
+action
+payload
+state
+revision
+idempotency_key
+request_digest
+result
+error
+created_by
+approved_by
+created_at
+updated_at
+```
+
+### 4.2 状态机
+
+```text
+CREATED -> APPROVED -> RUNNING -> COMPLETED
+    |          |          |
+    +----------+----------+-> CANCELLED
+                           +-> FAILED
+```
+
+允许转换：
+
+| 当前 | 允许目标 |
+|---|---|
+| CREATED | APPROVED, CANCELLED |
+| APPROVED | RUNNING, CANCELLED |
+| RUNNING | COMPLETED, FAILED, CANCELLED |
+| COMPLETED | 无 |
+| FAILED | 无 |
+| CANCELLED | 无 |
+
+约束：
+
+- 每次转换必须校验 `revision`。
+- COMPLETED 必须带 `result`。
+- FAILED 必须带 `error`。
+- 每次转换生成 AuditEvent。
+- Runtime 不得直接写 Task Store，只能通过 Orchestrator reconcile。
+
+## 5. Policy Contract
+
+### 5.1 PolicyDecision
+
+```text
+allowed
+reason
+policy_version
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- Policy 默认拒绝。
+- Runtime 不得覆盖 PolicyDecision。
+- 拒绝必须审计。
+- 高风险动作必须经过 Approval。
+
+## 6. Audit Contract
+
+### 6.1 AuditEvent
+
+```text
+event_id
+tenant_id
+principal_id
+trace_id
+action
+resource_type
+resource_id
+outcome
+policy_version
+details
+created_at
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- 按租户查询。
+- `details` 不得包含明文凭据。
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 生命周期事件必须映射到统一 AuditEvent。
+- 生产版需增加不可变外部固化和完整性验证。
+
+## 7. OpenClaw Contract
+
+### 7.1 OpenClawCommand
+
+```text
+contract_version
+command_id
+tenant_id
+task_id
+trace_id
+action
+payload
+idempotency_key
+created_at
+expires_at
+key_id
+signature
+```
+
+签名覆盖：
+
+- command_id
+- tenant_id
+- task_id
+- trace_id
+- action
+- payload
+- idempotency_key
+- created_at / expires_at
+- contract_version / key_id
+
+约束：
+
+- 使用规范化 JSON 和 HMAC-SHA256。
+- 只接受已批准任务生成的命令。
+- 过期、未来时间超差、签名错误命令必须拒绝。
+- `key_id` 只引用运行时材料，不包含材料本身。
+
+### 7.2 OpenClawResult
+
+```text
+command_id
+tenant_id
+task_id
+trace_id
+state
+output
+error
+started_at
+finished_at
+runtime_id
+attempts
+```
+
+状态：
+
+```text
+ACCEPTED
+RUNNING
+COMPLETED
+FAILED
+CANCELLED
+TIMED_OUT
+REJECTED
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- Adapter 对外只接受终态结果用于 reconcile。
+- 身份字段不匹配时拒绝回写。
+- 结果通过 Orchestrator 更新 AIOS Task。
+
+### 7.3 RuntimeHealth
+
+```text
+runtime
+runtime_id
+status
+version
+heartbeat_at
+active_tasks
+workspace_isolated
+credential_ref_configured
+details
+```
+
+健康策略：
+
+- heartbeat 不得超时。
+- workspace isolation 与 credential reference 必须符合策略。
+- 不安全 Runtime 应 quarantine，不得继续接收新任务。
+
+实现：`active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/`
+
+## 8. Hermes Contract
+
+### 8.1 HermesJob
+
+```text
+job_id
+tenant_id
+cell_id
+profile_id
+task_id
+trace_id
+action
+payload
+idempotency_key
+priority
+state
+revision
+assigned_worker_id
+lease_expires_at
+created_at
+updated_at
+```
+
+状态机：
+
+```text
+QUEUED -> CLAIMED -> RUNNING -> COMPLETED
+   |         |          |
+   +---------+----------+-> CANCELLED
+                        +-> FAILED
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- `tenant_id + cell_id + profile_id` 形成执行分区。
+- claim 只能领取同分区 Job。
+- Worker ID 不得跨分区复用。
+- Lease 到期 Job 回到 QUEUED。
+- revision 冲突不得覆盖。
+
+### 8.2 HermesResult
+
+```text
+job_id
+tenant_id
+task_id
+trace_id
+state
+worker_id
+output
+error
+started_at
+finished_at
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- COMPLETED 必须有 output。
+- FAILED 必须有 error。
+- 只允许 AIOS Orchestrator reconcile。
+
+### 8.3 HermesHealth
+
+```text
+runtime_id
+status
+version
+heartbeat_at
+active_workers
+active_jobs
+queued_jobs
+tenant_partitions
+profile_isolation_enforced
+details
+```
+
+实现：`active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/`
+
+## 9. Execution Evidence Contract
+
+### 9.1 ExecutionEvidence
+
+```text
+execution_id
+tenant_id
+task_id
+agent_id
+executor
+branch
+status
+progress_completed
+progress_total
+current_step
+last_commit
+test_status
+test_summary
+result_summary
+claimed_at
+heartbeat_at
+completed_at
+```
+
+状态建议：
+
+```text
+claimed
+running
+blocked
+complete
+failed
+cancelled
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- 按租户存储和查询。
+- 每个阻塞必须记录原因、责任方和解除条件。
+- 每次结果必须记录 branch、commit、测试命令和状态。
+- 不得包含 Secret 或完整敏感 payload。
+
+## 10. GitOps Status Contract
+
+```text
+available
+service_status
+workspace_mode
+workspace_branch
+workspace_ref
+workspace_dirty
+candidate_branch
+release_channel
+release_version
+sync_status
+details
+```
+
+约束：
+
+- Web 响应不得包含 remote URL、凭据或 stderr。
+- Controller 必须 `detached + clean`。
+- `sync_status` 必须区分 local 和 Gitea 镜像状态。
+
+## 11. Web/API Contract
+
+### 11.1 身份头
+
+可信代理注入：
+
+```text
+X-AIOS-Authenticated
+X-AIOS-Tenant-ID
+X-AIOS-Principal-ID
+X-AIOS-Roles
+X-AIOS-Trace-ID
+X-AIOS-Session-ID
+X-AIOS-Policy-Version
+```
+
+生产约束：
+
+- 代理必须删除客户端同名头后重新注入。
+- 应用不得直接暴露公网端口。
+
+### 11.2 核心 API
+
+```text
+GET  /api/v2/health
+POST /api/v2/tenants
+GET  /api/v2/tenants/current
+POST /api/v2/agents
+GET  /api/v2/agents
+POST /api/v2/tasks
+GET  /api/v2/tasks
+GET  /api/v2/tasks/{id}
+POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/approve
+POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/start
+POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/complete
+POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/fail
+POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/cancel
+POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/dispatch
+GET  /api/v2/audit
+GET  /api/v2/runtime
+GET  /api/v2/executions
+GET  /api/v2/gitops
+POST /api/v2/hermes/results/reconcile
+```
+
+## 12. Persistence Contract
+
+候选版：
+
+- SQLite WAL
+- `BEGIN IMMEDIATE`
+- 原子 snapshot
+- schema version
+- restart restore
+
+持久化范围：
+
+- tenants
+- agents
+- tasks
+- audit
+- idempotency
+
+生产替换要求：
+
+- 不改变 Domain/API Contract。
+- 提供 migration、backup、restore、HA、RLS/隔离和容量测试。
+
+## 13. Deployment Contract
+
+### systemd
+
+- 非 root `aios` 用户。
+- 状态目录 `/var/lib/aios-v2`。
+- 最小权限和文件系统保护。
+
+### Docker
+
+- 非 root UID/GID。
+- read-only root filesystem。
+- drop all capabilities。
+- 独立状态 volume。
+
+### Rollback
+
+- 回滚前备份状态。
+- 默认只回滚代码。
+- 状态恢复需显式授权。
+- 回滚后必须执行 healthcheck。
+
+## 14. 契约变更规则
+
+任何以下变化必须在同一提交或同一分支更新本文档：
+
+- 字段、状态、Header、API、错误语义；
+- 租户或安全约束；
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 边界；
+- Persistence 或 Deployment Contract；
+- Evidence/Audit 格式。
+
+不兼容变化必须新增 ADR 和版本号，不得静默修改。
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# AIOS V2 需求—架构—代码—测试—部署追踪矩阵
+
+- 文档版本：`V2R1C0-candidate`
+- 目的：确保每项用户需求都能追踪到架构设计、代码实现、自动测试、部署资产和验收命令
+
+## 1. 追踪规则
+
+每条需求至少具备：
+
+1. 需求编号；
+2. 架构章节；
+3. 实现路径；
+4. 测试路径；
+5. 部署/运维资产；
+6. 验收状态。
+
+状态定义：
+
+- `Implemented`：代码已进入 Candidate 分支；
+- `Test-defined`：测试代码已进入 Candidate 分支；
+- `Test-verified`：精确 commit 的测试已运行并保存证据；
+- `Pre-production verified`：预发布部署、健康检查和回滚演练已通过；
+- `Production released`：Owner 批准并完成 merge/tag/deploy。
+
+## 2. 核心追踪矩阵
+
+| 需求 | 设计依据 | 代码实现 | 测试 | 部署/运维 | 当前状态 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| UR-001 AIOS 唯一控制面 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §3.2/§3.3；ADR-001 | `aios_v2/control_plane.py`、`aios_v2/orchestrator.py`、`aios_v2/app.py` | `tests/aios_v2_candidate/test_candidate_flow.py` | `deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2.service` | Implemented / Test-defined |
+| UR-002 复用现有能力 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §2；`03-MIGRATION-AND-DELIVERY.md` §2 | `aios_openclaw/`、`aios_hermes/` | OpenClaw/Hermes flow tests | Candidate branch + adapter boundaries | Implemented / Test-defined |
+| UR-003 OpenClaw/Hermes 解耦 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §3.4/§3.5；ADR-002 | `aios_openclaw/adapter.py`、`aios_hermes/adapter.py` | runtime boundary tests in candidate flow suite | systemd/Docker runtime configuration | Implemented / Test-defined |
+| UR-004 全面 Web 化 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §3.1/§8 | `aios_v2/console.py`、`aios_v2/gateway.py`、`aios_v2/app.py` | API/console smoke test pending | Docker/systemd + reverse proxy requirement | Implemented / Test pending |
+| UR-005 多租户隔离 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §4；ADR-004 | `control_plane.py`、`orchestrator.py`、`aios_openclaw/*`、`aios_hermes/*`、`execution_tracking.py` | `test_cross_tenant_task_read_is_denied` | tenant-scoped state/evidence directories | Implemented / Test-defined |
+| UR-006 权威任务生命周期 | `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md` §4 | `control_plane.py` | OpenClaw/Hermes full-flow tests | persisted state + audit | Implemented / Test-defined |
+| UR-007 策略与审批 | `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md` §5 | `control_plane.py`、`gateway.py` | role/policy negative tests需补充 | reverse proxy identity + audit | Implemented / Partial test |
+| UR-008 幂等与并发安全 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §7 | `control_plane.py`、`aios_openclaw/adapter.py`、`aios_hermes/adapter.py`、`worker.py` | flow + restart tests；并发专项测试需补充 | GitOps detached guard + SQLite WAL | Implemented / Partial test |
+| UR-009 执行证据 | `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md` §9 | `execution_tracking.py` | `test_execution_tracking_persists_claim_heartbeat_and_result` | `/var/lib/aios-v2/executions` | Implemented / Test-defined |
+| UR-010 GitOps 唯一变更流程 | `03-MIGRATION-AND-DELIVERY.md` §4/§5；ADR-003 | GitOps Runtime、`gitops_status.py` | healthcheck 的 detached/clean 检查 | `deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh` | Implemented / Runtime verified partially |
+| UR-011 持久化与恢复 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §3.6 | `persistence.py` | `test_durable_service_recovers_state_after_restart` | state dir + backup/rollback | Implemented / Test-defined |
+| UR-012 审计与合规 | `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md` §6 | `control_plane.py`、`aios_openclaw/callback.py`、`app.py` | flow test + audit assertions需补充 | Console audit view | Implemented / Partial test |
+| UR-013 密钥安全 | `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` §6；ADR-006 | `FileSigningMaterialResolver`、credential refs、Secret Gate | permission/secret-scan test需补充 | env template + external protected file | Implemented / Partial test |
+| UR-014 部署与回滚 | `03-MIGRATION-AND-DELIVERY.md` §7 | deployment scripts/assets | acceptance runner + healthcheck | `deploy/aios-v2/` | Implemented / Pre-prod pending |
+| UR-015 文档与代码同步 | `03-MIGRATION-AND-DELIVERY.md` §9；ADR-005 | `tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py` | checker self-test / acceptance runner | CI/Gitea Actions 可调用 | Implemented after checker commit |
+
+## 3. API 追踪
+
+| API | 需求 | 实现 | 测试状态 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `GET /api/v2/health` | UR-004, UR-014 | `gateway.py` | healthcheck 定义完成 |
+| `POST /api/v2/tenants` | UR-001, UR-005 | `gateway.py` / `control_plane.py` | 需增加 HTTP 集成测试 |
+| `POST /api/v2/agents` | UR-001, UR-005 | `gateway.py` / `control_plane.py` | Domain flow 已覆盖 |
