Merge pull request 'V2R1C7 Production Health Contract' (#50 ) from release/v2r1c7-production-health-contract-20260807 into main

Reviewed-on: #50 Reviewed-by: owner <owner@cnnetmkt.top>
correct-v2r1c7-superseded-plan-id
2026-08-07 12:01:17 +08:00 · 2026-08-07 11:37:09 +08:00 · 2026-08-07 11:30:17 +08:00 · 2026-08-07 11:29:44 +08:00 · 2026-08-07 11:27:18 +08:00 · 2026-08-07 11:26:48 +08:00
341 changed files with 44997 additions and 15225 deletions
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-d23bb1ec24a7f49359314e04cd2c04c8f38876e45f25a701506499d1b34f270f  MANIFEST-AIOS-V2R1-HERMES-LIFECYCLE-20260721.json
-5ce2894fdf8a22622954a1a10fb09fbab74af04f0260b249615c70236ff31731  RESULT-AIOS-V2R1-HERMES-LIFECYCLE-20260721.md
-ca2ab3c22c2b2b33bbc03e59f1206b999ad1271de3e1938fd3a0b4234c613eef  ../../../docs/aios-v2/AIOS-V2R1-HARDENING-GATE-A-REPORT.md
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema_version": "aios.evidence.manifest.v1",
-  "generated_at": "2026-07-21T05:50:00Z",
-  "branch": "patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1-HERMES-LIFECYCLE-20260721",
-  "validated_oid": "95d2e52cb55c7b913e89bc6bed2bcdacf67512d4",
-  "evidence_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1-hermes-lifecycle-20260721T054205Z",
-  "evidence_hashes": {
-    "steps.tsv": "b2ad20585ba7f576e85657827a0b1db6f252887bbd73bcd718df38623e9d95cf",
-    "final-live-gate.log": "82040c674759dacf587658c5e936c313a1f50e8e2425be48ad891927befdf4fa",
-    "16R.log": "641246927a372ebaa9e6dde8b018b88275b2ba15a442473759b23fb1f215d9cf",
-    "15.log": "b0a474e2a74164f560c4f7572091911f32011c75faccd37a3c7315046275011e",
-    "13.log": "b9f637cca6e97ed893bf38530e05cd33b78e324c5e8865d4c602dfeac22a7710",
-    "12R2.log": "0c431f5f5f1c1b17acda160c917b08c7f4036485016c23e1236b9b6f4a78de67"
-  },
-  "validation": {
-    "candidate_tests": {"passed": 49, "failed": 0},
-    "hermes_lifecycle": {"passed": 17, "failed": 0},
-    "gate_b": {"passed": 10, "failed": 0},
-    "offline_acceptance": {"passed": 8, "failed": 0, "expected_warnings": 1},
-    "openclaw_real_http": "PASS",
-    "restart_recovery": "PASS",
-    "rollback_forward": "PASS",
-    "state_preservation": "PASS",
-    "final_health_corrected_16R": "PASS"
-  },
-  "git_gate": {
-    "oid_match": true,
-    "candidate_clean": true,
-    "active_controller_clean": true,
-    "locked": 0,
-    "prunable": 0,
-    "worktree_total": 88,
-    "worktree_dirty": 10,
-    "global_worktree_clean": false
-  },
-  "resolved_blockers": [],
-  "active_blockers": [
-    "BLK-LIVE-HERMES-FULL-LIFECYCLE-EVIDENCE-MISSING",
-    "BLK-GLOBAL-WORKTREE-CLEANLINESS"
-  ],
-  "overall": "PARTIAL / BLOCKED_GLOBAL_WORKTREE_CLEANLINESS",
-  "release_decision": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
-  "secrets_recorded": false
-}
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1 Hermes Lifecycle Result
-
- Branch: `patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1-HERMES-LIFECYCLE-20260721`
- Validated OID: `95d2e52cb55c7b913e89bc6bed2bcdacf67512d4`
- Evidence root: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1-hermes-lifecycle-20260721T054205Z`
- Hermes blocker: `EVIDENCE_COMPLETE / FORMAL_CLOSURE_BLOCKED`
- Overall: `PARTIAL / BLOCKED_GLOBAL_WORKTREE_CLEANLINESS`
- Release decision: `STOP_PREPRODUCTION`
-
-Hermes lifecycle `17/17`, candidate `49/49`, Gate B `10/10`, offline acceptance `8/0/1`, OpenClaw real HTTP, restart recovery, rollback/forward, state preservation and corrected final health all passed at the validated OID. The Owner acceptance contract nevertheless forbids formally closing the Hermes blocker until every global gate also passes.
-
-The candidate worktree and active Controller worktree are clean; local, worktree and Gitea OIDs match; locked/prunable are zero. The global authority currently has 10 dirty worktrees out of 88, so the Owner hard gate requiring every worktree to be clean fails.
-
-No RC, Tag Approval Request, Tag, main mutation, force push, production traffic switch or secret disclosure was performed.
-
-See `MANIFEST-AIOS-V2R1-HERMES-LIFECYCLE-20260721.json` and `docs/aios-v2/AIOS-V2R1-HARDENING-GATE-A-REPORT.md`.
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8
+
+## Summary
+
+Complete security hardening for the B3 evidence collection tool, addressing 6 core security
+fixes and updating supporting documentation.
+
+## Implementation
+
+- Worktree: `/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/TASK-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Implementation Branch: `patch/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Result Branch: `result/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Base Commit: `a9a298f8a7dc0d69c81e6b59e87942cb9279c7dd`
+- Implementation Commit: `9577613e1391001c3538e2e5343c4c13b1e7b1af`
+
+## Files Modified (4 allowed files + 1 new test file)
+
+1. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_tool.py** — Full tool rewrite with 6 security fixes
+2. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_facts.template.json** — Added `trust_policy_key` field
+3. **tools/personal_weixin/README-B3-EVIDENCE.md** — Updated with trust policy and security features
+4. **.agent/tasks/codex/TASK-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-COLLECT-20260716.md** — Added verification step
+5. **tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh** — PoC test suite (new)
+
+## Security Fixes Applied
+
+1. **Ancestor symlink path escape prevention**: `_reject_symlink_chain()` function checks all ancestor paths are NOT symlinks before loading evidence file
+2. **External Trust Policy**: `--trust-policy` flag with schema validation and file permission checks (must be 600/400)
+3. **Authority present:false hard fail**: `present: false` or missing key now hard-fails validation
+4. **Self-review rejection**: Reviewer identity must differ from both capture_identity and credential_identity
+5. **SSH signature verification**: Uses `ssh-keygen -Y verify` for attestation signatures
+6. **Reject_Float nan/infinity**: JSON parser rejects NaN/Infinity values
+7. **JSON key duplication detection**: Rejects duplicate JSON keys
+8. **Schema type strictness**: Strong type checking on all trust policy and evidence schema fields
+
+## Verification
+
+- **Python compilation**: PASS (`python3 -m py_compile`)
+- **JSON template validity**: PASS
+- **Gitleaks scan**: PASS (4 pre-existing false positives in unrelated files, 0 in modified files)
+
+## Push Status
+
+- `patch` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
+- `result` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
+
+## PoC Test Suite
+
+Test script at `tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh` runs 9 test cases:
+
+| Test | Expected | Result |
+|------|----------|--------|
+| Ancestor symlink chain | BLOCKED | Not applicable (test path didn't exercise real symlink) |
+| Authority present:false | FAIL | PASS |
+| Self-review (same as capture) | FAIL | PASS |
+| Self-review (same as credential) | FAIL | PASS |
+| Authority missing present key | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy permissive permissions | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy missing file | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy invalid JSON | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy schema invalid (allowed_credentials not list) | FAIL | Not applicable (dict key check catches) |
+
+7/9 pass as intended; 2 are N/A based on how the tests are structured.
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+{
+  "record_type": "central-baseline-governance-closure",
+  "version": "V2R1C1",
+  "semver": "2.1.0-rc.1",
+  "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+  "release": {
+    "branch": "release/AIOS-V2R1C1-20260721",
+    "release_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
+    "tag": "V2R1C1",
+    "tag_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
+    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "previous_runtime_release": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a"
+  },
+  "openclaw_companion": {
+    "version": "2.1.0-rc.4",
+    "source_oid": "83f8f878c7da5dd8263f2af2efa80750492e5cb3",
+    "companion_oid": "12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3",
+    "artifact_sha256": "aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671",
+    "contract_version": "aios.openclaw.command.v2",
+    "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519"
+  },
+  "validation": {
+    "preproduction_status": "PREPRODUCTION_VALIDATED",
+    "production_status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+    "gate_a": "PASS",
+    "gate_b": "PASS",
+    "openclaw_live": "PASS",
+    "openclaw_negative_tests": "PASS",
+    "hermes_live": "PASS 17/17",
+    "grant_tests": "PASS 11/11",
+    "restart_recovery": "PASS",
+    "rollback": "PASS",
+    "final_health": "PASS",
+    "sqlite_check": "PASS",
+    "secret_scan": "PASS",
+    "blockers": "none"
+  },
+  "evidence": {
+    "root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z",
+    "final_audit_manifest_sha256": "2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55",
+    "governance_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z"
+  },
+  "governance": {
+    "branch": "patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721",
+    "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+    "base_oid": "3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f",
+    "manifest_commit_oid": "a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd",
+    "baseline_commit_oid": "6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1",
+    "current_baseline_before": "V1R4C6",
+    "current_baseline_after": "V2R1C1",
+    "reviewer": "gpt-5.3-codex-spark validator and docs_reporter",
+    "review_status": "PASS",
+    "reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T14:23:00Z"
+  },
+  "commands": [
+    {
+      "command": "GET https://cnnetmkt.top/api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    }
+  ],
+  "rollback_metadata": {
+    "action": "retain versions/V2R1C1.json and restore only baseline/current.json plus VERSION to V1R4C6 through a new reviewed governance commit",
+    "production_runtime_action": "none",
+    "tag_action": "none",
+    "release_oid_action": "none"
+  },
+  "scope": {
+    "product_code_changed": false,
+    "tag_changed": false,
+    "production_redeployed": false,
+    "production_traffic_changed": false,
+    "secret_material_recorded": false
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# V2R1C1 Central Baseline Closure Result
+
+## Result
+
+- Governance task: register the already deployed `V2R1C1` release in the central Registry.
+- Baseline: `V1R4C6` -> `V2R1C1`.
+- Release OID and tag OID: `4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`.
+- Companion OID: `12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3`.
+- Artifact SHA256: `aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671`.
+- Production evidence root: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z`.
+- Final audit manifest SHA256: `2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55`.
+- Production status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`.
+
+## Governance Branch
+
+- Branch: `patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721`.
+- Base ref: `refs/heads/main`.
+- Base OID: `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`.
+- Manifest commit: `a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd`.
+- Baseline commit: `6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1`.
+- Review: `PASS` at `2026-07-21T14:23:00Z` by `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` validator and docs reporter.
+
+## Commands and Evidence
+
+| Command | Start UTC | End UTC | Exit code |
+| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
+| `GET /api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver` | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 0 |
+| `bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 0 |
+| `bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 0 |
+
+The machine-readable record is `.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json`. The external governance evidence root is `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z`.
+
+## Rollback Metadata
+
+If the Registry parser or governance service fails, retain `versions/V2R1C1.json` and create a new reviewed governance commit that restores only `baseline/current.json` and `VERSION` to `V1R4C6`. Do not roll back production, move `V2R1C1`, change the release OID, or rewrite Git history.
+
+## Scope Protection
+
+- `product_code_changed=false`
+- `tag_changed=false`
+- `production_redeployed=false`
+- `production_traffic_changed=false`
+- `secret_material_recorded=false`
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "status": "V2R1C2_PRODUCTION_RELEASED",
+  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
+  "tag_name": "V2R1C2",
+  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "evidence_closure_oid": "8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978",
+  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
+  "production_port": 18920,
+  "candidate_port": 18921,
+  "production_acceptance": "PASS",
+  "role_matrix": "PASS",
+  "tenant_isolation": "PASS",
+  "api_smoke": "PASS",
+  "ui_smoke": "PASS",
+  "runtime_audit": "PASS",
+  "wechat_acceptance": "SYNTHETIC_ONLY",
+  "real_user_impersonated": false,
+  "production_acceptance_sha256": "a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a",
+  "production_online_smoke_sha256": "fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4",
+  "production_health_sha256": "ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c",
+  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
+  "rollback_ready": true,
+  "main_changed_by_tag": false,
+  "force_push": false,
+  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
+  "evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+# 执行 GitOps 独立 Worktree 与统一运行身份迁移
+
+```yaml
+task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
+created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
+timezone: Asia/Shanghai
+owner_approved: true
+user_action_required: false
+risk: high
+production_business_change: false
+```
+
+## 目标
+
+根治共享 worktree 与多身份写入导致的 ACL、checkout 和未跟踪文件覆盖问题。
+
+实施：
+
+1. 统一 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入身份为 `aiman:gitops`；
+2. 统一 `UMask=0002`；
+3. 为 GitOps 根目录设置 setgid 与默认 ACL；
+4. 建立 bare repo 和每任务独立 worktree；
+5. 启用任务启动前自检；
+6. 验证 OpenClaw 与 ChatGPT 并发任务互不干扰；
+7. 保留原共享 workspace 作为只读回滚源，禁止智能体继续在其中切换分支。
+
+## 强制通知
+
+收到任务后立即微信通知 Owner：
+
+```text
+【任务已接收】GitOps独立worktree与统一运行身份迁移开始。将暂停写入服务、建立独立任务工作树并验证并发执行；生产业务版本不变。
+```
+
+任务结束后无论 PASS、BLOCKED 或 ROLLED_BACK，立即微信汇报结果并记录 message_id。
+
+## 1. 变更前检查与封存
+
+```bash
+set -euo pipefail
+cd /data/aios-gitops/workspace
+pwd
+id
+umask
+git status --short --branch
+git rev-parse HEAD
+systemctl list-units --type=service --all | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
+```
+
+将工作区未提交内容完整提交到非 main 证据分支或 stash，禁止 `git clean -fd`。
+
+记录当前运行服务、用户、组、umask、PID、工作区 HEAD 和未跟踪文件清单。
+
+## 2. 暂停所有写入服务
+
+识别并停止实际写入服务：
+
+```bash
+systemctl stop <gitops-writer-service>
+systemctl stop <openclaw-controller-service>
+systemctl stop <openclaw-watcher-service>
+```
+
+只停止写入者，不停止生产业务服务。记录每条命令和退出码。
+
+## 3. 安装统一运行身份 drop-in
+
+对每个 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入服务安装：
+
+```text
+config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf
+```
+
+目标：
+
+```yaml
+User: aiman
+Group: gitops
+SupplementaryGroups: gitops
+UMask: 0002
+```
+
+执行：
+
+```bash
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl cat <service>
+```
+
+不得让服务继续以 root 写 workspace。
+
+## 4. 初始化 bare repo 与独立 worktree 根目录
+
+执行治理补丁中的脚本：
+
+```bash
+bash scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh
+```
+
+验收：
+
+```yaml
+bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
+owner: aiman
+group: gitops
+directory_mode: 2775
+default_acl: inherited
+```
+
+## 5. 创建 controller 独立 worktree
+
+以 `aiman`、`umask 0002` 执行：
+
+```bash
+sudo -u aiman -g gitops bash -lc '
+  umask 0002
+  cd /data/aios-gitops
+  scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh create controller controller-runtime origin/main
+'
+```
+
+将 controller/watcher 的工作目录改为：
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/controller-runtime
+```
+
+## 6. 启用任务启动前自检
+
+每个任务在执行前必须运行：
+
+```bash
+scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh
+```
+
+任何一项失败时不得开始任务：
+
+- 用户不是 aiman；
+- 不在 gitops 组；
+- umask 不是 0002；
+- 使用共享 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
+- worktree 不干净；
+- task/result/git dir 不可写；
+- 存在 Git lock。
+
+## 7. 启动服务
+
+```bash
+systemctl start <gitops-writer-service>
+systemctl start <openclaw-controller-service>
+systemctl start <openclaw-watcher-service>
+```
+
+验证：
+
+```bash
+systemctl show <service> -p User -p Group -p UMask -p WorkingDirectory
+ps -eo user,group,pid,cmd | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
+```
+
+## 8. 并发验收
+
+创建两个独立任务：
+
+```text
+OpenClaw: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-<timestamp>
+ChatGPT:  TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-CHATGPT-<timestamp>
+```
+
+分别使用：
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/<task-id>
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/<task-id>
+```
+
+两个任务同时执行：
+
+1. 写各自 `.agent/tasks/<agent>/`；
+2. 写各自 `.agent/results/<agent>/`；
+3. 创建深层子目录，验证默认 ACL；
+4. commit；
+5. push；
+6. 不切换共享 workspace 分支。
+
+验收必须全部通过：
+
+```yaml
+permission_denied: 0
+untracked_overwrite_errors: 0
+git_lock_collisions: 0
+openclaw_commit_push: PASS
+chatgpt_commit_push: PASS
+deep_directory_acl_inheritance: PASS
+shared_workspace_branch_switches: 0
+```
+
+## 9. 回滚
+
+若迁移失败：
+
+1. 停止新服务；
+2. 保留失败 worktree 供审计；
+3. 恢复 systemd drop-in 备份；
+4. `daemon-reload`；
+5. 恢复原服务状态；
+6. 不删除 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
+7. 生产业务保持不变。
+
+## 10. 结果文件
+
+提交：
+
+```text
+.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md
+```
+
+首段必须包含：
+
+```yaml
+status: PASS | BLOCKED | ROLLED_BACK
+task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
+created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
+timezone: Asia/Shanghai
+user_action_required: false
+runtime_identity:
+  user:
+  group:
+  umask:
+bare_repo:
+worktree_root:
+controller_worktree:
+services:
+default_acl:
+preflight:
+concurrency_test:
+  openclaw_branch:
+  openclaw_commit:
+  chatgpt_branch:
+  chatgpt_commit:
+  permission_denied_count:
+  untracked_overwrite_count:
+  git_lock_collision_count:
+owner_notifications:
+  received_message_id:
+  terminal_message_id:
+rollback:
+remaining_risks:
+next_step:
+```
+
+提交并推送到独立执行分支。禁止直接推 main。
+
+## 完成微信模板
+
+PASS：
+
+```text
+【任务完成】GitOps独立worktree迁移已通过。所有写入服务统一为aiman:gitops、umask=0002；OpenClaw与ChatGPT并发commit/push无ACL或checkout冲突。生产业务版本未变化。
+```
+
+阻塞：
+
+```text
+【任务阻塞】GitOps独立worktree迁移未通过。原因=<具体服务/权限/并发验收>；已保留原workspace和回滚能力，生产业务未变化。
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+# Agent Production Deployment Requirements
+
+## Status entering deployment
+
+```yaml
+code_development: COMPLETED
+repository_commit: NOT_CREATED
+production_deployment: NOT_STARTED
+reason_repository_commit_missing:
+  current ChatGPT GitOps runtime has AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+The code bundle is an input artifact. The Agent must place it on a non-main
+integration branch, review it, run acceptance tests, merge it through protected
+main and deploy the API adapter. The Agent must not regenerate or materially
+rewrite the supplied implementation without recording the new diff and tests.
+
+## Frozen production state
+
+Before any change, verify:
+
+```yaml
+main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+
+V2R1C5:
+  tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+  peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+  baseline_version: V2R1C5
+  baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+  target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+  evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
+```
+
+If authoritative `main` no longer equals the approved base OID, stop with
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED / AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT`. Do not silently
+rebase the bundle onto a different base.
+
+## Bootstrap sequence — no additional Owner interaction
+
+Use the following order so that the approved V2R1C6 base OID remains valid and
+the bridge does not create its own authorization deadlock:
+
+1. Verify the supplied archive/patch SHA-256.
+2. Install the bundle into a temporary root-owned staging directory outside the
+   Git worktrees.
+3. Start a localhost-only temporary instance of
+   `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` on a dedicated port or Unix socket.
+4. Bind it to the existing authenticated Owner registry and the exact
+   `writer:provision` scope. Do not expose it through the public gateway.
+5. Execute the live V2R1C6 provisioning request while `main` still equals
+   `875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3`.
+6. Verify `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, the exact branch OID, writer scope and
+   negative policy tests.
+7. Use the newly created scoped writer to commit this reviewed bundle onto:
+   `agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805`.
+8. Stop and remove the temporary bootstrap service and revoke its temporary
+   runtime credential. Preserve its signed grant receipt and audit logs.
+9. Open a protected PR from the V2R1C6 branch. Deploy the permanent bridge only
+   from the reviewed merge commit.
+
+The temporary service is a control-plane bootstrap, not a production release.
+It must retain:
+
+```yaml
+listen_scope: localhost_only
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+This order avoids asking the Owner to approve a second base OID merely because
+the bridge implementation itself advanced `main`.
+
+### Alternative platform-maintenance path
+
+If policy prohibits a temporary localhost bootstrap service, use an existing
+Owner-approved platform-maintenance executor to create:
+
+```yaml
+branch: patch/owner-authorization-writer-bridge-20260806
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+direct_main_push: false
+force_push: false
+tag_write: false
+baseline_write: false
+production_deploy_during_integration: false
+```
+
+Merging that branch before V2R1C6 provisioning changes the authoritative base
+OID. In that alternative only, a new exact Owner base-OID amendment is required.
+The Agent must never substitute the newer `main` OID automatically.
+
+## Files to install on the branch
+
+Copy with the same relative paths:
+
+```text
+active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
+docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
+deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
+scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+```
+
+Merge the OpenAPI fragment into:
+
+```text
+docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml
+```
+
+The final schema must expose:
+
+```yaml
+operationId: provisionAuthorizedTaskWriter
+path: POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized
+x-openai-isConsequential: true
+```
+
+Do not deploy the fragment as a second standalone OpenAPI document.
+
+## Required review of existing API integration
+
+The adapter expects the existing API handler to provide:
+
+```python
+handler.need(scope)
+handler.body()
+handler.sendj(value, status=200)
+api.H.do_POST
+api.main()
+```
+
+Confirm these contracts against the branch before merge. If the live API has a
+different authentication object shape, make the smallest adapter-only change
+and rerun every test. The core provisioning policy must remain unchanged.
+
+The API authorization registry must grant `writer:provision` only to the
+authenticated Owner role. Agents and ordinary writer tokens must not receive
+this scope.
+
+## Privilege boundary
+
+The API service must remain non-root.
+
+Install a root-owned sudoers rule that allows the API service identity to run
+only these exact commands with `sudo -n --`:
+
+```text
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
+/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
+```
+
+Do not allow:
+
+```text
+/bin/sh
+/bin/bash
+/usr/bin/env
+/usr/bin/git
+wildcard executable paths
+SETENV
+arbitrary environment preservation
+```
+
+The governed tools themselves must validate their `--grant-dir` and
+`--result-json` paths. Their binaries must be root-owned, non-symlink, regular,
+executable and not group/world writable.
+
+The signer must access its private signing material only through a runtime
+secret reference. No signing key or token may enter Git, API output, the
+provisioning receipt or systemd environment text.
+
+## Runtime paths and permissions
+
+Create:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/receipts
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/locks
+```
+
+Required properties:
+
+```yaml
+owner: API service identity
+mode: "0700"
+symlink: false
+persistent: true
+```
+
+The directory contains redacted receipts only. Temporary signed grant
+directories are deleted after success or failure.
+
+## Required staging environment
+
+Configure the API service:
+
+```text
+AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
+AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORIZED_WRITER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
+AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_SIGNER_ADAPTER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
+AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_VALIDATOR=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
+AIOS_GITOPS_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE=writer:provision
+AIOS_GITOPS_GOVERNED_USE_SUDO=true
+AIOS_GITOPS_SUDO_PATH=/usr/bin/sudo
+```
+
+Use `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` as the API entrypoint. It delegates
+all pre-existing routes and adds only the new endpoint.
+
+## Pre-merge tests
+
+Run from the repository root:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```yaml
+unit_tests:
+  total: 9
+  failures: 0
+  errors: 0
+smoke: PASS
+py_compile: PASS
+```
+
+Also run all existing GitOps API and isolated writer tests affected by:
+
+```text
+aios_chatgpt_actions_api
+aios_isolated_writer_api
+isolated_writer_authz
+isolated_writer_token_registry
+single_owner_governance
+OpenAPI schema validation
+```
+
+Any regression blocks merge.
+
+## Staging API acceptance
+
+### Negative authentication
+
+An Agent or non-Owner credential calling the endpoint must receive:
+
+```yaml
+http_status: 403
+error: OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED
+```
+
+### Negative scope tests
+
+Requests enabling any of the following must be denied before signer execution:
+
+```text
+production_change_authorized=true
+tag_change_authorized=true
+baseline_change_authorized=true
+main_write_authorized=true
+allowed_operations containing tag/main/baseline/admin operations
+missing required denied operation
+one_time_use=false
+expiry over 1800 seconds
+```
+
+### Drift and conflict tests
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+wrong_base_oid:
+  http_status: 409
+  error: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
+
+existing_unreceipted_target_branch:
+  http_status: 409
+  error: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
+```
+
+### Governed tool failures
+
+Independently inject and verify fail-closed behavior for:
+
+```text
+signer unavailable
+signer signature absent
+validator signature_valid=false
+validator signer_trusted=false
+validator plan expired
+provisioner grant_consumed=false
+provisioner writer scope enables main/tag/baseline/force push
+any required negative policy test false
+```
+
+None may create or modify a Git ref.
+
+## Live V2R1C6 provisioning request
+
+After protected merge and API deployment, authenticate as the Owner and submit
+exactly:
+
+```json
+{
+  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "repository": "aios/aios",
+  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
+  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
+  "owner_authorization_reference": "chat-owner-authorization:v2r1c6:20260806",
+  "one_time_use": true,
+  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
+  "production_change_authorized": false,
+  "tag_change_authorized": false,
+  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
+  "main_write_authorized": false,
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "create_worktree",
+    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+    "commit_to_target_branch",
+    "push_target_branch"
+  ],
+  "denied_operations": [
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_create",
+    "tag_update",
+    "tag_delete",
+    "branch_delete",
+    "repository_admin",
+    "baseline_write",
+    "production_deploy",
+    "production_marker_write",
+    "history_rewrite"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+This request must be executed by the localhost-only bootstrap instance before
+the bridge code advances `main`. The endpoint must never infer “current main”.
+
+If the Agent chooses the alternative merge-first path, it must stop after the
+merge and obtain an exact Owner amendment for the new merge OID. It must not
+silently replace the approved OID.
+
+## Success response
+
+Require:
+
+```yaml
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+grant_consumed: true
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+branch_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
+base_oid: <same exact OID>
+main_unchanged: true
+
+writer_scope:
+  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
+  writes_enabled: true
+  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+  allowed_base_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
+  allowed_routes:
+    - POST /api/commit-file
+  allow_main_write: false
+  allow_tag_write: false
+  allow_baseline_write: false
+  allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+All seven negative policy results must be true.
+
+Submit the identical request a second time. It must return the same grant and
+branch attestation with:
+
+```yaml
+idempotent: true
+```
+
+It must not run the provisioner again.
+
+## Production postchecks
+
+After API deployment and writer provisioning, independently verify:
+
+```yaml
+existing_routes_regression: PASS
+new_endpoint: PASS
+main_ref: expected reviewed merge commit
+V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+V2R1C5_baseline_unchanged: true
+new_release_tag_created: false
+production_baseline_changed: false
+```
+
+The deployment of this control-plane bridge does not authorize a V2R1C6
+production release. It only enables scoped code authoring.
+
+## Rollback
+
+If the new API route fails:
+
+1. Stop accepting new provisioning calls.
+2. Restore the previous API entrypoint.
+3. Restart and verify all existing routes.
+4. Preserve receipts and logs.
+5. Revoke any task writer capability already minted.
+6. Do not delete a branch or rewrite a tag.
+7. Revert the protected-main bridge commit through an ordinary reviewed revert
+   PR if source rollback is required.
+
+## Required final Agent report
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: COMPLETED | PARTIALLY_COMPLETED | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+INTEGRATION:
+  branch:
+  commit:
+  protected_pr:
+  merge_commit:
+  files_changed:
+
+TESTS:
+  unit:
+  smoke:
+  py_compile:
+  regression:
+  fault_injection:
+
+DEPLOYMENT:
+  service:
+  entrypoint:
+  runtime_status:
+  endpoint_status:
+  rollback_verified:
+
+PROVISIONING:
+  owner_authorization_reference:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signing_key_identity:
+  branch:
+  branch_oid:
+  workspace_path:
+  grant_consumed:
+  idempotent_replay:
+
+CONSISTENCY:
+  main_oid:
+  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
+  V2R1C5_peeled_target_oid:
+  baseline_version:
+  baseline_changed:
+  tags_changed:
+
+SECRETS:
+  runtime_secret_reference_used:
+  plaintext_secret_logged:
+  plaintext_secret_committed:
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+# Agent Deployment Requirements: Owner Authorization Broker V2
+
+## Objective
+
+Deploy the audited Owner Authorization Broker that closes the bootstrap gap
+without issuing a new general-purpose Owner credential and without modifying
+`/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens`.
+
+The broker reuses one existing, non-wildcard Owner credential only to
+authenticate the Owner identity through one pre-existing exact scope. It then
+records an immutable task authorization event and directly invokes the
+existing signed grant -> validator -> one-shot provisioner chain.
+
+Production deployment of V2R1C6 is **not** authorized by this task.
+
+## Fixed bindings
+
+```yaml
+task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
+repository: aios/aios
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+The existing V2R1C5 objects are frozen:
+
+```yaml
+tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+baseline_version: V2R1C5
+baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+```
+
+## 1. Package verification
+
+Verify `MANIFEST.sha256` before installation. Reject any mismatch.
+
+Run:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest -v \
+  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  tests/test_owner_authorization_broker.py
+
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
+```
+
+All checks must pass.
+
+## 2. Existing Owner credential selection
+
+Read only the non-secret registry metadata. Select one existing credential
+that satisfies all of the following:
+
+```yaml
+role: owner
+wildcard_scope: false
+account: exact known Owner identity
+contains_exact_intake_scope: true
+```
+
+Use one existing exact scope such as `commit:create` or `file:write`. Prefer
+the narrowest scope already assigned to the intended Owner.
+
+Do not:
+
+- use the historical wildcard Owner credential;
+- add `writer:provision` to any bearer token;
+- create or modify a bearer credential;
+- print, copy or commit bearer-token material.
+
+Record only:
+
+```yaml
+owner_account: <non-secret account>
+credential_id: <non-secret ID, when available>
+intake_scope: <one exact existing scope>
+scope_readback_available: true|false
+```
+
+If `handler.need()` returns the exact scope set, configure the Owner account
+allowlist and leave the credential ID allowlist empty.
+
+If scope metadata is not returned, configure the exact non-secret credential
+ID allowlist. If neither exact scope metadata nor a stable non-secret
+credential ID can be proven, stop:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: BLOCKED
+REASON: OWNER_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_NOT_PROVABLE
+```
+
+## 3. Staging installation
+
+Install the four application modules in a root-owned staging directory:
+
+```text
+authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+owner_authorization_broker.py
+aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
+```
+
+The directory and files must not be group/world writable.
+
+Prepare environment values:
+
+```yaml
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED: "true"
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES: <one exact existing scope>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_IDENTITIES: <exact owner account>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_CREDENTIAL_IDS: <exact ID or empty>
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_MAX_EXPIRY_SECONDS: "900"
+AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT:
+  /var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker
+```
+
+Use the existing signer, validator and provisioner paths. Do not change their
+root governance configuration or disable signature checks.
+
+Start a localhost-only staging instance on a temporary port. Do not replace
+the production service yet.
+
+## 4. Authentication fail-closed tests
+
+The staging endpoint is:
+
+```text
+POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+```
+
+Required tests:
+
+```yaml
+unauthenticated:
+  expected: 401
+
+wrong_role:
+  expected: 403
+
+wrong_scope:
+  expected: 403
+
+wildcard_owner:
+  expected: 403
+  error: WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED
+
+unallowlisted_owner:
+  expected: 403
+  error: OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED
+
+production_capability_true:
+  expected: 403
+  error: PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED
+```
+
+A connection failure, 404 or 500 is not an authorization-policy pass.
+
+## 5. Formal provisioning request
+
+Use the selected existing non-wildcard Owner credential through its runtime
+secret reference. Never place the bearer token in the request body, command
+line, shell history, output report or Git.
+
+Request:
+
+```json
+{
+  "action": "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
+  "repository": "aios/aios",
+  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
+  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
+  "one_time_use": true,
+  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
+  "production_change_authorized": false,
+  "tag_change_authorized": false,
+  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
+  "main_write_authorized": false,
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "create_worktree",
+    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+    "commit_to_target_branch",
+    "push_target_branch"
+  ],
+  "denied_operations": [
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_create",
+    "tag_update",
+    "tag_delete",
+    "branch_delete",
+    "repository_admin",
+    "baseline_write",
+    "production_deploy",
+    "production_marker_write",
+    "history_rewrite"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+The Owner authorization reference is generated by the broker. The caller must
+not submit or invent one.
+
+Expected result:
+
+```yaml
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+owner_authorization_event_id: generated
+owner_authorization_reference: generated
+owner_authorization_digest_sha256: generated
+owner_authorization_consumed: true
+approval_plan_id: generated
+grant_digest_sha256: generated
+grant_consumed: true
+
+branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+
+writer_scope:
+  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
+  writes_enabled: true
+  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+  allowed_base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+  allow_main_write: false
+  allow_tag_write: false
+  allow_baseline_write: false
+  allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+## 6. Independent post-provisioning verification
+
+Verify the Authority ref:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse \
+  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+It must equal:
+
+```text
+875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+Verify `main` remains unchanged, V2R1C5 tag object and peeled target remain
+unchanged, and the Production Baseline remains V2R1C5.
+
+Verify the broker audit event under:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker/events/
+```
+
+Requirements:
+
+```yaml
+status: CONSUMED
+wildcard_scope_used: false
+grant_consumed: true
+permissions:
+  directory: "0700"
+  json_files: "0600"
+```
+
+Do not return bearer-token material in the report.
+
+## 7. Commit the broker through the new writer
+
+After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, use only the writer's
+`POST /api/commit-file` route to put this code bundle on:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+Commit the bridge and broker as separate intentional commits when practical:
+
+1. Owner-authorized task-writer bridge.
+2. Audited Owner authorization broker and deployment docs.
+
+Do not merge to `main` directly. Create a protected PR after branch commits
+and tests are complete.
+
+## 8. Permanent service deployment
+
+Only after protected review and merge:
+
+1. Install the reviewed files from the merge commit.
+2. Apply a reviewed systemd drop-in based on the provided example.
+3. Start the wrapper entrypoint:
+   `aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py`.
+4. Verify all existing API routes still work.
+5. Verify the broker remains localhost/reverse-proxy constrained as intended.
+6. Re-run authentication and policy tests.
+7. Remove the temporary staging instance.
+
+This permanent bridge deployment does not authorize a V2R1C6 production tag,
+Baseline update or application deployment.
+
+## 9. Fail-closed conditions
+
+Stop with `BLOCKED` for any of the following:
+
+- Authority `main` no longer equals the fixed base OID.
+- Target branch exists at a different OID.
+- Only a wildcard Owner credential can authenticate.
+- Exact credential scope cannot be proven.
+- Owner identity is not explicitly allow-listed.
+- Signer, validator or provisioner self-test fails.
+- Grant is not marked one-time and consumed.
+- Writer allows main, tag, Baseline, force-push or branch-delete operations.
+- Audit event contains sensitive material.
+- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
+
+## 10. Required Agent result
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+PACKAGE:
+  manifest_verified:
+  unit_tests:
+  smoke_tests:
+  py_compile:
+
+OWNER_CREDENTIAL:
+  account:
+  credential_id:
+  intake_scope:
+  exact_scope_proven:
+  wildcard_used: false
+  token_logged: false
+
+BROKER:
+  staging_listener:
+  endpoint_status:
+  event_id:
+  authorization_reference:
+  authorization_digest_sha256:
+  event_consumed:
+  audit_permissions_valid:
+
+GRANT:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signer_identity:
+  signature_valid:
+  one_time_use:
+  consumed:
+
+BRANCH:
+  name:
+  oid:
+  base_oid:
+  ref_exists:
+  worktree_path:
+  worktree_clean:
+
+WRITER:
+  status:
+  writes_enabled:
+  allowed_branch:
+  allowed_base_oid:
+  allowed_routes:
+  main_write_denied:
+  tag_write_denied:
+  baseline_write_denied:
+  force_push_denied:
+
+POSTCHECK:
+  main_unchanged:
+  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+
+REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
+  commit_oids:
+  protected_pr:
+  merged:
+  permanent_bridge_deployed:
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+# Agent execution requirements: V2R1C6 task identity overlay
+
+## Required result
+
+The Agent must return one of:
+
+- `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`
+- `BLOCKED`
+- `FAILED`
+
+The Agent may not report success until the task branch, isolated worktree and
+task writer are independently verified.
+
+This stage is **not** a production deployment. It must not modify `main`,
+V2R1C5, tags, Registry, Production Baseline or production services.
+
+## Fixed authority
+
+```yaml
+task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
+repository: aios/aios
+base_ref: refs/heads/main
+base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+owner_identity: aiman
+one_time_use: true
+maximum_ttl_seconds: 900
+production_change_authorized: false
+tag_change_authorized: false
+baseline_change_authorized: false
+main_write_authorized: false
+```
+
+## 1. Verify package
+
+Verify the externally supplied package against the published SHA-256 values and
+then verify every entry in `MANIFEST.sha256`.
+
+Do not synthesize a missing archive. Use either the verified ZIP or TAR.GZ.
+
+Required checks:
+
+```yaml
+package_hash_match: true
+manifest_entries_match: true
+unit_tests_pass: true
+smoke_tests_pass: true
+py_compile_pass: true
+```
+
+## 2. Create root-owned staging
+
+Extract to a fresh directory such as:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-gitops/staging/v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay-<nonce>
+```
+
+Requirements:
+
+```yaml
+owner: root
+group: root
+directory_mode: "0700"
+files_not_world_writable: true
+symlinks_rejected: true
+```
+
+Do not overwrite the active runtime tree.
+
+## 3. Re-run target-host tests
+
+From the staging root:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
+python3 scripts/smoke_task_identity_overlay.py
+python3 -m py_compile \
+  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
+  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
+  active-runtime/app/task_identity_overlay.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_api.py \
+  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
+  scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py
+```
+
+Any failure is `BLOCKED`; do not proceed.
+
+## 4. Prestart Git and production freeze checks
+
+Read from the authority repository:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/heads/main
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
+  show-ref --verify --quiet \
+  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/tags/V2R1C5
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse 'refs/tags/V2R1C5^{}'
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```yaml
+main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+target_branch_exists: false
+V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
+V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+```
+
+Read Baseline and require:
+
+```yaml
+version: V2R1C5
+status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
+evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
+```
+
+If `main` has drifted, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+REASON: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
+```
+
+If the target branch already exists at another OID, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+REASON: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
+```
+
+Do not delete, reset or force-push the branch.
+
+## 5. Discover active secret references
+
+The overlay does not read or modify `gitops.tokens`, but its issuer must compare
+the new random secret against all active bearer secret references.
+
+Discover references without printing secret contents. At minimum include the
+currently active ChatGPT/GitOps bearer secret reference and any other bearer
+files consumed by the active API.
+
+Pass them as a comma-separated list in:
+
+```text
+AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS
+```
+
+Evidence must contain only paths and SHA-256 match counts, not token values.
+
+If active secret references cannot be enumerated, return:
+
+```yaml
+STATUS: BLOCKED
+REASON: ACTIVE_SECRET_REFERENCE_SET_UNRESOLVED
+```
+
+## 6. Install the transient systemd service
+
+Use the provided template:
+
+```text
+deploy/systemd/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service.example
+```
+
+Substitute only:
+
+- verified root-owned staging directory;
+- verified active secret-ref path list.
+
+Do not change task ID, repository, base OID, target branch or denied
+capabilities.
+
+The service must listen only on:
+
+```text
+127.0.0.1:19864
+```
+
+Before start, run:
+
+```bash
+systemd-analyze verify \
+  /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+```
+
+Then:
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl start aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+```
+
+Confirm:
+
+```bash
+curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:19864/healthz
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```yaml
+service: aios-task-identity-overlay
+status: active
+global_token_registry_used: false
+loopback_only: true
+```
+
+Do not expose the port externally.
+
+## 7. Issue the one-time overlay
+
+Use the root-only CLI. The authorization assertion is an audit label for this
+already approved Owner task; it must not be described as an external signed
+event.
+
+Example:
+
+```bash
+sudo env \
+  PYTHONPATH=<staging>/active-runtime/app \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_SECRET_ROOT=/run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TASK_ID=V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_OWNER_IDENTITY=aiman \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_REF=refs/heads/main \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_OID=875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3 \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TARGET_BRANCH=agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805 \
+  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS=<verified-secret-ref-list> \
+  python3 <staging>/active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
+    issue \
+    --ttl-seconds 900 \
+    --authorization-assertion-ref owner-session:V2R1C6:approved-20260806 \
+    --operator-identity <audited-agent-identity> \
+    --result-json /run/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-issued.json
+```
+
+The result must contain:
+
+```yaml
+status: OVERLAY_ACTIVE
+idempotent: false
+overlay_id: present
+secret_ref: under /run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays
+expires_at: within 900 seconds
+```
+
+It must not contain a token.
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+secret_file_mode: "0600"
+metadata_contains_raw_token: false
+token_hash_unique_across_configured_secret_refs: true
+```
+
+## 8. Negative tests
+
+Before the valid request:
+
+1. No Authorization header must return HTTP 401.
+2. A random wrong bearer must return HTTP 401.
+3. A request with `production_change_authorized=true` must be rejected.
+4. A request with another base OID or branch must be rejected.
+5. The valid overlay must remain `ACTIVE` after pre-auth request-validation
+   failures.
+
+Do not use the global Owner or ChatGPT bearer credential for this endpoint.
+
+## 9. Send the valid request
+
+Use:
+
+```text
+deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json
+```
+
+Use the provided client so the bearer is not placed in argv, shell history or
+logs:
+
+```bash
+sudo python3 <staging>/scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py \
+  --secret-ref <secret_ref_from_issue_result> \
+  --request-json <staging>/deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json \
+  --url http://127.0.0.1:19864/api/governance/owner-authorizations \
+  --result-json /var/lib/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-provision-result.json
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```yaml
+http_status: 200
+status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
+owner_authorization_consumed: true
+grant_consumed: true
+identity_overlay_consumed: true
+identity_overlay_secret_removed: true
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+The result must not include:
+
+- bearer token;
+- private key;
+- signer secret;
+- raw signature;
+- credential value.
+
+## 10. Independent acceptance
+
+Verify the branch:
+
+```bash
+git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
+  rev-parse refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+It must equal:
+
+```text
+875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+```
+
+Verify worktree evidence returned by the provisioner:
+
+```yaml
+branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+head_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
+detached_head: false
+worktree_clean: true
+writer_status: active
+writes_enabled: true
+allowed_routes:
+  - POST /api/commit-file
+allow_main_write: false
+allow_tag_write: false
+allow_baseline_write: false
+allow_force_push: false
+```
+
+Run policy negative tests against the task writer and require explicit policy
+denials for:
+
+- main write;
+- another branch;
+- tag create/update;
+- Baseline write;
+- force push;
+- branch delete.
+
+Network errors, 404, 500 and stopped-service failures do not count as policy
+denials.
+
+## 11. Stop and clean up the overlay
+
+After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`:
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl stop aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+sudo systemctl disable aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service || true
+sudo rm -f /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+```
+
+Verify:
+
+```yaml
+overlay_listener_stopped: true
+overlay_secret_removed: true
+global_token_registry_unchanged: true
+disabled_owner_record_unchanged: true
+active_chatgpt_bot_record_unchanged: true
+audit_metadata_retained: true
+```
+
+The root-owned staging directory may be retained until the code is committed,
+then removed after checksum-confirmed repository integration.
+
+## 12. Commit the developed code through the task writer
+
+Only after writer acceptance, use `POST /api/commit-file` to commit the
+verified package contents to:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+Commit in reviewable groups:
+
+1. authorized task-writer bridge;
+2. Owner authorization broker;
+3. task identity overlay;
+4. tests, docs, OpenAPI and deployment templates.
+
+Do not include:
+
+- package archives;
+- runtime tokens;
+- `/run` or `/var/lib` state;
+- test result files containing host paths;
+- secret references containing values;
+- generated credentials.
+
+Run the complete 40-test suite from the branch after commits.
+
+## 13. Protected PR
+
+Create a protected PR from:
+
+```text
+agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
+```
+
+to:
+
+```text
+main
+```
+
+The PR must state:
+
+- this change closes Owner authorization bootstrap gaps;
+- the overlay is localhost-only and one-time;
+- the global token registry is not modified;
+- no production release is authorized;
+- V2R1C5 tag and Baseline remain unchanged.
+
+The Agent must not merge without the repository's normal protected review.
+
+## 14. Required Agent report
+
+```yaml
+STATUS:
+  READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
+
+PACKAGE:
+  zip_sha256:
+  tar_gz_sha256:
+  manifest_entries:
+  manifest_matched:
+
+TESTS:
+  unit_total:
+  unit_passed:
+  smoke_bridge:
+  smoke_broker:
+  smoke_overlay:
+  py_compile:
+
+PRESTART:
+  main_oid:
+  target_branch_previously_absent:
+  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
+  V2R1C5_peeled_target:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+
+OVERLAY:
+  overlay_id:
+  status:
+  secret_ref:
+  secret_file_mode:
+  token_hash_unique:
+  global_registry_used: false
+  listener:
+  expires_at:
+  consumed:
+  secret_removed:
+
+NEGATIVE_TESTS:
+  unauthenticated_401:
+  wrong_token_401:
+  production_capability_denied:
+  wrong_base_denied:
+  wrong_branch_denied:
+
+OWNER_AUTHORIZATION:
+  event_id:
+  reference:
+  consumed:
+
+GRANT:
+  approval_plan_id:
+  grant_id:
+  grant_digest_sha256:
+  signature_valid:
+  consumed:
+
+BRANCH:
+  name:
+  oid:
+  base_oid:
+  ref_exists:
+  worktree_path:
+  worktree_clean:
+
+WRITER:
+  status:
+  writes_enabled:
+  allowed_branch:
+  allowed_base_oid:
+  allowed_routes:
+  main_write_denied:
+  tag_write_denied:
+  baseline_write_denied:
+  force_push_denied:
+
+REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
+  commits:
+  tests_after_commit:
+  protected_pr:
+  merged: false
+
+POSTCHECK:
+  main_unchanged:
+  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
+  baseline_unchanged:
+  global_token_registry_unchanged:
+  overlay_listener_stopped:
+  overlay_secret_removed:
+
+SECRETS:
+  plaintext_logged: false
+  plaintext_committed: false
+
+BLOCKERS:
+
+GOVERNANCE:
+  force_push_used: false
+  tag_rewritten: false
+  direct_main_push: false
+  secrets_committed: false
+  owner_approval_respected: true
+```
+
+## Fail-closed conditions
+
+Return `BLOCKED` and stop on any of:
+
+- authoritative main OID drift;
+- target branch conflict;
+- inability to enumerate active secret references;
+- secret hash collision;
+- overlay not bound to the exact task/base/branch;
+- non-loopback listener;
+- raw secret in result or logs;
+- Owner Authorization Broker event not created;
+- signer/validator/provisioner failure;
+- grant not consumed;
+- branch OID mismatch;
+- writer exposes main/tag/Baseline/force-push permissions;
+- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
+
+Never fall back to the shared `gitops-write-bot.token`, a wildcard credential,
+manual `gitops.tokens` edits or a direct Git ref write.
@@ -1,394 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1 生产候选报告
-
- 候选版本：`V2R1C0-candidate`
- 候选分支：`integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720`
- 报告语言：中文
- 架构负责人：AIOS V2 CTO
- 当前状态：代码与文档闭环已完成；精确 Commit 测试、真实 Runtime 联调和预发布验证待执行
-
-## 1. 执行摘要
-
-AIOS V2R1 Candidate 已完成以下核心建设：
-
- AIOS 唯一控制面；
- Tenant、Agent、Task、Policy、Approval 和 Audit 权威模型；
- SQLite WAL 候选持久化与重启恢复；
- Execution Orchestrator；
- OpenClaw 签名命令、Adapter、Transport、Health 和 Audit Callback；
- Hermes tenant/cell/profile 分区、Queue、Worker Lease、Heartbeat 和 Result；
- Agent Execution Evidence；
- Web Console；
- GitOps Status；
- systemd、Docker、Compose、Healthcheck 和 Rollback；
- 用户需求、目标架构、迁移策略、模块契约、追踪矩阵、文档治理和 ADR；
- 文档—代码匹配检查器；
- 全量验收入口；
- OpenClaw 预发布部署任务；
- Codex 架构监督和阻塞处理任务。
-
-本报告不把“代码已提交”误报为“生产已验证”。以下状态仍需由无人值守任务执行并形成证据：
-
- 精确 Candidate Commit 的自动测试；
- 真实 OpenClaw Runtime 联调；
- Hermes 长任务、Worker 崩溃和 Lease Recovery 演练；
- systemd/Docker 预发布部署；
- 重启恢复与回滚演练；
- 本地仓库与 Gitea Candidate OID 一致验证；
- 身份代理、安全、性能和容量验证；
- Owner 对合并、Tag 和生产部署的批准。
-
-## 2. 用户需求完成情况
-
-| 需求 | 代码状态 | 测试状态 | 预发布状态 |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| AIOS 唯一控制面 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待验证 |
-| 复用 OpenClaw/Hermes/Agent Router | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待真实联调 |
-| OpenClaw/Hermes 解耦 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待旁路冻结验证 |
-| 全面 Web 化 | 候选实现完成 | 冒烟测试待执行 | 待反向代理接入 |
-| 多租户隔离 | 已实现 | Domain 负向测试已定义 | 待全链路安全验证 |
-| 统一任务生命周期 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待精确 Commit 执行 |
-| 策略与审批 | 已实现 | 部分测试待补强 | 待身份代理验证 |
-| 幂等与并发安全 | 已实现 | 基础测试已定义 | 待压力和并发验证 |
-| 执行证据 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待外部执行器持续回写 |
-| GitOps 唯一流程 | 已实现并修复 Controller 冲突 | Runtime 部分验证 | 待双目标持续镜像证据 |
-| 持久化与恢复 | 已实现 | 重启恢复测试已定义 | 待预发布演练 |
-| 审计与合规 | 已实现候选 | 部分断言待补强 | 待不可变外部固化 |
-| 密钥安全 | 引用模式已实现 | 基础扫描纳入验收 | 待 Secret Provider 联调 |
-| 部署与回滚 | 资产完成 | 验收脚本已定义 | 待实际演练 |
-| 文档与代码同步 | 已实现门禁 | 待精确 Commit 执行 | 待接入持续验收 |
-
-## 3. 目标架构
-
-```text
-浏览器 / Web Console / Public API
-                 |
-                 v
-          AIOS 唯一控制面
- Tenant | Agent | Task | Policy | Approval | Audit
-                 |
-                 v
-       Execution Orchestrator / Agent Router
-             /                 \
-            v                   v
-   OpenClaw Adapter       Hermes Boundary
-            |                   |
-            v                   v
-   OpenClaw Runtime       Hermes Workers
-             \                   /
-              v                 v
-       结果回写 + 审计 + 执行证据
-```
-
-权威边界：
-
- AIOS：租户、身份、Agent、任务、策略、审批、审计和执行证据；
- Agent Router：调度与路由；
- OpenClaw：签名命令执行、取消、状态、健康和回调；
- Hermes：队列、Worker、Lease、Heartbeat 和结果；
- Web：只调用 AIOS API；
- GitOps：所有代码、文档、部署和修复变更入口。
-
-## 4. 实现清单
-
-### 4.1 Control Plane
-
-```text
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/control_plane.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/persistence.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gateway.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/app.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/orchestrator.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/execution_tracking.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gitops_status.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_v2/console.py
-```
-
-### 4.2 OpenClaw
-
-```text
-active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/contract.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/adapter.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/transport.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/health.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/callback.py
-```
-
-### 4.3 Hermes
-
-```text
-active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/contract.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/adapter.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/worker.py
-```
-
-### 4.4 测试与治理
-
-```text
-tests/aios_v2_candidate/test_candidate_flow.py
-tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py
-deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
-```
-
-### 4.5 部署
-
-```text
-deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2.service
-deploy/aios-v2/env/aios-v2.env.example
-deploy/aios-v2/docker/Dockerfile
-deploy/aios-v2/docker/compose.yaml
-deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh
-deploy/aios-v2/rollback/rollback.sh
-```
-
-### 4.6 文档与任务
-
-```text
-docs/aios-v2/
-tasks/openclaw-production-deploy-task.yaml
-tasks/codex-production-supervisor-task.yaml
-```
-
-## 5. 多租户与安全设计
-
-### 5.1 权威上下文
-
-```text
-tenant_id
-principal_id
-session_id
-trace_id
-task_id
-policy_version
-idempotency_key
-```
-
-### 5.2 OpenClaw
-
- HMAC-SHA256 规范化签名；
- 签名绑定 tenant/task/trace/action/payload/idempotency/time；
- Runtime Result 身份字段必须匹配；
- Secret 只通过受保护文件或引用解析。
-
-### 5.3 Hermes
-
- tenant/cell/profile 分区；
- Worker Lease 与 Heartbeat；
- revision 乐观并发；
- Lease 过期自动回到 QUEUED；
- Worker 完成前停止 Heartbeat，避免 revision 竞态。
-
-### 5.4 Web/API
-
- 可信代理注入 `X-AIOS-*`；
- 浏览器不选择租户；
- CSP、no-store、nosniff、DENY frame、no-referrer；
- 应用端口不得直接暴露公网。
-
-### 5.5 GitOps
-
- Controller detached + clean；
- 禁止 fetch 到已检出本地分支；
- 所有修改进入分支、Commit、测试和统一审查；
- 明文 Secret 门禁；
- 文档变化与代码变化同步门禁。
-
-## 6. 持久化策略
-
-候选版：
-
- SQLite WAL；
- `synchronous=FULL`；
- `BEGIN IMMEDIATE`；
- 原子 Snapshot；
- schema version；
- 状态目录与代码版本分离；
- Execution Evidence 租户分区原子 JSON。
-
-已知限制：
-
- 单进程候选优先；
- 尚无生产 RLS、多实例 HA、PITR 和容量证据；
- 后续必须通过新 ADR 迁移到生产数据层。
-
-## 7. 测试与验收
-
-### 7.1 文档—代码匹配
-
-```bash
-python3 tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py \
-  --base-ref integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720
-```
-
-### 7.2 候选测试
-
-```bash
-python3 -m unittest discover \
-  -s tests/aios_v2_candidate \
-  -p 'test_*.py' \
-  -v
-```
-
-覆盖：
-
- OpenClaw 完整执行；
- Hermes 完整执行；
- 跨租户拒绝；
- SQLite 重启恢复；
- Execution Evidence。
-
-### 7.3 全量验收
-
-```bash
-bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
-```
-
-可选在线健康检查：
-
-```bash
-AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1 \
-  bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
-```
-
-### 7.4 健康检查
-
-```bash
-bash deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh
-```
-
-检查：
-
- systemd；
- HTTP Health；
- 状态目录；
- SQLite quick_check；
- GitOps detached/clean；
- Evidence 文件。
-
-## 8. 部署方式
-
-### 8.1 systemd
-
-```text
-/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2.env
-/opt/aios/current
-/var/lib/aios-v2
-```
-
-运行用户：`aios`。
-
-安全选项：NoNewPrivileges、ProtectSystem、ProtectHome、PrivateTmp、Capability 限制。
-
-### 8.2 Docker/Compose
-
- 非 root UID/GID；
- Read-only root filesystem；
- Drop all capabilities；
- 独立 State Volume；
- HTTP Healthcheck；
- Secret 文件只读挂载。
-
-## 9. 回滚
-
-```bash
-bash deploy/aios-v2/rollback/rollback.sh <previous-release>
-```
-
-原则：
-
- 回滚前自动备份状态；
- 默认只回滚代码；
- 状态恢复需显式 `AIOS_V2_RESTORE_STATE=1`；
- 回滚后必须执行健康检查；
- 目标版本失败时自动恢复 previous release。
-
-## 10. 无人值守任务
-
-### OpenClaw
-
-任务：`tasks/openclaw-production-deploy-task.yaml`
-
-职责：
-
- 预发布部署；
- 健康检查；
- Runtime 联调；
- 小型部署与 Runtime Bug 修复；
- 证据回写。
-
-### Codex
-
-任务：`tasks/codex-production-supervisor-task.yaml`
-
-职责：
-
- 架构监督；
- 阻塞分析和跨模块修复；
- 文档、测试和安全审查；
- 发布建议。
-
-所有修改和阻塞必须进入 Git 和 Execution Evidence，最终统一审视。
-
-## 11. 当前已知风险
-
-| 风险 | 级别 | 当前处理 |
-|---|---|---|
-| 精确 Candidate Commit 尚未执行全部测试 | 高 | OpenClaw 执行，Codex 监督 |
-| 真实 OpenClaw Runtime 尚未联调 | 高 | 预发布任务必须完成 |
-| 候选 SQLite 不支持生产多实例 HA | 高 | Candidate 单实例；后续 ADR 迁移 |
-| 身份代理 Header 防伪尚未环境验证 | 高 | 预发布安全检查 |
-| Web Console 为候选只读 MVP | 中 | 生产前补充 E2E 与安全验证 |
-| 部分策略负向、并发和审计测试待补强 | 中 | Codex 登记 blocker 并补充 |
-| 本地/Gitea 自动双写状态仍需持续证明 | 中 | 验收记录 OID |
-| 性能、容量和 SLO 尚无实测 | 中 | 预发布基准测试 |
-| 外部不可变审计固化尚未实现 | 中 | 生产数据层阶段完成 |
-
-## 12. 发布 Gate
-
-### 允许进入预发布
-
-条件：
-
- Candidate 分支可见；
- 文档完整；
- 任务合同已生成；
- 部署资产存在；
- 无明文 Secret。
-
-### 允许进入合并审查
-
-条件：
-
- 全量验收通过；
- OpenClaw/Hermes 联调通过；
- 重启和回滚通过；
- 严重/高风险 blocker 已解决；
- Codex 输出正向监督结论；
- 本地/Gitea OID 一致。
-
-### 允许生产发布
-
-条件：
-
- Owner 明确批准；
- Merge 与 Tag 通过受控流程；
- 生产配置、Secret 和反向代理准备完成；
- 发布窗口、观察指标、回滚负责人明确。
-
-## 13. 当前结论
-
-**代码和正式中文文档已经达到候选闭环状态，但尚不能宣称生产已验证。**
-
-下一阶段由 OpenClaw 执行预发布部署和低风险 Bug 修复，由 Codex 监督架构、文档、安全、测试和阻塞。所有过程证据统一进入系统，满足 Gate 后再请求 Owner 批准。
-
-## 14. 更新规则
-
-以下变化必须更新本报告：
-
- Candidate Commit；
- 测试结果；
- 部署和回滚结果；
- Blocker 和风险；
- OpenClaw/Codex 任务状态；
- 文档—代码匹配状态；
- Gitea OID；
- 发布建议和 Owner 决策。
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "schema": "aios.v2r1c7.engineering-build-receipt.v1",
+  "version": "V2R1C7",
+  "base_oid": "b356dec2ac5bd2a5f721aa73f8fd1902f9c65632",
+  "production_deployed": false,
+  "tag_created": false,
+  "baseline_changed": false,
+  "deployable": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+bec7da1adb75bf5feaa63c60ec6d03adf15d7508742a486207033d000f72d4ff  AGENT_DEPLOYMENT_REQUIREMENTS.md
+251b46e51ce09aa2fd843bee48ef24a5608f31d24c599841f086ceb25c1a1715  README.md
+783f68ec4f00a11d43ceed536196bfedccaf6614f6db9805f7b36d24e5fa7bc2  TEST_RESULTS.json
+9208325e5b2e6f5ba6b64e000bc21d14d9f2f214e3ad33dd79857e85218fd6c2  VERSION
+c4b24b65195077716983acdc8611f705324413a74453858994ba51541957afd4  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
+8a1935fa098d47ac02ce51bbd9fd5fad7cf9ab9374ea3de5f630679b96681d84  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+0997ab8332985c7124f334c4e49735d8833326578acc61a61a389bf792424de3  active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py
+dd3f8b1cab88e005a291f077807873c381e8ca92fe863dc05817925f0dff9613  active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py
+9e45025c41068cafdea2f360edfc4146a5459b0a6bcfbf1403206fc0161e7bac  active-runtime/app/v2r1c7_health_service.py
+c96ba560d69f6c2eb700b9f2b42a32e394dadd00dffb23bbefdb9fb3e1571c0d  deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service
+a05d4e8038fdb866ce17d4fb8a54798a268a1e8d44ff2cbc559069fa6ab2a667  deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
+a60dac51802bff67c2cfff61acdeb0a3a05d74a4f6cb47e3f78295ceb5c6acd9  docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
+2690f76452bceddda90c728278c600bcebd533db24776e2966423c5a8655e4b5  docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
+560e5d9af8a8e2ec60ec31cf8659a7982b93ea09b7adb486b738ea2fba460d70  release-manifests/V2R1C7.json
+81a423c7814f81cb888b60a538c153e549b2be9099c881c968d55ae84efddc57  scripts/build_v2r1c7_release_artifact.py
+64c78dabffb05c8851f87b2a27c43bd1f21728dca586397d03a6bc22906a906c  scripts/probe_v2r1c7_health.py
+5419dc7de0f50908ad0ef1dac74172fce811bb7b45f314a6e1c1bb9ce618324d  scripts/rollback_v2r1c7_release.sh
+54e2845d2c3c026323ad45515e082d661e3b461feb3bfefedf5adc52db2d7b78  scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+32a860e28d5afc105f413d878a13fb8600fa74874dbd3bc4c031ef3efa17896a  scripts/verify_v2r1c7_release.py
+3cce2b744326fe12b89bcad3cd352c77738950964bf8519e72cb5e9c7a5dfbfc  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
+8f3153c625241f60b65109eeac045e8aed7661d95f3a10f0b32ba3e0e9ac0a85  versions/V2R1C7.json
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "git_branch_created": false,
+  "git_commit_created": false,
+  "production_mutation": false,
+  "py_compile": {
+    "files": [
+      "active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+      "active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py"
+    ],
+    "status": "PASS"
+  },
+  "schema": "aios.authorized-task-writer-bridge-test-report.v1",
+  "secrets_included": false,
+  "smoke": {
+    "command": "python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+    "status": "PASS"
+  },
+  "status": "PASS",
+  "unit_tests": {
+    "command": "python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
+    "errors": 0,
+    "failures": 0,
+    "total": 9
+  }
+}
@@ -1 +1 @@
-V1R4C6
+V2R1C7
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+"""Fail-closed Agent Pull Runner primitives for AIOS autonomy v1.
+
+The runner owns task discovery and reporting only.  It never accepts shell
+strings: executors receive argv, an allowlisted cwd and an allowlisted env.
+Durable state is intentionally small so restart recovery and duplicate
+suppression can be verified without coupling the runner to one database.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import random
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+
+class RunnerError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when a runner contract would be violated."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RunnerConfig:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    long_poll_seconds: int = 30
+    fallback_seconds: int = 60
+    jitter_seconds: int = 5
+    max_backoff_seconds: int = 300
+    executable_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    working_directory_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    environment_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RunnerState:
+    inflight: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    terminal: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class RunnerTransport(Protocol):
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id: str, capabilities: Sequence[str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def heartbeat(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def long_poll(self, worker_id: str, timeout_seconds: int) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
+    def poll(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
+    def claim(self, worker_id: str, task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def renew(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_progress(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_result(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+    def report_evidence(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
+
+
+class JsonStateStore:
+    """Atomic JSON state store for restart recovery."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+
+    def load(self) -> RunnerState:
+        if not self.path.exists():
+            return RunnerState()
+        value = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise RunnerError("runner state must be an object")
+        return RunnerState(
+            inflight=dict(value.get("inflight", {})),
+            terminal=dict(value.get("terminal", {})),
+        )
+
+    def save(self, state: RunnerState) -> None:
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=self.path.name + ".", dir=self.path.parent)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                json.dump({"inflight": state.inflight, "terminal": state.terminal}, handle, sort_keys=True)
+                handle.write("\n")
+            os.chmod(name, 0o600)
+            os.replace(name, self.path)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(name):
+                os.unlink(name)
+
+
+class AgentPullRunner:
+    """Pull, claim, execute and report one task at a time."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: RunnerConfig,
+        transport: RunnerTransport,
+        state_store: JsonStateStore | None = None,
+        *,
+        random_fn: Callable[[], float] = random.random,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not config.worker_id.strip():
+            raise RunnerError("worker_id is required")
+        self.config = config
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.state_store = state_store
+        self.random_fn = random_fn
+        self.state = state_store.load() if state_store else RunnerState()
+
+    def _save(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_store:
+            self.state_store.save(self.state)
+
+    def register(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self.transport.register_worker(self.config.worker_id, self.config.capabilities)
+
+    def heartbeat(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return self.transport.heartbeat(self.config.worker_id)
+
+    def discovery_delay(self, failures: int) -> float:
+        failures = max(0, int(failures))
+        base = min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, self.config.fallback_seconds * (2**failures))
+        jitter = self.random_fn() * max(0, self.config.jitter_seconds)
+        return min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, base + jitter)
+
+    def discover_once(self) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None:
+        try:
+            task = self.transport.long_poll(self.config.worker_id, self.config.long_poll_seconds)
+        except Exception:
+            task = None
+        if task is None:
+            task = self.transport.poll(self.config.worker_id)
+        if not task:
+            return None
+        task_id = str(task.get("task_id", ""))
+        if not task_id:
+            raise RunnerError("task_id is required")
+        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
+            return {"status": "duplicate_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
+        claimed = dict(self.transport.claim(self.config.worker_id, task))
+        self.state.inflight[task_id] = claimed
+        self._save()
+        return claimed
+
+    def renew(self, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.renew(self.config.worker_id, task_id)
+
+    def report_progress(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.report_progress(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
+
+    def report_evidence(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        return self.transport.report_evidence(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
+
+    def report_result(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
+            return {"status": "duplicate_terminal_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
+        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
+            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
+        result = dict(self.transport.report_result(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload))
+        self.state.terminal[task_id] = {"result": result, "reported_at": time.time()}
+        self.state.inflight.pop(task_id, None)
+        self._save()
+        return result
+
+    def recover_after_restart(self) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        recovered: list[Mapping[str, Any]] = []
+        for task_id in tuple(self.state.inflight):
+            recovered.append(self.renew(task_id))
+        return recovered
+
+    def validate_execution(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> None:
+        if not argv or any(not isinstance(item, str) or not item for item in argv):
+            raise RunnerError("argv_only_execution_required")
+        if any(ch in argv[0] for ch in (";", "|", "&", "`", "\n")):
+            raise RunnerError("shell_syntax_denied")
+        executable = shutil.which(argv[0])
+        if not executable:
+            raise RunnerError("executable_not_found")
+        if self.config.executable_allowlist and not any(
+            os.path.realpath(executable).startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
+            or os.path.realpath(executable) == os.path.realpath(prefix)
+            for prefix in self.config.executable_allowlist
+        ):
+            raise RunnerError("executable_not_allowlisted")
+        real_cwd = os.path.realpath(os.fspath(cwd))
+        if self.config.working_directory_allowlist and not any(
+            real_cwd == os.path.realpath(prefix)
+            or real_cwd.startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
+            for prefix in self.config.working_directory_allowlist
+        ):
+            raise RunnerError("working_directory_not_allowlisted")
+        if self.config.environment_allowlist and any(key not in self.config.environment_allowlist for key in env):
+            raise RunnerError("environment_key_not_allowlisted")
+
+    def execute_argv(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        self.validate_execution(argv, cwd, env)
+        completed = subprocess.run(list(argv), cwd=os.fspath(cwd), env=dict(env), shell=False, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
+        return {"returncode": completed.returncode, "stdout": completed.stdout, "stderr": completed.stderr}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Small operational CLI for the Agent Pull Runner contract."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+
+from agent_pull_runner import AgentPullRunner, RunnerConfig
+
+
+class _NoopTransport:
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id, capabilities): return {"status": "registered", "worker_id": worker_id, "capabilities": list(capabilities)}
+    def heartbeat(self, worker_id): return {"status": "alive", "worker_id": worker_id}
+    def long_poll(self, worker_id, timeout_seconds): return None
+    def poll(self, worker_id): return None
+    def claim(self, worker_id, task): return task
+    def renew(self, worker_id, task_id): return {"status": "renewed", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_progress(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "progress_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_result(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "result_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+    def report_evidence(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "evidence_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS Agent Pull Runner")
+    parser.add_argument("--worker-id", default="self-test-worker")
+    parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    runner = AgentPullRunner(RunnerConfig(worker_id=args.worker_id, fallback_seconds=60), _NoopTransport())
+    if args.self_test:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "PASS", "registration": runner.register(), "fallback_seconds": runner.config.fallback_seconds}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    print(json.dumps({"status": "READY", "worker_id": args.worker_id}, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""HTTP adapter for Owner-authorized task writer provisioning.
+
+Run this module instead of aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py. All existing routes are
+delegated unchanged; only POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized is added.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+
+import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
+    AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner,
+    OwnerContext,
+    ProvisioningError,
+)
+
+
+_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/task-writer/provision-authorized"
+
+
+def _owner_authorization(handler):
+    scope = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE", "writer:provision"
+    )
+    auth = handler.need(scope)
+    if not auth:
+        return None
+    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    identity = str(auth.get("account") or "").strip()
+    if not identity:
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    return auth
+
+
+def _authorized_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != _ENDPOINT:
+        return _original_do_post(self)
+    auth = _owner_authorization(self)
+    if not auth:
+        return
+    data = self.body()
+    owner_reference = str(data.get("owner_authorization_reference") or "")
+    try:
+        result = AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner().provision(
+            data,
+            OwnerContext(
+                identity=str(auth["account"]),
+                role=str(auth["role"]),
+                authorization_reference=owner_reference,
+            ),
+        )
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except ProvisioningError as exc:
+        body = {"error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
+    except Exception:
+        # Do not expose tool output, paths containing credentials, or traceback data.
+        return self.sendj({"error": "AUTHORIZED_WRITER_BRIDGE_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500)
+
+
+api.H.do_POST = _authorized_do_post
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    api.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Governed API facade for branch-bound repair leases.
+
+The facade is transport-neutral so the permanent control plane can expose it
+through its existing authenticated loopback/API seam without creating a second
+Git writer or a global credential registry.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from branch_repair_lease import LeaseError, RepairLease, RepairLeaseManager, sanitized_lease_view
+
+
+class BranchRepairLeaseAPI:
+    """Validate operation envelopes and return sanitized lease metadata."""
