docs(hermes): define lifecycle contract and validation state

.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8.md

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-# RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8
-
-## Summary
-
-Complete security hardening for the B3 evidence collection tool, addressing 6 core security
-fixes and updating supporting documentation.
-
-## Implementation
-
-- Worktree: `/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/TASK-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8`
-- Implementation Branch: `patch/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
-- Result Branch: `result/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
-- Base Commit: `a9a298f8a7dc0d69c81e6b59e87942cb9279c7dd`
-- Implementation Commit: `9577613e1391001c3538e2e5343c4c13b1e7b1af`
-
-## Files Modified (4 allowed files + 1 new test file)
-
-1. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_tool.py** — Full tool rewrite with 6 security fixes
-2. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_facts.template.json** — Added `trust_policy_key` field
-3. **tools/personal_weixin/README-B3-EVIDENCE.md** — Updated with trust policy and security features
-4. **.agent/tasks/codex/TASK-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-COLLECT-20260716.md** — Added verification step
-5. **tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh** — PoC test suite (new)
-
-## Security Fixes Applied
-
-1. **Ancestor symlink path escape prevention**: `_reject_symlink_chain()` function checks all ancestor paths are NOT symlinks before loading evidence file
-2. **External Trust Policy**: `--trust-policy` flag with schema validation and file permission checks (must be 600/400)
-3. **Authority present:false hard fail**: `present: false` or missing key now hard-fails validation
-4. **Self-review rejection**: Reviewer identity must differ from both capture_identity and credential_identity
-5. **SSH signature verification**: Uses `ssh-keygen -Y verify` for attestation signatures
-6. **Reject_Float nan/infinity**: JSON parser rejects NaN/Infinity values
-7. **JSON key duplication detection**: Rejects duplicate JSON keys
-8. **Schema type strictness**: Strong type checking on all trust policy and evidence schema fields
-
-## Verification
-
-- **Python compilation**: PASS (`python3 -m py_compile`)
-- **JSON template validity**: PASS
-- **Gitleaks scan**: PASS (4 pre-existing false positives in unrelated files, 0 in modified files)
-
-## Push Status
-
-- `patch` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
-- `result` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
-
-## PoC Test Suite
-
-Test script at `tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh` runs 9 test cases:
-
-| Test | Expected | Result |
-|------|----------|--------|
-| Ancestor symlink chain | BLOCKED | Not applicable (test path didn't exercise real symlink) |
-| Authority present:false | FAIL | PASS |
-| Self-review (same as capture) | FAIL | PASS |
-| Self-review (same as credential) | FAIL | PASS |
-| Authority missing present key | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy permissive permissions | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy missing file | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy invalid JSON | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy schema invalid (allowed_credentials not list) | FAIL | Not applicable (dict key check catches) |
-
-7/9 pass as intended; 2 are N/A based on how the tests are structured.

.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "record_type": "central-baseline-governance-closure",
-  "version": "V2R1C1",
-  "semver": "2.1.0-rc.1",
-  "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
-  "release": {
-    "branch": "release/AIOS-V2R1C1-20260721",
-    "release_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
-    "tag": "V2R1C1",
-    "tag_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
-    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C6",
-    "previous_runtime_release": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a"
-  },
-  "openclaw_companion": {
-    "version": "2.1.0-rc.4",
-    "source_oid": "83f8f878c7da5dd8263f2af2efa80750492e5cb3",
-    "companion_oid": "12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3",
-    "artifact_sha256": "aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671",
-    "contract_version": "aios.openclaw.command.v2",
-    "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519"
-  },
-  "validation": {
-    "preproduction_status": "PREPRODUCTION_VALIDATED",
-    "production_status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
-    "gate_a": "PASS",
-    "gate_b": "PASS",
-    "openclaw_live": "PASS",
-    "openclaw_negative_tests": "PASS",
-    "hermes_live": "PASS 17/17",
-    "grant_tests": "PASS 11/11",
-    "restart_recovery": "PASS",
-    "rollback": "PASS",
-    "final_health": "PASS",
-    "sqlite_check": "PASS",
-    "secret_scan": "PASS",
-    "blockers": "none"
-  },
-  "evidence": {
-    "root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z",
-    "final_audit_manifest_sha256": "2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55",
-    "governance_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z"
-  },
-  "governance": {
-    "branch": "patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721",
-    "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
-    "base_oid": "3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f",
-    "manifest_commit_oid": "a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd",
-    "baseline_commit_oid": "6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1",
-    "current_baseline_before": "V1R4C6",
-    "current_baseline_after": "V2R1C1",
-    "reviewer": "gpt-5.3-codex-spark validator and docs_reporter",
-    "review_status": "PASS",
-    "reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T14:23:00Z"
-  },
-  "commands": [
-    {
-      "command": "GET https://cnnetmkt.top/api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver",
-      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
-      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
-      "exit_code": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh",
-      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
-      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
-      "exit_code": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh",
-      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
-      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
-      "exit_code": 0
-    }
-  ],
-  "rollback_metadata": {
-    "action": "retain versions/V2R1C1.json and restore only baseline/current.json plus VERSION to V1R4C6 through a new reviewed governance commit",
-    "production_runtime_action": "none",
-    "tag_action": "none",
-    "release_oid_action": "none"
-  },
-  "scope": {
-    "product_code_changed": false,
-    "tag_changed": false,
-    "production_redeployed": false,
-    "production_traffic_changed": false,
-    "secret_material_recorded": false
-  }
-}

.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.md

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# V2R1C1 Central Baseline Closure Result
-
-## Result
-
-- Governance task: register the already deployed `V2R1C1` release in the central Registry.
-- Baseline: `V1R4C6` -> `V2R1C1`.
-- Release OID and tag OID: `4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`.
-- Companion OID: `12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3`.
-- Artifact SHA256: `aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671`.
-- Production evidence root: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z`.
-- Final audit manifest SHA256: `2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55`.
-- Production status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`.
-
-## Governance Branch
-
-- Branch: `patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721`.
-- Base ref: `refs/heads/main`.
-- Base OID: `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`.
-- Manifest commit: `a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd`.
-- Baseline commit: `6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1`.
-- Review: `PASS` at `2026-07-21T14:23:00Z` by `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` validator and docs reporter.
-
-## Commands and Evidence
-
-| Command | Start UTC | End UTC | Exit code |
-| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
-| `GET /api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver` | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 0 |
-| `bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 0 |
-| `bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 0 |
-
-The machine-readable record is `.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json`. The external governance evidence root is `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z`.
-
-## Rollback Metadata
-
-If the Registry parser or governance service fails, retain `versions/V2R1C1.json` and create a new reviewed governance commit that restores only `baseline/current.json` and `VERSION` to `V1R4C6`. Do not roll back production, move `V2R1C1`, change the release OID, or rewrite Git history.
-
-## Scope Protection
-
-- `product_code_changed=false`
-- `tag_changed=false`
-- `production_redeployed=false`
-- `production_traffic_changed=false`
-- `secret_material_recorded=false`

.agent/results/releases/V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-RELEASE.json

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "status": "V2R1C2_PRODUCTION_RELEASED",
-  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
-  "tag_name": "V2R1C2",
-  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
-  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
-  "evidence_closure_oid": "8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978",
-  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
-  "production_port": 18920,
-  "candidate_port": 18921,
-  "production_acceptance": "PASS",
-  "role_matrix": "PASS",
-  "tenant_isolation": "PASS",
-  "api_smoke": "PASS",
-  "ui_smoke": "PASS",
-  "runtime_audit": "PASS",
-  "wechat_acceptance": "SYNTHETIC_ONLY",
-  "real_user_impersonated": false,
-  "production_acceptance_sha256": "a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a",
-  "production_online_smoke_sha256": "fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4",
-  "production_health_sha256": "ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c",
-  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
-  "rollback_ready": true,
-  "main_changed_by_tag": false,
-  "force_push": false,
-  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
-  "evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z"
-}

.agent/tasks/openclaw/TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md

@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-# 执行 GitOps 独立 Worktree 与统一运行身份迁移
-
-```yaml
-task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
-created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
-timezone: Asia/Shanghai
-owner_approved: true
-user_action_required: false
-risk: high
-production_business_change: false
-```
-
-## 目标
-
-根治共享 worktree 与多身份写入导致的 ACL、checkout 和未跟踪文件覆盖问题。
-
-实施：
-
-1. 统一 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入身份为 `aiman:gitops`；
-2. 统一 `UMask=0002`；
-3. 为 GitOps 根目录设置 setgid 与默认 ACL；
-4. 建立 bare repo 和每任务独立 worktree；
-5. 启用任务启动前自检；
-6. 验证 OpenClaw 与 ChatGPT 并发任务互不干扰；
-7. 保留原共享 workspace 作为只读回滚源，禁止智能体继续在其中切换分支。
-
-## 强制通知
-
-收到任务后立即微信通知 Owner：
-
-```text
-【任务已接收】GitOps独立worktree与统一运行身份迁移开始。将暂停写入服务、建立独立任务工作树并验证并发执行；生产业务版本不变。
-```
-
-任务结束后无论 PASS、BLOCKED 或 ROLLED_BACK，立即微信汇报结果并记录 message_id。
-
-## 1. 变更前检查与封存
-
-```bash
-set -euo pipefail
-cd /data/aios-gitops/workspace
-pwd
-id
-umask
-git status --short --branch
-git rev-parse HEAD
-systemctl list-units --type=service --all | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
-```
-
-将工作区未提交内容完整提交到非 main 证据分支或 stash，禁止 `git clean -fd`。
-
-记录当前运行服务、用户、组、umask、PID、工作区 HEAD 和未跟踪文件清单。
-
-## 2. 暂停所有写入服务
-
-识别并停止实际写入服务：
-
-```bash
-systemctl stop <gitops-writer-service>
-systemctl stop <openclaw-controller-service>
-systemctl stop <openclaw-watcher-service>
-```
-
-只停止写入者，不停止生产业务服务。记录每条命令和退出码。
-
-## 3. 安装统一运行身份 drop-in
-
-对每个 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入服务安装：
-
-```text
-config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf
-```
-
-目标：
-
-```yaml
-User: aiman
-Group: gitops
-SupplementaryGroups: gitops
-UMask: 0002
-```
-
-执行：
-
-```bash
-systemctl daemon-reload
-systemctl cat <service>
-```
-
-不得让服务继续以 root 写 workspace。
-
-## 4. 初始化 bare repo 与独立 worktree 根目录
-
-执行治理补丁中的脚本：
-
-```bash
-bash scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh
-```
-
-验收：
-
-```yaml
-bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
-owner: aiman
-group: gitops
-directory_mode: 2775
-default_acl: inherited
-```
-
-## 5. 创建 controller 独立 worktree
-
-以 `aiman`、`umask 0002` 执行：
-
-```bash
-sudo -u aiman -g gitops bash -lc '
-  umask 0002
-  cd /data/aios-gitops
-  scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh create controller controller-runtime origin/main
-'
-```
-
-将 controller/watcher 的工作目录改为：
-
-```text
-/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/controller-runtime
-```
-
-## 6. 启用任务启动前自检
-
-每个任务在执行前必须运行：
-
-```bash
-scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh
-```
-
-任何一项失败时不得开始任务：
-
-- 用户不是 aiman；
-- 不在 gitops 组；
-- umask 不是 0002；
-- 使用共享 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
-- worktree 不干净；
-- task/result/git dir 不可写；
-- 存在 Git lock。
-
-## 7. 启动服务
-
-```bash
-systemctl start <gitops-writer-service>
-systemctl start <openclaw-controller-service>
-systemctl start <openclaw-watcher-service>
-```
-
-验证：
-
-```bash
-systemctl show <service> -p User -p Group -p UMask -p WorkingDirectory
-ps -eo user,group,pid,cmd | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
-```
-
-## 8. 并发验收
-
-创建两个独立任务：
-
-```text
-OpenClaw: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-<timestamp>
-ChatGPT:  TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-CHATGPT-<timestamp>
-```
-
-分别使用：
-
-```text
-/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/<task-id>
-/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/<task-id>
-```
-
-两个任务同时执行：
-
-1. 写各自 `.agent/tasks/<agent>/`；
-2. 写各自 `.agent/results/<agent>/`；
-3. 创建深层子目录，验证默认 ACL；
-4. commit；
-5. push；
-6. 不切换共享 workspace 分支。
-
-验收必须全部通过：
-
-```yaml
-permission_denied: 0
-untracked_overwrite_errors: 0
-git_lock_collisions: 0
-openclaw_commit_push: PASS
-chatgpt_commit_push: PASS
-deep_directory_acl_inheritance: PASS
-shared_workspace_branch_switches: 0
-```
-
-## 9. 回滚
-
-若迁移失败：
-
-1. 停止新服务；
-2. 保留失败 worktree 供审计；
-3. 恢复 systemd drop-in 备份；
-4. `daemon-reload`；
-5. 恢复原服务状态；
-6. 不删除 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
-7. 生产业务保持不变。
-
-## 10. 结果文件
-
-提交：
-
-```text
-.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md
-```
-
-首段必须包含：
-
-```yaml
-status: PASS | BLOCKED | ROLLED_BACK
-task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
-created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
-timezone: Asia/Shanghai
-user_action_required: false
-runtime_identity:
-  user:
-  group:
-  umask:
-bare_repo:
-worktree_root:
-controller_worktree:
-services:
-default_acl:
-preflight:
-concurrency_test:
-  openclaw_branch:
-  openclaw_commit:
-  chatgpt_branch:
-  chatgpt_commit:
-  permission_denied_count:
-  untracked_overwrite_count:
-  git_lock_collision_count:
-owner_notifications:
-  received_message_id:
-  terminal_message_id:
-rollback:
-remaining_risks:
-next_step:
-```
-
-提交并推送到独立执行分支。禁止直接推 main。
-
-## 完成微信模板
-
-PASS：
-
-```text
-【任务完成】GitOps独立worktree迁移已通过。所有写入服务统一为aiman:gitops、umask=0002；OpenClaw与ChatGPT并发commit/push无ACL或checkout冲突。生产业务版本未变化。
-```
-
-阻塞：
-
-```text
-【任务阻塞】GitOps独立worktree迁移未通过。原因=<具体服务/权限/并发验收>；已保留原workspace和回滚能力，生产业务未变化。
-```

AGENT_DEPLOYMENT_REQUIREMENTS.md

@@ -1,486 +0,0 @@
-# Agent Production Deployment Requirements
-
-## Status entering deployment
-
-```yaml
-code_development: COMPLETED
-repository_commit: NOT_CREATED
-production_deployment: NOT_STARTED
-reason_repository_commit_missing:
-  current ChatGPT GitOps runtime has AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-```
-
-The code bundle is an input artifact. The Agent must place it on a non-main
-integration branch, review it, run acceptance tests, merge it through protected
-main and deploy the API adapter. The Agent must not regenerate or materially
-rewrite the supplied implementation without recording the new diff and tests.
-
-## Frozen production state
-
-Before any change, verify:
-
-```yaml
-main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-
-V2R1C5:
-  tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
-  peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
-  baseline_version: V2R1C5
-  baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
-  target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
-  evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
-```
-
-If authoritative `main` no longer equals the approved base OID, stop with
-`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED / AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT`. Do not silently
-rebase the bundle onto a different base.
-
-## Bootstrap sequence — no additional Owner interaction
-
-Use the following order so that the approved V2R1C6 base OID remains valid and
-the bridge does not create its own authorization deadlock:
-
-1. Verify the supplied archive/patch SHA-256.
-2. Install the bundle into a temporary root-owned staging directory outside the
-   Git worktrees.
-3. Start a localhost-only temporary instance of
-   `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` on a dedicated port or Unix socket.
-4. Bind it to the existing authenticated Owner registry and the exact
-   `writer:provision` scope. Do not expose it through the public gateway.
-5. Execute the live V2R1C6 provisioning request while `main` still equals
-   `875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3`.
-6. Verify `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, the exact branch OID, writer scope and
-   negative policy tests.
-7. Use the newly created scoped writer to commit this reviewed bundle onto:
-   `agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805`.
-8. Stop and remove the temporary bootstrap service and revoke its temporary
-   runtime credential. Preserve its signed grant receipt and audit logs.
-9. Open a protected PR from the V2R1C6 branch. Deploy the permanent bridge only
-   from the reviewed merge commit.
-
-The temporary service is a control-plane bootstrap, not a production release.
-It must retain:
-
-```yaml
-listen_scope: localhost_only
-production_change_authorized: false
-tag_change_authorized: false
-baseline_change_authorized: false
-main_write_authorized: false
-```
-
-This order avoids asking the Owner to approve a second base OID merely because
-the bridge implementation itself advanced `main`.
-
-### Alternative platform-maintenance path
-
-If policy prohibits a temporary localhost bootstrap service, use an existing
-Owner-approved platform-maintenance executor to create:
-
-```yaml
-branch: patch/owner-authorization-writer-bridge-20260806
-base_ref: refs/heads/main
-base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-direct_main_push: false
-force_push: false
-tag_write: false
-baseline_write: false
-production_deploy_during_integration: false
-```
-
-Merging that branch before V2R1C6 provisioning changes the authoritative base
-OID. In that alternative only, a new exact Owner base-OID amendment is required.
-The Agent must never substitute the newer `main` OID automatically.
-
-## Files to install on the branch
-
-Copy with the same relative paths:
-
-```text
-active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
-docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
-docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
-deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
-scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-```
-
-Merge the OpenAPI fragment into:
-
-```text
-docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml
-```
-
-The final schema must expose:
-
-```yaml
-operationId: provisionAuthorizedTaskWriter
-path: POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized
-x-openai-isConsequential: true
-```
-
-Do not deploy the fragment as a second standalone OpenAPI document.
-
-## Required review of existing API integration
-
-The adapter expects the existing API handler to provide:
-
-```python
-handler.need(scope)
-handler.body()
-handler.sendj(value, status=200)
-api.H.do_POST
-api.main()
-```
-
-Confirm these contracts against the branch before merge. If the live API has a
-different authentication object shape, make the smallest adapter-only change
-and rerun every test. The core provisioning policy must remain unchanged.
-
-The API authorization registry must grant `writer:provision` only to the
-authenticated Owner role. Agents and ordinary writer tokens must not receive
-this scope.
-
-## Privilege boundary
-
-The API service must remain non-root.
-
-Install a root-owned sudoers rule that allows the API service identity to run
-only these exact commands with `sudo -n --`:
-
-```text
-/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
-/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
-/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
-```
-
-Do not allow:
-
-```text
-/bin/sh
-/bin/bash
-/usr/bin/env
-/usr/bin/git
-wildcard executable paths
-SETENV
-arbitrary environment preservation
-```
-
-The governed tools themselves must validate their `--grant-dir` and
-`--result-json` paths. Their binaries must be root-owned, non-symlink, regular,
-executable and not group/world writable.
-
-The signer must access its private signing material only through a runtime
-secret reference. No signing key or token may enter Git, API output, the
-provisioning receipt or systemd environment text.
-
-## Runtime paths and permissions
-
-Create:
-
-```text
-/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
-/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/receipts
-/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge/locks
-```
-
-Required properties:
-
-```yaml
-owner: API service identity
-mode: "0700"
-symlink: false
-persistent: true
-```
-
-The directory contains redacted receipts only. Temporary signed grant
-directories are deleted after success or failure.
-
-## Required staging environment
-
-Configure the API service:
-
-```text
-AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
-AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORIZED_WRITER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/authorized-writer-bridge
-AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_SIGNER_ADAPTER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter
-AIOS_GITOPS_GRANT_VALIDATOR=/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-validator
-AIOS_GITOPS_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONER=/usr/local/libexec/aios-task-writer-provisioner
-AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE=writer:provision
-AIOS_GITOPS_GOVERNED_USE_SUDO=true
-AIOS_GITOPS_SUDO_PATH=/usr/bin/sudo
-```
-
-Use `aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py` as the API entrypoint. It delegates
-all pre-existing routes and adds only the new endpoint.
-
-## Pre-merge tests
-
-Run from the repository root:
-
-```bash
-python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-python3 -m py_compile \
-  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
-  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
-```
-
-Required result:
-
-```yaml
-unit_tests:
-  total: 9
-  failures: 0
-  errors: 0
-smoke: PASS
-py_compile: PASS
-```
-
-Also run all existing GitOps API and isolated writer tests affected by:
-
-```text
-aios_chatgpt_actions_api
-aios_isolated_writer_api
-isolated_writer_authz
-isolated_writer_token_registry
-single_owner_governance
-OpenAPI schema validation
-```
-
-Any regression blocks merge.
-
-## Staging API acceptance
-
-### Negative authentication
-
-An Agent or non-Owner credential calling the endpoint must receive:
-
-```yaml
-http_status: 403
-error: OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED
-```
-
-### Negative scope tests
-
-Requests enabling any of the following must be denied before signer execution:
-
-```text
-production_change_authorized=true
-tag_change_authorized=true
-baseline_change_authorized=true
-main_write_authorized=true
-allowed_operations containing tag/main/baseline/admin operations
-missing required denied operation
-one_time_use=false
-expiry over 1800 seconds
-```
-
-### Drift and conflict tests
-
-Verify:
-
-```yaml
-wrong_base_oid:
-  http_status: 409
-  error: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
-
-existing_unreceipted_target_branch:
-  http_status: 409
-  error: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
-```
-
-### Governed tool failures
-
-Independently inject and verify fail-closed behavior for:
-
-```text
-signer unavailable
-signer signature absent
-validator signature_valid=false
-validator signer_trusted=false
-validator plan expired
-provisioner grant_consumed=false
-provisioner writer scope enables main/tag/baseline/force push
-any required negative policy test false
-```
-
-None may create or modify a Git ref.
-
-## Live V2R1C6 provisioning request
-
-After protected merge and API deployment, authenticate as the Owner and submit
-exactly:
-
-```json
-{
-  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
-  "repository": "aios/aios",
-  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
-  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
-  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
-  "owner_authorization_reference": "chat-owner-authorization:v2r1c6:20260806",
-  "one_time_use": true,
-  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
-  "production_change_authorized": false,
-  "tag_change_authorized": false,
-  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
-  "main_write_authorized": false,
-  "allowed_operations": [
-    "create_worktree",
-    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
-    "commit_to_target_branch",
-    "push_target_branch"
-  ],
-  "denied_operations": [
-    "direct_main_push",
-    "force_push",
-    "tag_create",
-    "tag_update",
-    "tag_delete",
-    "branch_delete",
-    "repository_admin",
-    "baseline_write",
-    "production_deploy",
-    "production_marker_write",
-    "history_rewrite"
-  ]
-}
-```
-
-This request must be executed by the localhost-only bootstrap instance before
-the bridge code advances `main`. The endpoint must never infer “current main”.
-
-If the Agent chooses the alternative merge-first path, it must stop after the
-merge and obtain an exact Owner amendment for the new merge OID. It must not
-silently replace the approved OID.
-
-## Success response
-
-Require:
-
-```yaml
-status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
-grant_consumed: true
-branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-branch_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
-base_oid: <same exact OID>
-main_unchanged: true
-
-writer_scope:
-  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
-  writes_enabled: true
-  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-  allowed_base_oid: <exact amended authorized base OID>
-  allowed_routes:
-    - POST /api/commit-file
-  allow_main_write: false
-  allow_tag_write: false
-  allow_baseline_write: false
-  allow_force_push: false
-```
-
-All seven negative policy results must be true.
-
-Submit the identical request a second time. It must return the same grant and
-branch attestation with:
-
-```yaml
-idempotent: true
-```
-
-It must not run the provisioner again.
-
-## Production postchecks
-
-After API deployment and writer provisioning, independently verify:
-
-```yaml
-existing_routes_regression: PASS
-new_endpoint: PASS
-main_ref: expected reviewed merge commit
-V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
-V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
-V2R1C5_baseline_unchanged: true
-new_release_tag_created: false
-production_baseline_changed: false
-```
-
-The deployment of this control-plane bridge does not authorize a V2R1C6
-production release. It only enables scoped code authoring.
-
-## Rollback
-
-If the new API route fails:
-
-1. Stop accepting new provisioning calls.
-2. Restore the previous API entrypoint.
-3. Restart and verify all existing routes.
-4. Preserve receipts and logs.
-5. Revoke any task writer capability already minted.
-6. Do not delete a branch or rewrite a tag.
-7. Revert the protected-main bridge commit through an ordinary reviewed revert
-   PR if source rollback is required.
-
-## Required final Agent report
-
-```yaml
-STATUS: COMPLETED | PARTIALLY_COMPLETED | BLOCKED | FAILED
-
-INTEGRATION:
-  branch:
-  commit:
-  protected_pr:
-  merge_commit:
-  files_changed:
-
-TESTS:
-  unit:
-  smoke:
-  py_compile:
-  regression:
-  fault_injection:
-
-DEPLOYMENT:
-  service:
-  entrypoint:
-  runtime_status:
-  endpoint_status:
-  rollback_verified:
-
-PROVISIONING:
-  owner_authorization_reference:
-  approval_plan_id:
-  grant_id:
-  grant_digest_sha256:
-  signing_key_identity:
-  branch:
-  branch_oid:
-  workspace_path:
-  grant_consumed:
-  idempotent_replay:
-
-CONSISTENCY:
-  main_oid:
-  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
-  V2R1C5_peeled_target_oid:
-  baseline_version:
-  baseline_changed:
-  tags_changed:
-
-SECRETS:
-  runtime_secret_reference_used:
-  plaintext_secret_logged:
-  plaintext_secret_committed:
-
-BLOCKERS:
-
-GOVERNANCE:
-  force_push_used: false
-  tag_rewritten: false
-  direct_main_push: false
-  secrets_committed: false
-  owner_approval_respected: true
-```

AGENT_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -1,401 +0,0 @@
-# Agent Deployment Requirements: Owner Authorization Broker V2
-
-## Objective
-
-Deploy the audited Owner Authorization Broker that closes the bootstrap gap
-without issuing a new general-purpose Owner credential and without modifying
-`/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens`.
-
-The broker reuses one existing, non-wildcard Owner credential only to
-authenticate the Owner identity through one pre-existing exact scope. It then
-records an immutable task authorization event and directly invokes the
-existing signed grant -> validator -> one-shot provisioner chain.
-
-Production deployment of V2R1C6 is **not** authorized by this task.
-
-## Fixed bindings
-
-```yaml
-task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
-repository: aios/aios
-base_ref: refs/heads/main
-base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-production_change_authorized: false
-tag_change_authorized: false
-baseline_change_authorized: false
-main_write_authorized: false
-```
-
-The existing V2R1C5 objects are frozen:
-
-```yaml
-tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
-peeled_target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
-baseline_version: V2R1C5
-baseline_status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
-```
-
-## 1. Package verification
-
-Verify `MANIFEST.sha256` before installation. Reject any mismatch.
-
-Run:
-
-```bash
-python3 -m unittest -v \
-  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
-  tests/test_owner_authorization_broker.py
-
-python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
-python3 -m py_compile \
-  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
-  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
-  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
-  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
-```
-
-All checks must pass.
-
-## 2. Existing Owner credential selection
-
-Read only the non-secret registry metadata. Select one existing credential
-that satisfies all of the following:
-
-```yaml
-role: owner
-wildcard_scope: false
-account: exact known Owner identity
-contains_exact_intake_scope: true
-```
-
-Use one existing exact scope such as `commit:create` or `file:write`. Prefer
-the narrowest scope already assigned to the intended Owner.
-
-Do not:
-
-- use the historical wildcard Owner credential;
-- add `writer:provision` to any bearer token;
-- create or modify a bearer credential;
-- print, copy or commit bearer-token material.
-
-Record only:
-
-```yaml
-owner_account: <non-secret account>
-credential_id: <non-secret ID, when available>
-intake_scope: <one exact existing scope>
-scope_readback_available: true|false
-```
-
-If `handler.need()` returns the exact scope set, configure the Owner account
-allowlist and leave the credential ID allowlist empty.
-
-If scope metadata is not returned, configure the exact non-secret credential
-ID allowlist. If neither exact scope metadata nor a stable non-secret
-credential ID can be proven, stop:
-
-```yaml
-STATUS: BLOCKED
-REASON: OWNER_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_NOT_PROVABLE
-```
-
-## 3. Staging installation
-
-Install the four application modules in a root-owned staging directory:
-
-```text
-authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
-owner_authorization_broker.py
-aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py
-```
-
-The directory and files must not be group/world writable.
-
-Prepare environment values:
-
-```yaml
-AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED: "true"
-AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES: <one exact existing scope>
-AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_IDENTITIES: <exact owner account>
-AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_CREDENTIAL_IDS: <exact ID or empty>
-AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_MAX_EXPIRY_SECONDS: "900"
-AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT:
-  /var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker
-```
-
-Use the existing signer, validator and provisioner paths. Do not change their
-root governance configuration or disable signature checks.
-
-Start a localhost-only staging instance on a temporary port. Do not replace
-the production service yet.
-
-## 4. Authentication fail-closed tests
-
-The staging endpoint is:
-
-```text
-POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
-```
-
-Required tests:
-
-```yaml
-unauthenticated:
-  expected: 401
-
-wrong_role:
-  expected: 403
-
-wrong_scope:
-  expected: 403
-
-wildcard_owner:
-  expected: 403
-  error: WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED
-
-unallowlisted_owner:
-  expected: 403
-  error: OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED
-
-production_capability_true:
-  expected: 403
-  error: PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED
-```
-
-A connection failure, 404 or 500 is not an authorization-policy pass.
-
-## 5. Formal provisioning request
-
-Use the selected existing non-wildcard Owner credential through its runtime
-secret reference. Never place the bearer token in the request body, command
-line, shell history, output report or Git.
-
-Request:
-
-```json
-{
-  "action": "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
-  "task_id": "V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING",
-  "repository": "aios/aios",
-  "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
-  "base_oid": "875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3",
-  "target_branch": "agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805",
-  "one_time_use": true,
-  "expires_in_seconds": 900,
-  "production_change_authorized": false,
-  "tag_change_authorized": false,
-  "baseline_change_authorized": false,
-  "main_write_authorized": false,
-  "allowed_operations": [
-    "create_worktree",
-    "create_target_branch_if_absent",
-    "commit_to_target_branch",
-    "push_target_branch"
-  ],
-  "denied_operations": [
-    "direct_main_push",
-    "force_push",
-    "tag_create",
-    "tag_update",
-    "tag_delete",
-    "branch_delete",
-    "repository_admin",
-    "baseline_write",
-    "production_deploy",
-    "production_marker_write",
-    "history_rewrite"
-  ]
-}
-```
-
-The Owner authorization reference is generated by the broker. The caller must
-not submit or invent one.
-
-Expected result:
-
-```yaml
-status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
-owner_authorization_event_id: generated
-owner_authorization_reference: generated
-owner_authorization_digest_sha256: generated
-owner_authorization_consumed: true
-approval_plan_id: generated
-grant_digest_sha256: generated
-grant_consumed: true
-
-branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-
-writer_scope:
-  workspace_role: task-scoped-isolated-writer
-  writes_enabled: true
-  allowed_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-  allowed_base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-  allow_main_write: false
-  allow_tag_write: false
-  allow_baseline_write: false
-  allow_force_push: false
-```
-
-## 6. Independent post-provisioning verification
-
-Verify the Authority ref:
-
-```bash
-git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse \
-  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-```
-
-It must equal:
-
-```text
-875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-```
-
-Verify `main` remains unchanged, V2R1C5 tag object and peeled target remain
-unchanged, and the Production Baseline remains V2R1C5.
-
-Verify the broker audit event under:
-
-```text
-/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker/events/
-```
-
-Requirements:
-
-```yaml
-status: CONSUMED
-wildcard_scope_used: false
-grant_consumed: true
-permissions:
-  directory: "0700"
-  json_files: "0600"
-```
-
-Do not return bearer-token material in the report.
-
-## 7. Commit the broker through the new writer
-
-After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`, use only the writer's
-`POST /api/commit-file` route to put this code bundle on:
-
-```text
-agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-```
-
-Commit the bridge and broker as separate intentional commits when practical:
-
-1. Owner-authorized task-writer bridge.
-2. Audited Owner authorization broker and deployment docs.
-
-Do not merge to `main` directly. Create a protected PR after branch commits
-and tests are complete.
-
-## 8. Permanent service deployment
-
-Only after protected review and merge:
-
-1. Install the reviewed files from the merge commit.
-2. Apply a reviewed systemd drop-in based on the provided example.
-3. Start the wrapper entrypoint:
-   `aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py`.
-4. Verify all existing API routes still work.
-5. Verify the broker remains localhost/reverse-proxy constrained as intended.
-6. Re-run authentication and policy tests.
-7. Remove the temporary staging instance.
-
-This permanent bridge deployment does not authorize a V2R1C6 production tag,
-Baseline update or application deployment.
-
-## 9. Fail-closed conditions
-
-Stop with `BLOCKED` for any of the following:
-
-- Authority `main` no longer equals the fixed base OID.
-- Target branch exists at a different OID.
-- Only a wildcard Owner credential can authenticate.
-- Exact credential scope cannot be proven.
-- Owner identity is not explicitly allow-listed.
-- Signer, validator or provisioner self-test fails.
-- Grant is not marked one-time and consumed.
-- Writer allows main, tag, Baseline, force-push or branch-delete operations.
-- Audit event contains sensitive material.
-- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
-
-## 10. Required Agent result
-
-```yaml
-STATUS: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
-
-PACKAGE:
-  manifest_verified:
-  unit_tests:
-  smoke_tests:
-  py_compile:
-
-OWNER_CREDENTIAL:
-  account:
-  credential_id:
-  intake_scope:
-  exact_scope_proven:
-  wildcard_used: false
-  token_logged: false
-
-BROKER:
-  staging_listener:
-  endpoint_status:
-  event_id:
-  authorization_reference:
-  authorization_digest_sha256:
-  event_consumed:
-  audit_permissions_valid:
-
-GRANT:
-  approval_plan_id:
-  grant_digest_sha256:
-  signer_identity:
-  signature_valid:
-  one_time_use:
-  consumed:
-
-BRANCH:
-  name:
-  oid:
-  base_oid:
-  ref_exists:
-  worktree_path:
-  worktree_clean:
-
-WRITER:
-  status:
-  writes_enabled:
-  allowed_branch:
-  allowed_base_oid:
-  allowed_routes:
-  main_write_denied:
-  tag_write_denied:
-  baseline_write_denied:
-  force_push_denied:
-
-POSTCHECK:
-  main_unchanged:
-  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
-  baseline_unchanged:
-
-REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
-  commit_oids:
-  protected_pr:
-  merged:
-  permanent_bridge_deployed:
-
-BLOCKERS:
-
-GOVERNANCE:
-  force_push_used: false
-  tag_rewritten: false
-  direct_main_push: false
-  secrets_committed: false
-  owner_approval_respected: true
-```

AGENT_TASK_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -1,562 +0,0 @@
-# Agent execution requirements: V2R1C6 task identity overlay
-
-## Required result
-
-The Agent must return one of:
-
-- `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`
-- `BLOCKED`
-- `FAILED`
-
-The Agent may not report success until the task branch, isolated worktree and
-task writer are independently verified.
-
-This stage is **not** a production deployment. It must not modify `main`,
-V2R1C5, tags, Registry, Production Baseline or production services.
-
-## Fixed authority
-
-```yaml
-task_id: V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING
-repository: aios/aios
-base_ref: refs/heads/main
-base_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-target_branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-owner_identity: aiman
-one_time_use: true
-maximum_ttl_seconds: 900
-production_change_authorized: false
-tag_change_authorized: false
-baseline_change_authorized: false
-main_write_authorized: false
-```
-
-## 1. Verify package
-
-Verify the externally supplied package against the published SHA-256 values and
-then verify every entry in `MANIFEST.sha256`.
-
-Do not synthesize a missing archive. Use either the verified ZIP or TAR.GZ.
-
-Required checks:
-
-```yaml
-package_hash_match: true
-manifest_entries_match: true
-unit_tests_pass: true
-smoke_tests_pass: true
-py_compile_pass: true
-```
-
-## 2. Create root-owned staging
-
-Extract to a fresh directory such as:
-
-```text
-/var/lib/aios-gitops/staging/v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay-<nonce>
-```
-
-Requirements:
-
-```yaml
-owner: root
-group: root
-directory_mode: "0700"
-files_not_world_writable: true
-symlinks_rejected: true
-```
-
-Do not overwrite the active runtime tree.
-
-## 3. Re-run target-host tests
-
-From the staging root:
-
-```bash
-python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
-python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-python3 scripts/smoke_owner_authorization_broker.py
-python3 scripts/smoke_task_identity_overlay.py
-python3 -m py_compile \
-  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py \
-  active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py \
-  active-runtime/app/task_identity_overlay.py \
-  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py \
-  active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py \
-  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_api.py \
-  active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
-  scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py
-```
-
-Any failure is `BLOCKED`; do not proceed.
-
-## 4. Prestart Git and production freeze checks
-
-Read from the authority repository:
-
-```bash
-git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/heads/main
-git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
-  show-ref --verify --quiet \
-  refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse refs/tags/V2R1C5
-git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git rev-parse 'refs/tags/V2R1C5^{}'
-```
-
-Expected:
-
-```yaml
-main_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-target_branch_exists: false
-V2R1C5_tag_oid: 9e65bd59baea392294c0f253046d3ab116f63145
-V2R1C5_peeled_target: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
-```
-
-Read Baseline and require:
-
-```yaml
-version: V2R1C5
-status: PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
-target_oid: aa60e891547abd7e215af7cf2bf3f21fd23541da
-evidence_closure_oid: 5e2cf8276f5093f3352b9a3252c701a44c5ab807
-```
-
-If `main` has drifted, return:
-
-```yaml
-STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
-REASON: AUTHORIZED_BASE_OID_DRIFT
-```
-
-If the target branch already exists at another OID, return:
-
-```yaml
-STATUS: MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
-REASON: EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT
-```
-
-Do not delete, reset or force-push the branch.
-
-## 5. Discover active secret references
-
-The overlay does not read or modify `gitops.tokens`, but its issuer must compare
-the new random secret against all active bearer secret references.
-
-Discover references without printing secret contents. At minimum include the
-currently active ChatGPT/GitOps bearer secret reference and any other bearer
-files consumed by the active API.
-
-Pass them as a comma-separated list in:
-
-```text
-AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS
-```
-
-Evidence must contain only paths and SHA-256 match counts, not token values.
-
-If active secret references cannot be enumerated, return:
-
-```yaml
-STATUS: BLOCKED
-REASON: ACTIVE_SECRET_REFERENCE_SET_UNRESOLVED
-```
-
-## 6. Install the transient systemd service
-
-Use the provided template:
-
-```text
-deploy/systemd/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service.example
-```
-
-Substitute only:
-
-- verified root-owned staging directory;
-- verified active secret-ref path list.
-
-Do not change task ID, repository, base OID, target branch or denied
-capabilities.
-
-The service must listen only on:
-
-```text
-127.0.0.1:19864
-```
-
-Before start, run:
-
-```bash
-systemd-analyze verify \
-  /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
-```
-
-Then:
-
-```bash
-sudo systemctl daemon-reload
-sudo systemctl start aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
-```
-
-Confirm:
-
-```bash
-curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:19864/healthz
-```
-
-Expected:
-
-```yaml
-service: aios-task-identity-overlay
-status: active
-global_token_registry_used: false
-loopback_only: true
-```
-
-Do not expose the port externally.
-
-## 7. Issue the one-time overlay
-
-Use the root-only CLI. The authorization assertion is an audit label for this
-already approved Owner task; it must not be described as an external signed
-event.
-
-Example:
-
-```bash
-sudo env \
-  PYTHONPATH=<staging>/active-runtime/app \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_SECRET_ROOT=/run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TASK_ID=V2R1C6_TASK_SCOPED_WRITER_PROVISIONING \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_OWNER_IDENTITY=aiman \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_REF=refs/heads/main \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_BASE_OID=875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3 \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_TARGET_BRANCH=agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805 \
-  AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_COLLISION_SECRET_REFS=<verified-secret-ref-list> \
-  python3 <staging>/active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py \
-    issue \
-    --ttl-seconds 900 \
-    --authorization-assertion-ref owner-session:V2R1C6:approved-20260806 \
-    --operator-identity <audited-agent-identity> \
-    --result-json /run/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-issued.json
-```
-
-The result must contain:
-
-```yaml
-status: OVERLAY_ACTIVE
-idempotent: false
-overlay_id: present
-secret_ref: under /run/aios-gitops/task-identity-overlays
-expires_at: within 900 seconds
-```
-
-It must not contain a token.
-
-Verify:
-
-```yaml
-secret_file_mode: "0600"
-metadata_contains_raw_token: false
-token_hash_unique_across_configured_secret_refs: true
-```
-
-## 8. Negative tests
-
-Before the valid request:
-
-1. No Authorization header must return HTTP 401.
-2. A random wrong bearer must return HTTP 401.
-3. A request with `production_change_authorized=true` must be rejected.
-4. A request with another base OID or branch must be rejected.
-5. The valid overlay must remain `ACTIVE` after pre-auth request-validation
-   failures.
-
-Do not use the global Owner or ChatGPT bearer credential for this endpoint.
-
-## 9. Send the valid request
-
-Use:
-
-```text
-deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json
-```
-
-Use the provided client so the bearer is not placed in argv, shell history or
-logs:
-
-```bash
-sudo python3 <staging>/scripts/call_task_identity_overlay.py \
-  --secret-ref <secret_ref_from_issue_result> \
-  --request-json <staging>/deploy/v2r1c6-task-writer-authorization-request.json \
-  --url http://127.0.0.1:19864/api/governance/owner-authorizations \
-  --result-json /var/lib/aios-gitops/v2r1c6-overlay-provision-result.json
-```
-
-Required result:
-
-```yaml
-http_status: 200
-status: READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING
-owner_authorization_consumed: true
-grant_consumed: true
-identity_overlay_consumed: true
-identity_overlay_secret_removed: true
-branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-branch_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-```
-
-The result must not include:
-
-- bearer token;
-- private key;
-- signer secret;
-- raw signature;
-- credential value.
-
-## 10. Independent acceptance
-
-Verify the branch:
-
-```bash
-git --git-dir=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git \
-  rev-parse refs/heads/agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-```
-
-It must equal:
-
-```text
-875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-```
-
-Verify worktree evidence returned by the provisioner:
-
-```yaml
-branch: agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-head_oid: 875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3
-detached_head: false
-worktree_clean: true
-writer_status: active
-writes_enabled: true
-allowed_routes:
-  - POST /api/commit-file
-allow_main_write: false
-allow_tag_write: false
-allow_baseline_write: false
-allow_force_push: false
-```
-
-Run policy negative tests against the task writer and require explicit policy
-denials for:
-
-- main write;
-- another branch;
-- tag create/update;
-- Baseline write;
-- force push;
-- branch delete.
-
-Network errors, 404, 500 and stopped-service failures do not count as policy
-denials.
-
-## 11. Stop and clean up the overlay
-
-After `READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING`:
-
-```bash
-sudo systemctl stop aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
-sudo systemctl disable aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service || true
-sudo rm -f /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c6-task-identity-overlay.service
-sudo systemctl daemon-reload
-```
-
-Verify:
-
-```yaml
-overlay_listener_stopped: true
-overlay_secret_removed: true
-global_token_registry_unchanged: true
-disabled_owner_record_unchanged: true
-active_chatgpt_bot_record_unchanged: true
-audit_metadata_retained: true
-```
-
-The root-owned staging directory may be retained until the code is committed,
-then removed after checksum-confirmed repository integration.
-
-## 12. Commit the developed code through the task writer
-
-Only after writer acceptance, use `POST /api/commit-file` to commit the
-verified package contents to:
-
-```text
-agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-```
-
-Commit in reviewable groups:
-
-1. authorized task-writer bridge;
-2. Owner authorization broker;
-3. task identity overlay;
-4. tests, docs, OpenAPI and deployment templates.
-
-Do not include:
-
-- package archives;
-- runtime tokens;
-- `/run` or `/var/lib` state;
-- test result files containing host paths;
-- secret references containing values;
-- generated credentials.
-
-Run the complete 40-test suite from the branch after commits.
-
-## 13. Protected PR
-
-Create a protected PR from:
-
-```text
-agent/v2r1c6-mainline-reconciliation-20260805
-```
-
-to:
-
-```text
-main
-```
-
-The PR must state:
-
-- this change closes Owner authorization bootstrap gaps;
-- the overlay is localhost-only and one-time;
-- the global token registry is not modified;
-- no production release is authorized;
-- V2R1C5 tag and Baseline remain unchanged.
-
-The Agent must not merge without the repository's normal protected review.
-
-## 14. Required Agent report
-
-```yaml
-STATUS:
-  READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING | BLOCKED | FAILED
-
-PACKAGE:
-  zip_sha256:
-  tar_gz_sha256:
-  manifest_entries:
-  manifest_matched:
-
-TESTS:
-  unit_total:
-  unit_passed:
-  smoke_bridge:
-  smoke_broker:
-  smoke_overlay:
-  py_compile:
-
-PRESTART:
-  main_oid:
-  target_branch_previously_absent:
-  V2R1C5_tag_oid:
-  V2R1C5_peeled_target:
-  baseline_unchanged:
-
-OVERLAY:
-  overlay_id:
-  status:
-  secret_ref:
-  secret_file_mode:
-  token_hash_unique:
-  global_registry_used: false
-  listener:
-  expires_at:
-  consumed:
-  secret_removed:
-
-NEGATIVE_TESTS:
-  unauthenticated_401:
-  wrong_token_401:
-  production_capability_denied:
-  wrong_base_denied:
-  wrong_branch_denied:
-
-OWNER_AUTHORIZATION:
-  event_id:
-  reference:
-  consumed:
-
-GRANT:
-  approval_plan_id:
-  grant_id:
-  grant_digest_sha256:
-  signature_valid:
-  consumed:
-
-BRANCH:
-  name:
-  oid:
-  base_oid:
-  ref_exists:
-  worktree_path:
-  worktree_clean:
-
-WRITER:
-  status:
-  writes_enabled:
-  allowed_branch:
-  allowed_base_oid:
-  allowed_routes:
-  main_write_denied:
-  tag_write_denied:
-  baseline_write_denied:
-  force_push_denied:
-
-REPOSITORY_INTEGRATION:
-  commits:
-  tests_after_commit:
-  protected_pr:
-  merged: false
-
-POSTCHECK:
-  main_unchanged:
-  V2R1C5_tag_unchanged:
-  baseline_unchanged:
-  global_token_registry_unchanged:
-  overlay_listener_stopped:
-  overlay_secret_removed:
-
-SECRETS:
-  plaintext_logged: false
-  plaintext_committed: false
-
-BLOCKERS:
-
-GOVERNANCE:
-  force_push_used: false
-  tag_rewritten: false
-  direct_main_push: false
-  secrets_committed: false
-  owner_approval_respected: true
-```
-
-## Fail-closed conditions
-
-Return `BLOCKED` and stop on any of:
-
-- authoritative main OID drift;
-- target branch conflict;
-- inability to enumerate active secret references;
-- secret hash collision;
-- overlay not bound to the exact task/base/branch;
-- non-loopback listener;
-- raw secret in result or logs;
-- Owner Authorization Broker event not created;
-- signer/validator/provisioner failure;
-- grant not consumed;
-- branch OID mismatch;
-- writer exposes main/tag/Baseline/force-push permissions;
-- V2R1C5 tag or Baseline changes.
-
-Never fall back to the shared `gitops-write-bot.token`, a wildcard credential,
-manual `gitops.tokens` edits or a direct Git ref write.

AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-CANDIDATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+# AIOS V2R1 生产候选报告
+
+- 候选版本：`V2R1C0-candidate`
+- 候选分支：`integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720`
+- 报告语言：中文
+- 架构负责人：AIOS V2 CTO
+- 当前状态：代码与文档闭环已完成；精确 Commit 测试、真实 Runtime 联调和预发布验证待执行
+
+## 1. 执行摘要
+
+AIOS V2R1 Candidate 已完成以下核心建设：
+
+- AIOS 唯一控制面；
+- Tenant、Agent、Task、Policy、Approval 和 Audit 权威模型；
+- SQLite WAL 候选持久化与重启恢复；
+- Execution Orchestrator；
+- OpenClaw 签名命令、Adapter、Transport、Health 和 Audit Callback；
+- Hermes tenant/cell/profile 分区、Queue、Worker Lease、Heartbeat 和 Result；
+- Agent Execution Evidence；
+- Web Console；
+- GitOps Status；
+- systemd、Docker、Compose、Healthcheck 和 Rollback；
+- 用户需求、目标架构、迁移策略、模块契约、追踪矩阵、文档治理和 ADR；
+- 文档—代码匹配检查器；
+- 全量验收入口；
+- OpenClaw 预发布部署任务；
+- Codex 架构监督和阻塞处理任务。
+
+本报告不把“代码已提交”误报为“生产已验证”。以下状态仍需由无人值守任务执行并形成证据：
+
+- 精确 Candidate Commit 的自动测试；
+- 真实 OpenClaw Runtime 联调；
+- Hermes 长任务、Worker 崩溃和 Lease Recovery 演练；
+- systemd/Docker 预发布部署；
+- 重启恢复与回滚演练；
+- 本地仓库与 Gitea Candidate OID 一致验证；
+- 身份代理、安全、性能和容量验证；
+- Owner 对合并、Tag 和生产部署的批准。
+
+## 2. 用户需求完成情况
+
+| 需求 | 代码状态 | 测试状态 | 预发布状态 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| AIOS 唯一控制面 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待验证 |
+| 复用 OpenClaw/Hermes/Agent Router | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待真实联调 |
+| OpenClaw/Hermes 解耦 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待旁路冻结验证 |
+| 全面 Web 化 | 候选实现完成 | 冒烟测试待执行 | 待反向代理接入 |
+| 多租户隔离 | 已实现 | Domain 负向测试已定义 | 待全链路安全验证 |
+| 统一任务生命周期 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待精确 Commit 执行 |
+| 策略与审批 | 已实现 | 部分测试待补强 | 待身份代理验证 |
+| 幂等与并发安全 | 已实现 | 基础测试已定义 | 待压力和并发验证 |
+| 执行证据 | 已实现 | 已定义 | 待外部执行器持续回写 |
+| GitOps 唯一流程 | 已实现并修复 Controller 冲突 | Runtime 部分验证 | 待双目标持续镜像证据 |
+| 持久化与恢复 | 已实现 | 重启恢复测试已定义 | 待预发布演练 |
+| 审计与合规 | 已实现候选 | 部分断言待补强 | 待不可变外部固化 |
+| 密钥安全 | 引用模式已实现 | 基础扫描纳入验收 | 待 Secret Provider 联调 |
+| 部署与回滚 | 资产完成 | 验收脚本已定义 | 待实际演练 |
+| 文档与代码同步 | 已实现门禁 | 待精确 Commit 执行 | 待接入持续验收 |
+
+## 3. 目标架构
+
+```text
+浏览器 / Web Console / Public API
+                 |
+                 v
+          AIOS 唯一控制面
+ Tenant | Agent | Task | Policy | Approval | Audit
+                 |
+                 v
+       Execution Orchestrator / Agent Router
+             /                 \
+            v                   v
+   OpenClaw Adapter       Hermes Boundary
+            |                   |
+            v                   v
+   OpenClaw Runtime       Hermes Workers
+             \                   /
+              v                 v
+       结果回写 + 审计 + 执行证据
+```
+
+权威边界：
+
+- AIOS：租户、身份、Agent、任务、策略、审批、审计和执行证据；
+- Agent Router：调度与路由；
+- OpenClaw：签名命令执行、取消、状态、健康和回调；
+- Hermes：队列、Worker、Lease、Heartbeat 和结果；
+- Web：只调用 AIOS API；
+- GitOps：所有代码、文档、部署和修复变更入口。
+
+## 4. 实现清单
+
+### 4.1 Control Plane
+
+```text
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/control_plane.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/persistence.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gateway.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/app.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/orchestrator.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/execution_tracking.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gitops_status.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_v2/console.py
+```
+
+### 4.2 OpenClaw
+
+```text
+active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/contract.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/adapter.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/transport.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/health.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/callback.py
+```
+
+### 4.3 Hermes
+
+```text
+active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/contract.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/adapter.py
+active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/worker.py
+```
+
+### 4.4 测试与治理
+
+```text
+tests/aios_v2_candidate/test_candidate_flow.py
+tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py
+deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
+```
+
+### 4.5 部署
+
+```text
+deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2.service
+deploy/aios-v2/env/aios-v2.env.example
+deploy/aios-v2/docker/Dockerfile
+deploy/aios-v2/docker/compose.yaml
+deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh
+deploy/aios-v2/rollback/rollback.sh
+```
+
+### 4.6 文档与任务
+
+```text
+docs/aios-v2/
+tasks/openclaw-production-deploy-task.yaml
+tasks/codex-production-supervisor-task.yaml
+```
+
+## 5. 多租户与安全设计
+
+### 5.1 权威上下文
+
+```text
+tenant_id
+principal_id
+session_id
+trace_id
+task_id
+policy_version
+idempotency_key
+```
+
+### 5.2 OpenClaw
+
+- HMAC-SHA256 规范化签名；
+- 签名绑定 tenant/task/trace/action/payload/idempotency/time；
+- Runtime Result 身份字段必须匹配；
+- Secret 只通过受保护文件或引用解析。
+
+### 5.3 Hermes
+
+- tenant/cell/profile 分区；
+- Worker Lease 与 Heartbeat；
+- revision 乐观并发；
+- Lease 过期自动回到 QUEUED；
+- Worker 完成前停止 Heartbeat，避免 revision 竞态。
+
+### 5.4 Web/API
+
+- 可信代理注入 `X-AIOS-*`；
+- 浏览器不选择租户；
+- CSP、no-store、nosniff、DENY frame、no-referrer；
+- 应用端口不得直接暴露公网。
+
+### 5.5 GitOps
+
+- Controller detached + clean；
+- 禁止 fetch 到已检出本地分支；
+- 所有修改进入分支、Commit、测试和统一审查；
+- 明文 Secret 门禁；
+- 文档变化与代码变化同步门禁。
+
+## 6. 持久化策略
+
+候选版：
+
+- SQLite WAL；
+- `synchronous=FULL`；
+- `BEGIN IMMEDIATE`；
+- 原子 Snapshot；
+- schema version；
+- 状态目录与代码版本分离；
+- Execution Evidence 租户分区原子 JSON。
+
+已知限制：
+
+- 单进程候选优先；
+- 尚无生产 RLS、多实例 HA、PITR 和容量证据；
+- 后续必须通过新 ADR 迁移到生产数据层。
+
+## 7. 测试与验收
+
+### 7.1 文档—代码匹配
+
+```bash
+python3 tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py \
+  --base-ref integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720
+```
+
+### 7.2 候选测试
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest discover \
+  -s tests/aios_v2_candidate \
+  -p 'test_*.py' \
+  -v
+```
+
+覆盖：
+
+- OpenClaw 完整执行；
+- Hermes 完整执行；
+- 跨租户拒绝；
+- SQLite 重启恢复；
+- Execution Evidence。
+
+### 7.3 全量验收
+
+```bash
+bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
+```
+
+可选在线健康检查：
+
+```bash
+AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1 \
+  bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
+```
+
+### 7.4 健康检查
+
+```bash
+bash deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh
+```
+
+检查：
+
+- systemd；
+- HTTP Health；
+- 状态目录；
+- SQLite quick_check；
+- GitOps detached/clean；
+- Evidence 文件。
+
+## 8. 部署方式
+
+### 8.1 systemd
+
+```text
+/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2.env
+/opt/aios/current
+/var/lib/aios-v2
+```
+
+运行用户：`aios`。
+
+安全选项：NoNewPrivileges、ProtectSystem、ProtectHome、PrivateTmp、Capability 限制。
+
+### 8.2 Docker/Compose
+
+- 非 root UID/GID；
+- Read-only root filesystem；
+- Drop all capabilities；
+- 独立 State Volume；
+- HTTP Healthcheck；
+- Secret 文件只读挂载。
+
+## 9. 回滚
+
+```bash
+bash deploy/aios-v2/rollback/rollback.sh <previous-release>
+```
+
+原则：
+
+- 回滚前自动备份状态；
+- 默认只回滚代码；
+- 状态恢复需显式 `AIOS_V2_RESTORE_STATE=1`；
+- 回滚后必须执行健康检查；
+- 目标版本失败时自动恢复 previous release。
+
+## 10. 无人值守任务
+
+### OpenClaw
+
+任务：`tasks/openclaw-production-deploy-task.yaml`
+
+职责：
+
+- 预发布部署；
+- 健康检查；
+- Runtime 联调；
+- 小型部署与 Runtime Bug 修复；
+- 证据回写。
+
+### Codex
+
+任务：`tasks/codex-production-supervisor-task.yaml`
+
+职责：
+
+- 架构监督；
+- 阻塞分析和跨模块修复；
+- 文档、测试和安全审查；
+- 发布建议。
+
+所有修改和阻塞必须进入 Git 和 Execution Evidence，最终统一审视。
+
+## 11. 当前已知风险
+
+| 风险 | 级别 | 当前处理 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 精确 Candidate Commit 尚未执行全部测试 | 高 | OpenClaw 执行，Codex 监督 |
+| 真实 OpenClaw Runtime 尚未联调 | 高 | 预发布任务必须完成 |
+| 候选 SQLite 不支持生产多实例 HA | 高 | Candidate 单实例；后续 ADR 迁移 |
+| 身份代理 Header 防伪尚未环境验证 | 高 | 预发布安全检查 |
+| Web Console 为候选只读 MVP | 中 | 生产前补充 E2E 与安全验证 |
+| 部分策略负向、并发和审计测试待补强 | 中 | Codex 登记 blocker 并补充 |
+| 本地/Gitea 自动双写状态仍需持续证明 | 中 | 验收记录 OID |
+| 性能、容量和 SLO 尚无实测 | 中 | 预发布基准测试 |
+| 外部不可变审计固化尚未实现 | 中 | 生产数据层阶段完成 |
+
+## 12. 发布 Gate
+
+### 允许进入预发布
+
+条件：
+
+- Candidate 分支可见；
+- 文档完整；
+- 任务合同已生成；
+- 部署资产存在；
+- 无明文 Secret。
+
+### 允许进入合并审查
+
+条件：
+
+- 全量验收通过；
+- OpenClaw/Hermes 联调通过；
+- 重启和回滚通过；
+- 严重/高风险 blocker 已解决；
+- Codex 输出正向监督结论；
+- 本地/Gitea OID 一致。
+
+### 允许生产发布
+
+条件：
+
+- Owner 明确批准；
+- Merge 与 Tag 通过受控流程；
+- 生产配置、Secret 和反向代理准备完成；
+- 发布窗口、观察指标、回滚负责人明确。
+
+## 13. 当前结论
+
+**代码和正式中文文档已经达到候选闭环状态，但尚不能宣称生产已验证。**
+
+下一阶段由 OpenClaw 执行预发布部署和低风险 Bug 修复，由 Codex 监督架构、文档、安全、测试和阻塞。所有过程证据统一进入系统，满足 Gate 后再请求 Owner 批准。
+
+## 14. 更新规则
+
+以下变化必须更新本报告：
+
+- Candidate Commit；
+- 测试结果；
+- 部署和回滚结果；
+- Blocker 和风险；
+- OpenClaw/Codex 任务状态；
+- 文档—代码匹配状态；
+- Gitea OID；
+- 发布建议和 Owner 决策。

BUILD_RECEIPT_V2R1C7.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "aios.v2r1c7.engineering-build-receipt.v1",
-  "version": "V2R1C7",
-  "base_oid": "b356dec2ac5bd2a5f721aa73f8fd1902f9c65632",
-  "production_deployed": false,
-  "tag_created": false,
-  "baseline_changed": false,
-  "deployable": true
-}

MANIFEST.sha256

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-bec7da1adb75bf5feaa63c60ec6d03adf15d7508742a486207033d000f72d4ff  AGENT_DEPLOYMENT_REQUIREMENTS.md
-251b46e51ce09aa2fd843bee48ef24a5608f31d24c599841f086ceb25c1a1715  README.md
-783f68ec4f00a11d43ceed536196bfedccaf6614f6db9805f7b36d24e5fa7bc2  TEST_RESULTS.json
-9208325e5b2e6f5ba6b64e000bc21d14d9f2f214e3ad33dd79857e85218fd6c2  VERSION
-c4b24b65195077716983acdc8611f705324413a74453858994ba51541957afd4  active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py
-8a1935fa098d47ac02ce51bbd9fd5fad7cf9ab9374ea3de5f630679b96681d84  active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-0997ab8332985c7124f334c4e49735d8833326578acc61a61a389bf792424de3  active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py
-dd3f8b1cab88e005a291f077807873c381e8ca92fe863dc05817925f0dff9613  active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py
-9e45025c41068cafdea2f360edfc4146a5459b0a6bcfbf1403206fc0161e7bac  active-runtime/app/v2r1c7_health_service.py
-c96ba560d69f6c2eb700b9f2b42a32e394dadd00dffb23bbefdb9fb3e1571c0d  deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service
-a05d4e8038fdb866ce17d4fb8a54798a268a1e8d44ff2cbc559069fa6ab2a667  deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api-authorized-writer-bridge.conf.example
-a60dac51802bff67c2cfff61acdeb0a3a05d74a4f6cb47e3f78295ceb5c6acd9  docs/gitops/authorized-task-writer-provisioning.md
-2690f76452bceddda90c728278c600bcebd533db24776e2966423c5a8655e4b5  docs/gitops/openapi-authorized-task-writer-fragment.yaml
-560e5d9af8a8e2ec60ec31cf8659a7982b93ea09b7adb486b738ea2fba460d70  release-manifests/V2R1C7.json
-81a423c7814f81cb888b60a538c153e549b2be9099c881c968d55ae84efddc57  scripts/build_v2r1c7_release_artifact.py
-64c78dabffb05c8851f87b2a27c43bd1f21728dca586397d03a6bc22906a906c  scripts/probe_v2r1c7_health.py
-5419dc7de0f50908ad0ef1dac74172fce811bb7b45f314a6e1c1bb9ce618324d  scripts/rollback_v2r1c7_release.sh
-54e2845d2c3c026323ad45515e082d661e3b461feb3bfefedf5adc52db2d7b78  scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-32a860e28d5afc105f413d878a13fb8600fa74874dbd3bc4c031ef3efa17896a  scripts/verify_v2r1c7_release.py
-3cce2b744326fe12b89bcad3cd352c77738950964bf8519e72cb5e9c7a5dfbfc  tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py
-8f3153c625241f60b65109eeac045e8aed7661d95f3a10f0b32ba3e0e9ac0a85  versions/V2R1C7.json

TEST_RESULTS.json

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "git_branch_created": false,
-  "git_commit_created": false,
-  "production_mutation": false,
-  "py_compile": {
-    "files": [
-      "active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
-      "active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py"
-    ],
-    "status": "PASS"
-  },
-  "schema": "aios.authorized-task-writer-bridge-test-report.v1",
-  "secrets_included": false,
-  "smoke": {
-    "command": "python3 scripts/smoke_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
-    "status": "PASS"
-  },
-  "status": "PASS",
-  "unit_tests": {
-    "command": "python3 -m unittest -v tests/test_authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py",
-    "errors": 0,
-    "failures": 0,
-    "total": 9
-  }
-}

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-V2R1C7
+V1R4C6

active-runtime/app/agent_pull_runner.py

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed Agent Pull Runner primitives for AIOS autonomy v1.
-
-The runner owns task discovery and reporting only.  It never accepts shell
-strings: executors receive argv, an allowlisted cwd and an allowlisted env.
-Durable state is intentionally small so restart recovery and duplicate
-suppression can be verified without coupling the runner to one database.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import random
-import shutil
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import time
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
-
-
-class RunnerError(RuntimeError):
-    """Raised when a runner contract would be violated."""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RunnerConfig:
-    worker_id: str
-    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    long_poll_seconds: int = 30
-    fallback_seconds: int = 60
-    jitter_seconds: int = 5
-    max_backoff_seconds: int = 300
-    executable_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    working_directory_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    environment_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-
-
-@dataclass
-class RunnerState:
-    inflight: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    terminal: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=dict)
-
-
-class RunnerTransport(Protocol):
-    def register_worker(self, worker_id: str, capabilities: Sequence[str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def heartbeat(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def long_poll(self, worker_id: str, timeout_seconds: int) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
-    def poll(self, worker_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: ...
-    def claim(self, worker_id: str, task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def renew(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def report_progress(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def report_result(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def report_evidence(self, worker_id: str, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-
-
-class JsonStateStore:
-    """Atomic JSON state store for restart recovery."""
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path)
-
-    def load(self) -> RunnerState:
-        if not self.path.exists():
-            return RunnerState()
-        value = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        if not isinstance(value, dict):
-            raise RunnerError("runner state must be an object")
-        return RunnerState(
-            inflight=dict(value.get("inflight", {})),
-            terminal=dict(value.get("terminal", {})),
-        )
-
-    def save(self, state: RunnerState) -> None:
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=self.path.name + ".", dir=self.path.parent)
-        try:
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                json.dump({"inflight": state.inflight, "terminal": state.terminal}, handle, sort_keys=True)
-                handle.write("\n")
-            os.chmod(name, 0o600)
-            os.replace(name, self.path)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(name):
-                os.unlink(name)
-
-
-class AgentPullRunner:
-    """Pull, claim, execute and report one task at a time."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        config: RunnerConfig,
-        transport: RunnerTransport,
-        state_store: JsonStateStore | None = None,
-        *,
-        random_fn: Callable[[], float] = random.random,
-    ) -> None:
-        if not config.worker_id.strip():
-            raise RunnerError("worker_id is required")
-        self.config = config
-        self.transport = transport
-        self.state_store = state_store
-        self.random_fn = random_fn
-        self.state = state_store.load() if state_store else RunnerState()
-
-    def _save(self) -> None:
-        if self.state_store:
-            self.state_store.save(self.state)
-
-    def register(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        return self.transport.register_worker(self.config.worker_id, self.config.capabilities)
-
-    def heartbeat(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        return self.transport.heartbeat(self.config.worker_id)
-
-    def discovery_delay(self, failures: int) -> float:
-        failures = max(0, int(failures))
-        base = min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, self.config.fallback_seconds * (2**failures))
-        jitter = self.random_fn() * max(0, self.config.jitter_seconds)
-        return min(self.config.max_backoff_seconds, base + jitter)
-
-    def discover_once(self) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None:
-        try:
-            task = self.transport.long_poll(self.config.worker_id, self.config.long_poll_seconds)
-        except Exception:
-            task = None
-        if task is None:
-            task = self.transport.poll(self.config.worker_id)
-        if not task:
-            return None
-        task_id = str(task.get("task_id", ""))
-        if not task_id:
-            raise RunnerError("task_id is required")
-        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
-            return {"status": "duplicate_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
-        claimed = dict(self.transport.claim(self.config.worker_id, task))
-        self.state.inflight[task_id] = claimed
-        self._save()
-        return claimed
-
-    def renew(self, task_id: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
-            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
-        return self.transport.renew(self.config.worker_id, task_id)
-
-    def report_progress(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
-            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
-        return self.transport.report_progress(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
-
-    def report_evidence(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
-            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
-        return self.transport.report_evidence(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload)
-
-    def report_result(self, task_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        if task_id in self.state.terminal:
-            return {"status": "duplicate_terminal_suppressed", "task_id": task_id}
-        if task_id not in self.state.inflight:
-            raise RunnerError("task is not inflight")
-        result = dict(self.transport.report_result(self.config.worker_id, task_id, payload))
-        self.state.terminal[task_id] = {"result": result, "reported_at": time.time()}
-        self.state.inflight.pop(task_id, None)
-        self._save()
-        return result
-
-    def recover_after_restart(self) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
-        recovered: list[Mapping[str, Any]] = []
-        for task_id in tuple(self.state.inflight):
-            recovered.append(self.renew(task_id))
-        return recovered
-
-    def validate_execution(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> None:
-        if not argv or any(not isinstance(item, str) or not item for item in argv):
-            raise RunnerError("argv_only_execution_required")
-        if any(ch in argv[0] for ch in (";", "|", "&", "`", "\n")):
-            raise RunnerError("shell_syntax_denied")
-        executable = shutil.which(argv[0])
-        if not executable:
-            raise RunnerError("executable_not_found")
-        if self.config.executable_allowlist and not any(
-            os.path.realpath(executable).startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
-            or os.path.realpath(executable) == os.path.realpath(prefix)
-            for prefix in self.config.executable_allowlist
-        ):
-            raise RunnerError("executable_not_allowlisted")
-        real_cwd = os.path.realpath(os.fspath(cwd))
-        if self.config.working_directory_allowlist and not any(
-            real_cwd == os.path.realpath(prefix)
-            or real_cwd.startswith(os.path.realpath(prefix).rstrip(os.sep) + os.sep)
-            for prefix in self.config.working_directory_allowlist
-        ):
-            raise RunnerError("working_directory_not_allowlisted")
-        if self.config.environment_allowlist and any(key not in self.config.environment_allowlist for key in env):
-            raise RunnerError("environment_key_not_allowlisted")
-
-    def execute_argv(self, argv: Sequence[str], cwd: str | os.PathLike[str], env: Mapping[str, str]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        self.validate_execution(argv, cwd, env)
-        completed = subprocess.run(list(argv), cwd=os.fspath(cwd), env=dict(env), shell=False, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
-        return {"returncode": completed.returncode, "stdout": completed.stdout, "stderr": completed.stderr}

active-runtime/app/agent_pull_runner_cli.py

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-"""Small operational CLI for the Agent Pull Runner contract."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-
-from agent_pull_runner import AgentPullRunner, RunnerConfig
-
-
-class _NoopTransport:
-    def register_worker(self, worker_id, capabilities): return {"status": "registered", "worker_id": worker_id, "capabilities": list(capabilities)}
-    def heartbeat(self, worker_id): return {"status": "alive", "worker_id": worker_id}
-    def long_poll(self, worker_id, timeout_seconds): return None
-    def poll(self, worker_id): return None
-    def claim(self, worker_id, task): return task
-    def renew(self, worker_id, task_id): return {"status": "renewed", "task_id": task_id}
-    def report_progress(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "progress_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
-    def report_result(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "result_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
-    def report_evidence(self, worker_id, task_id, payload): return {"status": "evidence_recorded", "task_id": task_id}
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS Agent Pull Runner")
-    parser.add_argument("--worker-id", default="self-test-worker")
-    parser.add_argument("--self-test", action="store_true")
-    args = parser.parse_args()
-    runner = AgentPullRunner(RunnerConfig(worker_id=args.worker_id, fallback_seconds=60), _NoopTransport())
-    if args.self_test:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "PASS", "registration": runner.register(), "fallback_seconds": runner.config.fallback_seconds}, sort_keys=True))
-        return 0
-    print(json.dumps({"status": "READY", "worker_id": args.worker_id}, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_authority_git_executor.py

@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed Authority Git side-effect boundary.
-
-Only this module may issue the narrowly scoped ref CAS primitives used by the
-durable executor. It never accepts force updates, arbitrary refs, tags, or
-direct production mutations.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-from typing import Mapping, Sequence
-
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-TASK_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^refs/heads/agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
-
-
-class AuthorityGitError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise AuthorityGitError(f"{field}_INVALID")
-    return value
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class AuthorityGitExecutor:
-    git_dir: Path
-    worktree_root: Path = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/worktrees")
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if not self.git_dir.is_absolute() or self.git_dir.is_symlink():
-            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR_INVALID")
-        if not self.worktree_root.is_absolute() or self.worktree_root.is_symlink():
-            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ROOT_INVALID")
-
-    def _git(self, args: Sequence[str], *, check: bool = True) -> str:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", *args],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if check and result.returncode != 0:
-            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_GIT_COMMAND_FAILED")
-        return result.stdout.strip()
-
-    def read_ref(self, ref: str) -> str | None:
-        if not ref.startswith("refs/") or ref.startswith(("refs/tags/", "refs/remotes/")):
-            raise AuthorityGitError("REF_READ_SCOPE_DENIED")
-        value = self._git(["rev-parse", "--verify", ref], check=False)
-        return value if value and OID_RE.fullmatch(value) else None
-
-    def commit_exists(self, oid: str) -> bool:
-        _oid(oid, "commit_oid")
-        result = subprocess.run(["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "cat-file", "-e", oid + "^{commit}"], capture_output=True, check=False)
-        return result.returncode == 0
-
-    def ancestry_check(self, older_oid: str, newer_oid: str) -> bool:
-        _oid(older_oid, "older_oid")
-        _oid(newer_oid, "newer_oid")
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", older_oid, newer_oid],
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if result.returncode not in (0, 1):
-            raise AuthorityGitError("ANCESTRY_CHECK_FAILED")
-        return result.returncode == 0
-
-    def create_detached_worktree(
-        self,
-        base_oid: str,
-        worktree_name: str,
-        root: Path | None = None,
-    ) -> Path:
-        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
-        if not worktree_name or "/" in worktree_name or "\\" in worktree_name or worktree_name in {".", ".."}:
-            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_NAME_INVALID")
-        parent = root or self.worktree_root
-        if not parent.is_absolute() or parent.is_symlink():
-            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ROOT_INVALID")
-        path = parent / worktree_name
-        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
-            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ALREADY_EXISTS")
-        parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(path), base_oid])
-        return path
-
-    def advance_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
-        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
-            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
-        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
-        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
-        current = self.read_ref(branch)
-        if current != expected_oid:
-            if current == new_oid:
-                return new_oid
-            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_oid, new_oid):
-            raise AuthorityGitError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
-        self._git(["update-ref", branch, new_oid, expected_oid])
-        readback = self.read_ref(branch)
-        if readback != new_oid:
-            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
-        return readback
-
-    def ff_CAS_main_after_verified_protected_merge(self, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
-        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
-        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
-        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_oid, new_oid):
-            raise AuthorityGitError("MAIN_FF_REQUIRED")
-        current = self.read_ref("refs/heads/main")
-        if current != expected_oid:
-            if current == new_oid:
-                return new_oid
-            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        self._git(["update-ref", "refs/heads/main", new_oid, expected_oid])
-        readback = self.read_ref("refs/heads/main")
-        if readback != new_oid:
-            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
-        return readback
-
-    def commit_file_in_isolated_worktree(
-        self,
-        *,
-        base_oid: str,
-        files: Mapping[str, bytes],
-        message: str,
-        worktree_name: str,
-    ) -> str:
-        _oid(base_oid, "base_oid")
-        if not worktree_name or "/" in worktree_name or "\\" in worktree_name or worktree_name in {".", ".."}:
-            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_NAME_INVALID")
-        root = self.worktree_root / worktree_name
-        if root.exists() or root.is_symlink():
-            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ALREADY_EXISTS")
-        self.worktree_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(root), base_oid])
-        try:
-            for relative, content in files.items():
-                path = Path(relative)
-                if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or not path.parts or path.parts[0] == ".git":
-                    raise AuthorityGitError("FILE_PATH_INVALID")
-                target = root / path
-                target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-                target.write_bytes(content)
-            result = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "-C", str(root), "add", "--", *files.keys()],
-                text=True,
-                capture_output=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if result.returncode != 0:
-                raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_ADD_FAILED")
-            result = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "-C", str(root), "-c", "user.name=aios-durable-job", "-c", "user.email=aios-durable-job@localhost", "commit", "--no-verify", "-m", message],
-                text=True,
-                capture_output=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if result.returncode != 0:
-                raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_COMMIT_FAILED")
-            return subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(root), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
-        finally:
-            subprocess.run(["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "worktree", "remove", "--force", str(root)], capture_output=True, check=False)

active-runtime/app/aios_authorized_task_writer_api.py

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-"""HTTP adapter for Owner-authorized task writer provisioning.
-
-Run this module instead of aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py. All existing routes are
-delegated unchanged; only POST /api/task-writer/provision-authorized is added.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import urllib.parse
-
-import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
-from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
-    AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner,
-    OwnerContext,
-    ProvisioningError,
-)
-
-
-_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
-_ENDPOINT = "/api/task-writer/provision-authorized"
-
-
-def _owner_authorization(handler):
-    scope = os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_PROVISION_SCOPE", "writer:provision"
-    )
-    auth = handler.need(scope)
-    if not auth:
-        return None
-    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
-        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED"}, 403)
-        return None
-    identity = str(auth.get("account") or "").strip()
-    if not identity:
-        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
-        return None
-    return auth
-
-
-def _authorized_do_post(self):
-    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-    if path != _ENDPOINT:
-        return _original_do_post(self)
-    auth = _owner_authorization(self)
-    if not auth:
-        return
-    data = self.body()
-    owner_reference = str(data.get("owner_authorization_reference") or "")
-    try:
-        result = AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner().provision(
-            data,
-            OwnerContext(
-                identity=str(auth["account"]),
-                role=str(auth["role"]),
-                authorization_reference=owner_reference,
-            ),
-        )
-        return self.sendj(result)
-    except ProvisioningError as exc:
-        body = {"error": exc.code}
-        if exc.details:
-            body["details"] = exc.details
-        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
-    except Exception:
-        # Do not expose tool output, paths containing credentials, or traceback data.
-        return self.sendj({"error": "AUTHORIZED_WRITER_BRIDGE_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500)
-
-
-api.H.do_POST = _authorized_do_post
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    api.main()

active-runtime/app/aios_branch_repair_lease_api.py

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-"""Governed API facade for branch-bound repair leases.
-
-The facade is transport-neutral so the permanent control plane can expose it
-through its existing authenticated loopback/API seam without creating a second
-Git writer or a global credential registry.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from branch_repair_lease import LeaseError, RepairLease, RepairLeaseManager, sanitized_lease_view
-
-
-class BranchRepairLeaseAPI:
-    """Validate operation envelopes and return sanitized lease metadata."""
-
-    def __init__(self, manager: RepairLeaseManager) -> None:
-        self.manager = manager
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _required(request: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> Any:
-        value = request.get(name)
-        if value is None or value == "":
-            raise LeaseError(f"missing required field: {name}")
-        return value
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _view(lease: RepairLease) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"status": "ok", "lease": sanitized_lease_view(lease)}
-
-    def handle(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        try:
-            operation = self._required(request, "operation")
-            owner = str(self._required(request, "owner_identity"))
-            if operation == "issue":
-                lease = self.manager.issue(
-                    task_id=str(self._required(request, "task_id")),
-                    owner_identity=owner,
-                    branch=str(self._required(request, "branch")),
-                    description=str(self._required(request, "description")),
-                    allowed_paths=tuple(self._required(request, "allowed_paths")),
-                    ttl_seconds=int(request.get("ttl_seconds", 3600)),
-                )
-            elif operation == "attach_existing_branch":
-                lease = self.manager.attach_existing_branch(
-                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
-                    owner_identity=owner,
-                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
-                )
-            elif operation == "authorize_commit":
-                lease = self.manager.authorize_commit(
-                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
-                    owner_identity=owner,
-                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
-                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
-                    content=request.get("content"),
-                )
-            elif operation == "record_commit":
-                lease = self.manager.record_commit(
-                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
-                    owner_identity=owner,
-                    expected_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "expected_head_oid")),
-                    new_head_oid=str(self._required(request, "new_head_oid")),
-                    paths=tuple(self._required(request, "paths")),
-                )
-            elif operation == "recover":
-                lease = self.manager.recover(
-                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
-                )
-            elif operation == "renew":
-                lease = self.manager.renew(
-                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")),
-                    owner_identity=owner,
-                    ttl_seconds=int(self._required(request, "ttl_seconds")),
-                )
-            elif operation == "complete":
-                lease = self.manager.complete(
-                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
-                )
-            elif operation == "revoke":
-                lease = self.manager.revoke(
-                    str(self._required(request, "lease_id")), owner_identity=owner
-                )
-            else:
-                raise LeaseError("unsupported lease operation")
-            return self._view(lease)
-        except (LeaseError, TypeError, ValueError):
-            return {"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_request_rejected"}

active-runtime/app/aios_branch_repair_lease_cli.py

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-"""Root-only CLI for the branch-bound repair lease API."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-
-from aios_branch_repair_lease_api import BranchRepairLeaseAPI
-from branch_repair_lease import GitProbe, LeaseStore
-from branch_repair_lease import RepairLeaseManager
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS branch repair lease CLI")
-    parser.add_argument("--store", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--request-file")
-    parser.add_argument("--request-json")
-    args = parser.parse_args()
-    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "root_required"}))
-        return 2
-    if bool(args.request_file) == bool(args.request_json):
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "one_request_source_required"}))
-        return 2
-    try:
-        raw = (
-            Path(args.request_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-            if args.request_file
-            else str(args.request_json)
-        )
-        request = json.loads(raw)
-        if not isinstance(request, dict):
-            raise ValueError("request must be an object")
-        api = BranchRepairLeaseAPI(RepairLeaseManager(LeaseStore(args.store), GitProbe(args.bare_repo)))
-        response = api.handle(request)
-        print(json.dumps(response, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")))
-        return 0 if response.get("status") == "ok" else 1
-    except Exception:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "blocked", "error": "lease_cli_failed"}))
-        return 1
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_campaign_recovery.py

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-"""Read-only validation of recovered campaign authorization evidence."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import stat
-from typing import Any
-
-
-class RecoveryEvidenceError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def _digest(path: Path) -> str:
-    h = hashlib.sha256()
-    with path.open("rb") as stream:
-        for block in iter(lambda: stream.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
-            h.update(block)
-    return h.hexdigest()
-
-
-def _secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_MISSING")
-    info = path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
-    if info.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o022:
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_PERMISSIONS")
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_INVALID") from exc
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
-    return value
-
-
-def load_recovered_authorization(path: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Verify the recovery receipt, sidecar, and all referenced immutable files."""
-    receipt_path = Path(path)
-    receipt = _secure_json(receipt_path)
-    sidecar = receipt_path.with_suffix(receipt_path.suffix + ".sha256")
-    if sidecar.is_symlink() or not sidecar.is_file():
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_SIDECAR_MISSING")
-    expected = sidecar.read_text(encoding="ascii").split()[0]
-    actual = _digest(receipt_path)
-    if expected != actual:
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
-    required = {
-        "schema",
-        "campaign_id",
-        "original_event_id",
-        "original_authorization_digest",
-        "signed_grant_id",
-        "signed_grant_digest",
-        "task_id",
-        "repository",
-        "original_base_oid",
-        "branch",
-        "expected_branch_oid",
-        "recovered_from_existing_evidence",
-        "new_owner_interaction",
-        "recovery_state",
-        "production_side_effect_executed",
-        "global_writes_enabled",
-        "grant_consumed",
-        "owner_authorization_consumed",
-        "original_receipts_immutable",
-        "recovered_at",
-        "evidence_files",
-    }
-    if set(receipt) != required or receipt["schema"] != "aios.owner-authorization-recovery.v1":
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    if receipt["recovered_from_existing_evidence"] is not True or receipt["new_owner_interaction"] is not False:
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_NOT_APPEND_ONLY")
-    if receipt["production_side_effect_executed"] is not False or receipt["global_writes_enabled"] is not False:
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_SCOPE_INVALID")
-    if receipt["recovery_state"] != "RECOVERED_PENDING_CONTINUATION_LEASE":
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_STATE_INVALID")
-    evidence = receipt["evidence_files"]
-    if not isinstance(evidence, list) or not evidence:
-        raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_LIST_INVALID")
-    for item in evidence:
-        if not isinstance(item, dict) or set(item) != {"path", "sha256"}:
-            raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_ENTRY_INVALID")
-        target = Path(item["path"])
-        if _digest(target) != item["sha256"]:
-            raise RecoveryEvidenceError("RECOVERY_EVIDENCE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
-    return {
-        "schema": receipt["schema"],
-        "state": receipt["recovery_state"],
-        "campaign_id": receipt["campaign_id"],
-        "original_event_id": receipt["original_event_id"],
-        "original_authorization_digest": receipt["original_authorization_digest"],
-        "signed_grant_id": receipt["signed_grant_id"],
-        "task_id": receipt["task_id"],
-        "repository": receipt["repository"],
-        "original_base_oid": receipt["original_base_oid"],
-        "branch": receipt["branch"],
-        "expected_branch_oid": receipt["expected_branch_oid"],
-        "digest": actual,
-        "new_owner_interaction": False,
-    }

