evidence: close live activation hardening candidate

Source: patch/isolated-writer-token-policy-v2-20260724
Source commit: b1e240dda3
Target base: df099420d2
Production runtime changes: not authorized
Tag/Baseline/Registry operations: not authorized

.agent/results/releases/V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-RELEASE.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "status": "V2R1C2_PRODUCTION_RELEASED",
+  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
+  "tag_name": "V2R1C2",
+  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "evidence_closure_oid": "8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978",
+  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
+  "production_port": 18920,
+  "candidate_port": 18921,
+  "production_acceptance": "PASS",
+  "role_matrix": "PASS",
+  "tenant_isolation": "PASS",
+  "api_smoke": "PASS",
+  "ui_smoke": "PASS",
+  "runtime_audit": "PASS",
+  "wechat_acceptance": "SYNTHETIC_ONLY",
+  "real_user_impersonated": false,
+  "production_acceptance_sha256": "a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a",
+  "production_online_smoke_sha256": "fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4",
+  "production_health_sha256": "ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c",
+  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
+  "rollback_ready": true,
+  "main_changed_by_tag": false,
+  "force_push": false,
+  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
+  "evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z"
+}

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-V2R1C1
+V2R1C2

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py

@@ -5,8 +5,59 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', '/data/aios-gitops/workspace')) / 'runtime' / 'agent-os'))
+try:
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    PublicationConflict,
+    PublicationPending,
+    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
+    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
+    PublicationRequest,
+    TagPublisher,
+    redact,
+    validate_version,
+)
 from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+from silent_release_hardening import (
+    ApprovalKeyRing,
+    ApprovalRevocationStore,
+    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
+    SagaConflict,
+    SignedApprovalVerifier,
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+    SilentReleaseActionService,
+)
+try:
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )
 
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
@@ -16,6 +67,19 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
+AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
+REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
+SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
+    '/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
+))
+SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED = str(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED', 'false'
+)).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
+SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
+    '/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
+))
 monitor = ActionMonitor()
 
 BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -24,7 +88,43 @@ BASE_MODELS = [
   {'id':'base.gpt-5.5','provider':'openai','model':'gpt-5.5','display_name':'GPT-5.5','scope':'global'},
 ]
 SECRET_RE = re.compile(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})')
-SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})')
+SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(
+    r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])'
+    r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})'
+)
+
+READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
+    '/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
+    '/api/base', '/api/baseline', '/base', '/api/ver', '/api/versions', '/ver',
+    '/api/diff', '/diff', '/api/patch', '/api/patches', '/api/branches', '/patch',
+    '/api/model', '/model', '/api/run', '/api/runtime-status', '/run',
+    '/api/action-monitor', '/action-monitor', '/admin/ai-evolution',
+    '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
+    '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
+    '/api/release-acceptance',
+    '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
+    '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
+    '/getRecoveryStatus',
+})
+SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/createReleaseCandidate',
+    '/createReleaseIntent',
+    '/submitSignedApproval',
+    '/submitOwnerApproval',
+    '/startDeployment',
+})
+
+def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if method == 'GET':
+        return False
+    if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
+        return False
+    decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
+    if decision.allowed:
+        return False
+    handler.sendj(decision.payload(), decision.status_code)
+    return True
 