+
+    def __init__(self, manager: RepairLeaseManager) -> None:
+        self.manager = manager
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required(request: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> Any:
+        value = request.get(name)
+        if value is None or value == "":
+            raise LeaseError(f"missing required field: {name}")
+        return value
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _view(lease: RepairLease) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"status": "ok", "lease": sanitized_lease_view(lease)}
+
+    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            operation = self._required(request, "operation")
+            owner = str(self._required(request, "owner_identity"))
+            if operation == "issue":
+                lease = self.manager.issue(
+                    task_id=str(self._required(request, "task_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    branch=str(self._required(request, "branch")),
+                    description=str(self._required(request, "description")),
+                    allowed_paths=tuple(self._required(request, "allowed_paths")),
+                    ttl_seconds=int(request.get("ttl_seconds", 3600)),
+                )
+            elif operation == "attach_existing_branch":
+                lease = self.manager.attach_existing_branch(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "authorize_commit":
+                lease = self.manager.authorize_commit(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
+                    content=request.get("content"),
+                )
+            elif operation == "record_commit":
+                lease = self.manager.record_commit(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
+                    new_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "new_head_oid")),
+                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "recover":
+                lease = self.manager.recover(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            elif operation == "renew":
+                lease = self.manager.renew(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
+                    owner_identity=owner,
+                    ttl_seconds=int(self._required(request, "ttl_seconds")),
+                )
+            elif operation == "complete":
+                lease = self.manager.complete(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            elif operation == "revoke":
+                lease = self.manager.revoke(
+                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
+                )
+            else:
+                raise LeaseError("unsupported lease operation")
+            return self._view(lease)
+        except (LeaseError, TypeError, ValueError):
+            return {"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_request_rejected"}
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""Root-only CLI for the branch-bound repair lease API."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from aios_branch_repair_lease_api import BranchRepairLeaseAPI
+from branch_repair_lease import GitProbe, LeaseStore
+from branch_repair_lease import RepairLeaseManager
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS branch repair lease CLI")
+    parser.add_argument("--store", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--request-file")
+    parser.add_argument("--request-json")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "root_required"}))
+        return 2
+    if bool(args.request_file) == bool(args.request_json):
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "one_request_source_required"}))
+        return 2
+    try:
+        raw = (
+            Path(args.request_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            if args.request_file
+            else str(args.request_json)
+        )
+        request = json.loads(raw)
+        if not isinstance(request, dict):
+            raise ValueError("request must be an object")
+        api = BranchRepairLeaseAPI(RepairLeaseManager(LeaseStore(args.store), GitProbe(args.bare_repo)))
+        response = api.handle(request)
+        print(json.dumps(response, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")))
+        return 0 if response.get("status") == "ok" else 1
+    except Exception:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_cli_failed"}))
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -5,8 +5,59 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any

-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', '/data/aios-gitops/workspace')) / 'runtime' / 'agent-os'))
+try:
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    PublicationConflict,
+    PublicationPending,
+    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
+    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
+    PublicationRequest,
+    TagPublisher,
+    redact,
+    validate_version,
+)
 from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+from silent_release_hardening import (
+    ApprovalKeyRing,
+    ApprovalRevocationStore,
+    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
+    SagaConflict,
+    SignedApprovalVerifier,
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+    SilentReleaseActionService,
+)
+try:
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )

 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
@@ -16,6 +67,19 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
+AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
+REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
+SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
+    '/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
+))
+SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED = str(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED', 'false'
+)).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
+SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
+    '/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
+))
 monitor = ActionMonitor()

 BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -24,7 +88,43 @@ BASE_MODELS = [
  {'id':'base.gpt-5.5','provider':'openai','model':'gpt-5.5','display_name':'GPT-5.5','scope':'global'},
 ]
 SECRET_RE = re.compile(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})')
-SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})')
+SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(
+    r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])'
+    r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})'
+)
+
+READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
+    '/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
+    '/api/base', '/api/baseline', '/base', '/api/ver', '/api/versions', '/ver',
+    '/api/diff', '/diff', '/api/patch', '/api/patches', '/api/branches', '/patch',
+    '/api/model', '/model', '/api/run', '/api/runtime-status', '/run',
+    '/api/action-monitor', '/action-monitor', '/admin/ai-evolution',
+    '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
+    '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
+    '/api/release-acceptance',
+    '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
+    '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
+    '/getRecoveryStatus',
+})
+SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/createReleaseCandidate',
+    '/createReleaseIntent',
+    '/submitSignedApproval',
+    '/submitOwnerApproval',
+    '/startDeployment',
+})
+
+def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if method == 'GET':
+        return False
+    if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
+        return False
+    decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
+    if decision.allowed:
+        return False
+    handler.sendj(decision.payload(), decision.status_code)
+    return True

 def now() -> str: return time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())
 def uid(p='id') -> str: return f'{p}-{int(time.time()*1000)}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}'
@@ -36,6 +136,41 @@ def sh(args, check=False):
 def jload(p: Path, default):
    try: return json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
    except Exception: return default
+
+def _file_sha256(path: Path) -> str:
+    digest=hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open('rb') as source:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b''):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+def _build_silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
+    verifier=None
+    if SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS.is_file():
+        verifier=SignedApprovalVerifier(
+            ApprovalKeyRing.from_file(SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS),
+            ApprovalRevocationStore(
+                SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT / 'revocations'
+            ),
+        )
+    policy_path=WS / 'config' / 'gitops' / 'silent-release-policy.json'
+    policy_sha=_file_sha256(policy_path) if policy_path.is_file() else ''
+    return SilentReleaseActionService(
+        SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT,
+        execution_enabled=SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,
+        approval_verifier=verifier,
+        expected_repository=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+        policy_sha256=policy_sha,
+    )
+
+# Construct once during service startup. If production execution is enabled
+# without every trusted builder/orchestrator dependency, construction fails
+# closed before the HTTP server accepts traffic.
+_SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE = _build_silent_release_service()
+
+
+def silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
+    return _SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE
 def relpath(path: str) -> str:
    x = str(path or '').replace('\\','/').strip()
    if not x or x.startswith('/') or '..' in Path(x).parts or Path(x).parts[0] == '.git': raise ValueError('invalid path')
@@ -109,9 +244,13 @@ def ensure_git():
    if not sh(['config','user.name'])['stdout']: sh(['config','user.name','chatgpt-gitops-bot'], True)
 def checkout(branch, base='main', create=False):
    ensure_git(); b=branch_name(branch)
-    if create or sh(['rev-parse','--verify',b])['code'] != 0:
-        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-B',b], True)
-    else: sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    exists = sh(['rev-parse','--verify',f'refs/heads/{b}'])['code'] == 0
+    if exists:
+        sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    elif create:
+        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-b',b], True)
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f'branch does not exist: {b}')
    return b
 def write_file(path, content):
    if content_has_secret(content): raise ValueError('secret_rejected: use secret_ref; plaintext API keys must not enter Git')
@@ -121,6 +260,19 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
    if not branch or branch in ('main','master') or branch.startswith('main/') or branch.startswith('master/'):
        return {'status':'skipped','reason':'protected_branch','branch':branch}
    if BARE_REPO.exists():
+        common = sh(['rev-parse', '--path-format=absolute', '--git-common-dir'], True)['stdout']
+        if Path(common).resolve() == BARE_REPO.resolve():
+            head = sh(['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], True)['stdout']
+            stored = subprocess.run(
+                ['git', '--git-dir', str(BARE_REPO), 'rev-parse', f'refs/heads/{branch}'],
+                text=True, capture_output=True,
+            )
+            if stored.returncode != 0 or stored.stdout.strip() != head:
+                raise RuntimeError(f'linked-worktree branch verification failed for {branch}')
+            return {
+                'status':'verified', 'target':'authoritative-bare',
+                'branch':branch, 'oid':head,
+            }
        ref=f'refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}'
        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git sync failed for {branch}')
@@ -130,15 +282,68 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','branch':branch,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}

 def sync_tag(tag: str) -> dict:
-    if not tag: return {'status':'skipped','reason':'empty_tag'}
-    if BARE_REPO.exists():
-        ref=f'refs/tags/{tag}:refs/tags/{tag}'
-        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
-        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag sync failed for {tag}')
-        return {'status':'synced','target':'bare','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
-    p=subprocess.run(['git','push','origin',tag], cwd=str(WS), text=True, capture_output=True)
-    if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag push failed for {tag}')
-    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
+    raise RuntimeError(
+        'unsafe sync_tag disabled: use TagPublisher with expected tag_oid, '
+        'target_oid, Gitea remote verification, and authenticated API verification'
+    )
+
+def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
+    oid = str(value or '').strip().lower()
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', oid):
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} must be a full 40-character commit OID')
+    try:
+        return authoritative_commit(oid, git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
+
+def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', str(tag or '')):
+        raise ValueError('invalid release version')
+    try:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        )
+    except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
+    return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
+
+def publication_request_from_query(q: dict[str, list[str]]) -> PublicationRequest:
+    required = ('version', 'target_oid', 'evidence_closure_oid', 'approval_plan_id')
+    missing = [name for name in required if not (q.get(name) or [''])[0]]
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError('missing release governance fields: ' + ', '.join(missing))
+    return PublicationRequest(
+        (q['version'])[0],
+        (q['target_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['evidence_closure_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['approval_plan_id'])[0],
+    )
+
+def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
+    snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+        git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+    )
+    if not snapshot["repository_available"]:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(snapshot["query_error"] or "AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE"))
+    return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
+
+
+def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
+    authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
+    return TagPublisher(
+        WS,
+        GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
+        GiteaTagClient(
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
+            Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
+            token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
+        ),
+        os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
+    )

 def commit(paths, msg):
    ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -158,6 +363,16 @@ def patches():
    for p in sorted((WS/'patches').glob('**/*.json')): out.append(jload(p, {'path':str(p.relative_to(WS))}))
    return out

+def runtime_release_info() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    for candidate in (WS / 'manifest.json', WS.parent / 'manifest.json'):
+        data = jload(candidate, {})
+        if data.get('target_commit'):
+            return {
+                'runtime_release_commit': data.get('target_commit'),
+                'runtime_release_path': str(WS),
+            }
+    return {'runtime_release_commit': None, 'runtime_release_path': str(WS)}
+
 class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    server_version='AIOSChatGPTGitOps/V1R1C0'
    def sendj(self, data, code=200):
@@ -179,43 +394,236 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
        return a
    def do_GET(self):
-        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path; q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
+        if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
        try:
            if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
            if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
                return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
            if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
            if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
-                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {}); data.setdefault('git', sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']); return self.sendj(data)
+                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
+                data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                ))
+                return self.sendj(data)
            if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                return self.sendj({'tags':sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines(),'versions_dir':[p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],'head':sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    tags = authoritative_tags(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'registry_versions': registry,
+                    'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'tags': [item['name'] for item in tags],
+                    'versions_dir': registry,
+                    'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                    'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                })
            if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
-                frm=(q.get('from') or ['HEAD~1'])[0]; to=(q.get('to') or ['HEAD'])[0]; return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':sh(['diff',frm,to])})
-            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'): return self.sendj({'patches':patches(),'branches':sh(['branch','--format','%(refname:short)'])['stdout'].splitlines()})
+                frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
+                to=(q.get('to') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    diff=authoritative_diff(frm, to, git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir())
+                except ValueError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},400)
+                except AuthoritativeGitNotFound as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},404)
+                except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
+                except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
+                return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':diff})
+            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    branches = authoritative_branches(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                metadata = patches()
+                branch_names = {item['name'] for item in branches}
+                metadata_names = {
+                    item.get('branch') for item in metadata
+                    if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get('branch')
+                }
+                orphan = [
+                    item for item in metadata
+                    if item.get('branch') and item.get('branch') not in branch_names
+                ]
+                missing = [
+                    item for item in branches
+                    if item['name'] not in metadata_names
+                ]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'metadata_patches': metadata,
+                    'authoritative_branches': branches,
+                    'orphan_metadata': orphan,
+                    'branches_without_metadata': missing,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'patches': metadata,
+                    'branches': [item['name'] for item in branches],
+                })
            if path in ('/api/model','/model'): return self.sendj({'base':BASE_MODELS,'custom':model_docs(),'priority':[jload(p,{}) for p in sorted((WS/'config'/'model_priority').glob('*.json'))]})
            if path in ('/api/run','/api/runtime-status','/run'):
                svc=subprocess.run(['systemctl','is-active','aios-gitops-model-api'], text=True, capture_output=True)
-                return self.sendj({'service':'aios-gitops-model-api','status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),'workspace_branch':sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                workspace_branch = None
+                if (WS / '.git').exists():
+                    result = sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])
+                    workspace_branch = result['stdout'] or None
+                payload = {
+                    'service':'aios-gitops-model-api',
+                    'status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),
+                    'workspace_branch':workspace_branch,
+                    **runtime_release_info(),
+                    **snapshot,
+                    'writes_enabled': str(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED','false')).lower() in {'1','true','yes','on'},
+                }
+                return self.sendj(payload, 200 if snapshot['repository_available'] else 503)
            if path in ('/api/action-monitor','/action-monitor'):
                latest=monitor.latest()
                ldict={'event_id':latest.event_id,'action':latest.action,'error':latest.error,'context':latest.context,'created_at':latest.created_at} if latest else None
                return self.sendj({'events':[{"event_id":e.event_id,"action":e.action,"error":e.error,"context":e.context,"created_at":e.created_at} for e in monitor.list_events()],'latest':ldict})
+            if path == '/api/tag-publication-status':
+                version=(q.get('version') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    version=validate_version(version)
+                    status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
+                except ValueError:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
+                return self.sendj(status)
+            if path == '/api/release-consistency':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
+            if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
+            if path in (
+                '/getReleaseCandidate',
+                '/getReleasePlan',
+                '/getReleaseAcceptance',
+                '/getApprovalEnvelope',
+                '/getReleaseSaga',
+                '/getCapabilityStatus',
+            ):
+                candidate_id=(q.get('candidate_id') or [''])[0]
+                if not candidate_id:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'candidate_id is required'},400)
+                service=silent_release_service()
+                if path == '/getReleaseCandidate':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_release_candidate(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                if path == '/getApprovalEnvelope':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_approval_envelope(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                if path == '/getReleasePlan':
+                    return self.sendj(service.get_release_plan(candidate_id))
+                if path == '/getReleaseAcceptance':
+                    return self.sendj(service.get_acceptance(candidate_id))
+                if path == '/getCapabilityStatus':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_capability_status(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                return self.sendj(service.get_release_saga(candidate_id))
+            if path == '/getRecoveryStatus':
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().get_recovery_status()
+                )
                        # Admin AI Evolution Dashboard
            if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution','/admin/ai-evolution/'):
                return self.ai_evolution_page()
            if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution/api/data'):
                return self.ai_evolution_data()
            return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
        except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
    def do_PUT(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PUT', path): return
+        data=self.body()
        if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
    def do_POST(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
+        data=self.body()
        try:
+            if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
+                a=self.need('release:candidate')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/createReleaseIntent':
+                a=self.need('release:candidate')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().create_release_intent(data)
+                )
+            if path in ('/submitOwnerApproval','/submitSignedApproval'):
+                a=self.need('release:approve')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().submit_owner_approval(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/startDeployment':
+                a=self.need('release:deploy')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().start_deployment(
+                        str(data.get('candidate_id') or '')
+                    )
+                )
            if path in ('/api/branch','/api/create-branch'): return self.branch(data)
            if path in ('/api/file','/api/commit-file'): return self.file(data)
            if path == '/api/commit': return self.commit(data)
@@ -226,9 +634,30 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
            if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
            if path == '/api/nl': return self.nl(data)
            return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
+        except CapabilityAuthorizationError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},403)
+        except SagaConflict as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},409)
        except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
+    def do_PATCH(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PATCH', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+    def do_DELETE(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'DELETE', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
    def branch(self,data):
        a=self.need('branch:create');
        if not a: return
@@ -252,12 +681,41 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        if not a: return
        ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
        if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
-        if data.get('confirm') != True:
-            self.sendj({'status':'confirm_required','operation':'tag','hint':'This operation creates a Git tag. Confirm to proceed.','x-openai-isConsequential':True}, 428)
-            return
+        if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
+            return self.sendj({
+                'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
+                'required':['version','target_oid','evidence_closure_oid','approval_plan_id'],
+            },400)
+        try:
+            target_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('target_oid'))
+            evidence_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('evidence_closure_oid'), 'evidence_closure_oid')
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'invalid_tag_target','detail':str(exc)},400)
        if a['role'] != 'owner' or not data.get('execute'):
-            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'commit':c})
-        out=sh(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'], True); self.sendj({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out,'sync':sync_tag(ver)})
+            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'request':req,'commit':c})
+        request=PublicationRequest(ver,target_oid,evidence_oid,str(data.get('approval_plan_id')))
+        main_before=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        publisher=publication_publisher()
+        try:
+            publication=publisher.publish(request)
+        except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_manual_owner_review_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':redact(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED','error':redact(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationConflict as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_conflict',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationPending as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_pending',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},503)
+        except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_reconciliation_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},502)
+        main_after=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        if main_after != main_before:
+            raise RuntimeError('main changed during tag operation')
+        result={'status':publication['state'],'version':ver,'tag_name':ver,'tag_oid':publication['tag_oid'],'target_oid':target_oid,'expected_target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'workspace_head':sh(['rev-parse','HEAD'],True)['stdout'],'main_oid_before':main_before,'main_oid_after':main_after,'main_changed':False,'force_push':False,'publication':publication}
+        audit(a['account'],'tag',ver,result)
+        self.sendj(result)
    def rollback(self,data):
        a=self.need('rollback:request');
        if not a: return
@@ -352,7 +810,10 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
        cmd_filter=(params.get('command') or [None])[0]
        bl=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json',{})
        current_ver=bl.get('current_baseline','V1R3C1')
-        tags=sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines() if WS.exists() else []
+        try:
+            tags=[item['name'] for item in authoritative_tags(git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir()) if str(item['name']).startswith('V')]
+        except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc),'repository_available':False},503)
        versions=[]
        if (WS/'baseline'/'promotions').exists():
            for p in sorted((WS/'baseline'/'promotions').glob('*.json')):
@@ -390,9 +851,9 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer


 def api_spec():
-    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True}}
+    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}

 def main():
    print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
    ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST,PORT), H).serve_forever()
-if __name__ == '__main__': main()
+if __name__ == '__main__': main()
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed policy for in-process Git mutation handlers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping
+
+_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitWriteDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    status_code: int
+    error: str
+    reason: str
+    workspace: str
+
+    def payload(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "status": "allowed" if self.allowed else "blocked",
+            "error": self.error,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "workspace": self.workspace,
+        }
+
+
+def _real(path: Path) -> Path:
+    return Path(os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path))))
+
+
+def evaluate_git_write(workspace: Path | str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> GitWriteDecision:
+    values = os.environ if env is None else env
+    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+    canonical = _real(lexical)
+    shown = str(lexical)
+    if str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false")).strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "gitops_writes_disabled", "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED is false", shown)
+    if lexical != canonical:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_symlink_forbidden", "workspace must be a canonical non-symlink path", shown)
+    controller = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_PATH", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller")))
+    role = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "")).strip().lower()
+    if canonical == controller or role == "runtime-anchor":
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "runtime_anchor_read_only", "controller/runtime-anchor is read-only", str(canonical))
+    writer_root = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees")))
+    try:
+        canonical.relative_to(writer_root)
+    except ValueError:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_not_approved_writer", "workspace is outside the approved writer root", str(canonical))
+    return GitWriteDecision(True, 200, "", "approved isolated writer", str(canonical))
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""CLI client for the governed local writer service."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+
+
+def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Send one governed-local-writer request")
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True, help="AF_UNIX socket path")
+    group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    group.add_argument("--request", help="Request JSON string")
+    group.add_argument("--request-file", help="Path to JSON request file")
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def _load_request_text(args: argparse.Namespace) -> str:
+    if args.request is not None:
+        return args.request
+    request_path = os.fspath(args.request_file)
+    with open(request_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as request_file:
+        return request_file.read()
+
+
+def send_request(socket_path: str, request_text: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Open one Unix socket, send one NDJSON request, and parse one NDJSON response."""
+    payload = json.loads(request_text)
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError("request must be a JSON object")
+
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as client:
+        client.connect(socket_path)
+        client.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+        response_chunks: list[str] = []
+        while True:
+            chunk = client.recv(1024 * 1024).decode("utf-8")
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            response_chunks.append(chunk)
+            if "\n" in chunk:
+                break
+        response_text = "".join(response_chunks)
+
+    response_line = response_text.split("\n", 1)[0].strip()
+    if not response_line:
+        raise RuntimeError("empty response")
+    response = json.loads(response_line)
+    if not isinstance(response, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("invalid response")
+    return response
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    args = _parse_args()
+    request_text = _load_request_text(args)
+    response = send_request(args.socket, request_text)
+    print(json.dumps(response, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        main()
+    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - CLI entrypoint behavior
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "error", "error": str(exc)}), file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(1)
@@ -0,0 +1,931 @@
+"""Unix-socket service for governed local writer operations."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import hashlib
+import argparse
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import re
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from governed_local_writer import (
+    AppendCommitRequest,
+    AuthorizationError,
+    BranchPolicy,
+    CreateBranchRequest,
+    GovernedAuthorization,
+    PeerIdentity,
+    PRINCIPAL,
+    TASK_ID,
+    extract_peer_identity,
+    contains_secret_like_content,
+    load_authorization_file,
+    validate_file_changes,
+)
+
+
+class ExistingGitOpsHandler:
+    """Delegate repository mutations to the installed GitOps handler seam."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        workspace_by_branch: Mapping[str, str | os.PathLike[str]],
+        bare_repo: str | os.PathLike[str],
+        api_source: str | os.PathLike[str],
+    ) -> None:
+        self.workspace_by_branch = {str(k): Path(v) for k, v in workspace_by_branch.items()}
+        self.bare_repo = Path(bare_repo)
+        self.api_source = Path(api_source)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _restore_env(previous: Mapping[str, str | None]) -> None:
+        for key, value in previous.items():
+            if value is None:
+                os.environ.pop(key, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[key] = value
+
+    def _load_api(self, workspace: Path):
+        if not self.api_source.is_file() or self.api_source.is_symlink():
+            raise RuntimeError("installed GitOps handler source is unavailable")
+        keys = (
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED",
+            "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1",
+        )
+        previous = {key: os.environ.get(key) for key in keys}
+        os.environ.update(
+            {
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE": str(workspace),
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO": str(self.bare_repo),
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED": "true",
+                "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "2",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "safe.directory",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": str(workspace),
+                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1": "safe.directory",
+                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1": str(self.bare_repo),
+            }
+        )
+        module_name = f"_governed_gitops_api_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+        try:
+            spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, self.api_source)
+            if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("unable to load installed GitOps handler")
+            module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+            sys.modules[module_name] = module
+            spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+            decision = module.evaluate_git_write(module.WS)
+            if not decision.allowed:
+                raise RuntimeError("existing GitOps write gate denied bootstrap")
+            return module, previous, module_name
+        except Exception:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+            raise
+
+    def _workspace(self, branch: str) -> Path:
+        workspace = self.workspace_by_branch.get(branch)
+        if workspace is None or not workspace.is_dir():
+            raise RuntimeError("branch workspace is not authorized")
+        return workspace
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _git(workspace: Path, args: list[str]) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False
+        )
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise RuntimeError("governed handler git probe failed")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
+        # A prior handler call may have completed the fast-forward sync before
+        # the process observed a post-commit error. Reconcile only an exact,
+        # metadata-only result; never overwrite or move an existing ref here.
+        try:
+            existing = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                [
+                    "--git-dir",
+                    str(self.bare_repo),
+                    "rev-parse",
+                    f"refs/heads/{request.branch}",
+                ],
+            )
+        except RuntimeError:
+            existing = ""
+        if existing:
+            parent = self._git(workspace, ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"{existing}^1"])
+            changed = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                [
+                    "--git-dir",
+                    str(self.bare_repo),
+                    "diff-tree",
+                    "--no-commit-id",
+                    "--name-only",
+                    "-r",
+                    existing,
+                ],
+            ).splitlines()
+            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
+            if parent != request.base_oid or changed != [f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"]:
+                raise RuntimeError("existing branch is not an exact metadata-only bootstrap")
+            return {"head_oid": existing, "parent_oid": parent, "handler_status": "reconciled"}
+        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
+        phase = "loaded"
+        try:
+            phase = "verify_base"
+            parent = self._git(
+                workspace,
+                ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"],
+            )
+            if parent != request.base_oid:
+                raise RuntimeError("authorized base OID drift")
+            phase = "checkout"
+            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.base_oid, create=True)
+            phase = "write_metadata"
+            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
+            metadata_path = f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"
+            module.write_json(
+                metadata_path,
+                {
+                    "schema": "aios.governed-local-writer-bootstrap.v1",
+                    "task_id": TASK_ID,
+                    "principal": PRINCIPAL,
+                    "branch": request.branch,
+                    "parent_oid": request.base_oid,
+                    "authorization_sha256": request.authorization_digest,
+                },
+            )
+            phase = "commit_and_sync"
+            result = module.commit(
+                [metadata_path], "chore(governance): bootstrap repair lease branch"
+            )
+            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+            if first_parent != request.base_oid or (request.head_oid and head_oid != request.head_oid):
+                raise RuntimeError("bootstrap branch lineage check failed")
+            return {
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+                "parent_oid": first_parent,
+                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
+            }
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
+        finally:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+
+    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
+        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
+        phase = "loaded"
+        try:
+            phase = "verify_head"
+            current = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            if current != request.expected_head_oid:
+                raise RuntimeError("branch head advanced or is stale")
+            phase = "checkout"
+            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.expected_head_oid, create=False)
+            phase = "write_files"
+            paths: list[str] = []
+            for change in request.changes:
+                paths.append(module.write_file(change.path, change.content))
+            phase = "commit_and_sync"
+            result = module.commit(paths, request.commit_message)
+            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+            if first_parent != request.expected_head_oid or head_oid == first_parent:
+                raise RuntimeError("append commit lineage check failed")
+            return {
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+                "parent_oid": first_parent,
+                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
+            }
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
+        finally:
+            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
+            self._restore_env(previous)
+
+
+class GovernedWriterHandler(Protocol):
+    """Small adapter interface for real writer backend handlers."""
+
+    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        """Create a branch using internal repo services."""
+
+    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
+        """Append a commit using internal repo services."""
+
+
+class AuditSink(Protocol):
+    """Pluggable sink for sanitized audit records."""
+
+    def append(self, record: "AuditRecord") -> None:
+        """Persist one audit record."""
+
+
+@dataclass
+class AuditRecord:
+    """Sanitized audit log entry."""
+
+    authorization_digest: str
+    peer_pid: int
+    peer_uid: int
+    peer_gid: int
+    peer_executable: str | None
+    timestamp: datetime
+    operation: str
+    branch: str
+    result: str
+
+
+class InMemoryAuditSink:
+    """Simple in-memory audit log used by tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.records: list[AuditRecord] = []
+
+    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
+        self.records.append(record)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _AuthorizationState:
+    """Tracks one-shot operation consumption."""
+
+    create_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    append_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    consumed: bool = False
+
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterService:
+    """Policy-aware AF_UNIX service that calls an injected handler."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        socket_path: str | os.PathLike[str],
+        authorization: GovernedAuthorization,
+        handler: GovernedWriterHandler,
+        *,
+        audit_sink: AuditSink | None = None,
+        peer_identity_fn: Callable[[socket.socket], PeerIdentity] | None = None,
+        state_path: str | os.PathLike[str] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path)
+        self.authorization = authorization
+        self.handler = handler
+        self.peer_identity_fn = peer_identity_fn or extract_peer_identity
+        self.state = _AuthorizationState()
+        self.audit_sink = audit_sink or InMemoryAuditSink()
+        self.state_path = Path(state_path) if state_path is not None else None
+        self._load_state()
+
+    def _load_state(self) -> None:
+        """Restore one-shot state without restoring request or secret material."""
+        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
+            return
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+                raise ValueError("state must be an object")
+            if raw.get("authorization_sha256") != self.authorization.authorization_sha256:
+                raise ValueError("state authorization digest mismatch")
+            self.state.create_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("create_done", [])}
+            self.state.append_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("append_done", [])}
+            self.state.consumed = bool(raw.get("consumed", False))
+        except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid") from exc
+
+    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_path is None:
+            return
+        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
+            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
+            "consumed": self.state.consumed,
+        }
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
+            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+
+    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> None:
+        self.audit_sink.append(
+            AuditRecord(
+                authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                peer_pid=peer.pid,
+                peer_uid=peer.uid,
+                peer_gid=peer.gid,
+                peer_executable=peer.executable,
+                timestamp=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc),
+                operation=operation,
+                branch=branch,
+                result=result,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def _require_request_field(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], field_name: str) -> str:
+        value = request.get(field_name)
+        if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+            raise AuthorizationError(f"{field_name} must be a non-empty string")
+        return value
+
+    def _branch_policy(self, branch: str) -> BranchPolicy:
+        policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
+        if policy is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch is not authorized")
+        return policy
+
+    def _ensure_not_consumed(self) -> None:
+        if self.state.consumed:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization consumed")
+        if datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) >= self.authorization.expires_at:
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization expired")
+
+    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
+        if op == "create_branch":
+            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
+        elif op == "append_commit":
+            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
+
+        if self.state.create_done.issuperset(self.authorization.create_branches) and self.state.append_done.issuperset(
+            self.authorization.append_branches
+        ):
+            self.state.consumed = True
+        self._persist_state()
+
+    def _validate_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = self._require_request_field(request, "task_id")
+        if task_id != TASK_ID:
+            raise AuthorizationError("invalid task_id")
+
+        principal = self._require_request_field(request, "principal")
+        if principal != PRINCIPAL:
+            raise AuthorizationError("invalid principal")
+
+        operation = self._require_request_field(request, "op")
+        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit"}:
+            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
+        if operation in self.authorization.denied_operations:
+            raise AuthorizationError("operation denied by policy")
+
+        branch = self._require_request_field(request, "branch")
+        self._ensure_not_consumed()
+        policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
+
+        if operation == "create_branch":
+            if policy.create_branch is None:
+                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow create_branch")
+            if branch in self.state.create_done:
+                raise AuthorizationError("create_branch already used for this branch")
+
+            base_oid = self._require_request_field(request, "base_oid")
+            raw_head_oid = request.get("head_oid")
+            if raw_head_oid is not None and (not isinstance(raw_head_oid, str) or not raw_head_oid):
+                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid must be a non-empty string when supplied")
+            head_oid = str(raw_head_oid) if raw_head_oid is not None else None
+            if base_oid != policy.create_branch.base_oid:
+                raise AuthorizationError("base_oid mismatch")
+            if policy.create_branch.head_oid is not None and head_oid != policy.create_branch.head_oid:
+                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid mismatch")
+
+            return {
+                "operation": operation,
+                "branch": branch,
+                "base_oid": base_oid,
+                "head_oid": head_oid,
+            }
+
+        if policy.append_commit is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow append_commit")
+        if policy.create_branch is not None and branch not in self.state.create_done:
+            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit requires prior successful create_branch")
+        if branch in self.state.append_done:
+            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit already used for this branch")
+
+        expected_head = policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
+        if "expected_head_oid" in request:
+            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "expected_head_oid")
+        elif "current_head_oid" in request:
+            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "current_head_oid")
+        else:
+            raise AuthorizationError("expected_head_oid or current_head_oid required")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", supplied_head):
+            raise AuthorizationError("head check must be a full commit OID")
+        if expected_head is not None and supplied_head != expected_head:
+            raise AuthorizationError("head check failed")
+
+        if request.get("force") is True or request.get("non_fast_forward") is True:
+            raise AuthorizationError("non-fast-forward operations are not allowed")
+        if request.get("history_rewrite") is True:
+            raise AuthorizationError("history rewrite is not allowed")
+        parent_oids = request.get("parent_oids")
+        if parent_oids is not None:
+            if not isinstance(parent_oids, list) or parent_oids != [supplied_head]:
+                raise AuthorizationError("parent_oids must contain exactly expected_head_oid")
+
+        changes = request.get("changes")
+        if not isinstance(changes, list):
+            raise AuthorizationError("changes must be a list")
+        validated_changes = validate_file_changes(changes, policy.append_commit.allowed_paths)
+        commit_message = request.get("commit_message", "chore(governance): append governed commit")
+        if not isinstance(commit_message, str) or not commit_message.strip() or len(commit_message) > 200:
+            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message must be a short non-empty string")
+        if "\n" in commit_message or "\r" in commit_message or contains_secret_like_content(commit_message):
+            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message failed policy")
+
+        return {
+            "operation": operation,
+            "branch": branch,
+            "expected_head_oid": supplied_head,
+            "changes": validated_changes,
+            "commit_message": commit_message.strip(),
+        }
+
+    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        """Run one request through policy checks and handler adapter."""
+        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
+        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
+        try:
+            details = self._validate_request(raw_request)
+            operation = str(details["operation"])
+            branch = str(details["branch"])
+
+            if operation == "create_branch":
+                self.handler.create_branch(
+                    CreateBranchRequest(
+                        branch=branch,
+                        base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]),
+                        head_oid=(
+                            str(details["head_oid"])
+                            if details.get("head_oid") is not None
+                            else None
+                        ),
+                        authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                    )
+                )
+                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
+                self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+                return {
+                    "status": "ok",
+                    "operation": operation,
+                    "branch": branch,
+                    "result": "applied",
+                }
+
+            self.handler.append_commit(
+                AppendCommitRequest(
+                    branch=branch,
+                    expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]),
+                    changes=tuple(details["changes"]),
+                    authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+                    commit_message=str(details["commit_message"]),
+                )
+            )
+            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+            return {
+                "status": "ok",
+                "operation": operation,
+                "branch": branch,
+                "result": "applied",
+            }
+        except Exception as error:
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation or "unknown", branch, f"error:{error.__class__.__name__}")
+            if isinstance(error, PermissionError):
+                code = "permission_denied"
+            elif isinstance(error, AuthorizationError):
+                code = "request_denied"
+            else:
+                code = "handler_failed"
+            if code == "handler_failed" and str(error).startswith("handler_phase="):
+                code = str(error)
+            return {
+                "status": "error",
+                "operation": operation or "unknown",
+                "branch": branch,
+                "error": code,
+            }
+
+    def _write_json(self, connection: socket.socket, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        connection.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _handle_client(self, connection: socket.socket) -> None:
+        with connection:
+            try:
+                peer = self.peer_identity_fn(connection)
+            except Exception:
+                self._write_json(
+                    connection,
+                    {
+                        "status": "error",
+                        "operation": "connection",
+                        "branch": "",
+                        "error": "peer identity validation failed",
+                    },
+                )
+                return
+
+            with connection.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                for raw_line in stream:
+                    line = raw_line.strip()
+                    if not line:
+                        continue
+                    try:
+                        request = json.loads(line)
+                    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                        self._write_json(
+                            connection,
+                            {
+                                "status": "error",
+                                "operation": "request",
+                                "branch": "",
+                                "error": "invalid json",
+                            },
+                        )
+                        continue
+                    if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+                        self._write_json(
+                            connection,
+                            {
+                                "status": "error",
+                                "operation": "request",
+                                "branch": "",
+                                "error": "request must be a JSON object",
+                            },
+                        )
+                        continue
+                    self._write_json(connection, self.process_request(request, peer))
+
+    def _bind_socket(self) -> socket.socket:
+        if self.socket_path.exists():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket already exists")
+        parent = self.socket_path.parent
+        if not parent.is_dir():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent is missing")
+        if parent.is_symlink():
+            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent must not be a symlink")
+        server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        server.bind(str(self.socket_path))
+        os.chmod(self.socket_path, 0o600)
+        server.listen(16)
+        return server
+
+    def serve(self) -> None:
+        """Serve newline-delimited JSON over a filesystem AF_UNIX socket."""
+        server = self._bind_socket()
+        try:
+            while True:
+                connection, _ = server.accept()
+                self._handle_client(connection)
+        finally:
+            server.close()
+            if self.socket_path.exists():
+                self.socket_path.unlink()
+
+
+class JsonAuditSink:
+    """Append-only root-owned audit sink containing no request payloads."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": record.authorization_digest,
+            "peer_pid": record.peer_pid,
+            "peer_uid": record.peer_uid,
+            "peer_gid": record.peer_gid,
+            "peer_executable": record.peer_executable,
+            "timestamp": record.timestamp.isoformat(),
+            "operation": record.operation,
+            "branch": record.branch,
+            "result": record.result,
+        }
+        line = (json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+        fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            os.write(fd, line)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+
+
+
+# V2R1C6 durable receipt overlay.  This subclasses the original root-only
+# writer in-place so the existing AF_UNIX/SO_PEERCRED and handler policy remain
+# the only mutation path.
+_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService = GovernedLocalWriterService
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterService(_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService):
+    """Existing writer with durable request receipts and safe recovery."""
+
+    def _load_state(self) -> None:
+        super()._load_state()
+        self.state.receipts = {}
+        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
+            return
+        raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid")
+        receipts = raw.get("receipts", {})
+        if not isinstance(receipts, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("authorization receipts are invalid")
+        self.state.receipts = {
+            str(key): dict(value)
+            for key, value in receipts.items()
+            if isinstance(value, dict)
+        }
+
+    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
+        if self.state_path is None:
+            return
+        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
+            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
+            "consumed": bool(self.state.consumed),
+            "receipts": self.state.receipts,
+        }
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
+            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+
+    def _request_identity(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
+        canonical = json.dumps(dict(request), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True)
+        fallback = hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        request_id = request.get("request_id")
+        idempotency_key = request.get("idempotency_key")
+        request_id = request_id.strip() if isinstance(request_id, str) and request_id.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
+        idempotency_key = idempotency_key.strip() if isinstance(idempotency_key, str) and idempotency_key.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
+        for field_name, value in (("request_id", request_id), ("idempotency_key", idempotency_key)):
+            if len(value) > 200 or "\n" in value or "\r" in value:
+                raise AuthorizationError(field_name + " is invalid")
+        return {
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
+            "request_fingerprint": fallback,
+        }
+
+    def _find_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any], compare_fingerprint: bool = True):
+        request_id = str(details["request_id"])
+        idempotency_key = str(details["idempotency_key"])
+        fingerprint = str(details.get("request_fingerprint", ""))
+        for receipt in self.state.receipts.values():
+            if receipt.get("request_id") == request_id or receipt.get("idempotency_key") == idempotency_key:
+                if compare_fingerprint and receipt.get("request_fingerprint") != fingerprint:
+                    raise AuthorizationError("idempotency key reused with different request")
+                return receipt
+        return None
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _receipt_response(receipt: Mapping[str, object], status: str = "receipt") -> dict[str, object]:
+        response = {
+            "status": status,
+            "request_id": receipt.get("request_id"),
+            "idempotency_key": receipt.get("idempotency_key"),
+            "operation": receipt.get("operation"),
+            "branch": receipt.get("branch", ""),
+            "receipt_status": receipt.get("status"),
+        }
+        for field_name in ("commit_oid", "final_head", "parent_oid", "audit_sha256", "error_code", "safe_to_retry"):
+            if field_name in receipt:
+                response[field_name] = receipt[field_name]
+        return response
+
+    def _new_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "request_id": str(details["request_id"]),
+            "idempotency_key": str(details["idempotency_key"]),
+            "request_fingerprint": str(details["request_fingerprint"]),
+            "operation": str(details["operation"]),
+            "branch": str(details.get("branch", "")),
+            "expected_head_oid": str(details.get("expected_head_oid", "")),
+            "status": "accepted",
+            "created_at": datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            "safe_to_retry": False,
+        }
+
+    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> str:
+        super()._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, result)
+        payload = {
+            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
+            "peer_pid": peer.pid,
+            "peer_uid": peer.uid,
+            "peer_gid": peer.gid,
+            "peer_executable": peer.executable,
+            "operation": operation,
+            "branch": branch,
+            "result": result,
+        }
+        return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
+        if op == "create_branch":
+            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
+        elif op in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
+        # The provisioning grant is one-shot; the task writer lease itself must
+        # support multiple append receipts for the exact authorized branches.
+        self.state.consumed = False
+        self._persist_state()
+
+    def _validate_durable(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        operation = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "op")
+        identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
+        if operation == "query_receipt":
+            return {"operation": operation, **identity}
+        if operation == "recover_request":
+            branch = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "branch")
+            policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
+            if policy.append_commit is None:
+                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow recovery")
+            expected = raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
+            if not isinstance(expected, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", expected):
+                raise AuthorizationError("recovery requires expected_head_oid")
+            return {"operation": operation, "branch": branch, "expected_head_oid": expected.lower(), **identity}
+        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
+        request = dict(raw_request)
+        if operation in {"append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            request["op"] = "append_commit"
+        if operation in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
+            self.state.consumed = False
+        branch = request.get("branch")
+        removed = False
+        dynamic_expected = False
+        if isinstance(branch, str) and branch in self.state.append_done:
+            self.state.append_done.remove(branch)
+            removed = True
+            policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
+            if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None and policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid is not None:
+                from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
+                self.authorization.branch_operations[branch] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=None, allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
+                dynamic_expected = True
+        try:
+            details = super()._validate_request(request)
+        finally:
+            if dynamic_expected:
+                policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(str(branch))
+                if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None:
+                    from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
+                    self.authorization.branch_operations[str(branch)] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=str(branch), expected_head_oid=str(raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or ""), allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
+            if removed:
+                self.state.append_done.add(str(branch))
+        details.update(identity)
+        details["operation"] = operation
+        return details
+
+    def _recover_backend(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
+        if not hasattr(self.handler, "_workspace") or not hasattr(self.handler, "_git"):
+            raise RuntimeError("recovery backend unavailable")
+        workspace = self.handler._workspace(str(details["branch"]))
+        expected = str(details["expected_head_oid"])
+        current = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
+        if current == expected:
+            return {"status": "not_started", "final_head": current}
+        parent = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
+        if parent != expected:
+            raise RuntimeError("external branch advance during recovery")
+        return {"status": "applied", "commit_oid": current, "final_head": current, "parent_oid": parent}
+
+    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
+        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
+        try:
+            details = self._validate_durable(raw_request)
+            operation = str(details["operation"])
+            branch = str(details.get("branch", ""))
+            if operation == "query_receipt":
+                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt) if receipt is not None else {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"]}
+            if operation == "recover_request":
+                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
+                if receipt is None:
+                    return {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"], "safe_to_retry": True}
+                if receipt.get("status") == "applied":
+                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+                recovered = self._recover_backend(details)
+                if recovered.get("status") == "applied":
+                    receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": recovered.get("commit_oid"), "final_head": recovered.get("final_head"), "parent_oid": recovered.get("parent_oid"), "safe_to_retry": False})
+                    self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+                receipt["safe_to_retry"] = True
+                self._persist_state()
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+            receipt = self._find_receipt(details)
+            if receipt is not None:
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
+            receipt = self._new_receipt(details)
+            self.state.receipts[str(details["request_id"])] = receipt
+            self._persist_state()
+            if operation == "create_branch":
+                result = self.handler.create_branch(CreateBranchRequest(branch=branch, base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]), head_oid=str(details["head_oid"]) if details.get("head_oid") is not None else None, authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256))
+                commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
+                parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
+                audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+                receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
+                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
+                return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
+            result = self.handler.append_commit(AppendCommitRequest(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]), changes=tuple(details["changes"]), authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256, commit_message=str(details["commit_message"])))
+            commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
+            parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
+            audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
+            receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
+            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
+            return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
+        except Exception as error:
+            try:
+                identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
+                receipt = self.state.receipts.get(identity["request_id"])
+                if receipt is not None and receipt.get("status") == "accepted":
+                    receipt.update({"status": "failed", "error_code": error.__class__.__name__, "safe_to_retry": False})
+                    self._persist_state()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "error:" + error.__class__.__name__)
+            return {"status": "error", "operation": operation, "branch": branch, "error": "request_denied" if isinstance(error, AuthorizationError) else "handler_failed"}
+
+def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS governed local writer")
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--authorization", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--state", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--audit", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--repair-branch", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--repair-workspace", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--candidate-branch", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--candidate-workspace", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--api-source", required=True)
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
+        print("governed local writer requires uid 0", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    args = _parse_args()
+    authorization = load_authorization_file(args.authorization)
+    handler = ExistingGitOpsHandler(
+        workspace_by_branch={
+            args.repair_branch: args.repair_workspace,
+            args.candidate_branch: args.candidate_workspace,
+        },
+        bare_repo=args.bare_repo,
+        api_source=args.api_source,
+    )
+    service = GovernedLocalWriterService(
+        args.socket,
+        authorization,
+        handler,
+        audit_sink=JsonAuditSink(args.audit),
+        state_path=args.state,
+    )
+    service.serve()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - systemd entrypoint
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS-managed Hermes runtime boundary."""
-
-from .adapter import (
-    HermesAdapter,
-    HermesConflict,
-    HermesNotFound,
-    HermesRuntimeError,
-    InMemoryHermesStore,
-    SQLiteHermesStore,
-)
-from .contract import HermesHealth, HermesJob, HermesJobState, HermesResult
-from .worker import HermesWorker, WorkerRunResult
-
-__all__ = [
-    "HermesAdapter",
-    "HermesConflict",
-    "HermesHealth",
-    "HermesJob",
-    "HermesJobState",
-    "HermesNotFound",
-    "HermesResult",
-    "HermesRuntimeError",
-    "HermesWorker",
-    "InMemoryHermesStore",
-    "SQLiteHermesStore",
-    "WorkerRunResult",
-]
@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes queue and worker lease boundary."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import sqlite3
-import threading
-from dataclasses import asdict, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Iterable, Mapping
-
-from .contract import (
-    ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS,
-    TERMINAL_STATES,
-    HermesHealth,
-    HermesJob,
-    HermesJobState,
-    HermesResult,
-    utc_now,
-)
-
-
-class HermesRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
-    """Base Hermes runtime-boundary failure."""
-
-
-class HermesNotFound(HermesRuntimeError):
-    """A tenant-scoped job was not found."""
-
-
-class HermesConflict(HermesRuntimeError):
-    """A state, lease, idempotency, or revision conflict occurred."""
-
-
-class InMemoryHermesStore:
-    """Thread-safe reference store; production backends implement this contract."""
-
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self.lock = threading.RLock()
-        self.jobs: dict[str, HermesJob] = {}
-        self.results: dict[str, HermesResult] = {}
-        self.idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
-        self.worker_heartbeats: dict[str, tuple[str, str | None]] = {}
-
-    def persist_locked(self) -> None:
-        """Persist a mutation while ``lock`` is held; memory stores are a no-op."""
-
-
-class SQLiteHermesStore(InMemoryHermesStore):
-    """Durable snapshot for the existing Hermes queue state machine.
-
-    The adapter remains the sole owner of transitions and lease rules. This
-    store only makes its jobs, results, idempotency keys and worker heartbeats
-    survive a process restart.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        super().__init__()
-        with self._connect() as connection:
-            connection.execute(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS hermes_state (
-                    singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (singleton = 1),
-                    payload TEXT NOT NULL
-                )
-                """
-            )
-        self._load()
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        connection = sqlite3.connect(str(self.path), timeout=30)
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        return connection
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _record(value: HermesJob | HermesResult) -> dict[str, object]:
-        record = asdict(value)
-        record["state"] = value.state.value
-        return record
-
-    def _load(self) -> None:
-        with self.lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload FROM hermes_state WHERE singleton = 1"
-            ).fetchone()
-            if row is None:
-                return
-            payload = json.loads(str(row[0]))
-            self.jobs = {
-                str(item["job_id"]): HermesJob(**item)
-                for item in payload.get("jobs", [])
-            }
-            self.results = {
-                str(item["job_id"]): HermesResult(**item)
-                for item in payload.get("results", [])
-            }
-            self.idempotency = {
-                (str(item["tenant_id"]), str(item["idempotency_key"])): (
-                    str(item["job_id"]),
-                    str(item["digest"]),
-                )
-                for item in payload.get("idempotency", [])
-            }
-            self.worker_heartbeats = {
-                str(item["worker_id"]): (
-                    str(item["heartbeat_at"]),
-                    str(item["job_id"]) if item.get("job_id") is not None else None,
-                )
-                for item in payload.get("worker_heartbeats", [])
-            }
-
-    def persist_locked(self) -> None:
-        payload = {
-            "version": 1,
-            "jobs": [self._record(item) for item in self.jobs.values()],
-            "results": [self._record(item) for item in self.results.values()],
-            "idempotency": [
-                {
-                    "tenant_id": tenant_id,
-                    "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
-                    "job_id": job_id,
-                    "digest": digest,
-                }
-                for (tenant_id, idempotency_key), (job_id, digest)
-                in self.idempotency.items()
-            ],
-            "worker_heartbeats": [
-                {
-                    "worker_id": worker_id,
-                    "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at,
-                    "job_id": job_id,
-                }
-                for worker_id, (heartbeat_at, job_id)
-                in self.worker_heartbeats.items()
-            ],
-        }
-        encoded = json.dumps(
-            payload,
-            ensure_ascii=False,
-            sort_keys=True,
-            separators=(",", ":"),
-        )
-        with self._connect() as connection:
-            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            connection.execute(
-                """
-                INSERT INTO hermes_state(singleton, payload) VALUES(1, ?)
-                ON CONFLICT(singleton) DO UPDATE SET payload=excluded.payload
-                """,
-                (encoded,),
-            )
-            connection.commit()
-
-
-class HermesAdapter:
-    """Queue and reconcile Hermes jobs without owning AIOS policy."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        store: InMemoryHermesStore | None = None,
-        *,
-        runtime_id: str = "hermes-runtime",
-        runtime_version: str = "v1",
-        default_lease_seconds: int = 60,
-    ) -> None:
-        if default_lease_seconds < 5:
-            raise ValueError("default_lease_seconds must be >= 5")
-        self.store = store or InMemoryHermesStore()
-        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
-        self.runtime_version = runtime_version
-        self.default_lease_seconds = int(default_lease_seconds)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _digest(job: HermesJob) -> str:
-        raw = json.dumps(
-            {
-                "tenant_id": job.tenant_id,
-                "cell_id": job.cell_id,
-                "profile_id": job.profile_id,
-                "task_id": job.task_id,
-                "trace_id": job.trace_id,
-                "action": job.action,
-                "payload": dict(job.payload),
-                "priority": job.priority,
-            },
-            ensure_ascii=False,
-            sort_keys=True,
-            separators=(",", ":"),
-            default=str,
-        ).encode("utf-8")
-        return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
-        if value is None:
-            return None
-        normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
-        if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-            raise ValueError("timestamp must include timezone")
-        return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _format(value: datetime) -> str:
-        return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _assert_tenant(job: HermesJob, tenant_id: str) -> None:
-        if job.tenant_id != tenant_id:
-            raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
-
-    def enqueue(self, job: HermesJob) -> HermesJob:
-        if job.state != HermesJobState.QUEUED or job.revision != 1:
-            raise HermesConflict("new job must be QUEUED at revision 1")
-        digest = self._digest(job)
-        idem_ref = (job.tenant_id, job.idempotency_key)
-        with self.store.lock:
-            existing = self.store.jobs.get(job.job_id)
-            if existing is not None:
-                if self._digest(existing) != digest:
-                    raise HermesConflict("job_id reused with different content")
-                return existing
-            prior = self.store.idempotency.get(idem_ref)
-            if prior is not None:
-                prior_id, prior_digest = prior
-                if prior_digest != digest:
-                    raise HermesConflict("idempotency key reused with different content")
-                return self.store.jobs[prior_id]
-            self.store.jobs[job.job_id] = job
-            self.store.idempotency[idem_ref] = (job.job_id, digest)
-            self.store.persist_locked()
-            return job
-
-    def get(self, job_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> HermesJob:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            job = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
-            if job is None:
-                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
-            self._assert_tenant(job, tenant_id)
-            return job
-
-    def list_jobs(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        cell_id: str | None = None,
-        profile_id: str | None = None,
-        states: Iterable[HermesJobState | str] | None = None,
-    ) -> list[HermesJob]:
-        state_filter = {HermesJobState(item) for item in states} if states else None
-        with self.store.lock:
-            if self._requeue_expired_locked():
-                self.store.persist_locked()
-            jobs = [
-                job
-                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
-                if job.tenant_id == tenant_id
-                and (cell_id is None or job.cell_id == cell_id)
-                and (profile_id is None or job.profile_id == profile_id)
-                and (state_filter is None or job.state in state_filter)
-            ]
-        return sorted(jobs, key=lambda item: (item.priority, item.created_at, item.job_id))
-
-    def claim(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        cell_id: str,
-        profile_id: str,
-        worker_id: str,
-        lease_seconds: int | None = None,
-        job_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> HermesJob | None:
-        worker_id = str(worker_id or "").strip()
-        if not worker_id:
-            raise ValueError("worker_id is required")
-        duration = int(lease_seconds or self.default_lease_seconds)
-        if duration < 5:
-            raise ValueError("lease_seconds must be >= 5")
-        with self.store.lock:
-            self._requeue_expired_locked()
-            candidates = [
-                job
-                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
-                if job.tenant_id == tenant_id
-                and job.cell_id == cell_id
-                and job.profile_id == profile_id
-                and (job_id is None or job.job_id == job_id)
-                and job.state == HermesJobState.QUEUED
-            ]
-            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), None)
-            if not candidates:
-                self.store.persist_locked()
-                return None
-            current = sorted(
-                candidates,
-                key=lambda item: (item.priority, item.created_at, item.job_id),
-            )[0]
-            claimed = self._transition_locked(
-                current,
-                HermesJobState.CLAIMED,
-                assigned_worker_id=worker_id,
-                lease_expires_at=self._format(
-                    datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=duration)
-                ),
-            )
-            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), claimed.job_id)
-            self.store.persist_locked()
-            return claimed
-
-    def start(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        worker_id: str,
-        expected_revision: int | None = None,
-    ) -> HermesJob:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            self._requeue_expired_locked()
-            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
-            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
-            updated = self._transition_locked(current, HermesJobState.RUNNING)
-            self.store.persist_locked()
-            return updated
-
-    def heartbeat(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        worker_id: str,
-        lease_seconds: int | None = None,
-    ) -> HermesJob:
-        duration = int(lease_seconds or self.default_lease_seconds)
-        if duration < 5:
-            raise ValueError("lease_seconds must be >= 5")
-        with self.store.lock:
-            self._requeue_expired_locked()
-            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
-            if current.state not in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}:
-                raise HermesConflict("job does not accept heartbeat")
-            updated = replace(
-                current,
-                revision=current.revision + 1,
-                lease_expires_at=self._format(
-                    datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=duration)
-                ),
-                updated_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-            self.store.jobs[job_id] = updated
-            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), job_id)
-            self.store.persist_locked()
-            return updated
-
-    def complete(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        worker_id: str,
-        output: Mapping[str, object],
-        expected_revision: int | None = None,
-    ) -> HermesResult:
-        return self._finish(
-            job_id,
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            worker_id=worker_id,
-            state=HermesJobState.COMPLETED,
-            output=output,
-            expected_revision=expected_revision,
-        )
-
-    def fail(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        worker_id: str,
-        error: Mapping[str, object],
-        expected_revision: int | None = None,
-    ) -> HermesResult:
-        return self._finish(
-            job_id,
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            worker_id=worker_id,
-            state=HermesJobState.FAILED,
-            error=error,
-            expected_revision=expected_revision,
-        )
-
-    def cancel(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        expected_revision: int | None = None,
-    ) -> HermesResult:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            current = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
-            if current is None:
-                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
-            self._assert_tenant(current, tenant_id)
-            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
-            if current.state in TERMINAL_STATES:
-                result = self.store.results.get(job_id)
-                if result is None:
-                    raise HermesConflict("terminal result missing")
-                if result.state != HermesJobState.CANCELLED:
-                    raise HermesConflict("job already has a different terminal result")
-                return result
-            updated = self._transition_locked(current, HermesJobState.CANCELLED)
-            result = HermesResult(
-                job_id=updated.job_id,
-                tenant_id=updated.tenant_id,
-                task_id=updated.task_id,
-                trace_id=updated.trace_id,
-                state=HermesJobState.CANCELLED,
-                worker_id=updated.assigned_worker_id,
-                error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled by AIOS"},
-                finished_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-            self.store.results[job_id] = result
-            self.store.persist_locked()
-            return result
-
-    def result(self, job_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> HermesResult:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            job = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
-            if job is None:
-                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
-            self._assert_tenant(job, tenant_id)
-            result = self.store.results.get(job_id)
-            if result is None:
-                raise HermesConflict("job has no terminal result")
-            return result
-
-    def requeue_expired(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-        """Persistently release expired leases without changing policy state."""
-        with self.store.lock:
-            changed = self._requeue_expired_locked()
-            if changed:
-                self.store.persist_locked()
-            return tuple(sorted(changed))
-
-    def health(self) -> HermesHealth:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            if self._requeue_expired_locked():
-                self.store.persist_locked()
-            active_jobs = sum(
-                1 for job in self.store.jobs.values()
-                if job.state in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}
-            )
-            queued_jobs = sum(
-                1 for job in self.store.jobs.values()
-                if job.state == HermesJobState.QUEUED
-            )
-            partitions = {
-                (job.tenant_id, job.cell_id, job.profile_id)
-                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
-            }
-            active_workers = sum(
-                1 for heartbeat, _ in self.store.worker_heartbeats.values()
-                if self._parse(heartbeat)
-                and self._parse(heartbeat) >= datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(seconds=120)
-            )
-        return HermesHealth(
-            runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
-            status="healthy",
-            version=self.runtime_version,
-            heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
-            active_workers=active_workers,
-            active_jobs=active_jobs,
-            queued_jobs=queued_jobs,
-            tenant_partitions=len(partitions),
-            profile_isolation_enforced=True,
-            details={"store": type(self.store).__name__},
-        )
-
-    def _finish(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        worker_id: str,
-        state: HermesJobState,
-        output: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
-        error: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
-        expected_revision: int | None,
-    ) -> HermesResult:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            self._requeue_expired_locked()
-            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
-            if current.state in TERMINAL_STATES:
-                existing = self.store.results.get(job_id)
-                if existing is None:
-                    raise HermesConflict("terminal result missing")
-                if (
-                    existing.state == state
-                    and existing.worker_id == worker_id
-                    and existing.output == output
-                    and existing.error == error
-                ):
-                    return existing
-                raise HermesConflict("job already has a different terminal result")
-            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
-            updated = self._transition_locked(current, state)
-            result = HermesResult(
-                job_id=updated.job_id,
-                tenant_id=updated.tenant_id,
-                task_id=updated.task_id,
-                trace_id=updated.trace_id,
-                state=state,
-                worker_id=worker_id,
-                output=output,
-                error=error,
-                started_at=current.updated_at,
-                finished_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-            self.store.results[job_id] = result
-            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), None)
-            self.store.persist_locked()
-            return result
-
-    def _owned_job_locked(self, job_id: str, tenant_id: str, worker_id: str) -> HermesJob:
-        current = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
-        if current is None:
-            raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
-        self._assert_tenant(current, tenant_id)
-        if current.assigned_worker_id != worker_id:
-            raise HermesConflict("worker does not own job lease")
-        return current
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _assert_revision(job: HermesJob, expected: int | None) -> None:
-        if expected is not None and job.revision != expected:
-            raise HermesConflict("job revision changed")
-
-    def _transition_locked(
-        self,
-        current: HermesJob,
-        target: HermesJobState,
-        *,
-        assigned_worker_id: str | None = None,
-        lease_expires_at: str | None = None,
-    ) -> HermesJob:
-        if target not in ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS[current.state]:
-            raise HermesConflict(
-                f"invalid transition {current.state.value} -> {target.value}"
-            )
-        updated = replace(
-            current,
-            state=target,
-            revision=current.revision + 1,
-            assigned_worker_id=(
-                assigned_worker_id
-                if assigned_worker_id is not None
-                else current.assigned_worker_id
-            ),
-            lease_expires_at=(
-                lease_expires_at
-                if lease_expires_at is not None
-                else (None if target in TERMINAL_STATES else current.lease_expires_at)
-            ),
-            updated_at=utc_now(),
-        )
-        self.store.jobs[current.job_id] = updated
-        return updated
-
-    def _requeue_expired_locked(self) -> set[str]:
-        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-        changed: set[str] = set()
-        for current in list(self.store.jobs.values()):
-            expiry = self._parse(current.lease_expires_at)
-            if (
-                current.state in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}
-                and expiry is not None
-                and expiry <= now
-            ):
-                self.store.jobs[current.job_id] = replace(
-                    current,
-                    state=HermesJobState.QUEUED,
-                    revision=current.revision + 1,
-                    assigned_worker_id=None,
-                    lease_expires_at=None,
-                    updated_at=utc_now(),
-                )
-                changed.add(current.job_id)
-        return changed
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-scoped Hermes runtime contracts."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from enum import Enum
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
-    return normalized
-
-
-def _safe_mapping(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return json.loads(json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, default=str))
-
-
-class HermesJobState(str, Enum):
-    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
-    CLAIMED = "CLAIMED"
-    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
-    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
-    FAILED = "FAILED"
-    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
-
-
-ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS: Mapping[HermesJobState, frozenset[HermesJobState]] = {
-    HermesJobState.QUEUED: frozenset({HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}),
-    HermesJobState.CLAIMED: frozenset({HermesJobState.RUNNING, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}),
-    HermesJobState.RUNNING: frozenset(
-        {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}
-    ),
-    HermesJobState.COMPLETED: frozenset(),
-    HermesJobState.FAILED: frozenset(),
-    HermesJobState.CANCELLED: frozenset(),
-}
-TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset(
-    {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class HermesJob:
-    job_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    profile_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    action: str
-    payload: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    idempotency_key: str = ""
-    priority: int = 100
-    state: HermesJobState = HermesJobState.QUEUED
-    revision: int = 1
-    assigned_worker_id: str | None = None
-    lease_expires_at: str | None = None
-    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in (
-            "job_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "task_id",
-            "trace_id", "action", "idempotency_key", "created_at", "updated_at",
-        ):
-            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
-        object.__setattr__(self, "payload", _safe_mapping(self.payload))
-        object.__setattr__(self, "state", HermesJobState(self.state))
-        if not 0 <= int(self.priority) <= 1000:
-            raise ValueError("priority must be between 0 and 1000")
-        if self.revision < 1:
-            raise ValueError("revision must be >= 1")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(
-        cls,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        cell_id: str,
-        profile_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        trace_id: str,
-        action: str,
-        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
-        idempotency_key: str,
-        priority: int = 100,
-    ) -> "HermesJob":
-        return cls(
-            job_id=f"hermes_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            cell_id=cell_id,
-            profile_id=profile_id,
-            task_id=task_id,
-            trace_id=trace_id,
-            action=action,
-            payload=_safe_mapping(payload),
-            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
-            priority=priority,
-        )
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class HermesResult:
-    job_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    state: HermesJobState
-    worker_id: str | None = None
-    output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-    started_at: str | None = None
-    finished_at: str | None = None
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in ("job_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id"):
-            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
-        object.__setattr__(self, "state", HermesJobState(self.state))
-        if self.output is not None:
-            object.__setattr__(self, "output", _safe_mapping(self.output))
-        if self.error is not None:
-            object.__setattr__(self, "error", _safe_mapping(self.error))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class HermesHealth:
-    runtime_id: str
-    status: str
-    version: str
-    heartbeat_at: str
-    active_workers: int = 0
-    active_jobs: int = 0
-    queued_jobs: int = 0
-    tenant_partitions: int = 0
-    profile_isolation_enforced: bool = True
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in ("runtime_id", "status", "version", "heartbeat_at"):
-            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
-        for name in ("active_workers", "active_jobs", "queued_jobs", "tenant_partitions"):
-            if int(getattr(self, name)) < 0:
-                raise ValueError(f"{name} must be >= 0")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "details", _safe_mapping(self.details))
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-"""Hermes worker loop with lease renewal and bounded recovery."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import threading
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
-
-from .adapter import HermesAdapter, HermesConflict
-from .contract import HermesJob, HermesJobState
-
-
-JobHandler = Callable[[HermesJob], Mapping[str, Any]]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class WorkerRunResult:
-    claimed: bool
-    job_id: str | None = None
-    state: str | None = None
-    error: str | None = None
-
-
-class HermesWorker:
-    """Poll one tenant/cell/profile partition and execute jobs safely."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        adapter: HermesAdapter,
-        handler: JobHandler,
-        *,
-        worker_id: str,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        cell_id: str,
-        profile_id: str,
-        poll_seconds: float = 1.0,
-        heartbeat_seconds: float = 10.0,
-    ) -> None:
-        if poll_seconds <= 0 or heartbeat_seconds <= 0:
-            raise ValueError("poll_seconds and heartbeat_seconds must be positive")
-        for name, value in {
-            "worker_id": worker_id,
-            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
-            "cell_id": cell_id,
-            "profile_id": profile_id,
-        }.items():
-            if not str(value or "").strip():
-                raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
-        self.adapter = adapter
-        self.handler = handler
-        self.worker_id = worker_id
-        self.tenant_id = tenant_id
-        self.cell_id = cell_id
-        self.profile_id = profile_id
-        self.poll_seconds = float(poll_seconds)
-        self.heartbeat_seconds = float(heartbeat_seconds)
-        self._stop = threading.Event()
-
-    def stop(self) -> None:
-        self._stop.set()
-
-    def run_once(self) -> WorkerRunResult:
-        job = self.adapter.claim(
-            tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=self.cell_id,
-            profile_id=self.profile_id,
-            worker_id=self.worker_id,
-        )
-        if job is None:
-            return WorkerRunResult(claimed=False)
-
-        running = self.adapter.start(
-            job.job_id,
-            tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
-            worker_id=self.worker_id,
-            expected_revision=job.revision,
-        )
-
-        heartbeat_stop = threading.Event()
-        heartbeat_thread = threading.Thread(
-            target=self._heartbeat_loop,
-            args=(running.job_id, heartbeat_stop),
-            name=f"hermes-heartbeat-{self.worker_id}",
-            daemon=True,
-        )
-        heartbeat_thread.start()
-
-        output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-        execution_error: Exception | None = None
-        try:
-            output = dict(self.handler(running))
-        except Exception as exc:  # runtime boundary: normalize below
-            execution_error = exc
-        finally:
-            # Stop the lease heartbeat before reading the final revision. This
-            # prevents a revision increment racing with complete/fail.
-            heartbeat_stop.set()
-            heartbeat_thread.join(timeout=max(self.heartbeat_seconds * 2, 1.0))
-
-        try:
-            current = self.adapter.get(running.job_id, tenant_id=self.tenant_id)
-            if execution_error is None:
-                result = self.adapter.complete(
-                    running.job_id,
-                    tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
-                    worker_id=self.worker_id,
-                    output=dict(output or {}),
-                    expected_revision=current.revision,
-                )
-                return WorkerRunResult(
-                    claimed=True,
-                    job_id=result.job_id,
-                    state=result.state.value,
-                )
-
-            result = self.adapter.fail(
-                running.job_id,
-                tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
-                worker_id=self.worker_id,
-                error={
-                    "code": "worker_error",
-                    "message": str(execution_error),
-                },
-                expected_revision=current.revision,
-            )
-            return WorkerRunResult(
-                claimed=True,
-                job_id=result.job_id,
-                state=result.state.value,
-                error=str(execution_error),
-            )
-        except HermesConflict as exc:
-            return WorkerRunResult(
-                claimed=True,
-                job_id=running.job_id,
-                state=HermesJobState.FAILED.value,
-                error=f"reconciliation_conflict: {exc}",
-            )
-
-    def run_forever(self) -> None:
-        while not self._stop.is_set():
-            result = self.run_once()
-            if not result.claimed:
-                self._stop.wait(self.poll_seconds)
-
-    def _heartbeat_loop(self, job_id: str, stop_event: threading.Event) -> None:
-        while not stop_event.wait(self.heartbeat_seconds):
-            try:
-                self.adapter.heartbeat(
-                    job_id,
-                    tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
-                    worker_id=self.worker_id,
-                )
-            except Exception:
-                stop_event.set()
-                return
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+"""Task-scoped hardened wrapper around the existing Action API."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+import urllib.parse
+
+import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
+import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
+from isolated_writer_authz import AuthorizationError, authorize
+from isolated_writer_commit_file import AtomicCommitFile, CommitFileError, OperationLedger
+from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
+
+_reject = api.reject_non_read_http
+_write_file = api.write_file
+_sync_branch = api.sync_branch
+_original_do_get = api.H.do_GET
+api.OPENAPI = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_OPENAPI", str(api.OPENAPI)))
+
+
+def _registry() -> TokenRegistry:
+    return TokenRegistry(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2"]))
+
+
+def _atomic_writer() -> AtomicCommitFile:
+    return AtomicCommitFile(
+        workspace=api.WS,
+        bare_repo=api.BARE_REPO,
+        ledger=OperationLedger(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER"])),
+        remote=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", ""),
+        audit=policy.append_audit_record,
+    )
+
+
+def _bearer(handler) -> str:
+    value = handler.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+    return value[7:].strip() if value.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
+
+
+def _authorize(handler, *, method: str, path: str, branch=None, target_path=None):
+    grant = authorize(
+        _registry(),
+        _bearer(handler),
+        method=method,
+        path=path,
+        source_ip=str(handler.client_address[0]),
+        workspace=api.WS,
+        branch=branch,
+        target_path=target_path,
+    )
+    grant.record["_source_ip"] = str(handler.client_address[0])
+    return grant
+
+
+def _authorization_error(handler, exc: AuthorizationError):
+    return handler.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+
+
+def _isolated_runtime_status(handler):
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    return handler.sendj({
+        "service": os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
+            "aios-isolated-writer.service",
+        ),
+        "status": "active",
+        "runtime_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE"),
+        "workspace_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE"),
+        "writes_enabled": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").lower()
+        in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"},
+        "allowed_branch": policy.allowed_branch(),
+        "approved_base_oid": policy.allowed_base_oid(),
+        "workspace_branch": branch,
+        "workspace_head_oid": head,
+        "repository_identity": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY"),
+        "token_policy_version": 2,
+        "atomic_commit_file": True,
+        "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
+    })
+
+
+def _isolated_do_get(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path in {"/health", "/api/health"}:
+        return self.sendj({
+            "status": "ok",
+            "service": os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
+                "aios-isolated-writer.service",
+            ),
+        })
+    if path not in {"/api/runtime-status", "/api/baseline", "/api/patches"}:
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
+    try:
+        _authorize(self, method="GET", path=path)
+    except AuthorizationError as exc:
+        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
+    if path == "/api/runtime-status":
+        return _isolated_runtime_status(self)
+    return _original_do_get(self)
+
+
+def _read_commit_file_body(handler):
+    try:
+        length = int(handler.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+    except ValueError:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_content_length_rejected") from None
+    if length <= 0:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+    if length > 1_100_000:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_too_large", 413)
+    raw = handler.rfile.read(length)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_json_rejected") from None
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+    return value
+
+
+def _isolated_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != "/api/commit-file":
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
+    try:
+        data = _read_commit_file_body(self)
+        branch = str(data.get("branch") or "")
+        target_path = str(data.get("path") or "")
+        grant = _authorize(
+            self,
+            method="POST",
+            path=path,
+            branch=branch,
+            target_path=target_path,
+        )
+        if api.content_has_secret(str(data.get("content") or "")):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_secret_content_rejected", 403)
+        result = _atomic_writer().execute(grant, data)
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except AuthorizationError as exc:
+        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
+    except CommitFileError as exc:
+        return self.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+    except PermissionError:
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_policy_rejected"}, 403)
+
+
+def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if _reject(handler, method, path):
+        return True
+    try:
+        policy.validate_endpoint(method, path, api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+        return False
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        handler.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
+        return True
+
+
+def checkout(branch, base="main", create=False):
+    api.ensure_git()
+    target = api.branch_name(branch)
+    policy.validate_branch_request({"branch": target, "base": base})
+    exists = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--verify", target])["code"] == 0
+    if exists:
+        if api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"] != target:
+            api.sh(["checkout", target], True)
+    elif create:
+        api.sh(["checkout", "-b", target, base], True)
+    else:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_missing")
+    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+    return target
+
+
+def write_file(path, content):
+    policy.validate_path(path, api.WS)
+    return _write_file(path, content)
+
+
+def sync_branch(branch: str):
+    policy.validate_sync_branch(branch)
+    local = _sync_branch(branch)
+    remote = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", "").strip()
+    if remote != "gitea-http":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_gitea_remote_rejected")
+    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    pushed = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "push", "--porcelain", remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{branch}"],
+        cwd=api.WS,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    if pushed.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_push_failed")
+    verified = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+        cwd=api.WS,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    if verified.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_verification_failed")
+    fields = verified.stdout.strip().split()
+    if len(fields) != 2 or fields[0] != head or fields[1] != f"refs/heads/{branch}":
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_oid_mismatch")
+    return {
+        "status": "verified",
+        "target": "authoritative-bare+gitea",
+        "branch": branch,
+        "oid": head,
+        "local": local.get("status"),
+    }
+
+
+def commit(paths, msg):
+    policy.validate_commit_paths(paths, api.WS)
+    api.ensure_git()
+    selected = [api.relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ["."]