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py

@@ -1,69 +1,12 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 from __future__ import annotations
-import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, uuid
+import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, uuid
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
-try:
-    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
-except ModuleNotFoundError:
-    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
-    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
-
-from gitea_tag_publication import (
-    GiteaTagClient,
-    GitTagBackend,
-    PublicationConflict,
-    PublicationPending,
-    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
-    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
-    PublicationRequest,
-    TagPublisher,
-    redact,
-    validate_version,
-    validate_gitea_api_url,
-)
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', '/data/aios-gitops/workspace')) / 'runtime' / 'agent-os'))
 from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
-from silent_release_hardening import (
-    ApprovalKeyRing,
-    ApprovalRevocationStore,
-    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
-    SagaConflict,
-    SignedApprovalVerifier,
-    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
-    SilentReleaseActionService,
-)
-try:
-    from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, ServiceUnavailable, JobStore
-except ModuleNotFoundError:
-    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
-    from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, ServiceUnavailable, JobStore
-try:
-    from authoritative_git import (
-        AuthoritativeGitError,
-        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
-        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
-        authoritative_branches,
-        authoritative_diff,
-        authoritative_commit,
-        authoritative_tags,
-        repository_snapshot,
-        run_authoritative_git,
-    )
-except ModuleNotFoundError:
-    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
-    from authoritative_git import (
-        AuthoritativeGitError,
-        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
-        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
-        authoritative_branches,
-        authoritative_diff,
-        authoritative_commit,
-        authoritative_tags,
-        repository_snapshot,
-        run_authoritative_git,
-    )
 
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
@@ -73,19 +16,6 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
-AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
-REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
-SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
-    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
-    '/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
-))
-SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED = str(os.getenv(
-    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED', 'false'
-)).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
-SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
-    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
-    '/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
-))
 monitor = ActionMonitor()
 
 BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -94,49 +24,7 @@ BASE_MODELS = [
   {'id':'base.gpt-5.5','provider':'openai','model':'gpt-5.5','display_name':'GPT-5.5','scope':'global'},
 ]
 SECRET_RE = re.compile(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})')
-SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(
-    r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])'
-    r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})'
-)
-
-READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
-    '/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
-    '/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
-    '/api/base', '/api/baseline', '/base', '/api/ver', '/api/versions', '/ver',
-    '/api/diff', '/diff', '/api/patch', '/api/patches', '/api/branches', '/patch',
-    '/api/model', '/model', '/api/run', '/api/runtime-status', '/run',
-    '/api/action-monitor', '/action-monitor', '/admin/ai-evolution',
-    '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
-    '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
-    '/api/release-acceptance',
-    '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
-    '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
-    '/getRecoveryStatus',
-})
-SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
-    '/createReleaseCandidate',
-    '/createReleaseIntent',
-    '/submitSignedApproval',
-    '/submitOwnerApproval',
-    '/startDeployment',
-})
-
-def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
-    if method == 'GET':
-        return False
-    if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
-        return False
-    if (
-        method == 'POST'
-        and path in ('/api/file', '/api/commit-file')
-        and os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED', os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_CONTROLLER_ENABLED', 'false')).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
-    ):
-        return False
-    decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
-    if decision.allowed:
-        return False
-    handler.sendj(decision.payload(), decision.status_code)
-    return True
+SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})')
 
 def now() -> str: return time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())
 def uid(p='id') -> str: return f'{p}-{int(time.time()*1000)}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}'
@@ -148,41 +36,6 @@ def sh(args, check=False):
 def jload(p: Path, default):
     try: return json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
     except Exception: return default
-
-def _file_sha256(path: Path) -> str:
-    digest=hashlib.sha256()
-    with path.open('rb') as source:
-        for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b''):
-            digest.update(chunk)
-    return digest.hexdigest()
-
-def _build_silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
-    verifier=None
-    if SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS.is_file():
-        verifier=SignedApprovalVerifier(
-            ApprovalKeyRing.from_file(SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS),
-            ApprovalRevocationStore(
-                SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT / 'revocations'
-            ),
-        )
-    policy_path=WS / 'config' / 'gitops' / 'silent-release-policy.json'
-    policy_sha=_file_sha256(policy_path) if policy_path.is_file() else ''
-    return SilentReleaseActionService(
-        SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT,
-        execution_enabled=SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,
-        approval_verifier=verifier,
-        expected_repository=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-        policy_sha256=policy_sha,
-    )
-
-# Construct once during service startup. If production execution is enabled
-# without every trusted builder/orchestrator dependency, construction fails
-# closed before the HTTP server accepts traffic.
-_SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE = _build_silent_release_service()
-
-
-def silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
-    return _SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE
 def relpath(path: str) -> str:
     x = str(path or '').replace('\\','/').strip()
     if not x or x.startswith('/') or '..' in Path(x).parts or Path(x).parts[0] == '.git': raise ValueError('invalid path')
@@ -256,13 +109,9 @@ def ensure_git():
     if not sh(['config','user.name'])['stdout']: sh(['config','user.name','chatgpt-gitops-bot'], True)
 def checkout(branch, base='main', create=False):
     ensure_git(); b=branch_name(branch)
-    exists = sh(['rev-parse','--verify',f'refs/heads/{b}'])['code'] == 0
-    if exists:
-        sh(['checkout',b], True)
-    elif create:
-        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-b',b], True)
-    else:
-        raise ValueError(f'branch does not exist: {b}')
+    if create or sh(['rev-parse','--verify',b])['code'] != 0:
+        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-B',b], True)
+    else: sh(['checkout',b], True)
     return b
 def write_file(path, content):
     if content_has_secret(content): raise ValueError('secret_rejected: use secret_ref; plaintext API keys must not enter Git')
@@ -272,19 +121,6 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
     if not branch or branch in ('main','master') or branch.startswith('main/') or branch.startswith('master/'):
         return {'status':'skipped','reason':'protected_branch','branch':branch}
     if BARE_REPO.exists():
-        common = sh(['rev-parse', '--path-format=absolute', '--git-common-dir'], True)['stdout']
-        if Path(common).resolve() == BARE_REPO.resolve():
-            head = sh(['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], True)['stdout']
-            stored = subprocess.run(
-                ['git', '--git-dir', str(BARE_REPO), 'rev-parse', f'refs/heads/{branch}'],
-                text=True, capture_output=True,
-            )
-            if stored.returncode != 0 or stored.stdout.strip() != head:
-                raise RuntimeError(f'linked-worktree branch verification failed for {branch}')
-            return {
-                'status':'verified', 'target':'authoritative-bare',
-                'branch':branch, 'oid':head,
-            }
         ref=f'refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}'
         p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
         if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git sync failed for {branch}')
@@ -294,67 +130,15 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
     return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','branch':branch,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
 
 def sync_tag(tag: str) -> dict:
-    raise RuntimeError(
-        'unsafe sync_tag disabled: use TagPublisher with expected tag_oid, '
-        'target_oid, Gitea remote verification, and authenticated API verification'
-    )
-
-def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
-    oid = str(value or '').strip().lower()
-    if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', oid):
-        raise ValueError(f'{field} must be a full 40-character commit OID')
-    try:
-        return authoritative_commit(oid, git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
-    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
-        raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
-
-def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
-    validate_version(tag)
-    try:
-        result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
-            check=False,
-            git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-        )
-    except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
-    return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
-
-def publication_request_from_query(q: dict[str, list[str]]) -> PublicationRequest:
-    required = ('version', 'target_oid', 'evidence_closure_oid', 'approval_plan_id')
-    missing = [name for name in required if not (q.get(name) or [''])[0]]
-    if missing:
-        raise ValueError('missing release governance fields: ' + ', '.join(missing))
-    return PublicationRequest(
-        (q['version'])[0],
-        (q['target_oid'])[0].lower(),
-        (q['evidence_closure_oid'])[0].lower(),
-        (q['approval_plan_id'])[0],
-    )
-
-def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
-    snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-        git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-        repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-    )
-    if not snapshot["repository_available"]:
-        raise RuntimeError(str(snapshot["query_error"] or "AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE"))
-    return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
-
-
-def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
-    authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
-    return TagPublisher(
-        WS,
-        GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
-        GiteaTagClient(
-            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
-            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
-            Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
-            token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
-        ),
-        os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
-    )
+    if not tag: return {'status':'skipped','reason':'empty_tag'}
+    if BARE_REPO.exists():
+        ref=f'refs/tags/{tag}:refs/tags/{tag}'
+        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
+        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag sync failed for {tag}')
+        return {'status':'synced','target':'bare','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
+    p=subprocess.run(['git','push','origin',tag], cwd=str(WS), text=True, capture_output=True)
+    if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag push failed for {tag}')
+    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
 
 def commit(paths, msg):
     ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -374,16 +158,6 @@ def patches():
     for p in sorted((WS/'patches').glob('**/*.json')): out.append(jload(p, {'path':str(p.relative_to(WS))}))
     return out
 
-def runtime_release_info() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    for candidate in (WS / 'manifest.json', WS.parent / 'manifest.json'):
-        data = jload(candidate, {})
-        if data.get('target_commit'):
-            return {
-                'runtime_release_commit': data.get('target_commit'),
-                'runtime_release_path': str(WS),
-            }
-    return {'runtime_release_commit': None, 'runtime_release_path': str(WS)}
-
 class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     server_version='AIOSChatGPTGitOps/V1R1C0'
     def sendj(self, data, code=200):
@@ -404,290 +178,44 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if not a['ok']: self.sendj({'error':'unauthorized','hint':'Bearer token required'},401); return None
         if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
         return a
-    def bridge_release(self, path, data):
-        route = {
-            '/createTagApprovalRequest': '/v2/tag/approval-request',
-            '/requestOrCreateTag': '/v2/tag/publish',
-            '/getTagPublicationStatus': '/v2/tag/status',
-            '/buildProductionArtifact': '/v2/release/artifact',
-            '/executeApprovedProductionRelease': '/v2/release/execute',
-            '/getReleaseConsistency': '/v2/release/consistency',
-            '/runReleaseAcceptance': '/v2/release/acceptance',
-        }.get(path)
-        if route is None:
-            raise ValueError('governed_release_route_invalid')
-        base = os.getenv('AIOS_BRIDGE_V2_URL', 'http://127.0.0.1:18892').rstrip('/')
-        request = urllib.request.Request(
-            base + route,
-            data=json.dumps(data, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode('utf-8'),
-            headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
-            method='POST',
-        )
-        try:
-            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
-                result = json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
-                return self.sendj(result, response.status)
-        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-            try:
-                body = json.loads(exc.read().decode('utf-8'))
-            except Exception:
-                body = {'error': 'bridge_http_error'}
-            return self.sendj(body, exc.code)
-        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
-            return self.sendj({'error': 'GOVERNED_BRIDGE_UNAVAILABLE', 'detail': type(exc).__name__}, 503)
-    def do_POST(self):
-        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
-        if path in {
-            '/createTagApprovalRequest', '/requestOrCreateTag', '/getTagPublicationStatus',
-            '/buildProductionArtifact', '/executeApprovedProductionRelease',
-            '/getReleaseConsistency', '/runReleaseAcceptance',
-        }:
-            actor = self.need('tag:create')
-            if not actor:
-                return
-            return self.bridge_release(path, self.body())
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path):
-            return
-        return self.sendj({'error': 'not_found', 'path': path}, 404)
     def do_GET(self):
-        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
-        if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-        q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path; q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
         try:
             if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
             if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
                 return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
             if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
             if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
-                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
-                data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                ))
-                return self.sendj(data)
+                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {}); data.setdefault('git', sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']); return self.sendj(data)
             if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                )
-                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
-                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
-                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                try:
-                    tags = authoritative_tags(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
-                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': str(exc),
-                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
-                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
-                return self.sendj({
-                    'registry_versions': registry,
-                    'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
-                    'repository_available': True,
-                    'query_error': None,
-                    'tags': [item['name'] for item in tags],
-                    'versions_dir': registry,
-                    'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
-                    'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
-                })
+                return self.sendj({'tags':sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines(),'versions_dir':[p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],'head':sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']})
             if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
-                frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
-                to=(q.get('to') or [''])[0]
-                try:
-                    diff=authoritative_diff(frm, to, git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir())
-                except ValueError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},400)
-                except AuthoritativeGitNotFound as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},404)
-                except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
-                except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
-                payload = {'from': frm, 'to': to, 'diff': diff}
-                payload.update({
-                    key: diff[key]
-                    for key in (
-                        'from_oid', 'to_oid', 'changed_paths', 'stats',
-                        'total_size_bytes', 'truncated', 'patch_limit_bytes',
-                    )
-                })
-                return self.sendj(payload)
-            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
-                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                )
-                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
-                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
-                        'authoritative_branches': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                try:
-                    branches = authoritative_branches(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
-                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': str(exc),
-                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
-                        'authoritative_branches': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                metadata = patches()
-                branch_names = {item['name'] for item in branches}
-                metadata_names = {
-                    item.get('branch') for item in metadata
-                    if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get('branch')
-                }
-                orphan = [
-                    item for item in metadata
-                    if item.get('branch') and item.get('branch') not in branch_names
-                ]
-                missing = [
-                    item for item in branches
-                    if item['name'] not in metadata_names
-                ]
-                return self.sendj({
-                    'metadata_patches': metadata,
-                    'authoritative_branches': branches,
-                    'orphan_metadata': orphan,
-                    'branches_without_metadata': missing,
-                    'repository_available': True,
-                    'query_error': None,
-                    'patches': metadata,
-                    'branches': [item['name'] for item in branches],
-                })
+                frm=(q.get('from') or ['HEAD~1'])[0]; to=(q.get('to') or ['HEAD'])[0]; return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':sh(['diff',frm,to])})
+            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'): return self.sendj({'patches':patches(),'branches':sh(['branch','--format','%(refname:short)'])['stdout'].splitlines()})
             if path in ('/api/model','/model'): return self.sendj({'base':BASE_MODELS,'custom':model_docs(),'priority':[jload(p,{}) for p in sorted((WS/'config'/'model_priority').glob('*.json'))]})
             if path in ('/api/run','/api/runtime-status','/run'):
                 svc=subprocess.run(['systemctl','is-active','aios-gitops-model-api'], text=True, capture_output=True)
-                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                )
-                workspace_branch = None
-                if (WS / '.git').exists():
-                    result = sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])
-                    workspace_branch = result['stdout'] or None
-                payload = {
-                    'service':'aios-gitops-model-api',
-                    'status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),
-                    'workspace_branch':workspace_branch,
-                    **runtime_release_info(),
-                    **snapshot,
-                    'writes_enabled': str(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED','false')).lower() in {'1','true','yes','on'},
-                }
-                return self.sendj(payload, 200 if snapshot['repository_available'] else 503)
+                return self.sendj({'service':'aios-gitops-model-api','status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),'workspace_branch':sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])['stdout']})
             if path in ('/api/action-monitor','/action-monitor'):
                 latest=monitor.latest()
                 ldict={'event_id':latest.event_id,'action':latest.action,'error':latest.error,'context':latest.context,'created_at':latest.created_at} if latest else None
                 return self.sendj({'events':[{"event_id":e.event_id,"action":e.action,"error":e.error,"context":e.context,"created_at":e.created_at} for e in monitor.list_events()],'latest':ldict})
-            if path == '/api/tag-publication-status':
-                version=(q.get('version') or [''])[0]
-                try:
-                    version=validate_version(version)
-                    status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
-                except ValueError:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
-                return self.sendj(status)
-            if path == '/api/release-consistency':
-                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
-                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
-            if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
-                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
-                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
-            if path in (
-                '/getReleaseCandidate',
-                '/getReleasePlan',
-                '/getReleaseAcceptance',
-                '/getApprovalEnvelope',
-                '/getReleaseSaga',
-                '/getCapabilityStatus',
-            ):
-                candidate_id=(q.get('candidate_id') or [''])[0]
-                if not candidate_id:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':'candidate_id is required'},400)
-                service=silent_release_service()
-                if path == '/getReleaseCandidate':
-                    return self.sendj(
-                        service.get_release_candidate(candidate_id)
-                    )
-                if path == '/getApprovalEnvelope':
-                    return self.sendj(
-                        service.get_approval_envelope(candidate_id)
-                    )
-                if path == '/getReleasePlan':
-                    return self.sendj(service.get_release_plan(candidate_id))
-                if path == '/getReleaseAcceptance':
-                    return self.sendj(service.get_acceptance(candidate_id))
-                if path == '/getCapabilityStatus':
-                    return self.sendj(
-                        service.get_capability_status(candidate_id)
-                    )
-                return self.sendj(service.get_release_saga(candidate_id))
-            if path == '/getRecoveryStatus':
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().get_recovery_status()
-                )
                         # Admin AI Evolution Dashboard
             if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution','/admin/ai-evolution/'):
                 return self.ai_evolution_page()
             if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution/api/data'):
                 return self.ai_evolution_data()
             return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
-        except ValueError as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
         except Exception as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', str(e), {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
     def do_PUT(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PUT', path): return
-        data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
         if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
         return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
     def do_POST(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
-        data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
         try:
-            if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
-                a=self.need('release:candidate')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
-                )
-            if path == '/createReleaseIntent':
-                a=self.need('release:candidate')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().create_release_intent(data)
-                )
-            if path in ('/submitOwnerApproval','/submitSignedApproval'):
-                a=self.need('release:approve')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().submit_owner_approval(data)
-                )
-            if path == '/startDeployment':
-                a=self.need('release:deploy')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().start_deployment(
-                        str(data.get('candidate_id') or '')
-                    )
-                )
             if path in ('/api/branch','/api/create-branch'): return self.branch(data)
             if path in ('/api/file','/api/commit-file'): return self.file(data)
             if path == '/api/commit': return self.commit(data)
@@ -698,30 +226,9 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
             if path == '/api/nl': return self.nl(data)
             return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
-        except CapabilityAuthorizationError as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},403)
-        except SagaConflict as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},409)
         except Exception as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
-    def do_PATCH(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PATCH', path): return
-        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-    def do_DELETE(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'DELETE', path): return
-        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', str(e), {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
     def branch(self,data):
         a=self.need('branch:create');
         if not a: return
@@ -730,44 +237,7 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     def file(self,data):
         a=self.need('file:write');
         if not a: return
-        if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED', os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_CONTROLLER_ENABLED', 'false')).lower() not in {'1','true','yes','on'}:
-            return self.sendj({'error':'DURABLE_JOB_CONTROLLER_UNAVAILABLE','retryable':True},503)
-        try:
-            path = relpath(str(data.get('path') or ''))
-            branch = str(data.get('branch') or '')
-            expected = str(data.get('expected_branch_oid') or '')
-            campaign_id = str(data.get('campaign_id') or os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_CAMPAIGN_ID') or '')
-            supplied_digest = str(data.get('payload_digest') or '')
-            content = data.get('content')
-            payload_bytes = None
-            if content is not None:
-                payload_bytes = content.encode('utf-8') if isinstance(content, str) else json.dumps(content, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False).encode('utf-8')
-            payload_digest = supplied_digest or hashlib.sha256(payload_bytes or b'').hexdigest()
-            if not campaign_id or not branch or not expected:
-                return self.sendj({'error':'JOB_BINDING_REQUIRED','retryable':False},409)
-            request = {
-                'campaign_id': campaign_id,
-                'repository': REPOSITORY_IDENTITY or 'aios/aios',
-                'operation': 'commit-file',
-                'branch': branch,
-                'expected_branch_oid': expected,
-                'payload_digest': payload_digest,
-                # The controller persists only the binding and digest. Raw
-                # content is never copied into durable state or logs.
-            }
-            receipt = GitOpsJobController(
-                JobStore(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_JOB_ROOT', '/var/lib/aios-gitops/jobs')))
-            ).submit(request, payload=payload_bytes)
-            return self.sendj({
-                'job_id': receipt.job_id,
-                'state': receipt.state.value,
-                'side_effect_state': receipt.side_effect_state,
-                'retryable': receipt.http_status == 503,
-            }, receipt.http_status)
-        except ServiceUnavailable as exc:
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(exc),'layer':'durable_job','retryable':True,'side_effect_state':'UNKNOWN'},503)
-        except JobError as exc:
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(exc),'retryable':False},409)
+        b=checkout(data.get('branch'), data.get('base','main'), bool(data.get('create_branch'))); r=write_file(data.get('path'), data.get('content','')); c=commit([r], data.get('message') or f'chore(chatgpt): update {r}'); audit(a['account'],'file',r,{'branch':b,'commit':c}); self.sendj({'status':'committed','branch':b,'path':r,'commit':c})
     def commit(self,data):
         a=self.need('commit:create');
         if not a: return
@@ -781,45 +251,13 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         a=self.need('tag:create');
         if not a: return
         ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
-        try:
-            validate_version(ver)
-        except ValueError:
-            return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
-        if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
-            return self.sendj({
-                'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
-                'required':['version','target_oid','evidence_closure_oid','approval_plan_id'],
-            },400)
-        try:
-            target_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('target_oid'))
-            evidence_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('evidence_closure_oid'), 'evidence_closure_oid')
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            return self.sendj({'error':'invalid_tag_target','detail':str(exc)},400)
+        if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
+        if data.get('confirm') != True:
+            self.sendj({'status':'confirm_required','operation':'tag','hint':'This operation creates a Git tag. Confirm to proceed.','x-openai-isConsequential':True}, 428)
+            return
         if a['role'] != 'owner' or not data.get('execute'):
-            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'request':req,'commit':c})
-        request=PublicationRequest(ver,target_oid,evidence_oid,str(data.get('approval_plan_id')))
-        main_before=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
-        publisher=publication_publisher()
-        try:
-            publication=publisher.publish(request)
-        except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_manual_owner_review_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':redact(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED','error':redact(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
-        except PublicationConflict as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_conflict',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
-        except PublicationPending as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_pending',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},503)
-        except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_reconciliation_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},502)
-        main_after=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
-        if main_after != main_before:
-            raise RuntimeError('main changed during tag operation')
-        result={'status':publication['state'],'version':ver,'tag_name':ver,'tag_oid':publication['tag_oid'],'target_oid':target_oid,'expected_target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'workspace_head':sh(['rev-parse','HEAD'],True)['stdout'],'main_oid_before':main_before,'main_oid_after':main_after,'main_changed':False,'force_push':False,'publication':publication}
-        audit(a['account'],'tag',ver,result)
-        self.sendj(result)
+            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'commit':c})
+        out=sh(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'], True); self.sendj({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out,'sync':sync_tag(ver)})
     def rollback(self,data):
         a=self.need('rollback:request');
         if not a: return
@@ -914,10 +352,7 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
         cmd_filter=(params.get('command') or [None])[0]
         bl=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json',{})
         current_ver=bl.get('current_baseline','V1R3C1')
-        try:
-            tags=[item['name'] for item in authoritative_tags(git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir()) if str(item['name']).startswith('V')]
-        except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
-            return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc),'repository_available':False},503)
+        tags=sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines() if WS.exists() else []
         versions=[]
         if (WS/'baseline'/'promotions').exists():
             for p in sorted((WS/'baseline'/'promotions').glob('*.json')):
@@ -955,11 +390,9 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
 
 
 def api_spec():
-    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}
+    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True}}
 
 def main():
-    validate_gitea_api_url(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL', ''))
     print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
     ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST,PORT), H).serve_forever()
-if __name__ == '__main__': main()
-
+if __name__ == '__main__': main()

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2.py

@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
-"""ChatGPT GitOps Bridge v2 contract and governed release operations."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import hashlib
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
-
-
-BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION = "aios.chatgpt-gitops-bridge.v2"
-BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
-    "getRuntimeStatus",
-    "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
-    "createGovernedTask",
-    "acquireWriterLease",
-    "commitFileGoverned",
-    "commitFilesGoverned",
-    "getGitOpsJob",
-    "resumeGitOpsJob",
-    "reconcileGitOpsJob",
-    "createTagApprovalRequest",
-    "requestOrCreateTag",
-    "getTagPublicationStatus",
-    "buildProductionArtifact",
-    "executeApprovedProductionRelease",
-    "getReleaseConsistency",
-    "runReleaseAcceptance",
-    "getControlPlaneSnapshot",
-)
-
-OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
-    "createGovernedTask": ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key"),
-    "acquireWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
-    "commitFileGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "path", "content_base64", "message"),
-    "commitFilesGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "files", "message"),
-    "getGitOpsJob": ("job_id",),
-    "resumeGitOpsJob": ("job_id", "expected_revision"),
-    "reconcileGitOpsJob": ("job_id", "expected_revision"),
-    "createTagApprovalRequest": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "owner_approval", "execute"),
-    "requestOrCreateTag": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "execute"),
-    "getTagPublicationStatus": ("version",),
-    "buildProductionArtifact": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
-    "executeApprovedProductionRelease": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "execute"),
-    "getReleaseConsistency": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
-    "runReleaseAcceptance": ("version", "target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"),
-    "getControlPlaneSnapshot": (),
-}
-
-_OPERATION_PATHS = {
-    "createGovernedTask": "/v2/governed-task",
-    "acquireWriterLease": "/v2/writer-lease",
-    "commitFileGoverned": "/v2/commit-file",
-    "commitFilesGoverned": "/v2/commit-files",
-    "getGitOpsJob": "/v2/job",
-    "resumeGitOpsJob": "/v2/job/resume",
-    "reconcileGitOpsJob": "/v2/job/reconcile",
-    "getTagPublicationStatus": "/v2/tag/status",
-    "getReleaseConsistency": "/v2/release/consistency",
-    "runReleaseAcceptance": "/v2/release/acceptance",
-}
-
-
-def operation_contracts() -> dict[str, dict[str, object]]:
-    """Return the runtime contract consumed by adapters and schema tooling."""
-    return {
-        operation: {
-            "method": "POST",
-            "path": _OPERATION_PATHS.get(operation),
-            "required_fields": list(fields),
-        }
-        for operation, fields in OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS.items()
-    }
-
-
-def render_openapi_contract_fragment() -> str:
-    required = "\n".join(
-        f"                - {field}"
-        for field in OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFilesGoverned"]
-    )
-    return (
-        "  /v2/commit-files:\n"
-        "    post:\n"
-        "      operationId: commitFilesGoverned\n"
-        "      summary: Submit one atomic governed commit containing multiple files\n"
-        "      requestBody:\n"
-        "        required: true\n"
-        "        content:\n"
-        "          application/json:\n"
-        "            schema:\n"
-        "              type: object\n"
-        "              additionalProperties: false\n"
-        "              required:\n"
-        f"{required}\n"
-        "              properties:\n"
-        "                task_id: {type: string}\n"
-        "                repository: {type: string, example: aios/aios}\n"
-        "                expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}\n"
-        "                target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$'}\n"
-        "                generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}\n"
-        "                idempotency_key: {type: string}\n"
-        "                files:\n"
-        "                  type: array\n"
-        "                  minItems: 1\n"
-        "                  items:\n"
-        "                    type: object\n"
-        "                    additionalProperties: false\n"
-        "                    required: [path, content_base64]\n"
-        "                    properties:\n"
-        "                      path: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 512}\n"
-        "                      content_base64: {type: string}\n"
-        "                message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}\n"
-        "      responses:\n"
-        "        '200': {description: Governed commit job and verified branch result}\n"
-        "        '400': {description: Contract or policy rejection}\n"
-        "        '409': {description: Branch CAS or idempotency conflict}\n"
-    )
-
-
-class RuntimeDriftError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-class BridgeV2Error(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class ControlPlaneReleaseManifest:
-    control_plane_release_version: str
-    control_plane_target_oid: str
-    artifact_sha256: str
-    runtime_path: Path
-    bridge_schema_version: str
-    repository_identity: str
-    authoritative_git_dir: Path
-    deployment_state: str
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
-        return {
-            "control_plane_release_version": self.control_plane_release_version,
-            "control_plane_target_oid": self.control_plane_target_oid,
-            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
-            "runtime_path": str(self.runtime_path),
-            "bridge_schema_version": self.bridge_schema_version,
-            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
-            "authoritative_git_dir": str(self.authoritative_git_dir),
-            "deployment_state": self.deployment_state,
-        }
-
-    def validate(self, artifact: Path, *, observed_oid: str, approved_root: Path = Path("/opt/aios/gitops-control-plane")) -> dict[str, object]:
-        try:
-            runtime = self.runtime_path.resolve(strict=True)
-            root = approved_root.resolve(strict=True)
-            artifact_path = artifact.resolve(strict=True)
-            runtime.relative_to(root)
-            artifact_path.relative_to(runtime)
-        except (OSError, ValueError):
-            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT") from None
-        mutable_markers = {"workspace", "workspaces", "worktree", "worktrees"}
-        if mutable_markers.intersection(part.lower() for part in runtime.parts):
-            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT")
-        valid = (
-            len(self.control_plane_target_oid) == 40
-            and observed_oid == self.control_plane_target_oid
-            and len(self.artifact_sha256) == 64
-            and hashlib.sha256(artifact_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() == self.artifact_sha256
-            and self.bridge_schema_version == BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION
-            and self.repository_identity == "aios/aios"
-            and self.authoritative_git_dir == Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
-            and self.authoritative_git_dir.is_absolute()
-            and self.deployment_state == "STAGING"
-        )
-        if not valid:
-            raise RuntimeDriftError("CONTROL_PLANE_RUNTIME_DRIFT")
-        return {**self.as_dict(), "drift_status": "PASS"}
-
-
-class BridgeV2Adapter:
-    """Thin operation adapter; all mutating handlers are injected seams."""
-
-    def __init__(self, *, runtime_status: Mapping[str, Any], handlers: Mapping[str, Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Any]] | None = None) -> None:
-        self.runtime_status = dict(runtime_status)
-        self.handlers = dict(handlers or {})
-
-    def getRuntimeStatus(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"bridge_schema_version": BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION, **self.runtime_status}
-
-    def getGovernedWriteCapabilities(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "bridge_schema_version": BRIDGE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-            "legacy_writes_enabled": False,
-            "governed_writes_enabled": True,
-            "operations": list(BRIDGE_OPERATIONS),
-            "operation_contracts": operation_contracts(),
-            "force_push": False,
-            "main_write": False,
-            "tag_write": False,
-            "baseline_write": False,
-            "production_write": False,
-            "approved_release_operations": True,
-            "approved_release_scope": {
-                "version": "V2R2C1",
-                "target_oid": "998d30304787e31e5ae607c0bd86b5edb2b0e5ad",
-                "evidence_closure_oid": "a8b906d1bc24088c19647e98de6a679268f6d0a2",
-                "approval_plan_id": "sha256:c0df52008ae7f64cec5ee2d28947aa7b892066c670ab8295e4549140b1a7500e",
-            },
-        }
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def legacy_write_disabled() -> dict[str, object]:
-        return {"error": "LEGACY_WRITE_DISABLED", "replacement": "createGovernedTask", "governed_writes_available": True}
-
-    def _call(self, operation: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any:
-        required = OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation]
-        if any(key not in request for key in required):
-            raise BridgeV2Error("BRIDGE_REQUEST_FIELDS_MISSING")
-        handler = self.handlers.get(operation)
-        if handler is None:
-            raise BridgeV2Error("GOVERNED_HANDLER_UNAVAILABLE")
-        return handler(dict(request))
-
-    def createGovernedTask(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createGovernedTask", request)
-    def acquireWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("acquireWriterLease", request)
-    def commitFileGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFileGoverned", request)
-    def commitFilesGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFilesGoverned", request)
-    def getGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getGitOpsJob", request)
-    def resumeGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("resumeGitOpsJob", request)
-    def reconcileGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("reconcileGitOpsJob", request)
-    def createTagApprovalRequest(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createTagApprovalRequest", request)
-    def requestOrCreateTag(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("requestOrCreateTag", request)
-    def getTagPublicationStatus(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getTagPublicationStatus", request)
-    def buildProductionArtifact(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("buildProductionArtifact", request)
-    def executeApprovedProductionRelease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("executeApprovedProductionRelease", request)
-    def getReleaseConsistency(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getReleaseConsistency", request)
-    def runReleaseAcceptance(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("runReleaseAcceptance", request)
-
-    def getControlPlaneSnapshot(self, request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> Any: return self._call("getControlPlaneSnapshot", request or {})

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server.py

@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
-"""Loopback-only governed Bridge v2 HTTP gateway with durable handlers."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-import base64
-import json
-import os
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import sqlite3
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor
-from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2 import BridgeV2Adapter, BridgeV2Error, OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS
-from gitea_tag_publication import validate_gitea_api_url
-from aios_continuation_executor import AuthorityGitAdapter, ContinuationCommit, ContinuationExecutor, ContinuationPermissions, ContinuationRuntimeBinding, DetachedGitWorkspace, GiteaContinuationRemote, ServerSideCredentialProjection
-from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
-from aios_control_plane_snapshot import build_control_plane_snapshot
-from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobState, JobStore, _RECOVERABLE
-from aios_governed_task_bootstrap import BootstrapError, GovernedTaskBootstrap
-from governed_production_release import build_executor_config
-
-MAX_BODY = 2 * 1024 * 1024
-ROUTES = {
-    "/v2/runtime": "getRuntimeStatus",
-    "/v2/capabilities": "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
-    "/v2/governed-task": "createGovernedTask",
-    "/v2/writer-lease": "acquireWriterLease",
-    "/v2/commit-file": "commitFileGoverned",
-    "/v2/commit-files": "commitFilesGoverned",
-    "/v2/job": "getGitOpsJob",
-    "/v2/job/resume": "resumeGitOpsJob",
-    "/v2/job/reconcile": "reconcileGitOpsJob",
-    "/v2/tag/approval-request": "createTagApprovalRequest",
-    "/v2/tag/publish": "requestOrCreateTag",
-    "/v2/tag/status": "getTagPublicationStatus",
-    "/v2/release/artifact": "buildProductionArtifact",
-    "/v2/release/execute": "executeApprovedProductionRelease",
-    "/v2/release/consistency": "getReleaseConsistency",
-    "/v2/release/acceptance": "runReleaseAcceptance",
-}
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class RuntimeConfig:
-    target_oid: str
-    authoritative_git_dir: Path
-    state_root: Path
-    v2_job_root: Path
-    token_path: Path
-    ssh_key_path: Path
-    remote_name: str = "gitea-http"
-    repository: str = "aios/aios"
-    api_base: str = ""
-    v2_task_id: str = "TASK-P0-CHATGPT-BRIDGE-V2-CONTROL-PLANE-CONVERGENCE-20260809"
-    v2_branch: str = "agent/p0-chatgpt-bridge-v2-control-plane-convergence-20260809"
-    target_version: str = "V2R2C1"
-    registry_root: Path = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/registry-projection")
-    baseline_path: Path = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops-runtime-anchor/baseline/current.json")
-    health_url: str = "http://127.0.0.1:18927/health"
-
-
-def _safe(value: str) -> str:
-    return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", value).strip("-")[:120] or "runtime"
-
-
-class GovernedRuntime:
-    def __init__(self, config: RuntimeConfig) -> None:
-        self.config = config
-        config.state_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.authority = AuthorityGitExecutor(config.authoritative_git_dir, config.state_root / "worktrees")
-        self.bootstrap = GovernedTaskBootstrap(self.authority, config.state_root, remote_name=config.remote_name, token_path=config.token_path, ssh_key_path=config.ssh_key_path, api_base=config.api_base)
-        self.runtimes: dict[tuple[str, int], tuple[Any, GitOpsJobController, ContinuationExecutor]] = {}
-        self.controllers: dict[str, GitOpsJobController] = {}
-        self.bindings: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
-        self.release = build_executor_config(config)
-        metadata_root = config.state_root / "task-bindings"
-        if metadata_root.is_dir():
-            for metadata in metadata_root.glob("*.json"):
-                try:
-                    value = json.loads(metadata.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-                    if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("task_id"):
-                        self.bindings[str(value["task_id"])] = value
-                except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError):
-                    continue
-        askpass = config.state_root / "bridge-v2-askpass.sh"
-        if not askpass.exists():
-            askpass.write_text('#!/bin/sh\ncase "$1" in *Username*) printf "%s\\n" "$GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR" ;; *) cat "$CREDENTIAL_FILE" ;; esac\n', encoding="utf-8")
-            askpass.chmod(0o700)
-        os.environ.setdefault("GIT_ASKPASS", str(askpass)); os.environ.setdefault("GIT_ASKPASS_REQUIRE", "force"); os.environ.setdefault("GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT", "0"); os.environ.setdefault("GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR", "aios-autonomy-agent")
-
-    def runtime_status(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "status": "active",
-            "health": 200,
-            "bridge_schema_version": "aios.chatgpt-gitops-bridge.v2",
-            "control_plane_release_version": self.config.target_version,
-            "control_plane_target_oid": self.config.target_oid,
-            "runtime_release_commit": self.config.target_oid,
-            "runtime_path": str(self.config.state_root),
-            "artifact_sha256": os.environ.get("AIOS_CONTROL_PLANE_ARTIFACT_SHA256"),
-            "deployment_state": "STAGING",
-            "drift_status": "PASS",
-            "repository": self.config.repository,
-            "repository_identity": self.config.repository,
-            "authoritative_git_dir": str(self.config.authoritative_git_dir),
-            "legacy_global_writes_enabled": False,
-        }
-
-    def _job_root(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
-        return self.config.state_root / "jobs" / _safe(task_id)
-
-    def _runtime(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[Any, GitOpsJobController, ContinuationExecutor]:
-        key = (str(request["task_id"]), int(request["generation"]))
-        if key in self.runtimes: return self.runtimes[key]
-        lease = WriterLeaseRequestV2(task_id=str(request["task_id"]), repository=str(request["repository"]), branch_mode=str(request.get("branch_mode", "CONTINUE_EXISTING")), base_oid=str(request["base_oid"]), expected_branch_oid=str(request["expected_branch_oid"]), target_branch=str(request["target_branch"]), generation=int(request["generation"]), lease_seconds=int(request.get("lease_seconds", 900)))
-        lease.validate(AuthorityGitAdapter(self.authority))
-        worktree_path = self.config.state_root / "worktrees" / _safe(lease.task_id)
-        if worktree_path.exists():
-            workspace = DetachedGitWorkspace(worktree_path)
-        else:
-            self.authority.create_detached_worktree(lease.expected_branch_oid, _safe(lease.task_id), self.config.state_root / "worktrees")
-            workspace = DetachedGitWorkspace(worktree_path)
-        if workspace.head_oid() != lease.expected_branch_oid or not workspace.is_detached(): raise RuntimeError("WORKTREE_HEAD_MISMATCH")
-        job_root = self._job_root(lease.task_id); controller = GitOpsJobController(JobStore(job_root, payload_root=job_root / "payloads")); credential = ServerSideCredentialProjection(self.config.ssh_key_path, self.config.token_path); remote = GiteaContinuationRemote(workspace=worktree_path, credential=credential, remote_name=self.config.remote_name, repository=lease.repository, api_base=self.config.api_base); executor = ContinuationExecutor(controller, AuthorityGitAdapter(self.authority), workspace, remote, credential)
-        binding = ContinuationRuntimeBinding(request=lease, workspace_path=worktree_path, lease_not_before=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(seconds=1), lease_expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=lease.lease_seconds), original_receipt_valid=True, original_grant_consumed=True, permissions=ContinuationPermissions())
-        result = (binding, controller, executor); self.runtimes[key] = result; self.controllers[lease.task_id] = controller; return result
-
-    def create_task(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        result = self.bootstrap.create(request); self.bindings[result["task_id"]] = result; return result
-
-    def acquire_lease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        binding, _, _ = self._runtime(request)
-        req = binding.request
-        return {"schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema, "task_id": req.task_id, "repository": req.repository, "branch_mode": req.branch_mode, "base_oid": req.base_oid, "expected_branch_oid": req.expected_branch_oid, "target_branch": req.target_branch, "generation": req.generation, "lease_seconds": req.lease_seconds, "create_target_branch": req.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW", "worktree_mode": "detached_at_base_oid" if req.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" else "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True}
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _files(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, bytes]:
-        raw = request.get("files") or {request["path"]: request["content_base64"]}; pairs = raw.items() if isinstance(raw, dict) else ((item["path"], item["content_base64"]) for item in raw); files = {str(path): base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True) for path, encoded in pairs}
-        if not files: raise ValueError("FILES_EMPTY")
-        return files
-
-    def commit_files(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        runtime = self.runtimes.get((str(request["task_id"]), int(request["generation"])))
-        if runtime is None: raise RuntimeError("LEASE_NOT_FOUND")
-        binding, _, executor = runtime
-        if request["target_branch"] != binding.request.target_branch or request["expected_branch_oid"] != binding.request.expected_branch_oid: raise RuntimeError("LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT")
-        commit = ContinuationCommit(idempotency_key=str(request["idempotency_key"]), files=self._files(request), message=str(request["message"]))
-        executor.workspace.materialize_files(commit.files)
-        return executor.execute(binding, commit)
-
-    def _controller_for_job(self, job_id: str) -> GitOpsJobController:
-        for controller in self.controllers.values():
-            try:
-                controller.store.read(job_id)
-                return controller
-            except Exception:
-                continue
-        jobs_root = self.config.state_root / "jobs"
-        if jobs_root.is_dir():
-            for root in jobs_root.iterdir():
-                if not root.is_dir():
-                    continue
-                controller = GitOpsJobController(JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads"))
-                try:
-                    controller.store.read(job_id)
-                    self.controllers[str(job_id)] = controller
-                    return controller
-                except Exception:
-                    continue
-        raise RuntimeError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _valid_oid(value: object) -> bool:
-        return isinstance(value, str) and re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", value) is not None
-
-    def _reconstruct_legacy_binding(
-        self,
-        row: Mapping[str, Any],
-        controller: GitOpsJobController,
-    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        raw = json.loads(row["request_json"])
-        binding = raw.get("binding", raw)
-        if not isinstance(binding, dict):
-            raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_BINDING_INVALID")
-        task_id = str(binding.get("task_id") or binding.get("campaign_id") or "").strip()
-        repository = str(binding.get("repository") or "").strip()
-        operation = str(binding.get("operation") or row.get("operation") or "").strip()
-        branch = str(binding.get("target_branch") or binding.get("branch") or row.get("branch") or "").strip()
-        expected = str(binding.get("expected_branch_oid") or row.get("expected_branch_oid") or "").strip()
-        base = binding.get("base_oid") or binding.get("lineage_anchor_oid")
-        if not base:
-            with controller.store._connect() as connection:
-                lease_row = connection.execute(
-                    "SELECT lineage_anchor_oid FROM branch_leases WHERE job_id=? ORDER BY revision DESC LIMIT 1",
-                    (str(row["job_id"]),),
-                ).fetchone()
-            if lease_row is not None:
-                base = lease_row["lineage_anchor_oid"]
-        base = str(base or "").strip()
-        branch_mode = str(
-            binding.get("branch_mode")
-            or ("CREATE_NEW" if operation.endswith("_CREATE_NEW") else "CONTINUE_EXISTING")
-        ).strip()
-        try:
-            generation = int(binding.get("generation") or 0)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-            raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_BINDING_GENERATION_INVALID") from exc
-        if (
-            not task_id
-            or repository != self.config.repository
-            or not branch.startswith("agent/")
-            or branch in {"main", "master"}
-            or branch_mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}
-            or generation < 1
-            or not self._valid_oid(base)
-            or not self._valid_oid(expected)
-        ):
-            raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_BINDING_INVALID")
-        current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + branch)
-        if (
-            current is None
-            or not self.authority.commit_exists(base)
-            or not self.authority.commit_exists(expected)
-            or not self.authority.ancestry_check(base, current)
-            or not self.authority.ancestry_check(expected, current)
-        ):
-            raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_BINDING_LINEAGE_INVALID")
-        return {
-            "task_id": task_id,
-            "repository": repository,
-            "branch_mode": branch_mode,
-            "base_oid": base,
-            "expected_branch_oid": expected,
-            "target_branch": branch,
-            "generation": generation,
-            "lease_seconds": int(binding.get("lease_seconds") or 900),
-        }
-
-    def _executor_from_row(
-        self,
-        row: Mapping[str, Any],
-        controller: GitOpsJobController,
-    ) -> ContinuationExecutor:
-        request = self._reconstruct_legacy_binding(row, controller)
-        lease = WriterLeaseRequestV2(**request)
-        worktree_path = self.config.state_root / "worktrees" / _safe(lease.task_id)
-        if not worktree_path.exists():
-            current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + lease.target_branch)
-            if current is None:
-                raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_WORKTREE_BRANCH_MISSING")
-            self.authority.create_detached_worktree(
-                current,
-                _safe(lease.task_id),
-                self.config.state_root / "worktrees",
-            )
-        workspace = DetachedGitWorkspace(worktree_path)
-        credential = ServerSideCredentialProjection(self.config.ssh_key_path, self.config.token_path)
-        remote = GiteaContinuationRemote(
-            workspace=worktree_path,
-            credential=credential,
-            remote_name=self.config.remote_name,
-            repository=lease.repository,
-            api_base=self.config.api_base,
-        )
-        return ContinuationExecutor(
-            controller,
-            AuthorityGitAdapter(self.authority),
-            workspace,
-            remote,
-            credential,
-        )
-
-    def job(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], action: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        job_id = str(request["job_id"])
-        controller = self._controller_for_job(job_id)
-        row = controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if action == "get":
-            return controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        if action == "resume":
-            return controller.resume(job_id).as_dict()
-        if JobState(row["state"]) not in _RECOVERABLE:
-            return controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        return self._executor_from_row(row, controller).reconcile(job_id)
-
-    def _snapshot_task(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        candidates: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        for value in self.bindings.values():
-            task_id = str(value.get("task_id") or "").strip()
-            branch = str(value.get("target_branch") or "").strip()
-            if not task_id or not branch.startswith("agent/"):
-                continue
-            authority = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + branch)
-            try:
-                generation = int(value.get("generation") or 0)
-            except (TypeError, ValueError):
-                generation = 0
-            reconciliation_state = "OBSERVATION_REQUIRED"
-            db = self.config.state_root / "jobs" / _safe(task_id) / "state.sqlite3"
-            if db.is_file():
-                connection = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{db}?mode=ro", uri=True)
-                try:
-                    lease = connection.execute(
-                        "SELECT MAX(generation) FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
-                        (branch,),
-                    ).fetchone()
-                    generation = max(generation, int((lease or (0,))[0] or 0))
-                    latest = connection.execute(
-                        "SELECT state, side_effect_state FROM jobs WHERE branch=? ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 1",
-                        (branch,),
-                    ).fetchone()
-                    if latest is not None:
-                        reconciliation_state = (
-                            "COMPLETED"
-                            if latest[0] == "COMPLETED"
-                            else str(latest[1] or latest[0])
-                        )
-                finally:
-                    connection.close()
-            candidates.append(
-                {
-                    "task_id": task_id,
-                    "branch": branch,
-                    "authority_branch_oid": authority,
-                    "gitea_git_oid": None,
-                    "gitea_api_oid": None,
-                    "commit_visible": None,
-                    "generation": generation,
-                    "reconciliation_state": reconciliation_state,
-                }
-            )
-        if not candidates:
-            return {}
-        return max(
-            candidates,
-            key=lambda item: (int(item["generation"] or 0), bool(item["authority_branch_oid"])),
-        )
-
-    def snapshot(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        task = self._snapshot_task()
-        return build_control_plane_snapshot(target_version=self.config.target_version, runtime=self.runtime_status(), repository={"identity": self.config.repository, "authority_git_dir": str(self.config.authoritative_git_dir), "authority_main_oid": self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/main")}, production={"baseline_version": "V2R1C7", "target_oid": "c7adece1cc8beffe7c718d53c775898b45d6c7f8", "deployment_state": "ACTIVE"}, task=task, capabilities={"legacy_writes_enabled": False, "governed_writes_enabled": True, "force_push": False, "main_write": False, "tag_write": False, "baseline_write": False, "production_write": False}, credential_broker={"status": "SERVER_SIDE_ONLY", "provider": "FileCredentialProvider"})
-
-    def handlers(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "createGovernedTask": self.create_task,
-            "acquireWriterLease": self.acquire_lease,
-            "commitFileGoverned": lambda request: self.commit_files({**request, "files": {request["path"]: request["content_base64"]}}),
-            "commitFilesGoverned": self.commit_files,
-            "getGitOpsJob": lambda request: self.job(request, "get"),
-            "resumeGitOpsJob": lambda request: self.job(request, "resume"),
-            "reconcileGitOpsJob": lambda request: self.job(request, "reconcile"),
-            "getControlPlaneSnapshot": lambda request: self.snapshot(),
-            "createTagApprovalRequest": self.release.approval_request,
-            "requestOrCreateTag": self.release.publish_tag,
-            "getTagPublicationStatus": self.release.tag_status,
-            "buildProductionArtifact": self.release.build_artifact,
-            "executeApprovedProductionRelease": self.release.execute_request,
-            "getReleaseConsistency": self.release.consistency,
-            "runReleaseAcceptance": self.release.acceptance,
-        }
-
-
-def build_governed_handlers(runtime_config: RuntimeConfig | Mapping[str, Any]) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-    if isinstance(runtime_config, Mapping): runtime_config = RuntimeConfig(**runtime_config)
-    return GovernedRuntime(runtime_config).handlers()
-
-
-class _HTTPError(RuntimeError): pass
-
-
-class BridgeHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    adapter: BridgeV2Adapter | None = None
-    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None: return
-    def _json(self, value: Any, status: int = 200) -> None:
-        raw = json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode(); self.send_response(status); self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json"); self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw))); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(raw)
-    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        try: length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "-1"))
-        except ValueError as exc: raise _HTTPError("CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID") from exc
-        if length < 0 or length > MAX_BODY: raise _HTTPError("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
-        value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
-        if not isinstance(value, dict): raise _HTTPError("JSON_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
-        return value
-    def _allowed(self, operation: str, body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        allowed = set(OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS[operation]) | {"schema", "lease_seconds", "create_target_branch", "worktree_mode", "cas_ref_update_required", "expected_branch_oid", "generation", "branch_mode"}
-        if operation == "commitFilesGoverned": allowed.add("files")
-        allowed.update({"owner_approval", "execute"})
-        if set(body) - allowed: raise _HTTPError("UNKNOWN_FIELDS")
-    def do_GET(self) -> None:
-        if self.adapter is None: self._json({"error": "RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE"}, 503); return
-        if self.path == "/v2/runtime": self._json(self.adapter.getRuntimeStatus()); return
-        if self.path == "/v2/capabilities": self._json(self.adapter.getGovernedWriteCapabilities()); return
-        if self.path == "/v2/control-plane-snapshot": self._json(self.adapter.getControlPlaneSnapshot({})); return
-        self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
-    def do_POST(self) -> None:
-        operation = ROUTES.get(self.path)
-        if operation is None or operation in ("getRuntimeStatus", "getGovernedWriteCapabilities") or self.adapter is None: self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404); return
-        try:
-            body = self._body(); self._allowed(operation, body); self._json(getattr(self.adapter, operation)(body))
-        except _HTTPError as exc: self._json({"error": str(exc)}, 413 if str(exc) == "REQUEST_TOO_LARGE" else 400)
-        except (BootstrapError, ValueError, BridgeV2Error) as exc: self._json({"error": str(exc)}, 409 if "CONFLICT" in str(exc) else 400)
-        except Exception as exc: self._json({"error": str(exc) or type(exc).__name__}, 409 if any(token in str(exc) for token in ("CONFLICT", "EXPECTATION", "MONOTONIC")) else 503)
-
-
-def serve(adapter: BridgeV2Adapter, host: str = "127.0.0.1", port: int = 18892) -> None:
-    BridgeHandler.adapter = adapter; ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), BridgeHandler).serve_forever()
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    state_root = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/bridge-v2-staging")
-    token_path = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", "/run/credentials/aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service/gitea_token"))
-    ssh_key_path = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_SSH_KEY_PATH", "/home/aiman/.ssh/id_ed25519_codex_tmp"))
-    os.environ["CREDENTIAL_FILE"] = str(token_path)
-    os.environ.setdefault("GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR", "aios-autonomy-agent")
-    config = RuntimeConfig(
-        os.environ.get("AIOS_CONTROL_PLANE_TARGET_OID", ""),
-        Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"),
-        state_root,
-        state_root / "jobs",
-        token_path,
-        ssh_key_path,
-        remote_name=os.environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_REMOTE", "gitea-http"),
-        api_base=validate_gitea_api_url(os.environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_API_BASE", "")),
-        target_version=os.environ.get("AIOS_CONTROL_PLANE_TARGET_VERSION", "V2R2C1"),
-    )
-    runtime = GovernedRuntime(config)
-    serve(
-        BridgeV2Adapter(runtime_status=runtime.runtime_status(), handlers=runtime.handlers()),
-        port=int(os.environ.get("AIOS_BRIDGE_V2_PORT", "18892")),
-    )
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__": main()

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_executor.py

@@ -1,594 +0,0 @@
-"""Governed continuation executor for exact existing task branches.
-
-The executor composes the existing continuation lease and durable Job store.
-All Git and Gitea side effects live behind injected narrow interfaces so the
-state machine can prove Authority, Git-network, API-branch, and commit-object
-agreement before it reports completion.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
-import re
-import subprocess
-from typing import Callable, Mapping, Protocol
-from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
-from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit
-from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
-
-from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor
-from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
-from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobState
-from aios_gitops_reconciliation_core import ReconciliationAction, RemoteObservation, decide_reconciliation
-from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import validate_writer_lease_request_v2
-
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-SECRET_PATTERNS = (
-    re.compile(rb"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"),
-    re.compile(rb"(?i)(?:token|password|secret|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*[\"'][^\"'\s]{12,}[\"']"),
-    re.compile(rb"-----BEGIN " + rb"(?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
-)
-
-
-class ContinuationExecutionError(RuntimeError):
-    """Stable fail-closed continuation execution error."""
-
-
-class DetachedWorkspace(Protocol):
-    def is_detached(self) -> bool: ...
-    def head_oid(self) -> str: ...
-    def commit_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes], message: str) -> str: ...
-
-
-class AuthorityPort(Protocol):
-    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
-    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
-    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
-    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
-
-
-class RemotePort(Protocol):
-    def repository_identity(self) -> str: ...
-    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None: ...
-    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
-    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
-    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool: ...
-
-
-class CredentialProjection(Protocol):
-    def project(self) -> None: ...
-    def revoke(self) -> None: ...
-
-
-def _run(argv: list[str], *, cwd: Path | None = None, environment: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        argv,
-        cwd=cwd,
-        env=None if environment is None else dict(environment),
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-        check=False,
-    )
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise ContinuationExecutionError("SUBPROCESS_FAILED")
-    return result.stdout.strip()
-
-
-@dataclass(slots=True)
-class AuthorityGitAdapter:
-    """Branch-name adapter over the existing narrow AuthorityGitExecutor."""
-
-    executor: AuthorityGitExecutor
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _ref(branch: str) -> str:
-        return f"refs/heads/{branch}"
-
-    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool:
-        return self.executor.read_ref(self._ref(branch)) is not None
-
-    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str:
-        value = self.executor.read_ref(self._ref(branch))
-        if value is None:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("EXISTING_BRANCH_MISSING")
-        return value
-
-    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
-        return self.executor.ancestry_check(older, newer)
-
-    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str:
-        return self.executor.advance_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected, new)
-
-
-@dataclass(slots=True)
-class DetachedGitWorkspace:
-    path: Path
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if not self.path.is_absolute() or self.path.is_symlink() or not self.path.is_dir():
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_PATH_INVALID")
-        top = Path(_run(["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], cwd=self.path)).resolve()
-        if top != self.path.resolve():
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_PATH_INVALID")
-
-    def is_detached(self) -> bool:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
-            cwd=self.path,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        return result.returncode == 1
-
-    def head_oid(self) -> str:
-        return _run(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=self.path)
-
-    def _dirty_paths(self) -> set[str]:
-        command = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "status", "--porcelain=v1", "--untracked-files=all"],
-            cwd=self.path,
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if command.returncode != 0:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("SUBPROCESS_FAILED")
-        output = command.stdout
-        result: set[str] = set()
-        for line in output.splitlines():
-            path = line[3:]
-            if " -> " in path:
-                path = path.split(" -> ", 1)[1]
-            result.add(path)
-        return result
-
-    def materialize_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes]) -> None:
-        dirty = self._dirty_paths()
-        expected_paths = set(files)
-        if dirty and dirty != expected_paths:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_DIRTY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
-        for relative, content in files.items():
-            target = (self.path / relative).resolve()
-            try:
-                target.relative_to(self.path.resolve())
-            except ValueError as exc:
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED") from exc
-            if target.is_symlink():
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED")
-            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            target.write_bytes(content)
-
-    def commit_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes], message: str) -> str:
-        expected_paths = set(files)
-        if self._dirty_paths() != expected_paths:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_DIRTY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
-        for relative, content in files.items():
-            target = (self.path / relative).resolve()
-            try:
-                target.relative_to(self.path.resolve())
-            except ValueError as exc:
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED") from exc
-            if not target.is_file() or target.is_symlink() or target.read_bytes() != content:
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORING_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH")
-        _run(["git", "add", "--", *sorted(expected_paths)], cwd=self.path)
-        staged = set(_run(["git", "diff", "--cached", "--name-only"], cwd=self.path).splitlines())
-        if staged != expected_paths:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("STAGED_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
-        environment = os.environ.copy()
-        environment.update(
-            {
-                "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "AIOS Governed Continuation",
-                "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "aios-governed-continuation@localhost",
-                "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "AIOS Governed Continuation",
-                "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "aios-governed-continuation@localhost",
-            }
-        )
-        _run(["git", "commit", "--no-gpg-sign", "-m", message, "--", *sorted(expected_paths)], cwd=self.path, environment=environment)
-        if not self.is_detached():
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
-        return self.head_oid()
-
-
-@dataclass(slots=True)
-class ServerSideCredentialProjection:
-    ssh_key_path: Path
-    api_token_path: Path
-    active: bool = False
-
-    def project(self) -> None:
-        for path in (self.ssh_key_path, self.api_token_path):
-            if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size < 32:
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
-        self.active = True
-
-    def revoke(self) -> None:
-        self.active = False
-
-
-@dataclass(slots=True)
-class GiteaContinuationRemote:
-    workspace: Path
-    credential: ServerSideCredentialProjection
-    remote_name: str = "gitea"
-    repository: str = "aios/aios"
-    api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1"
-    expected_host: str = "g.cnnetmkt.top"
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def validate_remote_url(value: str, expected_host: str = "g.cnnetmkt.top") -> None:
-        if value.startswith(("/", "file:")) or value.endswith("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"):
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
-        if "://" in value:
-            parsed = urlsplit(value)
-            host, path = parsed.hostname, parsed.path
-        else:
-            location = value.split("@", 1)[-1]
-            host, separator, path = location.partition(":")
-            if not separator:
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
-            path = "/" + path
-        if host != expected_host or path.rstrip("/") not in {"/aios/aios.git", "/git/aios/aios.git"}:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_REMOTE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
-
-    def repository_identity(self) -> str:
-        url = _run(["git", "remote", "get-url", self.remote_name], cwd=self.workspace)
-        self.validate_remote_url(url, self.expected_host)
-        if self.repository != "aios/aios":
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("REMOTE_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-        return self.repository
-
-    def _require_projected(self) -> None:
-        if not self.credential.active:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
-
-    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
-        self._require_projected()
-        output = _run(["git", "ls-remote", self.remote_name, f"refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
-        if not output:
-            return None
-        oid, ref = output.split(maxsplit=1)
-        if ref != f"refs/heads/{branch}" or not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_GIT_READBACK_INVALID")
-        return oid
-
-    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None:
-        self._require_projected()
-        self.repository_identity()
-        if self.read_git_ref(branch) != expected:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        _run(["git", "push", self.remote_name, f"{new}:refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
-
-    def _api(self, path: str) -> object:
-        self._require_projected()
-        token = self.credential.api_token_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-        request = Request(
-            self.api_base.rstrip("/") + path,
-            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"token {token}"},
-        )
-        try:
-            with urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response:
-                return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-        except HTTPError as exc:
-            if exc.code == 404:
-                return None
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError(f"GITEA_API_HTTP_{exc.code}") from exc
-        except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-
-    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
-        owner, name = self.repository.split("/", 1)
-        page = 1
-        while page <= 100:
-            value = self._api(f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/branches?page={page}&limit=50")
-            if value is None:
-                return None
-            if not isinstance(value, list):
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_COLLECTION_INVALID")
-            for item in value:
-                if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get("name") != branch:
-                    continue
-                oid = item.get("commit", {}).get("id")
-                if not isinstance(oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-                    raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_INVALID")
-                return oid
-            if len(value) < 50:
-                return None
-            page += 1
-        raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_API_BRANCH_PAGINATION_LIMIT")
-
-    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool:
-        owner, name = self.repository.split("/", 1)
-        value = self._api(f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/git/commits/{oid}")
-        if not isinstance(value, dict):
-            return False
-        observed = value.get("sha") or value.get("id")
-        return observed == oid
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class ContinuationPermissions:
-    create_target_branch: bool = False
-    force_push: bool = False
-    tag_write: bool = False
-    baseline_write: bool = False
-    production_write: bool = False
-    main_write: bool = False
-
-    def validate(self) -> None:
-        if any(asdict(self).values()):
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("MUTATION_PERMISSION_DENIED")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class ContinuationRuntimeBinding:
-    request: WriterLeaseRequestV2
-    workspace_path: Path
-    lease_not_before: datetime
-    lease_expires_at: datetime
-    original_receipt_valid: bool
-    original_grant_consumed: bool
-    permissions: ContinuationPermissions
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class ContinuationCommit:
-    idempotency_key: str
-    files: Mapping[str, bytes]
-    message: str
-
-    def payload(self) -> bytes:
-        if not self.idempotency_key or not self.message.strip() or not self.files:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_REQUEST_INVALID")
-        normalized: dict[str, str] = {}
-        for path, content in self.files.items():
-            pure = PurePosixPath(path)
-            if (
-                not isinstance(path, str)
-                or pure.is_absolute()
-                or ".." in pure.parts
-                or path.startswith((".git/", "baseline/", "production/"))
-                or not isinstance(content, bytes)
-            ):
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("COMMIT_PATH_REJECTED")
-            if any(pattern.search(content) for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS):
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("SECRET_LIKE_PAYLOAD_REJECTED")
-            normalized[path] = base64.b64encode(content).decode("ascii")
-        return json.dumps(
-            {"files_base64": normalized, "message": self.message},
-            sort_keys=True,
-            separators=(",", ":"),
-        ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-class ContinuationExecutor:
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        controller: GitOpsJobController,
-        authority: AuthorityPort,
-        workspace: DetachedWorkspace,
-        remote: RemotePort,
-        credential: CredentialProjection,
-        *,
-        now: Callable[[], datetime] = lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc),
-    ) -> None:
-        self.controller = controller
-        self.authority = authority
-        self.workspace = workspace
-        self.remote = remote
-        self.credential = credential
-        self.now = now
-        self._observed_generations: dict[str, int] = {}
-
-    def observe_generation(self, branch: str, generation: int) -> None:
-        self._observed_generations[branch] = max(generation, self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0))
-
-    def _max_generation(self, branch: str) -> int:
-        observed = self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0)
-        with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
-                (branch,),
-            ).fetchone()
-        durable = int(row["generation"] or 0)
-        return max(observed, durable)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _request_mapping(request: WriterLeaseRequestV2) -> dict[str, object]:
-        return {
-            "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
-            "task_id": request.task_id,
-            "repository": request.repository,
-            "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
-            "base_oid": request.base_oid,
-            "expected_branch_oid": request.expected_branch_oid,
-            "target_branch": request.target_branch,
-            "generation": request.generation,
-            "lease_seconds": request.lease_seconds,
-        }
-
-    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding) -> None:
-        request = binding.request
-        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(self._request_mapping(request), self.authority)
-        if normalized != {**self._request_mapping(request), "create_target_branch": False, "worktree_mode": "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True}:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("CONTINUATION_NORMALIZATION_INVALID")
-        if not binding.original_receipt_valid or not binding.original_grant_consumed:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("ORIGINAL_GRANT_LINEAGE_INVALID")
-        binding.permissions.validate()
-        now = self.now()
-        if now < binding.lease_not_before:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
-        if now >= binding.lease_expires_at:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_EXPIRED")
-        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch):
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
-        if not self.workspace.is_detached():
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
-        if self.workspace.head_oid() != request.expected_branch_oid:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_HEAD_MISMATCH")
-        if self.remote.repository_identity() != request.repository:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("REMOTE_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-
-    def _job_request(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit, payload: bytes) -> dict[str, object]:
-        request = binding.request
-        return {
-            "idempotency_key": commit.idempotency_key,
-            "campaign_id": request.task_id,
-            "task_id": request.task_id,
-            "repository": request.repository,
-            "operation": "CONTINUATION_COMMIT_FILES",
-            "branch": request.target_branch,
-            "expected_branch_oid": request.expected_branch_oid,
-            "base_oid": request.base_oid,
-            "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
-            "payload_digest": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(),
-            "lineage_anchor_oid": request.base_oid,
-            "generation": request.generation,
-        }
-
-    def execute(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit) -> dict[str, object]:
-        payload = commit.payload()
-        submitted = self.controller.submit(self._job_request(binding, commit, payload), payload=payload)
-        current = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
-            return self.controller.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        self._validate_preflight(binding)
-        request = binding.request
-        projected = False
-        try:
-            self.credential.project()
-            projected = True
-            row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REQUESTED:
-                self.controller.advance(
-                    submitted.job_id,
-                    JobState.AUTHORIZED,
-                    side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED",
-                    receipt={"task_id": request.task_id, "original_grant_consumed": True},
-                )
-                row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
-                self.controller.lease_job(
-                    submitted.job_id,
-                    lease_id=f"lease-{submitted.job_id}",
-                    lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
-                    current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
-                    generation=request.generation,
-                    lease_expires_at=binding.lease_expires_at.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-                    expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
-                )
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY")
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
-            new_oid = self.workspace.commit_files(commit.files, commit.message)
-            if not OID_RE.fullmatch(new_oid) or not self.authority.is_ancestor(request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
-            authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
-            if authority_oid != new_oid:
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
-            self.controller.advance(
-                submitted.job_id,
-                JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
-                side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED",
-                receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "force_push": False},
-            )
-            try:
-                self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
-                self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
-            except Exception:
-                return self._remote_pending(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
-            return self._finish_remote_verification(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
-        finally:
-            if projected:
-                self.credential.revoke()
-
-    def _observe_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, bool]:
-        return self.remote.read_git_ref(branch), self.remote.read_api_branch(branch), self.remote.commit_visible(oid)
-
-    def _remote_pending(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
-        receipt = {
-            "authority_oid": authority_oid,
-            "desired_remote_oid": new_oid,
-            "remote_verified": False,
-            "force_push": False,
-        }
-        result = self.controller.advance(
-            job_id,
-            JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
-            side_effect_state="REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING",
-            receipt=receipt,
-        )
-        return result.as_dict()
-
-    def _finish_remote_verification(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        branch = row["branch"]
-        request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
-        git_oid, api_oid, visible = self._observe_remote(branch, new_oid)
-        decision = decide_reconciliation(RemoteObservation("aios/aios", branch, new_oid, authority_oid, git_oid, api_oid, visible, datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(), request.get("expected_branch_oid")))
-        if decision.action is not ReconciliationAction.MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED:
-            return self._remote_pending(job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
-        receipt = {
-            "authority_oid": authority_oid,
-            "git_remote_oid": git_oid,
-            "api_branch_oid": api_oid,
-            "commit_visible": True,
-            "remote_verified": True,
-            "reconciliation_decision": decision.action.value,
-            "force_push": False,
-        }
-        self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt)
-        return self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt).as_dict()
-
-    def reconcile(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        state = JobState(row["state"])
-        if state == JobState.COMPLETED:
-            return self.controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        if state != JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("JOB_NOT_RECONCILABLE")
-        request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
-        receipt = json.loads(row["receipt_json"])
-        new_oid = receipt["desired_remote_oid"]
-        authority_oid = self.authority.branch_head(row["branch"])
-        try:
-            generation = int(request.get("generation") or 0)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-            raise ContinuationExecutionError("DURABLE_BINDING_GENERATION_INVALID") from exc
-        if generation > 0:
-            with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
-                earlier = connection.execute(
-                    "SELECT 1 FROM jobs WHERE branch=? AND state=? "
-                    "AND CAST(json_extract(request_json, '$.binding.generation') AS INTEGER) < ? LIMIT 1",
-                    (row["branch"], JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED.value, generation),
-                ).fetchone()
-            if earlier is not None:
-                raise ContinuationExecutionError("EARLIER_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
-        self.credential.project()
-        try:
-            git_oid, api_oid, visible = self._observe_remote(row["branch"], new_oid)
-            if authority_oid == git_oid == api_oid == new_oid and visible:
-                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST")
-                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
-            expected_oid = request["expected_branch_oid"]
-            if (
-                self.authority.is_ancestor(new_oid, authority_oid)
-                and git_oid is not None
-                and git_oid == api_oid
-                and self.authority.is_ancestor(git_oid, new_oid)
-            ):
-                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST_CHAIN")
-                self.remote.push_exact(row["branch"], git_oid, new_oid)
-                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
-            if authority_oid == new_oid and git_oid == api_oid == expected_oid:
-                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="OBSERVATION_FIRST_RETRY")
-                self.remote.push_exact(row["branch"], expected_oid, new_oid)
-                return self._finish_remote_verification(job_id, new_oid, new_oid)
-            return self.controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        finally:
-            self.credential.revoke()

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_lease.py

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-"""Campaign-aware continuation leases for an existing Git branch.
-
-This module is deliberately transport-neutral. It validates branch lineage
-and hands ref mutation to an injected compare-and-swap broker; it does not run
-Git, inspect credentials, or create a branch itself.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-import re
-from typing import Protocol
-
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-TARGET_BRANCH = "agent/autonomous-release-campaign-v1-20260807"
-LINEAGE_ANCHOR = "69b45e81dcd2c3707c367003b08c55fd361faae8"
-CAMPAIGN_HEAD = "bba675fab3b7e0c5fba7066720252b3c91b9f20d"
-
-
-class ContinuationError(RuntimeError):
-    """Stable fail-closed error for lease or branch binding violations."""
-
-
-class BranchProbe(Protocol):
-    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
-    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
-    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
-
-
-class RefCAS(Protocol):
-    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
-
-
-def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise ContinuationError(f"{field}_invalid")
-    return value
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    branch_mode: str
-    base_oid: str
-    expected_branch_oid: str
-    target_branch: str
-    generation: int
-    lease_seconds: int = 900
-
-    schema = "aios.task-writer-lease.v2"
-    accepted_schemas = frozenset({"aios.task-writer-lease.v2", "aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2"})
-
-    def validate(self, probe: BranchProbe) -> None:
-        if not self.task_id or self.repository != "aios/aios":
-            raise ContinuationError("request_identity_invalid")
-        if self.branch_mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
-            raise ContinuationError("branch_mode_invalid")
-        _oid(self.base_oid, "base_oid")
-        _oid(self.expected_branch_oid, "expected_branch_oid")
-        if self.target_branch in {"main", "master"} or self.target_branch.startswith(("refs/", "tags/")):
-            raise ContinuationError("protected_branch_rejected")
-        if not isinstance(self.generation, int) or isinstance(self.generation, bool) or self.generation < 1:
-            raise ContinuationError("generation_invalid")
-        if not isinstance(self.lease_seconds, int) or not 1 <= self.lease_seconds <= 86_400:
-            raise ContinuationError("lease_duration_invalid")
-        if self.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING":
-            if not probe.branch_exists(self.target_branch):
-                raise ContinuationError("EXISTING_BRANCH_MISSING")
-            actual = _oid(probe.branch_head(self.target_branch), "actual_branch_oid")
-            if actual != self.expected_branch_oid:
-                raise ContinuationError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT")
-            if not probe.is_ancestor(self.base_oid, actual):
-                raise ContinuationError("BASE_NOT_ANCESTOR_OF_BRANCH")
-        elif hasattr(probe, "commit_exists") and not probe.commit_exists(self.base_oid):
-            raise ContinuationError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
-        elif self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" and probe.branch_exists(self.target_branch):
-            raise ContinuationError("TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
-        elif self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" and self.base_oid != self.expected_branch_oid:
-            raise ContinuationError("CREATE_NEW_BASE_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class CampaignWriterLease:
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    branch: str
-    lineage_anchor_oid: str
-    current_head_oid: str
-    generation: int
-    lease_expires_at: datetime
-    append_only: bool = True
-    renewable: bool = True
-    multi_commit: bool = True
-    recoverable: bool = True
-    state: str = "ACTIVE"
-    branch_bound: bool = True
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        _oid(self.lineage_anchor_oid, "lineage_anchor_oid")
-        _oid(self.current_head_oid, "current_head_oid")
-        if not all((self.append_only, self.renewable, self.multi_commit, self.recoverable, self.branch_bound)):
-            raise ContinuationError("lease_capability_downgrade")
-
-
-class ContinuationLeaseManager:
-    """State machine for a multi-commit lease with CAS-only ref updates."""
-
-    def __init__(self, probe: BranchProbe, refs: RefCAS, *, now=datetime.now) -> None:
-        self.probe = probe
-        self.refs = refs
-        self.now = now
-
-    def open(self, request: WriterLeaseRequestV2) -> CampaignWriterLease:
-        request.validate(self.probe)
-        if request.branch_mode != "CONTINUE_EXISTING":
-            raise ContinuationError("CREATE_NEW_REQUIRES_SEPARATE_PROVISIONER")
-        return CampaignWriterLease(
-            task_id=request.task_id,
-            repository=request.repository,
-            branch=request.target_branch,
-            lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
-            current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
-            generation=request.generation,
-            lease_expires_at=self.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=request.lease_seconds),
-        )
-
-    def renew(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease, seconds: int) -> CampaignWriterLease:
-        if lease.state != "ACTIVE" or not lease.renewable or seconds < 1:
-            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_renewable")
-        return replace(lease, lease_expires_at=self.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=seconds))
-
-    def append_commit(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease, new_head_oid: str) -> CampaignWriterLease:
-        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
-            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_active")
-        _oid(new_head_oid, "new_head_oid")
-        if not self.probe.is_ancestor(lease.current_head_oid, new_head_oid):
-            raise ContinuationError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
-        try:
-            actual = self.refs.compare_and_swap_branch(
-                lease.branch, lease.current_head_oid, new_head_oid
-            )
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise ContinuationError("BRANCH_LEASE_STALE") from exc
-        if actual != new_head_oid:
-            raise ContinuationError("BRANCH_LEASE_STALE")
-        return replace(lease, current_head_oid=new_head_oid)
-
-    def supersede(self, lease: CampaignWriterLease) -> CampaignWriterLease:
-        if lease.state not in {"ACTIVE", "RECOVERABLE_FAILURE", "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"}:
-            raise ContinuationError("lease_not_supersedable")
-        return replace(lease, generation=lease.generation + 1, state="SUPERSEDED")

active-runtime/app/aios_control_plane_runtime_status.py

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-"""Separate read, write, and release plane readiness evaluation."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Mapping
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class RuntimeStatus:
-    read_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
-    write_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
-    release_plane: Mapping[str, bool]
-
-    @property
-    def release_control_plane_ready(self) -> bool:
-        return all(self.read_plane.values()) and all(self.write_plane.values()) and all(self.release_plane.values())
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
-        return {
-            "READ_PLANE": dict(self.read_plane),
-            "WRITE_PLANE": dict(self.write_plane),
-            "RELEASE_PLANE": dict(self.release_plane),
-            "release_control_plane_ready": self.release_control_plane_ready,
-        }

active-runtime/app/aios_control_plane_sentinel.py

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-"""Workspace-independent authority/network/Gitea ref sentinel."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-from typing import Callable, Mapping
-
-
-class SentinelError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class SentinelInputs:
-    authority_git_dir: Path
-    gitea_remote: str
-    gitea_api: str
-    ref: str
-    expected_oid: str
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class SentinelResult:
-    authority_oid: str | None
-    network_oid: str | None
-    gitea_oid: str | None
-    equal: bool
-    error: str | None = None
-
-
-def authority_oid(inputs: SentinelInputs) -> str:
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "--git-dir", str(inputs.authority_git_dir), "rev-parse", inputs.ref],
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-        check=False,
-    )
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise SentinelError("AUTHORITY_REF_UNAVAILABLE")
-    return result.stdout.strip()
-
-
-def evaluate(
-    inputs: SentinelInputs,
-    *,
-    network_reader: Callable[[str, str], str | None],
-    gitea_reader: Callable[[str, str], str | None],
-) -> SentinelResult:
-    try:
-        local = authority_oid(inputs)
-        network = network_reader(inputs.gitea_remote, inputs.ref)
-        gitea = gitea_reader(inputs.gitea_api, inputs.ref)
-        equal = local == network == gitea == inputs.expected_oid
-        return SentinelResult(local, network, gitea, equal, None if equal else "OID_MISMATCH")
-    except SentinelError as exc:
-        return SentinelResult(None, None, None, False, str(exc))

active-runtime/app/aios_control_plane_snapshot.py

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-"""Non-sensitive control-plane snapshot assembly."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-
-def _copy(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None, keys: tuple[str, ...]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    value = value or {}
-    return {key: value.get(key) for key in keys}
-
-
-def build_control_plane_snapshot(*, target_version: str, runtime: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, repository: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, production: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, task: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, capabilities: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, credential_broker: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "version": {"target_release": target_version},
-        "runtime": _copy(runtime, ("bridge_schema_version", "control_plane_release_version", "runtime_release_commit", "runtime_path", "artifact_sha256", "drift_status")),
-        "repository": _copy(repository, ("identity", "authority_git_dir", "authority_main_oid")),
-        "production": _copy(production, ("baseline_version", "target_oid", "deployment_state")),
-        "task": _copy(task, ("task_id", "branch", "authority_branch_oid", "gitea_git_oid", "gitea_api_oid", "commit_visible", "generation", "reconciliation_state")),
-        "capabilities": _copy(capabilities, ("legacy_writes_enabled", "governed_writes_enabled", "force_push", "main_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "production_write")),
-        "credential_broker": _copy(credential_broker, ("status", "provider")),
-        "secret_material_exposed": False,
-    }
-
-
-def getControlPlaneSnapshot(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return build_control_plane_snapshot(**kwargs)

active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-"""Metadata-only, server-side credential lease broker."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import secrets
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class CredentialLease:
-    lease_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    target_branch: str
-    generation: int
-    issued_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-    scopes: tuple[str, ...]
-    provider: str
-    state: str = "ACTIVE"
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state}
-
-
-class FileCredentialProvider:
-    def __init__(self, token_path: str | os.PathLike[str], *, actor: str = "aios-autonomy-agent") -> None:
-        self.token_path = Path(token_path)
-        self.actor = actor
-
-    def environment(self, lease: CredentialLease) -> dict[str, str]:
-        if not self.token_path.is_file():
-            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE")
-        return {"CREDENTIAL_FILE": str(self.token_path), "GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR": self.actor}
-
-
-class CredentialBroker:
-    def __init__(self, provider: Any, *, now: Callable[[], datetime] | None = None) -> None:
-        self.provider = provider
-        self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
-        self._leases: dict[str, CredentialLease] = {}
-
-    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if repository != "aios/aios" or not target_branch.startswith("agent/") or generation < 1 or not 1 <= lease_seconds <= 86400:
-            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
-        now = self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__)
-        self._leases[lease.lease_id] = lease
-        return lease.as_dict()
-
-    def _get(self, lease_id: str) -> CredentialLease:
-        lease = self._leases.get(lease_id)
-        if lease is None:
-            raise KeyError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_FOUND")
-        if lease.state == "ACTIVE" and self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc) >= datetime.fromisoformat(lease.expires_at):
-            lease = CredentialLease(**{**lease.as_dict(), "scopes": tuple(lease.scopes), "state": "EXPIRED"})
-            self._leases[lease_id] = lease
-        return lease
-
-    def environment(self, lease_id: str) -> Mapping[str, str]:
-        lease = self._get(lease_id)
-        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
-            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
-        return self.provider.environment(lease)
-
-    def status(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._get(lease_id).as_dict()
-
-    def revoke(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        lease = self._get(lease_id)
-        if lease.state == "REVOKED":
-            return lease.as_dict()
-        updated = CredentialLease(**{**lease.as_dict(), "scopes": tuple(lease.scopes), "state": "REVOKED"})
-        self._leases[lease_id] = updated
-        return updated.as_dict()

active-runtime/app/aios_gitea_machine_broker.py

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-"""Non-Owner Gitea machine capability and branch reconciliation boundary."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
-
-
-class MachineBrokerError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-class GiteaTransport(Protocol):
-    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str: ...
-    def create_or_update_pr(self, branch: str, target: str, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def publish_status(self, branch: str, state: str, description: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def protected_merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def read_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
-    def whoami(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-    def repository(self, owner: str, name: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]: ...
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class MachineCredentialProjection:
-    """Opaque systemd credential reference; the credential value is never accepted."""
-
-    reference: str
-    account: str
-    owner_account: str = "aiman"
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "MachineCredentialProjection":
-        if set(value) != {"scheme", "name", "account"}:
-            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
-        if value["scheme"] != "systemd-credential" or value["name"] != "gitea-machine-token":
-            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
-        return cls(f"{value['scheme']}:{value['name']}", str(value["account"]))
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if self.reference != "systemd-credential:gitea-machine-token":
-            raise MachineBrokerError("CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
-        if not self.account or self.account == self.owner_account:
-            raise MachineBrokerError("OWNER_MACHINE_IDENTITY_REJECTED")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class CampaignCapabilityReceipt:
-    campaign_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    branch: str
-    expected_oid: str
-    capabilities: frozenset[str]
-    denied: frozenset[str]
-
-    def require(self, capability: str) -> None:
-        if capability in self.denied or capability not in self.capabilities:
-            raise MachineBrokerError("CAPABILITY_DENIED")
-        if self.branch in {"main", "master"}:
-            raise MachineBrokerError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_DENIED")
-
-
-class GiteaMachineBroker:
-    def __init__(self, transport: GiteaTransport, credential: MachineCredentialProjection, receipt: CampaignCapabilityReceipt) -> None:
-        self.transport = transport
-        self.credential = credential
-        self.receipt = receipt
-
-    def verify_identity(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        identity = dict(self.transport.whoami())
-        login = identity.get("login") or identity.get("username")
-        if not isinstance(login, str) or not login or login == self.credential.owner_account or login != self.credential.account:
-            raise MachineBrokerError("GITEA_MACHINE_IDENTITY_INVALID")
-        owner, name = self.receipt.repository.split("/", 1)
-        repo = dict(self.transport.repository(owner, name))
-        if repo.get("full_name") != self.receipt.repository:
-            raise MachineBrokerError("GITEA_REPOSITORY_MISMATCH")
-        return {"login": login, "repository": self.receipt.repository, "owner_account": self.credential.owner_account}
-
-    def push_branch(self, new_oid: str) -> str:
-        self.receipt.require("exact_task_branch_push")
-        return self.transport.compare_and_swap_branch(self.receipt.branch, self.receipt.expected_oid, new_oid)
-
-    def create_pr(self, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        self.receipt.require("pr_create_update")
-        return self.transport.create_or_update_pr(self.receipt.branch, "main", title, body)
-
-    def status(self, state: str, description: str, context: str = "aios/durable-release") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        self.receipt.require("status_publish")
-        return self.transport.publish_status(self.receipt.branch, state, description, context)
-
-    def merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        self.receipt.require("protected_merge")
-        return self.transport.protected_merge(pr_number)
-
-    def readback(self) -> str | None:
-        self.receipt.require("remote_readback")
-        return self.transport.read_branch(self.receipt.branch)
-
-
-def reconcile_exact_branch(authority_oid: str, gitea_oid: str | None, expected_oid: str) -> str:
-    if authority_oid != expected_oid:
-        return "AUTHORITY_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH"
-    if gitea_oid is None:
-        return "CREATE_REQUIRED"
-    if gitea_oid == expected_oid:
-        return "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
-    return "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-
-
-def reconcile_fast_forward(
-    remote_oid: str | None,
-    expected_old_oid: str,
-    new_oid: str,
-    *,
-    old_is_ancestor_of_new: bool,
-) -> str:
-    """Return a bounded action for an active Job/lease branch scope."""
-    if remote_oid is None:
-        return "CREATE_REQUIRED"
-    if remote_oid == new_oid:
-        return "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
-    if remote_oid == expected_old_oid and old_is_ancestor_of_new:
-        return "FAST_FORWARD_REQUIRED"
-    return "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"

active-runtime/app/aios_gitea_machine_transport.py

@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-"""Gitea HTTP/Git transport using only a projected systemd credential."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
-from urllib.parse import quote, urlencode
-from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
-
-
-class GiteaTransportError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def _safe_oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
-        raise GiteaTransportError(f"{field}_INVALID")
-    return value
-
-
-@dataclass(slots=True)
-class GiteaMachineTransport:
-    api_base: str
-    repository_id: str
-    remote_url: str
-    authority_git_dir: Path
-    credential_name: str = "gitea-machine-token"
-    actor: str = "aios-autonomy-agent"
-    timeout: int = 20
-    expected_merge_head: str | None = None
-    expected_merge_base: str | None = None
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if self.credential_name != "gitea-machine-token":
-            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_NAME_INVALID")
-        if "/" not in self.repository_id or self.repository_id.startswith("/"):
-            raise GiteaTransportError("REPOSITORY_INVALID")
-        if not self.api_base.startswith("https://") and not self.api_base.startswith("http://127.0.0.1"):
-            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_API_SCOPE_INVALID")
-        if not self.remote_url.startswith("https://"):
-            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_REMOTE_SCOPE_INVALID")
-
-    @property
-    def _credential_path(self) -> Path:
-        directory = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "")
-        if not directory:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
-        path = Path(directory) / self.credential_name
-        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
-            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_MISSING")
-        return path
-
-    def _token(self) -> str:
-        value = self._credential_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-        if not value:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("CREDENTIAL_EMPTY")
-        return value
-
-    def _request(self, method: str, path: str, body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> tuple[int, Any]:
-        data = None if body is None else json.dumps(dict(body), separators=(",", ":")).encode()
-        headers = {"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"token {self._token()}"}
-        if data is not None:
-            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
-        request = Request(self.api_base.rstrip("/") + path, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
-        try:
-            with urlopen(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
-                raw = response.read()
-                return response.status, json.loads(raw.decode()) if raw else {}
-        except HTTPError as exc:
-            # Never include response bodies: Gitea may echo sensitive request context.
-            raise GiteaTransportError(f"GITEA_HTTP_{exc.code}") from exc
-        except (URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_NETWORK_ERROR") from exc
-
-    def whoami(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        return self._request("GET", "/user")[1]
-
-    def repository_info(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
-        return self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}")[1]
-
-    def repository(self, owner: str, name: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        if f"{owner}/{name}" != self.repository_id:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("REPOSITORY_SCOPE_DENIED")
-        return self.repository_info()
-
-    def read_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None:
-        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
-        try:
-            value = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/branches/{quote(branch, safe='/')}")[1]
-        except GiteaTransportError as exc:
-            if str(exc) == "GITEA_HTTP_404":
-                return None
-            raise
-        sha = value.get("commit", {}).get("id") if isinstance(value, dict) else None
-        return _safe_oid(sha, "remote_branch_oid")
-
-    def _askpass(self) -> tuple[Path, dict[str, str]]:
-        credential = self._credential_path
-        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="aios-gitea-askpass-", dir="/tmp")
-        path = Path(name)
-        os.fchmod(fd, 0o700)
-        script = "#!/bin/sh\ncase \"$1\" in *Username*) printf '%s\\n' \"$GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR\" ;; *) cat \"$CREDENTIAL_FILE\" ;; esac\n"
-        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
-            stream.write(script)
-            stream.flush()
-            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-        return path, {
-            "GIT_ASKPASS": str(path),
-            "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
-            "GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR": self.actor,
-            "CREDENTIAL_FILE": str(credential),
-        }
-
-    def _push_branch_fast_forward(self, branch: str, new_oid: str) -> None:
-        askpass, additions = self._askpass()
-        environment = os.environ.copy()
-        environment.update(additions)
-        try:
-            result = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", f"--git-dir={self.authority_git_dir}", "push", self.remote_url, f"{new_oid}:refs/heads/{branch}"],
-                text=True,
-                capture_output=True,
-                check=False,
-                env=environment,
-                timeout=self.timeout,
-            )
-            if result.returncode != 0:
-                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CREATE_FAILED")
-        finally:
-            askpass.unlink(missing_ok=True)
-
-    def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
-        _safe_oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
-        _safe_oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
-        current = self.read_branch(branch)
-        if current == new_oid:
-            return new_oid
-        if current is None:
-            self._push_branch_fast_forward(branch, new_oid)
-            readback = self.read_branch(branch)
-            if readback != new_oid:
-                raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
-            return readback
-        if current != expected_oid:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        # The preflight read binds the expected old tip. The Git receive-pack
-        # then enforces the actual fast-forward CAS while transferring the new
-        # objects; no force/lease override or arbitrary ref is permitted.
-        self._push_branch_fast_forward(branch, new_oid)
-        readback = self.read_branch(branch)
-        if readback != new_oid:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("GITEA_BRANCH_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
-        return readback
-
-    def _pulls(self) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
-        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
-        query = urlencode({"state": "all", "base_branch": "main", "limit": 100})
-        value = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls?{query}")[1]
-        return value if isinstance(value, list) else []
-
-    def create_or_update_pr(self, branch: str, target: str, title: str, body: str) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        if target != "main":
-            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_BASE_SCOPE_DENIED")
-        head = self.read_branch(branch)
-        if head is None:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_MISSING")
-        matches = [p for p in self._pulls() if (p.get("head") or {}).get("ref") == branch and (p.get("base") or {}).get("ref") == target]
-        open_matches = [p for p in matches if p.get("state") == "open"]
-        if len(open_matches) > 1:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("MULTIPLE_MATCHING_PRS")
-        if open_matches:
-            if (open_matches[0].get("head") or {}).get("sha") != head:
-                raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_CONFLICT")
-            return open_matches[0]
-        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
-        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls", {"head": branch, "base": target, "title": title, "body": body, "allow_maintainer_edit": False})[1]
-
-    def publish_status(self, branch: str, state: str, description: str, context: str = "aios/durable-release") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        oid = self.read_branch(branch)
-        if oid is None:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("STATUS_BRANCH_MISSING")
-        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
-        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/statuses/{oid}", {"state": state, "context": context, "description": description})[1]
-
-    def protected_merge(self, pr_number: int) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        if not isinstance(pr_number, int) or pr_number < 1:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_NUMBER_INVALID")
-        owner, name = self.repository_id.split("/", 1)
-        pr = self._request("GET", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls/{pr_number}")[1]
-        if pr.get("state") != "open" or (pr.get("base") or {}).get("ref") != "main":
-            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_MERGE_BINDING_INVALID")
-        if pr.get("mergeable") is False:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_NOT_MERGEABLE")
-        head_oid = (pr.get("head") or {}).get("sha")
-        base_oid = (pr.get("base") or {}).get("sha")
-        if self.expected_merge_head is not None and head_oid != self.expected_merge_head:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_HEAD_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        if self.expected_merge_base is not None and base_oid != self.expected_merge_base:
-            raise GiteaTransportError("PR_BASE_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        body = {"do": "fast-forward-only", "force_merge": False, "merge_when_checks_succeed": False, "head_commit_id": head_oid}
-        return self._request("POST", f"/repos/{quote(owner)}/{quote(name)}/pulls/{pr_number}/merge", body)[1]

active-runtime/app/aios_gitea_publisher.py

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-"""Canonical Gitea transport and slash-branch verification."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Optional
-from urllib.parse import quote
-from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
-
-from aios_gitops_reconciliation_core import RemoteObservation
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class GiteaPublisherConfig:
-    repository: str = "aios/aios"
-    api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1"
-    remote_name: str = "gitea-http"
-
-
-class GiteaPublisher:
-    def __init__(self, workspace: Path, *, config: GiteaPublisherConfig = GiteaPublisherConfig(), credential: Any = None, api_get: Callable[[str], Any] | None = None, git_ref: Callable[[str], Optional[str]] | None = None) -> None:
-        self.workspace = Path(workspace)
-        self.config = config
-        self.credential = credential
-        self._api_get = api_get
-        self._git_ref = git_ref
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def validate_repository(repository: str) -> None:
-        if repository != "aios/aios":
-            raise ValueError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def validate_branch(branch: str) -> None:
-        if not isinstance(branch, str) or not branch.startswith("agent/") or branch in {"main", "master"}:
-            raise ValueError("BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
-
-    def repository_identity(self) -> str:
-        self.validate_repository(self.config.repository)
-        return self.config.repository
-
-    def _environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        if self.credential is not None and hasattr(self.credential, "environment"):
-            return dict(self.credential.environment())
-        return {}
-
-    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> Optional[str]:
-        self.validate_branch(branch)
-        if self._git_ref is not None:
-            return self._git_ref(branch)
-        result = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.workspace), "ls-remote", self.config.remote_name, f"refs/heads/{branch}"], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False, env={**os.environ, **self._environment(), "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"})
-        if result.returncode != 0 or not result.stdout.strip():
-            return None
-        return result.stdout.split()[0]
-
-    def _api(self, path: str) -> Any:
-        if self._api_get is not None:
-            return self._api_get(path)
-        headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
-        env = self._environment()
-        if env.get("AIOS_GITEA_TOKEN"):
-            headers["Authorization"] = "token " + env["AIOS_GITEA_TOKEN"]
-        with urlopen(Request(self.config.api_base.rstrip("/") + path, headers=headers), timeout=20) as response:
-            return json.loads(response.read() or b"{}")
-
-    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> Optional[str]:
-        self.validate_branch(branch)
-        for page in range(1, 101):
-            value = self._api(f"/repos/aios/aios/branches?page={page}&limit=50")
-            if not isinstance(value, list):
-                return None
-            for item in value:
-                if isinstance(item, Mapping) and item.get("name") == branch:
-                    commit = item.get("commit")
-                    return commit.get("id") if isinstance(commit, Mapping) else None
-            if len(value) < 50:
-                return None
-        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_BRANCH_PAGINATION_LIMIT")
-
-    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool:
-        if not isinstance(oid, str) or len(oid) != 40:
-            return False
-        try:
-            value = self._api(f"/repos/aios/aios/git/commits/{quote(oid, safe='')}")
-            return isinstance(value, Mapping) and value.get("sha", oid) == oid
-        except Exception:
-            return False
-
-    def observe(self, branch: str, desired_oid: str, authority_oid: Optional[str], *, expected_oid: Optional[str] = None, observed_at: str = "") -> RemoteObservation:
-        return RemoteObservation(self.repository_identity(), branch, desired_oid, authority_oid, self.read_git_ref(branch), self.read_api_branch(branch), self.commit_visible(desired_oid), observed_at, expected_oid)