 def now() -> str: return time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())
 def uid(p='id') -> str: return f'{p}-{int(time.time()*1000)}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}'
@@ -36,6 +136,41 @@ def sh(args, check=False):
 def jload(p: Path, default):
     try: return json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
     except Exception: return default
+
+def _file_sha256(path: Path) -> str:
+    digest=hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open('rb') as source:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b''):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+def _build_silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
+    verifier=None
+    if SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS.is_file():
+        verifier=SignedApprovalVerifier(
+            ApprovalKeyRing.from_file(SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS),
+            ApprovalRevocationStore(
+                SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT / 'revocations'
+            ),
+        )
+    policy_path=WS / 'config' / 'gitops' / 'silent-release-policy.json'
+    policy_sha=_file_sha256(policy_path) if policy_path.is_file() else ''
+    return SilentReleaseActionService(
+        SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT,
+        execution_enabled=SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,
+        approval_verifier=verifier,
+        expected_repository=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+        policy_sha256=policy_sha,
+    )
+
+# Construct once during service startup. If production execution is enabled
+# without every trusted builder/orchestrator dependency, construction fails
+# closed before the HTTP server accepts traffic.
+_SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE = _build_silent_release_service()
+
+
+def silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
+    return _SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE
 def relpath(path: str) -> str:
     x = str(path or '').replace('\\','/').strip()
     if not x or x.startswith('/') or '..' in Path(x).parts or Path(x).parts[0] == '.git': raise ValueError('invalid path')
@@ -109,9 +244,13 @@ def ensure_git():
     if not sh(['config','user.name'])['stdout']: sh(['config','user.name','chatgpt-gitops-bot'], True)
 def checkout(branch, base='main', create=False):
     ensure_git(); b=branch_name(branch)
-    if create or sh(['rev-parse','--verify',b])['code'] != 0:
-        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-B',b], True)
-    else: sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    exists = sh(['rev-parse','--verify',f'refs/heads/{b}'])['code'] == 0
+    if exists:
+        sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    elif create:
+        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-b',b], True)
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f'branch does not exist: {b}')
     return b
 def write_file(path, content):
     if content_has_secret(content): raise ValueError('secret_rejected: use secret_ref; plaintext API keys must not enter Git')
@@ -121,6 +260,19 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
     if not branch or branch in ('main','master') or branch.startswith('main/') or branch.startswith('master/'):
         return {'status':'skipped','reason':'protected_branch','branch':branch}
     if BARE_REPO.exists():
+        common = sh(['rev-parse', '--path-format=absolute', '--git-common-dir'], True)['stdout']
+        if Path(common).resolve() == BARE_REPO.resolve():
+            head = sh(['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], True)['stdout']
+            stored = subprocess.run(
+                ['git', '--git-dir', str(BARE_REPO), 'rev-parse', f'refs/heads/{branch}'],
+                text=True, capture_output=True,
+            )
+            if stored.returncode != 0 or stored.stdout.strip() != head:
+                raise RuntimeError(f'linked-worktree branch verification failed for {branch}')
+            return {
+                'status':'verified', 'target':'authoritative-bare',
+                'branch':branch, 'oid':head,
+            }
         ref=f'refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}'
         p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
         if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git sync failed for {branch}')
@@ -130,15 +282,68 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
     return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','branch':branch,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
 
 def sync_tag(tag: str) -> dict:
-    if not tag: return {'status':'skipped','reason':'empty_tag'}
-    if BARE_REPO.exists():
-        ref=f'refs/tags/{tag}:refs/tags/{tag}'
-        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
-        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag sync failed for {tag}')
-        return {'status':'synced','target':'bare','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
-    p=subprocess.run(['git','push','origin',tag], cwd=str(WS), text=True, capture_output=True)
-    if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag push failed for {tag}')
-    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
+    raise RuntimeError(
+        'unsafe sync_tag disabled: use TagPublisher with expected tag_oid, '
+        'target_oid, Gitea remote verification, and authenticated API verification'
+    )
+
+def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
+    oid = str(value or '').strip().lower()
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', oid):
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} must be a full 40-character commit OID')
+    try:
+        return authoritative_commit(oid, git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
+
+def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', str(tag or '')):
+        raise ValueError('invalid release version')
+    try:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        )
+    except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
+    return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
+
+def publication_request_from_query(q: dict[str, list[str]]) -> PublicationRequest:
+    required = ('version', 'target_oid', 'evidence_closure_oid', 'approval_plan_id')
+    missing = [name for name in required if not (q.get(name) or [''])[0]]
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError('missing release governance fields: ' + ', '.join(missing))
+    return PublicationRequest(
+        (q['version'])[0],
+        (q['target_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['evidence_closure_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['approval_plan_id'])[0],
+    )
+
+def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
+    snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+        git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+    )
+    if not snapshot["repository_available"]:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(snapshot["query_error"] or "AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE"))
+    return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
+
+
+def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
+    authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
+    return TagPublisher(
+        WS,
+        GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
+        GiteaTagClient(
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
+            Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
+            token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
+        ),
+        os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
+    )
 
 def commit(paths, msg):
     ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -158,6 +363,16 @@ def patches():
     for p in sorted((WS/'patches').glob('**/*.json')): out.append(jload(p, {'path':str(p.relative_to(WS))}))
     return out
 