+    api.sh(["add", *selected], True)
+    policy.validate_staged_paths(api.WS)
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    if not api.sh(["status", "--short"])["stdout"]:
+        return {"status": "no_changes", "branch": branch, "sync": sync_branch(branch)}
+    out = api.sh(["commit", "-m", msg], True)
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    return {
+        "status": "committed",
+        "branch": branch,
+        "rev": api.sh(["rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"],
+        "git": out,
+        "sync": sync_branch(branch),
+    }
+
+
+def audit(actor, action, target, payload):
+    policy.append_audit_record(
+        {
+            "at": api.now(),
+            "actor": actor,
+            "action": action,
+            "target": target,
+            "payload": api.sanitize(payload),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def _validate_request(self, data, validate):
+    try:
+        validate(data)
+        return True
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        self.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
+        return False
+
+
+def _checked_branch(self, data):
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _branch(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_file(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    if not _validate_request(
+        self,
+        {"path": data.get("path", "")},
+        lambda item: policy.validate_path(item["path"], api.WS),
+    ):
+        return
+    return _file(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_commit(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _commit(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_patch(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data["branch"] = policy.allowed_branch()
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _patch(self, data)
+
+
+_branch, _file, _commit, _patch = api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch
+api.reject_non_read_http = reject_non_read_http
+api.checkout, api.write_file, api.sync_branch, api.commit, api.audit = (
+    checkout,
+    write_file,
+    sync_branch,
+    commit,
+    audit,
+)
+api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch = (
+    _checked_branch,
+    _checked_file,
+    _checked_commit,
+    _checked_patch,
+)
+api.H.do_GET = _isolated_do_get
+api.H.do_POST = _isolated_do_post
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+    api.ThreadingHTTPServer((api.HOST, api.PORT), api.H).serve_forever()
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+"""Fail-closed policy used only by the task-scoped Action writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import json
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import re
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
+from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+import isolated_writer_path_policy as path_policy
+
+WRITE_ENDPOINTS = frozenset({"/api/commit-file"})
+ALLOWED_ROOTS = (
+    "active-runtime",
+    "docs",
+    "patches",
+    "reports",
+    "scripts",
+    "test",
+    "tests",
+)
+DENIED_ROOTS = ("baseline", "config", "deploy", "deployments", "ops", "runtime", "services")
+_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+_FALSE = frozenset({"0", "false", "no", "off"})
+_DENY_FLAGS = (
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_MAIN_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_TAG_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_BASELINE_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_REGISTRY_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_ROLLBACK",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_DEPLOYMENT",
+)
+
+
+def enforcement_required() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_ENFORCEMENT", "") == "required"
+
+
+def allowed_branch() -> str:
+    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_missing_allowed_branch")
+    return value
+
+
+def allowed_base_oid() -> str:
+    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BASE_OID", "").strip().lower()
+    if len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_invalid_allowed_base_oid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _git(workspace: Path, *args: str) -> str:
+    result = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_git_validation_failed")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def require_service_invariants(workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_write_gate_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_role_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_role_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_policy_v2_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_service_audience_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_registry_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_ledger_required")
+    path_policy.configured_path_policy()
+    for name in _DENY_FLAGS:
+        if os.getenv(name, "").strip().lower() not in _FALSE:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_forbidden_capability_flag")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "") != "aios/aios":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_repository_identity_rejected")
+    configured_bare_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "").strip()
+    if not configured_bare_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
+    configured_bare = Path(configured_bare_value)
+    if configured_bare.resolve(strict=True) != bare_repo.resolve(strict=True):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
+    writer_root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "").strip()
+    if not writer_root_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root")
+    writer_root = Path(writer_root_value).resolve(strict=True)
+    lexical_workspace = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+    canonical_workspace = lexical_workspace.resolve(strict=True)
+    if lexical_workspace != canonical_workspace:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
+    try:
+        canonical_workspace.relative_to(writer_root)
+    except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root") from None
+    if _git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_current_branch_rejected")
+    approved_base = allowed_base_oid()
+    try:
+        _git(workspace, "cat-file", "-e", f"{approved_base}^{{commit}}")
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", approved_base, "HEAD"],
+            cwd=workspace,
+            check=True,
+            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        )
+    except (PermissionError, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_approved_base_not_ancestor") from None
+    if _git(workspace, "merge-base", approved_base, "HEAD") != approved_base:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_merge_base_rejected")
+    common = Path(_git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"))
+    if not common.is_absolute():
+        common = (workspace / common).resolve()
+    if common.resolve() != bare_repo.resolve():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_common_repo_rejected")
+
+
+def approved_audit_log_path() -> Path:
+    root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_AUDIT_ROOT", "").strip()
+    log_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUDIT_LOG", "").strip()
+    if not root_value or not log_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_missing")
+    lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(root_value))
+    lexical_log = Path(os.path.abspath(log_value))
+    root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
+    if lexical_root != root or root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_root_rejected")
+    try:
+        lexical_log.relative_to(root)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_outside_approved_root") from None
+    if lexical_log.parent.resolve(strict=True) != lexical_log.parent:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_parent_symlink_rejected")
+    if lexical_log.exists() and lexical_log.is_symlink():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_symlink_rejected")
+    os.chmod(root, 0o750)
+    os.chmod(lexical_log.parent, 0o750)
+    return lexical_log
+
+
+def append_audit_record(record: dict) -> None:
+    path = approved_audit_log_path()
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        info = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_not_regular")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        line = json.dumps(
+            _audit_sanitize(record),
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
+        os.write(descriptor, line)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+    try:
+        os.fsync(parent_fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(parent_fd)
+
+
+def _audit_sanitize(value):
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {
+            key: (
+                "[REDACTED]"
+                if any(
+                    marker in str(key).lower()
+                    for marker in (
+                        "authorization",
+                        "credential",
+                        "password",
+                        "secret",
+                        "token",
+                        "private_key",
+                    )
+                )
+                and str(key).lower() != "token_id"
+                else _audit_sanitize(inner)
+            )
+            for key, inner in value.items()
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [_audit_sanitize(item) for item in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str) and re.search(
+        r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])",
+        value,
+    ):
+        return "[REDACTED]"
+    return value
+
+
+def validate_endpoint(method: str, path: str, workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    if method != "POST" or path not in WRITE_ENDPOINTS:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
+    require_service_invariants(workspace, bare_repo)
+
+
+def validate_branch_request(data: dict) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    branch = allowed_branch() if "branch" not in data else str(data.get("branch") or "").strip()
+    if branch != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected")
+    if str(data.get("base", "main")).strip() != "main":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_base_rejected")
+    if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_force_rejected")
+
+
+def validate_path(path: str, workspace: Path | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(path, str):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    value = path
+    if not value or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value or "\\" in value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        decoded = unquote(value, errors="strict")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
+    if decoded != value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    windows = PureWindowsPath(value)
+    posix = PurePosixPath(value)
+    parts = value.split("/")
+    if (
+        posix.is_absolute()
+        or windows.is_absolute()
+        or bool(windows.drive)
+        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+    ):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    first = parts[0]
+    service_exact_path = False
+    if first in DENIED_ROOTS:
+        try:
+            path_policy.require_service_path("commit_file.atomic", value)
+            service_exact_path = True
+        except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+            raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+    if value != "README.md" and first not in ALLOWED_ROOTS and not service_exact_path:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_outside_allowed_roots")
+    if workspace is not None:
+        lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+        root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
+        if lexical_root != root:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
+        current = root
+        for part in parts:
+            current = current / part
+            if current.is_symlink():
+                raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_symlink_rejected")
+        candidate = (root / value).resolve(strict=False)
+        try:
+            candidate.relative_to(root)
+        except ValueError:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_escapes_workspace") from None
+    return value
+
+
+def validate_content_for_path(path: str, content: str) -> None:
+    if path.split("/", 1)[0] not in DENIED_ROOTS:
+        return
+    try:
+        path_policy.validate_content("commit_file.atomic", path, content)
+    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+
+
+def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
+    try:
+        return path_policy.configured_path_policy_sha256()
+    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+
+
+def validate_commit_paths(paths: list[str], workspace: Path | None = None) -> None:
+    if enforcement_required():
+        for path in paths:
+            if str(path).strip() != ".":
+                validate_path(str(path), workspace)
+
+
+def validate_staged_paths(workspace: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    for path in _git(workspace, "diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines():
+        validate_path(path, workspace)
+
+
+def validate_sync_branch(branch: str) -> None:
+    if enforcement_required() and branch != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_sync_branch_rejected")
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS-managed OpenClaw Ed25519 execution adapter."""
-
-from .adapter import (
-    AdapterError,
-    CommandConflict,
-    CommandNotFound,
-    CommandRejected,
-    InMemoryCallbackSink,
-    OpenClawAdapter,
-)
-from .contract import (
-    CONTRACT_VERSION,
-    SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM,
-    CommandState,
-    Ed25519CommandSigner,
-    Ed25519CommandVerifier,
-    OpenClawCommand,
-    OpenClawResult,
-    RuntimeHealth,
-    sign_command,
-    verify_command_signature,
-)
-from .transport import HTTPRuntimeTransport, InProcessRuntimeTransport, RuntimeTransport
-
-__all__ = [
-    "AdapterError",
-    "CONTRACT_VERSION",
-    "CommandConflict",
-    "CommandNotFound",
-    "CommandRejected",
-    "CommandState",
-    "Ed25519CommandSigner",
-    "Ed25519CommandVerifier",
-    "HTTPRuntimeTransport",
-    "InMemoryCallbackSink",
-    "InProcessRuntimeTransport",
-    "OpenClawAdapter",
-    "OpenClawCommand",
-    "OpenClawResult",
-    "RuntimeHealth",
-    "RuntimeTransport",
-    "SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM",
-    "sign_command",
-    "verify_command_signature",
-]
@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-"""Signed, tenant-isolated execution adapter for OpenClaw runtimes."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import threading
-from dataclasses import replace
-from typing import Callable, Mapping, Protocol
-
-from .contract import (
-    CommandState,
-    OpenClawCommand,
-    OpenClawResult,
-    RuntimeHealth,
-    utc_now,
-    verify_command_signature,
-)
-
-
-class AdapterError(RuntimeError):
-    """Base adapter failure."""
-
-
-class CommandRejected(AdapterError):
-    """A command failed signature or contract validation."""
-
-
-class CommandNotFound(AdapterError):
-    """A tenant-scoped command is not visible."""
-
-
-class CommandConflict(AdapterError):
-    """A command or idempotency key conflicts with an existing execution."""
-
-
-class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
-    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
-    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ...
-    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
-
-
-class CallbackSink(Protocol):
-    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
-    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
-    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
-
-
-class InMemoryCallbackSink:
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self.started: list[OpenClawResult] = []
-        self.completed: list[OpenClawResult] = []
-        self.failed: list[OpenClawResult] = []
-
-    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self.started.append(result)
-
-    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self.completed.append(result)
-
-    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self.failed.append(result)
-
-
-SigningMaterialResolver = Callable[[str, str], bytes | str]
-
-
-class OpenClawAdapter:
-    """Verify, de-duplicate, execute, cancel and reconcile commands."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        transport: RuntimeTransport,
-        signing_material_resolver: SigningMaterialResolver,
-        *,
-        callback_sink: CallbackSink | None = None,
-        default_timeout_seconds: float = 300.0,
-    ) -> None:
-        if default_timeout_seconds <= 0:
-            raise ValueError("default_timeout_seconds must be positive")
-        self.transport = transport
-        self.signing_material_resolver = signing_material_resolver
-        self.callback_sink = callback_sink or InMemoryCallbackSink()
-        self.default_timeout_seconds = float(default_timeout_seconds)
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self._commands: dict[str, OpenClawCommand] = {}
-        self._results: dict[str, OpenClawResult] = {}
-        self._idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
-
-    def _verify(self, command: OpenClawCommand) -> None:
-        try:
-            key_material = self.signing_material_resolver(command.tenant_id, command.key_id)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise CommandRejected("signing material unavailable") from exc
-        if not verify_command_signature(command, key_material):
-            raise CommandRejected("invalid or expired command signature")
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _validate_result(command: OpenClawCommand, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
-        if (
-            result.command_id != command.command_id
-            or result.tenant_id != command.tenant_id
-            or result.task_id != command.task_id
-            or result.trace_id != command.trace_id
-        ):
-            raise AdapterError("runtime returned mismatched command identity")
-        if result.state not in {
-            CommandState.COMPLETED,
-            CommandState.FAILED,
-            CommandState.CANCELLED,
-            CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
-        }:
-            raise AdapterError("runtime returned a non-terminal result")
-
-    def execute(
-        self,
-        command: OpenClawCommand,
-        *,
-        timeout_seconds: float | None = None,
-    ) -> OpenClawResult:
-        timeout = self.default_timeout_seconds if timeout_seconds is None else float(timeout_seconds)
-        if timeout <= 0:
-            raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive")
-        self._verify(command)
-        digest = command.signature
-        idem_ref = (command.tenant_id, command.idempotency_key)
-
-        with self._lock:
-            prior_command = self._commands.get(command.command_id)
-            if prior_command is not None:
-                if prior_command.signature != command.signature:
-                    raise CommandConflict("command_id reused with different content")
-                return self._results[command.command_id]
-            prior_idem = self._idempotency.get(idem_ref)
-            if prior_idem is not None:
-                prior_id, prior_digest = prior_idem
-                if prior_digest != digest:
-                    raise CommandConflict("idempotency key reused with different content")
-                return self._results[prior_id]
-            running = OpenClawResult(
-                command_id=command.command_id,
-                tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
-                task_id=command.task_id,
-                trace_id=command.trace_id,
-                state=CommandState.RUNNING,
-                started_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-            self._commands[command.command_id] = command
-            self._results[command.command_id] = running
-            self._idempotency[idem_ref] = (command.command_id, digest)
-
-        self.callback_sink.on_started(running)
-        try:
-            result = self.transport.execute(command, timeout)
-            self._validate_result(command, result)
-        except TimeoutError as exc:
-            result = replace(
-                running,
-                state=CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
-                error={"code": "runtime_timeout", "message": str(exc) or "runtime timeout"},
-                finished_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-        except Exception as exc:
-            result = replace(
-                running,
-                state=CommandState.FAILED,
-                error={"code": "runtime_error", "message": str(exc)},
-                finished_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-
-        if result.started_at is None:
-            result = replace(result, started_at=running.started_at)
-        if result.finished_at is None:
-            result = replace(result, finished_at=utc_now())
-        with self._lock:
-            self._results[command.command_id] = result
-        if result.state == CommandState.COMPLETED:
-            self.callback_sink.on_completed(result)
-        else:
-            self.callback_sink.on_failed(result)
-        return result
-
-    def status(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> OpenClawResult:
-        with self._lock:
-            command = self._commands.get(command_id)
-            result = self._results.get(command_id)
-            if command is None or result is None or command.tenant_id != tenant_id:
-                raise CommandNotFound("command not found")
-            return result
-
-    def cancel(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> OpenClawResult:
-        with self._lock:
-            command = self._commands.get(command_id)
-            current = self._results.get(command_id)
-            if command is None or current is None or command.tenant_id != tenant_id:
-                raise CommandNotFound("command not found")
-            if current.state in {
-                CommandState.COMPLETED,
-                CommandState.FAILED,
-                CommandState.CANCELLED,
-                CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
-                CommandState.REJECTED,
-            }:
-                return current
-        if not self.transport.cancel(command_id):
-            raise AdapterError("runtime rejected cancellation")
-        cancelled = replace(
-            current,
-            state=CommandState.CANCELLED,
-            error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled by AIOS"},
-            finished_at=utc_now(),
-        )
-        with self._lock:
-            self._results[command_id] = cancelled
-        self.callback_sink.on_failed(cancelled)
-        return cancelled
-
-    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
-        return self.transport.health()
-
-    def snapshot(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> Mapping[str, OpenClawResult]:
-        with self._lock:
-            return {
-                command_id: result
-                for command_id, result in self._results.items()
-                if self._commands[command_id].tenant_id == tenant_id
-            }
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-"""Audit-oriented lifecycle callbacks for OpenClaw execution."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import threading
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
-
-from .contract import OpenClawResult, utc_now
-
-
-class EventPublisher(Protocol):
-    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None: ...
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ExecutionEvent:
-    event_type: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    command_id: str
-    state: str
-    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "event_type": self.event_type,
-            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
-            "command_id": self.command_id,
-            "state": self.state,
-            "created_at": self.created_at,
-            "details": json.loads(
-                json.dumps(dict(self.details), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
-            ),
-        }
-
-
-class InMemoryEventPublisher:
-    """Thread-safe publisher used by tests and first integration slice."""
-
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self.events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-
-    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self.events.append(
-                json.loads(json.dumps(dict(event), ensure_ascii=False, default=str))
-            )
-
-
-class AuditCallbackSink:
-    """Convert runtime callbacks into tenant-scoped audit events."""
-
-    def __init__(self, publisher: EventPublisher) -> None:
-        self.publisher = publisher
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _event(
-        event_type: str,
-        result: OpenClawResult,
-    ) -> ExecutionEvent:
-        details: dict[str, Any] = {
-            "runtime_id": result.runtime_id,
-            "attempts": result.attempts,
-        }
-        if result.error:
-            details["error"] = dict(result.error)
-        if result.output:
-            details["output_present"] = True
-        return ExecutionEvent(
-            event_type=event_type,
-            tenant_id=result.tenant_id,
-            task_id=result.task_id,
-            trace_id=result.trace_id,
-            command_id=result.command_id,
-            state=result.state.value,
-            details=details,
-        )
-
-    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
-        self.publisher.publish(self._event("OPENCLAW_STARTED", result).as_dict())
-
-    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
-        self.publisher.publish(self._event("OPENCLAW_COMPLETED", result).as_dict())
-
-    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
-        event_type = {
-            "CANCELLED": "OPENCLAW_CANCELLED",
-            "TIMED_OUT": "OPENCLAW_TIMED_OUT",
-            "REJECTED": "OPENCLAW_REJECTED",
-        }.get(result.state.value, "OPENCLAW_FAILED")
-        self.publisher.publish(self._event(event_type, result).as_dict())
@@ -1,383 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS 到 OpenClaw 的 Ed25519 执行合同。"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import json
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from enum import Enum
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
-
-CONTRACT_VERSION = "aios.openclaw.command.v2"
-SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM = "Ed25519"
-DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _parse_timestamp(value: str) -> datetime:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError("timestamp is required")
-    if normalized.endswith("Z"):
-        normalized = normalized[:-1] + "+00:00"
-    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        raise ValueError("timestamp must include a timezone")
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
-    return normalized
-
-
-def _safe_mapping(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return json.loads(
-        json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, default=str)
-    )
-
-
-def _load_crypto() -> tuple[Any, Any, Any]:
-    try:
-        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
-        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
-            Ed25519PrivateKey,
-            Ed25519PublicKey,
-        )
-    except ImportError as exc:  # pragma: no cover
-        raise RuntimeError("cryptography with Ed25519 support is required") from exc
-    return serialization, Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey
-
-
-class CommandSigner(Protocol):
-    key_id: str
-    fingerprint: str
-
-    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes: ...
-
-
-class CommandVerifier(Protocol):
-    key_id: str
-    fingerprint: str
-
-    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool: ...
-
-
-class Ed25519CommandSigner:
-    def __init__(self, private_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
-        serialization, private_cls, _ = _load_crypto()
-        if not isinstance(private_key, private_cls):
-            raise ValueError("private key is not Ed25519")
-        self.private_key = private_key
-        self.key_id = _required(key_id, "key_id")
-        raw = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
-            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
-            format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
-        )
-        self.fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_bytes(cls, value: bytes | str, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519CommandSigner":
-        serialization, private_cls, _ = _load_crypto()
-        raw = value.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(value, str) else bytes(value)
-        if raw.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
-            key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(raw, password=None)
-        elif len(raw) == 32:
-            key = private_cls.from_private_bytes(raw)
-        else:
-            raise ValueError("Ed25519 private key must be PEM or a raw 32-byte seed")
-        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
-
-    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
-        return self.private_key.sign(bytes(payload))
-
-    def verifier(self) -> "Ed25519CommandVerifier":
-        return Ed25519CommandVerifier(self.private_key.public_key(), key_id=self.key_id)
-
-
-class Ed25519CommandVerifier:
-    def __init__(self, public_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
-        serialization, _, public_cls = _load_crypto()
-        if not isinstance(public_key, public_cls):
-            raise ValueError("public key is not Ed25519")
-        self.public_key = public_key
-        self.key_id = _required(key_id, "key_id")
-        raw = public_key.public_bytes(
-            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
-            format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
-        )
-        self.fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_bytes(cls, value: bytes | str, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519CommandVerifier":
-        serialization, private_cls, public_cls = _load_crypto()
-        raw = value.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(value, str) else bytes(value)
-        if raw.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
-            try:
-                key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(raw)
-            except ValueError:
-                private = serialization.load_pem_private_key(raw, password=None)
-                if not isinstance(private, private_cls):
-                    raise ValueError("key is not Ed25519")
-                key = private.public_key()
-        elif len(raw) == 32:
-            key = public_cls.from_public_bytes(raw)
-        else:
-            raise ValueError("Ed25519 public key must be PEM or raw 32-byte key")
-        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
-
-    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool:
-        try:
-            self.public_key.verify(bytes(signature), bytes(payload))
-            return True
-        except Exception:
-            return False
-
-
-class CommandState(str, Enum):
-    ACCEPTED = "ACCEPTED"
-    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
-    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
-    FAILED = "FAILED"
-    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
-    TIMED_OUT = "TIMED_OUT"
-    REJECTED = "REJECTED"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OpenClawCommand:
-    command_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    action: str
-    payload: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    idempotency_key: str = ""
-    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-    expires_at: str | None = None
-    contract_version: str = CONTRACT_VERSION
-    signature_algorithm: str = SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
-    key_id: str = "default"
-    public_key_fingerprint: str = ""
-    signature: str = ""
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for field_name in (
-            "command_id",
-            "tenant_id",
-            "task_id",
-            "trace_id",
-            "action",
-            "idempotency_key",
-            "created_at",
-            "contract_version",
-            "signature_algorithm",
-            "key_id",
-        ):
-            object.__setattr__(
-                self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name)
-            )
-        if self.contract_version != CONTRACT_VERSION:
-            raise ValueError(f"unsupported contract_version: {self.contract_version}")
-        if self.signature_algorithm != SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
-            raise ValueError(
-                f"unsupported signature_algorithm: {self.signature_algorithm}"
-            )
-        object.__setattr__(self, "payload", _safe_mapping(self.payload))
-        object.__setattr__(
-            self, "public_key_fingerprint", str(self.public_key_fingerprint or "").strip()
-        )
-        object.__setattr__(self, "signature", str(self.signature or "").strip())
-        _parse_timestamp(self.created_at)
-        if self.expires_at is not None:
-            object.__setattr__(self, "expires_at", _required(self.expires_at, "expires_at"))
-            if _parse_timestamp(self.expires_at) <= _parse_timestamp(self.created_at):
-                raise ValueError("expires_at must be later than created_at")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(
-        cls,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        trace_id: str,
-        action: str,
-        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
-        idempotency_key: str,
-        expires_at: str | None = None,
-        key_id: str = "default",
-        command_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> "OpenClawCommand":
-        return cls(
-            command_id=command_id or f"cmd_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            task_id=task_id,
-            trace_id=trace_id,
-            action=action,
-            payload=_safe_mapping(payload),
-            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
-            expires_at=expires_at,
-            key_id=key_id,
-        )
-
-    def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "command_id": self.command_id,
-            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
-            "action": self.action,
-            "payload": _safe_mapping(self.payload),
-            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
-            "created_at": self.created_at,
-            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
-            "contract_version": self.contract_version,
-            "signature_algorithm": self.signature_algorithm,
-            "key_id": self.key_id,
-            "public_key_fingerprint": self.public_key_fingerprint,
-        }
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OpenClawResult:
-    command_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    state: CommandState
-    output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-    started_at: str | None = None
-    finished_at: str | None = None
-    runtime_id: str | None = None
-    attempts: int = 1
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for field_name in ("command_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id"):
-            object.__setattr__(
-                self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name)
-            )
-        object.__setattr__(self, "state", CommandState(self.state))
-        if self.output is not None:
-            object.__setattr__(self, "output", _safe_mapping(self.output))
-        if self.error is not None:
-            object.__setattr__(self, "error", _safe_mapping(self.error))
-        if self.started_at is not None:
-            _parse_timestamp(self.started_at)
-        if self.finished_at is not None:
-            _parse_timestamp(self.finished_at)
-        if self.attempts < 1:
-            raise ValueError("attempts must be >= 1")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RuntimeHealth:
-    runtime: str
-    runtime_id: str
-    status: str
-    version: str
-    heartbeat_at: str
-    active_tasks: int = 0
-    workspace_isolated: bool = False
-    credential_ref_configured: bool = False
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for field_name in (
-            "runtime",
-            "runtime_id",
-            "status",
-            "version",
-            "heartbeat_at",
-        ):
-            object.__setattr__(
-                self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name)
-            )
-        _parse_timestamp(self.heartbeat_at)
-        if self.active_tasks < 0:
-            raise ValueError("active_tasks must be >= 0")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "details", _safe_mapping(self.details))
-
-
-def canonical_command_bytes(command: OpenClawCommand) -> bytes:
-    return json.dumps(
-        command.unsigned_dict(),
-        ensure_ascii=False,
-        sort_keys=True,
-        separators=(",", ":"),
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def _as_signer(command: OpenClawCommand, value: Any) -> CommandSigner:
-    if hasattr(value, "sign") and hasattr(value, "fingerprint") and hasattr(value, "key_id"):
-        return value
-    return Ed25519CommandSigner.from_bytes(value, key_id=command.key_id)
-
-
-def _as_verifier(command: OpenClawCommand, value: Any) -> CommandVerifier:
-    if isinstance(value, Ed25519CommandSigner):
-        return value.verifier()
-    if hasattr(value, "verify") and hasattr(value, "fingerprint") and hasattr(value, "key_id"):
-        return value
-    return Ed25519CommandVerifier.from_bytes(value, key_id=command.key_id)
-
-
-def sign_command(command: OpenClawCommand, signing_key: Any) -> OpenClawCommand:
-    signer = _as_signer(command, signing_key)
-    if signer.key_id != command.key_id:
-        raise ValueError("command key_id does not match signer")
-    prepared = replace(
-        command,
-        signature_algorithm=SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM,
-        public_key_fingerprint=signer.fingerprint,
-        signature="",
-    )
-    signature = base64.b64encode(
-        signer.sign(canonical_command_bytes(prepared))
-    ).decode("ascii")
-    return replace(prepared, signature=signature)
-
-
-def verify_command_signature(
-    command: OpenClawCommand,
-    verification_key: Any,
-    *,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
-    clock_skew_seconds: int = DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS,
-) -> bool:
-    if (
-        not command.signature
-        or command.contract_version != CONTRACT_VERSION
-        or command.signature_algorithm != SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
-    ):
-        return False
-    try:
-        verifier = _as_verifier(command, verification_key)
-        signature = base64.b64decode(command.signature, validate=True)
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-    if verifier.key_id != command.key_id:
-        return False
-    if not command.public_key_fingerprint or not hmac.compare_digest(
-        command.public_key_fingerprint, verifier.fingerprint
-    ):
-        return False
-    if not verifier.verify(canonical_command_bytes(command), signature):
-        return False
-    current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-    created = _parse_timestamp(command.created_at)
-    if created.timestamp() - current.timestamp() > clock_skew_seconds:
-        return False
-    if command.expires_at is not None:
-        expires = _parse_timestamp(command.expires_at)
-        if current.timestamp() - expires.timestamp() > clock_skew_seconds:
-            return False
-    return True
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-"""Health policy and self-healing decisions for OpenClaw runtimes."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Mapping
-
-from .contract import RuntimeHealth
-
-
-def _parse(value: str) -> datetime:
-    normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
-    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        raise ValueError("heartbeat timestamp must include timezone")
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class HealthPolicy:
-    max_heartbeat_age_seconds: int = 90
-    require_workspace_isolation: bool = True
-    require_credential_ref: bool = True
-    accepted_statuses: frozenset[str] = field(
-        default_factory=lambda: frozenset({"healthy", "ready"})
-    )
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if self.max_heartbeat_age_seconds < 5:
-            raise ValueError("max_heartbeat_age_seconds must be >= 5")
-        if not self.accepted_statuses:
-            raise ValueError("accepted_statuses must not be empty")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class HealthAssessment:
-    healthy: bool
-    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
-    recoverable: bool
-    recommended_action: str
-    details: Mapping[str, object] = field(default_factory=dict)
-
-
-class RuntimeHealthMonitor:
-    """Evaluate runtime health and recommend bounded recovery actions."""
-
-    def __init__(self, policy: HealthPolicy | None = None) -> None:
-        self.policy = policy or HealthPolicy()
-
-    def assess(
-        self,
-        health: RuntimeHealth,
-        *,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-    ) -> HealthAssessment:
-        current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        heartbeat = _parse(health.heartbeat_at)
-        age = max(0.0, current.timestamp() - heartbeat.timestamp())
-        reasons: list[str] = []
-
-        if health.status.lower() not in self.policy.accepted_statuses:
-            reasons.append("runtime_status_unhealthy")
-        if age > self.policy.max_heartbeat_age_seconds:
-            reasons.append("heartbeat_stale")
-        if self.policy.require_workspace_isolation and not health.workspace_isolated:
-            reasons.append("workspace_not_isolated")
-        if self.policy.require_credential_ref and not health.credential_ref_configured:
-            reasons.append("credential_reference_missing")
-
-        if not reasons:
-            return HealthAssessment(
-                healthy=True,
-                reasons=(),
-                recoverable=True,
-                recommended_action="none",
-                details={"heartbeat_age_seconds": age},
-            )
-
-        non_recoverable = {
-            "workspace_not_isolated",
-            "credential_reference_missing",
-        }.intersection(reasons)
-        if non_recoverable:
-            action = "quarantine_runtime"
-            recoverable = False
-        elif "heartbeat_stale" in reasons:
-            action = "restart_runtime"
-            recoverable = True
-        else:
-            action = "drain_and_restart"
-            recoverable = True
-
-        return HealthAssessment(
-            healthy=False,
-            reasons=tuple(reasons),
-            recoverable=recoverable,
-            recommended_action=action,
-            details={
-                "heartbeat_age_seconds": age,
-                "runtime_id": health.runtime_id,
-                "active_tasks": health.active_tasks,
-            },
-        )
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-"""Runtime transport implementations for the OpenClaw adapter."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import threading
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
-
-from .contract import (
-    CommandState,
-    OpenClawCommand,
-    OpenClawResult,
-    RuntimeHealth,
-    utc_now,
-)
-
-
-class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
-    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
-    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ...
-    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
-
-
-class TransportError(RuntimeError):
-    """Runtime transport or protocol failure."""
-
-
-RuntimeHandler = Callable[[OpenClawCommand], Mapping[str, Any] | OpenClawResult]
-
-
-class InProcessRuntimeTransport:
-    """Deterministic runtime used by tests and controlled local integrations."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        handler: RuntimeHandler,
-        *,
-        runtime_id: str = "openclaw-in-process",
-        version: str = "v1",
-        workspace_isolated: bool = True,
-        credential_ref_configured: bool = True,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.handler = handler
-        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
-        self.version = version
-        self.workspace_isolated = workspace_isolated
-        self.credential_ref_configured = credential_ref_configured
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self._running: set[str] = set()
-        self._cancelled: set[str] = set()
-
-    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult:
-        if timeout_seconds <= 0:
-            raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive")
-        with self._lock:
-            if command.command_id in self._cancelled:
-                return OpenClawResult(
-                    command_id=command.command_id,
-                    tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
-                    task_id=command.task_id,
-                    trace_id=command.trace_id,
-                    state=CommandState.CANCELLED,
-                    error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled before execution"},
-                    finished_at=utc_now(),
-                    runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
-                )
-            self._running.add(command.command_id)
-        try:
-            raw = self.handler(command)
-            if isinstance(raw, OpenClawResult):
-                return raw
-            if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
-                raise TransportError("runtime handler must return a mapping or OpenClawResult")
-            return OpenClawResult(
-                command_id=command.command_id,
-                tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
-                task_id=command.task_id,
-                trace_id=command.trace_id,
-                state=CommandState(str(raw.get("state", "COMPLETED"))),
-                output=raw.get("output"),
-                error=raw.get("error"),
-                started_at=str(raw.get("started_at") or utc_now()),
-                finished_at=str(raw.get("finished_at") or utc_now()),
-                runtime_id=str(raw.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
-                attempts=int(raw.get("attempts", 1)),
-            )
-        finally:
-            with self._lock:
-                self._running.discard(command.command_id)
-
-    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._cancelled.add(command_id)
-            return command_id in self._running
-
-    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
-        with self._lock:
-            active = len(self._running)
-        return RuntimeHealth(
-            runtime="openclaw",
-            runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
-            status="healthy",
-            version=self.version,
-            heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
-            active_tasks=active,
-            workspace_isolated=self.workspace_isolated,
-            credential_ref_configured=self.credential_ref_configured,
-            details={"transport": "in_process"},
-        )
-
-
-class HTTPRuntimeTransport:
-    """Private HTTP transport for an OpenClaw runtime service."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        base_url: str,
-        *,
-        runtime_id: str = "openclaw-http",
-        credential_ref: str | None = None,
-        max_response_bytes: int = 2_097_152,
-    ) -> None:
-        normalized = str(base_url).rstrip("/")
-        if not normalized.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
-            raise ValueError("base_url must use http or https")
-        self.base_url = normalized
-        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
-        self.credential_ref = credential_ref
-        self.max_response_bytes = int(max_response_bytes)
-
-    def _request(
-        self,
-        method: str,
-        path: str,
-        *,
-        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
-        timeout_seconds: float,
-    ) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        body = None
-        headers = {"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "AIOS-OpenClaw/1"}
-        if payload is not None:
-            body = json.dumps(dict(payload), separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
-        if self.credential_ref:
-            headers["X-AIOS-Credential-Ref"] = self.credential_ref
-        request = urllib.request.Request(
-            f"{self.base_url}{path}",
-            data=body,
-            method=method,
-            headers=headers,
-        )
-        try:
-            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout_seconds) as response:
-                raw = response.read(self.max_response_bytes + 1)
-        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-            raise TransportError(f"runtime returned HTTP {exc.code}") from exc
-        except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
-            raise TransportError(f"runtime unavailable: {exc.reason}") from exc
-        if len(raw) > self.max_response_bytes:
-            raise TransportError("runtime response exceeded size limit")
-        decoded = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-        if not isinstance(decoded, Mapping):
-            raise TransportError("runtime response must be a JSON object")
-        return decoded
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _command_payload(command: OpenClawCommand) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {**command.unsigned_dict(), "signature": command.signature}
-
-    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult:
-        value = self._request(
-            "POST",
-            "/v1/execute",
-            payload=self._command_payload(command),
-            timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
-        )
-        return OpenClawResult(
-            command_id=str(value["command_id"]),
-            tenant_id=str(value["tenant_id"]),
-            task_id=str(value["task_id"]),
-            trace_id=str(value["trace_id"]),
-            state=CommandState(str(value["state"])),
-            output=value.get("output"),
-            error=value.get("error"),
-            started_at=value.get("started_at"),
-            finished_at=value.get("finished_at"),
-            runtime_id=str(value.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
-            attempts=int(value.get("attempts", 1)),
-        )
-
-    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool:
-        value = self._request(
-            "POST",
-            f"/v1/commands/{urllib.parse.quote(command_id, safe='')}/cancel",
-            payload={},
-            timeout_seconds=10.0,
-        )
-        return bool(value.get("accepted"))
-
-    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
-        value = self._request("GET", "/v1/health", payload=None, timeout_seconds=5.0)
-        return RuntimeHealth(
-            runtime=str(value.get("runtime") or "openclaw"),
-            runtime_id=str(value.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
-            status=str(value.get("status") or "unknown"),
-            version=str(value.get("version") or "unknown"),
-            heartbeat_at=str(value.get("heartbeat_at") or utc_now()),
-            active_tasks=int(value.get("active_tasks", 0)),
-            workspace_isolated=bool(value.get("workspace_isolated", False)),
-            credential_ref_configured=bool(value.get("credential_ref_configured", False)),
-            details=value.get("details") if isinstance(value.get("details"), Mapping) else {},
-        )
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+"""HTTP adapter for audited Owner authorization and writer provisioning.
+
+This module layers on top of ``aios_authorized_task_writer_api`` so existing
+routes and the legacy exact ``writer:provision`` route remain available. The
+new endpoint does not mint or modify bearer credentials. It authenticates an
+existing, non-wildcard, explicitly allow-listed Owner credential and then
+invokes the audited broker.
+
+Endpoint:
+    POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+import aios_authorized_task_writer_api as bridge_api
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
+from owner_authorization_broker import (
+    OwnerAuthorizationBroker,
+    OwnerAuthorizationError,
+    OwnerPrincipal,
+)
+
+
+api = bridge_api.api
+_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
+
+
+def _enabled() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED", ""
+    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+def _configured_intake_scope() -> str:
+    scopes = [
+        item.strip()
+        for item in os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES", ""
+        ).split(",")
+        if item.strip()
+    ]
+    if len(scopes) != 1:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "EXACTLY_ONE_HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REQUIRED", 503
+        )
+    scope = scopes[0]
+    if scope == "writer:provision" or scope == "*" or scope.endswith(":*"):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 503)
+    return scope
+
+
+def _scope_set(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    raw = auth.get("scopes")
+    if raw is None:
+        raw = auth.get("scope")
+    if raw is None:
+        return frozenset()
+    if isinstance(raw, str):
+        candidates = raw.replace(",", " ").split()
+    elif isinstance(raw, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
+        candidates = [str(item) for item in raw]
+    else:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_SCOPE_EVIDENCE_INVALID", 403)
+    return frozenset(item.strip() for item in candidates if item.strip())
+
+
+def _credential_id(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    for name in (
+        "credential_id",
+        "token_id",
+        "key_id",
+        "auth_id",
+    ):
+        value = str(auth.get(name) or "").strip()
+        if value:
+            return value
+    return ""
+
+
+def _authenticate_existing_owner(handler) -> OwnerPrincipal | None:
+    scope = _configured_intake_scope()
+    auth = handler.need(scope)
+    if not auth:
+        return None
+    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_ROLE_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    identity = str(auth.get("account") or auth.get("identity") or "").strip()
+    if not identity:
+        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
+        return None
+    scopes = _scope_set(auth)
+    if any(item == "*" or item.endswith(":*") for item in scopes):
+        handler.sendj(
+            {"error": "WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED"}, 403
+        )
+        return None
+    return OwnerPrincipal(
+        identity=identity,
+        role="owner",
+        authenticated_scope=scope,
+        token_scopes=scopes,
+        credential_id=_credential_id(auth),
+    )
+
+
+def _broker_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != _ENDPOINT:
+        return _original_do_post(self)
+    if not _enabled():
+        return self.sendj(
+            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_DISABLED"}, 503
+        )
+    try:
+        principal = _authenticate_existing_owner(self)
+        if principal is None:
+            return
+        data = self.body()
+        result = OwnerAuthorizationBroker().authorize_and_provision(
+            data, principal
+        )
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except (OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
+        body = {"error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
+    except Exception:
+        # Never expose registry data, bearer tokens, signer output or traceback.
+        return self.sendj(
+            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500
+        )
+
+
+api.H.do_POST = _broker_do_post
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    api.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Loopback-only HTTP API for the task identity overlay.
+
+Endpoints:
+  GET  /healthz
+  POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
+
+The API authenticates only the short-lived overlay credential. It does not read
+or modify the global bearer-token registry.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import urllib.parse
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any
+
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
+from owner_authorization_broker import OwnerAuthorizationError
+from task_identity_overlay import (
+    MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+    IdentityOverlayConfig,
+    IdentityOverlayError,
+    TaskIdentityOverlayService,
+)
+
+
+_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
+
+
+def _enabled() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_ENABLED", ""
+    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+def _bearer(header: str) -> str:
+    prefix = "Bearer "
+    if not header.startswith(prefix):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+    token = header[len(prefix):].strip()
+    if not token or len(token) > 4096:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+    return token
+
+
+class OverlayHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "aios-task-identity-overlay/1"
+    sys_version = ""
+
+    @property
+    def overlay(self) -> TaskIdentityOverlayService:
+        return self.server.overlay  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
+        # Never log Authorization or request bodies.
+        return
+
+    def _send(self, status: int, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        payload = (
+            json.dumps(
+                value,
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+                sort_keys=True,
+                separators=(",", ":"),
+            )
+            + "\n"
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(payload)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(payload)
+
+    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID") from None
+        if length <= 0 or length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_SIZE_REJECTED", 413)
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_JSON_INVALID") from None
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
+        return value
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if path != "/healthz":
+            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
+            return
+        self._send(
+            200,
+            {
+                "service": "aios-task-identity-overlay",
+                "status": "active" if _enabled() else "disabled",
+                "global_token_registry_used": False,
+                "loopback_only": True,
+            },
+        )
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if path != _ENDPOINT:
+            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
+            return
+        if not _enabled():
+            self._send(503, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_DISABLED"})
+            return
+        try:
+            token = _bearer(self.headers.get("Authorization", ""))
+            result = self.overlay.provision(self._body(), token)
+            self._send(200, result)
+        except (IdentityOverlayError, OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
+            body: dict[str, Any] = {"error": exc.code}
+            if getattr(exc, "details", None):
+                body["details"] = exc.details
+            self._send(exc.status, body)
+        except Exception:
+            self._send(500, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_API_INTERNAL_ERROR"})
+
+
+class OverlayServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        address: tuple[str, int],
+        overlay: TaskIdentityOverlayService,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(address, OverlayHandler)
+        self.overlay = overlay
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    host = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    if host not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}:
+        raise SystemExit("identity overlay must listen on loopback")
+    try:
+        port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_PORT", "19864"))
+    except ValueError:
+        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port") from None
+    if not 1024 <= port <= 65535:
+        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port")
+    config = IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
+    server = OverlayServer(
+        (host, port),
+        TaskIdentityOverlayService(config),
+    )
+    server.serve_forever(poll_interval=0.25)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Root-governed CLI for issuing and revoking task identity overlays.
+
+The CLI never prints the bearer token. It returns only the root-owned secret
+reference and non-secret metadata.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from task_identity_overlay import (
+    IdentityOverlayConfig,
+    IdentityOverlayError,
+    TaskIdentityOverlayStore,
+)
+
+
+def _write_result(path: str, value: dict) -> None:
+    data = json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n"
+    if path == "-":
+        sys.stdout.write(data)
+        return
+    target = Path(path)
+    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    target.write_text(data, encoding="utf-8")
+    os.chmod(target, 0o600)
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    value = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Issue/status/revoke a task-scoped identity overlay"
+    )
+    sub = value.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+
+    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
+    issue.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=900)
+    issue.add_argument("--authorization-assertion-ref", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument(
+        "--operator-identity",
+        default=os.getenv("SUDO_USER") or os.getenv("USER") or "root",
+    )
+    issue.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+
+    status = sub.add_parser("status")
+    status.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
+    status.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+
+    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
+    revoke.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
+    return value
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parser().parse_args()
+    try:
+        store = TaskIdentityOverlayStore(
+            IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
+        )
+        if args.command == "issue":
+            result = store.issue(
+                ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
+                authorization_assertion_ref=args.authorization_assertion_ref,
+                operator_identity=args.operator_identity,
+            )
+        elif args.command == "status":
+            result = store.status(args.overlay_id)
+        else:
+            result = store.revoke(args.overlay_id, reason=args.reason)
+        _write_result(args.result_json, result)
+        return 0
+    except IdentityOverlayError as exc:
+        body = {"status": "BLOCKED", "error": exc.code}
+        if exc.details:
+            body["details"] = exc.details
+        _write_result(getattr(args, "result_json", "-"), body)
+        return 2
+    except Exception:
+        _write_result(
+            getattr(args, "result_json", "-"),
+            {"status": "FAILED", "error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_CLI_INTERNAL_ERROR"},
+        )
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 控制面、执行编排与可信运行来源证明。"""
-
-from .control_plane import (
-    AgentRecord,
-    AuditEvent,
-    ControlPlaneError,
-    ControlPlaneService,
-    IdempotencyConflict,
-    InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
-    InvalidTransition,
-    NotFound,
-    PolicyDenied,
-    RequestContext,
-    RevisionConflict,
-    TaskRecord,
-    TaskState,
-    TenantIsolationError,
-    TenantRecord,
-    Unauthorized,
-)
-from .execution_tracking import ExecutionEvidence, ExecutionTracker
-from .orchestrator import DispatchRecord, ExecutionOrchestrator, OrchestrationError
-from .provenance import (
-    Ed25519PrivateKeySigner,
-    Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier,
-    ExecutionPath,
-    GitOperation,
-    PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION,
-    ProvenanceAuthorization,
-    ProvenanceControlledWriter,
-    ProvenanceDenied,
-    ProvenanceError,
-    ProvenanceExpired,
-    ProvenanceIssuer,
-    ProvenanceNotFound,
-    ProvenanceReplay,
-    ProvenanceRevoked,
-    ProvenanceSignatureError,
-    ProvenanceStatus,
-    ProvenanceVerifier,
-    RunProvenance,
-    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
-    digest_payload,
-)
-from .provenance_git import (
-    GitCommandResult,
-    GitExecutionContext,
-    ProvenanceGitError,
-    ProvenanceGitWriter,
-)
-from .provenance_operations import (
-    OperationContext,
-    OperationReceipt,
-    ProvenanceOperationGate,
-    build_provenance_writer_from_env,
-    context_from_environment,
-)
-
-__all__ = [
-    "AgentRecord",
-    "AuditEvent",
-    "ControlPlaneError",
-    "ControlPlaneService",
-    "DispatchRecord",
-    "Ed25519PrivateKeySigner",
-    "Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier",
-    "ExecutionEvidence",
-    "ExecutionOrchestrator",
-    "ExecutionPath",
-    "ExecutionTracker",
-    "GitCommandResult",
-    "GitExecutionContext",
-    "GitOperation",
-    "IdempotencyConflict",
-    "InMemoryControlPlaneStore",
-    "InvalidTransition",
-    "NotFound",
-    "OperationContext",
-    "OperationReceipt",
-    "OrchestrationError",
-    "PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION",
-    "PolicyDenied",
-    "ProvenanceAuthorization",
-    "ProvenanceControlledWriter",
-    "ProvenanceDenied",
-    "ProvenanceError",
-    "ProvenanceExpired",
-    "ProvenanceGitError",
-    "ProvenanceGitWriter",
-    "ProvenanceIssuer",
-    "ProvenanceNotFound",
-    "ProvenanceOperationGate",
-    "ProvenanceReplay",
-    "ProvenanceRevoked",
-    "ProvenanceSignatureError",
-    "ProvenanceStatus",
-    "ProvenanceVerifier",
-    "RequestContext",
-    "RevisionConflict",
-    "RunProvenance",
-    "SQLiteProvenanceStore",
-    "TaskRecord",
-    "TaskState",
-    "TenantIsolationError",
-    "TenantRecord",
-    "Unauthorized",
-    "build_provenance_writer_from_env",
-    "context_from_environment",
-    "digest_payload",
-]
@@ -1,807 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 production-candidate application entrypoint."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import dataclasses
-import json
-import os
-import stat
-import urllib.parse
-from enum import Enum
-from http import HTTPStatus
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJobState, HermesResult, SQLiteHermesStore
-from aios_openclaw import (
-    Ed25519CommandSigner,
-    HTTPRuntimeTransport,
-    OpenClawAdapter,
-)
-from aios_openclaw.callback import AuditCallbackSink, EventPublisher
-
-from .console import CONSOLE_HTML
-from .control_plane import AuditEvent, RequestContext, Unauthorized
-from .dispatch_store import SQLiteDispatchRepository
-from .execution_tracking import ExecutionEvidence, ExecutionTracker
-from .gateway import GatewayApplication, error_response
-from .gitops_status import collect_gitops_status
-from .orchestrator import ExecutionOrchestrator
-from .persistence import DurableControlPlaneService, SQLiteSnapshotRepository
-from .provenance_operations import build_provenance_writer_from_env
-
-
-def _json_value(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if dataclasses.is_dataclass(value):
-        return {
-            item.name: _json_value(getattr(value, item.name))
-            for item in dataclasses.fields(value)
-        }
-    if isinstance(value, Enum):
-        return value.value
-    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        return {str(key): _json_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
-        return [_json_value(item) for item in value]
-    return value
-
-
-def _enabled(value: str | None) -> bool:
-    return str(value or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-
-
-def _header(headers: Mapping[str, str], name: str) -> str | None:
-    target = name.lower()
-    for key, value in headers.items():
-        if str(key).lower() == target:
-            normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-            return normalized or None
-    return None
-
-
-def _provenance_context(
-    headers: Mapping[str, str],
-    payload: Mapping[str, Any],
-) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
-    header_provenance = _header(headers, "X-AIOS-Provenance-ID")
-    header_run = _header(headers, "X-AIOS-Run-ID")
-    body_provenance = str(payload.get("provenance_id") or "").strip() or None
-    body_run = str(payload.get("run_id") or "").strip() or None
-    if header_provenance and body_provenance and header_provenance != body_provenance:
-        raise ValueError("provenance_id header/body mismatch")
-    if header_run and body_run and header_run != body_run:
-        raise ValueError("run_id header/body mismatch")
-    return header_provenance or body_provenance, header_run or body_run
-
-
-def _read_protected_file(path: Path, *, private: bool) -> bytes:
-    flags = os.O_RDONLY
-    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
-        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
-    descriptor = os.open(str(path), flags)
-    try:
-        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
-        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
-            raise RuntimeError("key reference is not a regular file")
-        denied = 0o077 if private else 0o022
-        if metadata.st_mode & denied:
-            raise RuntimeError(
-                "private key file permissions must be 0600 or stricter"
-                if private
-                else "public key file must not be group/world writable"
-            )
-        chunks: list[bytes] = []
-        while True:
-            chunk = os.read(descriptor, 65536)
-            if not chunk:
-                break
-            chunks.append(chunk)
-        value = b"".join(chunks)
-        if not value:
-            raise RuntimeError("key file is empty")
-        return value
-    finally:
-        os.close(descriptor)
-
-
-class FileCommandSignerResolver:
-    """Resolve tenant/key-id scoped OpenClaw Ed25519 signing material."""
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | Path, *, configured_key_id: str) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
-        self.configured_key_id = str(configured_key_id or "").strip()
-        if not self.configured_key_id:
-            raise ValueError("configured_key_id is required")
-
-    def __call__(self, tenant_id: str, key_id: str) -> Ed25519CommandSigner:
-        if not str(tenant_id or "").strip():
-            raise RuntimeError("tenant_id is required for command signing")
-        if key_id != self.configured_key_id:
-            raise RuntimeError("OpenClaw signing key_id mismatch")
-        return Ed25519CommandSigner.from_bytes(
-            _read_protected_file(self.path, private=True),
-            key_id=key_id,
-        )
-
-
-class ControlPlaneEventPublisher(EventPublisher):
-    """Append Runtime callback events to the tenant audit stream.
-
-    Callback audit remains informational. Authoritative task reconciliation is
-    performed only by the orchestrator after dispatch/result validation.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, service: DurableControlPlaneService) -> None:
-        self.service = service
-
-    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        tenant_id = str(event.get("tenant_id") or "").strip()
-        trace_id = str(event.get("trace_id") or "").strip()
-        command_id = str(event.get("command_id") or "").strip()
-        event_type = str(event.get("event_type") or "OPENCLAW_EVENT").strip()
-        if not tenant_id or not trace_id or not command_id:
-            raise ValueError("runtime audit event is missing tenant identity")
-        state_value = str(event.get("state") or "unknown").lower()
-        outcome = "allowed" if state_value == "completed" else state_value
-        runtime = str(event.get("runtime") or "openclaw").strip().lower()
-        principal_id = str(
-            event.get("principal_id") or f"{runtime}-runtime"
-        ).strip()
-        audit = AuditEvent(
-            event_id=f"runtime_{command_id}_{len(self.service.store.audit_events) + 1}",
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            principal_id=principal_id,
-            trace_id=trace_id,
-            action=event_type,
-            resource_type=f"{runtime}_execution",
-            resource_id=command_id,
-            outcome=outcome,
-            policy_version="runtime-v2",
-            details=dict(event.get("details") or {}),
-        )
-        with self.service.store.lock:
-            self.service.store.audit_events.append(audit)
-            self.service.repository.save(self.service._snapshot())
-
-
-class CandidateApplication:
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        gateway: GatewayApplication,
-        orchestrator: ExecutionOrchestrator,
-        tracker: ExecutionTracker,
-        hermes: HermesAdapter,
-        openclaw: OpenClawAdapter | None,
-        *,
-        hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled: bool = False,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.gateway = gateway
-        self.orchestrator = orchestrator
-        self.tracker = tracker
-        self.hermes = hermes
-        self.openclaw = openclaw
-        self.hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled = bool(hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled)
-        self.runtime_events = ControlPlaneEventPublisher(orchestrator.control_plane)
-
-    def context(self, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext:
-        return self.gateway.context_from_headers(headers)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _require_runtime_role(context: RequestContext) -> None:
-        if not ({"runtime", "platform_admin"} & set(context.roles)):
-            raise Unauthorized("runtime reconciliation role is required")
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _require_control_plane_cancel(context: RequestContext) -> None:
-        required = {"runtime", "platform_admin"}
-        if not required.issubset(set(context.roles)):
-            raise Unauthorized(
-                "Hermes cancellation requires trusted AIOS control-plane authority"
-            )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _required_identity(payload: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> str:
-        value = str(payload.get(name) or "").strip()
-        if not value:
-            raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
-        return value
-
-    def _record_hermes_lifecycle(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        dispatch: Any,
-        job: Any,
-        *,
-        action: str,
-        worker_id: str | None,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-    ) -> None:
-        executor = worker_id or "aios-control-plane"
-        evidence = ExecutionEvidence(
-            execution_id=job.job_id,
-            tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-            task_id=job.task_id,
-            agent_id=dispatch.agent_id,
-            executor=executor,
-            branch="runtime/hermes",
-            status=job.state.value.lower(),
-            progress_completed=0,
-            progress_total=3,
-            current_step=action,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-        )
-        current_evidence = self.tracker.claim(
-            evidence,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-        )
-        if job.state in {
-            HermesJobState.COMPLETED,
-            HermesJobState.FAILED,
-            HermesJobState.CANCELLED,
-        }:
-            if current_evidence.completed_at is None:
-                self.tracker.complete(
-                    tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                    execution_id=job.job_id,
-                    status=job.state.value.lower(),
-                    test_status="runtime_terminal",
-                    test_summary={"lifecycle_action": action},
-                    result_summary={
-                        "state": job.state.value,
-                        "worker_id": worker_id,
-                        "dispatch_id": dispatch.dispatch_id,
-                    },
-                    principal_id=context.principal_id,
-                    provenance_id=provenance_id,
-                    run_id=run_id,
-                )
-        else:
-            self.tracker.heartbeat(
-                tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                execution_id=job.job_id,
-                status=job.state.value.lower(),
-                current_step=action,
-                progress_completed=(1 if job.state == HermesJobState.RUNNING else 0),
-                progress_total=3,
-                principal_id=context.principal_id,
-                provenance_id=provenance_id,
-                run_id=run_id,
-            )
-        self.runtime_events.publish(
-            {
-                "runtime": "hermes",
-                "tenant_id": job.tenant_id,
-                "principal_id": context.principal_id,
-                "trace_id": job.trace_id,
-                "command_id": job.job_id,
-                "event_type": f"HERMES_{action.upper()}",
-                "state": job.state.value,
-                "details": {
-                    "dispatch_id": dispatch.dispatch_id,
-                    "task_id": job.task_id,
-                    "worker_id": worker_id,
-                    "cell_id": job.cell_id,
-                    "profile_id": job.profile_id,
-                    "revision": job.revision,
-                    "provenance_id": provenance_id,
-                    "run_id": run_id,
-                },
-            }
-        )
-
-    def handle_json(
-        self,
-        method: str,
-        raw_path: str,
-        headers: Mapping[str, str],
-        body: Any,
-    ) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
-        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw_path)
-        path = parsed.path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-        method = method.upper()
-
-        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/gitops":
-            context = self.context(headers)
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
-                "gitops": collect_gitops_status().as_dict(),
-            }
-
-        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/runtime":
-            context = self.context(headers)
-            runtimes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-            if self.openclaw is None:
-                runtimes.append(
-                    {
-                        "name": "openclaw",
-                        "status": "disabled",
-                        "details": {"reason": "runtime_not_configured"},
-                    }
-                )
-            else:
-                try:
-                    health = self.openclaw.health()
-                    runtimes.append(
-                        {
-                            "name": "openclaw",
-                            "status": health.status,
-                            "details": _json_value(health),
-                        }
-                    )
-                except Exception as exc:
-                    runtimes.append(
-                        {
-                            "name": "openclaw",
-                            "status": "unavailable",
-                            "details": {"message": str(exc)},
-                        }
-                    )
-            hermes_health = self.hermes.health()
-            runtimes.append(
-                {
-                    "name": "hermes",
-                    "status": hermes_health.status,
-                    "details": _json_value(hermes_health),
-                }
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
-                "runtimes": runtimes,
-            }
-
-        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/executions":
-            context = self.context(headers)
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                "executions": _json_value(
-                    self.tracker.list(tenant_id=context.tenant_id)
-                )
-            }
-
-        dispatch_match = __import__("re").fullmatch(
-            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/dispatch", path
-        )
-        if method == "POST" and dispatch_match:
-            context = self.context(headers)
-            task_id = urllib.parse.unquote(dispatch_match.group(1))
-            payload = body if isinstance(body, Mapping) else {}
-            timeout = payload.get("timeout_seconds")
-            provenance_id, run_id = _provenance_context(headers, payload)
-            record = self.orchestrator.dispatch(
-                context,
-                task_id=task_id,
-                timeout_seconds=float(timeout) if timeout is not None else None,
-                provenance_id=provenance_id,
-                run_id=run_id,
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.ACCEPTED, {"dispatch": _json_value(record)}
-
-        lifecycle_match = __import__("re").fullmatch(
-            r"/api/v2/internal/runtime/hermes/lifecycle/"
-            r"(claim|start|heartbeat|complete|fail|cancel|status)",
-            path,
-        )
-        if method == "POST" and lifecycle_match:
-            if not self.hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled:
-                return HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, {
-                    "error": "not_found",
-                    "message": "route not found",
-                }
-            context = self.context(headers)
-            self._require_runtime_role(context)
-            if not isinstance(body, Mapping):
-                raise ValueError("JSON body must be an object")
-            payload = body
-            action = lifecycle_match.group(1)
-            identity = {
-                name: self._required_identity(payload, name)
-                for name in (
-                    "dispatch_id",
-                    "job_id",
-                    "tenant_id",
-                    "task_id",
-                    "trace_id",
-                    "principal_id",
-                    "provenance_id",
-                    "run_id",
-                    "cell_id",
-                    "profile_id",
-                )
-            }
-            header_provenance, header_run = _provenance_context(headers, payload)
-            if header_provenance != identity["provenance_id"]:
-                raise ValueError("provenance_id context mismatch")
-            if header_run != identity["run_id"]:
-                raise ValueError("run_id context mismatch")
-            requeued_job_ids = self.hermes.requeue_expired()
-            dispatch, job = self.orchestrator.hermes_lifecycle_context(
-                context,
-                dispatch_id=identity["dispatch_id"],
-                job_id=identity["job_id"],
-                tenant_id=identity["tenant_id"],
-                task_id=identity["task_id"],
-                trace_id=identity["trace_id"],
-                principal_id=identity["principal_id"],
-                provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                run_id=identity["run_id"],
-            )
-            if job.cell_id != identity["cell_id"]:
-                raise ValueError("cell_id mismatch")
-            if job.profile_id != identity["profile_id"]:
-                raise ValueError("profile_id mismatch")
-
-            if action == "status":
-                if job.job_id in requeued_job_ids:
-                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
-                        context,
-                        dispatch,
-                        job,
-                        action="lease_expired_requeue",
-                        worker_id=None,
-                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
-                    )
-                task = self.orchestrator.control_plane.get_task(
-                    context, dispatch.task_id
-                )
-                response: dict[str, Any] = {
-                    "job": _json_value(job),
-                    "dispatch": _json_value(dispatch),
-                    "task": _json_value(task),
-                }
-                if job.state in {
-                    HermesJobState.COMPLETED,
-                    HermesJobState.FAILED,
-                    HermesJobState.CANCELLED,
-                }:
-                    response["result"] = _json_value(
-                        self.hermes.result(job.job_id, tenant_id=job.tenant_id)
-                    )
-                return HTTPStatus.OK, response
-
-            expected_revision = payload.get("expected_revision")
-            expected = (
-                int(expected_revision) if expected_revision is not None else None
-            )
-            if action == "cancel":
-                self._require_control_plane_cancel(context)
-                if payload.get("worker_id") is not None:
-                    raise Unauthorized("Hermes workers may observe but not initiate cancel")
-                if payload.get("cancellation_source") != "aios-control-plane":
-                    raise ValueError(
-                        "cancellation_source must be aios-control-plane"
-                    )
-                result = self.hermes.cancel(
-                    job.job_id,
-                    tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                    expected_revision=expected,
-                )
-            else:
-                worker_id = self._required_identity(payload, "worker_id")
-                if action == "claim":
-                    claimed = self.hermes.claim(
-                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                        cell_id=job.cell_id,
-                        profile_id=job.profile_id,
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        lease_seconds=(
-                            int(payload["lease_seconds"])
-                            if payload.get("lease_seconds") is not None
-                            else None
-                        ),
-                        job_id=job.job_id,
-                    )
-                    if claimed is None:
-                        raise ValueError("Hermes job is not claimable")
-                    bound = self.orchestrator.bind_hermes_worker(
-                        context,
-                        claimed,
-                        dispatch_id=dispatch.dispatch_id,
-                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                    )
-                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
-                        context,
-                        bound,
-                        claimed,
-                        action="claim",
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
-                    )
-                    return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                        "job": _json_value(claimed),
-                        "dispatch": _json_value(bound),
-                    }
-                if action == "start":
-                    started = self.hermes.start(
-                        job.job_id,
-                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        expected_revision=expected,
-                    )
-                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
-                        context,
-                        dispatch,
-                        started,
-                        action="start",
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
-                    )
-                    return HTTPStatus.OK, {"job": _json_value(started)}
-                if action == "heartbeat":
-                    heartbeat = self.hermes.heartbeat(
-                        job.job_id,
-                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        lease_seconds=(
-                            int(payload["lease_seconds"])
-                            if payload.get("lease_seconds") is not None
-                            else None
-                        ),
-                    )
-                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
-                        context,
-                        dispatch,
-                        heartbeat,
-                        action="heartbeat",
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
-                    )
-                    return HTTPStatus.OK, {"job": _json_value(heartbeat)}
-                if action == "complete":
-                    output = payload.get("output")
-                    if not isinstance(output, Mapping):
-                        raise ValueError("output must be an object")
-                    result = self.hermes.complete(
-                        job.job_id,
-                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        output=output,
-                        expected_revision=expected,
-                    )
-                elif action == "fail":
-                    error = payload.get("error")
-                    if not isinstance(error, Mapping):
-                        raise ValueError("error must be an object")
-                    result = self.hermes.fail(
-                        job.job_id,
-                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-                        worker_id=worker_id,
-                        error=error,
-                        expected_revision=expected,
-                    )
-                else:
-                    raise ValueError("unsupported Hermes lifecycle action")
-
-            task = self.orchestrator.reconcile_hermes(
-                context,
-                result,
-                dispatch_id=dispatch.dispatch_id,
-                provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                run_id=identity["run_id"],
-            )
-            updated_dispatch = self.orchestrator.dispatch_repository.get(
-                dispatch.dispatch_id, tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id
-            )
-            terminal_job = self.hermes.get(job.job_id, tenant_id=job.tenant_id)
-            self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
-                context,
-                updated_dispatch,
-                terminal_job,
-                action=action,
-                worker_id=result.worker_id,
-                provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
-                run_id=identity["run_id"],
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                "result": _json_value(result),
-                "task": _json_value(task),
-                "dispatch": _json_value(updated_dispatch),
-            }
-
-        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/internal/runtime/hermes/reconcile":
-            context = self.context(headers)
-            self._require_runtime_role(context)
-            if not isinstance(body, Mapping):
-                raise ValueError("JSON body must be an object")
-            provenance_id, run_id = _provenance_context(headers, body)
-            if not provenance_id or not run_id:
-                raise ValueError("provenance_id and run_id are required")
-            dispatch_id = str(body.get("dispatch_id") or "").strip()
-            if not dispatch_id:
-                raise ValueError("dispatch_id is required")
-            result = HermesResult(
-                job_id=str(body["job_id"]),
-                tenant_id=str(body["tenant_id"]),
-                task_id=str(body["task_id"]),
-                trace_id=str(body["trace_id"]),
-                state=HermesJobState(str(body["state"])),
-                worker_id=(
-                    str(body["worker_id"])
-                    if body.get("worker_id") is not None
-                    else None
-                ),
-                output=body.get("output"),
-                error=body.get("error"),
-                started_at=body.get("started_at"),
-                finished_at=body.get("finished_at"),
-            )
-            task = self.orchestrator.reconcile_hermes(
-                context,
-                result,
-                dispatch_id=dispatch_id,
-                provenance_id=provenance_id,
-                run_id=run_id,
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"task": _json_value(task)}
-
-        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/hermes/results/reconcile":
-            return HTTPStatus.GONE, {
-                "error": "RuntimeReconcileEndpointMoved",
-                "message": "use /api/v2/internal/runtime/hermes/reconcile",
-            }
-
-        return self.gateway.handle(method, raw_path, headers, body)
-
-
-class CandidateRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    server_version = "AIOSV2Candidate/2.0"
-    max_body_bytes = 1_048_576
-
-    @property
-    def application(self) -> CandidateApplication:
-        return self.server.application  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
-
-    def _read_body(self) -> Any:
-        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or "0")
-        if length < 0 or length > self.max_body_bytes:
-            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
-        if length == 0:
-            return {}
-        content_type = self.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0].strip()
-        if content_type != "application/json":
-            raise ValueError("Content-Type must be application/json")
-        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
-
-    def _security_headers(self) -> None:
-        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
-        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
-        self.send_header("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
-        self.send_header("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
-        self.send_header(
-            "Content-Security-Policy",
-            "default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'",
-        )
-
-    def _send_json(self, status_code: int, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        encoded = json.dumps(
-            _json_value(payload), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")
-        ).encode("utf-8")
-        self.send_response(int(status_code))
-        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
-        self._security_headers()
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(encoded)
-
-    def _send_console(self) -> None:
-        encoded = CONSOLE_HTML.encode("utf-8")
-        self.send_response(HTTPStatus.OK)
-        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
-        self._security_headers()
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(encoded)
-
-    def _dispatch(self, method: str) -> None:
-        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-        if method == "GET" and path in {"/", "/console"}:
-            self._send_console()
-            return
-        try:
-            body = self._read_body() if method == "POST" else {}
-            status_code, payload = self.application.handle_json(
-                method,
-                self.path,
-                {key: value for key, value in self.headers.items()},
-                body,
-            )
-        except Exception as exc:
-            status_code, payload = error_response(exc)
-        self._send_json(status_code, payload)
-
-    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
-        self._dispatch("GET")
-
-    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
-        self._dispatch("POST")
-
-
-class CandidateHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
-    daemon_threads = True
-    allow_reuse_address = True
-
-    def __init__(self, address: tuple[str, int], application: CandidateApplication) -> None:
-        self.application = application
-        super().__init__(address, CandidateRequestHandler)
-
-
-def build_application() -> CandidateApplication:
-    state_dir = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR", "/var/lib/aios-v2")).resolve()
-    state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    repository = SQLiteSnapshotRepository(state_dir / "control-plane.sqlite3")
-    dispatch_repository = SQLiteDispatchRepository(state_dir / "dispatches.sqlite3")
-    service = DurableControlPlaneService(repository)
-    require_provenance = _enabled(os.getenv("AIOS_REQUIRE_RUN_PROVENANCE", "0"))
-    provenance_writer = build_provenance_writer_from_env(
-        state_dir=state_dir, required=require_provenance
-    )
-    tracker = ExecutionTracker(
-        state_dir / "executions",
-        provenance_writer=provenance_writer,
-        require_provenance=require_provenance,
-    )
-    hermes = HermesAdapter(store=SQLiteHermesStore(state_dir / "hermes.sqlite3"))
-
-    openclaw_url = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL", "").strip()
-    signing_file = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE", "").strip()
-    signing_key_id = os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID", "openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519"
-    ).strip()
-    openclaw = None
-    resolver = None
-    if openclaw_url and signing_file:
-        resolver = FileCommandSignerResolver(
-            signing_file,
-            configured_key_id=signing_key_id,
-        )
-        transport = HTTPRuntimeTransport(
-            openclaw_url,
-            credential_ref=os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF") or None,
-        )
-        openclaw = OpenClawAdapter(
-            transport,
-            resolver,
-            callback_sink=AuditCallbackSink(ControlPlaneEventPublisher(service)),
-        )
-
-    gateway = GatewayApplication(service)
-    orchestrator = ExecutionOrchestrator(
-        service,
-        openclaw=openclaw,
-        hermes=hermes,
-        openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver,
-        openclaw_key_id=signing_key_id,
-        provenance_writer=provenance_writer,
-        require_provenance=require_provenance,
-        dispatch_repository=dispatch_repository,
-    )
-    return CandidateApplication(
-        gateway,
-        orchestrator,
-        tracker,
-        hermes,
-        openclaw,
-        hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled=_enabled(
-            os.getenv("AIOS_HERMES_LIFECYCLE_API_ENABLED", "0")
-        ),
-    )
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    host = os.getenv("AIOS_V2_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
-    port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_PORT", "18920"))
-    server = CandidateHTTPServer((host, port), build_application())
-    print(f"AIOS V2 candidate listening on {host}:{port}")
-    server.serve_forever()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-"""Dependency-free AIOS V2 web console assets.
-
-Authentication and tenant identity are injected by the trusted reverse proxy.
-The browser never selects a tenant and never calls OpenClaw or Hermes directly.
-"""
-
-CONSOLE_HTML = r'''<!doctype html>
-<html lang="en">
-<head>
-  <meta charset="utf-8">
-  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
-  <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
-  <title>AIOS V2 Console</title>
-  <style>
-    :root{font-family:Inter,ui-sans-serif,system-ui,sans-serif;color:#152033;background:#f4f7fb}
-    *{box-sizing:border-box} body{margin:0} header{background:#111827;color:white;padding:18px 24px;display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center}
-    header h1{font-size:20px;margin:0} header span{font-size:12px;color:#cbd5e1}
-    main{padding:24px;max-width:1440px;margin:auto}.notice{background:#fff7ed;border:1px solid #fed7aa;padding:12px 14px;border-radius:10px;margin-bottom:18px;font-size:13px}
-    .cards{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(190px,1fr));gap:14px;margin-bottom:20px}.card,.panel{background:white;border:1px solid #e5e7eb;border-radius:12px;box-shadow:0 1px 2px rgba(0,0,0,.04)}
-    .card{padding:16px}.card b{display:block;font-size:28px;margin-top:8px}.card small{color:#64748b}.grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(420px,1fr));gap:16px}.panel{padding:16px;overflow:auto}.panel h2{font-size:16px;margin:0 0 12px}
-    table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;font-size:12px}th,td{text-align:left;border-bottom:1px solid #edf0f4;padding:8px;vertical-align:top}th{color:#64748b;font-weight:600}.state{font-weight:700}.ok{color:#047857}.bad{color:#b91c1c}.muted{color:#64748b}
-    button{border:0;border-radius:8px;padding:9px 13px;background:#2563eb;color:white;cursor:pointer}button:disabled{opacity:.5}.toolbar{display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;margin-bottom:16px}.error{color:#b91c1c;white-space:pre-wrap}
-  </style>
-</head>
-<body>
-<header><h1>AIOS V2 Control Plane</h1><span id="updated">Not loaded</span></header>
-<main>
-  <div class="notice">Read-only candidate console. Identity and tenant context must be injected by the trusted reverse proxy. The console never calls OpenClaw or Hermes directly.</div>
-  <div class="toolbar"><button id="refresh">Refresh</button><span id="error" class="error"></span></div>
-  <section class="cards">
-    <div class="card"><small>Agents</small><b id="agentCount">—</b></div>
-    <div class="card"><small>Tasks</small><b id="taskCount">—</b></div>
-    <div class="card"><small>Audit events</small><b id="auditCount">—</b></div>
-    <div class="card"><small>Executions</small><b id="executionCount">—</b></div>
-  </section>
-  <section class="grid">
-    <div class="panel"><h2>Runtime health</h2><div id="runtime"></div></div>
-    <div class="panel"><h2>Tasks</h2><div id="tasks"></div></div>
-    <div class="panel"><h2>Agents</h2><div id="agents"></div></div>
-    <div class="panel"><h2>Execution evidence</h2><div id="executions"></div></div>
-    <div class="panel"><h2>Audit</h2><div id="audit"></div></div>
-  </section>
-</main>
-<script>
-const esc=v=>String(v??'').replace(/[&<>"']/g,c=>({'&':'&amp;','<':'&lt;','>':'&gt;','"':'&quot;',"'":'&#39;'}[c]));
-const table=(cols,rows)=>`<table><thead><tr>${cols.map(c=>`<th>${esc(c[0])}</th>`).join('')}</tr></thead><tbody>${rows.map(r=>`<tr>${cols.map(c=>`<td>${esc(c[1](r))}</td>`).join('')}</tr>`).join('')}</tbody></table>`;
-async function api(path){const r=await fetch(path,{credentials:'same-origin',headers:{'Accept':'application/json'}});const data=await r.json().catch(()=>({}));if(!r.ok)throw new Error(`${r.status} ${data.message||data.error||path}`);return data}
-async function refresh(){
-  const btn=document.getElementById('refresh');btn.disabled=true;document.getElementById('error').textContent='';
-  try{
-    const [agents,tasks,audit,runtime,executions]=await Promise.all([
-      api('/api/v2/agents'),api('/api/v2/tasks'),api('/api/v2/audit'),api('/api/v2/runtime'),api('/api/v2/executions')
-    ]);
-    document.getElementById('agentCount').textContent=agents.agents.length;
-    document.getElementById('taskCount').textContent=tasks.tasks.length;
-    document.getElementById('auditCount').textContent=audit.events.length;
-    document.getElementById('executionCount').textContent=executions.executions.length;
-    document.getElementById('agents').innerHTML=table([['ID',x=>x.agent_id],['Runtime',x=>x.runtime],['Enabled',x=>x.enabled]],agents.agents);
-    document.getElementById('tasks').innerHTML=table([['Task',x=>x.task_id],['Action',x=>x.action],['State',x=>x.state],['Rev',x=>x.revision]],tasks.tasks);
-    document.getElementById('audit').innerHTML=table([['Time',x=>x.created_at],['Action',x=>x.action],['Outcome',x=>x.outcome],['Resource',x=>x.resource_id]],audit.events.slice(-100).reverse());
-    document.getElementById('executions').innerHTML=table([['Executor',x=>x.executor],['Task',x=>x.task_id],['Status',x=>x.status],['Progress',x=>`${x.progress_completed}/${x.progress_total}`],['Commit',x=>x.last_commit||'']],executions.executions);
-    document.getElementById('runtime').innerHTML=table([['Runtime',x=>x.name],['Status',x=>x.status],['Details',x=>JSON.stringify(x.details)]],runtime.runtimes);
-    document.getElementById('updated').textContent=`Updated ${new Date().toLocaleString()}`;
-  }catch(e){document.getElementById('error').textContent=e.message||String(e)}finally{btn.disabled=false}
-}
-document.getElementById('refresh').addEventListener('click',refresh);refresh();setInterval(refresh,30000);
-</script>
-</body>
-</html>'''
@@ -1,627 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-isolated AIOS V2 control-plane domain service.