+| `POST /api/v2/tasks` | UR-006, UR-008 | `gateway.py` / `control_plane.py` | Domain flow 已覆盖 |
+| `POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/approve` | UR-006, UR-007 | `gateway.py` | Domain flow 已覆盖 |
+| `POST /api/v2/tasks/{id}/dispatch` | UR-001, UR-003 | `app.py` / `orchestrator.py` | OpenClaw/Hermes flow 已覆盖 |
+| `GET /api/v2/runtime` | UR-004, UR-009 | `app.py` | HTTP smoke test待执行 |
+| `GET /api/v2/executions` | UR-009 | `app.py` / `execution_tracking.py` | Evidence persistence test已定义 |
+| `GET /api/v2/gitops` | UR-010 | `app.py` / `gitops_status.py` | Runtime/healthcheck验证待执行 |
+| `POST /api/v2/hermes/results/reconcile` | UR-003, UR-006 | `app.py` / `orchestrator.py` | Hermes flow已覆盖 Domain 路径 |
+
+## 4. 运行时契约追踪
+
+| 契约 | 设计 | 代码 | 测试 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| OpenClawCommand | `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md` §7.1 | `aios_openclaw/contract.py` | OpenClaw full-flow；签名负向测试需补充 |
+| OpenClawResult | §7.2 | `aios_openclaw/contract.py` | OpenClaw full-flow |
+| RuntimeHealth | §7.3 | `aios_openclaw/contract.py`、`health.py` | health policy测试需补充 |
+| HermesJob | §8.1 | `aios_hermes/contract.py` | Hermes full-flow |
+| HermesResult | §8.2 | `aios_hermes/contract.py` | Hermes full-flow |
+| HermesHealth | §8.3 | `aios_hermes/contract.py`、`adapter.py` | healthcheck/worker test待执行 |
+| ExecutionEvidence | §9 | `execution_tracking.py` | evidence persistence test |
+| GitOpsStatus | §10 | `gitops_status.py` | healthcheck detached/clean检查 |
+
+## 5. 部署追踪
+
+| 能力 | 文件 | 验收命令 |
+|---|---|---|
+| systemd | `deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2.service` | `systemctl status aios-v2` |
+| 环境模板 | `deploy/aios-v2/env/aios-v2.env.example` | `systemd-analyze verify` + 文件权限检查 |
+| Docker | `deploy/aios-v2/docker/Dockerfile` | `docker build` |
+| Compose | `deploy/aios-v2/docker/compose.yaml` | `docker compose config` / `up` |
+| 健康检查 | `deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh` | 直接执行 |
+| 回滚 | `deploy/aios-v2/rollback/rollback.sh` | 预发布回滚演练 |
+| 全量验收 | `deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh` | 直接执行 |
+
+## 6. 文档覆盖追踪
+
+| 文档 | 覆盖内容 | 代码/变更触发条件 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `README.md` | 事实源索引、状态语言、实现地图 | 新模块/目录/版本 |
+| `01-USER-REQUIREMENTS.md` | 用户需求、NFR、验收场景 | 用户行为、功能范围、验收变化 |
+| `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md` | 分层、边界、数据流、安全、租户 | 架构边界、数据流、运行时变化 |
+| `03-MIGRATION-AND-DELIVERY.md` | 迁移、GitOps、Gate、回滚 | 发布流程、迁移阶段、门禁变化 |
+| `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md` | 字段、API、状态机、错误语义 | Contract/API/模型变化 |
+| `05-TRACEABILITY-MATRIX.md` | 需求到代码测试部署映射 | 代码、测试、部署路径变化 |
+| `adr/*` | 关键不可逆或跨模块决策 | 新架构决策或旧决策替换 |
+
+## 7. 当前未完成验证项
+
+以下项目代码或测试定义已存在，但尚不能标记为 `Test-verified` 或 `Pre-production verified`：
+
+1. 精确 Candidate commit 的测试执行结果；
+2. HTTP API 与 Web Console 冒烟测试；
+3. 真实 OpenClaw Runtime 签名、取消、超时和健康联调；
+4. Hermes 长任务心跳、Worker 崩溃和 Lease 恢复演练；
+5. 多实例 SQLite/并发容量边界；
+6. systemd、Docker、Compose、restart 和 rollback 演练；
+7. local/Gitea Candidate OID 一致证明；
+8. 生产身份代理、防伪 Header、CSRF/CORS/Rate Limit 验证；
+9. 文档—代码同步检查器在 CI/Acceptance 中执行通过。
+
+## 8. 更新要求
+
+任何代码、API、部署或测试路径变化，必须同步更新本矩阵。验收脚本会检查本文档引用的关键路径存在，并检查架构/功能代码变化是否同时包含 `docs/aios-v2/` 变化。
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# AIOS V2 Architecture and Delivery Index
+
+- Version line: `V2R1C0-candidate`
+- Candidate branch: `integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720`
+- Architecture owner: AIOS V2 CTO
+- Status: implementation-complete candidate; runtime and production verification pending
+
+## 1. Purpose
+
+This directory is the single source of truth for AIOS V2 requirements, target architecture, module boundaries, migration strategy, release gates and architectural decisions.
+
+The design is based on the following non-negotiable principles:
+
+1. Do not rewrite the existing platform.
+2. Reuse OpenClaw, Hermes and Agent Router capabilities.
+3. Decouple OpenClaw and Hermes from control-plane ownership.
+4. AIOS is the only control plane.
+5. All user-facing and operational capabilities are Web/API accessible.
+6. Every module enforces multi-tenant isolation.
+7. Every change flows through Git branches, commits, tests, review and controlled promotion.
+
+## 2. Document map
+
+| Document | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| [01-USER-REQUIREMENTS.md](01-USER-REQUIREMENTS.md) | Product goals, user requirements, non-functional requirements and acceptance criteria |
+| [02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md](02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md) | Target logical architecture, control boundaries, data flow, security and tenancy model |
+| [03-MIGRATION-AND-DELIVERY.md](03-MIGRATION-AND-DELIVERY.md) | Incremental migration plan, reuse strategy, GitOps workflow and release gates |
+| [04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md](04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md) | Tenant context, task lifecycle, OpenClaw, Hermes, audit and execution-evidence contracts |
+| [05-TRACEABILITY-MATRIX.md](05-TRACEABILITY-MATRIX.md) | Requirement-to-design-to-code-to-test mapping |
+| [adr/README.md](adr/README.md) | Architecture decision records |
+
+## 3. Current implementation map
+
+| Architecture capability | Candidate implementation |
+|---|---|
+| Tenant, agent, task, policy and audit control plane | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/control_plane.py` |
+| Durable control-plane state | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/persistence.py` |
+| Web/API gateway | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gateway.py` |
+| Unified application entrypoint | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/app.py` |
+| Runtime dispatch and reconciliation | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/orchestrator.py` |
+| Agent execution evidence | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/execution_tracking.py` |
+| GitOps runtime visibility | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gitops_status.py` |
+| Web Console | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2/console.py` |
+| OpenClaw execution boundary | `active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/` |
+| Hermes runtime boundary | `active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/` |
+| Candidate tests | `tests/aios_v2_candidate/` |
+| Deployment, health and rollback | `deploy/aios-v2/` |
+
+## 4. Status vocabulary
+
+The project separates code availability from release readiness:
+
+- **Designed**: documented boundary and acceptance criteria exist.
+- **Implemented**: code is committed on the candidate branch.
+- **Test-defined**: automated tests exist in Git.
+- **Test-verified**: tests were executed for the exact commit and evidence was recorded.
+- **Pre-production verified**: deployed in an isolated environment with health, restart and rollback evidence.
+- **Production released**: owner-approved merge/tag/deployment completed.
+
+A branch or file existing does not, by itself, mean a capability is production-ready.
+
+## 5. Design summary
+
+```text
+Browser / Web Console / Public API
+                 |
+                 v
+          AIOS Control Plane
+  Tenant | Agent | Task | Policy | Audit
+                 |
+                 v
+       Execution Orchestrator / Router
+             /                 \
+            v                   v
+   OpenClaw Adapter       Hermes Boundary
+            |                   |
+            v                   v
+   OpenClaw Runtime       Hermes Workers
+                 \
+                  v
+      Result Reconciliation + Evidence
+```
+
+The control plane owns authoritative identity, policy, approval, task lifecycle and audit state. OpenClaw and Hermes receive only tenant-scoped, approved execution work and return runtime results.
+
+## 6. Release rule
+
+No candidate may be promoted until:
+
+- requirement-to-code traceability is complete;
+- multi-tenant negative tests pass;
+- controller workspace is detached and clean;
+- local Git and Gitea branch OIDs match;
+- persistence restart recovery passes;
+- healthcheck and rollback pass in pre-production;
+- no plaintext secret enters Git;
+- owner approval is recorded for merge, tag and production deployment.
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# ADR-001: AIOS 作为唯一控制面
+
+- Status: Accepted
+- Date: 2026-07-20
+
+## Context
+
+现有系统包含多个执行和调度能力，若每个 Runtime 保存自己的任务、租户和策略状态，会形成多个事实源。
+
+## Decision
+
+AIOS Control Plane 是唯一权威控制面，负责：
+
+- Tenant
+- Agent
+- Task
+- Policy
+- Approval
+- Audit
+- Execution Evidence
+
+OpenClaw、Hermes、Agent Router 只能执行或路由，不拥有第二套控制状态。
+
+## Consequences
+
+Positive:
+
+- 状态唯一；
+- 审计完整；
+- Web/API 统一。
+
+Negative:
+
+- Runtime 接入需要 Adapter。
+- 迁移需要阶段性边界收敛。
+
+## Compliance
+
+任何新 Runtime 必须通过 AIOS Orchestrator 接入。
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# ADR-002: OpenClaw/Hermes 与控制面解耦
+
+- Status: Accepted
+- Date: 2026-07-20
+
+## Context
+
+OpenClaw 和 Hermes 已具备执行能力，但历史上可能承担部分控制职责。
+
+## Decision
+
+引入边界层：
+
+```text
+AIOS Control Plane
+        |
+        v
+Adapter / Boundary
+        |
+        v
+Runtime
+```
+
+OpenClaw：
+
+- 执行签名命令；
+- 返回结果；
+- 提供健康状态。
+
+Hermes：
+
+- 队列；
+- Worker；
+- Lease；
+- Heartbeat；
+- 执行结果。
+
+## Consequences
+
+- Runtime 可独立演进。
+- 控制逻辑不会分裂。
+- 需要维护稳定 Contract。
+
+## Migration
+
+先接 Adapter，再迁移旧调用入口，最后关闭控制旁路。
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# ADR-003: 所有变更必须通过 GitOps
+
+- Status: Accepted
+- Date: 2026-07-20
+
+## Context
+
+直接在生产目录、长期 worktree 或主分支上修改代码，会造成不可追踪、不可回滚和分支冲突。
+
+## Decision
+
+所有代码、配置、文档、测试、部署和回滚资产必须通过以下流程：
+
+```text
+non-main branch -> commit -> local sync -> Gitea sync -> test -> review -> controlled promotion
+```
+
+Controller worktree 必须长期保持 detached 且 clean。每个写任务使用独立工作区或受控写入流程；相同分支写入必须串行。
+
+## Required evidence
+
+每个任务必须记录：
+
+- branch
+- commit
+- changed files
+- test command and result
+- blocker and resolution
+- local/Gitea sync status
+- rollback note
+
+## Prohibited
+
+- 直接 push `main`
+- 未审批创建生产 Tag
+- 在生产目录手工修改后不回写 Git
+- fetch 到已被 worktree 检出的本地 branch ref
+- 在 Git 中提交明文密钥
+
+## Consequences
+
+优点：可审计、可回滚、可并行治理。
+
+成本：紧急修复也必须形成 patch branch 和证据。
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# ADR-005: 文档与代码同步门禁
+
+- Status: Accepted
+- Date: 2026-07-20
+
+## Context
+
+架构、功能和部署变化如果不同步文档，会导致版本无法审计，后续 Agent 无法判断真实设计。
+
+## Decision
+
+所有影响以下内容的变更必须同步 `docs/aios-v2/`：
+
+- 用户行为；
+- API；
+- 数据模型；
+- 状态机；
+- Runtime Boundary；
+- 安全策略；
+- 部署流程；
+- 测试门禁。
+
+## Gate
+
+验收必须检查：
+
+1. 文档引用代码路径存在；
+2. API 文档有实现映射；
+3. Contract 字段有模型映射；
+4. Traceability Matrix 已更新；
+5. ADR 与架构变化一致。
+
+## Consequences
+
+优点：
+
+- 架构长期可维护；
+- Agent 执行有明确上下文；
+- Bug 修复有历史依据。
+
+成本：
+
+- 小功能也需要更新对应文档。