+def runtime_release_info() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    for candidate in (WS / 'manifest.json', WS.parent / 'manifest.json'):
+        data = jload(candidate, {})
+        if data.get('target_commit'):
+            return {
+                'runtime_release_commit': data.get('target_commit'),
+                'runtime_release_path': str(WS),
+            }
+    return {'runtime_release_commit': None, 'runtime_release_path': str(WS)}
+
 class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     server_version='AIOSChatGPTGitOps/V1R1C0'
     def sendj(self, data, code=200):
@@ -179,43 +394,236 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
         return a
     def do_GET(self):
-        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path; q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
+        if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
         try:
             if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
             if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
                 return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
             if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
             if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
-                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {}); data.setdefault('git', sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']); return self.sendj(data)
+                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
+                data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                ))
+                return self.sendj(data)
             if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                return self.sendj({'tags':sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines(),'versions_dir':[p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],'head':sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    tags = authoritative_tags(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'registry_versions': registry,
+                    'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'tags': [item['name'] for item in tags],
+                    'versions_dir': registry,
+                    'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                    'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                })
             if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
-                frm=(q.get('from') or ['HEAD~1'])[0]; to=(q.get('to') or ['HEAD'])[0]; return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':sh(['diff',frm,to])})
-            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'): return self.sendj({'patches':patches(),'branches':sh(['branch','--format','%(refname:short)'])['stdout'].splitlines()})
+                frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
+                to=(q.get('to') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    diff=authoritative_diff(frm, to, git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir())
+                except ValueError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},400)
+                except AuthoritativeGitNotFound as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},404)
+                except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
+                except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
+                return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':diff})
+            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    branches = authoritative_branches(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                metadata = patches()
+                branch_names = {item['name'] for item in branches}
+                metadata_names = {
+                    item.get('branch') for item in metadata
+                    if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get('branch')
+                }
+                orphan = [
+                    item for item in metadata
+                    if item.get('branch') and item.get('branch') not in branch_names
+                ]
+                missing = [
+                    item for item in branches
+                    if item['name'] not in metadata_names
+                ]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'metadata_patches': metadata,
+                    'authoritative_branches': branches,
+                    'orphan_metadata': orphan,
+                    'branches_without_metadata': missing,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'patches': metadata,
+                    'branches': [item['name'] for item in branches],
+                })
             if path in ('/api/model','/model'): return self.sendj({'base':BASE_MODELS,'custom':model_docs(),'priority':[jload(p,{}) for p in sorted((WS/'config'/'model_priority').glob('*.json'))]})
             if path in ('/api/run','/api/runtime-status','/run'):
                 svc=subprocess.run(['systemctl','is-active','aios-gitops-model-api'], text=True, capture_output=True)
-                return self.sendj({'service':'aios-gitops-model-api','status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),'workspace_branch':sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                workspace_branch = None
+                if (WS / '.git').exists():
+                    result = sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])
+                    workspace_branch = result['stdout'] or None
+                payload = {
+                    'service':'aios-gitops-model-api',
+                    'status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),
+                    'workspace_branch':workspace_branch,
+                    **runtime_release_info(),
+                    **snapshot,
+                    'writes_enabled': str(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED','false')).lower() in {'1','true','yes','on'},
+                }
+                return self.sendj(payload, 200 if snapshot['repository_available'] else 503)
             if path in ('/api/action-monitor','/action-monitor'):
                 latest=monitor.latest()
                 ldict={'event_id':latest.event_id,'action':latest.action,'error':latest.error,'context':latest.context,'created_at':latest.created_at} if latest else None
                 return self.sendj({'events':[{"event_id":e.event_id,"action":e.action,"error":e.error,"context":e.context,"created_at":e.created_at} for e in monitor.list_events()],'latest':ldict})
+            if path == '/api/tag-publication-status':
+                version=(q.get('version') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    version=validate_version(version)
+                    status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
+                except ValueError:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
+                return self.sendj(status)
+            if path == '/api/release-consistency':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
+            if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
+            if path in (
+                '/getReleaseCandidate',
+                '/getReleasePlan',
+                '/getReleaseAcceptance',
+                '/getApprovalEnvelope',
+                '/getReleaseSaga',
+                '/getCapabilityStatus',
+            ):
+                candidate_id=(q.get('candidate_id') or [''])[0]
+                if not candidate_id:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'candidate_id is required'},400)
+                service=silent_release_service()