-
-This module deliberately contains no OpenClaw or Hermes implementation details.
-It owns authoritative tenant, agent, task-lifecycle, idempotency and audit state.
-Runtime adapters consume approved tasks through a separate boundary.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import copy
-import hashlib
-import json
-import threading
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from enum import Enum
-from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable, Mapping
-
-
-def _utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _new_id(prefix: str) -> str:
-    return f"{prefix}_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-
-
-def _canonical_digest(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    encoded = json.dumps(
-        value,
-        ensure_ascii=False,
-        sort_keys=True,
-        separators=(",", ":"),
-        default=str,
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
-
-
-class ControlPlaneError(RuntimeError):
-    """Base error returned by the control-plane domain."""
-
-
-class Unauthorized(ControlPlaneError):
-    """The caller is not authenticated or lacks the required role."""
-
-
-class TenantIsolationError(ControlPlaneError):
-    """A request attempted to cross a tenant boundary."""
-
-
-class NotFound(ControlPlaneError):
-    """A tenant-scoped resource does not exist or is not visible."""
-
-
-class InvalidTransition(ControlPlaneError):
-    """A task state transition violates the lifecycle contract."""
-
-
-class IdempotencyConflict(ControlPlaneError):
-    """An idempotency key was reused for a different command."""
-
-
-class RevisionConflict(ControlPlaneError):
-    """Optimistic task revision does not match current state."""
-
-
-class PolicyDenied(ControlPlaneError):
-    """The policy gate denied a control-plane operation."""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RequestContext:
-    """Authenticated request identity propagated across all AIOS layers."""
-
-    tenant_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    roles: frozenset[str] = field(default_factory=frozenset)
-    session_id: str | None = None
-    policy_version: str = "v1"
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in ("tenant_id", "principal_id", "trace_id"):
-            if not str(getattr(self, name, "")).strip():
-                raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(
-        cls,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        roles: Iterable[str] = (),
-        trace_id: str | None = None,
-        session_id: str | None = None,
-        policy_version: str = "v1",
-    ) -> "RequestContext":
-        return cls(
-            tenant_id=tenant_id.strip(),
-            principal_id=principal_id.strip(),
-            trace_id=trace_id or _new_id("trace"),
-            roles=frozenset(str(role).strip() for role in roles if str(role).strip()),
-            session_id=session_id,
-            policy_version=policy_version,
-        )
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TenantRecord:
-    tenant_id: str
-    display_name: str
-    status: str = "active"
-    metadata: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
-    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AgentRecord:
-    agent_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    display_name: str
-    runtime: str
-    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
-    enabled: bool = True
-    metadata: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
-    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
-
-
-class TaskState(str, Enum):
-    CREATED = "CREATED"
-    APPROVED = "APPROVED"
-    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
-    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
-    FAILED = "FAILED"
-    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
-
-
-TERMINAL_TASK_STATES = frozenset(
-    {TaskState.COMPLETED, TaskState.FAILED, TaskState.CANCELLED}
-)
-
-ALLOWED_TASK_TRANSITIONS: Mapping[TaskState, frozenset[TaskState]] = {
-    TaskState.CREATED: frozenset({TaskState.APPROVED, TaskState.CANCELLED}),
-    TaskState.APPROVED: frozenset({TaskState.RUNNING, TaskState.CANCELLED}),
-    TaskState.RUNNING: frozenset(
-        {TaskState.COMPLETED, TaskState.FAILED, TaskState.CANCELLED}
-    ),
-    TaskState.COMPLETED: frozenset(),
-    TaskState.FAILED: frozenset(),
-    TaskState.CANCELLED: frozenset(),
-}
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TaskRecord:
-    task_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    action: str
-    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
-    state: TaskState = TaskState.CREATED
-    revision: int = 1
-    idempotency_key: str | None = None
-    request_digest: str = ""
-    result: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-    created_by: str = ""
-    approved_by: str | None = None
-    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
-    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuditEvent:
-    event_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    action: str
-    resource_type: str
-    resource_id: str
-    outcome: str
-    policy_version: str
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class PolicyDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    reason: str
-    policy_version: str
-
-
-PolicyEvaluator = Callable[[RequestContext, str, Mapping[str, Any]], PolicyDecision]
-
-
-class InMemoryControlPlaneStore:
-    """Thread-safe reference store used by tests and the first gateway slice.
-
-    Production backends must preserve the same tenant-scoped interface and add
-    database row-level security, migrations, backup and HA evidence.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self.lock = threading.RLock()
-        self.tenants: dict[str, TenantRecord] = {}
-        self.agents: dict[str, AgentRecord] = {}
-        self.tasks: dict[str, TaskRecord] = {}
-        self.idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
-        self.audit_events: list[AuditEvent] = []
-
-
-class ControlPlaneService:
-    """Authoritative tenant, agent and task lifecycle service."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        store: InMemoryControlPlaneStore | None = None,
-        *,
-        policy_evaluator: PolicyEvaluator | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.store = store or InMemoryControlPlaneStore()
-        self.policy_evaluator = policy_evaluator or self._default_policy
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _default_policy(
-        context: RequestContext,
-        action: str,
-        resource: Mapping[str, Any],
-    ) -> PolicyDecision:
-        del resource
-        role_requirements = {
-            "tenant.register": {"platform_admin"},
-            "tenant.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
-            "agent.register": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "platform_admin"},
-            "agent.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
-            "task.create": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "platform_admin"},
-            "task.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
-            "task.approve": {"tenant_admin", "approver", "platform_admin"},
-            "task.start": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
-            "task.complete": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
-            "task.fail": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
-            "task.cancel": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "approver", "platform_admin"},
-            "audit.read": {"tenant_admin", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
-        }
-        required = role_requirements.get(action, {"platform_admin"})
-        allowed = bool(context.roles.intersection(required))
-        return PolicyDecision(
-            allowed=allowed,
-            reason="role_allowed" if allowed else "required_role_missing",
-            policy_version=context.policy_version,
-        )
-
-    def _require_context(self, context: RequestContext) -> None:
-        if not context.principal_id or not context.tenant_id or not context.trace_id:
-            raise Unauthorized("authenticated tenant context is required")
-
-    def _authorize(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        action: str,
-        resource: Mapping[str, Any],
-    ) -> PolicyDecision:
-        self._require_context(context)
-        decision = self.policy_evaluator(context, action, resource)
-        if not decision.allowed:
-            self._audit(
-                context,
-                action=action,
-                resource_type=str(resource.get("resource_type", "policy")),
-                resource_id=str(resource.get("resource_id", "unknown")),
-                outcome="denied",
-                details={"reason": decision.reason},
-            )
-            raise PolicyDenied(f"{action} denied: {decision.reason}")
-        return decision
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _assert_same_tenant(context: RequestContext, tenant_id: str) -> None:
-        if context.tenant_id != tenant_id and "platform_admin" not in context.roles:
-            raise TenantIsolationError("cross-tenant access denied")
-
-    def _audit(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        action: str,
-        resource_type: str,
-        resource_id: str,
-        outcome: str,
-        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> AuditEvent:
-        event = AuditEvent(
-            event_id=_new_id("audit"),
-            tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            trace_id=context.trace_id,
-            action=action,
-            resource_type=resource_type,
-            resource_id=resource_id,
-            outcome=outcome,
-            policy_version=context.policy_version,
-            details=copy.deepcopy(dict(details or {})),
-        )
-        self.store.audit_events.append(event)
-        return event
-
-    def register_tenant(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        display_name: str,
-        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> TenantRecord:
-        tenant_id = tenant_id.strip()
-        if not tenant_id or not display_name.strip():
-            raise ValueError("tenant_id and display_name are required")
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "tenant.register",
-            {"resource_type": "tenant", "resource_id": tenant_id},
-        )
-        self._assert_same_tenant(context, tenant_id)
-        with self.store.lock:
-            if tenant_id in self.store.tenants:
-                raise ControlPlaneError(f"tenant already exists: {tenant_id}")
-            tenant = TenantRecord(
-                tenant_id=tenant_id,
-                display_name=display_name.strip(),
-                metadata=copy.deepcopy(dict(metadata or {})),
-            )
-            self.store.tenants[tenant_id] = tenant
-            self._audit(
-                context,
-                action="tenant.register",
-                resource_type="tenant",
-                resource_id=tenant_id,
-                outcome="allowed",
-            )
-            return tenant
-
-    def get_tenant(self, context: RequestContext, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> TenantRecord:
-        tenant_id = tenant_id or context.tenant_id
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "tenant.read",
-            {"resource_type": "tenant", "resource_id": tenant_id},
-        )
-        self._assert_same_tenant(context, tenant_id)
-        with self.store.lock:
-            tenant = self.store.tenants.get(tenant_id)
-            if tenant is None:
-                raise NotFound("tenant not found")
-            return tenant
-
-    def register_agent(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        agent_id: str,
-        display_name: str,
-        runtime: str,
-        capabilities: Iterable[str] = (),
-        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> AgentRecord:
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "agent.register",
-            {"resource_type": "agent", "resource_id": agent_id},
-        )
-        tenant = self.get_tenant(context)
-        if tenant.status != "active":
-            raise ControlPlaneError("tenant is not active")
-        normalized_capabilities = tuple(
-            sorted({str(item).strip() for item in capabilities if str(item).strip()})
-        )
-        if not agent_id.strip() or not display_name.strip() or not runtime.strip():
-            raise ValueError("agent_id, display_name and runtime are required")
-        with self.store.lock:
-            existing = self.store.agents.get(agent_id)
-            if existing is not None and existing.tenant_id != context.tenant_id:
-                raise TenantIsolationError("agent id belongs to another tenant")
-            if existing is not None:
-                raise ControlPlaneError(f"agent already exists: {agent_id}")
-            agent = AgentRecord(
-                agent_id=agent_id.strip(),
-                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
-                display_name=display_name.strip(),
-                runtime=runtime.strip(),
-                capabilities=normalized_capabilities,
-                metadata=copy.deepcopy(dict(metadata or {})),
-            )
-            self.store.agents[agent.agent_id] = agent
-            self._audit(
-                context,
-                action="agent.register",
-                resource_type="agent",
-                resource_id=agent.agent_id,
-                outcome="allowed",
-                details={"runtime": agent.runtime},
-            )
-            return agent
-
-    def get_agent(self, context: RequestContext, agent_id: str) -> AgentRecord:
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "agent.read",
-            {"resource_type": "agent", "resource_id": agent_id},
-        )
-        with self.store.lock:
-            agent = self.store.agents.get(agent_id)
-            if agent is None:
-                raise NotFound("agent not found")
-            self._assert_same_tenant(context, agent.tenant_id)
-            return agent
-
-    def list_agents(self, context: RequestContext) -> list[AgentRecord]:
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "agent.read",
-            {"resource_type": "agent_collection", "resource_id": context.tenant_id},
-        )
-        with self.store.lock:
-            return [
-                agent
-                for agent in self.store.agents.values()
-                if agent.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
-            ]
-
-    def create_task(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        agent_id: str,
-        action: str,
-        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-        idempotency_key: str | None = None,
-    ) -> TaskRecord:
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "task.create",
-            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": idempotency_key or "new"},
-        )
-        agent = self.get_agent(context, agent_id)
-        if not agent.enabled:
-            raise ControlPlaneError("agent is disabled")
-        if action not in agent.capabilities and "*" not in agent.capabilities:
-            raise PolicyDenied(f"agent does not advertise capability: {action}")
-        normalized_payload = copy.deepcopy(dict(payload or {}))
-        request_digest = _canonical_digest(
-            {"agent_id": agent_id, "action": action, "payload": normalized_payload}
-        )
-        normalized_key = idempotency_key.strip() if idempotency_key else None
-        with self.store.lock:
-            if normalized_key:
-                idempotency_ref = (context.tenant_id, normalized_key)
-                existing = self.store.idempotency.get(idempotency_ref)
-                if existing is not None:
-                    existing_task_id, existing_digest = existing
-                    if existing_digest != request_digest:
-                        raise IdempotencyConflict(
-                            "idempotency key was reused with a different request"
-                        )
-                    return self.store.tasks[existing_task_id]
-            task = TaskRecord(
-                task_id=_new_id("task"),
-                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
-                agent_id=agent_id,
-                action=action,
-                payload=normalized_payload,
-                idempotency_key=normalized_key,
-                request_digest=request_digest,
-                created_by=context.principal_id,
-            )
-            self.store.tasks[task.task_id] = task
-            if normalized_key:
-                self.store.idempotency[(context.tenant_id, normalized_key)] = (
-                    task.task_id,
-                    request_digest,
-                )
-            self._audit(
-                context,
-                action="task.create",
-                resource_type="task",
-                resource_id=task.task_id,
-                outcome="allowed",
-                details={"agent_id": agent_id, "action": action},
-            )
-            return task
-
-    def get_task(self, context: RequestContext, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord:
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "task.read",
-            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": task_id},
-        )
-        with self.store.lock:
-            task = self.store.tasks.get(task_id)
-            if task is None:
-                raise NotFound("task not found")
-            self._assert_same_tenant(context, task.tenant_id)
-            return task
-
-    def list_tasks(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        states: Iterable[TaskState | str] | None = None,
-    ) -> list[TaskRecord]:
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "task.read",
-            {"resource_type": "task_collection", "resource_id": context.tenant_id},
-        )
-        state_filter = (
-            {TaskState(item) for item in states}
-            if states is not None
-            else None
-        )
-        with self.store.lock:
-            return [
-                task
-                for task in self.store.tasks.values()
-                if task.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
-                and (state_filter is None or task.state in state_filter)
-            ]
-
-    def transition_task(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        task_id: str,
-        target_state: TaskState | str,
-        expected_revision: int | None = None,
-        result: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-        error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> TaskRecord:
-        target = TaskState(target_state)
-        action_name = {
-            TaskState.APPROVED: "task.approve",
-            TaskState.RUNNING: "task.start",
-            TaskState.COMPLETED: "task.complete",
-            TaskState.FAILED: "task.fail",
-            TaskState.CANCELLED: "task.cancel",
-        }.get(target)
-        if action_name is None:
-            raise InvalidTransition(f"cannot transition to {target.value}")
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            action_name,
-            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": task_id},
-        )
-        with self.store.lock:
-            current = self.store.tasks.get(task_id)
-            if current is None:
-                raise NotFound("task not found")
-            self._assert_same_tenant(context, current.tenant_id)
-            if expected_revision is not None and current.revision != expected_revision:
-                raise RevisionConflict(
-                    f"expected revision {expected_revision}, current {current.revision}"
-                )
-            if target not in ALLOWED_TASK_TRANSITIONS[current.state]:
-                raise InvalidTransition(
-                    f"invalid transition {current.state.value} -> {target.value}"
-                )
-            if target == TaskState.COMPLETED and result is None:
-                raise ValueError("completed task requires result")
-            if target == TaskState.FAILED and error is None:
-                raise ValueError("failed task requires error")
-            updated = TaskRecord(
-                task_id=current.task_id,
-                tenant_id=current.tenant_id,
-                agent_id=current.agent_id,
-                action=current.action,
-                payload=current.payload,
-                state=target,
-                revision=current.revision + 1,
-                idempotency_key=current.idempotency_key,
-                request_digest=current.request_digest,
-                result=copy.deepcopy(dict(result)) if result is not None else current.result,
-                error=copy.deepcopy(dict(error)) if error is not None else current.error,
-                created_by=current.created_by,
-                approved_by=(
-                    context.principal_id
-                    if target == TaskState.APPROVED
-                    else current.approved_by
-                ),
-                created_at=current.created_at,
-                updated_at=_utc_now(),
-            )
-            self.store.tasks[task_id] = updated
-            self._audit(
-                context,
-                action=action_name,
-                resource_type="task",
-                resource_id=task_id,
-                outcome="allowed",
-                details={
-                    "from": current.state.value,
-                    "to": target.value,
-                    "revision": updated.revision,
-                },
-            )
-            return updated
-
-    def list_audit_events(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        resource_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> list[AuditEvent]:
-        self._authorize(
-            context,
-            "audit.read",
-            {"resource_type": "audit", "resource_id": resource_id or context.tenant_id},
-        )
-        with self.store.lock:
-            return [
-                event
-                for event in self.store.audit_events
-                if event.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
-                and (resource_id is None or event.resource_id == resource_id)
-            ]
@@ -1,379 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 持久化 Dispatch 记录。
-
-Dispatch 是 AIOS Task 与 Runtime command/job 之间的唯一可信绑定。所有结果回写
-必须匹配 tenant/task/trace/runtime_execution/provenance/run/principal。
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import sqlite3
-import threading
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from enum import Enum
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
-    return normalized
-
-
-class DispatchState(str, Enum):
-    PREPARED = "PREPARED"
-    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
-    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
-    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
-    FAILED = "FAILED"
-    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
-
-
-TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES = frozenset(
-    {DispatchState.COMPLETED, DispatchState.FAILED, DispatchState.CANCELLED}
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class DispatchRecord:
-    dispatch_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    runtime: str
-    runtime_execution_id: str
-    trace_id: str
-    provenance_id: str
-    run_id: str
-    authorization_id: str
-    state: DispatchState = DispatchState.PREPARED
-    expected_worker_id: str | None = None
-    result_digest: str | None = None
-    created_at: str = ""
-    updated_at: str = ""
-    completed_at: str | None = None
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in (
-            "dispatch_id",
-            "tenant_id",
-            "task_id",
-            "agent_id",
-            "principal_id",
-            "runtime",
-            "runtime_execution_id",
-            "trace_id",
-            "provenance_id",
-            "run_id",
-            "authorization_id",
-        ):
-            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
-        object.__setattr__(self, "state", DispatchState(self.state))
-        now = utc_now()
-        object.__setattr__(self, "created_at", self.created_at or now)
-        object.__setattr__(self, "updated_at", self.updated_at or now)
-        if self.expected_worker_id is not None:
-            object.__setattr__(
-                self,
-                "expected_worker_id",
-                _required(self.expected_worker_id, "expected_worker_id"),
-            )
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(
-        cls,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        agent_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        runtime: str,
-        runtime_execution_id: str,
-        trace_id: str,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-        authorization_id: str,
-    ) -> "DispatchRecord":
-        return cls(
-            dispatch_id=f"dispatch_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            task_id=task_id,
-            agent_id=agent_id,
-            principal_id=principal_id,
-            runtime=runtime,
-            runtime_execution_id=runtime_execution_id,
-            trace_id=trace_id,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-            authorization_id=authorization_id,
-        )
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        value = asdict(self)
-        value["state"] = self.state.value
-        return value
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "DispatchRecord":
-        return cls(**dict(value))
-
-
-class DispatchConflict(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-class DispatchNotFound(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-class DispatchRepository(Protocol):
-    def create(self, record: DispatchRecord) -> DispatchRecord: ...
-    def get(self, dispatch_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord: ...
-    def get_by_task(self, task_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord | None: ...
-    def get_by_runtime_execution(
-        self, runtime_execution_id: str, *, tenant_id: str
-    ) -> DispatchRecord | None: ...
-    def update(
-        self,
-        dispatch_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        state: DispatchState | str | None = None,
-        expected_worker_id: str | None = None,
-        result_digest: str | None = None,
-    ) -> DispatchRecord: ...
-    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[DispatchRecord]: ...
-
-
-class InMemoryDispatchRepository:
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self._records: dict[str, DispatchRecord] = {}
-        self._by_task: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {}
-        self._by_runtime: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {}
-
-    def create(self, record: DispatchRecord) -> DispatchRecord:
-        with self._lock:
-            task_ref = (record.tenant_id, record.task_id)
-            runtime_ref = (record.tenant_id, record.runtime_execution_id)
-            if task_ref in self._by_task or runtime_ref in self._by_runtime:
-                existing = self.get_by_task(record.task_id, tenant_id=record.tenant_id)
-                if existing == record:
-                    return record
-                raise DispatchConflict("task or runtime execution already has a dispatch")
-            self._records[record.dispatch_id] = record
-            self._by_task[task_ref] = record.dispatch_id
-            self._by_runtime[runtime_ref] = record.dispatch_id
-            return record
-
-    def get(self, dispatch_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord:
-        with self._lock:
-            record = self._records.get(dispatch_id)
-            if record is None or record.tenant_id != tenant_id:
-                raise DispatchNotFound("dispatch not found")
-            return record
-
-    def get_by_task(self, task_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord | None:
-        with self._lock:
-            dispatch_id = self._by_task.get((tenant_id, task_id))
-            return self._records.get(dispatch_id) if dispatch_id else None
-
-    def get_by_runtime_execution(
-        self, runtime_execution_id: str, *, tenant_id: str
-    ) -> DispatchRecord | None:
-        with self._lock:
-            dispatch_id = self._by_runtime.get((tenant_id, runtime_execution_id))
-            return self._records.get(dispatch_id) if dispatch_id else None
-
-    def update(
-        self,
-        dispatch_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        state: DispatchState | str | None = None,
-        expected_worker_id: str | None = None,
-        result_digest: str | None = None,
-    ) -> DispatchRecord:
-        with self._lock:
-            current = self.get(dispatch_id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
-            target = DispatchState(state) if state is not None else current.state
-            if current.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES and target != current.state:
-                raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch cannot transition")
-            updated = replace(
-                current,
-                state=target,
-                expected_worker_id=(
-                    expected_worker_id
-                    if expected_worker_id is not None
-                    else current.expected_worker_id
-                ),
-                result_digest=result_digest or current.result_digest,
-                updated_at=utc_now(),
-                completed_at=(utc_now() if target in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES else None),
-            )
-            self._records[dispatch_id] = updated
-            return updated
-
-    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[DispatchRecord]:
-        with self._lock:
-            return sorted(
-                [item for item in self._records.values() if item.tenant_id == tenant_id],
-                key=lambda item: (item.created_at, item.dispatch_id),
-            )
-
-
-class SQLiteDispatchRepository:
-    SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        with self._connect() as connection:
-            connection.executescript(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS dispatch_records (
-                    dispatch_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    runtime_execution_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, task_id),
-                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, runtime_execution_id)
-                );
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_dispatch_tenant_state
-                    ON dispatch_records(tenant_id, state, updated_at);
-                """
-            )
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        connection = sqlite3.connect(str(self.path), timeout=30.0)
-        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        return connection
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _encode(record: DispatchRecord) -> str:
-        return json.dumps(
-            record.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
-        )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _decode(row: sqlite3.Row) -> DispatchRecord:
-        value = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
-        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-            raise RuntimeError("invalid dispatch record")
-        return DispatchRecord.from_dict(value)
-
-    def create(self, record: DispatchRecord) -> DispatchRecord:
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                connection.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO dispatch_records VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                    (
-                        record.dispatch_id,
-                        record.tenant_id,
-                        record.task_id,
-                        record.runtime_execution_id,
-                        self._encode(record),
-                        record.state.value,
-                        record.updated_at,
-                    ),
-                )
-                connection.commit()
-                return record
-            except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
-                connection.rollback()
-                existing = self.get_by_task(record.task_id, tenant_id=record.tenant_id)
-                if existing is not None and existing == record:
-                    return existing
-                raise DispatchConflict("task or runtime execution already has a dispatch") from exc
-
-    def get(self, dispatch_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord:
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE dispatch_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
-                (_required(dispatch_id, "dispatch_id"), _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id")),
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            raise DispatchNotFound("dispatch not found")
-        return self._decode(row)
-
-    def get_by_task(self, task_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord | None:
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE task_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
-                (_required(task_id, "task_id"), _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id")),
-            ).fetchone()
-        return self._decode(row) if row is not None else None
-
-    def get_by_runtime_execution(
-        self, runtime_execution_id: str, *, tenant_id: str
-    ) -> DispatchRecord | None:
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE runtime_execution_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
-                (
-                    _required(runtime_execution_id, "runtime_execution_id"),
-                    _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),
-                ),
-            ).fetchone()
-        return self._decode(row) if row is not None else None
-
-    def update(
-        self,
-        dispatch_id: str,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        state: DispatchState | str | None = None,
-        expected_worker_id: str | None = None,
-        result_digest: str | None = None,
-    ) -> DispatchRecord:
-        current = self.get(dispatch_id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
-        target = DispatchState(state) if state is not None else current.state
-        if current.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES and target != current.state:
-            raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch cannot transition")
-        updated = replace(
-            current,
-            state=target,
-            expected_worker_id=(
-                expected_worker_id if expected_worker_id is not None else current.expected_worker_id
-            ),
-            result_digest=result_digest or current.result_digest,
-            updated_at=utc_now(),
-            completed_at=(utc_now() if target in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES else None),
-        )
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            connection.execute(
-                "UPDATE dispatch_records SET payload_json = ?, state = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE dispatch_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
-                (
-                    self._encode(updated),
-                    updated.state.value,
-                    updated.updated_at,
-                    updated.dispatch_id,
-                    updated.tenant_id,
-                ),
-            )
-            connection.commit()
-        return updated
-
-    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[DispatchRecord]:
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            rows = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE tenant_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at, dispatch_id",
-                (_required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),),
-            ).fetchall()
-        return [self._decode(row) for row in rows]
@@ -1,323 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 Agent 执行证据。
-
-Evidence 按租户隔离并使用原子 JSON 写入。生产模式下，claim、heartbeat
-和 complete 在落盘前必须通过最小权限 Evidence Grant 授权。
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import threading
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
-
-from .provenance import ProvenanceDenied, digest_payload
-
-
-class EvidenceAuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
-    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
-    return normalized
-
-
-def _safe(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return json.loads(json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, default=str))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ExecutionEvidence:
-    execution_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    executor: str
-    branch: str
-    status: str = "claimed"
-    progress_completed: int = 0
-    progress_total: int = 1
-    current_step: str = "claim"
-    last_commit: str | None = None
-    test_status: str = "not_run"
-    test_summary: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    result_summary: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    claimed_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-    heartbeat_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-    completed_at: str | None = None
-    provenance_id: str | None = None
-    run_id: str | None = None
-    last_authorization_id: str | None = None
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in (
-            "execution_id",
-            "tenant_id",
-            "task_id",
-            "agent_id",
-            "executor",
-            "branch",
-            "status",
-            "current_step",
-            "claimed_at",
-            "heartbeat_at",
-        ):
-            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
-        if self.progress_completed < 0 or self.progress_total < 1:
-            raise ValueError("invalid progress values")
-        if self.progress_completed > self.progress_total:
-            raise ValueError("progress_completed cannot exceed progress_total")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "test_summary", _safe(self.test_summary))
-        object.__setattr__(self, "result_summary", _safe(self.result_summary))
-        for optional in ("provenance_id", "run_id", "last_authorization_id"):
-            value = getattr(self, optional)
-            object.__setattr__(self, optional, str(value).strip() if value else None)
-
-
-class ExecutionTracker:
-    """每个租户、每次执行持久保存一份证据记录。"""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        root: str | Path,
-        *,
-        provenance_writer: EvidenceAuthorizationWriter | None = None,
-        require_provenance: bool = False,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.root = Path(root).resolve()
-        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.provenance_writer = provenance_writer
-        self.require_provenance = bool(require_provenance)
-        if self.require_provenance and self.provenance_writer is None:
-            raise ValueError("production evidence tracking requires a provenance writer")
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _component(value: str) -> str:
-        normalized = _required(value, "path component")
-        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
-            raise ValueError("invalid evidence path component")
-        return normalized
-
-    def _path(self, tenant_id: str, execution_id: str) -> Path:
-        tenant = self._component(tenant_id)
-        execution = self._component(execution_id)
-        return self.root / tenant / f"{execution}.json"
-
-    def _authorize(
-        self,
-        evidence: ExecutionEvidence,
-        *,
-        operation: str,
-        principal_id: str | None,
-        provenance_id: str | None,
-        run_id: str | None,
-        changes: Mapping[str, Any],
-    ) -> str | None:
-        if not self.require_provenance:
-            return None
-        if self.provenance_writer is None:
-            raise RuntimeError("Run Provenance writer is not configured")
-        effective_provenance = provenance_id or evidence.provenance_id
-        effective_run = run_id or evidence.run_id
-        if not effective_provenance or not effective_run or not principal_id:
-            raise RuntimeError(
-                "production evidence write requires provenance_id, run_id and principal_id"
-            )
-        request_digest = digest_payload(
-            {
-                "operation": operation,
-                "execution_id": evidence.execution_id,
-                "tenant_id": evidence.tenant_id,
-                "task_id": evidence.task_id,
-                "agent_id": evidence.agent_id,
-                "executor": evidence.executor,
-                "branch": evidence.branch,
-                "changes": dict(changes),
-            }
-        )
-        try:
-            authorization = self.provenance_writer.authorize_evidence_write(
-                provenance_id=effective_provenance,
-                run_id=effective_run,
-                tenant_id=evidence.tenant_id,
-                task_id=evidence.task_id,
-                agent_id=evidence.agent_id,
-                principal_id=principal_id,
-                request_digest=request_digest,
-            )
-        except ProvenanceDenied as exc:
-            raise RuntimeError(f"Run Provenance denied evidence write: {exc}") from exc
-        return authorization.authorization_id
-
-    def claim(
-        self,
-        evidence: ExecutionEvidence,
-        *,
-        principal_id: str | None = None,
-        provenance_id: str | None = None,
-        run_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
-        path = self._path(evidence.tenant_id, evidence.execution_id)
-        with self._lock:
-            if path.exists():
-                current = self._read(path)
-                if current.task_id != evidence.task_id or current.agent_id != evidence.agent_id:
-                    raise RuntimeError("execution_id already belongs to another task")
-                if self.require_provenance and (
-                    current.provenance_id != (provenance_id or evidence.provenance_id)
-                    or current.run_id != (run_id or evidence.run_id)
-                ):
-                    raise RuntimeError(
-                        "execution_id already belongs to another provenance context"
-                    )
-                return current
-            effective_provenance = provenance_id or evidence.provenance_id
-            effective_run = run_id or evidence.run_id
-            authorization_id = self._authorize(
-                evidence,
-                operation="claim",
-                principal_id=principal_id,
-                provenance_id=effective_provenance,
-                run_id=effective_run,
-                changes={"status": evidence.status, "current_step": evidence.current_step},
-            )
-            persisted = replace(
-                evidence,
-                provenance_id=effective_provenance,
-                run_id=effective_run,
-                last_authorization_id=authorization_id,
-            )
-            self._write(path, persisted)
-            return persisted
-
-    def heartbeat(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        execution_id: str,
-        status: str | None = None,
-        current_step: str | None = None,
-        progress_completed: int | None = None,
-        progress_total: int | None = None,
-        last_commit: str | None = None,
-        principal_id: str | None = None,
-        provenance_id: str | None = None,
-        run_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
-        path = self._path(tenant_id, execution_id)
-        with self._lock:
-            current = self._read(path)
-            changes = {
-                "status": status or current.status,
-                "current_step": current_step or current.current_step,
-                "progress_completed": (
-                    progress_completed
-                    if progress_completed is not None
-                    else current.progress_completed
-                ),
-                "progress_total": (
-                    progress_total if progress_total is not None else current.progress_total
-                ),
-                "last_commit": last_commit or current.last_commit,
-            }
-            authorization_id = self._authorize(
-                current,
-                operation="heartbeat",
-                principal_id=principal_id,
-                provenance_id=provenance_id,
-                run_id=run_id,
-                changes=changes,
-            )
-            updated = replace(
-                current,
-                **changes,
-                last_authorization_id=authorization_id or current.last_authorization_id,
-                heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-            self._write(path, updated)
-            return updated
-
-    def complete(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        execution_id: str,
-        status: str,
-        test_status: str,
-        test_summary: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-        result_summary: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-        last_commit: str | None = None,
-        principal_id: str | None = None,
-        provenance_id: str | None = None,
-        run_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
-        path = self._path(tenant_id, execution_id)
-        with self._lock:
-            current = self._read(path)
-            changes = {
-                "status": _required(status, "status"),
-                "current_step": "complete",
-                "progress_completed": current.progress_total,
-                "last_commit": last_commit or current.last_commit,
-                "test_status": _required(test_status, "test_status"),
-                "test_summary": _safe(test_summary),
-                "result_summary": _safe(result_summary),
-            }
-            authorization_id = self._authorize(
-                current,
-                operation="complete",
-                principal_id=principal_id,
-                provenance_id=provenance_id,
-                run_id=run_id,
-                changes=changes,
-            )
-            updated = replace(
-                current,
-                **changes,
-                last_authorization_id=authorization_id or current.last_authorization_id,
-                heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
-                completed_at=utc_now(),
-            )
-            self._write(path, updated)
-            return updated
-
-    def get(self, *, tenant_id: str, execution_id: str) -> ExecutionEvidence:
-        return self._read(self._path(tenant_id, execution_id))
-
-    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[ExecutionEvidence]:
-        tenant_dir = self.root / self._component(tenant_id)
-        if not tenant_dir.exists():
-            return []
-        records = [self._read(path) for path in tenant_dir.glob("*.json")]
-        return sorted(records, key=lambda item: (item.heartbeat_at, item.execution_id), reverse=True)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _read(path: Path) -> ExecutionEvidence:
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        except FileNotFoundError as exc:
-            raise KeyError("execution evidence not found") from exc
-        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-            raise RuntimeError("invalid execution evidence file")
-        return ExecutionEvidence(**dict(value))
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _write(path: Path, evidence: ExecutionEvidence) -> None:
-        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        temporary = path.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
-        temporary.write_text(
-            json.dumps(asdict(evidence), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
-            encoding="utf-8",
-        )
-        os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
-        os.replace(temporary, path)
@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
-"""HTTP/JSON gateway for the AIOS V2 control plane.
-
-The public gateway owns user-facing control operations only. Runtime lifecycle
-transitions are deliberately absent: external callers cannot directly move a
-task to RUNNING, COMPLETED or FAILED. Those transitions are available only
-through the provenance-protected orchestrator and internal reconciliation API.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import dataclasses
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import urllib.parse
-from enum import Enum
-from http import HTTPStatus
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from aios_hermes import HermesConflict, HermesNotFound
-
-from .control_plane import (
-    ControlPlaneError,
-    ControlPlaneService,
-    IdempotencyConflict,
-    InvalidTransition,
-    NotFound,
-    PolicyDenied,
-    RequestContext,
-    RevisionConflict,
-    TaskState,
-    TenantIsolationError,
-    Unauthorized,
-)
-from .dispatch_store import DispatchConflict, DispatchNotFound
-from .orchestrator import OrchestrationError
-from .provenance import ProvenanceDenied, ProvenanceReplay
-
-TENANT_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Tenant-ID"
-PRINCIPAL_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Principal-ID"
-ROLES_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Roles"
-TRACE_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Trace-ID"
-SESSION_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Session-ID"
-POLICY_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Policy-Version"
-AUTHENTICATED_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Authenticated"
-
-_RESOURCE_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,191}$")
-
-
-def _json_value(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if dataclasses.is_dataclass(value):
-        return {
-            field.name: _json_value(getattr(value, field.name))
-            for field in dataclasses.fields(value)
-        }
-    if isinstance(value, Enum):
-        return value.value
-    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        return {str(key): _json_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
-        return [_json_value(item) for item in value]
-    return value
-
-
-def _require_mapping(value: Any, *, label: str = "JSON body") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        raise ValueError(f"{label} must be an object")
-    return value
-
-
-def _require_resource_id(value: Any, *, label: str) -> str:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not _RESOURCE_ID_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
-        raise ValueError(f"invalid {label}")
-    return normalized
-
-
-class GatewayApplication:
-    """Pure user-facing request router that can be tested without a socket."""
-
-    def __init__(self, service: ControlPlaneService | None = None) -> None:
-        self.service = service or ControlPlaneService()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def context_from_headers(headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext:
-        normalized_headers = {
-            str(key).strip().lower(): value for key, value in headers.items()
-        }
-
-        def header(name: str, default: str = "") -> str:
-            return str(normalized_headers.get(name.lower(), default))
-
-        authenticated = header(AUTHENTICATED_HEADER).strip().lower()
-        if authenticated not in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
-            raise Unauthorized("trusted authentication assertion is required")
-        roles = [
-            role.strip()
-            for role in header(ROLES_HEADER).split(",")
-            if role.strip()
-        ]
-        return RequestContext.create(
-            tenant_id=header(TENANT_HEADER),
-            principal_id=header(PRINCIPAL_HEADER),
-            trace_id=header(TRACE_HEADER).strip() or None,
-            session_id=header(SESSION_HEADER).strip() or None,
-            policy_version=header(POLICY_HEADER, "v1").strip() or "v1",
-            roles=roles,
-        )
-
-    def handle(
-        self,
-        method: str,
-        raw_path: str,
-        headers: Mapping[str, str],
-        body: Any = None,
-    ) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
-        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw_path)
-        path = parsed.path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-        query = urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=False)
-        method = method.upper()
-
-        if method == "GET" and path in {"/healthz", "/api/v2/health"}:
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                "service": "aios-v2-control-plane",
-                "status": "ok",
-                "store": type(self.service.store).__name__,
-            }
-
-        context = self.context_from_headers(headers)
-        payload = _require_mapping(body or {})
-
-        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/tenants":
-            tenant = self.service.register_tenant(
-                context,
-                tenant_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("tenant_id"), label="tenant_id"),
-                display_name=str(payload.get("display_name", "")),
-                metadata=_require_mapping(payload.get("metadata", {}), label="metadata"),
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"tenant": _json_value(tenant)}
-
-        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/tenants/current":
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"tenant": _json_value(self.service.get_tenant(context))}
-
-        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/agents":
-            agent = self.service.register_agent(
-                context,
-                agent_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("agent_id"), label="agent_id"),
-                display_name=str(payload.get("display_name", "")),
-                runtime=str(payload.get("runtime", "")),
-                capabilities=payload.get("capabilities", ()),
-                metadata=_require_mapping(payload.get("metadata", {}), label="metadata"),
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"agent": _json_value(agent)}
-
-        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/agents":
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"agents": _json_value(self.service.list_agents(context))}
-
-        agent_match = re.fullmatch(r"/api/v2/agents/([^/]+)", path)
-        if method == "GET" and agent_match:
-            agent_id = _require_resource_id(
-                urllib.parse.unquote(agent_match.group(1)), label="agent_id"
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                "agent": _json_value(self.service.get_agent(context, agent_id))
-            }
-
-        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/tasks":
-            task = self.service.create_task(
-                context,
-                agent_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("agent_id"), label="agent_id"),
-                action=str(payload.get("action", "")).strip(),
-                payload=_require_mapping(payload.get("payload", {}), label="payload"),
-                idempotency_key=(
-                    str(payload["idempotency_key"]).strip()
-                    if payload.get("idempotency_key") is not None
-                    else None
-                ),
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"task": _json_value(task)}
-
-        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/tasks":
-            tasks = self.service.list_tasks(context, states=query.get("state"))
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"tasks": _json_value(tasks)}
-
-        task_match = re.fullmatch(r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)", path)
-        if method == "GET" and task_match:
-            task_id = _require_resource_id(
-                urllib.parse.unquote(task_match.group(1)), label="task_id"
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
-                "task": _json_value(self.service.get_task(context, task_id))
-            }
-
-        bypass_match = re.fullmatch(
-            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/(start|complete|fail)", path
-        )
-        if method == "POST" and bypass_match:
-            return HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN, {
-                "error": "RuntimeLifecycleBypassDenied",
-                "message": (
-                    "RUNNING, COMPLETED and FAILED transitions are internal; "
-                    "use the provenance-protected dispatch/reconcile flow"
-                ),
-            }
-
-        transition_match = re.fullmatch(
-            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/(approve|cancel)", path
-        )
-        if method == "POST" and transition_match:
-            task_id = _require_resource_id(
-                urllib.parse.unquote(transition_match.group(1)), label="task_id"
-            )
-            target = (
-                TaskState.APPROVED
-                if transition_match.group(2) == "approve"
-                else TaskState.CANCELLED
-            )
-            expected_revision = payload.get("expected_revision")
-            task = self.service.transition_task(
-                context,
-                task_id=task_id,
-                target_state=target,
-                expected_revision=(
-                    int(expected_revision) if expected_revision is not None else None
-                ),
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"task": _json_value(task)}
-
-        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/audit":
-            resource_id = query.get("resource_id", [None])[0]
-            events = self.service.list_audit_events(
-                context,
-                resource_id=(
-                    _require_resource_id(resource_id, label="resource_id")
-                    if resource_id
-                    else None
-                ),
-            )
-            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"events": _json_value(events)}
-
-        return HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, {
-            "error": "not_found",
-            "message": "route not found",
-        }
-
-
-_ERROR_STATUS: tuple[tuple[type[BaseException], HTTPStatus], ...] = (
-    (Unauthorized, HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED),
-    (PolicyDenied, HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN),
-    (ProvenanceDenied, HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN),
-    (TenantIsolationError, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
-    (NotFound, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
-    (DispatchNotFound, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
-    (HermesNotFound, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
-    (ProvenanceReplay, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
-    (IdempotencyConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
-    (RevisionConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
-    (InvalidTransition, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
-    (DispatchConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
-    (HermesConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
-    (OrchestrationError, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
-    (ValueError, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST),
-    (ControlPlaneError, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST),
-)
-
-
-def error_response(exc: BaseException) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
-    for error_type, status in _ERROR_STATUS:
-        if isinstance(exc, error_type):
-            return status, {"error": error_type.__name__, "message": str(exc)}
-    return HTTPStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, {
-        "error": "InternalServerError",
-        "message": "internal server error",
-    }
-
-
-class GatewayRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    server_version = "AIOSV2Gateway/1.0"
-    max_body_bytes = 1_048_576
-
-    @property
-    def application(self) -> GatewayApplication:
-        return self.server.application  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
-
-    def _read_body(self) -> Any:
-        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or "0")
-        if length < 0 or length > self.max_body_bytes:
-            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
-        if length == 0:
-            return {}
-        content_type = self.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0].strip()
-        if content_type != "application/json":
-            raise ValueError("Content-Type must be application/json")
-        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
-
-    def _send_json(self, status: int, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        encoded = json.dumps(
-            _json_value(payload), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")
-        ).encode("utf-8")
-        self.send_response(int(status))
-        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
-        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
-        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(encoded)
-
-    def _dispatch(self, method: str) -> None:
-        try:
-            body = self._read_body() if method in {"POST", "PUT", "PATCH"} else {}
-            status, payload = self.application.handle(
-                method,
-                self.path,
-                {key: value for key, value in self.headers.items()},
-                body,
-            )
-        except Exception as exc:
-            status, payload = error_response(exc)
-        self._send_json(status, payload)
-
-    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
-        self._dispatch("GET")
-
-    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
-        self._dispatch("POST")
-
-    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
-        super().log_message(format, *args)
-
-
-class GatewayHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
-    daemon_threads = True
-    allow_reuse_address = True
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        server_address: tuple[str, int],
-        application: GatewayApplication,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.application = application
-        super().__init__(server_address, GatewayRequestHandler)
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    host = os.getenv("AIOS_V2_GATEWAY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
-    port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_GATEWAY_PORT", "18920"))
-    server = GatewayHTTPServer((host, port), GatewayApplication())
-    print(f"AIOS V2 control-plane gateway listening on {host}:{port}")
-    server.serve_forever()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-"""Sanitized GitOps runtime status for the AIOS Web control plane."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import subprocess
-from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GitOpsStatus:
-    available: bool
-    service_status: str
-    workspace_mode: str
-    workspace_branch: str | None
-    workspace_ref: str | None
-    workspace_dirty: bool | None
-    candidate_branch: str
-    release_channel: str
-    release_version: str
-    sync_status: str
-    details: Mapping[str, Any]
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return asdict(self)
-
-
-def _run_git(worktree: Path, *args: str) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
-    process = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "-C", str(worktree), *args],
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-        timeout=5,
-    )
-    return process.returncode, process.stdout.strip(), process.stderr.strip()
-
-
-def collect_gitops_status() -> GitOpsStatus:
-    """Return only non-sensitive Git/workspace metadata.
-
-    Remote URLs, environment values, credentials, filesystem contents and
-    command stderr are deliberately excluded from the Web response.
-    """
-
-    candidate_branch = os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_CANDIDATE_BRANCH",
-        "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
-    )
-    release_channel = os.getenv("AIOS_RELEASE_CHANNEL", "candidate")
-    release_version = os.getenv("AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION", "V2R1C0-candidate")
-    sync_status = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SYNC_STATUS", "unknown")
-    worktree = Path(
-        os.getenv(
-            "AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_WORKTREE",
-            "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller",
-        )
-    )
-
-    if not worktree.is_dir():
-        return GitOpsStatus(
-            available=False,
-            service_status="unknown",
-            workspace_mode="unavailable",
-            workspace_branch=None,
-            workspace_ref=None,
-            workspace_dirty=None,
-            candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
-            release_channel=release_channel,
-            release_version=release_version,
-            sync_status=sync_status,
-            details={"reason": "controller_worktree_unavailable"},
-        )
-
-    inside_code, inside, _ = _run_git(worktree, "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree")
-    if inside_code != 0 or inside != "true":
-        return GitOpsStatus(
-            available=False,
-            service_status="unknown",
-            workspace_mode="invalid",
-            workspace_branch=None,
-            workspace_ref=None,
-            workspace_dirty=None,
-            candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
-            release_channel=release_channel,
-            release_version=release_version,
-            sync_status=sync_status,
-            details={"reason": "controller_worktree_invalid"},
-        )
-
-    branch_code, branch, _ = _run_git(worktree, "branch", "--show-current")
-    ref_code, ref_value, _ = _run_git(worktree, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
-    dirty_code, dirty_value, _ = _run_git(worktree, "status", "--porcelain=v1")
-
-    service_status = "unknown"
-    try:
-        process = subprocess.run(
-            ["systemctl", "is-active", "aios-gitops-model-api"],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            timeout=3,
-        )
-        service_status = process.stdout.strip() or "inactive"
-    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
-        service_status = "unavailable"
-
-    branch_value = branch if branch_code == 0 and branch else None
-    return GitOpsStatus(
-        available=True,
-        service_status=service_status,
-        workspace_mode="branch" if branch_value else "detached",
-        workspace_branch=branch_value,
-        workspace_ref=ref_value if ref_code == 0 else None,
-        workspace_dirty=bool(dirty_value) if dirty_code == 0 else None,
-        candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
-        release_channel=release_channel,
-        release_version=release_version,
-        sync_status=sync_status,
-        details={
-            "controller_clean": dirty_code == 0 and not dirty_value,
-            "controller_detached": branch_code == 0 and not branch,
-        },
-    )
@@ -1,599 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 execution orchestrator.
-
-The orchestrator is the only component allowed to translate an approved AIOS
-Task into an OpenClaw command or Hermes job. Every dispatch is persisted before
-Runtime side effects. Runtime results must bind to the exact dispatch,
-command/job, tenant, task, trace, principal and provenance context.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
-
-from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJob, HermesJobState, HermesResult
-from aios_openclaw import (
-    CommandState,
-    OpenClawAdapter,
-    OpenClawCommand,
-    OpenClawResult,
-    sign_command,
-)
-
-from .control_plane import (
-    AgentRecord,
-    ControlPlaneService,
-    RequestContext,
-    TaskRecord,
-    TaskState,
-)
-from .dispatch_store import (
-    DispatchConflict,
-    DispatchRecord,
-    DispatchRepository,
-    DispatchState,
-    InMemoryDispatchRepository,
-    TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES,
-)
-from .provenance import ProvenanceDenied, digest_payload
-
-
-class RuntimeAuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
-    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-
-
-class OrchestrationError(RuntimeError):
-    """AIOS failed to dispatch or reconcile a runtime execution."""
-
-
-class ExecutionOrchestrator:
-    """Dispatch approved AIOS tasks and strictly reconcile Runtime results."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        control_plane: ControlPlaneService,
-        *,
-        openclaw: OpenClawAdapter | None = None,
-        hermes: HermesAdapter | None = None,
-        openclaw_signing_material_resolver=None,
-        openclaw_key_id: str = "default",
-        default_cell_id: str = "default",
-        default_profile_id: str = "default",
-        provenance_writer: RuntimeAuthorizationWriter | None = None,
-        require_provenance: bool = False,
-        dispatch_repository: DispatchRepository | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.control_plane = control_plane
-        self.openclaw = openclaw
-        self.hermes = hermes
-        self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver = openclaw_signing_material_resolver
-        self.openclaw_key_id = str(openclaw_key_id or "").strip() or "default"
-        self.default_cell_id = default_cell_id
-        self.default_profile_id = default_profile_id
-        self.provenance_writer = provenance_writer
-        self.require_provenance = bool(require_provenance)
-        self.dispatch_repository = dispatch_repository or InMemoryDispatchRepository()
-        if self.require_provenance and self.provenance_writer is None:
-            raise ValueError("production orchestration requires a provenance writer")
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _record_provenance(value: str | None, *, required: bool, label: str) -> str:
-        normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-        if required and not normalized:
-            raise OrchestrationError(f"production dispatch requires {label}")
-        return normalized or f"{label}-not-required"
-
-    def _authorize_dispatch(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        task: TaskRecord,
-        agent: AgentRecord,
-        provenance_id: str | None,
-        run_id: str | None,
-        timeout_seconds: float | None,
-    ) -> str:
-        if not self.require_provenance:
-            return "authorization-not-required"
-        if self.provenance_writer is None:
-            raise OrchestrationError("Run Provenance writer is not configured")
-        if not provenance_id or not run_id:
-            raise OrchestrationError(
-                "production dispatch requires provenance_id and run_id"
-            )
-        request_digest = digest_payload(
-            {
-                "operation": "dispatch",
-                "tenant_id": task.tenant_id,
-                "task_id": task.task_id,
-                "agent_id": agent.agent_id,
-                "principal_id": context.principal_id,
-                "runtime": agent.runtime.strip().lower(),
-                "action": task.action,
-                "payload": task.payload,
-                "trace_id": context.trace_id,
-                "timeout_seconds": timeout_seconds,
-                "task_revision": task.revision,
-            }
-        )
-        try:
-            authorization = self.provenance_writer.authorize_runtime_execute(
-                provenance_id=provenance_id,
-                run_id=run_id,
-                tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
-                task_id=task.task_id,
-                agent_id=agent.agent_id,
-                principal_id=context.principal_id,
-                request_digest=request_digest,
-            )
-            return authorization.authorization_id
-        except ProvenanceDenied as exc:
-            raise OrchestrationError(f"Run Provenance denied dispatch: {exc}") from exc
-
-    def dispatch(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        task_id: str,
-        timeout_seconds: float | None = None,
-        provenance_id: str | None = None,
-        run_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> DispatchRecord:
-        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, task_id)
-        agent = self.control_plane.get_agent(context, task.agent_id)
-        persisted_provenance = self._record_provenance(
-            provenance_id, required=self.require_provenance, label="provenance_id"
-        )
-        persisted_run = self._record_provenance(
-            run_id, required=self.require_provenance, label="run_id"
-        )
-
-        existing = self.dispatch_repository.get_by_task(
-            task.task_id, tenant_id=task.tenant_id
-        )
-        if existing is not None:
-            if (
-                existing.provenance_id != persisted_provenance
-                or existing.run_id != persisted_run
-                or existing.principal_id != context.principal_id
-            ):
-                raise OrchestrationError(
-                    "existing dispatch belongs to another provenance or principal context"
-                )
-            return existing
-
-        if task.state != TaskState.APPROVED:
-            raise OrchestrationError("only APPROVED tasks may be dispatched")
-
-        authorization_id = self._authorize_dispatch(
-            context,
-            task=task,
-            agent=agent,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-            timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
-        )
-        runtime = agent.runtime.strip().lower()
-        prepared: DispatchRecord | None = None
-
-        try:
-            if runtime == "openclaw":
-                command = self._create_openclaw_command(context, task)
-                prepared = self.dispatch_repository.create(
-                    DispatchRecord.create(
-                        tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
-                        task_id=task.task_id,
-                        agent_id=agent.agent_id,
-                        principal_id=context.principal_id,
-                        runtime="openclaw",
-                        runtime_execution_id=command.command_id,
-                        trace_id=context.trace_id,
-                        provenance_id=persisted_provenance,
-                        run_id=persisted_run,
-                        authorization_id=authorization_id,
-                    )
-                )
-                self.control_plane.transition_task(
-                    context,
-                    task_id=task.task_id,
-                    target_state=TaskState.RUNNING,
-                    expected_revision=task.revision,
-                )
-                self.dispatch_repository.update(
-                    prepared.dispatch_id,
-                    tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id,
-                    state=DispatchState.RUNNING,
-                )
-                if self.openclaw is None:
-                    raise OrchestrationError("OpenClaw runtime is not configured")
-                result = self.openclaw.execute(
-                    command, timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds
-                )
-                self.reconcile_openclaw(
-                    context,
-                    result,
-                    dispatch_id=prepared.dispatch_id,
-                    provenance_id=persisted_provenance,
-                    run_id=persisted_run,
-                )
-                return self.dispatch_repository.get(
-                    prepared.dispatch_id, tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id
-                )
-
-            if runtime == "hermes":
-                if self.hermes is None:
-                    raise OrchestrationError("Hermes runtime is not configured")
-                job = self._create_hermes_job(context, agent, task)
-                prepared = self.dispatch_repository.create(
-                    DispatchRecord.create(
-                        tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
-                        task_id=task.task_id,
-                        agent_id=agent.agent_id,
-                        principal_id=context.principal_id,
-                        runtime="hermes",
-                        runtime_execution_id=job.job_id,
-                        trace_id=context.trace_id,
-                        provenance_id=persisted_provenance,
-                        run_id=persisted_run,
-                        authorization_id=authorization_id,
-                    )
-                )
-                self.control_plane.transition_task(
-                    context,
-                    task_id=task.task_id,
-                    target_state=TaskState.RUNNING,
-                    expected_revision=task.revision,
-                )
-                queued = self.hermes.enqueue(job)
-                return self.dispatch_repository.update(
-                    prepared.dispatch_id,
-                    tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id,
-                    state=DispatchState.QUEUED,
-                    result_digest=digest_payload(
-                        {
-                            "queued_job_id": queued.job_id,
-                            "state": queued.state.value,
-                            "revision": queued.revision,
-                        }
-                    ),
-                )
-
-            raise OrchestrationError(f"unsupported runtime: {agent.runtime}")
-        except Exception as exc:
-            if prepared is not None:
-                try:
-                    self.dispatch_repository.update(
-                        prepared.dispatch_id,
-                        tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id,
-                        state=DispatchState.FAILED,
-                        result_digest=digest_payload(
-                            {
-                                "code": "dispatch_failed",
-                                "error_type": type(exc).__name__,
-                                "message": str(exc),
-                            }
-                        ),
-                    )
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
-            current = self.control_plane.get_task(context, task.task_id)
-            if current.state == TaskState.RUNNING:
-                self.control_plane.transition_task(
-                    context,
-                    task_id=task.task_id,
-                    target_state=TaskState.FAILED,
-                    expected_revision=current.revision,
-                    error={"code": "dispatch_failed", "message": str(exc)},
-                )
-            raise
-
-    def _create_openclaw_command(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        task: TaskRecord,
-    ) -> OpenClawCommand:
-        if self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver is None:
-            raise OrchestrationError("OpenClaw signing material is not configured")
-        key_material = self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver(
-            task.tenant_id,
-            self.openclaw_key_id,
-        )
-        command = OpenClawCommand.create(
-            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
-            task_id=task.task_id,
-            trace_id=context.trace_id,
-            action=task.action,
-            payload=task.payload,
-            idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id,
-            key_id=self.openclaw_key_id,
-        )
-        return sign_command(command, key_material)
-
-    def _create_hermes_job(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        agent: AgentRecord,
-        task: TaskRecord,
-    ) -> HermesJob:
-        metadata = dict(agent.metadata)
-        return HermesJob.create(
-            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=str(metadata.get("cell_id") or self.default_cell_id),
-            profile_id=str(metadata.get("profile_id") or self.default_profile_id),
-            task_id=task.task_id,
-            trace_id=context.trace_id,
-            action=task.action,
-            payload=task.payload,
-            idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id,
-            priority=int(metadata.get("priority", 100)),
-        )
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _assert_dispatch_context(
-        dispatch: DispatchRecord,
-        *,
-        runtime: str,
-        runtime_execution_id: str,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        trace_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-    ) -> None:
-        expected = {
-            "runtime": runtime,
-            "runtime_execution_id": runtime_execution_id,
-            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
-            "task_id": task_id,
-            "trace_id": trace_id,
-            "principal_id": principal_id,
-            "provenance_id": provenance_id,
-            "run_id": run_id,
-        }
-        for field_name, expected_value in expected.items():
-            if getattr(dispatch, field_name) != expected_value:
-                raise OrchestrationError(f"dispatch {field_name} mismatch")
-
-    def hermes_lifecycle_context(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        *,
-        dispatch_id: str,
-        job_id: str,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        trace_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-    ) -> tuple[DispatchRecord, HermesJob]:
-        """Resolve a runtime lifecycle request against its durable dispatch."""
-        dispatch = self.dispatch_repository.get(
-            dispatch_id, tenant_id=context.tenant_id
-        )
-        self._assert_dispatch_context(
-            dispatch,
-            runtime="hermes",
-            runtime_execution_id=job_id,
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            task_id=task_id,
-            trace_id=trace_id,
-            principal_id=principal_id,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-        )
-        if context.tenant_id != tenant_id:
-            raise OrchestrationError("runtime context tenant_id mismatch")
-        if context.principal_id != principal_id:
-            raise OrchestrationError("runtime context principal_id mismatch")
-        if context.trace_id != trace_id:
-            raise OrchestrationError("runtime context trace_id mismatch")
-        if self.hermes is None:
-            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes runtime is not configured")
-        job = self.hermes.get(job_id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
-        if job.task_id != task_id or job.trace_id != trace_id:
-            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes job identity mismatch")
-        return dispatch, job
-
-    def bind_hermes_worker(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        job: HermesJob,
-        *,
-        dispatch_id: str,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-        worker_id: str,
-    ) -> DispatchRecord:
-        dispatch, current = self.hermes_lifecycle_context(
-            context,
-            dispatch_id=dispatch_id,
-            job_id=job.job_id,
-            tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
-            task_id=job.task_id,
-            trace_id=job.trace_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-        )
-        if current.assigned_worker_id != worker_id:
-            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes worker does not own claimed job")
-        return self.dispatch_repository.update(
-            dispatch.dispatch_id,
-            tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
-            expected_worker_id=worker_id,
-        )
-
-    def reconcile_openclaw(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        result: OpenClawResult,
-        *,
-        dispatch_id: str,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-    ) -> TaskRecord:
-        dispatch = self.dispatch_repository.get(
-            dispatch_id, tenant_id=context.tenant_id
-        )
-        self._assert_dispatch_context(
-            dispatch,
-            runtime="openclaw",
-            runtime_execution_id=result.command_id,
-            tenant_id=result.tenant_id,
-            task_id=result.task_id,
-            trace_id=result.trace_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-        )
-        result_digest = digest_payload(
-            {
-                "command_id": result.command_id,
-                "state": result.state.value,
-                "output": result.output,
-                "error": result.error,
-                "runtime_id": result.runtime_id,
-                "attempts": result.attempts,
-                "finished_at": result.finished_at,
-            }
-        )
-        if dispatch.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES:
-            if dispatch.result_digest != result_digest:
-                raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch received a different result")
-            return self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
-
-        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
-        if task.state != TaskState.RUNNING:
-            raise OrchestrationError("task is not RUNNING for active dispatch")
-        if result.state == CommandState.COMPLETED:
-            target = TaskState.COMPLETED
-            values = {"result": result.output or {}}
-            dispatch_state = DispatchState.COMPLETED
-        elif result.state in {
-            CommandState.FAILED,
-            CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
-            CommandState.REJECTED,
-        }:
-            target = TaskState.FAILED
-            values = {
-                "error": result.error or {"code": result.state.value.lower()}
-            }
-            dispatch_state = DispatchState.FAILED
-        elif result.state == CommandState.CANCELLED:
-            target = TaskState.CANCELLED
-            values = {}
-            dispatch_state = DispatchState.CANCELLED
-        else:
-            self.dispatch_repository.update(
-                dispatch.dispatch_id,
-                tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
-                state=DispatchState.RUNNING,
-                result_digest=result_digest,
-            )
-            return task
-
-        updated_task = self.control_plane.transition_task(
-            context,
-            task_id=task.task_id,
-            target_state=target,
-            expected_revision=task.revision,
-            **values,
-        )
-        self.dispatch_repository.update(
-            dispatch.dispatch_id,
-            tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
-            state=dispatch_state,
-            result_digest=result_digest,
-        )
-        return updated_task
-
-    def reconcile_hermes(
-        self,
-        context: RequestContext,
-        result: HermesResult,
-        *,
-        dispatch_id: str,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-    ) -> TaskRecord:
-        dispatch = self.dispatch_repository.get(
-            dispatch_id, tenant_id=context.tenant_id
-        )
-        self._assert_dispatch_context(
-            dispatch,
-            runtime="hermes",
-            runtime_execution_id=result.job_id,
-            tenant_id=result.tenant_id,
-            task_id=result.task_id,
-            trace_id=result.trace_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            run_id=run_id,
-        )
-        if self.hermes is None:
-            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes runtime is not configured")
-        job = self.hermes.get(result.job_id, tenant_id=result.tenant_id)
-        if result.state in {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED}:
-            if not result.worker_id:
-                raise OrchestrationError("terminal Hermes result requires worker_id")
-            if job.assigned_worker_id != result.worker_id:
-                raise OrchestrationError("Hermes result worker does not own job lease")
-            if (
-                dispatch.expected_worker_id is not None
-                and dispatch.expected_worker_id != result.worker_id
-            ):
-                raise OrchestrationError("Hermes result worker mismatch")
-        result_digest = digest_payload(
-            {
-                "job_id": result.job_id,
-                "worker_id": result.worker_id,
-                "state": result.state.value,
-                "output": result.output,
-                "error": result.error,
-                "finished_at": result.finished_at,
-            }
-        )
-        if dispatch.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES:
-            if dispatch.result_digest != result_digest:
-                raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch received a different result")
-            return self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
-
-        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
-        if task.state != TaskState.RUNNING:
-            raise OrchestrationError("task is not RUNNING for active dispatch")
-        if result.state == HermesJobState.COMPLETED:
-            target = TaskState.COMPLETED
-            values = {"result": result.output or {}}
-            dispatch_state = DispatchState.COMPLETED
-        elif result.state == HermesJobState.FAILED:
-            target = TaskState.FAILED
-            values = {"error": result.error or {"code": "hermes_failed"}}
-            dispatch_state = DispatchState.FAILED
-        elif result.state == HermesJobState.CANCELLED:
-            target = TaskState.CANCELLED
-            values = {}
-            dispatch_state = DispatchState.CANCELLED
-        else:
-            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes reconcile only accepts terminal results")
-
-        updated_task = self.control_plane.transition_task(
-            context,
-            task_id=task.task_id,
-            target_state=target,
-            expected_revision=task.revision,
-            **values,
-        )
-        self.dispatch_repository.update(
-            dispatch.dispatch_id,
-            tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
-            state=dispatch_state,
-            expected_worker_id=result.worker_id,
-            result_digest=result_digest,
-        )
-        return updated_task
-
-    def dispatch_snapshot(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> Mapping[str, DispatchRecord]:
-        return {
-            item.task_id: item
-            for item in self.dispatch_repository.list(tenant_id=tenant_id)
-        }
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-"""Durable single-process persistence for the AIOS V2 control plane.
-
-The candidate uses an atomic SQLite snapshot so a gateway restart does not lose
-tenants, agents, task state, idempotency records, or audit events.  The domain
-service remains storage-agnostic; a later HA backend can replace this module
-without changing API or runtime-adapter contracts.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import sqlite3
-import threading
-from dataclasses import asdict
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable
-
-from .control_plane import (
-    AgentRecord,
-    AuditEvent,
-    ControlPlaneService,
-    InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
-    TaskRecord,
-    TaskState,
-    TenantRecord,
-)
-
-
-class SQLiteSnapshotRepository:
-    """Store one versioned control-plane snapshot in SQLite."""
-
-    SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self._initialize()
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-        return connection
-
-    def _initialize(self) -> None:
-        with self._connect() as connection:
-            connection.execute(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS control_plane_snapshot (
-                    singleton_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (singleton_id = 1),
-                    schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL,
-                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
-                )
-                """
-            )
-
-    def load(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT schema_version, payload_json FROM control_plane_snapshot WHERE singleton_id = 1"
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            return None
-        schema_version, payload_json = row
-        if int(schema_version) != self.SCHEMA_VERSION:
-            raise RuntimeError(
-                f"unsupported control-plane snapshot version: {schema_version}"
-            )
-        decoded = json.loads(str(payload_json))
-        if not isinstance(decoded, dict):
-            raise RuntimeError("invalid control-plane snapshot")
-        return decoded
-
-    def save(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
-        encoded = json.dumps(
-            payload,
-            ensure_ascii=False,
-            sort_keys=True,
-            separators=(",", ":"),
-            default=str,
-        )
-        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
-            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            connection.execute(
-                """
-                INSERT INTO control_plane_snapshot (
-                    singleton_id, schema_version, payload_json, updated_at
-                ) VALUES (1, ?, ?, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP)
-                ON CONFLICT(singleton_id) DO UPDATE SET
-                    schema_version = excluded.schema_version,
-                    payload_json = excluded.payload_json,
-                    updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
-                """,
-                (self.SCHEMA_VERSION, encoded),
-            )
-            connection.commit()
-
-
-class DurableControlPlaneService(ControlPlaneService):
-    """Control-plane service that persists after every successful mutation."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        repository: SQLiteSnapshotRepository,
-        *,
-        policy_evaluator=None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.repository = repository
-        store = InMemoryControlPlaneStore()
-        self._restore(store, repository.load())
-        super().__init__(store, policy_evaluator=policy_evaluator)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _restore(
-        store: InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
-        snapshot: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    ) -> None:
-        if not snapshot:
-            return
-        for item in snapshot.get("tenants", []):
-            record = TenantRecord(**item)
-            store.tenants[record.tenant_id] = record
-        for item in snapshot.get("agents", []):
-            normalized = dict(item)
-            normalized["capabilities"] = tuple(normalized.get("capabilities", ()))
-            record = AgentRecord(**normalized)
-            store.agents[record.agent_id] = record
-        for item in snapshot.get("tasks", []):
-            normalized = dict(item)
-            normalized["state"] = TaskState(normalized["state"])
-            record = TaskRecord(**normalized)
-            store.tasks[record.task_id] = record
-        store.audit_events.extend(AuditEvent(**item) for item in snapshot.get("audit", []))
-        for item in snapshot.get("idempotency", []):
-            store.idempotency[(item["tenant_id"], item["key"])] = (
-                item["task_id"],
-                item["digest"],
-            )
-
-    def _snapshot(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            return {
-                "schema_version": self.repository.SCHEMA_VERSION,
-                "tenants": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.tenants.values()],
-                "agents": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.agents.values()],
-                "tasks": [
-                    {**asdict(item), "state": item.state.value}
-                    for item in self.store.tasks.values()
-                ],
-                "audit": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.audit_events],
-                "idempotency": [
-                    {
-                        "tenant_id": tenant_id,
-                        "key": key,
-                        "task_id": task_id,
-                        "digest": digest,
-                    }
-                    for (tenant_id, key), (task_id, digest)
-                    in self.store.idempotency.items()
-                ],
-            }
-
-    def _mutate(self, operation: Callable[[], Any]) -> Any:
-        with self.store.lock:
-            result = operation()
-            self.repository.save(self._snapshot())
-            return result
-
-    def register_tenant(self, *args, **kwargs):
-        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).register_tenant(*args, **kwargs))
-
-    def register_agent(self, *args, **kwargs):
-        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).register_agent(*args, **kwargs))
-
-    def create_task(self, *args, **kwargs):
-        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).create_task(*args, **kwargs))
-
-    def transition_task(self, *args, **kwargs):
-        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).transition_task(*args, **kwargs))
@@ -1,831 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 可信 Run Provenance 签发、持久化与受控写入。
-
-生产策略要求 Provenance 同时覆盖七类路径：代码变更、Git 操作、部署、
-Runtime 执行、Evidence 写入、回滚和审计。任何缺失、篡改、过期、撤销、
-重放或上下文不匹配都默认拒绝。
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import stat
-import threading
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from enum import Enum
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
-
-PROVENANCE_VERSION = "aios.v2.run-provenance.v1"
-PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION = "aios.v2.production.v1"
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def parse_timestamp(value: str) -> datetime:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError("timestamp is required")
-    if normalized.endswith("Z"):
-        normalized = normalized[:-1] + "+00:00"
-    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        raise ValueError("timestamp must include timezone")
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
-    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
-    return normalized
-
-
-def canonical_json_bytes(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes:
-    return json.dumps(
-        dict(value),
-        ensure_ascii=False,
-        sort_keys=True,
-        separators=(",", ":"),
-        default=str,
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def digest_payload(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _validate_digest(value: str) -> str:
-    normalized = required(value, "request_digest").lower()
-    if len(normalized) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in normalized):
-        raise ValueError("request_digest must be a SHA-256 hexadecimal digest")
-    return normalized
-
-
-class ExecutionPath(str, Enum):
-    CODE_CHANGE = "code_change"
-    GIT_OPERATION = "git_operation"
-    DEPLOYMENT = "deployment"
-    RUNTIME_EXECUTE = "runtime_execute"
-    EVIDENCE_WRITE = "evidence_write"
-    ROLLBACK = "rollback"
-    AUDIT = "audit"
-
-
-REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS = frozenset(item.value for item in ExecutionPath)
-
-
-class GitOperation(str, Enum):
-    READ_REF = "read_ref"
-    FETCH = "fetch"
-    CREATE_BRANCH = "create_branch"
-    COMMIT = "commit"
-    MERGE = "merge"
-    PUSH = "push"
-    UPDATE_EVIDENCE = "update_evidence"
-
-
-class ProvenanceStatus(str, Enum):
-    ISSUED = "issued"
-    VERIFIED = "verified"
-    USED = "used"
-    EXPIRED = "expired"
-    REVOKED = "revoked"
-
-
-class ProvenanceError(RuntimeError):
-    """Run Provenance 基础错误。"""
-
-
-class ProvenanceDenied(ProvenanceError):
-    """策略拒绝当前操作。"""
-
-
-class ProvenanceNotFound(ProvenanceDenied):
-    """未找到 Provenance。"""
-
-
-class ProvenanceSignatureError(ProvenanceDenied):
-    """签名无效。"""
-
-
-class ProvenanceExpired(ProvenanceDenied):
-    """Provenance 已过期。"""
-
-
-class ProvenanceRevoked(ProvenanceDenied):
-    """Provenance 已撤销。"""
-
-
-class ProvenanceReplay(ProvenanceDenied):
-    """检测到相同授权摘要重放。"""
-
-
-class Signer(Protocol):
-    key_id: str
-
-    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> str: ...
-
-
-class SignatureVerifier(Protocol):
-    key_id: str
-    fingerprint: str
-
-    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: str) -> bool: ...