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# AIOS V2 Architecture Decision Records
+
+本目录记录影响多个模块、长期演进、兼容性、安全或交付流程的关键架构决策。
+
+## ADR 列表
+
+| ADR | 决策 |
+|---|---|
+| [ADR-001](ADR-001-single-control-plane.md) | AIOS 作为唯一控制面 |
+| [ADR-002](ADR-002-openclaw-hermes-decoupling.md) | OpenClaw/Hermes 与控制面解耦 |
+| [ADR-003](ADR-003-gitops-only-change-flow.md) | 所有变更必须通过 GitOps |
+| [ADR-004](ADR-004-multi-tenant-isolation.md) | 多租户隔离默认拒绝 |
+| [ADR-005](ADR-005-document-code-sync-gate.md) | 文档与代码同步门禁 |
+| [ADR-006](ADR-006-candidate-persistence-strategy.md) | 候选持久化采用可替换 SQLite Snapshot |
+
+## ADR 状态
+
+- `Proposed`：提出但未采纳。
+- `Accepted`：当前有效决策。
+- `Superseded`：被新 ADR 替代。
+- `Deprecated`：保留历史但禁止新实现采用。
+
+## 何时必须新增或更新 ADR
+
+以下变化必须新增或更新 ADR：
+
+1. 控制面与 Runtime 权限边界变化；
+2. 多租户隔离模型变化；
+3. API、数据模型或状态机出现不兼容变化；
+4. 持久化、消息、密钥、审计或部署方案发生跨模块变化；
+5. GitOps、发布、回滚或文档门禁变化；
+6. 替换 OpenClaw、Hermes、Agent Router 或核心基础设施。
+
+ADR 变化必须同步更新：
+
+- `02-TARGET-ARCHITECTURE.md`
+- `04-MODULE-CONTRACTS.md`
+- `05-TRACEABILITY-MATRIX.md`
+- 对应代码、测试和部署资产
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 # AIOS Agent Audit Plane Architecture

 ## Overview
@@ -24,10 +25,9 @@ Agent Command Plane (agents/commands/)
    +---> Audit
    |         |
    |         v
-    |     audit/agent-runs/          (per-agent log)
-    |     audit/command-history/     (per-command log)
-    |     audit/version-history/     (per-baseline log)
-    |     audit/interaction-history/ (agent conversation traces)
+    |     audit/agent-runs/        (per-agent log)
+    |     audit/command-history/   (per-command log)
+    |     audit/version-history/   (per-baseline log)
    |
    +---> Git Commit
              |
@@ -45,39 +45,8 @@ Agent Command Plane (agents/commands/)
 5. Git commit locks the audit record
 6. Web UI displays timeline from git history

-## Directory Structure
-
-```
-audit/
-├── agent-runs/          # Per-execution records (JSON)
-├── command-history/     # Command lifecycle history
-├── version-history/     # Version/baseline change log
-└── interaction-history/ # Agent conversation traces
-```
-
 ## Audit Record Schema

-Current agent-run records use the following fields:
-
-| Field | Description |
-|-------|-------------|
-| agent_run_id | Unique execution ID |
-| command | Command file name |
-| agent | Executing agent name |
-| version | Baseline version at execution time |
-| objective | Human-readable goal |
-| start_time | ISO-8601 start timestamp |
-| end_time | ISO-8601 completion timestamp |
-| interaction_count | Agent-owner interaction turns |
-| tool_call_count | Tool invocations during execution |
-| changed_files | Files modified in this run |
-| commit_sha | Git commit hash |
-| test_result | Test verification outcome |
-| final_result | SUCCESS / FAILED / PARTIAL |
-| evidence_path | Link to evidence directory |
-
-Legacy records remain valid and may use the following compatibility shape:
-
 ```json
 {
  "id": "",
@@ -103,6 +72,51 @@ Legacy records remain valid and may use the following compatibility shape:
 - Every code change must be traceable to who/what agent created it
 - No agent-created changes without audit trail

+## Related
+
+- [Agent Command Plane](../agents/README.md)
+- [Baseline System](baseline-system.md)
+=======
+# AIOS Agent Audit Plane
+
+## Purpose
+
+Every agent action is recorded. All code changes are traceable to:
+- Who made the change
+- Why the change was made
+- When it was made
+- Which version introduced it
+- What test results showed
+
+## Directory Structure
+
+```
+audit/
+├── agent-runs/         # Per-execution records (JSON)
+├── command-history/    # Command lifecycle history
+├── version-history/    # Version/baseline change log
+└── interaction-history/ # Agent conversation traces
+```
+
+## Agent Run Record
+
+| Field | Description |
+|-------|-------------|
+| agent_run_id | Unique execution ID |
+| command | Command file name |
+| agent | Executing agent name |
+| version | Baseline version at execution time |
+| objective | Human-readable goal |
+| start_time | ISO-8601 start timestamp |
+| end_time | ISO-8601 completion timestamp |
+| interaction_count | Agent-owner interaction turns |
+| tool_call_count | Tool invocations during execution |
+| changed_files | Files modified in this run |
+| commit_sha | Git commit hash |
+| test_result | Test verification outcome |
+| final_result | SUCCESS / FAILED / PARTIAL |
+| evidence_path | Link to evidence directory |
+
 ## Version History

 Records baseline promotions, rollbacks, and version changes.
@@ -113,9 +127,6 @@ Conversation logs between agent and owner for each command execution.

 ## Audit Trail Requirement

-All changes are tracked via Git with signed commits where possible. Every commit references the originating Command ID.
-
-## Related
-
- [Agent Command Plane](../agents/README.md)
- [Baseline System](baseline-system.md)
+All changes tracked via Git with signed commits where possible.
+Every commit message references the originating Command ID.
+>>>>>>> 4d18ee0 (feat(cmd): enable Agent Command Plane, audit plane, and Web UI dashboard)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V1R5 to V2R1 Migration Plan
-
-## Goal
-
-Move from shared Gateway assumptions to Tenant Cell isolation.
-
-## Order
-
-1. Establish Tenant Registry and signed Tenant Context.
-2. Implement Tenant Router.
-3. Implement OpenClaw Cell lifecycle management.
-4. Introduce canonical message envelope.
-5. Add provenance and execution policy enforcement.
-6. Migrate Hermes into shared fabric with isolated profiles.
-7. Migrate memory, secrets and audit storage.
-
-## Do Not
-
- Do not modify Hermes first.
- Do not share production credentials across tenants.
- Do not treat workspace separation as a sandbox.
- Do not allow unknown message origins to execute tools.
-
-## Acceptance
-
-Each migration stage requires automated tests and runtime evidence before promotion.
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1 OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric Architecture
-
-## Status
-
-Release train: V2R1C0
-
-Purpose: replace shared runtime trust assumptions with tenant-isolated Cell architecture.
-
-## Principles
-
-1. OpenClaw Gateway is a trust boundary.
-2. Each production tenant receives an isolated Cell.
-3. Hermes provides shared scheduling/fabric capability but not shared tenant state.
-4. Tenant identity, origin, session and task scope are mandatory in every event.
-5. Unknown provenance fails closed.
-
-## Target Components
-
- Tenant Router
- OpenClaw Cell Manager
- Canonical Message Envelope
- Tenant Inbox/Outbox Ledger
- Secret Scope Manager
- Memory Namespace Manager
- Hermes Profile Worker Fabric
- Sandbox Execution Layer
- Audit Event Pipeline
-
-## Migration Order
-
-Phase 1: Tenant Router + Cell Manager
-
-Phase 2: Canonical Message and Policy Layer
-
-Phase 3: Hermes Shared Agent Fabric
-
-Phase 4: Memory, Secret and Audit isolation
-
-Phase 5: Production tenant migration
-
-## Release Gate
-
-A V2R1 production release requires:
-
- tenant isolation tests passed
- message provenance tests passed
- runtime commit matches release commit
- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspection passed
- rollback verified
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# 微信文本-图片缓存隔离事故报告
+
+## 结论
+
+本次事故已经按最新备份链路回滚并完成第二轮评审修复。`3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a` 进一步修复了英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本误入图片路径的问题，`706c0b0` 则是后续最小修复提交。当前文档只记录证据、部署和验收边界，不把“真实 owner inbound 已完成”写成结论。
+
+## 现象
+
+- 纯文本消息被误答成旧图片回复，属于 stale-image reply on pure text。
+- 现场证据显示 `types=1` 且 `hasMedia=false`，但后续又进入 `message_type=image`、`image_count=0`、`implicit_image_message`，最终落到 `cached_image_expired`。
+- 这说明“诊断文本”被误判成图片意图后，又继承了 sender 级旧图缓存。
+
+## 根因
+
+- `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py:768-839` 把文本意图判断和缓存回退放在同一条链上。
+- `looksLikeHermesImageFollowup()` 会把含图片关键字的诊断文本推进 image intent。
+- `resolveHermesFollowupImageContext()` 随后会读取 sender 级缓存；一旦缓存命中失败或过期，就会落到 `cached_image_expired`，从而让纯文本沾上旧图上下文。
+- `handleHermesImplicitImage()` 继续把消息送入 `handleHermes(..., "implicit_image_message")`，所以误判会沿着同一条图片处理通道传播。
+
+## 护栏不变量
+
+- 图片处理上下文必须来自当前消息图片、已确认的引用图片，或精确匹配的缓存图片 ID；缺少这三类证据时，纯文本不能进入 `handleHermesImplicitImage()`。
+- 未确认的引用文本不能继承 sender 级旧图缓存，必须返回 `referenced_image_not_confirmed`。
+- 只有精确缓存图片 ID 命中且缓存仍有效时，才允许走 `resolveHermesCachedImageEntry()` 的 `cached_image_matched` 路径。
+- `/hermes` 这类 slash 路径保持原有分流，slash/channel 面不变。
+- 这次修复的守卫目标，是把中英文诊断文本、未确认引用文本与图片缓存回退拆开，避免再把普通文本提升成图片意图。
+
+## TDD 与幂等性
+
+- `66d637fc0364a617c7b9fd8cd9baa68fb0368675`（`fix(weixin): isolate text from stale image cache`）引入了隔离修复和 `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`。
+- `2de29c59bb946cc3db3e14e8a06270391ede8401`（`fix(weixin): add process-only runtime patch mode`）继续收紧 process-only 运行模式，保持回放幂等。
+- `3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a`（`fix(weixin): require confirmed image reference context`）补齐英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本用例，并把图片引用收紧到已确认上下文。
+- 用户实测的 TDD 路径为 RED `8 PASS / 1 FAIL`，随后 GREEN `9 PASS`。
+- 最小修复提交为 `706c0b0`，对应 quoted pure text 的最后一层收敛修复。
+- 第二轮回归结果为 `8 PASS`；node check 同样通过，重复应用补丁保持幂等。
+- 生产 npm 分发侧本身缺少 `tsconfig/tests`，baseline 与 patched 共享这一限制，所以这里不把分发目录的缺口当成回归点；验收以 node check 和 8 tests 为准。
+
+## 用户实测补充
+
+- 普通文本两项为 PASS。
+- quoted pure text 为 FAIL，日志证据包含 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE`、quoted id、`implicit_image_message`、`referenced_image_unresolved`。
+- 这组证据说明 quoted pure text 没有被当成真正的图片 follow-up，且没有越过引用确认边界。
+
+## 回滚与备份
+
+- 回滚按最新备份执行，基线指向 `/data/aios-gitops/runtime/latest-backup-dir.txt` 所示的最新备份目录。
+- 备份路径链路按供给证据记录为 `T064506Z`、`T074212Z`、`T081658Z`。
+- 第一轮恢复后的部署过程哈希记录为 `e9625d12` 和 `c00c58f8`。
+- v2 部署备份为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-text-cache-isolation-20260711T094908Z`。
+- v2 部署文件哈希为 TS `024c6498284d1871b048f6157d5d3dbd4d34e54b53a05afd744b00458ceeb79f`、JS `d73b15d6752056192a1d1939b04107334419785b41175b39f1cbc1132ac65c47`；slash/channel 口径保持不变。
+- 首次部署因为 `-- No entries --` 门禁误判而回滚，随后纠正部署在线，PID 为 `2496603`。
+- 在线修复后的 hashes 为 `86dfe...` / `a9b854...`，`channel 4` accounts healthy，cache unchanged。
+
+## 主线合并与生产发布
+
+- 主线 fast-forward source rev 为 `9269e819972c2e709e0c27bed7eab590da6961c9`，本次不 tag、不 baseline。
+- 生产发布结论为 PASS，release dir 为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-mainline-release-20260711T181842Z`。
+- old PID 为 `2655072`，new PID 为 `2656106`。
+- TS hash 为 `86dfe4543c4414bc86778a4b218c244a742a139c66e3c9f19cf6f0de871234c3`，JS hash 为 `a9b854015108020458ce6f31b9d9187eff82e170c4c214259b0afb9be6a7336f`。
+- `18789` 监听，`channel 4` accounts healthy，`error_count=0`，cache unchanged。
+- 一次参数门禁失败已回滚，且不影响最终发布。
+- owner quoted-text live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## 运行态验证
+