+                if path == '/getReleaseCandidate':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_release_candidate(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                if path == '/getApprovalEnvelope':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_approval_envelope(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                if path == '/getReleasePlan':
+                    return self.sendj(service.get_release_plan(candidate_id))
+                if path == '/getReleaseAcceptance':
+                    return self.sendj(service.get_acceptance(candidate_id))
+                if path == '/getCapabilityStatus':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_capability_status(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                return self.sendj(service.get_release_saga(candidate_id))
+            if path == '/getRecoveryStatus':
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().get_recovery_status()
+                )
                         # Admin AI Evolution Dashboard
             if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution','/admin/ai-evolution/'):
                 return self.ai_evolution_page()
             if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution/api/data'):
                 return self.ai_evolution_data()
             return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
         except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
     def do_PUT(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PUT', path): return
+        data=self.body()
         if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
         return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
     def do_POST(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
+        data=self.body()
         try:
+            if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
+                a=self.need('release:candidate')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/createReleaseIntent':
+                a=self.need('release:candidate')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().create_release_intent(data)
+                )
+            if path in ('/submitOwnerApproval','/submitSignedApproval'):
+                a=self.need('release:approve')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().submit_owner_approval(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/startDeployment':
+                a=self.need('release:deploy')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().start_deployment(
+                        str(data.get('candidate_id') or '')
+                    )
+                )
             if path in ('/api/branch','/api/create-branch'): return self.branch(data)
             if path in ('/api/file','/api/commit-file'): return self.file(data)
             if path == '/api/commit': return self.commit(data)
@@ -226,9 +634,30 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
             if path == '/api/nl': return self.nl(data)
             return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
+        except CapabilityAuthorizationError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},403)
+        except SagaConflict as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},409)
         except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
+    def do_PATCH(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PATCH', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+    def do_DELETE(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'DELETE', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
     def branch(self,data):
         a=self.need('branch:create');
         if not a: return
@@ -252,12 +681,41 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if not a: return
         ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
         if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
-        if data.get('confirm') != True:
-            self.sendj({'status':'confirm_required','operation':'tag','hint':'This operation creates a Git tag. Confirm to proceed.','x-openai-isConsequential':True}, 428)
-            return
+        if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
+            return self.sendj({
+                'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
+                'required':['version','target_oid','evidence_closure_oid','approval_plan_id'],
+            },400)
+        try:
+            target_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('target_oid'))
+            evidence_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('evidence_closure_oid'), 'evidence_closure_oid')
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'invalid_tag_target','detail':str(exc)},400)
         if a['role'] != 'owner' or not data.get('execute'):
-            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'commit':c})
-        out=sh(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'], True); self.sendj({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out,'sync':sync_tag(ver)})
+            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'request':req,'commit':c})
+        request=PublicationRequest(ver,target_oid,evidence_oid,str(data.get('approval_plan_id')))
+        main_before=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        publisher=publication_publisher()
+        try:
+            publication=publisher.publish(request)
+        except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_manual_owner_review_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':redact(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED','error':redact(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationConflict as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_conflict',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationPending as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_pending',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},503)
+        except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_reconciliation_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},502)
+        main_after=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        if main_after != main_before:
+            raise RuntimeError('main changed during tag operation')
+        result={'status':publication['state'],'version':ver,'tag_name':ver,'tag_oid':publication['tag_oid'],'target_oid':target_oid,'expected_target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'workspace_head':sh(['rev-parse','HEAD'],True)['stdout'],'main_oid_before':main_before,'main_oid_after':main_after,'main_changed':False,'force_push':False,'publication':publication}
+        audit(a['account'],'tag',ver,result)
+        self.sendj(result)
     def rollback(self,data):
         a=self.need('rollback:request');
         if not a: return
@@ -352,7 +810,10 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
         cmd_filter=(params.get('command') or [None])[0]
         bl=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json',{})
         current_ver=bl.get('current_baseline','V1R3C1')
-        tags=sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines() if WS.exists() else []
+        try:
+            tags=[item['name'] for item in authoritative_tags(git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir()) if str(item['name']).startswith('V')]
+        except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc),'repository_available':False},503)
         versions=[]
         if (WS/'baseline'/'promotions').exists():
             for p in sorted((WS/'baseline'/'promotions').glob('*.json')):
@@ -390,9 +851,9 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
 