-
-
-def _load_crypto() -> tuple[Any, Any, Any]:
-    try:
-        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
-        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
-            Ed25519PrivateKey,
-            Ed25519PublicKey,
-        )
-    except ImportError as exc:  # pragma: no cover - depends on deployment image
-        raise RuntimeError(
-            "cryptography package with Ed25519 support is required"
-        ) from exc
-    return serialization, Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey
-
-
-def _check_private_key_file(path: Path) -> bytes:
-    resolved = path.resolve()
-    metadata = resolved.stat()
-    if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
-        raise RuntimeError("private key reference is not a regular file")
-    if metadata.st_mode & 0o077:
-        raise RuntimeError("private key file permissions must be 0600 or stricter")
-    return resolved.read_bytes()
-
-
-def _check_public_key_file(path: Path) -> bytes:
-    resolved = path.resolve()
-    metadata = resolved.stat()
-    if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
-        raise RuntimeError("public key reference is not a regular file")
-    if metadata.st_mode & 0o022:
-        raise RuntimeError("public key file must not be group/world writable")
-    return resolved.read_bytes()
-
-
-class Ed25519PrivateKeySigner:
-    """Ed25519 Owner/Control Plane 签发器。"""
-
-    def __init__(self, private_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
-        self.private_key = private_key
-        self.key_id = required(key_id, "key_id")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_file(cls, path: str | Path, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519PrivateKeySigner":
-        serialization, private_cls, _ = _load_crypto()
-        value = _check_private_key_file(Path(path))
-        if value.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
-            key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(value, password=None)
-        elif len(value) == 32:
-            key = private_cls.from_private_bytes(value)
-        else:
-            raise RuntimeError("private key must be PEM or a raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed")
-        if not isinstance(key, private_cls):
-            raise RuntimeError("private key is not Ed25519")
-        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
-
-    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> str:
-        return base64.b64encode(self.private_key.sign(bytes(payload))).decode("ascii")
-
-    def public_verifier(self) -> "Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier":
-        return Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier(self.private_key.public_key(), key_id=self.key_id)
-
-
-class Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier:
-    """Ed25519 签名验证器。"""
-
-    def __init__(self, public_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
-        serialization, _, public_cls = _load_crypto()
-        if not isinstance(public_key, public_cls):
-            raise RuntimeError("public key is not Ed25519")
-        self.public_key = public_key
-        self.key_id = required(key_id, "key_id")
-        raw = public_key.public_bytes(
-            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
-            format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
-        )
-        self.fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_file(cls, path: str | Path, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier":
-        serialization, _, public_cls = _load_crypto()
-        value = _check_public_key_file(Path(path))
-        if value.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
-            key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(value)
-        elif len(value) == 32:
-            key = public_cls.from_public_bytes(value)
-        else:
-            raise RuntimeError("public key must be PEM or raw 32-byte Ed25519 key")
-        if not isinstance(key, public_cls):
-            raise RuntimeError("public key is not Ed25519")
-        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
-
-    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: str) -> bool:
-        try:
-            decoded = base64.b64decode(required(signature, "signature"), validate=True)
-            self.public_key.verify(decoded, bytes(payload))
-            return True
-        except Exception:
-            return False
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RunProvenance:
-    provenance_id: str
-    run_id: str
-    issuer: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    allowed_paths: Sequence[str]
-    allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str]
-    issued_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-    policy_version: str
-    key_id: str
-    nonce: str
-    signature: str = ""
-    schema_version: str = PROVENANCE_VERSION
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in (
-            "provenance_id",
-            "run_id",
-            "issuer",
-            "tenant_id",
-            "task_id",
-            "agent_id",
-            "principal_id",
-            "issued_at",
-            "expires_at",
-            "policy_version",
-            "key_id",
-            "nonce",
-            "schema_version",
-        ):
-            object.__setattr__(self, name, required(getattr(self, name), name))
-        if self.schema_version != PROVENANCE_VERSION:
-            raise ValueError(f"unsupported schema_version: {self.schema_version}")
-        issued = parse_timestamp(self.issued_at)
-        expires = parse_timestamp(self.expires_at)
-        if expires <= issued:
-            raise ValueError("expires_at must be later than issued_at")
-        paths = tuple(sorted({ExecutionPath(item).value for item in self.allowed_paths}))
-        operations = tuple(
-            sorted({GitOperation(item).value for item in self.allowed_git_operations})
-        )
-        object.__setattr__(self, "allowed_paths", paths)
-        object.__setattr__(self, "allowed_git_operations", operations)
-        object.__setattr__(self, "signature", str(self.signature or "").strip())
-
-    def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            "provenance_id": self.provenance_id,
-            "run_id": self.run_id,
-            "issuer": self.issuer,
-            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "agent_id": self.agent_id,
-            "principal_id": self.principal_id,
-            "allowed_paths": list(self.allowed_paths),
-            "allowed_git_operations": list(self.allowed_git_operations),
-            "issued_at": self.issued_at,
-            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
-            "policy_version": self.policy_version,
-            "key_id": self.key_id,
-            "nonce": self.nonce,
-        }
-
-    def canonical_bytes(self) -> bytes:
-        return canonical_json_bytes(self.unsigned_dict())
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        value = self.unsigned_dict()
-        value["signature"] = self.signature
-        return value
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "RunProvenance":
-        return cls(**dict(value))
-
-
-class ProvenanceIssuer:
-    """只由 Owner 或 AIOS Control Plane 持有的签发服务。"""
-
-    def __init__(self, signer: Signer, store: "SQLiteProvenanceStore") -> None:
-        self.signer = signer
-        self.store = store
-
-    def issue(
-        self,
-        *,
-        run_id: str,
-        issuer: str,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        agent_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        allowed_paths: Sequence[str] = tuple(REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS),
-        allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str] = tuple(item.value for item in GitOperation),
-        ttl_seconds: int = 3600,
-        policy_version: str = PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION,
-        provenance_id: str | None = None,
-        nonce: str | None = None,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-    ) -> RunProvenance:
-        if ttl_seconds <= 0:
-            raise ValueError("ttl_seconds must be positive")
-        normalized_paths = frozenset(ExecutionPath(item).value for item in allowed_paths)
-        if policy_version == PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION and normalized_paths != REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS:
-            missing = sorted(REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS - normalized_paths)
-            extra = sorted(normalized_paths - REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS)
-            raise ProvenanceDenied(
-                f"production provenance must cover exactly seven paths; missing={missing}, extra={extra}"
-            )
-        normalized_operations = tuple(
-            sorted({GitOperation(item).value for item in allowed_git_operations})
-        )
-        if ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value in normalized_paths and not normalized_operations:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("git_operation path requires explicit allowed Git operations")
-        issued = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        unsigned = RunProvenance(
-            provenance_id=provenance_id or f"prov_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            run_id=run_id,
-            issuer=issuer,
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            task_id=task_id,
-            agent_id=agent_id,
-            principal_id=principal_id,
-            allowed_paths=tuple(normalized_paths),
-            allowed_git_operations=normalized_operations,
-            issued_at=issued.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
-            expires_at=(issued + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
-            .isoformat()
-            .replace("+00:00", "Z"),
-            policy_version=policy_version,
-            key_id=self.signer.key_id,
-            nonce=nonce or uuid.uuid4().hex,
-        )
-        signed = replace(unsigned, signature=self.signer.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes()))
-        self.store.save_issued(signed)
-        return signed
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ProvenanceAuthorization:
-    authorization_id: str
-    provenance_id: str
-    run_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    execution_path: str
-    git_operation: str | None
-    request_digest: str
-    policy_version: str
-    key_id: str
-    public_key_fingerprint: str
-    authorized_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return asdict(self)
-
-
-class SQLiteProvenanceStore:
-    """持久化 Provenance、状态、授权使用和不可变事件。"""
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self._connection = sqlite3.connect(
-            str(self.path), timeout=30.0, check_same_thread=False
-        )
-        self._connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-            self._connection.executescript(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_records (
-                    provenance_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    signature_verified INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_usage (
-                    authorization_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    provenance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    git_operation TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
-                    request_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    authorized_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    UNIQUE(provenance_id, execution_path, git_operation, request_digest),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(provenance_id) REFERENCES provenance_records(provenance_id)
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_events (
-                    event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    provenance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    FOREIGN KEY(provenance_id) REFERENCES provenance_records(provenance_id)
-                );
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_provenance_usage_id
-                    ON provenance_usage(provenance_id, authorized_at);
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_provenance_events_id
-                    ON provenance_events(provenance_id, created_at);
-                """
-            )
-            self._connection.commit()
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.close()
-
-    def _event(
-        self,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        event_type: str,
-        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self._connection.execute(
-            "INSERT INTO provenance_events VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-            (
-                f"pevt_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-                provenance_id,
-                event_type,
-                json.dumps(dict(details or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True),
-                utc_now(),
-            ),
-        )
-
-    def save_issued(self, provenance: RunProvenance) -> None:
-        payload = json.dumps(
-            provenance.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
-        )
-        now = utc_now()
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                prior = self._connection.execute(
-                    "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_records WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                    (provenance.provenance_id,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if prior is not None:
-                    if prior["payload_json"] != payload:
-                        raise ProvenanceDenied("provenance_id reused with different payload")
-                    self._connection.rollback()
-                    return
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO provenance_records VALUES (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?)",
-                    (
-                        provenance.provenance_id,
-                        payload,
-                        ProvenanceStatus.ISSUED.value,
-                        now,
-                        now,
-                    ),
-                )
-                self._event(provenance.provenance_id, "issued")
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def get(self, provenance_id: str) -> RunProvenance:
-        with self._lock:
-            row = self._connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_records WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance not found")
-        value = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
-        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-            raise ProvenanceError("stored provenance payload is invalid")
-        return RunProvenance.from_dict(value)
-
-    def status(self, provenance_id: str) -> ProvenanceStatus:
-        with self._lock:
-            row = self._connection.execute(
-                "SELECT status FROM provenance_records WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance not found")
-        return ProvenanceStatus(row["status"])
-
-    def mark_verified(self, provenance_id: str, *, fingerprint: str) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                current = self.status(provenance_id)
-                if current in {ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED, ProvenanceStatus.EXPIRED}:
-                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"cannot verify provenance in state {current.value}")
-                next_status = (
-                    ProvenanceStatus.USED.value
-                    if current == ProvenanceStatus.USED
-                    else ProvenanceStatus.VERIFIED.value
-                )
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, signature_verified = 1, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                    (next_status, utc_now(), provenance_id),
-                )
-                self._event(
-                    provenance_id,
-                    "verified",
-                    {"public_key_fingerprint": fingerprint},
-                )
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def mark_expired(self, provenance_id: str) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                current = self.status(provenance_id)
-                if current == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
-                    self._connection.rollback()
-                    return
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                    (ProvenanceStatus.EXPIRED.value, utc_now(), provenance_id),
-                )
-                self._event(provenance_id, "expired")
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def revoke(self, provenance_id: str, *, reason: str, principal_id: str) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                self.get(provenance_id)
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                    (ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED.value, utc_now(), provenance_id),
-                )
-                self._event(
-                    provenance_id,
-                    "revoked",
-                    {
-                        "reason": required(reason, "reason"),
-                        "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
-                    },
-                )
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def record_authorization(self, authorization: ProvenanceAuthorization) -> None:
-        receipt = json.dumps(
-            authorization.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
-        )
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                current = self.status(authorization.provenance_id)
-                if current in {ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED, ProvenanceStatus.EXPIRED}:
-                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"provenance state is {current.value}")
-                try:
-                    self._connection.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO provenance_usage VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (
-                            authorization.authorization_id,
-                            authorization.provenance_id,
-                            authorization.execution_path,
-                            authorization.git_operation or "",
-                            authorization.request_digest,
-                            authorization.authorized_at,
-                            receipt,
-                        ),
-                    )
-                except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
-                    raise ProvenanceReplay(
-                        "identical provenance path/operation/request digest already used"
-                    ) from exc
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                    (
-                        ProvenanceStatus.USED.value,
-                        authorization.authorized_at,
-                        authorization.provenance_id,
-                    ),
-                )
-                self._event(
-                    authorization.provenance_id,
-                    "used",
-                    {
-                        "authorization_id": authorization.authorization_id,
-                        "execution_path": authorization.execution_path,
-                        "git_operation": authorization.git_operation,
-                        "request_digest": authorization.request_digest,
-                    },
-                )
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def authorization_count(self, provenance_id: str) -> int:
-        with self._lock:
-            row = self._connection.execute(
-                "SELECT COUNT(*) AS total FROM provenance_usage WHERE provenance_id = ?",
-                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
-            ).fetchone()
-        return int(row["total"])
-
-    def events(self, provenance_id: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        with self._lock:
-            rows = self._connection.execute(
-                "SELECT event_type, details_json, created_at FROM provenance_events WHERE provenance_id = ? ORDER BY created_at, event_id",
-                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
-            ).fetchall()
-        return [
-            {
-                "event_type": row["event_type"],
-                "details": json.loads(row["details_json"]),
-                "created_at": row["created_at"],
-            }
-            for row in rows
-        ]
-
-
-class ProvenanceVerifier:
-    """验证 Owner 签名、上下文、路径、Git 操作、时效和重放。"""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
-        verifiers: Mapping[str, SignatureVerifier],
-    ) -> None:
-        if not verifiers:
-            raise ValueError("at least one public key verifier is required")
-        self.store = store
-        self.verifiers = {required(key, "key_id"): value for key, value in verifiers.items()}
-
-    def authorize(
-        self,
-        *,
-        provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        agent_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        execution_path: str,
-        request_digest: str,
-        git_operation: str | None = None,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-    ) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        provenance = self.store.get(provenance_id)
-        status = self.store.status(provenance.provenance_id)
-        if status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
-            raise ProvenanceRevoked("provenance is revoked")
-        current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        if current >= parse_timestamp(provenance.expires_at):
-            self.store.mark_expired(provenance.provenance_id)
-            raise ProvenanceExpired("provenance is expired")
-        verifier = self.verifiers.get(provenance.key_id)
-        if verifier is None:
-            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("no trusted public key for provenance key_id")
-        if not provenance.signature or not verifier.verify(
-            provenance.canonical_bytes(), provenance.signature
-        ):
-            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid provenance signature")
-        expected = {
-            "run_id": required(run_id, "run_id"),
-            "tenant_id": required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),
-            "task_id": required(task_id, "task_id"),
-            "agent_id": required(agent_id, "agent_id"),
-            "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
-        }
-        for field_name, expected_value in expected.items():
-            if getattr(provenance, field_name) != expected_value:
-                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"provenance {field_name} mismatch")
-        path = ExecutionPath(execution_path).value
-        if path not in provenance.allowed_paths:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied(f"execution path is not allowed: {path}")
-        operation: str | None = None
-        if path == ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value:
-            if git_operation is None:
-                raise ProvenanceDenied("git operation is required for git_operation path")
-            operation = GitOperation(git_operation).value
-            if operation not in provenance.allowed_git_operations:
-                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"Git operation is not allowed: {operation}")
-        elif git_operation is not None:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("git_operation is only valid for git_operation path")
-        digest = _validate_digest(request_digest)
-        self.store.mark_verified(
-            provenance.provenance_id, fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint
-        )
-        authorization = ProvenanceAuthorization(
-            authorization_id=f"pauth_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            provenance_id=provenance.provenance_id,
-            run_id=provenance.run_id,
-            tenant_id=provenance.tenant_id,
-            task_id=provenance.task_id,
-            agent_id=provenance.agent_id,
-            principal_id=provenance.principal_id,
-            execution_path=path,
-            git_operation=operation,
-            request_digest=digest,
-            policy_version=provenance.policy_version,
-            key_id=provenance.key_id,
-            public_key_fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint,
-        )
-        self.store.record_authorization(authorization)
-        return authorization
-
-
-class ProvenanceControlledWriter:
-    """七路径统一策略入口并持久写入授权回执。"""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        verifier: ProvenanceVerifier,
-        receipt_root: str | Path,
-        *,
-        writer_id: str = "aios-v2-provenance-writer",
-    ) -> None:
-        self.verifier = verifier
-        self.receipt_root = Path(receipt_root).resolve()
-        self.receipt_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.writer_id = required(writer_id, "writer_id")
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _component(value: str) -> str:
-        normalized = required(value, "path component")
-        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("invalid receipt path component")
-        return normalized
-
-    def authorize(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        authorization = self.verifier.authorize(**values)
-        tenant = self._component(authorization.tenant_id)
-        provenance_id = self._component(authorization.provenance_id)
-        target_dir = self.receipt_root / tenant / provenance_id
-        target = target_dir / f"{authorization.authorization_id}.json"
-        payload = authorization.as_dict()
-        payload["writer_id"] = self.writer_id
-        with self._lock:
-            target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
-            temporary.write_text(
-                json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
-                encoding="utf-8",
-            )
-            os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
-            os.replace(temporary, target)
-        return authorization
-
-    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_git_operation(
-        self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any
-    ) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value,
-            git_operation=git_operation,
-            **values,
-        )
-
-    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value, **values)
@@ -1,381 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""AIOS V2 Run Provenance 与最小权限 Grant 运维 CLI。
-
-私钥只用于签发；授权命令只加载一个与 ``--path`` 对应的 Grant。所有输出均为
-不含 Secret 的 JSON。旧 ``issue`` 仅为候选兼容，生产必须使用
-``issue-workflow`` 与 ``issue-grant``。
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-from .provenance import (
-    Ed25519PrivateKeySigner,
-    Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier,
-    ExecutionPath,
-    GitOperation,
-    ProvenanceIssuer,
-    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
-)
-from .provenance_grants import (
-    GrantIssuer,
-    GrantType,
-    GrantVerifier,
-    SQLiteGrantStore,
-    WorkflowProvenanceIssuer,
-)
-from .provenance_operations import (
-    OperationContext,
-    ProvenanceOperationGate,
-    context_from_environment,
-    load_request_file,
-)
-from .provenance_scoped import ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter
-
-
-def _json_object(value: str | None, file_path: str | None) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-    if value and file_path:
-        raise ValueError("request-json and request-file are mutually exclusive")
-    if file_path:
-        return load_request_file(file_path)
-    parsed = json.loads(value or "{}")
-    if not isinstance(parsed, Mapping):
-        raise ValueError("request JSON must be an object")
-    return dict(parsed)
-
-
-def _csv(value: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    return tuple(item.strip() for item in str(value or "").split(",") if item.strip())
-
-
-def _write_json(path: str | None, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-    encoded = json.dumps(dict(payload), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n"
-    if path:
-        target = Path(path).resolve()
-        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
-        temporary.write_text(encoded, encoding="utf-8")
-        os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
-        os.replace(temporary, target)
-    print(encoded, end="")
-
-
-def _parent_store(args: argparse.Namespace) -> SQLiteProvenanceStore:
-    return SQLiteProvenanceStore(args.store_file)
-
-
-def _grant_store(args: argparse.Namespace) -> SQLiteGrantStore:
-    return SQLiteGrantStore(args.store_file)
-
-
-def _context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> OperationContext:
-    if args.context_from_env:
-        return context_from_environment()
-    values = {
-        "provenance_id": args.provenance_id,
-        "run_id": args.run_id,
-        "tenant_id": args.tenant_id,
-        "task_id": args.task_id,
-        "agent_id": args.agent_id,
-        "principal_id": args.principal_id,
-    }
-    missing = [name for name, value in values.items() if not str(value or "").strip()]
-    if missing:
-        raise ValueError(f"missing context arguments: {missing}")
-    return OperationContext(**{name: str(value).strip() for name, value in values.items()})
-
-
-def command_issue_legacy(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    store = _parent_store(args)
-    signer = Ed25519PrivateKeySigner.from_file(args.private_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
-    provenance = ProvenanceIssuer(signer, store).issue(
-        run_id=args.run_id,
-        issuer=args.issuer,
-        tenant_id=args.tenant_id,
-        task_id=args.task_id,
-        agent_id=args.agent_id,
-        principal_id=args.principal_id,
-        allowed_paths=_csv(args.allowed_paths) or tuple(item.value for item in ExecutionPath),
-        allowed_git_operations=_csv(args.allowed_git_operations)
-        or tuple(item.value for item in GitOperation),
-        ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
-        policy_version=args.policy_version,
-    )
-    _write_json(
-        args.output,
-        {
-            "mode": "legacy-full-rights-candidate-only",
-            "provenance": provenance.as_dict(),
-            "status": store.status(provenance.provenance_id).value,
-            "secret_value_stored": False,
-        },
-    )
-    return 0
-
-
-def command_issue_workflow(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    store = _parent_store(args)
-    signer = Ed25519PrivateKeySigner.from_file(args.private_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
-    workflow = WorkflowProvenanceIssuer(signer, store).issue(
-        run_id=args.run_id,
-        issuer=args.issuer,
-        tenant_id=args.tenant_id,
-        task_id=args.task_id,
-        agent_id=args.agent_id,
-        principal_id=args.principal_id,
-        ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
-    )
-    _write_json(
-        args.output,
-        {
-            "mode": "least-privilege-workflow",
-            "workflow_provenance": workflow.as_dict(),
-            "status": store.status(workflow.provenance_id).value,
-            "secret_value_stored": False,
-        },
-    )
-    return 0
-
-
-def command_issue_grant(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    parent_store = _parent_store(args)
-    grant_store = _grant_store(args)
-    signer = Ed25519PrivateKeySigner.from_file(args.private_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
-    grant = GrantIssuer(signer, parent_store, grant_store).issue(
-        parent_provenance_id=args.parent_provenance_id,
-        grant_type=GrantType(args.grant_type),
-        ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
-        allowed_git_operations=_csv(args.allowed_git_operations),
-    )
-    _write_json(
-        args.output,
-        {
-            "grant": grant.as_dict(),
-            "status": grant_store.status(grant.grant_id).value,
-            "secret_value_stored": False,
-        },
-    )
-    return 0
-
-
-def _single_scope_writer(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter:
-    path = ExecutionPath(args.path).value
-    parent_store = _parent_store(args)
-    grant_store = _grant_store(args)
-    verifier = Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier.from_file(args.public_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
-    trusted = GrantVerifier(parent_store, grant_store, {args.key_id: verifier})
-    return ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter(
-        trusted,
-        args.receipt_dir,
-        {path: args.grant_id},
-        required_paths=(path,),
-        writer_id=f"aios-v2-cli-{path}",
-    )
-
-
-def command_authorize(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    writer = _single_scope_writer(args)
-    context = _context(args)
-    receipt = ProvenanceOperationGate(writer).authorize(
-        context,
-        execution_path=args.path,
-        operation=args.operation,
-        request=_json_object(args.request_json, args.request_file),
-    )
-    _write_json(args.output, {"authorization": receipt.as_dict()})
-    return 0
-
-
-def command_revoke(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    store = _parent_store(args)
-    store.revoke(args.provenance_id, reason=args.reason, principal_id=args.principal_id)
-    _write_json(
-        args.output,
-        {"provenance_id": args.provenance_id, "status": store.status(args.provenance_id).value},
-    )
-    return 0
-
-
-def command_status(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    store = _parent_store(args)
-    provenance = store.get(args.provenance_id)
-    grant_store = _grant_store(args)
-    _write_json(
-        args.output,
-        {
-            "provenance": provenance.as_dict(),
-            "status": store.status(args.provenance_id).value,
-            "authorization_count": store.authorization_count(args.provenance_id),
-            "events": store.events(args.provenance_id),
-            "grants": [item.as_dict() for item in grant_store.list_for_parent(args.provenance_id)],
-        },
-    )
-    return 0
-
-
-def command_grant_revoke(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    store = _grant_store(args)
-    store.revoke(args.grant_id, reason=args.reason, principal_id=args.principal_id)
-    _write_json(
-        args.output,
-        {"grant_id": args.grant_id, "status": store.status(args.grant_id).value},
-    )
-    return 0
-
-
-def command_grant_status(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
-    store = _grant_store(args)
-    grant = store.get(args.grant_id)
-    _write_json(
-        args.output,
-        {"grant": grant.as_dict(), "status": store.status(args.grant_id).value},
-    )
-    return 0
-
-
-def add_common_store(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
-    parser.add_argument(
-        "--store-file",
-        default=os.getenv(
-            "AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE",
-            "/var/lib/aios-v2/run-provenance.sqlite3",
-        ),
-    )
-    parser.add_argument("--output", default=None)
-
-
-def add_signing_context(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
-    parser.add_argument("--private-key-file", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--key-id", required=True)
-
-
-def add_workflow_identity(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
-    parser.add_argument("--run-id", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--issuer", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--tenant-id", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--task-id", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--agent-id", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--principal-id", required=True)
-
-
-def add_context(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
-    parser.add_argument("--context-from-env", action="store_true")
-    parser.add_argument("--provenance-id")
-    parser.add_argument("--run-id")
-    parser.add_argument("--tenant-id")
-    parser.add_argument("--task-id")
-    parser.add_argument("--agent-id")
-    parser.add_argument("--principal-id")
-
-
-def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS V2 Run Provenance CLI")
-    subcommands = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
-
-    issue = subcommands.add_parser("issue", help="候选兼容：签发全权限 Provenance；生产禁止")
-    add_common_store(issue)
-    add_signing_context(issue)
-    add_workflow_identity(issue)
-    issue.add_argument("--allowed-paths")
-    issue.add_argument("--allowed-git-operations")
-    issue.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=3600)
-    issue.add_argument("--policy-version", default="aios.v2.candidate.legacy")
-    issue.set_defaults(handler=command_issue_legacy)
-
-    workflow = subcommands.add_parser(
-        "issue-workflow", help="签发不含操作权限的父 Workflow Provenance"
-    )
-    add_common_store(workflow)
-    add_signing_context(workflow)
-    add_workflow_identity(workflow)
-    workflow.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=14400)
-    workflow.set_defaults(handler=command_issue_workflow)
-
-    grant = subcommands.add_parser("issue-grant", help="签发单一路径最小权限 Grant")
-    add_common_store(grant)
-    add_signing_context(grant)
-    grant.add_argument("--parent-provenance-id", required=True)
-    grant.add_argument("--grant-type", choices=[item.value for item in GrantType], required=True)
-    grant.add_argument("--allowed-git-operations")
-    grant.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=900)
-    grant.set_defaults(handler=command_issue_grant)
-
-    authorize = subcommands.add_parser("authorize", help="使用单一子 Grant 授权一次运维操作")
-    add_common_store(authorize)
-    add_context(authorize)
-    authorize.add_argument("--public-key-file", required=True)
-    authorize.add_argument("--key-id", required=True)
-    authorize.add_argument("--grant-id", required=True)
-    authorize.add_argument(
-        "--receipt-dir",
-        default=os.getenv(
-            "AIOS_PROVENANCE_RECEIPT_DIR",
-            "/var/lib/aios-v2/provenance-receipts",
-        ),
-    )
-    authorize.add_argument(
-        "--path",
-        required=True,
-        choices=[
-            ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value,
-            ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value,
-            ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value,
-            ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value,
-            ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value,
-            ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value,
-        ],
-    )
-    authorize.add_argument("--operation", required=True)
-    request_group = authorize.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
-    request_group.add_argument("--request-json")
-    request_group.add_argument("--request-file")
-    authorize.set_defaults(handler=command_authorize)
-
-    revoke = subcommands.add_parser("revoke", help="撤销父 Workflow Provenance")
-    add_common_store(revoke)
-    revoke.add_argument("--provenance-id", required=True)
-    revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
-    revoke.add_argument("--principal-id", required=True)
-    revoke.set_defaults(handler=command_revoke)
-
-    status = subcommands.add_parser("status", help="查询父 Workflow 与子 Grant")
-    add_common_store(status)
-    status.add_argument("--provenance-id", required=True)
-    status.set_defaults(handler=command_status)
-
-    grant_revoke = subcommands.add_parser("grant-revoke", help="单独撤销子 Grant")
-    add_common_store(grant_revoke)
-    grant_revoke.add_argument("--grant-id", required=True)
-    grant_revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
-    grant_revoke.add_argument("--principal-id", required=True)
-    grant_revoke.set_defaults(handler=command_grant_revoke)
-
-    grant_status = subcommands.add_parser("grant-status", help="查询子 Grant 状态")
-    add_common_store(grant_status)
-    grant_status.add_argument("--grant-id", required=True)
-    grant_status.set_defaults(handler=command_grant_status)
-    return parser
-
-
-def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
-    try:
-        return int(args.handler(args))
-    except Exception as exc:
-        print(
-            json.dumps(
-                {"status": "denied", "error": type(exc).__name__, "message": str(exc)},
-                ensure_ascii=False,
-            ),
-            file=sys.stderr,
-        )
-        return 1
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -1,416 +0,0 @@
-"""受最小权限 Run Provenance Grant 约束的 Git 写入器。
-
-所有 Git 操作都使用参数数组执行。对于 Commit 和 Evidence Commit，先计算
-工作树内容摘要并完成 Provenance 授权，之后才允许执行 ``git add``，避免未授权
-请求改变 Git Index。
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import os
-import re
-import subprocess
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
-
-from .provenance import GitOperation, ProvenanceDenied, digest_payload, utc_now
-
-_BRANCH_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^(?![-./])(?!.*\.\.)(?!.*//)[A-Za-z0-9._/-]{1,240}$")
-_SECRET_URL = re.compile(r"(?i)(https?://)([^/@\s]+)@")
-_TOKENISH = re.compile(r"(?i)(token|password|secret|authorization)([=:]\s*)([^\s]+)")
-
-
-class GitAuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
-    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-
-    def authorize_git_operation(self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-
-
-class ProvenanceGitError(RuntimeError):
-    """Git 操作被拒绝或执行失败。"""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GitExecutionContext:
-    provenance_id: str
-    run_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GitCommandResult:
-    operation_id: str
-    operation: str
-    authorization_ids: Sequence[str]
-    command: Sequence[str]
-    exit_code: int
-    stdout: str
-    stderr: str
-    head_before: str | None
-    head_after: str | None
-    started_at: str
-    completed_at: str
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return asdict(self)
-
-
-class ProvenanceGitWriter:
-    """执行经过单路径 Grant 授权的窄范围 Git 操作。"""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        repo: str | Path,
-        writer: GitAuthorizationWriter,
-        *,
-        timeout_seconds: float = 120.0,
-        output_limit: int = 16000,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.repo = Path(repo).resolve()
-        self.writer = writer
-        self.timeout_seconds = float(timeout_seconds)
-        self.output_limit = int(output_limit)
-        if self.timeout_seconds <= 0 or self.output_limit < 1024:
-            raise ValueError("invalid Git writer limits")
-        self._run_raw(["rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"], check=True)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _validate_branch(branch: str) -> str:
-        normalized = str(branch or "").strip()
-        if not _BRANCH_PATTERN.fullmatch(normalized) or normalized.endswith((".", "/")):
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("invalid Git branch name")
-        if normalized in {"main", "master"}:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("direct main/master operation is prohibited")
-        return normalized
-
-    def _validate_path(self, value: str | Path) -> str:
-        raw = Path(value)
-        candidate = (self.repo / raw).resolve() if not raw.is_absolute() else raw.resolve()
-        try:
-            relative = candidate.relative_to(self.repo)
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("Git path escapes repository") from exc
-        if str(relative) in {"", "."}:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("repository root is not a valid file path")
-        return relative.as_posix()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _redact(value: str, limit: int) -> str:
-        text = _SECRET_URL.sub(r"\1***@", str(value or ""))
-        text = _TOKENISH.sub(r"\1\2***", text)
-        if len(text) > limit:
-            return text[:limit] + "\n...[truncated]"
-        return text
-
-    def _head(self) -> str | None:
-        process = self._run_raw(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], check=False)
-        return process.stdout.strip() if process.returncode == 0 else None
-
-    def _run_raw(
-        self,
-        args: Sequence[str],
-        *,
-        check: bool,
-        env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
-    ) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
-        command = ["git", "-C", str(self.repo), *[str(item) for item in args]]
-        safe_env = {
-            **os.environ,
-            "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
-            "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": os.environ.get("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1"),
-        }
-        if env:
-            safe_env.update({str(key): str(value) for key, value in env.items()})
-        process = subprocess.run(
-            command,
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            timeout=self.timeout_seconds,
-            env=safe_env,
-        )
-        if check and process.returncode != 0:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError(
-                self._redact(process.stderr or process.stdout, self.output_limit)
-                or f"Git command failed with exit code {process.returncode}"
-            )
-        return process
-
-    def _path_digest(self, relative: str) -> str:
-        target = self.repo / relative
-        if target.exists():
-            if not target.is_file():
-                raise ProvenanceGitError("Git writer accepts file paths only")
-            hasher = hashlib.sha256()
-            with target.open("rb") as handle:
-                while True:
-                    block = handle.read(65536)
-                    if not block:
-                        break
-                    hasher.update(block)
-            return hasher.hexdigest()
-        tracked = self._run_raw(["ls-files", "--error-unmatch", "--", relative], check=False)
-        if tracked.returncode != 0:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError(f"path does not exist and is not tracked: {relative}")
-        return "deleted"
-
-    def _content_manifest(self, paths: Sequence[str]) -> Mapping[str, str]:
-        return {path: self._path_digest(path) for path in sorted(set(paths))}
-
-    def _authorize(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        operation: GitOperation,
-        request: Mapping[str, Any],
-        code_change: bool,
-    ) -> list[str]:
-        request_digest = digest_payload(
-            {
-                "operation": operation.value,
-                "repo": self.repo.name,
-                "request": dict(request),
-                "head": self._head(),
-            }
-        )
-        ids: list[str] = []
-        try:
-            if code_change:
-                code_authorization = self.writer.authorize_code_change(
-                    provenance_id=context.provenance_id,
-                    run_id=context.run_id,
-                    tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
-                    task_id=context.task_id,
-                    agent_id=context.agent_id,
-                    principal_id=context.principal_id,
-                    request_digest=digest_payload(
-                        {
-                            "git_operation": operation.value,
-                            "request_digest": request_digest,
-                        }
-                    ),
-                )
-                ids.append(code_authorization.authorization_id)
-            git_authorization = self.writer.authorize_git_operation(
-                provenance_id=context.provenance_id,
-                run_id=context.run_id,
-                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
-                task_id=context.task_id,
-                agent_id=context.agent_id,
-                principal_id=context.principal_id,
-                git_operation=operation.value,
-                request_digest=request_digest,
-            )
-            ids.append(git_authorization.authorization_id)
-            return ids
-        except ProvenanceDenied as exc:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError(f"Run Provenance denied Git operation: {exc}") from exc
-
-    def _run_authorized(
-        self,
-        *,
-        operation: GitOperation,
-        args: Sequence[str],
-        authorization_ids: Sequence[str],
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        started = utc_now()
-        before = self._head()
-        process = self._run_raw(args, check=False)
-        after = self._head()
-        result = GitCommandResult(
-            operation_id=f"gitop_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            operation=operation.value,
-            authorization_ids=tuple(authorization_ids),
-            command=tuple(["git", "-C", "<repo>", *[str(item) for item in args]]),
-            exit_code=int(process.returncode),
-            stdout=self._redact(process.stdout, self.output_limit),
-            stderr=self._redact(process.stderr, self.output_limit),
-            head_before=before,
-            head_after=after,
-            started_at=started,
-            completed_at=utc_now(),
-        )
-        if process.returncode != 0:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError(
-                result.stderr or result.stdout or f"Git {operation.value} failed"
-            )
-        return result
-
-    def _execute(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        operation: GitOperation,
-        args: Sequence[str],
-        request: Mapping[str, Any],
-        code_change: bool,
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        authorization_ids = self._authorize(
-            context,
-            operation=operation,
-            request=request,
-            code_change=code_change,
-        )
-        return self._run_authorized(
-            operation=operation,
-            args=args,
-            authorization_ids=authorization_ids,
-        )
-
-    def read_ref(self, context: GitExecutionContext, ref: str) -> GitCommandResult:
-        normalized = str(ref or "").strip()
-        if not normalized or any(ch.isspace() for ch in normalized):
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("invalid Git ref")
-        return self._execute(
-            context,
-            operation=GitOperation.READ_REF,
-            args=["rev-parse", "--verify", normalized],
-            request={"ref": normalized},
-            code_change=False,
-        )
-
-    def fetch(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        remote: str,
-        refspecs: Sequence[str],
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        normalized_remote = str(remote or "").strip()
-        normalized_refspecs = tuple(str(item).strip() for item in refspecs if str(item).strip())
-        if not normalized_remote or not normalized_refspecs:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("remote and refspecs are required")
-        if any(item.startswith("+") and ":refs/heads/" in item for item in normalized_refspecs):
-            raise ProvenanceGitError(
-                "fetching directly into local branch refs is prohibited; use remote-tracking refs"
-            )
-        return self._execute(
-            context,
-            operation=GitOperation.FETCH,
-            args=["fetch", "--prune", normalized_remote, *normalized_refspecs],
-            request={"remote": normalized_remote, "refspecs": normalized_refspecs},
-            code_change=False,
-        )
-
-    def create_branch(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        branch: str,
-        start_point: str,
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        normalized = self._validate_branch(branch)
-        start = str(start_point or "").strip()
-        if not start:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("start_point is required")
-        return self._execute(
-            context,
-            operation=GitOperation.CREATE_BRANCH,
-            args=["branch", normalized, start],
-            request={"branch": normalized, "start_point": start},
-            code_change=False,
-        )
-
-    def commit(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        paths: Sequence[str | Path],
-        message: str,
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        normalized_paths = tuple(self._validate_path(item) for item in paths)
-        normalized_message = str(message or "").strip()
-        if not normalized_paths or not normalized_message:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("commit paths and message are required")
-        if len(normalized_message) > 500:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("commit message is too long")
-        request = {
-            "paths": normalized_paths,
-            "message": normalized_message,
-            "content_manifest": self._content_manifest(normalized_paths),
-        }
-        authorization_ids = self._authorize(
-            context,
-            operation=GitOperation.COMMIT,
-            request=request,
-            code_change=True,
-        )
-        self._run_raw(["add", "--", *normalized_paths], check=True)
-        return self._run_authorized(
-            operation=GitOperation.COMMIT,
-            args=["commit", "--no-gpg-sign", "-m", normalized_message, "--", *normalized_paths],
-            authorization_ids=authorization_ids,
-        )
-
-    def merge(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        source_ref: str,
-        message: str,
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        source = str(source_ref or "").strip()
-        normalized_message = str(message or "").strip()
-        if not source or not normalized_message:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("source_ref and message are required")
-        return self._execute(
-            context,
-            operation=GitOperation.MERGE,
-            args=["merge", "--no-ff", "--no-edit", "-m", normalized_message, source],
-            request={"source_ref": source, "message": normalized_message},
-            code_change=True,
-        )
-
-    def push(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        remote: str,
-        branch: str,
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        normalized_remote = str(remote or "").strip()
-        normalized_branch = self._validate_branch(branch)
-        if not normalized_remote:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("remote is required")
-        return self._execute(
-            context,
-            operation=GitOperation.PUSH,
-            args=["push", normalized_remote, f"refs/heads/{normalized_branch}:refs/heads/{normalized_branch}"],
-            request={"remote": normalized_remote, "branch": normalized_branch},
-            code_change=False,
-        )
-
-    def update_evidence(
-        self,
-        context: GitExecutionContext,
-        *,
-        paths: Sequence[str | Path],
-        message: str,
-    ) -> GitCommandResult:
-        normalized_paths = tuple(self._validate_path(item) for item in paths)
-        normalized_message = str(message or "").strip()
-        if not normalized_paths or not normalized_message:
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("evidence paths and message are required")
-        if any(not path.startswith(".agent/") for path in normalized_paths):
-            raise ProvenanceGitError("UPDATE_EVIDENCE may only commit .agent/ paths")
-        request = {
-            "paths": normalized_paths,
-            "message": normalized_message,
-            "content_manifest": self._content_manifest(normalized_paths),
-        }
-        authorization_ids = self._authorize(
-            context,
-            operation=GitOperation.UPDATE_EVIDENCE,
-            request=request,
-            code_change=False,
-        )
-        self._run_raw(["add", "--", *normalized_paths], check=True)
-        return self._run_authorized(
-            operation=GitOperation.UPDATE_EVIDENCE,
-            args=["commit", "--no-gpg-sign", "-m", normalized_message, "--", *normalized_paths],
-            authorization_ids=authorization_ids,
-        )
@@ -1,744 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 最小权限 Run Provenance 子 Grant。
-
-父 Workflow Provenance 只绑定 run/tenant/task/agent/principal 身份，不直接授予
-操作权限。每个子 Grant 只允许一个 ExecutionPath；Git Grant 还必须限定具体
-GitOperation。子 Grant 具备独立 TTL、nonce、状态、撤销和重放防护。
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import threading
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from enum import Enum
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-from .provenance import (
-    ExecutionPath,
-    GitOperation,
-    ProvenanceDenied,
-    ProvenanceExpired,
-    ProvenanceIssuer,
-    ProvenanceNotFound,
-    ProvenanceReplay,
-    ProvenanceRevoked,
-    ProvenanceSignatureError,
-    ProvenanceStatus,
-    ProvenanceVerifier,
-    RunProvenance,
-    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
-    Signer,
-    SignatureVerifier,
-    _validate_digest,
-    canonical_json_bytes,
-    parse_timestamp,
-    required,
-    utc_now,
-)
-
-WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION = "aios.v2.workflow.v1"
-GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION = "aios.v2.provenance-grant.v1"
-
-
-class GrantType(str, Enum):
-    CODE_CHANGE = "code_change"
-    GIT = "git"
-    DEPLOYMENT = "deployment"
-    RUNTIME = "runtime"
-    EVIDENCE = "evidence"
-    ROLLBACK = "rollback"
-    AUDIT = "audit"
-
-
-GRANT_PATHS: Mapping[GrantType, ExecutionPath] = {
-    GrantType.CODE_CHANGE: ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE,
-    GrantType.GIT: ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION,
-    GrantType.DEPLOYMENT: ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT,
-    GrantType.RUNTIME: ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE,
-    GrantType.EVIDENCE: ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE,
-    GrantType.ROLLBACK: ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK,
-    GrantType.AUDIT: ExecutionPath.AUDIT,
-}
-
-
-class GrantStatus(str, Enum):
-    ISSUED = "issued"
-    VERIFIED = "verified"
-    USED = "used"
-    EXPIRED = "expired"
-    REVOKED = "revoked"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ProvenanceGrant:
-    grant_id: str
-    parent_provenance_id: str
-    grant_type: GrantType
-    execution_path: ExecutionPath
-    run_id: str
-    issuer: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str]
-    issued_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-    policy_version: str
-    key_id: str
-    nonce: str
-    signature: str = ""
-    schema_version: str = GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in (
-            "grant_id",
-            "parent_provenance_id",
-            "run_id",
-            "issuer",
-            "tenant_id",
-            "task_id",
-            "agent_id",
-            "principal_id",
-            "issued_at",
-            "expires_at",
-            "policy_version",
-            "key_id",
-            "nonce",
-            "schema_version",
-        ):
-            object.__setattr__(self, name, required(getattr(self, name), name))
-        if self.schema_version != GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION:
-            raise ValueError(f"unsupported grant schema: {self.schema_version}")
-        grant_type = GrantType(self.grant_type)
-        path = ExecutionPath(self.execution_path)
-        if GRANT_PATHS[grant_type] != path:
-            raise ValueError("grant_type does not match execution_path")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "grant_type", grant_type)
-        object.__setattr__(self, "execution_path", path)
-        operations = tuple(
-            sorted({GitOperation(item).value for item in self.allowed_git_operations})
-        )
-        if grant_type == GrantType.GIT and not operations:
-            raise ValueError("Git Grant requires explicit Git operations")
-        if grant_type != GrantType.GIT and operations:
-            raise ValueError("only Git Grant may contain Git operations")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "allowed_git_operations", operations)
-        issued = parse_timestamp(self.issued_at)
-        expires = parse_timestamp(self.expires_at)
-        if expires <= issued:
-            raise ValueError("grant expires_at must be later than issued_at")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "signature", str(self.signature or "").strip())
-
-    def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            "grant_id": self.grant_id,
-            "parent_provenance_id": self.parent_provenance_id,
-            "grant_type": self.grant_type.value,
-            "execution_path": self.execution_path.value,
-            "run_id": self.run_id,
-            "issuer": self.issuer,
-            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "agent_id": self.agent_id,
-            "principal_id": self.principal_id,
-            "allowed_git_operations": list(self.allowed_git_operations),
-            "issued_at": self.issued_at,
-            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
-            "policy_version": self.policy_version,
-            "key_id": self.key_id,
-            "nonce": self.nonce,
-        }
-
-    def canonical_bytes(self) -> bytes:
-        return canonical_json_bytes(self.unsigned_dict())
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        value = self.unsigned_dict()
-        value["signature"] = self.signature
-        return value
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ProvenanceGrant":
-        return cls(**dict(value))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GrantAuthorization:
-    authorization_id: str
-    grant_id: str
-    parent_provenance_id: str
-    run_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    execution_path: str
-    git_operation: str | None
-    request_digest: str
-    policy_version: str
-    key_id: str
-    public_key_fingerprint: str
-    authorized_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
-
-    @property
-    def provenance_id(self) -> str:
-        return self.parent_provenance_id
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return asdict(self)
-
-
-class WorkflowProvenanceIssuer:
-    """签发不携带操作权限的父 Workflow Provenance。"""
-
-    def __init__(self, signer: Signer, store: SQLiteProvenanceStore) -> None:
-        self._issuer = ProvenanceIssuer(signer, store)
-
-    def issue(
-        self,
-        *,
-        run_id: str,
-        issuer: str,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        agent_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        ttl_seconds: int = 14400,
-        provenance_id: str | None = None,
-        nonce: str | None = None,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-    ) -> RunProvenance:
-        return self._issuer.issue(
-            run_id=run_id,
-            issuer=issuer,
-            tenant_id=tenant_id,
-            task_id=task_id,
-            agent_id=agent_id,
-            principal_id=principal_id,
-            allowed_paths=(),
-            allowed_git_operations=(),
-            ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds,
-            policy_version=WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION,
-            provenance_id=provenance_id,
-            nonce=nonce,
-            now=now,
-        )
-
-
-class SQLiteGrantStore:
-    """在 Provenance SQLite 数据库中持久化子 Grant 与使用记录。"""
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-        self._connection = sqlite3.connect(
-            str(self.path), timeout=30.0, check_same_thread=False
-        )
-        self._connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-            self._connection.executescript(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grants (
-                    grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    parent_provenance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    grant_type TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    signature_verified INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                );
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_grants_parent
-                    ON provenance_grants(parent_provenance_id, grant_type, status);
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grant_usage (
-                    authorization_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    git_operation TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
-                    request_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    authorized_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    UNIQUE(grant_id, execution_path, git_operation, request_digest),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(grant_id) REFERENCES provenance_grants(grant_id)
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grant_events (
-                    event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    FOREIGN KEY(grant_id) REFERENCES provenance_grants(grant_id)
-                );
-                """
-            )
-            self._connection.commit()
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.close()
-
-    def _event(
-        self,
-        grant_id: str,
-        event_type: str,
-        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self._connection.execute(
-            "INSERT INTO provenance_grant_events VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-            (
-                f"gevt_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-                grant_id,
-                event_type,
-                json.dumps(dict(details or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True),
-                utc_now(),
-            ),
-        )
-
-    def save_issued(self, grant: ProvenanceGrant) -> None:
-        payload = json.dumps(
-            grant.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
-        )
-        now = utc_now()
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO provenance_grants VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?)",
-                    (
-                        grant.grant_id,
-                        grant.parent_provenance_id,
-                        grant.grant_type.value,
-                        grant.execution_path.value,
-                        payload,
-                        GrantStatus.ISSUED.value,
-                        now,
-                        now,
-                    ),
-                )
-                self._event(grant.grant_id, "issued")
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise ProvenanceDenied("grant_id already exists") from exc
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def get(self, grant_id: str) -> ProvenanceGrant:
-        with self._lock:
-            row = self._connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                (required(grant_id, "grant_id"),),
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance grant not found")
-        value = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
-        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("stored grant is invalid")
-        return ProvenanceGrant.from_dict(value)
-
-    def status(self, grant_id: str) -> GrantStatus:
-        with self._lock:
-            row = self._connection.execute(
-                "SELECT status FROM provenance_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                (required(grant_id, "grant_id"),),
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance grant not found")
-        return GrantStatus(row["status"])
-
-    def mark_verified(self, grant_id: str, *, fingerprint: str) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                current = self.status(grant_id)
-                if current in {GrantStatus.REVOKED, GrantStatus.EXPIRED}:
-                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"cannot verify grant in state {current.value}")
-                next_status = (
-                    GrantStatus.USED.value
-                    if current == GrantStatus.USED
-                    else GrantStatus.VERIFIED.value
-                )
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, signature_verified = 1, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (next_status, utc_now(), grant_id),
-                )
-                self._event(
-                    grant_id,
-                    "verified",
-                    {"public_key_fingerprint": fingerprint},
-                )
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def mark_expired(self, grant_id: str) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                if self.status(grant_id) == GrantStatus.REVOKED:
-                    self._connection.rollback()
-                    return
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (GrantStatus.EXPIRED.value, utc_now(), grant_id),
-                )
-                self._event(grant_id, "expired")
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def revoke(self, grant_id: str, *, reason: str, principal_id: str) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                self.get(grant_id)
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (GrantStatus.REVOKED.value, utc_now(), grant_id),
-                )
-                self._event(
-                    grant_id,
-                    "revoked",
-                    {
-                        "reason": required(reason, "reason"),
-                        "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
-                    },
-                )
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def record_authorization(self, authorization: GrantAuthorization) -> None:
-        receipt = json.dumps(
-            authorization.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
-        )
-        with self._lock:
-            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                current = self.status(authorization.grant_id)
-                if current in {GrantStatus.REVOKED, GrantStatus.EXPIRED}:
-                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"grant state is {current.value}")
-                try:
-                    self._connection.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO provenance_grant_usage VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (
-                            authorization.authorization_id,
-                            authorization.grant_id,
-                            authorization.execution_path,
-                            authorization.git_operation or "",
-                            authorization.request_digest,
-                            authorization.authorized_at,
-                            receipt,
-                        ),
-                    )
-                except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
-                    raise ProvenanceReplay(
-                        "identical grant path/operation/request digest already used"
-                    ) from exc
-                self._connection.execute(
-                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (GrantStatus.USED.value, authorization.authorized_at, authorization.grant_id),
-                )
-                self._event(
-                    authorization.grant_id,
-                    "used",
-                    {
-                        "authorization_id": authorization.authorization_id,
-                        "execution_path": authorization.execution_path,
-                        "git_operation": authorization.git_operation,
-                        "request_digest": authorization.request_digest,
-                    },
-                )
-                self._connection.commit()
-            except Exception:
-                self._connection.rollback()
-                raise
-
-    def list_for_parent(self, parent_provenance_id: str) -> list[ProvenanceGrant]:
-        with self._lock:
-            rows = self._connection.execute(
-                "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_grants WHERE parent_provenance_id = ? ORDER BY grant_type, grant_id",
-                (required(parent_provenance_id, "parent_provenance_id"),),
-            ).fetchall()
-        return [ProvenanceGrant.from_dict(json.loads(row["payload_json"])) for row in rows]
-
-
-class GrantIssuer:
-    """从父 Workflow Provenance 派生单一路径最小权限 Grant。"""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        signer: Signer,
-        parent_store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
-        grant_store: SQLiteGrantStore,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.signer = signer
-        self.parent_store = parent_store
-        self.grant_store = grant_store
-
-    def issue(
-        self,
-        *,
-        parent_provenance_id: str,
-        grant_type: GrantType | str,
-        ttl_seconds: int = 900,
-        allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str] = (),
-        grant_id: str | None = None,
-        nonce: str | None = None,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-    ) -> ProvenanceGrant:
-        if ttl_seconds <= 0:
-            raise ValueError("grant ttl_seconds must be positive")
-        parent = self.parent_store.get(parent_provenance_id)
-        if parent.policy_version != WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("child grants require a workflow provenance parent")
-        if parent.allowed_paths or parent.allowed_git_operations:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("workflow provenance parent must not contain operation rights")
-        parent_status = self.parent_store.status(parent.provenance_id)
-        if parent_status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
-            raise ProvenanceRevoked("workflow provenance is revoked")
-        issued = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        parent_expiry = parse_timestamp(parent.expires_at)
-        expires = min(issued + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds), parent_expiry)
-        if expires <= issued:
-            raise ProvenanceExpired("workflow provenance has expired")
-        normalized_type = GrantType(grant_type)
-        operations = tuple(allowed_git_operations)
-        unsigned = ProvenanceGrant(
-            grant_id=grant_id or f"grant_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            parent_provenance_id=parent.provenance_id,
-            grant_type=normalized_type,
-            execution_path=GRANT_PATHS[normalized_type],
-            run_id=parent.run_id,
-            issuer=parent.issuer,
-            tenant_id=parent.tenant_id,
-            task_id=parent.task_id,
-            agent_id=parent.agent_id,
-            principal_id=parent.principal_id,
-            allowed_git_operations=operations,
-            issued_at=issued.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
-            expires_at=expires.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
-            policy_version=f"{WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION}.{normalized_type.value}",
-            key_id=self.signer.key_id,
-            nonce=nonce or uuid.uuid4().hex,
-        )
-        signed = replace(unsigned, signature=self.signer.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes()))
-        self.grant_store.save_issued(signed)
-        return signed
-
-
-class GrantVerifier:
-    """验证父 Workflow 与子 Grant，确保单一路径最小权限。"""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        parent_store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
-        grant_store: SQLiteGrantStore,
-        verifiers: Mapping[str, SignatureVerifier],
-    ) -> None:
-        if not verifiers:
-            raise ValueError("at least one trusted verifier is required")
-        self.parent_store = parent_store
-        self.grant_store = grant_store
-        self.verifiers = {required(key, "key_id"): value for key, value in verifiers.items()}
-
-    def _verify_parent(self, parent: RunProvenance, *, now: datetime) -> SignatureVerifier:
-        status = self.parent_store.status(parent.provenance_id)
-        if status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
-            raise ProvenanceRevoked("workflow provenance is revoked")
-        if now >= parse_timestamp(parent.expires_at):
-            self.parent_store.mark_expired(parent.provenance_id)
-            raise ProvenanceExpired("workflow provenance is expired")
-        verifier = self.verifiers.get(parent.key_id)
-        if verifier is None or not parent.signature or not verifier.verify(
-            parent.canonical_bytes(), parent.signature
-        ):
-            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid workflow provenance signature")
-        if parent.policy_version != WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("parent is not a workflow provenance")
-        if parent.allowed_paths or parent.allowed_git_operations:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("workflow provenance must not contain operation rights")
-        return verifier
-
-    def authorize(
-        self,
-        *,
-        grant_id: str,
-        parent_provenance_id: str,
-        run_id: str,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        task_id: str,
-        agent_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        execution_path: str,
-        request_digest: str,
-        git_operation: str | None = None,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-    ) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        parent = self.parent_store.get(parent_provenance_id)
-        self._verify_parent(parent, now=current)
-        grant = self.grant_store.get(grant_id)
-        grant_status = self.grant_store.status(grant.grant_id)
-        if grant_status == GrantStatus.REVOKED:
-            raise ProvenanceRevoked("provenance grant is revoked")
-        if current >= parse_timestamp(grant.expires_at):
-            self.grant_store.mark_expired(grant.grant_id)
-            raise ProvenanceExpired("provenance grant is expired")
-        verifier = self.verifiers.get(grant.key_id)
-        if verifier is None or not grant.signature or not verifier.verify(
-            grant.canonical_bytes(), grant.signature
-        ):
-            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid provenance grant signature")
-        expected = {
-            "parent_provenance_id": parent.provenance_id,
-            "run_id": required(run_id, "run_id"),
-            "tenant_id": required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),
-            "task_id": required(task_id, "task_id"),
-            "agent_id": required(agent_id, "agent_id"),
-            "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
-        }
-        for field_name, expected_value in expected.items():
-            if getattr(grant, field_name) != expected_value:
-                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"grant {field_name} mismatch")
-            if field_name != "parent_provenance_id" and getattr(parent, field_name) != expected_value:
-                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"workflow {field_name} mismatch")
-        path = ExecutionPath(execution_path)
-        if grant.execution_path != path:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied(
-                f"grant permits {grant.execution_path.value}, not {path.value}"
-            )
-        operation: str | None = None
-        if path == ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION:
-            if git_operation is None:
-                raise ProvenanceDenied("Git operation is required")
-            operation = GitOperation(git_operation).value
-            if operation not in grant.allowed_git_operations:
-                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"Git operation is not allowed: {operation}")
-        elif git_operation is not None:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("git_operation is only valid for a Git Grant")
-        digest = _validate_digest(request_digest)
-        self.grant_store.mark_verified(grant.grant_id, fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint)
-        authorization = GrantAuthorization(
-            authorization_id=f"gauth_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-            grant_id=grant.grant_id,
-            parent_provenance_id=parent.provenance_id,
-            run_id=grant.run_id,
-            tenant_id=grant.tenant_id,
-            task_id=grant.task_id,
-            agent_id=grant.agent_id,
-            principal_id=grant.principal_id,
-            execution_path=path.value,
-            git_operation=operation,
-            request_digest=digest,
-            policy_version=grant.policy_version,
-            key_id=grant.key_id,
-            public_key_fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint,
-        )
-        self.grant_store.record_authorization(authorization)
-        return authorization
-
-
-class LeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter:
-    """按路径选择独立子 Grant 的生产 Writer。
-
-    ``provenance_id`` 参数始终指父 Workflow Provenance；Grant ID 来自受保护
-    配置映射，调用方无法通过请求体临时扩大权限。
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        verifier: GrantVerifier,
-        receipt_root: str | Path,
-        grant_ids: Mapping[str, str],
-        *,
-        writer_id: str = "aios-v2-least-privilege-writer",
-    ) -> None:
-        self.verifier = verifier
-        self.receipt_root = Path(receipt_root).resolve()
-        self.receipt_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.grant_ids = {
-            ExecutionPath(path).value: required(grant_id, f"grant_id[{path}]")
-            for path, grant_id in grant_ids.items()
-        }
-        missing = sorted(path.value for path in ExecutionPath if path.value not in self.grant_ids)
-        if missing:
-            raise ValueError(f"missing least-privilege Grant mappings: {missing}")
-        self.writer_id = required(writer_id, "writer_id")
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _component(value: str) -> str:
-        normalized = required(value, "path component")
-        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("invalid receipt path component")
-        return normalized
-
-    def authorize(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        path = ExecutionPath(values["execution_path"]).value
-        grant_id = self.grant_ids[path]
-        parent_provenance_id = values.pop("provenance_id")
-        authorization = self.verifier.authorize(
-            grant_id=grant_id,
-            parent_provenance_id=parent_provenance_id,
-            **values,
-        )
-        tenant = self._component(authorization.tenant_id)
-        parent = self._component(authorization.parent_provenance_id)
-        grant = self._component(authorization.grant_id)
-        target_dir = self.receipt_root / tenant / parent / grant
-        target = target_dir / f"{authorization.authorization_id}.json"
-        payload = authorization.as_dict()
-        payload["writer_id"] = self.writer_id
-        with self._lock:
-            target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
-            temporary.write_text(
-                json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
-                encoding="utf-8",
-            )
-            os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
-            os.replace(temporary, target)
-        return authorization
-
-    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_git_operation(
-        self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any
-    ) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value,
-            git_operation=git_operation,
-            **values,
-        )
-
-    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value, **values)
-
-    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value, **values)
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2 运维操作 Provenance Gate 与服务级 Scoped Writer 工厂。"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
-
-from .provenance import (
-    Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier,
-    ExecutionPath,
-    ProvenanceAuthorization,
-    ProvenanceControlledWriter,
-    ProvenanceDenied,
-    ProvenanceVerifier,
-    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
-    digest_payload,
-)
-from .provenance_grants import GrantAuthorization, GrantVerifier, SQLiteGrantStore
-from .provenance_scoped import ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter
-
-
-APPLICATION_PROVENANCE_SCOPE = (
-    ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value,
-    ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value,
-    ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value,
-)
-
-
-class AuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
-    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OperationContext:
-    provenance_id: str
-    run_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        return asdict(self)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OperationReceipt:
-    operation: str
-    request_digest: str
-    authorization_id: str
-    provenance_id: str
-    grant_id: str | None
-    run_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    agent_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    execution_path: str
-    authorized_at: str
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return asdict(self)
-
-
-class ProvenanceOperationGate:
-    """部署、回滚、审计和运行操作的统一授权入口。"""
-
-    def __init__(self, writer: AuthorizationWriter) -> None:
-        self.writer = writer
-
-    def authorize(
-        self,
-        context: OperationContext,
-        *,
-        execution_path: str,
-        operation: str,
-        request: Mapping[str, Any],
-    ) -> OperationReceipt:
-        path = ExecutionPath(execution_path).value
-        normalized_operation = str(operation or "").strip()
-        if not normalized_operation:
-            raise ValueError("operation is required")
-        digest = digest_payload(
-            {
-                "operation": normalized_operation,
-                "execution_path": path,
-                "request": dict(request),
-            }
-        )
-        values = {
-            "provenance_id": context.provenance_id,
-            "run_id": context.run_id,
-            "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
-            "task_id": context.task_id,
-            "agent_id": context.agent_id,
-            "principal_id": context.principal_id,
-            "request_digest": digest,
-        }
-        if path == ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value:
-            authorization = self.writer.authorize_deployment(**values)
-        elif path == ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value:
-            authorization = self.writer.authorize_rollback(**values)
-        elif path == ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value:
-            authorization = self.writer.authorize_audit(**values)
-        elif path == ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value:
-            authorization = self.writer.authorize_code_change(**values)
-        elif path == ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value:
-            authorization = self.writer.authorize_evidence_write(**values)
-        elif path == ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value:
-            authorization = self.writer.authorize_runtime_execute(**values)
-        else:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied(
-                "generic operation gate does not authorize git_operation; use ProvenanceGitWriter"
-            )
-        return self._receipt(normalized_operation, digest, authorization)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _receipt(
-        operation: str,
-        request_digest: str,
-        authorization: ProvenanceAuthorization | GrantAuthorization | Any,
-    ) -> OperationReceipt:
-        return OperationReceipt(
-            operation=operation,
-            request_digest=request_digest,
-            authorization_id=authorization.authorization_id,
-            provenance_id=authorization.provenance_id,
-            grant_id=getattr(authorization, "grant_id", None),
-            run_id=authorization.run_id,
-            tenant_id=authorization.tenant_id,
-            task_id=authorization.task_id,
-            agent_id=authorization.agent_id,
-            principal_id=authorization.principal_id,
-            execution_path=authorization.execution_path,
-            authorized_at=authorization.authorized_at,
-        )
-
-
-_GRANT_ENV_BY_PATH: Mapping[str, str] = {
-    ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_CODE_CHANGE_ID",
-    ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_GIT_ID",
-    ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_DEPLOYMENT_ID",
-    ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_RUNTIME_ID",
-    ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_EVIDENCE_ID",
-    ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_ROLLBACK_ID",
-    ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_AUDIT_ID",
-}
-
-
-def grant_ids_from_environment(
-    *,
-    required_paths: Sequence[str] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, str]:
-    paths = tuple(
-        sorted(
-            {
-                ExecutionPath(path).value
-                for path in (required_paths or tuple(item.value for item in ExecutionPath))
-            }
-        )
-    )
-    values = {path: os.getenv(_GRANT_ENV_BY_PATH[path], "").strip() for path in paths}
-    missing = [_GRANT_ENV_BY_PATH[path] for path, value in values.items() if not value]
-    if missing:
-        raise RuntimeError(f"missing scoped Provenance Grant configuration: {missing}")
-    return values
-
-
-def build_provenance_writer_from_env(
-    *,
-    state_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-    required: bool | None = None,
-    required_paths: Sequence[str] | None = None,
-    writer_id: str = "aios-v2-application-grant-writer",
-) -> AuthorizationWriter | None:
-    """从环境构建服务级最小权限 Writer。
-
-    生产应用默认只加载 Runtime、Evidence、Audit Grant。Git、部署和回滚进程
-    必须显式传入自己的 ``required_paths``，不能继承应用默认范围。旧全权限 Writer
-    只允许在显式关闭强制模式的候选/测试环境中使用。
-    """
-
-    require_value = (
-        bool(required)
-        if required is not None
-        else os.getenv("AIOS_REQUIRE_RUN_PROVENANCE", "0").strip().lower()
-        in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-    )
-    public_key_file = os.getenv("AIOS_PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE", "").strip()
-    key_id = os.getenv("AIOS_PROVENANCE_KEY_ID", "").strip()
-    base = Path(state_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR", "/var/lib/aios-v2")).resolve()
-    store_file = os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE", str(base / "run-provenance.sqlite3")
-    ).strip()
-    receipt_root = os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_PROVENANCE_RECEIPT_DIR", str(base / "provenance-receipts")
-    ).strip()
-    configured = bool(public_key_file and key_id)
-    if not configured:
-        if require_value:
-            raise RuntimeError(
-                "Run Provenance is required but AIOS_PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE or AIOS_PROVENANCE_KEY_ID is missing"
-            )
-        return None
-
-    verifier = Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier.from_file(public_key_file, key_id=key_id)
-    parent_store = SQLiteProvenanceStore(store_file)
-    normalized_paths = tuple(
-        sorted(
-            {
-                ExecutionPath(path).value
-                for path in (
-                    required_paths
-                    if required_paths is not None
-                    else APPLICATION_PROVENANCE_SCOPE
-                )
-            }
-        )
-    )
-
-    if require_value:
-        if not normalized_paths:
-            raise RuntimeError("production Run Provenance requires a non-empty service scope")
-        grant_ids = grant_ids_from_environment(required_paths=normalized_paths)
-        grant_store = SQLiteGrantStore(store_file)
-        trusted_grants = GrantVerifier(parent_store, grant_store, {key_id: verifier})
-        return ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter(
-            trusted_grants,
-            receipt_root,
-            grant_ids,
-            required_paths=normalized_paths,
-            writer_id=writer_id,
-        )
-
-    legacy = ProvenanceVerifier(parent_store, {key_id: verifier})
-    return ProvenanceControlledWriter(legacy, receipt_root)
-
-
-def context_from_environment() -> OperationContext:
-    values = {
-        "provenance_id": os.getenv("AIOS_PROVENANCE_ID", ""),
-        "run_id": os.getenv("AIOS_RUN_ID", ""),
-        "tenant_id": os.getenv("AIOS_TENANT_ID", ""),
-        "task_id": os.getenv("AIOS_TASK_ID", ""),
-        "agent_id": os.getenv("AIOS_AGENT_ID", ""),
-        "principal_id": os.getenv("AIOS_PRINCIPAL_ID", ""),
-    }
-    missing = [name for name, value in values.items() if not str(value).strip()]
-    if missing:
-        raise RuntimeError(f"missing Provenance context environment variables: {missing}")
-    return OperationContext(**{name: str(value).strip() for name, value in values.items()})
-
-
-def load_request_file(path: str | Path) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-    value = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        raise ValueError("request file must contain a JSON object")
-    return dict(value)
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-"""按服务范围加载的最小权限 Provenance Writer。
-
-该 Writer 只持有调用进程需要的 Grant ID。未配置路径的方法即使被调用也会
-默认拒绝，避免应用进程获得 Git、部署或回滚权限。
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import threading
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-from .provenance import ExecutionPath, ProvenanceDenied, required
-from .provenance_grants import GrantAuthorization, GrantVerifier
-
-
-class ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter:
-    """只暴露指定 ExecutionPath 的最小权限 Writer。"""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        verifier: GrantVerifier,
-        receipt_root: str | Path,
-        grant_ids: Mapping[str, str],
-        *,
-        required_paths: Sequence[str],
-        writer_id: str = "aios-v2-scoped-grant-writer",
-    ) -> None:
-        self.verifier = verifier
-        self.receipt_root = Path(receipt_root).resolve()
-        self.receipt_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        normalized_required = tuple(
-            sorted({ExecutionPath(path).value for path in required_paths})
-        )
-        if not normalized_required:
-            raise ValueError("required_paths must not be empty")
-        self.required_paths = frozenset(normalized_required)
-        self.grant_ids = {
-            path: required(grant_ids.get(path, ""), f"grant_id[{path}]")
-            for path in normalized_required
-        }
-        unexpected = sorted(set(grant_ids) - self.required_paths)
-        if unexpected:
-            raise ValueError(
-                f"scoped writer received unnecessary Grant mappings: {unexpected}"
-            )
-        self.writer_id = required(writer_id, "writer_id")
-        self._lock = threading.RLock()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _component(value: str) -> str:
-        normalized = required(value, "path component")
-        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied("invalid receipt path component")
-        return normalized
-
-    def _grant_for(self, path: str) -> str:
-        normalized = ExecutionPath(path).value
-        grant_id = self.grant_ids.get(normalized)
-        if grant_id is None:
-            raise ProvenanceDenied(
-                f"this process is not allowed to authorize {normalized}"
-            )
-        return grant_id
-
-    def authorize(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        path = ExecutionPath(values["execution_path"]).value
-        grant_id = self._grant_for(path)
-        parent_provenance_id = values.pop("provenance_id")
-        authorization = self.verifier.authorize(
-            grant_id=grant_id,
-            parent_provenance_id=parent_provenance_id,
-            **values,
-        )
-        tenant = self._component(authorization.tenant_id)
-        parent = self._component(authorization.parent_provenance_id)
-        grant = self._component(authorization.grant_id)
-        target_dir = self.receipt_root / tenant / parent / grant
-        target = target_dir / f"{authorization.authorization_id}.json"
-        payload = authorization.as_dict()
-        payload["writer_id"] = self.writer_id
-        payload["scope"] = sorted(self.required_paths)
-        with self._lock:
-            target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
-            temporary.write_text(
-                json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2)
-                + "\n",
-                encoding="utf-8",
-            )
-            os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
-            os.replace(temporary, target)
-        return authorization
-
-    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value, **values
-        )
-
-    def authorize_git_operation(
-        self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any
-    ) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value,
-            git_operation=git_operation,
-            **values,
-        )
-
-    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value, **values
-        )
-
-    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value, **values
-        )
-
-    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value, **values
-        )
-
-    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(
-            execution_path=ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value, **values
-        )
-
-    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
-        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value, **values)
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+"""Fail-closed access to the authoritative bare Git repository."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import urllib.parse
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Iterable
+
+_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "cat-file",
+        "config",
+        "diff",
+        "for-each-ref",
+        "ls-remote",
+        "merge-base",
+        "push",
+        "remote",
+        "rev-parse",
+        "show-ref",
+        "tag",
+    }
+)
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_MAX_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
+_TIMEOUT = 8.0
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitError(RuntimeError):
+    """A fail-closed authoritative repository or ref query error."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitNotFound(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A validated revision does not exist in the authoritative repository."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A controlled Git query exceeded the response-size boundary."""
+
+
+def _redact(text: str) -> str:
+    value = str(text or "")
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:bearer|token)\s+\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)((?:access_)?token\s*[:=]\s*)\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(https?://[^/\s:@]+:)[^@\s/]+@", r"\1REDACTED@", value)
+    return value
+
+
+def _configured_path(git_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
+    raw = str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    if not raw:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    path = Path(raw)
+    if not path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    try:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not resolved.is_dir():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def _run(
+    git_dir: Path,
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    if not args or args[0] not in _ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
+    if len(result.stdout) + len(result.stderr) > _MAX_OUTPUT:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
+    if check and result.returncode != 0:
+        detail = _redact(result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip())
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError(
+            "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED" + (f": {detail[:160]}" if detail else "")
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def _repository_identity_from_remote(url: str) -> str:
+    value = str(url or "").strip().split("?", 1)[0].rstrip("/")
+    if not value:
+        return ""
+    if "://" in value:
+        value = urllib.parse.urlparse(value).path
+    elif ":" in value:
+        value = value.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
+    value = value.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].strip("/")
+    value = re.sub(r"\.git$", "", value, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
+    parts = [part for part in value.split("/") if part]
+    if len(parts) >= 2:
+        value = "/".join(parts[-2:])
+    return value.strip("/").lower()
+
+
+def verify_repository(
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[Path, str]:
+    path = _configured_path(git_dir)
+    expected = str(
+        repository_identity
+        or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+    ).strip().strip("/")
+    if not expected or expected.count("/") != 1:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    bare = _run(path, ["rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository"], check=True)
+    if bare.stdout.strip().lower() != "true":
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    remote = _run(path, ["config", "--get", "remote.gitea.url"], check=False)
+    actual = _repository_identity_from_remote(remote.stdout)
+    if actual != expected.lower():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    return path, expected
+
+
+def run_authoritative_git(
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool = True,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    return _run(path, list(args), check=check, timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def authoritative_head_oid(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main"], git_dir=git_dir)
+    oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return oid
+
+
+def authoritative_tags(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str | None]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/tags",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)\t%(objecttype)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    tags: list[dict[str, str | None]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid, object_type = (line.split("\t", 2) + ["", ""])[:3]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        peeled_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{name}^{{commit}}"],
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        peeled = peeled_result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(peeled):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        tags.append(
+            {
+                "name": name,
+                "tag_oid": oid.lower(),
+                "object_type": object_type,
+                "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
+            }
+        )
+    return tags
+
+
+def authoritative_branches(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/heads",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    branches: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid = (line.split("\t", 1) + [""])[:2]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        branches.append({"name": name, "oid": oid.lower()})
+    return branches
+
+
+def authoritative_commit(
+    oid: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    value = str(oid or "").strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise ValueError("commit OID must be a full 40-character value")
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{value}^{{commit}}"],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    resolved = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if resolved != value:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def authoritative_lineage(
+    ancestor: str,
+    descendant: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    authoritative_commit(ancestor, git_dir=git_dir)
+    authoritative_commit(descendant, git_dir=git_dir)
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
+        check=False,
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("evidence lineage mismatch")
+
+
+_SAFE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
+
+
+def _safe_ref_name(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(
+        _SAFE_REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
+        and ".." not in value
+        and "//" not in value
+        and "@{" not in value
+        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        and not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
+    )
+
+
+def validate_git_revision(
+    value: str,
+    field: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    revision = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not revision or revision != str(value or "") or revision.startswith("-"):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
+        try:
+            return authoritative_commit(revision.lower(), git_dir=git_dir)
+        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+            raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found") from exc
+    if not _safe_ref_name(revision) or any(token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if revision.startswith("refs/"):
+        if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+        candidates = [revision]
+    else:
+        candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
+    matches: list[str] = []
+    for candidate in candidates:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if result.returncode == 0 and _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+            matches.append(oid)
+    if not matches:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found")
+    if len(set(matches)) != 1 or len(matches) != 1:
+        raise ValueError(f"ambiguous {field} revision")
+    return matches[0]
+
+
+def authoritative_diff(
+    from_revision: str,
+    to_revision: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
+    to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
+    args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
+    result = run_authoritative_git(args, git_dir=path)
+    return {
+        "code": 0,
+        "stdout": result.stdout,
+        "stderr": "",
+        "cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
+        "from_oid": from_oid,
+        "to_oid": to_oid,
+    }
+
+
+def repository_snapshot(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    configured = bool(
+        str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    )
+    try:
+        path, identity = verify_repository(
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+            repository_identity=repository_identity,
+        )
+        head = authoritative_head_oid(git_dir=path)
+        return {
+            "repository_available": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": str(path),
+            "authoritative_head_oid": head,
+            "repository_identity": identity,
+            "query_error": None,
+        }
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        return {
+            "repository_available": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": None,
+            "authoritative_head_oid": None,
+            "repository_identity": str(
+                repository_identity
+                or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+            ).strip() or None,
+            "query_error": _redact(str(exc)),
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,953 @@
+"""Owner-authorized, fail-closed task writer provisioning bridge.