+- 第一轮 gateway PID 由 `4025932` 变为 `1723576`；v2 部署后由 `1723576` 变为 `1876713`。
+- v2 现场/供给证据为 `active`、监听 `18789`、`error_count=0`、`channel gate pass`、`cache preserved`。
+- 最终 read-only gate 通过，说明部署后运行态未出现新的插件错误，channel 状态和缓存均保持预期。
+- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## 未完成的真实验收
+
+- owner 纯文本
+- diagnostic text
+- genuine image-followup message
+- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance
+
+以上四类消息仍需要由 owner 真实 inbound 到达，才能把这次“文本隔离”结论升格为完整的线上接受；本报告明确保留该项为 pending，不把它们写成已经完成。
+
+## 引用文字语义修复与发布（2026-07-12）
+
+- 后续 owner 实测证明图片误路由已消失，但模型在没有被引正文时根据 `chat_id/message_id/timestamp` 编造解释，因此图片隔离 PASS、语义验收 FAIL。
+- 现场 payload 的 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE` 只有 quoted ID 与时间字段，没有 `text_item`；session transcript 又没有原始 Weixin 数字 message ID，不能精确回表。
+- 出站 `clientId` 与引用的 19 位数字 `msg_id` 格式不同，发送 API 也不返回服务端 message ID。本次明确禁止 recent-message、时间窗口、session 顺序和近似 ID 猜测。
+- `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab` 增加证据优先处理：payload 明确含 `text_item.text` 时才构造引用上下文；引用存在但正文缺失时，经标准 dispatcher 确定性回复“无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。”，并在模型 dispatch 前返回。
+- TDD 先出现两项预期 RED（quoted-text resolver 不存在），最终 GREEN 为 `17 passed`；`py_compile`、`git diff --check`、`node --check` 均通过。
+- Scratch 双跑验证只改变 `src/messaging/process-message.ts` 与 `dist/src/messaging/process-message.js`，第二次应用 diff 为 0；slash/channel 文件保持不变。
+- 主线为 `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab`，生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-failclosed-release-20260712T054451Z`。
+- 发布后 PID 从 `2656106` 变为 `3670157`；TS hash 为 `1a73e735e9c8fb40a1f82d2a66bc022396c8105ed989aac95e11b66326e9fdf1`，JS hash 为 `1c76bf6ec3b45021e68b932cbf52222ba2130a867b95e41d7a91f261b991a304`。
+- `18789`、4 个 Weixin accounts、post-start error 0 和图片 cache unchanged 均通过。新的 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## Owner 引用文字 Fail-Closed 验收（2026-07-12）
+
+- Owner 引用一条微信未提供正文的文字消息并发送“是什么意思”，收到固定回复“无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。”。
+- 日志窗口为 `2026-07-12 14:06:23.424-14:06:23.893 +08:00`：入站 `types=1`、`bodyLen=6`、`hasMedia=false`，出站 `textLen=20` 且发送成功。
+- 同一窗口 `model-fetch=0`、`implicit_image_message=0`、Hermes route=0，`quoted_text_unavailable=1` 且 `quoted_message_id=present`。
+- 该证据确认无正文引用不会进入模型猜测或图片缓存路径。Owner quoted-text no-body live acceptance 为 **PASS**。
+- 微信 payload 明确携带 `text_item.text` 时的 grounded explanation 和 genuine image follow-up 仍作为独立兼容性验收项保留。
+
+## 可见引用摘要解析修复（2026-07-12）
+
+- Owner 进一步确认微信客户端能够显示被引用正文，因此上一节的“未提供正文”只适用于旧 resolver 的观察结果，不代表协议 payload 没有可用文本。
+- 根因是插件 `inbound.ts` 已将协议字段 `ref_msg.title` 定义为引用摘要并拼入 `ctx.Body`，而 `extractHermesReferencedText()` 只读取 `ref_msg.message_item.text_item.text`，导致客户端可见摘要被错误丢弃。
+- `13c2a182860131abcad0f5a70ae8263477578588` 在真实 `text_item.text` 缺失时，仅从 reference envelope 读取 `ref_msg.title`；不会读取 `message_item.title` 或任意嵌套通用 `title`，也不改变图片、slash 或 channel 路由。
+- TDD 先得到 `18 passed / 1 failed`，失败项为可见 `ref_msg.title` 仍落到 `quoted_text_unavailable`；修复后为 `19 passed`，`py_compile`、`node --check` 与 `git diff --check` 通过。
+- 生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-title-resolution-20260712T155112+0800`，PID 从 `3859376` 变为 `3860863`，post-start error 为 0，图片 cache unchanged。
+- 部署后 TS hash 为 `8e77ce61214688a2507b07f0cf1ee85401b58198b8271bebd69efc2681872726`，JS hash 为 `663db8d30a5cd5eb80fe46cf941cce6e6f5d04cb7e4b8d9b4d0086d87faba290`。
+- 可见正文引用的 owner live acceptance 尚待下一条真实微信消息确认；预期日志必须命中 `quoted_text_resolved`，且同一窗口不得出现 `quoted_text_unavailable` 或图片路由。
+
+## 安全说明
+
+- 本次仅更新本报告，没有修改代码、runtime、services 或 secrets。
+- 报告里没有任何凭据、密钥或原始敏感 ID。
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Resolve explicit quoted text safely and fail closed without a model call when Weixin omits the quoted body.
+
+**Architecture:** Add pure JS/TS reference-text helpers and one process hook guard to the existing patcher. Keep the patch surface limited to generated `process-message.ts/js`; do not introduce a persistent cache or modify send/monitor/API modules.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Python patch generator, TypeScript/JavaScript, Node test harness, pytest.
+
+## Global Constraints
+
+- Sub-agents use `gpt-5.3-codex-spark`.
+- No force push, tag, baseline promotion, credential persistence, recent-message fallback, or approximate text matching.
+- Existing confirmed image and ordinary text behavior must remain unchanged.
+
+---
+
+### Task 1: Add Quoted Text Resolver With TDD
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
+- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Produces: `extractHermesReferencedText(items)` and `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` in TS and JS helper templates.
+
+- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `ref_msg.message_item.type=1` and explicit `text_item.text="被引用的正文"`; assert `reason="quoted_text_resolved"`, `handled=false`, and a prompt containing only delimited quoted/current text.
+- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `type=0`, quoted ID, no text, and no confirmed image; assert `reason="quoted_text_unavailable"`, `handled=true`, and exact deterministic `replyText`.
+- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py -k 'quoted_text'` and record expected RED because the resolver is absent.
+- [ ] Implement the smallest recursive explicit-text extractor. Accept only known referenced text fields; cap each extracted string at 4000 characters and reject blank values.
+- [ ] Implement the resolver in both TS and JS templates. Do not read session history, image latest cache, timestamps, or metadata values.
+- [ ] Re-run the focused tests and record GREEN.
+- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): fail closed on unavailable quoted text`.
+
+### Task 2: Guard The Real Process Hook
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
+- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Consumes: `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)`.
+- Produces: process hook behavior that replies deterministically or replaces only the ordinary text prompt.
+
+- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test that stubs the ordinary model dispatch and reply function. For type 0 without text, assert reply called once and model called zero times.
+- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test for explicit quoted text. Assert model called once with delimited context and no message metadata.
+- [ ] Add regression assertions for plain text, current image, and exact quoted image.
+- [ ] Run focused tests and record RED for the missing guard.
+- [ ] Insert the resolver after reference/image evidence extraction and before ordinary model dispatch. Confirmed image references must bypass the text fail-closed branch.
+- [ ] Emit structured reason-only diagnostics without message bodies.
+- [ ] Run focused tests and record GREEN.
+- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): guard quoted text model dispatch`.
+
+### Task 3: Idempotence, Review, And Release
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `docs/incidents/WEIXIN_TEXT_IMAGE_CACHE_ISOLATION_20260711.md`
+
+- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py` and require all tests pass.
+- [ ] Run `python3 -m py_compile fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`.
+- [ ] Run `git diff --check`.
+- [ ] Apply `--process-only` twice to a scratch production-plugin copy and require identical second-run hashes; require slash/channel files unchanged.
+- [ ] Obtain independent spec and code review.
+- [ ] Update the incident document with RED/GREEN evidence, main revision, production hashes, rollback directory, and owner live acceptance state.
+- [ ] Merge by non-force fast-forward from a clean main-based branch, deploy only the two generated process-message files, restart only `openclaw-gateway.service`, and verify service, port 18789, four accounts, zero post-start errors, and unchanged image cache.
+- [ ] Owner live acceptance: quote a type 0 text message and verify deterministic no-body response; quote a payload that includes explicit text and verify grounded explanation.
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Design
+
+## Goal
+
+Prevent quoted-text questions from being answered with invented message metadata when Weixin does not provide the quoted body. Preserve normal text and confirmed image behavior.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- A quoted text event can arrive as `ref_msg.message_item.type=0` with only `msg_id` and timestamps.
+- Session transcripts retain text but not the original Weixin numeric message ID.
+- Outbound `clientId` values are not the same format as quoted numeric `msg_id` values, and the send API does not expose a server message ID.
+- Therefore recent-message, timestamp, session, and outbound-client-ID matching are not exact evidence and must not be used.
+
+## Decision
+
+Use an evidence-only resolver in `process-message`:
+
+1. If reference payload contains an explicit text item, extract that text and build a bounded quoted-text context for the ordinary text model path.
+2. If reference context exists but has no explicit text and is not a confirmed image, return a deterministic response: `无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。`
+3. The unresolved branch is handled before ordinary model dispatch and before Hermes image dispatch.
+4. Do not infer quoted text from metadata, recent messages, session order, timestamps, or approximate IDs.
+
+No persistent text cache is introduced in this change. Outbound ID aliasing remains a separate observation task because an exact mapping has not been proved.
+
+## Interfaces
+
+- `extractHermesReferencedText(items): string` returns only explicit referenced text, otherwise an empty string.
+- `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` returns one of:
+  - `{ referenced: false, handled: false, prompt: currentText, reason: "none" }`
+  - `{ referenced: true, handled: false, prompt, reason: "quoted_text_resolved" }`
+  - `{ referenced: true, handled: true, replyText: "无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。", reason: "quoted_text_unavailable" }`
+- Confirmed referenced images bypass this text resolver and keep the existing exact image path.
+
+## Privacy And Logging
+
+- Do not log quoted or current text.
+- Log only `reason`, account ID, a one-way bounded hash of quoted ID when available, and boolean evidence flags.
+- Do not persist tokens, credentials, full payloads, or message text.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+- Explicit quoted text is supplied to the ordinary text model with a clear delimiter.
+- Type 0 reference without text returns the deterministic Chinese response and does not call the model.
+- Plain text, current image, and exact quoted image behavior remain unchanged.