 
 def api_spec():
-    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True}}
+    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}
 
 def main():
     print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
     ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST,PORT), H).serve_forever()
-if __name__ == '__main__': main()
+if __name__ == '__main__': main()

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_write_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed policy for in-process Git mutation handlers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping
+
+_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitWriteDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    status_code: int
+    error: str
+    reason: str
+    workspace: str
+
+    def payload(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "status": "allowed" if self.allowed else "blocked",
+            "error": self.error,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "workspace": self.workspace,
+        }
+
+
+def _real(path: Path) -> Path:
+    return Path(os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path))))
+
+
+def evaluate_git_write(workspace: Path | str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> GitWriteDecision:
+    values = os.environ if env is None else env
+    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+    canonical = _real(lexical)
+    shown = str(lexical)
+    if str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false")).strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "gitops_writes_disabled", "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED is false", shown)
+    if lexical != canonical:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_symlink_forbidden", "workspace must be a canonical non-symlink path", shown)
+    controller = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_PATH", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller")))
+    role = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "")).strip().lower()
+    if canonical == controller or role == "runtime-anchor":
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "runtime_anchor_read_only", "controller/runtime-anchor is read-only", str(canonical))
+    writer_root = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees")))
+    try:
+        canonical.relative_to(writer_root)
+    except ValueError:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_not_approved_writer", "workspace is outside the approved writer root", str(canonical))
+    return GitWriteDecision(True, 200, "", "approved isolated writer", str(canonical))