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_job_controller.py

@@ -1,602 +0,0 @@
-"""SQLite-backed durable GitOps Job Controller.
-
-The controller owns durable intent, idempotency, lease metadata, state
-transitions, receipts, and payload references. A worker owns Git side effects
-behind the campaign capability and branch-CAS boundaries.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from enum import Enum
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import sqlite3
-import tempfile
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
-
-
-class JobError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-class ServiceUnavailable(JobError):
-    pass
-
-
-class BindingConflict(JobError):
-    pass
-
-
-class JobState(str, Enum):
-    REQUESTED = "REQUESTED"
-    AUTHORIZED = "AUTHORIZED"
-    LEASED = "LEASED"
-    WORKTREE_READY = "WORKTREE_READY"
-    EXECUTING = "EXECUTING"
-    LOCAL_VERIFIED = "LOCAL_VERIFIED"
-    REMOTE_SYNCING = "REMOTE_SYNCING"
-    REMOTE_VERIFIED = "REMOTE_VERIFIED"
-    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
-    FAILED = "FAILED"
-    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
-    RECOVERABLE_FAILURE = "RECOVERABLE_FAILURE"
-    RECONCILING = "RECONCILING"
-    RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED = "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
-    MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-
-
-_ORDER = {
-    JobState.REQUESTED: 0,
-    JobState.AUTHORIZED: 1,
-    JobState.LEASED: 2,
-    JobState.WORKTREE_READY: 3,
-    JobState.EXECUTING: 4,
-    JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED: 5,
-    JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING: 6,
-    JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED: 7,
-    JobState.COMPLETED: 8,
-}
-_RECOVERABLE = {JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED}
-_TERMINAL = {
-    JobState.COMPLETED,
-    JobState.FAILED,
-    JobState.CANCELLED,
-    JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
-}
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return (
-        json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n"
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value)).hexdigest()
-
-
-class PayloadStore:
-    """Content-addressed filesystem payloads; raw content never enters SQLite."""
-
-    def __init__(self, root: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
-        self.root = Path(root)
-        if not self.root.is_absolute() or self.root.is_symlink():
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_ROOT_INVALID")
-        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
-        os.chmod(self.root, 0o700)
-
-    def put(self, content: bytes, expected_digest: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
-        digest = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
-        if digest != expected_digest:
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
-        if len(expected_digest) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in expected_digest):
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_DIGEST_INVALID")
-        target = self.root / expected_digest
-        if target.is_symlink():
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_PATH_SYMLINK")
-        if target.is_file():
-            if target.stat().st_size != len(content) or hashlib.sha256(target.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != digest:
-                raise JobError("PAYLOAD_EXISTING_MISMATCH")
-            return f"sha256/{digest}", len(content)
-        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".payload-", dir=self.root)
-        try:
-            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as stream:
-                stream.write(content)
-                stream.flush()
-                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-            os.replace(temporary, target)
-            os.chmod(target, 0o600)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temporary):
-                os.unlink(temporary)
-        return f"sha256/{digest}", len(content)
-
-    def read_verified(self, reference: str, expected_digest: str, expected_size: int) -> bytes:
-        if reference != f"sha256/{expected_digest}":
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_REFERENCE_MISMATCH")
-        path = self.root / expected_digest
-        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_MISSING")
-        content = path.read_bytes()
-        if len(content) != expected_size or hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() != expected_digest:
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_VERIFY_FAILED")
-        return content
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class JobReceipt:
-    job_id: str
-    idempotency_key: str
-    state: JobState
-    side_effect_state: str
-    http_status: int
-    revision: int
-    receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "job_id": self.job_id,
-            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
-            "state": self.state.value,
-            "side_effect_state": self.side_effect_state,
-            "http_status": self.http_status,
-            "revision": self.revision,
-            "receipt": dict(self.receipt) if self.receipt else None,
-        }
-
-
-class JobStore:
-    SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-    def __init__(self, root: str | os.PathLike[str], *, payload_root: str | os.PathLike[str] | None = None) -> None:
-        self.root = Path(root)
-        if not self.root.is_absolute() or self.root.is_symlink():
-            raise JobError("JOB_ROOT_INVALID")
-        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
-        os.chmod(self.root, 0o700)
-        self.db_path = self.root / "state.sqlite3"
-        self.payloads = PayloadStore(payload_root or self.root.parent / "payloads" / "sha256")
-        self._initialize()
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        if self.db_path.is_symlink():
-            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_SYMLINK")
-        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
-        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
-        return connection
-
-    def _initialize(self) -> None:
-        try:
-            with self._connect() as connection:
-                connection.executescript(
-                    """
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS metadata (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL);
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS jobs (
-                      job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                      campaign_id TEXT NOT NULL, repository TEXT NOT NULL, operation TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      branch TEXT NOT NULL, expected_branch_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL, payload_ref TEXT, payload_size INTEGER,
-                      state TEXT NOT NULL, side_effect_state TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      revision INTEGER NOT NULL, request_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      receipt_json TEXT, created_at TEXT NOT NULL, updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                    );
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS idempotency_keys (
-                      key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                      binding_json TEXT NOT NULL, created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
-                    );
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS branch_leases (
-                      lease_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                      branch TEXT NOT NULL, lineage_anchor_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      current_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
-                      lease_expires_at TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      revision INTEGER NOT NULL, FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
-                    );
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS state_transitions (
-                      sequence INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      from_state TEXT, to_state TEXT NOT NULL, revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
-                      side_effect_state TEXT NOT NULL, created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
-                    );
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS receipts (
-                      receipt_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      kind TEXT NOT NULL, digest TEXT NOT NULL, payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                      created_at TEXT NOT NULL, FOREIGN KEY(job_id) REFERENCES jobs(job_id)
-                    );
-                    INSERT OR REPLACE INTO metadata(key, value) VALUES('schema_version', '1');
-                    """
-                )
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-
-    def _mirror(self, job: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        directory = self.root / str(job["job_id"])
-        directory.mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
-        (directory / "receipts").mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
-        (directory / "logs-digest").mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
-        for name, value in (("request.json", job["request"]), ("state.json", job)):
-            target = directory / name
-            fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".mirror-", dir=directory)
-            try:
-                os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-                with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as stream:
-                    stream.write(canonical_json(value))
-                    stream.flush()
-                    os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-                os.replace(temporary, target)
-            finally:
-                if os.path.exists(temporary):
-                    os.unlink(temporary)
-
-    def read(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        try:
-            with self._connect() as connection:
-                row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-        if row is None:
-            raise JobError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
-        return dict(row)
-
-    def _receipt(self, row: Mapping[str, Any], *, duplicate: bool) -> JobReceipt:
-        state = JobState(row["state"])
-        if state == JobState.COMPLETED:
-            status, side = 200, "COMPLETED"
-        elif state in _RECOVERABLE:
-            status = 202
-            side = row["side_effect_state"] if row["side_effect_state"] == "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING" else "RESUME_SAME_JOB"
-        elif row["side_effect_state"] == "UNKNOWN":
-            status, side = 503, "UNKNOWN"
-        else:
-            status, side = 202, "SAME_JOB" if duplicate else "QUEUED"
-        receipt = json.loads(row["receipt_json"]) if row["receipt_json"] else None
-        return JobReceipt(row["job_id"], row["idempotency_key"], state, side, status, int(row["revision"]), receipt)
-
-
-class GitOpsJobController:
-    def __init__(self, store: JobStore) -> None:
-        self.store = store
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _binding(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
-        fields = ("campaign_id", "repository", "operation", "branch", "expected_branch_oid", "payload_digest")
-        if any(not isinstance(request.get(field), str) or not request[field].strip() for field in fields):
-            raise JobError("JOB_BINDING_INVALID")
-        oid = request["expected_branch_oid"]
-        digest = request["payload_digest"]
-        if len(oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in oid):
-            raise JobError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
-        if len(digest) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in digest):
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_DIGEST_INVALID")
-        if request["branch"] in {"main", "master"} or request["branch"].startswith(("refs/", "tags/")):
-            raise JobError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_REJECTED")
-        binding = {field: str(request[field]) for field in fields}
-        # Operation-specific, non-secret binding inputs must survive the
-        # durable round trip and participate in idempotency. Arbitrary request
-        # fields are intentionally discarded rather than persisted.
-        optional = (
-            "idempotency_key",
-            "task_id",
-            "new_branch_oid",
-            "authorization_recovery_digest",
-            "lineage_anchor_oid",
-            "base_oid",
-            "branch_mode",
-            "generation",
-            "expected_main_oid",
-            "pr_number",
-            "target_branch",
-            "check_context",
-            "check_state",
-            "check_description",
-        )
-        for field in optional:
-            value = request.get(field)
-            if value is None:
-                continue
-            if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (str, int)):
-                raise JobError("JOB_BINDING_OPTION_INVALID")
-            text = str(value).strip()
-            if not text or len(text) > 512:
-                raise JobError("JOB_BINDING_OPTION_INVALID")
-            binding[field] = text
-        return binding
-
-    def submit(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], *, payload: bytes | None = None) -> JobReceipt:
-        binding = self._binding(request)
-        payload_ref = request.get("payload_ref")
-        payload_size = request.get("payload_size")
-        if payload is not None:
-            payload_ref, payload_size = self.store.payloads.put(payload, binding["payload_digest"])
-        if payload_ref is not None and payload_ref != f"sha256/{binding['payload_digest']}":
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_REFERENCE_MISMATCH")
-        if payload_ref is not None and (not isinstance(payload_size, int) or payload_size < 0):
-            raise JobError("PAYLOAD_SIZE_INVALID")
-        client_idempotency_key = binding.get("idempotency_key")
-        if client_idempotency_key is not None:
-            if len(client_idempotency_key) > 128 or not all(
-                character.isalnum() or character in "._:-" for character in client_idempotency_key
-            ):
-                raise JobError("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
-            key = sha256_json({"client_idempotency_key": client_idempotency_key})
-        else:
-            key = sha256_json(binding)
-        job_id = "job-" + key[:32]
-        durable_request = dict(binding)
-        if payload_ref is not None:
-            durable_request.update({"payload_ref": str(payload_ref), "payload_size": int(payload_size)})
-        now = utc_now()
-        try:
-            with self.store._connect() as connection:
-                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                existing = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)).fetchone()
-                if existing is not None:
-                    if json.loads(existing["request_json"]).get("binding") != binding:
-                        raise BindingConflict("BINDING_CONFLICT")
-                    row = dict(existing)
-                    connection.commit()
-                    return self.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True)
-                connection.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO jobs(job_id,idempotency_key,campaign_id,repository,operation,branch,expected_branch_oid,payload_digest,payload_ref,payload_size,state,side_effect_state,revision,request_json,receipt_json,created_at,updated_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                    (job_id, key, binding["campaign_id"], binding["repository"], binding["operation"], binding["branch"], binding["expected_branch_oid"], binding["payload_digest"], payload_ref, payload_size, JobState.REQUESTED.value, "NONE", 0, json.dumps({"binding": binding, **durable_request}, sort_keys=True), None, now, now),
-                )
-                connection.execute("INSERT INTO idempotency_keys(key,job_id,binding_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?)", (key, job_id, json.dumps(binding, sort_keys=True), now))
-                connection.execute("INSERT INTO state_transitions(job_id,from_state,to_state,revision,side_effect_state,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (job_id, None, JobState.REQUESTED.value, 0, "NONE", now))
-                row = dict(connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone())
-                connection.commit()
-        except BindingConflict:
-            raise
-        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
-            row = self.store.read(job_id)
-            return self.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True)
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-        row["request"] = json.loads(row["request_json"])
-        self.store._mirror(row)
-        return self.store._receipt(row, duplicate=False)
-
-    def lease_job(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        *,
-        lease_id: str,
-        lineage_anchor_oid: str,
-        current_head_oid: str,
-        generation: int,
-        lease_expires_at: str,
-        expected_revision: int,
-    ) -> JobReceipt:
-        """Atomically create a branch lease and move its Job to LEASED."""
-        if generation < 1 or any(len(oid) != 40 for oid in (lineage_anchor_oid, current_head_oid)):
-            raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
-        try:
-            with self.store._connect() as connection:
-                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
-                if row is None:
-                    raise JobError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
-                if int(row["revision"]) != expected_revision:
-                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
-                if row["branch"] in {"main", "master"}:
-                    raise JobError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_REJECTED")
-                now = utc_now()
-                connection.execute("INSERT INTO branch_leases(lease_id,job_id,branch,lineage_anchor_oid,current_head_oid,generation,lease_expires_at,state,revision) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)", (lease_id, job_id, row["branch"], lineage_anchor_oid, current_head_oid, generation, lease_expires_at, "ACTIVE", 0))
-                next_revision = expected_revision + 1
-                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE jobs SET state=?,side_effect_state=?,revision=?,updated_at=? WHERE job_id=? AND revision=?", (JobState.LEASED.value, "LEASED", next_revision, now, job_id, expected_revision))
-                if updated.rowcount != 1:
-                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
-                connection.execute("INSERT INTO state_transitions(job_id,from_state,to_state,revision,side_effect_state,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (job_id, row["state"], JobState.LEASED.value, next_revision, "LEASED", now))
-                result = dict(connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone())
-                connection.commit()
-        except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
-            raise JobError("LEASE_CONFLICT") from exc
-        except (JobError, BindingConflict):
-            raise
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-        result["request"] = json.loads(result["request_json"])
-        self.store._mirror(result)
-        return self.store._receipt(result, duplicate=True)
-
-    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE") -> None:
-        if len(current_head_oid) != 40 or generation < 1:
-            raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
-        try:
-            with self.store._connect() as connection:
-                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
-                if updated.rowcount != 1:
-                    raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
-                connection.commit()
-        except JobError:
-            raise
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-
-    def advance(self, job_id: str, state: JobState, *, side_effect_state: str, receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, expected_revision: int | None = None) -> JobReceipt:
-        return self._advance(
-            job_id,
-            state,
-            side_effect_state=side_effect_state,
-            receipt=receipt,
-            expected_revision=expected_revision,
-        )
-
-    def _advance(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        state: JobState,
-        *,
-        side_effect_state: str,
-        receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-        expected_revision: int | None = None,
-        _allow_verified_external_recovery: bool = False,
-    ) -> JobReceipt:
-        try:
-            with self.store._connect() as connection:
-                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
-                if row is None:
-                    raise JobError("JOB_NOT_FOUND")
-                previous = JobState(row["state"])
-                revision = int(row["revision"])
-                if expected_revision is not None and expected_revision != revision:
-                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
-                recovery_transition = (
-                    _allow_verified_external_recovery
-                    and previous == JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
-                    and state == JobState.COMPLETED
-                )
-                if previous in _TERMINAL and state != previous and not recovery_transition:
-                    raise JobError("JOB_TERMINAL")
-                if state not in _RECOVERABLE | {JobState.RECONCILING, JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED}:
-                    if previous in _RECOVERABLE:
-                        raise JobError("RECONCILE_REQUIRED")
-                    if previous != JobState.RECONCILING and _ORDER.get(state, -1) < _ORDER.get(previous, -1):
-                        raise JobError("JOB_STATE_REGRESSION")
-                next_revision = revision + 1
-                receipt_json = json.dumps(dict(receipt), sort_keys=True) if receipt is not None else row["receipt_json"]
-                now = utc_now()
-                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE jobs SET state=?,side_effect_state=?,revision=?,receipt_json=?,updated_at=? WHERE job_id=? AND revision=?", (state.value, side_effect_state, next_revision, receipt_json, now, job_id, revision))
-                if updated.rowcount != 1:
-                    raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
-                connection.execute("INSERT INTO state_transitions(job_id,from_state,to_state,revision,side_effect_state,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (job_id, previous.value, state.value, next_revision, side_effect_state, now))
-                if receipt is not None:
-                    digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(receipt)).hexdigest()
-                    connection.execute("INSERT INTO receipts(receipt_id,job_id,kind,digest,payload_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)", (f"receipt-{job_id}-{next_revision}", job_id, state.value, digest, json.dumps(dict(receipt), sort_keys=True), now))
-                result = dict(connection.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone())
-                connection.commit()
-        except (JobError, BindingConflict):
-            raise
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-        result["request"] = json.loads(result["request_json"])
-        self.store._mirror(result)
-        return self.store._receipt(result, duplicate=True)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _validate_verified_external_merge_proof(
-        job_id: str,
-        binding: Mapping[str, Any],
-        proof: Mapping[str, Any],
-    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if not isinstance(proof, Mapping):
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_INVALID")
-
-        def require_oid(field: str) -> str:
-            value = proof.get(field)
-            if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
-                raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_INVALID")
-            return value
-
-        if proof.get("proof_schema") != "aios.job-recovery.v1":
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_INVALID")
-        if proof.get("job_id") != job_id:
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-        if proof.get("operation") != "PROTECTED_MERGE" or binding.get("operation") != "PROTECTED_MERGE":
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_OPERATION_REJECTED")
-        if proof.get("pr_number") != 53 or str(binding.get("pr_number")) != "53":
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-        if proof.get("pr_merged") is not True or proof.get("protected_merge") is not True:
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-        if proof.get("force_push") is not False:
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-        if proof.get("machine_actor") != "aios-autonomy-agent":
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-
-        expected_head = str(binding.get("expected_branch_oid", ""))
-        expected_base = str(binding.get("expected_main_oid", ""))
-        head_oid = require_oid("head_oid")
-        base_oid = require_oid("base_oid")
-        merged_main = require_oid("main_oid_after_protected_merge")
-        gitea_merged_main = require_oid("gitea_main_oid_after_protected_merge")
-        authority_merged_main = require_oid("authority_main_oid_after_protected_merge")
-        current_gitea = require_oid("current_gitea_main_oid")
-        current_authority = require_oid("current_authority_main_oid")
-        if head_oid != expected_head or base_oid != expected_base:
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-        if not (merged_main == gitea_merged_main == authority_merged_main == head_oid):
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-        if current_gitea != current_authority or proof.get("current_main_descends_from_protected_merge") is not True:
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_PROOF_MISMATCH")
-        return dict(proof)
-
-    def complete_verified_external_side_effect(
-        self,
-        job_id: str,
-        proof: Mapping[str, Any],
-        *,
-        expected_revision: int | None = None,
-    ) -> JobReceipt:
-        """Close one historical manual job from independently verified proof.
-
-        This is deliberately narrower than advance: it is only valid for the
-        known protected PR53 recovery shape and preserves the old receipt.
-        The actual state change still uses the normal revision-CAS path.
-        """
-        current = self.store.read(job_id)
-        revision = int(current["revision"])
-        if expected_revision is not None and expected_revision != revision:
-            raise JobError("REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
-        request = json.loads(current["request_json"])
-        binding = request.get("binding", request)
-        normalized_proof = self._validate_verified_external_merge_proof(job_id, binding, proof)
-        existing_receipt = json.loads(current["receipt_json"]) if current["receipt_json"] else None
-        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
-            if (
-                existing_receipt
-                and existing_receipt.get("recovered_from_historical_manual") is True
-                and existing_receipt.get("proof") == normalized_proof
-            ):
-                return self.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True)
-            raise JobError("JOB_TERMINAL")
-        if JobState(current["state"]) != JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED:
-            raise JobError("EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT_RECOVERY_STATE_INVALID")
-        recovery_receipt = {
-            "recovered_from_historical_manual": True,
-            "recovery_kind": "VERIFIED_EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT",
-            "historical_receipt": existing_receipt,
-            "proof": normalized_proof,
-        }
-        return self._advance(
-            job_id,
-            JobState.COMPLETED,
-            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
-            receipt=recovery_receipt,
-            expected_revision=revision,
-            _allow_verified_external_recovery=True,
-        )
-
-    def reconcile(self, job_id: str, observer: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], Mapping[str, Any]]) -> JobReceipt:
-        current = self.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(current["state"]) not in _RECOVERABLE:
-            return self.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True)
-        self.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
-        try:
-            observed = dict(observer(current))
-            stable = JobState(observed.get("state", JobState.REQUESTED.value))
-            if stable in {JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILING}:
-                raise JobError("RECONCILIATION_UNSTABLE")
-            return self.advance(job_id, stable, side_effect_state=str(observed.get("side_effect_state", "NONE")), receipt=observed.get("receipt"))
-        except Exception as exc:
-            self.advance(job_id, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, side_effect_state="UNKNOWN", receipt={"error_code": type(exc).__name__})
-            raise JobError("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED") from exc
-
-    def resume(self, job_id: str) -> JobReceipt:
-        current = self.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(current["state"]) in _TERMINAL:
-            raise JobError("JOB_TERMINAL")
-        return self.reconcile(job_id, lambda _current: {"state": JobState.REQUESTED.value, "side_effect_state": "RESUME_SAME_JOB"})

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_job_executor.py

@@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
-"""Durable Job side-effect executor for the AIOS campaign control plane."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import base64
-from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor, AuthorityGitError
-from aios_campaign_recovery import RecoveryEvidenceError, load_recovered_authorization
-from aios_gitea_machine_broker import CampaignCapabilityReceipt, GiteaMachineBroker, MachineBrokerError
-from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, JobState, JobStore
-
-
-TASK_ID = "AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_RELEASE_CAMPAIGN_V1"
-CAMPAIGN_ID = "AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807"
-REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
-BRANCH = "agent/autonomous-release-campaign-v1-20260807"
-EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID = "bba675fab3b7e0c5fba7066720252b3c91b9f20d"
-AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST = "6b0bf550eb702126e967eeff2d561fa808444b924d8a71f5399accad508ed3b2"
-LINEAGE_ANCHOR = "69b45e81dcd2c3707c367003b08c55fd361faae8"
-
-
-class JobExecutionError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass(slots=True)
-class DurableJobExecutor:
-    controller: GitOpsJobController
-    authority: AuthorityGitExecutor
-    broker: GiteaMachineBroker
-    recovery_path: Path
-
-    def _request(self, job_id: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        try:
-            request = json.loads(row["request_json"])
-        except (KeyError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            raise JobExecutionError("JOB_REQUEST_INVALID") from exc
-        return row, dict(request.get("binding") or {})
-
-    def _validate_campaign(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-        operation = str(request.get("operation", ""))
-        expected_branch_oid = request.get("expected_branch_oid")
-        required = {
-            "task_id": TASK_ID,
-            "campaign_id": CAMPAIGN_ID,
-            "repository": REPOSITORY,
-            "branch": BRANCH,
-            "authorization_recovery_digest": AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST,
-        }
-        for key, expected in required.items():
-            if request.get(key) != expected:
-                raise JobExecutionError(f"JOB_{key.upper()}_MISMATCH")
-        new_oid = request.get("new_branch_oid")
-        if not isinstance(new_oid, str) or len(new_oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in new_oid):
-            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
-        if not isinstance(expected_branch_oid, str) or len(expected_branch_oid) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in expected_branch_oid):
-            raise JobExecutionError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
-        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH" and expected_branch_oid == new_oid:
-            raise JobExecutionError("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
-        if operation != "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH" and expected_branch_oid != new_oid:
-            raise JobExecutionError("POST_ADVANCE_HEAD_BINDING_INVALID")
-        try:
-            recovery = load_recovered_authorization(self.recovery_path)
-        except RecoveryEvidenceError as exc:
-            raise JobExecutionError(str(exc)) from exc
-        if recovery["digest"] != AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST:
-            raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
-        for key, expected in required.items():
-            if key == "campaign_id":
-                actual = recovery.get(key)
-            elif key == "authorization_recovery_digest":
-                continue
-            else:
-                actual = recovery.get({"expected_branch_oid": "expected_branch_oid"}.get(key, key))
-            if actual is not None and actual != expected:
-                raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_BINDING_MISMATCH")
-        if recovery.get("expected_branch_oid") != EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID:
-            raise JobExecutionError("RECOVERY_BRANCH_OID_MISMATCH")
-        authority_head = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
-        if authority_head not in {expected_branch_oid, new_oid}:
-            raise JobExecutionError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        if not self.authority.ancestry_check(expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
-            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
-        if not self.authority.ancestry_check(EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID, new_oid):
-            raise JobExecutionError("NEW_OID_OUTSIDE_AUTHORIZED_LINEAGE")
-        identity = self.broker.verify_identity()
-        if identity.get("repository") != REPOSITORY or identity.get("login") == "aiman":
-            raise JobExecutionError("MACHINE_IDENTITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
-        return new_oid
-
-    def dry_run(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        _row, request = self._request(job_id)
-        new_oid = self._validate_campaign(request)
-        remote = self.broker.readback()
-        if remote is None:
-            action = "CREATE_REQUIRED"
-        elif remote == new_oid:
-            action = "ALREADY_IN_SYNC"
-        elif remote == request["expected_branch_oid"]:
-            action = "FAST_FORWARD_REQUIRED"
-        else:
-            action = "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-        if action == "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
-            raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_CONFLICT")
-        return {
-            "decision": "SAFE_TO_ADVANCE",
-            "authority_action": "CAS_REQUIRED",
-            "gitea_action": action,
-            "previous_branch_oid": request["expected_branch_oid"],
-            "final_branch_oid": new_oid,
-            "force_push": False,
-        }
-
-    def _recover_requested(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(row["state"]) in {JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED}:
-            self.controller.resume(job_id)
-            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        return row
-
-    def execute(self, job_id: str, *, dry_run: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        try:
-            return self._execute_unprotected(job_id, dry_run=dry_run)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            try:
-                row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-                state = JobState(row["state"])
-                if state not in {JobState.COMPLETED, JobState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED, JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, JobState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED}:
-                    self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.RECOVERABLE_FAILURE, side_effect_state="UNKNOWN", receipt={"error_code": type(exc).__name__})
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-            raise
-
-    def _execute_unprotected(self, job_id: str, *, dry_run: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        row, request = self._request(job_id)
-        operation = request.get("operation")
-        if operation == "ADVANCE_EXISTING_CAMPAIGN_BRANCH":
-            if dry_run:
-                return self.dry_run(job_id)
-            return self._advance_campaign(job_id)
-        if operation == "COMMIT_FILE":
-            return self._commit_file(job_id, request)
-        if operation == "SYNC_TASK_BRANCH_TO_GITEA":
-            new_oid = self._validate_campaign(request)
-            final = self.broker.push_branch(new_oid)
-            return {"operation": operation, "remote_verified": final == new_oid, "final_network_oid": final}
-        if operation == "CREATE_PR":
-            self._validate_campaign(request)
-            return dict(self.broker.create_pr("AIOS autonomous release control plane", "Durable campaign continuation; exact head and recovery evidence are bound in the Job."))
-        if operation == "PUBLISH_CHECK":
-            self._validate_campaign(request)
-            context = request.get("check_context", "aios/durable-release")
-            state = request.get("check_state", "success")
-            description = request.get("check_description", "Durable campaign control-plane check passed")
-            return dict(self.broker.status(str(state), str(description), str(context)))
-        if operation == "PROTECTED_MERGE":
-            self._validate_campaign(request)
-            number = int(request.get("pr_number", "0"))
-            self.broker.transport.expected_merge_head = request["expected_branch_oid"]
-            expected_main = request.get("expected_main_oid")
-            if expected_main is not None:
-                self.broker.transport.expected_merge_base = expected_main
-            return dict(self.broker.merge(number))
-        if operation == "RECONCILE_AUTHORITY_MAIN":
-            self._validate_campaign(request)
-            old = request.get("expected_main_oid")
-            new = request.get("new_branch_oid")
-            if not isinstance(old, str) or not isinstance(new, str):
-                raise JobExecutionError("MAIN_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID")
-            gitea_main = self.broker.transport.read_branch("main")
-            if gitea_main != new:
-                raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-            if not self.authority.ancestry_check(old, new):
-                raise JobExecutionError("MAIN_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
-            return {"authority_main": self.authority.ff_CAS_main_after_verified_protected_merge(old, new)}
-        raise JobExecutionError("OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED")
-
-    def _advance_campaign(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        self._recover_requested(job_id)
-        row, request = self._request(job_id)
-        new_oid = self._validate_campaign(request)
-        expected_oid = request["expected_branch_oid"]
-        state = JobState(row["state"])
-        if state == JobState.REQUESTED:
-            receipt = self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.AUTHORIZED, side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED", receipt={"authorization_digest": AUTHORIZATION_DIGEST, "task_id": TASK_ID})
-            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
-            self.controller.lease_job(job_id, lease_id=f"lease-{job_id}", lineage_anchor_oid=LINEAGE_ANCHOR, current_head_oid=expected_oid, generation=1, lease_expires_at="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
-            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.LEASED:
-            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY", receipt={"branch": BRANCH, "expected_oid": expected_oid})
-            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.WORKTREE_READY:
-            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
-            row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        authority_before = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
-        if authority_before == expected_oid:
-            authority_oid = self.authority.advance_task_branch_CAS(f"refs/heads/{BRANCH}", expected_oid, new_oid)
-        elif authority_before == new_oid:
-            authority_oid = new_oid
-        else:
-            raise JobExecutionError("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_CONFLICT")
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.EXECUTING:
-            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED", receipt={"authority": {"branch": BRANCH, "previous_oid": expected_oid, "new_oid": new_oid, "CAS_success": True, "readback_oid": authority_oid}})
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        remote_before = self.broker.readback()
-        if remote_before != new_oid:
-            if remote_before not in {None, expected_oid}:
-                raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_CONFLICT")
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED:
-                if hasattr(self.broker, "receipt"):
-                    self.broker.receipt = replace(self.broker.receipt, expected_oid=expected_oid)
-                self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS", receipt={"gitea": {"previous_oid": remote_before, "desired_oid": new_oid, "force_push": False}})
-            final_network = self.broker.push_branch(new_oid)
-        else:
-            final_network = new_oid
-        final_api = self.broker.readback()
-        if final_api != new_oid:
-            raise JobExecutionError("GITEA_BRANCH_READBACK_MISMATCH")
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(row["state"]) in {JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING}:
-            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt={"gitea": {"machine_actor": "aios-autonomy-agent", "previous_oid": remote_before, "desired_oid": new_oid, "final_network_oid": final_network, "final_API_oid": final_api, "force_push": False}})
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED:
-            self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "network_oid": final_network, "gitea_api_oid": final_api, "force_push": False})
-        return self.controller.store._receipt(self.controller.store.read(job_id), duplicate=True).as_dict()
-
-    def _commit_file(self, job_id: str, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
-        payload_ref = request.get("payload_ref")
-        if not payload_ref:
-            raise JobExecutionError("PAYLOAD_REQUIRED")
-        payload = self.controller.store.payloads.read_verified(payload_ref, row["payload_digest"], int(request["payload_size"]))
-        try:
-            spec = json.loads(payload.decode())
-            path = str(spec["path"])
-            content = base64.b64decode(spec["content_base64"], validate=True)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise JobExecutionError("COMMIT_FILE_PAYLOAD_INVALID") from exc
-        new_oid = self.authority.commit_file_in_isolated_worktree(base_oid=row["expected_branch_oid"], files={path: content}, message="chore(gitops): durable commit-file", worktree_name=job_id)
-        return {"operation": "COMMIT_FILE", "new_oid": new_oid}
-
-
-def build_from_environment(job_root: Path) -> DurableJobExecutor:
-    from aios_gitea_machine_transport import GiteaMachineTransport
-    from aios_gitea_machine_broker import MachineCredentialProjection
-
-    account = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_MACHINE_ACCOUNT", "aios-autonomy-agent")
-    api = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_API", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1")
-    remote = __import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITEA_REMOTE", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git")
-    authority_dir = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR", "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"))
-    worktree_root = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKTREE_ROOT", "/var/lib/aios-gitops/worktrees"))
-    recovery = Path(__import__("os").environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_RECOVERY_RECEIPT", "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-campaigns/AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807/authorization-recovery.json"))
-    transport = GiteaMachineTransport(api, REPOSITORY, remote, authority_dir)
-    credential = MachineCredentialProjection.from_mapping({"scheme": "systemd-credential", "name": "gitea-machine-token", "account": account})
-    receipt = CampaignCapabilityReceipt(CAMPAIGN_ID, TASK_ID, REPOSITORY, BRANCH, EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID, frozenset({"exact_task_branch_push", "pr_create_update", "status_publish", "protected_merge", "remote_readback"}), frozenset({"direct_main_push", "force_push", "tag_update", "tag_delete", "baseline_write", "production_deploy"}))
-    return DurableJobExecutor(GitOpsJobController(JobStore(job_root)), AuthorityGitExecutor(authority_dir, worktree_root), GiteaMachineBroker(transport, credential, receipt), recovery)
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--job-root", required=True, type=Path)
-    parser.add_argument("--job-id", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
-    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
-    result = build_from_environment(args.job_root).execute(args.job_id, dry_run=args.dry_run)
-    print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_model_api.py

@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
-from release_version import validate_release_version
-
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WORKSPACE = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
 DB_PATH = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_DB', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitops_model.sqlite3')))
@@ -220,11 +218,7 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 a = self.require_write(['owner']);
                 if not a: return
                 ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
-                try:
-            validate_release_version(ver)
-        except ValueError:
-            self.send_json({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
-            return
+                if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): self.send_json({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400); return
                 msg=data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'; out=git_cmd(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',msg]);
                 if data.get('push',False): git_cmd(['push','origin',ver])
                 level='V' if re.match(r'^V[1-9]\d*R0C0', ver) else ('R' if re.match(r'^V\d+R[1-9]\d*C0', ver) else 'C'); exec_sql('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO gitops_versions(version,tag,level,summary,status,created_by,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',(ver,ver,level,msg,'ready',a['username'],now())); exec_sql('UPDATE gitops_baseline SET active_version=?,active_tag=?,updated_at=? WHERE id=?',(ver,ver,now(),'current')); audit(a['username'],'git_tag',ver,{'level':level}); self.send_json({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out}); return

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_reconciliation_core.py

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-"""Pure, observation-first decisions for governed GitOps reconciliation."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from enum import Enum
-import re
-from typing import Optional
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-
-
-class ReconciliationAction(str, Enum):
-    NOOP = "NOOP"
-    PUSH_EXACT = "PUSH_EXACT"
-    VERIFY_REMOTE = "VERIFY_REMOTE"
-    MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED = "MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED"
-    MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED = "MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
-    FAIL_CONFLICT = "FAIL_CONFLICT"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class RemoteObservation:
-    repository_identity: str
-    branch: str
-    desired_oid: str
-    authority_oid: Optional[str]
-    remote_git_oid: Optional[str]
-    remote_api_oid: Optional[str]
-    commit_visible: bool
-    observed_at: str
-    expected_oid: Optional[str] = None
-
-    @property
-    def all_equal(self) -> bool:
-        values = (self.authority_oid, self.remote_git_oid, self.remote_api_oid, self.desired_oid)
-        return all(isinstance(value, str) for value in values) and len(set(values)) == 1
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class ReconciliationDecision:
-    action: ReconciliationAction
-    state: str
-    reason: str
-    retry_safe: bool = False
-
-
-def _valid_oid(value: Optional[str]) -> bool:
-    return value is None or bool(OID_RE.fullmatch(value))
-
-
-def decide_reconciliation(observation: RemoteObservation) -> ReconciliationDecision:
-    """Decide from a fresh observation; never complete on a missing remote."""
-    if observation.repository_identity != "aios/aios":
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-    if not observation.branch.startswith("agent/"):
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
-    if not _valid_oid(observation.desired_oid) or not _valid_oid(observation.expected_oid):
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "OID_INVALID")
-    if observation.authority_oid is None:
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    if observation.authority_oid != observation.desired_oid:
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "AUTHORITY_CONFLICT")
-    present = [oid for oid in (observation.remote_git_oid, observation.remote_api_oid) if oid is not None]
-    if any(oid not in {observation.desired_oid, observation.expected_oid} for oid in present):
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.FAIL_CONFLICT, "CONFLICT", "REMOTE_OID_CONFLICT")
-    if observation.all_equal and observation.commit_visible:
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_REMOTE_VERIFIED, "REMOTE_VERIFIED", "ALL_OIDS_EQUAL_AND_VISIBLE")
-    if observation.remote_git_oid is None and observation.remote_api_oid is None:
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", "AUTHORITY_DESIRED_REMOTE_MISSING")
-    if observation.remote_git_oid == observation.desired_oid or observation.remote_api_oid == observation.desired_oid:
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.VERIFY_REMOTE, "REMOTE_VERIFY_PENDING", "REMOTE_PROOF_PARTIAL")
-    if observation.expected_oid is not None and observation.remote_git_oid == observation.expected_oid and observation.remote_api_oid == observation.expected_oid:
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.PUSH_EXACT, "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", "SAFE_EXACT_FAST_FORWARD_RETRY", retry_safe=True)
-    if not observation.commit_visible:
-        return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.VERIFY_REMOTE, "COMMIT_VISIBILITY_PENDING", "COMMIT_VISIBILITY_LAG")
-    return ReconciliationDecision(ReconciliationAction.MARK_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "PARTIAL_REMOTE_OBSERVATION")
-
-
-def reconcile_observation(**kwargs: object) -> ReconciliationDecision:
-    return decide_reconciliation(RemoteObservation(**kwargs))

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_write_guard.py

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Fail-closed policy for in-process Git mutation handlers."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Mapping
-
-_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GitWriteDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    status_code: int
-    error: str
-    reason: str
-    workspace: str
-
-    def payload(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        return {
-            "status": "allowed" if self.allowed else "blocked",
-            "error": self.error,
-            "reason": self.reason,
-            "workspace": self.workspace,
-        }
-
-
-def _real(path: Path) -> Path:
-    return Path(os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path))))
-
-
-def evaluate_git_write(workspace: Path | str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> GitWriteDecision:
-    values = os.environ if env is None else env
-    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
-    canonical = _real(lexical)
-    shown = str(lexical)
-    if str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false")).strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "gitops_writes_disabled", "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED is false", shown)
-    if lexical != canonical:
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_symlink_forbidden", "workspace must be a canonical non-symlink path", shown)
-    controller = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_PATH", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller")))
-    role = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "")).strip().lower()
-    if canonical == controller or role == "runtime-anchor":
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "runtime_anchor_read_only", "controller/runtime-anchor is read-only", str(canonical))
-    writer_root = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees")))
-    try:
-        canonical.relative_to(writer_root)
-    except ValueError:
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_not_approved_writer", "workspace is outside the approved writer root", str(canonical))
-    return GitWriteDecision(True, 200, "", "approved isolated writer", str(canonical))

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_writer_worker.py

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-"""Single supervised socket-activated worker for durable GitOps Jobs.
-
-The worker consumes durable requests and reconciliation queries. Repository
-mutation is a separate injected executor and remains impossible while the
-legacy global write gate is false.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import signal
-import socket
-import threading
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, JobState, JobStore, ServiceUnavailable
-
-
-def runtime_policy(environment: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, bool]:
-    env = environment or os.environ
-    legacy = env.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-    durable = env.get("AIOS_GITOPS_DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_ENABLED", "false").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-    # Legacy direct Git mutation remains disabled. Authorized durable Jobs use
-    # their own campaign/task capability and may mutate only through the
-    # worker's lease/CAS path while the legacy gate stays false.
-    return {"legacy_global_write": legacy, "durable_job_execution": durable, "repository_mutation_allowed": durable}
-
-
-def handle_request(controller: GitOpsJobController, request: Mapping[str, Any], executor: Any | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    job_id = str(request.get("job_id") or "")
-    if not job_id:
-        raise JobError("JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
-    if request.get("action") == "execute":
-        if executor is None:
-            raise JobError("JOB_EXECUTOR_UNAVAILABLE")
-        result = executor.execute(job_id, dry_run=bool(request.get("dry_run", False)))
-        receipt = controller.store._receipt(controller.store.read(job_id), duplicate=True)
-        return {"job": result, **receipt.as_dict()}
-    if request.get("action") == "resume":
-        receipt = controller.resume(job_id)
-    else:
-        row = controller.store.read(job_id)
-        receipt = controller.store._receipt(row, duplicate=True)
-    return receipt.as_dict()
-
-
-def serve_socket(sock: socket.socket, controller: GitOpsJobController, stopping: threading.Event, executor: Any | None = None) -> None:
-    sock.listen(32)
-    sock.settimeout(1.0)
-    while not stopping.is_set():
-        try:
-            connection, _ = sock.accept()
-        except socket.timeout:
-            continue
-        with connection:
-            try:
-                raw = connection.makefile("rb").readline(1_048_576)
-                request = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-                response = {"status": "ok", **handle_request(controller, request, executor)}
-            except ServiceUnavailable as exc:
-                response = {"status": "error", "error": str(exc), "retryable": True, "side_effect_state": "UNKNOWN"}
-            except Exception as exc:
-                response = {"status": "error", "error": type(exc).__name__, "retryable": False}
-            connection.sendall((json.dumps(response, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
-
-
-def socket_from_systemd() -> socket.socket:
-    if os.environ.get("LISTEN_FDS") != "1":
-        raise RuntimeError("SOCKET_ACTIVATION_REQUIRED")
-    return socket.fromfd(3, socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--job-root", required=True, type=Path)
-    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
-    policy = runtime_policy()
-    if policy["legacy_global_write"]:
-        raise RuntimeError("LEGACY_GLOBAL_WRITES_MUST_REMAIN_FALSE")
-    if not policy["durable_job_execution"]:
-        raise RuntimeError("DURABLE_JOB_EXECUTION_GATE_CLOSED")
-    controller = GitOpsJobController(JobStore(args.job_root))
-    from aios_gitops_job_executor import build_from_environment
-    executor = build_from_environment(args.job_root)
-    stopping = threading.Event()
-    signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: stopping.set())
-    signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: stopping.set())
-    sock = socket_from_systemd()
-    try:
-        serve_socket(sock, controller, stopping, executor)
-    finally:
-        sock.close()
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_local_writer_cli.py

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-"""CLI client for the governed local writer service."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import socket
-import sys
-
-
-def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Send one governed-local-writer request")
-    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True, help="AF_UNIX socket path")
-    group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
-    group.add_argument("--request", help="Request JSON string")
-    group.add_argument("--request-file", help="Path to JSON request file")
-    return parser.parse_args()
-
-
-def _load_request_text(args: argparse.Namespace) -> str:
-    if args.request is not None:
-        return args.request
-    request_path = os.fspath(args.request_file)
-    with open(request_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as request_file:
-        return request_file.read()
-
-
-def send_request(socket_path: str, request_text: str) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Open one Unix socket, send one NDJSON request, and parse one NDJSON response."""
-    payload = json.loads(request_text)
-    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
-        raise ValueError("request must be a JSON object")
-
-    with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as client:
-        client.connect(socket_path)
-        client.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
-        response_chunks: list[str] = []
-        while True:
-            chunk = client.recv(1024 * 1024).decode("utf-8")
-            if not chunk:
-                break
-            response_chunks.append(chunk)
-            if "\n" in chunk:
-                break
-        response_text = "".join(response_chunks)
-
-    response_line = response_text.split("\n", 1)[0].strip()
-    if not response_line:
-        raise RuntimeError("empty response")
-    response = json.loads(response_line)
-    if not isinstance(response, dict):
-        raise RuntimeError("invalid response")
-    return response
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    args = _parse_args()
-    request_text = _load_request_text(args)
-    response = send_request(args.socket, request_text)
-    print(json.dumps(response, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    try:
-        main()
-    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - CLI entrypoint behavior
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "error", "error": str(exc)}), file=sys.stderr)
-        raise SystemExit(1)

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_local_writer_service.py

@@ -1,931 +0,0 @@
-"""Unix-socket service for governed local writer operations."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import hashlib
-import argparse
-import importlib.util
-import os
-import re
-import socket
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
-
-from governed_local_writer import (
-    AppendCommitRequest,
-    AuthorizationError,
-    BranchPolicy,
-    CreateBranchRequest,
-    GovernedAuthorization,
-    PeerIdentity,
-    PRINCIPAL,
-    TASK_ID,
-    extract_peer_identity,
-    contains_secret_like_content,
-    load_authorization_file,
-    validate_file_changes,
-)
-
-
-class ExistingGitOpsHandler:
-    """Delegate repository mutations to the installed GitOps handler seam."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        workspace_by_branch: Mapping[str, str | os.PathLike[str]],
-        bare_repo: str | os.PathLike[str],
-        api_source: str | os.PathLike[str],
-    ) -> None:
-        self.workspace_by_branch = {str(k): Path(v) for k, v in workspace_by_branch.items()}
-        self.bare_repo = Path(bare_repo)
-        self.api_source = Path(api_source)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _restore_env(previous: Mapping[str, str | None]) -> None:
-        for key, value in previous.items():
-            if value is None:
-                os.environ.pop(key, None)
-            else:
-                os.environ[key] = value
-
-    def _load_api(self, workspace: Path):
-        if not self.api_source.is_file() or self.api_source.is_symlink():
-            raise RuntimeError("installed GitOps handler source is unavailable")
-        keys = (
-            "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE",
-            "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO",
-            "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED",
-            "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE",
-            "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT",
-            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0",
-            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0",
-            "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1",
-            "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1",
-        )
-        previous = {key: os.environ.get(key) for key in keys}
-        os.environ.update(
-            {
-                "AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE": str(workspace),
-                "AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO": str(self.bare_repo),
-                "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED": "true",
-                "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1",
-                "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "2",
-                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "safe.directory",
-                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": str(workspace),
-                "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1": "safe.directory",
-                "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1": str(self.bare_repo),
-            }
-        )
-        module_name = f"_governed_gitops_api_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-        try:
-            spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, self.api_source)
-            if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
-                raise RuntimeError("unable to load installed GitOps handler")
-            module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-            sys.modules[module_name] = module
-            spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-            decision = module.evaluate_git_write(module.WS)
-            if not decision.allowed:
-                raise RuntimeError("existing GitOps write gate denied bootstrap")
-            return module, previous, module_name
-        except Exception:
-            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
-            self._restore_env(previous)
-            raise
-
-    def _workspace(self, branch: str) -> Path:
-        workspace = self.workspace_by_branch.get(branch)
-        if workspace is None or not workspace.is_dir():
-            raise RuntimeError("branch workspace is not authorized")
-        return workspace
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _git(workspace: Path, args: list[str]) -> str:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False
-        )
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            raise RuntimeError("governed handler git probe failed")
-        return result.stdout.strip()
-
-    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
-        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
-        # A prior handler call may have completed the fast-forward sync before
-        # the process observed a post-commit error. Reconcile only an exact,
-        # metadata-only result; never overwrite or move an existing ref here.
-        try:
-            existing = self._git(
-                workspace,
-                [
-                    "--git-dir",
-                    str(self.bare_repo),
-                    "rev-parse",
-                    f"refs/heads/{request.branch}",
-                ],
-            )
-        except RuntimeError:
-            existing = ""
-        if existing:
-            parent = self._git(workspace, ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"{existing}^1"])
-            changed = self._git(
-                workspace,
-                [
-                    "--git-dir",
-                    str(self.bare_repo),
-                    "diff-tree",
-                    "--no-commit-id",
-                    "--name-only",
-                    "-r",
-                    existing,
-                ],
-            ).splitlines()
-            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
-            if parent != request.base_oid or changed != [f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"]:
-                raise RuntimeError("existing branch is not an exact metadata-only bootstrap")
-            return {"head_oid": existing, "parent_oid": parent, "handler_status": "reconciled"}
-        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
-        phase = "loaded"
-        try:
-            phase = "verify_base"
-            parent = self._git(
-                workspace,
-                ["--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"],
-            )
-            if parent != request.base_oid:
-                raise RuntimeError("authorized base OID drift")
-            phase = "checkout"
-            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.base_oid, create=True)
-            phase = "write_metadata"
-            safe_branch = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", request.branch).strip("-")
-            metadata_path = f"patches/{safe_branch}.branch.json"
-            module.write_json(
-                metadata_path,
-                {
-                    "schema": "aios.governed-local-writer-bootstrap.v1",
-                    "task_id": TASK_ID,
-                    "principal": PRINCIPAL,
-                    "branch": request.branch,
-                    "parent_oid": request.base_oid,
-                    "authorization_sha256": request.authorization_digest,
-                },
-            )
-            phase = "commit_and_sync"
-            result = module.commit(
-                [metadata_path], "chore(governance): bootstrap repair lease branch"
-            )
-            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
-            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
-            if first_parent != request.base_oid or (request.head_oid and head_oid != request.head_oid):
-                raise RuntimeError("bootstrap branch lineage check failed")
-            return {
-                "head_oid": head_oid,
-                "parent_oid": first_parent,
-                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
-            }
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
-        finally:
-            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
-            self._restore_env(previous)
-
-    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
-        workspace = self._workspace(request.branch)
-        module, previous, module_name = self._load_api(workspace)
-        phase = "loaded"
-        try:
-            phase = "verify_head"
-            current = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
-            if current != request.expected_head_oid:
-                raise RuntimeError("branch head advanced or is stale")
-            phase = "checkout"
-            module.checkout(request.branch, base=request.expected_head_oid, create=False)
-            phase = "write_files"
-            paths: list[str] = []
-            for change in request.changes:
-                paths.append(module.write_file(change.path, change.content))
-            phase = "commit_and_sync"
-            result = module.commit(paths, request.commit_message)
-            head_oid = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
-            first_parent = self._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
-            if first_parent != request.expected_head_oid or head_oid == first_parent:
-                raise RuntimeError("append commit lineage check failed")
-            return {
-                "head_oid": head_oid,
-                "parent_oid": first_parent,
-                "handler_status": str(result.get("status")),
-            }
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise RuntimeError(f"handler_phase={phase};error={exc.__class__.__name__}") from exc
-        finally:
-            sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
-            self._restore_env(previous)
-
-
-class GovernedWriterHandler(Protocol):
-    """Small adapter interface for real writer backend handlers."""
-
-    def create_branch(self, request: CreateBranchRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
-        """Create a branch using internal repo services."""
-
-    def append_commit(self, request: AppendCommitRequest) -> Mapping[str, object]:
-        """Append a commit using internal repo services."""
-
-
-class AuditSink(Protocol):
-    """Pluggable sink for sanitized audit records."""
-
-    def append(self, record: "AuditRecord") -> None:
-        """Persist one audit record."""
-
-
-@dataclass
-class AuditRecord:
-    """Sanitized audit log entry."""
-
-    authorization_digest: str
-    peer_pid: int
-    peer_uid: int
-    peer_gid: int
-    peer_executable: str | None
-    timestamp: datetime
-    operation: str
-    branch: str
-    result: str
-
-
-class InMemoryAuditSink:
-    """Simple in-memory audit log used by tests."""
-
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self.records: list[AuditRecord] = []
-
-    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
-        self.records.append(record)
-
-
-@dataclass
-class _AuthorizationState:
-    """Tracks one-shot operation consumption."""
-
-    create_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
-    append_done: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
-    consumed: bool = False
-
-
-class GovernedLocalWriterService:
-    """Policy-aware AF_UNIX service that calls an injected handler."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        socket_path: str | os.PathLike[str],
-        authorization: GovernedAuthorization,
-        handler: GovernedWriterHandler,
-        *,
-        audit_sink: AuditSink | None = None,
-        peer_identity_fn: Callable[[socket.socket], PeerIdentity] | None = None,
-        state_path: str | os.PathLike[str] | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path)
-        self.authorization = authorization
-        self.handler = handler
-        self.peer_identity_fn = peer_identity_fn or extract_peer_identity
-        self.state = _AuthorizationState()
-        self.audit_sink = audit_sink or InMemoryAuditSink()
-        self.state_path = Path(state_path) if state_path is not None else None
-        self._load_state()
-
-    def _load_state(self) -> None:
-        """Restore one-shot state without restoring request or secret material."""
-        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
-            return
-        try:
-            raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-            if not isinstance(raw, dict):
-                raise ValueError("state must be an object")
-            if raw.get("authorization_sha256") != self.authorization.authorization_sha256:
-                raise ValueError("state authorization digest mismatch")
-            self.state.create_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("create_done", [])}
-            self.state.append_done = {str(v) for v in raw.get("append_done", [])}
-            self.state.consumed = bool(raw.get("consumed", False))
-        except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid") from exc
-
-    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
-        if self.state_path is None:
-            return
-        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        payload = {
-            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
-            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
-            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
-            "consumed": self.state.consumed,
-        }
-        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
-        try:
-            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
-                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-                stream.write("\n")
-            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
-            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
-                os.unlink(temp_name)
-
-    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> None:
-        self.audit_sink.append(
-            AuditRecord(
-                authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
-                peer_pid=peer.pid,
-                peer_uid=peer.uid,
-                peer_gid=peer.gid,
-                peer_executable=peer.executable,
-                timestamp=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc),
-                operation=operation,
-                branch=branch,
-                result=result,
-            )
-        )
-
-    def _require_request_field(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], field_name: str) -> str:
-        value = request.get(field_name)
-        if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
-            raise AuthorizationError(f"{field_name} must be a non-empty string")
-        return value
-
-    def _branch_policy(self, branch: str) -> BranchPolicy:
-        policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
-        if policy is None:
-            raise AuthorizationError("branch is not authorized")
-        return policy
-
-    def _ensure_not_consumed(self) -> None:
-        if self.state.consumed:
-            raise AuthorizationError("authorization consumed")
-        if datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) >= self.authorization.expires_at:
-            raise AuthorizationError("authorization expired")
-
-    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
-        if op == "create_branch":
-            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
-        elif op == "append_commit":
-            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
-
-        if self.state.create_done.issuperset(self.authorization.create_branches) and self.state.append_done.issuperset(
-            self.authorization.append_branches
-        ):
-            self.state.consumed = True
-        self._persist_state()
-
-    def _validate_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        task_id = self._require_request_field(request, "task_id")
-        if task_id != TASK_ID:
-            raise AuthorizationError("invalid task_id")
-
-        principal = self._require_request_field(request, "principal")
-        if principal != PRINCIPAL:
-            raise AuthorizationError("invalid principal")
-
-        operation = self._require_request_field(request, "op")
-        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit"}:
-            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
-        if operation in self.authorization.denied_operations:
-            raise AuthorizationError("operation denied by policy")
-
-        branch = self._require_request_field(request, "branch")
-        self._ensure_not_consumed()
-        policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
-
-        if operation == "create_branch":
-            if policy.create_branch is None:
-                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow create_branch")
-            if branch in self.state.create_done:
-                raise AuthorizationError("create_branch already used for this branch")
-
-            base_oid = self._require_request_field(request, "base_oid")
-            raw_head_oid = request.get("head_oid")
-            if raw_head_oid is not None and (not isinstance(raw_head_oid, str) or not raw_head_oid):
-                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid must be a non-empty string when supplied")
-            head_oid = str(raw_head_oid) if raw_head_oid is not None else None
-            if base_oid != policy.create_branch.base_oid:
-                raise AuthorizationError("base_oid mismatch")
-            if policy.create_branch.head_oid is not None and head_oid != policy.create_branch.head_oid:
-                raise AuthorizationError("head_oid mismatch")
-
-            return {
-                "operation": operation,
-                "branch": branch,
-                "base_oid": base_oid,
-                "head_oid": head_oid,
-            }
-
-        if policy.append_commit is None:
-            raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow append_commit")
-        if policy.create_branch is not None and branch not in self.state.create_done:
-            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit requires prior successful create_branch")
-        if branch in self.state.append_done:
-            raise AuthorizationError("append_commit already used for this branch")
-
-        expected_head = policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
-        if "expected_head_oid" in request:
-            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "expected_head_oid")
-        elif "current_head_oid" in request:
-            supplied_head = self._require_request_field(request, "current_head_oid")
-        else:
-            raise AuthorizationError("expected_head_oid or current_head_oid required")
-        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", supplied_head):
-            raise AuthorizationError("head check must be a full commit OID")
-        if expected_head is not None and supplied_head != expected_head:
-            raise AuthorizationError("head check failed")
-
-        if request.get("force") is True or request.get("non_fast_forward") is True:
-            raise AuthorizationError("non-fast-forward operations are not allowed")
-        if request.get("history_rewrite") is True:
-            raise AuthorizationError("history rewrite is not allowed")
-        parent_oids = request.get("parent_oids")
-        if parent_oids is not None:
-            if not isinstance(parent_oids, list) or parent_oids != [supplied_head]:
-                raise AuthorizationError("parent_oids must contain exactly expected_head_oid")
-
-        changes = request.get("changes")
-        if not isinstance(changes, list):
-            raise AuthorizationError("changes must be a list")
-        validated_changes = validate_file_changes(changes, policy.append_commit.allowed_paths)
-        commit_message = request.get("commit_message", "chore(governance): append governed commit")
-        if not isinstance(commit_message, str) or not commit_message.strip() or len(commit_message) > 200:
-            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message must be a short non-empty string")
-        if "\n" in commit_message or "\r" in commit_message or contains_secret_like_content(commit_message):
-            raise AuthorizationError("commit_message failed policy")
-
-        return {
-            "operation": operation,
-            "branch": branch,
-            "expected_head_oid": supplied_head,
-            "changes": validated_changes,
-            "commit_message": commit_message.strip(),
-        }
-
-    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        """Run one request through policy checks and handler adapter."""
-        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
-        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
-        try:
-            details = self._validate_request(raw_request)
-            operation = str(details["operation"])
-            branch = str(details["branch"])
-
-            if operation == "create_branch":
-                self.handler.create_branch(
-                    CreateBranchRequest(
-                        branch=branch,
-                        base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]),
-                        head_oid=(
-                            str(details["head_oid"])
-                            if details.get("head_oid") is not None
-                            else None
-                        ),
-                        authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
-                    )
-                )
-                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
-                self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
-                return {
-                    "status": "ok",
-                    "operation": operation,
-                    "branch": branch,
-                    "result": "applied",
-                }
-
-            self.handler.append_commit(
-                AppendCommitRequest(
-                    branch=branch,
-                    expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]),
-                    changes=tuple(details["changes"]),
-                    authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
-                    commit_message=str(details["commit_message"]),
-                )
-            )
-            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
-            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
-            return {
-                "status": "ok",
-                "operation": operation,
-                "branch": branch,
-                "result": "applied",
-            }
-        except Exception as error:
-            self._new_audit(peer, operation or "unknown", branch, f"error:{error.__class__.__name__}")
-            if isinstance(error, PermissionError):
-                code = "permission_denied"
-            elif isinstance(error, AuthorizationError):
-                code = "request_denied"
-            else:
-                code = "handler_failed"
-            if code == "handler_failed" and str(error).startswith("handler_phase="):
-                code = str(error)
-            return {
-                "status": "error",
-                "operation": operation or "unknown",
-                "branch": branch,
-                "error": code,
-            }
-
-    def _write_json(self, connection: socket.socket, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        connection.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
-
-    def _handle_client(self, connection: socket.socket) -> None:
-        with connection:
-            try:
-                peer = self.peer_identity_fn(connection)
-            except Exception:
-                self._write_json(
-                    connection,
-                    {
-                        "status": "error",
-                        "operation": "connection",
-                        "branch": "",
-                        "error": "peer identity validation failed",
-                    },
-                )
-                return
-
-            with connection.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
-                for raw_line in stream:
-                    line = raw_line.strip()
-                    if not line:
-                        continue
-                    try:
-                        request = json.loads(line)
-                    except json.JSONDecodeError:
-                        self._write_json(
-                            connection,
-                            {
-                                "status": "error",
-                                "operation": "request",
-                                "branch": "",
-                                "error": "invalid json",
-                            },
-                        )
-                        continue
-                    if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
-                        self._write_json(
-                            connection,
-                            {
-                                "status": "error",
-                                "operation": "request",
-                                "branch": "",
-                                "error": "request must be a JSON object",
-                            },
-                        )
-                        continue
-                    self._write_json(connection, self.process_request(request, peer))
-
-    def _bind_socket(self) -> socket.socket:
-        if self.socket_path.exists():
-            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket already exists")
-        parent = self.socket_path.parent
-        if not parent.is_dir():
-            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent is missing")
-        if parent.is_symlink():
-            raise RuntimeError("governed writer socket parent must not be a symlink")
-        server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-        server.bind(str(self.socket_path))
-        os.chmod(self.socket_path, 0o600)
-        server.listen(16)
-        return server
-
-    def serve(self) -> None:
-        """Serve newline-delimited JSON over a filesystem AF_UNIX socket."""
-        server = self._bind_socket()
-        try:
-            while True:
-                connection, _ = server.accept()
-                self._handle_client(connection)
-        finally:
-            server.close()
-            if self.socket_path.exists():
-                self.socket_path.unlink()
-
-
-class JsonAuditSink:
-    """Append-only root-owned audit sink containing no request payloads."""
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-
-    def append(self, record: AuditRecord) -> None:
-        payload = {
-            "authorization_sha256": record.authorization_digest,
-            "peer_pid": record.peer_pid,
-            "peer_uid": record.peer_uid,
-            "peer_gid": record.peer_gid,
-            "peer_executable": record.peer_executable,
-            "timestamp": record.timestamp.isoformat(),
-            "operation": record.operation,
-            "branch": record.branch,
-            "result": record.result,
-        }
-        line = (json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
-        fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
-        try:
-            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-            os.write(fd, line)
-        finally:
-            os.close(fd)
-
-
-
-# V2R1C6 durable receipt overlay.  This subclasses the original root-only
-# writer in-place so the existing AF_UNIX/SO_PEERCRED and handler policy remain
-# the only mutation path.
-_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService = GovernedLocalWriterService
-
-class GovernedLocalWriterService(_LegacyGovernedLocalWriterService):
-    """Existing writer with durable request receipts and safe recovery."""
-
-    def _load_state(self) -> None:
-        super()._load_state()
-        self.state.receipts = {}
-        if self.state_path is None or not self.state_path.exists():
-            return
-        raw = json.loads(self.state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
-            raise AuthorizationError("authorization state is invalid")
-        receipts = raw.get("receipts", {})
-        if not isinstance(receipts, dict):
-            raise AuthorizationError("authorization receipts are invalid")
-        self.state.receipts = {
-            str(key): dict(value)
-            for key, value in receipts.items()
-            if isinstance(value, dict)
-        }
-
-    def _persist_state(self) -> None:
-        if self.state_path is None:
-            return
-        self.state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        payload = {
-            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
-            "create_done": sorted(self.state.create_done),
-            "append_done": sorted(self.state.append_done),
-            "consumed": bool(self.state.consumed),
-            "receipts": self.state.receipts,
-        }
-        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-state-", dir=self.state_path.parent)
-        try:
-            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
-                json.dump(payload, stream, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-                stream.write("\n")
-            os.replace(temp_name, self.state_path)
-            os.chmod(self.state_path, 0o600)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temp_name):
-                os.unlink(temp_name)
-
-    def _request_identity(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
-        canonical = json.dumps(dict(request), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True)
-        fallback = hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-        request_id = request.get("request_id")
-        idempotency_key = request.get("idempotency_key")
-        request_id = request_id.strip() if isinstance(request_id, str) and request_id.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
-        idempotency_key = idempotency_key.strip() if isinstance(idempotency_key, str) and idempotency_key.strip() else "legacy-" + fallback
-        for field_name, value in (("request_id", request_id), ("idempotency_key", idempotency_key)):
-            if len(value) > 200 or "\n" in value or "\r" in value:
-                raise AuthorizationError(field_name + " is invalid")
-        return {
-            "request_id": request_id,
-            "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
-            "request_fingerprint": fallback,
-        }
-
-    def _find_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any], compare_fingerprint: bool = True):
-        request_id = str(details["request_id"])
-        idempotency_key = str(details["idempotency_key"])
-        fingerprint = str(details.get("request_fingerprint", ""))
-        for receipt in self.state.receipts.values():
-            if receipt.get("request_id") == request_id or receipt.get("idempotency_key") == idempotency_key:
-                if compare_fingerprint and receipt.get("request_fingerprint") != fingerprint:
-                    raise AuthorizationError("idempotency key reused with different request")
-                return receipt
-        return None
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _receipt_response(receipt: Mapping[str, object], status: str = "receipt") -> dict[str, object]:
-        response = {
-            "status": status,
-            "request_id": receipt.get("request_id"),
-            "idempotency_key": receipt.get("idempotency_key"),
-            "operation": receipt.get("operation"),
-            "branch": receipt.get("branch", ""),
-            "receipt_status": receipt.get("status"),
-        }
-        for field_name in ("commit_oid", "final_head", "parent_oid", "audit_sha256", "error_code", "safe_to_retry"):
-            if field_name in receipt:
-                response[field_name] = receipt[field_name]
-        return response
-
-    def _new_receipt(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
-        return {
-            "request_id": str(details["request_id"]),
-            "idempotency_key": str(details["idempotency_key"]),
-            "request_fingerprint": str(details["request_fingerprint"]),
-            "operation": str(details["operation"]),
-            "branch": str(details.get("branch", "")),
-            "expected_head_oid": str(details.get("expected_head_oid", "")),
-            "status": "accepted",
-            "created_at": datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-            "safe_to_retry": False,
-        }
-
-    def _new_audit(self, peer: PeerIdentity, operation: str, branch: str, result: str) -> str:
-        super()._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, result)
-        payload = {
-            "authorization_sha256": self.authorization.authorization_sha256,
-            "peer_pid": peer.pid,
-            "peer_uid": peer.uid,
-            "peer_gid": peer.gid,
-            "peer_executable": peer.executable,
-            "operation": operation,
-            "branch": branch,
-            "result": result,
-        }
-        return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-    def _mark_success(self, op: str, branch: str) -> None:
-        if op == "create_branch":
-            self.state.create_done.add(branch)
-        elif op in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
-            self.state.append_done.add(branch)
-        # The provisioning grant is one-shot; the task writer lease itself must
-        # support multiple append receipts for the exact authorized branches.
-        self.state.consumed = False
-        self._persist_state()
-
-    def _validate_durable(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        operation = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "op")
-        identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
-        if operation == "query_receipt":
-            return {"operation": operation, **identity}
-        if operation == "recover_request":
-            branch = self._require_request_field(raw_request, "branch")
-            policy = self._branch_policy(branch)
-            if policy.append_commit is None:
-                raise AuthorizationError("branch does not allow recovery")
-            expected = raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid
-            if not isinstance(expected, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", expected):
-                raise AuthorizationError("recovery requires expected_head_oid")
-            return {"operation": operation, "branch": branch, "expected_head_oid": expected.lower(), **identity}
-        if operation not in {"create_branch", "append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
-            raise AuthorizationError("unsupported operation")
-        request = dict(raw_request)
-        if operation in {"append_files", "append_batch"}:
-            request["op"] = "append_commit"
-        if operation in {"append_commit", "append_files", "append_batch"}:
-            self.state.consumed = False
-        branch = request.get("branch")
-        removed = False
-        dynamic_expected = False
-        if isinstance(branch, str) and branch in self.state.append_done:
-            self.state.append_done.remove(branch)
-            removed = True
-            policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(branch)
-            if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None and policy.append_commit.expected_head_oid is not None:
-                from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
-                self.authorization.branch_operations[branch] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=None, allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
-                dynamic_expected = True
-        try:
-            details = super()._validate_request(request)
-        finally:
-            if dynamic_expected:
-                policy = self.authorization.branch_operations.get(str(branch))
-                if policy is not None and policy.append_commit is not None:
-                    from governed_local_writer import BranchAppendPolicy, BranchPolicy
-                    self.authorization.branch_operations[str(branch)] = BranchPolicy(create_branch=policy.create_branch, append_commit=BranchAppendPolicy(branch=str(branch), expected_head_oid=str(raw_request.get("expected_head_oid") or ""), allowed_paths=policy.append_commit.allowed_paths))
-            if removed:
-                self.state.append_done.add(str(branch))
-        details.update(identity)
-        details["operation"] = operation
-        return details
-
-    def _recover_backend(self, details: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, object]:
-        if not hasattr(self.handler, "_workspace") or not hasattr(self.handler, "_git"):
-            raise RuntimeError("recovery backend unavailable")
-        workspace = self.handler._workspace(str(details["branch"]))
-        expected = str(details["expected_head_oid"])
-        current = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
-        if current == expected:
-            return {"status": "not_started", "final_head": current}
-        parent = self.handler._git(workspace, ["rev-parse", "HEAD^1"])
-        if parent != expected:
-            raise RuntimeError("external branch advance during recovery")
-        return {"status": "applied", "commit_oid": current, "final_head": current, "parent_oid": parent}
-
-    def process_request(self, raw_request: Mapping[str, Any], peer: PeerIdentity) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
-        operation = raw_request.get("op") if isinstance(raw_request.get("op"), str) else "unknown"
-        branch = raw_request.get("branch") if isinstance(raw_request.get("branch"), str) else ""
-        try:
-            details = self._validate_durable(raw_request)
-            operation = str(details["operation"])
-            branch = str(details.get("branch", ""))
-            if operation == "query_receipt":
-                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
-                return self._receipt_response(receipt) if receipt is not None else {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"]}
-            if operation == "recover_request":
-                receipt = self._find_receipt(details, compare_fingerprint=False)
-                if receipt is None:
-                    return {"status": "not_found", "request_id": details["request_id"], "idempotency_key": details["idempotency_key"], "safe_to_retry": True}
-                if receipt.get("status") == "applied":
-                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
-                recovered = self._recover_backend(details)
-                if recovered.get("status") == "applied":
-                    receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": recovered.get("commit_oid"), "final_head": recovered.get("final_head"), "parent_oid": recovered.get("parent_oid"), "safe_to_retry": False})
-                    self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
-                    return self._receipt_response(receipt)
-                receipt["safe_to_retry"] = True
-                self._persist_state()
-                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
-            receipt = self._find_receipt(details)
-            if receipt is not None:
-                return self._receipt_response(receipt)
-            receipt = self._new_receipt(details)
-            self.state.receipts[str(details["request_id"])] = receipt
-            self._persist_state()
-            if operation == "create_branch":
-                result = self.handler.create_branch(CreateBranchRequest(branch=branch, base_oid=str(details["base_oid"]), head_oid=str(details["head_oid"]) if details.get("head_oid") is not None else None, authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256))
-                commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
-                parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
-                audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
-                receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
-                self._mark_success("create_branch", branch)
-                return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
-            result = self.handler.append_commit(AppendCommitRequest(branch=branch, expected_head_oid=str(details["expected_head_oid"]), changes=tuple(details["changes"]), authorization_digest=self.authorization.authorization_sha256, commit_message=str(details["commit_message"])))
-            commit_oid = str(result.get("head_oid", ""))
-            parent_oid = str(result.get("parent_oid", ""))
-            audit_sha = self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "ok")
-            receipt.update({"status": "applied", "commit_oid": commit_oid, "final_head": commit_oid, "parent_oid": parent_oid, "audit_sha256": audit_sha, "safe_to_retry": False})
-            self._mark_success("append_commit", branch)
-            return self._receipt_response(receipt, status="ok") | {"result": "applied"}
-        except Exception as error:
-            try:
-                identity = self._request_identity(raw_request)
-                receipt = self.state.receipts.get(identity["request_id"])
-                if receipt is not None and receipt.get("status") == "accepted":
-                    receipt.update({"status": "failed", "error_code": error.__class__.__name__, "safe_to_retry": False})
-                    self._persist_state()
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-            self._new_audit(peer, operation, branch, "error:" + error.__class__.__name__)
-            return {"status": "error", "operation": operation, "branch": branch, "error": "request_denied" if isinstance(error, AuthorizationError) else "handler_failed"}
-
-def _parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS governed local writer")
-    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--authorization", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--state", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--audit", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--repair-branch", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--repair-workspace", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--candidate-branch", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--candidate-workspace", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--bare-repo", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--api-source", required=True)
-    return parser.parse_args()
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    if hasattr(os, "geteuid") and os.geteuid() != 0:
-        print("governed local writer requires uid 0", file=sys.stderr)
-        return 2
-    args = _parse_args()
-    authorization = load_authorization_file(args.authorization)
-    handler = ExistingGitOpsHandler(
-        workspace_by_branch={
-            args.repair_branch: args.repair_workspace,
-            args.candidate_branch: args.candidate_workspace,
-        },
-        bare_repo=args.bare_repo,
-        api_source=args.api_source,
-    )
-    service = GovernedLocalWriterService(
-        args.socket,
-        authorization,
-        handler,
-        audit_sink=JsonAuditSink(args.audit),
-        state_path=args.state,
-    )
-    service.serve()
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - systemd entrypoint
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_policy.py

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-"""Central fail-closed policy seam for governed task and continuation requests."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import re
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class GovernedPolicyInput:
-    identity: str
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    operation: str
-    base_oid: str
-    expected_branch_oid: str
-    target_branch: str
-    generation: int
-    risk: str = "engineering"
-    requested_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    previous_generation: int | None = None
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class PolicyDecision:
-    decision: str
-    reason: str
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        return {"decision": self.decision, "reason": self.reason}
-
-
-def evaluate_policy(value: GovernedPolicyInput | Mapping[str, Any]) -> PolicyDecision:
-    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        value = GovernedPolicyInput(**value)
-    if value.repository != "aios/aios":
-        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(value.base_oid) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value.expected_branch_oid):
-        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "OID_INVALID")
-    if not value.target_branch.startswith("agent/") or value.target_branch in {"main", "master"}:
-        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
-    if "force_push" in value.requested_capabilities or "force" in value.operation.lower():
-        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "FORCE_PUSH_DENIED")
-    if {"main_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "production_write", "production_deploy", "tag_mutation", "baseline_mutation"}.intersection(value.requested_capabilities):
-        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "MUTATION_SCOPE_DENIED")
-    if not isinstance(value.generation, int) or isinstance(value.generation, bool) or value.generation < 1:
-        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "GENERATION_INVALID")
-    if value.previous_generation is not None and value.generation <= value.previous_generation:
-        return PolicyDecision("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", "GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
-    if not value.task_id:
-        return PolicyDecision("DENY", "TASK_ID_INVALID")
-    return PolicyDecision("ALLOW", "GOVERNED_ENGINEERING_SCOPE")
-
-
-class GovernedPolicy:
-    def decide(self, request: GovernedPolicyInput | Mapping[str, Any]) -> PolicyDecision:
-        return evaluate_policy(request)