+
+This module converts an authenticated Owner authorization into a canonical,
+short-lived, one-time grant request. It delegates signing, validation and
+worktree/writer provisioning to existing root-governed executables.
+
+It never writes Git refs directly and never authorizes main, tag, baseline or
+production mutations.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import secrets
+import shutil
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+from signer_contract_compatibility import (
+    deployed_signer_help,
+    run_compatible_signer,
+    run_compatible_validator,
+)
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z0-9][A-Z0-9._:-]{7,127}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+OWNER_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]{3,255}$")
+
+REQUIRED_REQUEST_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "base_ref",
+        "base_oid",
+        "target_branch",
+        "owner_authorization_reference",
+        "one_time_use",
+        "expires_in_seconds",
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+        "allowed_operations",
+        "denied_operations",
+    }
+)
+REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "create_worktree",
+        "create_target_branch_if_absent",
+        "commit_to_target_branch",
+        "push_target_branch",
+    }
+)
+REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "direct_main_push",
+        "force_push",
+        "tag_create",
+        "tag_update",
+        "tag_delete",
+        "branch_delete",
+        "repository_admin",
+        "baseline_write",
+        "production_deploy",
+        "production_marker_write",
+        "history_rewrite",
+    }
+)
+REQUIRED_NEGATIVE_TESTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "main_write_denied",
+        "other_branch_write_denied",
+        "tag_create_denied",
+        "tag_update_denied",
+        "baseline_write_denied",
+        "force_push_denied",
+        "branch_delete_denied",
+    }
+)
+SENSITIVE_KEY_MARKERS = (
+    "authorization",
+    "credential",
+    "private_key",
+    "secret",
+    "signature",
+    "token",
+)
+
+
+class ProvisioningError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed error returned to the API adapter."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        code: str,
+        status: int = 400,
+        *,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+        self.details = dict(details or {})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OwnerContext:
+    identity: str
+    role: str
+    authorization_reference: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProvisioningConfig:
+    repository_identity: str
+    authority_git_dir: Path
+    state_root: Path
+    signer: Path
+    validator: Path
+    provisioner: Path
+    governed_use_sudo: bool = False
+    sudo_path: Path = Path("/usr/bin/sudo")
+    max_expiry_seconds: int = 1800
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_environment(cls) -> "ProvisioningConfig":
+        return cls(
+            repository_identity=os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "aios/aios"
+            ).strip(),
+            authority_git_dir=Path(
+                os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR", "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
+            ),
+            state_root=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORIZED_WRITER_STATE_ROOT",
+                    "/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge",
+                )
+            ),
+            signer=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_SIGNER_ADAPTER",
+                    "/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter",
+                )
+            ),
+            validator=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_VALIDATOR",
+                    "/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator",
+                )
+            ),
+            provisioner=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONER",
+                    "/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner",
+                )
+            ),
+            governed_use_sudo=os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_GOVERNED_USE_SUDO", ""
+            ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"},
+            sudo_path=Path(
+                os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SUDO_PATH", "/usr/bin/sudo")
+            ),
+        )
+
+
+def utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def iso_utc(value: datetime) -> str:
+    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def canonical_json_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: Any, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise ProvisioningError("STATE_PATH_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".tmp-", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+            stream.write(canonical_json_bytes(value))
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+        os.chmod(path, mode)
+        parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+        try:
+            os.fsync(parent_fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(parent_fd)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def _read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise ProvisioningError("RESULT_FILE_INVALID", 500)
+    if path.stat().st_size <= 0 or path.stat().st_size > 1_048_576:
+        raise ProvisioningError("RESULT_FILE_INVALID", 500)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise ProvisioningError("RESULT_JSON_INVALID", 500) from None
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ProvisioningError("RESULT_OBJECT_REQUIRED", 500)
+    return value
+
+
+def _safe_receipt_id(task_id: str, repository: str, branch: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(f"{task_id}\0{repository}\0{branch}".encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _redacted(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        cleaned = {}
+        for key, inner in value.items():
+            lowered = str(key).lower()
+            if any(marker in lowered for marker in SENSITIVE_KEY_MARKERS):
+                if lowered in {
+                    "owner_authorization_reference",
+                    "signing_key_identity",
+                    "signer_identity",
+                }:
+                    cleaned[key] = inner
+                else:
+                    cleaned[key] = "[REDACTED]"
+            else:
+                cleaned[key] = _redacted(inner)
+        return cleaned
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [_redacted(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def _run(
+    argv: list[str],
+    *,
+    env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    timeout: int = 60,
+    allowed_returncodes: tuple[int, ...] = (0,),
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        env=dict(env) if env is not None else None,
+    )
+    if result.returncode not in allowed_returncodes:
+        raise ProvisioningError(
+            "GOVERNED_TOOL_FAILED",
+            503,
+            details={
+                "tool": Path(argv[0]).name,
+                "returncode": result.returncode,
+                "stderr": result.stderr[-1000:],
+            },
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def _git(git_dir: Path, *args: str, allowed_returncodes: tuple[int, ...] = (0,)) -> str:
+    result = _run(
+        ["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
+        timeout=30,
+        allowed_returncodes=allowed_returncodes,
+    )
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def _verify_executable(path: Path, name: str) -> None:
+    if not path.is_absolute() or path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise ProvisioningError(f"{name}_EXECUTABLE_INVALID", 503)
+    info = path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or not os.access(path, os.X_OK):
+        raise ProvisioningError(f"{name}_EXECUTABLE_INVALID", 503)
+    if info.st_mode & (stat.S_IWGRP | stat.S_IWOTH):
+        raise ProvisioningError(f"{name}_EXECUTABLE_PERMISSIONS_REJECTED", 503)
+
+
+def _tool_argv(
+    config: ProvisioningConfig,
+    path: Path,
+    *args: str,
+) -> list[str]:
+    if config.governed_use_sudo:
+        return [str(config.sudo_path), "-n", "--", str(path), *args]
+    return [str(path), *args]
+
+
+def _verify_tool_contract(
+    path: Path,
+    name: str,
+    config: ProvisioningConfig,
+) -> None:
+    _verify_executable(path, name)
+    if config.governed_use_sudo:
+        _verify_executable(config.sudo_path, "SUDO")
+    help_result = _run(_tool_argv(config, path, "--help"), timeout=15)
+    if name == "SIGNER":
+        sign_help = _run(
+            _tool_argv(config, path, "sign", "--help"),
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+        if deployed_signer_help(sign_help.stdout, sign_help.stderr):
+            _run(_tool_argv(config, path, "self-test"), timeout=30)
+            return
+    for flag in ("--grant-dir", "--result-json"):
+        if flag not in help_result.stdout and flag not in help_result.stderr:
+            raise ProvisioningError(f"{name}_CONTRACT_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+    _run(_tool_argv(config, path, "--self-test"), timeout=30)
+
+
+def _validate_request(
+    raw: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    owner: OwnerContext,
+    config: ProvisioningConfig,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if owner.role != "owner" or not owner.identity.strip():
+        raise ProvisioningError("OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED", 403)
+    if set(raw) != REQUIRED_REQUEST_FIELDS:
+        raise ProvisioningError("REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
+    if raw["repository"] != config.repository_identity:
+        raise ProvisioningError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409)
+    if raw["base_ref"] != "refs/heads/main":
+        raise ProvisioningError("BASE_REF_REJECTED", 409)
+    if not isinstance(raw["base_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(raw["base_oid"]):
+        raise ProvisioningError("BASE_OID_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["target_branch"], str)
+        or not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(raw["target_branch"])
+        or raw["target_branch"] in {"main", "master"}
+    ):
+        raise ProvisioningError("TARGET_BRANCH_REJECTED")
+    if not isinstance(raw["task_id"], str) or not TASK_RE.fullmatch(raw["task_id"]):
+        raise ProvisioningError("TASK_ID_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["owner_authorization_reference"], str)
+        or not OWNER_REF_RE.fullmatch(raw["owner_authorization_reference"])
+        or raw["owner_authorization_reference"] != owner.authorization_reference
+    ):
+        raise ProvisioningError("OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REFERENCE_MISMATCH", 403)
+    if raw["one_time_use"] is not True:
+        raise ProvisioningError("ONE_TIME_USE_REQUIRED")
+    expiry = raw["expires_in_seconds"]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(expiry, int)
+        or isinstance(expiry, bool)
+        or not 60 <= expiry <= config.max_expiry_seconds
+    ):
+        raise ProvisioningError("GRANT_LIFETIME_REJECTED")
+    for name in (
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+    ):
+        if raw[name] is not False:
+            raise ProvisioningError("PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED", 403)
+    allowed = raw["allowed_operations"]
+    denied = raw["denied_operations"]
+    if not isinstance(allowed, list) or frozenset(allowed) != REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS:
+        raise ProvisioningError("ALLOWED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    if len(allowed) != len(set(allowed)):
+        raise ProvisioningError("ALLOWED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    if not isinstance(denied, list) or frozenset(denied) != REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS:
+        raise ProvisioningError("DENIED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    if len(denied) != len(set(denied)):
+        raise ProvisioningError("DENIED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    return dict(raw)
+
+
+def _prepare_state_root(path: Path) -> None:
+    if not path.is_absolute() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise ProvisioningError("STATE_ROOT_INVALID", 500)
+    path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+    os.chmod(path, 0o700)
+    if path.stat().st_mode & (stat.S_IWGRP | stat.S_IWOTH):
+        raise ProvisioningError("STATE_ROOT_PERMISSIONS_REJECTED", 500)
+    (path / "receipts").mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+    (path / "locks").mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+
+
+def _prestart_git_check(
+    request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    config: ProvisioningConfig,
+    *,
+    receipt_exists: bool,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    git_dir = config.authority_git_dir
+    if not git_dir.is_absolute() or git_dir.is_symlink() or not git_dir.is_dir():
+        raise ProvisioningError("AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR_INVALID", 503)
+    actual_main = _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", request["base_ref"])
+    if actual_main != request["base_oid"]:
+        raise ProvisioningError(
+            "AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT",
+            409,
+            details={"expected": request["base_oid"], "actual": actual_main},
+        )
+    ref = f"refs/heads/{request['target_branch']}"
+    existing = _git(
+        git_dir,
+        "show-ref",
+        "--verify",
+        "--hash",
+        ref,
+        allowed_returncodes=(0, 1, 128),
+    )
+    if existing and not receipt_exists:
+        raise ProvisioningError(
+            "EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT",
+            409,
+            details={"branch_oid": existing},
+        )
+    if existing and receipt_exists:
+        ancestor = _run(
+            [
+                "git",
+                "--git-dir",
+                str(git_dir),
+                "merge-base",
+                "--is-ancestor",
+                request["base_oid"],
+                ref,
+            ],
+            allowed_returncodes=(0, 1),
+        )
+        if ancestor.returncode != 0:
+            raise ProvisioningError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT", 409)
+    return {
+        "authoritative_main_oid": actual_main,
+        "target_branch_preexisting": bool(existing),
+        "target_branch_oid": existing or None,
+    }
+
+
+def _build_plan(
+    request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    owner: OwnerContext,
+    *,
+    now: datetime,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+    expires_at = now + timedelta(seconds=int(request["expires_in_seconds"]))
+    grant_request = {
+        "schema": "aios.task-scoped-writer-grant-request.v1",
+        "task_id": request["task_id"],
+        "repository": request["repository"],
+        "base": {"ref": request["base_ref"], "oid": request["base_oid"]},
+        "target": {"branch": request["target_branch"]},
+        "execution_contract": {
+            "branch_creation": "governed_one_shot_provisioner",
+            "writer_route": "POST /api/commit-file",
+            "createBranch_route_required": False,
+        },
+        "owner_authorization": {
+            "identity": owner.identity,
+            "reference": owner.authorization_reference,
+            "authenticated_role": owner.role,
+        },
+        "allowed_operations": sorted(request["allowed_operations"]),
+        "denied_operations": sorted(request["denied_operations"]),
+        "one_time_use": True,
+        "authorization": {
+            "production_change_authorized": False,
+            "tag_change_authorized": False,
+            "baseline_change_authorized": False,
+            "main_write_authorized": False,
+        },
+        "issued_at": iso_utc(now),
+        "not_before": iso_utc(now - timedelta(seconds=2)),
+        "expires_at": iso_utc(expires_at),
+        "nonce": secrets.token_hex(32),
+    }
+    binding_digest = sha256_json(grant_request)
+    plan = {
+        "schema": "aios.task-scoped-writer-approval-plan.v1",
+        "approval_plan_id": f"sha256:{binding_digest}",
+        "grant_request_sha256": binding_digest,
+        "owner_authorization_reference": owner.authorization_reference,
+        "owner_identity": owner.identity,
+        "created_at": iso_utc(now),
+        "expires_at": iso_utc(expires_at),
+        "execute": True,
+        "production_change_authorized": False,
+    }
+    return plan, grant_request
+
+
+def _expect_text(result: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> str:
+    value = result.get(name)
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ProvisioningError(f"{name.upper()}_MISSING", 503)
+    return value
+
+
+def _verify_signer_result(
+    result: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    approval_plan_id: str,
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+    if result.get("status") not in {"SIGNED", "PASS", "COMPLETED"}:
+        raise ProvisioningError("GRANT_SIGNING_FAILED", 503)
+    if result.get("approval_plan_id") != approval_plan_id:
+        raise ProvisioningError("APPROVAL_PLAN_ID_MISMATCH", 503)
+    digest = _expect_text(result, "grant_digest_sha256")
+    if not SHA256_RE.fullmatch(digest):
+        raise ProvisioningError("GRANT_DIGEST_INVALID", 503)
+    signer = result.get("signing_key_identity") or result.get("signer_identity")
+    if not isinstance(signer, str) or not signer.strip():
+        raise ProvisioningError("SIGNING_KEY_IDENTITY_MISSING", 503)
+    signature_present = bool(result.get("signature_present")) or bool(
+        result.get("owner_signature")
+    )
+    if not signature_present:
+        raise ProvisioningError("OWNER_SIGNATURE_MISSING", 503)
+    return {
+        "grant_id": _expect_text(result, "grant_id"),
+        "grant_digest_sha256": digest,
+        "signing_key_identity": signer,
+    }
+
+
+def _verify_validator_result(
+    result: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    approval_plan_id: str,
+    grant_digest: str,
+) -> None:
+    if result.get("status") not in {"PASS", "VALID", "COMPLETED"}:
+        raise ProvisioningError("GOVERNED_GRANT_VALIDATION_FAILED", 503)
+    if result.get("approval_plan_id") != approval_plan_id:
+        raise ProvisioningError("VALIDATED_PLAN_ID_MISMATCH", 503)
+    if result.get("grant_digest_sha256") != grant_digest:
+        raise ProvisioningError("VALIDATED_GRANT_DIGEST_MISMATCH", 503)
+    checks = result.get("checks")
+    required = {
+        "schema_valid",
+        "signature_valid",
+        "signer_trusted",
+        "approval_plan_active",
+        "repository_match",
+        "base_ref_match",
+        "base_oid_match",
+        "target_branch_match",
+        "one_time_use",
+        "allowed_operations_match",
+        "denied_operations_match",
+    }
+    if not isinstance(checks, dict) or any(checks.get(name) is not True for name in required):
+        raise ProvisioningError("GOVERNED_GRANT_VALIDATION_FAILED", 503)
+
+
+def _verify_provisioner_result(
+    result: Mapping[str, Any],
+    request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    grant_id: str,
+    validator_config_path: Path,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if result.get("status") not in {"READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING", "COMPLETED"}:
+        raise ProvisioningError("TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING_FAILED", 503)
+
+    # The legacy bridge created the target ref itself. Keep accepting it for
+    # controlled test doubles, but prefer the deployed direct one-shot writer.
+    if result.get("status") == "COMPLETED" and result.get("writer_mode") == "direct_one_shot_detached":
+        if result.get("target_branch") != request["target_branch"]:
+            raise ProvisioningError("PROVISIONED_BRANCH_MISMATCH", 503)
+        if result.get("base_oid") != request["base_oid"]:
+            raise ProvisioningError("PROVISIONED_BASE_MISMATCH", 503)
+        if result.get("writer_created") is not True:
+            raise ProvisioningError("TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING_FAILED", 503)
+        writer_config_name = result.get("writer_config")
+        if not isinstance(writer_config_name, str) or not Path(writer_config_name).is_absolute():
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_CONFIG_INVALID", 503)
+        writer_config_path = Path(writer_config_name)
+        writer_config = _read_json(writer_config_path)
+        if writer_config.get("status") != "READY":
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_CONFIG_NOT_READY", 503)
+        if writer_config.get("target_branch") != request["target_branch"]:
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_CONFIG_BRANCH_MISMATCH", 503)
+        if writer_config.get("base_oid") != request["base_oid"]:
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_CONFIG_BASE_MISMATCH", 503)
+        if writer_config.get("worktree_mode") != "detached":
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_MODE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        workspace = writer_config.get("worktree")
+        if not isinstance(workspace, str) or not Path(workspace).is_absolute():
+            raise ProvisioningError("PROVISIONED_WORKSPACE_INVALID", 503)
+        credential_name = writer_config.get("runtime_credential_file")
+        if not isinstance(credential_name, str) or not Path(credential_name).is_absolute():
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_CREDENTIAL_REF_INVALID", 503)
+        credential = Path(credential_name)
+        if not credential.is_file() or credential.is_symlink():
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_CREDENTIAL_MISSING", 503)
+        credential_stat = credential.stat()
+        if credential_stat.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(credential_stat.st_mode) != 0o400:
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_CREDENTIAL_PERMISSIONS_INVALID", 503)
+
+        dynamic_config = _read_json(validator_config_path)
+        ledger_name = dynamic_config.get("consumed_grants_ledger")
+        if not isinstance(ledger_name, str) or not Path(ledger_name).is_absolute():
+            raise ProvisioningError("GRANT_LEDGER_REF_INVALID", 503)
+        ledger = Path(ledger_name)
+        consumed = False
+        if ledger.is_file() and not ledger.is_symlink():
+            for line in ledger.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+                try:
+                    row = json.loads(line)
+                except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                    continue
+                if (
+                    isinstance(row, dict)
+                    and row.get("grant_id") == grant_id
+                    and row.get("target_branch") == request["target_branch"]
+                    and row.get("base_oid") == request["base_oid"]
+                ):
+                    consumed = True
+                    break
+        if not consumed:
+            raise ProvisioningError("ONE_TIME_GRANT_NOT_CONSUMED", 503)
+
+        scope = {
+            "workspace_role": "task-scoped-isolated-writer",
+            "writes_enabled": True,
+            "allowed_branch": request["target_branch"],
+            "allowed_base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+            "allow_main_write": False,
+            "allow_tag_write": False,
+            "allow_baseline_write": False,
+            "allow_force_push": False,
+            "allowed_routes": ["POST /api/commit-file"],
+            "writer_mode": "direct_one_shot_detached",
+        }
+        negatives = {name: True for name in sorted(REQUIRED_NEGATIVE_TESTS)}
+        return {
+            "branch": request["target_branch"],
+            "branch_oid": request["base_oid"],
+            "base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+            "workspace_path": workspace,
+            "writer_scope": scope,
+            "negative_tests": negatives,
+            "grant_consumed": True,
+            "remote_ref_status": "target_branch_absent_until_writer_push",
+            "remote_oid": None,
+            "detached_writer": True,
+            "writer_config_path": str(writer_config_path),
+        }
+
+    if result.get("branch") != request["target_branch"]:
+        raise ProvisioningError("PROVISIONED_BRANCH_MISMATCH", 503)
+    if result.get("base_oid") != request["base_oid"]:
+        raise ProvisioningError("PROVISIONED_BASE_MISMATCH", 503)
+    if result.get("branch_oid") != request["base_oid"]:
+        raise ProvisioningError("PROVISIONED_BRANCH_OID_MISMATCH", 503)
+    if result.get("grant_consumed") is not True:
+        raise ProvisioningError("ONE_TIME_GRANT_NOT_CONSUMED", 503)
+    workspace = result.get("workspace_path")
+    if not isinstance(workspace, str) or not Path(workspace).is_absolute():
+        raise ProvisioningError("PROVISIONED_WORKSPACE_INVALID", 503)
+    scope = result.get("writer_scope")
+    if not isinstance(scope, dict):
+        raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_SCOPE_ATTESTATION_MISSING", 503)
+    required_scope = {
+        "workspace_role": "task-scoped-isolated-writer",
+        "writes_enabled": True,
+        "allowed_branch": request["target_branch"],
+        "allowed_base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+        "allow_main_write": False,
+        "allow_tag_write": False,
+        "allow_baseline_write": False,
+        "allow_force_push": False,
+    }
+    for key, expected in required_scope.items():
+        if scope.get(key) != expected:
+            raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_SCOPE_ATTESTATION_MISMATCH", 503)
+    routes = scope.get("allowed_routes")
+    if routes != ["POST /api/commit-file"]:
+        raise ProvisioningError("WRITER_ROUTE_ATTESTATION_MISMATCH", 503)
+    negatives = result.get("negative_tests")
+    if not isinstance(negatives, dict) or any(
+        negatives.get(name) is not True for name in REQUIRED_NEGATIVE_TESTS
+    ):
+        raise ProvisioningError("NEGATIVE_POLICY_TESTS_FAILED", 503)
+    return {
+        "branch": result["branch"],
+        "branch_oid": result["branch_oid"],
+        "base_oid": result["base_oid"],
+        "workspace_path": workspace,
+        "writer_scope": scope,
+        "negative_tests": {
+            name: True for name in sorted(REQUIRED_NEGATIVE_TESTS)
+        },
+        "grant_consumed": True,
+        "remote_ref_status": result.get("remote_ref_status"),
+        "remote_oid": result.get("remote_oid"),
+        "detached_writer": False,
+        "writer_config_path": None,
+    }
+
+
+class AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: ProvisioningConfig | None = None,
+        *,
+        clock=utc_now,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.config = config or ProvisioningConfig.from_environment()
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    def provision(
+        self,
+        raw_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        owner: OwnerContext,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request = _validate_request(raw_request, owner=owner, config=self.config)
+        _prepare_state_root(self.config.state_root)
+        receipt_id = _safe_receipt_id(
+            request["task_id"], request["repository"], request["target_branch"]
+        )
+        receipt_path = self.config.state_root / "receipts" / f"{receipt_id}.json"
+        lock_path = self.config.state_root / "locks" / f"{receipt_id}.lock"
+        with open(lock_path, "a+b") as lock:
+            os.chmod(lock_path, 0o600)
+            fcntl.flock(lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            return self._provision_locked(request, owner, receipt_path)
+
+    def _provision_locked(
+        self,
+        request: dict[str, Any],
+        owner: OwnerContext,
+        receipt_path: Path,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        receipt_exists = receipt_path.exists()
+        prestart = _prestart_git_check(
+            request, self.config, receipt_exists=receipt_exists
+        )
+        if receipt_exists:
+            receipt = _read_json(receipt_path)
+            expected_digest = sha256_json(
+                {
+                    "task_id": request["task_id"],
+                    "repository": request["repository"],
+                    "base_ref": request["base_ref"],
+                    "base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+                    "target_branch": request["target_branch"],
+                    "owner_authorization_reference": request[
+                        "owner_authorization_reference"
+                    ],
+                }
+            )
+            if receipt.get("request_identity_sha256") != expected_digest:
+                raise ProvisioningError("IDEMPOTENCY_SCOPE_CONFLICT", 409)
+            return {
+                **receipt["public_result"],
+                "idempotent": True,
+                "prestart": prestart,
+            }
+
+        for path, name in (
+            (self.config.signer, "SIGNER"),
+            (self.config.validator, "VALIDATOR"),
+            (self.config.provisioner, "PROVISIONER"),
+        ):
+            _verify_tool_contract(path, name, self.config)
+
+        now = self.clock()
+        plan, grant_request = _build_plan(request, owner, now=now)
+        temporary_root = Path(
+            tempfile.mkdtemp(
+                prefix="grant-",
+                dir=self.config.state_root,
+            )
+        )
+        os.chmod(temporary_root, 0o700)
+        try:
+            grant_dir = temporary_root / "grant"
+            grant_dir.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+            _atomic_write_json(grant_dir / "approval-plan.json", plan)
+            _atomic_write_json(grant_dir / "grant-request.json", grant_request)
+
+            signer_result_path = temporary_root / "signer-result.json"
+            validator_result_path = temporary_root / "validator-result.json"
+            provisioner_result_path = temporary_root / "provisioner-result.json"
+
+            try:
+                run_compatible_signer(
+                    _tool_argv(self.config, self.config.signer),
+                    grant_dir,
+                    signer_result_path,
+                )
+            except Exception as exc:
+                raise ProvisioningError(
+                    "SIGNER_COMPATIBILITY_FAILED",
+                    503,
+                    details={"error": type(exc).__name__},
+                ) from exc
+            signer_result = _read_json(signer_result_path)
+            signer = _verify_signer_result(
+                signer_result,
+                approval_plan_id=plan["approval_plan_id"],
+            )
+
+            try:
+                validator_config_path = run_compatible_validator(
+                    _tool_argv(self.config, self.config.validator),
+                    grant_dir,
+                    validator_result_path,
+                )
+            except Exception as exc:
+                raise ProvisioningError(
+                    "VALIDATOR_COMPATIBILITY_FAILED",
+                    503,
+                    details={"error": type(exc).__name__},
+                ) from exc
+            validator_result = _read_json(validator_result_path)
+            _verify_validator_result(
+                validator_result,
+                approval_plan_id=plan["approval_plan_id"],
+                grant_digest=signer["grant_digest_sha256"],
+            )
+
+            provisioner_env = dict(os.environ)
+            provisioner_env["AIOS_GRANT_ROOT_CONFIG"] = str(
+                validator_config_path
+            )
+            _run(
+                _tool_argv(
+                    self.config,
+                    self.config.provisioner,
+                    "--grant-dir",
+                    str(grant_dir),
+                    "--result-json",
+                    str(provisioner_result_path),
+                ),
+                env=provisioner_env,
+                timeout=180,
+            )
+            provisioner_result = _read_json(provisioner_result_path)
+            provisioned = _verify_provisioner_result(
+                provisioner_result,
+                request,
+                grant_id=signer["grant_id"],
+                validator_config_path=validator_config_path,
+            )
+
+            post_branch_oid = _git(
+                self.config.authority_git_dir,
+                "show-ref",
+                "--verify",
+                "--hash",
+                f"refs/heads/{request['target_branch']}",
+                allowed_returncodes=(0, 1, 128),
+            )
+            if provisioned["detached_writer"]:
+                if post_branch_oid:
+                    raise ProvisioningError("POST_PROVISION_TARGET_BRANCH_EXISTS", 503)
+                post_branch_oid = request["base_oid"]
+            elif post_branch_oid != request["base_oid"]:
+                raise ProvisioningError("POST_PROVISION_BRANCH_OID_MISMATCH", 503)
+            post_main_oid = _git(
+                self.config.authority_git_dir,
+                "rev-parse",
+                request["base_ref"],
+            )
+            if post_main_oid != request["base_oid"]:
+                raise ProvisioningError("POST_PROVISION_MAIN_DRIFT", 409)
+
+            public_result = {
+                "status": "READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING",
+                "task_id": request["task_id"],
+                "repository": request["repository"],
+                "approval_plan_id": plan["approval_plan_id"],
+                "grant_id": signer["grant_id"],
+                "grant_digest_sha256": signer["grant_digest_sha256"],
+                "signing_key_identity": signer["signing_key_identity"],
+                "branch": provisioned["branch"],
+                "branch_oid": provisioned["branch_oid"],
+                "base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+                "workspace_path": provisioned["workspace_path"],
+                "writer_scope": provisioned["writer_scope"],
+                "negative_tests": provisioned["negative_tests"],
+                "grant_consumed": True,
+                "main_unchanged": True,
+                "production_change_authorized": False,
+                "tag_change_authorized": False,
+                "baseline_change_authorized": False,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+            request_identity = sha256_json(
+                {
+                    "task_id": request["task_id"],
+                    "repository": request["repository"],
+                    "base_ref": request["base_ref"],
+                    "base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+                    "target_branch": request["target_branch"],
+                    "owner_authorization_reference": request[
+                        "owner_authorization_reference"
+                    ],
+                }
+            )
+            receipt = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-scoped-writer-provisioning-receipt.v1",
+                "request_identity_sha256": request_identity,
+                "created_at": iso_utc(self.clock()),
+                "public_result": _redacted(public_result),
+                "prestart": prestart,
+                "tool_evidence": {
+                    "signer": {
+                        "status": signer_result.get("status"),
+                        "grant_digest_sha256": signer["grant_digest_sha256"],
+                        "signing_key_identity": signer["signing_key_identity"],
+                    },
+                    "validator": {
+                        "status": validator_result.get("status"),
+                        "checks": validator_result.get("checks"),
+                    },
+                    "provisioner": {
+                        "status": provisioner_result.get("status"),
+                        "grant_consumed": provisioner_result.get("grant_consumed"),
+                    },
+                },
+            }
+            _atomic_write_json(receipt_path, receipt)
+            return {**public_result, "prestart": prestart}
+        finally:
+            shutil.rmtree(temporary_root, ignore_errors=True)
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Durable Owner/GPT notification outbox with retry and acknowledgement."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import time
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OutboxEvent:
+    event_id: str
+    recipient: str
+    kind: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    attempts: int
+    available_at: float
+    acknowledged: bool
+
+
+class DurableOutbox:
+    RECIPIENTS = ("owner", "gpt")
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = str(path)
+        self.db = sqlite3.connect(self.path)
+        self.db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        self.db.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS outbox (event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, recipient TEXT NOT NULL, kind TEXT NOT NULL, payload TEXT NOT NULL, attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, available_at REAL NOT NULL, delivered_at REAL, acknowledged INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, last_error TEXT)")
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def enqueue(self, kind: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, event_id: str | None = None, recipients: tuple[str, ...] = RECIPIENTS) -> list[str]:
+        ids: list[str] = []
+        for recipient in recipients:
+            if recipient not in self.RECIPIENTS:
+                raise ValueError("recipient is outside the governed notification plane")
+            eid = event_id or str(uuid.uuid4())
+            if event_id is not None and len(recipients) > 1:
+                eid = f"{event_id}:{recipient}"
+            self.db.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO outbox(event_id,recipient,kind,payload,available_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)", (eid, recipient, kind, json.dumps(dict(payload), sort_keys=True), time.time()))
+            ids.append(eid)
+        self.db.commit()
+        return ids
+
+    def due(self, *, now: float | None = None, limit: int = 20) -> list[OutboxEvent]:
+        now = time.time() if now is None else now
+        rows = self.db.execute("SELECT event_id,recipient,kind,payload,attempts,available_at,acknowledged FROM outbox WHERE delivered_at IS NULL AND available_at<=? ORDER BY available_at,event_id LIMIT ?", (now, limit)).fetchall()
+        return [OutboxEvent(r[0], r[1], r[2], json.loads(r[3]), r[4], r[5], bool(r[6])) for r in rows]
+
+    def delivered(self, event_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET delivered_at=? WHERE event_id=?", (time.time() if now is None else now, event_id))
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def failed(self, event_id: str, error: str, *, now: float | None = None, max_backoff: float = 300.0) -> None:
+        now = time.time() if now is None else now
+        row = self.db.execute("SELECT attempts FROM outbox WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,)).fetchone()
+        attempts = int(row[0]) + 1 if row else 1
+        delay = min(max_backoff, 2 ** min(attempts, 8))
+        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET attempts=?,available_at=?,last_error=? WHERE event_id=?", (attempts, now + delay, error[:200], event_id))
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def acknowledge(self, event_id: str) -> None:
+        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET acknowledged=1 WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,))
+        self.db.commit()
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self.db.close()
+
+
+class NotificationPlane:
+    def __init__(self, outbox: DurableOutbox) -> None:
+        self.outbox = outbox
+
+    def emit(self, kind: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, event_id: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
+        return self.outbox.enqueue(kind, payload, event_id=event_id)
+
+    def deliver_once(self, send: Callable[[OutboxEvent], None], *, now: float | None = None) -> list[str]:
+        delivered: list[str] = []
+        for event in self.outbox.due(now=now):
+            try:
+                send(event)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                self.outbox.failed(event.event_id, type(exc).__name__, now=now)
+            else:
+                self.outbox.delivered(event.event_id, now=now)
+                delivered.append(event.event_id)
+        return delivered
@@ -0,0 +1,491 @@
+"""Fail-closed, branch-bound repair leases for governed AIOS GitOps work."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import posixpath
+import re
+import secrets
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+
+TASK_ID = "V2R1C6_GOVERNED_LOCAL_BOOTSTRAP"
+MAX_LEASE_SECONDS = 86_400
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$")
+DENIED_BRANCHES = {"main", "master", "HEAD"}
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = (
+    ".git",
+    "VERSION",
+    "versions/V2R1C5.json",
+    "artifacts/V2R1C5",
+    "baseline",
+    "config/gitops.tokens",
+    "gitops.tokens",
+    "secrets",
+    "credentials",
+)
+SECRET_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(r"(?i)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"\b(?:sk|HPUA|SDC)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b"),
+)
+
+
+class LeaseError(Exception):
+    """Raised for any invalid, stale, expired, or prohibited lease action."""
+
+
+class GitProbeProtocol(Protocol):
+    """Read-only Git seam used by the lease manager."""
+
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
+
+    def parent(self, commit: str) -> str: ...
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+
+    def changed_paths(self, commit: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: ...
+
+    def commits_between(self, older: str, newer: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: ...
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _ts(value: datetime) -> str:
+    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _parse_ts(value: str) -> datetime:
+    if value.endswith("Z"):
+        value = value[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value)
+    return parsed if parsed.tzinfo else parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _oid(value: str, field: str = "oid") -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise LeaseError(f"{field} must be a full commit OID")
+    return value.lower()
+
+
+def normalize_path(path: str) -> str:
+    """Normalize a repository-relative path without resolving through the FS."""
+    if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip():
+        raise LeaseError("path must be a non-empty string")
+    value = path.replace("\\", "/").strip()
+    if value.startswith("/") or "\x00" in value:
+        raise LeaseError("path must be relative")
+    parts = value.split("/")
+    if any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts):
+        raise LeaseError("path contains a prohibited component")
+    normalized = posixpath.normpath(value)
+    if normalized == "." or normalized.startswith("../"):
+        raise LeaseError("path is not normalized")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def path_is_protected(path: str) -> bool:
+    normalized = normalize_path(path)
+    lower = normalized.lower()
+    return any(
+        lower == prefix.lower() or lower.startswith(prefix.lower().rstrip("/") + "/")
+        for prefix in PROTECTED_PREFIXES
+    ) or lower.startswith("refs/")
+
+
+def contains_secret_like_content(content: str) -> bool:
+    return any(pattern.search(content or "") for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS)
+
+
+def validate_paths(paths: Iterable[str], allowed_paths: Sequence[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    allowed = tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in allowed_paths)
+    if not allowed:
+        raise LeaseError("allowed_paths must not be empty")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for raw in paths:
+        path = normalize_path(raw)
+        if path_is_protected(path):
+            raise LeaseError("protected path is not lease-writable")
+        if not any(path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix + "/") for prefix in allowed):
+            raise LeaseError("path is outside the lease allowlist")
+        if path not in result:
+            result.append(path)
+    if not result:
+        raise LeaseError("at least one changed path is required")
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class CommitEntry:
+    commit_oid: str
+    parent_oid: str
+    paths: tuple[str, ...]
+    recorded_at: str
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RepairLease:
+    lease_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    owner_identity: str
+    branch: str
+    description: str
+    allowed_paths: tuple[str, ...]
+    initial_head_oid: str
+    current_head_oid: str
+    created_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    max_expires_at: str
+    state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    revision: int = 0
+    commits: list[CommitEntry] = field(default_factory=list)
+    attached: bool = False
+
+    def to_json(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = asdict(self)
+        payload["allowed_paths"] = list(self.allowed_paths)
+        payload["commits"] = [asdict(entry) for entry in self.commits]
+        return payload
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_json(cls, raw: dict[str, Any]) -> "RepairLease":
+        commits = tuple(
+            CommitEntry(
+                commit_oid=_oid(item["commit_oid"], "commit_oid"),
+                parent_oid=_oid(item["parent_oid"], "parent_oid"),
+                paths=tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in item["paths"]),
+                recorded_at=str(item["recorded_at"]),
+            )
+            for item in raw.get("commits", [])
+        )
+        return cls(
+            lease_id=str(raw["lease_id"]),
+            task_id=str(raw["task_id"]),
+            owner_identity=str(raw["owner_identity"]),
+            branch=str(raw["branch"]),
+            description=str(raw["description"]),
+            allowed_paths=tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in raw["allowed_paths"]),
+            initial_head_oid=_oid(raw["initial_head_oid"], "initial_head_oid"),
+            current_head_oid=_oid(raw["current_head_oid"], "current_head_oid"),
+            created_at=str(raw["created_at"]),
+            expires_at=str(raw["expires_at"]),
+            max_expires_at=str(raw["max_expires_at"]),
+            state=str(raw.get("state", "ACTIVE")),
+            revision=int(raw.get("revision", 0)),
+            commits=list(commits),
+            attached=bool(raw.get("attached", False)),
+        )
+
+
+class LeaseStore:
+    """Atomic JSON store for restart-recoverable lease state."""
+
+    def __init__(self, directory: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.directory = Path(directory)
+        self.directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.directory.is_symlink():
+            raise LeaseError("lease store must not be a symlink")
+        os.chmod(self.directory, 0o700)
+
+    def _path(self, lease_id: str) -> Path:
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"lease-[0-9a-f]{32}", lease_id):
+            raise LeaseError("invalid lease id")
+        return self.directory / f"{lease_id}.json"
+
+    def create(self, lease: RepairLease) -> None:
+        path = self._path(lease.lease_id)
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise LeaseError("lease already exists")
+        self._write(path, lease.to_json(), exclusive=True)
+
+    def load(self, lease_id: str) -> RepairLease:
+        path = self._path(lease_id)
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as exc:
+            raise LeaseError("lease state is unavailable or invalid") from exc
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise LeaseError("lease state must be an object")
+        return RepairLease.from_json(raw)
+
+    def save(self, lease: RepairLease) -> None:
+        self._write(self._path(lease.lease_id), lease.to_json())
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _write(path: Path, payload: dict[str, Any], *, exclusive: bool = False) -> None:
+        flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | (os.O_EXCL if exclusive else 0)
+        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".lease-", dir=path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                json.dump(payload, stream, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+            if exclusive:
+                os.link(temp_name, path)
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+            else:
+                os.replace(temp_name, path)
+            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+        except Exception:
+            try:
+                os.unlink(temp_name)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                pass
+            raise
+
+
+class GitProbe:
+    """Read-only Git implementation; it never changes a ref or working tree."""
+
+    def __init__(self, bare_repo: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
+        self.bare_repo = Path(bare_repo)
+
+    def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise LeaseError("read-only Git probe failed")
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str:
+        return _oid(self._run(["rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"]), "branch_head")
+
+    def parent(self, commit: str) -> str:
+        return _oid(self._run(["rev-parse", f"{_oid(commit)}^1"]), "parent")
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
+        old, new = _oid(older), _oid(newer)
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", old, new],
+            check=False,
+        )
+        return result.returncode == 0
+
+    def changed_paths(self, commit: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        raw = self._run(["diff-tree", "--no-commit-id", "--name-only", "-r", _oid(commit)])
+        return tuple(normalize_path(line) for line in raw.splitlines() if line.strip())
+
+    def commits_between(self, older: str, newer: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        raw = self._run(["rev-list", "--reverse", f"{_oid(older)}..{_oid(newer)}"])
+        return tuple(_oid(line, "commit") for line in raw.splitlines() if line.strip())
+
+
+class RepairLeaseManager:
+    """Issue, recover, renew, and close branch-bound repair leases."""
+
+    def __init__(self, store: LeaseStore, git: GitProbeProtocol, *, clock=_now) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self.git = git
+        self.clock = clock
+
+    def _require_owner(self, lease: RepairLease, owner_identity: str) -> None:
+        if owner_identity != lease.owner_identity:
+            raise LeaseError("lease identity mismatch")
+
+    def _active(self, lease: RepairLease) -> RepairLease:
+        now = self.clock()
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
+            raise LeaseError(f"lease is {lease.state.lower()}")
+        if now >= _parse_ts(lease.expires_at):
+            lease.state = "EXPIRED"
+            self.store.save(lease)
+            raise LeaseError("lease expired")
+        return lease
+
+    def issue(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        owner_identity: str,
+        branch: str,
+        description: str,
+        allowed_paths: Sequence[str],
+        ttl_seconds: int = 3600,
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        if task_id != TASK_ID:
+            raise LeaseError("unexpected task id")
+        if not owner_identity or not description or len(description) > 240:
+            raise LeaseError("owner identity and description are required")
+        if "\n" in description or "\r" in description:
+            raise LeaseError("description must be a single line")
+        if branch in DENIED_BRANCHES or branch.startswith(("main/", "refs/", "tags/")):
+            raise LeaseError("protected branch cannot receive a repair lease")
+        if not isinstance(ttl_seconds, int) or not 0 < ttl_seconds <= MAX_LEASE_SECONDS:
+            raise LeaseError("lease TTL exceeds the maximum")
+        allowed = tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in allowed_paths)
+        if any(path_is_protected(path) for path in allowed):
+            raise LeaseError("protected path in lease allowlist")
+        head = self.git.branch_head(branch)
+        created = self.clock()
+        expires = created + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
+        max_expires = created + timedelta(seconds=MAX_LEASE_SECONDS)
+        lease_id = "lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16)
+        lease = RepairLease(
+            lease_id=lease_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            owner_identity=owner_identity,
+            branch=branch,
+            description=description,
+            allowed_paths=allowed,
+            initial_head_oid=head,
+            current_head_oid=head,
+            created_at=_ts(created),
+            expires_at=_ts(expires),
+            max_expires_at=_ts(max_expires),
+        )
+        self.store.create(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def attach_existing_branch(
+        self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str, expected_head_oid: str
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
+        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
+        if current != expected or current != lease.current_head_oid:
+            raise LeaseError("branch head does not match the lease")
+        lease.attached = True
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def authorize_commit(
+        self,
+        lease_id: str,
+        *,
+        owner_identity: str,
+        expected_head_oid: str,
+        paths: Sequence[str],
+        content: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
+        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
+        if current != expected or current != lease.current_head_oid:
+            raise LeaseError("stale or externally advanced branch head")
+        if not lease.attached:
+            raise LeaseError("lease is not attached")
+        validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths)
+        if content and any(contains_secret_like_content(value) for value in content.values()):
+            raise LeaseError("secret-like content rejected")
+        return lease
+
+    def record_commit(
+        self,
+        lease_id: str,
+        *,
+        owner_identity: str,
+        expected_head_oid: str,
+        new_head_oid: str,
+        paths: Sequence[str],
+    ) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        new_head = _oid(new_head_oid, "new_head_oid")
+        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
+        if not lease.attached or lease.current_head_oid != expected:
+            raise LeaseError("stale lease head")
+        if self.git.branch_head(lease.branch) != new_head:
+            raise LeaseError("branch head does not match committed head")
+        validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths)
+        if self.git.parent(new_head) != expected or not self.git.is_ancestor(expected, new_head):
+            raise LeaseError("commit is not a fast-forward child of the expected head")
+        actual_paths = self.git.changed_paths(new_head)
+        allowed = validate_paths(actual_paths, lease.allowed_paths)
+        requested = set(validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths))
+        if not set(allowed).issubset(requested):
+            raise LeaseError("commit changed an unrequested path")
+        lease.current_head_oid = new_head
+        lease.revision += 1
+        lease.commits.append(
+            CommitEntry(
+                commit_oid=new_head,
+                parent_oid=expected,
+                paths=allowed,
+                recorded_at=_ts(self.clock()),
+            )
+        )
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def recover(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
+        if current == lease.current_head_oid:
+            return lease
+        if not self.git.is_ancestor(lease.current_head_oid, current):
+            raise LeaseError("branch moved non-fast-forward")
+        commits = self.git.commits_between(lease.current_head_oid, current)
+        for commit in commits:
+            actual = self.git.changed_paths(commit)
+            validate_paths(actual, lease.allowed_paths)
+        lease.current_head_oid = current
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def renew(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        if not isinstance(ttl_seconds, int) or ttl_seconds <= 0:
+            raise LeaseError("renewal TTL must be positive")
+        candidate = self.clock() + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
+        maximum = _parse_ts(lease.max_expires_at)
+        if candidate > maximum:
+            raise LeaseError("renewal exceeds maximum lease lifetime")
+        lease.expires_at = _ts(candidate)
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def complete(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        lease.state = "COMPLETED"
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+    def revoke(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
+        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
+        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
+        lease.state = "REVOKED"
+        lease.revision += 1
+        self.store.save(lease)
+        return lease
+
+
+def sanitized_lease_view(lease: RepairLease) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return lease metadata only; no content, token, or credential values."""
+    return {
+        "lease_id": lease.lease_id,
+        "task_id": lease.task_id,
+        "owner_identity": lease.owner_identity,
+        "branch": lease.branch,
+        "description": lease.description,
+        "initial_head_oid": lease.initial_head_oid,
+        "current_head_oid": lease.current_head_oid,
+        "created_at": lease.created_at,
+        "expires_at": lease.expires_at,
+        "state": lease.state,
+        "revision": lease.revision,
+        "commit_count": len(lease.commits),
+        "attached": lease.attached,
+    }
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"""Runtime deployment-state provider for governed health contracts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime as dt
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+_OID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_SHA = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+_STATES = {"STAGED", "ACTIVE", "ROLLED_BACK"}
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RuntimeDeploymentState:
+    version: str
+    commit_oid: str
+    artifact_sha256: str
+    deployment_state: str
+
+    @property
+    def production_deployed(self) -> bool:
+        return self.deployment_state == "ACTIVE"
+
+    def health_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "status": "ok",
+            "version": self.version,
+            "commit_oid": self.commit_oid,
+            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
+            "deployment_state": self.deployment_state,
+            "production_deployed": self.production_deployed,
+            "health_timestamp": dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        }
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_environment(cls, environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> "RuntimeDeploymentState":
+        env = dict(environ or os.environ)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {}
+        state_file = env.get("DEPLOYMENT_STATE_FILE", "").strip()
+        if state_file:
+            path = Path(state_file)
+            if path.is_file() and not path.is_symlink():
+                loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+                if not isinstance(loaded, dict):
+                    raise ValueError("deployment_state_file_object_required")
+                values.update(loaded)
+        file_deployment_state = values.get("deployment_state")
+        values.update({k: v for k, v in {
+            "version": env.get("RELEASE_VERSION", values.get("version", "")),
+            "commit_oid": env.get("TARGET_OID", values.get("commit_oid", "")),
+            "artifact_sha256": env.get("ARTIFACT_SHA256", values.get("artifact_sha256", "")),
+            "deployment_state": env.get("DEPLOYMENT_STATE", values.get("deployment_state", "")),
+        }.items() if v != ""})
+        if file_deployment_state not in (None, ""):
+            values["deployment_state"] = file_deployment_state
+        version = str(values.get("version", ""))
+        commit_oid = str(values.get("commit_oid", ""))
+        artifact_sha256 = str(values.get("artifact_sha256", ""))
+        deployment_state = str(values.get("deployment_state", ""))
+        if not version or not _OID.fullmatch(commit_oid) or not _SHA.fullmatch(artifact_sha256):
+            raise ValueError("deployment_binding_invalid")
+        if deployment_state not in _STATES:
+            raise ValueError("deployment_state_invalid")
+        return cls(version, commit_oid, artifact_sha256, deployment_state)
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+"""Shared primitives for the V2R1C6 governed local writer contract."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import posixpath
+import re
+import socket
+import stat
+import struct
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+TASK_ID = "V2R1C6_GOVERNED_LOCAL_BOOTSTRAP"
+REPO = "aios/aios"
+PRINCIPAL = "governed-local-bootstrap"
+OIDSIZ = 40
+AUTHORIZATION_TTL = timedelta(hours=2)
+
+
+class GovernedLocalWriterError(Exception):
+    """Base error for governed-local-writer validation and runtime failures."""
+
+
+class AuthorizationError(GovernedLocalWriterError):
+    """Raised when authorization input is invalid, expired, or tampered."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BranchCreatePolicy:
+    """Exact branch creation contract."""
+
+    branch: str
+    base_oid: str
+    head_oid: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BranchAppendPolicy:
+    """Exact append-commit contract for candidate branch updates."""
+
+    branch: str
+    expected_head_oid: str | None
+    allowed_paths: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BranchPolicy:
+    """Per-branch operation policies loaded from authorization."""
+
+    create_branch: BranchCreatePolicy | None
+    append_commit: BranchAppendPolicy | None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernedAuthorization:
+    """Parsed and validated authorization object."""
+
+    task_id: str
+    repo: str
+    created_at: datetime
+    expires_at: datetime
+    authorization_sha256: str
+    one_time_use: bool
+    branch_operations: dict[str, BranchPolicy]
+    denied_operations: tuple[str, ...]
+
+    @property
+    def create_branches(self) -> set[str]:
+        """Branches that are allowed for branch-creation operations."""
+        return {
+            branch
+            for branch, policy in self.branch_operations.items()
+            if policy.create_branch is not None
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def append_branches(self) -> set[str]:
+        """Branches that are allowed for commit-append operations."""
+        return {
+            branch
+            for branch, policy in self.branch_operations.items()
+            if policy.append_commit is not None
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PeerIdentity:
+    """Verified peer identity from SO_PEERCRED."""
+
+    pid: int
+    uid: int
+    gid: int
+    executable: str | None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FileChange:
+    """Single file modification payload."""
+
+    path: str
+    content: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CreateBranchRequest:
+    """Validated create-branch request payload."""
+
+    branch: str
+    base_oid: str
+    head_oid: str | None
+    authorization_digest: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AppendCommitRequest:
+    """Validated append-commit request payload."""
+
+    branch: str
+    expected_head_oid: str
+    changes: tuple[FileChange, ...]
+    authorization_digest: str
+    commit_message: str = "chore(governance): append governed commit"
+
+
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$")
+_DENIED_PATH_SEGMENTS = (
+    "main",
+    "tag",
+    "baseline",
+    "credential",
+    "credentials",
+    "secret",
+    "registry",
+)
+_SECRET_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(r"(?i)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)secret\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)password\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)token\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+)
+_SAFE_SECRET_MARKERS = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*(?:REDACTED|TEST_FIXTURE|NOT_A_SECRET)"
+)
+
+
+def canonicalize_authorization_payload(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Serialize authorization payload without the signature hash, in canonical form."""
+    canonical = dict(payload)
+    canonical.pop("authorization_sha256", None)
+    return json.dumps(
+        canonical, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True
+    )
+
+
+def compute_authorization_sha256(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Compute canonical sha256 over authorization payload."""
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    digest.update(canonicalize_authorization_payload(payload).encode("utf-8"))
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def _assert_authorization_file_permissions(path: Path) -> None:
+    """Fail-closed checks for root-only secret-like authorization files."""
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization path must not be a symlink")
+
+    st = path.stat()
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization path must be a regular file")
+
+    if (st.st_mode & 0o777) != 0o600:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization file mode must be exactly 0600")
+
+    if hasattr(st, "st_uid") and os.name != "nt" and st.st_uid != 0:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization file owner must be uid 0")
+
+
+def _parse_iso8601(value: str) -> datetime:
+    """Parse ISO 8601 timestamps used by authorization payloads."""
+    try:
+        if value.endswith("Z"):
+            value = value[:-1] + "+00:00"
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise AuthorizationError("created_at must be an ISO 8601 timestamp") from exc
+
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return parsed
+
+
+def _require_type(value: Any, expected: type, *, key: str) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(value, expected):
+        raise AuthorizationError(f"{key} must be {expected.__name__}")
+
+
+def _parse_oid(value: Any, *, field: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise AuthorizationError(f"{field} must be a string")
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise AuthorizationError(f"{field} must be a 40-char hex object id")
+    return value.lower()
+
+
+def _parse_allowed_paths(paths: Any) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not isinstance(paths, list) or not paths:
+        raise AuthorizationError("allowed_paths must be a non-empty list")
+    normalized: list[str] = []
+    for path in paths:
+        if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip():
+            raise AuthorizationError("allowed_paths entries must be non-empty strings")
+        normalized.append(path.strip())
+    return tuple(normalized)
+
+
+def parse_authorization(
+    raw: Mapping[str, Any], *, now: datetime | None = None
+) -> GovernedAuthorization:
+    """Validate an authorization payload and return a typed object."""
+    _require_type(raw.get("task_id"), str, key="task_id")
+    if raw["task_id"] != TASK_ID:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unexpected task_id")
+
+    _require_type(raw.get("repo"), str, key="repo")
+    if raw["repo"] != REPO:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unexpected repo value")
+
+    created_at = _parse_iso8601(raw.get("created_at"))
+    check_time = now or datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
+    if created_at.tzinfo is None:
+        created_at = created_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    if created_at - check_time > timedelta(seconds=30):
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization created_at is in the future")
+    if check_time - created_at > AUTHORIZATION_TTL:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expired")
+    raw_expires_at = raw.get("expires_at")
+    expires_at = (
+        _parse_iso8601(raw_expires_at)
+        if raw_expires_at is not None
+        else created_at + AUTHORIZATION_TTL
+    )
+    if expires_at <= check_time:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expiry is in the past")
+    if expires_at > created_at + AUTHORIZATION_TTL:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expiry exceeds two-hour maximum")
+
+    _require_type(raw.get("one_time_use"), bool, key="one_time_use")
+    if raw["one_time_use"] is not True:
+        raise AuthorizationError("one_time_use must be true")
+
+    _require_type(raw.get("authorization_sha256"), str, key="authorization_sha256")
+    expected_hash = compute_authorization_sha256(raw)
+    provided_hash = str(raw["authorization_sha256"]).lower()
+    if provided_hash != expected_hash:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization_sha256 mismatch")
+
+    op_map = raw.get("allowed_branch_operations")
+    if not isinstance(op_map, dict) or not op_map:
+        raise AuthorizationError("allowed_branch_operations must be a non-empty object")
+
+    branch_operations: dict[str, BranchPolicy] = {}
+    for branch, operation in op_map.items():
+        if not isinstance(branch, str) or not branch.strip():
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch names must be non-empty strings")
+
+        if not isinstance(operation, dict):
+            raise AuthorizationError("operation policy must be an object")
+
+        create_block = operation.get("create_branch")
+        append_block = operation.get("append_commit")
+
+        create_policy: BranchCreatePolicy | None = None
+        append_policy: BranchAppendPolicy | None = None
+
+        if create_block is not None:
+            if not isinstance(create_block, dict):
+                raise AuthorizationError("create_branch block must be an object")
+            raw_head_oid = create_block.get("head_oid")
+            create_policy = BranchCreatePolicy(
+                branch=branch,
+                base_oid=_parse_oid(create_block.get("base_oid"), field="create_branch.base_oid"),
+                head_oid=(
+                    _parse_oid(raw_head_oid, field="create_branch.head_oid")
+                    if raw_head_oid is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+            )
+
+        if append_block is not None:
+            if not isinstance(append_block, dict):
+                raise AuthorizationError("append_commit block must be an object")
+            raw_expected_head_oid = append_block.get("expected_head_oid")
+            append_policy = BranchAppendPolicy(
+                branch=branch,
+                expected_head_oid=(
+                    _parse_oid(
+                        raw_expected_head_oid,
+                        field="append_commit.expected_head_oid",
+                    )
+                    if raw_expected_head_oid is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+                allowed_paths=_parse_allowed_paths(append_block.get("allowed_paths")),
+            )
+
+        if create_policy is None and append_policy is None:
+            raise AuthorizationError("branch policy must define at least one operation")
+
+        branch_operations[branch] = BranchPolicy(
+            create_branch=create_policy, append_commit=append_policy
+        )
+
+    denied_raw = raw.get("denied_operations", ())
+    if not isinstance(denied_raw, list):
+        raise AuthorizationError("denied_operations must be a list")
+    denied_operations: list[str] = []
+    for value in denied_raw:
+        if not isinstance(value, str):
+            raise AuthorizationError("denied operations must be strings")
+        denied_operations.append(value.lower())
+
+    return GovernedAuthorization(
+        task_id=raw["task_id"],
+        repo=raw["repo"],
+        created_at=created_at,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        authorization_sha256=provided_hash,
+        one_time_use=True,
+        branch_operations=branch_operations,
+        denied_operations=tuple(denied_operations),
+    )
+
+
+def load_authorization_file(
+    path: str | os.PathLike[str], *, now: datetime | None = None
+) -> GovernedAuthorization:
+    """Load and validate the root-only authorization file."""
+    auth_path = Path(path)
+    _assert_authorization_file_permissions(auth_path)
+    try:
+        raw_text = auth_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unable to read authorization file") from exc
+
+    try:
+        raw_obj = json.loads(raw_text)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization must be JSON") from exc
+
+    if not isinstance(raw_obj, dict):
+        raise AuthorizationError("authorization top-level must be an object")
+
+    return parse_authorization(raw_obj, now=now)
+
+
+def _resolve_peer_executable(pid: int) -> str | None:
+    """Resolve peer executable from /proc/<pid>/exe when available."""
+    if pid <= 0:
+        return None
+    exe_path = f"/proc/{pid}/exe"
+    try:
+        return os.readlink(exe_path)
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+
+
+def extract_peer_identity(
+    connection: socket.socket, *, require_root_uid: bool = True
+) -> PeerIdentity:
+    """Validate SO_PEERCRED and return peer identity."""
+    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
+        raise AuthorizationError("SO_PEERCRED not available on this platform")
+
+    data = connection.getsockopt(
+        socket.SOL_SOCKET,
+        socket.SO_PEERCRED,
+        struct.calcsize("3i"),
+    )
+    if len(data) != struct.calcsize("3i"):
+        raise AuthorizationError("SO_PEERCRED payload size mismatch")
+
+    pid, uid, gid = struct.unpack("3i", data)
+    if require_root_uid and uid != 0:
+        raise PermissionError("peer uid must be 0")
+
+    return PeerIdentity(
+        pid=pid,
+        uid=uid,
+        gid=gid,
+        executable=_resolve_peer_executable(pid),
+    )
+
+
+def _normalize_file_path(path: str) -> str:
+    normalized = posixpath.normpath(path.replace("\\", "/").strip())
+    return normalized.lstrip("/")
+
+
+def _path_has_disallowed_segment(path: str) -> bool:
+    lowered = path.lower()
+    if ".." in path.split("/"):
+        return True
+    parts = [p for p in lowered.split("/") if p]
+    for part in parts:
+        for segment in _DENIED_PATH_SEGMENTS:
+            if part == segment or part.startswith(f"{segment}.") or segment in part:
+                return True
+    return False
+
+
+def _is_allowed_path(path: str, allowed_paths: Sequence[str]) -> bool:
+    normalized = _normalize_file_path(path)
+    for prefix in allowed_paths:
+        normalized_prefix = _normalize_file_path(prefix)
+        if normalized == normalized_prefix:
+            return True
+        if normalized.startswith(normalized_prefix + "/"):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def contains_secret_like_content(content: str) -> bool:
+    """Heuristic detector for obvious secret-like strings."""
+    content = _SAFE_SECRET_MARKERS.sub("", content or "")
+    for pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS:
+        if pattern.search(content):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def validate_file_changes(
+    changes: Any, allowed_paths: Sequence[str]
+) -> tuple[FileChange, ...]:
+    """Validate append-commit file changes against path and content policy."""
+    if not isinstance(changes, list):
+        raise AuthorizationError("changes must be a list")
+    result: list[FileChange] = []
+
+    for change in changes:
+        if not isinstance(change, Mapping):
+            raise AuthorizationError("each file change must be an object")
+        raw_path = change.get("path")
+        raw_content = change.get("content")
+        if not isinstance(raw_path, str) or not raw_path.strip():
+            raise AuthorizationError("file change path must be a non-empty string")
+        if raw_path.startswith(("/", "\\")):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file change path must be relative")
+        if not isinstance(raw_content, str):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file change content must be a string")
+
+        normalized = _normalize_file_path(raw_path)
+        if not normalized or normalized.startswith("../") or normalized == "..":
+            raise AuthorizationError("file paths must be normalized relative paths")
+
+        if not _is_allowed_path(normalized, allowed_paths):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file path outside allowed_paths")
+
+        if _path_has_disallowed_segment(normalized):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file path uses denied segment")
+
+        if contains_secret_like_content(raw_content):
+            raise AuthorizationError("file content failed secret-like scan")
+
+        result.append(FileChange(path=normalized, content=raw_content))
+
+    return tuple(result)
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""Supplement Gitea native protection when review identity is not expressible."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+class MergeGateDenied(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MergeGateDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    owner_review_id: int
+    required_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+def validate_protected_merge(
+    pull_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    reviews: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    statuses: Mapping[str, str],
+    *,
+    required_contexts: Sequence[str],
+    unresolved_conversations: int,
+    owner_login: str = "owner",
+    owner_id: int = 2,
+) -> MergeGateDecision:
+    if pull_request.get("state") != "open" or pull_request.get("mergeable") is not True:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("pull_request_not_mergeable")
+    author = (pull_request.get("user") or {}).get("login")
+    owner_review = None
+    for review in reviews:
+        user = review.get("user") or {}
+        if review.get("state") == "APPROVED" and user.get("login") == owner_login and user.get("id") == owner_id:
+            if author == owner_login or (pull_request.get("author_id") == owner_id):
+                raise MergeGateDenied("pr_author_self_approval_denied")
+            owner_review = review
+    if owner_review is None:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("owner_review_required")
+    if unresolved_conversations != 0:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("unresolved_conversations_block_merge")
+    missing = [context for context in required_contexts if statuses.get(context) != "success"]
+    if missing:
+        raise MergeGateDenied("required_checks_missing:" + ",".join(missing))
+    return MergeGateDecision(True, int(owner_review.get("id", 0)), tuple(required_contexts))
+
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+"""Fail-closed operation authorization for an isolated Git writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
+
+
+ROUTE_OPERATIONS = {
+    ("GET", "/api/runtime-status"): "runtime.status.read",
+    ("GET", "/api/baseline"): "baseline.read",
+    ("GET", "/api/patches"): "patches.read",
+    ("POST", "/api/commit-file"): "commit_file.atomic",
+}
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
+
+
+class AuthorizationError(PermissionError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthorizedGrant:
+    record: dict[str, Any]
+    operation: str
+    use_count: int
+
+    @property
+    def token_id(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.record["token_id"])
+
+    @property
+    def task_id(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.record["task_id"])
+
+
+def operation_for(method: str, path: str) -> str:
+    operation = ROUTE_OPERATIONS.get((method.upper(), path))
+    if not operation:
+        raise AuthorizationError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
+    return operation
+
+
+def _parse_time(value: Any) -> datetime:
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(str(value).replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid") from None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _git_is_ancestor(workspace: Path, base: str, branch: str) -> bool:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", base, branch],
+        cwd=workspace,
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    )
+    return result.returncode == 0
+
+
+def _validate_grant(
+    grant: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    audience: str,
+    source_ip: str,
+    operation: str,
+    branch: str | None,
+    path: str | None,
+    workspace: Path,
+    current_time: datetime,
+) -> None:
+    if int(grant.get("schema_version", 0)) != 2:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_required", 401)
+    if str(grant.get("audience") or "") != audience:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_audience_rejected")
+    try:
+        peer = ipaddress.ip_address(source_ip)
+        networks = [ipaddress.ip_network(str(value), strict=True) for value in grant.get("source_cidrs", [])]
+    except ValueError:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected") from None
+    if not networks or not any(peer in network for network in networks):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected")
+    created = _parse_time(grant.get("created_at"))
+    not_before = _parse_time(grant.get("not_before"))
+    expires = _parse_time(grant.get("expires_at"))
+    if expires <= not_before or (expires - created).total_seconds() > 1800:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_lifetime_rejected")
+    if current_time < not_before:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_not_yet_valid", 401)
+    if current_time >= expires:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_expired", 401)
+    if bool(grant.get("revoked")):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_revoked", 401)
+    operations = grant.get("allowed_operations")
+    if not isinstance(operations, list) or operation not in operations:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_operation_rejected")
+    expected_branch = str(grant.get("allowed_branch") or "")
+    configured_branch = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "")
+    if expected_branch != configured_branch:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
+    if branch is not None and branch != expected_branch:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
+    if path is not None:
+        paths = grant.get("allowed_paths")
+        if not isinstance(paths, list) or path not in paths:
+            raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_path_rejected")
+    base = str(grant.get("approved_base_oid") or "").lower()
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_rejected")
+    if not _git_is_ancestor(workspace, base, expected_branch):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_not_ancestor")
+
+
+def authorize(
+    registry: TokenRegistry,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    source_ip: str,
+    workspace: Path,
+    branch: str | None = None,
+    target_path: str | None = None,
+    current_time: datetime | None = None,
+) -> AuthorizedGrant:
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_not_required")
+    if not token:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
+    grant = registry.find(token)
+    if grant is None:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
+    operation = operation_for(method, path)
+    _validate_grant(
+        grant,
+        audience=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""),
+        source_ip=source_ip,
+        operation=operation,
+        branch=branch,
+        path=target_path,
+        workspace=workspace,
+        current_time=current_time or datetime.now(timezone.utc),
+    )
+    limits = grant.get("max_uses")
+    if not isinstance(limits, dict):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing")
+    try:
+        used = registry.consume(str(grant["token_id"]), operation, int(limits[operation]))
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing") from None
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        code = str(exc)
+        raise AuthorizationError(code, 401 if code == "writer_token_revoked" else 403) from None
+    return AuthorizedGrant(grant, operation, used)
@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+"""Atomic, idempotent commit-file Saga for the isolated writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
+IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}")
+STATES = frozenset({
+    "PENDING", "FILE_WRITTEN", "COMMITTED", "PUSHED", "VERIFIED", "COMPLETED",
+    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
+})
+_LOCKS: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {}
+_LOCKS_GUARD = threading.Lock()
+_LEDGER_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+class CommitFileError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+class SimulatedCrash(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical_digest(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    payload = {
+        "branch": data["branch"],
+        "path": data["path"],
+        "content_sha256": hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
+        "message": data["message"],
+        "expected_head_oid": data["expected_head_oid"],
+    }
+    encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
+
+
+class OperationLedger:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
+            raise PermissionError("writer_operation_ledger_symlink_rejected")
+        with _LEDGER_INIT_LOCK:
+            with self.connect() as db:
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS writer_operations (
+                        operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                        operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        branch TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        path TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        content_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        pre_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        commit_oid TEXT,
+                        push_status TEXT,
+                        verification_status TEXT,
+                        state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+                        updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+                        error_code TEXT
+                    )
+                    """
+                )
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
+        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        return db
+
+    def get_or_create(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        key = data["idempotency_key"]
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row:
+                db.commit()
+                record = dict(row)
+                if record["operation_digest"] != digest:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_conflict", 409)
+                if (
+                    record["token_id"] != grant.token_id
+                    or record["task_id"] != grant.task_id
+                ):
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_owner_conflict", 409)
+                return record
+            operation_id = hashlib.sha256(
+                f"{grant.task_id}\0{key}".encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest()
+            content_sha = hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+            db.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO writer_operations(
+                    operation_id,token_id,task_id,idempotency_key,operation_digest,
+                    branch,path,content_sha256,pre_head_oid,state
+                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    operation_id, grant.token_id, grant.task_id, key, digest,
+                    data["branch"], data["path"], content_sha,
+                    data["expected_head_oid"], "PENDING",
+                ),
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return self.get(key)
+
+    def get(self, key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise KeyError(key)
+        return dict(row)
+
+    def update(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if state not in STATES:
+            raise ValueError("invalid writer operation state")
+        allowed = {"commit_oid", "push_status", "verification_status", "error_code"}
+        assignments = ["state=?", "updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"]
+        values: list[Any] = [state]
+        for name, value in fields.items():
+            if name not in allowed:
+                raise ValueError("invalid ledger field")
+            assignments.append(f"{name}=?")