+- Generated TS and JS remain byte-idempotent under `--process-only`.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# TASK-AIOS-CONTROL-PLANE-GATEWAY-V1
+
+## Owner
+Codex
+
+## Goal
+建立 AIOS V2 唯一控制面 Gateway v1。
+
+## Architecture Boundary
+
+AIOS Control Plane:
+- Tenant Registry
+- Agent Registry
+- Task Lifecycle
+- Policy Gate
+- Approval
+- Audit Event
+
+不允许：
+- OpenClaw 直接管理任务生命周期
+- Hermes 直接暴露控制 API
+- Web UI 绕过 AIOS API
+
+## Deliverables
+
+1. Control Plane API skeleton
+2. Tenant context middleware
+3. Task state machine
+4. Agent registration contract
+5. Audit event interface
+
+## Acceptance
+
+- 所有 API 携带 tenant_id
+- 未授权跨租户访问拒绝
+- Task create/update/cancel 可审计
+- GitOps commit 可追踪
+- pytest + integration test 通过
+
+## Migration
+
+复用：
+- Agent Router
+- OpenClaw adapter
+- Hermes runtime
+
+不重写执行层。
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+TS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
+const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText: string): GetUpdatesResp {
+  return JSON.parse(rawText, (key: string, value: unknown, context?: { source?: string }) => {
+    if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
+    if (typeof value !== "number") throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
+    const source = context?.source;
+    if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source)) throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
+    return source;
+  }) as GetUpdatesResp;
+}
+// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
+
+JS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
+const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText) {
+    return JSON.parse(rawText, (key, value, context) => {
+        if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string")
+            return value;
+        if (typeof value !== "number")
+            throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
+        const source = context?.source;
+        if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source))
+            throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
+        return source;
+    });
+}
+// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
+
+
+def insert_once(text: str, marker: str, addition: str) -> str:
+    if addition in text:
+        return text
+    if marker not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError(f'marker not found: {marker}')
+    return text.replace(marker, marker + '\n' + addition, 1)
+
+
+def patch_api_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + TS_HELPER)
+    old = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
+    new = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
+    if new not in text:
+        if old not in text:
+            raise RuntimeError('TypeScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
+        text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_api_js(text: str) -> str:
+    text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + JS_HELPER)
+    old = 'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
+    new = 'const resp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
+    if new not in text:
+        if old not in text:
+            raise RuntimeError('JavaScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
+        text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_types_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    new = 'message_id?: string | number;'
+    if new in text:
+        return text
+    old = 'message_id?: number;'
+    if old not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError('message_id type marker not found')
+    return text.replace(old, new, 1)
+
+
+def write_if_changed(path: Path, content: str) -> bool:
+    original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+    if original == content:
+        return False
+    path.write_text(content, encoding='utf-8')
+    return True
+
+
+def apply(plugin_root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    paths = {
+        'src/api/api.ts': patch_api_ts,
+        'dist/src/api/api.js': patch_api_js,
+        'src/api/types.ts': patch_types_ts,
+    }
+    changed: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    for relative, transform in paths.items():
+        path = plugin_root / relative
+        if not path.exists():
+            raise RuntimeError(f'missing plugin file: {path}')
+        original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+        changed[relative] = write_if_changed(path, transform(original))
+    return changed
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    changed = apply(args.plugin_root.resolve())
+    print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(args.plugin_root.resolve()), 'changed': changed}, ensure_ascii=False))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def replace_required(text: str, old: str, new: str, label: str) -> str:
+    if new in text:
+        return text
+    if old not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError(f'{label} marker not found')
+    return text.replace(old, new, 1)
+
+
+def patch_send_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '}): Promise<{ messageId: string }> {\n  const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
+        '}): Promise<{ messageId: string; createTimeMs: number }> {\n  const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
+        'TS send return type',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  const clientId = generateClientId();\n  const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        '  const clientId = generateClientId();\n  const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n  const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        'TS create time',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  });\n  try {\n    await sendMessageApi({',
+        '  });\n  if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0]) throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n  req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n  try {\n    await sendMessageApi({',
+        'TS request timestamp',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        '  return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        'TS send result',
+    )
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_send_js(text: str) -> str:
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    const clientId = generateClientId();\n    const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        '    const clientId = generateClientId();\n    const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n    const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        'JS create time',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    });\n    try {\n        await sendMessageApi({',
+        '    });\n    if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0])\n        throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n    req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n    try {\n        await sendMessageApi({',
+        'JS request timestamp',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        '    return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        'JS send result',
+    )
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_process_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                token: deps.token,
+                contextToken,
+                runId,
+              }});'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                token: deps.token,
+                contextToken,
+                runId,
+              }});
+              rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS fallback text send')
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+              baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+              token: deps.token,
+              contextToken,
+              runId,
+            }});'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+              baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+              token: deps.token,
+              contextToken,
+              runId,
+            }});
+            rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    return replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS normal text send')
+
+
+def patch_process_js(text: str) -> str:
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                                token: deps.token,
+                                contextToken,
+                                runId,
+                            } });'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                                token: deps.token,
+                                contextToken,
+                                runId,
+                            } });
+                        rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS fallback text send')
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                            baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                            token: deps.token,
+                            contextToken,
+                            runId,
+                        } });'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                            baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                            token: deps.token,
+                            contextToken,
+                            runId,
+                        } });
+                    rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    return replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS normal text send')
+
+
+def apply(root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    transforms = {
+        'src/messaging/send.ts': patch_send_ts,
+        'dist/src/messaging/send.js': patch_send_js,
+        'src/messaging/process-message.ts': patch_process_ts,
+        'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': patch_process_js,
+    }
+    changed = {}
+    for relative, transform in transforms.items():
+        path = root / relative
+        original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+        updated = transform(original)
+        changed[relative] = updated != original
+        if updated != original:
+            path.write_text(updated, encoding='utf-8')
+    return changed
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    root = args.plugin_root.resolve()
+    print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(root), 'changed': apply(root)}, ensure_ascii=False))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  classifyRun,
-  decideToolCall,
-  runKey,
-} from "./policy.js";
-
-const activeRuns = new Map();
-const MAX_RUN_AGE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
-
-function prune(now = Date.now()) {
-  for (const [key, value] of activeRuns.entries()) {
-    if (now - value.recordedAt > MAX_RUN_AGE_MS) activeRuns.delete(key);
-  }
-}
-
-export default {
-  id: "aios-tenant-boundary",
-  name: "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
-  description: "Fail-closed user-origin and side-effect policy for Tenant Cells.",
-
-  register(api) {
-    api.on(
-      "before_agent_run",
-      async (event, ctx) => {
-        prune();
-        const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
-        const trust = classifyRun(ctx, config);
-        const key = runKey(event, ctx);
-        if (key) {
-          activeRuns.set(key, { ...trust, recordedAt: Date.now() });
-        }
-
-        if (
-          config.blockUnknownAgentRuns === true &&
-          trust.trusted !== true &&
-          trust.reason !== "job_id_present"
-        ) {
-          return {
-            outcome: "block",
-            reason: trust.reason,
-            message: "This message cannot be verified as coming from the active authenticated user.",
-          };
-        }
-        return { outcome: "pass" };
-      },
-      { priority: 100 },
-    );
-
-    api.on(
-      "before_tool_call",
-      async (event, ctx) => {
-        prune();
-        const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
-        const key = runKey(event, ctx);
-        const trust = key ? activeRuns.get(key) : undefined;
-        const decision = decideToolCall(event.toolName, trust, config);
-
-        if (decision.action === "block") {
-          return {
-            block: true,
-            blockReason: `AIOS V2R1 origin policy denied tool call: ${decision.code}`,
-          };
-        }
-        if (decision.action === "approval") {
-          return {
-            requireApproval: {
-              title: `Approve ${String(event.toolName)}`,
-              description: "Authenticated user requested a side-effecting tool call in this Tenant Cell.",
-              severity: "warning",
-              timeoutMs: Number(config.approvalTimeoutMs ?? 60000),
-              allowedDecisions: ["allow-once", "deny"],
-              pluginId: "aios-tenant-boundary",
-            },
-          };
-        }
-        return undefined;
-      },
-      { priority: 100 },
-    );
-
-    api.on("agent_end", async (event, ctx) => {
-      const key = runKey(event, ctx);
-      if (key) activeRuns.delete(key);
-    });
-  },
-};
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-const DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS = Object.freeze([
-  "read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
-  "memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
-]);
-
-function strings(value) {
-  return Array.isArray(value)
-    ? value.filter((item) => typeof item === "string" && item.trim())
-        .map((item) => item.trim())
-    : [];
-}
-
-export function resolveSenderId(ctx = {}) {
-  const direct = typeof ctx.senderId === "string" ? ctx.senderId.trim() : "";
-  const nested = typeof ctx.channelContext?.sender?.id === "string"
-    ? ctx.channelContext.sender.id.trim()
-    : "";
-  return direct || nested || undefined;
-}
-
-export function classifyRun(ctx = {}, config = {}) {
-  const senderId = resolveSenderId(ctx);
-  const trusted = new Set(strings(config.trustedSenderIds));
-  const blocked = new Set(strings(config.blockedSenderIds));
-
-  if (typeof ctx.jobId === "string" && ctx.jobId) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "automation", reason: "job_id_present" };
-  }
-  if (!senderId) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "system_or_unknown", reason: "sender_id_missing" };
-  }
-  if (blocked.has(senderId)) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "blocked_sender", reason: "sender_blocked", senderId };
-  }
-  if (config.requireExplicitTrustedSenders !== false && !trusted.has(senderId)) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "untrusted_sender", reason: "sender_not_allowlisted", senderId };
-  }
-  return {
-    trusted: true,
-    origin: "authenticated_channel_user",
-    reason: "sender_verified",
-    senderId,
-  };
-}
-
-export function decideToolCall(toolName, runTrust, config = {}) {
-  const name = typeof toolName === "string" ? toolName.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
-  const configured = strings(config.readOnlyTools).map((item) => item.toLowerCase());
-  const readOnly = new Set(configured.length ? configured : DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS);
-  if (!name) {
-    return { action: "block", code: "tool_name_missing" };
-  }
-  if (readOnly.has(name)) {
-    return { action: "allow", code: "read_only" };
-  }
-  if (!runTrust || runTrust.trusted !== true) {
-    return {
-      action: "block",
-      code: runTrust?.reason || "run_provenance_missing",
-    };
-  }
-  if (config.requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects === false) {
-    return { action: "allow", code: "trusted_side_effect" };
-  }
-  return { action: "approval", code: "human_side_effect" };
-}
-
-export function runKey(event = {}, ctx = {}) {
-  const key = event.runId || ctx.runId;
-  return typeof key === "string" && key.trim() ? key.trim() : undefined;
-}
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "aios-tenant-boundary",
-  "name": "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
-  "description": "Enforces AIOS V2R1 tenant provenance and tool policy boundaries.",
-  "version": "2.1.0-rc1",
-  "entry": "dist/index.js",
-  "configSchema": {
-    "type": "object",
-    "additionalProperties": false,
-    "properties": {
-      "requireExplicitTrustedSenders": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
-      "trustedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
-      "blockedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
-      "readOnlyTools": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
-      "requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects": { "type": "boolean", "default": true }
-    }
-  }
-}
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "@aios/openclaw-tenant-boundary",
-  "version": "2.1.0-rc.1",
-  "type": "module",
-  "description": "AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell provenance and side-effect policy boundary for OpenClaw.",
-  "files": [
-    "dist",
-    "openclaw.plugin.json"
-  ],
-  "scripts": {
-    "test": "node --test test/*.test.js"
-  },
-  "openclaw": {
-    "extensions": [
-      "./dist/index.js"
-    ]
-  }
-}
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 {
  "type": "branch",
-  "branch": "release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712",
+  "branch": "deploy/v1r4c6-production-20260711",
  "base": "main",
  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
-  "created_at": "2026-07-12T14:39:23Z",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-11T13:10:51Z",
  "direct_main_push": false,
  "owner_approval_required": true
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
+  "base": "task/codex/AIOS-V2-CONTROL-PLANE-GATEWAY-V1-20260720",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-20T01:47:01Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "task/codex/AIOS-V2-CONTROL-PLANE-GATEWAY-V1-20260720",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-19T17:06:04Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "task/codex/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
+  "base": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-20T03:49:13Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1
-
-## Architecture
-
-OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric.
-
-## Included
-
- Signed Tenant Context
- Canonical Message Envelope
- Tenant Router
- OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter
- Exact Message Ledger
- Hermes tenant partitioned scheduler
- Memory Namespace policy
- Secret Scope references
- Append-only Audit Chain
- Hermes Profile isolation
- OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin
-
-## Release Gates
-
-Before production:
-
- automated isolation tests pass
- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspect passes
- Cell health probes pass
- running commit matches release commit
- rollback test passes
-
-## Security Rules
-
-Unknown provenance fails closed.
-Quoted text is data, not command input.
-Cross-tenant access is denied.
-Shared Fabric does not share tenant state.
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 Live Status
-
-Last verified: 2026-07-13 Europe/Amsterdam
-
-## Source of truth
-
- Release branch: `release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712`
- Verified branch tree: `6569065`
- Current promoted baseline: `V1R4C6`
- Production baseline state: not yet promoted to V2R1C0
-
-This file is the single human-readable progress page for V2R1C0 RC1. Update it in the same commit that changes a release gate.
-
-## Overall status
-
-`DEVELOPMENT COMPLETE / EXECUTABLE ACCEPTANCE INCOMPLETE / NOT DEPLOYED`
-
-## Component status
-
-| Workstream | Status | Evidence | Remaining gate |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| Architecture baseline | Done | `docs/architecture/AIOS_V2R1_OpenClaw_Tenant_Cell_Hermes_Shared_Agent_Fabric_Architecture.md` | none |
-| Tenant Context | Done | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py` | executable security tests |
-| Canonical Message | Done | `tenant_context.py` | channel adapter integration test |
-| Tenant Router | Done | `router.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
-| Cell lifecycle adapter | Done | `fleet.py`, `cell_manager.py`, `cli.py` | real OpenClaw Fleet probe |
-| Message Ledger | Done | `message_ledger.py` | concurrency and restart tests |
-| Hermes Fabric | Done | `hermes_fabric.py` | worker/profile runtime test |
-| Memory isolation | Done | `memory_scope.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
-| Secret scope | Done | `secret_scope.py` | secret broker integration |
-| Audit chain | Done | `audit.py` | tamper executable test |
-| Hermes Profile isolation | Done | `hermes_profile.py` | container/profile runtime test |
-| OpenClaw boundary plugin | Code complete | `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/` | install + runtime hook inspection |
-| Python automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
-| Node plugin automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
-| Staging Cell deployment | Not started | none | tests must pass first |
-| Rollback rehearsal | Not started | none | staging deployment required |
-| Merge to `main` | Not started | release branch differs from main | owner approval after gates pass |
-| RC tag | Not created | no V2R1 tag | owner approval |
-| Production deployment | Not started | baseline remains V1R4C6 | owner production approval |
-
-## Release gates
-
- [ ] Python executable tests committed and passing
- [ ] Node executable tests committed and passing
- [ ] OpenClaw plugin installs successfully
- [ ] Runtime inspection proves hooks registered
- [ ] Tenant Cell status and doctor pass
- [ ] Staging message and tool-policy smoke tests pass
- [ ] Rollback succeeds
- [ ] Running commit matches approved release commit
- [ ] Owner approves merge, tag and production cutover
-
-## Parallel work ownership
-
- Track A: Python isolation and message tests
- Track B: OpenClaw plugin tests and runtime inspection
- Track C: Cell staging deployment, health and rollback
- Track D: release evidence, digests and final acceptance report
-
-## Update rule
-
-Every worker must update this page with:
-
-1. exact command,
-2. exit code,
-3. test counts,
-4. commit hash,
-5. artifact digest,
-6. blocker or PASS result.
-
-No item may be marked Done from prose-only reports.