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_task_bootstrap.py

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-"""Durable governed task binding for CREATE_NEW and CONTINUE_EXISTING."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
-import hashlib
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobStore
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
-
-
-class BootstrapError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class GovernedTaskBinding:
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    base_oid: str
-    target_branch: str
-    risk: str
-    description: str
-    idempotency_key: str
-    expected_branch_oid: str
-    branch_mode: str
-    generation: int
-    job_id: str | None = None
-
-    def response(self, *, idempotent: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "base_oid": self.base_oid, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid, "generation": self.generation, "branch_mode": self.branch_mode, "create_target_branch": self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW", "worktree_mode": "detached_at_base_oid" if self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" else "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True, "idempotent": idempotent, "state": "BOUND", "job_id": self.job_id}
-
-
-def _safe(value: str) -> str:
-    return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", value).strip("-")[:120] or "task"
-
-
-class GovernedTaskBootstrap:
-    def __init__(self, authority: Any, root: Path, *, remote_name: str, token_path: Path, ssh_key_path: Path, api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1") -> None:
-        self.authority = authority; self.root = Path(root); self.remote_name = remote_name; self.token_path = Path(token_path); self.ssh_key_path = Path(ssh_key_path); self.api_base = api_base; self.task_meta_root = self.root / "task-bindings"; self.job_root = self.root / "jobs"; self.task_meta_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True); self.job_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-
-    def _store(self, task_id: str) -> tuple[JobStore, GitOpsJobController]:
-        root = self.job_root / _safe(task_id); store = JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads"); return store, GitOpsJobController(store)
-
-    def _metadata(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
-        return self.task_meta_root / (_safe(task_id) + ".json")
-
-    def _read_existing(self, task_id: str) -> GovernedTaskBinding | None:
-        path = self._metadata(task_id)
-        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink(): return None
-        return GovernedTaskBinding(**json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
-
-    def _write(self, binding: GovernedTaskBinding) -> None:
-        path = self._metadata(binding.task_id); temporary = path.with_suffix(".tmp"); temporary.write_text(json.dumps(asdict(binding), sort_keys=True), encoding="utf-8"); temporary.replace(path)
-
-    def create(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        values = {key: str(request[key]) for key in ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key")}
-        if values["repository"] != "aios/aios" or not OID_RE.fullmatch(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_INVALID")
-        if not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(values["target_branch"]): raise BootstrapError("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
-        existing = self._read_existing(values["task_id"])
-        if existing is not None:
-            if any(getattr(existing, key) != values[key] for key in ("repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description")): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT")
-            return existing.response(idempotent=True)
-        if not self.authority.commit_exists(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
-        current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + values["target_branch"])
-        expected = str(request.get("expected_branch_oid") or values["base_oid"])
-        if current is None:
-            mode, generation = "CREATE_NEW", 1
-            if expected != values["base_oid"]: raise BootstrapError("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
-        else:
-            if expected != current: raise BootstrapError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT")
-            mode, generation = "CONTINUE_EXISTING", int(request.get("generation", 2))
-            if generation < 1: raise BootstrapError("GENERATION_INVALID")
-        payload = json.dumps(values, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
-        _, controller = self._store(values["task_id"])
-        receipt = controller.submit({"idempotency_key": values["idempotency_key"], "campaign_id": values["task_id"], "task_id": values["task_id"], "repository": values["repository"], "operation": "GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE", "branch": values["target_branch"], "expected_branch_oid": expected, "payload_digest": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(), "lineage_anchor_oid": values["base_oid"]}, payload=payload)
-        binding = GovernedTaskBinding(**values, expected_branch_oid=expected, branch_mode=mode, generation=generation, job_id=receipt.job_id)
-        self._write(binding)
-        return binding.response()

active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+"""AIOS-managed Hermes runtime boundary."""
+
+from .adapter import (
+    HermesAdapter,
+    HermesConflict,
+    HermesNotFound,
+    HermesRuntimeError,
+    InMemoryHermesStore,
+    SQLiteHermesStore,
+)
+from .contract import HermesHealth, HermesJob, HermesJobState, HermesResult
+from .worker import HermesWorker, WorkerRunResult
+
+__all__ = [
+    "HermesAdapter",
+    "HermesConflict",
+    "HermesHealth",
+    "HermesJob",
+    "HermesJobState",
+    "HermesNotFound",
+    "HermesResult",
+    "HermesRuntimeError",
+    "HermesWorker",
+    "InMemoryHermesStore",
+    "SQLiteHermesStore",
+    "WorkerRunResult",
+]

active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/adapter.py

@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
+"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes queue and worker lease boundary."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from dataclasses import asdict, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Iterable, Mapping
+
+from .contract import (
+    ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS,
+    TERMINAL_STATES,
+    HermesHealth,
+    HermesJob,
+    HermesJobState,
+    HermesResult,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+
+class HermesRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base Hermes runtime-boundary failure."""
+
+
+class HermesNotFound(HermesRuntimeError):
+    """A tenant-scoped job was not found."""
+
+
+class HermesConflict(HermesRuntimeError):
+    """A state, lease, idempotency, or revision conflict occurred."""
+
+
+class InMemoryHermesStore:
+    """Thread-safe reference store; production backends implement this contract."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.jobs: dict[str, HermesJob] = {}
+        self.results: dict[str, HermesResult] = {}
+        self.idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
+        self.worker_heartbeats: dict[str, tuple[str, str | None]] = {}
+
+    def persist_locked(self) -> None:
+        """Persist a mutation while ``lock`` is held; memory stores are a no-op."""
+
+
+class SQLiteHermesStore(InMemoryHermesStore):
+    """Durable snapshot for the existing Hermes queue state machine.
+
+    The adapter remains the sole owner of transitions and lease rules. This
+    store only makes its jobs, results, idempotency keys and worker heartbeats
+    survive a process restart.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        super().__init__()
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS hermes_state (
+                    singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (singleton = 1),
+                    payload TEXT NOT NULL
+                )
+                """
+            )
+        self._load()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(str(self.path), timeout=30)
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _record(value: HermesJob | HermesResult) -> dict[str, object]:
+        record = asdict(value)
+        record["state"] = value.state.value
+        return record
+
+    def _load(self) -> None:
+        with self.lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload FROM hermes_state WHERE singleton = 1"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return
+            payload = json.loads(str(row[0]))
+            self.jobs = {
+                str(item["job_id"]): HermesJob(**item)
+                for item in payload.get("jobs", [])
+            }
+            self.results = {
+                str(item["job_id"]): HermesResult(**item)
+                for item in payload.get("results", [])
+            }
+            self.idempotency = {
+                (str(item["tenant_id"]), str(item["idempotency_key"])): (
+                    str(item["job_id"]),
+                    str(item["digest"]),
+                )
+                for item in payload.get("idempotency", [])
+            }
+            self.worker_heartbeats = {
+                str(item["worker_id"]): (
+                    str(item["heartbeat_at"]),
+                    str(item["job_id"]) if item.get("job_id") is not None else None,
+                )
+                for item in payload.get("worker_heartbeats", [])
+            }
+
+    def persist_locked(self) -> None:
+        payload = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "jobs": [self._record(item) for item in self.jobs.values()],
+            "results": [self._record(item) for item in self.results.values()],
+            "idempotency": [
+                {
+                    "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+                    "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
+                    "job_id": job_id,
+                    "digest": digest,
+                }
+                for (tenant_id, idempotency_key), (job_id, digest)
+                in self.idempotency.items()
+            ],
+            "worker_heartbeats": [
+                {
+                    "worker_id": worker_id,
+                    "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at,
+                    "job_id": job_id,
+                }
+                for worker_id, (heartbeat_at, job_id)
+                in self.worker_heartbeats.items()
+            ],
+        }
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            payload,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        )
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO hermes_state(singleton, payload) VALUES(1, ?)
+                ON CONFLICT(singleton) DO UPDATE SET payload=excluded.payload
+                """,
+                (encoded,),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+
+
+class HermesAdapter:
+    """Queue and reconcile Hermes jobs without owning AIOS policy."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: InMemoryHermesStore | None = None,
+        *,
+        runtime_id: str = "hermes-runtime",
+        runtime_version: str = "v1",
+        default_lease_seconds: int = 60,
+    ) -> None:
+        if default_lease_seconds < 5:
+            raise ValueError("default_lease_seconds must be >= 5")
+        self.store = store or InMemoryHermesStore()
+        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
+        self.runtime_version = runtime_version
+        self.default_lease_seconds = int(default_lease_seconds)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _digest(job: HermesJob) -> str:
+        raw = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "tenant_id": job.tenant_id,
+                "cell_id": job.cell_id,
+                "profile_id": job.profile_id,
+                "task_id": job.task_id,
+                "trace_id": job.trace_id,
+                "action": job.action,
+                "payload": dict(job.payload),
+                "priority": job.priority,
+            },
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+            default=str,
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _parse(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+        if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("timestamp must include timezone")
+        return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _format(value: datetime) -> str:
+        return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_tenant(job: HermesJob, tenant_id: str) -> None:
+        if job.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+            raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+
+    def enqueue(self, job: HermesJob) -> HermesJob:
+        if job.state != HermesJobState.QUEUED or job.revision != 1:
+            raise HermesConflict("new job must be QUEUED at revision 1")
+        digest = self._digest(job)
+        idem_ref = (job.tenant_id, job.idempotency_key)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            existing = self.store.jobs.get(job.job_id)
+            if existing is not None:
+                if self._digest(existing) != digest:
+                    raise HermesConflict("job_id reused with different content")
+                return existing
+            prior = self.store.idempotency.get(idem_ref)
+            if prior is not None:
+                prior_id, prior_digest = prior
+                if prior_digest != digest:
+                    raise HermesConflict("idempotency key reused with different content")
+                return self.store.jobs[prior_id]
+            self.store.jobs[job.job_id] = job
+            self.store.idempotency[idem_ref] = (job.job_id, digest)
+            self.store.persist_locked()
+            return job
+
+    def get(self, job_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> HermesJob:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            job = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+            if job is None:
+                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+            self._assert_tenant(job, tenant_id)
+            return job
+
+    def list_jobs(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str | None = None,
+        profile_id: str | None = None,
+        states: Iterable[HermesJobState | str] | None = None,
+    ) -> list[HermesJob]:
+        state_filter = {HermesJobState(item) for item in states} if states else None
+        with self.store.lock:
+            if self._requeue_expired_locked():
+                self.store.persist_locked()
+            jobs = [
+                job
+                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.tenant_id == tenant_id
+                and (cell_id is None or job.cell_id == cell_id)
+                and (profile_id is None or job.profile_id == profile_id)
+                and (state_filter is None or job.state in state_filter)
+            ]
+        return sorted(jobs, key=lambda item: (item.priority, item.created_at, item.job_id))
+
+    def claim(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str,
+        profile_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        lease_seconds: int | None = None,
+        job_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob | None:
+        worker_id = str(worker_id or "").strip()
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise ValueError("worker_id is required")
+        duration = int(lease_seconds or self.default_lease_seconds)
+        if duration < 5:
+            raise ValueError("lease_seconds must be >= 5")
+        with self.store.lock:
+            self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            candidates = [
+                job
+                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.tenant_id == tenant_id
+                and job.cell_id == cell_id
+                and job.profile_id == profile_id
+                and (job_id is None or job.job_id == job_id)
+                and job.state == HermesJobState.QUEUED
+            ]
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), None)
+            if not candidates:
+                self.store.persist_locked()
+                return None
+            current = sorted(
+                candidates,
+                key=lambda item: (item.priority, item.created_at, item.job_id),
+            )[0]
+            claimed = self._transition_locked(
+                current,
+                HermesJobState.CLAIMED,
+                assigned_worker_id=worker_id,
+                lease_expires_at=self._format(
+                    datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=duration)
+                ),
+            )
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), claimed.job_id)
+            self.store.persist_locked()
+            return claimed
+
+    def start(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
+            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
+            updated = self._transition_locked(current, HermesJobState.RUNNING)
+            self.store.persist_locked()
+            return updated
+
+    def heartbeat(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        lease_seconds: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob:
+        duration = int(lease_seconds or self.default_lease_seconds)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
+            if current.state not in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}:
+                raise HermesConflict("job does not accept heartbeat")
+            updated = replace(
+                current,
+                revision=current.revision + 1,
+                lease_expires_at=self._format(
+                    datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=duration)
+                ),
+                updated_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.jobs[job_id] = updated
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), job_id)
+            self.store.persist_locked()
+            return updated
+
+    def complete(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        output: Mapping[str, object],
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        return self._finish(
+            job_id,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            state=HermesJobState.COMPLETED,
+            output=output,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def fail(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        error: Mapping[str, object],
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        return self._finish(
+            job_id,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            state=HermesJobState.FAILED,
+            error=error,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def cancel(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            current = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+            if current is None:
+                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+            self._assert_tenant(current, tenant_id)
+            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
+            if current.state in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                result = self.store.results.get(job_id)
+                if result is None:
+                    raise HermesConflict("terminal result missing")
+                if result.state != HermesJobState.CANCELLED:
+                    raise HermesConflict("job already has a different terminal result")
+                return result
+            updated = self._transition_locked(current, HermesJobState.CANCELLED)
+            result = HermesResult(
+                job_id=updated.job_id,
+                tenant_id=updated.tenant_id,
+                task_id=updated.task_id,
+                trace_id=updated.trace_id,
+                state=HermesJobState.CANCELLED,
+                worker_id=updated.assigned_worker_id,
+                error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled by AIOS"},
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.results[job_id] = result
+            self.store.persist_locked()
+            return result
+
+    def result(self, job_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> HermesResult:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            job = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+            if job is None:
+                raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+            self._assert_tenant(job, tenant_id)
+            result = self.store.results.get(job_id)
+            if result is None:
+                raise HermesConflict("job has no terminal result")
+            return result
+
+    def requeue_expired(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        """Persistently release expired leases without changing policy state."""
+        with self.store.lock:
+            changed = self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            if changed:
+                self.store.persist_locked()
+            return tuple(sorted(changed))
+
+    def health(self) -> HermesHealth:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            if self._requeue_expired_locked():
+                self.store.persist_locked()
+            active_jobs = sum(
+                1 for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.state in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}
+            )
+            queued_jobs = sum(
+                1 for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+                if job.state == HermesJobState.QUEUED
+            )
+            partitions = {
+                (job.tenant_id, job.cell_id, job.profile_id)
+                for job in self.store.jobs.values()
+            }
+            active_workers = sum(
+                1 for heartbeat, _ in self.store.worker_heartbeats.values()
+                if self._parse(heartbeat)
+                and self._parse(heartbeat) >= datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(seconds=120)
+            )
+        return HermesHealth(
+            runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
+            status="healthy",
+            version=self.runtime_version,
+            heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+            active_workers=active_workers,
+            active_jobs=active_jobs,
+            queued_jobs=queued_jobs,
+            tenant_partitions=len(partitions),
+            profile_isolation_enforced=True,
+            details={"store": type(self.store).__name__},
+        )
+
+    def _finish(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        state: HermesJobState,
+        output: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
+        error: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
+        expected_revision: int | None,
+    ) -> HermesResult:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            self._requeue_expired_locked()
+            current = self._owned_job_locked(job_id, tenant_id, worker_id)
+            if current.state in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                existing = self.store.results.get(job_id)
+                if existing is None:
+                    raise HermesConflict("terminal result missing")
+                if (
+                    existing.state == state
+                    and existing.worker_id == worker_id
+                    and existing.output == output
+                    and existing.error == error
+                ):
+                    return existing
+                raise HermesConflict("job already has a different terminal result")
+            self._assert_revision(current, expected_revision)
+            updated = self._transition_locked(current, state)
+            result = HermesResult(
+                job_id=updated.job_id,
+                tenant_id=updated.tenant_id,
+                task_id=updated.task_id,
+                trace_id=updated.trace_id,
+                state=state,
+                worker_id=worker_id,
+                output=output,
+                error=error,
+                started_at=current.updated_at,
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.results[job_id] = result
+            self.store.worker_heartbeats[worker_id] = (utc_now(), None)
+            self.store.persist_locked()
+            return result
+
+    def _owned_job_locked(self, job_id: str, tenant_id: str, worker_id: str) -> HermesJob:
+        current = self.store.jobs.get(job_id)
+        if current is None:
+            raise HermesNotFound("job not found")
+        self._assert_tenant(current, tenant_id)
+        if current.assigned_worker_id != worker_id:
+            raise HermesConflict("worker does not own job lease")
+        return current
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_revision(job: HermesJob, expected: int | None) -> None:
+        if expected is not None and job.revision != expected:
+            raise HermesConflict("job revision changed")
+
+    def _transition_locked(
+        self,
+        current: HermesJob,
+        target: HermesJobState,
+        *,
+        assigned_worker_id: str | None = None,
+        lease_expires_at: str | None = None,
+    ) -> HermesJob:
+        if target not in ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS[current.state]:
+            raise HermesConflict(
+                f"invalid transition {current.state.value} -> {target.value}"
+            )
+        updated = replace(
+            current,
+            state=target,
+            revision=current.revision + 1,
+            assigned_worker_id=(
+                assigned_worker_id
+                if assigned_worker_id is not None
+                else current.assigned_worker_id
+            ),
+            lease_expires_at=(
+                lease_expires_at
+                if lease_expires_at is not None
+                else (None if target in TERMINAL_STATES else current.lease_expires_at)
+            ),
+            updated_at=utc_now(),
+        )
+        self.store.jobs[current.job_id] = updated
+        return updated
+
+    def _requeue_expired_locked(self) -> set[str]:
+        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        changed: set[str] = set()
+        for current in list(self.store.jobs.values()):
+            expiry = self._parse(current.lease_expires_at)
+            if (
+                current.state in {HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.RUNNING}
+                and expiry is not None
+                and expiry <= now
+            ):
+                self.store.jobs[current.job_id] = replace(
+                    current,
+                    state=HermesJobState.QUEUED,
+                    revision=current.revision + 1,
+                    assigned_worker_id=None,
+                    lease_expires_at=None,
+                    updated_at=utc_now(),
+                )
+                changed.add(current.job_id)
+        return changed

active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+"""Tenant-scoped Hermes runtime contracts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _safe_mapping(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return json.loads(json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, default=str))
+
+
+class HermesJobState(str, Enum):
+    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
+    CLAIMED = "CLAIMED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+
+
+ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS: Mapping[HermesJobState, frozenset[HermesJobState]] = {
+    HermesJobState.QUEUED: frozenset({HermesJobState.CLAIMED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}),
+    HermesJobState.CLAIMED: frozenset({HermesJobState.RUNNING, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}),
+    HermesJobState.RUNNING: frozenset(
+        {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}
+    ),
+    HermesJobState.COMPLETED: frozenset(),
+    HermesJobState.FAILED: frozenset(),
+    HermesJobState.CANCELLED: frozenset(),
+}
+TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset(
+    {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED, HermesJobState.CANCELLED}
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HermesJob:
+    job_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    profile_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    action: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    idempotency_key: str = ""
+    priority: int = 100
+    state: HermesJobState = HermesJobState.QUEUED
+    revision: int = 1
+    assigned_worker_id: str | None = None
+    lease_expires_at: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "job_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "task_id",
+            "trace_id", "action", "idempotency_key", "created_at", "updated_at",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "payload", _safe_mapping(self.payload))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "state", HermesJobState(self.state))
+        if not 0 <= int(self.priority) <= 1000:
+            raise ValueError("priority must be between 0 and 1000")
+        if self.revision < 1:
+            raise ValueError("revision must be >= 1")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str,
+        profile_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        trace_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+        priority: int = 100,
+    ) -> "HermesJob":
+        return cls(
+            job_id=f"hermes_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            cell_id=cell_id,
+            profile_id=profile_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            action=action,
+            payload=_safe_mapping(payload),
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            priority=priority,
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HermesResult:
+    job_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    state: HermesJobState
+    worker_id: str | None = None
+    output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    started_at: str | None = None
+    finished_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("job_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "state", HermesJobState(self.state))
+        if self.output is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "output", _safe_mapping(self.output))
+        if self.error is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "error", _safe_mapping(self.error))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HermesHealth:
+    runtime_id: str
+    status: str
+    version: str
+    heartbeat_at: str
+    active_workers: int = 0
+    active_jobs: int = 0
+    queued_jobs: int = 0
+    tenant_partitions: int = 0
+    profile_isolation_enforced: bool = True
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("runtime_id", "status", "version", "heartbeat_at"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        for name in ("active_workers", "active_jobs", "queued_jobs", "tenant_partitions"):
+            if int(getattr(self, name)) < 0:
+                raise ValueError(f"{name} must be >= 0")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "details", _safe_mapping(self.details))

active-runtime/app/aios_hermes/worker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+"""Hermes worker loop with lease renewal and bounded recovery."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+from .adapter import HermesAdapter, HermesConflict
+from .contract import HermesJob, HermesJobState
+
+
+JobHandler = Callable[[HermesJob], Mapping[str, Any]]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class WorkerRunResult:
+    claimed: bool
+    job_id: str | None = None
+    state: str | None = None
+    error: str | None = None
+
+
+class HermesWorker:
+    """Poll one tenant/cell/profile partition and execute jobs safely."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        adapter: HermesAdapter,
+        handler: JobHandler,
+        *,
+        worker_id: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        cell_id: str,
+        profile_id: str,
+        poll_seconds: float = 1.0,
+        heartbeat_seconds: float = 10.0,
+    ) -> None:
+        if poll_seconds <= 0 or heartbeat_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("poll_seconds and heartbeat_seconds must be positive")
+        for name, value in {
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+            "cell_id": cell_id,
+            "profile_id": profile_id,
+        }.items():
+            if not str(value or "").strip():
+                raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
+        self.adapter = adapter
+        self.handler = handler
+        self.worker_id = worker_id
+        self.tenant_id = tenant_id
+        self.cell_id = cell_id
+        self.profile_id = profile_id
+        self.poll_seconds = float(poll_seconds)
+        self.heartbeat_seconds = float(heartbeat_seconds)
+        self._stop = threading.Event()
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        self._stop.set()
+
+    def run_once(self) -> WorkerRunResult:
+        job = self.adapter.claim(
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+            cell_id=self.cell_id,
+            profile_id=self.profile_id,
+            worker_id=self.worker_id,
+        )
+        if job is None:
+            return WorkerRunResult(claimed=False)
+
+        running = self.adapter.start(
+            job.job_id,
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+            worker_id=self.worker_id,
+            expected_revision=job.revision,
+        )
+
+        heartbeat_stop = threading.Event()
+        heartbeat_thread = threading.Thread(
+            target=self._heartbeat_loop,
+            args=(running.job_id, heartbeat_stop),
+            name=f"hermes-heartbeat-{self.worker_id}",
+            daemon=True,
+        )
+        heartbeat_thread.start()
+
+        output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+        execution_error: Exception | None = None
+        try:
+            output = dict(self.handler(running))
+        except Exception as exc:  # runtime boundary: normalize below
+            execution_error = exc
+        finally:
+            # Stop the lease heartbeat before reading the final revision. This
+            # prevents a revision increment racing with complete/fail.
+            heartbeat_stop.set()
+            heartbeat_thread.join(timeout=max(self.heartbeat_seconds * 2, 1.0))
+
+        try:
+            current = self.adapter.get(running.job_id, tenant_id=self.tenant_id)
+            if execution_error is None:
+                result = self.adapter.complete(
+                    running.job_id,
+                    tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                    worker_id=self.worker_id,
+                    output=dict(output or {}),
+                    expected_revision=current.revision,
+                )
+                return WorkerRunResult(
+                    claimed=True,
+                    job_id=result.job_id,
+                    state=result.state.value,
+                )
+
+            result = self.adapter.fail(
+                running.job_id,
+                tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                worker_id=self.worker_id,
+                error={
+                    "code": "worker_error",
+                    "message": str(execution_error),
+                },
+                expected_revision=current.revision,
+            )
+            return WorkerRunResult(
+                claimed=True,
+                job_id=result.job_id,
+                state=result.state.value,
+                error=str(execution_error),
+            )
+        except HermesConflict as exc:
+            return WorkerRunResult(
+                claimed=True,
+                job_id=running.job_id,
+                state=HermesJobState.FAILED.value,
+                error=f"reconciliation_conflict: {exc}",
+            )
+
+    def run_forever(self) -> None:
+        while not self._stop.is_set():
+            result = self.run_once()
+            if not result.claimed:
+                self._stop.wait(self.poll_seconds)
+
+    def _heartbeat_loop(self, job_id: str, stop_event: threading.Event) -> None:
+        while not stop_event.wait(self.heartbeat_seconds):
+            try:
+                self.adapter.heartbeat(
+                    job_id,
+                    tenant_id=self.tenant_id,
+                    worker_id=self.worker_id,
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                stop_event.set()
+                return

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_writer_api.py

@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-"""Task-scoped hardened wrapper around the existing Action API."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import subprocess
-from pathlib import Path
-import urllib.parse
-
-import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
-import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
-from isolated_writer_authz import AuthorizationError, authorize
-from isolated_writer_commit_file import AtomicCommitFile, CommitFileError, OperationLedger
-from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
-
-_reject = api.reject_non_read_http
-_write_file = api.write_file
-_sync_branch = api.sync_branch
-_original_do_get = api.H.do_GET
-api.OPENAPI = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_OPENAPI", str(api.OPENAPI)))
-
-
-def _registry() -> TokenRegistry:
-    return TokenRegistry(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2"]))
-
-
-def _atomic_writer() -> AtomicCommitFile:
-    return AtomicCommitFile(
-        workspace=api.WS,
-        bare_repo=api.BARE_REPO,
-        ledger=OperationLedger(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER"])),
-        remote=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", ""),
-        audit=policy.append_audit_record,
-    )
-
-
-def _bearer(handler) -> str:
-    value = handler.headers.get("Authorization", "")
-    return value[7:].strip() if value.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
-
-
-def _authorize(handler, *, method: str, path: str, branch=None, target_path=None):
-    grant = authorize(
-        _registry(),
-        _bearer(handler),
-        method=method,
-        path=path,
-        source_ip=str(handler.client_address[0]),
-        workspace=api.WS,
-        branch=branch,
-        target_path=target_path,
-    )
-    grant.record["_source_ip"] = str(handler.client_address[0])
-    return grant
-
-
-def _authorization_error(handler, exc: AuthorizationError):
-    return handler.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
-
-
-def _isolated_runtime_status(handler):
-    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    return handler.sendj({
-        "service": os.getenv(
-            "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
-            "aios-isolated-writer.service",
-        ),
-        "status": "active",
-        "runtime_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE"),
-        "workspace_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE"),
-        "writes_enabled": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").lower()
-        in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"},
-        "allowed_branch": policy.allowed_branch(),
-        "approved_base_oid": policy.allowed_base_oid(),
-        "workspace_branch": branch,
-        "workspace_head_oid": head,
-        "repository_identity": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY"),
-        "token_policy_version": 2,
-        "atomic_commit_file": True,
-        "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
-    })
-
-
-def _isolated_do_get(self):
-    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-    if path in {"/health", "/api/health"}:
-        return self.sendj({
-            "status": "ok",
-            "service": os.getenv(
-                "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
-                "aios-isolated-writer.service",
-            ),
-        })
-    if path not in {"/api/runtime-status", "/api/baseline", "/api/patches"}:
-        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
-    try:
-        _authorize(self, method="GET", path=path)
-    except AuthorizationError as exc:
-        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
-    if path == "/api/runtime-status":
-        return _isolated_runtime_status(self)
-    return _original_do_get(self)
-
-
-def _read_commit_file_body(handler):
-    try:
-        length = int(handler.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-    except ValueError:
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_content_length_rejected") from None
-    if length <= 0:
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
-    if length > 1_100_000:
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_too_large", 413)
-    raw = handler.rfile.read(length)
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_json_rejected") from None
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
-    return value
-
-
-def _isolated_do_post(self):
-    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-    if path != "/api/commit-file":
-        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
-    try:
-        data = _read_commit_file_body(self)
-        branch = str(data.get("branch") or "")
-        target_path = str(data.get("path") or "")
-        grant = _authorize(
-            self,
-            method="POST",
-            path=path,
-            branch=branch,
-            target_path=target_path,
-        )
-        if api.content_has_secret(str(data.get("content") or "")):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_secret_content_rejected", 403)
-        result = _atomic_writer().execute(grant, data)
-        return self.sendj(result)
-    except AuthorizationError as exc:
-        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
-    except CommitFileError as exc:
-        return self.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
-    except PermissionError:
-        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_policy_rejected"}, 403)
-
-
-def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
-    if _reject(handler, method, path):
-        return True
-    try:
-        policy.validate_endpoint(method, path, api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
-        return False
-    except PermissionError as exc:
-        handler.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
-        return True
-
-
-def checkout(branch, base="main", create=False):
-    api.ensure_git()
-    target = api.branch_name(branch)
-    policy.validate_branch_request({"branch": target, "base": base})
-    exists = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--verify", target])["code"] == 0
-    if exists:
-        if api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"] != target:
-            api.sh(["checkout", target], True)
-    elif create:
-        api.sh(["checkout", "-b", target, base], True)
-    else:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_missing")
-    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
-    return target
-
-
-def write_file(path, content):
-    policy.validate_path(path, api.WS)
-    return _write_file(path, content)
-
-
-def sync_branch(branch: str):
-    policy.validate_sync_branch(branch)
-    local = _sync_branch(branch)
-    remote = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", "").strip()
-    if remote != "gitea-http":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_gitea_remote_rejected")
-    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    pushed = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "push", "--porcelain", remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{branch}"],
-        cwd=api.WS,
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-    )
-    if pushed.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_push_failed")
-    verified = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
-        cwd=api.WS,
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-    )
-    if verified.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_verification_failed")
-    fields = verified.stdout.strip().split()
-    if len(fields) != 2 or fields[0] != head or fields[1] != f"refs/heads/{branch}":
-        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_oid_mismatch")
-    return {
-        "status": "verified",
-        "target": "authoritative-bare+gitea",
-        "branch": branch,
-        "oid": head,
-        "local": local.get("status"),
-    }
-
-
-def commit(paths, msg):
-    policy.validate_commit_paths(paths, api.WS)
-    api.ensure_git()
-    selected = [api.relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ["."]
-    api.sh(["add", *selected], True)
-    policy.validate_staged_paths(api.WS)
-    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    if not api.sh(["status", "--short"])["stdout"]:
-        return {"status": "no_changes", "branch": branch, "sync": sync_branch(branch)}
-    out = api.sh(["commit", "-m", msg], True)
-    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    return {
-        "status": "committed",
-        "branch": branch,
-        "rev": api.sh(["rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"],
-        "git": out,
-        "sync": sync_branch(branch),
-    }
-
-
-def audit(actor, action, target, payload):
-    policy.append_audit_record(
-        {
-            "at": api.now(),
-            "actor": actor,
-            "action": action,
-            "target": target,
-            "payload": api.sanitize(payload),
-        }
-    )
-
-
-def _validate_request(self, data, validate):
-    try:
-        validate(data)
-        return True
-    except PermissionError as exc:
-        self.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
-        return False
-
-
-def _checked_branch(self, data):
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    return _branch(self, data)
-
-
-def _checked_file(self, data):
-    data = dict(data)
-    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    if not _validate_request(
-        self,
-        {"path": data.get("path", "")},
-        lambda item: policy.validate_path(item["path"], api.WS),
-    ):
-        return
-    return _file(self, data)
-
-
-def _checked_commit(self, data):
-    data = dict(data)
-    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    return _commit(self, data)
-
-
-def _checked_patch(self, data):
-    data = dict(data)
-    data["branch"] = policy.allowed_branch()
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    return _patch(self, data)
-
-
-_branch, _file, _commit, _patch = api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch
-api.reject_non_read_http = reject_non_read_http
-api.checkout, api.write_file, api.sync_branch, api.commit, api.audit = (
-    checkout,
-    write_file,
-    sync_branch,
-    commit,
-    audit,
-)
-api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch = (
-    _checked_branch,
-    _checked_file,
-    _checked_commit,
-    _checked_patch,
-)
-api.H.do_GET = _isolated_do_get
-api.H.do_POST = _isolated_do_post
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
-    api.ThreadingHTTPServer((api.HOST, api.PORT), api.H).serve_forever()

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_writer_policy.py

@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed policy used only by the task-scoped Action writer."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import json
-import stat
-import subprocess
-import re
-from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
-from urllib.parse import unquote
-
-import isolated_writer_path_policy as path_policy
-
-WRITE_ENDPOINTS = frozenset({"/api/commit-file"})
-ALLOWED_ROOTS = (
-    "active-runtime",
-    "docs",
-    "patches",
-    "reports",
-    "scripts",
-    "test",
-    "tests",
-)
-DENIED_ROOTS = ("baseline", "config", "deploy", "deployments", "ops", "runtime", "services")
-_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
-_FALSE = frozenset({"0", "false", "no", "off"})
-_DENY_FLAGS = (
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_MAIN_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_TAG_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_BASELINE_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_REGISTRY_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_ROLLBACK",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_DEPLOYMENT",
-)
-
-
-def enforcement_required() -> bool:
-    return os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_ENFORCEMENT", "") == "required"
-
-
-def allowed_branch() -> str:
-    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "").strip()
-    if not value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_missing_allowed_branch")
-    return value
-
-
-def allowed_base_oid() -> str:
-    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BASE_OID", "").strip().lower()
-    if len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_invalid_allowed_base_oid")
-    return value
-
-
-def _git(workspace: Path, *args: str) -> str:
-    result = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_git_validation_failed")
-    return result.stdout.strip()
-
-
-def require_service_invariants(workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_write_gate_required")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_role_required")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_role_required")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_policy_v2_required")
-    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", "").strip():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_service_audience_required")
-    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2", "").strip():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_registry_required")
-    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER", "").strip():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_ledger_required")
-    path_policy.configured_path_policy()
-    for name in _DENY_FLAGS:
-        if os.getenv(name, "").strip().lower() not in _FALSE:
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_forbidden_capability_flag")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "") != "aios/aios":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_repository_identity_rejected")
-    configured_bare_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "").strip()
-    if not configured_bare_value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
-    configured_bare = Path(configured_bare_value)
-    if configured_bare.resolve(strict=True) != bare_repo.resolve(strict=True):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
-    writer_root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "").strip()
-    if not writer_root_value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root")
-    writer_root = Path(writer_root_value).resolve(strict=True)
-    lexical_workspace = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
-    canonical_workspace = lexical_workspace.resolve(strict=True)
-    if lexical_workspace != canonical_workspace:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
-    try:
-        canonical_workspace.relative_to(writer_root)
-    except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root") from None
-    if _git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != allowed_branch():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_current_branch_rejected")
-    approved_base = allowed_base_oid()
-    try:
-        _git(workspace, "cat-file", "-e", f"{approved_base}^{{commit}}")
-        subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", approved_base, "HEAD"],
-            cwd=workspace,
-            check=True,
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        )
-    except (PermissionError, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_approved_base_not_ancestor") from None
-    if _git(workspace, "merge-base", approved_base, "HEAD") != approved_base:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_merge_base_rejected")
-    common = Path(_git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"))
-    if not common.is_absolute():
-        common = (workspace / common).resolve()
-    if common.resolve() != bare_repo.resolve():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_common_repo_rejected")
-
-
-def approved_audit_log_path() -> Path:
-    root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_AUDIT_ROOT", "").strip()
-    log_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUDIT_LOG", "").strip()
-    if not root_value or not log_value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_missing")
-    lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(root_value))
-    lexical_log = Path(os.path.abspath(log_value))
-    root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
-    if lexical_root != root or root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_root_rejected")
-    try:
-        lexical_log.relative_to(root)
-    except ValueError:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_outside_approved_root") from None
-    if lexical_log.parent.resolve(strict=True) != lexical_log.parent:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_parent_symlink_rejected")
-    if lexical_log.exists() and lexical_log.is_symlink():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_symlink_rejected")
-    os.chmod(root, 0o750)
-    os.chmod(lexical_log.parent, 0o750)
-    return lexical_log
-
-
-def append_audit_record(record: dict) -> None:
-    path = approved_audit_log_path()
-    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT
-    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
-        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
-    descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
-    try:
-        info = os.fstat(descriptor)
-        if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_not_regular")
-        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
-        line = json.dumps(
-            _audit_sanitize(record),
-            ensure_ascii=False,
-            sort_keys=True,
-            separators=(",", ":"),
-        ).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
-        os.write(descriptor, line)
-        os.fsync(descriptor)
-    finally:
-        os.close(descriptor)
-    parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
-    try:
-        os.fsync(parent_fd)
-    finally:
-        os.close(parent_fd)
-
-
-def _audit_sanitize(value):
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {
-            key: (
-                "[REDACTED]"
-                if any(
-                    marker in str(key).lower()
-                    for marker in (
-                        "authorization",
-                        "credential",
-                        "password",
-                        "secret",
-                        "token",
-                        "private_key",
-                    )
-                )
-                and str(key).lower() != "token_id"
-                else _audit_sanitize(inner)
-            )
-            for key, inner in value.items()
-        }
-    if isinstance(value, list):
-        return [_audit_sanitize(item) for item in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str) and re.search(
-        r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])",
-        value,
-    ):
-        return "[REDACTED]"
-    return value
-
-
-def validate_endpoint(method: str, path: str, workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    if method != "POST" or path not in WRITE_ENDPOINTS:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
-    require_service_invariants(workspace, bare_repo)
-
-
-def validate_branch_request(data: dict) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    branch = allowed_branch() if "branch" not in data else str(data.get("branch") or "").strip()
-    if branch != allowed_branch():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected")
-    if str(data.get("base", "main")).strip() != "main":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_base_rejected")
-    if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_force_rejected")
-
-
-def validate_path(path: str, workspace: Path | None = None) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(path, str):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    value = path
-    if not value or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value or "\\" in value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    try:
-        decoded = unquote(value, errors="strict")
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
-    if decoded != value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    windows = PureWindowsPath(value)
-    posix = PurePosixPath(value)
-    parts = value.split("/")
-    if (
-        posix.is_absolute()
-        or windows.is_absolute()
-        or bool(windows.drive)
-        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
-    ):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    first = parts[0]
-    service_exact_path = False
-    if first in DENIED_ROOTS:
-        try:
-            path_policy.require_service_path("commit_file.atomic", value)
-            service_exact_path = True
-        except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
-            raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
-    if value != "README.md" and first not in ALLOWED_ROOTS and not service_exact_path:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_outside_allowed_roots")
-    if workspace is not None:
-        lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
-        root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
-        if lexical_root != root:
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
-        current = root
-        for part in parts:
-            current = current / part
-            if current.is_symlink():
-                raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_symlink_rejected")
-        candidate = (root / value).resolve(strict=False)
-        try:
-            candidate.relative_to(root)
-        except ValueError:
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_escapes_workspace") from None
-    return value
-
-
-def validate_content_for_path(path: str, content: str) -> None:
-    if path.split("/", 1)[0] not in DENIED_ROOTS:
-        return
-    try:
-        path_policy.validate_content("commit_file.atomic", path, content)
-    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
-        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
-
-
-def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
-    try:
-        return path_policy.configured_path_policy_sha256()
-    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
-        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
-
-
-def validate_commit_paths(paths: list[str], workspace: Path | None = None) -> None:
-    if enforcement_required():
-        for path in paths:
-            if str(path).strip() != ".":
-                validate_path(str(path), workspace)
-
-
-def validate_staged_paths(workspace: Path) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    for path in _git(workspace, "diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines():
-        validate_path(path, workspace)
-
-
-def validate_sync_branch(branch: str) -> None:
-    if enforcement_required() and branch != allowed_branch():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_sync_branch_rejected")

active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+"""AIOS-managed OpenClaw Ed25519 execution adapter."""
+
+from .adapter import (
+    AdapterError,
+    CommandConflict,
+    CommandNotFound,
+    CommandRejected,
+    InMemoryCallbackSink,
+    OpenClawAdapter,
+)
+from .contract import (
+    CONTRACT_VERSION,
+    SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM,
+    CommandState,
+    Ed25519CommandSigner,
+    Ed25519CommandVerifier,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    RuntimeHealth,
+    sign_command,
+    verify_command_signature,
+)
+from .transport import HTTPRuntimeTransport, InProcessRuntimeTransport, RuntimeTransport
+
+__all__ = [
+    "AdapterError",
+    "CONTRACT_VERSION",
+    "CommandConflict",
+    "CommandNotFound",
+    "CommandRejected",
+    "CommandState",
+    "Ed25519CommandSigner",
+    "Ed25519CommandVerifier",
+    "HTTPRuntimeTransport",
+    "InMemoryCallbackSink",
+    "InProcessRuntimeTransport",
+    "OpenClawAdapter",
+    "OpenClawCommand",
+    "OpenClawResult",
+    "RuntimeHealth",
+    "RuntimeTransport",
+    "SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM",
+    "sign_command",
+    "verify_command_signature",
+]

active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/adapter.py

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+"""Signed, tenant-isolated execution adapter for OpenClaw runtimes."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+from dataclasses import replace
+from typing import Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .contract import (
+    CommandState,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    RuntimeHealth,
+    utc_now,
+    verify_command_signature,
+)
+
+
+class AdapterError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base adapter failure."""
+
+
+class CommandRejected(AdapterError):
+    """A command failed signature or contract validation."""
+
+
+class CommandNotFound(AdapterError):
+    """A tenant-scoped command is not visible."""
+
+
+class CommandConflict(AdapterError):
+    """A command or idempotency key conflicts with an existing execution."""
+
+
+class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ...
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
+
+
+class CallbackSink(Protocol):
+    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
+    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
+    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None: ...
+
+
+class InMemoryCallbackSink:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.started: list[OpenClawResult] = []
+        self.completed: list[OpenClawResult] = []
+        self.failed: list[OpenClawResult] = []
+
+    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.started.append(result)
+
+    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.completed.append(result)
+
+    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.failed.append(result)
+
+
+SigningMaterialResolver = Callable[[str, str], bytes | str]
+
+
+class OpenClawAdapter:
+    """Verify, de-duplicate, execute, cancel and reconcile commands."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        transport: RuntimeTransport,
+        signing_material_resolver: SigningMaterialResolver,
+        *,
+        callback_sink: CallbackSink | None = None,
+        default_timeout_seconds: float = 300.0,
+    ) -> None:
+        if default_timeout_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("default_timeout_seconds must be positive")
+        self.transport = transport
+        self.signing_material_resolver = signing_material_resolver
+        self.callback_sink = callback_sink or InMemoryCallbackSink()
+        self.default_timeout_seconds = float(default_timeout_seconds)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._commands: dict[str, OpenClawCommand] = {}
+        self._results: dict[str, OpenClawResult] = {}
+        self._idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
+
+    def _verify(self, command: OpenClawCommand) -> None:
+        try:
+            key_material = self.signing_material_resolver(command.tenant_id, command.key_id)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise CommandRejected("signing material unavailable") from exc
+        if not verify_command_signature(command, key_material):
+            raise CommandRejected("invalid or expired command signature")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_result(command: OpenClawCommand, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        if (
+            result.command_id != command.command_id
+            or result.tenant_id != command.tenant_id
+            or result.task_id != command.task_id
+            or result.trace_id != command.trace_id
+        ):
+            raise AdapterError("runtime returned mismatched command identity")
+        if result.state not in {
+            CommandState.COMPLETED,
+            CommandState.FAILED,
+            CommandState.CANCELLED,
+            CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+        }:
+            raise AdapterError("runtime returned a non-terminal result")
+
+    def execute(
+        self,
+        command: OpenClawCommand,
+        *,
+        timeout_seconds: float | None = None,
+    ) -> OpenClawResult:
+        timeout = self.default_timeout_seconds if timeout_seconds is None else float(timeout_seconds)
+        if timeout <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive")
+        self._verify(command)
+        digest = command.signature
+        idem_ref = (command.tenant_id, command.idempotency_key)
+
+        with self._lock:
+            prior_command = self._commands.get(command.command_id)
+            if prior_command is not None:
+                if prior_command.signature != command.signature:
+                    raise CommandConflict("command_id reused with different content")
+                return self._results[command.command_id]
+            prior_idem = self._idempotency.get(idem_ref)
+            if prior_idem is not None:
+                prior_id, prior_digest = prior_idem
+                if prior_digest != digest:
+                    raise CommandConflict("idempotency key reused with different content")
+                return self._results[prior_id]
+            running = OpenClawResult(
+                command_id=command.command_id,
+                tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
+                task_id=command.task_id,
+                trace_id=command.trace_id,
+                state=CommandState.RUNNING,
+                started_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self._commands[command.command_id] = command
+            self._results[command.command_id] = running
+            self._idempotency[idem_ref] = (command.command_id, digest)
+
+        self.callback_sink.on_started(running)
+        try:
+            result = self.transport.execute(command, timeout)
+            self._validate_result(command, result)
+        except TimeoutError as exc:
+            result = replace(
+                running,
+                state=CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+                error={"code": "runtime_timeout", "message": str(exc) or "runtime timeout"},
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            result = replace(
+                running,
+                state=CommandState.FAILED,
+                error={"code": "runtime_error", "message": str(exc)},
+                finished_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+
+        if result.started_at is None:
+            result = replace(result, started_at=running.started_at)
+        if result.finished_at is None:
+            result = replace(result, finished_at=utc_now())
+        with self._lock:
+            self._results[command.command_id] = result
+        if result.state == CommandState.COMPLETED:
+            self.callback_sink.on_completed(result)
+        else:
+            self.callback_sink.on_failed(result)
+        return result
+
+    def status(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> OpenClawResult:
+        with self._lock:
+            command = self._commands.get(command_id)
+            result = self._results.get(command_id)
+            if command is None or result is None or command.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+                raise CommandNotFound("command not found")
+            return result
+
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> OpenClawResult:
+        with self._lock:
+            command = self._commands.get(command_id)
+            current = self._results.get(command_id)
+            if command is None or current is None or command.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+                raise CommandNotFound("command not found")
+            if current.state in {
+                CommandState.COMPLETED,
+                CommandState.FAILED,
+                CommandState.CANCELLED,
+                CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+                CommandState.REJECTED,
+            }:
+                return current
+        if not self.transport.cancel(command_id):
+            raise AdapterError("runtime rejected cancellation")
+        cancelled = replace(
+            current,
+            state=CommandState.CANCELLED,
+            error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled by AIOS"},
+            finished_at=utc_now(),
+        )
+        with self._lock:
+            self._results[command_id] = cancelled
+        self.callback_sink.on_failed(cancelled)
+        return cancelled
+
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
+        return self.transport.health()
+
+    def snapshot(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> Mapping[str, OpenClawResult]:
+        with self._lock:
+            return {
+                command_id: result
+                for command_id, result in self._results.items()
+                if self._commands[command_id].tenant_id == tenant_id
+            }

active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/callback.py

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+"""Audit-oriented lifecycle callbacks for OpenClaw execution."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import threading
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .contract import OpenClawResult, utc_now
+
+
+class EventPublisher(Protocol):
+    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionEvent:
+    event_type: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    command_id: str
+    state: str
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "event_type": self.event_type,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "command_id": self.command_id,
+            "state": self.state,
+            "created_at": self.created_at,
+            "details": json.loads(
+                json.dumps(dict(self.details), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+            ),
+        }
+
+
+class InMemoryEventPublisher:
+    """Thread-safe publisher used by tests and first integration slice."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self.events.append(
+                json.loads(json.dumps(dict(event), ensure_ascii=False, default=str))
+            )
+
+
+class AuditCallbackSink:
+    """Convert runtime callbacks into tenant-scoped audit events."""
+
+    def __init__(self, publisher: EventPublisher) -> None:
+        self.publisher = publisher
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event(
+        event_type: str,
+        result: OpenClawResult,
+    ) -> ExecutionEvent:
+        details: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "runtime_id": result.runtime_id,
+            "attempts": result.attempts,
+        }
+        if result.error:
+            details["error"] = dict(result.error)
+        if result.output:
+            details["output_present"] = True
+        return ExecutionEvent(
+            event_type=event_type,
+            tenant_id=result.tenant_id,
+            task_id=result.task_id,
+            trace_id=result.trace_id,
+            command_id=result.command_id,
+            state=result.state.value,
+            details=details,
+        )
+
+    def on_started(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        self.publisher.publish(self._event("OPENCLAW_STARTED", result).as_dict())
+
+    def on_completed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        self.publisher.publish(self._event("OPENCLAW_COMPLETED", result).as_dict())
+
+    def on_failed(self, result: OpenClawResult) -> None:
+        event_type = {
+            "CANCELLED": "OPENCLAW_CANCELLED",
+            "TIMED_OUT": "OPENCLAW_TIMED_OUT",
+            "REJECTED": "OPENCLAW_REJECTED",
+        }.get(result.state.value, "OPENCLAW_FAILED")
+        self.publisher.publish(self._event(event_type, result).as_dict())

active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+"""AIOS 到 OpenClaw 的 Ed25519 执行合同。"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+CONTRACT_VERSION = "aios.openclaw.command.v2"
+SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM = "Ed25519"
+DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _parse_timestamp(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError("timestamp is required")
+    if normalized.endswith("Z"):
+        normalized = normalized[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("timestamp must include a timezone")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _safe_mapping(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return json.loads(
+        json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, default=str)
+    )
+
+
+def _load_crypto() -> tuple[Any, Any, Any]:
+    try:
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+            Ed25519PrivateKey,
+            Ed25519PublicKey,
+        )
+    except ImportError as exc:  # pragma: no cover
+        raise RuntimeError("cryptography with Ed25519 support is required") from exc
+    return serialization, Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey
+
+
+class CommandSigner(Protocol):
+    key_id: str
+    fingerprint: str
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes: ...
+
+
+class CommandVerifier(Protocol):
+    key_id: str
+    fingerprint: str
+
+    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool: ...
+
+
+class Ed25519CommandSigner:
+    def __init__(self, private_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
+        serialization, private_cls, _ = _load_crypto()
+        if not isinstance(private_key, private_cls):
+            raise ValueError("private key is not Ed25519")
+        self.private_key = private_key
+        self.key_id = _required(key_id, "key_id")
+        raw = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
+            format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
+        )
+        self.fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_bytes(cls, value: bytes | str, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519CommandSigner":
+        serialization, private_cls, _ = _load_crypto()
+        raw = value.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(value, str) else bytes(value)
+        if raw.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
+            key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(raw, password=None)
+        elif len(raw) == 32:
+            key = private_cls.from_private_bytes(raw)
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("Ed25519 private key must be PEM or a raw 32-byte seed")
+        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        return self.private_key.sign(bytes(payload))
+
+    def verifier(self) -> "Ed25519CommandVerifier":
+        return Ed25519CommandVerifier(self.private_key.public_key(), key_id=self.key_id)
+
+
+class Ed25519CommandVerifier:
+    def __init__(self, public_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
+        serialization, _, public_cls = _load_crypto()
+        if not isinstance(public_key, public_cls):
+            raise ValueError("public key is not Ed25519")
+        self.public_key = public_key
+        self.key_id = _required(key_id, "key_id")
+        raw = public_key.public_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
+            format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
+        )
+        self.fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_bytes(cls, value: bytes | str, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519CommandVerifier":
+        serialization, private_cls, public_cls = _load_crypto()
+        raw = value.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(value, str) else bytes(value)
+        if raw.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
+            try:
+                key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(raw)
+            except ValueError:
+                private = serialization.load_pem_private_key(raw, password=None)
+                if not isinstance(private, private_cls):
+                    raise ValueError("key is not Ed25519")
+                key = private.public_key()
+        elif len(raw) == 32:
+            key = public_cls.from_public_bytes(raw)
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("Ed25519 public key must be PEM or raw 32-byte key")
+        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
+
+    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: bytes) -> bool:
+        try:
+            self.public_key.verify(bytes(signature), bytes(payload))
+            return True
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+
+class CommandState(str, Enum):
+    ACCEPTED = "ACCEPTED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+    TIMED_OUT = "TIMED_OUT"
+    REJECTED = "REJECTED"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OpenClawCommand:
+    command_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    action: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    idempotency_key: str = ""
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+    contract_version: str = CONTRACT_VERSION
+    signature_algorithm: str = SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+    key_id: str = "default"
+    public_key_fingerprint: str = ""
+    signature: str = ""
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for field_name in (
+            "command_id",
+            "tenant_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "trace_id",
+            "action",
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "created_at",
+            "contract_version",
+            "signature_algorithm",
+            "key_id",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(
+                self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name)
+            )
+        if self.contract_version != CONTRACT_VERSION:
+            raise ValueError(f"unsupported contract_version: {self.contract_version}")
+        if self.signature_algorithm != SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"unsupported signature_algorithm: {self.signature_algorithm}"
+            )
+        object.__setattr__(self, "payload", _safe_mapping(self.payload))
+        object.__setattr__(
+            self, "public_key_fingerprint", str(self.public_key_fingerprint or "").strip()
+        )
+        object.__setattr__(self, "signature", str(self.signature or "").strip())
+        _parse_timestamp(self.created_at)
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "expires_at", _required(self.expires_at, "expires_at"))
+            if _parse_timestamp(self.expires_at) <= _parse_timestamp(self.created_at):
+                raise ValueError("expires_at must be later than created_at")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        trace_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+        expires_at: str | None = None,
+        key_id: str = "default",
+        command_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> "OpenClawCommand":
+        return cls(
+            command_id=command_id or f"cmd_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            action=action,
+            payload=_safe_mapping(payload),
+            idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+            expires_at=expires_at,
+            key_id=key_id,
+        )
+
+    def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "command_id": self.command_id,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "action": self.action,
+            "payload": _safe_mapping(self.payload),
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "created_at": self.created_at,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            "contract_version": self.contract_version,
+            "signature_algorithm": self.signature_algorithm,
+            "key_id": self.key_id,
+            "public_key_fingerprint": self.public_key_fingerprint,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OpenClawResult:
+    command_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    state: CommandState
+    output: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    started_at: str | None = None
+    finished_at: str | None = None
+    runtime_id: str | None = None
+    attempts: int = 1
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for field_name in ("command_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(
+                self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name)
+            )
+        object.__setattr__(self, "state", CommandState(self.state))
+        if self.output is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "output", _safe_mapping(self.output))
+        if self.error is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "error", _safe_mapping(self.error))
+        if self.started_at is not None:
+            _parse_timestamp(self.started_at)
+        if self.finished_at is not None:
+            _parse_timestamp(self.finished_at)
+        if self.attempts < 1:
+            raise ValueError("attempts must be >= 1")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RuntimeHealth:
+    runtime: str
+    runtime_id: str
+    status: str
+    version: str
+    heartbeat_at: str
+    active_tasks: int = 0
+    workspace_isolated: bool = False
+    credential_ref_configured: bool = False
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for field_name in (
+            "runtime",
+            "runtime_id",
+            "status",
+            "version",
+            "heartbeat_at",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(
+                self, field_name, _required(getattr(self, field_name), field_name)
+            )
+        _parse_timestamp(self.heartbeat_at)
+        if self.active_tasks < 0:
+            raise ValueError("active_tasks must be >= 0")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "details", _safe_mapping(self.details))
+
+
+def canonical_command_bytes(command: OpenClawCommand) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        command.unsigned_dict(),
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _as_signer(command: OpenClawCommand, value: Any) -> CommandSigner:
+    if hasattr(value, "sign") and hasattr(value, "fingerprint") and hasattr(value, "key_id"):
+        return value
+    return Ed25519CommandSigner.from_bytes(value, key_id=command.key_id)
+
+
+def _as_verifier(command: OpenClawCommand, value: Any) -> CommandVerifier:
+    if isinstance(value, Ed25519CommandSigner):
+        return value.verifier()
+    if hasattr(value, "verify") and hasattr(value, "fingerprint") and hasattr(value, "key_id"):
+        return value
+    return Ed25519CommandVerifier.from_bytes(value, key_id=command.key_id)
+
+
+def sign_command(command: OpenClawCommand, signing_key: Any) -> OpenClawCommand:
+    signer = _as_signer(command, signing_key)
+    if signer.key_id != command.key_id:
+        raise ValueError("command key_id does not match signer")
+    prepared = replace(
+        command,
+        signature_algorithm=SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM,
+        public_key_fingerprint=signer.fingerprint,
+        signature="",
+    )
+    signature = base64.b64encode(
+        signer.sign(canonical_command_bytes(prepared))
+    ).decode("ascii")
+    return replace(prepared, signature=signature)
+
+
+def verify_command_signature(
+    command: OpenClawCommand,
+    verification_key: Any,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    clock_skew_seconds: int = DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS,
+) -> bool:
+    if (
+        not command.signature
+        or command.contract_version != CONTRACT_VERSION
+        or command.signature_algorithm != SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+    ):
+        return False
+    try:
+        verifier = _as_verifier(command, verification_key)
+        signature = base64.b64decode(command.signature, validate=True)
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    if verifier.key_id != command.key_id:
+        return False
+    if not command.public_key_fingerprint or not hmac.compare_digest(
+        command.public_key_fingerprint, verifier.fingerprint
+    ):
+        return False
+    if not verifier.verify(canonical_command_bytes(command), signature):
+        return False
+    current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+    created = _parse_timestamp(command.created_at)
+    if created.timestamp() - current.timestamp() > clock_skew_seconds:
+        return False
+    if command.expires_at is not None:
+        expires = _parse_timestamp(command.expires_at)
+        if current.timestamp() - expires.timestamp() > clock_skew_seconds:
+            return False
+    return True

active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+"""Health policy and self-healing decisions for OpenClaw runtimes."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Mapping
+
+from .contract import RuntimeHealth
+
+
+def _parse(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("heartbeat timestamp must include timezone")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HealthPolicy:
+    max_heartbeat_age_seconds: int = 90
+    require_workspace_isolation: bool = True
+    require_credential_ref: bool = True
+    accepted_statuses: frozenset[str] = field(
+        default_factory=lambda: frozenset({"healthy", "ready"})
+    )
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.max_heartbeat_age_seconds < 5:
+            raise ValueError("max_heartbeat_age_seconds must be >= 5")
+        if not self.accepted_statuses:
+            raise ValueError("accepted_statuses must not be empty")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HealthAssessment:
+    healthy: bool
+    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
+    recoverable: bool
+    recommended_action: str
+    details: Mapping[str, object] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class RuntimeHealthMonitor:
+    """Evaluate runtime health and recommend bounded recovery actions."""
+
+    def __init__(self, policy: HealthPolicy | None = None) -> None:
+        self.policy = policy or HealthPolicy()
+
+    def assess(
+        self,
+        health: RuntimeHealth,
+        *,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> HealthAssessment:
+        current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        heartbeat = _parse(health.heartbeat_at)
+        age = max(0.0, current.timestamp() - heartbeat.timestamp())
+        reasons: list[str] = []
+
+        if health.status.lower() not in self.policy.accepted_statuses:
+            reasons.append("runtime_status_unhealthy")
+        if age > self.policy.max_heartbeat_age_seconds:
+            reasons.append("heartbeat_stale")
+        if self.policy.require_workspace_isolation and not health.workspace_isolated:
+            reasons.append("workspace_not_isolated")
+        if self.policy.require_credential_ref and not health.credential_ref_configured:
+            reasons.append("credential_reference_missing")
+
+        if not reasons:
+            return HealthAssessment(
+                healthy=True,
+                reasons=(),
+                recoverable=True,
+                recommended_action="none",
+                details={"heartbeat_age_seconds": age},
+            )
+
+        non_recoverable = {
+            "workspace_not_isolated",
+            "credential_reference_missing",
+        }.intersection(reasons)
+        if non_recoverable:
+            action = "quarantine_runtime"
+            recoverable = False
+        elif "heartbeat_stale" in reasons:
+            action = "restart_runtime"
+            recoverable = True
+        else:
+            action = "drain_and_restart"
+            recoverable = True
+
+        return HealthAssessment(
+            healthy=False,
+            reasons=tuple(reasons),
+            recoverable=recoverable,
+            recommended_action=action,
+            details={
+                "heartbeat_age_seconds": age,
+                "runtime_id": health.runtime_id,
+                "active_tasks": health.active_tasks,
+            },
+        )

active-runtime/app/aios_openclaw/transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+"""Runtime transport implementations for the OpenClaw adapter."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import threading
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .contract import (
+    CommandState,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    RuntimeHealth,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+
+class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ...
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
+
+
+class TransportError(RuntimeError):
+    """Runtime transport or protocol failure."""
+
+
+RuntimeHandler = Callable[[OpenClawCommand], Mapping[str, Any] | OpenClawResult]
+
+
+class InProcessRuntimeTransport:
+    """Deterministic runtime used by tests and controlled local integrations."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        handler: RuntimeHandler,
+        *,
+        runtime_id: str = "openclaw-in-process",
+        version: str = "v1",
+        workspace_isolated: bool = True,
+        credential_ref_configured: bool = True,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.handler = handler
+        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
+        self.version = version
+        self.workspace_isolated = workspace_isolated
+        self.credential_ref_configured = credential_ref_configured
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._running: set[str] = set()
+        self._cancelled: set[str] = set()
+
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult:
+        if timeout_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive")
+        with self._lock:
+            if command.command_id in self._cancelled:
+                return OpenClawResult(
+                    command_id=command.command_id,
+                    tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
+                    task_id=command.task_id,
+                    trace_id=command.trace_id,
+                    state=CommandState.CANCELLED,
+                    error={"code": "cancelled", "message": "cancelled before execution"},
+                    finished_at=utc_now(),
+                    runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
+                )
+            self._running.add(command.command_id)
+        try:
+            raw = self.handler(command)
+            if isinstance(raw, OpenClawResult):
+                return raw
+            if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+                raise TransportError("runtime handler must return a mapping or OpenClawResult")
+            return OpenClawResult(
+                command_id=command.command_id,
+                tenant_id=command.tenant_id,
+                task_id=command.task_id,
+                trace_id=command.trace_id,
+                state=CommandState(str(raw.get("state", "COMPLETED"))),
+                output=raw.get("output"),
+                error=raw.get("error"),
+                started_at=str(raw.get("started_at") or utc_now()),
+                finished_at=str(raw.get("finished_at") or utc_now()),
+                runtime_id=str(raw.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
+                attempts=int(raw.get("attempts", 1)),
+            )
+        finally:
+            with self._lock:
+                self._running.discard(command.command_id)
+
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._cancelled.add(command_id)
+            return command_id in self._running
+
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
+        with self._lock:
+            active = len(self._running)
+        return RuntimeHealth(
+            runtime="openclaw",
+            runtime_id=self.runtime_id,
+            status="healthy",
+            version=self.version,
+            heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+            active_tasks=active,
+            workspace_isolated=self.workspace_isolated,
+            credential_ref_configured=self.credential_ref_configured,
+            details={"transport": "in_process"},
+        )
+
+
+class HTTPRuntimeTransport:
+    """Private HTTP transport for an OpenClaw runtime service."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        base_url: str,
+        *,
+        runtime_id: str = "openclaw-http",
+        credential_ref: str | None = None,
+        max_response_bytes: int = 2_097_152,
+    ) -> None:
+        normalized = str(base_url).rstrip("/")
+        if not normalized.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
+            raise ValueError("base_url must use http or https")
+        self.base_url = normalized
+        self.runtime_id = runtime_id
+        self.credential_ref = credential_ref
+        self.max_response_bytes = int(max_response_bytes)
+
+    def _request(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        *,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+        timeout_seconds: float,
+    ) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        body = None
+        headers = {"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": "AIOS-OpenClaw/1"}
+        if payload is not None:
+            body = json.dumps(dict(payload), separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        if self.credential_ref:
+            headers["X-AIOS-Credential-Ref"] = self.credential_ref
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            f"{self.base_url}{path}",
+            data=body,
+            method=method,
+            headers=headers,
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout_seconds) as response:
+                raw = response.read(self.max_response_bytes + 1)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raise TransportError(f"runtime returned HTTP {exc.code}") from exc
+        except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
+            raise TransportError(f"runtime unavailable: {exc.reason}") from exc
+        if len(raw) > self.max_response_bytes:
+            raise TransportError("runtime response exceeded size limit")
+        decoded = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(decoded, Mapping):
+            raise TransportError("runtime response must be a JSON object")
+        return decoded
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _command_payload(command: OpenClawCommand) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {**command.unsigned_dict(), "signature": command.signature}
+
+    def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult:
+        value = self._request(
+            "POST",
+            "/v1/execute",
+            payload=self._command_payload(command),
+            timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
+        )
+        return OpenClawResult(
+            command_id=str(value["command_id"]),
+            tenant_id=str(value["tenant_id"]),
+            task_id=str(value["task_id"]),
+            trace_id=str(value["trace_id"]),
+            state=CommandState(str(value["state"])),
+            output=value.get("output"),
+            error=value.get("error"),
+            started_at=value.get("started_at"),
+            finished_at=value.get("finished_at"),
+            runtime_id=str(value.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
+            attempts=int(value.get("attempts", 1)),
+        )
+
+    def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool:
+        value = self._request(
+            "POST",
+            f"/v1/commands/{urllib.parse.quote(command_id, safe='')}/cancel",
+            payload={},
+            timeout_seconds=10.0,
+        )
+        return bool(value.get("accepted"))
+
+    def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth:
+        value = self._request("GET", "/v1/health", payload=None, timeout_seconds=5.0)
+        return RuntimeHealth(
+            runtime=str(value.get("runtime") or "openclaw"),
+            runtime_id=str(value.get("runtime_id") or self.runtime_id),
+            status=str(value.get("status") or "unknown"),
+            version=str(value.get("version") or "unknown"),
+            heartbeat_at=str(value.get("heartbeat_at") or utc_now()),
+            active_tasks=int(value.get("active_tasks", 0)),
+            workspace_isolated=bool(value.get("workspace_isolated", False)),
+            credential_ref_configured=bool(value.get("credential_ref_configured", False)),
+            details=value.get("details") if isinstance(value.get("details"), Mapping) else {},
+        )

active-runtime/app/aios_owner_authorization_broker_api.py

@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-"""HTTP adapter for audited Owner authorization and writer provisioning.
-
-This module layers on top of ``aios_authorized_task_writer_api`` so existing
-routes and the legacy exact ``writer:provision`` route remain available. The
-new endpoint does not mint or modify bearer credentials. It authenticates an
-existing, non-wildcard, explicitly allow-listed Owner credential and then
-invokes the audited broker.
-
-Endpoint:
-    POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import urllib.parse
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-import aios_authorized_task_writer_api as bridge_api
-from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
-from owner_authorization_broker import (
-    OwnerAuthorizationBroker,
-    OwnerAuthorizationError,
-    OwnerPrincipal,
-)
-
-
-api = bridge_api.api
-_original_do_post = api.H.do_POST
-_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
-
-
-def _enabled() -> bool:
-    return os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_ENABLED", ""
-    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-
-
-def _configured_intake_scope() -> str:
-    scopes = [
-        item.strip()
-        for item in os.getenv(
-            "AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES", ""
-        ).split(",")
-        if item.strip()
-    ]
-    if len(scopes) != 1:
-        raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
-            "EXACTLY_ONE_HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REQUIRED", 503
-        )
-    scope = scopes[0]
-    if scope == "writer:provision" or scope == "*" or scope.endswith(":*"):
-        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("HTTP_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 503)
-    return scope
-
-
-def _scope_set(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> frozenset[str]:
-    raw = auth.get("scopes")
-    if raw is None:
-        raw = auth.get("scope")
-    if raw is None:
-        return frozenset()
-    if isinstance(raw, str):
-        candidates = raw.replace(",", " ").split()
-    elif isinstance(raw, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
-        candidates = [str(item) for item in raw]
-    else:
-        raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_SCOPE_EVIDENCE_INVALID", 403)
-    return frozenset(item.strip() for item in candidates if item.strip())
-
-
-def _credential_id(auth: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    for name in (
-        "credential_id",
-        "token_id",
-        "key_id",
-        "auth_id",
-    ):
-        value = str(auth.get(name) or "").strip()
-        if value:
-            return value
-    return ""
-
-
-def _authenticate_existing_owner(handler) -> OwnerPrincipal | None:
-    scope = _configured_intake_scope()
-    auth = handler.need(scope)
-    if not auth:
-        return None
-    if auth.get("role") != "owner":
-        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_ROLE_REQUIRED"}, 403)
-        return None
-    identity = str(auth.get("account") or auth.get("identity") or "").strip()
-    if not identity:
-        handler.sendj({"error": "OWNER_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"}, 403)
-        return None
-    scopes = _scope_set(auth)
-    if any(item == "*" or item.endswith(":*") for item in scopes):
-        handler.sendj(
-            {"error": "WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED"}, 403
-        )
-        return None
-    return OwnerPrincipal(
-        identity=identity,
-        role="owner",
-        authenticated_scope=scope,
-        token_scopes=scopes,
-        credential_id=_credential_id(auth),
-    )
-
-
-def _broker_do_post(self):
-    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-    if path != _ENDPOINT:
-        return _original_do_post(self)
-    if not _enabled():
-        return self.sendj(
-            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_DISABLED"}, 503
-        )
-    try:
-        principal = _authenticate_existing_owner(self)
-        if principal is None:
-            return
-        data = self.body()
-        result = OwnerAuthorizationBroker().authorize_and_provision(
-            data, principal
-        )
-        return self.sendj(result)
-    except (OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
-        body = {"error": exc.code}
-        if exc.details:
-            body["details"] = exc.details
-        return self.sendj(body, exc.status)
-    except Exception:
-        # Never expose registry data, bearer tokens, signer output or traceback.
-        return self.sendj(
-            {"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR"}, 500
-        )
-
-
-api.H.do_POST = _broker_do_post
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    api.main()

active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_api.py

@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Loopback-only HTTP API for the task identity overlay.
-
-Endpoints:
-  GET  /healthz
-  POST /api/governance/owner-authorizations
-
-The API authenticates only the short-lived overlay credential. It does not read
-or modify the global bearer-token registry.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import urllib.parse
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-from typing import Any
-
-from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import ProvisioningError
-from owner_authorization_broker import OwnerAuthorizationError
-from task_identity_overlay import (
-    MAX_BODY_BYTES,
-    IdentityOverlayConfig,
-    IdentityOverlayError,
-    TaskIdentityOverlayService,
-)
-
-
-_ENDPOINT = "/api/governance/owner-authorizations"
-
-
-def _enabled() -> bool:
-    return os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_ENABLED", ""
-    ).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-
-
-def _bearer(header: str) -> str:
-    prefix = "Bearer "
-    if not header.startswith(prefix):
-        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
-    token = header[len(prefix):].strip()
-    if not token or len(token) > 4096:
-        raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED", 401)
-    return token
-
-
-class OverlayHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    server_version = "aios-task-identity-overlay/1"
-    sys_version = ""
-
-    @property
-    def overlay(self) -> TaskIdentityOverlayService:
-        return self.server.overlay  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
-
-    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
-        # Never log Authorization or request bodies.
-        return
-
-    def _send(self, status: int, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
-        payload = (
-            json.dumps(
-                value,
-                ensure_ascii=False,
-                sort_keys=True,
-                separators=(",", ":"),
-            )
-            + "\n"
-        ).encode("utf-8")
-        self.send_response(status)
-        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(payload)))
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(payload)
-
-    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        try:
-            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-        except ValueError:
-            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID") from None
-        if length <= 0 or length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
-            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_SIZE_REJECTED", 413)
-        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(raw)
-        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_JSON_INVALID") from None
-        if not isinstance(value, dict):
-            raise IdentityOverlayError("OVERLAY_BODY_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
-        return value
-
-    def do_GET(self) -> None:
-        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-        if path != "/healthz":
-            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
-            return
-        self._send(
-            200,
-            {
-                "service": "aios-task-identity-overlay",
-                "status": "active" if _enabled() else "disabled",
-                "global_token_registry_used": False,
-                "loopback_only": True,
-            },
-        )
-
-    def do_POST(self) -> None:
-        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-        if path != _ENDPOINT:
-            self._send(404, {"error": "NOT_FOUND"})
-            return
-        if not _enabled():
-            self._send(503, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_DISABLED"})
-            return
-        try:
-            token = _bearer(self.headers.get("Authorization", ""))
-            result = self.overlay.provision(self._body(), token)
-            self._send(200, result)
-        except (IdentityOverlayError, OwnerAuthorizationError, ProvisioningError) as exc:
-            body: dict[str, Any] = {"error": exc.code}
-            if getattr(exc, "details", None):
-                body["details"] = exc.details
-            self._send(exc.status, body)
-        except Exception:
-            self._send(500, {"error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_API_INTERNAL_ERROR"})
-
-
-class OverlayServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
-    allow_reuse_address = True
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        address: tuple[str, int],
-        overlay: TaskIdentityOverlayService,
-    ) -> None:
-        super().__init__(address, OverlayHandler)
-        self.overlay = overlay
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    host = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
-    if host not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}:
-        raise SystemExit("identity overlay must listen on loopback")
-    try:
-        port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_IDENTITY_OVERLAY_PORT", "19864"))
-    except ValueError:
-        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port") from None
-    if not 1024 <= port <= 65535:
-        raise SystemExit("invalid overlay port")
-    config = IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
-    server = OverlayServer(
-        (host, port),
-        TaskIdentityOverlayService(config),
-    )
-    server.serve_forever(poll_interval=0.25)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()

active-runtime/app/aios_task_identity_overlay_cli.py

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Root-governed CLI for issuing and revoking task identity overlays.
-
-The CLI never prints the bearer token. It returns only the root-owned secret
-reference and non-secret metadata.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-
-from task_identity_overlay import (
-    IdentityOverlayConfig,
-    IdentityOverlayError,
-    TaskIdentityOverlayStore,
-)
-
-
-def _write_result(path: str, value: dict) -> None:
-    data = json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n"
-    if path == "-":
-        sys.stdout.write(data)
-        return
-    target = Path(path)
-    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    target.write_text(data, encoding="utf-8")
-    os.chmod(target, 0o600)
-
-
-def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
-    value = argparse.ArgumentParser(
-        description="Issue/status/revoke a task-scoped identity overlay"
-    )
-    sub = value.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
-
-    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
-    issue.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=900)
-    issue.add_argument("--authorization-assertion-ref", required=True)
-    issue.add_argument(
-        "--operator-identity",
-        default=os.getenv("SUDO_USER") or os.getenv("USER") or "root",
-    )
-    issue.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
-
-    status = sub.add_parser("status")
-    status.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
-    status.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
-
-    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
-    revoke.add_argument("--overlay-id", required=True)
-    revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
-    revoke.add_argument("--result-json", default="-")
-    return value
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    args = parser().parse_args()
-    try:
-        store = TaskIdentityOverlayStore(
-            IdentityOverlayConfig.from_environment()
-        )
-        if args.command == "issue":
-            result = store.issue(
-                ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
-                authorization_assertion_ref=args.authorization_assertion_ref,
-                operator_identity=args.operator_identity,
-            )
-        elif args.command == "status":
-            result = store.status(args.overlay_id)
-        else:
-            result = store.revoke(args.overlay_id, reason=args.reason)
-        _write_result(args.result_json, result)
-        return 0
-    except IdentityOverlayError as exc:
-        body = {"status": "BLOCKED", "error": exc.code}
-        if exc.details:
-            body["details"] = exc.details
-        _write_result(getattr(args, "result_json", "-"), body)
-        return 2
-    except Exception:
-        _write_result(
-            getattr(args, "result_json", "-"),
-            {"status": "FAILED", "error": "IDENTITY_OVERLAY_CLI_INTERNAL_ERROR"},
-        )
-        return 1
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+"""AIOS V2 控制面、执行编排与可信运行来源证明。"""
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    AgentRecord,
+    AuditEvent,
+    ControlPlaneError,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    IdempotencyConflict,
+    InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
+    InvalidTransition,
+    NotFound,
+    PolicyDenied,
+    RequestContext,
+    RevisionConflict,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskState,
+    TenantIsolationError,
+    TenantRecord,
+    Unauthorized,
+)
+from .execution_tracking import ExecutionEvidence, ExecutionTracker
+from .orchestrator import DispatchRecord, ExecutionOrchestrator, OrchestrationError
+from .provenance import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKeySigner,
+    Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier,
+    ExecutionPath,
+    GitOperation,
+    PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION,
+    ProvenanceAuthorization,
+    ProvenanceControlledWriter,
+    ProvenanceDenied,
+    ProvenanceError,
+    ProvenanceExpired,
+    ProvenanceIssuer,
+    ProvenanceNotFound,
+    ProvenanceReplay,
+    ProvenanceRevoked,
+    ProvenanceSignatureError,
+    ProvenanceStatus,
+    ProvenanceVerifier,
+    RunProvenance,
+    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
+    digest_payload,
+)
+from .provenance_git import (
+    GitCommandResult,
+    GitExecutionContext,
+    ProvenanceGitError,
+    ProvenanceGitWriter,
+)
+from .provenance_operations import (
+    OperationContext,
+    OperationReceipt,
+    ProvenanceOperationGate,
+    build_provenance_writer_from_env,
+    context_from_environment,
+)
+
+__all__ = [
+    "AgentRecord",
+    "AuditEvent",
+    "ControlPlaneError",
+    "ControlPlaneService",
+    "DispatchRecord",
+    "Ed25519PrivateKeySigner",
+    "Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier",
+    "ExecutionEvidence",
+    "ExecutionOrchestrator",
+    "ExecutionPath",
+    "ExecutionTracker",
+    "GitCommandResult",
+    "GitExecutionContext",
+    "GitOperation",
+    "IdempotencyConflict",
+    "InMemoryControlPlaneStore",
+    "InvalidTransition",
+    "NotFound",
+    "OperationContext",
+    "OperationReceipt",
+    "OrchestrationError",
+    "PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION",
+    "PolicyDenied",
+    "ProvenanceAuthorization",
+    "ProvenanceControlledWriter",
+    "ProvenanceDenied",
+    "ProvenanceError",
+    "ProvenanceExpired",
+    "ProvenanceGitError",
+    "ProvenanceGitWriter",
+    "ProvenanceIssuer",
+    "ProvenanceNotFound",
+    "ProvenanceOperationGate",
+    "ProvenanceReplay",
+    "ProvenanceRevoked",
+    "ProvenanceSignatureError",
+    "ProvenanceStatus",
+    "ProvenanceVerifier",
+    "RequestContext",
+    "RevisionConflict",
+    "RunProvenance",
+    "SQLiteProvenanceStore",
+    "TaskRecord",
+    "TaskState",
+    "TenantIsolationError",
+    "TenantRecord",
+    "Unauthorized",
+    "build_provenance_writer_from_env",
+    "context_from_environment",
+    "digest_payload",
+]