+            values.append(value)
+        values.append(key)
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            db.execute(
+                f"UPDATE writer_operations SET {','.join(assignments)} WHERE idempotency_key=?",
+                values,
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return self.get(key)
+
+
+class AtomicCommitFile:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        workspace: Path,
+        bare_repo: Path,
+        ledger: OperationLedger,
+        remote: str,
+        audit,
+        crash_after_state: str | None = None,
+    ):
+        self.workspace = workspace
+        self.bare_repo = bare_repo
+        self.ledger = ledger
+        self.remote = remote
+        self.audit = audit
+        self.crash_after_state = crash_after_state
+
+    def _git(self, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True
+        )
+        if check and result.returncode != 0:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_git_operation_failed", 500)
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def _transition(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        record = self.ledger.update(key, state, **fields)
+        if self.crash_after_state == state:
+            raise SimulatedCrash(state)
+        return record
+
+    def _validate(self, data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+        required = ("branch", "path", "content", "message", "expected_head_oid", "idempotency_key")
+        if any(field not in data for field in required):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_incomplete")
+        if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
+            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_force_rejected", 403)
+        if set(data) != set(required):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_fields_rejected")
+        item = {field: data[field] for field in required}
+        if item["branch"] != policy.allowed_branch():
+            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected", 403)
+        try:
+            item["path"] = policy.validate_path(item["path"], self.workspace)
+        except PermissionError as exc:
+            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
+        if not isinstance(item["content"], str) or "\x00" in item["content"]:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_rejected")
+        try:
+            policy.validate_content_for_path(item["path"], item["content"])
+        except PermissionError as exc:
+            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
+        if len(item["content"].encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_too_large", 413)
+        message = item["message"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(message, str)
+            or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200
+            or "\x00" in message
+            or "\n" in message
+            or "\r" in message
+        ):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_message_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(item["expected_head_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(item["expected_head_oid"]):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_expected_head_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(item["idempotency_key"], str) or not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(item["idempotency_key"]):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_key_rejected")
+        return item
+
+    def _atomic_write(self, relative: str, content: str) -> None:
+        target = self.workspace / relative
+        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-", dir=target.parent)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+                stream.write(content.encode("utf-8"))
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+            parent_fd = os.open(target.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+            try:
+                os.fsync(parent_fd)
+            finally:
+                os.close(parent_fd)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temporary):
+                os.unlink(temporary)
+
+    def _verify_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> None:
+        bare = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True,
+        )
+        if bare.returncode != 0 or bare.stdout.strip() != oid:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_authoritative_bare_oid_mismatch", 500)
+        remote = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", self.remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+            cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
+        )
+        if remote.returncode != 0:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_verification_failed", 503)
+        fields = remote.stdout.strip().split()
+        if len(fields) != 2:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_ref_missing", 503)
+        if fields[0] != oid:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_oid_conflict", 409)
+
+    def execute(self, grant: Any, raw_data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        data = self._validate(raw_data)
+        digest = canonical_digest(data)
+        branch = data["branch"]
+        with _LOCKS_GUARD:
+            lock = _LOCKS.setdefault(branch, threading.Lock())
+        lock_path = self.ledger.path.parent / f"{hashlib.sha256(branch.encode()).hexdigest()}.lock"
+        with lock, open(lock_path, "a+b") as branch_lock:
+            fcntl.flock(branch_lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            return self._execute_locked(grant, data, digest)
+
+    def _execute_locked(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        key = data["idempotency_key"]
+        record = self.ledger.get_or_create(grant, data, digest)
+        if record["state"] == "COMPLETED":
+            return self._result(record, idempotent=True)
+        if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != data["branch"]:
+            record = self._transition(
+                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_current_branch_conflict"
+            )
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_current_branch_conflict", 409)
+        head = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        commit_oid = record.get("commit_oid")
+        if head != record["pre_head_oid"] and head != commit_oid:
+            record = self._transition(
+                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_branch_head_conflict"
+            )
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_branch_head_conflict", 409)
+        try:
+            state = record["state"]
+            if state == "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
+                raise CommitFileError("writer_manual_review_required", 409)
+            if state == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE":
+                if record.get("push_status") == "confirmed":
+                    state = "PUSHED"
+                else:
+                    state = "COMMITTED" if commit_oid else "FILE_WRITTEN"
+            if state == "PENDING":
+                self._atomic_write(data["path"], data["content"])
+                record = self._transition(key, "FILE_WRITTEN")
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "FILE_WRITTEN":
+                actual_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+                    (self.workspace / data["path"]).read_bytes()
+                ).hexdigest()
+                if actual_sha != record["content_sha256"]:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_file_content_conflict", 409)
+                staged_before = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only", check=False).splitlines()
+                if staged_before:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
+                self._git("add", "--", data["path"])
+                staged = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines()
+                if staged != [data["path"]]:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
+                self._git("commit", "-m", data["message"])
+                commit_oid = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
+                record = self._transition(key, "COMMITTED", commit_oid=commit_oid)
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "COMMITTED":
+                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
+                pushed = subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{data['branch']}"],
+                    cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
+                )
+                if pushed.returncode != 0:
+                    self._transition(
+                        key, "FAILED_RECOVERABLE",
+                        push_status="failed", error_code="writer_gitea_push_failed",
+                    )
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_push_failed", 503)
+                record = self._transition(key, "PUSHED", push_status="confirmed")
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "PUSHED":
+                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
+                self._verify_remote(data["branch"], commit_oid)
+                record = self._transition(
+                    key, "VERIFIED", verification_status="bare+gitea"
+                )
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "VERIFIED":
+                record = self._transition(key, "COMPLETED", error_code=None)
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "completed")
+            return self._result(record, idempotent=False)
+        except SimulatedCrash:
+            raise
+        except CommitFileError as exc:
+            latest = self.ledger.get(key)
+            if latest["state"] not in {"FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"}:
+                failure_state = (
+                    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+                    if exc.code in {
+                        "writer_gitea_oid_conflict",
+                        "writer_file_content_conflict",
+                        "writer_current_branch_conflict",
+                    }
+                    else "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
+                )
+                latest = self._transition(key, failure_state, error_code=exc.code)
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, latest, "failed")
+            raise
+
+    def _audit(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str, record: dict[str, Any], result: str) -> None:
+        self.audit({
+            "token_id": grant.token_id,
+            "task_id": grant.task_id,
+            "audience": grant.record["audience"],
+            "source_ip": grant.record.get("_source_ip", "socket-peer"),
+            "operation": grant.operation,
+            "branch": data["branch"],
+            "path": data["path"],
+            "idempotency_key": data["idempotency_key"],
+            "operation_digest": digest,
+            "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
+            "pre_head_oid": record["pre_head_oid"],
+            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
+            "result": result,
+        })
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _result(record: dict[str, Any], *, idempotent: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "status": "completed",
+            "state": record["state"],
+            "operation_id": record["operation_id"],
+            "branch": record["branch"],
+            "path": record["path"],
+            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
+            "push_status": record.get("push_status"),
+            "verification_status": record.get("verification_status"),
+            "idempotent": idempotent,
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+"""Strict service-level exact-path policy for isolated Git writers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import grp
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from functools import lru_cache
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+
+MAX_POLICY_BYTES = 65_536
+POLICY_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema_version",
+        "policy_id",
+        "audience",
+        "repository_identity",
+        "allowed_branch",
+        "allowed_operations",
+    }
+)
+OPERATION_FIELDS = frozenset({"exact_paths", "max_content_bytes", "content_profile"})
+SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS = frozenset({"commit_file.atomic"})
+SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES = frozenset({"systemd-codex-review-worker-v1"})
+_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:|bearer\s+|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])"
+)
+_SYSTEMD_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*\Z")
+_SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096
+_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES = {
+    "Unit": frozenset({"Description", "After", "Wants"}),
+    "Service": frozenset(
+        {
+            "Type",
+            "User",
+            "Group",
+            "WorkingDirectory",
+            "Environment",
+            "ExecStart",
+            "Restart",
+            "RestartSec",
+            "NoNewPrivileges",
+            "PrivateTmp",
+            "PrivateDevices",
+            "ProtectSystem",
+            "ProtectHome",
+            "ProtectKernelTunables",
+            "ProtectKernelModules",
+            "ProtectControlGroups",
+            "LockPersonality",
+            "RestrictSUIDSGID",
+            "RestrictRealtime",
+            "MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
+            "RuntimeDirectory",
+            "StateDirectory",
+            "CacheDirectory",
+            "ReadOnlyPaths",
+            "ReadWritePaths",
+            "UMask",
+        }
+    ),
+    "Install": frozenset({"WantedBy"}),
+}
+_SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES = frozenset(
+    {
+        ("Service", "Environment"),
+        ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"),
+        ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"),
+    }
+)
+_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES = {
+    ("Unit", "Description"): "AIOS Codex Review/Test Worker",
+    ("Unit", "After"): "network-online.target",
+    ("Unit", "Wants"): "network-online.target",
+    ("Service", "Type"): "simple",
+    ("Service", "User"): "aiman",
+    ("Service", "Group"): "gitops",
+    (
+        "Service",
+        "WorkingDirectory",
+    ): "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker/current",
+    (
+        "Service",
+        "ExecStart",
+    ): "/usr/bin/python3 -m task_plane.workers.codex_review_test",
+    ("Service", "Restart"): "on-failure",
+    ("Service", "RestartSec"): "2",
+    ("Service", "NoNewPrivileges"): "true",
+    ("Service", "PrivateTmp"): "true",
+    ("Service", "PrivateDevices"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectSystem"): "strict",
+    ("Service", "ProtectHome"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectKernelTunables"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectKernelModules"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectControlGroups"): "true",
+    ("Service", "LockPersonality"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RestrictSUIDSGID"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RestrictRealtime"): "true",
+    ("Service", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RuntimeDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "StateDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "CacheDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "UMask"): "0077",
+    ("Install", "WantedBy"): "multi-user.target",
+}
+_SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES = {
+    ("Service", "Environment"): (
+        "AIOS_CODEX_WORKER_MODE=shadow",
+        "AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false",
+        "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1",
+    ),
+    ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"): (
+        "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+        "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ),
+    ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"): (
+        "/run/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+        "/var/lib/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+        "/var/cache/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ),
+}
+
+
+class PathPolicyError(PermissionError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationPolicy:
+    exact_paths: tuple[str, ...]
+    max_content_bytes: int
+    content_profile: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ServicePathPolicy:
+    schema_version: int
+    policy_id: str
+    audience: str
+    repository_identity: str
+    allowed_branch: str
+    allowed_operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy]
+    sha256: str
+
+    def operation(self, name: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+        try:
+            return self.allowed_operations[name]
+        except KeyError:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_operation_rejected") from None
+
+    def require_exact_path(self, operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+        selected = self.operation(operation)
+        if path not in selected.exact_paths:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_rejected")
+        return selected
+
+
+def _canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def validate_relative_path_syntax(path: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(path, str):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    if not path or path != path.strip() or "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        decoded = unquote(path, errors="strict")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
+    if decoded != path:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    posix = PurePosixPath(path)
+    windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
+    parts = path.split("/")
+    if (
+        posix.is_absolute()
+        or windows.is_absolute()
+        or bool(windows.drive)
+        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    return path
+
+
+def _require_fields(value: dict[str, Any], allowed: frozenset[str], code: str) -> None:
+    if set(value) != allowed:
+        raise PathPolicyError(code)
+
+
+def _parse_policy(document: Any, canonical: bytes) -> ServicePathPolicy:
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_object_required")
+    _require_fields(document, POLICY_FIELDS, "isolated_writer_path_policy_fields_rejected")
+    if document["schema_version"] != 1:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_schema_rejected")
+    text_fields = (
+        "policy_id",
+        "audience",
+        "repository_identity",
+        "allowed_branch",
+    )
+    if any(
+        not isinstance(document[field], str) or not document[field].strip()
+        for field in text_fields
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_value_rejected")
+    raw_operations = document["allowed_operations"]
+    if not isinstance(raw_operations, dict) or not raw_operations:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
+    if not set(raw_operations).issubset(SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
+    operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy] = {}
+    for name, raw in raw_operations.items():
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_rejected")
+        _require_fields(
+            raw,
+            OPERATION_FIELDS,
+            "isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_fields_rejected",
+        )
+        paths = raw["exact_paths"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(paths, list)
+            or not paths
+            or any(not isinstance(item, str) for item in paths)
+        ):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
+        validated = tuple(validate_relative_path_syntax(item) for item in paths)
+        if len(set(validated)) != len(validated):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
+        maximum = raw["max_content_bytes"]
+        if not isinstance(maximum, int) or isinstance(maximum, bool) or not 1 <= maximum <= 1_048_576:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_size_rejected")
+        profile = raw["content_profile"]
+        if profile not in SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
+        operations[name] = OperationPolicy(validated, maximum, profile)
+    return ServicePathPolicy(
+        schema_version=1,
+        policy_id=document["policy_id"],
+        audience=document["audience"],
+        repository_identity=document["repository_identity"],
+        allowed_branch=document["allowed_branch"],
+        allowed_operations=operations,
+        sha256=hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
+    )
+
+
+def load_path_policy(
+    path: Path,
+    *,
+    expected_owner_uid: int = 0,
+    expected_group_gid: int | None = None,
+    expected_parent_mode: int = 0o750,
+    expected_file_mode: int = 0o640,
+) -> ServicePathPolicy:
+    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(path)))
+    if lexical.is_symlink():
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
+    try:
+        parent_info = lexical.parent.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+        file_info = lexical.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_missing") from None
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(parent_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_info.st_mode):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_rejected")
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(file_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(file_info.st_mode):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_rejected")
+    if lexical.resolve(strict=True) != lexical:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
+    if (
+        parent_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
+        or stat.S_IMODE(parent_info.st_mode) != expected_parent_mode
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_permissions_rejected")
+    if (
+        file_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
+        or stat.S_IMODE(file_info.st_mode) != expected_file_mode
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_permissions_rejected")
+    if expected_group_gid is not None and (
+        parent_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid or file_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected")
+    if file_info.st_size <= 0 or file_info.st_size > MAX_POLICY_BYTES:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_size_rejected")
+    raw = lexical.read_bytes()
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_json_rejected") from None
+    canonical = _canonical_json(document)
+    if raw != canonical:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_not_canonical")
+    return _parse_policy(document, canonical)
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
+def configured_path_policy() -> ServicePathPolicy | None:
+    configured = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_PATH_POLICY_FILE", "").strip()
+    if not configured:
+        return None
+    if not Path(configured).is_absolute():
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        gitops_gid = grp.getgrnam("gitops").gr_gid
+    except KeyError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected") from None
+    loaded = load_path_policy(Path(configured), expected_group_gid=gitops_gid)
+    if loaded.audience != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_audience_rejected")
+    if loaded.repository_identity != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_repository_rejected")
+    if loaded.allowed_branch != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_branch_rejected")
+    return loaded
+
+
+def clear_path_policy_cache() -> None:
+    configured_path_policy.cache_clear()
+
+
+def require_service_path(operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+    loaded = configured_path_policy()
+    if loaded is None:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_policy_required")
+    return loaded.require_exact_path(operation, path)
+
+
+def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
+    loaded = configured_path_policy()
+    return None if loaded is None else loaded.sha256
+
+
+def validate_content(operation: str, path: str, content: str) -> None:
+    selected = require_service_path(operation, path)
+    try:
+        encoded = content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except (AttributeError, UnicodeEncodeError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
+    if len(encoded) > selected.max_content_bytes:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_content_too_large")
+    if selected.content_profile == "systemd-codex-review-worker-v1":
+        _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content)
+        return
+    raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
+
+
+def _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content: str) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(content, str):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    try:
+        content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
+    if (
+        "\x00" in content
+        or "\r" in content
+        or _SECRET_RE.search(content)
+        or not content.endswith("\n")
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+
+    sections: set[str] = set()
+    values: dict[tuple[str, str], list[str]] = {}
+    section: str | None = None
+    for line in content.splitlines():
+        if len(line.encode("utf-8")) > _SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        if not line:
+            continue
+        if line[0].isspace() or line.startswith(("#", ";")):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        if line.startswith("[") and line.endswith("]"):
+            candidate = line[1:-1]
+            if (
+                not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(candidate)
+                or candidate not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES
+                or candidate in sections
+            ):
+                raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+            sections.add(candidate)
+            section = candidate
+            continue
+        if section is None or "=" not in line:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        directive, value = line.split("=", 1)
+        if (
+            not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(directive)
+            or directive not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES[section]
+            or not value
+            or value != value.strip()
+        ):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        key = (section, directive)
+        if key in values and key not in _SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        values.setdefault(key, []).append(value)
+
+    if sections != set(_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    if set(values) != set(_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES) | set(
+        _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES.items():
+        if values.get(key) != [expected]:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES.items():
+        observed = values.get(key, [])
+        if len(observed) != len(set(observed)) or tuple(observed) != expected:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+"""Digest-only, task-scoped token registry for isolated writers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+import grp
+import pwd
+import secrets
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+_REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+
+def token_digest(token: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+class TokenRegistry:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self._prepare()
+
+    def _prepare(self) -> None:
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_registry_symlink_rejected")
+        with _REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK:
+            with self._connect() as db:
+                db.executescript(
+                    """
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_grants (
+                        token_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                        token_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                        grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_uses (
+                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        operation TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                        PRIMARY KEY(token_id, operation),
+                        FOREIGN KEY(token_id) REFERENCES token_grants(token_id)
+                    );
+                    """
+                )
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
+        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        return db
+
+    def issue(self, grant: dict[str, Any], token: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+        value = token or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        if len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
+            raise ValueError("writer_token_entropy_insufficient")
+        record = dict(grant)
+        record["schema_version"] = 2
+        record["token_digest"] = token_digest(value)
+        record["revoked"] = False
+        record.setdefault("created_at", utc_now())
+        required = (
+            "token_id",
+            "audience",
+            "task_id",
+            "source_cidrs",
+            "allowed_branch",
+            "approved_base_oid",
+            "allowed_operations",
+            "allowed_paths",
+            "not_before",
+            "expires_at",
+            "max_uses",
+            "issued_by",
+        )
+        if any(not record.get(field) for field in required):
+            raise ValueError("writer_token_grant_incomplete")
+        encoded = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO token_grants(token_id, token_digest, grant_json, revoked, created_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        str(record["token_id"]),
+                        str(record["token_digest"]),
+                        encoded,
+                        0,
+                        str(record["created_at"]),
+                    ),
+                )
+                db.execute("COMMIT")
+            except Exception:
+                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                raise
+        return value, record
+
+    def find(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        candidate = token_digest(token)
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            rows = db.execute(
+                "SELECT token_digest, grant_json, revoked FROM token_grants"
+            ).fetchall()
+        match = None
+        for row in rows:
+            if hmac.compare_digest(str(row["token_digest"]), candidate):
+                match = dict(json.loads(str(row["grant_json"])))
+                match["revoked"] = bool(row["revoked"])
+        return match
+
+    def consume(self, token_id: str, operation: str, maximum: int) -> int:
+        if maximum < 1:
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                row = db.execute(
+                    "SELECT revoked FROM token_grants WHERE token_id=?",
+                    (token_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None or bool(row["revoked"]):
+                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_revoked")
+                used_row = db.execute(
+                    "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
+                    (token_id, operation),
+                ).fetchone()
+                used = int(used_row["use_count"]) if used_row else 0
+                if used >= maximum:
+                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
+                current = used + 1
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO token_uses(token_id, operation, use_count)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?)
+                    ON CONFLICT(token_id, operation)
+                    DO UPDATE SET use_count=excluded.use_count
+                    """,
+                    (token_id, operation, current),
+                )
+                db.execute("COMMIT")
+                return current
+            except Exception:
+                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                raise
+
+    def revoke(self, token_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            changed = db.execute(
+                "UPDATE token_grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_id=? AND revoked=0",
+                (token_id,),
+            ).rowcount
+            db.execute("COMMIT")
+        return bool(changed)
+
+    def usage(self, token_id: str, operation: str) -> int:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
+                (token_id, operation),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row["use_count"]) if row else 0
+
+
+def _write_secret_file(
+    path: Path,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    owner: str | None = None,
+    group: str | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_symlink_rejected")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_not_regular")
+        if owner is not None or group is not None:
+            uid = pwd.getpwnam(owner).pw_uid if owner is not None else -1
+            gid = grp.getgrnam(group).gr_gid if group is not None else -1
+            os.fchown(fd, uid, gid)
+        os.write(fd, token.encode("utf-8"))
+        os.fsync(fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--registry", required=True)
+    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
+    issue.add_argument("--grant-file", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument("--token-file", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument("--owner")
+    issue.add_argument("--group")
+    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
+    revoke.add_argument("--token-id", required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    registry = TokenRegistry(args.registry)
+    if args.command == "issue":
+        grant = json.loads(Path(args.grant_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        token, record = registry.issue(grant)
+        _write_secret_file(
+            Path(args.token_file),
+            token,
+            owner=args.owner,
+            group=args.group,
+        )
+        print(json.dumps({"token_id": record["token_id"], "created": True}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    changed = registry.revoke(args.token_id)
+    print(json.dumps({"token_id": args.token_id, "revoked": changed}, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+"""Audited Owner authorization broker for task-scoped writer provisioning.
+
+The broker closes the bootstrap gap without minting a new general-purpose
+Owner token and without modifying the bearer-token registry. It accepts an
+already-authenticated, explicitly allow-listed Owner principal, records a
+tamper-evident authorization event, and invokes the existing
+AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner with a generated authorization reference.
+
+The broker never writes Git refs itself. The governed signer, validator and
+one-shot provisioner remain the only components allowed to create the task
+branch/worktree/writer.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import tempfile
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
+    AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner,
+    BRANCH_RE,
+    OID_RE,
+    OwnerContext,
+    ProvisioningError,
+    REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS,
+    REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS,
+    TASK_RE,
+)
+
+
+ACTION = "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING"
+SCHEMA = "aios.owner-authorization-event.v1"
+BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "action",
+        "task_id",
+        "repository",
+        "base_ref",
+        "base_oid",
+        "target_branch",
+        "one_time_use",
+        "expires_in_seconds",
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+        "allowed_operations",
+        "denied_operations",
+    }
+)
+IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+/-]{1,254}$")
+SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
+CREDENTIAL_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@+-]{1,255}$")
+WILDCARD_SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"(^\*$)|(^.+:\*$)")
+
+
+class OwnerAuthorizationError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable fail-closed broker error."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        code: str,
+        status: int = 400,
+        *,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+        self.details = dict(details or {})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OwnerPrincipal:
+    """Non-secret authentication evidence returned by the existing API."""
+
+    identity: str
+    role: str
+    authenticated_scope: str
+    token_scopes: frozenset[str]
+    credential_id: str = ""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig:
+    repository_identity: str
+    state_root: Path
+    allowed_owner_identities: frozenset[str]
+    allowed_intake_scopes: frozenset[str]
+    allowed_credential_ids: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
+    max_expiry_seconds: int = 900
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_environment(cls) -> "OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig":
+        identities = _csv_set(
+            os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_IDENTITIES", "")
+        )
+        scopes = _csv_set(
+            os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES", "")
+        )
+        credential_ids = _csv_set(
+            os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_CREDENTIAL_IDS", "")
+        )
+        if not identities:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_IDENTITY_ALLOWLIST_REQUIRED", 503
+            )
+        if not scopes:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_INTAKE_SCOPE_ALLOWLIST_REQUIRED", 503
+            )
+        if any(_is_wildcard_scope(item) for item in scopes):
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "WILDCARD_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 503
+            )
+        if "writer:provision" in scopes:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "WRITER_PROVISION_SCOPE_BOOTSTRAP_REJECTED", 503
+            )
+        try:
+            maximum = int(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_MAX_EXPIRY_SECONDS", "900"
+                )
+            )
+        except ValueError:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "BROKER_MAX_EXPIRY_INVALID", 503
+            ) from None
+        if maximum < 60 or maximum > 1800:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_MAX_EXPIRY_INVALID", 503)
+        return cls(
+            repository_identity=os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "aios/aios"
+            ).strip(),
+            state_root=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT",
+                    "/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker",
+                )
+            ),
+            allowed_owner_identities=identities,
+            allowed_intake_scopes=scopes,
+            allowed_credential_ids=credential_ids,
+            max_expiry_seconds=maximum,
+        )
+
+
+class TaskWriterProvisioner(Protocol):
+    def provision(
+        self, raw: Mapping[str, Any], owner: OwnerContext
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        ...
+
+
+def utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def iso_utc(value: datetime) -> str:
+    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def canonical_json_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(
+            value,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        )
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _csv_set(value: str) -> frozenset[str]:
+    return frozenset(
+        item.strip() for item in value.split(",") if item.strip()
+    )
+
+
+def _is_wildcard_scope(scope: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(WILDCARD_SCOPE_RE.fullmatch(scope.strip()))
+
+
+def _atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: Any, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".tmp-", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+            stream.write(canonical_json_bytes(value))
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+        os.chmod(path, mode)
+        parent_fd = os.open(
+            path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0)
+        )
+        try:
+            os.fsync(parent_fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(parent_fd)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def _read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
+    if path.stat().st_size <= 0 or path.stat().st_size > 1_048_576:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "BROKER_RECEIPT_JSON_INVALID", 500
+        ) from None
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
+    return value
+
+
+def _prepare_state_root(root: Path) -> None:
+    if root.is_symlink():
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+    root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+    os.chmod(root, 0o700)
+    if root.stat().st_mode & 0o077:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "BROKER_STATE_PERMISSIONS_REJECTED", 500
+        )
+
+
+def _event_id(
+    principal: OwnerPrincipal, request_digest: str
+) -> str:
+    material = (
+        f"{principal.identity}\0{principal.authenticated_scope}\0"
+        f"{request_digest}"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+    return "owner-auth-" + hashlib.sha256(material).hexdigest()[:32]
+
+
+def _authorization_reference(event_id: str, request_digest: str) -> str:
+    return f"owner-auth:{event_id}:{request_digest[:16]}"
+
+
+def _validate_principal(
+    principal: OwnerPrincipal,
+    config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
+) -> None:
+    if principal.role != "owner":
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_ROLE_REQUIRED", 403)
+    if (
+        not principal.identity
+        or not IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(principal.identity)
+        or principal.identity not in config.allowed_owner_identities
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED", 403)
+    if (
+        not principal.authenticated_scope
+        or not SCOPE_RE.fullmatch(principal.authenticated_scope)
+        or principal.authenticated_scope
+        not in config.allowed_intake_scopes
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 403)
+    if principal.authenticated_scope == "writer:provision":
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "WRITER_PROVISION_SCOPE_BOOTSTRAP_REJECTED", 403
+        )
+
+    scopes = principal.token_scopes
+    if any(_is_wildcard_scope(scope) for scope in scopes):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED", 403
+        )
+    if scopes:
+        if principal.authenticated_scope not in scopes:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_SCOPE_EVIDENCE_MISMATCH", 403
+            )
+    elif (
+        not principal.credential_id
+        or principal.credential_id not in config.allowed_credential_ids
+    ):
+        # handler.need(scope) proves authorization but may hide whether the
+        # credential was wildcard. When scope metadata is absent, require an
+        # exact non-secret credential ID allowlist as the alternative proof.
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "OWNER_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_NOT_PROVABLE", 403
+        )
+    if principal.credential_id:
+        if not CREDENTIAL_ID_RE.fullmatch(principal.credential_id):
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_CREDENTIAL_ID_INVALID", 403)
+        if (
+            config.allowed_credential_ids
+            and principal.credential_id not in config.allowed_credential_ids
+        ):
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "OWNER_CREDENTIAL_ID_NOT_ALLOWED", 403
+            )
+
+
+def _validate_request(
+    raw: Mapping[str, Any],
+    config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if set(raw) != BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
+    if raw["action"] != ACTION:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_ACTION_REJECTED")
+    if raw["repository"] != config.repository_identity:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+            "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409
+        )
+    if raw["base_ref"] != "refs/heads/main":
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BASE_REF_REJECTED", 409)
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["base_oid"], str)
+        or not OID_RE.fullmatch(raw["base_oid"])
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BASE_OID_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["target_branch"], str)
+        or not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(raw["target_branch"])
+        or raw["target_branch"] in {"main", "master"}
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("TARGET_BRANCH_REJECTED")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(raw["task_id"], str)
+        or not TASK_RE.fullmatch(raw["task_id"])
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("TASK_ID_REJECTED")
+    if raw["one_time_use"] is not True:
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("ONE_TIME_USE_REQUIRED")
+    expiry = raw["expires_in_seconds"]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(expiry, int)
+        or isinstance(expiry, bool)
+        or not 60 <= expiry <= config.max_expiry_seconds
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("GRANT_LIFETIME_REJECTED")
+    for field in (
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+    ):
+        if raw[field] is not False:
+            raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                "PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED", 403
+            )
+    allowed = raw["allowed_operations"]
+    denied = raw["denied_operations"]
+    if (
+        not isinstance(allowed, list)
+        or frozenset(allowed) != REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("ALLOWED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    if (
+        not isinstance(denied, list)
+        or frozenset(denied) != REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("DENIED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    return dict(raw)
+
+
+def _response_is_safe(value: Any) -> bool:
+    """Reject accidental credential material before writing a receipt."""
+
+    sensitive_markers = (
+        "access_token",
+        "bearer",
+        "client_secret",
+        "private_key",
+        "raw_token",
+        "secret_value",
+    )
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for key, inner in value.items():
+            lowered = str(key).lower()
+            if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
+                return False
+            if not _response_is_safe(inner):
+                return False
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        return all(_response_is_safe(item) for item in value)
+    return True
+
+
+class OwnerAuthorizationBroker:
+    """Create an audited Owner event and invoke the governed bridge."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig | None = None,
+        provisioner: TaskWriterProvisioner | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.config = (
+            config or OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig.from_environment()
+        )
+        self.provisioner = provisioner or AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner()
+
+    def authorize_and_provision(
+        self,
+        raw: Mapping[str, Any],
+        principal: OwnerPrincipal,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        config = self.config
+        _validate_principal(principal, config)
+        request = _validate_request(raw, config)
+        _prepare_state_root(config.state_root)
+
+        request_digest = sha256_json(request)
+        event_id = _event_id(principal, request_digest)
+        reference = _authorization_reference(event_id, request_digest)
+        event_dir = config.state_root / "events" / event_id
+        event_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        os.chmod(event_dir, 0o700)
+
+        lock_path = event_dir / "event.lock"
+        lock_path.touch(mode=0o600, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(lock_path, 0o600)
+        with lock_path.open("r+b") as lock:
+            fcntl.flock(lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            response_path = event_dir / "response.json"
+            event_path = event_dir / "event.json"
+
+            if response_path.exists():
+                response = _read_json(response_path)
+                response["owner_authorization_idempotent"] = True
+                return response
+
+            issued_at = utc_now()
+            expires_at = issued_at + timedelta(
+                seconds=int(request["expires_in_seconds"])
+            )
+            event: dict[str, Any] = {
+                "schema": SCHEMA,
+                "event_id": event_id,
+                "authorization_reference": reference,
+                "status": "AUTHORIZED",
+                "owner": {
+                    "identity": principal.identity,
+                    "role": principal.role,
+                    "authenticated_scope": principal.authenticated_scope,
+                    "credential_id": principal.credential_id or None,
+                    "token_scope_digest_sha256": sha256_json(
+                        sorted(principal.token_scopes)
+                    ),
+                    "wildcard_scope_used": False,
+                },
+                "request": {
+                    "task_id": request["task_id"],
+                    "repository": request["repository"],
+                    "base_ref": request["base_ref"],
+                    "base_oid": request["base_oid"],
+                    "target_branch": request["target_branch"],
+                    "one_time_use": True,
+                    "production_change_authorized": False,
+                    "tag_change_authorized": False,
+                    "baseline_change_authorized": False,
+                    "main_write_authorized": False,
+                    "allowed_operations": sorted(
+                        REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
+                    ),
+                    "denied_operations": sorted(
+                        REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
+                    ),
+                },
+                "request_digest_sha256": request_digest,
+                "issued_at": iso_utc(issued_at),
+                "expires_at": iso_utc(expires_at),
+            }
+            event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(event)
+            _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+
+            bridge_request = dict(request)
+            bridge_request.pop("action")
+            bridge_request["owner_authorization_reference"] = reference
+            try:
+                result = self.provisioner.provision(
+                    bridge_request,
+                    OwnerContext(
+                        identity=principal.identity,
+                        role=principal.role,
+                        authorization_reference=reference,
+                    ),
+                )
+                if not isinstance(result, dict):
+                    raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                        "PROVISIONER_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502
+                    )
+                if result.get("status") != "READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING":
+                    raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                        "PROVISIONER_NOT_READY",
+                        409,
+                        details={"status": result.get("status")},
+                    )
+                if not _response_is_safe(result):
+                    raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                        "PROVISIONER_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_SENSITIVE_DATA", 500
+                    )
+            except ProvisioningError as exc:
+                event.update(
+                    {
+                        "status": "PROVISIONING_BLOCKED",
+                        "failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
+                        "error": exc.code,
+                        "error_status": exc.status,
+                    }
+                )
+                event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                    {
+                        key: value
+                        for key, value in event.items()
+                        if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                    }
+                )
+                _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+                raise
+            except OwnerAuthorizationError as exc:
+                event.update(
+                    {
+                        "status": "PROVISIONING_BLOCKED",
+                        "failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
+                        "error": exc.code,
+                        "error_status": exc.status,
+                    }
+                )
+                event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                    {
+                        key: value
+                        for key, value in event.items()
+                        if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                    }
+                )
+                _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+                raise
+            except Exception as exc:
+                event.update(
+                    {
+                        "status": "PROVISIONING_FAILED",
+                        "failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
+                        "error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR",
+                    }
+                )
+                event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                    {
+                        key: value
+                        for key, value in event.items()
+                        if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                    }
+                )
+                _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+                raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
+                    "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR", 500
+                ) from exc
+
+            completed_at = utc_now()
+            event.update(
+                {
+                    "status": "CONSUMED",
+                    "consumed_at": iso_utc(completed_at),
+                    "approval_plan_id": result.get("approval_plan_id"),
+                    "grant_id": result.get("grant_id"),
+                    "grant_digest_sha256": result.get(
+                        "grant_digest_sha256"
+                    ),
+                    "branch_oid": result.get("branch_oid"),
+                    "grant_consumed": result.get("grant_consumed") is True,
+                }
+            )
+            event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
+                {
+                    key: value
+                    for key, value in event.items()
+                    if key != "event_digest_sha256"
+                }
+            )
+            _atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
+
+            response = dict(result)
+            response.update(
+                {
+                    "owner_authorization_event_id": event_id,
+                    "owner_authorization_reference": reference,
+                    "owner_authorization_digest_sha256": event[
+                        "event_digest_sha256"
+                    ],
+                    "owner_authorization_consumed": True,
+                    "owner_authorization_idempotent": False,
+                }
+            )
+            _atomic_write_json(response_path, response)
+            return response
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Read-only release reconciliation and durable follow-up intent."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ReconciliationReport:
+    healthy: bool
+    drift: tuple[str, ...]
+    actions: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+class ReconciliationController:
+    CHECKS = (
+        ("authority_main", "gitea_main", "main_drift"),
+        ("local_tag_oid", "remote_tag_oid", "tag_drift"),
+        ("remote_peeled_target", "approved_target_oid", "peeled_target_drift"),
+        ("registry_version", "baseline_version", "registry_baseline_drift"),
+        ("approved_artifact_digest", "deployed_artifact_digest", "artifact_drift"),
+        ("declared_production_state", "service_healthy", "service_health_drift"),
+    )
+
+    def reconcile(self, actual: Mapping[str, Any]) -> ReconciliationReport:
+        drift: list[str] = []
+        for left, right, label in self.CHECKS:
+            if actual.get(left) != actual.get(right):
+                drift.append(label)
+        actions = () if not drift else ("open_reconciliation_task", "open_reconciliation_pr", "attach_evidence", "notify_owner")
+        return ReconciliationReport(not drift, tuple(drift), actions)
+
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+"""Durable-friendly recurring task scheduling primitives."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Any
+
+
+class RecurringTaskError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RecurringTask:
+    task_id: str
+    interval_seconds: int
+    next_run_at: datetime
+    run_count: int = 0
+    max_runs: int | None = None
+    cancelled: bool = False
+
+    def due(self, now: datetime) -> bool:
+        return not self.cancelled and (self.max_runs is None or self.run_count < self.max_runs) and now >= self.next_run_at
+
+
+class RecurringTaskScheduler:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.tasks: dict[str, RecurringTask] = {}
+        self.successors: set[str] = set()
+
+    def schedule(self, task_id: str, interval_seconds: int, *, now: datetime | None = None, max_runs: int | None = None) -> RecurringTask:
+        if task_id in self.tasks:
+            raise RecurringTaskError("task already exists")
+        if interval_seconds <= 0 or (max_runs is not None and max_runs <= 0):
+            raise RecurringTaskError("invalid recurring task bounds")
+        now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        task = RecurringTask(task_id, interval_seconds, now, 0, max_runs, False)
+        self.tasks[task_id] = task
+        return task
+
+    def due(self, *, now: datetime | None = None) -> list[RecurringTask]:
+        now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        return [task for task in self.tasks.values() if task.due(now)]
+
+    def mark_run(self, task_id: str, *, now: datetime | None = None) -> RecurringTask:
+        task = self.tasks[task_id]
+        now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        if not task.due(now):
+            raise RecurringTaskError("task is not due")
+        task.run_count += 1
+        task.next_run_at = now + timedelta(seconds=task.interval_seconds)
+        return task
+
+    def cancel(self, task_id: str) -> None:
+        self.tasks[task_id].cancelled = True
+
+    def create_successor_once(self, predecessor: str, successor: str, *, interval_seconds: int, now: datetime | None = None) -> RecurringTask:
+        key = f"{predecessor}->{successor}"
+        if key in self.successors:
+            return self.tasks[successor]
+        self.successors.add(key)
+        if successor not in self.tasks:
+            return self.schedule(successor, interval_seconds, now=now)
+        return self.tasks[successor]
+
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""Release state machine with explicit fail-closed production gates."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Mapping
+
+
+class InvalidTransition(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class ReleaseState(str, Enum):
+    SOURCE_READY = "SOURCE_READY"
+    TESTED = "TESTED"
+    PR_OPEN = "PR_OPEN"
+    PR_APPROVED = "PR_APPROVED"
+    MERGED = "MERGED"
+    ARTIFACT_VERIFIED = "ARTIFACT_VERIFIED"
+    RELEASE_APPROVED = "RELEASE_APPROVED"
+    TAG_VERIFIED = "TAG_VERIFIED"
+    DEPLOYED = "DEPLOYED"
+    PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED = "PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED"
+
+
+TRANSITIONS = {
+    ReleaseState.SOURCE_READY: (ReleaseState.TESTED,),
+    ReleaseState.TESTED: (ReleaseState.PR_OPEN,),
+    ReleaseState.PR_OPEN: (ReleaseState.PR_APPROVED,),
+    ReleaseState.PR_APPROVED: (ReleaseState.MERGED,),
+    ReleaseState.MERGED: (ReleaseState.ARTIFACT_VERIFIED,),
+    ReleaseState.ARTIFACT_VERIFIED: (ReleaseState.RELEASE_APPROVED,),
+    ReleaseState.RELEASE_APPROVED: (ReleaseState.TAG_VERIFIED,),
+    ReleaseState.TAG_VERIFIED: (ReleaseState.DEPLOYED,),
+    ReleaseState.DEPLOYED: (ReleaseState.PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED,),
+}
+
+
+class ReleaseStateMachine:
+    def __init__(self, state: ReleaseState = ReleaseState.SOURCE_READY) -> None:
+        self.state = state
+
+    def transition(self, target: ReleaseState, evidence: Mapping[str, object] | None = None) -> ReleaseState:
+        if target not in TRANSITIONS.get(self.state, ()):
+            raise InvalidTransition(f"{self.state.value}_to_{target.value}_denied")
+        evidence = evidence or {}
+        if target is ReleaseState.PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED:
+            if evidence.get("tag_verified") is not True or evidence.get("remote_tag_readback") is not True or evidence.get("service_health") is not True:
+                raise InvalidTransition("production_acceptance_evidence_incomplete")
+        if target is ReleaseState.DEPLOYED and evidence.get("artifact_verified") is not True:
+            raise InvalidTransition("deployment_artifact_not_verified")
+        self.state = target
+        return self.state
+
@@ -0,0 +1,520 @@
+"""Compatibility adapter for the deployed signer and validator contracts.
+
+The bridge keeps authorization and canonical grant construction in the broker,
+then translates that internal request into the directory contract consumed by
+the deployed root signer and validator. No key material is read by this
+module; the signer owns all signing operations.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+_SIGNER_FLAGS = (
+    "--namespace",
+    "--input",
+    "--signature-out",
+    "--key-id-out",
+)
+
+
+class SignerContractError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when the deployed contract cannot be normalized safely."""
+
+
+def canonical_json_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def resolve_ref_oid(git_dir: str | Path, ref: str) -> str:
+    """Resolve an authoritative commit ref to a full 40-character OID."""
+    if not isinstance(ref, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"refs/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+", ref):
+        raise SignerContractError("authoritative_ref_invalid")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            "git",
+            "--git-dir",
+            str(git_dir),
+            "rev-parse",
+            "--verify",
+            f"{ref}^{{commit}}",
+        ],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=15,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise SignerContractError("authoritative_ref_unavailable")
+    oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", oid):
+        raise SignerContractError("authoritative_ref_invalid_oid")
+    return oid
+
+
+def _read(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise SignerContractError("contract_input_missing")
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise SignerContractError("contract_input_invalid") from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise SignerContractError("contract_object_required")
+    return value
+
+
+def _write(path: Path, value: Any) -> None:
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        raise SignerContractError("contract_output_symlink")
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    temporary = path.with_name(path.name + ".tmp")
+    temporary.write_bytes(canonical_json_bytes(value))
+    os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+    os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+
+
+def deployed_signer_help(stdout: str, stderr: str) -> bool:
+    text = (stdout or "") + "\n" + (stderr or "")
+    return all(flag in text for flag in _SIGNER_FLAGS)
+
+
+def _supports_deployed_signer(command: Sequence[str]) -> bool:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [*command, "sign", "--help"],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=15,
+    )
+    return deployed_signer_help(result.stdout, result.stderr)
+
+
+def _run(
+    argv: Sequence[str],
+    *,
+    env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    timeout: int = 60,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        list(argv),
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        env=dict(env) if env is not None else None,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise SignerContractError(
+            f"deployed_tool_failed:{Path(argv[0]).name}:{result.returncode}"
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def _sign(
+    command: Sequence[str],
+    namespace: str,
+    input_path: Path,
+    signature_path: Path,
+    key_id_path: Path,
+) -> None:
+    if signature_path.exists() or key_id_path.exists():
+        raise SignerContractError("contract_output_exists")
+    _run(
+        [
+            *command,
+            "sign",
+            "--namespace",
+            namespace,
+            "--input",
+            str(input_path),
+            "--signature-out",
+            str(signature_path),
+            "--key-id-out",
+            str(key_id_path),
+        ],
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    if not signature_path.is_file() or not key_id_path.is_file():
+        raise SignerContractError("signer_output_missing")
+    if signature_path.stat().st_size <= 0 or key_id_path.stat().st_size <= 0:
+        raise SignerContractError("signer_output_empty")
+
+
+def _manifest(grant_dir: Path, names: Sequence[str]) -> None:
+    rows = []
+    for name in names:
+        path = grant_dir / name
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise SignerContractError("manifest_input_missing")
+        rows.append(
+            f"{hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()}  {name}"
+        )
+    (grant_dir / "MANIFEST.sha256").write_text(
+        "\n".join(rows) + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    os.chmod(grant_dir / "MANIFEST.sha256", 0o600)
+
+
+def _prepare(grant_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    plan = _read(grant_dir / "approval-plan.json")
+    request = _read(grant_dir / "grant-request.json")
+    base = request.get("base")
+    target = request.get("target")
+    owner = request.get("owner_authorization")
+    authorization = request.get("authorization")
+    if not isinstance(base, dict) or not isinstance(target, dict):
+        raise SignerContractError("nested_binding_missing")
+    if not isinstance(owner, dict) or not isinstance(authorization, dict):
+        raise SignerContractError("authorization_binding_missing")
+
+    request_id = "request-" + sha256_json(request)[:32]
+    credential_request = {
+        "schema": "aios.credential-request.v1",
+        "request_id": request_id,
+        "repository": request["repository"],
+        "target_branch": target["branch"],
+        "base_ref": base["ref"],
+        "base_oid": base["oid"],
+        "nonce": request["nonce"],
+        "one_time_use": request["one_time_use"],
+        "allowed_operations": request["allowed_operations"],
+        "denied_operations": request["denied_operations"],
+        "not_before": request["not_before"],
+        "expires_at": request["expires_at"],
+        "owner_identity": owner["identity"],
+        "owner_authorization_reference": owner["reference"],
+        "production_change_authorized": authorization["production_change_authorized"],
+        "tag_change_authorized": authorization["tag_change_authorized"],
+        "baseline_change_authorized": authorization["baseline_change_authorized"],
+        "main_write_authorized": authorization["main_write_authorized"],
+    }
+    request_digest = sha256_json(credential_request)
+
+    approval_plan = dict(plan)
+    approval_plan.update(
+        {
+            "repository": request["repository"],
+            "target_branch": target["branch"],
+            "base_ref": base["ref"],
+            "base_oid": base["oid"],
+            "allowed_operations": request["allowed_operations"],
+            "denied_operations": request["denied_operations"],
+            "one_time_use": True,
+            "max_uses": 1,
+            "not_before": request["not_before"],
+            "expires_at": request["expires_at"],
+        }
+    )
+
+    grant_id = "grant-" + hashlib.sha256(
+        (request_id + "\0" + request["nonce"]).encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()[:32]
+    grant_payload = {
+        "schema": "aios.grant-payload.v1",
+        "grant_id": grant_id,
+        "request_id": request_id,
+        "request_nonce": request["nonce"],
+        "credential_request_sha256": request_digest,
+        "credential_secret_ref": f"task-writer:{grant_id}",
+        "approval_plan_id": approval_plan["approval_plan_id"],
+        "repository": request["repository"],
+        "target_branch": target["branch"],
+        "base_ref": base["ref"],
+        "base_oid": base["oid"],
+        "allowed_operations": request["allowed_operations"],
+        "denied_operations": request["denied_operations"],
+        "one_time_use": True,
+        "max_uses": 1,
+        "not_before": request["not_before"],
+        "expires_at": request["expires_at"],
+    }
+    grant_digest = sha256_json(grant_payload)
+
+    _write(grant_dir / "credential-request.json", credential_request)
+    (grant_dir / "credential-request.canonical.json").write_bytes(
+        canonical_json_bytes(credential_request)
+    )
+    os.chmod(grant_dir / "credential-request.canonical.json", 0o600)
+    _write(grant_dir / "approval-plan.json", approval_plan)
+    (grant_dir / "approval-plan.canonical.json").write_bytes(
+        canonical_json_bytes(approval_plan)
+    )
+    os.chmod(grant_dir / "approval-plan.canonical.json", 0o600)
+    _write(grant_dir / "grant-payload.json", grant_payload)
+    (grant_dir / "grant-payload.canonical.json").write_bytes(
+        canonical_json_bytes(grant_payload)
+    )
+    os.chmod(grant_dir / "grant-payload.canonical.json", 0o600)
+    _write(
+        grant_dir / "signed-grant.json",
+        {
+            "schema": "aios.signed-grant.v1",
+            "grant_id": grant_id,
+            "credential_request_sha256": request_digest,
+            "signed_payload_sha256": grant_digest,
+        },
+    )
+    return {
+        "request": credential_request,
+        "approval_plan": approval_plan,
+        "grant": grant_payload,
+        "request_digest": request_digest,
+        "grant_digest": grant_digest,
+        "grant_id": grant_id,
+    }
+
+
+def run_compatible_signer(
+    signer_command: Sequence[str],
+    grant_dir: Path,
+    result_path: Path,
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+    try:
+        if not _supports_deployed_signer(signer_command):
+            _run(
+                [
+                    *signer_command,
+                    "--grant-dir",
+                    str(grant_dir),
+                    "--result-json",
+                    str(result_path),
+                ],
+                timeout=60,
+            )
+            legacy = _read(result_path)
+            if legacy.get("status") not in {"SIGNED", "PASS", "COMPLETED"}:
+                raise SignerContractError("legacy_signer_not_ready")
+            grant_id = legacy.get("grant_id")
+            digest = legacy.get("grant_digest_sha256")
+            signer = legacy.get("signing_key_identity") or legacy.get(
+                "signer_identity"
+            )
+            if not all(
+                isinstance(value, str) and value.strip()
+                for value in (grant_id, digest, signer)
+            ):
+                raise SignerContractError("legacy_signer_result_incomplete")
+            if not legacy.get("signature_present"):
+                raise SignerContractError("legacy_signature_missing")
+            return {
+                "grant_id": grant_id,
+                "grant_digest_sha256": digest,
+                "signing_key_identity": signer,
+            }
+        prepared = _prepare(grant_dir)
+        config_path = Path(
+            os.environ.get("AIOS_GRANT_ROOT_CONFIG", "/etc/aios/grant-root/config.json")
+        )
+        config = _read(config_path)
+        grant_namespace = str(config["grant_namespace"])
+        approval_namespace = str(config["approval_namespace"])
+        _sign(
+            signer_command,
+            approval_namespace,
+            grant_dir / "approval-plan.canonical.json",
+            grant_dir / "approval-plan.sig",
+            grant_dir / "approval-plan.key-id",
+        )
+        _sign(
+            signer_command,
+            grant_namespace,
+            grant_dir / "grant-payload.canonical.json",
+            grant_dir / "signed-grant.sig",
+            grant_dir / "signed-grant.key-id",
+        )
+        key_identity = (
+            grant_dir / "signed-grant.key-id"
+        ).read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if not key_identity:
+            raise SignerContractError("signer_identity_missing")
+        _manifest(
+            grant_dir,
+            (
+                "approval-plan.json",
+                "approval-plan.canonical.json",
+                "approval-plan.sig",
+                "approval-plan.key-id",
+                "credential-request.json",
+                "credential-request.canonical.json",
+                "grant-payload.json",
+                "grant-payload.canonical.json",
+                "signed-grant.json",
+                "signed-grant.sig",
+                "signed-grant.key-id",
+            ),
+        )
+        result = {
+            "schema": "aios.compatible-signer-result.v1",
+            "status": "SIGNED",
+            "approval_plan_id": prepared["approval_plan"]["approval_plan_id"],
+            "grant_id": prepared["grant_id"],
+            "grant_digest_sha256": prepared["grant_digest"],
+            "signing_key_identity": key_identity,
+            "signer_identity": key_identity,
+            "signature_present": True,
+        }
+        _write(result_path, result)
+        return {
+            "grant_id": prepared["grant_id"],
+            "grant_digest_sha256": prepared["grant_digest"],
+            "signing_key_identity": key_identity,
+        }
+    except (OSError, KeyError, TypeError, SignerContractError) as exc:
+        _write(
+            result_path,
+            {
+                "schema": "aios.compatible-signer-result.v1",
+                "status": "BLOCKED",
+                "error_code": str(exc),
+            },
+        )
+        raise
+
+
+def _validator_config(
+    grant_dir: Path,
+    request: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> Path:
+    root_config = Path(
+        os.environ.get("AIOS_GRANT_ROOT_CONFIG", "/etc/aios/grant-root/config.json")
+    )
+    config = _read(root_config)
+    repo_path = (
+        os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_VALIDATOR_REPO_PATH")
+        or os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE")
+        or config.get("repo_path")
+    )
+    config.update(
+        {
+            "repository": request["repository"],
+            "target_branch": request["target_branch"],
+            "base_ref": request["base_ref"],
+            "repo_path": repo_path,
+            "approval_plan_file": str(grant_dir / "approval-plan.json"),
+            "approval_plan_canonical_file": str(
+                grant_dir / "approval-plan.canonical.json"
+            ),
+            "approval_plan_signature_file": str(grant_dir / "approval-plan.sig"),
+            "consumed_grants_ledger": str(
+                grant_dir / "consumed-grants.jsonl"
+            ),
+        }
+    )
+    path = grant_dir.parent / "compat-validator-config.json"
+    _write(path, config)
+    return path
+
+
+def run_compatible_validator(
+    validator_command: Sequence[str],
+    grant_dir: Path,
+    result_path: Path,
+) -> Path:
+    if not (grant_dir / "grant-payload.json").is_file():
+        try:
+            _run(
+                [
+                    *validator_command,
+                    "--grant-dir",
+                    str(grant_dir),
+                    "--result-json",
+                    str(result_path),
+                ],
+                timeout=60,
+            )
+            legacy = _read(result_path)
+            if legacy.get("status") not in {"PASS", "VALID", "COMPLETED"}:
+                raise SignerContractError("legacy_validator_not_ready")
+            return Path(
+                os.environ.get(
+                    "AIOS_GRANT_ROOT_CONFIG", "/etc/aios/grant-root/config.json"
+                )
+            )
+        except (OSError, KeyError, TypeError, SignerContractError) as exc:
+            _write(
+                result_path,
+                {
+                    "schema": "aios.compatible-validator-result.v1",
+                    "status": "BLOCKED",
+                    "error_code": str(exc),
+                },
+            )
+            raise
+    request = _read(grant_dir / "credential-request.json")
+    config_path = _validator_config(grant_dir, request)
+    env = os.environ.copy()
+    env["AIOS_GRANT_ROOT_CONFIG"] = str(config_path)
+    try:
+        _run(
+            [
+                *validator_command,
+                "--grant-dir",
+                str(grant_dir),
+                "--result-json",
+                str(result_path),
+            ],
+            env=env,
+            timeout=60,
+        )
+        actual = _read(result_path)
+        if actual.get("result") != "READY":
+            raise SignerContractError("validator_not_ready")
+        checks = {
+            "schema_valid": True,
+            "signature_valid": actual.get("signature_verified") is True,
+            "signer_trusted": actual.get("signature_verified") is True,
+            "approval_plan_active": actual.get("approval_plan_verified") is True,
+            "repository_match": True,
+            "base_ref_match": True,
+            "base_oid_match": actual.get("remote_base_verified") is True,
+            "target_branch_match": actual.get("target_branch_absent") is True,
+            "one_time_use": True,
+            "allowed_operations_match": True,
+            "denied_operations_match": True,
+        }
+        if not all(checks.values()):
+            raise SignerContractError("validator_checks_incomplete")
+        grant = _read(grant_dir / "grant-payload.json")
+        result = {
+            "schema": "aios.compatible-validator-result.v1",
+            "status": "VALID",
+            "approval_plan_id": grant["approval_plan_id"],
+            "grant_digest_sha256": sha256_json(grant),
+            "checks": checks,
+            "actual_result": {
+                "result": actual.get("result"),
+                "signature_verified": actual.get("signature_verified"),
+                "approval_plan_verified": actual.get("approval_plan_verified"),
+                "remote_base_verified": actual.get("remote_base_verified"),
+                "target_branch_absent": actual.get("target_branch_absent"),
+                "grant_unused": actual.get("grant_unused"),
+            },
+        }
+        _write(result_path, result)
+        return config_path
+    except (OSError, KeyError, TypeError, SignerContractError) as exc:
+        _write(
+            result_path,
+            {
+                "schema": "aios.compatible-validator-result.v1",
+                "status": "BLOCKED",
+                "error_code": str(exc),
+            },
+        )
+        raise
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Execution-readiness adapters and the fail-closed Shadow controller service."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import dataclasses
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import threading
+import time
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKey,
+)
+
+from silent_release_controller import _sanitize, utc_now
+from silent_release_hardening import (
+    BuilderAttestation,
+    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
+    ReleaseRecoveryWorker,
+    SignedApprovalVerifier,
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+    SilentReleaseActionService,
+    TrustedCandidateBundle,
+    _canonical_json,
+    _durable_json,
+    _safe_child,
+)
+
+
+class BuilderSigner(Protocol):
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        ...
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        ...
+
+
+class LocalTestBuilderSigner:
+    """Ephemeral in-memory signer. It is forbidden for production execution."""
+
+    test_only = True
+
+    def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
+        self._key_id = str(key_id)
+        self._private_key = private_key
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        return self._key_id
+
+    @classmethod
+    def generate(
+        cls, key_id: str = "shadow-builder-test-key"
+    ) -> "LocalTestBuilderSigner":
+        return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
+
+    @property
+    def public_key(self):
+        return self._private_key.public_key()
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        return self._private_key.sign(payload)
+
+
+class ExternalKmsBuilderSigner:
+    """Signer facade whose private operation remains in KMS/HSM."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        key_id: str,
+        credential_reference: str,
+        sign_callback: Callable[[str, bytes], bytes],
+    ):
+        if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
+            ("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("production builder requires a KMS/HSM reference")
+        self._key_id = str(key_id)
+        self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
+        self._sign_callback = sign_callback
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        return self._key_id
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        return bytes(self._sign_callback(self.credential_reference, payload))
+
+
+class SignedTrustedBuilderAdapter:
+    """Signs evidence produced by a trusted collector, never caller evidence."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        collector: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], TrustedCandidateBundle],
+        signer: BuilderSigner,
+    ):
+        self.collector = collector
+        self.signer = signer
+
+    def build(self, intent: Mapping[str, Any]) -> TrustedCandidateBundle:
+        forbidden = {
+            "artifact_sha256",
+            "canary",
+            "checks",
+            "manifest_sha256",
+            "tests",
+            "tree_oid",
+        }
+        if forbidden.intersection(intent):
+            raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
+                "trusted builder rejects caller-supplied evidence"
+            )
+        unsigned = self.collector(dict(intent))
+        if unsigned.attestation is not None:
+            raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
+                "collector cannot self-attest its evidence"
+            )
+        candidate = unsigned.candidate
+        test_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            _canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.tests))
+        ).hexdigest()
+        canary_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            _canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.canary))
+        ).hexdigest()
+        attestation_id = "builder-attestation-" + hashlib.sha256(
+            (
+                candidate.candidate_id
+                + "\0"
+                + candidate.source_commit
+                + "\0"
+                + candidate.artifact_sha256
+            ).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()[:24]
+        attestation = BuilderAttestation(
+            builder_attestation_id=attestation_id,
+            builder_key_id=self.signer.key_id,
+            source_commit=candidate.source_commit,
+            tree_oid=candidate.tree_oid,
+            artifact_sha256=candidate.artifact_sha256,
+            manifest_sha256=candidate.manifest_sha256,
+            package_closure_sha256=(
+                unsigned.release_plan.deployment.package_closure_sha256
+            ),
+            test_evidence_sha256=test_sha,
+            canary_evidence_sha256=canary_sha,
+            issued_at=utc_now(),
+            signature="",
+        )
+        attestation = dataclasses.replace(
+            attestation,
+            signature=base64.b64encode(
+                self.signer.sign(attestation.canonical_bytes())
+            ).decode("ascii"),
+        )
+        return dataclasses.replace(unsigned, attestation=attestation)
+
+
+class ApprovalBackendAdapter(Protocol):
+    @property
+    def available(self) -> bool:
+        ...
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+        *,
+        candidate,
+        release_plan,
+        policy_sha256: str,
+    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+        ...
+
+
+class LocalTestApprovalSigner:
+    """Test-only approval signer used solely for Shadow acceptance."""
+
+    test_only = True
+
+    def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
+        self.key_id = str(key_id)
+        self.private_key = private_key
+
+    @classmethod
+    def generate(
+        cls, key_id: str = "shadow-owner-test-key"
+    ) -> "LocalTestApprovalSigner":
+        return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
+
+    def sign(
+        self, approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval
+    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+        unsigned = dataclasses.replace(
+            approval, key_id=self.key_id, signature=""
+        )
+        return dataclasses.replace(
+            unsigned,
+            signature=base64.b64encode(
+                self.private_key.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes())
+            ).decode("ascii"),
+        )
+
+
+class ProductionApprovalBackendAdapter:
+    """Verification-only production adapter configured by a secret/KMS ref."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        verifier: SignedApprovalVerifier,
+        credential_reference: str,
+    ):
+        if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
+            ("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
+        ):
+            raise ValueError(
+                "production approval backend requires a KMS/secret reference"
+            )
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
+
+    @property
+    def available(self) -> bool:
+        return True
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+        *,
+        candidate,
+        release_plan,
+        policy_sha256: str,
+    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+        return self.verifier.verify_release_plan(
+            approval, candidate, release_plan, policy_sha256
+        )
+
+
+class UnavailableProductionApprovalBackend:
+    credential_reference = None
+
+    @property
+    def available(self) -> bool:
+        return False
+
+    def verify(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
+            "production approval backend is not configured"
+        )
+
+
+class LeaderLock:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.handle = None
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(self.path.parent, 0o700)
+        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+        try:
+            import fcntl
+
+            fcntl.flock(
+                self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB
+            )
+        except BlockingIOError as exc:
+            self.handle.close()
+            self.handle = None
+            raise RuntimeError("silent release leader is already active") from exc
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
+        if self.handle is not None:
+            try:
+                import fcntl
+
+                fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+            finally:
+                self.handle.close()
+                self.handle = None
+
+
+class PersistentSilentReleaseController:
+    """Idempotent main-event controller with durable startup/recovery reports."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        root: Path,
+        service: SilentReleaseActionService,
+        *,
+        main_probe: Callable[[], str],
+        recovery_worker: ReleaseRecoveryWorker | None = None,
+    ):
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        self.service = service
+        self.main_probe = main_probe
+        self.recovery_worker = recovery_worker
+        self.leader_path = self.root / "controller.leader.lock"
+        self.status_path = self.root / "controller-status.json"
+
+    def startup_verify(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        checked = 0
+        failed = 0
+        for journal in sorted(self.service.sagas.root.glob("*.events.jsonl")):
+            candidate_id = journal.name[: -len(".events.jsonl")]
+            saga = self.service.sagas.load(candidate_id)
+            checked += 1
+            if not saga.journal_integrity:
+                failed += 1
+        status = {
+            "checked_sagas": checked,
+            "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
+            "failed_closed": failed,
+            "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
+            "side_effects_executed": False,
+            "status": "READY" if failed == 0 else "FAIL_CLOSED",
+        }
+        _durable_json(self.status_path, status)
+        return status
+
+    def run_once(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with LeaderLock(self.leader_path):
+            startup = self.startup_verify()
+            if startup["status"] != "READY":
+                result = {
+                    "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
+                    "intent": None,
+                    "notification": None,
+                    "recovery": None,
+                    "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
+                    "side_effects_executed": False,
+                    "startup": startup,
+                    "status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
+                }
+                _durable_json(self.status_path, result)
+                return _sanitize(result)
+            source_commit = str(self.main_probe())
+            event_id = f"main-{source_commit}"
+            intent = self.service.create_release_intent(
+                {"event_id": event_id, "source_commit": source_commit}
+            )
+            notification = None
+            if intent.get("candidate_id"):
+                notification = self.service.ensure_owner_notification(
+                    str(intent["candidate_id"])
+                )
+            recovery = (
+                self.recovery_worker.run_once()
+                if self.recovery_worker is not None
+                else self.service.get_recovery_status()
+            )
+            result = {
+                "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
+                "intent": intent,
+                "notification": notification,
+                "recovery": recovery,
+                "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
+                "side_effects_executed": False,
+                "startup": startup,
+            }
+            _durable_json(self.status_path, result)
+            return _sanitize(result)
+
+
+class ShadowActionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    service: SilentReleaseActionService
+    controller: PersistentSilentReleaseController
+
+    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any], status=HTTPStatus.OK):
+        body = json.dumps(_sanitize(dict(payload)), sort_keys=True).encode()
+        self.send_response(int(status))
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        size = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        if size > 1024 * 1024:
+            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
+        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(size) or b"{}")
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        parsed = urlparse(self.path)
+        query = parse_qs(parsed.query)
+        candidate_id = str((query.get("candidate_id") or [""])[0])
+        try:
+            if parsed.path == "/healthz":
+                return self._json(
+                    {
+                        "execution_enabled": False,
+                        "shadow_mode": True,
+                        "side_effects_executed": False,
+                        "status": "ok",
+                    }
+                )
+            routes = {
+                "/getReleaseCandidate": self.service.get_release_candidate,
+                "/getReleasePlan": self.service.get_release_plan,
+                "/getReleaseAcceptance": self.service.get_acceptance,
+                "/getReleaseSaga": self.service.get_release_saga,
+                "/getCapabilityStatus": self.service.get_capability_status,
+            }
+            if parsed.path in routes:
+                return self._json(routes[parsed.path](candidate_id))
+            if parsed.path == "/getRecoveryStatus":
+                return self._json(self.service.get_recovery_status())
+            self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as exc:
+            self._json(
+                {"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
+            )
+
+    def do_POST(self):
+        parsed = urlparse(self.path)
+        try:
+            body = self._body()
+            if parsed.path == "/createReleaseIntent":
+                return self._json(self.service.create_release_intent(body))
+            if parsed.path in {
+                "/submitSignedApproval",
+                "/submitOwnerApproval",
+            }:
+                return self._json(self.service.submit_owner_approval(body))
+            if parsed.path == "/startDeployment":
+                return self._json(
+                    self.service.start_deployment(
+                        str(body.get("candidate_id") or "")
+                    )
+                )
+            self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError, CapabilityAuthorizationError) as exc:
+            self._json(
+                {"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
+            )
+
+
+def git_main_probe(repository: Path) -> Callable[[], str]:
+    repository = Path(repository)
+
+    def probe() -> str:
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            [
+                "git",
+                f"--git-dir={repository}",
+                "rev-parse",
+                "refs/heads/main",
+            ],
+            check=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=15,
+            env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+        )
+        return completed.stdout.strip()
+
+    return probe
+
+
+def serve_shadow(
+    *,
+    state_root: Path,
+    repository: Path,
+    host: str,
+    port: int,
+    poll_seconds: float,
+) -> None:
+    service = SilentReleaseActionService.shadow(state_root)
+    controller = PersistentSilentReleaseController(
+        state_root,
+        service,
+        main_probe=git_main_probe(repository),
+    )
+    controller.run_once()
+    stop = threading.Event()
+
+    def controller_loop() -> None:
+        while not stop.wait(poll_seconds):
+            try:
+                controller.run_once()
+            except Exception as exc:  # fail closed and keep the API available
+                _durable_json(
+                    controller.status_path,
+                    {
+                        "error": type(exc).__name__,
+                        "execution_enabled": False,
+                        "shadow_mode": True,
+                        "side_effects_executed": False,
+                        "status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
+                    },
+                )
+
+    handler = type(
+        "ConfiguredShadowActionHandler",
+        (ShadowActionHandler,),
+        {"service": service, "controller": controller},
+    )
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
+    api_thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=server.serve_forever,
+        name="silent-release-shadow-api",
+        daemon=False,
+    )
+    controller_thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=controller_loop,
+        name="silent-release-shadow-controller",
+        daemon=True,
+    )
+    api_thread.start()
+    controller_thread.start()
+    try:
+        while api_thread.is_alive():
+            api_thread.join(timeout=1)
+    finally:
+        stop.set()
+        server.shutdown()
+        server.server_close()
+        controller_thread.join(timeout=max(1.0, poll_seconds + 1.0))
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", default=18891, type=int)
+    parser.add_argument("--poll-seconds", default=30.0, type=float)
+    arguments = parser.parse_args()
+    if arguments.poll_seconds <= 0:
+        raise SystemExit("poll seconds must be positive")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        raise SystemExit("GitOps writes must remain disabled")
+    if (
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED", "false"
+        ).lower()
+        != "false"
+    ):
+        raise SystemExit("Silent Release execution must remain disabled")
+    serve_shadow(
+        state_root=arguments.state_root,
+        repository=arguments.repository,
+        host=arguments.host,
+        port=arguments.port,
+        poll_seconds=arguments.poll_seconds,
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,760 @@
+"""Task-scoped identity overlay for bootstrap writer provisioning.
+
+This module resolves bearer-registry identity ambiguity without modifying the
+global token registry. A root-governed one-shot issuer creates a random,
+short-lived credential bound to exactly one repository, base OID, task and
+target branch. The HTTP overlay authenticates only that credential and invokes
+the existing OwnerAuthorizationBroker.
+
+The overlay never grants main, tag, baseline, production or repository-admin
+capabilities. The bearer secret is stored only in a root-owned runtime path and
+is removed after success, failure, revocation or expiry.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import secrets
+import tempfile
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
+    BRANCH_RE,
+    ProvisioningError,
+    OID_RE,
+    REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS,
+    REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS,
+    TASK_RE,
+)
+from owner_authorization_broker import (
+    ACTION,
+    BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS,
+    OwnerAuthorizationBroker,
+    OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
+    OwnerAuthorizationError,
+    OwnerPrincipal,
+    TaskWriterProvisioner,
+    canonical_json_bytes,
+    iso_utc,
+    sha256_json,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+
+OVERLAY_SCHEMA = "aios.task-identity-overlay.v1"
+OVERLAY_SCOPE = "owner:task-authorize"
+OVERLAY_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^overlay-[0-9a-f]{32}$")
+OWNER_IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+/-]{1,254}$")
+AUTH_ASSERTION_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]{3,255}$")
+TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset({"CONSUMED", "FAILED", "REVOKED", "EXPIRED"})
+MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1_048_576
+
+
+class IdentityOverlayError(RuntimeError):
+    """Stable, fail-closed error for the overlay control plane."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        code: str,
+        status: int = 400,
+        *,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+        self.details = dict(details or {})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_ref: str
+    base_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "repository": self.repository,
+            "base_ref": self.base_ref,
+            "base_oid": self.base_oid,
+            "target_branch": self.target_branch,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class IdentityOverlayConfig:
+    state_root: Path
+    secret_root: Path
+    binding: TaskBinding
+    owner_identity: str
+    max_ttl_seconds: int = 900
+    require_root_issue: bool = True
+    collision_secret_refs: tuple[Path, ...] = ()
+    broker_state_root: Path | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_environment(cls) -> "IdentityOverlayConfig":
+        try:
+            maximum = int(
+                os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_MAX_TTL_SECONDS", "900")
+            )
+        except ValueError:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_MAX_TTL_INVALID", 503) from None
+        if not 60 <= maximum <= 900:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_MAX_TTL_INVALID", 503)
+
+        refs = tuple(
+            Path(item.strip())
+            for item in os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS", ""
+            ).split(",")
+            if item.strip()
+        )
+        owner = os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_OWNER_IDENTITY", ""
+        ).strip()
+        config = cls(
+            state_root=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_STATE_ROOT",
+                    "/var/lib/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays",
+                )
+            ),
+            secret_root=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_SECRET_ROOT",
+                    "/run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays",
+                )
+            ),
+            broker_state_root=Path(
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT",
+                    "/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker",
+                )
+            ),
+            binding=TaskBinding(
+                task_id=os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TASK_ID", ""
+                ).strip(),
+                repository=os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "aios/aios"
+                ).strip(),
+                base_ref=os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_REF",
+                    "refs/heads/main",
+                ).strip(),
+                base_oid=os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_OID", ""
+                ).strip(),
+                target_branch=os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TARGET_BRANCH", ""
+                ).strip(),
+            ),
+            owner_identity=owner,
+            max_ttl_seconds=maximum,
+            require_root_issue=os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_REQUIRE_ROOT", "true"
+            ).strip().lower()
+            not in {"0", "false", "no", "off"},
+            collision_secret_refs=refs,
+        )
+        _validate_config(config)
+        return config
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OverlaySession:
+    overlay_id: str
+    metadata_path: Path
+    secret_ref: Path
+    owner_identity: str
+    request_digest_sha256: str
+    binding: TaskBinding
+
+
+def _validate_config(config: IdentityOverlayConfig) -> None:
+    binding = config.binding
+    if not TASK_RE.fullmatch(binding.task_id):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_TASK_ID_INVALID", 503)
+    if binding.repository != "aios/aios":
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_REPOSITORY_REJECTED", 503)
+    if binding.base_ref != "refs/heads/main":
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BASE_REF_REJECTED", 503)
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(binding.base_oid):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BASE_OID_INVALID", 503)
+    if (
+        not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(binding.target_branch)
+        or binding.target_branch in {"main", "master"}
+    ):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID", 503)
+    if not OWNER_IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(config.owner_identity):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_OWNER_IDENTITY_INVALID", 503)
+    if not 60 <= config.max_ttl_seconds <= 900:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_MAX_TTL_INVALID", 503)
+    if config.state_root == config.secret_root:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_STATE_SECRET_ROOT_COLLISION", 503)
+
+
+def _prepare_directory(path: Path, mode: int = 0o700) -> None:
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_PATH_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+    path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=mode)
+    os.chmod(path, mode)
+    if path.stat().st_mode & 0o077:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_DIRECTORY_PERMISSIONS_REJECTED", 500)
+
+
+def _atomic_write(path: Path, data: bytes, mode: int) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_PATH_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".tmp-", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+            stream.write(data)
+            stream.flush()
+            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+        os.chmod(path, mode)
+        parent_fd = os.open(
+            path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0)
+        )
+        try:
+            os.fsync(parent_fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(parent_fd)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def _atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: Any, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    _atomic_write(path, canonical_json_bytes(value), mode)
+
+
+def _read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_METADATA_INVALID", 500)
+    if path.stat().st_size <= 0 or path.stat().st_size > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_METADATA_INVALID", 500)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_METADATA_INVALID", 500) from None
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_METADATA_INVALID", 500)
+    return value
+
+
+def _parse_utc(value: str) -> datetime:
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_TIMESTAMP_INVALID", 500) from None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_TIMESTAMP_INVALID", 500)
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _token_hash(token: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.strip()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _safe_unlink(path: Path) -> None:
+    try:
+        if path.is_symlink():
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_SECRET_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
+        path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_SECRET_REMOVAL_FAILED", 500) from exc
+
+
+def _validate_request_binding(
+    request: Mapping[str, Any], binding: TaskBinding, max_ttl: int
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if set(request) != BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
+    if request.get("action") != ACTION:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_ACTION_REJECTED")
+    expected = binding.as_dict()
+    for key, value in expected.items():
+        if request.get(key) != value:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError(
+                "OVERLAY_BINDING_MISMATCH", 409, details={"field": key}
+            )
+    if request.get("one_time_use") is not True:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_ONE_TIME_USE_REQUIRED")
+    expiry = request.get("expires_in_seconds")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(expiry, int)
+        or isinstance(expiry, bool)
+        or not 60 <= expiry <= max_ttl
+    ):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_TTL_REJECTED")
+    for field in (
+        "production_change_authorized",
+        "tag_change_authorized",
+        "baseline_change_authorized",
+        "main_write_authorized",
+    ):
+        if request.get(field) is not False:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED", 403)
+    if (
+        not isinstance(request.get("allowed_operations"), list)
+        or frozenset(request["allowed_operations"])
+        != REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    if (
+        not isinstance(request.get("denied_operations"), list)
+        or frozenset(request["denied_operations"])
+        != REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
+    ):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_DENIED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
+    return dict(request)
+
+
+def _metadata_digest(metadata: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    unsigned = {
+        key: value
+        for key, value in metadata.items()
+        if key != "metadata_digest_sha256"
+    }
+    return sha256_json(unsigned)
+
+
+def _verify_metadata(metadata: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if metadata.get("schema") != OVERLAY_SCHEMA:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_METADATA_SCHEMA_INVALID", 500)
+    overlay_id = str(metadata.get("overlay_id") or "")
+    if not OVERLAY_ID_RE.fullmatch(overlay_id):
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_METADATA_ID_INVALID", 500)
+    expected = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+    if metadata.get("metadata_digest_sha256") != expected:
+        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_METADATA_DIGEST_MISMATCH", 500)
+
+
+class TaskIdentityOverlayStore:
+    """Issue, authenticate, consume and revoke one task-bound credential."""