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+apiVersion: aios.v2/v1
+kind: AgentTask
+metadata:
+  name: codex-production-supervisor-task
+  owner: AIOS-Control-Plane
+spec:
+  executor: codex
+  role: architecture-supervisor
+  objective: >-
+    Supervise AIOS V2R1 production candidate deployment, resolve blocking issues,
+    review patches, and maintain architecture/document consistency.
+  responsibilities:
+    - review OpenClaw deployment evidence
+    - review Hermes runtime issues
+    - analyze failed tests and blockers
+    - approve or reject patch direction
+    - verify docs/code/traceability consistency
+    - require ADR updates for architecture changes
+    - maintain final release readiness assessment
+  prohibited:
+    - bypass GitOps process
+    - directly apply unreviewed production changes
+    - weaken tenant isolation or security gates
+    - approve missing evidence
+  required_checks:
+    - requirement traceability
+    - architecture boundary compliance
+    - test evidence
+    - secret safety
+    - rollback readiness
+    - document synchronization
+  evidence_required:
+    - claim
+    - heartbeat
+    - progress
+    - blocker
+    - review_result
+    - commit
+    - final_recommendation
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: aios.v2/v1
+kind: AgentTask
+metadata:
+  name: openclaw-production-deploy-task
+  owner: AIOS-Control-Plane
+spec:
+  executor: openclaw
+  role: deployment-operator
+  objective: >-
+    Deploy AIOS V2R1 candidate runtime, execute health checks, integrate OpenClaw
+    runtime boundary, and fix low-risk runtime/deployment defects.
+  responsibilities:
+    - install systemd or Docker candidate deployment
+    - validate environment configuration
+    - execute healthcheck and smoke tests
+    - verify OpenClaw runtime connectivity
+    - fix small deployment/runtime defects through patch branches
+    - update ExecutionEvidence after every step
+  prohibited:
+    - modify AIOS control-plane architecture
+    - bypass GitOps workflow
+    - commit secrets
+    - directly edit production without a recorded change
+  evidence_required:
+    - claim
+    - heartbeat
+    - progress
+    - blocker
+    - commit
+    - test_status
+    - result
+  escalation:
+    - architecture change -> Codex supervisor
+    - security issue -> AIOS owner
+    - blocked deployment -> Codex supervisor
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+APP_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app"
+if str(APP_ROOT) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(APP_ROOT))
+
+from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJobState, HermesWorker
+from aios_openclaw import (
+    CommandState,
+    InProcessRuntimeTransport,
+    OpenClawAdapter,
+)
+from aios_v2 import (
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    ExecutionEvidence,
+    ExecutionOrchestrator,
+    ExecutionTracker,
+    RequestContext,
+    TaskState,
+    TenantIsolationError,
+)
+from aios_v2.persistence import DurableControlPlaneService, SQLiteSnapshotRepository
+
+
+SIGNING_MATERIAL = b"candidate-test-signing-material-0001"
+
+
+def context(
+    tenant_id: str,
+    principal: str,
+    *roles: str,
+) -> RequestContext:
+    return RequestContext.create(
+        tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        principal_id=principal,
+        roles=roles,
+        trace_id=f"trace-{tenant_id}-{principal}",
+    )
+
+
+def bootstrap(service: ControlPlaneService, tenant_id: str = "tenant-a"):
+    platform = context(tenant_id, "platform", "platform_admin")
+    service.register_tenant(
+        platform,
+        tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        display_name=tenant_id,
+    )
+    operator = context(
+        tenant_id,
+        "operator",
+        "tenant_admin",
+        "operator",
+        "approver",
+        "auditor",
+        "runtime",
+    )
+    return platform, operator
+
+
+class CandidateFlowTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_openclaw_full_flow_reconciles_completed_task(self) -> None:
+        service = ControlPlaneService()
+        _, operator = bootstrap(service)
+        agent = service.register_agent(
+            operator,
+            agent_id="openclaw-agent",
+            display_name="OpenClaw",
+            runtime="openclaw",
+            capabilities=("echo",),
+        )
+        task = service.create_task(
+            operator,
+            agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+            action="echo",
+            payload={"message": "hello"},
+            idempotency_key="openclaw-flow-1",
+        )
+        approved = service.transition_task(
+            operator,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            target_state=TaskState.APPROVED,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+        )
+
+        transport = InProcessRuntimeTransport(
+            lambda command: {
+                "state": CommandState.COMPLETED.value,
+                "output": {"echo": command.payload["message"]},
+            }
+        )
+        resolver = lambda tenant_id, key_id: SIGNING_MATERIAL
+        adapter = OpenClawAdapter(transport, resolver)
+        orchestrator = ExecutionOrchestrator(
+            service,
+            openclaw=adapter,
+            openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver,
+        )
+
+        dispatch = orchestrator.dispatch(operator, task_id=approved.task_id)
+        completed = service.get_task(operator, task.task_id)
+
+        self.assertEqual(dispatch.runtime, "openclaw")
+        self.assertEqual(dispatch.state, CommandState.COMPLETED.value)
+        self.assertEqual(completed.state, TaskState.COMPLETED)
+        self.assertEqual(completed.result, {"echo": "hello"})
+
+    def test_hermes_full_flow_reconciles_worker_result(self) -> None:
+        service = ControlPlaneService()
+        _, operator = bootstrap(service)
+        agent = service.register_agent(
+            operator,
+            agent_id="hermes-agent",
+            display_name="Hermes",
+            runtime="hermes",
+            capabilities=("transform",),
+            metadata={"cell_id": "cell-a", "profile_id": "profile-a"},
+        )
+        task = service.create_task(
+            operator,
+            agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+            action="transform",
+            payload={"value": 7},
+            idempotency_key="hermes-flow-1",
+        )
+        approved = service.transition_task(
+            operator,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            target_state=TaskState.APPROVED,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+        )
+
+        hermes = HermesAdapter(default_lease_seconds=10)
+        orchestrator = ExecutionOrchestrator(service, hermes=hermes)
+        dispatch = orchestrator.dispatch(operator, task_id=approved.task_id)
+        self.assertEqual(dispatch.runtime, "hermes")
+        self.assertEqual(dispatch.state, HermesJobState.QUEUED.value)
+
+        worker = HermesWorker(
+            hermes,
+            lambda job: {"transformed": int(job.payload["value"]) * 2},
+            worker_id="worker-a",
+            tenant_id="tenant-a",
+            cell_id="cell-a",
+            profile_id="profile-a",
+            heartbeat_seconds=0.05,
+        )
+        run = worker.run_once()
+        self.assertTrue(run.claimed)
+        self.assertEqual(run.state, HermesJobState.COMPLETED.value)
+
+        result = hermes.result(dispatch.runtime_execution_id, tenant_id="tenant-a")
+        completed = orchestrator.reconcile_hermes(operator, result)
+        self.assertEqual(completed.state, TaskState.COMPLETED)
+        self.assertEqual(completed.result, {"transformed": 14})
+
+    def test_cross_tenant_task_read_is_denied(self) -> None:
+        service = ControlPlaneService()
+        _, tenant_a = bootstrap(service, "tenant-a")
+        platform_b = context("tenant-b", "platform", "platform_admin")
+        service.register_tenant(
+            platform_b,
+            tenant_id="tenant-b",
+            display_name="Tenant B",
+        )
+        tenant_b = context("tenant-b", "auditor", "auditor")
+
+        agent = service.register_agent(
+            tenant_a,
+            agent_id="agent-a",
+            display_name="Agent A",
+            runtime="hermes",
+            capabilities=("work",),
+        )
+        task = service.create_task(
+            tenant_a,
+            agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+            action="work",
+            payload={},
+            idempotency_key="tenant-isolation-1",
+        )
+
+        with self.assertRaises(TenantIsolationError):
+            service.get_task(tenant_b, task.task_id)
+
+    def test_durable_service_recovers_state_after_restart(self) -> None:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary:
+            path = Path(temporary) / "state.sqlite3"
+            service = DurableControlPlaneService(SQLiteSnapshotRepository(path))
+            _, operator = bootstrap(service)
+            agent = service.register_agent(
+                operator,
+                agent_id="persistent-agent",
+                display_name="Persistent",
+                runtime="hermes",
+                capabilities=("persist",),
+            )
+            task = service.create_task(
+                operator,
+                agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+                action="persist",
+                payload={"ok": True},
+                idempotency_key="persist-1",
+            )
+
+            recovered = DurableControlPlaneService(SQLiteSnapshotRepository(path))
+            restored_task = recovered.get_task(operator, task.task_id)
+            self.assertEqual(restored_task.payload, {"ok": True})
+            self.assertEqual(restored_task.state, TaskState.CREATED)
+
+    def test_execution_tracking_persists_claim_heartbeat_and_result(self) -> None:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary:
+            tracker = ExecutionTracker(temporary)
+            claimed = tracker.claim(
+                ExecutionEvidence(
+                    execution_id="exec-1",
+                    tenant_id="tenant-a",
+                    task_id="task-1",
+                    agent_id="agent-1",
+                    executor="codex",
+                    branch="task/codex/example",
+                    progress_total=3,
+                )
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(claimed.status, "claimed")
+            tracker.heartbeat(
+                tenant_id="tenant-a",
+                execution_id="exec-1",
+                status="running",
+                current_step="tests",
+                progress_completed=2,
+                last_commit="abc123",
+            )
+            tracker.complete(
+                tenant_id="tenant-a",
+                execution_id="exec-1",
+                status="complete",
+                test_status="passed",
+                test_summary={"passed": 5, "failed": 0},
+            )
+            restored = ExecutionTracker(temporary).get(
+                tenant_id="tenant-a",
+                execution_id="exec-1",
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(restored.status, "complete")
+            self.assertEqual(restored.progress_completed, 3)
+            self.assertEqual(restored.test_summary["passed"], 5)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-"""End-to-end boundary tests for the V2R1 authenticated ingress runtime."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import sys
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
-
-from aios_v2r1.runtime import RuntimeWiring
-from aios_v2r1.message_ledger import MessageLedger
-from aios_v2r1.tenant_context import canonical_json
-
-
-class FixedClock:
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self.now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-
-    def __call__(self) -> datetime:
-        return self.now
-
-
-class TestRuntimeIngressFlow:
-    """Use the public ingress boundary; do not reach into router internals."""
-
-    internal_key = b"runtime-integration-internal-key-32bytes"
-    ingress_key = b"runtime-integration-ingress-key-32bytes!"
-
-    def setup_method(self) -> None:
-        self.directory = TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.clock = FixedClock()
-        self.runtime = RuntimeWiring.create(
-            self.directory.name,
-            signing_key=self.internal_key,
-            ingress_hmac_key=self.ingress_key,
-            clock=self.clock,
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.register_tenant("tenant-a", "cell-a")
-        self.runtime.router.register_tenant("tenant-b", "cell-b")
-        self.runtime.router.bind_channel(
-            tenant_id="tenant-a", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-a"
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.bind_channel(
-            tenant_id="tenant-b", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-b"
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.bind_principal(
-            tenant_id="tenant-a",
-            channel="weixin",
-            channel_account_id="account-a",
-            principal_id="user-a",
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.bind_session(
-            tenant_id="tenant-a",
-            session_id="session-a",
-            cell_id="cell-a",
-            principal_id="user-a",
-            ttl_seconds=60,
-        )
-
-    def teardown_method(self) -> None:
-        self.directory.cleanup()
-
-    def _message(self, *, event_id: str = "event-a", message_id: str = "message-a",
-                 body: str = "hello", **changes: object) -> dict[str, object]:
-        values: dict[str, object] = {
-            "tenant_id": "tenant-a", "cell_id": "cell-a", "principal_id": "user-a",
-            "principal_type": "authenticated_user", "origin_type": "channel_user",
-            "channel": "weixin", "channel_account_id": "account-a", "peer_id": "peer-a",
-            "conversation_id": "conversation-a", "session_id": "session-a", "task_id": None,
-            "event_id": event_id, "message_id": message_id, "reply_to_message_id": None,
-            "direction": "inbound", "command_capable": True,
-            "occurred_at": "2026-07-13T00:00:00+00:00",
-            "received_at": "2026-07-13T00:00:01+00:00",
-            "content": {"body": body, "quoted_body": None},
-            "adapter": {"name": "weixin", "version": "v2"},
-        }
-        values.update(changes)
-        return values
-
-    def _request(self, **changes: object) -> dict[str, object]:
-        values: dict[str, object] = {
-            "principal_id": "user-a", "tenant_id": "tenant-a", "cell_id": "cell-a",
-            "channel": "weixin", "channel_account_id": "account-a", "session_id": "session-a",
-            "message": self._message(),
-        }
-        values.update(changes)
-        values["signature"] = hmac.new(
-            self.ingress_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
-        ).hexdigest()
-        return values
-
-    def test_authenticated_ingress_uses_direct_append_and_acquires_session(self) -> None:
-        # Observe the real MessageLedger object while preserving every method
-        # implementation.  This proves the public ingress path never calls
-        # the legacy compatibility entrypoint; it is not a mock or bypass.