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/app.py

@@ -0,0 +1,792 @@
+"""AIOS V2 production-candidate application entrypoint."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import json
+import os
+import stat
+import urllib.parse
+from enum import Enum
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJobState, HermesResult, SQLiteHermesStore
+from aios_openclaw import (
+    Ed25519CommandSigner,
+    HTTPRuntimeTransport,
+    OpenClawAdapter,
+)
+from aios_openclaw.callback import AuditCallbackSink, EventPublisher
+
+from .console import CONSOLE_HTML
+from .control_plane import AuditEvent, RequestContext, Unauthorized
+from .dispatch_store import SQLiteDispatchRepository
+from .execution_tracking import ExecutionEvidence, ExecutionTracker
+from .gateway import GatewayApplication, error_response
+from .gitops_status import collect_gitops_status
+from .orchestrator import ExecutionOrchestrator
+from .persistence import DurableControlPlaneService, SQLiteSnapshotRepository
+from .provenance_operations import build_provenance_writer_from_env
+
+
+def _json_value(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if dataclasses.is_dataclass(value):
+        return {
+            item.name: _json_value(getattr(value, item.name))
+            for item in dataclasses.fields(value)
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, Enum):
+        return value.value
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return {str(key): _json_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
+        return [_json_value(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def _enabled(value: str | None) -> bool:
+    return str(value or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+def _header(headers: Mapping[str, str], name: str) -> str | None:
+    target = name.lower()
+    for key, value in headers.items():
+        if str(key).lower() == target:
+            normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+            return normalized or None
+    return None
+
+
+def _provenance_context(
+    headers: Mapping[str, str],
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
+    header_provenance = _header(headers, "X-AIOS-Provenance-ID")
+    header_run = _header(headers, "X-AIOS-Run-ID")
+    body_provenance = str(payload.get("provenance_id") or "").strip() or None
+    body_run = str(payload.get("run_id") or "").strip() or None
+    if header_provenance and body_provenance and header_provenance != body_provenance:
+        raise ValueError("provenance_id header/body mismatch")
+    if header_run and body_run and header_run != body_run:
+        raise ValueError("run_id header/body mismatch")
+    return header_provenance or body_provenance, header_run or body_run
+
+
+def _read_protected_file(path: Path, *, private: bool) -> bytes:
+    flags = os.O_RDONLY
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    descriptor = os.open(str(path), flags)
+    try:
+        metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+            raise RuntimeError("key reference is not a regular file")
+        denied = 0o077 if private else 0o022
+        if metadata.st_mode & denied:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "private key file permissions must be 0600 or stricter"
+                if private
+                else "public key file must not be group/world writable"
+            )
+        chunks: list[bytes] = []
+        while True:
+            chunk = os.read(descriptor, 65536)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            chunks.append(chunk)
+        value = b"".join(chunks)
+        if not value:
+            raise RuntimeError("key file is empty")
+        return value
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+
+
+class FileCommandSignerResolver:
+    """Resolve tenant/key-id scoped OpenClaw Ed25519 signing material."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path, *, configured_key_id: str) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+        self.configured_key_id = str(configured_key_id or "").strip()
+        if not self.configured_key_id:
+            raise ValueError("configured_key_id is required")
+
+    def __call__(self, tenant_id: str, key_id: str) -> Ed25519CommandSigner:
+        if not str(tenant_id or "").strip():
+            raise RuntimeError("tenant_id is required for command signing")
+        if key_id != self.configured_key_id:
+            raise RuntimeError("OpenClaw signing key_id mismatch")
+        return Ed25519CommandSigner.from_bytes(
+            _read_protected_file(self.path, private=True),
+            key_id=key_id,
+        )
+
+
+class ControlPlaneEventPublisher(EventPublisher):
+    """Append Runtime callback events to the tenant audit stream.
+
+    Callback audit remains informational. Authoritative task reconciliation is
+    performed only by the orchestrator after dispatch/result validation.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, service: DurableControlPlaneService) -> None:
+        self.service = service
+
+    def publish(self, event: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        tenant_id = str(event.get("tenant_id") or "").strip()
+        trace_id = str(event.get("trace_id") or "").strip()
+        command_id = str(event.get("command_id") or "").strip()
+        event_type = str(event.get("event_type") or "OPENCLAW_EVENT").strip()
+        if not tenant_id or not trace_id or not command_id:
+            raise ValueError("runtime audit event is missing tenant identity")
+        state_value = str(event.get("state") or "unknown").lower()
+        outcome = "allowed" if state_value == "completed" else state_value
+        runtime = str(event.get("runtime") or "openclaw").strip().lower()
+        principal_id = str(
+            event.get("principal_id") or f"{runtime}-runtime"
+        ).strip()
+        audit = AuditEvent(
+            event_id=f"runtime_{command_id}_{len(self.service.store.audit_events) + 1}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            principal_id=principal_id,
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            action=event_type,
+            resource_type=f"{runtime}_execution",
+            resource_id=command_id,
+            outcome=outcome,
+            policy_version="runtime-v2",
+            details=dict(event.get("details") or {}),
+        )
+        with self.service.store.lock:
+            self.service.store.audit_events.append(audit)
+            self.service.repository.save(self.service._snapshot())
+
+
+class CandidateApplication:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        gateway: GatewayApplication,
+        orchestrator: ExecutionOrchestrator,
+        tracker: ExecutionTracker,
+        hermes: HermesAdapter,
+        openclaw: OpenClawAdapter | None,
+        *,
+        hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled: bool = False,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.gateway = gateway
+        self.orchestrator = orchestrator
+        self.tracker = tracker
+        self.hermes = hermes
+        self.openclaw = openclaw
+        self.hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled = bool(hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled)
+        self.runtime_events = ControlPlaneEventPublisher(orchestrator.control_plane)
+
+    def context(self, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext:
+        return self.gateway.context_from_headers(headers)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _require_runtime_role(context: RequestContext) -> None:
+        if not ({"runtime", "platform_admin"} & set(context.roles)):
+            raise Unauthorized("runtime reconciliation role is required")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required_identity(payload: Mapping[str, Any], name: str) -> str:
+        value = str(payload.get(name) or "").strip()
+        if not value:
+            raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
+        return value
+
+    def _record_hermes_lifecycle(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        dispatch: Any,
+        job: Any,
+        *,
+        action: str,
+        worker_id: str | None,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        executor = worker_id or "aios-control-plane"
+        evidence = ExecutionEvidence(
+            execution_id=job.job_id,
+            tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+            task_id=job.task_id,
+            agent_id=dispatch.agent_id,
+            executor=executor,
+            branch="runtime/hermes",
+            status=job.state.value.lower(),
+            progress_completed=0,
+            progress_total=3,
+            current_step=action,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        )
+        current_evidence = self.tracker.claim(
+            evidence,
+            principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        )
+        if job.state in {
+            HermesJobState.COMPLETED,
+            HermesJobState.FAILED,
+            HermesJobState.CANCELLED,
+        }:
+            if current_evidence.completed_at is None:
+                self.tracker.complete(
+                    tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                    execution_id=job.job_id,
+                    status=job.state.value.lower(),
+                    test_status="runtime_terminal",
+                    test_summary={"lifecycle_action": action},
+                    result_summary={
+                        "state": job.state.value,
+                        "worker_id": worker_id,
+                        "dispatch_id": dispatch.dispatch_id,
+                    },
+                    principal_id=context.principal_id,
+                    provenance_id=provenance_id,
+                    run_id=run_id,
+                )
+        else:
+            self.tracker.heartbeat(
+                tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                execution_id=job.job_id,
+                status=job.state.value.lower(),
+                current_step=action,
+                progress_completed=(1 if job.state == HermesJobState.RUNNING else 0),
+                progress_total=3,
+                principal_id=context.principal_id,
+                provenance_id=provenance_id,
+                run_id=run_id,
+            )
+        self.runtime_events.publish(
+            {
+                "runtime": "hermes",
+                "tenant_id": job.tenant_id,
+                "principal_id": context.principal_id,
+                "trace_id": job.trace_id,
+                "command_id": job.job_id,
+                "event_type": f"HERMES_{action.upper()}",
+                "state": job.state.value,
+                "details": {
+                    "dispatch_id": dispatch.dispatch_id,
+                    "task_id": job.task_id,
+                    "worker_id": worker_id,
+                    "cell_id": job.cell_id,
+                    "profile_id": job.profile_id,
+                    "revision": job.revision,
+                    "provenance_id": provenance_id,
+                    "run_id": run_id,
+                },
+            }
+        )
+
+    def handle_json(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        raw_path: str,
+        headers: Mapping[str, str],
+        body: Any,
+    ) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw_path)
+        path = parsed.path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        method = method.upper()
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/gitops":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
+                "gitops": collect_gitops_status().as_dict(),
+            }
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/runtime":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            runtimes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+            if self.openclaw is None:
+                runtimes.append(
+                    {
+                        "name": "openclaw",
+                        "status": "disabled",
+                        "details": {"reason": "runtime_not_configured"},
+                    }
+                )
+            else:
+                try:
+                    health = self.openclaw.health()
+                    runtimes.append(
+                        {
+                            "name": "openclaw",
+                            "status": health.status,
+                            "details": _json_value(health),
+                        }
+                    )
+                except Exception as exc:
+                    runtimes.append(
+                        {
+                            "name": "openclaw",
+                            "status": "unavailable",
+                            "details": {"message": str(exc)},
+                        }
+                    )
+            hermes_health = self.hermes.health()
+            runtimes.append(
+                {
+                    "name": "hermes",
+                    "status": hermes_health.status,
+                    "details": _json_value(hermes_health),
+                }
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
+                "runtimes": runtimes,
+            }
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/executions":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "executions": _json_value(
+                    self.tracker.list(tenant_id=context.tenant_id)
+                )
+            }
+
+        dispatch_match = __import__("re").fullmatch(
+            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/dispatch", path
+        )
+        if method == "POST" and dispatch_match:
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            task_id = urllib.parse.unquote(dispatch_match.group(1))
+            payload = body if isinstance(body, Mapping) else {}
+            timeout = payload.get("timeout_seconds")
+            provenance_id, run_id = _provenance_context(headers, payload)
+            record = self.orchestrator.dispatch(
+                context,
+                task_id=task_id,
+                timeout_seconds=float(timeout) if timeout is not None else None,
+                provenance_id=provenance_id,
+                run_id=run_id,
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.ACCEPTED, {"dispatch": _json_value(record)}
+
+        lifecycle_match = __import__("re").fullmatch(
+            r"/api/v2/internal/runtime/hermes/lifecycle/"
+            r"(claim|start|heartbeat|complete|fail|cancel|status)",
+            path,
+        )
+        if method == "POST" and lifecycle_match:
+            if not self.hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled:
+                return HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, {
+                    "error": "not_found",
+                    "message": "route not found",
+                }
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            self._require_runtime_role(context)
+            if not isinstance(body, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError("JSON body must be an object")
+            payload = body
+            action = lifecycle_match.group(1)
+            identity = {
+                name: self._required_identity(payload, name)
+                for name in (
+                    "dispatch_id",
+                    "job_id",
+                    "tenant_id",
+                    "task_id",
+                    "trace_id",
+                    "principal_id",
+                    "provenance_id",
+                    "run_id",
+                    "cell_id",
+                    "profile_id",
+                )
+            }
+            header_provenance, header_run = _provenance_context(headers, payload)
+            if header_provenance != identity["provenance_id"]:
+                raise ValueError("provenance_id context mismatch")
+            if header_run != identity["run_id"]:
+                raise ValueError("run_id context mismatch")
+            requeued_job_ids = self.hermes.requeue_expired()
+            dispatch, job = self.orchestrator.hermes_lifecycle_context(
+                context,
+                dispatch_id=identity["dispatch_id"],
+                job_id=identity["job_id"],
+                tenant_id=identity["tenant_id"],
+                task_id=identity["task_id"],
+                trace_id=identity["trace_id"],
+                principal_id=identity["principal_id"],
+                provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                run_id=identity["run_id"],
+            )
+            if job.cell_id != identity["cell_id"]:
+                raise ValueError("cell_id mismatch")
+            if job.profile_id != identity["profile_id"]:
+                raise ValueError("profile_id mismatch")
+
+            if action == "status":
+                if job.job_id in requeued_job_ids:
+                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
+                        context,
+                        dispatch,
+                        job,
+                        action="lease_expired_requeue",
+                        worker_id=None,
+                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
+                    )
+                task = self.orchestrator.control_plane.get_task(
+                    context, dispatch.task_id
+                )
+                response: dict[str, Any] = {
+                    "job": _json_value(job),
+                    "dispatch": _json_value(dispatch),
+                    "task": _json_value(task),
+                }
+                if job.state in {
+                    HermesJobState.COMPLETED,
+                    HermesJobState.FAILED,
+                    HermesJobState.CANCELLED,
+                }:
+                    response["result"] = _json_value(
+                        self.hermes.result(job.job_id, tenant_id=job.tenant_id)
+                    )
+                return HTTPStatus.OK, response
+
+            expected_revision = payload.get("expected_revision")
+            expected = (
+                int(expected_revision) if expected_revision is not None else None
+            )
+            if action == "cancel":
+                result = self.hermes.cancel(
+                    job.job_id,
+                    tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                    expected_revision=expected,
+                )
+            else:
+                worker_id = self._required_identity(payload, "worker_id")
+                if action == "claim":
+                    claimed = self.hermes.claim(
+                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                        cell_id=job.cell_id,
+                        profile_id=job.profile_id,
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        lease_seconds=(
+                            int(payload["lease_seconds"])
+                            if payload.get("lease_seconds") is not None
+                            else None
+                        ),
+                        job_id=job.job_id,
+                    )
+                    if claimed is None:
+                        raise ValueError("Hermes job is not claimable")
+                    bound = self.orchestrator.bind_hermes_worker(
+                        context,
+                        claimed,
+                        dispatch_id=dispatch.dispatch_id,
+                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                    )
+                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
+                        context,
+                        bound,
+                        claimed,
+                        action="claim",
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
+                    )
+                    return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                        "job": _json_value(claimed),
+                        "dispatch": _json_value(bound),
+                    }
+                if action == "start":
+                    started = self.hermes.start(
+                        job.job_id,
+                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        expected_revision=expected,
+                    )
+                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
+                        context,
+                        dispatch,
+                        started,
+                        action="start",
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
+                    )
+                    return HTTPStatus.OK, {"job": _json_value(started)}
+                if action == "heartbeat":
+                    heartbeat = self.hermes.heartbeat(
+                        job.job_id,
+                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        lease_seconds=(
+                            int(payload["lease_seconds"])
+                            if payload.get("lease_seconds") is not None
+                            else None
+                        ),
+                    )
+                    self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
+                        context,
+                        dispatch,
+                        heartbeat,
+                        action="heartbeat",
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                        run_id=identity["run_id"],
+                    )
+                    return HTTPStatus.OK, {"job": _json_value(heartbeat)}
+                if action == "complete":
+                    output = payload.get("output")
+                    if not isinstance(output, Mapping):
+                        raise ValueError("output must be an object")
+                    result = self.hermes.complete(
+                        job.job_id,
+                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        output=output,
+                        expected_revision=expected,
+                    )
+                elif action == "fail":
+                    error = payload.get("error")
+                    if not isinstance(error, Mapping):
+                        raise ValueError("error must be an object")
+                    result = self.hermes.fail(
+                        job.job_id,
+                        tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+                        worker_id=worker_id,
+                        error=error,
+                        expected_revision=expected,
+                    )
+                else:
+                    raise ValueError("unsupported Hermes lifecycle action")
+
+            task = self.orchestrator.reconcile_hermes(
+                context,
+                result,
+                dispatch_id=dispatch.dispatch_id,
+                provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                run_id=identity["run_id"],
+            )
+            updated_dispatch = self.orchestrator.dispatch_repository.get(
+                dispatch.dispatch_id, tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id
+            )
+            terminal_job = self.hermes.get(job.job_id, tenant_id=job.tenant_id)
+            self._record_hermes_lifecycle(
+                context,
+                updated_dispatch,
+                terminal_job,
+                action=action,
+                worker_id=result.worker_id,
+                provenance_id=identity["provenance_id"],
+                run_id=identity["run_id"],
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "result": _json_value(result),
+                "task": _json_value(task),
+                "dispatch": _json_value(updated_dispatch),
+            }
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/internal/runtime/hermes/reconcile":
+            context = self.context(headers)
+            self._require_runtime_role(context)
+            if not isinstance(body, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError("JSON body must be an object")
+            provenance_id, run_id = _provenance_context(headers, body)
+            if not provenance_id or not run_id:
+                raise ValueError("provenance_id and run_id are required")
+            dispatch_id = str(body.get("dispatch_id") or "").strip()
+            if not dispatch_id:
+                raise ValueError("dispatch_id is required")
+            result = HermesResult(
+                job_id=str(body["job_id"]),
+                tenant_id=str(body["tenant_id"]),
+                task_id=str(body["task_id"]),
+                trace_id=str(body["trace_id"]),
+                state=HermesJobState(str(body["state"])),
+                worker_id=(
+                    str(body["worker_id"])
+                    if body.get("worker_id") is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+                output=body.get("output"),
+                error=body.get("error"),
+                started_at=body.get("started_at"),
+                finished_at=body.get("finished_at"),
+            )
+            task = self.orchestrator.reconcile_hermes(
+                context,
+                result,
+                dispatch_id=dispatch_id,
+                provenance_id=provenance_id,
+                run_id=run_id,
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"task": _json_value(task)}
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/hermes/results/reconcile":
+            return HTTPStatus.GONE, {
+                "error": "RuntimeReconcileEndpointMoved",
+                "message": "use /api/v2/internal/runtime/hermes/reconcile",
+            }
+
+        return self.gateway.handle(method, raw_path, headers, body)
+
+
+class CandidateRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "AIOSV2Candidate/2.0"
+    max_body_bytes = 1_048_576
+
+    @property
+    def application(self) -> CandidateApplication:
+        return self.server.application  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+    def _read_body(self) -> Any:
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or "0")
+        if length < 0 or length > self.max_body_bytes:
+            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
+        if length == 0:
+            return {}
+        content_type = self.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0].strip()
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise ValueError("Content-Type must be application/json")
+        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _security_headers(self) -> None:
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        self.send_header("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
+        self.send_header("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+        self.send_header(
+            "Content-Security-Policy",
+            "default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'",
+        )
+
+    def _send_json(self, status_code: int, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            _json_value(payload), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(int(status_code))
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self._security_headers()
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _send_console(self) -> None:
+        encoded = CONSOLE_HTML.encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(HTTPStatus.OK)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self._security_headers()
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _dispatch(self, method: str) -> None:
+        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        if method == "GET" and path in {"/", "/console"}:
+            self._send_console()
+            return
+        try:
+            body = self._read_body() if method == "POST" else {}
+            status_code, payload = self.application.handle_json(
+                method,
+                self.path,
+                {key: value for key, value in self.headers.items()},
+                body,
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            status_code, payload = error_response(exc)
+        self._send_json(status_code, payload)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("POST")
+
+
+class CandidateHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    daemon_threads = True
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(self, address: tuple[str, int], application: CandidateApplication) -> None:
+        self.application = application
+        super().__init__(address, CandidateRequestHandler)
+
+
+def build_application() -> CandidateApplication:
+    state_dir = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR", "/var/lib/aios-v2")).resolve()
+    state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    repository = SQLiteSnapshotRepository(state_dir / "control-plane.sqlite3")
+    dispatch_repository = SQLiteDispatchRepository(state_dir / "dispatches.sqlite3")
+    service = DurableControlPlaneService(repository)
+    require_provenance = _enabled(os.getenv("AIOS_REQUIRE_RUN_PROVENANCE", "0"))
+    provenance_writer = build_provenance_writer_from_env(
+        state_dir=state_dir, required=require_provenance
+    )
+    tracker = ExecutionTracker(
+        state_dir / "executions",
+        provenance_writer=provenance_writer,
+        require_provenance=require_provenance,
+    )
+    hermes = HermesAdapter(store=SQLiteHermesStore(state_dir / "hermes.sqlite3"))
+
+    openclaw_url = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL", "").strip()
+    signing_file = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE", "").strip()
+    signing_key_id = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID", "openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519"
+    ).strip()
+    openclaw = None
+    resolver = None
+    if openclaw_url and signing_file:
+        resolver = FileCommandSignerResolver(
+            signing_file,
+            configured_key_id=signing_key_id,
+        )
+        transport = HTTPRuntimeTransport(
+            openclaw_url,
+            credential_ref=os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF") or None,
+        )
+        openclaw = OpenClawAdapter(
+            transport,
+            resolver,
+            callback_sink=AuditCallbackSink(ControlPlaneEventPublisher(service)),
+        )
+
+    gateway = GatewayApplication(service)
+    orchestrator = ExecutionOrchestrator(
+        service,
+        openclaw=openclaw,
+        hermes=hermes,
+        openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver,
+        openclaw_key_id=signing_key_id,
+        provenance_writer=provenance_writer,
+        require_provenance=require_provenance,
+        dispatch_repository=dispatch_repository,
+    )
+    return CandidateApplication(
+        gateway,
+        orchestrator,
+        tracker,
+        hermes,
+        openclaw,
+        hermes_lifecycle_api_enabled=_enabled(
+            os.getenv("AIOS_HERMES_LIFECYCLE_API_ENABLED", "0")
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    host = os.getenv("AIOS_V2_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_PORT", "18920"))
+    server = CandidateHTTPServer((host, port), build_application())
+    print(f"AIOS V2 candidate listening on {host}:{port}")
+    server.serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/console.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""Dependency-free AIOS V2 web console assets.
+
+Authentication and tenant identity are injected by the trusted reverse proxy.
+The browser never selects a tenant and never calls OpenClaw or Hermes directly.
+"""
+
+CONSOLE_HTML = r'''<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
+  <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
+  <title>AIOS V2 Console</title>
+  <style>
+    :root{font-family:Inter,ui-sans-serif,system-ui,sans-serif;color:#152033;background:#f4f7fb}
+    *{box-sizing:border-box} body{margin:0} header{background:#111827;color:white;padding:18px 24px;display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center}
+    header h1{font-size:20px;margin:0} header span{font-size:12px;color:#cbd5e1}
+    main{padding:24px;max-width:1440px;margin:auto}.notice{background:#fff7ed;border:1px solid #fed7aa;padding:12px 14px;border-radius:10px;margin-bottom:18px;font-size:13px}
+    .cards{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(190px,1fr));gap:14px;margin-bottom:20px}.card,.panel{background:white;border:1px solid #e5e7eb;border-radius:12px;box-shadow:0 1px 2px rgba(0,0,0,.04)}
+    .card{padding:16px}.card b{display:block;font-size:28px;margin-top:8px}.card small{color:#64748b}.grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(420px,1fr));gap:16px}.panel{padding:16px;overflow:auto}.panel h2{font-size:16px;margin:0 0 12px}
+    table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;font-size:12px}th,td{text-align:left;border-bottom:1px solid #edf0f4;padding:8px;vertical-align:top}th{color:#64748b;font-weight:600}.state{font-weight:700}.ok{color:#047857}.bad{color:#b91c1c}.muted{color:#64748b}
+    button{border:0;border-radius:8px;padding:9px 13px;background:#2563eb;color:white;cursor:pointer}button:disabled{opacity:.5}.toolbar{display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;margin-bottom:16px}.error{color:#b91c1c;white-space:pre-wrap}
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+<header><h1>AIOS V2 Control Plane</h1><span id="updated">Not loaded</span></header>
+<main>
+  <div class="notice">Read-only candidate console. Identity and tenant context must be injected by the trusted reverse proxy. The console never calls OpenClaw or Hermes directly.</div>
+  <div class="toolbar"><button id="refresh">Refresh</button><span id="error" class="error"></span></div>
+  <section class="cards">
+    <div class="card"><small>Agents</small><b id="agentCount">—</b></div>
+    <div class="card"><small>Tasks</small><b id="taskCount">—</b></div>
+    <div class="card"><small>Audit events</small><b id="auditCount">—</b></div>
+    <div class="card"><small>Executions</small><b id="executionCount">—</b></div>
+  </section>
+  <section class="grid">
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Runtime health</h2><div id="runtime"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Tasks</h2><div id="tasks"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Agents</h2><div id="agents"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Execution evidence</h2><div id="executions"></div></div>
+    <div class="panel"><h2>Audit</h2><div id="audit"></div></div>
+  </section>
+</main>
+<script>
+const esc=v=>String(v??'').replace(/[&<>"']/g,c=>({'&':'&amp;','<':'&lt;','>':'&gt;','"':'&quot;',"'":'&#39;'}[c]));
+const table=(cols,rows)=>`<table><thead><tr>${cols.map(c=>`<th>${esc(c[0])}</th>`).join('')}</tr></thead><tbody>${rows.map(r=>`<tr>${cols.map(c=>`<td>${esc(c[1](r))}</td>`).join('')}</tr>`).join('')}</tbody></table>`;
+async function api(path){const r=await fetch(path,{credentials:'same-origin',headers:{'Accept':'application/json'}});const data=await r.json().catch(()=>({}));if(!r.ok)throw new Error(`${r.status} ${data.message||data.error||path}`);return data}
+async function refresh(){
+  const btn=document.getElementById('refresh');btn.disabled=true;document.getElementById('error').textContent='';
+  try{
+    const [agents,tasks,audit,runtime,executions]=await Promise.all([
+      api('/api/v2/agents'),api('/api/v2/tasks'),api('/api/v2/audit'),api('/api/v2/runtime'),api('/api/v2/executions')
+    ]);
+    document.getElementById('agentCount').textContent=agents.agents.length;
+    document.getElementById('taskCount').textContent=tasks.tasks.length;
+    document.getElementById('auditCount').textContent=audit.events.length;
+    document.getElementById('executionCount').textContent=executions.executions.length;
+    document.getElementById('agents').innerHTML=table([['ID',x=>x.agent_id],['Runtime',x=>x.runtime],['Enabled',x=>x.enabled]],agents.agents);
+    document.getElementById('tasks').innerHTML=table([['Task',x=>x.task_id],['Action',x=>x.action],['State',x=>x.state],['Rev',x=>x.revision]],tasks.tasks);
+    document.getElementById('audit').innerHTML=table([['Time',x=>x.created_at],['Action',x=>x.action],['Outcome',x=>x.outcome],['Resource',x=>x.resource_id]],audit.events.slice(-100).reverse());
+    document.getElementById('executions').innerHTML=table([['Executor',x=>x.executor],['Task',x=>x.task_id],['Status',x=>x.status],['Progress',x=>`${x.progress_completed}/${x.progress_total}`],['Commit',x=>x.last_commit||'']],executions.executions);
+    document.getElementById('runtime').innerHTML=table([['Runtime',x=>x.name],['Status',x=>x.status],['Details',x=>JSON.stringify(x.details)]],runtime.runtimes);
+    document.getElementById('updated').textContent=`Updated ${new Date().toLocaleString()}`;
+  }catch(e){document.getElementById('error').textContent=e.message||String(e)}finally{btn.disabled=false}
+}
+document.getElementById('refresh').addEventListener('click',refresh);refresh();setInterval(refresh,30000);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>'''

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/control_plane.py

@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
+"""Tenant-isolated AIOS V2 control-plane domain service.
+
+This module deliberately contains no OpenClaw or Hermes implementation details.
+It owns authoritative tenant, agent, task-lifecycle, idempotency and audit state.
+Runtime adapters consume approved tasks through a separate boundary.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import hashlib
+import json
+import threading
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable, Mapping
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _new_id(prefix: str) -> str:
+    return f"{prefix}_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+
+
+def _canonical_digest(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    encoded = json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+        default=str,
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
+
+
+class ControlPlaneError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base error returned by the control-plane domain."""
+
+
+class Unauthorized(ControlPlaneError):
+    """The caller is not authenticated or lacks the required role."""
+
+
+class TenantIsolationError(ControlPlaneError):
+    """A request attempted to cross a tenant boundary."""
+
+
+class NotFound(ControlPlaneError):
+    """A tenant-scoped resource does not exist or is not visible."""
+
+
+class InvalidTransition(ControlPlaneError):
+    """A task state transition violates the lifecycle contract."""
+
+
+class IdempotencyConflict(ControlPlaneError):
+    """An idempotency key was reused for a different command."""
+
+
+class RevisionConflict(ControlPlaneError):
+    """Optimistic task revision does not match current state."""
+
+
+class PolicyDenied(ControlPlaneError):
+    """The policy gate denied a control-plane operation."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RequestContext:
+    """Authenticated request identity propagated across all AIOS layers."""
+
+    tenant_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    roles: frozenset[str] = field(default_factory=frozenset)
+    session_id: str | None = None
+    policy_version: str = "v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("tenant_id", "principal_id", "trace_id"):
+            if not str(getattr(self, name, "")).strip():
+                raise ValueError(f"{name} is required")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        roles: Iterable[str] = (),
+        trace_id: str | None = None,
+        session_id: str | None = None,
+        policy_version: str = "v1",
+    ) -> "RequestContext":
+        return cls(
+            tenant_id=tenant_id.strip(),
+            principal_id=principal_id.strip(),
+            trace_id=trace_id or _new_id("trace"),
+            roles=frozenset(str(role).strip() for role in roles if str(role).strip()),
+            session_id=session_id,
+            policy_version=policy_version,
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TenantRecord:
+    tenant_id: str
+    display_name: str
+    status: str = "active"
+    metadata: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AgentRecord:
+    agent_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    display_name: str
+    runtime: str
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+    enabled: bool = True
+    metadata: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+class TaskState(str, Enum):
+    CREATED = "CREATED"
+    APPROVED = "APPROVED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+
+
+TERMINAL_TASK_STATES = frozenset(
+    {TaskState.COMPLETED, TaskState.FAILED, TaskState.CANCELLED}
+)
+
+ALLOWED_TASK_TRANSITIONS: Mapping[TaskState, frozenset[TaskState]] = {
+    TaskState.CREATED: frozenset({TaskState.APPROVED, TaskState.CANCELLED}),
+    TaskState.APPROVED: frozenset({TaskState.RUNNING, TaskState.CANCELLED}),
+    TaskState.RUNNING: frozenset(
+        {TaskState.COMPLETED, TaskState.FAILED, TaskState.CANCELLED}
+    ),
+    TaskState.COMPLETED: frozenset(),
+    TaskState.FAILED: frozenset(),
+    TaskState.CANCELLED: frozenset(),
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    action: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    state: TaskState = TaskState.CREATED
+    revision: int = 1
+    idempotency_key: str | None = None
+    request_digest: str = ""
+    result: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None
+    created_by: str = ""
+    approved_by: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+    updated_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuditEvent:
+    event_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    action: str
+    resource_type: str
+    resource_id: str
+    outcome: str
+    policy_version: str
+    details: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    created_at: str = field(default_factory=_utc_now)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    reason: str
+    policy_version: str
+
+
+PolicyEvaluator = Callable[[RequestContext, str, Mapping[str, Any]], PolicyDecision]
+
+
+class InMemoryControlPlaneStore:
+    """Thread-safe reference store used by tests and the first gateway slice.
+
+    Production backends must preserve the same tenant-scoped interface and add
+    database row-level security, migrations, backup and HA evidence.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.tenants: dict[str, TenantRecord] = {}
+        self.agents: dict[str, AgentRecord] = {}
+        self.tasks: dict[str, TaskRecord] = {}
+        self.idempotency: dict[tuple[str, str], tuple[str, str]] = {}
+        self.audit_events: list[AuditEvent] = []
+
+
+class ControlPlaneService:
+    """Authoritative tenant, agent and task lifecycle service."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: InMemoryControlPlaneStore | None = None,
+        *,
+        policy_evaluator: PolicyEvaluator | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.store = store or InMemoryControlPlaneStore()
+        self.policy_evaluator = policy_evaluator or self._default_policy
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _default_policy(
+        context: RequestContext,
+        action: str,
+        resource: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> PolicyDecision:
+        del resource
+        role_requirements = {
+            "tenant.register": {"platform_admin"},
+            "tenant.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+            "agent.register": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "agent.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.create": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.read": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.approve": {"tenant_admin", "approver", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.start": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.complete": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.fail": {"runtime", "operator", "platform_admin"},
+            "task.cancel": {"tenant_admin", "operator", "approver", "platform_admin"},
+            "audit.read": {"tenant_admin", "auditor", "platform_admin"},
+        }
+        required = role_requirements.get(action, {"platform_admin"})
+        allowed = bool(context.roles.intersection(required))
+        return PolicyDecision(
+            allowed=allowed,
+            reason="role_allowed" if allowed else "required_role_missing",
+            policy_version=context.policy_version,
+        )
+
+    def _require_context(self, context: RequestContext) -> None:
+        if not context.principal_id or not context.tenant_id or not context.trace_id:
+            raise Unauthorized("authenticated tenant context is required")
+
+    def _authorize(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        action: str,
+        resource: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> PolicyDecision:
+        self._require_context(context)
+        decision = self.policy_evaluator(context, action, resource)
+        if not decision.allowed:
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action=action,
+                resource_type=str(resource.get("resource_type", "policy")),
+                resource_id=str(resource.get("resource_id", "unknown")),
+                outcome="denied",
+                details={"reason": decision.reason},
+            )
+            raise PolicyDenied(f"{action} denied: {decision.reason}")
+        return decision
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_same_tenant(context: RequestContext, tenant_id: str) -> None:
+        if context.tenant_id != tenant_id and "platform_admin" not in context.roles:
+            raise TenantIsolationError("cross-tenant access denied")
+
+    def _audit(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        action: str,
+        resource_type: str,
+        resource_id: str,
+        outcome: str,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> AuditEvent:
+        event = AuditEvent(
+            event_id=_new_id("audit"),
+            tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+            principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+            action=action,
+            resource_type=resource_type,
+            resource_id=resource_id,
+            outcome=outcome,
+            policy_version=context.policy_version,
+            details=copy.deepcopy(dict(details or {})),
+        )
+        self.store.audit_events.append(event)
+        return event
+
+    def register_tenant(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        display_name: str,
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> TenantRecord:
+        tenant_id = tenant_id.strip()
+        if not tenant_id or not display_name.strip():
+            raise ValueError("tenant_id and display_name are required")
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "tenant.register",
+            {"resource_type": "tenant", "resource_id": tenant_id},
+        )
+        self._assert_same_tenant(context, tenant_id)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            if tenant_id in self.store.tenants:
+                raise ControlPlaneError(f"tenant already exists: {tenant_id}")
+            tenant = TenantRecord(
+                tenant_id=tenant_id,
+                display_name=display_name.strip(),
+                metadata=copy.deepcopy(dict(metadata or {})),
+            )
+            self.store.tenants[tenant_id] = tenant
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action="tenant.register",
+                resource_type="tenant",
+                resource_id=tenant_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+            )
+            return tenant
+
+    def get_tenant(self, context: RequestContext, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> TenantRecord:
+        tenant_id = tenant_id or context.tenant_id
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "tenant.read",
+            {"resource_type": "tenant", "resource_id": tenant_id},
+        )
+        self._assert_same_tenant(context, tenant_id)
+        with self.store.lock:
+            tenant = self.store.tenants.get(tenant_id)
+            if tenant is None:
+                raise NotFound("tenant not found")
+            return tenant
+
+    def register_agent(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        agent_id: str,
+        display_name: str,
+        runtime: str,
+        capabilities: Iterable[str] = (),
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> AgentRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "agent.register",
+            {"resource_type": "agent", "resource_id": agent_id},
+        )
+        tenant = self.get_tenant(context)
+        if tenant.status != "active":
+            raise ControlPlaneError("tenant is not active")
+        normalized_capabilities = tuple(
+            sorted({str(item).strip() for item in capabilities if str(item).strip()})
+        )
+        if not agent_id.strip() or not display_name.strip() or not runtime.strip():
+            raise ValueError("agent_id, display_name and runtime are required")
+        with self.store.lock:
+            existing = self.store.agents.get(agent_id)
+            if existing is not None and existing.tenant_id != context.tenant_id:
+                raise TenantIsolationError("agent id belongs to another tenant")
+            if existing is not None:
+                raise ControlPlaneError(f"agent already exists: {agent_id}")
+            agent = AgentRecord(
+                agent_id=agent_id.strip(),
+                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+                display_name=display_name.strip(),
+                runtime=runtime.strip(),
+                capabilities=normalized_capabilities,
+                metadata=copy.deepcopy(dict(metadata or {})),
+            )
+            self.store.agents[agent.agent_id] = agent
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action="agent.register",
+                resource_type="agent",
+                resource_id=agent.agent_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+                details={"runtime": agent.runtime},
+            )
+            return agent
+
+    def get_agent(self, context: RequestContext, agent_id: str) -> AgentRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "agent.read",
+            {"resource_type": "agent", "resource_id": agent_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            agent = self.store.agents.get(agent_id)
+            if agent is None:
+                raise NotFound("agent not found")
+            self._assert_same_tenant(context, agent.tenant_id)
+            return agent
+
+    def list_agents(self, context: RequestContext) -> list[AgentRecord]:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "agent.read",
+            {"resource_type": "agent_collection", "resource_id": context.tenant_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return [
+                agent
+                for agent in self.store.agents.values()
+                if agent.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
+            ]
+
+    def create_task(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        agent_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        idempotency_key: str | None = None,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "task.create",
+            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": idempotency_key or "new"},
+        )
+        agent = self.get_agent(context, agent_id)
+        if not agent.enabled:
+            raise ControlPlaneError("agent is disabled")
+        if action not in agent.capabilities and "*" not in agent.capabilities:
+            raise PolicyDenied(f"agent does not advertise capability: {action}")
+        normalized_payload = copy.deepcopy(dict(payload or {}))
+        request_digest = _canonical_digest(
+            {"agent_id": agent_id, "action": action, "payload": normalized_payload}
+        )
+        normalized_key = idempotency_key.strip() if idempotency_key else None
+        with self.store.lock:
+            if normalized_key:
+                idempotency_ref = (context.tenant_id, normalized_key)
+                existing = self.store.idempotency.get(idempotency_ref)
+                if existing is not None:
+                    existing_task_id, existing_digest = existing
+                    if existing_digest != request_digest:
+                        raise IdempotencyConflict(
+                            "idempotency key was reused with a different request"
+                        )
+                    return self.store.tasks[existing_task_id]
+            task = TaskRecord(
+                task_id=_new_id("task"),
+                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+                agent_id=agent_id,
+                action=action,
+                payload=normalized_payload,
+                idempotency_key=normalized_key,
+                request_digest=request_digest,
+                created_by=context.principal_id,
+            )
+            self.store.tasks[task.task_id] = task
+            if normalized_key:
+                self.store.idempotency[(context.tenant_id, normalized_key)] = (
+                    task.task_id,
+                    request_digest,
+                )
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action="task.create",
+                resource_type="task",
+                resource_id=task.task_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+                details={"agent_id": agent_id, "action": action},
+            )
+            return task
+
+    def get_task(self, context: RequestContext, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "task.read",
+            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": task_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            task = self.store.tasks.get(task_id)
+            if task is None:
+                raise NotFound("task not found")
+            self._assert_same_tenant(context, task.tenant_id)
+            return task
+
+    def list_tasks(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        states: Iterable[TaskState | str] | None = None,
+    ) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "task.read",
+            {"resource_type": "task_collection", "resource_id": context.tenant_id},
+        )
+        state_filter = (
+            {TaskState(item) for item in states}
+            if states is not None
+            else None
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return [
+                task
+                for task in self.store.tasks.values()
+                if task.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
+                and (state_filter is None or task.state in state_filter)
+            ]
+
+    def transition_task(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        target_state: TaskState | str,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+        result: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        error: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        target = TaskState(target_state)
+        action_name = {
+            TaskState.APPROVED: "task.approve",
+            TaskState.RUNNING: "task.start",
+            TaskState.COMPLETED: "task.complete",
+            TaskState.FAILED: "task.fail",
+            TaskState.CANCELLED: "task.cancel",
+        }.get(target)
+        if action_name is None:
+            raise InvalidTransition(f"cannot transition to {target.value}")
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            action_name,
+            {"resource_type": "task", "resource_id": task_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            current = self.store.tasks.get(task_id)
+            if current is None:
+                raise NotFound("task not found")
+            self._assert_same_tenant(context, current.tenant_id)
+            if expected_revision is not None and current.revision != expected_revision:
+                raise RevisionConflict(
+                    f"expected revision {expected_revision}, current {current.revision}"
+                )
+            if target not in ALLOWED_TASK_TRANSITIONS[current.state]:
+                raise InvalidTransition(
+                    f"invalid transition {current.state.value} -> {target.value}"
+                )
+            if target == TaskState.COMPLETED and result is None:
+                raise ValueError("completed task requires result")
+            if target == TaskState.FAILED and error is None:
+                raise ValueError("failed task requires error")
+            updated = TaskRecord(
+                task_id=current.task_id,
+                tenant_id=current.tenant_id,
+                agent_id=current.agent_id,
+                action=current.action,
+                payload=current.payload,
+                state=target,
+                revision=current.revision + 1,
+                idempotency_key=current.idempotency_key,
+                request_digest=current.request_digest,
+                result=copy.deepcopy(dict(result)) if result is not None else current.result,
+                error=copy.deepcopy(dict(error)) if error is not None else current.error,
+                created_by=current.created_by,
+                approved_by=(
+                    context.principal_id
+                    if target == TaskState.APPROVED
+                    else current.approved_by
+                ),
+                created_at=current.created_at,
+                updated_at=_utc_now(),
+            )
+            self.store.tasks[task_id] = updated
+            self._audit(
+                context,
+                action=action_name,
+                resource_type="task",
+                resource_id=task_id,
+                outcome="allowed",
+                details={
+                    "from": current.state.value,
+                    "to": target.value,
+                    "revision": updated.revision,
+                },
+            )
+            return updated
+
+    def list_audit_events(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        resource_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> list[AuditEvent]:
+        self._authorize(
+            context,
+            "audit.read",
+            {"resource_type": "audit", "resource_id": resource_id or context.tenant_id},
+        )
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return [
+                event
+                for event in self.store.audit_events
+                if event.tenant_id == context.tenant_id
+                and (resource_id is None or event.resource_id == resource_id)
+            ]

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/dispatch_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+"""AIOS V2 持久化 Dispatch 记录。
+
+Dispatch 是 AIOS Task 与 Runtime command/job 之间的唯一可信绑定。所有结果回写
+必须匹配 tenant/task/trace/runtime_execution/provenance/run/principal。
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+class DispatchState(str, Enum):
+    PREPARED = "PREPARED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+
+
+TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES = frozenset(
+    {DispatchState.COMPLETED, DispatchState.FAILED, DispatchState.CANCELLED}
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DispatchRecord:
+    dispatch_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    runtime: str
+    runtime_execution_id: str
+    trace_id: str
+    provenance_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    state: DispatchState = DispatchState.PREPARED
+    expected_worker_id: str | None = None
+    result_digest: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = ""
+    updated_at: str = ""
+    completed_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "dispatch_id",
+            "tenant_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "agent_id",
+            "principal_id",
+            "runtime",
+            "runtime_execution_id",
+            "trace_id",
+            "provenance_id",
+            "run_id",
+            "authorization_id",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "state", DispatchState(self.state))
+        now = utc_now()
+        object.__setattr__(self, "created_at", self.created_at or now)
+        object.__setattr__(self, "updated_at", self.updated_at or now)
+        if self.expected_worker_id is not None:
+            object.__setattr__(
+                self,
+                "expected_worker_id",
+                _required(self.expected_worker_id, "expected_worker_id"),
+            )
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        runtime: str,
+        runtime_execution_id: str,
+        trace_id: str,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+        authorization_id: str,
+    ) -> "DispatchRecord":
+        return cls(
+            dispatch_id=f"dispatch_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            principal_id=principal_id,
+            runtime=runtime,
+            runtime_execution_id=runtime_execution_id,
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+            authorization_id=authorization_id,
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = asdict(self)
+        value["state"] = self.state.value
+        return value
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "DispatchRecord":
+        return cls(**dict(value))
+
+
+class DispatchConflict(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class DispatchNotFound(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class DispatchRepository(Protocol):
+    def create(self, record: DispatchRecord) -> DispatchRecord: ...
+    def get(self, dispatch_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord: ...
+    def get_by_task(self, task_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord | None: ...
+    def get_by_runtime_execution(
+        self, runtime_execution_id: str, *, tenant_id: str
+    ) -> DispatchRecord | None: ...
+    def update(
+        self,
+        dispatch_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        state: DispatchState | str | None = None,
+        expected_worker_id: str | None = None,
+        result_digest: str | None = None,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord: ...
+    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[DispatchRecord]: ...
+
+
+class InMemoryDispatchRepository:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._records: dict[str, DispatchRecord] = {}
+        self._by_task: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {}
+        self._by_runtime: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {}
+
+    def create(self, record: DispatchRecord) -> DispatchRecord:
+        with self._lock:
+            task_ref = (record.tenant_id, record.task_id)
+            runtime_ref = (record.tenant_id, record.runtime_execution_id)
+            if task_ref in self._by_task or runtime_ref in self._by_runtime:
+                existing = self.get_by_task(record.task_id, tenant_id=record.tenant_id)
+                if existing == record:
+                    return record
+                raise DispatchConflict("task or runtime execution already has a dispatch")
+            self._records[record.dispatch_id] = record
+            self._by_task[task_ref] = record.dispatch_id
+            self._by_runtime[runtime_ref] = record.dispatch_id
+            return record
+
+    def get(self, dispatch_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord:
+        with self._lock:
+            record = self._records.get(dispatch_id)
+            if record is None or record.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+                raise DispatchNotFound("dispatch not found")
+            return record
+
+    def get_by_task(self, task_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord | None:
+        with self._lock:
+            dispatch_id = self._by_task.get((tenant_id, task_id))
+            return self._records.get(dispatch_id) if dispatch_id else None
+
+    def get_by_runtime_execution(
+        self, runtime_execution_id: str, *, tenant_id: str
+    ) -> DispatchRecord | None:
+        with self._lock:
+            dispatch_id = self._by_runtime.get((tenant_id, runtime_execution_id))
+            return self._records.get(dispatch_id) if dispatch_id else None
+
+    def update(
+        self,
+        dispatch_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        state: DispatchState | str | None = None,
+        expected_worker_id: str | None = None,
+        result_digest: str | None = None,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord:
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self.get(dispatch_id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
+            target = DispatchState(state) if state is not None else current.state
+            if current.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES and target != current.state:
+                raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch cannot transition")
+            updated = replace(
+                current,
+                state=target,
+                expected_worker_id=(
+                    expected_worker_id
+                    if expected_worker_id is not None
+                    else current.expected_worker_id
+                ),
+                result_digest=result_digest or current.result_digest,
+                updated_at=utc_now(),
+                completed_at=(utc_now() if target in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES else None),
+            )
+            self._records[dispatch_id] = updated
+            return updated
+
+    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[DispatchRecord]:
+        with self._lock:
+            return sorted(
+                [item for item in self._records.values() if item.tenant_id == tenant_id],
+                key=lambda item: (item.created_at, item.dispatch_id),
+            )
+
+
+class SQLiteDispatchRepository:
+    SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS dispatch_records (
+                    dispatch_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    runtime_execution_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, task_id),
+                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, runtime_execution_id)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_dispatch_tenant_state
+                    ON dispatch_records(tenant_id, state, updated_at);
+                """
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(str(self.path), timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _encode(record: DispatchRecord) -> str:
+        return json.dumps(
+            record.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _decode(row: sqlite3.Row) -> DispatchRecord:
+        value = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise RuntimeError("invalid dispatch record")
+        return DispatchRecord.from_dict(value)
+
+    def create(self, record: DispatchRecord) -> DispatchRecord:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO dispatch_records VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                    (
+                        record.dispatch_id,
+                        record.tenant_id,
+                        record.task_id,
+                        record.runtime_execution_id,
+                        self._encode(record),
+                        record.state.value,
+                        record.updated_at,
+                    ),
+                )
+                connection.commit()
+                return record
+            except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+                connection.rollback()
+                existing = self.get_by_task(record.task_id, tenant_id=record.tenant_id)
+                if existing is not None and existing == record:
+                    return existing
+                raise DispatchConflict("task or runtime execution already has a dispatch") from exc
+
+    def get(self, dispatch_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE dispatch_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
+                (_required(dispatch_id, "dispatch_id"), _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id")),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise DispatchNotFound("dispatch not found")
+        return self._decode(row)
+
+    def get_by_task(self, task_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> DispatchRecord | None:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE task_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
+                (_required(task_id, "task_id"), _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id")),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return self._decode(row) if row is not None else None
+
+    def get_by_runtime_execution(
+        self, runtime_execution_id: str, *, tenant_id: str
+    ) -> DispatchRecord | None:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE runtime_execution_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
+                (
+                    _required(runtime_execution_id, "runtime_execution_id"),
+                    _required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),
+                ),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return self._decode(row) if row is not None else None
+
+    def update(
+        self,
+        dispatch_id: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        state: DispatchState | str | None = None,
+        expected_worker_id: str | None = None,
+        result_digest: str | None = None,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord:
+        current = self.get(dispatch_id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
+        target = DispatchState(state) if state is not None else current.state
+        if current.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES and target != current.state:
+            raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch cannot transition")
+        updated = replace(
+            current,
+            state=target,
+            expected_worker_id=(
+                expected_worker_id if expected_worker_id is not None else current.expected_worker_id
+            ),
+            result_digest=result_digest or current.result_digest,
+            updated_at=utc_now(),
+            completed_at=(utc_now() if target in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES else None),
+        )
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE dispatch_records SET payload_json = ?, state = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE dispatch_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?",
+                (
+                    self._encode(updated),
+                    updated.state.value,
+                    updated.updated_at,
+                    updated.dispatch_id,
+                    updated.tenant_id,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+        return updated
+
+    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[DispatchRecord]:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload_json FROM dispatch_records WHERE tenant_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at, dispatch_id",
+                (_required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),),
+            ).fetchall()
+        return [self._decode(row) for row in rows]

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/execution_tracking.py

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+"""AIOS V2 Agent 执行证据。
+
+Evidence 按租户隔离并使用原子 JSON 写入。生产模式下，claim、heartbeat
+和 complete 在落盘前必须通过最小权限 Evidence Grant 授权。
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import threading
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from .provenance import ProvenanceDenied, digest_payload
+
+
+class EvidenceAuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
+    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _safe(value: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return json.loads(json.dumps(dict(value or {}), ensure_ascii=False, default=str))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionEvidence:
+    execution_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    executor: str
+    branch: str
+    status: str = "claimed"
+    progress_completed: int = 0
+    progress_total: int = 1
+    current_step: str = "claim"
+    last_commit: str | None = None
+    test_status: str = "not_run"
+    test_summary: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    result_summary: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    claimed_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    heartbeat_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    completed_at: str | None = None
+    provenance_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    last_authorization_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "execution_id",
+            "tenant_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "agent_id",
+            "executor",
+            "branch",
+            "status",
+            "current_step",
+            "claimed_at",
+            "heartbeat_at",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        if self.progress_completed < 0 or self.progress_total < 1:
+            raise ValueError("invalid progress values")
+        if self.progress_completed > self.progress_total:
+            raise ValueError("progress_completed cannot exceed progress_total")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "test_summary", _safe(self.test_summary))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "result_summary", _safe(self.result_summary))
+        for optional in ("provenance_id", "run_id", "last_authorization_id"):
+            value = getattr(self, optional)
+            object.__setattr__(self, optional, str(value).strip() if value else None)
+
+
+class ExecutionTracker:
+    """每个租户、每次执行持久保存一份证据记录。"""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        root: str | Path,
+        *,
+        provenance_writer: EvidenceAuthorizationWriter | None = None,
+        require_provenance: bool = False,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root).resolve()
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.provenance_writer = provenance_writer
+        self.require_provenance = bool(require_provenance)
+        if self.require_provenance and self.provenance_writer is None:
+            raise ValueError("production evidence tracking requires a provenance writer")
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _component(value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = _required(value, "path component")
+        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
+            raise ValueError("invalid evidence path component")
+        return normalized
+
+    def _path(self, tenant_id: str, execution_id: str) -> Path:
+        tenant = self._component(tenant_id)
+        execution = self._component(execution_id)
+        return self.root / tenant / f"{execution}.json"
+
+    def _authorize(
+        self,
+        evidence: ExecutionEvidence,
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        principal_id: str | None,
+        provenance_id: str | None,
+        run_id: str | None,
+        changes: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> str | None:
+        if not self.require_provenance:
+            return None
+        if self.provenance_writer is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("Run Provenance writer is not configured")
+        effective_provenance = provenance_id or evidence.provenance_id
+        effective_run = run_id or evidence.run_id
+        if not effective_provenance or not effective_run or not principal_id:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "production evidence write requires provenance_id, run_id and principal_id"
+            )
+        request_digest = digest_payload(
+            {
+                "operation": operation,
+                "execution_id": evidence.execution_id,
+                "tenant_id": evidence.tenant_id,
+                "task_id": evidence.task_id,
+                "agent_id": evidence.agent_id,
+                "executor": evidence.executor,
+                "branch": evidence.branch,
+                "changes": dict(changes),
+            }
+        )
+        try:
+            authorization = self.provenance_writer.authorize_evidence_write(
+                provenance_id=effective_provenance,
+                run_id=effective_run,
+                tenant_id=evidence.tenant_id,
+                task_id=evidence.task_id,
+                agent_id=evidence.agent_id,
+                principal_id=principal_id,
+                request_digest=request_digest,
+            )
+        except ProvenanceDenied as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"Run Provenance denied evidence write: {exc}") from exc
+        return authorization.authorization_id
+
+    def claim(
+        self,
+        evidence: ExecutionEvidence,
+        *,
+        principal_id: str | None = None,
+        provenance_id: str | None = None,
+        run_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        path = self._path(evidence.tenant_id, evidence.execution_id)
+        with self._lock:
+            if path.exists():
+                current = self._read(path)
+                if current.task_id != evidence.task_id or current.agent_id != evidence.agent_id:
+                    raise RuntimeError("execution_id already belongs to another task")
+                if self.require_provenance and (
+                    current.provenance_id != (provenance_id or evidence.provenance_id)
+                    or current.run_id != (run_id or evidence.run_id)
+                ):
+                    raise RuntimeError(
+                        "execution_id already belongs to another provenance context"
+                    )
+                return current
+            effective_provenance = provenance_id or evidence.provenance_id
+            effective_run = run_id or evidence.run_id
+            authorization_id = self._authorize(
+                evidence,
+                operation="claim",
+                principal_id=principal_id,
+                provenance_id=effective_provenance,
+                run_id=effective_run,
+                changes={"status": evidence.status, "current_step": evidence.current_step},
+            )
+            persisted = replace(
+                evidence,
+                provenance_id=effective_provenance,
+                run_id=effective_run,
+                last_authorization_id=authorization_id,
+            )
+            self._write(path, persisted)
+            return persisted
+
+    def heartbeat(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        execution_id: str,
+        status: str | None = None,
+        current_step: str | None = None,
+        progress_completed: int | None = None,
+        progress_total: int | None = None,
+        last_commit: str | None = None,
+        principal_id: str | None = None,
+        provenance_id: str | None = None,
+        run_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        path = self._path(tenant_id, execution_id)
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self._read(path)
+            changes = {
+                "status": status or current.status,
+                "current_step": current_step or current.current_step,
+                "progress_completed": (
+                    progress_completed
+                    if progress_completed is not None
+                    else current.progress_completed
+                ),
+                "progress_total": (
+                    progress_total if progress_total is not None else current.progress_total
+                ),
+                "last_commit": last_commit or current.last_commit,
+            }
+            authorization_id = self._authorize(
+                current,
+                operation="heartbeat",
+                principal_id=principal_id,
+                provenance_id=provenance_id,
+                run_id=run_id,
+                changes=changes,
+            )
+            updated = replace(
+                current,
+                **changes,
+                last_authorization_id=authorization_id or current.last_authorization_id,
+                heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self._write(path, updated)
+            return updated
+
+    def complete(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        execution_id: str,
+        status: str,
+        test_status: str,
+        test_summary: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        result_summary: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        last_commit: str | None = None,
+        principal_id: str | None = None,
+        provenance_id: str | None = None,
+        run_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        path = self._path(tenant_id, execution_id)
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self._read(path)
+            changes = {
+                "status": _required(status, "status"),
+                "current_step": "complete",
+                "progress_completed": current.progress_total,
+                "last_commit": last_commit or current.last_commit,
+                "test_status": _required(test_status, "test_status"),
+                "test_summary": _safe(test_summary),
+                "result_summary": _safe(result_summary),
+            }
+            authorization_id = self._authorize(
+                current,
+                operation="complete",
+                principal_id=principal_id,
+                provenance_id=provenance_id,
+                run_id=run_id,
+                changes=changes,
+            )
+            updated = replace(
+                current,
+                **changes,
+                last_authorization_id=authorization_id or current.last_authorization_id,
+                heartbeat_at=utc_now(),
+                completed_at=utc_now(),
+            )
+            self._write(path, updated)
+            return updated
+
+    def get(self, *, tenant_id: str, execution_id: str) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        return self._read(self._path(tenant_id, execution_id))
+
+    def list(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> list[ExecutionEvidence]:
+        tenant_dir = self.root / self._component(tenant_id)
+        if not tenant_dir.exists():
+            return []
+        records = [self._read(path) for path in tenant_dir.glob("*.json")]
+        return sorted(records, key=lambda item: (item.heartbeat_at, item.execution_id), reverse=True)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _read(path: Path) -> ExecutionEvidence:
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+            raise KeyError("execution evidence not found") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise RuntimeError("invalid execution evidence file")
+        return ExecutionEvidence(**dict(value))
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _write(path: Path, evidence: ExecutionEvidence) -> None:
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        temporary = path.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
+        temporary.write_text(
+            json.dumps(asdict(evidence), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
+        os.replace(temporary, path)

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gateway.py

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+"""HTTP/JSON gateway for the AIOS V2 control plane.
+
+The public gateway owns user-facing control operations only. Runtime lifecycle
+transitions are deliberately absent: external callers cannot directly move a
+task to RUNNING, COMPLETED or FAILED. Those transitions are available only
+through the provenance-protected orchestrator and internal reconciliation API.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import urllib.parse
+from enum import Enum
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_hermes import HermesConflict, HermesNotFound
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    ControlPlaneError,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    IdempotencyConflict,
+    InvalidTransition,
+    NotFound,
+    PolicyDenied,
+    RequestContext,
+    RevisionConflict,
+    TaskState,
+    TenantIsolationError,
+    Unauthorized,
+)
+from .dispatch_store import DispatchConflict, DispatchNotFound
+from .orchestrator import OrchestrationError
+from .provenance import ProvenanceDenied, ProvenanceReplay
+
+TENANT_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Tenant-ID"
+PRINCIPAL_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Principal-ID"
+ROLES_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Roles"
+TRACE_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Trace-ID"
+SESSION_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Session-ID"
+POLICY_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Policy-Version"
+AUTHENTICATED_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Authenticated"
+
+_RESOURCE_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,191}$")
+
+
+def _json_value(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if dataclasses.is_dataclass(value):
+        return {
+            field.name: _json_value(getattr(value, field.name))
+            for field in dataclasses.fields(value)
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, Enum):
+        return value.value
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return {str(key): _json_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
+        return [_json_value(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_mapping(value: Any, *, label: str = "JSON body") -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def _require_resource_id(value: Any, *, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not _RESOURCE_ID_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {label}")
+    return normalized
+
+
+class GatewayApplication:
+    """Pure user-facing request router that can be tested without a socket."""
+
+    def __init__(self, service: ControlPlaneService | None = None) -> None:
+        self.service = service or ControlPlaneService()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def context_from_headers(headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext:
+        normalized_headers = {
+            str(key).strip().lower(): value for key, value in headers.items()
+        }
+
+        def header(name: str, default: str = "") -> str:
+            return str(normalized_headers.get(name.lower(), default))
+
+        authenticated = header(AUTHENTICATED_HEADER).strip().lower()
+        if authenticated not in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
+            raise Unauthorized("trusted authentication assertion is required")
+        roles = [
+            role.strip()
+            for role in header(ROLES_HEADER).split(",")
+            if role.strip()
+        ]
+        return RequestContext.create(
+            tenant_id=header(TENANT_HEADER),
+            principal_id=header(PRINCIPAL_HEADER),
+            trace_id=header(TRACE_HEADER).strip() or None,
+            session_id=header(SESSION_HEADER).strip() or None,
+            policy_version=header(POLICY_HEADER, "v1").strip() or "v1",
+            roles=roles,
+        )
+
+    def handle(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        raw_path: str,
+        headers: Mapping[str, str],
+        body: Any = None,
+    ) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw_path)
+        path = parsed.path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+        query = urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=False)
+        method = method.upper()
+
+        if method == "GET" and path in {"/healthz", "/api/v2/health"}:
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "service": "aios-v2-control-plane",
+                "status": "ok",
+                "store": type(self.service.store).__name__,
+            }
+
+        context = self.context_from_headers(headers)
+        payload = _require_mapping(body or {})
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/tenants":
+            tenant = self.service.register_tenant(
+                context,
+                tenant_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("tenant_id"), label="tenant_id"),
+                display_name=str(payload.get("display_name", "")),
+                metadata=_require_mapping(payload.get("metadata", {}), label="metadata"),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"tenant": _json_value(tenant)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/tenants/current":
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"tenant": _json_value(self.service.get_tenant(context))}
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/agents":
+            agent = self.service.register_agent(
+                context,
+                agent_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("agent_id"), label="agent_id"),
+                display_name=str(payload.get("display_name", "")),
+                runtime=str(payload.get("runtime", "")),
+                capabilities=payload.get("capabilities", ()),
+                metadata=_require_mapping(payload.get("metadata", {}), label="metadata"),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"agent": _json_value(agent)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/agents":
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"agents": _json_value(self.service.list_agents(context))}
+
+        agent_match = re.fullmatch(r"/api/v2/agents/([^/]+)", path)
+        if method == "GET" and agent_match:
+            agent_id = _require_resource_id(
+                urllib.parse.unquote(agent_match.group(1)), label="agent_id"
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "agent": _json_value(self.service.get_agent(context, agent_id))
+            }
+
+        if method == "POST" and path == "/api/v2/tasks":
+            task = self.service.create_task(
+                context,
+                agent_id=_require_resource_id(payload.get("agent_id"), label="agent_id"),
+                action=str(payload.get("action", "")).strip(),
+                payload=_require_mapping(payload.get("payload", {}), label="payload"),
+                idempotency_key=(
+                    str(payload["idempotency_key"]).strip()
+                    if payload.get("idempotency_key") is not None
+                    else None
+                ),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.CREATED, {"task": _json_value(task)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/tasks":
+            tasks = self.service.list_tasks(context, states=query.get("state"))
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"tasks": _json_value(tasks)}
+
+        task_match = re.fullmatch(r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)", path)
+        if method == "GET" and task_match:
+            task_id = _require_resource_id(
+                urllib.parse.unquote(task_match.group(1)), label="task_id"
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {
+                "task": _json_value(self.service.get_task(context, task_id))
+            }
+
+        bypass_match = re.fullmatch(
+            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/(start|complete|fail)", path
+        )
+        if method == "POST" and bypass_match:
+            return HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN, {
+                "error": "RuntimeLifecycleBypassDenied",
+                "message": (
+                    "RUNNING, COMPLETED and FAILED transitions are internal; "
+                    "use the provenance-protected dispatch/reconcile flow"
+                ),
+            }
+
+        transition_match = re.fullmatch(
+            r"/api/v2/tasks/([^/]+)/(approve|cancel)", path
+        )
+        if method == "POST" and transition_match:
+            task_id = _require_resource_id(
+                urllib.parse.unquote(transition_match.group(1)), label="task_id"
+            )
+            target = (
+                TaskState.APPROVED
+                if transition_match.group(2) == "approve"
+                else TaskState.CANCELLED
+            )
+            expected_revision = payload.get("expected_revision")
+            task = self.service.transition_task(
+                context,
+                task_id=task_id,
+                target_state=target,
+                expected_revision=(
+                    int(expected_revision) if expected_revision is not None else None
+                ),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"task": _json_value(task)}
+
+        if method == "GET" and path == "/api/v2/audit":
+            resource_id = query.get("resource_id", [None])[0]
+            events = self.service.list_audit_events(
+                context,
+                resource_id=(
+                    _require_resource_id(resource_id, label="resource_id")
+                    if resource_id
+                    else None
+                ),
+            )
+            return HTTPStatus.OK, {"events": _json_value(events)}
+
+        return HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND, {
+            "error": "not_found",
+            "message": "route not found",
+        }
+
+
+_ERROR_STATUS: tuple[tuple[type[BaseException], HTTPStatus], ...] = (
+    (Unauthorized, HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED),
+    (PolicyDenied, HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN),
+    (ProvenanceDenied, HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN),
+    (TenantIsolationError, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
+    (NotFound, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
+    (DispatchNotFound, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
+    (HermesNotFound, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND),
+    (ProvenanceReplay, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (IdempotencyConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (RevisionConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (InvalidTransition, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (DispatchConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (HermesConflict, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (OrchestrationError, HTTPStatus.CONFLICT),
+    (ValueError, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST),
+    (ControlPlaneError, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST),
+)
+
+
+def error_response(exc: BaseException) -> tuple[int, Mapping[str, Any]]:
+    for error_type, status in _ERROR_STATUS:
+        if isinstance(exc, error_type):
+            return status, {"error": error_type.__name__, "message": str(exc)}
+    return HTTPStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, {
+        "error": "InternalServerError",
+        "message": "internal server error",
+    }
+
+
+class GatewayRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "AIOSV2Gateway/1.0"
+    max_body_bytes = 1_048_576
+
+    @property
+    def application(self) -> GatewayApplication:
+        return self.server.application  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+    def _read_body(self) -> Any:
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or "0")
+        if length < 0 or length > self.max_body_bytes:
+            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
+        if length == 0:
+            return {}
+        content_type = self.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0].strip()
+        if content_type != "application/json":
+            raise ValueError("Content-Type must be application/json")
+        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _send_json(self, status: int, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            _json_value(payload), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(int(status))
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _dispatch(self, method: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            body = self._read_body() if method in {"POST", "PUT", "PATCH"} else {}
+            status, payload = self.application.handle(
+                method,
+                self.path,
+                {key: value for key, value in self.headers.items()},
+                body,
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            status, payload = error_response(exc)
+        self._send_json(status, payload)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        self._dispatch("POST")
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
+        super().log_message(format, *args)
+
+
+class GatewayHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    daemon_threads = True
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        server_address: tuple[str, int],
+        application: GatewayApplication,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.application = application
+        super().__init__(server_address, GatewayRequestHandler)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    host = os.getenv("AIOS_V2_GATEWAY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.getenv("AIOS_V2_GATEWAY_PORT", "18920"))
+    server = GatewayHTTPServer((host, port), GatewayApplication())
+    print(f"AIOS V2 control-plane gateway listening on {host}:{port}")
+    server.serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/gitops_status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+"""Sanitized GitOps runtime status for the AIOS Web control plane."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitOpsStatus:
+    available: bool
+    service_status: str
+    workspace_mode: str
+    workspace_branch: str | None
+    workspace_ref: str | None
+    workspace_dirty: bool | None
+    candidate_branch: str
+    release_channel: str
+    release_version: str
+    sync_status: str
+    details: Mapping[str, Any]
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def _run_git(worktree: Path, *args: str) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
+    process = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", str(worktree), *args],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=5,
+    )
+    return process.returncode, process.stdout.strip(), process.stderr.strip()
+
+
+def collect_gitops_status() -> GitOpsStatus:
+    """Return only non-sensitive Git/workspace metadata.
+
+    Remote URLs, environment values, credentials, filesystem contents and
+    command stderr are deliberately excluded from the Web response.
+    """
+
+    candidate_branch = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_CANDIDATE_BRANCH",
+        "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
+    )
+    release_channel = os.getenv("AIOS_RELEASE_CHANNEL", "candidate")
+    release_version = os.getenv("AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION", "V2R1C0-candidate")
+    sync_status = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SYNC_STATUS", "unknown")
+    worktree = Path(
+        os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_WORKTREE",
+            "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller",
+        )
+    )
+
+    if not worktree.is_dir():
+        return GitOpsStatus(
+            available=False,
+            service_status="unknown",
+            workspace_mode="unavailable",
+            workspace_branch=None,
+            workspace_ref=None,
+            workspace_dirty=None,
+            candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
+            release_channel=release_channel,
+            release_version=release_version,
+            sync_status=sync_status,
+            details={"reason": "controller_worktree_unavailable"},
+        )
+
+    inside_code, inside, _ = _run_git(worktree, "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree")
+    if inside_code != 0 or inside != "true":
+        return GitOpsStatus(
+            available=False,
+            service_status="unknown",
+            workspace_mode="invalid",
+            workspace_branch=None,
+            workspace_ref=None,
+            workspace_dirty=None,
+            candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
+            release_channel=release_channel,
+            release_version=release_version,
+            sync_status=sync_status,
+            details={"reason": "controller_worktree_invalid"},
+        )
+
+    branch_code, branch, _ = _run_git(worktree, "branch", "--show-current")
+    ref_code, ref_value, _ = _run_git(worktree, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+    dirty_code, dirty_value, _ = _run_git(worktree, "status", "--porcelain=v1")
+
+    service_status = "unknown"
+    try:
+        process = subprocess.run(
+            ["systemctl", "is-active", "aios-gitops-model-api"],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=3,
+        )
+        service_status = process.stdout.strip() or "inactive"
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        service_status = "unavailable"
+
+    branch_value = branch if branch_code == 0 and branch else None
+    return GitOpsStatus(
+        available=True,
+        service_status=service_status,
+        workspace_mode="branch" if branch_value else "detached",
+        workspace_branch=branch_value,
+        workspace_ref=ref_value if ref_code == 0 else None,
+        workspace_dirty=bool(dirty_value) if dirty_code == 0 else None,
+        candidate_branch=candidate_branch,
+        release_channel=release_channel,
+        release_version=release_version,
+        sync_status=sync_status,
+        details={
+            "controller_clean": dirty_code == 0 and not dirty_value,
+            "controller_detached": branch_code == 0 and not branch,
+        },
+    )

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/orchestrator.py

@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+"""AIOS V2 execution orchestrator.
+
+The orchestrator is the only component allowed to translate an approved AIOS
+Task into an OpenClaw command or Hermes job. Every dispatch is persisted before
+Runtime side effects. Runtime results must bind to the exact dispatch,
+command/job, tenant, task, trace, principal and provenance context.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
+
+from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJob, HermesJobState, HermesResult
+from aios_openclaw import (
+    CommandState,
+    OpenClawAdapter,
+    OpenClawCommand,
+    OpenClawResult,
+    sign_command,
+)
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    AgentRecord,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    RequestContext,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskState,
+)
+from .dispatch_store import (
+    DispatchConflict,
+    DispatchRecord,
+    DispatchRepository,
+    DispatchState,
+    InMemoryDispatchRepository,
+    TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES,
+)
+from .provenance import ProvenanceDenied, digest_payload
+
+
+class RuntimeAuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
+    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+
+
+class OrchestrationError(RuntimeError):
+    """AIOS failed to dispatch or reconcile a runtime execution."""
+
+
+class ExecutionOrchestrator:
+    """Dispatch approved AIOS tasks and strictly reconcile Runtime results."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        control_plane: ControlPlaneService,
+        *,
+        openclaw: OpenClawAdapter | None = None,
+        hermes: HermesAdapter | None = None,
+        openclaw_signing_material_resolver=None,
+        openclaw_key_id: str = "default",
+        default_cell_id: str = "default",
+        default_profile_id: str = "default",
+        provenance_writer: RuntimeAuthorizationWriter | None = None,
+        require_provenance: bool = False,
+        dispatch_repository: DispatchRepository | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.control_plane = control_plane
+        self.openclaw = openclaw
+        self.hermes = hermes
+        self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver = openclaw_signing_material_resolver
+        self.openclaw_key_id = str(openclaw_key_id or "").strip() or "default"
+        self.default_cell_id = default_cell_id
+        self.default_profile_id = default_profile_id
+        self.provenance_writer = provenance_writer
+        self.require_provenance = bool(require_provenance)
+        self.dispatch_repository = dispatch_repository or InMemoryDispatchRepository()
+        if self.require_provenance and self.provenance_writer is None:
+            raise ValueError("production orchestration requires a provenance writer")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _record_provenance(value: str | None, *, required: bool, label: str) -> str:
+        normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+        if required and not normalized:
+            raise OrchestrationError(f"production dispatch requires {label}")
+        return normalized or f"{label}-not-required"
+
+    def _authorize_dispatch(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        task: TaskRecord,
+        agent: AgentRecord,
+        provenance_id: str | None,
+        run_id: str | None,
+        timeout_seconds: float | None,
+    ) -> str:
+        if not self.require_provenance:
+            return "authorization-not-required"
+        if self.provenance_writer is None:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Run Provenance writer is not configured")
+        if not provenance_id or not run_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError(
+                "production dispatch requires provenance_id and run_id"
+            )
+        request_digest = digest_payload(
+            {
+                "operation": "dispatch",
+                "tenant_id": task.tenant_id,
+                "task_id": task.task_id,
+                "agent_id": agent.agent_id,
+                "principal_id": context.principal_id,
+                "runtime": agent.runtime.strip().lower(),
+                "action": task.action,
+                "payload": task.payload,
+                "trace_id": context.trace_id,
+                "timeout_seconds": timeout_seconds,
+                "task_revision": task.revision,
+            }
+        )
+        try:
+            authorization = self.provenance_writer.authorize_runtime_execute(
+                provenance_id=provenance_id,
+                run_id=run_id,
+                tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+                task_id=task.task_id,
+                agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+                principal_id=context.principal_id,
+                request_digest=request_digest,
+            )
+            return authorization.authorization_id
+        except ProvenanceDenied as exc:
+            raise OrchestrationError(f"Run Provenance denied dispatch: {exc}") from exc
+
+    def dispatch(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        timeout_seconds: float | None = None,
+        provenance_id: str | None = None,
+        run_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord:
+        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, task_id)
+        agent = self.control_plane.get_agent(context, task.agent_id)
+        persisted_provenance = self._record_provenance(
+            provenance_id, required=self.require_provenance, label="provenance_id"
+        )
+        persisted_run = self._record_provenance(
+            run_id, required=self.require_provenance, label="run_id"
+        )
+
+        existing = self.dispatch_repository.get_by_task(
+            task.task_id, tenant_id=task.tenant_id
+        )
+        if existing is not None:
+            if (
+                existing.provenance_id != persisted_provenance
+                or existing.run_id != persisted_run
+                or existing.principal_id != context.principal_id
+            ):
+                raise OrchestrationError(
+                    "existing dispatch belongs to another provenance or principal context"
+                )
+            return existing
+
+        if task.state != TaskState.APPROVED:
+            raise OrchestrationError("only APPROVED tasks may be dispatched")
+
+        authorization_id = self._authorize_dispatch(
+            context,
+            task=task,
+            agent=agent,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+            timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
+        )
+        runtime = agent.runtime.strip().lower()
+        prepared: DispatchRecord | None = None
+
+        try:
+            if runtime == "openclaw":
+                command = self._create_openclaw_command(context, task)
+                prepared = self.dispatch_repository.create(
+                    DispatchRecord.create(
+                        tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+                        task_id=task.task_id,
+                        agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+                        principal_id=context.principal_id,
+                        runtime="openclaw",
+                        runtime_execution_id=command.command_id,
+                        trace_id=context.trace_id,
+                        provenance_id=persisted_provenance,
+                        run_id=persisted_run,
+                        authorization_id=authorization_id,
+                    )
+                )
+                self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                    context,
+                    task_id=task.task_id,
+                    target_state=TaskState.RUNNING,
+                    expected_revision=task.revision,
+                )
+                self.dispatch_repository.update(
+                    prepared.dispatch_id,
+                    tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id,
+                    state=DispatchState.RUNNING,
+                )
+                if self.openclaw is None:
+                    raise OrchestrationError("OpenClaw runtime is not configured")
+                result = self.openclaw.execute(
+                    command, timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds
+                )
+                self.reconcile_openclaw(
+                    context,
+                    result,
+                    dispatch_id=prepared.dispatch_id,
+                    provenance_id=persisted_provenance,
+                    run_id=persisted_run,
+                )
+                return self.dispatch_repository.get(
+                    prepared.dispatch_id, tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id
+                )
+
+            if runtime == "hermes":
+                if self.hermes is None:
+                    raise OrchestrationError("Hermes runtime is not configured")
+                job = self._create_hermes_job(context, agent, task)
+                prepared = self.dispatch_repository.create(
+                    DispatchRecord.create(
+                        tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+                        task_id=task.task_id,
+                        agent_id=agent.agent_id,
+                        principal_id=context.principal_id,
+                        runtime="hermes",
+                        runtime_execution_id=job.job_id,
+                        trace_id=context.trace_id,
+                        provenance_id=persisted_provenance,
+                        run_id=persisted_run,
+                        authorization_id=authorization_id,
+                    )
+                )
+                self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                    context,
+                    task_id=task.task_id,
+                    target_state=TaskState.RUNNING,
+                    expected_revision=task.revision,
+                )
+                queued = self.hermes.enqueue(job)
+                return self.dispatch_repository.update(
+                    prepared.dispatch_id,
+                    tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id,
+                    state=DispatchState.QUEUED,
+                    result_digest=digest_payload(
+                        {
+                            "queued_job_id": queued.job_id,
+                            "state": queued.state.value,
+                            "revision": queued.revision,
+                        }
+                    ),
+                )
+
+            raise OrchestrationError(f"unsupported runtime: {agent.runtime}")
+        except Exception as exc:
+            if prepared is not None:
+                try:
+                    self.dispatch_repository.update(
+                        prepared.dispatch_id,
+                        tenant_id=prepared.tenant_id,
+                        state=DispatchState.FAILED,
+                        result_digest=digest_payload(
+                            {
+                                "code": "dispatch_failed",
+                                "error_type": type(exc).__name__,
+                                "message": str(exc),
+                            }
+                        ),
+                    )
+                except Exception:
+                    pass
+            current = self.control_plane.get_task(context, task.task_id)
+            if current.state == TaskState.RUNNING:
+                self.control_plane.transition_task(
+                    context,
+                    task_id=task.task_id,
+                    target_state=TaskState.FAILED,
+                    expected_revision=current.revision,
+                    error={"code": "dispatch_failed", "message": str(exc)},
+                )
+            raise
+
+    def _create_openclaw_command(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        task: TaskRecord,
+    ) -> OpenClawCommand:
+        if self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver is None:
+            raise OrchestrationError("OpenClaw signing material is not configured")
+        key_material = self.openclaw_signing_material_resolver(
+            task.tenant_id,
+            self.openclaw_key_id,
+        )
+        command = OpenClawCommand.create(
+            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+            action=task.action,
+            payload=task.payload,
+            idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id,
+            key_id=self.openclaw_key_id,
+        )
+        return sign_command(command, key_material)
+
+    def _create_hermes_job(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        agent: AgentRecord,
+        task: TaskRecord,
+    ) -> HermesJob:
+        metadata = dict(agent.metadata)
+        return HermesJob.create(
+            tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
+            cell_id=str(metadata.get("cell_id") or self.default_cell_id),
+            profile_id=str(metadata.get("profile_id") or self.default_profile_id),
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            trace_id=context.trace_id,
+            action=task.action,
+            payload=task.payload,
+            idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id,
+            priority=int(metadata.get("priority", 100)),
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _assert_dispatch_context(
+        dispatch: DispatchRecord,
+        *,
+        runtime: str,
+        runtime_execution_id: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        trace_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        expected = {
+            "runtime": runtime,
+            "runtime_execution_id": runtime_execution_id,
+            "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "trace_id": trace_id,
+            "principal_id": principal_id,
+            "provenance_id": provenance_id,
+            "run_id": run_id,
+        }
+        for field_name, expected_value in expected.items():
+            if getattr(dispatch, field_name) != expected_value:
+                raise OrchestrationError(f"dispatch {field_name} mismatch")
+
+    def hermes_lifecycle_context(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        *,
+        dispatch_id: str,
+        job_id: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        trace_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+    ) -> tuple[DispatchRecord, HermesJob]:
+        """Resolve a runtime lifecycle request against its durable dispatch."""
+        dispatch = self.dispatch_repository.get(
+            dispatch_id, tenant_id=context.tenant_id
+        )
+        self._assert_dispatch_context(
+            dispatch,
+            runtime="hermes",
+            runtime_execution_id=job_id,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            trace_id=trace_id,
+            principal_id=principal_id,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        )
+        if context.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError("runtime context tenant_id mismatch")
+        if context.principal_id != principal_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError("runtime context principal_id mismatch")
+        if context.trace_id != trace_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError("runtime context trace_id mismatch")
+        if self.hermes is None:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes runtime is not configured")
+        job = self.hermes.get(job_id, tenant_id=tenant_id)
+        if job.task_id != task_id or job.trace_id != trace_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes job identity mismatch")
+        return dispatch, job
+
+    def bind_hermes_worker(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        job: HermesJob,
+        *,
+        dispatch_id: str,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+    ) -> DispatchRecord:
+        dispatch, current = self.hermes_lifecycle_context(
+            context,
+            dispatch_id=dispatch_id,
+            job_id=job.job_id,
+            tenant_id=job.tenant_id,
+            task_id=job.task_id,
+            trace_id=job.trace_id,
+            principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        )
+        if current.assigned_worker_id != worker_id:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes worker does not own claimed job")
+        return self.dispatch_repository.update(
+            dispatch.dispatch_id,
+            tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
+            expected_worker_id=worker_id,
+        )
+
+    def reconcile_openclaw(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        result: OpenClawResult,
+        *,
+        dispatch_id: str,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        dispatch = self.dispatch_repository.get(
+            dispatch_id, tenant_id=context.tenant_id
+        )
+        self._assert_dispatch_context(
+            dispatch,
+            runtime="openclaw",
+            runtime_execution_id=result.command_id,
+            tenant_id=result.tenant_id,
+            task_id=result.task_id,
+            trace_id=result.trace_id,
+            principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        )
+        result_digest = digest_payload(
+            {
+                "command_id": result.command_id,
+                "state": result.state.value,
+                "output": result.output,
+                "error": result.error,
+                "runtime_id": result.runtime_id,
+                "attempts": result.attempts,
+                "finished_at": result.finished_at,
+            }
+        )
+        if dispatch.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES:
+            if dispatch.result_digest != result_digest:
+                raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch received a different result")
+            return self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
+
+        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
+        if task.state != TaskState.RUNNING:
+            raise OrchestrationError("task is not RUNNING for active dispatch")
+        if result.state == CommandState.COMPLETED:
+            target = TaskState.COMPLETED
+            values = {"result": result.output or {}}
+            dispatch_state = DispatchState.COMPLETED
+        elif result.state in {
+            CommandState.FAILED,
+            CommandState.TIMED_OUT,
+            CommandState.REJECTED,
+        }:
+            target = TaskState.FAILED
+            values = {
+                "error": result.error or {"code": result.state.value.lower()}
+            }
+            dispatch_state = DispatchState.FAILED
+        elif result.state == CommandState.CANCELLED:
+            target = TaskState.CANCELLED
+            values = {}
+            dispatch_state = DispatchState.CANCELLED
+        else:
+            self.dispatch_repository.update(
+                dispatch.dispatch_id,
+                tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
+                state=DispatchState.RUNNING,
+                result_digest=result_digest,
+            )
+            return task
+
+        updated_task = self.control_plane.transition_task(
+            context,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            target_state=target,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+            **values,
+        )
+        self.dispatch_repository.update(
+            dispatch.dispatch_id,
+            tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
+            state=dispatch_state,
+            result_digest=result_digest,
+        )
+        return updated_task
+
+    def reconcile_hermes(
+        self,
+        context: RequestContext,
+        result: HermesResult,
+        *,
+        dispatch_id: str,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
+        dispatch = self.dispatch_repository.get(
+            dispatch_id, tenant_id=context.tenant_id
+        )
+        self._assert_dispatch_context(
+            dispatch,
+            runtime="hermes",
+            runtime_execution_id=result.job_id,
+            tenant_id=result.tenant_id,
+            task_id=result.task_id,
+            trace_id=result.trace_id,
+            principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        )
+        if self.hermes is None:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes runtime is not configured")
+        job = self.hermes.get(result.job_id, tenant_id=result.tenant_id)
+        if result.state in {HermesJobState.COMPLETED, HermesJobState.FAILED}:
+            if not result.worker_id:
+                raise OrchestrationError("terminal Hermes result requires worker_id")
+            if job.assigned_worker_id != result.worker_id:
+                raise OrchestrationError("Hermes result worker does not own job lease")
+            if (
+                dispatch.expected_worker_id is not None
+                and dispatch.expected_worker_id != result.worker_id
+            ):
+                raise OrchestrationError("Hermes result worker mismatch")
+        result_digest = digest_payload(
+            {
+                "job_id": result.job_id,
+                "worker_id": result.worker_id,
+                "state": result.state.value,
+                "output": result.output,
+                "error": result.error,
+                "finished_at": result.finished_at,
+            }
+        )
+        if dispatch.state in TERMINAL_DISPATCH_STATES:
+            if dispatch.result_digest != result_digest:
+                raise DispatchConflict("terminal dispatch received a different result")
+            return self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
+
+        task = self.control_plane.get_task(context, dispatch.task_id)
+        if task.state != TaskState.RUNNING:
+            raise OrchestrationError("task is not RUNNING for active dispatch")
+        if result.state == HermesJobState.COMPLETED:
+            target = TaskState.COMPLETED
+            values = {"result": result.output or {}}
+            dispatch_state = DispatchState.COMPLETED
+        elif result.state == HermesJobState.FAILED:
+            target = TaskState.FAILED
+            values = {"error": result.error or {"code": "hermes_failed"}}
+            dispatch_state = DispatchState.FAILED
+        elif result.state == HermesJobState.CANCELLED:
+            target = TaskState.CANCELLED
+            values = {}
+            dispatch_state = DispatchState.CANCELLED
+        else:
+            raise OrchestrationError("Hermes reconcile only accepts terminal results")
+
+        updated_task = self.control_plane.transition_task(
+            context,
+            task_id=task.task_id,
+            target_state=target,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+            **values,
+        )
+        self.dispatch_repository.update(
+            dispatch.dispatch_id,
+            tenant_id=dispatch.tenant_id,
+            state=dispatch_state,
+            expected_worker_id=result.worker_id,
+            result_digest=result_digest,
+        )
+        return updated_task
+
+    def dispatch_snapshot(self, *, tenant_id: str) -> Mapping[str, DispatchRecord]:
+        return {
+            item.task_id: item
+            for item in self.dispatch_repository.list(tenant_id=tenant_id)
+        }

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/persistence.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Durable single-process persistence for the AIOS V2 control plane.
+
+The candidate uses an atomic SQLite snapshot so a gateway restart does not lose
+tenants, agents, task state, idempotency records, or audit events.  The domain
+service remains storage-agnostic; a later HA backend can replace this module
+without changing API or runtime-adapter contracts.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from dataclasses import asdict
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from .control_plane import (
+    AgentRecord,
+    AuditEvent,
+    ControlPlaneService,
+    InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskState,
+    TenantRecord,
+)
+
+
+class SQLiteSnapshotRepository:
+    """Store one versioned control-plane snapshot in SQLite."""
+
+    SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        return connection
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS control_plane_snapshot (
+                    singleton_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (singleton_id = 1),
+                    schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+                )
+                """
+            )
+
+    def load(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT schema_version, payload_json FROM control_plane_snapshot WHERE singleton_id = 1"
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return None
+        schema_version, payload_json = row
+        if int(schema_version) != self.SCHEMA_VERSION:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"unsupported control-plane snapshot version: {schema_version}"
+            )
+        decoded = json.loads(str(payload_json))
+        if not isinstance(decoded, dict):
+            raise RuntimeError("invalid control-plane snapshot")
+        return decoded
+
+    def save(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            payload,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+            default=str,
+        )
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO control_plane_snapshot (
+                    singleton_id, schema_version, payload_json, updated_at
+                ) VALUES (1, ?, ?, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP)
+                ON CONFLICT(singleton_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    schema_version = excluded.schema_version,
+                    payload_json = excluded.payload_json,
+                    updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+                """,
+                (self.SCHEMA_VERSION, encoded),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+
+
+class DurableControlPlaneService(ControlPlaneService):
+    """Control-plane service that persists after every successful mutation."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        repository: SQLiteSnapshotRepository,
+        *,
+        policy_evaluator=None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.repository = repository
+        store = InMemoryControlPlaneStore()
+        self._restore(store, repository.load())
+        super().__init__(store, policy_evaluator=policy_evaluator)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _restore(
+        store: InMemoryControlPlaneStore,
+        snapshot: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not snapshot:
+            return
+        for item in snapshot.get("tenants", []):
+            record = TenantRecord(**item)
+            store.tenants[record.tenant_id] = record
+        for item in snapshot.get("agents", []):
+            normalized = dict(item)
+            normalized["capabilities"] = tuple(normalized.get("capabilities", ()))
+            record = AgentRecord(**normalized)
+            store.agents[record.agent_id] = record
+        for item in snapshot.get("tasks", []):
+            normalized = dict(item)
+            normalized["state"] = TaskState(normalized["state"])
+            record = TaskRecord(**normalized)
+            store.tasks[record.task_id] = record
+        store.audit_events.extend(AuditEvent(**item) for item in snapshot.get("audit", []))
+        for item in snapshot.get("idempotency", []):
+            store.idempotency[(item["tenant_id"], item["key"])] = (
+                item["task_id"],
+                item["digest"],
+            )
+
+    def _snapshot(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            return {
+                "schema_version": self.repository.SCHEMA_VERSION,
+                "tenants": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.tenants.values()],
+                "agents": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.agents.values()],
+                "tasks": [
+                    {**asdict(item), "state": item.state.value}
+                    for item in self.store.tasks.values()
+                ],
+                "audit": [asdict(item) for item in self.store.audit_events],
+                "idempotency": [
+                    {
+                        "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+                        "key": key,
+                        "task_id": task_id,
+                        "digest": digest,
+                    }
+                    for (tenant_id, key), (task_id, digest)
+                    in self.store.idempotency.items()
+                ],
+            }
+
+    def _mutate(self, operation: Callable[[], Any]) -> Any:
+        with self.store.lock:
+            result = operation()
+            self.repository.save(self._snapshot())
+            return result
+
+    def register_tenant(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).register_tenant(*args, **kwargs))
+
+    def register_agent(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).register_agent(*args, **kwargs))
+
+    def create_task(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).create_task(*args, **kwargs))
+
+    def transition_task(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return self._mutate(lambda: super(DurableControlPlaneService, self).transition_task(*args, **kwargs))