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_writer_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+"""Task-scoped hardened wrapper around the existing Action API."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+import urllib.parse
+
+import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
+import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
+from isolated_writer_authz import AuthorizationError, authorize
+from isolated_writer_commit_file import AtomicCommitFile, CommitFileError, OperationLedger
+from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
+
+_reject = api.reject_non_read_http
+_write_file = api.write_file
+_sync_branch = api.sync_branch
+_original_do_get = api.H.do_GET
+api.OPENAPI = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_OPENAPI", str(api.OPENAPI)))
+
+
+def _registry() -> TokenRegistry:
+    return TokenRegistry(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2"]))
+
+
+def _atomic_writer() -> AtomicCommitFile:
+    return AtomicCommitFile(
+        workspace=api.WS,
+        bare_repo=api.BARE_REPO,
+        ledger=OperationLedger(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER"])),
+        remote=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", ""),
+        audit=policy.append_audit_record,
+    )
+
+
+def _bearer(handler) -> str:
+    value = handler.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+    return value[7:].strip() if value.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
+
+
+def _authorize(handler, *, method: str, path: str, branch=None, target_path=None):
+    grant = authorize(
+        _registry(),
+        _bearer(handler),
+        method=method,
+        path=path,
+        source_ip=str(handler.client_address[0]),
+        workspace=api.WS,
+        branch=branch,
+        target_path=target_path,
+    )
+    grant.record["_source_ip"] = str(handler.client_address[0])
+    return grant
+
+
+def _authorization_error(handler, exc: AuthorizationError):
+    return handler.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+
+
+def _isolated_runtime_status(handler):
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    return handler.sendj({
+        "service": os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
+            "aios-isolated-writer.service",
+        ),
+        "status": "active",
+        "runtime_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE"),
+        "workspace_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE"),
+        "writes_enabled": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").lower()
+        in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"},
+        "allowed_branch": policy.allowed_branch(),
+        "approved_base_oid": policy.allowed_base_oid(),
+        "workspace_branch": branch,
+        "workspace_head_oid": head,
+        "repository_identity": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY"),
+        "token_policy_version": 2,
+        "atomic_commit_file": True,
+        "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
+    })
+
+
+def _isolated_do_get(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path in {"/health", "/api/health"}:
+        return self.sendj({
+            "status": "ok",
+            "service": os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
+                "aios-isolated-writer.service",
+            ),
+        })
+    if path not in {"/api/runtime-status", "/api/baseline", "/api/patches"}:
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
+    try:
+        _authorize(self, method="GET", path=path)
+    except AuthorizationError as exc:
+        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
+    if path == "/api/runtime-status":
+        return _isolated_runtime_status(self)
+    return _original_do_get(self)
+
+
+def _read_commit_file_body(handler):
+    try:
+        length = int(handler.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+    except ValueError:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_content_length_rejected") from None
+    if length <= 0:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+    if length > 1_100_000:
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_too_large", 413)
+    raw = handler.rfile.read(length)
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_json_rejected") from None
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+    return value
+
+
+def _isolated_do_post(self):
+    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+    if path != "/api/commit-file":
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
+    try:
+        data = _read_commit_file_body(self)
+        branch = str(data.get("branch") or "")
+        target_path = str(data.get("path") or "")
+        grant = _authorize(
+            self,
+            method="POST",
+            path=path,
+            branch=branch,
+            target_path=target_path,
+        )
+        if api.content_has_secret(str(data.get("content") or "")):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_secret_content_rejected", 403)
+        result = _atomic_writer().execute(grant, data)
+        return self.sendj(result)
+    except AuthorizationError as exc:
+        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
+    except CommitFileError as exc:
+        return self.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+    except PermissionError:
+        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_policy_rejected"}, 403)
+
+
+def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if _reject(handler, method, path):
+        return True
+    try:
+        policy.validate_endpoint(method, path, api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+        return False
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        handler.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
+        return True
+
+
+def checkout(branch, base="main", create=False):
+    api.ensure_git()
+    target = api.branch_name(branch)
+    policy.validate_branch_request({"branch": target, "base": base})
+    exists = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--verify", target])["code"] == 0
+    if exists:
+        if api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"] != target:
+            api.sh(["checkout", target], True)
+    elif create:
+        api.sh(["checkout", "-b", target, base], True)
+    else:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_missing")
+    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+    return target
+
+
+def write_file(path, content):
+    policy.validate_path(path, api.WS)
+    return _write_file(path, content)
+
+
+def sync_branch(branch: str):
+    policy.validate_sync_branch(branch)
+    local = _sync_branch(branch)
+    remote = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", "").strip()
+    if remote != "gitea-http":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_gitea_remote_rejected")
+    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    pushed = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "push", "--porcelain", remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{branch}"],
+        cwd=api.WS,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    if pushed.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_push_failed")
+    verified = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+        cwd=api.WS,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    if verified.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_verification_failed")
+    fields = verified.stdout.strip().split()
+    if len(fields) != 2 or fields[0] != head or fields[1] != f"refs/heads/{branch}":
+        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_oid_mismatch")
+    return {
+        "status": "verified",
+        "target": "authoritative-bare+gitea",
+        "branch": branch,
+        "oid": head,
+        "local": local.get("status"),
+    }
+
+
+def commit(paths, msg):
+    policy.validate_commit_paths(paths, api.WS)
+    api.ensure_git()
+    selected = [api.relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ["."]
+    api.sh(["add", *selected], True)
+    policy.validate_staged_paths(api.WS)
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    if not api.sh(["status", "--short"])["stdout"]:
+        return {"status": "no_changes", "branch": branch, "sync": sync_branch(branch)}
+    out = api.sh(["commit", "-m", msg], True)
+    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
+    return {
+        "status": "committed",
+        "branch": branch,
+        "rev": api.sh(["rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"],
+        "git": out,
+        "sync": sync_branch(branch),
+    }
+
+
+def audit(actor, action, target, payload):
+    policy.append_audit_record(
+        {
+            "at": api.now(),
+            "actor": actor,
+            "action": action,
+            "target": target,
+            "payload": api.sanitize(payload),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def _validate_request(self, data, validate):
+    try:
+        validate(data)
+        return True
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        self.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
+        return False
+
+
+def _checked_branch(self, data):
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _branch(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_file(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    if not _validate_request(
+        self,
+        {"path": data.get("path", "")},
+        lambda item: policy.validate_path(item["path"], api.WS),
+    ):
+        return
+    return _file(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_commit(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _commit(self, data)
+
+
+def _checked_patch(self, data):
+    data = dict(data)
+    data["branch"] = policy.allowed_branch()
+    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
+        return
+    return _patch(self, data)
+
+
+_branch, _file, _commit, _patch = api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch
+api.reject_non_read_http = reject_non_read_http
+api.checkout, api.write_file, api.sync_branch, api.commit, api.audit = (
+    checkout,
+    write_file,
+    sync_branch,
+    commit,
+    audit,
+)
+api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch = (
+    _checked_branch,
+    _checked_file,
+    _checked_commit,
+    _checked_patch,
+)
+api.H.do_GET = _isolated_do_get
+api.H.do_POST = _isolated_do_post
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
+    api.ThreadingHTTPServer((api.HOST, api.PORT), api.H).serve_forever()