-        remember_code = MessageLedger.remember.__code__
-        remember_calls = 0
-        previous_profile = sys.getprofile()
-
-        def observe(frame: object, event: str, arg: object) -> None:
-            nonlocal remember_calls
-            if event == "call" and getattr(frame, "f_code", None) is remember_code:
-                remember_calls += 1
-
-        sys.setprofile(observe)
-        try:
-            response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request())
-        finally:
-            sys.setprofile(previous_profile)
-
-        assert response.status == "ACCEPTED"
-        assert response.result is not None
-        assert response.result.record.message_id == "message-a"
-        assert response.result.session.session_id == "session-a"
-        assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 1
-        assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 1
-        assert remember_calls == 0
-
-    def test_forged_tenant_claim_is_rejected_before_ledger_or_session_mutation(self) -> None:
-        response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
-            tenant_id="tenant-b",
-            cell_id="cell-b",
-            message=self._message(tenant_id="tenant-b", cell_id="cell-b"),
-        ))
-
-        assert response.status == "AUTH_FAILED"
-        assert response.result is None
-        assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 0
-        assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 0
-
-    def test_conflicting_duplicate_message_is_mapped_at_the_ingress_boundary(self) -> None:
-        assert self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
-            message=self._message(body="first")
-        )).status == "ACCEPTED"
-
-        response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
-            message=self._message(event_id="event-b", body="second")
-        ))
-
-        assert response.status == "CONFLICT"
-        assert response.result is None
-        assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 1
-        assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 1
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+PATCHER_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint.py'
+
+
+def load_patcher():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint', PATCHER_PATH)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_api_patch_is_idempotent_and_scoped() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher()
+    ts = '\n'.join([
+        'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
+        'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
+        'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
+    ])
+    js = '\n'.join([
+        'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
+        'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
+        'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
+    ])
+    types = 'export interface WeixinMessage {\n  message_id?: number;\n}\n'
+
+    ts_once = patcher.patch_api_ts(ts)
+    js_once = patcher.patch_api_js(js)
+    types_once = patcher.patch_types_ts(types)
+
+    assert patcher.patch_api_ts(ts_once) == ts_once
+    assert patcher.patch_api_js(js_once) == js_once
+    assert patcher.patch_types_ts(types_once) == types_once
+    assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in ts_once
+    assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in js_once
+    assert 'message_id?: string | number;' in types_once
+
+
+def test_node_reviver_preserves_only_weixin_exact_ids() -> None:
+    script = '''
+const ids = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+const parsed = JSON.parse('{"ret":0,"seq":42,"msgs":[{"message_id":7482038281766381234,"create_time_ms":1783856936191,"item_list":[{"msg_id":"3123141975110186863"}]}]}', (key, value, context) => {
+  if (!ids.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
+  if (typeof value !== "number" || !context?.source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(context.source)) throw new Error("unsafe id");
+  return context.source;
+});
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ messageId: parsed.msgs[0].message_id, msgId: parsed.msgs[0].item_list[0].msg_id, seqType: typeof parsed.seq, timestampType: typeof parsed.msgs[0].create_time_ms }));
+'''
+    completed = subprocess.run(['node', '-e', script], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    result = json.loads(completed.stdout)
+    assert result == {
+        'messageId': '7482038281766381234',
+        'msgId': '3123141975110186863',
+        'seqType': 'number',
+        'timestampType': 'number',
+    }
@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+
+def load_js_process_helpers() -> str:
+    patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
+    assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
+
+
+
+def load_patcher_module() -> object:
+    patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
+    assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+
+def run_js_process_helpers(tmp_path: Path, body: str) -> dict:
+    js_process_helpers = load_js_process_helpers()
+    node_prelude = '\n'.join(
+        [
+            'const hermesTestFs = require("node:fs");',
+            'globalThis.existsSync = hermesTestFs.existsSync;',
+            'globalThis.readFileSync = hermesTestFs.readFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.writeFileSync = hermesTestFs.writeFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.mkdirSync = hermesTestFs.mkdirSync;',
+            'globalThis.appendFileSync = hermesTestFs.appendFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.path = require("node:path");',
+            'globalThis.logger = { info() {}, warn() {}, error() {} };',
+        ]
+    )
+    node_script = tmp_path / 'hermes_image_followup_check.js'
+    node_script.write_text(node_prelude + '\n\n' + js_process_helpers + '\n\n' + body, encoding='utf-8')
+    completed = subprocess.run(['node', str(node_script)], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    return json.loads(completed.stdout.strip())
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('is_ts', [True, False], ids=['ts', 'js'])
+def test_replace_or_insert_process_helpers_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    marker = 'export async function processOneMessage'
+    source = marker + '(message) {\n  return message;\n}\n'
+
+    once = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(source, is_ts=is_ts)
+    twice = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(once, is_ts=is_ts)
+    helpers = patcher.TS_PROCESS_HELPERS if is_ts else patcher.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
+
+    assert helpers + '\n\n' + marker in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ('is_ts', 'hook_name'),
+    [(True, 'TS_PROCESS_HOOK'), (False, 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK')],
+    ids=['ts', 'js'],
+)
+def test_remove_and_reinsert_process_hook_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, hook_name: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
+    indent = '  ' if is_ts else '    '
+    needle = indent + 'ctx.CommandAuthorized = commandAuthorized;\n'
+    next_nonblank = indent + 'continueProcessing();\n'
+
+    def cycle(text: str) -> str:
+        without_hook = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
+        return without_hook.replace(needle, needle + hook + '\n', 1)
+
+    once = cycle(needle + next_nonblank)
+    twice = cycle(once)
+
+    assert hook + '\n' + next_nonblank in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+
+def test_looks_like_hermes_image_followup_distinguishes_diagnostics_from_real_image_questions(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cases = {
+        'diag_cache_expired': ('\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
+        'diag_cache_error_en': ('image cache error', False),
+        'diag_cache_expired_en': ('the image cache expired, please resend', False),
+        'diag_copying_text_shows_cache_error': ('\u4e3a\u4ec0\u4e48\u6211\u590d\u5236\u53d1\u7ed9\u4f60\u7684\u6587\u5b57\uff0c\u4f60\u90fd\u663e\u793a\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
+        'diag_not_image': ('\u8fd9\u4e0d\u662f\u56fe\u7247\uff0c\u662f\u6587\u5b57\u6d88\u606f', False),
+        'diag_text_not_image_en': ('this is a text message, not an image', False),
+        'diag_no_image_sent': ('\u6211\u6ca1\u6709\u53d1\u56fe\u7247', False),
+        'diag_system_logs': ('\u8bf7\u68c0\u67e5\u7cfb\u7edf\u65e5\u5fd7\uff0c\u4ece\u673a\u5236\u4e0a\u4fee\u590d\u9519\u8bef', False),
+        'image_cn_1': ('\u8bf7\u770b\u4e00\u4e0b\u8fd9\u5f20\u56fe\u7247', True),
+        'image_cn_2': ('\u8fd9\u56fe\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48', True),
+        'image_cn_3': ('\u8bc6\u522b\u56fe\u7247\u5185\u5bb9', True),
+        'image_en': ('look at this image', True),
+    }
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        'const cases = '
+        + json.dumps({key: text for key, (text, _) in cases.items()}, ensure_ascii=False)
+        + ';\nconst results = {};\n'
+        + 'for (const [key, text] of Object.entries(cases)) {\n'
+        + '  results[key] = looksLikeHermesImageFollowup(text);\n'
+        + '}\n'
+        + 'console.log(JSON.stringify(results));\n',
+    )
+    for key, (_, expected) in cases.items():
+        assert results[key] is expected, f'{key}: expected {expected}, got {results[key]!r}'
+
+
+
+def test_resolve_hermes_referenced_image_followup_requires_exact_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const fs = require("fs");',
+                f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const exactQuotedId = "quoted-123";',
+                'const cache = {};',
+                'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: "latest-999",',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'cache[hermesExactImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId, exactQuotedId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: exactQuotedId,',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
+                'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
+                'const generic = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", "quoted-999");',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId);',
+                'const forced = resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId, false, true);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ generic, exact, forced }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['generic']['imageIntent'] is False
+    assert results['generic']['matched'] is False
+    assert results['generic']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
+    assert results['exact']['imageIntent'] is True
+    assert results['exact']['matched'] is True
+    assert results['exact']['reason'] == 'cached_image_matched'
+    assert results['forced']['imageIntent'] is True
+    assert results['forced']['matched'] is True
+
+
+
+def test_referenced_text_without_media_evidence_stays_out_of_image_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const fs = require("fs");',
+                f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const cache = {};',
+                'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: "latest-999",',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
+                'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
+                'const full = { item_list: [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, id: "quoted-999" } } }] };',
+                'const hermesContent = "\u8fd9\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48";',
+                'const hermesReferenceContextPresent = hasHermesReferenceContext(full.item_list);',
+                'const hermesQuotedMessageId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(full.item_list);',
+                'const refMediaItem = undefined;',
+                'const hermesReferencedMediaIsImage = Boolean(refMediaItem && hermesCurrentMessageIsImage({}, refMediaItem));',
+                'const hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent = hermesReferenceContextPresent && !refMediaItem;',
+                'const hermesCurrentImage = false;',
+                'const hermesFollowup = hermesCurrentImage',
+                '  ? { imageIntent: false, matched: false, reason: "current_image_message", cacheStrategy: "current", quotedMessageId: hermesQuotedMessageId }',
+                '  : (hermesReferencedMediaIsImage',
+                '      ? resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId, false, true)',
+                '      : (hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent',
+                '          ? resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId)',
+                '          : resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent)));',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ hermesReferenceContextPresent, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesReferencedMediaIsImage, hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent, hermesFollowup }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['hermesReferenceContextPresent'] is True
+    assert results['hermesQuotedMessageId'] == 'quoted-999'
+    assert results['hermesReferencedMediaIsImage'] is False
+    assert results['hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent'] is True
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['imageIntent'] is False
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['matched'] is False
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
+
+
+def test_explicit_quoted_text_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 1, text_item: { text: "被引用的正文" } } } }];',
+                'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？") : null;',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['available'] is True
+    assert results['result'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n被引用的正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+
+
+def test_visible_ref_title_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { title: "客户端可见的引用正文", message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-123" } } }];',
+                'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端可见的引用正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+
+
+def test_nested_generic_title_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, title: "非协议引用摘要" } } }];',
+                'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': True,
+        'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
+    }
+
+
+def test_exact_message_id_cache_resolves_server_reference_without_guessing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const original = { item_list: [{ type: 1, msg_id: "7481729105240418312", text_item: { text: "客户端已经显示的原始正文" } }] };',
+                'rememberHermesTextMessage(accountId, senderId, original, "客户端已经显示的原始正文");',
+                'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } }, text_item: { text: "这是什么意思？" } }];',
+                'const quotedId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(quotedItems);',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, quotedId);',
+                'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "7481729105240418313");',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "这是什么意思？", exact);',
+                'const mode = (hermesTestFs.statSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE).mode & 0o777).toString(8);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ quotedId, exact, wrong, resolved, mode }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['quotedId'] == '7481729105240418312'
+    assert results['exact'] == '客户端已经显示的原始正文'
+    assert results['wrong'] == ''
+    assert results['resolved'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端已经显示的原始正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+    assert results['mode'] == '600'
+
+
+def test_expired_message_id_cache_entry_is_not_resolved(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const key = hermesTextMessageCacheKey("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
+                'hermesTestFs.writeFileSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE, JSON.stringify({ [key]: { text: "过期正文", timestampMs: Date.now() - (8 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) } }), { encoding: "utf-8", mode: 0o600 });',
+                'const result = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ result }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['result'] == ''
+
+