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/provenance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,831 @@
+"""AIOS V2 可信 Run Provenance 签发、持久化与受控写入。
+
+生产策略要求 Provenance 同时覆盖七类路径：代码变更、Git 操作、部署、
+Runtime 执行、Evidence 写入、回滚和审计。任何缺失、篡改、过期、撤销、
+重放或上下文不匹配都默认拒绝。
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import threading
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+PROVENANCE_VERSION = "aios.v2.run-provenance.v1"
+PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION = "aios.v2.production.v1"
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def parse_timestamp(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError("timestamp is required")
+    if normalized.endswith("Z"):
+        normalized = normalized[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("timestamp must include timezone")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def required(value: str, label: str) -> str:
+    normalized = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not normalized:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label} is required")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def canonical_json_bytes(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        dict(value),
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+        default=str,
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def digest_payload(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _validate_digest(value: str) -> str:
+    normalized = required(value, "request_digest").lower()
+    if len(normalized) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in normalized):
+        raise ValueError("request_digest must be a SHA-256 hexadecimal digest")
+    return normalized
+
+
+class ExecutionPath(str, Enum):
+    CODE_CHANGE = "code_change"
+    GIT_OPERATION = "git_operation"
+    DEPLOYMENT = "deployment"
+    RUNTIME_EXECUTE = "runtime_execute"
+    EVIDENCE_WRITE = "evidence_write"
+    ROLLBACK = "rollback"
+    AUDIT = "audit"
+
+
+REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS = frozenset(item.value for item in ExecutionPath)
+
+
+class GitOperation(str, Enum):
+    READ_REF = "read_ref"
+    FETCH = "fetch"
+    CREATE_BRANCH = "create_branch"
+    COMMIT = "commit"
+    MERGE = "merge"
+    PUSH = "push"
+    UPDATE_EVIDENCE = "update_evidence"
+
+
+class ProvenanceStatus(str, Enum):
+    ISSUED = "issued"
+    VERIFIED = "verified"
+    USED = "used"
+    EXPIRED = "expired"
+    REVOKED = "revoked"
+
+
+class ProvenanceError(RuntimeError):
+    """Run Provenance 基础错误。"""
+
+
+class ProvenanceDenied(ProvenanceError):
+    """策略拒绝当前操作。"""
+
+
+class ProvenanceNotFound(ProvenanceDenied):
+    """未找到 Provenance。"""
+
+
+class ProvenanceSignatureError(ProvenanceDenied):
+    """签名无效。"""
+
+
+class ProvenanceExpired(ProvenanceDenied):
+    """Provenance 已过期。"""
+
+
+class ProvenanceRevoked(ProvenanceDenied):
+    """Provenance 已撤销。"""
+
+
+class ProvenanceReplay(ProvenanceDenied):
+    """检测到相同授权摘要重放。"""
+
+
+class Signer(Protocol):
+    key_id: str
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> str: ...
+
+
+class SignatureVerifier(Protocol):
+    key_id: str
+    fingerprint: str
+
+    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+def _load_crypto() -> tuple[Any, Any, Any]:
+    try:
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+            Ed25519PrivateKey,
+            Ed25519PublicKey,
+        )
+    except ImportError as exc:  # pragma: no cover - depends on deployment image
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "cryptography package with Ed25519 support is required"
+        ) from exc
+    return serialization, Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey
+
+
+def _check_private_key_file(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    resolved = path.resolve()
+    metadata = resolved.stat()
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise RuntimeError("private key reference is not a regular file")
+    if metadata.st_mode & 0o077:
+        raise RuntimeError("private key file permissions must be 0600 or stricter")
+    return resolved.read_bytes()
+
+
+def _check_public_key_file(path: Path) -> bytes:
+    resolved = path.resolve()
+    metadata = resolved.stat()
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+        raise RuntimeError("public key reference is not a regular file")
+    if metadata.st_mode & 0o022:
+        raise RuntimeError("public key file must not be group/world writable")
+    return resolved.read_bytes()
+
+
+class Ed25519PrivateKeySigner:
+    """Ed25519 Owner/Control Plane 签发器。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, private_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
+        self.private_key = private_key
+        self.key_id = required(key_id, "key_id")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_file(cls, path: str | Path, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519PrivateKeySigner":
+        serialization, private_cls, _ = _load_crypto()
+        value = _check_private_key_file(Path(path))
+        if value.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
+            key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(value, password=None)
+        elif len(value) == 32:
+            key = private_cls.from_private_bytes(value)
+        else:
+            raise RuntimeError("private key must be PEM or a raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed")
+        if not isinstance(key, private_cls):
+            raise RuntimeError("private key is not Ed25519")
+        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> str:
+        return base64.b64encode(self.private_key.sign(bytes(payload))).decode("ascii")
+
+    def public_verifier(self) -> "Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier":
+        return Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier(self.private_key.public_key(), key_id=self.key_id)
+
+
+class Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier:
+    """Ed25519 签名验证器。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, public_key: Any, *, key_id: str) -> None:
+        serialization, _, public_cls = _load_crypto()
+        if not isinstance(public_key, public_cls):
+            raise RuntimeError("public key is not Ed25519")
+        self.public_key = public_key
+        self.key_id = required(key_id, "key_id")
+        raw = public_key.public_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
+            format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
+        )
+        self.fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_file(cls, path: str | Path, *, key_id: str) -> "Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier":
+        serialization, _, public_cls = _load_crypto()
+        value = _check_public_key_file(Path(path))
+        if value.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
+            key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(value)
+        elif len(value) == 32:
+            key = public_cls.from_public_bytes(value)
+        else:
+            raise RuntimeError("public key must be PEM or raw 32-byte Ed25519 key")
+        if not isinstance(key, public_cls):
+            raise RuntimeError("public key is not Ed25519")
+        return cls(key, key_id=key_id)
+
+    def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature: str) -> bool:
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(required(signature, "signature"), validate=True)
+            self.public_key.verify(decoded, bytes(payload))
+            return True
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RunProvenance:
+    provenance_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    issuer: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    allowed_paths: Sequence[str]
+    allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str]
+    issued_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    policy_version: str
+    key_id: str
+    nonce: str
+    signature: str = ""
+    schema_version: str = PROVENANCE_VERSION
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "provenance_id",
+            "run_id",
+            "issuer",
+            "tenant_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "agent_id",
+            "principal_id",
+            "issued_at",
+            "expires_at",
+            "policy_version",
+            "key_id",
+            "nonce",
+            "schema_version",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        if self.schema_version != PROVENANCE_VERSION:
+            raise ValueError(f"unsupported schema_version: {self.schema_version}")
+        issued = parse_timestamp(self.issued_at)
+        expires = parse_timestamp(self.expires_at)
+        if expires <= issued:
+            raise ValueError("expires_at must be later than issued_at")
+        paths = tuple(sorted({ExecutionPath(item).value for item in self.allowed_paths}))
+        operations = tuple(
+            sorted({GitOperation(item).value for item in self.allowed_git_operations})
+        )
+        object.__setattr__(self, "allowed_paths", paths)
+        object.__setattr__(self, "allowed_git_operations", operations)
+        object.__setattr__(self, "signature", str(self.signature or "").strip())
+
+    def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "provenance_id": self.provenance_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id,
+            "issuer": self.issuer,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "agent_id": self.agent_id,
+            "principal_id": self.principal_id,
+            "allowed_paths": list(self.allowed_paths),
+            "allowed_git_operations": list(self.allowed_git_operations),
+            "issued_at": self.issued_at,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            "policy_version": self.policy_version,
+            "key_id": self.key_id,
+            "nonce": self.nonce,
+        }
+
+    def canonical_bytes(self) -> bytes:
+        return canonical_json_bytes(self.unsigned_dict())
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = self.unsigned_dict()
+        value["signature"] = self.signature
+        return value
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "RunProvenance":
+        return cls(**dict(value))
+
+
+class ProvenanceIssuer:
+    """只由 Owner 或 AIOS Control Plane 持有的签发服务。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, signer: Signer, store: "SQLiteProvenanceStore") -> None:
+        self.signer = signer
+        self.store = store
+
+    def issue(
+        self,
+        *,
+        run_id: str,
+        issuer: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        allowed_paths: Sequence[str] = tuple(REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS),
+        allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str] = tuple(item.value for item in GitOperation),
+        ttl_seconds: int = 3600,
+        policy_version: str = PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION,
+        provenance_id: str | None = None,
+        nonce: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> RunProvenance:
+        if ttl_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("ttl_seconds must be positive")
+        normalized_paths = frozenset(ExecutionPath(item).value for item in allowed_paths)
+        if policy_version == PRODUCTION_POLICY_VERSION and normalized_paths != REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS:
+            missing = sorted(REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS - normalized_paths)
+            extra = sorted(normalized_paths - REQUIRED_PRODUCTION_PATHS)
+            raise ProvenanceDenied(
+                f"production provenance must cover exactly seven paths; missing={missing}, extra={extra}"
+            )
+        normalized_operations = tuple(
+            sorted({GitOperation(item).value for item in allowed_git_operations})
+        )
+        if ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value in normalized_paths and not normalized_operations:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("git_operation path requires explicit allowed Git operations")
+        issued = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        unsigned = RunProvenance(
+            provenance_id=provenance_id or f"prov_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            run_id=run_id,
+            issuer=issuer,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            principal_id=principal_id,
+            allowed_paths=tuple(normalized_paths),
+            allowed_git_operations=normalized_operations,
+            issued_at=issued.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+            expires_at=(issued + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
+            .isoformat()
+            .replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+            policy_version=policy_version,
+            key_id=self.signer.key_id,
+            nonce=nonce or uuid.uuid4().hex,
+        )
+        signed = replace(unsigned, signature=self.signer.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes()))
+        self.store.save_issued(signed)
+        return signed
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProvenanceAuthorization:
+    authorization_id: str
+    provenance_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    execution_path: str
+    git_operation: str | None
+    request_digest: str
+    policy_version: str
+    key_id: str
+    public_key_fingerprint: str
+    authorized_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+class SQLiteProvenanceStore:
+    """持久化 Provenance、状态、授权使用和不可变事件。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._connection = sqlite3.connect(
+            str(self.path), timeout=30.0, check_same_thread=False
+        )
+        self._connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+            self._connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_records (
+                    provenance_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    signature_verified INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_usage (
+                    authorization_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    provenance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    git_operation TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+                    request_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    authorized_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    UNIQUE(provenance_id, execution_path, git_operation, request_digest),
+                    FOREIGN KEY(provenance_id) REFERENCES provenance_records(provenance_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_events (
+                    event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    provenance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    FOREIGN KEY(provenance_id) REFERENCES provenance_records(provenance_id)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_provenance_usage_id
+                    ON provenance_usage(provenance_id, authorized_at);
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_provenance_events_id
+                    ON provenance_events(provenance_id, created_at);
+                """
+            )
+            self._connection.commit()
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.close()
+
+    def _event(
+        self,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        event_type: str,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO provenance_events VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+            (
+                f"pevt_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+                provenance_id,
+                event_type,
+                json.dumps(dict(details or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True),
+                utc_now(),
+            ),
+        )
+
+    def save_issued(self, provenance: RunProvenance) -> None:
+        payload = json.dumps(
+            provenance.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        )
+        now = utc_now()
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                prior = self._connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_records WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                    (provenance.provenance_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if prior is not None:
+                    if prior["payload_json"] != payload:
+                        raise ProvenanceDenied("provenance_id reused with different payload")
+                    self._connection.rollback()
+                    return
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO provenance_records VALUES (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?)",
+                    (
+                        provenance.provenance_id,
+                        payload,
+                        ProvenanceStatus.ISSUED.value,
+                        now,
+                        now,
+                    ),
+                )
+                self._event(provenance.provenance_id, "issued")
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def get(self, provenance_id: str) -> RunProvenance:
+        with self._lock:
+            row = self._connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_records WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance not found")
+        value = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ProvenanceError("stored provenance payload is invalid")
+        return RunProvenance.from_dict(value)
+
+    def status(self, provenance_id: str) -> ProvenanceStatus:
+        with self._lock:
+            row = self._connection.execute(
+                "SELECT status FROM provenance_records WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance not found")
+        return ProvenanceStatus(row["status"])
+
+    def mark_verified(self, provenance_id: str, *, fingerprint: str) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                current = self.status(provenance_id)
+                if current in {ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED, ProvenanceStatus.EXPIRED}:
+                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"cannot verify provenance in state {current.value}")
+                next_status = (
+                    ProvenanceStatus.USED.value
+                    if current == ProvenanceStatus.USED
+                    else ProvenanceStatus.VERIFIED.value
+                )
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, signature_verified = 1, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                    (next_status, utc_now(), provenance_id),
+                )
+                self._event(
+                    provenance_id,
+                    "verified",
+                    {"public_key_fingerprint": fingerprint},
+                )
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def mark_expired(self, provenance_id: str) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                current = self.status(provenance_id)
+                if current == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
+                    self._connection.rollback()
+                    return
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                    (ProvenanceStatus.EXPIRED.value, utc_now(), provenance_id),
+                )
+                self._event(provenance_id, "expired")
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def revoke(self, provenance_id: str, *, reason: str, principal_id: str) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                self.get(provenance_id)
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                    (ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED.value, utc_now(), provenance_id),
+                )
+                self._event(
+                    provenance_id,
+                    "revoked",
+                    {
+                        "reason": required(reason, "reason"),
+                        "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
+                    },
+                )
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def record_authorization(self, authorization: ProvenanceAuthorization) -> None:
+        receipt = json.dumps(
+            authorization.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        )
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                current = self.status(authorization.provenance_id)
+                if current in {ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED, ProvenanceStatus.EXPIRED}:
+                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"provenance state is {current.value}")
+                try:
+                    self._connection.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO provenance_usage VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (
+                            authorization.authorization_id,
+                            authorization.provenance_id,
+                            authorization.execution_path,
+                            authorization.git_operation or "",
+                            authorization.request_digest,
+                            authorization.authorized_at,
+                            receipt,
+                        ),
+                    )
+                except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+                    raise ProvenanceReplay(
+                        "identical provenance path/operation/request digest already used"
+                    ) from exc
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_records SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                    (
+                        ProvenanceStatus.USED.value,
+                        authorization.authorized_at,
+                        authorization.provenance_id,
+                    ),
+                )
+                self._event(
+                    authorization.provenance_id,
+                    "used",
+                    {
+                        "authorization_id": authorization.authorization_id,
+                        "execution_path": authorization.execution_path,
+                        "git_operation": authorization.git_operation,
+                        "request_digest": authorization.request_digest,
+                    },
+                )
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def authorization_count(self, provenance_id: str) -> int:
+        with self._lock:
+            row = self._connection.execute(
+                "SELECT COUNT(*) AS total FROM provenance_usage WHERE provenance_id = ?",
+                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row["total"])
+
+    def events(self, provenance_id: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        with self._lock:
+            rows = self._connection.execute(
+                "SELECT event_type, details_json, created_at FROM provenance_events WHERE provenance_id = ? ORDER BY created_at, event_id",
+                (required(provenance_id, "provenance_id"),),
+            ).fetchall()
+        return [
+            {
+                "event_type": row["event_type"],
+                "details": json.loads(row["details_json"]),
+                "created_at": row["created_at"],
+            }
+            for row in rows
+        ]
+
+
+class ProvenanceVerifier:
+    """验证 Owner 签名、上下文、路径、Git 操作、时效和重放。"""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
+        verifiers: Mapping[str, SignatureVerifier],
+    ) -> None:
+        if not verifiers:
+            raise ValueError("at least one public key verifier is required")
+        self.store = store
+        self.verifiers = {required(key, "key_id"): value for key, value in verifiers.items()}
+
+    def authorize(
+        self,
+        *,
+        provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        execution_path: str,
+        request_digest: str,
+        git_operation: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        provenance = self.store.get(provenance_id)
+        status = self.store.status(provenance.provenance_id)
+        if status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
+            raise ProvenanceRevoked("provenance is revoked")
+        current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        if current >= parse_timestamp(provenance.expires_at):
+            self.store.mark_expired(provenance.provenance_id)
+            raise ProvenanceExpired("provenance is expired")
+        verifier = self.verifiers.get(provenance.key_id)
+        if verifier is None:
+            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("no trusted public key for provenance key_id")
+        if not provenance.signature or not verifier.verify(
+            provenance.canonical_bytes(), provenance.signature
+        ):
+            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid provenance signature")
+        expected = {
+            "run_id": required(run_id, "run_id"),
+            "tenant_id": required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),
+            "task_id": required(task_id, "task_id"),
+            "agent_id": required(agent_id, "agent_id"),
+            "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
+        }
+        for field_name, expected_value in expected.items():
+            if getattr(provenance, field_name) != expected_value:
+                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"provenance {field_name} mismatch")
+        path = ExecutionPath(execution_path).value
+        if path not in provenance.allowed_paths:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied(f"execution path is not allowed: {path}")
+        operation: str | None = None
+        if path == ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value:
+            if git_operation is None:
+                raise ProvenanceDenied("git operation is required for git_operation path")
+            operation = GitOperation(git_operation).value
+            if operation not in provenance.allowed_git_operations:
+                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"Git operation is not allowed: {operation}")
+        elif git_operation is not None:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("git_operation is only valid for git_operation path")
+        digest = _validate_digest(request_digest)
+        self.store.mark_verified(
+            provenance.provenance_id, fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint
+        )
+        authorization = ProvenanceAuthorization(
+            authorization_id=f"pauth_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            provenance_id=provenance.provenance_id,
+            run_id=provenance.run_id,
+            tenant_id=provenance.tenant_id,
+            task_id=provenance.task_id,
+            agent_id=provenance.agent_id,
+            principal_id=provenance.principal_id,
+            execution_path=path,
+            git_operation=operation,
+            request_digest=digest,
+            policy_version=provenance.policy_version,
+            key_id=provenance.key_id,
+            public_key_fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint,
+        )
+        self.store.record_authorization(authorization)
+        return authorization
+
+
+class ProvenanceControlledWriter:
+    """七路径统一策略入口并持久写入授权回执。"""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        verifier: ProvenanceVerifier,
+        receipt_root: str | Path,
+        *,
+        writer_id: str = "aios-v2-provenance-writer",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.receipt_root = Path(receipt_root).resolve()
+        self.receipt_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.writer_id = required(writer_id, "writer_id")
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _component(value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = required(value, "path component")
+        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("invalid receipt path component")
+        return normalized
+
+    def authorize(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        authorization = self.verifier.authorize(**values)
+        tenant = self._component(authorization.tenant_id)
+        provenance_id = self._component(authorization.provenance_id)
+        target_dir = self.receipt_root / tenant / provenance_id
+        target = target_dir / f"{authorization.authorization_id}.json"
+        payload = authorization.as_dict()
+        payload["writer_id"] = self.writer_id
+        with self._lock:
+            target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
+            temporary.write_text(
+                json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
+                encoding="utf-8",
+            )
+            os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+        return authorization
+
+    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_git_operation(
+        self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any
+    ) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value,
+            git_operation=git_operation,
+            **values,
+        )
+
+    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> ProvenanceAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value, **values)

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/provenance_cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""AIOS V2 Run Provenance 与最小权限 Grant 运维 CLI。
+
+私钥只用于签发；授权命令只加载一个与 ``--path`` 对应的 Grant。所有输出均为
+不含 Secret 的 JSON。旧 ``issue`` 仅为候选兼容，生产必须使用
+``issue-workflow`` 与 ``issue-grant``。
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from .provenance import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKeySigner,
+    Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier,
+    ExecutionPath,
+    GitOperation,
+    ProvenanceIssuer,
+    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
+)
+from .provenance_grants import (
+    GrantIssuer,
+    GrantType,
+    GrantVerifier,
+    SQLiteGrantStore,
+    WorkflowProvenanceIssuer,
+)
+from .provenance_operations import (
+    OperationContext,
+    ProvenanceOperationGate,
+    context_from_environment,
+    load_request_file,
+)
+from .provenance_scoped import ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter
+
+
+def _json_object(value: str | None, file_path: str | None) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if value and file_path:
+        raise ValueError("request-json and request-file are mutually exclusive")
+    if file_path:
+        return load_request_file(file_path)
+    parsed = json.loads(value or "{}")
+    if not isinstance(parsed, Mapping):
+        raise ValueError("request JSON must be an object")
+    return dict(parsed)
+
+
+def _csv(value: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    return tuple(item.strip() for item in str(value or "").split(",") if item.strip())
+
+
+def _write_json(path: str | None, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    encoded = json.dumps(dict(payload), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n"
+    if path:
+        target = Path(path).resolve()
+        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
+        temporary.write_text(encoded, encoding="utf-8")
+        os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
+        os.replace(temporary, target)
+    print(encoded, end="")
+
+
+def _parent_store(args: argparse.Namespace) -> SQLiteProvenanceStore:
+    return SQLiteProvenanceStore(args.store_file)
+
+
+def _grant_store(args: argparse.Namespace) -> SQLiteGrantStore:
+    return SQLiteGrantStore(args.store_file)
+
+
+def _context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> OperationContext:
+    if args.context_from_env:
+        return context_from_environment()
+    values = {
+        "provenance_id": args.provenance_id,
+        "run_id": args.run_id,
+        "tenant_id": args.tenant_id,
+        "task_id": args.task_id,
+        "agent_id": args.agent_id,
+        "principal_id": args.principal_id,
+    }
+    missing = [name for name, value in values.items() if not str(value or "").strip()]
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError(f"missing context arguments: {missing}")
+    return OperationContext(**{name: str(value).strip() for name, value in values.items()})
+
+
+def command_issue_legacy(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    store = _parent_store(args)
+    signer = Ed25519PrivateKeySigner.from_file(args.private_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
+    provenance = ProvenanceIssuer(signer, store).issue(
+        run_id=args.run_id,
+        issuer=args.issuer,
+        tenant_id=args.tenant_id,
+        task_id=args.task_id,
+        agent_id=args.agent_id,
+        principal_id=args.principal_id,
+        allowed_paths=_csv(args.allowed_paths) or tuple(item.value for item in ExecutionPath),
+        allowed_git_operations=_csv(args.allowed_git_operations)
+        or tuple(item.value for item in GitOperation),
+        ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
+        policy_version=args.policy_version,
+    )
+    _write_json(
+        args.output,
+        {
+            "mode": "legacy-full-rights-candidate-only",
+            "provenance": provenance.as_dict(),
+            "status": store.status(provenance.provenance_id).value,
+            "secret_value_stored": False,
+        },
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def command_issue_workflow(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    store = _parent_store(args)
+    signer = Ed25519PrivateKeySigner.from_file(args.private_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
+    workflow = WorkflowProvenanceIssuer(signer, store).issue(
+        run_id=args.run_id,
+        issuer=args.issuer,
+        tenant_id=args.tenant_id,
+        task_id=args.task_id,
+        agent_id=args.agent_id,
+        principal_id=args.principal_id,
+        ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
+    )
+    _write_json(
+        args.output,
+        {
+            "mode": "least-privilege-workflow",
+            "workflow_provenance": workflow.as_dict(),
+            "status": store.status(workflow.provenance_id).value,
+            "secret_value_stored": False,
+        },
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def command_issue_grant(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    parent_store = _parent_store(args)
+    grant_store = _grant_store(args)
+    signer = Ed25519PrivateKeySigner.from_file(args.private_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
+    grant = GrantIssuer(signer, parent_store, grant_store).issue(
+        parent_provenance_id=args.parent_provenance_id,
+        grant_type=GrantType(args.grant_type),
+        ttl_seconds=args.ttl_seconds,
+        allowed_git_operations=_csv(args.allowed_git_operations),
+    )
+    _write_json(
+        args.output,
+        {
+            "grant": grant.as_dict(),
+            "status": grant_store.status(grant.grant_id).value,
+            "secret_value_stored": False,
+        },
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def _single_scope_writer(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter:
+    path = ExecutionPath(args.path).value
+    parent_store = _parent_store(args)
+    grant_store = _grant_store(args)
+    verifier = Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier.from_file(args.public_key_file, key_id=args.key_id)
+    trusted = GrantVerifier(parent_store, grant_store, {args.key_id: verifier})
+    return ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter(
+        trusted,
+        args.receipt_dir,
+        {path: args.grant_id},
+        required_paths=(path,),
+        writer_id=f"aios-v2-cli-{path}",
+    )
+
+
+def command_authorize(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    writer = _single_scope_writer(args)
+    context = _context(args)
+    receipt = ProvenanceOperationGate(writer).authorize(
+        context,
+        execution_path=args.path,
+        operation=args.operation,
+        request=_json_object(args.request_json, args.request_file),
+    )
+    _write_json(args.output, {"authorization": receipt.as_dict()})
+    return 0
+
+
+def command_revoke(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    store = _parent_store(args)
+    store.revoke(args.provenance_id, reason=args.reason, principal_id=args.principal_id)
+    _write_json(
+        args.output,
+        {"provenance_id": args.provenance_id, "status": store.status(args.provenance_id).value},
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def command_status(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    store = _parent_store(args)
+    provenance = store.get(args.provenance_id)
+    grant_store = _grant_store(args)
+    _write_json(
+        args.output,
+        {
+            "provenance": provenance.as_dict(),
+            "status": store.status(args.provenance_id).value,
+            "authorization_count": store.authorization_count(args.provenance_id),
+            "events": store.events(args.provenance_id),
+            "grants": [item.as_dict() for item in grant_store.list_for_parent(args.provenance_id)],
+        },
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def command_grant_revoke(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    store = _grant_store(args)
+    store.revoke(args.grant_id, reason=args.reason, principal_id=args.principal_id)
+    _write_json(
+        args.output,
+        {"grant_id": args.grant_id, "status": store.status(args.grant_id).value},
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def command_grant_status(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    store = _grant_store(args)
+    grant = store.get(args.grant_id)
+    _write_json(
+        args.output,
+        {"grant": grant.as_dict(), "status": store.status(args.grant_id).value},
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def add_common_store(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--store-file",
+        default=os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE",
+            "/var/lib/aios-v2/run-provenance.sqlite3",
+        ),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("--output", default=None)
+
+
+def add_signing_context(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
+    parser.add_argument("--private-key-file", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--key-id", required=True)
+
+
+def add_workflow_identity(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
+    parser.add_argument("--run-id", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--issuer", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--tenant-id", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--task-id", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--agent-id", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--principal-id", required=True)
+
+
+def add_context(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
+    parser.add_argument("--context-from-env", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--provenance-id")
+    parser.add_argument("--run-id")
+    parser.add_argument("--tenant-id")
+    parser.add_argument("--task-id")
+    parser.add_argument("--agent-id")
+    parser.add_argument("--principal-id")
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS V2 Run Provenance CLI")
+    subcommands = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+
+    issue = subcommands.add_parser("issue", help="候选兼容：签发全权限 Provenance；生产禁止")
+    add_common_store(issue)
+    add_signing_context(issue)
+    add_workflow_identity(issue)
+    issue.add_argument("--allowed-paths")
+    issue.add_argument("--allowed-git-operations")
+    issue.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=3600)
+    issue.add_argument("--policy-version", default="aios.v2.candidate.legacy")
+    issue.set_defaults(handler=command_issue_legacy)
+
+    workflow = subcommands.add_parser(
+        "issue-workflow", help="签发不含操作权限的父 Workflow Provenance"
+    )
+    add_common_store(workflow)
+    add_signing_context(workflow)
+    add_workflow_identity(workflow)
+    workflow.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=14400)
+    workflow.set_defaults(handler=command_issue_workflow)
+
+    grant = subcommands.add_parser("issue-grant", help="签发单一路径最小权限 Grant")
+    add_common_store(grant)
+    add_signing_context(grant)
+    grant.add_argument("--parent-provenance-id", required=True)
+    grant.add_argument("--grant-type", choices=[item.value for item in GrantType], required=True)
+    grant.add_argument("--allowed-git-operations")
+    grant.add_argument("--ttl-seconds", type=int, default=900)
+    grant.set_defaults(handler=command_issue_grant)
+
+    authorize = subcommands.add_parser("authorize", help="使用单一子 Grant 授权一次运维操作")
+    add_common_store(authorize)
+    add_context(authorize)
+    authorize.add_argument("--public-key-file", required=True)
+    authorize.add_argument("--key-id", required=True)
+    authorize.add_argument("--grant-id", required=True)
+    authorize.add_argument(
+        "--receipt-dir",
+        default=os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_PROVENANCE_RECEIPT_DIR",
+            "/var/lib/aios-v2/provenance-receipts",
+        ),
+    )
+    authorize.add_argument(
+        "--path",
+        required=True,
+        choices=[
+            ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value,
+            ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value,
+            ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value,
+            ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value,
+            ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value,
+            ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value,
+        ],
+    )
+    authorize.add_argument("--operation", required=True)
+    request_group = authorize.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
+    request_group.add_argument("--request-json")
+    request_group.add_argument("--request-file")
+    authorize.set_defaults(handler=command_authorize)
+
+    revoke = subcommands.add_parser("revoke", help="撤销父 Workflow Provenance")
+    add_common_store(revoke)
+    revoke.add_argument("--provenance-id", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
+    revoke.add_argument("--principal-id", required=True)
+    revoke.set_defaults(handler=command_revoke)
+
+    status = subcommands.add_parser("status", help="查询父 Workflow 与子 Grant")
+    add_common_store(status)
+    status.add_argument("--provenance-id", required=True)
+    status.set_defaults(handler=command_status)
+
+    grant_revoke = subcommands.add_parser("grant-revoke", help="单独撤销子 Grant")
+    add_common_store(grant_revoke)
+    grant_revoke.add_argument("--grant-id", required=True)
+    grant_revoke.add_argument("--reason", required=True)
+    grant_revoke.add_argument("--principal-id", required=True)
+    grant_revoke.set_defaults(handler=command_grant_revoke)
+
+    grant_status = subcommands.add_parser("grant-status", help="查询子 Grant 状态")
+    add_common_store(grant_status)
+    grant_status.add_argument("--grant-id", required=True)
+    grant_status.set_defaults(handler=command_grant_status)
+    return parser
+
+
+def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
+    try:
+        return int(args.handler(args))
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(
+            json.dumps(
+                {"status": "denied", "error": type(exc).__name__, "message": str(exc)},
+                ensure_ascii=False,
+            ),
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/provenance_git.py

@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
+"""受最小权限 Run Provenance Grant 约束的 Git 写入器。
+
+所有 Git 操作都使用参数数组执行。对于 Commit 和 Evidence Commit，先计算
+工作树内容摘要并完成 Provenance 授权，之后才允许执行 ``git add``，避免未授权
+请求改变 Git Index。
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+from .provenance import GitOperation, ProvenanceDenied, digest_payload, utc_now
+
+_BRANCH_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^(?![-./])(?!.*\.\.)(?!.*//)[A-Za-z0-9._/-]{1,240}$")
+_SECRET_URL = re.compile(r"(?i)(https?://)([^/@\s]+)@")
+_TOKENISH = re.compile(r"(?i)(token|password|secret|authorization)([=:]\s*)([^\s]+)")
+
+
+class GitAuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
+    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+
+    def authorize_git_operation(self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+
+
+class ProvenanceGitError(RuntimeError):
+    """Git 操作被拒绝或执行失败。"""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitExecutionContext:
+    provenance_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitCommandResult:
+    operation_id: str
+    operation: str
+    authorization_ids: Sequence[str]
+    command: Sequence[str]
+    exit_code: int
+    stdout: str
+    stderr: str
+    head_before: str | None
+    head_after: str | None
+    started_at: str
+    completed_at: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+class ProvenanceGitWriter:
+    """执行经过单路径 Grant 授权的窄范围 Git 操作。"""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        repo: str | Path,
+        writer: GitAuthorizationWriter,
+        *,
+        timeout_seconds: float = 120.0,
+        output_limit: int = 16000,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.repo = Path(repo).resolve()
+        self.writer = writer
+        self.timeout_seconds = float(timeout_seconds)
+        self.output_limit = int(output_limit)
+        if self.timeout_seconds <= 0 or self.output_limit < 1024:
+            raise ValueError("invalid Git writer limits")
+        self._run_raw(["rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"], check=True)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validate_branch(branch: str) -> str:
+        normalized = str(branch or "").strip()
+        if not _BRANCH_PATTERN.fullmatch(normalized) or normalized.endswith((".", "/")):
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("invalid Git branch name")
+        if normalized in {"main", "master"}:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("direct main/master operation is prohibited")
+        return normalized
+
+    def _validate_path(self, value: str | Path) -> str:
+        raw = Path(value)
+        candidate = (self.repo / raw).resolve() if not raw.is_absolute() else raw.resolve()
+        try:
+            relative = candidate.relative_to(self.repo)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("Git path escapes repository") from exc
+        if str(relative) in {"", "."}:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("repository root is not a valid file path")
+        return relative.as_posix()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _redact(value: str, limit: int) -> str:
+        text = _SECRET_URL.sub(r"\1***@", str(value or ""))
+        text = _TOKENISH.sub(r"\1\2***", text)
+        if len(text) > limit:
+            return text[:limit] + "\n...[truncated]"
+        return text
+
+    def _head(self) -> str | None:
+        process = self._run_raw(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], check=False)
+        return process.stdout.strip() if process.returncode == 0 else None
+
+    def _run_raw(
+        self,
+        args: Sequence[str],
+        *,
+        check: bool,
+        env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    ) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+        command = ["git", "-C", str(self.repo), *[str(item) for item in args]]
+        safe_env = {
+            **os.environ,
+            "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
+            "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": os.environ.get("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1"),
+        }
+        if env:
+            safe_env.update({str(key): str(value) for key, value in env.items()})
+        process = subprocess.run(
+            command,
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=self.timeout_seconds,
+            env=safe_env,
+        )
+        if check and process.returncode != 0:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError(
+                self._redact(process.stderr or process.stdout, self.output_limit)
+                or f"Git command failed with exit code {process.returncode}"
+            )
+        return process
+
+    def _path_digest(self, relative: str) -> str:
+        target = self.repo / relative
+        if target.exists():
+            if not target.is_file():
+                raise ProvenanceGitError("Git writer accepts file paths only")
+            hasher = hashlib.sha256()
+            with target.open("rb") as handle:
+                while True:
+                    block = handle.read(65536)
+                    if not block:
+                        break
+                    hasher.update(block)
+            return hasher.hexdigest()
+        tracked = self._run_raw(["ls-files", "--error-unmatch", "--", relative], check=False)
+        if tracked.returncode != 0:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError(f"path does not exist and is not tracked: {relative}")
+        return "deleted"
+
+    def _content_manifest(self, paths: Sequence[str]) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        return {path: self._path_digest(path) for path in sorted(set(paths))}
+
+    def _authorize(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        operation: GitOperation,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        code_change: bool,
+    ) -> list[str]:
+        request_digest = digest_payload(
+            {
+                "operation": operation.value,
+                "repo": self.repo.name,
+                "request": dict(request),
+                "head": self._head(),
+            }
+        )
+        ids: list[str] = []
+        try:
+            if code_change:
+                code_authorization = self.writer.authorize_code_change(
+                    provenance_id=context.provenance_id,
+                    run_id=context.run_id,
+                    tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+                    task_id=context.task_id,
+                    agent_id=context.agent_id,
+                    principal_id=context.principal_id,
+                    request_digest=digest_payload(
+                        {
+                            "git_operation": operation.value,
+                            "request_digest": request_digest,
+                        }
+                    ),
+                )
+                ids.append(code_authorization.authorization_id)
+            git_authorization = self.writer.authorize_git_operation(
+                provenance_id=context.provenance_id,
+                run_id=context.run_id,
+                tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
+                task_id=context.task_id,
+                agent_id=context.agent_id,
+                principal_id=context.principal_id,
+                git_operation=operation.value,
+                request_digest=request_digest,
+            )
+            ids.append(git_authorization.authorization_id)
+            return ids
+        except ProvenanceDenied as exc:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError(f"Run Provenance denied Git operation: {exc}") from exc
+
+    def _run_authorized(
+        self,
+        *,
+        operation: GitOperation,
+        args: Sequence[str],
+        authorization_ids: Sequence[str],
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        started = utc_now()
+        before = self._head()
+        process = self._run_raw(args, check=False)
+        after = self._head()
+        result = GitCommandResult(
+            operation_id=f"gitop_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            operation=operation.value,
+            authorization_ids=tuple(authorization_ids),
+            command=tuple(["git", "-C", "<repo>", *[str(item) for item in args]]),
+            exit_code=int(process.returncode),
+            stdout=self._redact(process.stdout, self.output_limit),
+            stderr=self._redact(process.stderr, self.output_limit),
+            head_before=before,
+            head_after=after,
+            started_at=started,
+            completed_at=utc_now(),
+        )
+        if process.returncode != 0:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError(
+                result.stderr or result.stdout or f"Git {operation.value} failed"
+            )
+        return result
+
+    def _execute(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        operation: GitOperation,
+        args: Sequence[str],
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        code_change: bool,
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        authorization_ids = self._authorize(
+            context,
+            operation=operation,
+            request=request,
+            code_change=code_change,
+        )
+        return self._run_authorized(
+            operation=operation,
+            args=args,
+            authorization_ids=authorization_ids,
+        )
+
+    def read_ref(self, context: GitExecutionContext, ref: str) -> GitCommandResult:
+        normalized = str(ref or "").strip()
+        if not normalized or any(ch.isspace() for ch in normalized):
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("invalid Git ref")
+        return self._execute(
+            context,
+            operation=GitOperation.READ_REF,
+            args=["rev-parse", "--verify", normalized],
+            request={"ref": normalized},
+            code_change=False,
+        )
+
+    def fetch(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        remote: str,
+        refspecs: Sequence[str],
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        normalized_remote = str(remote or "").strip()
+        normalized_refspecs = tuple(str(item).strip() for item in refspecs if str(item).strip())
+        if not normalized_remote or not normalized_refspecs:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("remote and refspecs are required")
+        if any(item.startswith("+") and ":refs/heads/" in item for item in normalized_refspecs):
+            raise ProvenanceGitError(
+                "fetching directly into local branch refs is prohibited; use remote-tracking refs"
+            )
+        return self._execute(
+            context,
+            operation=GitOperation.FETCH,
+            args=["fetch", "--prune", normalized_remote, *normalized_refspecs],
+            request={"remote": normalized_remote, "refspecs": normalized_refspecs},
+            code_change=False,
+        )
+
+    def create_branch(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        branch: str,
+        start_point: str,
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        normalized = self._validate_branch(branch)
+        start = str(start_point or "").strip()
+        if not start:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("start_point is required")
+        return self._execute(
+            context,
+            operation=GitOperation.CREATE_BRANCH,
+            args=["branch", normalized, start],
+            request={"branch": normalized, "start_point": start},
+            code_change=False,
+        )
+
+    def commit(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        paths: Sequence[str | Path],
+        message: str,
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        normalized_paths = tuple(self._validate_path(item) for item in paths)
+        normalized_message = str(message or "").strip()
+        if not normalized_paths or not normalized_message:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("commit paths and message are required")
+        if len(normalized_message) > 500:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("commit message is too long")
+        request = {
+            "paths": normalized_paths,
+            "message": normalized_message,
+            "content_manifest": self._content_manifest(normalized_paths),
+        }
+        authorization_ids = self._authorize(
+            context,
+            operation=GitOperation.COMMIT,
+            request=request,
+            code_change=True,
+        )
+        self._run_raw(["add", "--", *normalized_paths], check=True)
+        return self._run_authorized(
+            operation=GitOperation.COMMIT,
+            args=["commit", "--no-gpg-sign", "-m", normalized_message, "--", *normalized_paths],
+            authorization_ids=authorization_ids,
+        )
+
+    def merge(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        source_ref: str,
+        message: str,
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        source = str(source_ref or "").strip()
+        normalized_message = str(message or "").strip()
+        if not source or not normalized_message:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("source_ref and message are required")
+        return self._execute(
+            context,
+            operation=GitOperation.MERGE,
+            args=["merge", "--no-ff", "--no-edit", "-m", normalized_message, source],
+            request={"source_ref": source, "message": normalized_message},
+            code_change=True,
+        )
+
+    def push(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        remote: str,
+        branch: str,
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        normalized_remote = str(remote or "").strip()
+        normalized_branch = self._validate_branch(branch)
+        if not normalized_remote:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("remote is required")
+        return self._execute(
+            context,
+            operation=GitOperation.PUSH,
+            args=["push", normalized_remote, f"refs/heads/{normalized_branch}:refs/heads/{normalized_branch}"],
+            request={"remote": normalized_remote, "branch": normalized_branch},
+            code_change=False,
+        )
+
+    def update_evidence(
+        self,
+        context: GitExecutionContext,
+        *,
+        paths: Sequence[str | Path],
+        message: str,
+    ) -> GitCommandResult:
+        normalized_paths = tuple(self._validate_path(item) for item in paths)
+        normalized_message = str(message or "").strip()
+        if not normalized_paths or not normalized_message:
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("evidence paths and message are required")
+        if any(not path.startswith(".agent/") for path in normalized_paths):
+            raise ProvenanceGitError("UPDATE_EVIDENCE may only commit .agent/ paths")
+        request = {
+            "paths": normalized_paths,
+            "message": normalized_message,
+            "content_manifest": self._content_manifest(normalized_paths),
+        }
+        authorization_ids = self._authorize(
+            context,
+            operation=GitOperation.UPDATE_EVIDENCE,
+            request=request,
+            code_change=False,
+        )
+        self._run_raw(["add", "--", *normalized_paths], check=True)
+        return self._run_authorized(
+            operation=GitOperation.UPDATE_EVIDENCE,
+            args=["commit", "--no-gpg-sign", "-m", normalized_message, "--", *normalized_paths],
+            authorization_ids=authorization_ids,
+        )

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/provenance_grants.py

@@ -0,0 +1,744 @@
+"""AIOS V2 最小权限 Run Provenance 子 Grant。
+
+父 Workflow Provenance 只绑定 run/tenant/task/agent/principal 身份，不直接授予
+操作权限。每个子 Grant 只允许一个 ExecutionPath；Git Grant 还必须限定具体
+GitOperation。子 Grant 具备独立 TTL、nonce、状态、撤销和重放防护。
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from .provenance import (
+    ExecutionPath,
+    GitOperation,
+    ProvenanceDenied,
+    ProvenanceExpired,
+    ProvenanceIssuer,
+    ProvenanceNotFound,
+    ProvenanceReplay,
+    ProvenanceRevoked,
+    ProvenanceSignatureError,
+    ProvenanceStatus,
+    ProvenanceVerifier,
+    RunProvenance,
+    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
+    Signer,
+    SignatureVerifier,
+    _validate_digest,
+    canonical_json_bytes,
+    parse_timestamp,
+    required,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION = "aios.v2.workflow.v1"
+GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION = "aios.v2.provenance-grant.v1"
+
+
+class GrantType(str, Enum):
+    CODE_CHANGE = "code_change"
+    GIT = "git"
+    DEPLOYMENT = "deployment"
+    RUNTIME = "runtime"
+    EVIDENCE = "evidence"
+    ROLLBACK = "rollback"
+    AUDIT = "audit"
+
+
+GRANT_PATHS: Mapping[GrantType, ExecutionPath] = {
+    GrantType.CODE_CHANGE: ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE,
+    GrantType.GIT: ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION,
+    GrantType.DEPLOYMENT: ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT,
+    GrantType.RUNTIME: ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE,
+    GrantType.EVIDENCE: ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE,
+    GrantType.ROLLBACK: ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK,
+    GrantType.AUDIT: ExecutionPath.AUDIT,
+}
+
+
+class GrantStatus(str, Enum):
+    ISSUED = "issued"
+    VERIFIED = "verified"
+    USED = "used"
+    EXPIRED = "expired"
+    REVOKED = "revoked"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProvenanceGrant:
+    grant_id: str
+    parent_provenance_id: str
+    grant_type: GrantType
+    execution_path: ExecutionPath
+    run_id: str
+    issuer: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str]
+    issued_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    policy_version: str
+    key_id: str
+    nonce: str
+    signature: str = ""
+    schema_version: str = GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "grant_id",
+            "parent_provenance_id",
+            "run_id",
+            "issuer",
+            "tenant_id",
+            "task_id",
+            "agent_id",
+            "principal_id",
+            "issued_at",
+            "expires_at",
+            "policy_version",
+            "key_id",
+            "nonce",
+            "schema_version",
+        ):
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, required(getattr(self, name), name))
+        if self.schema_version != GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION:
+            raise ValueError(f"unsupported grant schema: {self.schema_version}")
+        grant_type = GrantType(self.grant_type)
+        path = ExecutionPath(self.execution_path)
+        if GRANT_PATHS[grant_type] != path:
+            raise ValueError("grant_type does not match execution_path")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "grant_type", grant_type)
+        object.__setattr__(self, "execution_path", path)
+        operations = tuple(
+            sorted({GitOperation(item).value for item in self.allowed_git_operations})
+        )
+        if grant_type == GrantType.GIT and not operations:
+            raise ValueError("Git Grant requires explicit Git operations")
+        if grant_type != GrantType.GIT and operations:
+            raise ValueError("only Git Grant may contain Git operations")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "allowed_git_operations", operations)
+        issued = parse_timestamp(self.issued_at)
+        expires = parse_timestamp(self.expires_at)
+        if expires <= issued:
+            raise ValueError("grant expires_at must be later than issued_at")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "signature", str(self.signature or "").strip())
+
+    def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "grant_id": self.grant_id,
+            "parent_provenance_id": self.parent_provenance_id,
+            "grant_type": self.grant_type.value,
+            "execution_path": self.execution_path.value,
+            "run_id": self.run_id,
+            "issuer": self.issuer,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "agent_id": self.agent_id,
+            "principal_id": self.principal_id,
+            "allowed_git_operations": list(self.allowed_git_operations),
+            "issued_at": self.issued_at,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            "policy_version": self.policy_version,
+            "key_id": self.key_id,
+            "nonce": self.nonce,
+        }
+
+    def canonical_bytes(self) -> bytes:
+        return canonical_json_bytes(self.unsigned_dict())
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value = self.unsigned_dict()
+        value["signature"] = self.signature
+        return value
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ProvenanceGrant":
+        return cls(**dict(value))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GrantAuthorization:
+    authorization_id: str
+    grant_id: str
+    parent_provenance_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    execution_path: str
+    git_operation: str | None
+    request_digest: str
+    policy_version: str
+    key_id: str
+    public_key_fingerprint: str
+    authorized_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+
+    @property
+    def provenance_id(self) -> str:
+        return self.parent_provenance_id
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+class WorkflowProvenanceIssuer:
+    """签发不携带操作权限的父 Workflow Provenance。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, signer: Signer, store: SQLiteProvenanceStore) -> None:
+        self._issuer = ProvenanceIssuer(signer, store)
+
+    def issue(
+        self,
+        *,
+        run_id: str,
+        issuer: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        ttl_seconds: int = 14400,
+        provenance_id: str | None = None,
+        nonce: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> RunProvenance:
+        return self._issuer.issue(
+            run_id=run_id,
+            issuer=issuer,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            task_id=task_id,
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            principal_id=principal_id,
+            allowed_paths=(),
+            allowed_git_operations=(),
+            ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds,
+            policy_version=WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION,
+            provenance_id=provenance_id,
+            nonce=nonce,
+            now=now,
+        )
+
+
+class SQLiteGrantStore:
+    """在 Provenance SQLite 数据库中持久化子 Grant 与使用记录。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path).resolve()
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self._connection = sqlite3.connect(
+            str(self.path), timeout=30.0, check_same_thread=False
+        )
+        self._connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+            self._connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+            self._connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grants (
+                    grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    parent_provenance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    grant_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    signature_verified INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_grants_parent
+                    ON provenance_grants(parent_provenance_id, grant_type, status);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grant_usage (
+                    authorization_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    git_operation TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+                    request_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    authorized_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    UNIQUE(grant_id, execution_path, git_operation, request_digest),
+                    FOREIGN KEY(grant_id) REFERENCES provenance_grants(grant_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grant_events (
+                    event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    FOREIGN KEY(grant_id) REFERENCES provenance_grants(grant_id)
+                );
+                """
+            )
+            self._connection.commit()
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.close()
+
+    def _event(
+        self,
+        grant_id: str,
+        event_type: str,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO provenance_grant_events VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+            (
+                f"gevt_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+                grant_id,
+                event_type,
+                json.dumps(dict(details or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True),
+                utc_now(),
+            ),
+        )
+
+    def save_issued(self, grant: ProvenanceGrant) -> None:
+        payload = json.dumps(
+            grant.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        )
+        now = utc_now()
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO provenance_grants VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?)",
+                    (
+                        grant.grant_id,
+                        grant.parent_provenance_id,
+                        grant.grant_type.value,
+                        grant.execution_path.value,
+                        payload,
+                        GrantStatus.ISSUED.value,
+                        now,
+                        now,
+                    ),
+                )
+                self._event(grant.grant_id, "issued")
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise ProvenanceDenied("grant_id already exists") from exc
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def get(self, grant_id: str) -> ProvenanceGrant:
+        with self._lock:
+            row = self._connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                (required(grant_id, "grant_id"),),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance grant not found")
+        value = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("stored grant is invalid")
+        return ProvenanceGrant.from_dict(value)
+
+    def status(self, grant_id: str) -> GrantStatus:
+        with self._lock:
+            row = self._connection.execute(
+                "SELECT status FROM provenance_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                (required(grant_id, "grant_id"),),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance grant not found")
+        return GrantStatus(row["status"])
+
+    def mark_verified(self, grant_id: str, *, fingerprint: str) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                current = self.status(grant_id)
+                if current in {GrantStatus.REVOKED, GrantStatus.EXPIRED}:
+                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"cannot verify grant in state {current.value}")
+                next_status = (
+                    GrantStatus.USED.value
+                    if current == GrantStatus.USED
+                    else GrantStatus.VERIFIED.value
+                )
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, signature_verified = 1, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (next_status, utc_now(), grant_id),
+                )
+                self._event(
+                    grant_id,
+                    "verified",
+                    {"public_key_fingerprint": fingerprint},
+                )
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def mark_expired(self, grant_id: str) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                if self.status(grant_id) == GrantStatus.REVOKED:
+                    self._connection.rollback()
+                    return
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (GrantStatus.EXPIRED.value, utc_now(), grant_id),
+                )
+                self._event(grant_id, "expired")
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def revoke(self, grant_id: str, *, reason: str, principal_id: str) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                self.get(grant_id)
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (GrantStatus.REVOKED.value, utc_now(), grant_id),
+                )
+                self._event(
+                    grant_id,
+                    "revoked",
+                    {
+                        "reason": required(reason, "reason"),
+                        "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
+                    },
+                )
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def record_authorization(self, authorization: GrantAuthorization) -> None:
+        receipt = json.dumps(
+            authorization.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        )
+        with self._lock:
+            self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                current = self.status(authorization.grant_id)
+                if current in {GrantStatus.REVOKED, GrantStatus.EXPIRED}:
+                    raise ProvenanceDenied(f"grant state is {current.value}")
+                try:
+                    self._connection.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO provenance_grant_usage VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (
+                            authorization.authorization_id,
+                            authorization.grant_id,
+                            authorization.execution_path,
+                            authorization.git_operation or "",
+                            authorization.request_digest,
+                            authorization.authorized_at,
+                            receipt,
+                        ),
+                    )
+                except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+                    raise ProvenanceReplay(
+                        "identical grant path/operation/request digest already used"
+                    ) from exc
+                self._connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (GrantStatus.USED.value, authorization.authorized_at, authorization.grant_id),
+                )
+                self._event(
+                    authorization.grant_id,
+                    "used",
+                    {
+                        "authorization_id": authorization.authorization_id,
+                        "execution_path": authorization.execution_path,
+                        "git_operation": authorization.git_operation,
+                        "request_digest": authorization.request_digest,
+                    },
+                )
+                self._connection.commit()
+            except Exception:
+                self._connection.rollback()
+                raise
+
+    def list_for_parent(self, parent_provenance_id: str) -> list[ProvenanceGrant]:
+        with self._lock:
+            rows = self._connection.execute(
+                "SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_grants WHERE parent_provenance_id = ? ORDER BY grant_type, grant_id",
+                (required(parent_provenance_id, "parent_provenance_id"),),
+            ).fetchall()
+        return [ProvenanceGrant.from_dict(json.loads(row["payload_json"])) for row in rows]
+
+
+class GrantIssuer:
+    """从父 Workflow Provenance 派生单一路径最小权限 Grant。"""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        signer: Signer,
+        parent_store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
+        grant_store: SQLiteGrantStore,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.signer = signer
+        self.parent_store = parent_store
+        self.grant_store = grant_store
+
+    def issue(
+        self,
+        *,
+        parent_provenance_id: str,
+        grant_type: GrantType | str,
+        ttl_seconds: int = 900,
+        allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str] = (),
+        grant_id: str | None = None,
+        nonce: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> ProvenanceGrant:
+        if ttl_seconds <= 0:
+            raise ValueError("grant ttl_seconds must be positive")
+        parent = self.parent_store.get(parent_provenance_id)
+        if parent.policy_version != WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("child grants require a workflow provenance parent")
+        if parent.allowed_paths or parent.allowed_git_operations:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("workflow provenance parent must not contain operation rights")
+        parent_status = self.parent_store.status(parent.provenance_id)
+        if parent_status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
+            raise ProvenanceRevoked("workflow provenance is revoked")
+        issued = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        parent_expiry = parse_timestamp(parent.expires_at)
+        expires = min(issued + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds), parent_expiry)
+        if expires <= issued:
+            raise ProvenanceExpired("workflow provenance has expired")
+        normalized_type = GrantType(grant_type)
+        operations = tuple(allowed_git_operations)
+        unsigned = ProvenanceGrant(
+            grant_id=grant_id or f"grant_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            parent_provenance_id=parent.provenance_id,
+            grant_type=normalized_type,
+            execution_path=GRANT_PATHS[normalized_type],
+            run_id=parent.run_id,
+            issuer=parent.issuer,
+            tenant_id=parent.tenant_id,
+            task_id=parent.task_id,
+            agent_id=parent.agent_id,
+            principal_id=parent.principal_id,
+            allowed_git_operations=operations,
+            issued_at=issued.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+            expires_at=expires.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+            policy_version=f"{WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION}.{normalized_type.value}",
+            key_id=self.signer.key_id,
+            nonce=nonce or uuid.uuid4().hex,
+        )
+        signed = replace(unsigned, signature=self.signer.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes()))
+        self.grant_store.save_issued(signed)
+        return signed
+
+
+class GrantVerifier:
+    """验证父 Workflow 与子 Grant，确保单一路径最小权限。"""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        parent_store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
+        grant_store: SQLiteGrantStore,
+        verifiers: Mapping[str, SignatureVerifier],
+    ) -> None:
+        if not verifiers:
+            raise ValueError("at least one trusted verifier is required")
+        self.parent_store = parent_store
+        self.grant_store = grant_store
+        self.verifiers = {required(key, "key_id"): value for key, value in verifiers.items()}
+
+    def _verify_parent(self, parent: RunProvenance, *, now: datetime) -> SignatureVerifier:
+        status = self.parent_store.status(parent.provenance_id)
+        if status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
+            raise ProvenanceRevoked("workflow provenance is revoked")
+        if now >= parse_timestamp(parent.expires_at):
+            self.parent_store.mark_expired(parent.provenance_id)
+            raise ProvenanceExpired("workflow provenance is expired")
+        verifier = self.verifiers.get(parent.key_id)
+        if verifier is None or not parent.signature or not verifier.verify(
+            parent.canonical_bytes(), parent.signature
+        ):
+            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid workflow provenance signature")
+        if parent.policy_version != WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("parent is not a workflow provenance")
+        if parent.allowed_paths or parent.allowed_git_operations:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("workflow provenance must not contain operation rights")
+        return verifier
+
+    def authorize(
+        self,
+        *,
+        grant_id: str,
+        parent_provenance_id: str,
+        run_id: str,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        execution_path: str,
+        request_digest: str,
+        git_operation: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        parent = self.parent_store.get(parent_provenance_id)
+        self._verify_parent(parent, now=current)
+        grant = self.grant_store.get(grant_id)
+        grant_status = self.grant_store.status(grant.grant_id)
+        if grant_status == GrantStatus.REVOKED:
+            raise ProvenanceRevoked("provenance grant is revoked")
+        if current >= parse_timestamp(grant.expires_at):
+            self.grant_store.mark_expired(grant.grant_id)
+            raise ProvenanceExpired("provenance grant is expired")
+        verifier = self.verifiers.get(grant.key_id)
+        if verifier is None or not grant.signature or not verifier.verify(
+            grant.canonical_bytes(), grant.signature
+        ):
+            raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid provenance grant signature")
+        expected = {
+            "parent_provenance_id": parent.provenance_id,
+            "run_id": required(run_id, "run_id"),
+            "tenant_id": required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),
+            "task_id": required(task_id, "task_id"),
+            "agent_id": required(agent_id, "agent_id"),
+            "principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
+        }
+        for field_name, expected_value in expected.items():
+            if getattr(grant, field_name) != expected_value:
+                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"grant {field_name} mismatch")
+            if field_name != "parent_provenance_id" and getattr(parent, field_name) != expected_value:
+                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"workflow {field_name} mismatch")
+        path = ExecutionPath(execution_path)
+        if grant.execution_path != path:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied(
+                f"grant permits {grant.execution_path.value}, not {path.value}"
+            )
+        operation: str | None = None
+        if path == ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION:
+            if git_operation is None:
+                raise ProvenanceDenied("Git operation is required")
+            operation = GitOperation(git_operation).value
+            if operation not in grant.allowed_git_operations:
+                raise ProvenanceDenied(f"Git operation is not allowed: {operation}")
+        elif git_operation is not None:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("git_operation is only valid for a Git Grant")
+        digest = _validate_digest(request_digest)
+        self.grant_store.mark_verified(grant.grant_id, fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint)
+        authorization = GrantAuthorization(
+            authorization_id=f"gauth_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+            grant_id=grant.grant_id,
+            parent_provenance_id=parent.provenance_id,
+            run_id=grant.run_id,
+            tenant_id=grant.tenant_id,
+            task_id=grant.task_id,
+            agent_id=grant.agent_id,
+            principal_id=grant.principal_id,
+            execution_path=path.value,
+            git_operation=operation,
+            request_digest=digest,
+            policy_version=grant.policy_version,
+            key_id=grant.key_id,
+            public_key_fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint,
+        )
+        self.grant_store.record_authorization(authorization)
+        return authorization
+
+
+class LeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter:
+    """按路径选择独立子 Grant 的生产 Writer。
+
+    ``provenance_id`` 参数始终指父 Workflow Provenance；Grant ID 来自受保护
+    配置映射，调用方无法通过请求体临时扩大权限。
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        verifier: GrantVerifier,
+        receipt_root: str | Path,
+        grant_ids: Mapping[str, str],
+        *,
+        writer_id: str = "aios-v2-least-privilege-writer",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.receipt_root = Path(receipt_root).resolve()
+        self.receipt_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.grant_ids = {
+            ExecutionPath(path).value: required(grant_id, f"grant_id[{path}]")
+            for path, grant_id in grant_ids.items()
+        }
+        missing = sorted(path.value for path in ExecutionPath if path.value not in self.grant_ids)
+        if missing:
+            raise ValueError(f"missing least-privilege Grant mappings: {missing}")
+        self.writer_id = required(writer_id, "writer_id")
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _component(value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = required(value, "path component")
+        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("invalid receipt path component")
+        return normalized
+
+    def authorize(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        path = ExecutionPath(values["execution_path"]).value
+        grant_id = self.grant_ids[path]
+        parent_provenance_id = values.pop("provenance_id")
+        authorization = self.verifier.authorize(
+            grant_id=grant_id,
+            parent_provenance_id=parent_provenance_id,
+            **values,
+        )
+        tenant = self._component(authorization.tenant_id)
+        parent = self._component(authorization.parent_provenance_id)
+        grant = self._component(authorization.grant_id)
+        target_dir = self.receipt_root / tenant / parent / grant
+        target = target_dir / f"{authorization.authorization_id}.json"
+        payload = authorization.as_dict()
+        payload["writer_id"] = self.writer_id
+        with self._lock:
+            target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
+            temporary.write_text(
+                json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
+                encoding="utf-8",
+            )
+            os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+        return authorization
+
+    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_git_operation(
+        self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any
+    ) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value,
+            git_operation=git_operation,
+            **values,
+        )
+
+    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value, **values)
+
+    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value, **values)

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/provenance_operations.py

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+"""AIOS V2 运维操作 Provenance Gate 与服务级 Scoped Writer 工厂。"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
+
+from .provenance import (
+    Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier,
+    ExecutionPath,
+    ProvenanceAuthorization,
+    ProvenanceControlledWriter,
+    ProvenanceDenied,
+    ProvenanceVerifier,
+    SQLiteProvenanceStore,
+    digest_payload,
+)
+from .provenance_grants import GrantAuthorization, GrantVerifier, SQLiteGrantStore
+from .provenance_scoped import ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter
+
+
+APPLICATION_PROVENANCE_SCOPE = (
+    ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value,
+    ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value,
+    ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value,
+)
+
+
+class AuthorizationWriter(Protocol):
+    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> Any: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationContext:
+    provenance_id: str
+    run_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationReceipt:
+    operation: str
+    request_digest: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    provenance_id: str
+    grant_id: str | None
+    run_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    execution_path: str
+    authorized_at: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+class ProvenanceOperationGate:
+    """部署、回滚、审计和运行操作的统一授权入口。"""
+
+    def __init__(self, writer: AuthorizationWriter) -> None:
+        self.writer = writer
+
+    def authorize(
+        self,
+        context: OperationContext,
+        *,
+        execution_path: str,
+        operation: str,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> OperationReceipt:
+        path = ExecutionPath(execution_path).value
+        normalized_operation = str(operation or "").strip()
+        if not normalized_operation:
+            raise ValueError("operation is required")
+        digest = digest_payload(
+            {
+                "operation": normalized_operation,
+                "execution_path": path,
+                "request": dict(request),
+            }
+        )
+        values = {
+            "provenance_id": context.provenance_id,
+            "run_id": context.run_id,
+            "tenant_id": context.tenant_id,
+            "task_id": context.task_id,
+            "agent_id": context.agent_id,
+            "principal_id": context.principal_id,
+            "request_digest": digest,
+        }
+        if path == ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value:
+            authorization = self.writer.authorize_deployment(**values)
+        elif path == ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value:
+            authorization = self.writer.authorize_rollback(**values)
+        elif path == ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value:
+            authorization = self.writer.authorize_audit(**values)
+        elif path == ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value:
+            authorization = self.writer.authorize_code_change(**values)
+        elif path == ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value:
+            authorization = self.writer.authorize_evidence_write(**values)
+        elif path == ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value:
+            authorization = self.writer.authorize_runtime_execute(**values)
+        else:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied(
+                "generic operation gate does not authorize git_operation; use ProvenanceGitWriter"
+            )
+        return self._receipt(normalized_operation, digest, authorization)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _receipt(
+        operation: str,
+        request_digest: str,
+        authorization: ProvenanceAuthorization | GrantAuthorization | Any,
+    ) -> OperationReceipt:
+        return OperationReceipt(
+            operation=operation,
+            request_digest=request_digest,
+            authorization_id=authorization.authorization_id,
+            provenance_id=authorization.provenance_id,
+            grant_id=getattr(authorization, "grant_id", None),
+            run_id=authorization.run_id,
+            tenant_id=authorization.tenant_id,
+            task_id=authorization.task_id,
+            agent_id=authorization.agent_id,
+            principal_id=authorization.principal_id,
+            execution_path=authorization.execution_path,
+            authorized_at=authorization.authorized_at,
+        )
+
+
+_GRANT_ENV_BY_PATH: Mapping[str, str] = {
+    ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_CODE_CHANGE_ID",
+    ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_GIT_ID",
+    ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_DEPLOYMENT_ID",
+    ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_RUNTIME_ID",
+    ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_EVIDENCE_ID",
+    ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_ROLLBACK_ID",
+    ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value: "AIOS_PROVENANCE_GRANT_AUDIT_ID",
+}
+
+
+def grant_ids_from_environment(
+    *,
+    required_paths: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+    paths = tuple(
+        sorted(
+            {
+                ExecutionPath(path).value
+                for path in (required_paths or tuple(item.value for item in ExecutionPath))
+            }
+        )
+    )
+    values = {path: os.getenv(_GRANT_ENV_BY_PATH[path], "").strip() for path in paths}
+    missing = [_GRANT_ENV_BY_PATH[path] for path, value in values.items() if not value]
+    if missing:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"missing scoped Provenance Grant configuration: {missing}")
+    return values
+
+
+def build_provenance_writer_from_env(
+    *,
+    state_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    required: bool | None = None,
+    required_paths: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+    writer_id: str = "aios-v2-application-grant-writer",
+) -> AuthorizationWriter | None:
+    """从环境构建服务级最小权限 Writer。
+
+    生产应用默认只加载 Runtime、Evidence、Audit Grant。Git、部署和回滚进程
+    必须显式传入自己的 ``required_paths``，不能继承应用默认范围。旧全权限 Writer
+    只允许在显式关闭强制模式的候选/测试环境中使用。
+    """
+
+    require_value = (
+        bool(required)
+        if required is not None
+        else os.getenv("AIOS_REQUIRE_RUN_PROVENANCE", "0").strip().lower()
+        in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+    )
+    public_key_file = os.getenv("AIOS_PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE", "").strip()
+    key_id = os.getenv("AIOS_PROVENANCE_KEY_ID", "").strip()
+    base = Path(state_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR", "/var/lib/aios-v2")).resolve()
+    store_file = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE", str(base / "run-provenance.sqlite3")
+    ).strip()
+    receipt_root = os.getenv(
+        "AIOS_PROVENANCE_RECEIPT_DIR", str(base / "provenance-receipts")
+    ).strip()
+    configured = bool(public_key_file and key_id)
+    if not configured:
+        if require_value:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "Run Provenance is required but AIOS_PROVENANCE_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE or AIOS_PROVENANCE_KEY_ID is missing"
+            )
+        return None
+
+    verifier = Ed25519PublicKeyVerifier.from_file(public_key_file, key_id=key_id)
+    parent_store = SQLiteProvenanceStore(store_file)
+    normalized_paths = tuple(
+        sorted(
+            {
+                ExecutionPath(path).value
+                for path in (
+                    required_paths
+                    if required_paths is not None
+                    else APPLICATION_PROVENANCE_SCOPE
+                )
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+    if require_value:
+        if not normalized_paths:
+            raise RuntimeError("production Run Provenance requires a non-empty service scope")
+        grant_ids = grant_ids_from_environment(required_paths=normalized_paths)
+        grant_store = SQLiteGrantStore(store_file)
+        trusted_grants = GrantVerifier(parent_store, grant_store, {key_id: verifier})
+        return ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter(
+            trusted_grants,
+            receipt_root,
+            grant_ids,
+            required_paths=normalized_paths,
+            writer_id=writer_id,
+        )
+
+    legacy = ProvenanceVerifier(parent_store, {key_id: verifier})
+    return ProvenanceControlledWriter(legacy, receipt_root)
+
+
+def context_from_environment() -> OperationContext:
+    values = {
+        "provenance_id": os.getenv("AIOS_PROVENANCE_ID", ""),
+        "run_id": os.getenv("AIOS_RUN_ID", ""),
+        "tenant_id": os.getenv("AIOS_TENANT_ID", ""),
+        "task_id": os.getenv("AIOS_TASK_ID", ""),
+        "agent_id": os.getenv("AIOS_AGENT_ID", ""),
+        "principal_id": os.getenv("AIOS_PRINCIPAL_ID", ""),
+    }
+    missing = [name for name, value in values.items() if not str(value).strip()]
+    if missing:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"missing Provenance context environment variables: {missing}")
+    return OperationContext(**{name: str(value).strip() for name, value in values.items()})
+
+
+def load_request_file(path: str | Path) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    value = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ValueError("request file must contain a JSON object")
+    return dict(value)

active-runtime/app/aios_v2/provenance_scoped.py

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+"""按服务范围加载的最小权限 Provenance Writer。
+
+该 Writer 只持有调用进程需要的 Grant ID。未配置路径的方法即使被调用也会
+默认拒绝，避免应用进程获得 Git、部署或回滚权限。
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from .provenance import ExecutionPath, ProvenanceDenied, required
+from .provenance_grants import GrantAuthorization, GrantVerifier
+
+
+class ScopedLeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter:
+    """只暴露指定 ExecutionPath 的最小权限 Writer。"""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        verifier: GrantVerifier,
+        receipt_root: str | Path,
+        grant_ids: Mapping[str, str],
+        *,
+        required_paths: Sequence[str],
+        writer_id: str = "aios-v2-scoped-grant-writer",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.receipt_root = Path(receipt_root).resolve()
+        self.receipt_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        normalized_required = tuple(
+            sorted({ExecutionPath(path).value for path in required_paths})
+        )
+        if not normalized_required:
+            raise ValueError("required_paths must not be empty")
+        self.required_paths = frozenset(normalized_required)
+        self.grant_ids = {
+            path: required(grant_ids.get(path, ""), f"grant_id[{path}]")
+            for path in normalized_required
+        }
+        unexpected = sorted(set(grant_ids) - self.required_paths)
+        if unexpected:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"scoped writer received unnecessary Grant mappings: {unexpected}"
+            )
+        self.writer_id = required(writer_id, "writer_id")
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _component(value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = required(value, "path component")
+        if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied("invalid receipt path component")
+        return normalized
+
+    def _grant_for(self, path: str) -> str:
+        normalized = ExecutionPath(path).value
+        grant_id = self.grant_ids.get(normalized)
+        if grant_id is None:
+            raise ProvenanceDenied(
+                f"this process is not allowed to authorize {normalized}"
+            )
+        return grant_id
+
+    def authorize(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        path = ExecutionPath(values["execution_path"]).value
+        grant_id = self._grant_for(path)
+        parent_provenance_id = values.pop("provenance_id")
+        authorization = self.verifier.authorize(
+            grant_id=grant_id,
+            parent_provenance_id=parent_provenance_id,
+            **values,
+        )
+        tenant = self._component(authorization.tenant_id)
+        parent = self._component(authorization.parent_provenance_id)
+        grant = self._component(authorization.grant_id)
+        target_dir = self.receipt_root / tenant / parent / grant
+        target = target_dir / f"{authorization.authorization_id}.json"
+        payload = authorization.as_dict()
+        payload["writer_id"] = self.writer_id
+        payload["scope"] = sorted(self.required_paths)
+        with self._lock:
+            target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
+            temporary.write_text(
+                json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2)
+                + "\n",
+                encoding="utf-8",
+            )
+            os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+        return authorization
+
+    def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value, **values
+        )
+
+    def authorize_git_operation(
+        self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any
+    ) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value,
+            git_operation=git_operation,
+            **values,
+        )
+
+    def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value, **values
+        )
+
+    def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value, **values
+        )
+
+    def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value, **values
+        )
+
+    def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(
+            execution_path=ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value, **values
+        )
+
+    def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
+        return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value, **values)

active-runtime/app/approved_release_executor.py

@@ -1,652 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""One-shot governed executor for an already approved exact release binding.
-
-This module deliberately does not build release artifacts. The build/staging
-evidence is completed before Owner production approval. Production execution
-consumes that immutable binding, revalidates it, and performs narrow
-side-effects through adapters in a durable fail-closed order.
-
-Adapter protocol:
-  stdin: JSON request with operation = "probe" | "apply" | "rollback"
-  stdout: one JSON object on the final non-empty line
-  shell: never used
-
-The executor never rewrites tags, never writes refs/heads/main, and records
-Baseline last.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import dataclasses
-import fcntl
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import stat
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import time
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-PLAN_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-
-REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS = {
-    "payload/VERSION",
-    "payload/active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py",
-    "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py",
-    "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r1c7_health_service.py",
-    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service",
-    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/v2r1c7-runtime-config.json",
-    "payload/deploy/aios-v2/v2r1c7-rollback.json",
-    "payload/scripts/probe_v2r1c7_health.py",
-    "payload/scripts/rollback_v2r1c7_release.sh",
-    "payload/BUILD-METADATA.json",
-    "payload/ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json",
-    "payload/ROLLBACK-METADATA.json",
-}
-
-class ReleaseBlocked(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-class ManualOwnerReviewRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
-    pass
-
-class ReconciliationRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Binding:
-    version: str
-    target_oid: str
-    evidence_closure_oid: str
-    artifact_sha256: str
-    approval_plan_id: str
-    artifact_path: str
-    artifact_size: int
-    production_service: str
-    production_port: int
-    repository_identity: str = "aios/aios"
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if not self.version or not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.target_oid):
-            raise ValueError("invalid release target binding")
-        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.evidence_closure_oid):
-            raise ValueError("invalid evidence closure OID")
-        if not SHA_RE.fullmatch(self.artifact_sha256):
-            raise ValueError("invalid artifact SHA-256")
-        if not PLAN_RE.fullmatch(self.approval_plan_id):
-            raise ValueError("invalid approval plan id")
-        if self.artifact_size <= 0:
-            raise ValueError("invalid artifact size")
-        if not self.production_service:
-            raise ValueError("production service is required")
-        if not 1024 <= self.production_port <= 65535:
-            raise ValueError("invalid production port")
-        if self.repository_identity != "aios/aios":
-            raise ValueError("unexpected repository identity")
-
-    @property
-    def tag(self) -> str:
-        return self.version
-
-    @property
-    def fingerprint(self) -> str:
-        payload = {
-            "version": self.version,
-            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
-            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
-            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
-            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
-            "artifact_size": self.artifact_size,
-            "production_service": self.production_service,
-            "production_port": self.production_port,
-            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
-        }
-        return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(payload)).hexdigest()
-
-    def request(self, operation: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "schema": "aios.production-executor-request.v1",
-            "operation": operation,
-            "binding_fingerprint": self.fingerprint,
-            "version": self.version,
-            "tag": self.tag,
-            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
-            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
-            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
-            "artifact_path": self.artifact_path,
-            "artifact_size": self.artifact_size,
-            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
-            "production_service": self.production_service,
-            "production_port": self.production_port,
-            "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
-        }
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
-    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    st = path.lstat()
-    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode) or path.is_symlink():
-        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"non-regular authorization file: {path}")
-    if st.st_uid != 0:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"authorization file must be root-owned: {path}")
-    if st.st_mode & 0o022:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"authorization file is group/world writable: {path}")
-    data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if not isinstance(data, dict):
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("authorization receipt must be a JSON object")
-    return data
-
-
-def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
-    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact must be a regular non-symlink file")
-    digest = hashlib.sha256()
-    with path.open("rb") as source:
-        for block in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
-            digest.update(block)
-    return digest.hexdigest()
-
-
-def run_git(git_dir: Path, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
-    return subprocess.run(
-        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
-        check=check,
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        timeout=30,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-
-
-def verify_git_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    authority_main = run_git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main").stdout.strip()
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(authority_main):
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Authority main OID is invalid")
-
-    target_type = run_git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.target_oid).stdout.strip()
-    if target_type != "commit":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("target_oid is not a commit")
-
-    evidence_type = run_git(
-        git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.evidence_closure_oid
-    ).stdout.strip()
-    if evidence_type != "commit":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("evidence_closure_oid is not a commit")
-
-    # A control-plane-only patch may advance main after release approval.
-    # The approved release target remains valid only while it is still on main.
-    target_on_main = run_git(
-        git_dir,
-        "merge-base",
-        "--is-ancestor",
-        binding.target_oid,
-        authority_main,
-        check=False,
-    ).returncode == 0
-    if not target_on_main:
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
-            "approved target is no longer an ancestor of Authority main"
-        )
-
-    target_in_evidence = run_git(
-        git_dir,
-        "merge-base",
-        "--is-ancestor",
-        binding.target_oid,
-        binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-        check=False,
-    ).returncode == 0
-    if not target_in_evidence:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("approved target is not an ancestor of evidence closure")
-
-    return {
-        "authority_main_oid": authority_main,
-        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "target_is_ancestor_of_main": True,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-        "evidence_object_type": evidence_type,
-        "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
-    }
-
-
-def verify_artifact(binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    path = Path(binding.artifact_path)
-    if path.stat().st_size != binding.artifact_size:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact size mismatch")
-    actual = sha256_file(path)
-    if actual != binding.artifact_sha256:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact SHA-256 mismatch")
-
-    if binding.version == "V2R1C7":
-        # Python tarfile may not have zstd support on the target host, so
-        # decompress into a private temporary tar and inspect it there.
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-artifact-verify-") as temp_dir:
-            tar_path = Path(temp_dir) / "release.tar"
-            with tar_path.open("wb") as output:
-                completed = subprocess.run(
-                    ["zstd", "-dc", str(path)],
-                    check=False,
-                    stdout=output,
-                    stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
-                    timeout=60,
-                    env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-                )
-            if completed.returncode != 0:
-                raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact zstd decompression failed")
-            import tarfile
-            with tarfile.open(tar_path, "r:") as archive:
-                names: set[str] = set()
-                for member in archive.getmembers():
-                    candidate = Path(member.name)
-                    if (
-                        candidate.is_absolute()
-                        or ".." in candidate.parts
-                        or member.issym()
-                        or member.islnk()
-                        or not (member.isfile() or member.isdir())
-                    ):
-                        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"unsafe artifact member: {member.name}")
-                    names.add(member.name)
-            missing = sorted(REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS - names)
-            if missing:
-                raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                    "artifact missing required members: " + ",".join(missing)
-                )
-    return {
-        "artifact_path": str(path),
-        "artifact_sha256": actual,
-        "artifact_size": binding.artifact_size,
-        "verified": True,
-    }
-
-
-def verify_authorization(receipt: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    if receipt.get("accepted") is not True:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Owner production authorization is not accepted")
-    if receipt.get("binding_replaced") not in (None, False):
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("Owner binding was replaced")
-    expected = {
-        "version": binding.version,
-        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-        "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
-        "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
-    }
-    for key, value in expected.items():
-        if receipt.get(key) != value:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"Owner authorization mismatch: {key}")
-    return {"accepted": True, **expected}
-
-
-class DurableState:
-    def __init__(self, root: Path, binding: Binding):
-        self.root = root
-        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        os.chmod(self.root, 0o700)
-        self.path = self.root / "execution.json"
-        self.binding = binding
-        self.value: dict[str, Any]
-        if self.path.exists():
-            existing = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-            if existing.get("binding_fingerprint") != binding.fingerprint:
-                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
-                    "state root contains a different production binding"
-                )
-            self.value = existing
-        else:
-            self.value = {
-                "schema": "aios.production-execution-state.v1",
-                "binding_fingerprint": binding.fingerprint,
-                "version": binding.version,
-                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                "state": "AUTHORIZED",
-                "completed": {},
-                "history": [],
-            }
-            self.save()
-
-    def save(self) -> None:
-        temporary = self.path.with_suffix(".tmp")
-        temporary.write_bytes(canonical_json(self.value))
-        os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
-        os.replace(temporary, self.path)
-
-    def record(self, state: str, step: str, result: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        now = time.time()
-        sanitized = json.loads(json.dumps(result))
-        self.value["state"] = state
-        self.value["completed"][step] = sanitized
-        self.value["history"].append(
-            {"at": now, "state": state, "step": step, "result": sanitized}
-        )
-        self.save()
-
-    def fail(self, state: str, reason: str) -> None:
-        self.value["state"] = state
-        self.value["history"].append(
-            {"at": time.time(), "state": state, "reason": reason}
-        )
-        self.save()
-
-
-class FileLock:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path):
-        self.path = path
-        self.handle = None
-
-    def __enter__(self) -> "FileLock":
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
-        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
-        try:
-            fcntl.flock(
-                self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB
-            )
-        except BlockingIOError as exc:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked("production executor is already running") from exc
-        return self
-
-    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
-        if self.handle is not None:
-            fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
-            self.handle.close()
-
-
-def parse_command(values: Sequence[str]) -> list[str]:
-    command = [str(x) for x in values if str(x)]
-    if not command:
-        raise ValueError("adapter command is required")
-    if not os.path.isabs(command[0]):
-        raise ValueError("adapter executable must be an absolute path")
-    return command
-
-
-def run_adapter(command: Sequence[str], request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        list(command),
-        input=canonical_json(request),
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        timeout=180,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked(
-            f"adapter failed: {Path(command[0]).name} rc={completed.returncode}"
-        )
-    lines = [line for line in completed.stdout.decode("utf-8").splitlines() if line.strip()]
-    if not lines:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter returned no JSON result")
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(lines[-1])
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter returned invalid JSON") from exc
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("adapter result must be an object")
-    return value
-
-
-def require_exact_response(result: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Binding) -> None:
-    for key, expected in {
-        "version": binding.version,
-        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-        "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
-        "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
-    }.items():
-        if key in result and result[key] != expected:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"adapter binding mismatch: {key}")
-
-
-def tag_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = binding.request("probe")
-    probe = run_adapter(command, request)
-    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
-    state = probe.get("status")
-    if state == "CONFLICT":
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("same-name tag conflicts with approved binding")
-    if state == "INDETERMINATE":
-        raise ReconciliationRequired("tag publication state is indeterminate")
-    if state not in {"APPLIED_VERIFIED", "NOT_APPLIED", "PARTIAL_LOCAL"}:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"unsupported tag probe status: {state}")
-    if state != "APPLIED_VERIFIED":
-        applied = run_adapter(command, binding.request("apply"))
-        require_exact_response(applied, binding)
-        if applied.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("tag conflict during publication")
-        probe = run_adapter(command, request)
-        require_exact_response(probe, binding)
-    if probe.get("status") != "APPLIED_VERIFIED":
-        raise ReconciliationRequired("tag was not independently verified")
-    if probe.get("peeled_target_oid") != binding.target_oid:
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("published tag peeled target mismatch")
-    tag_oid = probe.get("tag_oid")
-    if not isinstance(tag_oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(tag_oid):
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("verified annotated tag object OID missing")
-    return dict(probe)
-
-
-def deploy_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    probe = run_adapter(command, binding.request("probe"))
-    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
-    if probe.get("status") == "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
-        return dict(probe)
-    if probe.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("production runtime has conflicting binding")
-    applied = run_adapter(command, binding.request("apply"))
-    require_exact_response(applied, binding)
-    probe = run_adapter(command, binding.request("probe"))
-    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
-    if probe.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
-        try:
-            run_adapter(command, binding.request("rollback"))
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-        raise ReconciliationRequired("production runtime did not verify after apply")
-    if (
-        probe.get("deployment_state") != "ACTIVE"
-        or probe.get("production_deployed") is not True
-    ):
-        raise ReconciliationRequired("production health contract is not ACTIVE")
-    return dict(probe)
-
-
-def finalize_step(
-    command: Sequence[str],
-    binding: Binding,
-    *,
-    name: str,
-    tag_oid: str,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = binding.request("probe")
-    request["tag_oid"] = tag_oid
-    probe = run_adapter(command, request)
-    require_exact_response(probe, binding)
-    if probe.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"{name} has conflicting release binding")
-    if probe.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
-        apply_request = binding.request("apply")
-        apply_request["tag_oid"] = tag_oid
-        applied = run_adapter(command, apply_request)
-        require_exact_response(applied, binding)
-        probe = run_adapter(command, request)
-        require_exact_response(probe, binding)
-    if probe.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
-        raise ReconciliationRequired(f"{name} did not verify after apply")
-    if probe.get("tag_oid") not in (None, tag_oid):
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"{name} tag object mismatch")
-    return dict(probe)
-
-
-def execute(
-    *,
-    binding: Binding,
-    authorization_path: Path,
-    repository: Path,
-    state_root: Path,
-    tag_command: Sequence[str],
-    deploy_command: Sequence[str],
-    registry_command: Sequence[str],
-    baseline_command: Sequence[str],
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    authorization = verify_authorization(secure_json(authorization_path), binding)
-    lineage = verify_git_lineage(repository, binding)
-    artifact = verify_artifact(binding)
-    state = DurableState(state_root, binding)
-    with FileLock(state_root / "executor.lock"):
-        state.record(
-            "PREFLIGHT_VERIFIED",
-            "preflight",
-            {"authorization": authorization, "lineage": lineage, "artifact": artifact},
-        )
-        tag: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-        runtime: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-        try:
-            tag = tag_step(tag_command, binding)
-            state.record("TAG_VERIFIED", "tag", tag)
-
-            runtime = deploy_step(deploy_command, binding)
-            state.record("RUNTIME_VERIFIED", "runtime", runtime)
-
-            registry = finalize_step(
-                registry_command,
-                binding,
-                name="registry",
-                tag_oid=tag["tag_oid"],
-            )
-            state.record("REGISTRY_VERIFIED", "registry", registry)
-
-            baseline = finalize_step(
-                baseline_command,
-                binding,
-                name="baseline",
-                tag_oid=tag["tag_oid"],
-            )
-            state.record("BASELINE_VERIFIED", "baseline", baseline)
-
-            # Final readback: no mutation, all four planes must still agree.
-            final_tag = tag_step(tag_command, binding)
-            final_runtime = run_adapter(deploy_command, binding.request("probe"))
-            final_registry_request = binding.request("probe")
-            final_registry_request["tag_oid"] = tag["tag_oid"]
-            final_registry = run_adapter(registry_command, final_registry_request)
-            final_baseline_request = binding.request("probe")
-            final_baseline_request["tag_oid"] = tag["tag_oid"]
-            final_baseline = run_adapter(baseline_command, final_baseline_request)
-            for value in (final_runtime, final_registry, final_baseline):
-                require_exact_response(value, binding)
-            if final_runtime.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
-                raise ReconciliationRequired("final runtime readback failed")
-            if final_registry.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
-                raise ReconciliationRequired("final Registry readback failed")
-            if final_baseline.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
-                raise ReconciliationRequired("final Baseline readback failed")
-            final = {
-                "status": "PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED",
-                "version": binding.version,
-                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-                "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
-                "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
-                "tag_oid": tag["tag_oid"],
-                "tag": final_tag,
-                "runtime": final_runtime,
-                "registry": final_registry,
-                "baseline": final_baseline,
-                "force_push_used": False,
-                "tag_rewritten": False,
-                "direct_main_push": False,
-                "secrets_committed": False,
-            }
-            state.record("COMPLETED", "final_consistency", final)
-            return final
-        except ManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
-            state.fail("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", str(exc))
-            raise
-        except ReconciliationRequired as exc:
-            state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", str(exc))
-            raise
-        except Exception as exc:
-            # Once a formal tag has been verified, no later error is a clean
-            # pre-side-effect failure. Preserve the tag and require idempotent
-            # reconciliation rather than pretending the release never started.
-            if tag is not None:
-                reason = f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
-                state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", reason)
-                raise ReconciliationRequired(reason) from exc
-            state.fail("FAIL_CLOSED", f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")
-            raise
-
-
-def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
-    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    p.add_argument("--authorization", required=True, type=Path)
-    p.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
-    p.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
-    p.add_argument("--artifact", required=True, type=Path)
-    p.add_argument("--artifact-size", required=True, type=int)
-    p.add_argument("--version", required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--target-oid", required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--evidence-closure-oid", required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--artifact-sha256", required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--approval-plan-id", required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--production-service", required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--production-port", required=True, type=int)
-    p.add_argument("--repository-identity", default="aios/aios")
-    p.add_argument("--tag-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
-    p.add_argument("--deploy-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
-    p.add_argument("--registry-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
-    p.add_argument("--baseline-adapter", required=True, nargs="+")
-    return p
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    args = parser().parse_args()
-    binding = Binding(
-        version=args.version,
-        target_oid=args.target_oid,
-        evidence_closure_oid=args.evidence_closure_oid,
-        artifact_sha256=args.artifact_sha256,
-        approval_plan_id=args.approval_plan_id,
-        artifact_path=str(args.artifact),
-        artifact_size=args.artifact_size,
-        production_service=args.production_service,
-        production_port=args.production_port,
-        repository_identity=args.repository_identity,
-    )
-    try:
-        result = execute(
-            binding=binding,
-            authorization_path=args.authorization,
-            repository=args.repository,
-            state_root=args.state_root,
-            tag_command=parse_command(args.tag_adapter),
-            deploy_command=parse_command(args.deploy_adapter),
-            registry_command=parse_command(args.registry_adapter),
-            baseline_command=parse_command(args.baseline_adapter),
-        )
-        print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
-        return 0
-    except ManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        return 20
-    except ReconciliationRequired as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        return 21
-    except Exception as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAIL_CLOSED", "error": type(exc).__name__, "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        return 22
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/authoritative_git.py