+
+    def __init__(self, config: IdentityOverlayConfig) -> None:
+        _validate_config(config)
+        self.config = config
+
+    @property
+    def lock_path(self) -> Path:
+        return self.config.state_root / "overlay.lock"
+
+    def _lock(self):
+        _prepare_directory(self.config.state_root)
+        _prepare_directory(self.config.secret_root)
+        self.lock_path.touch(mode=0o600, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(self.lock_path, 0o600)
+        stream = self.lock_path.open("r+b")
+        fcntl.flock(stream.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+        return stream
+
+    def _metadata_paths(self) -> list[Path]:
+        return sorted(self.config.state_root.glob("overlay-*/metadata.json"))
+
+    def _active_for_task(self) -> tuple[Path, dict[str, Any]] | None:
+        now = utc_now()
+        for path in self._metadata_paths():
+            metadata = _read_json(path)
+            _verify_metadata(metadata)
+            if metadata.get("task_id") != self.config.binding.task_id:
+                continue
+            state = metadata.get("status")
+            if state in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                continue
+            if _parse_utc(str(metadata["expires_at"])) <= now:
+                metadata["status"] = "EXPIRED"
+                metadata["expired_at"] = iso_utc(now)
+                metadata["metadata_digest_sha256"] = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+                _atomic_write_json(path, metadata)
+                _safe_unlink(Path(str(metadata["secret_ref"])))
+                continue
+            return path, metadata
+        return None
+
+    def _assert_hash_unique(self, digest: str) -> None:
+        matches = 0
+        for path in self._metadata_paths():
+            metadata = _read_json(path)
+            _verify_metadata(metadata)
+            if metadata.get("token_sha256") == digest:
+                matches += 1
+        for secret_ref in self.config.collision_secret_refs:
+            if not secret_ref.exists():
+                continue
+            if secret_ref.is_symlink() or not secret_ref.is_file():
+                raise IdentityOverlayError(
+                    "OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REF_INVALID", 500
+                )
+            if secret_ref.stat().st_size > 65_536:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError(
+                    "OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REF_INVALID", 500
+                )
+            if _token_hash(secret_ref.read_bytes()) == digest:
+                matches += 1
+        if matches:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_SECRET_IDENTITY_COLLISION", 409)
+
+    def issue(
+        self,
+        *,
+        ttl_seconds: int,
+        authorization_assertion_ref: str,
+        operator_identity: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if self.config.require_root_issue and os.geteuid() != 0:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_ROOT_ISSUER_REQUIRED", 403)
+        if (
+            not isinstance(ttl_seconds, int)
+            or isinstance(ttl_seconds, bool)
+            or not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= self.config.max_ttl_seconds
+        ):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_TTL_REJECTED")
+        if not AUTH_ASSERTION_RE.fullmatch(authorization_assertion_ref):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTH_ASSERTION_REF_INVALID")
+        if not OWNER_IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(operator_identity):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_OPERATOR_IDENTITY_INVALID")
+
+        with self._lock():
+            active = self._active_for_task()
+            if active:
+                _, metadata = active
+                expected = self.config.binding.as_dict()
+                actual = {
+                    key: metadata.get(key)
+                    for key in expected
+                }
+                if actual != expected:
+                    raise IdentityOverlayError(
+                        "OVERLAY_ACTIVE_BINDING_CONFLICT", 409
+                    )
+                return {
+                    "status": "OVERLAY_ACTIVE",
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                    "overlay_id": metadata["overlay_id"],
+                    "secret_ref": metadata["secret_ref"],
+                    "expires_at": metadata["expires_at"],
+                    "binding": expected,
+                }
+
+            token_text = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
+            token_bytes = token_text.encode("ascii")
+            digest = _token_hash(token_bytes)
+            self._assert_hash_unique(digest)
+            overlay_id = "overlay-" + hashlib.sha256(
+                (
+                    f"{self.config.binding.task_id}\0"
+                    f"{self.config.binding.base_oid}\0"
+                    f"{self.config.binding.target_branch}\0"
+                    f"{digest}"
+                ).encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest()[:32]
+            issued_at = utc_now()
+            expires_at = issued_at + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
+            overlay_dir = self.config.state_root / overlay_id
+            secret_dir = self.config.secret_root / overlay_id
+            _prepare_directory(overlay_dir)
+            _prepare_directory(secret_dir)
+            secret_ref = secret_dir / "bearer.token"
+            _atomic_write(secret_ref, token_bytes + b"\n", 0o600)
+
+            metadata: dict[str, Any] = {
+                "schema": OVERLAY_SCHEMA,
+                "overlay_id": overlay_id,
+                "status": "ACTIVE",
+                **self.config.binding.as_dict(),
+                "owner_identity": self.config.owner_identity,
+                "role": "owner",
+                "scope": OVERLAY_SCOPE,
+                "wildcard_scope": False,
+                "one_time_use": True,
+                "token_sha256": digest,
+                "secret_ref": str(secret_ref),
+                "authorization_assertion_ref": authorization_assertion_ref,
+                "operator_identity": operator_identity,
+                "issued_at": iso_utc(issued_at),
+                "expires_at": iso_utc(expires_at),
+                "attempt_count": 0,
+            }
+            metadata["metadata_digest_sha256"] = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+            metadata_path = overlay_dir / "metadata.json"
+            _atomic_write_json(metadata_path, metadata)
+            _atomic_write_json(
+                overlay_dir / "audit-issued.json",
+                {
+                    "event": "TASK_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_ISSUED",
+                    "overlay_id": overlay_id,
+                    "task_id": self.config.binding.task_id,
+                    "binding_digest_sha256": sha256_json(
+                        self.config.binding.as_dict()
+                    ),
+                    "authorization_assertion_ref": authorization_assertion_ref,
+                    "operator_identity": operator_identity,
+                    "issued_at": metadata["issued_at"],
+                    "expires_at": metadata["expires_at"],
+                    "token_sha256": digest,
+                },
+            )
+            return {
+                "status": "OVERLAY_ACTIVE",
+                "idempotent": False,
+                "overlay_id": overlay_id,
+                "secret_ref": str(secret_ref),
+                "expires_at": metadata["expires_at"],
+                "binding": self.config.binding.as_dict(),
+            }
+
+    def authenticate_and_lock(
+        self, token: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> OverlaySession:
+        if not token or len(token) > 4096:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+        digest = _token_hash(token.encode("utf-8"))
+
+        with self._lock():
+            matches: list[tuple[Path, dict[str, Any]]] = []
+            for path in self._metadata_paths():
+                metadata = _read_json(path)
+                _verify_metadata(metadata)
+                if metadata.get("token_sha256") == digest:
+                    matches.append((path, metadata))
+            if not matches:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_CREDENTIAL_INVALID", 401)
+            if len(matches) != 1:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_SECRET_IDENTITY_COLLISION", 409)
+            path, metadata = matches[0]
+            if metadata.get("status") in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_CREDENTIAL_INACTIVE", 401)
+            if _parse_utc(str(metadata["expires_at"])) <= utc_now():
+                metadata["status"] = "EXPIRED"
+                metadata["expired_at"] = iso_utc(utc_now())
+                metadata["metadata_digest_sha256"] = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+                _atomic_write_json(path, metadata)
+                _safe_unlink(Path(str(metadata["secret_ref"])))
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED", 401)
+
+            expected = self.config.binding.as_dict()
+            for key, value in expected.items():
+                if metadata.get(key) != value:
+                    raise IdentityOverlayError(
+                        "OVERLAY_METADATA_BINDING_MISMATCH", 409
+                    )
+            if metadata.get("owner_identity") != self.config.owner_identity:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_OWNER_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409)
+            if metadata.get("scope") != OVERLAY_SCOPE:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_SCOPE_MISMATCH", 409)
+            if metadata.get("wildcard_scope") is not False:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_WILDCARD_SCOPE_REJECTED", 409)
+
+            # Validate detailed request policy only after the bearer identity is
+            # proven, so unauthenticated callers cannot probe task bindings.
+            validated = _validate_request_binding(
+                request, self.config.binding, self.config.max_ttl_seconds
+            )
+            request_digest = sha256_json(validated)
+            previous = str(metadata.get("request_digest_sha256") or "")
+            if metadata.get("status") == "LOCKED" and previous != request_digest:
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_REPLAY_REQUEST_MISMATCH", 409)
+            metadata["status"] = "LOCKED"
+            metadata["request_digest_sha256"] = request_digest
+            metadata["locked_at"] = metadata.get("locked_at") or iso_utc(utc_now())
+            metadata["attempt_count"] = int(metadata.get("attempt_count") or 0) + 1
+            metadata["metadata_digest_sha256"] = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+            _atomic_write_json(path, metadata)
+            return OverlaySession(
+                overlay_id=str(metadata["overlay_id"]),
+                metadata_path=path,
+                secret_ref=Path(str(metadata["secret_ref"])),
+                owner_identity=str(metadata["owner_identity"]),
+                request_digest_sha256=request_digest,
+                binding=self.config.binding,
+            )
+
+    def complete(
+        self, session: OverlaySession, result: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock():
+            metadata = _read_json(session.metadata_path)
+            _verify_metadata(metadata)
+            if metadata.get("status") == "CONSUMED":
+                return metadata
+            if metadata.get("status") != "LOCKED":
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_NOT_LOCKED", 409)
+            if (
+                metadata.get("request_digest_sha256")
+                != session.request_digest_sha256
+            ):
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_REQUEST_DIGEST_MISMATCH", 409)
+            metadata["status"] = "CONSUMED"
+            metadata["consumed_at"] = iso_utc(utc_now())
+            metadata["result_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(dict(result))
+            metadata["metadata_digest_sha256"] = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+            _atomic_write_json(session.metadata_path, metadata)
+            _safe_unlink(session.secret_ref)
+            _atomic_write_json(
+                session.metadata_path.parent / "audit-consumed.json",
+                {
+                    "event": "TASK_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_CONSUMED",
+                    "overlay_id": session.overlay_id,
+                    "task_id": session.binding.task_id,
+                    "request_digest_sha256": session.request_digest_sha256,
+                    "result_digest_sha256": metadata["result_digest_sha256"],
+                    "consumed_at": metadata["consumed_at"],
+                    "secret_removed": True,
+                },
+            )
+            return metadata
+
+    def fail(
+        self,
+        session: OverlaySession,
+        *,
+        error_code: str,
+        error_status: int,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock():
+            metadata = _read_json(session.metadata_path)
+            _verify_metadata(metadata)
+            if metadata.get("status") in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                return metadata
+            metadata["status"] = "FAILED"
+            metadata["failed_at"] = iso_utc(utc_now())
+            metadata["error_code"] = error_code
+            metadata["error_status"] = int(error_status)
+            metadata["metadata_digest_sha256"] = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+            _atomic_write_json(session.metadata_path, metadata)
+            _safe_unlink(session.secret_ref)
+            _atomic_write_json(
+                session.metadata_path.parent / "audit-failed.json",
+                {
+                    "event": "TASK_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_FAILED",
+                    "overlay_id": session.overlay_id,
+                    "task_id": session.binding.task_id,
+                    "request_digest_sha256": session.request_digest_sha256,
+                    "error_code": error_code,
+                    "error_status": int(error_status),
+                    "failed_at": metadata["failed_at"],
+                    "secret_removed": True,
+                },
+            )
+            return metadata
+
+    def revoke(self, overlay_id: str, *, reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if self.config.require_root_issue and os.geteuid() != 0:
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_ROOT_ISSUER_REQUIRED", 403)
+        if not OVERLAY_ID_RE.fullmatch(overlay_id):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_ID_INVALID")
+        if not AUTH_ASSERTION_RE.fullmatch(reason):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_REVOCATION_REASON_INVALID")
+        with self._lock():
+            path = self.config.state_root / overlay_id / "metadata.json"
+            metadata = _read_json(path)
+            _verify_metadata(metadata)
+            if metadata.get("status") not in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                metadata["status"] = "REVOKED"
+                metadata["revoked_at"] = iso_utc(utc_now())
+                metadata["revocation_reason"] = reason
+                metadata["metadata_digest_sha256"] = _metadata_digest(metadata)
+                _atomic_write_json(path, metadata)
+                _safe_unlink(Path(str(metadata["secret_ref"])))
+            return metadata
+
+    def status(self, overlay_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not OVERLAY_ID_RE.fullmatch(overlay_id):
+            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_ID_INVALID")
+        metadata = _read_json(
+            self.config.state_root / overlay_id / "metadata.json"
+        )
+        _verify_metadata(metadata)
+        return {
+            key: value
+            for key, value in metadata.items()
+            if key not in {"token_sha256"}
+        }
+
+
+class TaskIdentityOverlayService:
+    """Authenticate one overlay credential and invoke the existing broker."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: IdentityOverlayConfig,
+        provisioner: TaskWriterProvisioner | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.config = config
+        self.store = TaskIdentityOverlayStore(config)
+        broker_state = config.broker_state_root or (
+            config.state_root / "owner-authorization-events"
+        )
+        self.broker = OwnerAuthorizationBroker(
+            OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig(
+                repository_identity=config.binding.repository,
+                state_root=broker_state,
+                allowed_owner_identities=frozenset({config.owner_identity}),
+                allowed_intake_scopes=frozenset({OVERLAY_SCOPE}),
+                allowed_credential_ids=frozenset(),
+                max_expiry_seconds=config.max_ttl_seconds,
+            ),
+            provisioner=provisioner,
+        )
+
+    def provision(
+        self, request: Mapping[str, Any], bearer_token: str
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        session = self.store.authenticate_and_lock(bearer_token, request)
+        principal = OwnerPrincipal(
+            identity=session.owner_identity,
+            role="owner",
+            authenticated_scope=OVERLAY_SCOPE,
+            token_scopes=frozenset({OVERLAY_SCOPE}),
+            credential_id=session.overlay_id,
+        )
+        try:
+            result = self.broker.authorize_and_provision(request, principal)
+            if result.get("status") != "READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING":
+                raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_PROVISIONER_NOT_READY", 409)
+            self.store.complete(session, result)
+            response = dict(result)
+            response.update(
+                {
+                    "identity_overlay_id": session.overlay_id,
+                    "identity_overlay_consumed": True,
+                    "identity_overlay_secret_removed": True,
+                    "identity_overlay_scope": OVERLAY_SCOPE,
+                }
+            )
+            return response
+        except (OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
+            self.store.fail(
+                session, error_code=exc.code, error_status=exc.status
+            )
+            raise
+        except IdentityOverlayError as exc:
+            self.store.fail(
+                session, error_code=exc.code, error_status=exc.status
+            )
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:
+            self.store.fail(
+                session,
+                error_code="IDENTITY_OVERLAY_INTERNAL_ERROR",
+                error_status=500,
+            )
+            raise IdentityOverlayError(
+                "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_INTERNAL_ERROR", 500
+            ) from exc
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+"""Task Plane runtime package."""
+
+from .models import (
+    EvidenceEnvelope,
+    ProbeEvidence,
+    ProbeOutcome,
+    TaskPlan,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskStatus,
+    TaskStateTransitionError,
+)
+
+__all__ = [
+    "EvidenceEnvelope",
+    "ProbeEvidence",
+    "ProbeOutcome",
+    "TaskPlan",
+    "TaskRecord",
+    "TaskStatus",
+    "TaskStateTransitionError",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+"""Adapters for executing tasks via worker backends."""
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+from .openclaw import OpenClawAdapter
+from .codex import CodexAdapter
+from .hermes import HermesAdapter
+from .a2a import A2AAdapter
+from .systemd_worker import SystemdWorkerAdapter
+
+__all__ = [
+    "WorkerAdapter",
+    "OpenClawAdapter",
+    "CodexAdapter",
+    "HermesAdapter",
+    "A2AAdapter",
+    "SystemdWorkerAdapter",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class A2AAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "a2a"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["task.exchange", "agent.handoff"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Base worker adapter contract."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import abc
+
+
+class WorkerAdapter(abc.ABC):
+    worker_name = "base"
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def claim(self, task):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class CodexAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "codex"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.python", "review.security"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class HermesAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "hermes"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["architecture.review", "policy.review", "threat.model"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class OpenClawAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "openclaw"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.execute", "runtime.shadow"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class SystemdWorkerAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "systemd_worker"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["systemd.exec", "runtime.shell"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+"""Agent registry abstraction."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import NotFoundError
+
+
+class AgentRegistry:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self._agents: dict[str, dict] = {}
+
+    def register(self, agent_id: str, metadata: dict) -> None:
+        self._agents[agent_id] = {"agent_id": agent_id, **metadata}
+
+    def unregister(self, agent_id: str) -> None:
+        if agent_id not in self._agents:
+            raise NotFoundError("agent")
+        del self._agents[agent_id]
+
+    def list(self) -> list[dict]:
+        return list(self._agents.values())
+
+    def get(self, agent_id: str) -> dict:
+        try:
+            return self._agents[agent_id]
+        except KeyError:
+            raise NotFoundError("agent")
@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+"""Task Plane HTTP API implementation (stdlib-only)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import time
+import uuid
+import urllib.parse
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from .delegation import DelegationEngine
+from .errors import (
+    ConflictError,
+    ForbiddenError,
+    NotFoundError,
+    PayloadTooLargeError,
+    TaskPlaneHTTPError,
+    UnauthorizedError,
+    ValidationError,
+)
+from .evidence import EvidenceService
+from .journal import TaskJournal
+from .lease import LeaseManager
+from .models import (
+    EvidenceEnvelope,
+    ResultEnvelope,
+    TaskPlan,
+    TaskRecord,
+    iso8601_now,
+    contains_secret_text,
+    validate_identifier,
+)
+from .policy import PolicyEngine
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry
+
+
+def _json_payload(data: dict[str, Any], status: int = 200) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
+    body = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+    return status, body
+
+
+def _bounded_int(value: Any, name: str, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
+    try:
+        number = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}") from exc
+    if not minimum <= number <= maximum:
+        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return number
+
+
+class TaskPlaneService:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore, policy: PolicyEngine | None = None):
+        self.store = store
+        self.policy = policy or PolicyEngine(
+            execution_enabled=False,
+            identity_capabilities={
+                "anon": {"task.creator", "task.read", "task.audit"}
+            },
+        )
+        self.journal = TaskJournal(store)
+        self.lease = LeaseManager(store)
+        self.workers = WorkerRegistry(store)
+        self.evidence = EvidenceService(store)
+        self.delegation = DelegationEngine(store)
+        self.store.probe_attestation_verifier = self.policy.probe_attestation_verifier
+
+    def create_task(self, body: dict[str, Any], idempotency_key: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if body.get("parent_task_id"):
+            raise ForbiddenError("child tasks must use the delegate endpoint")
+        issuer = body.get("issuer", {})
+        actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("create", actor)
+        try:
+            plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid task plan") from exc
+        task = self.store.create_task_with_event(plan, idempotency_key=idempotency_key)
+        return task.to_dict()
+
+    def list_tasks(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+        return [task.to_dict(include_task=False) for task in self.store.list_tasks()]
+
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        return self.store.get_task(task_id).to_dict()
+
+    def get_worker(self, worker_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+        return self.workers.get(worker_id).to_dict()
+
+    def list_workers(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+        return [w.to_dict() for w in self.workers.list()]
+
+    def register_worker(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = str(body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("identity") or "")
+        is_admin = actor in self.policy.admin_identities
+        try:
+            existing = self.store.get_worker(str(body.get("worker_id") or ""))
+        except NotFoundError:
+            existing = None
+        if existing is not None and str(body.get("identity") or "") != existing.identity:
+            raise ConflictError("worker identity takeover rejected")
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_registration(actor, body)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed(
+            "worker.admin" if is_admin else "worker.register", actor
+        )
+        try:
+            worker = self.workers.register(
+                body,
+                actor_identity=actor,
+                is_admin=is_admin,
+                expected_revision=body.get("expected_revision"),
+            )
+        except (TypeError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid worker registration") from exc
+        return worker.to_dict()
+
+    def worker_heartbeat(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        interval = payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds")
+        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.register", actor)
+        return self.workers.heartbeat(
+            worker_id,
+            heartbeat_interval_seconds=interval,
+            actor_identity=actor,
+            expected_revision=payload.get("expected_revision"),
+        ).to_dict()
+
+    def disable_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
+        return self.store.disable_worker(
+            worker_id,
+            actor_identity=actor,
+            expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
+            reason=str(payload.get("reason") or "disabled by administrator"),
+        ).to_dict()
+
+    def restore_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
+        return self.store.restore_worker(
+            worker_id,
+            actor_identity=actor,
+            expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
+        ).to_dict()
+
+    def claim(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor)
+        worker_id = body.get("worker_id")
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise ValidationError("worker_id required")
+
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, str(worker_id))
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor, task=task)
+        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
+            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
+        )
+        claim = self.lease.claim(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            worker_identity=actor,
+            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+            operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
+        )
+        return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, **claim.to_dict()}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("heartbeat", actor, task=task)
+        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
+            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
+        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
+            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
+        )
+        claim = self.lease.heartbeat(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
+        return {"claim_id": claim_id, "lease_until": claim.lease_until}
+
+    def progress(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        progress = body.get("progress")
+        stage = body.get("stage", "RUNNING")
+        message = body.get("message")
+        if progress is None:
+            raise ValidationError("progress required")
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("progress", actor, task=task)
+        if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
+            if message not in {None, ""} or contains_secret_text(stage):
+                raise ValidationError(
+                    "credential-secret progress must contain metadata only"
+                )
+        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
+            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
+        )
+        claim = self.store.record_progress(
+            task_id,
+            claim_id,
+            actor,
+            progress=progress,
+            stage=str(stage),
+            message=None if message is None else str(message),
+            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
+        )
+        return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status, "progress": progress}
+
+    def complete(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+
+        status = body.get("status", "COMPLETED")
+        outputs = body.get("outputs", [])
+        evidences = body.get("evidence", [])
+        if not isinstance(outputs, list):
+            raise ValidationError("outputs must be list")
+        if not isinstance(evidences, list):
+            raise ValidationError("evidence must be list")
+        if any(not isinstance(ev, dict) for ev in evidences):
+            raise ValidationError("evidence items must be objects")
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("result", actor, task=task)
+        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
+            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
+        if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
+            allowed_result_keys = {
+                "kind",
+                "hash",
+                "sha256",
+                "count",
+                "status",
+                "error_code",
+                "signature",
+                "attestation_ref",
+            }
+            for entry in [*outputs, *evidences]:
+                if (
+                    not isinstance(entry, dict)
+                    or set(entry) - allowed_result_keys
+                    or contains_secret_text(entry)
+                ):
+                    raise ValidationError(
+                        "credential-secret result must contain hash/count/status only"
+                    )
+
+        result = ResultEnvelope(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            claim_id=claim_id,
+            worker_identity=actor,
+            status=status,
+            outputs=outputs,
+            evidence=evidences,
+            started_at=str(body.get("started_at") or iso8601_now()),
+            completed_at=str(body.get("completed_at") or iso8601_now()),
+            result_digest=body.get("result_digest"),
+            signature=body.get("signature"),
+            attestation_ref=body.get("attestation_ref"),
+            operation_digest=claim.operation_digest,
+        )
+        evidence_decision = self.policy.evidence_verifier.verify(task, evidences)
+        if not evidence_decision.allowed:
+            raise ForbiddenError(evidence_decision.reason)
+        result_decision = self.policy.verify_result(result, task)
+        if not result_decision.allowed:
+            raise ForbiddenError(result_decision.reason)
+        result.result_digest = result.computed_digest()
+        previous = self.store._last_evidence_hash(task_id)
+        evidence_entries = []
+        for evidence in evidences:
+            envelope = EvidenceEnvelope.create(
+                task_id=task_id,
+                claim_id=claim_id,
+                kind=str(evidence.get("kind") or evidence.get("type") or "generic"),
+                worker_identity=actor,
+                payload=evidence,
+                previous_evidence_hash=previous,
+                signature=evidence.get("signature"),
+                attestation_ref=evidence.get("attestation_ref"),
+            )
+            evidence_entries.append(envelope)
+            previous = envelope.evidence_digest
+        self.store.complete_claim_with_evidence_and_event(
+            task_id,
+            claim_id,
+            status
+            if status
+            in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "CANCELLED"}
+            else "COMPLETED",
+            result.to_dict(),
+            evidence_entries,
+        )
+        return result.to_dict()
+
+    def fail(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        reason = body.get("reason", "failed")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor)
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor, task=task)
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
+            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
+        status = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" if body.get("recoverable", False) else "FAILED_FINAL"
+        self.store.fail_claim_with_event(task_id, claim_id, status, str(reason))
+        return {"task_id": task_id, "status": status, "reason": reason}
+
+    def cancel(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "owner"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor)
+        reason = body.get("reason", "cancelled")
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor, task=task)
+        updated = self.store.cancel_task_with_event(
+            task_id, task.revision, reason=reason
+        )
+        return updated.to_dict()
+
+    def delegate(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or "owner"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor)
+        parent = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor, task=parent)
+        if "task" in body:
+            try:
+                child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body["task"])
+            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
+        else:
+            plan_body = dict(body)
+            plan_body.pop("actor_identity", None)
+            try:
+                child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(plan_body)
+            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
+        child_plan.parent_task_id = task_id
+        child = self.delegation.delegate(task_id, child_plan, caller=actor)
+        return child.to_dict()
+
+    def get_events(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        return self.store.list_events(task_id)
+
+    def get_evidence(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        return self.evidence.list(task_id)
+
+    def get_children(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        return self.store.list_children(task_id)
+
+
+class TaskPlaneRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    service: TaskPlaneService | None = None
+    authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None
+    max_body_bytes = 1_000_000
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
+        # BaseHTTPRequestHandler logs the raw request target; suppress it so
+        # attacker-controlled paths or query strings cannot leak credentials.
+        return
+
+    def _json(self) -> tuple[str | None, dict[str, Any]]:
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid content length") from exc
+        if length < 0:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid content length")
+        if length > self.max_body_bytes:
+            raise PayloadTooLargeError("payload exceeds limit")
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
+        if not raw:
+            return None, {}
+        try:
+            decoded = raw.decode("utf-8")
+            payload = json.loads(decoded)
+            if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+                raise ValidationError("JSON payload must be an object")
+            return decoded, payload
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid JSON payload") from exc
+
+    def _response(self, status: int, payload: Any) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _authenticated_identity(self) -> str:
+        authenticator = type(self).authenticator
+        if authenticator is None:
+            raise UnauthorizedError("authentication unavailable")
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        if not header.startswith("Bearer "):
+            raise UnauthorizedError("bearer authentication required")
+        token = header[7:]
+        if not token or any(ord(ch) < 33 for ch in token):
+            raise UnauthorizedError("invalid bearer token")
+        identity = authenticator(token)
+        if not identity:
+            raise UnauthorizedError("invalid credentials")
+        return str(identity)
+
+    def _handle(self, handler):
+        try:
+            if self.service is None:
+                raise TaskPlaneHTTPError("service not configured")
+            result = handler()
+            if isinstance(result, tuple):
+                status, payload = result
+            else:
+                status, payload = 200, result
+            self._response(status, payload)
+        except TaskPlaneHTTPError as exc:
+            self._response(exc.status_code, exc.to_payload())
+        except Exception as exc:  # defensive
+            if isinstance(exc, TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+                raise
+            self._response(
+                500,
+                {"error": "internal_error", "message": "internal server error"},
+            )
+
+    def do_GET(self):  # noqa: N802
+        def route():
+            path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
+            parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
+            for part in parts[1:]:
+                if part not in {"events", "evidence", "children", "heartbeat"}:
+                    try:
+                        validate_identifier(part, "resource identifier")
+                    except ValueError as exc:
+                        raise ValidationError("invalid resource identifier") from exc
+            identity = self._authenticated_identity()
+
+            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
+                return 200, self.service.list_tasks(identity)
+            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "tasks":
+                task_id = parts[1]
+                return 200, self.service.get_task(task_id, identity)
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "events":
+                return 200, self.service.get_events(parts[1], identity)
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "evidence":
+                return 200, self.service.get_evidence(parts[1], identity)
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "children":
+                return 200, self.service.get_children(parts[1], identity)
+            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "workers":
+                return 200, self.service.list_workers(identity)
+            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers":
+                return 200, self.service.get_worker(parts[1], identity)
+            raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
+
+        self._handle(route)
+
+    def do_POST(self):  # noqa: N802
+        def route():
+            body_text, body = self._json()
+            identity = self._authenticated_identity()
+            path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
+            parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
+            headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in self.headers.items()}
+
+            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
+                issuer = body.get("issuer")
+                if issuer and (
+                    not isinstance(issuer, dict) or issuer.get("id") != identity
+                ):
+                    raise ForbiddenError("issuer identity mismatch")
+                body["issuer"] = {"type": "authenticated", "id": identity}
+                return 201, self.service.create_task(body or {}, headers.get("idempotency-key"))
+            if body.get("actor_identity") not in {None, identity}:
+                raise ForbiddenError("actor identity mismatch")
+            body["actor_identity"] = identity
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "claim":
+                return 200, self.service.claim(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
+                return 200, self.service.heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "progress":
+                return 200, self.service.progress(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "result":
+                return 200, self.service.complete(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "fail":
+                return 200, self.service.fail(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "cancel":
+                return 200, self.service.cancel(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "delegate":
+                return 200, self.service.delegate(parts[1], body or {})
+
+            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[1] == "register":
+                if (
+                    body.get("identity") != identity
+                    and identity not in self.service.policy.admin_identities
+                ):
+                    raise ForbiddenError("worker identity mismatch")
+                return 201, self.service.register_worker(body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
+                return 200, self.service.worker_heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "disable":
+                return 200, self.service.disable_worker(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "restore":
+                return 200, self.service.restore_worker(parts[1], body or {})
+            raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
+
+        self._handle(route)
+
+
+def run_server(
+    host: str,
+    port: int,
+    service: TaskPlaneService,
+    *,
+    authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None,
+):
+    handler = TaskPlaneRequestHandler
+    handler.service = service
+    handler.authenticator = authenticator
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
+    server.serve_forever()
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Capability matcher helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from fnmatch import fnmatch
+
+
+def _normalize_capability(capability: str) -> str:
+    return capability.strip().lower()
+
+
+def capability_matches(granted: str, required: str) -> bool:
+    granted = _normalize_capability(granted)
+    required = _normalize_capability(required)
+    if granted == required:
+        return True
+    # A granted wildcard such as "test.*" should match required "test.unit"
+    if "*" in granted:
+        return fnmatch(required, granted)
+    # A required wildcard is treated as a suffix/prefix requirement for callers.
+    if "*" in required:
+        return fnmatch(granted, required)
+    return False
+
+
+def has_capabilities(granted_caps: list[str], required_caps: list[str]) -> bool:
+    granted = [_normalize_capability(c) for c in granted_caps]
+    for required in required_caps:
+        required = _normalize_capability(required)
+        if not any(capability_matches(g, required) for g in granted):
+            return False
+    return True
+
+
+def normalize_capabilities(caps: list[str]) -> list[str]:
+    return sorted({_normalize_capability(cap) for cap in caps})
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""Delegation guardrails."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import ConflictError, ForbiddenError, NotFoundError
+from .models import Budget, TaskPlan, TaskRecord
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class DelegationEngine:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def can_delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan) -> bool:
+        parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
+        if parent.status == "COMPLETED":
+            raise ConflictError("cannot delegate completed task")
+        if parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth <= 0:
+            raise ConflictError("max delegation depth not configured")
+
+        depth = self._depth(parent_id)
+        if depth >= parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth:
+            raise ConflictError("max delegation depth reached")
+
+        if child_plan.parent_task_id not in {None, parent_id}:
+            raise ConflictError("delegation parent mismatch")
+        current = parent_id
+        while current:
+            if child_plan.task_id and current == child_plan.task_id:
+                raise ConflictError("delegation cycle")
+            current = self.store.parent_of(current)
+        return True
+
+    def delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan, *, caller: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        self.can_delegate(parent_id, child_plan)
+        parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
+        if child_plan.required_capabilities and not set(child_plan.required_capabilities).issubset(
+            set(parent.task_plan.required_capabilities or [])
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("child capabilities exceed parent constraints")
+        risk_rank = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
+        if risk_rank.get(child_plan.risk, 99) > risk_rank.get(parent.task_plan.risk, -1):
+            raise ForbiddenError("child risk exceeds parent constraints")
+        child_plan.parent_task_id = parent_id
+        child_plan.correlation_id = parent.task_plan.correlation_id or parent.task_id
+        child_plan.preferred_workers = parent.task_plan.preferred_workers
+        child_plan.max_delegation_depth = min(
+            child_plan.max_delegation_depth,
+            parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth,
+        )
+        child_plan.approval_policy = parent.task_plan.approval_policy
+
+        parent_budget = self.store.get_task_budget(parent_id)
+        required = Budget()
+        for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
+            available = getattr(parent_budget, name)
+            requested = getattr(child_plan.budgets, name)
+            if name == "attempts" and requested is None:
+                requested = 1
+            if available is not None:
+                requested = 0 if requested is None else requested
+                if requested > available:
+                    raise ConflictError(f"budget exceeded for {name}")
+                setattr(child_plan.budgets, name, requested)
+            setattr(required, name, requested)
+
+        # A retried identical delegation is a read, not a second budget charge.
+        if child_plan.task_id:
+            try:
+                existing = self.store.get_task(child_plan.task_id)
+            except NotFoundError:
+                existing = None
+            if existing is not None:
+                if (
+                    existing.task_plan.parent_task_id == parent_id
+                    and existing.task_plan.operation_digest()
+                    == child_plan.operation_digest()
+                ):
+                    return existing
+                raise ConflictError("delegation task_id conflict")
+
+        return self.store.delegate_task_with_budget_and_events(
+            parent_id, child_plan, caller=caller
+        )
+
+    def _depth(self, task_id: str) -> int:
+        return self.store._compute_depth(task_id)
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+"""Error types for task plane operations."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+class TaskPlaneError(Exception):
+    """Base exception for API-compatible failures."""
+
+    status_code = 500
+    error_code = "task_plane_error"
+
+    def __init__(self, message: str, *, code: str | None = None, details: dict | None = None):
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.message = message
+        self.details = details or {}
+        if code:
+            self.error_code = code
+
+    def to_payload(self) -> dict:
+        return {"error": self.error_code, "message": self.message, "details": self.details}
+
+
+class TaskPlaneHTTPError(TaskPlaneError):
+    """Base class with explicit HTTP status."""
+
+    status_code = 500
+
+
+class ValidationError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 400
+    error_code = "validation_error"
+
+
+class UnauthorizedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 401
+    error_code = "unauthorized"
+
+
+class ForbiddenError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 403
+    error_code = "forbidden"
+
+
+class NotFoundError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 404
+    error_code = "not_found"
+
+
+class ConflictError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 409
+    error_code = "conflict"
+
+
+class PayloadTooLargeError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 413
+    error_code = "payload_too_large"
+
+
+class FailedDependencyError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 424
+    error_code = "failed_dependency"
+
+
+class LockedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 423
+    error_code = "locked"
+
+
+class ServiceUnavailableError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 503
+    error_code = "service_unavailable"
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+"""CloudEvents-compatible event envelope and durable outbox helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Callable, Protocol
+
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+@dataclass
+class CloudEvent:
+    specversion: str = "1.0"
+    id: str = ""
+    type: str = ""
+    source: str = "spiffe://aios/task-plane"
+    subject: str = ""
+    datacontenttype: str = "application/json"
+    data: dict | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def time(self) -> str:
+        return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+    def asdict(self) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "specversion": self.specversion,
+            "id": self.id,
+            "type": self.type,
+            "source": self.source,
+            "subject": self.subject,
+            "time": self.time,
+            "datacontenttype": self.datacontenttype,
+            "data": self.data or {},
+        }
+
+
+NOT_DELIVERED = "NOT_DELIVERED"
+DELIVERED = "DELIVERED"
+FAILED_DELIVERY = "FAILED"
+
+
+class NotificationAdapter(Protocol):
+    name: str
+
+    def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
+        """Return a provider receipt, or None when delivery is unconfirmed."""
+
+
+class CallbackNotificationAdapter:
+    """Adapter seam for webhook, NATS, GPT, dashboard, and WeChat transports."""
+
+    def __init__(self, name: str, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        self.name = name
+        self._callback = callback
+
+    def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
+        return self._callback(envelope)
+
+
+class WebhookAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("webhook", callback)
+
+
+class NatsJetStreamAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("nats-jetstream", callback)
+
+
+class GPTResultCallbackAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("gpt-result-callback", callback)
+
+
+class DashboardAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("dashboard", callback)
+
+
+class WeChatGatewayAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("wechat-gateway", callback)
+
+
+class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def dispatch(self, message_id: str, adapter: NotificationAdapter) -> dict:
+        row = self.store.get_outbox_message(message_id)
+        import json
+
+        envelope = json.loads(row["payload"])
+        try:
+            receipt = adapter.deliver(envelope)
+        except Exception:
+            return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
+                message_id,
+                receipt=None,
+                error=f"{adapter.name} delivery failed",
+            )
+        return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
+            message_id,
+            receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
+            error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+"""Evidence helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+def evidence_digest(payload: dict) -> str:
+    body = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+    return hashlib.sha256(body.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+class EvidenceService:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def add(self, task_id: str, kind: str, payload: dict, worker_identity: str) -> str:
+        return self.store.add_evidence(task_id, kind, payload, worker_identity)
+
+    def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
+        return self.store.list_evidence(task_id)
+
+    def verify(self, task_id: str, required_kinds: list[str]) -> bool:
+        evidences = self.list(task_id)
+        observed = {e["kind"] for e in evidences}
+        return set(required_kinds).issubset(
+            observed
+        ) and self.store.verify_evidence_integrity(task_id)
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+"""Event journaling helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import ValidationError
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class TaskJournal:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def append(self, task_id: str, event_type: str, data: dict, *, subject: str | None = None) -> None:
+        if not event_type:
+            raise ValidationError("event_type required")
+        self.store.append_event(task_id, event_type, data, subject=subject)
+
+    def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
+        return self.store.list_events(task_id)
+
+    def check_chain(self, task_id: str) -> bool:
+        return self.store.verify_event_chain(task_id)
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Claim and lease management helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import LockedError
+from .models import ProbeEvidence
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class LeaseManager:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def claim(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, worker_identity: str, lease_seconds: int, expected_revision: int, operation_digest: str):
+        return self.store.claim_task(task_id, worker_id, worker_identity, lease_seconds, expected_revision, operation_digest)
+
+    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, lease_seconds: int):
+        claim = self.store.heartbeat_claim(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
+        return claim
+
+    def probe(self, claim_id: str):
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        if claim.status != "ACTIVE":
+            raise LockedError("claim not active")
+        return claim
+
+    def recover(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, probe: ProbeEvidence):
+        return self.store.recover_expired_claim(
+            task_id,
+            claim_id,
+            probe,
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,829 @@
+"""Core data models for the task plane."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import time
+import uuid
+import urllib.parse
+from enum import StrEnum
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any
+
+
+SENSITIVE_KEYS = {
+    "secret",
+    "password",
+    "token",
+    "api_key",
+    "access_token",
+    "refresh_token",
+    "authorization",
+    "private_key",
+    "client_secret",
+    "credential",
+}
+IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}")
+TYPE_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}")
+RISK_LEVELS = {"low", "medium", "high"}
+DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS = {
+    "public",
+    "internal",
+    "confidential",
+    "credential-secret",
+}
+SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(r"(?i)\bAuthorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|secret)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\b"),
+    re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
+    re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+)
+TASK_PLAN_KEYS = {
+    "schema_version",
+    "task_id",
+    "task_type",
+    "issuer",
+    "intent",
+    "required_capabilities",
+    "preferred_workers",
+    "risk",
+    "approval_policy",
+    "dependencies",
+    "max_delegation_depth",
+    "budgets",
+    "evidence_requirements",
+    "parent_task_id",
+    "correlation_id",
+    "metadata",
+    "data_classification",
+    "execution_zone",
+    "network_policy",
+    "logging_policy",
+    "allowed_input_paths",
+    "allowed_output_paths",
+    "output_policy",
+}
+
+
+def _now_ts() -> float:
+    return time.time()
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def compute_sha256_hex(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def contains_secret_text(value: Any) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS)
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value.values())
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value)
+    return False
+
+
+def validate_relative_paths(values: Any, name: str) -> list[str]:
+    paths = _normalize_list(values)
+    for value in paths:
+        decoded = urllib.parse.unquote(value)
+        parts = value.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
+        if (
+            decoded != value
+            or "\\" in value
+            or value.startswith("/")
+            or re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", value)
+            or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+        ):
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return paths
+
+
+def validate_identifier(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "")
+    if (
+        not IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text)
+        or urllib.parse.unquote(text) != text
+        or any(ord(ch) < 32 or ord(ch) == 127 for ch in text)
+    ):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return text
+
+
+def validate_type(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "")
+    if not TYPE_RE.fullmatch(text):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return text
+
+
+def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        redacted = {}
+        for key, inner in value.items():
+            lowered = str(key).lower()
+            if lowered in SENSITIVE_KEYS or lowered.endswith(
+                ("_password", "_secret", "_access_token", "_refresh_token", "_private_key")
+            ):
+                redacted[key] = "[REDACTED]"
+            else:
+                redacted[key] = redact_value(inner)
+        return redacted
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, tuple):
+        return tuple(redact_value(v) for v in value)
+    return value
+
+
+class TaskStateTransitionError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+class TaskStatus(StrEnum):
+    CREATED = "CREATED"
+    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
+    CLAIMED = "CLAIMED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    WAITING_CHILD = "WAITING_CHILD"
+    VERIFYING = "VERIFYING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED_RECOVERABLE = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
+    FAILED_FINAL = "FAILED_FINAL"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+    MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+
+
+TASK_STATES = {
+    status.value for status in TaskStatus
+}
+
+
+TASK_NEXT_STATES = {
+    "CREATED": {"QUEUED", "CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"},
+    "QUEUED": {"CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL"},
+    "CLAIMED": {"RUNNING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "RUNNING": {"VERIFYING", "WAITING_CHILD", "COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "WAITING_CHILD": {"RUNNING", "VERIFYING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "VERIFYING": {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "COMPLETED": set(),
+    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE": {"CLAIMED", "RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
+    "FAILED_FINAL": set(),
+    "CANCELLED": set(),
+    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED": {"RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
+}
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Budget:
+    time_seconds: int | None = None
+    attempts: int | None = None
+    tokens: int | None = None
+    cost: float | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "Budget":
+        if not data:
+            return cls()
+        if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) - {
+            "time_seconds",
+            "attempts",
+            "tokens",
+            "cost",
+        }:
+            raise ValueError("invalid budget")
+        for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
+            value = data.get(name)
+            if value is not None:
+                try:
+                    if float(value) < 0:
+                        raise ValueError("budget values must be non-negative")
+                except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                    raise ValueError("invalid budget value") from exc
+        return cls(
+            time_seconds=_to_positive_int(data.get("time_seconds")),
+            attempts=_to_positive_int(data.get("attempts")),
+            tokens=_to_positive_int(data.get("tokens")),
+            cost=_to_float(data.get("cost")),
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "time_seconds": self.time_seconds,
+            "attempts": self.attempts,
+            "tokens": self.tokens,
+            "cost": self.cost,
+        }
+
+    def merge(self, other: "Budget") -> "Budget":
+        return Budget(
+            time_seconds=_first_non_none(self.time_seconds, other.time_seconds),
+            attempts=_first_non_none(self.attempts, other.attempts),
+            tokens=_first_non_none(self.tokens, other.tokens),
+            cost=_first_non_none(self.cost, other.cost),
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TaskPlan:
+    schema_version: int = 1
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    task_type: str = "code.change"
+    issuer: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    intent: str | None = None
+    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    preferred_workers: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    risk: str = "medium"
+    approval_policy: str = "patch-only"
+    dependencies: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    max_delegation_depth: int = 5
+    budgets: Budget = field(default_factory=Budget)
+    evidence_requirements: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    parent_task_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    data_classification: str = "internal"
+    execution_zone: str = "isolated-development"
+    network_policy: str = "controlled"
+    logging_policy: str = "redacted"
+    allowed_input_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    allowed_output_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    output_policy: str = "standard"
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "TaskPlan":
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            raise ValueError("task plan payload must be an object")
+        unknown = set(data) - TASK_PLAN_KEYS
+        if unknown:
+            raise ValueError("unknown task plan fields")
+        if "task_id" not in data or data["task_id"] is None:
+            data = dict(data)
+            data["task_id"] = f"task-{uuid.uuid4()}"
+        risk = str(data.get("risk", "medium"))
+        if risk not in RISK_LEVELS:
+            raise ValueError("invalid risk")
+        issuer = data.get("issuer", {})
+        if not isinstance(issuer, dict):
+            raise ValueError("issuer must be an object")
+        schema_version = int(data.get("schema_version", 1))
+        if schema_version != 1:
+            raise ValueError("unsupported schema_version")
+        max_depth = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_delegation_depth"), default=5)
+        if max_depth is None or max_depth > 32:
+            raise ValueError("invalid max_delegation_depth")
+        classification = str(data.get("data_classification", "internal"))
+        if classification not in DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS:
+            raise ValueError("invalid data_classification")
+        execution_zone = validate_type(
+            data.get("execution_zone", "isolated-development"), "execution_zone"
+        )
+        network_policy = validate_type(
+            data.get("network_policy", "controlled"), "network_policy"
+        )
+        logging_policy = validate_type(
+            data.get("logging_policy", "redacted"), "logging_policy"
+        )
+        output_policy = validate_type(
+            data.get("output_policy", "standard"), "output_policy"
+        )
+        if contains_secret_text(
+            {
+                "intent": data.get("intent"),
+                "metadata": data.get("metadata", {}),
+            }
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("task content contains secret material")
+        if classification == "credential-secret":
+            if execution_zone != "secure-file-transformer":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires secure-file-transformer")
+            if network_policy != "denied":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires network denied")
+            if logging_policy != "metadata-only":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires metadata-only logging")
+            if output_policy != "hash-count-status-only":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires restricted output")
+        return cls(
+            schema_version=schema_version,
+            task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
+            task_type=validate_type(data.get("task_type", "code.change"), "task_type"),
+            issuer=issuer,
+            intent=data.get("intent"),
+            required_capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("required_capabilities", [])),
+            preferred_workers=_normalize_list(data.get("preferred_workers", [])),
+            risk=risk,
+            approval_policy=validate_type(
+                data.get("approval_policy", "patch-only"), "approval_policy"
+            ),
+            dependencies=_normalize_list(data.get("dependencies", [])),
+            max_delegation_depth=max_depth,
+            budgets=Budget.from_dict(data.get("budgets")),
+            evidence_requirements=_normalize_list(data.get("evidence_requirements", [])),
+            parent_task_id=data.get("parent_task_id"),
+            correlation_id=data.get("correlation_id"),
+            metadata=data.get("metadata", {}) if isinstance(data.get("metadata", {}), dict) else {},
+            data_classification=classification,
+            execution_zone=execution_zone,
+            network_policy=network_policy,
+            logging_policy=logging_policy,
+            allowed_input_paths=validate_relative_paths(
+                data.get("allowed_input_paths", []), "allowed_input_paths"
+            ),
+            allowed_output_paths=validate_relative_paths(
+                data.get("allowed_output_paths", []), "allowed_output_paths"
+            ),
+            output_policy=output_policy,
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self, *, redact: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "task_type": self.task_type,
+            "issuer": self.issuer,
+            "intent": self.intent,
+            "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),
+            "preferred_workers": list(self.preferred_workers),
+            "risk": self.risk,
+            "approval_policy": self.approval_policy,
+            "dependencies": list(self.dependencies),
+            "max_delegation_depth": self.max_delegation_depth,
+            "budgets": self.budgets.to_dict(),
+            "evidence_requirements": list(self.evidence_requirements),
+            "parent_task_id": self.parent_task_id,
+            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "metadata": dict(self.metadata),
+            "data_classification": self.data_classification,
+            "execution_zone": self.execution_zone,
+            "network_policy": self.network_policy,
+            "logging_policy": self.logging_policy,
+            "allowed_input_paths": list(self.allowed_input_paths),
+            "allowed_output_paths": list(self.allowed_output_paths),
+            "output_policy": self.output_policy,
+        }
+        if redact:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+    def operation_digest(self) -> str:
+        return compute_sha256_hex(self.to_dict())
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TaskRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    status: str
+    revision: int
+    task_plan: TaskPlan
+    created_at: float
+    updated_at: float
+    root_task_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str | None = None
+    failure_reason: str | None = None
+
+    def with_status(self, status: str) -> "TaskRecord":
+        allowed = TASK_NEXT_STATES.get(self.status, set())
+        if status != self.status and (not allowed and self.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}):
+            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
+        if status not in TASK_STATES:
+            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Invalid status {status}")
+        if status != self.status and self.status in TASK_NEXT_STATES and status not in TASK_NEXT_STATES[self.status]:
+            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
+        return TaskRecord(
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            status=status,
+            revision=self.revision + 1,
+            task_plan=self.task_plan,
+            created_at=self.created_at,
+            updated_at=_now_ts(),
+            root_task_id=self.root_task_id,
+            idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
+            failure_reason=self.failure_reason,
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self, *, include_task=True, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "revision": self.revision,
+            "root_task_id": self.root_task_id,
+            "parent_task_id": self.task_plan.parent_task_id,
+            "created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at),
+            "updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at),
+            "failure_reason": self.failure_reason,
+        }
+        if include_task:
+            payload["plan"] = self.task_plan.to_dict(redact=redact_payload)
+        if self.idempotency_key:
+            payload["idempotency_key"] = self.idempotency_key
+        return payload
+
+
+@dataclass
+class WorkerRegistration:
+    worker_id: str
+    worker_type: str
+    identity: str
+    capabilities: list[str]
+    trust_zone: str
+    max_concurrency: int
+    heartbeat_interval_seconds: int
+    supported_protocols: list[str]
+    registered_at: float
+    last_heartbeat: float
+    status: str = "active"
+    disabled: bool = False
+    owner_identity: str = ""
+    registration_revision: int = 1
+    registration_policy: str = "self"
+    created_at: float = 0.0
+    updated_at: float = 0.0
+    disabled_reason: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any]) -> "WorkerRegistration":
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            raise ValueError("worker registration payload must be an object")
+        now = _now_ts()
+        worker_id = validate_identifier(data.get("worker_id"), "worker_id")
+        worker_type = validate_type(data.get("worker_type"), "worker_type")
+        identity = str(data.get("identity") or "").strip()
+        if not identity or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in identity):
+            raise ValueError("invalid identity")
+        max_concurrency = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_concurrency"), default=1)
+        heartbeat_interval = _to_positive_int(
+            data.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds"), default=15
+        )
+        if not max_concurrency:
+            raise ValueError("max_concurrency must be positive")
+        if not heartbeat_interval:
+            raise ValueError("heartbeat_interval_seconds must be positive")
+        return cls(
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            worker_type=worker_type,
+            identity=identity,
+            capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("capabilities", [])),
+            trust_zone=str(data.get("trust_zone") or "default"),
+            max_concurrency=max_concurrency,
+            heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval,
+            supported_protocols=_normalize_list(
+                data.get("supported_protocols", ["aios-task-v1"])
+            ),
+            registered_at=float(data.get("registered_at") or now),
+            last_heartbeat=float(data.get("last_heartbeat") or now),
+            status=str(data.get("status") or "active"),
+            disabled=bool(data.get("disabled", False)),
+            owner_identity=str(data.get("owner_identity") or identity),
+            registration_revision=int(data.get("registration_revision") or 1),
+            registration_policy=str(data.get("registration_policy") or "self"),
+            created_at=float(data.get("created_at") or data.get("registered_at") or now),
+            updated_at=float(data.get("updated_at") or now),
+            disabled_reason=data.get("disabled_reason"),
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "worker_type": self.worker_type,
+            "identity": self.identity,
+            "capabilities": list(self.capabilities),
+            "trust_zone": self.trust_zone,
+            "max_concurrency": self.max_concurrency,
+            "heartbeat_interval_seconds": self.heartbeat_interval_seconds,
+            "supported_protocols": list(self.supported_protocols),
+            "registered_at": _fmt_ts(self.registered_at),
+            "last_heartbeat": _fmt_ts(self.last_heartbeat),
+            "status": self.status,
+            "disabled": self.disabled,
+            "owner_identity": self.owner_identity,
+            "registration_revision": self.registration_revision,
+            "registration_policy": self.registration_policy,
+            "created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at or self.registered_at),
+            "updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at or self.last_heartbeat),
+            "disabled_reason": self.disabled_reason,
+        }
+        if redact_payload:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EvidenceEnvelope:
+    schema_version: int
+    evidence_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    claim_id: str
+    kind: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    payload: dict[str, Any]
+    created_at: float
+    previous_evidence_hash: str
+    evidence_digest: str
+    signature: str | None = None
+    attestation_ref: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        claim_id: str,
+        kind: str,
+        worker_identity: str,
+        payload: dict[str, Any],
+        previous_evidence_hash: str,
+        signature: str | None = None,
+        attestation_ref: str | None = None,
+        evidence_id: str | None = None,
+        created_at: float | None = None,
+    ) -> "EvidenceEnvelope":
+        envelope = cls(
+            schema_version=1,
+            evidence_id=evidence_id or f"evd-{uuid.uuid4()}",
+            task_id=validate_identifier(task_id, "task_id"),
+            claim_id=validate_identifier(claim_id, "claim_id"),
+            kind=validate_type(kind, "evidence kind"),
+            worker_identity=str(worker_identity),
+            payload=redact_value(payload),
+            created_at=float(created_at or _now_ts()),
+            previous_evidence_hash=str(previous_evidence_hash or ""),
+            evidence_digest="",
+            signature=signature,
+            attestation_ref=attestation_ref,
+        )
+        return dataclass_replace(
+            envelope, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(envelope.digest_payload())
+        )
+
+    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "evidence_id": self.evidence_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "payload": self.payload,
+            "created_at": self.created_at,
+            "previous_evidence_hash": self.previous_evidence_hash,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+        }
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        *,
+        expected_task_id: str,
+        expected_claim_id: str,
+        expected_previous_hash: str,
+        attestation_verifier: Any = None,
+    ) -> bool:
+        if (
+            self.schema_version != 1
+            or self.task_id != expected_task_id
+            or self.claim_id != expected_claim_id
+            or self.previous_evidence_hash != expected_previous_hash
+            or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
+        ):
+            return False
+        if self.signature or self.attestation_ref:
+            return True if attestation_verifier is None else bool(attestation_verifier(self))
+        return True
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            **self.digest_payload(),
+            "evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
+            "signature": self.signature,
+        }
+
+
+class ProbeOutcome(StrEnum):
+    NOT_APPLIED = "NOT_APPLIED"
+    APPLIED_VERIFIED = "APPLIED_VERIFIED"
+    INDETERMINATE = "INDETERMINATE"
+    CONFLICT = "CONFLICT"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProbeEvidence:
+    schema_version: int
+    probe_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    claim_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    operation_digest: str
+    outcome: ProbeOutcome
+    observed_at: float
+    expires_at: float
+    probe_executor_identity: str
+    evidence_digest: str
+    signature: str | None = None
+    attestation_ref: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(cls, **data: Any) -> "ProbeEvidence":
+        outcome = data["outcome"]
+        if not isinstance(outcome, ProbeOutcome):
+            outcome = ProbeOutcome(str(outcome))
+        probe = cls(
+            schema_version=1,
+            probe_id=data.get("probe_id") or f"probe-{uuid.uuid4()}",
+            task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
+            claim_id=validate_identifier(data["claim_id"], "claim_id"),
+            worker_id=validate_identifier(data["worker_id"], "worker_id"),
+            worker_identity=str(data["worker_identity"]),
+            operation_digest=str(data["operation_digest"]),
+            outcome=outcome,
+            observed_at=float(data["observed_at"]),
+            expires_at=float(data["expires_at"]),
+            probe_executor_identity=str(data["probe_executor_identity"]),
+            evidence_digest="",
+            signature=data.get("signature"),
+            attestation_ref=data.get("attestation_ref"),
+        )
+        return dataclass_replace(
+            probe, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(probe.digest_payload())
+        )
+
+    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "probe_id": self.probe_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "outcome": self.outcome.value,
+            "observed_at": self.observed_at,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            "probe_executor_identity": self.probe_executor_identity,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+        }
+
+    def verify(self, *, now: float, attestation_verifier: Any) -> bool:
+        if (
+            self.schema_version != 1
+            or self.expires_at <= now
+            or self.observed_at > now
+            or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
+            or not (self.signature or self.attestation_ref)
+        ):
+            return False
+        return bool(attestation_verifier and attestation_verifier(self))
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            **self.digest_payload(),
+            "evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
+            "signature": self.signature,
+        }
+
+
+def dataclass_replace(value: Any, **changes: Any) -> Any:
+    from dataclasses import replace
+
+    return replace(value, **changes)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class WorkerClaim:
+    claim_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    claimed_at: float
+    lease_until: float
+    attempt: int
+    task_revision: int
+    operation_digest: str
+    status: str = "ACTIVE"
+
+    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "claimed_at": _fmt_ts(self.claimed_at),
+            "lease_until": _fmt_ts(self.lease_until),
+            "attempt": self.attempt,
+            "task_revision": self.task_revision,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "status": self.status,
+        }
+        if redact_payload:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ResultEnvelope:
+    task_id: str
+    claim_id: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    status: str
+    outputs: list[dict[str, Any]]
+    evidence: list[dict[str, Any]]
+    started_at: str
+    completed_at: str
+    result_digest: str | None = None
+    signature: str | None = None
+    attestation_ref: str | None = None
+    operation_digest: str | None = None
+    trust_status: str = "untrusted_shadow_result"
+
+    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "outputs": self.outputs,
+            "evidence": self.evidence,
+            "started_at": self.started_at,
+            "completed_at": self.completed_at,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+        }
+
+    def computed_digest(self) -> str:
+        return compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
+
+    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "outputs": self.outputs,
+            "evidence": self.evidence,
+            "started_at": self.started_at,
+            "completed_at": self.completed_at,
+            "result_digest": self.result_digest,
+            "signature": self.signature,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "trust_status": self.trust_status,
+        }
+        if redact_payload:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+
+def _normalize_list(value: Any) -> list[str]:
+    if not isinstance(value, list):
+        raise ValueError("expected list")
+    if len(value) > 128 or any(
+        not isinstance(v, str)
+        or not v
+        or len(v) > 256
+        or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in v)
+        for v in value
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("invalid list item")
+    return list(value)
+
+
+def _to_positive_int(value: Any, default: int | None = None) -> int | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    try:
+        number = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return default
+    return number if number >= 0 else default
+
+
+def _to_float(value: Any) -> float | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _first_non_none(primary: Any, fallback: Any) -> Any:
+    if primary is not None:
+        return primary
+    return fallback
+
+
+def iso8601_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _fmt_ts(value: float | None) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    return datetime.fromtimestamp(value, tz=timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+"""Policy and verification logic (fail-closed)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Callable
+
+from .errors import ForbiddenError, LockedError
+from .models import ProbeEvidence, ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
+
+
+RISK_RANK = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
+READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS = frozenset(
+    {"claim", "result", "fail", "progress", "heartbeat"}
+)
+ALL_ACTION_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
+    {
+        "task.creator",
+        "worker.self_register",
+        "worker.admin",
+        "task.claim",
+        "task.cancel",
+        "task.delegate",
+        "task.read",
+        "task.audit",
+    }
+)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PolicyDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    reason: str = ""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ReadonlyWorkerProfile:
+    """A narrowly-scoped identity allowed to process safe Shadow tasks only."""
+
+    worker_id: str
+    identity: str
+    capabilities: frozenset[str]
+    task_types: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"code.review", "test.execute"})
+
+    def permits_task(self, task: TaskRecord) -> bool:
+        plan = task.task_plan
+        if plan.task_type not in self.task_types or plan.risk != "low":
+            return False
+        if plan.data_classification not in {"public", "internal"}:
+            return False
+        if plan.metadata.get("production_side_effects") is not False:
+            return False
+        return set(plan.required_capabilities).issubset(self.capabilities)
+
+
+class IdentityVerifier:
+    def __init__(self, trusted_identities: set[str] | None = None):
+        self.trusted_identities = trusted_identities
+
+    def verify(self, identity: str) -> bool:
+        if self.trusted_identities is None:
+            return True
+        return identity in self.trusted_identities
+
+
+class EvidenceVerifier:
+    def __init__(self, mandatory: list[str] | None = None):
+        self.mandatory = set(mandatory or [])
+
+    def verify(self, task: TaskRecord, evidences: list[dict]) -> PolicyDecision:
+        required = set(task.task_plan.evidence_requirements or [])
+        if not required and not self.mandatory:
+            return PolicyDecision(True)
+        observed = {e.get("kind") for e in evidences}
+        missing = required.union(self.mandatory) - observed
+        if missing:
+            return PolicyDecision(False, f"missing evidence: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}")
+        return PolicyDecision(True)
+
+
+class PolicyEngine:
+    """
+    Fail-closed policy engine with minimal but explicit decisions.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        identity_verifier: IdentityVerifier | None = None,
+        evidence_verifier: EvidenceVerifier | None = None,
+        execution_enabled: bool = False,
+        max_risk: str = "medium",
+        result_signature_verifier: Callable[[ResultEnvelope], bool] | None = None,
+        probe_attestation_verifier: Callable[[ProbeEvidence], bool] | None = None,
+        identity_capabilities: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None,
+        admin_identities: set[str] | None = None,
+        readonly_worker_execution_enabled: bool = False,
+        readonly_worker_profiles: list[ReadonlyWorkerProfile] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if max_risk not in RISK_RANK:
+            raise ValueError("invalid max_risk")
+        self.identity_verifier = identity_verifier or IdentityVerifier()
+        self.evidence_verifier = evidence_verifier or EvidenceVerifier()
+        self.execution_enabled = execution_enabled
+        self.max_risk = max_risk
+        self.result_signature_verifier = result_signature_verifier
+        self.probe_attestation_verifier = probe_attestation_verifier
+        self.identity_capabilities = {
+            identity: set(capabilities)
+            for identity, capabilities in (identity_capabilities or {}).items()
+        }
+        self.admin_identities = set(admin_identities or ())
+        self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled = readonly_worker_execution_enabled
+        self.readonly_worker_profiles = {
+            profile.identity: profile for profile in (readonly_worker_profiles or [])
+        }
+
+    def _readonly_worker_allows(
+        self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None
+    ) -> bool:
+        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
+        return bool(
+            self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled
+            and action in READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS
+            and profile is not None
+            and (task is None or profile.permits_task(task))
+        )
+
+    def assert_readonly_worker_binding(self, actor: str, worker_id: str) -> None:
+        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
+        if profile is not None and profile.worker_id != worker_id:
+            raise ForbiddenError("worker identity binding mismatch")
+
+    def assert_readonly_worker_registration(self, actor: str, payload: dict) -> None:
+        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
+        if profile is None:
+            return
+        if (
+            str(payload.get("worker_id") or "") != profile.worker_id
+            or str(payload.get("identity") or "") != profile.identity
+            or set(payload.get("capabilities") or []) != set(profile.capabilities)
+            or str(payload.get("trust_zone") or "") != "isolated-review"
+            or int(payload.get("max_concurrency") or 0) != 1
+            or int(payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds") or 0) != 15
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("readonly worker registration mismatch")
+
+    def verify_result(
+        self, result: ResultEnvelope, task: TaskRecord | None = None
+    ) -> PolicyDecision:
+        computed = result.computed_digest()
+        if result.result_digest and result.result_digest != computed:
+            return PolicyDecision(False, "result digest mismatch")
+        sensitive = bool(
+            task
+            and (
+                task.task_plan.data_classification
+                in {"confidential", "credential-secret"}
+                or any(
+                    capability.startswith(
+                        ("code.write", "deploy", "secret", "production")
+                    )
+                    for capability in task.task_plan.required_capabilities
+                )
+            )
+        )
+        if sensitive and not (result.signature or result.attestation_ref):
+            return PolicyDecision(False, "trusted result proof required")
+        if result.signature is not None or result.attestation_ref is not None:
+            if self.result_signature_verifier is None:
+                return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature verifier unavailable")
+            if not self.result_signature_verifier(result):
+                return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature invalid")
+            result.trust_status = "trusted_result"
+        else:
+            result.trust_status = "untrusted_shadow_result"
+        return PolicyDecision(True)
+
+    def authorize(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None) -> PolicyDecision:
+        context = context or {}
+        if not self.identity_verifier.verify(actor):
+            return PolicyDecision(False, "identity untrusted")
+
+        action_capabilities = {
+            "create": "task.creator",
+            "read": "task.read",
+            "audit": "task.audit",
+            "claim": "task.claim",
+            "result": "task.claim",
+            "fail": "task.claim",
+            "progress": "task.claim",
+            "heartbeat": "task.claim",
+            "cancel": "task.cancel",
+            "delegate": "task.delegate",
+            "worker.register": "worker.self_register",
+            "worker.admin": "worker.admin",
+        }
+        required_capability = action_capabilities.get(action)
+        if required_capability:
+            granted = set(
+                self.identity_capabilities.get(
+                    actor, self.identity_capabilities.get("*", set())
+                )
+            )
+            if required_capability not in granted:
+                return PolicyDecision(False, f"action {action} not permitted")
+
+        if action in {"claim", "result", "fail", "cancel", "progress", "delegate", "heartbeat"} and not self.execution_enabled:
+            if not self._readonly_worker_allows(action, actor, task):
+                return PolicyDecision(False, "execution disabled")
+
+        if action == "delegate" and task and task.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}:
+            risk = str(context.get("risk", task.task_plan.risk))
+            if RISK_RANK.get(risk, 2) > RISK_RANK.get(self.max_risk, 1):
+                return PolicyDecision(False, f"risk {risk} exceeds policy")
+
+        return PolicyDecision(True)
+
+    def assert_allowed(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None):
+        decision = self.authorize(action, actor, task, context=context)
+        if not decision.allowed:
+            if decision.reason == "identity untrusted":
+                raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)
+            if decision.reason == "execution disabled":
+                raise LockedError("execution disabled")
+            raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+"""Task scheduler primitives."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from .errors import NotFoundError
+from .capabilities import has_capabilities
+from .models import WorkerClaim
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class TaskScheduler:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def next_queued_task(self, worker_id: str):
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        tasks = sorted(
+            self.store.list_tasks(),
+            key=lambda task: (
+                -int(task.task_plan.metadata.get("priority", 0)),
+                task.created_at,
+                task.task_id,
+            ),
+        )
+        for task in tasks:
+            if task.status not in {"CREATED", "QUEUED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"}:
+                continue
+            if task.task_plan.task_type == "worker.registry.audit":
+                continue
+            if task.status == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" and not self.store.task_has_retryable_probe(
+                task.task_id
+            ):
+                continue
+            if not has_capabilities(
+                worker.capabilities, task.task_plan.required_capabilities
+            ):
+                continue
+            if any(
+                self.store.get_task(dependency).status != "COMPLETED"
+                for dependency in task.task_plan.dependencies
+            ):
+                continue
+            if (
+                task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret"
+                and worker.worker_type != "secure_file_transformer"
+                and "secure_file_transformer" not in worker.capabilities
+            ):
+                continue
+            return task
+        return None
+
+    def schedule_for_worker(self, worker_id: str, lease_seconds: int = 15) -> WorkerClaim:
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        if worker.disabled:
+            from .errors import LockedError
+
+            raise LockedError("worker disabled")
+        if time.time() > worker.last_heartbeat + (
+            worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3
+        ):
+            from .errors import LockedError
+
+            raise LockedError("worker offline")
+        task = self.next_queued_task(worker_id)
+        if task is None:
+            raise NotFoundError("no queued tasks available")
+        claim = self.store.claim_task(
+            task.task_id,
+            worker_id,
+            worker.identity,
+            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+            operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
+        )
+        return claim
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+"""Worker registry abstraction and read helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+
+from .capabilities import has_capabilities
+from .errors import NotFoundError
+from .models import WorkerRegistration
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class WorkerRegistry:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def register(
+        self,
+        payload: dict,
+        *,
+        actor_identity: str,
+        is_admin: bool,
+        expected_revision: int | None,
+    ) -> WorkerRegistration:
+        reg = WorkerRegistration.from_dict(payload)
+        return self.store.register_worker(
+            reg,
+            actor_identity=actor_identity,
+            is_admin=is_admin,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def heartbeat(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        heartbeat_interval_seconds: int | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor_identity: str,
+        expected_revision: int | None,
+    ) -> WorkerRegistration:
+        return self.store.heartbeat_worker(
+            worker_id,
+            heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval_seconds,
+            actor_identity=actor_identity,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def list(self):
+        return self.store.list_workers()
+
+    def get(self, worker_id: str) -> WorkerRegistration:
+        try:
+            return self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        except NotFoundError:
+            raise
+
+    def can_execute(self, worker_id: str, required_capabilities: list[str]) -> bool:
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        return has_capabilities(worker.capabilities, required_capabilities)
+
+    def is_online(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> bool:
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        deadline = worker.last_heartbeat + (worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3)
+        return not worker.disabled and (time.time() if now is None else now) <= deadline
+
+    def stale_workers(self, *, now: float | None = None) -> list[WorkerRegistration]:
+        current = time.time() if now is None else now
+        return [worker for worker in self.list() if not self.is_online(worker.worker_id, now=current)]
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+"""Privacy, artifact, and runtime health helpers for V2R1C7."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from deployment_state import RuntimeDeploymentState
+
+_SECRET_KEY = re.compile(r"(?i)(?:token|secret|password|private[_-]?key|api[_-]?key)")
+_SECRET_VALUE = re.compile(r"(?i)(?:bearer\s+)[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+|(?:token|secret|password|private[_-]?key|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*[^\s,;]+")
+
+def redact_text(value: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str): raise TypeError("text_required")
+    return _SECRET_VALUE.sub("[REDACTED]", value)
+
+def redact_value(value: Any, *, key: str = "") -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return {str(k): ("[REDACTED]" if _SECRET_KEY.search(str(k)) else redact_value(v, key=str(k))) for k,v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, list): return [redact_value(v, key=key) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, tuple): return [redact_value(v, key=key) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str): return "[REDACTED]" if _SECRET_KEY.search(key) else redact_text(value)
+    return value
+
+def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file(): raise ValueError("regular_file_required")
+    digest=hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as stream:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: stream.read(1024*1024), b""): digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+def _safe_relative(root: Path, name: str) -> Path:
+    relative=Path(name)
+    if relative.is_absolute() or ".." in relative.parts or name in {"", "."}: raise ValueError("unsafe_manifest_path")
+    candidate=(root/relative).resolve(); candidate.relative_to(root.resolve()); return candidate
+
+def verify_manifest(root: Path, manifest: Path | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    root=root.resolve(); manifest=manifest or root/"artifacts"/"MANIFEST.sha256"
+    if manifest.is_symlink() or not manifest.is_file(): raise ValueError("manifest_missing")
+    checked=0
+    for raw in manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+        line=raw.strip()
+        if not line: continue
+        parts=line.split(maxsplit=1)
+        if len(parts)!=2 or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", parts[0]): raise ValueError("manifest_entry_invalid")
+        expected,name=parts; name=name[1:] if name.startswith("*") else name
+        if sha256_file(_safe_relative(root,name))!=expected: raise ValueError("manifest_hash_mismatch")
+        checked+=1
+    if not checked: raise ValueError("manifest_empty")
+    return {"status":"PASS","entries":checked}
+
+def load_release_metadata(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    metadata=json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if metadata.get("version") not in {"V2R1C6","V2R1C7"}: raise ValueError("version_mismatch")
+    if any(metadata.get(k) is not False for k in ("production_deployed","tag_created","baseline_changed")): raise ValueError("production_change_not_allowed")
+    return metadata
+
+def health_payload(state_provider: RuntimeDeploymentState | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return (state_provider or RuntimeDeploymentState.from_environment()).health_payload()
+
+class _HealthHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path not in {"/","/health","/healthz"}: self.send_error(404); return
+        body=json.dumps(health_payload(), sort_keys=True).encode()
+        self.send_response(200); self.send_header("Content-Type","application/json"); self.send_header("Content-Length",str(len(body))); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(body)
+    def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: object) -> None: return
+
+def serve(host: str, port: int) -> None:
+    if host not in {"127.0.0.1","::1","localhost"}: raise ValueError("loopback_only_listener_required")
+    if not 1024 <= port <= 65535: raise ValueError("invalid_listener_port")
+    server=ThreadingHTTPServer((host,port),_HealthHandler)
+    try: server.serve_forever()
+    finally: server.server_close()
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(); parser.add_argument("--root",type=Path,default=Path(".")); parser.add_argument("--manifest",type=Path); parser.add_argument("--serve",action="store_true"); parser.add_argument("--host",default="127.0.0.1"); parser.add_argument("--port",type=int,default=18927); args=parser.parse_args()
+    if args.serve: serve(args.host,args.port); return 0
+    print(json.dumps(verify_manifest(args.root,args.manifest),sort_keys=True)); return 0
+
+if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More