+def test_unsafe_numeric_message_id_is_rejected_before_cache_keying(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const exactString = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: "7482038281766381234" });',
+                'const unsafeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 7482038281766381234 });',
+                'const safeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 12345 });',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ exactString, unsafeNumber: unsafeNumber ?? null, safeNumber }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'exactString': '7482038281766381234',
+        'unsafeNumber': None,
+        'safeNumber': '12345',
+    }
+
+
+def test_exact_outbound_create_time_resolves_quoted_bot_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(accountId, senderId, "机器人出站正文", createTimeMs);',
+                'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "server-quoted", create_time_ms: createTimeMs } }, text_item: { text: "进展汇报" } }];',
+                'const referencedTime = findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(quotedItems);',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", referencedTime);',
+                'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", createTimeMs + 1);',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "进展汇报", exact);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ referencedTime, exact, wrong, resolved }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['referencedTime'] == '1783857900123'
+    assert results['exact'] == '机器人出站正文'
+    assert results['wrong'] == ''
+    assert results['resolved']['reason'] == 'quoted_text_resolved'
+    assert '机器人出站正文' in results['resolved']['prompt']
+
+
+def test_outbound_create_time_collision_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第一条", createTimeMs);',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第二条", createTimeMs);',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", undefined, createTimeMs);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ resolved }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['resolved'] == ''
+
+
+def test_missing_quoted_text_fails_closed_without_model_prompt(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } } }];',
+                'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？") : null;',
+                'let modelCalls = 0;',
+                'if (result && !result.handled) modelCalls += 1;',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result, modelCalls }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['available'] is True
+    assert results['result'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': True,
+        'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
+    }
+    assert results['modelCalls'] == 0
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('hook_name', ['TS_PROCESS_HOOK', 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK'])
+def test_process_hook_stops_unavailable_quote_before_model_dispatch(hook_name: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
+    guard_name = 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD' if hook_name.startswith('TS_') else 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD'
+    guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
+
+    assert 'rememberHermesTextMessage(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, full, textBody)' in hook
+    assert 'findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(full.item_list)' in hook
+    assert 'resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesQuotedCreateTimeMs)' in hook
+    assert 'resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(full.item_list, hermesContent, hermesCachedQuotedText)' in hook
+    assert '!hermesQuotedTextContext.referenced && !textBody.startsWith("/")' in hook
+    assert 'ctx.Body = hermesQuotedTextContext.prompt' in hook
+    assert 'await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(hermesQuotedTextContext, dispatcher)' in guard
+    assert 'markDispatchIdle();' in guard
+
+
+def test_dispatch_quoted_text_fail_closed_uses_dispatcher_without_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    result = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                '(async () => {',
+                '  const calls = [];',
+                '  const dispatcher = {',
+                '    sendFinalReply(payload) { calls.push(["final", payload]); },',
+                '    markComplete() { calls.push(["complete"]); },',
+                '    async waitForIdle() { calls.push(["idle"]); },',
+                '  };',
+                '  const context = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext([{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1" } } }], "这是什么意思？");',
+                '  let modelCalls = 0;',
+                '  const handled = await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(context, dispatcher);',
+                '  if (!handled) modelCalls += 1;',
+                '  console.log(JSON.stringify({ handled, modelCalls, calls }));',
+                '})();',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert result['handled'] is True
+    assert result['modelCalls'] == 0
+    assert result['calls'] == [
+        ['final', {'text': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。'}],
+        ['complete'],
+        ['idle'],
+    ]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ('is_ts', 'guard_name', 'needle'),
+    [
+        (True, 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', '  logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
+        (False, 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', '    logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
+    ],
+    ids=['ts', 'js'],
+)
+def test_dispatch_guard_remove_and_reinsert_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, guard_name: str, needle: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
+
+    def cycle(text: str) -> str:
+        without = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
+        return without.replace(needle, guard + '\n' + needle, 1)
+
+    once = cycle(needle)
+    twice = cycle(once)
+
+    assert guard + '\n' + needle in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+def test_reference_metadata_content_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    result = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1", content: "metadata only" } } }];',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？")));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert result['handled'] is True
+    assert result['reason'] == 'quoted_text_unavailable'
+    assert result['replyText'] == '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。'
+
+
+def test_patch_plugin_process_only_skips_slash_and_channel(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    calls: list[tuple[str, Path]] = []
+
+    def record(name: str, result):
+        def _inner(root: Path):
+            calls.append((name, root))
+            return result
+
+        return _inner
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_ts', record('patch_ts', False))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_js', record('patch_js', False))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_process_messages', record('patch_process_messages', {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_channel_files', record('patch_channel_files', {'src/channel.ts': False, 'dist/src/channel.js': False}))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'verify_plugin_hook', record('verify_plugin_hook', {
+        'hook_status': {},
+        'hook_installed': False,
+        'process_status': {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': True},
+        'process_hook_installed': True,
+        'channel_status': {},
+        'channel_hook_installed': False,
+        'dispatch_reference_found': False,
+        'dispatch_reference_files': [],
+    }))
+
+    result = patcher.patch_plugin(tmp_path, process_only=True)
+
+    assert calls == [
+        ('patch_process_messages', tmp_path),
+        ('verify_plugin_hook', tmp_path),
+    ]
+    assert result['mode'] == 'process-only'
+    assert result['plugin_root'] == str(tmp_path)
+    assert result['slash_changes'] == {}
+    assert result['channel_changes'] == {}
+    assert result['process_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
+    assert result['behavior_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
+    assert result['verification']['process_hook_installed'] is True
+
+
+
+def test_parse_args_supports_default_root_and_process_only_flag() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+
+    defaults = patcher.parse_args([])
+    assert defaults.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
+    assert defaults.process_only is False
+
+    process_only = patcher.parse_args(['--process-only'])
+    assert process_only.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
+    assert process_only.process_only is True
+
+    custom_root = Path('/tmp/custom-plugin-root')
+    custom = patcher.parse_args([str(custom_root), '--process-only'])
+    assert custom.plugin_root == custom_root
+    assert custom.process_only is True
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Codex	6b0db21a85	review(codex): 固化 V2R1 最新发布审查结论	2026-07-21 12:34:00 +08:00
Codex	be4726178a	task(agent): 转入 provenance 后正式 Gate 复审	2026-07-21 11:23:44 +08:00
AIOS-Owner	0834b272f0	task(agent): 审查四项清障并保留 provenance 门禁	2026-07-20 18:18:36 +08:00
Codex Supervisor	e28245f411	chore(evidence): refine AIOS V2 signing-material blocker	2026-07-20 17:05:10 +08:00
Codex Supervisor	8a9d033e9c	chore(agent): record final V2R1 first-round blocked review	2026-07-20 17:03:08 +08:00
Codex Supervisor	e567699283	chore(agent): claim V2R1 Codex supervision and block preproduction	2026-07-20 16:51:25 +08:00
Codex	c935aac3b8	task(codex): 初始化无人值守监督状态	2026-07-20 12:08:06 +08:00
Codex	75f0148878	task(codex): 写入生产监督无人值守任务载荷	2026-07-20 12:07:58 +08:00
Codex	91afbfaf76	task(codex): launch architecture supervision and blocker resolution	2026-07-20 11:49:13 +08:00
Codex	f23b694ad3	tasks(aios-v2): add Codex production supervisor task	2026-07-20 11:46:43 +08:00
Codex	f97dea55ac	tasks(aios-v2): add OpenClaw production deployment task	2026-07-20 11:46:39 +08:00
Codex	efd08d7771	docs(aios-v2): add ADR-003 GitOps-only flow	2026-07-20 11:46:31 +08:00
Codex	ff6cb2e217	docs(aios-v2): add ADR-005 documentation sync gate	2026-07-20 11:45:16 +08:00
Codex	d774620fea	docs(aios-v2): add ADR-002 runtime decoupling decision	2026-07-20 11:45:12 +08:00
Codex	b26ff010fc	docs(aios-v2): add ADR-001 control plane decision	2026-07-20 11:45:09 +08:00
Codex	4b49f2ba4b	docs(aios-v2): add ADR index	2026-07-20 11:45:04 +08:00
Codex	b4b8fe8828	docs(aios-v2): add traceability matrix	2026-07-20 11:43:46 +08:00
Codex	4e8ab051a0	docs(aios-v2): add module contracts	2026-07-20 11:41:39 +08:00
Codex	f61e35b218	docs(aios-v2): add migration and delivery strategy	2026-07-20 11:34:33 +08:00
Codex	b2f90f24a3	docs(aios-v2): add target architecture	2026-07-20 11:32:16 +08:00
Codex	6721eb4752	docs(aios-v2): add user requirements baseline	2026-07-20 11:29:07 +08:00
Codex	a9e4fd1e40	docs(aios-v2): establish architecture source of truth	2026-07-20 11:24:12 +08:00
Codex	621750976a	deploy(candidate): add guarded release rollback	2026-07-20 11:22:04 +08:00
Codex	5359e88806	feat(candidate): expose sanitized GitOps status API	2026-07-20 11:19:37 +08:00
Codex	76636931ba	feat(candidate): add sanitized GitOps status provider	2026-07-20 11:17:18 +08:00
Codex	180c1fc66e	deploy(candidate): add end-to-end healthcheck	2026-07-20 11:14:53 +08:00
Codex	c0ff052dab	deploy(candidate): add Docker Compose runtime	2026-07-20 11:12:42 +08:00
Codex	94cffb6ba3	deploy(candidate): add hardened container image	2026-07-20 11:10:36 +08:00
Codex	9ad5628e69	deploy(candidate): add environment configuration template	2026-07-20 11:08:37 +08:00
Codex	6d397a7894	deploy(candidate): add hardened systemd service	2026-07-20 11:07:06 +08:00
Codex	165fea6ba9	fix(candidate): prevent Hermes completion heartbeat revision race	2026-07-20 11:05:45 +08:00
Codex	d079e2087c	test(candidate): add end-to-end runtime and persistence tests	2026-07-20 11:01:07 +08:00
Codex	e3b36ebdcc	feat(candidate): add production application entrypoint	2026-07-20 10:57:42 +08:00
Codex	5e791b11c0	feat(candidate): add tenant-safe web console	2026-07-20 10:54:43 +08:00
Codex	50be65b76e	feat(candidate): add durable SQLite control-plane persistence	2026-07-20 10:50:31 +08:00
Codex	7bb86e30bf	feat(candidate): export orchestration and execution tracking	2026-07-20 10:42:49 +08:00
Codex	ea56b45b7e	feat(candidate): add persistent agent execution tracking	2026-07-20 10:40:22 +08:00
Codex	f53682da7a	feat(candidate): add unified AIOS execution orchestrator	2026-07-20 10:38:06 +08:00
Codex	71884ac088	feat(candidate): add Hermes worker loop and lease heartbeat	2026-07-20 10:35:55 +08:00
Codex	969c278cb0	feat(candidate): implement Hermes queue and lease adapter	2026-07-20 10:34:25 +08:00
Codex	6fe2a1e036	feat(candidate): expose Hermes runtime package	2026-07-20 10:31:07 +08:00
Codex	9a60e0c68e	feat(candidate): add Hermes runtime contracts	2026-07-20 10:27:47 +08:00
Codex	46f553ca11	feat(candidate): expose Hermes runtime boundary package	2026-07-20 10:17:02 +08:00
Codex	4f0a0c2184	feat(candidate): add OpenClaw audit callback sink	2026-07-20 10:07:54 +08:00
Codex	c107b193d9	feat(candidate): add OpenClaw runtime health policy	2026-07-20 10:06:36 +08:00
Codex	2db7ced7a4	feat(candidate): add OpenClaw runtime transports	2026-07-20 10:01:59 +08:00
Codex	6361d9a334	feat(candidate): implement OpenClaw execution adapter	2026-07-20 09:59:53 +08:00
Codex	2cf54f04ef	feat(candidate): expose OpenClaw adapter package	2026-07-20 09:56:06 +08:00
Codex	f840ce5c94	feat(integration): add OpenClaw command contract	2026-07-20 09:49:15 +08:00
Codex	35e7b55490	integration(aios-v2): create CTO production candidate branch	2026-07-20 09:47:01 +08:00
Codex	1f8d1f23b3	feat(aios-v2): add tenant-aware HTTP control plane gateway	2026-07-20 02:24:19 +08:00
Codex	e93011791e	feat(aios-v2): add tenant-isolated control plane domain	2026-07-20 02:19:16 +08:00
Codex	4460564a48	feat(aios-v2): initialize control plane package	2026-07-20 01:11:11 +08:00
Codex	4d6658136e	docs(task): add AIOS control plane gateway task contract	2026-07-20 01:06:11 +08:00
Codex	5767e665c2	task(codex): implement AIOS V2 control plane gateway v1	2026-07-20 01:06:04 +08:00
openclaw	3cf9958cb9	integrate(gate1): replay accepted clean-room evidence onto current main	2026-07-14 01:33:53 +08:00
openclaw	6b70a33080	fix(weixin): resolve outbound quotes by exact create time	2026-07-12 21:41:10 +08:00
openclaw	8d23692320	fix(weixin): preserve exact server message ids	2026-07-12 19:58:26 +08:00
openclaw	33d3947da6	fix(weixin): resolve quotes from exact message id cache	2026-07-12 17:09:33 +08:00
openclaw	806163b8ba	docs(weixin): record visible quote parser release	2026-07-12 15:55:38 +08:00
openclaw	13c2a18286	fix(weixin): resolve visible quoted text summaries	2026-07-12 15:50:03 +08:00
openclaw	b8f10951ea	docs(weixin): record owner quoted text acceptance	2026-07-12 14:11:27 +08:00
openclaw	2fcf0879c6	docs(weixin): record quoted text fail-closed release	2026-07-12 13:46:14 +08:00
openclaw	1136b4186d	fix(weixin): fail closed on unavailable quoted text	2026-07-12 13:42:32 +08:00
openclaw	cca73ad52f	docs(weixin): design quoted text fail-closed handling	2026-07-12 13:42:32 +08:00
openclaw	424bf36c03	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/audit'	2026-07-12 12:57:36 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	9eb00da0c4	docs(weixin): record mainline production release	2026-07-12 02:21:21 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	9269e81997	docs(weixin): record quoted text reference fix	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	6642820aa0	fix(weixin): ignore unconfirmed text references	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	8374c6b1c7	docs(weixin): update confirmed image reference recovery	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	c8a3251834	fix(weixin): require confirmed image reference context	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	2418f56273	docs(weixin): record text cache isolation recovery	2026-07-12 01:18:11 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	297582941f	fix(weixin): add process-only runtime patch mode	2026-07-12 01:18:11 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	958a61cbc4	fix(weixin): isolate text from stale image cache	2026-07-12 01:18:11 +08:00
V1R4C6 Deployment Audit	3096212919	audit: record V1R4C6 production deployment blocker	2026-07-12 00:57:05 +08:00
openclaw	aa2b091966	start V1R4C6 production deployment and verification	2026-07-11 21:10:51 +08:00