@@ -1,418 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed access to the authoritative bare Git repository."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import re
-import subprocess
-import time
-import urllib.parse
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Iterable
-
-_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset(
-    {
-        "cat-file",
-        "config",
-        "diff",
-        "for-each-ref",
-        "ls-remote",
-        "merge-base",
-        "push",
-        "remote",
-        "rev-parse",
-        "show-ref",
-        "tag",
-    }
-)
-_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-_MAX_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
-_TIMEOUT = 8.0
-
-
-class AuthoritativeGitError(RuntimeError):
-    """A fail-closed authoritative repository or ref query error."""
-
-
-class AuthoritativeGitNotFound(AuthoritativeGitError):
-    """A validated revision does not exist in the authoritative repository."""
-
-
-class AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge(AuthoritativeGitError):
-    """A controlled Git query exceeded the response-size boundary."""
-
-
-def _redact(text: str) -> str:
-    value = str(text or "")
-    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:bearer|token)\s+\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
-    value = re.sub(r"(?i)((?:access_)?token\s*[:=]\s*)\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
-    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(https?://[^/\s:@]+:)[^@\s/]+@", r"\1REDACTED@", value)
-    return value
-
-
-def _configured_path(git_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
-    raw = str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
-    if not raw:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    path = Path(raw)
-    if not path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    try:
-        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-    if not resolved.is_dir():
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    return resolved
-
-
-def _run(
-    git_dir: Path,
-    args: list[str],
-    *,
-    check: bool,
-    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
-) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
-    if not args or args[0] not in _ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-    try:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            timeout=timeout,
-            env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
-        )
-    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
-    if len(result.stdout) + len(result.stderr) > _MAX_OUTPUT:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
-    if check and result.returncode != 0:
-        detail = _redact(result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip())
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError(
-            "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED" + (f": {detail[:160]}" if detail else "")
-        )
-    return result
-
-
-def _repository_identity_from_remote(url: str) -> str:
-    value = str(url or "").strip().split("?", 1)[0].rstrip("/")
-    if not value:
-        return ""
-    if "://" in value:
-        value = urllib.parse.urlparse(value).path
-    elif ":" in value:
-        value = value.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
-    value = value.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].strip("/")
-    value = re.sub(r"\.git$", "", value, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
-    parts = [part for part in value.split("/") if part]
-    if len(parts) >= 2:
-        value = "/".join(parts[-2:])
-    return value.strip("/").lower()
-
-
-def verify_repository(
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-    repository_identity: str | None = None,
-) -> tuple[Path, str]:
-    path = _configured_path(git_dir)
-    expected = str(
-        repository_identity
-        or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
-    ).strip().strip("/")
-    if not expected or expected.count("/") != 1:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-    bare = _run(path, ["rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository"], check=True)
-    if bare.stdout.strip().lower() != "true":
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    remote = _run(path, ["config", "--get", "remote.gitea.url"], check=False)
-    actual = _repository_identity_from_remote(remote.stdout)
-    if actual != expected.lower():
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-    return path, expected
-
-
-def run_authoritative_git(
-    args: list[str],
-    *,
-    check: bool = True,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
-) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
-    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
-    return _run(path, list(args), check=check, timeout=timeout)
-
-
-def authoritative_head_oid(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    result = run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main"], git_dir=git_dir)
-    oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-    return oid
-
-
-def authoritative_tags(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> list[dict[str, str | None]]:
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        [
-            "for-each-ref",
-            "refs/tags",
-            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)\t%(objecttype)",
-        ],
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    tags: list[dict[str, str | None]] = []
-    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
-        name, oid, object_type = (line.split("\t", 2) + ["", ""])[:3]
-        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
-            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-        peeled_result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{name}^{{commit}}"],
-            git_dir=git_dir,
-        )
-        peeled = peeled_result.stdout.strip().lower()
-        if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(peeled):
-            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-        tags.append(
-            {
-                "name": name,
-                "tag_oid": oid.lower(),
-                "object_type": object_type,
-                "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
-            }
-        )
-    return tags
-
-
-def authoritative_branches(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        [
-            "for-each-ref",
-            "refs/heads",
-            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)",
-        ],
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    branches: list[dict[str, str]] = []
-    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
-        name, oid = (line.split("\t", 1) + [""])[:2]
-        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
-            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-        branches.append({"name": name, "oid": oid.lower()})
-    return branches
-
-
-def authoritative_commit(
-    oid: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    value = str(oid or "").strip().lower()
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise ValueError("commit OID must be a full 40-character value")
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{value}^{{commit}}"],
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    resolved = result.stdout.strip().lower()
-    if resolved != value:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-    return resolved
-
-
-def authoritative_lineage(
-    ancestor: str,
-    descendant: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> None:
-    authoritative_commit(ancestor, git_dir=git_dir)
-    authoritative_commit(descendant, git_dir=git_dir)
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        ["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
-        check=False,
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("evidence lineage mismatch")
-
-
-_SAFE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
-
-
-def _safe_ref_name(value: str) -> bool:
-    return bool(
-        _SAFE_REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
-        and ".." not in value
-        and "//" not in value
-        and "@{" not in value
-        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
-        and not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
-    )
-
-
-def validate_git_revision(
-    value: str,
-    field: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    revision = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not revision or revision != str(value or "") or revision.startswith("-"):
-        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
-    if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
-        try:
-            return authoritative_commit(revision.lower(), git_dir=git_dir)
-        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-            raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found") from exc
-    if not _safe_ref_name(revision) or any(token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")):
-        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
-    if revision.startswith("refs/"):
-        if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
-            raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
-        candidates = [revision]
-    else:
-        candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
-    matches: list[str] = []
-    for candidate in candidates:
-        result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
-            check=False,
-            git_dir=git_dir,
-        )
-        oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
-        if result.returncode == 0 and _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-            matches.append(oid)
-    if not matches:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found")
-    if len(set(matches)) != 1 or len(matches) != 1:
-        raise ValueError(f"ambiguous {field} revision")
-    return matches[0]
-
-
-def authoritative_diff(
-    from_revision: str,
-    to_revision: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
-    from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
-    to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
-    args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
-    patch_limit = max(1, min(_MAX_OUTPUT, 256 * 1024))
-    process = subprocess.Popen(
-        ["git", "--git-dir", str(path), *args],
-        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
-        stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
-        env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
-    )
-    chunks: list[bytes] = []
-    stored_bytes = 0
-    total_bytes = 0
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    try:
-        while process.stdout is not None:
-            chunk = process.stdout.read(64 * 1024)
-            if not chunk:
-                break
-            total_bytes += len(chunk)
-            if stored_bytes < patch_limit:
-                remaining = patch_limit - stored_bytes
-                selected = chunk[:remaining]
-                chunks.append(selected)
-                stored_bytes += len(selected)
-            if time.monotonic() - started > _TIMEOUT:
-                process.kill()
-                raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_TIMEOUT")
-        stderr = (
-            process.stderr.read(8192).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
-            if process.stderr is not None
-            else ""
-        )
-        returncode = process.wait(timeout=max(0.1, _TIMEOUT - (time.monotonic() - started)))
-    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
-        process.kill()
-        process.wait()
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
-    if returncode != 0:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError(_redact(stderr.strip() or "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")[:200])
-    try:
-        names_result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", "--name-status", from_oid, to_oid],
-            git_dir=path,
-        )
-        changed_paths = [
-            line.split("\t", 1)[-1]
-            for line in names_result.stdout.splitlines()
-            if line.strip()
-        ]
-    except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge:
-        changed_paths = []
-    try:
-        stats_result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", "--stat", from_oid, to_oid],
-            git_dir=path,
-        )
-        stats = stats_result.stdout.strip()
-    except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge:
-        stats = "GIT_STAT_OUTPUT_TRUNCATED"
-    patch = b"".join(chunks).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
-    return {
-        "code": 0,
-        "stdout": patch,
-        "stderr": "",
-        "cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
-        "from_oid": from_oid,
-        "to_oid": to_oid,
-        "changed_paths": changed_paths,
-        "stats": stats,
-        "total_size_bytes": total_bytes,
-        "truncated": total_bytes > patch_limit,
-        "patch_limit_bytes": patch_limit,
-    }
-
-
-def repository_snapshot(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-    repository_identity: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    configured = bool(
-        str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
-    )
-    try:
-        path, identity = verify_repository(
-            git_dir=git_dir,
-            repository_identity=repository_identity,
-        )
-        head = authoritative_head_oid(git_dir=path)
-        return {
-            "repository_available": True,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": True,
-            "authoritative_git_dir": str(path),
-            "authoritative_head_oid": head,
-            "repository_identity": identity,
-            "query_error": None,
-        }
-    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
-        return {
-            "repository_available": False,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": False,
-            "authoritative_git_dir": None,
-            "authoritative_head_oid": None,
-            "repository_identity": str(
-                repository_identity
-                or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
-            ).strip() or None,
-            "query_error": _redact(str(exc)),
-        }

active-runtime/app/autonomy_notification_plane.py

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-"""Durable Owner/GPT notification outbox with retry and acknowledgement."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import sqlite3
-import time
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OutboxEvent:
-    event_id: str
-    recipient: str
-    kind: str
-    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
-    attempts: int
-    available_at: float
-    acknowledged: bool
-
-
-class DurableOutbox:
-    RECIPIENTS = ("owner", "gpt")
-
-    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.path = str(path)
-        self.db = sqlite3.connect(self.path)
-        self.db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        self.db.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS outbox (event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, recipient TEXT NOT NULL, kind TEXT NOT NULL, payload TEXT NOT NULL, attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, available_at REAL NOT NULL, delivered_at REAL, acknowledged INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, last_error TEXT)")
-        self.db.commit()
-
-    def enqueue(self, kind: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, event_id: str | None = None, recipients: tuple[str, ...] = RECIPIENTS) -> list[str]:
-        ids: list[str] = []
-        for recipient in recipients:
-            if recipient not in self.RECIPIENTS:
-                raise ValueError("recipient is outside the governed notification plane")
-            eid = event_id or str(uuid.uuid4())
-            if event_id is not None and len(recipients) > 1:
-                eid = f"{event_id}:{recipient}"
-            self.db.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO outbox(event_id,recipient,kind,payload,available_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)", (eid, recipient, kind, json.dumps(dict(payload), sort_keys=True), time.time()))
-            ids.append(eid)
-        self.db.commit()
-        return ids
-
-    def due(self, *, now: float | None = None, limit: int = 20) -> list[OutboxEvent]:
-        now = time.time() if now is None else now
-        rows = self.db.execute("SELECT event_id,recipient,kind,payload,attempts,available_at,acknowledged FROM outbox WHERE delivered_at IS NULL AND available_at<=? ORDER BY available_at,event_id LIMIT ?", (now, limit)).fetchall()
-        return [OutboxEvent(r[0], r[1], r[2], json.loads(r[3]), r[4], r[5], bool(r[6])) for r in rows]
-
-    def delivered(self, event_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
-        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET delivered_at=? WHERE event_id=?", (time.time() if now is None else now, event_id))
-        self.db.commit()
-
-    def failed(self, event_id: str, error: str, *, now: float | None = None, max_backoff: float = 300.0) -> None:
-        now = time.time() if now is None else now
-        row = self.db.execute("SELECT attempts FROM outbox WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,)).fetchone()
-        attempts = int(row[0]) + 1 if row else 1
-        delay = min(max_backoff, 2 ** min(attempts, 8))
-        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET attempts=?,available_at=?,last_error=? WHERE event_id=?", (attempts, now + delay, error[:200], event_id))
-        self.db.commit()
-
-    def acknowledge(self, event_id: str) -> None:
-        self.db.execute("UPDATE outbox SET acknowledged=1 WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,))
-        self.db.commit()
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        self.db.close()
-
-
-class NotificationPlane:
-    def __init__(self, outbox: DurableOutbox) -> None:
-        self.outbox = outbox
-
-    def emit(self, kind: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], *, event_id: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
-        return self.outbox.enqueue(kind, payload, event_id=event_id)
-
-    def deliver_once(self, send: Callable[[OutboxEvent], None], *, now: float | None = None) -> list[str]:
-        delivered: list[str] = []
-        for event in self.outbox.due(now=now):
-            try:
-                send(event)
-            except Exception as exc:
-                self.outbox.failed(event.event_id, type(exc).__name__, now=now)
-            else:
-                self.outbox.delivered(event.event_id, now=now)
-                delivered.append(event.event_id)
-        return delivered

active-runtime/app/baseline_authority.py

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Single canonical Production Baseline authority for the GitOps reader.
-
-The API and the one-shot writer import this module.  Workspace and release
-copies are projections only; they are never selected as a fallback source.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-
-AUTHORITY_PATH = Path(os.getenv(
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_AUTHORITY",
-    "/var/lib/aios-gitops-runtime-anchor/baseline/current.json",
-))
-AUTHORITY_SHA_PATH = AUTHORITY_PATH.with_suffix(".sha256")
-
-
-class BaselineAuthorityError(RuntimeError):
-    """Fail-closed error raised for an unavailable or inconsistent authority."""
-
-
-class BaselineAuthority:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path | str = AUTHORITY_PATH):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self.sha_path = self.path.with_suffix(".sha256")
-
-    def _raw(self) -> bytes:
-        try:
-            raw = self.path.read_bytes()
-        except OSError as exc:
-            raise BaselineAuthorityError(f"authority_unavailable:{exc}") from exc
-        if not raw:
-            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_empty")
-        return raw
-
-    def read(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        raw = self._raw()
-        digest = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_invalid_json") from exc
-        if not isinstance(value, dict):
-            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_not_object")
-        expected = str(value.get("authority_sha256", ""))
-        if expected and expected != digest:
-            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_embedded_digest_mismatch")
-        if self.sha_path.exists():
-            sidecar = self.sha_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip().split()[0]
-            if sidecar != digest:
-                raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_sidecar_digest_mismatch")
-        required = {
-            "current_baseline", "previous_baseline", "target_oid", "tag_oid",
-            "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id", "status", "generation",
-            "source_identity",
-        }
-        missing = sorted(required.difference(value))
-        if missing:
-            raise BaselineAuthorityError("authority_missing:" + ",".join(missing))
-        value = dict(value)
-        value["authority_sha256"] = digest
-        value["authority_path"] = str(self.path)
-        return value
-
-    def read_consistent(self, policy: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        value = self.read()
-        if policy:
-            expected = policy.get("release_binding", policy)
-            for key, field in (("version", "current_baseline"),
-                               ("previous_version", "previous_baseline"),
-                               ("target_oid", "target_oid"),
-                               ("tag_oid", "tag_oid"),
-                               ("evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_closure_oid"),
-                               ("approval_plan_id", "approval_plan_id")):
-                wanted = expected.get(key)
-                if wanted is not None and value.get(field) != wanted:
-                    raise BaselineAuthorityError(f"authority_binding_mismatch:{field}")
-        return value
-

active-runtime/app/branch_repair_lease.py

@@ -1,491 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed, branch-bound repair leases for governed AIOS GitOps work."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import posixpath
-import re
-import secrets
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
-
-
-TASK_ID = "V2R1C6_GOVERNED_LOCAL_BOOTSTRAP"
-MAX_LEASE_SECONDS = 86_400
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$")
-DENIED_BRANCHES = {"main", "master", "HEAD"}
-PROTECTED_PREFIXES = (
-    ".git",
-    "VERSION",
-    "versions/V2R1C5.json",
-    "artifacts/V2R1C5",
-    "baseline",
-    "config/gitops.tokens",
-    "gitops.tokens",
-    "secrets",
-    "credentials",
-)
-SECRET_PATTERNS = (
-    re.compile(r"(?i)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
-    re.compile(r"\b(?:sk|HPUA|SDC)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b"),
-)
-
-
-class LeaseError(Exception):
-    """Raised for any invalid, stale, expired, or prohibited lease action."""
-
-
-class GitProbeProtocol(Protocol):
-    """Read-only Git seam used by the lease manager."""
-
-    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
-
-    def parent(self, commit: str) -> str: ...
-
-    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
-
-    def changed_paths(self, commit: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: ...
-
-    def commits_between(self, older: str, newer: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: ...
-
-
-def _now() -> datetime:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _ts(value: datetime) -> str:
-    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _parse_ts(value: str) -> datetime:
-    if value.endswith("Z"):
-        value = value[:-1] + "+00:00"
-    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value)
-    return parsed if parsed.tzinfo else parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _oid(value: str, field: str = "oid") -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise LeaseError(f"{field} must be a full commit OID")
-    return value.lower()
-
-
-def normalize_path(path: str) -> str:
-    """Normalize a repository-relative path without resolving through the FS."""
-    if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip():
-        raise LeaseError("path must be a non-empty string")
-    value = path.replace("\\", "/").strip()
-    if value.startswith("/") or "\x00" in value:
-        raise LeaseError("path must be relative")
-    parts = value.split("/")
-    if any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts):
-        raise LeaseError("path contains a prohibited component")
-    normalized = posixpath.normpath(value)
-    if normalized == "." or normalized.startswith("../"):
-        raise LeaseError("path is not normalized")
-    return normalized
-
-
-def path_is_protected(path: str) -> bool:
-    normalized = normalize_path(path)
-    lower = normalized.lower()
-    return any(
-        lower == prefix.lower() or lower.startswith(prefix.lower().rstrip("/") + "/")
-        for prefix in PROTECTED_PREFIXES
-    ) or lower.startswith("refs/")
-
-
-def contains_secret_like_content(content: str) -> bool:
-    return any(pattern.search(content or "") for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS)
-
-
-def validate_paths(paths: Iterable[str], allowed_paths: Sequence[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    allowed = tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in allowed_paths)
-    if not allowed:
-        raise LeaseError("allowed_paths must not be empty")
-    result: list[str] = []
-    for raw in paths:
-        path = normalize_path(raw)
-        if path_is_protected(path):
-            raise LeaseError("protected path is not lease-writable")
-        if not any(path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix + "/") for prefix in allowed):
-            raise LeaseError("path is outside the lease allowlist")
-        if path not in result:
-            result.append(path)
-    if not result:
-        raise LeaseError("at least one changed path is required")
-    return tuple(result)
-
-
-@dataclass
-class CommitEntry:
-    commit_oid: str
-    parent_oid: str
-    paths: tuple[str, ...]
-    recorded_at: str
-
-
-@dataclass
-class RepairLease:
-    lease_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    owner_identity: str
-    branch: str
-    description: str
-    allowed_paths: tuple[str, ...]
-    initial_head_oid: str
-    current_head_oid: str
-    created_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-    max_expires_at: str
-    state: str = "ACTIVE"
-    revision: int = 0
-    commits: list[CommitEntry] = field(default_factory=list)
-    attached: bool = False
-
-    def to_json(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        payload = asdict(self)
-        payload["allowed_paths"] = list(self.allowed_paths)
-        payload["commits"] = [asdict(entry) for entry in self.commits]
-        return payload
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_json(cls, raw: dict[str, Any]) -> "RepairLease":
-        commits = tuple(
-            CommitEntry(
-                commit_oid=_oid(item["commit_oid"], "commit_oid"),
-                parent_oid=_oid(item["parent_oid"], "parent_oid"),
-                paths=tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in item["paths"]),
-                recorded_at=str(item["recorded_at"]),
-            )
-            for item in raw.get("commits", [])
-        )
-        return cls(
-            lease_id=str(raw["lease_id"]),
-            task_id=str(raw["task_id"]),
-            owner_identity=str(raw["owner_identity"]),
-            branch=str(raw["branch"]),
-            description=str(raw["description"]),
-            allowed_paths=tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in raw["allowed_paths"]),
-            initial_head_oid=_oid(raw["initial_head_oid"], "initial_head_oid"),
-            current_head_oid=_oid(raw["current_head_oid"], "current_head_oid"),
-            created_at=str(raw["created_at"]),
-            expires_at=str(raw["expires_at"]),
-            max_expires_at=str(raw["max_expires_at"]),
-            state=str(raw.get("state", "ACTIVE")),
-            revision=int(raw.get("revision", 0)),
-            commits=list(commits),
-            attached=bool(raw.get("attached", False)),
-        )
-
-
-class LeaseStore:
-    """Atomic JSON store for restart-recoverable lease state."""
-
-    def __init__(self, directory: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
-        self.directory = Path(directory)
-        self.directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if self.directory.is_symlink():
-            raise LeaseError("lease store must not be a symlink")
-        os.chmod(self.directory, 0o700)
-
-    def _path(self, lease_id: str) -> Path:
-        if not re.fullmatch(r"lease-[0-9a-f]{32}", lease_id):
-            raise LeaseError("invalid lease id")
-        return self.directory / f"{lease_id}.json"
-
-    def create(self, lease: RepairLease) -> None:
-        path = self._path(lease.lease_id)
-        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
-            raise LeaseError("lease already exists")
-        self._write(path, lease.to_json(), exclusive=True)
-
-    def load(self, lease_id: str) -> RepairLease:
-        path = self._path(lease_id)
-        try:
-            raw = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as exc:
-            raise LeaseError("lease state is unavailable or invalid") from exc
-        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
-            raise LeaseError("lease state must be an object")
-        return RepairLease.from_json(raw)
-
-    def save(self, lease: RepairLease) -> None:
-        self._write(self._path(lease.lease_id), lease.to_json())
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _write(path: Path, payload: dict[str, Any], *, exclusive: bool = False) -> None:
-        flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | (os.O_EXCL if exclusive else 0)
-        fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".lease-", dir=path.parent)
-        try:
-            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
-                json.dump(payload, stream, ensure_ascii=True, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-                stream.write("\n")
-            if exclusive:
-                os.link(temp_name, path)
-                os.unlink(temp_name)
-            else:
-                os.replace(temp_name, path)
-            os.chmod(path, 0o600)
-        except Exception:
-            try:
-                os.unlink(temp_name)
-            except FileNotFoundError:
-                pass
-            raise
-
-
-class GitProbe:
-    """Read-only Git implementation; it never changes a ref or working tree."""
-
-    def __init__(self, bare_repo: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None:
-        self.bare_repo = Path(bare_repo)
-
-    def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> str:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), *args],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            raise LeaseError("read-only Git probe failed")
-        return result.stdout.strip()
-
-    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str:
-        return _oid(self._run(["rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"]), "branch_head")
-
-    def parent(self, commit: str) -> str:
-        return _oid(self._run(["rev-parse", f"{_oid(commit)}^1"]), "parent")
-
-    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
-        old, new = _oid(older), _oid(newer)
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", old, new],
-            check=False,
-        )
-        return result.returncode == 0
-
-    def changed_paths(self, commit: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-        raw = self._run(["diff-tree", "--no-commit-id", "--name-only", "-r", _oid(commit)])
-        return tuple(normalize_path(line) for line in raw.splitlines() if line.strip())
-
-    def commits_between(self, older: str, newer: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-        raw = self._run(["rev-list", "--reverse", f"{_oid(older)}..{_oid(newer)}"])
-        return tuple(_oid(line, "commit") for line in raw.splitlines() if line.strip())
-
-
-class RepairLeaseManager:
-    """Issue, recover, renew, and close branch-bound repair leases."""
-
-    def __init__(self, store: LeaseStore, git: GitProbeProtocol, *, clock=_now) -> None:
-        self.store = store
-        self.git = git
-        self.clock = clock
-
-    def _require_owner(self, lease: RepairLease, owner_identity: str) -> None:
-        if owner_identity != lease.owner_identity:
-            raise LeaseError("lease identity mismatch")
-
-    def _active(self, lease: RepairLease) -> RepairLease:
-        now = self.clock()
-        if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
-            raise LeaseError(f"lease is {lease.state.lower()}")
-        if now >= _parse_ts(lease.expires_at):
-            lease.state = "EXPIRED"
-            self.store.save(lease)
-            raise LeaseError("lease expired")
-        return lease
-
-    def issue(
-        self,
-        *,
-        task_id: str,
-        owner_identity: str,
-        branch: str,
-        description: str,
-        allowed_paths: Sequence[str],
-        ttl_seconds: int = 3600,
-    ) -> RepairLease:
-        if task_id != TASK_ID:
-            raise LeaseError("unexpected task id")
-        if not owner_identity or not description or len(description) > 240:
-            raise LeaseError("owner identity and description are required")
-        if "\n" in description or "\r" in description:
-            raise LeaseError("description must be a single line")
-        if branch in DENIED_BRANCHES or branch.startswith(("main/", "refs/", "tags/")):
-            raise LeaseError("protected branch cannot receive a repair lease")
-        if not isinstance(ttl_seconds, int) or not 0 < ttl_seconds <= MAX_LEASE_SECONDS:
-            raise LeaseError("lease TTL exceeds the maximum")
-        allowed = tuple(normalize_path(path) for path in allowed_paths)
-        if any(path_is_protected(path) for path in allowed):
-            raise LeaseError("protected path in lease allowlist")
-        head = self.git.branch_head(branch)
-        created = self.clock()
-        expires = created + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
-        max_expires = created + timedelta(seconds=MAX_LEASE_SECONDS)
-        lease_id = "lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16)
-        lease = RepairLease(
-            lease_id=lease_id,
-            task_id=task_id,
-            owner_identity=owner_identity,
-            branch=branch,
-            description=description,
-            allowed_paths=allowed,
-            initial_head_oid=head,
-            current_head_oid=head,
-            created_at=_ts(created),
-            expires_at=_ts(expires),
-            max_expires_at=_ts(max_expires),
-        )
-        self.store.create(lease)
-        return lease
-
-    def attach_existing_branch(
-        self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str, expected_head_oid: str
-    ) -> RepairLease:
-        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
-        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
-        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
-        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
-        if current != expected or current != lease.current_head_oid:
-            raise LeaseError("branch head does not match the lease")
-        lease.attached = True
-        lease.revision += 1
-        self.store.save(lease)
-        return lease
-
-    def authorize_commit(
-        self,
-        lease_id: str,
-        *,
-        owner_identity: str,
-        expected_head_oid: str,
-        paths: Sequence[str],
-        content: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
-    ) -> RepairLease:
-        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
-        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
-        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
-        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
-        if current != expected or current != lease.current_head_oid:
-            raise LeaseError("stale or externally advanced branch head")
-        if not lease.attached:
-            raise LeaseError("lease is not attached")
-        validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths)
-        if content and any(contains_secret_like_content(value) for value in content.values()):
-            raise LeaseError("secret-like content rejected")
-        return lease
-
-    def record_commit(
-        self,
-        lease_id: str,
-        *,
-        owner_identity: str,
-        expected_head_oid: str,
-        new_head_oid: str,
-        paths: Sequence[str],
-    ) -> RepairLease:
-        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
-        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
-        new_head = _oid(new_head_oid, "new_head_oid")
-        expected = _oid(expected_head_oid, "expected_head_oid")
-        if not lease.attached or lease.current_head_oid != expected:
-            raise LeaseError("stale lease head")
-        if self.git.branch_head(lease.branch) != new_head:
-            raise LeaseError("branch head does not match committed head")
-        validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths)
-        if self.git.parent(new_head) != expected or not self.git.is_ancestor(expected, new_head):
-            raise LeaseError("commit is not a fast-forward child of the expected head")
-        actual_paths = self.git.changed_paths(new_head)
-        allowed = validate_paths(actual_paths, lease.allowed_paths)
-        requested = set(validate_paths(paths, lease.allowed_paths))
-        if not set(allowed).issubset(requested):
-            raise LeaseError("commit changed an unrequested path")
-        lease.current_head_oid = new_head
-        lease.revision += 1
-        lease.commits.append(
-            CommitEntry(
-                commit_oid=new_head,
-                parent_oid=expected,
-                paths=allowed,
-                recorded_at=_ts(self.clock()),
-            )
-        )
-        self.store.save(lease)
-        return lease
-
-    def recover(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
-        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
-        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
-        current = self.git.branch_head(lease.branch)
-        if current == lease.current_head_oid:
-            return lease
-        if not self.git.is_ancestor(lease.current_head_oid, current):
-            raise LeaseError("branch moved non-fast-forward")
-        commits = self.git.commits_between(lease.current_head_oid, current)
-        for commit in commits:
-            actual = self.git.changed_paths(commit)
-            validate_paths(actual, lease.allowed_paths)
-        lease.current_head_oid = current
-        lease.revision += 1
-        self.store.save(lease)
-        return lease
-
-    def renew(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str, ttl_seconds: int) -> RepairLease:
-        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
-        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
-        if not isinstance(ttl_seconds, int) or ttl_seconds <= 0:
-            raise LeaseError("renewal TTL must be positive")
-        candidate = self.clock() + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)
-        maximum = _parse_ts(lease.max_expires_at)
-        if candidate > maximum:
-            raise LeaseError("renewal exceeds maximum lease lifetime")
-        lease.expires_at = _ts(candidate)
-        lease.revision += 1
-        self.store.save(lease)
-        return lease
-
-    def complete(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
-        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
-        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
-        lease.state = "COMPLETED"
-        lease.revision += 1
-        self.store.save(lease)
-        return lease
-
-    def revoke(self, lease_id: str, *, owner_identity: str) -> RepairLease:
-        lease = self._active(self.store.load(lease_id))
-        self._require_owner(lease, owner_identity)
-        lease.state = "REVOKED"
-        lease.revision += 1
-        self.store.save(lease)
-        return lease
-
-
-def sanitized_lease_view(lease: RepairLease) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Return lease metadata only; no content, token, or credential values."""
-    return {
-        "lease_id": lease.lease_id,
-        "task_id": lease.task_id,
-        "owner_identity": lease.owner_identity,
-        "branch": lease.branch,
-        "description": lease.description,
-        "initial_head_oid": lease.initial_head_oid,
-        "current_head_oid": lease.current_head_oid,
-        "created_at": lease.created_at,
-        "expires_at": lease.expires_at,
-        "state": lease.state,
-        "revision": lease.revision,
-        "commit_count": len(lease.commits),
-        "attached": lease.attached,
-    }

active-runtime/app/campaign_activation.py

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-"""Atomic, predicate-bound activation of the durable release campaign."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import tempfile
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from release_campaign_authorization import CampaignError, validate_policy
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-CAMPAIGN_ID = "AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807"
-
-
-class CampaignActivationError(CampaignError):
-    pass
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def digest_bytes(value: bytes) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest()
-
-
-def build_active_policy(current: Mapping[str, Any], facts: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    policy = validate_policy(dict(current))
-    required = {
-        "campaign_id",
-        "repository",
-        "source_main_oid",
-        "gitea_main_oid",
-        "authority_main_oid",
-        "runtime_source_oid",
-        "durable_job_state",
-        "writer_ready",
-        "gitea_machine_authenticated",
-        "governance_executor_ready",
-        "preapproval_publisher_ready",
-        "runtime_exact_main",
-        "main_lineage_verified",
-        "campaign_revoked",
-    }
-    if set(facts) != required:
-        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_FACTS_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    if policy["activation_state"] != "PENDING_CONTROL_PLANE_MERGE" or policy["active"] is not False:
-        raise CampaignActivationError("CAMPAIGN_NOT_PENDING")
-    if policy["campaign_id"] != CAMPAIGN_ID or facts["campaign_id"] != CAMPAIGN_ID:
-        raise CampaignActivationError("CAMPAIGN_ID_MISMATCH")
-    if facts["repository"] != "aios/aios" or policy["repository"] != facts["repository"]:
-        raise CampaignActivationError("REPOSITORY_MISMATCH")
-    for name in ("source_main_oid", "gitea_main_oid", "authority_main_oid", "runtime_source_oid"):
-        if not isinstance(facts[name], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(facts[name]):
-            raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_OID_INVALID")
-    if not (
-        facts["source_main_oid"]
-        == facts["gitea_main_oid"]
-        == facts["authority_main_oid"]
-        == facts["runtime_source_oid"]
-    ):
-        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_MAIN_DIVERGENCE")
-    if facts["durable_job_state"] != "COMPLETED":
-        raise CampaignActivationError("DURABLE_JOB_NOT_COMPLETED")
-    boolean_fields = (
-        "writer_ready",
-        "gitea_machine_authenticated",
-        "governance_executor_ready",
-        "preapproval_publisher_ready",
-        "runtime_exact_main",
-        "main_lineage_verified",
-    )
-    if any(facts[name] is not True for name in boolean_fields) or facts["campaign_revoked"] is not False:
-        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_PREDICATE_FAILED")
-    activated = dict(policy)
-    activated["activation_state"] = "ACTIVE"
-    activated["active"] = True
-    return validate_policy(activated)
-
-
-def atomic_write_policy(path: Path, sidecar: Path, receipt_path: Path, policy: Mapping[str, Any], receipt: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    if path.is_symlink() or sidecar.is_symlink() or receipt_path.exists() or receipt_path.is_symlink():
-        raise CampaignActivationError("ACTIVATION_PATH_INVALID")
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    raw = canonical_json(dict(policy))
-    digest = digest_bytes(raw)
-    for target, data, mode in (
-        (path, raw, "wb"),
-        (sidecar, f"{digest}  {path.name}\n".encode("ascii"), "wb"),
-        (receipt_path, canonical_json(dict(receipt)), "wb"),
-    ):
-        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{target.name}.", dir=target.parent)
-        try:
-            os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-            with os.fdopen(fd, mode) as stream:
-                stream.write(data)
-                stream.flush()
-                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-            os.replace(temporary, target)
-            os.chmod(target, 0o600)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temporary):
-                os.unlink(temporary)
-    return digest

active-runtime/app/campaign_approval_gate.py

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Machine campaign approval gate for protected engineering PRs."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from release_campaign_authorization import CampaignAuthorization, CampaignError
-
-
-class GateError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def git_is_ancestor(repository: Path, ancestor: str, descendant: str) -> bool:
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        [
-            "git",
-            f"--git-dir={repository}",
-            "merge-base",
-            "--is-ancestor",
-            ancestor,
-            descendant,
-        ],
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-    )
-    if result.returncode == 0:
-        return True
-    if result.returncode == 1:
-        return False
-    raise GateError("git_ancestor_check_failed")
-
-
-def evaluate(
-    campaign: CampaignAuthorization,
-    facts: Mapping[str, Any],
-    repository: Path,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    required = {
-        "repository",
-        "pr_number",
-        "base_ref",
-        "base_oid",
-        "head_oid",
-        "required_checks_all_success",
-        "required_checks_same_head",
-        "unresolved_conversations",
-        "mergeable",
-        "protected_target",
-    }
-    if set(facts) != required:
-        raise GateError("pr_facts_fields_invalid")
-    if facts["repository"] != "aios/aios":
-        raise GateError("repository_mismatch")
-    if facts["base_ref"] != "refs/heads/main" or facts["protected_target"] != "main":
-        raise GateError("protected_main_required")
-    if facts["required_checks_all_success"] is not True:
-        raise GateError("required_checks_not_success")
-    if facts["required_checks_same_head"] is not True:
-        raise GateError("required_checks_stale")
-    if facts["unresolved_conversations"] != 0:
-        raise GateError("unresolved_conversations")
-    if facts["mergeable"] is not True:
-        raise GateError("pr_not_mergeable")
-    if not git_is_ancestor(repository, campaign.anchor_oid, str(facts["base_oid"])):
-        raise GateError("base_outside_campaign_lineage")
-    if not git_is_ancestor(repository, str(facts["base_oid"]), str(facts["head_oid"])):
-        raise GateError("head_outside_pr_lineage")
-    campaign.assert_operation("protected_merge")
-    return {
-        "schema": "aios.campaign-approval-gate-result.v1",
-        "status": "SUCCESS",
-        "campaign_id": campaign.campaign_id,
-        "pr_number": facts["pr_number"],
-        "head_oid": facts["head_oid"],
-        "owner_ui_interaction_required": False,
-    }
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    p.add_argument("--campaign", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--revocation", type=Path)
-    p.add_argument("--pr-facts", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--repository", type=Path, required=True)
-    a = p.parse_args()
-    campaign = CampaignAuthorization.load(
-        a.campaign,
-        revocation=a.revocation,
-        require_active=True,
-    )
-    facts = json.loads(a.pr_facts.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    print(json.dumps(evaluate(campaign, facts, a.repository), sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    try:
-        raise SystemExit(main())
-    except (CampaignError, GateError) as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAILURE", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        raise SystemExit(2)

active-runtime/app/campaign_release_acceptance.py

@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Automatically accept an exact release binding under an ACTIVE campaign."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import stat
-import tempfile
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from release_campaign_authorization import CampaignAuthorization, CampaignError
-
-
-class AcceptanceError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def secure_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
-        raise AcceptanceError(f"invalid_file:{path}")
-    st = path.lstat()
-    if st.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode) & 0o022:
-        raise AcceptanceError(f"unsafe_file:{path}")
-    value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise AcceptanceError(f"json_object_required:{path}")
-    return value
-
-
-def atomic_new(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-    if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
-        raise AcceptanceError("acceptance_receipt_exists")
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=path.parent)
-    try:
-        os.fchmod(fd, 0o600)
-        if os.geteuid() == 0:
-            os.fchown(fd, 0, 0)
-        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8", closefd=True) as stream:
-            json.dump(dict(value), stream, sort_keys=True, indent=2)
-            stream.write("\n")
-            stream.flush()
-            os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-        os.replace(name, path)
-        os.chmod(path, 0o600)
-    finally:
-        try:
-            os.unlink(name)
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            pass
-
-
-def evaluate(
-    campaign: CampaignAuthorization,
-    binding: Mapping[str, Any],
-    evidence: Mapping[str, Any],
-    artifact: Mapping[str, Any],
-    staging: Mapping[str, Any],
-    main: Mapping[str, Any],
-    tag: Mapping[str, Any],
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    required_binding = {
-        "version",
-        "target_oid",
-        "evidence_closure_oid",
-        "artifact_sha256",
-        "artifact_size",
-        "approval_plan_id",
-    }
-    if set(binding) != required_binding:
-        raise AcceptanceError("binding_fields_invalid")
-    if main.get("repository") != "aios/aios":
-        raise AcceptanceError("repository_identity_mismatch")
-    if main.get("target_in_main_lineage") is not True:
-        raise AcceptanceError("target_outside_main_lineage")
-    if evidence.get("object_type") != "commit":
-        raise AcceptanceError("evidence_not_commit")
-    if evidence.get("target_is_ancestor") is not True:
-        raise AcceptanceError("target_not_evidence_ancestor")
-    if evidence.get("closure_oid") != binding["evidence_closure_oid"]:
-        raise AcceptanceError("evidence_oid_mismatch")
-    if artifact.get("sha256") != binding["artifact_sha256"]:
-        raise AcceptanceError("artifact_digest_mismatch")
-    if artifact.get("size") != binding["artifact_size"]:
-        raise AcceptanceError("artifact_size_mismatch")
-    if artifact.get("retained") is not True:
-        raise AcceptanceError("artifact_not_retained")
-    if staging.get("install") != "PASS":
-        raise AcceptanceError("staging_install_failed")
-    if staging.get("health") != "PASS":
-        raise AcceptanceError("staging_health_failed")
-    if staging.get("restart") != "PASS":
-        raise AcceptanceError("staging_restart_failed")
-    if staging.get("rollback_readiness") != "PASS":
-        raise AcceptanceError("rollback_readiness_failed")
-    if tag.get("conflict") is not False:
-        raise AcceptanceError("tag_conflict")
-    campaign.assert_operation("derive_campaign_acceptance")
-    return {
-        "schema": "aios.campaign-release-acceptance.v1",
-        "accepted": True,
-        "binding_replaced": False,
-        "campaign_id": campaign.campaign_id,
-        "campaign_generation": campaign.data["generation"],
-        **dict(binding),
-        "owner_interaction_required": False,
-    }
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    p.add_argument("--campaign", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--revocation", type=Path)
-    p.add_argument("--binding", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--evidence", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--artifact", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--staging", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--main-facts", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--tag-facts", type=Path, required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--output", type=Path, required=True)
-    a = p.parse_args()
-
-    campaign = CampaignAuthorization.load(
-        a.campaign,
-        revocation=a.revocation,
-        require_active=True,
-    )
-    receipt = evaluate(
-        campaign,
-        secure_json(a.binding),
-        secure_json(a.evidence),
-        secure_json(a.artifact),
-        secure_json(a.staging),
-        secure_json(a.main_facts),
-        secure_json(a.tag_facts),
-    )
-    atomic_new(a.output, receipt)
-    print(json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    try:
-        raise SystemExit(main())
-    except (CampaignError, AcceptanceError) as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "BLOCKED", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        raise SystemExit(2)

active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-"""Runtime deployment-state provider for governed health contracts."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import datetime as dt
-import json
-import os
-import re
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-_OID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-_SHA = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-_STATES = {"STAGED", "ACTIVE", "ROLLED_BACK"}
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RuntimeDeploymentState:
-    version: str
-    commit_oid: str
-    artifact_sha256: str
-    deployment_state: str
-
-    @property
-    def production_deployed(self) -> bool:
-        return self.deployment_state == "ACTIVE"
-
-    def health_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "status": "ok",
-            "version": self.version,
-            "commit_oid": self.commit_oid,
-            "artifact_sha256": self.artifact_sha256,
-            "deployment_state": self.deployment_state,
-            "production_deployed": self.production_deployed,
-            "health_timestamp": dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        }
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_environment(cls, environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> "RuntimeDeploymentState":
-        env = dict(environ or os.environ)
-        values: dict[str, Any] = {}
-        state_file = env.get("DEPLOYMENT_STATE_FILE", "").strip()
-        if state_file:
-            path = Path(state_file)
-            if path.is_file() and not path.is_symlink():
-                loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-                if not isinstance(loaded, dict):
-                    raise ValueError("deployment_state_file_object_required")
-                values.update(loaded)
-        file_deployment_state = values.get("deployment_state")
-        values.update({k: v for k, v in {
-            "version": env.get("RELEASE_VERSION", values.get("version", "")),
-            "commit_oid": env.get("TARGET_OID", values.get("commit_oid", "")),
-            "artifact_sha256": env.get("ARTIFACT_SHA256", values.get("artifact_sha256", "")),
-            "deployment_state": env.get("DEPLOYMENT_STATE", values.get("deployment_state", "")),
-        }.items() if v != ""})
-        if file_deployment_state not in (None, ""):
-            values["deployment_state"] = file_deployment_state
-        version = str(values.get("version", ""))
-        commit_oid = str(values.get("commit_oid", ""))
-        artifact_sha256 = str(values.get("artifact_sha256", ""))
-        deployment_state = str(values.get("deployment_state", ""))
-        if not version or not _OID.fullmatch(commit_oid) or not _SHA.fullmatch(artifact_sha256):
-            raise ValueError("deployment_binding_invalid")
-        if deployment_state not in _STATES:
-            raise ValueError("deployment_state_invalid")
-        return cls(version, commit_oid, artifact_sha256, deployment_state)

active-runtime/app/governance/__init__.py

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-"""Permanent AIOS governance source components."""

active-runtime/app/governance/aios-governance-drift-monitor

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-import json
-import pathlib
-import socket
-import time
-
-SOCKET = '/run/aios-governance-executor/executor.sock'
-STATE = pathlib.Path('/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-executor/drift-monitor.json')
-APPROVED = pathlib.Path('/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-PROTECTION-SNAPSHOT-DRIFT-FORENSICS-V1/protection-drift/semantic-analysis.json')
-
-
-def call():
-    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-    sock.settimeout(20)
-    sock.connect(SOCKET)
-    request = {'operation': 'GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION', 'payload': {'repository': 'aios/aios', 'branch': 'main'}}
-    sock.sendall((json.dumps(request, separators=(',', ':')) + '\n').encode())
-    chunks = []
-    while True:
-        part = sock.recv(1024 * 1024)
-        if not part:
-            break
-        chunks.append(part)
-        if b'\n' in part:
-            break
-    sock.close()
-    return json.loads(b''.join(chunks).splitlines()[0])
-
-
-def main():
-    try:
-        result = call()
-        if result.get('status') != 'PASS':
-            raise RuntimeError(str(result.get('code') or 'EXECUTOR_GET_FAILED'))
-        approved = json.loads(APPROVED.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
-        approved_transport = approved['approved_transport_digest_from_evidence']
-        approved_semantic = approved['approved_semantic_digest']
-        transport = result['transport_digest']
-        semantic = result['semantic_digest']
-        if semantic != approved_semantic:
-            state = 'GOVERNANCE_POLICY_DRIFT'
-        elif transport != approved_transport:
-            state = 'GOVERNANCE_TRANSPORT_METADATA_CHANGED'
-        else:
-            state = 'NO_DRIFT'
-        payload = {
-            'schema': 'aios.governance-drift-monitor.v1',
-            'observed_at_unix': int(time.time()),
-            'status': state,
-            'release_blocking': False,
-            'approved_transport_digest': approved_transport,
-            'observed_transport_digest': transport,
-            'approved_semantic_digest': approved_semantic,
-            'observed_semantic_digest': semantic,
-            'semantic_schema': result.get('semantic_schema'),
-            'source': 'Dedicated Governance Executor GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION',
-        }
-    except Exception as exc:
-        payload = {
-            'schema': 'aios.governance-drift-monitor.v1',
-            'observed_at_unix': int(time.time()),
-            'status': 'MONITOR_UNAVAILABLE',
-            'release_blocking': False,
-            'error_code': str(exc),
-        }
-    STATE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    temporary = STATE.with_suffix('.tmp')
-    temporary.write_text(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False) + '\n', encoding='utf-8')
-    temporary.replace(STATE)
-    STATE.chmod(0o640)
-    print(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False))
-
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-    main()

active-runtime/app/governance/aios-governance-executor

@@ -1,417 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-import base64
-import copy
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import pathlib
-import socket
-import time
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-
-SOURCE_GOVERNANCE = "/opt/aios/aios-control-plane/current/active-runtime/app/governance"
-if SOURCE_GOVERNANCE not in __import__("sys").path:
-    __import__("sys").path.insert(0, SOURCE_GOVERNANCE)
-from stage2_gate_migration import (
-    CAMPAIGN_GATE,
-    CAMPAIGN_ID,
-    OWNER_GATE,
-    STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA,
-    Stage2GateError,
-    build_target,
-    semantic_digest as stage2_semantic_digest,
-    validate_stage2_facts,
-)
-
-API = "http://127.0.0.1:3000"
-REPO = "aios/aios"
-SOCKET = "/run/aios-governance-executor/executor.sock"
-JOURNAL = pathlib.Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-executor/executor-journal.jsonl")
-RECONCILIATION_BINDING_PATH = pathlib.Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-executor/reconciliation-binding.json")
-PR54_HEAD = "015185d7e5191d18c5c1596160807ac228782a0a"
-PR54_REVIEW = 104
-PR54_MANIFEST_SHA = "1b11ee42d53a9f6c1646e5f5ddd8ce5b7ecf301483b9f3d47a068290d541ba4b"
-PR54_PREVIOUS_PROTECTION_SHA = "8b3370add21cd23c2b4f41d8d84d3eaaa09ddf0451549b72c7941bbd92d5d60a"
-SEMANTIC_SCHEMA = "aios.semantic-protection.v1"
-APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA = "ba15d512ed8c1f43e5f72c84125a3a71a7347ef59e18000bbfca24d6e69f1b19"
-STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA = "d911e856f71de6105b8efa08e13338a448e0b6d37536332decd80c9f409ecf27"
-USER_IDS = {"owner": 2, "aios-autonomy-agent": 153}
-
-
-def canon(value):
-    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
-
-
-def sha(value):
-    return hashlib.sha256(canon(value)).hexdigest()
-
-
-def token():
-    value = (pathlib.Path(os.environ["CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"]) / "gitea-governance-executor-token").read_text().strip()
-    if len(value) < 16:
-        raise RuntimeError("EXECUTOR_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
-    return value
-
-
-def api(method, path, value, body=None, expected=(200,)):
-    raw = None if body is None else json.dumps(body, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
-    req = urllib.request.Request(API + path, data=raw, method=method)
-    req.add_header("Authorization", "token " + value)
-    req.add_header("Accept", "application/json")
-    if raw is not None:
-        req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as response:
-            status = response.status
-            payload = response.read()
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        if exc.code in expected:
-            payload = exc.read()
-            return exc.code, json.loads(payload) if payload else None
-        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_HTTP_" + str(exc.code))
-    if status not in expected:
-        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_HTTP_" + str(status))
-    if not payload or not payload.strip():
-        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_EMPTY_JSON:" + path)
-    try:
-        decoded = json.loads(payload)
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise RuntimeError("GITEA_INVALID_JSON:" + path) from exc
-    return status, decoded
-
-
-def journal(event, **fields):
-    JOURNAL.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    record = {"schema": "aios.governance-executor-journal.v2", "event": event, "unix": int(time.time()), **fields}
-    with JOURNAL.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
-        stream.write(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
-        stream.flush()
-        os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-
-
-def typed_json(value):
-    if value in (None, "null"):
-        return []
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return json.loads(value)
-    return value
-
-
-def user_ids(names):
-    result = []
-    for name in names or []:
-        if name not in USER_IDS:
-            raise RuntimeError("UNKNOWN_GOVERNANCE_USER:" + str(name))
-        result.append(USER_IDS[name])
-    return sorted(result)
-
-
-def semantic_policy(value):
-    policy = {
-        "schema_version": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA,
-        "repo_id": 1,
-        "protection_id": 2,
-        "branch_name": value.get("branch_name"),
-        "can_push": value.get("enable_push"),
-        "can_force_push": value.get("enable_force_push"),
-        "enable_merge_whitelist": value.get("enable_merge_whitelist"),
-        "merge_whitelist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")),
-        "merge_whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "required_approvals": value.get("required_approvals"),
-        "enable_status_check": value.get("enable_status_check"),
-        "status_check_contexts": sorted(value.get("status_check_contexts") or []),
-        "block_admin_merge_override": value.get("block_admin_merge_override"),
-        "block_on_official_review_requests": value.get("block_on_official_review_requests"),
-        "block_on_outdated_branch": value.get("block_on_outdated_branch"),
-        "block_on_rejected_reviews": value.get("block_on_rejected_reviews"),
-        "dismiss_stale_approvals": value.get("dismiss_stale_approvals"),
-        "ignore_stale_approvals": value.get("ignore_stale_approvals"),
-        "enable_approvals_whitelist": value.get("enable_approvals_whitelist"),
-        "approvals_whitelist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("approvals_whitelist_username")),
-        "approvals_whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_bypass_allowlist": value.get("enable_bypass_allowlist"),
-        "bypass_allowlist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("bypass_allowlist_usernames")),
-        "bypass_allowlist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_force_push_allowlist": value.get("enable_force_push_allowlist"),
-        "force_push_allowlist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("force_push_allowlist_usernames")),
-        "force_push_allowlist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_whitelist": value.get("enable_push_whitelist"),
-        "whitelist_user_ids": user_ids(value.get("push_whitelist_usernames")),
-        "whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys": value.get("force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys"),
-        "whitelist_deploy_keys": value.get("push_whitelist_deploy_keys"),
-        "require_signed_commits": value.get("require_signed_commits"),
-        "priority": value.get("priority"),
-        "protected_file_patterns": value.get("protected_file_patterns"),
-        "unprotected_file_patterns": value.get("unprotected_file_patterns"),
-    }
-    return policy
-
-
-def semantic_sha(value):
-    return sha(semantic_policy(value))
-
-
-def verify_binding(binding, value):
-    required = {
-        "governance_request_PR", "exact_request_head", "Owner_review_id", "Owner_review_exact_head",
-        "manifest_sha256", "expected_previous_snapshot_sha256", "approved_delta",
-        "semantic_reconciliation_request_id", "semantic_reconciliation_head",
-        "semantic_reconciliation_review_id", "semantic_reconciliation_review_head",
-        "approved_semantic_digest",
-    }
-    if set(binding) != required:
-        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    if binding["governance_request_PR"] != 54 or binding["exact_request_head"] != PR54_HEAD:
-        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_PR54_MISMATCH")
-    if binding["Owner_review_id"] != PR54_REVIEW or binding["Owner_review_exact_head"] != PR54_HEAD:
-        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_REVIEW_MISMATCH")
-    if binding["manifest_sha256"] != PR54_MANIFEST_SHA:
-        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_MANIFEST_MISMATCH")
-    if binding["expected_previous_snapshot_sha256"] != PR54_PREVIOUS_PROTECTION_SHA:
-        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_SNAPSHOT_MISMATCH")
-    if binding["approved_delta"] != {"add_merge_whitelist_user_id": 153}:
-        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_DELTA_DENIED")
-    if binding["approved_semantic_digest"] != APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA:
-        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_SEMANTIC_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
-    if not RECONCILIATION_BINDING_PATH.is_file():
-        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_REQUIRED")
-    try:
-        reconciliation = json.loads(RECONCILIATION_BINDING_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except (OSError, ValueError):
-        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID") from None
-    required_reconciliation = {
-        "schema", "request_id", "pr_number", "request_head", "owner_review_id",
-        "owner_review_head", "approved_semantic_digest", "approved_delta",
-    }
-    if set(reconciliation) != required_reconciliation or reconciliation.get("schema") != "aios.semantic-reconciliation-binding.v1":
-        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_INVALID")
-    if reconciliation["approved_semantic_digest"] != APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA or reconciliation["approved_delta"] != binding["approved_delta"]:
-        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
-    if (
-        reconciliation["request_id"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_request_id"]
-        or reconciliation["request_head"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_head"]
-        or reconciliation["owner_review_id"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_review_id"]
-        or reconciliation["owner_review_head"] != binding["semantic_reconciliation_review_head"]
-    ):
-        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
-    _, reconciliation_pr = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/{reconciliation['pr_number']}", value)
-    if (
-        reconciliation_pr.get("state") != "open"
-        or reconciliation_pr.get("merged")
-        or reconciliation_pr.get("head", {}).get("sha") != reconciliation["request_head"]
-        or reconciliation_pr.get("base", {}).get("ref") != "governance/approvals"
-    ):
-        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_REQUEST_STALE")
-    _, reconciliation_reviews = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/{reconciliation['pr_number']}/reviews", value)
-    reconciliation_review = next((x for x in reconciliation_reviews if x.get("id") == reconciliation["owner_review_id"]), None)
-    if (
-        not reconciliation_review
-        or reconciliation_review.get("user", {}).get("id") != 2
-        or reconciliation_review.get("state") != "APPROVED"
-        or reconciliation_review.get("commit_id") != reconciliation["owner_review_head"]
-        or reconciliation_review.get("dismissed") is not False
-    ):
-        raise RuntimeError("SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_OWNER_REVIEW_STALE")
-    _, pr = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/54", value)
-    if pr.get("state") != "open" or pr.get("merged") or pr.get("head", {}).get("sha") != PR54_HEAD:
-        raise RuntimeError("PR54_APPROVAL_STALE")
-    _, reviews = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/pulls/54/reviews", value)
-    review = next((x for x in reviews if x.get("id") == PR54_REVIEW), None)
-    if not review or review.get("user", {}).get("id") != 2 or review.get("state") != "APPROVED" or review.get("commit_id") != PR54_HEAD or review.get("dismissed") is not False:
-        raise RuntimeError("PR54_APPROVAL_STALE")
-    manifest_path = "approvals/governance-policy/AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-MERGE-GOVERNANCE-SCOPE-EXTENSION-V1.json"
-    _, content = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/contents/{urllib.parse.quote(manifest_path, safe='/')}?ref={PR54_HEAD}", value)
-    raw = base64.b64decode("".join(content.get("content", "").split()))
-    if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() != PR54_MANIFEST_SHA:
-        raise RuntimeError("PR54_MANIFEST_STALE")
-
-
-def get_protection(value, branch):
-    if branch not in {"main", "governance/approvals"}:
-        raise RuntimeError("BRANCH_DENIED")
-    _, protection = api("GET", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/branch_protections/{urllib.parse.quote(branch, safe='')}", value)
-    return protection
-
-
-def mutation_receipt(before, after, binding, target_semantic):
-    return {
-        "before": {"transport_digest": sha(before), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(before)},
-        "approved": {
-            "mutation_predicate_digest": sha({"operation": "ADD_MERGE_EXECUTOR", "subject_user_id": 153, "preserve_all_unmodified_security_fields": True}),
-            "Owner_review_id": binding["Owner_review_id"],
-            "semantic_policy_digest": APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA,
-        },
-        "after": {"transport_digest": sha(after), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(after)},
-        "delta": {"add_merge_whitelist_user_id": 153},
-        "target_semantic_digest": sha(target_semantic),
-        "unmodified_security_fields": {"verified": True},
-    }
-
-
-def apply_stage1(binding, value):
-    verify_binding(binding, value)
-    before = get_protection(value, "main")
-    before_semantic = semantic_policy(before)
-    before_semantic_sha = sha(before_semantic)
-    names = list(before.get("merge_whitelist_usernames") or [])
-    name_ids = user_ids(names)
-    if name_ids not in ([2], [2, 153]):
-        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_WHITELIST_PRESTATE_INVALID")
-    target_names = ["owner", "aios-autonomy-agent"]
-    target_semantic = copy.deepcopy(before_semantic)
-    target_semantic["merge_whitelist_user_ids"] = [2, 153]
-    if name_ids == [2, 153]:
-        if before_semantic_sha != STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA:
-            journal("APPLY_BLOCKED_STAGE1_IDEMPOTENCY_SEMANTIC_CONFLICT", transport_digest=sha(before), semantic_digest=before_semantic_sha, expected_semantic_digest=STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA)
-            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_STAGE1_SEMANTIC_CONFLICT")
-        receipt = mutation_receipt(before, before, binding, target_semantic)
-        journal("APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA_IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS", receipt=receipt)
-        return {"status": "IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS", "protection": before, "transport_digest": sha(before), "semantic_digest": before_semantic_sha, "target_semantic_digest": sha(target_semantic)}
-    if before_semantic_sha != APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA:
-        journal("APPLY_BLOCKED_SEMANTIC_CAS", transport_digest=sha(before), semantic_digest=before_semantic_sha, expected_semantic_digest=APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA)
-        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_SEMANTIC_CAS_CONFLICT")
-    after_api = api("PATCH", f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/branch_protections/main", value, {"merge_whitelist_usernames": target_names})[1]
-    after = get_protection(value, "main")
-    for key in before:
-        if key in {"updated_at", "merge_whitelist_usernames"}:
-            continue
-        if after.get(key) != before.get(key):
-            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_UNAPPROVED_FIELD_CHANGED:" + key)
-    if user_ids(after.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")) != [2, 153]:
-        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
-    after_semantic = semantic_policy(after)
-    if after_semantic != target_semantic:
-        raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_SEMANTIC_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
-    receipt = mutation_receipt(before, after, binding, target_semantic)
-    journal("APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA_COMPLETED", receipt=receipt)
-    return {"status": "APPLIED", "protection": after, "previous_transport_digest": sha(before), "previous_semantic_digest": before_semantic_sha, "transport_digest": sha(after), "semantic_digest": sha(after_semantic), "receipt": receipt}
-
-
-def apply_stage2(binding, facts, value):
-    verify_binding(binding, value)
-    validate_stage2_facts(facts)
-    before = get_protection(value, "main")
-    if OWNER_GATE in (before.get("status_check_contexts") or []) and stage2_semantic_digest(before) != STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA:
-        raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_SEMANTIC_PRECONDITION_INVALID")
-    try:
-        status, target = build_target(before)
-    except Stage2GateError as exc:
-        journal("MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE_BLOCKED", reason=str(exc), semantic_digest=stage2_semantic_digest(before))
-        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
-    target_digest = stage2_semantic_digest(target)
-    if status == "IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS":
-        journal(
-            "MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE_IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS",
-            before_semantic_digest=stage2_semantic_digest(before),
-            target_semantic_digest=target_digest,
-            campaign_id=CAMPAIGN_ID,
-        )
-        return {
-            "status": status,
-            "protection": before,
-            "transport_digest": sha(before),
-            "semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(before),
-            "target_semantic_digest": target_digest,
-            "gate_transition": {"removed": OWNER_GATE, "required": CAMPAIGN_GATE},
-        }
-    after_api = api(
-        "PATCH",
-        f"/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/branch_protections/main",
-        value,
-        {"status_check_contexts": target["status_check_contexts"]},
-    )[1]
-    after = get_protection(value, "main")
-    for key in before:
-        if key in {"updated_at", "status_check_contexts"}:
-            continue
-        if after.get(key) != before.get(key):
-            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTION_UNAPPROVED_FIELD_CHANGED:" + key)
-    if after.get("status_check_contexts") != target["status_check_contexts"]:
-        raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_GATE_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
-    if stage2_semantic_digest(after) != target_digest:
-        raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_SEMANTIC_TARGET_READBACK_FAILED")
-    receipt = {
-        "before_transport_digest": sha(before),
-        "before_semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(before),
-        "after_transport_digest": sha(after),
-        "after_semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(after),
-        "target_semantic_digest": target_digest,
-        "campaign_id": CAMPAIGN_ID,
-        "gate_transition": {"removed": OWNER_GATE, "required": CAMPAIGN_GATE},
-        "preserved_security_fields": True,
-        "facts_digest": sha(facts),
-    }
-    journal("MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE_COMPLETED", receipt=receipt)
-    return {
-        "status": "APPLIED",
-        "protection": after,
-        "previous_transport_digest": sha(before),
-        "previous_semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(before),
-        "transport_digest": sha(after),
-        "semantic_digest": stage2_semantic_digest(after),
-        "target_semantic_digest": target_digest,
-        "receipt": receipt,
-    }
-
-
-def handle(request, value):
-    if not isinstance(request, dict) or set(request) != {"operation", "payload"}:
-        raise RuntimeError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    operation = request["operation"]
-    payload = request["payload"]
-    if not isinstance(payload, dict) or payload.get("repository") != REPO:
-        raise RuntimeError("REPOSITORY_DENIED")
-    if operation == "GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION":
-        protection = get_protection(value, payload.get("branch"))
-        journal("GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION", branch=payload.get("branch"), transport_digest=sha(protection), semantic_digest=semantic_sha(protection))
-        return {"status": "PASS", "protection": protection, "snapshot_sha256": sha(protection), "transport_digest": sha(protection), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(protection), "semantic_schema": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA}
-    if operation == "READBACK_BRANCH_PROTECTION":
-        protection = get_protection(value, payload.get("branch"))
-        return {"status": "PASS", "protection": protection, "snapshot_sha256": sha(protection), "transport_digest": sha(protection), "semantic_digest": semantic_sha(protection), "semantic_schema": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA}
-    if operation == "APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA":
-        binding = payload.get("GovernanceExecutionBinding")
-        if not isinstance(binding, dict):
-            raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_BINDING_REQUIRED")
-        return apply_stage1(binding, value)
-    if operation == "MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE":
-        binding = payload.get("GovernanceExecutionBinding")
-        facts = payload.get("Stage2Facts")
-        if not isinstance(binding, dict) or not isinstance(facts, dict):
-            raise RuntimeError("STAGE2_BINDING_OR_FACTS_REQUIRED")
-        return apply_stage2(binding, facts, value)
-    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_DENIED")
-
-
-def main():
-    value = token()
-    sock_path = pathlib.Path(SOCKET)
-    sock_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
-    server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-    server.bind(SOCKET)
-    os.chmod(SOCKET, 0o660)
-    server.listen(16)
-    journal("EXECUTOR_STARTED", api_surface=["GET_BRANCH_PROTECTION", "APPLY_APPROVED_PROTECTION_DELTA", "MIGRATE_APPROVED_GATE", "READBACK_BRANCH_PROTECTION"], semantic_schema=SEMANTIC_SCHEMA, approved_semantic_digest=APPROVED_SEMANTIC_SHA, stage1_semantic_digest=STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA, campaign_gate=CAMPAIGN_GATE)
-    try:
-        while True:
-            conn, _ = server.accept()
-            with conn:
-                data = conn.recv(1024 * 1024 + 1)
-                if len(data) > 1024 * 1024:
-                    result = {"status": "FAIL", "code": "REQUEST_TOO_LARGE"}
-                else:
-                    try:
-                        request = json.loads(data.decode())
-                        result = handle(request, value)
-                    except Exception as exc:
-                        result = {"status": "FAIL", "code": str(exc)}
-                conn.sendall((json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n").encode())
-    finally:
-        server.close()
-        sock_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()

active-runtime/app/governance/aios-governance-preapproval-publisher

@@ -1,347 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-import base64
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import pathlib
-import shutil
-import socket
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import time
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-
-LOCAL_API = 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1'
-NETWORK_API = 'https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1'
-NETWORK_REMOTE = 'https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git'
-REPO = 'aios/aios'
-BASE_BRANCH = 'governance/approvals'
-REQUEST_BRANCH = 'governance/request/protection-semantic-reconciliation-v1-20260808'
-SOCKET_PATH = '/run/aios-governance-preapproval-publisher/publisher.sock'
-CREDENTIAL_NAME = 'gitea-machine-token'
-AUTHORITY_REPO = '/data/aios-gitops/repo.git'
-TASK_ROOT = pathlib.Path('/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-PROTECTION-SNAPSHOT-DRIFT-FORENSICS-V1')
-INPUT_ROOT = TASK_ROOT / 'publication-input'
-RECEIPT = TASK_ROOT / 'publication-receipt.json'
-MANIFEST_REL = 'approvals/governance-policy/AIOS-PROTECTION-SEMANTIC-SNAPSHOT-RECONCILIATION-V1.json'
-EVIDENCE_REL = 'approvals/governance-policy/AIOS-PROTECTION-SEMANTIC-SNAPSHOT-RECONCILIATION-V1.evidence.json'
-
-
-def digest_bytes(data):
-    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
-
-
-def digest_json(value):
-    return digest_bytes(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode())
-
-
-def load_token():
-    path = pathlib.Path(os.environ['CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY']) / CREDENTIAL_NAME
-    value = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8').strip()
-    if len(value) < 16:
-        raise RuntimeError('MACHINE_CREDENTIAL_INVALID')
-    return value
-
-
-def api(base, method, path, token, body=None, expected=(200,)):
-    raw = None if body is None else json.dumps(body, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
-    request = urllib.request.Request(base + path, data=raw, method=method)
-    request.add_header('Authorization', 'token ' + token)
-    request.add_header('Accept', 'application/json')
-    if raw is not None:
-        request.add_header('Content-Type', 'application/json')
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response:
-            payload = response.read()
-            if response.status not in expected:
-                raise RuntimeError('GITEA_HTTP_' + str(response.status))
-            return response.status, json.loads(payload) if payload else None
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        payload = exc.read()
-        if exc.code in expected:
-            return exc.code, json.loads(payload) if payload else None
-        raise RuntimeError('GITEA_HTTP_' + str(exc.code) + ':' + method + ':' + path) from None
-
-
-def authority_head():
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        ['git', '--git-dir=' + AUTHORITY_REPO, 'rev-parse', 'refs/heads/' + BASE_BRANCH],
-        text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
-    )
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeError('AUTHORITY_BASE_UNAVAILABLE')
-    return result.stdout.strip()
-
-
-def branch_api(base, token, branch, expected=(200,)):
-    return api(base, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/branches/' + urllib.parse.quote(branch, safe=''), token, expected=expected)
-
-
-def verify_base(token):
-    authority = authority_head()
-    _, local = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, BASE_BRANCH)
-    _, network = branch_api(NETWORK_API, token, BASE_BRANCH)
-    local_oid = local.get('commit', {}).get('id')
-    network_oid = network.get('commit', {}).get('id')
-    if not authority or authority != local_oid or authority != network_oid:
-        raise RuntimeError('RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED')
-    return authority
-
-
-def verify_identity(token):
-    _, user = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/user', token)
-    if user.get('login') != 'aios-autonomy-agent' or user.get('id') != 153 or user.get('is_admin') is not False:
-        raise RuntimeError('MACHINE_IDENTITY_REJECTED')
-    return {'login': user['login'], 'id': user['id'], 'owner': user.get('is_admin')}
-
-
-def load_inputs():
-    manifest = json.dumps(json.loads((INPUT_ROOT / 'manifest.json').read_text(encoding='utf-8')), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
-    evidence = json.dumps(json.loads((INPUT_ROOT / 'evidence.json').read_text(encoding='utf-8')), sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False).encode()
-    for data in (manifest, evidence):
-        if any(secret in data.lower() for secret in (b'authorization:', b'ghp_', b'github_pat_', b'secret=', b'token=')):
-            raise RuntimeError('SECRET_CONTENT_REJECTED')
-    return manifest, evidence
-
-
-def publication_key(base_oid, manifest_sha, evidence_sha):
-    payload = REPO + base_oid + REQUEST_BRANCH + manifest_sha + evidence_sha
-    return hashlib.sha256(payload.encode()).hexdigest()
-
-
-def write_receipt(state, **fields):
-    record = {
-        'schema': 'aios.governance-preapproval-publication.v1',
-        'operation': 'SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_REQUEST',
-        'state': state,
-        'recorded_unix': int(time.time()),
-        'request_branch': REQUEST_BRANCH,
-        'manifest_path': MANIFEST_REL,
-        'evidence_path': EVIDENCE_REL,
-        'machine_actor': 'aios-autonomy-agent',
-        'owner': False,
-        'credential_ref': {'scheme': 'systemd-credential', 'name': CREDENTIAL_NAME},
-        'governance_capability_executed': False,
-        'protection_mutation': False,
-        'force_push': False,
-        **fields,
-    }
-    RECEIPT.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    temporary = RECEIPT.with_suffix('.tmp')
-    temporary.write_text(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False) + '\n', encoding='utf-8')
-    temporary.replace(RECEIPT)
-    RECEIPT.chmod(0o640)
-    return record
-
-
-def existing_prs(token):
-    _, prs = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls?state=all&base=' + urllib.parse.quote(BASE_BRANCH, safe='') + '&limit=100', token)
-    return [pr for pr in prs if pr.get('head', {}).get('ref') == REQUEST_BRANCH and pr.get('base', {}).get('ref') == BASE_BRANCH]
-
-
-def verify_existing_branch(token, branch_oid, manifest, evidence):
-    _, commit = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/git/commits/' + branch_oid, token)
-    if commit.get('parents', [{}])[0].get('sha') is None:
-        raise RuntimeError('REQUEST_BRANCH_COMMIT_INVALID')
-    for relative, expected in ((MANIFEST_REL, manifest), (EVIDENCE_REL, evidence)):
-        _, content = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/contents/' + urllib.parse.quote(relative, safe='/') + '?ref=' + branch_oid, token)
-        actual = base64.b64decode(''.join(content.get('content', '').split()))
-        if actual != expected:
-            raise RuntimeError('GOVERNANCE_REQUEST_BRANCH_CONFLICT')
-
-
-def push_one_commit(token, base_oid, manifest, evidence):
-    work_root = TASK_ROOT / 'publisher-work'
-    work_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    temporary = pathlib.Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='semantic-reconciliation-', dir=work_root))
-    askpass = temporary / 'askpass.sh'
-    clone = temporary / 'repo'
-    credential_path = pathlib.Path(os.environ['CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY']) / CREDENTIAL_NAME
-    askpass.write_text(
-        '#!/bin/sh\ncase "$1" in *Username*) printf "%s\\n" "$GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR";; *) cat "$CREDENTIAL_FILE";; esac\n',
-        encoding='utf-8',
-    )
-    askpass.chmod(0o700)
-    env = os.environ.copy()
-    env.update({
-        'GIT_ASKPASS': str(askpass),
-        'GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT': '0',
-        'GITEA_MACHINE_ACTOR': 'aios-autonomy-agent',
-        'CREDENTIAL_FILE': str(credential_path),
-        'GIT_CONFIG_COUNT': '1',
-        'GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0': 'safe.directory',
-        'GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0': AUTHORITY_REPO,
-    })
-    try:
-        run = subprocess.run(
-            ['git', 'clone', '--branch', BASE_BRANCH, '--single-branch', '--quiet', NETWORK_REMOTE, str(clone)],
-            text=True, capture_output=True, env=env, check=False,
-        )
-        if run.returncode != 0:
-            detail = ' '.join(run.stderr.strip().split())[:240]
-            raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_CLONE_FAILED:' + detail)
-        def git(*args, push_env=None):
-            result = subprocess.run(['git', *args], cwd=clone, text=True, capture_output=True, env=push_env or env, check=False)
-            if result.returncode != 0:
-                raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_GIT_OPERATION_FAILED')
-            return result.stdout.strip()
-        git('checkout', '--detach', base_oid)
-        git('switch', '--create', REQUEST_BRANCH)
-        manifest_path = clone / MANIFEST_REL
-        evidence_path = clone / EVIDENCE_REL
-        manifest_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        evidence_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        manifest_path.write_bytes(manifest)
-        evidence_path.write_bytes(evidence)
-        git('add', '--', MANIFEST_REL, EVIDENCE_REL)
-        staged = git('diff', '--cached', '--name-only').splitlines()
-        if staged != sorted([MANIFEST_REL, EVIDENCE_REL]):
-            raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_PATH_ALLOWLIST_FAILED')
-        git('-c', 'user.name=aios-autonomy-agent', '-c', 'user.email=aios-autonomy-agent@aios.invalid', 'commit', '--quiet', '-m', '[governance] publish semantic reconciliation evidence')
-        if git('rev-list', '--count', base_oid + '..HEAD') != '1':
-            raise RuntimeError('PUBLISHER_COMMIT_COUNT_FAILED')
-        git('push', '--porcelain', NETWORK_REMOTE, 'HEAD:refs/heads/' + REQUEST_BRANCH, push_env=env)
-        head = git('rev-parse', 'HEAD')
-        return head
-    finally:
-        shutil.rmtree(temporary, ignore_errors=True)
-
-
-def publish():
-    token = load_token()
-    identity = verify_identity(token)
-    base_oid = verify_base(token)
-    manifest, evidence = load_inputs()
-    manifest_sha = digest_bytes(manifest)
-    evidence_sha = digest_bytes(evidence)
-    key = publication_key(base_oid, manifest_sha, evidence_sha)
-    write_receipt('REQUESTED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, machine_identity=identity)
-    write_receipt('LOCAL_CANDIDATE_VERIFIED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, machine_identity=identity)
-
-    branch_status, branch = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH, expected=(200, 404))
-    if branch_status == 200:
-        branch_oid = branch.get('commit', {}).get('id')
-        verify_existing_branch(token, branch_oid, manifest, evidence)
-    else:
-        branch_oid = push_one_commit(token, base_oid, manifest, evidence)
-        verify_existing_branch(token, branch_oid, manifest, evidence)
-    write_receipt('BRANCH_PUSHED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, request_head_oid=branch_oid, machine_identity=identity)
-
-    prs = existing_prs(token)
-    if len(prs) > 1:
-        raise RuntimeError('MULTIPLE_MATCHING_APPROVAL_PRS')
-    if prs:
-        pr = prs[0]
-        if pr.get('head', {}).get('sha') != branch_oid:
-            raise RuntimeError('APPROVAL_PR_HEAD_MISMATCH')
-        pr_number = pr.get('number')
-    else:
-        _, pr = api(LOCAL_API, 'POST', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls', token, {
-            'title': '[GOVERNANCE RECONCILIATION] Semantic protection snapshot schema migration',
-            'head': REQUEST_BRANCH,
-            'base': BASE_BRANCH,
-            'body': 'Schema-only reconciliation for the existing PR54 Stage-1 and Stage-2 predicates. No new governance capability; Owner exact-head re-attestation required.',
-        }, expected=(201,))
-        pr_number = pr.get('number')
-    write_receipt('PR_CREATED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, request_head_oid=branch_oid, pr_number=pr_number, machine_identity=identity)
-
-    _, remote_branch = branch_api(NETWORK_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH)
-    if remote_branch.get('commit', {}).get('id') != branch_oid:
-        raise RuntimeError('NETWORK_BRANCH_READBACK_MISMATCH')
-    _, read_pr = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls/' + str(pr_number), token)
-    if read_pr.get('head', {}).get('sha') != branch_oid or read_pr.get('base', {}).get('ref') != BASE_BRANCH:
-        raise RuntimeError('PR_READBACK_MISMATCH')
-    result = write_receipt('COMPLETED', governance_base_oid=base_oid, manifest_sha256=manifest_sha, evidence_sha256=evidence_sha, idempotency_key=key, request_head_oid=branch_oid, pr_number=pr_number, pr_head_oid=read_pr.get('head', {}).get('sha'), machine_identity=identity)
-    return result
-
-
-def self_test():
-    token = load_token()
-    identity = verify_identity(token)
-    base_oid = verify_base(token)
-    branch_status, _ = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH, expected=(200, 404))
-    return {
-        'status': 'PASS',
-        'governance_base_oid': base_oid,
-        'machine_identity': identity,
-        'credential_ref': {'scheme': 'systemd-credential', 'name': CREDENTIAL_NAME},
-        'branch_namespace': 'refs/heads/governance/request/*',
-        'target_base': BASE_BRANCH,
-        'request_branch_status': 'EXISTS' if branch_status == 200 else 'ABSENT',
-        'operation_allowlist': ['READ_BASE', 'CREATE_ONE_REQUEST_BRANCH', 'WRITE_TWO_EVIDENCE_PATHS_ONE_COMMIT', 'CREATE_OR_READ_ONE_APPROVAL_PR', 'READBACK'],
-        'denied': ['MAIN_WRITE', 'DIRECT_APPROVALS_WRITE', 'BRANCH_PROTECTION', 'MERGE', 'FORCE_PUSH', 'TAG', 'PRODUCTION', 'CREDENTIAL_MUTATION'],
-        'governance_capability_executed': False,
-    }
-
-
-def read_publication_status():
-    token = load_token()
-    receipt = json.loads(RECEIPT.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
-    pr_number = receipt.get('pr_number')
-    if not pr_number:
-        raise RuntimeError('PUBLICATION_RECEIPT_PR_MISSING')
-    _, pr = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls/' + str(pr_number), token)
-    _, reviews = api(LOCAL_API, 'GET', '/repos/' + REPO + '/pulls/' + str(pr_number) + '/reviews', token)
-    _, branch = branch_api(LOCAL_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH)
-    _, network_branch = branch_api(NETWORK_API, token, REQUEST_BRANCH)
-    return {
-        'status': 'PASS',
-        'request_branch': REQUEST_BRANCH,
-        'branch_head': branch.get('commit', {}).get('id'),
-        'network_branch_head': network_branch.get('commit', {}).get('id'),
-        'pr_number': pr.get('number'),
-        'pr_state': pr.get('state'),
-        'pr_merged': pr.get('merged'),
-        'pr_head': pr.get('head', {}).get('sha'),
-        'pr_base': pr.get('base', {}).get('ref'),
-        'reviews': [
-            {
-                'id': item.get('id'),
-                'reviewer_id': item.get('user', {}).get('id'),
-                'state': item.get('state'),
-                'commit_id': item.get('commit_id'),
-                'dismissed': item.get('dismissed'),
-            }
-            for item in reviews
-        ],
-        'governance_capability_executed': False,
-        'protection_mutation': False,
-    }
-
-
-def handle(request):
-    if not isinstance(request, dict) or set(request) != {'operation'}:
-        raise RuntimeError('REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID')
-    if request['operation'] == 'DRY_RUN_SELF_TEST':
-        return self_test()
-    if request['operation'] == 'PUBLISH_SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION':
-        return publish()
-    if request['operation'] == 'READ_SEMANTIC_RECONCILIATION_STATUS':
-        return read_publication_status()
-    raise RuntimeError('OPERATION_DENIED')
-
-
-def serve(listener):
-    conn, _ = listener.accept()
-    with conn:
-        try:
-            data = conn.recv(1024 * 1024 + 1)
-            if len(data) > 1024 * 1024:
-                raise RuntimeError('REQUEST_TOO_LARGE')
-            result = handle(json.loads(data.decode()))
-        except Exception as exc:
-            result = {'status': 'FAIL', 'code': str(exc)}
-        conn.sendall((json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False) + '\n').encode())
-
-
-def main():
-    if os.environ.get('LISTEN_FDS') != '1':
-        raise SystemExit('SOCKET_ACTIVATION_REQUIRED')
-    listener = socket.fromfd(3, socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-    serve(listener)
-
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-    main()

active-runtime/app/governance/ref_reconciler.py

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed Authority/Gitea ref reconciliation after protected merge."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-
-
-class RefReconciliationError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def _oid(value: str, field: str) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) != 40 or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in value):
-        raise RefReconciliationError(field + "_INVALID")
-    return value
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class RefReconciler:
-    git_dir: Path
-
-    def read(self, ref: str) -> str:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "rev-parse", "--verify", ref],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_REF_UNAVAILABLE")
-        return result.stdout.strip()
-
-    def is_ancestor(self, ancestor: str, descendant: str) -> bool:
-        _oid(ancestor, "ancestor")
-        _oid(descendant, "descendant")
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if result.returncode == 0:
-            return True
-        if result.returncode == 1:
-            return False
-        raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_ANCESTRY_CHECK_FAILED")
-
-    def reconcile_main(self, *, expected_oid: str, merged_oid: str, gitea_main_oid: str) -> str:
-        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
-        _oid(merged_oid, "merged_oid")
-        _oid(gitea_main_oid, "gitea_main_oid")
-        if gitea_main_oid != merged_oid:
-            raise RefReconciliationError("GITEA_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        if not self.is_ancestor(expected_oid, merged_oid):
-            raise RefReconciliationError("MAIN_FF_REQUIRED")
-        current = self.read("refs/heads/main")
-        if current == merged_oid:
-            return merged_oid
-        if current != expected_oid:
-            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_EXPECTATION_MISMATCH")
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", f"--git-dir={self.git_dir}", "update-ref", "refs/heads/main", merged_oid, expected_oid],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_CAS_FAILED")
-        if self.read("refs/heads/main") != merged_oid:
-            raise RefReconciliationError("AUTHORITY_MAIN_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
-        return merged_oid

active-runtime/app/governance/semantic_protection.py

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-"""Canonical semantic branch-protection model used by AIOS governance gates."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-
-SCHEMA = "aios.semantic-protection.v1"
-USER_IDS = {"owner": 2, "aios-autonomy-agent": 153}
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def _typed_json(value: Any) -> list[Any]:
-    if value in (None, "null"):
-        return []
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return json.loads(value)
-    return list(value)
-
-
-def _user_ids(names: Any) -> list[int]:
-    result = []
-    for name in names or []:
-        if name not in USER_IDS:
-            raise ValueError("UNKNOWN_GOVERNANCE_USER:" + str(name))
-        result.append(USER_IDS[name])
-    return sorted(result)
-
-
-def semantic_policy(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Drop transport metadata and canonicalize semantic security fields."""
-    return {
-        "schema_version": SCHEMA,
-        "repo_id": 1,
-        "protection_id": 2,
-        "branch_name": protection.get("branch_name"),
-        "can_push": protection.get("enable_push"),
-        "can_force_push": protection.get("enable_force_push"),
-        "enable_merge_whitelist": protection.get("enable_merge_whitelist"),
-        "merge_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")),
-        "merge_whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "required_approvals": protection.get("required_approvals"),
-        "enable_status_check": protection.get("enable_status_check"),
-        "status_check_contexts": sorted(protection.get("status_check_contexts") or []),
-        "block_admin_merge_override": protection.get("block_admin_merge_override"),
-        "block_on_official_review_requests": protection.get("block_on_official_review_requests"),
-        "block_on_outdated_branch": protection.get("block_on_outdated_branch"),
-        "block_on_rejected_reviews": protection.get("block_on_rejected_reviews"),
-        "dismiss_stale_approvals": protection.get("dismiss_stale_approvals"),
-        "ignore_stale_approvals": protection.get("ignore_stale_approvals"),
-        "enable_approvals_whitelist": protection.get("enable_approvals_whitelist"),
-        "approvals_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("approvals_whitelist_username")),
-        "approvals_whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_bypass_allowlist": protection.get("enable_bypass_allowlist"),
-        "bypass_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("bypass_allowlist_usernames")),
-        "bypass_allowlist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_force_push_allowlist": protection.get("enable_force_push_allowlist"),
-        "force_push_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("force_push_allowlist_usernames")),
-        "enable_whitelist": protection.get("enable_push_whitelist"),
-        "whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("push_whitelist_usernames")),
-        "whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys": protection.get("force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys"),
-        "whitelist_deploy_keys": protection.get("push_whitelist_deploy_keys"),
-        "require_signed_commits": protection.get("require_signed_commits"),
-        "priority": protection.get("priority"),
-        "protected_file_patterns": _typed_json(protection.get("protected_file_patterns")),
-        "unprotected_file_patterns": _typed_json(protection.get("unprotected_file_patterns")),
-    }
-
-
-def semantic_digest(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(semantic_policy(protection))).hexdigest()
-
-
-def transport_digest(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(protection)).hexdigest()

active-runtime/app/governance/stage2_gate_migration.py

@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed Stage-2 campaign gate migration predicates."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import copy
-import hashlib
-import json
-import re
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-SEMANTIC_SCHEMA = "aios.semantic-protection.v1"
-STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA = "d911e856f71de6105b8efa08e13338a448e0b6d37536332decd80c9f409ecf27"
-CAMPAIGN_ID = "AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-CAMPAIGN-20260807"
-OWNER_GATE = "owner-approval-gate"
-CAMPAIGN_GATE = "campaign-approval-gate"
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-
-
-class Stage2GateError(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def _typed_json(value: Any) -> list[Any]:
-    if value in (None, "", "null"):
-        return []
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return json.loads(value)
-    return list(value)
-
-
-def _user_ids(names: Any) -> list[int]:
-    mapping = {"owner": 2, "aios-autonomy-agent": 153}
-    result = []
-    for name in names or []:
-        if name not in mapping:
-            raise Stage2GateError("UNKNOWN_GOVERNANCE_USER")
-        result.append(mapping[name])
-    return sorted(result)
-
-
-def semantic_policy(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "schema_version": SEMANTIC_SCHEMA,
-        "repo_id": 1,
-        "protection_id": 2,
-        "branch_name": protection.get("branch_name"),
-        "can_push": protection.get("enable_push"),
-        "can_force_push": protection.get("enable_force_push"),
-        "enable_merge_whitelist": protection.get("enable_merge_whitelist"),
-        "merge_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("merge_whitelist_usernames")),
-        "merge_whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "required_approvals": protection.get("required_approvals"),
-        "enable_status_check": protection.get("enable_status_check"),
-        "status_check_contexts": sorted(protection.get("status_check_contexts") or []),
-        "block_admin_merge_override": protection.get("block_admin_merge_override"),
-        "block_on_official_review_requests": protection.get("block_on_official_review_requests"),
-        "block_on_outdated_branch": protection.get("block_on_outdated_branch"),
-        "block_on_rejected_reviews": protection.get("block_on_rejected_reviews"),
-        "dismiss_stale_approvals": protection.get("dismiss_stale_approvals"),
-        "ignore_stale_approvals": protection.get("ignore_stale_approvals"),
-        "enable_approvals_whitelist": protection.get("enable_approvals_whitelist"),
-        "approvals_whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("approvals_whitelist_username")),
-        "approvals_whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_bypass_allowlist": protection.get("enable_bypass_allowlist"),
-        "bypass_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("bypass_allowlist_usernames")),
-        "bypass_allowlist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_force_push_allowlist": protection.get("enable_force_push_allowlist"),
-        "force_push_allowlist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("force_push_allowlist_usernames")),
-        "force_push_allowlist_team_ids": [],
-        "enable_whitelist": protection.get("enable_push_whitelist"),
-        "whitelist_user_ids": _user_ids(protection.get("push_whitelist_usernames")),
-        "whitelist_team_ids": [],
-        "force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys": protection.get("force_push_allowlist_deploy_keys"),
-        "whitelist_deploy_keys": protection.get("push_whitelist_deploy_keys"),
-        "require_signed_commits": protection.get("require_signed_commits"),
-        "priority": protection.get("priority"),
-        "protected_file_patterns": protection.get("protected_file_patterns"),
-        "unprotected_file_patterns": protection.get("unprotected_file_patterns"),
-    }
-
-
-def semantic_digest(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(semantic_policy(protection))).hexdigest()
-
-
-def build_target(protection: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
-    current = list(protection.get("status_check_contexts") or [])
-    has_owner = OWNER_GATE in current
-    has_campaign = CAMPAIGN_GATE in current
-    if has_owner and has_campaign:
-        raise Stage2GateError("GATE_PRESTATE_CONFLICT")
-    if not has_owner and not has_campaign:
-        raise Stage2GateError("OWNER_GATE_MISSING")
-    if has_campaign:
-        return "IDEMPOTENT_SUCCESS", copy.deepcopy(dict(protection))
-    if semantic_digest(protection) != STAGE1_SEMANTIC_SHA:
-        raise Stage2GateError("SEMANTIC_PRECONDITION_INVALID")
-    target = copy.deepcopy(dict(protection))
-    target["status_check_contexts"] = sorted(
-        [gate for gate in current if gate != OWNER_GATE] + [CAMPAIGN_GATE]
-    )
-    return "READY", target
-
-
-def validate_stage2_facts(facts: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-    required = {
-        "campaign_id",
-        "campaign_active",
-        "campaign_revoked",
-        "machine_actor",
-        "required_checks_all_success",
-        "required_checks_same_head",
-        "unresolved_conversations",
-        "mergeable",
-        "protected_target",
-        "current_main_oid",
-        "gitea_main_oid",
-        "current_main_lineage_verified",
-    }
-    if set(facts) != required:
-        raise Stage2GateError("STAGE2_FACTS_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    if facts["campaign_id"] != CAMPAIGN_ID or facts["campaign_active"] is not True or facts["campaign_revoked"] is not False:
-        raise Stage2GateError("CAMPAIGN_NOT_ACTIVE")
-    if facts["machine_actor"] != "aios-autonomy-agent":
-        raise Stage2GateError("MACHINE_ACTOR_MISMATCH")
-    if facts["required_checks_all_success"] is not True or facts["required_checks_same_head"] is not True:
-        raise Stage2GateError("REQUIRED_CHECKS_NOT_CURRENT")
-    if facts["unresolved_conversations"] != 0 or facts["mergeable"] is not True:
-        raise Stage2GateError("CAMPAIGN_GATE_FACTS_INVALID")
-    if facts["protected_target"] != "main" or facts["current_main_lineage_verified"] is not True:
-        raise Stage2GateError("PROTECTED_TARGET_OR_LINEAGE_INVALID")
-    if (
-        not isinstance(facts["current_main_oid"], str)
-        or not OID_RE.fullmatch(facts["current_main_oid"])
-        or facts["gitea_main_oid"] != facts["current_main_oid"]
-    ):
-        raise Stage2GateError("MAIN_READBACK_MISMATCH")

active-runtime/app/governed_local_writer.py

@@ -1,473 +0,0 @@
-"""Shared primitives for the V2R1C6 governed local writer contract."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import posixpath
-import re
-import socket
-import stat
-import struct
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-
-TASK_ID = "V2R1C6_GOVERNED_LOCAL_BOOTSTRAP"
-REPO = "aios/aios"
-PRINCIPAL = "governed-local-bootstrap"
-OIDSIZ = 40
-AUTHORIZATION_TTL = timedelta(hours=2)
-
-
-class GovernedLocalWriterError(Exception):
-    """Base error for governed-local-writer validation and runtime failures."""
-
-
-class AuthorizationError(GovernedLocalWriterError):
-    """Raised when authorization input is invalid, expired, or tampered."""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class BranchCreatePolicy:
-    """Exact branch creation contract."""
-
-    branch: str
-    base_oid: str
-    head_oid: str
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class BranchAppendPolicy:
-    """Exact append-commit contract for candidate branch updates."""
-
-    branch: str
-    expected_head_oid: str | None
-    allowed_paths: tuple[str, ...]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class BranchPolicy:
-    """Per-branch operation policies loaded from authorization."""
-
-    create_branch: BranchCreatePolicy | None
-    append_commit: BranchAppendPolicy | None
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GovernedAuthorization:
-    """Parsed and validated authorization object."""
-
-    task_id: str
-    repo: str
-    created_at: datetime
-    expires_at: datetime
-    authorization_sha256: str
-    one_time_use: bool
-    branch_operations: dict[str, BranchPolicy]
-    denied_operations: tuple[str, ...]
-
-    @property
-    def create_branches(self) -> set[str]:
-        """Branches that are allowed for branch-creation operations."""
-        return {
-            branch
-            for branch, policy in self.branch_operations.items()
-            if policy.create_branch is not None
-        }
-
-    @property
-    def append_branches(self) -> set[str]:
-        """Branches that are allowed for commit-append operations."""
-        return {
-            branch
-            for branch, policy in self.branch_operations.items()
-            if policy.append_commit is not None
-        }
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class PeerIdentity:
-    """Verified peer identity from SO_PEERCRED."""
-
-    pid: int
-    uid: int
-    gid: int
-    executable: str | None
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class FileChange:
-    """Single file modification payload."""
-
-    path: str
-    content: str
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CreateBranchRequest:
-    """Validated create-branch request payload."""
-
-    branch: str
-    base_oid: str
-    head_oid: str | None
-    authorization_digest: str
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AppendCommitRequest:
-    """Validated append-commit request payload."""
-
-    branch: str
-    expected_head_oid: str
-    changes: tuple[FileChange, ...]
-    authorization_digest: str
-    commit_message: str = "chore(governance): append governed commit"
-
-
-_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$")
-_DENIED_PATH_SEGMENTS = (
-    "main",
-    "tag",
-    "baseline",
-    "credential",
-    "credentials",
-    "secret",
-    "registry",
-)
-_SECRET_PATTERNS = (
-    re.compile(r"(?i)-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)secret\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)password\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)token\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
-)
-_SAFE_SECRET_MARKERS = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*(?:REDACTED|TEST_FIXTURE|NOT_A_SECRET)"
-)
-
-
-def canonicalize_authorization_payload(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    """Serialize authorization payload without the signature hash, in canonical form."""
-    canonical = dict(payload)
-    canonical.pop("authorization_sha256", None)
-    return json.dumps(
-        canonical, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True
-    )
-
-
-def compute_authorization_sha256(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    """Compute canonical sha256 over authorization payload."""
-    digest = hashlib.sha256()
-    digest.update(canonicalize_authorization_payload(payload).encode("utf-8"))
-    return digest.hexdigest()
-
-
-def _assert_authorization_file_permissions(path: Path) -> None:
-    """Fail-closed checks for root-only secret-like authorization files."""
-    if path.is_symlink():
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization path must not be a symlink")
-
-    st = path.stat()
-    if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization path must be a regular file")
-
-    if (st.st_mode & 0o777) != 0o600:
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization file mode must be exactly 0600")
-
-    if hasattr(st, "st_uid") and os.name != "nt" and st.st_uid != 0:
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization file owner must be uid 0")
-
-
-def _parse_iso8601(value: str) -> datetime:
-    """Parse ISO 8601 timestamps used by authorization payloads."""
-    try:
-        if value.endswith("Z"):
-            value = value[:-1] + "+00:00"
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-        raise AuthorizationError("created_at must be an ISO 8601 timestamp") from exc
-
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-    return parsed
-
-
-def _require_type(value: Any, expected: type, *, key: str) -> None:
-    if not isinstance(value, expected):
-        raise AuthorizationError(f"{key} must be {expected.__name__}")
-
-
-def _parse_oid(value: Any, *, field: str) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        raise AuthorizationError(f"{field} must be a string")
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise AuthorizationError(f"{field} must be a 40-char hex object id")
-    return value.lower()
-
-
-def _parse_allowed_paths(paths: Any) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    if not isinstance(paths, list) or not paths:
-        raise AuthorizationError("allowed_paths must be a non-empty list")
-    normalized: list[str] = []
-    for path in paths:
-        if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip():
-            raise AuthorizationError("allowed_paths entries must be non-empty strings")
-        normalized.append(path.strip())
-    return tuple(normalized)
-
-
-def parse_authorization(
-    raw: Mapping[str, Any], *, now: datetime | None = None
-) -> GovernedAuthorization:
-    """Validate an authorization payload and return a typed object."""
-    _require_type(raw.get("task_id"), str, key="task_id")
-    if raw["task_id"] != TASK_ID:
-        raise AuthorizationError("unexpected task_id")
-
-    _require_type(raw.get("repo"), str, key="repo")
-    if raw["repo"] != REPO:
-        raise AuthorizationError("unexpected repo value")
-
-    created_at = _parse_iso8601(raw.get("created_at"))
-    check_time = now or datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
-    if created_at.tzinfo is None:
-        created_at = created_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-    if created_at - check_time > timedelta(seconds=30):
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization created_at is in the future")
-    if check_time - created_at > AUTHORIZATION_TTL:
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expired")
-    raw_expires_at = raw.get("expires_at")
-    expires_at = (
-        _parse_iso8601(raw_expires_at)
-        if raw_expires_at is not None
-        else created_at + AUTHORIZATION_TTL
-    )
-    if expires_at <= check_time:
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expiry is in the past")
-    if expires_at > created_at + AUTHORIZATION_TTL:
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization expiry exceeds two-hour maximum")
-
-    _require_type(raw.get("one_time_use"), bool, key="one_time_use")
-    if raw["one_time_use"] is not True:
-        raise AuthorizationError("one_time_use must be true")
-
-    _require_type(raw.get("authorization_sha256"), str, key="authorization_sha256")
-    expected_hash = compute_authorization_sha256(raw)
-    provided_hash = str(raw["authorization_sha256"]).lower()
-    if provided_hash != expected_hash:
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization_sha256 mismatch")
-
-    op_map = raw.get("allowed_branch_operations")
-    if not isinstance(op_map, dict) or not op_map:
-        raise AuthorizationError("allowed_branch_operations must be a non-empty object")
-
-    branch_operations: dict[str, BranchPolicy] = {}
-    for branch, operation in op_map.items():
-        if not isinstance(branch, str) or not branch.strip():
-            raise AuthorizationError("branch names must be non-empty strings")
-
-        if not isinstance(operation, dict):
-            raise AuthorizationError("operation policy must be an object")
-
-        create_block = operation.get("create_branch")
-        append_block = operation.get("append_commit")
-
-        create_policy: BranchCreatePolicy | None = None
-        append_policy: BranchAppendPolicy | None = None
-
-        if create_block is not None:
-            if not isinstance(create_block, dict):
-                raise AuthorizationError("create_branch block must be an object")
-            raw_head_oid = create_block.get("head_oid")
-            create_policy = BranchCreatePolicy(
-                branch=branch,
-                base_oid=_parse_oid(create_block.get("base_oid"), field="create_branch.base_oid"),
-                head_oid=(
-                    _parse_oid(raw_head_oid, field="create_branch.head_oid")
-                    if raw_head_oid is not None
-                    else None
-                ),
-            )
-
-        if append_block is not None:
-            if not isinstance(append_block, dict):
-                raise AuthorizationError("append_commit block must be an object")
-            raw_expected_head_oid = append_block.get("expected_head_oid")
-            append_policy = BranchAppendPolicy(
-                branch=branch,
-                expected_head_oid=(
-                    _parse_oid(
-                        raw_expected_head_oid,
-                        field="append_commit.expected_head_oid",
-                    )
-                    if raw_expected_head_oid is not None
-                    else None
-                ),
-                allowed_paths=_parse_allowed_paths(append_block.get("allowed_paths")),
-            )
-
-        if create_policy is None and append_policy is None:
-            raise AuthorizationError("branch policy must define at least one operation")
-
-        branch_operations[branch] = BranchPolicy(
-            create_branch=create_policy, append_commit=append_policy
-        )
-
-    denied_raw = raw.get("denied_operations", ())
-    if not isinstance(denied_raw, list):
-        raise AuthorizationError("denied_operations must be a list")
-    denied_operations: list[str] = []
-    for value in denied_raw:
-        if not isinstance(value, str):
-            raise AuthorizationError("denied operations must be strings")
-        denied_operations.append(value.lower())
-
-    return GovernedAuthorization(
-        task_id=raw["task_id"],
-        repo=raw["repo"],
-        created_at=created_at,
-        expires_at=expires_at,
-        authorization_sha256=provided_hash,
-        one_time_use=True,
-        branch_operations=branch_operations,
-        denied_operations=tuple(denied_operations),
-    )
-
-
-def load_authorization_file(
-    path: str | os.PathLike[str], *, now: datetime | None = None
-) -> GovernedAuthorization:
-    """Load and validate the root-only authorization file."""
-    auth_path = Path(path)
-    _assert_authorization_file_permissions(auth_path)
-    try:
-        raw_text = auth_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
-        raise AuthorizationError("unable to read authorization file") from exc
-
-    try:
-        raw_obj = json.loads(raw_text)
-    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization must be JSON") from exc
-
-    if not isinstance(raw_obj, dict):
-        raise AuthorizationError("authorization top-level must be an object")
-
-    return parse_authorization(raw_obj, now=now)
-
-
-def _resolve_peer_executable(pid: int) -> str | None:
-    """Resolve peer executable from /proc/<pid>/exe when available."""
-    if pid <= 0:
-        return None
-    exe_path = f"/proc/{pid}/exe"
-    try:
-        return os.readlink(exe_path)
-    except OSError:
-        return None
-
-
-def extract_peer_identity(
-    connection: socket.socket, *, require_root_uid: bool = True
-) -> PeerIdentity:
-    """Validate SO_PEERCRED and return peer identity."""
-    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
-        raise AuthorizationError("SO_PEERCRED not available on this platform")
-
-    data = connection.getsockopt(
-        socket.SOL_SOCKET,
-        socket.SO_PEERCRED,
-        struct.calcsize("3i"),
-    )
-    if len(data) != struct.calcsize("3i"):
-        raise AuthorizationError("SO_PEERCRED payload size mismatch")
-
-    pid, uid, gid = struct.unpack("3i", data)
-    if require_root_uid and uid != 0:
-        raise PermissionError("peer uid must be 0")
-
-    return PeerIdentity(
-        pid=pid,
-        uid=uid,
-        gid=gid,
-        executable=_resolve_peer_executable(pid),
-    )
-
-
-def _normalize_file_path(path: str) -> str:
-    normalized = posixpath.normpath(path.replace("\\", "/").strip())
-    return normalized.lstrip("/")
-
-
-def _path_has_disallowed_segment(path: str) -> bool:
-    lowered = path.lower()
-    if ".." in path.split("/"):
-        return True
-    parts = [p for p in lowered.split("/") if p]
-    for part in parts:
-        for segment in _DENIED_PATH_SEGMENTS:
-            if part == segment or part.startswith(f"{segment}.") or segment in part:
-                return True
-    return False
-
-
-def _is_allowed_path(path: str, allowed_paths: Sequence[str]) -> bool:
-    normalized = _normalize_file_path(path)
-    for prefix in allowed_paths:
-        normalized_prefix = _normalize_file_path(prefix)
-        if normalized == normalized_prefix:
-            return True
-        if normalized.startswith(normalized_prefix + "/"):
-            return True
-    return False
-
-
-def contains_secret_like_content(content: str) -> bool:
-    """Heuristic detector for obvious secret-like strings."""
-    content = _SAFE_SECRET_MARKERS.sub("", content or "")
-    for pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS:
-        if pattern.search(content):
-            return True
-    return False
-
-
-def validate_file_changes(
-    changes: Any, allowed_paths: Sequence[str]
-) -> tuple[FileChange, ...]:
-    """Validate append-commit file changes against path and content policy."""
-    if not isinstance(changes, list):
-        raise AuthorizationError("changes must be a list")
-    result: list[FileChange] = []
-
-    for change in changes:
-        if not isinstance(change, Mapping):
-            raise AuthorizationError("each file change must be an object")
-        raw_path = change.get("path")
-        raw_content = change.get("content")
-        if not isinstance(raw_path, str) or not raw_path.strip():
-            raise AuthorizationError("file change path must be a non-empty string")
-        if raw_path.startswith(("/", "\\")):
-            raise AuthorizationError("file change path must be relative")
-        if not isinstance(raw_content, str):
-            raise AuthorizationError("file change content must be a string")
-
-        normalized = _normalize_file_path(raw_path)
-        if not normalized or normalized.startswith("../") or normalized == "..":
-            raise AuthorizationError("file paths must be normalized relative paths")
-
-        if not _is_allowed_path(normalized, allowed_paths):
-            raise AuthorizationError("file path outside allowed_paths")
-
-        if _path_has_disallowed_segment(normalized):
-            raise AuthorizationError("file path uses denied segment")
-
-        if contains_secret_like_content(raw_content):
-            raise AuthorizationError("file content failed secret-like scan")
-
-        result.append(FileChange(path=normalized, content=raw_content))
-
-    return tuple(result)

active-runtime/app/governed_merge_gate.py

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-"""Supplement Gitea native protection when review identity is not expressible."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-
-class MergeGateDenied(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class MergeGateDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    owner_review_id: int
-    required_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
-
-
-def validate_protected_merge(
-    pull_request: Mapping[str, Any],
-    reviews: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
-    statuses: Mapping[str, str],
-    *,
-    required_contexts: Sequence[str],
-    unresolved_conversations: int,
-    owner_login: str = "owner",
-    owner_id: int = 2,
-) -> MergeGateDecision:
-    if pull_request.get("state") != "open" or pull_request.get("mergeable") is not True:
-        raise MergeGateDenied("pull_request_not_mergeable")
-    author = (pull_request.get("user") or {}).get("login")
-    owner_review = None
-    for review in reviews:
-        user = review.get("user") or {}
-        if review.get("state") == "APPROVED" and user.get("login") == owner_login and user.get("id") == owner_id:
-            if author == owner_login or (pull_request.get("author_id") == owner_id):
-                raise MergeGateDenied("pr_author_self_approval_denied")
-            owner_review = review
-    if owner_review is None:
-        raise MergeGateDenied("owner_review_required")
-    if unresolved_conversations != 0:
-        raise MergeGateDenied("unresolved_conversations_block_merge")
-    missing = [context for context in required_contexts if statuses.get(context) != "success"]
-    if missing:
-        raise MergeGateDenied("required_checks_missing:" + ",".join(missing))
-    return MergeGateDecision(True, int(owner_review.get("id", 0)), tuple(required_contexts))
-

active-runtime/app/governed_production_release.py

@@ -1,568 +0,0 @@
-"""Governed V2R2C1 production release orchestration.
-
-This module is deliberately scoped to the Owner-approved V2R2C1 binding.  It
-uses the existing TagPublisher and metadata adapters; it does not introduce a
-second Git writer, a second durable job store, or an alternate baseline.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import fcntl
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import subprocess
-import tarfile
-import tempfile
-import time
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from gitea_tag_publication import (
-    GiteaTagClient,
-    GitTagBackend,
-    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
-    PublicationPending,
-    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
-    PublicationRequest,
-    TagPublisher,
-)
-
-
-VERSION = "V2R2C1"
-TARGET_OID = "998d30304787e31e5ae607c0bd86b5edb2b0e5ad"
-EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID = "a8b906d1bc24088c19647e98de6a679268f6d0a2"
-APPROVAL_PLAN_ID = "sha256:c0df52008ae7f64cec5ee2d28947aa7b892066c670ab8295e4549140b1a7500e"
-REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
-SERVICE = "aios-v2r1c7-production.service"
-PORT = 18927
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-
-
-class ReleaseBlocked(RuntimeError):
-    """A release gate failed and no unsafe recovery is permitted."""
-
-
-class ManualOwnerReviewRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
-    pass
-
-
-class ReconciliationRequired(ReleaseBlocked):
-    pass
-
-
-def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
-    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode()
-
-
-def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
-    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact must be a regular file")
-    digest = hashlib.sha256()
-    with path.open("rb") as stream:
-        for block in iter(lambda: stream.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
-            digest.update(block)
-    return digest.hexdigest()
-
-
-def atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any], mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    temporary = path.with_name(path.name + ".tmp")
-    temporary.write_bytes(canonical(dict(value)))
-    os.chmod(temporary, mode)
-    os.replace(temporary, path)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ReleaseBinding:
-    version: str = VERSION
-    target_oid: str = TARGET_OID
-    evidence_closure_oid: str = EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID
-    approval_plan_id: str = APPROVAL_PLAN_ID
-    repository: str = REPOSITORY
-    production_service: str = SERVICE
-    production_port: int = PORT
-
-    def validate(self) -> None:
-        if self.version != VERSION or self.repository != REPOSITORY:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("release binding is outside V2R2C1 scope")
-        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.target_oid) or self.target_oid != TARGET_OID:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 target_oid mismatch")
-        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.evidence_closure_oid) or self.evidence_closure_oid != EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 evidence closure mismatch")
-        if self.approval_plan_id != APPROVAL_PLAN_ID:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 approval plan mismatch")
-        if self.production_service != SERVICE or int(self.production_port) != PORT:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("production service binding mismatch")
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "version": self.version,
-            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
-            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
-            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
-            "repository": self.repository,
-            "production_service": self.production_service,
-            "production_port": self.production_port,
-        }
-
-
-class StateLock:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path):
-        self.path = path
-        self.handle = None
-
-    def __enter__(self) -> "StateLock":
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
-        fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
-        return self
-
-    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
-        if self.handle is not None:
-            fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
-            self.handle.close()
-
-
-class ReleaseState:
-    def __init__(self, root: Path, binding: ReleaseBinding):
-        self.root = root
-        self.path = root / "release-state.json"
-        self.binding = binding
-        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if self.path.exists():
-            value = json.loads(self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-            if value.get("binding") != binding.as_dict():
-                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("persisted release binding conflict")
-            self.value = value
-        else:
-            self.value = {
-                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.governed-production-release-state.v1",
-                "binding": binding.as_dict(),
-                "state": "INITIAL",
-                "completed": {},
-                "history": [],
-            }
-            self.save()
-
-    def save(self) -> None:
-        atomic_json(self.path, self.value)
-
-    def record(self, state: str, step: str, result: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        safe = json.loads(json.dumps(dict(result)))
-        self.value["state"] = state
-        self.value.setdefault("completed", {})[step] = safe
-        self.value.setdefault("history", []).append(
-            {"at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()), "state": state, "step": step, "result": safe}
-        )
-        self.save()
-
-    def fail(self, state: str, reason: str) -> None:
-        self.value["state"] = state
-        self.value.setdefault("history", []).append(
-            {"at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()), "state": state, "reason": str(reason)[:500]}
-        )
-        self.save()
-
-
-def _git(git_dir: Path, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if check and completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise ReconciliationRequired(completed.stderr.strip() or "authoritative git query failed")
-    return completed.stdout.strip()
-
-
-def _ancestor(git_dir: Path, ancestor: str, descendant: str) -> bool:
-    return subprocess.run(
-        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    ).returncode == 0
-
-
-def verify_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: ReleaseBinding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    binding.validate()
-    if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.target_oid) != "commit":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("approved target_oid is not a commit")
-    if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.evidence_closure_oid) != "commit":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("evidence closure is not a commit")
-    if not _ancestor(git_dir, binding.target_oid, binding.evidence_closure_oid):
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("approved target is not an ancestor of evidence closure")
-    return {
-        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-        "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
-        "main_oid": _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"),
-    }
-
-
-def verify_owner_approval(value: Mapping[str, Any], binding: ReleaseBinding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    approval = value.get("owner_approval")
-    if not isinstance(approval, Mapping):
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_APPROVAL_RECEIPT_REQUIRED")
-    if approval.get("approved") is not True or approval.get("status") != "APPROVED":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_APPROVAL_NOT_ACCEPTED")
-    if approval.get("approved_by") != "aiman":
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_ACTOR_MISMATCH")
-    if approval.get("approval_source") != "explicit_owner_approval_in_chat":
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_SOURCE_MISMATCH")
-    for key, expected in binding.as_dict().items():
-        if key in {"repository", "production_service", "production_port"}:
-            continue
-        if approval.get(key) != expected:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("OWNER_APPROVAL_BINDING_MISMATCH:" + key)
-    return dict(approval)
-
-
-def _payload_file(git_dir: Path, oid: str, path: str) -> bytes:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", "show", f"{oid}:{path}"],
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("required release source missing:" + path)
-    return completed.stdout
-
-
-def _commit_epoch(git_dir: Path, oid: str) -> int:
-    return int(_git(git_dir, "show", "-s", "--format=%ct", oid))
-
-
-def build_production_artifact(
-    git_dir: Path,
-    binding: ReleaseBinding,
-    output_root: Path,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a deterministic executable V2R2C1 health artifact from target_oid."""
-    binding.validate()
-    verify_lineage(git_dir, binding)
-    epoch = _commit_epoch(git_dir, binding.target_oid)
-    output_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    stem = f"aios-{VERSION}-{binding.target_oid[:12]}"
-    output = output_root / (stem + ".tar.zst")
-    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="v2r2c1-artifact-") as temp:
-        root = Path(temp) / "payload"
-        root.mkdir(parents=True)
-        source_paths = {
-            "active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py": "active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py",
-            "active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py": "active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py",
-        }
-        for destination, source in source_paths.items():
-            target = root / destination
-            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            target.write_bytes(_payload_file(git_dir, binding.target_oid, source))
-        generated: dict[str, str] = {
-            "VERSION": VERSION + "\n",
-            "active-runtime/app/v2r2c1_health_service.py": (
-                "from v2r1c6_privacy_tools import main\n\n"
-                "if __name__ == '__main__':\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n"
-            ),
-            "deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c7-production.service": (
-                "[Unit]\nDescription=AIOS V2R2C1 governed health contract service\n"
-                "After=network.target\n\n[Service]\nType=simple\n"
-                "User=aios-v2r1c7\nGroup=aios-v2r1c7\n"
-                "WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios/v2r2c1\n"
-                "EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios/aios-v2r2c1.env\n"
-                "ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/aios/v2r2c1/active-runtime/app/v2r2c1_health_service.py --serve --host 127.0.0.1 --port ${AIOS_V2R1C7_PORT}\n"
-                "Restart=on-failure\nRestartSec=5\nNoNewPrivileges=true\nPrivateTmp=true\n"
-                "ProtectHome=true\nProtectSystem=strict\nProtectKernelLogs=true\n"
-                "ProtectKernelModules=true\nProtectKernelTunables=true\nProtectControlGroups=true\n"
-                "RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6\nIPAddressDeny=any\n"
-                "IPAddressAllow=localhost\nUMask=0077\n\n[Install]\nWantedBy=multi-user.target\n"
-            ),
-            "deploy/aios-v2/v2r2c1-runtime-config.json": json.dumps({
-                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.production-runtime.v1",
-                "version": VERSION,
-                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                "service": SERVICE,
-                "port": PORT,
-                "health_path": "/health",
-                "deployment_state_source": "environment_and_state_file",
-            }, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n",
-            "deploy/aios-v2/v2r2c1-rollback.json": json.dumps({
-                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.rollback-metadata.v1",
-                "rollback_version": "V2R1C7",
-                "rollback_service": SERVICE,
-                "rollback_target_is_previous_production": True,
-                "automatic_rollback": False,
-            }, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n",
-            "scripts/probe_v2r2c1_health.py": (
-                "import json,sys,urllib.request\n"
-                "url=sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv)>1 else 'http://127.0.0.1:18927/health'\n"
-                "with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as r: print(json.dumps(json.load(r), sort_keys=True))\n"
-            ),
-            "scripts/rollback_v2r2c1_release.sh": "#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\nprintf '%s\\n' 'rollback requires governed owner-approved executor'\nexit 2\n",
-            "release-manifests/V2R2C1.json": json.dumps({
-                "schema": "aios.release-source.v2",
-                "version": VERSION,
-                "repository": REPOSITORY,
-                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-                "production_deployed": False,
-                "deployment_state": "STAGING",
-                "artifact_kind": "executable-production-health",
-            }, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n",
-        }
-        for rel, text in generated.items():
-            target = root / rel
-            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            target.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
-            if rel.startswith("scripts/"):
-                target.chmod(0o755)
-        metadata = {
-            "schema": "aios.release-artifact-build.v3",
-            "version": VERSION,
-            "repository": REPOSITORY,
-            "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
-            "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-            "source_date_epoch": epoch,
-            "clean_source": True,
-            "executable_payload": True,
-            "production_deployed": False,
-            "tag_created": False,
-            "baseline_changed": False,
-            "secrets_included": False,
-        }
-        (root / "BUILD-METADATA.json").write_bytes(canonical(metadata))
-        (root / "ROLLBACK-METADATA.json").write_bytes(canonical(json.loads((root / "deploy/aios-v2/v2r2c1-rollback.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))))
-        names = sorted("payload/" + str(path.relative_to(root)).replace(os.sep, "/") for path in root.rglob("*") if path.is_file())
-        (root / "ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json").write_bytes(canonical({
-            "schema": "aios.release-artifact-manifest.v3",
-            "version": VERSION,
-            "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
-            "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-            "repository": REPOSITORY,
-            "files": names + ["payload/ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json"],
-            "deployable": True,
-            "executable_payload": True,
-            "production_deployed": False,
-            "tag_created": False,
-            "baseline_changed": False,
-        }))
-        tar_path = Path(temp) / "release.tar"
-        with tarfile.open(tar_path, "w") as archive:
-            for path in sorted(root.rglob("*")):
-                relative = str(path.relative_to(root)).replace(os.sep, "/")
-                info = archive.gettarinfo(str(path), arcname="payload/" + relative)
-                info.uid = info.gid = 0
-                info.uname = "root"
-                info.gname = "root"
-                info.mtime = epoch
-                info.mode = 0o755 if path.is_dir() or path.suffix == ".sh" else 0o644
-                if path.is_file():
-                    with path.open("rb") as stream:
-                        archive.addfile(info, stream)
-                else:
-                    archive.addfile(info)
-        subprocess.run(["zstd", "-T1", "-19", "--no-progress", "-q", "-f", str(tar_path), "-o", str(output)], check=True, timeout=120)
-    digest = sha256_file(output)
-    receipt = {
-        "schema": "aios.release-artifact-receipt.v3",
-        "version": VERSION,
-        "repository": REPOSITORY,
-        "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-        "artifact": str(output),
-        "artifact_sha256": digest,
-        "artifact_size": output.stat().st_size,
-        "deployable": True,
-        "executable_payload": True,
-        "production_deployed": False,
-        "tag_created": False,
-        "baseline_changed": False,
-    }
-    atomic_json(output.with_suffix(output.suffix + ".receipt.json"), receipt, mode=0o640)
-    return receipt
-
-
-class GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor:
-    def __init__(self, config: Any):
-        self.config = config
-        self.binding = ReleaseBinding()
-        self.binding.validate()
-        self.root = Path(config.state_root) / "v2r2c1-governed-production-release"
-        self.state = ReleaseState(self.root, self.binding)
-        workspace = self.root / "publication-workspace"
-        workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.publisher = TagPublisher(
-            workspace,
-            GitTagBackend(workspace, authoritative_repo=Path(config.authoritative_git_dir)),
-            GiteaTagClient(config.api_base, REPOSITORY, Path(config.token_path)),
-            config.remote_name,
-            state_root=self.root / "tag-publication",
-        )
-
-    def _request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> PublicationRequest:
-        binding = self.binding
-        for key, expected in binding.as_dict().items():
-            if key in request and request[key] != expected:
-                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("release request binding mismatch:" + key)
-        return PublicationRequest(binding.version, binding.target_oid, binding.evidence_closure_oid, binding.approval_plan_id)
-
-    def approval_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if request.get("execute") is not False:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked("TAG_APPROVAL_REQUEST_MUST_BE_DRY_RUN")
-        owner = verify_owner_approval(request, self.binding)
-        with StateLock(self.root / "release.lock"):
-            current = self.state.value.get("approval")
-            approval_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical(owner)).hexdigest()
-            record = {
-                "schema": "aios.v2r2c1.tag-approval-request.v1",
-                "binding": self.binding.as_dict(),
-                "owner_approval": owner,
-                "owner_approval_digest_sha256": approval_digest,
-                "execute": False,
-                "recorded_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()),
-            }
-            if current and current != record:
-                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("persisted Owner approval differs")
-            self.state.value["approval"] = record
-            self.state.record("APPROVAL_REQUEST_RECORDED", "tag_approval_request", record)
-            return {"status": "RECORDED", "execute": False, "binding": self.binding.as_dict(), "owner_approval_digest_sha256": approval_digest}
-
-    def _require_approval(self) -> None:
-        approval = self.state.value.get("approval")
-        if not isinstance(approval, Mapping) or approval.get("binding") != self.binding.as_dict():
-            raise ReleaseBlocked("OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUEST_NOT_RECORDED")
-
-    def publish_tag(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if request.get("execute") is not True:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked("TAG_PUBLICATION_REQUIRES_EXECUTE_TRUE")
-        self._require_approval()
-        publication = self._request(request)
-        with StateLock(self.root / "release.lock"):
-            try:
-                verified = self.publisher._verify_publication(publication, allow_push=True, previously_deployed=False)
-            except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
-                self.state.fail("MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED", str(exc))
-                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(str(exc)) from exc
-            except PublicationPending as exc:
-                self.state.fail("REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING", str(exc))
-                raise ReconciliationRequired(str(exc)) from exc
-            except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
-                self.state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", str(exc))
-                raise ReconciliationRequired(str(exc)) from exc
-            result = dict(verified)
-            self.state.record("TAG_VERIFIED", "tag", result)
-            return {"status": "REMOTE_VERIFIED", **result}
-
-    def tag_status(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        self._request(request)
-        return self.publisher.get_tag_publication_status(VERSION)
-
-    def build_artifact(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        self._require_approval()
-        self._request(request)
-        receipt = build_production_artifact(Path(self.config.authoritative_git_dir), self.binding, self.root / "artifacts")
-        self.state.record("ARTIFACT_VERIFIED", "production_artifact", receipt)
-        return {"status": "VERIFIED", **receipt}
-
-    def execute_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        self._require_approval()
-        publication = self._request(request)
-        tag_state = self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("tag")
-        if not isinstance(tag_state, Mapping) or tag_state.get("state") not in {"GITEA_API_CONFIRMED", "REMOTE_VERIFIED"}:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked("REMOTE_TAG_PROOF_REQUIRED")
-        artifact = self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("production_artifact")
-        if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
-            artifact = self.build_artifact(request)
-        value = {
-            **self.binding.as_dict(),
-            "tag_oid": tag_state.get("tag_oid") or tag_state.get("gitea_tag_oid"),
-            "artifact_path": artifact["artifact"],
-            "artifact_size": int(artifact["artifact_size"]),
-            "artifact_sha256": artifact["artifact_sha256"],
-        }
-        # The production adapter is privileged and is run through the root
-        # approved-release service boundary by the caller.  This handler is
-        # still useful for a root-owned staging invocation and remains
-        # fail-closed when the adapter is not available.
-        import v2r2c1_production_adapter
-        runtime = v2r2c1_production_adapter.execute_request({"schema": "aios.production-executor-request.v1", "operation": "apply", **value})
-        if runtime.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
-            self.state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "production health did not verify")
-            raise ReconciliationRequired("production health did not verify")
-        self.state.record("PRODUCTION_VERIFIED", "production", runtime)
-        return {"status": "PRODUCTION_VERIFIED", "runtime": runtime, "artifact": artifact, "tag_oid": value["tag_oid"]}
-
-    def consistency(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        publication = self._request(request)
-        result = self.publisher.get_release_consistency(publication)
-        result["release_binding"] = self.binding.as_dict()
-        result["production_health"] = _health(self.config.health_url, self.binding, self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("production_artifact", {}))
-        result["registry"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.registry_root) / f"{VERSION}.json")
-        result["baseline"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.baseline_path))
-        return result
-
-    def acceptance(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        result = self.consistency(request)
-        result["accepted"] = result.get("status") == "PASS" and result.get("production_health", {}).get("status") == "ACTIVE_VERIFIED"
-        self.state.record("ACCEPTED" if result["accepted"] else "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "acceptance", result)
-        return result
-
-
-def _read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except FileNotFoundError:
-        return {"status": "MISSING", "path": str(path)}
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {"status": "INVALID", "path": str(path)}
-    return {"status": "PRESENT", "path": str(path), **value}
-
-
-def _health(url: str, binding: ReleaseBinding, artifact: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    import urllib.request
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as response:
-            body = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-            status = response.status
-    except Exception as exc:
-        return {"status": "UNAVAILABLE", "error": type(exc).__name__}
-    expected_artifact = artifact.get("artifact_sha256")
-    exact = (
-        status == 200
-        and body.get("version") == binding.version
-        and body.get("commit_oid") == binding.target_oid
-        and (not expected_artifact or body.get("artifact_sha256") == expected_artifact)
-        and body.get("deployment_state") == "ACTIVE"
-        and body.get("production_deployed") is True
-    )
-    return {"status": "ACTIVE_VERIFIED" if exact else "CONFLICT", "http_status": status, **body}
-
-
-def build_executor_config(config: Any) -> GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor:
-    return GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor(config)
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("operation", choices=("build-artifact", "status"))
-    parser.add_argument("--git-dir", type=Path, default=Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"))
-    parser.add_argument("--output-root", type=Path, default=Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/approved-artifacts/V2R2C1"))
-    args = parser.parse_args()
-    binding = ReleaseBinding()
-    if args.operation == "build-artifact":
-        print(json.dumps(build_production_artifact(args.git_dir, binding, args.output_root), sort_keys=True))
-    else:
-        print(json.dumps({"binding": binding.as_dict(), "status": "READY"}, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/governed_tag_adapter.py

@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Thin production tag adapter over AIOS's existing mature TagPublisher.
-
-This adapter deliberately does not call TagPublisher.publish(), because that
-legacy method also mutates Registry/Baseline. The production executor requires:
-Tag -> runtime ACTIVE -> Registry -> Baseline.
-
-`apply` reuses TagPublisher._verify_publication() under the publisher's durable
-per-version lock. That method performs the existing fail-closed annotated-tag,
-network remote, Gitea API, peeled-target and listing verification, but stops
-before Registry/Baseline mutation.
-
-`probe` is read-only.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from gitea_tag_publication import (
-    GiteaTagClient,
-    GitTagBackend,
-    PublicationConflict,
-    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
-    PublicationPending,
-    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
-    PublicationRequest,
-    PublicationState,
-    TagPublisher,
-)
-
-from release_version import validate_release_version
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-PLAN_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-
-
-def load_request() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    value = json.load(sys.stdin)
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise ValueError("request_object_required")
-    if value.get("schema") != "aios.production-executor-request.v1":
-        raise ValueError("request_schema_invalid")
-    try:
-        validate_release_version(value.get("version", ""))
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise ValueError("version_invalid") from exc
-    for name in ("target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid"):
-        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(value.get(name, ""))):
-            raise ValueError(f"{name}_invalid")
-    if not PLAN_RE.fullmatch(str(value.get("approval_plan_id", ""))):
-        raise ValueError("approval_plan_id_invalid")
-    if value.get("repository_identity") != "aios/aios":
-        raise ValueError("repository_identity_invalid")
-    return value
-
-
-def publication_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> PublicationRequest:
-    return PublicationRequest(
-        str(value["version"]),
-        str(value["target_oid"]),
-        str(value["evidence_closure_oid"]),
-        str(value["approval_plan_id"]),
-    )
-
-
-def response(value: Mapping[str, Any], status: str, **extra: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "status": status,
-        "version": value["version"],
-        "target_oid": value["target_oid"],
-        "evidence_closure_oid": value["evidence_closure_oid"],
-        "artifact_sha256": value["artifact_sha256"],
-        "approval_plan_id": value["approval_plan_id"],
-        **extra,
-    }
-
-
-def build(args: argparse.Namespace) -> tuple[TagPublisher, GitTagBackend, GiteaTagClient]:
-    git = GitTagBackend(args.workspace, authoritative_repo=args.repository)
-    gitea = GiteaTagClient(
-        args.gitea_api,
-        args.gitea_repo,
-        args.gitea_token_file,
-        token_line=args.gitea_token_line,
-    )
-    publisher = TagPublisher(
-        args.workspace,
-        git,
-        gitea,
-        args.remote,
-        state_root=args.state_root,
-    )
-    return publisher, git, gitea
-
-
-def _gitea_lookup(gitea: GiteaTagClient, version: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
-    try:
-        return gitea.lookup_tag(version)
-    except RuntimeError as exc:
-        if "HTTP 404" in str(exc):
-            return None
-        raise
-
-
-def probe(
-    args: argparse.Namespace,
-    value: Mapping[str, Any],
-    publisher: TagPublisher,
-    git: GitTagBackend,
-    gitea: GiteaTagClient,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = publication_request(value)
-    request.validate()
-    git.validate_evidence_lineage(request)
-
-    local_oid = git._rev(f"refs/tags/{request.version}")
-    local_target = git._rev(f"refs/tags/{request.version}^{{commit}}")
-    remote = git.remote_tag(args.remote, request.version)
-    api = _gitea_lookup(gitea, request.version)
-    listing = False
-    if api is not None:
-        listing = gitea.tag_visible_in_listing(request.version, request.target_oid)
-
-    if local_oid is None and remote is None and api is None:
-        return response(value, "NOT_APPLIED")
-
-    if local_oid is not None:
-        if local_target is None or local_oid == local_target:
-            return response(value, "CONFLICT", reason="local_tag_not_annotated")
-        if local_target != request.target_oid:
-            return response(
-                value,
-                "CONFLICT",
-                reason="local_peeled_target_mismatch",
-                tag_oid=local_oid,
-                peeled_target_oid=local_target,
-            )
-
-    # A remote/Gitea tag without the Authority tag object is not safe to
-    # recreate, because a new annotated tag would have a different object OID.
-    if local_oid is None and (remote is not None or api is not None):
-        return response(
-            value,
-            "INDETERMINATE",
-            reason="remote_or_gitea_tag_exists_without_authority_tag_object",
-        )
-
-    if remote is not None:
-        if remote[0] != local_oid or remote[1] != request.target_oid:
-            return response(
-                value,
-                "CONFLICT",
-                reason="network_remote_tag_mismatch",
-                tag_oid=local_oid,
-                peeled_target_oid=local_target,
-                remote_tag_oid=remote[0],
-                remote_peeled_target_oid=remote[1],
-            )
-
-    if api is not None:
-        if api[0] != local_oid or api[1] != request.target_oid:
-            return response(
-                value,
-                "CONFLICT",
-                reason="gitea_api_tag_mismatch",
-                tag_oid=local_oid,
-                peeled_target_oid=local_target,
-                gitea_tag_oid=api[0],
-                gitea_peeled_target_oid=api[1],
-            )
-
-    if (
-        local_oid is not None
-        and remote is not None
-        and api is not None
-        and listing
-    ):
-        return response(
-            value,
-            "APPLIED_VERIFIED",
-            tag_oid=local_oid,
-            peeled_target_oid=local_target,
-            remote_tag_oid=remote[0],
-            remote_peeled_target_oid=remote[1],
-            gitea_tag_oid=api[0],
-            gitea_peeled_target_oid=api[1],
-            gitea_listing_visible=True,
-        )
-
-    if local_oid is not None and remote is None and api is None:
-        return response(
-            value,
-            "PARTIAL_LOCAL",
-            tag_oid=local_oid,
-            peeled_target_oid=local_target,
-        )
-
-    return response(
-        value,
-        "INDETERMINATE",
-        reason="tag_visibility_partial",
-        tag_oid=local_oid,
-        peeled_target_oid=local_target,
-    )
-
-
-def apply(
-    args: argparse.Namespace,
-    value: Mapping[str, Any],
-    publisher: TagPublisher,
-    git: GitTagBackend,
-    gitea: GiteaTagClient,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    before = probe(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
-    if before["status"] in {"APPLIED_VERIFIED", "CONFLICT", "INDETERMINATE"}:
-        return before
-
-    request = publication_request(value)
-    with publisher.store.lock(request.version):
-        request.validate()
-        publisher._assert_fingerprint(request)
-        publisher.store.record(request, PublicationState.PENDING)
-        publisher._verify_publication(
-            request,
-            allow_push=True,
-            previously_deployed=False,
-        )
-    return probe(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--workspace", type=Path, default=Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_WORKSPACE"]))
-    parser.add_argument("--repository", type=Path, default=Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR"]))
-    parser.add_argument("--remote", default=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE", "gitea"))
-    parser.add_argument("--gitea-api", default=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL", ""))
-    parser.add_argument("--gitea-repo", default=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY", ""))
-    parser.add_argument(
-        "--gitea-token-file",
-        type=Path,
-        default=Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", "")),
-    )
-    parser.add_argument(
-        "--gitea-token-line",
-        type=int,
-        default=int(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE", "1")),
-    )
-    parser.add_argument(
-        "--state-root",
-        type=Path,
-        default=Path(
-            os.getenv(
-                "AIOS_GITOPS_PUBLICATION_STATE_DIR",
-                "/var/lib/aios-gitops/tag-publications",
-            )
-        ),
-    )
-    args = parser.parse_args()
-    value = load_request()
-    publisher, git, gitea = build(args)
-    operation = value.get("operation")
-    if operation == "probe":
-        result = probe(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
-    elif operation == "apply":
-        result = apply(args, value, publisher, git, gitea)
-    else:
-        raise ValueError("unsupported_operation")
-    print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    try:
-        raise SystemExit(main())
-    except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "CONFLICT", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        raise SystemExit(20)
-    except PublicationConflict as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "CONFLICT", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        raise SystemExit(20)
-    except (PublicationPending, PublicationReconciliationRequired) as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "INDETERMINATE", "reason": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
-        raise SystemExit(21)
-    except Exception as exc:
-        print(
-            json.dumps(
-                {"status": "INDETERMINATE", "error": type(exc).__name__, "reason": str(exc)},
-                sort_keys=True,
-            )
-        )
-        raise SystemExit(22)

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_authz.py

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed operation authorization for an isolated Git writer."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import ipaddress
-import os
-import re
-import subprocess
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
-
-
-ROUTE_OPERATIONS = {
-    ("GET", "/api/runtime-status"): "runtime.status.read",
-    ("GET", "/api/baseline"): "baseline.read",
-    ("GET", "/api/patches"): "patches.read",
-    ("POST", "/api/commit-file"): "commit_file.atomic",
-}
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
-
-
-class AuthorizationError(PermissionError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.status = status
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuthorizedGrant:
-    record: dict[str, Any]
-    operation: str
-    use_count: int
-
-    @property
-    def token_id(self) -> str:
-        return str(self.record["token_id"])
-
-    @property
-    def task_id(self) -> str:
-        return str(self.record["task_id"])
-
-
-def operation_for(method: str, path: str) -> str:
-    operation = ROUTE_OPERATIONS.get((method.upper(), path))
-    if not operation:
-        raise AuthorizationError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
-    return operation
-
-
-def _parse_time(value: Any) -> datetime:
-    try:
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(str(value).replace("Z", "+00:00"))
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid") from None
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid")
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _git_is_ancestor(workspace: Path, base: str, branch: str) -> bool:
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", base, branch],
-        cwd=workspace,
-        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-    )
-    return result.returncode == 0
-
-
-def _validate_grant(
-    grant: dict[str, Any],
-    *,
-    audience: str,
-    source_ip: str,
-    operation: str,
-    branch: str | None,
-    path: str | None,
-    workspace: Path,
-    current_time: datetime,
-) -> None:
-    if int(grant.get("schema_version", 0)) != 2:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_required", 401)
-    if str(grant.get("audience") or "") != audience:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_audience_rejected")
-    try:
-        peer = ipaddress.ip_address(source_ip)
-        networks = [ipaddress.ip_network(str(value), strict=True) for value in grant.get("source_cidrs", [])]
-    except ValueError:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected") from None
-    if not networks or not any(peer in network for network in networks):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected")
-    created = _parse_time(grant.get("created_at"))
-    not_before = _parse_time(grant.get("not_before"))
-    expires = _parse_time(grant.get("expires_at"))
-    if expires <= not_before or (expires - created).total_seconds() > 1800:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_lifetime_rejected")
-    if current_time < not_before:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_not_yet_valid", 401)
-    if current_time >= expires:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_expired", 401)
-    if bool(grant.get("revoked")):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_revoked", 401)
-    operations = grant.get("allowed_operations")
-    if not isinstance(operations, list) or operation not in operations:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_operation_rejected")
-    expected_branch = str(grant.get("allowed_branch") or "")
-    configured_branch = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "")
-    if expected_branch != configured_branch:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
-    if branch is not None and branch != expected_branch:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
-    if path is not None:
-        paths = grant.get("allowed_paths")
-        if not isinstance(paths, list) or path not in paths:
-            raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_path_rejected")
-    base = str(grant.get("approved_base_oid") or "").lower()
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_rejected")
-    if not _git_is_ancestor(workspace, base, expected_branch):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_not_ancestor")
-
-
-def authorize(
-    registry: TokenRegistry,
-    token: str,
-    *,
-    method: str,
-    path: str,
-    source_ip: str,
-    workspace: Path,
-    branch: str | None = None,
-    target_path: str | None = None,
-    current_time: datetime | None = None,
-) -> AuthorizedGrant:
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_not_required")
-    if not token:
-        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
-    grant = registry.find(token)
-    if grant is None:
-        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
-    operation = operation_for(method, path)
-    _validate_grant(
-        grant,
-        audience=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""),
-        source_ip=source_ip,
-        operation=operation,
-        branch=branch,
-        path=target_path,
-        workspace=workspace,
-        current_time=current_time or datetime.now(timezone.utc),
-    )
-    limits = grant.get("max_uses")
-    if not isinstance(limits, dict):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing")
-    try:
-        used = registry.consume(str(grant["token_id"]), operation, int(limits[operation]))
-    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing") from None
-    except PermissionError as exc:
-        code = str(exc)
-        raise AuthorizationError(code, 401 if code == "writer_token_revoked" else 403) from None
-    return AuthorizedGrant(grant, operation, used)

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_commit_file.py

@@ -1,403 +0,0 @@
-"""Atomic, idempotent commit-file Saga for the isolated writer."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import fcntl
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import sqlite3
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import threading
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
-
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
-IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}")
-STATES = frozenset({
-    "PENDING", "FILE_WRITTEN", "COMMITTED", "PUSHED", "VERIFIED", "COMPLETED",
-    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
-})
-_LOCKS: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {}
-_LOCKS_GUARD = threading.Lock()
-_LEDGER_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
-
-
-class CommitFileError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400):
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.status = status
-
-
-class SimulatedCrash(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def canonical_digest(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    payload = {
-        "branch": data["branch"],
-        "path": data["path"],
-        "content_sha256": hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
-        "message": data["message"],
-        "expected_head_oid": data["expected_head_oid"],
-    }
-    encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
-
-
-class OperationLedger:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
-            raise PermissionError("writer_operation_ledger_symlink_rejected")
-        with _LEDGER_INIT_LOCK:
-            with self.connect() as db:
-                db.execute(
-                    """
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS writer_operations (
-                        operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                        operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        branch TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        path TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        content_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        pre_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        commit_oid TEXT,
-                        push_status TEXT,
-                        verification_status TEXT,
-                        state TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
-                        updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
-                        error_code TEXT
-                    )
-                    """
-                )
-        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
-
-    def connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
-        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        return db
-
-    def get_or_create(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        key = data["idempotency_key"]
-        with self.connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if row:
-                db.commit()
-                record = dict(row)
-                if record["operation_digest"] != digest:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_conflict", 409)
-                if (
-                    record["token_id"] != grant.token_id
-                    or record["task_id"] != grant.task_id
-                ):
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_owner_conflict", 409)
-                return record
-            operation_id = hashlib.sha256(
-                f"{grant.task_id}\0{key}".encode("utf-8")
-            ).hexdigest()
-            content_sha = hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-            db.execute(
-                """
-                INSERT INTO writer_operations(
-                    operation_id,token_id,task_id,idempotency_key,operation_digest,
-                    branch,path,content_sha256,pre_head_oid,state
-                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
-                """,
-                (
-                    operation_id, grant.token_id, grant.task_id, key, digest,
-                    data["branch"], data["path"], content_sha,
-                    data["expected_head_oid"], "PENDING",
-                ),
-            )
-            db.commit()
-        return self.get(key)
-
-    def get(self, key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        with self.connect() as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            raise KeyError(key)
-        return dict(row)
-
-    def update(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if state not in STATES:
-            raise ValueError("invalid writer operation state")
-        allowed = {"commit_oid", "push_status", "verification_status", "error_code"}
-        assignments = ["state=?", "updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"]
-        values: list[Any] = [state]
-        for name, value in fields.items():
-            if name not in allowed:
-                raise ValueError("invalid ledger field")
-            assignments.append(f"{name}=?")
-            values.append(value)
-        values.append(key)
-        with self.connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            db.execute(
-                f"UPDATE writer_operations SET {','.join(assignments)} WHERE idempotency_key=?",
-                values,
-            )
-            db.commit()
-        return self.get(key)
-
-
-class AtomicCommitFile:
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        workspace: Path,
-        bare_repo: Path,
-        ledger: OperationLedger,
-        remote: str,
-        audit,
-        crash_after_state: str | None = None,
-    ):
-        self.workspace = workspace
-        self.bare_repo = bare_repo
-        self.ledger = ledger
-        self.remote = remote
-        self.audit = audit
-        self.crash_after_state = crash_after_state
-
-    def _git(self, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True
-        )
-        if check and result.returncode != 0:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_git_operation_failed", 500)
-        return result.stdout.strip()
-
-    def _transition(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        record = self.ledger.update(key, state, **fields)
-        if self.crash_after_state == state:
-            raise SimulatedCrash(state)
-        return record
-
-    def _validate(self, data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if not isinstance(data, dict):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
-        required = ("branch", "path", "content", "message", "expected_head_oid", "idempotency_key")
-        if any(field not in data for field in required):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_incomplete")
-        if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
-            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_force_rejected", 403)
-        if set(data) != set(required):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_fields_rejected")
-        item = {field: data[field] for field in required}
-        if item["branch"] != policy.allowed_branch():
-            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected", 403)
-        try:
-            item["path"] = policy.validate_path(item["path"], self.workspace)
-        except PermissionError as exc:
-            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
-        if not isinstance(item["content"], str) or "\x00" in item["content"]:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_rejected")
-        try:
-            policy.validate_content_for_path(item["path"], item["content"])
-        except PermissionError as exc:
-            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
-        if len(item["content"].encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_too_large", 413)
-        message = item["message"]
-        if (
-            not isinstance(message, str)
-            or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200
-            or "\x00" in message
-            or "\n" in message
-            or "\r" in message
-        ):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_message_rejected")
-        if not isinstance(item["expected_head_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(item["expected_head_oid"]):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_expected_head_rejected")
-        if not isinstance(item["idempotency_key"], str) or not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(item["idempotency_key"]):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_key_rejected")
-        return item
-
-    def _atomic_write(self, relative: str, content: str) -> None:
-        target = self.workspace / relative
-        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-", dir=target.parent)
-        try:
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
-                stream.write(content.encode("utf-8"))
-                stream.flush()
-                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-            os.replace(temporary, target)
-            parent_fd = os.open(target.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
-            try:
-                os.fsync(parent_fd)
-            finally:
-                os.close(parent_fd)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temporary):
-                os.unlink(temporary)
-
-    def _verify_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> None:
-        bare = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
-            text=True, capture_output=True,
-        )
-        if bare.returncode != 0 or bare.stdout.strip() != oid:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_authoritative_bare_oid_mismatch", 500)
-        remote = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", self.remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
-            cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
-        )
-        if remote.returncode != 0:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_verification_failed", 503)
-        fields = remote.stdout.strip().split()
-        if len(fields) != 2:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_ref_missing", 503)
-        if fields[0] != oid:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_oid_conflict", 409)
-
-    def execute(self, grant: Any, raw_data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        data = self._validate(raw_data)
-        digest = canonical_digest(data)
-        branch = data["branch"]
-        with _LOCKS_GUARD:
-            lock = _LOCKS.setdefault(branch, threading.Lock())
-        lock_path = self.ledger.path.parent / f"{hashlib.sha256(branch.encode()).hexdigest()}.lock"
-        with lock, open(lock_path, "a+b") as branch_lock:
-            fcntl.flock(branch_lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
-            return self._execute_locked(grant, data, digest)
-
-    def _execute_locked(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        key = data["idempotency_key"]
-        record = self.ledger.get_or_create(grant, data, digest)
-        if record["state"] == "COMPLETED":
-            return self._result(record, idempotent=True)
-        if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != data["branch"]:
-            record = self._transition(
-                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_current_branch_conflict"
-            )
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_current_branch_conflict", 409)
-        head = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-        commit_oid = record.get("commit_oid")
-        if head != record["pre_head_oid"] and head != commit_oid:
-            record = self._transition(
-                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_branch_head_conflict"
-            )
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_branch_head_conflict", 409)
-        try:
-            state = record["state"]
-            if state == "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
-                raise CommitFileError("writer_manual_review_required", 409)
-            if state == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE":
-                if record.get("push_status") == "confirmed":
-                    state = "PUSHED"
-                else:
-                    state = "COMMITTED" if commit_oid else "FILE_WRITTEN"
-            if state == "PENDING":
-                self._atomic_write(data["path"], data["content"])
-                record = self._transition(key, "FILE_WRITTEN")
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "FILE_WRITTEN":
-                actual_sha = hashlib.sha256(
-                    (self.workspace / data["path"]).read_bytes()
-                ).hexdigest()
-                if actual_sha != record["content_sha256"]:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_file_content_conflict", 409)
-                staged_before = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only", check=False).splitlines()
-                if staged_before:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
-                self._git("add", "--", data["path"])
-                staged = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines()
-                if staged != [data["path"]]:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
-                self._git("commit", "-m", data["message"])
-                commit_oid = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-                record = self._transition(key, "COMMITTED", commit_oid=commit_oid)
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "COMMITTED":
-                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
-                pushed = subprocess.run(
-                    ["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{data['branch']}"],
-                    cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
-                )
-                if pushed.returncode != 0:
-                    self._transition(
-                        key, "FAILED_RECOVERABLE",
-                        push_status="failed", error_code="writer_gitea_push_failed",
-                    )
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_push_failed", 503)
-                record = self._transition(key, "PUSHED", push_status="confirmed")
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "PUSHED":
-                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
-                self._verify_remote(data["branch"], commit_oid)
-                record = self._transition(
-                    key, "VERIFIED", verification_status="bare+gitea"
-                )
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "VERIFIED":
-                record = self._transition(key, "COMPLETED", error_code=None)
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "completed")
-            return self._result(record, idempotent=False)
-        except SimulatedCrash:
-            raise
-        except CommitFileError as exc:
-            latest = self.ledger.get(key)
-            if latest["state"] not in {"FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"}:
-                failure_state = (
-                    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-                    if exc.code in {
-                        "writer_gitea_oid_conflict",
-                        "writer_file_content_conflict",
-                        "writer_current_branch_conflict",
-                    }
-                    else "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
-                )
-                latest = self._transition(key, failure_state, error_code=exc.code)
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, latest, "failed")
-            raise
-
-    def _audit(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str, record: dict[str, Any], result: str) -> None:
-        self.audit({
-            "token_id": grant.token_id,
-            "task_id": grant.task_id,
-            "audience": grant.record["audience"],
-            "source_ip": grant.record.get("_source_ip", "socket-peer"),
-            "operation": grant.operation,
-            "branch": data["branch"],
-            "path": data["path"],
-            "idempotency_key": data["idempotency_key"],
-            "operation_digest": digest,
-            "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
-            "pre_head_oid": record["pre_head_oid"],
-            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
-            "result": result,
-        })
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _result(record: dict[str, Any], *, idempotent: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "state": record["state"],
-            "operation_id": record["operation_id"],
-            "branch": record["branch"],
-            "path": record["path"],
-            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
-            "push_status": record.get("push_status"),
-            "verification_status": record.get("verification_status"),
-            "idempotent": idempotent,
-        }

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_path_policy.py

@@ -1,422 +0,0 @@
-"""Strict service-level exact-path policy for isolated Git writers."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import grp
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import stat
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from functools import lru_cache
-from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
-from typing import Any
-from urllib.parse import unquote
-
-
-MAX_POLICY_BYTES = 65_536
-POLICY_FIELDS = frozenset(
-    {
-        "schema_version",
-        "policy_id",
-        "audience",
-        "repository_identity",
-        "allowed_branch",
-        "allowed_operations",
-    }
-)
-OPERATION_FIELDS = frozenset({"exact_paths", "max_content_bytes", "content_profile"})
-SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS = frozenset({"commit_file.atomic"})
-SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES = frozenset({"systemd-codex-review-worker-v1"})
-_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:|bearer\s+|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])"
-)
-_SYSTEMD_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*\Z")
-_SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096
-_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES = {
-    "Unit": frozenset({"Description", "After", "Wants"}),
-    "Service": frozenset(
-        {
-            "Type",
-            "User",
-            "Group",
-            "WorkingDirectory",
-            "Environment",
-            "ExecStart",
-            "Restart",
-            "RestartSec",
-            "NoNewPrivileges",
-            "PrivateTmp",
-            "PrivateDevices",
-            "ProtectSystem",
-            "ProtectHome",
-            "ProtectKernelTunables",
-            "ProtectKernelModules",
-            "ProtectControlGroups",
-            "LockPersonality",
-            "RestrictSUIDSGID",
-            "RestrictRealtime",
-            "MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
-            "RuntimeDirectory",
-            "StateDirectory",
-            "CacheDirectory",
-            "ReadOnlyPaths",
-            "ReadWritePaths",
-            "UMask",
-        }
-    ),
-    "Install": frozenset({"WantedBy"}),
-}
-_SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES = frozenset(
-    {
-        ("Service", "Environment"),
-        ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"),
-        ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"),
-    }
-)
-_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES = {
-    ("Unit", "Description"): "AIOS Codex Review/Test Worker",
-    ("Unit", "After"): "network-online.target",
-    ("Unit", "Wants"): "network-online.target",
-    ("Service", "Type"): "simple",
-    ("Service", "User"): "aiman",
-    ("Service", "Group"): "gitops",
-    (
-        "Service",
-        "WorkingDirectory",
-    ): "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker/current",
-    (
-        "Service",
-        "ExecStart",
-    ): "/usr/bin/python3 -m task_plane.workers.codex_review_test",
-    ("Service", "Restart"): "on-failure",
-    ("Service", "RestartSec"): "2",
-    ("Service", "NoNewPrivileges"): "true",
-    ("Service", "PrivateTmp"): "true",
-    ("Service", "PrivateDevices"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectSystem"): "strict",
-    ("Service", "ProtectHome"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectKernelTunables"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectKernelModules"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectControlGroups"): "true",
-    ("Service", "LockPersonality"): "true",
-    ("Service", "RestrictSUIDSGID"): "true",
-    ("Service", "RestrictRealtime"): "true",
-    ("Service", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute"): "true",
-    ("Service", "RuntimeDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ("Service", "StateDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ("Service", "CacheDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ("Service", "UMask"): "0077",
-    ("Install", "WantedBy"): "multi-user.target",
-}
-_SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES = {
-    ("Service", "Environment"): (
-        "AIOS_CODEX_WORKER_MODE=shadow",
-        "AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false",
-        "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1",
-    ),
-    ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"): (
-        "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
-        "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ),
-    ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"): (
-        "/run/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-        "/var/lib/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-        "/var/cache/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ),
-}
-
-
-class PathPolicyError(PermissionError):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OperationPolicy:
-    exact_paths: tuple[str, ...]
-    max_content_bytes: int
-    content_profile: str
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ServicePathPolicy:
-    schema_version: int
-    policy_id: str
-    audience: str
-    repository_identity: str
-    allowed_branch: str
-    allowed_operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy]
-    sha256: str
-
-    def operation(self, name: str) -> OperationPolicy:
-        try:
-            return self.allowed_operations[name]
-        except KeyError:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_operation_rejected") from None
-
-    def require_exact_path(self, operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
-        selected = self.operation(operation)
-        if path not in selected.exact_paths:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_rejected")
-        return selected
-
-
-def _canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return (
-        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-        + "\n"
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def validate_relative_path_syntax(path: str) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(path, str):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    if not path or path != path.strip() or "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    try:
-        decoded = unquote(path, errors="strict")
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
-    if decoded != path:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    posix = PurePosixPath(path)
-    windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
-    parts = path.split("/")
-    if (
-        posix.is_absolute()
-        or windows.is_absolute()
-        or bool(windows.drive)
-        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    return path
-
-
-def _require_fields(value: dict[str, Any], allowed: frozenset[str], code: str) -> None:
-    if set(value) != allowed:
-        raise PathPolicyError(code)
-
-
-def _parse_policy(document: Any, canonical: bytes) -> ServicePathPolicy:
-    if not isinstance(document, dict):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_object_required")
-    _require_fields(document, POLICY_FIELDS, "isolated_writer_path_policy_fields_rejected")
-    if document["schema_version"] != 1:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_schema_rejected")
-    text_fields = (
-        "policy_id",
-        "audience",
-        "repository_identity",
-        "allowed_branch",
-    )
-    if any(
-        not isinstance(document[field], str) or not document[field].strip()
-        for field in text_fields
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_value_rejected")
-    raw_operations = document["allowed_operations"]
-    if not isinstance(raw_operations, dict) or not raw_operations:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
-    if not set(raw_operations).issubset(SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
-    operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy] = {}
-    for name, raw in raw_operations.items():
-        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_rejected")
-        _require_fields(
-            raw,
-            OPERATION_FIELDS,
-            "isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_fields_rejected",
-        )
-        paths = raw["exact_paths"]
-        if (
-            not isinstance(paths, list)
-            or not paths
-            or any(not isinstance(item, str) for item in paths)
-        ):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
-        validated = tuple(validate_relative_path_syntax(item) for item in paths)
-        if len(set(validated)) != len(validated):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
-        maximum = raw["max_content_bytes"]
-        if not isinstance(maximum, int) or isinstance(maximum, bool) or not 1 <= maximum <= 1_048_576:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_size_rejected")
-        profile = raw["content_profile"]
-        if profile not in SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
-        operations[name] = OperationPolicy(validated, maximum, profile)
-    return ServicePathPolicy(
-        schema_version=1,
-        policy_id=document["policy_id"],
-        audience=document["audience"],
-        repository_identity=document["repository_identity"],
-        allowed_branch=document["allowed_branch"],
-        allowed_operations=operations,
-        sha256=hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
-    )
-
-
-def load_path_policy(
-    path: Path,
-    *,
-    expected_owner_uid: int = 0,
-    expected_group_gid: int | None = None,
-    expected_parent_mode: int = 0o750,
-    expected_file_mode: int = 0o640,
-) -> ServicePathPolicy:
-    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(path)))
-    if lexical.is_symlink():
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
-    try:
-        parent_info = lexical.parent.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
-        file_info = lexical.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
-    except FileNotFoundError:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_missing") from None
-    if stat.S_ISLNK(parent_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_info.st_mode):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_rejected")
-    if stat.S_ISLNK(file_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(file_info.st_mode):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_rejected")
-    if lexical.resolve(strict=True) != lexical:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
-    if (
-        parent_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
-        or stat.S_IMODE(parent_info.st_mode) != expected_parent_mode
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_permissions_rejected")
-    if (
-        file_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
-        or stat.S_IMODE(file_info.st_mode) != expected_file_mode
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_permissions_rejected")
-    if expected_group_gid is not None and (
-        parent_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid or file_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected")
-    if file_info.st_size <= 0 or file_info.st_size > MAX_POLICY_BYTES:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_size_rejected")
-    raw = lexical.read_bytes()
-    try:
-        document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_json_rejected") from None
-    canonical = _canonical_json(document)
-    if raw != canonical:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_not_canonical")
-    return _parse_policy(document, canonical)
-
-
-@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
-def configured_path_policy() -> ServicePathPolicy | None:
-    configured = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_PATH_POLICY_FILE", "").strip()
-    if not configured:
-        return None
-    if not Path(configured).is_absolute():
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_path_rejected")
-    try:
-        gitops_gid = grp.getgrnam("gitops").gr_gid
-    except KeyError:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected") from None
-    loaded = load_path_policy(Path(configured), expected_group_gid=gitops_gid)
-    if loaded.audience != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_audience_rejected")
-    if loaded.repository_identity != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_repository_rejected")
-    if loaded.allowed_branch != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", ""):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_branch_rejected")
-    return loaded
-
-
-def clear_path_policy_cache() -> None:
-    configured_path_policy.cache_clear()
-
-
-def require_service_path(operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
-    loaded = configured_path_policy()
-    if loaded is None:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_policy_required")
-    return loaded.require_exact_path(operation, path)
-
-
-def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
-    loaded = configured_path_policy()
-    return None if loaded is None else loaded.sha256
-
-
-def validate_content(operation: str, path: str, content: str) -> None:
-    selected = require_service_path(operation, path)
-    try:
-        encoded = content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
-    except (AttributeError, UnicodeEncodeError):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
-    if len(encoded) > selected.max_content_bytes:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_content_too_large")
-    if selected.content_profile == "systemd-codex-review-worker-v1":
-        _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content)
-        return
-    raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
-
-
-def _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content: str) -> None:
-    if not isinstance(content, str):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    try:
-        content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
-    except UnicodeEncodeError:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
-    if (
-        "\x00" in content
-        or "\r" in content
-        or _SECRET_RE.search(content)
-        or not content.endswith("\n")
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-
-    sections: set[str] = set()
-    values: dict[tuple[str, str], list[str]] = {}
-    section: str | None = None
-    for line in content.splitlines():
-        if len(line.encode("utf-8")) > _SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        if not line:
-            continue
-        if line[0].isspace() or line.startswith(("#", ";")):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        if line.startswith("[") and line.endswith("]"):
-            candidate = line[1:-1]
-            if (
-                not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(candidate)
-                or candidate not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES
-                or candidate in sections
-            ):
-                raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-            sections.add(candidate)
-            section = candidate
-            continue
-        if section is None or "=" not in line:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        directive, value = line.split("=", 1)
-        if (
-            not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(directive)
-            or directive not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES[section]
-            or not value
-            or value != value.strip()
-        ):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        key = (section, directive)
-        if key in values and key not in _SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        values.setdefault(key, []).append(value)
-
-    if sections != set(_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    if set(values) != set(_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES) | set(
-        _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES.items():
-        if values.get(key) != [expected]:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES.items():
-        observed = values.get(key, [])
-        if len(observed) != len(set(observed)) or tuple(observed) != expected:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_token_registry.py

@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-"""Digest-only, task-scoped token registry for isolated writers."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import json
-import os
-import grp
-import pwd
-import secrets
-import sqlite3
-import stat
-import threading
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-_REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
-
-
-def token_digest(token: str) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-
-class TokenRegistry:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self._prepare()
-
-    def _prepare(self) -> None:
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
-            raise PermissionError("writer_token_registry_symlink_rejected")
-        with _REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK:
-            with self._connect() as db:
-                db.executescript(
-                    """
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_grants (
-                        token_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                        token_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                        grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                    );
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_uses (
-                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        operation TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-                        PRIMARY KEY(token_id, operation),
-                        FOREIGN KEY(token_id) REFERENCES token_grants(token_id)
-                    );
-                    """
-                )
-        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
-        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-        return db
-
-    def issue(self, grant: dict[str, Any], token: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
-        value = token or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
-        if len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
-            raise ValueError("writer_token_entropy_insufficient")
-        record = dict(grant)
-        record["schema_version"] = 2
-        record["token_digest"] = token_digest(value)
-        record["revoked"] = False
-        record.setdefault("created_at", utc_now())
-        required = (
-            "token_id",
-            "audience",
-            "task_id",
-            "source_cidrs",
-            "allowed_branch",
-            "approved_base_oid",
-            "allowed_operations",
-            "allowed_paths",
-            "not_before",
-            "expires_at",
-            "max_uses",
-            "issued_by",
-        )
-        if any(not record.get(field) for field in required):
-            raise ValueError("writer_token_grant_incomplete")
-        encoded = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                db.execute(
-                    """
-                    INSERT INTO token_grants(token_id, token_digest, grant_json, revoked, created_at)
-                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)
-                    """,
-                    (
-                        str(record["token_id"]),
-                        str(record["token_digest"]),
-                        encoded,
-                        0,
-                        str(record["created_at"]),
-                    ),
-                )
-                db.execute("COMMIT")
-            except Exception:
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                raise
-        return value, record
-
-    def find(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-        candidate = token_digest(token)
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            rows = db.execute(
-                "SELECT token_digest, grant_json, revoked FROM token_grants"
-            ).fetchall()
-        match = None
-        for row in rows:
-            if hmac.compare_digest(str(row["token_digest"]), candidate):
-                match = dict(json.loads(str(row["grant_json"])))
-                match["revoked"] = bool(row["revoked"])
-        return match
-
-    def consume(self, token_id: str, operation: str, maximum: int) -> int:
-        if maximum < 1:
-            raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                row = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT revoked FROM token_grants WHERE token_id=?",
-                    (token_id,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if row is None or bool(row["revoked"]):
-                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_revoked")
-                used_row = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
-                    (token_id, operation),
-                ).fetchone()
-                used = int(used_row["use_count"]) if used_row else 0
-                if used >= maximum:
-                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
-                current = used + 1
-                db.execute(
-                    """
-                    INSERT INTO token_uses(token_id, operation, use_count)
-                    VALUES(?,?,?)
-                    ON CONFLICT(token_id, operation)
-                    DO UPDATE SET use_count=excluded.use_count
-                    """,
-                    (token_id, operation, current),
-                )
-                db.execute("COMMIT")
-                return current
-            except Exception:
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                raise
-
-    def revoke(self, token_id: str) -> bool:
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            changed = db.execute(
-                "UPDATE token_grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_id=? AND revoked=0",
-                (token_id,),
-            ).rowcount
-            db.execute("COMMIT")
-        return bool(changed)
-
-    def usage(self, token_id: str, operation: str) -> int:
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
-                (token_id, operation),
-            ).fetchone()
-        return int(row["use_count"]) if row else 0
-
-
-def _write_secret_file(
-    path: Path,
-    token: str,
-    *,
-    owner: str | None = None,
-    group: str | None = None,
-) -> None:
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
-        raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_symlink_rejected")
-    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
-    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
-        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
-    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
-    try:
-        if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
-            raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_not_regular")
-        if owner is not None or group is not None:
-            uid = pwd.getpwnam(owner).pw_uid if owner is not None else -1
-            gid = grp.getgrnam(group).gr_gid if group is not None else -1
-            os.fchown(fd, uid, gid)
-        os.write(fd, token.encode("utf-8"))
-        os.fsync(fd)
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--registry", required=True)
-    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
-    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
-    issue.add_argument("--grant-file", required=True)
-    issue.add_argument("--token-file", required=True)
-    issue.add_argument("--owner")
-    issue.add_argument("--group")
-    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
-    revoke.add_argument("--token-id", required=True)
-    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
-    registry = TokenRegistry(args.registry)
-    if args.command == "issue":
-        grant = json.loads(Path(args.grant_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        token, record = registry.issue(grant)
-        _write_secret_file(
-            Path(args.token_file),
-            token,
-            owner=args.owner,
-            group=args.group,
-        )
-        print(json.dumps({"token_id": record["token_id"], "created": True}, sort_keys=True))
-        return 0
-    changed = registry.revoke(args.token_id)
-    print(json.dumps({"token_id": args.token_id, "revoked": changed}, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())