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_writer_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+"""Fail-closed policy used only by the task-scoped Action writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import json
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import re
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
+from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+import isolated_writer_path_policy as path_policy
+
+WRITE_ENDPOINTS = frozenset({"/api/commit-file"})
+ALLOWED_ROOTS = (
+    "active-runtime",
+    "docs",
+    "patches",
+    "reports",
+    "scripts",
+    "test",
+    "tests",
+)
+DENIED_ROOTS = ("baseline", "config", "deploy", "deployments", "ops", "runtime", "services")
+_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+_FALSE = frozenset({"0", "false", "no", "off"})
+_DENY_FLAGS = (
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_MAIN_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_TAG_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_BASELINE_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_REGISTRY_WRITE",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_ROLLBACK",
+    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_DEPLOYMENT",
+)
+
+
+def enforcement_required() -> bool:
+    return os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_ENFORCEMENT", "") == "required"
+
+
+def allowed_branch() -> str:
+    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_missing_allowed_branch")
+    return value
+
+
+def allowed_base_oid() -> str:
+    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BASE_OID", "").strip().lower()
+    if len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_invalid_allowed_base_oid")
+    return value
+
+
+def _git(workspace: Path, *args: str) -> str:
+    result = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_git_validation_failed")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def require_service_invariants(workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_write_gate_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_role_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_role_required")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_policy_v2_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_service_audience_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_registry_required")
+    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER", "").strip():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_ledger_required")
+    path_policy.configured_path_policy()
+    for name in _DENY_FLAGS:
+        if os.getenv(name, "").strip().lower() not in _FALSE:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_forbidden_capability_flag")
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "") != "aios/aios":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_repository_identity_rejected")
+    configured_bare_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "").strip()
+    if not configured_bare_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
+    configured_bare = Path(configured_bare_value)
+    if configured_bare.resolve(strict=True) != bare_repo.resolve(strict=True):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
+    writer_root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "").strip()
+    if not writer_root_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root")
+    writer_root = Path(writer_root_value).resolve(strict=True)
+    lexical_workspace = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+    canonical_workspace = lexical_workspace.resolve(strict=True)
+    if lexical_workspace != canonical_workspace:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
+    try:
+        canonical_workspace.relative_to(writer_root)
+    except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root") from None
+    if _git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_current_branch_rejected")
+    approved_base = allowed_base_oid()
+    try:
+        _git(workspace, "cat-file", "-e", f"{approved_base}^{{commit}}")
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", approved_base, "HEAD"],
+            cwd=workspace,
+            check=True,
+            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        )
+    except (PermissionError, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_approved_base_not_ancestor") from None
+    if _git(workspace, "merge-base", approved_base, "HEAD") != approved_base:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_merge_base_rejected")
+    common = Path(_git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"))
+    if not common.is_absolute():
+        common = (workspace / common).resolve()
+    if common.resolve() != bare_repo.resolve():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_common_repo_rejected")
+
+
+def approved_audit_log_path() -> Path:
+    root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_AUDIT_ROOT", "").strip()
+    log_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUDIT_LOG", "").strip()
+    if not root_value or not log_value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_missing")
+    lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(root_value))
+    lexical_log = Path(os.path.abspath(log_value))
+    root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
+    if lexical_root != root or root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_root_rejected")
+    try:
+        lexical_log.relative_to(root)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_outside_approved_root") from None
+    if lexical_log.parent.resolve(strict=True) != lexical_log.parent:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_parent_symlink_rejected")
+    if lexical_log.exists() and lexical_log.is_symlink():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_symlink_rejected")
+    os.chmod(root, 0o750)
+    os.chmod(lexical_log.parent, 0o750)
+    return lexical_log
+
+
+def append_audit_record(record: dict) -> None:
+    path = approved_audit_log_path()
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        info = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_not_regular")
+        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
+        line = json.dumps(
+            _audit_sanitize(record),
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
+        os.write(descriptor, line)
+        os.fsync(descriptor)
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+    parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+    try:
+        os.fsync(parent_fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(parent_fd)
+
+
+def _audit_sanitize(value):
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {
+            key: (
+                "[REDACTED]"
+                if any(
+                    marker in str(key).lower()
+                    for marker in (
+                        "authorization",
+                        "credential",
+                        "password",
+                        "secret",
+                        "token",
+                        "private_key",
+                    )
+                )
+                and str(key).lower() != "token_id"
+                else _audit_sanitize(inner)
+            )
+            for key, inner in value.items()
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [_audit_sanitize(item) for item in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str) and re.search(
+        r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])",
+        value,
+    ):
+        return "[REDACTED]"
+    return value
+
+
+def validate_endpoint(method: str, path: str, workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    if method != "POST" or path not in WRITE_ENDPOINTS:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
+    require_service_invariants(workspace, bare_repo)
+
+
+def validate_branch_request(data: dict) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    branch = allowed_branch() if "branch" not in data else str(data.get("branch") or "").strip()
+    if branch != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected")
+    if str(data.get("base", "main")).strip() != "main":
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_base_rejected")
+    if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_force_rejected")
+
+
+def validate_path(path: str, workspace: Path | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(path, str):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    value = path
+    if not value or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value or "\\" in value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        decoded = unquote(value, errors="strict")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
+    if decoded != value:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    windows = PureWindowsPath(value)
+    posix = PurePosixPath(value)
+    parts = value.split("/")
+    if (
+        posix.is_absolute()
+        or windows.is_absolute()
+        or bool(windows.drive)
+        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+    ):
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    first = parts[0]
+    service_exact_path = False
+    if first in DENIED_ROOTS:
+        try:
+            path_policy.require_service_path("commit_file.atomic", value)
+            service_exact_path = True
+        except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+            raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+    if value != "README.md" and first not in ALLOWED_ROOTS and not service_exact_path:
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_outside_allowed_roots")
+    if workspace is not None:
+        lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+        root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
+        if lexical_root != root:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
+        current = root
+        for part in parts:
+            current = current / part
+            if current.is_symlink():
+                raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_symlink_rejected")
+        candidate = (root / value).resolve(strict=False)
+        try:
+            candidate.relative_to(root)
+        except ValueError:
+            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_escapes_workspace") from None
+    return value
+
+
+def validate_content_for_path(path: str, content: str) -> None:
+    if path.split("/", 1)[0] not in DENIED_ROOTS:
+        return
+    try:
+        path_policy.validate_content("commit_file.atomic", path, content)
+    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+
+
+def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
+    try:
+        return path_policy.configured_path_policy_sha256()
+    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
+        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
+
+
+def validate_commit_paths(paths: list[str], workspace: Path | None = None) -> None:
+    if enforcement_required():
+        for path in paths:
+            if str(path).strip() != ".":
+                validate_path(str(path), workspace)
+
+
+def validate_staged_paths(workspace: Path) -> None:
+    if not enforcement_required():
+        return
+    for path in _git(workspace, "diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines():
+        validate_path(path, workspace)
+
+
+def validate_sync_branch(branch: str) -> None:
+    if enforcement_required() and branch != allowed_branch():
+        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_sync_branch_rejected")

active-runtime/app/authoritative_git.py

@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+"""Fail-closed access to the authoritative bare Git repository."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import urllib.parse
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Iterable
+
+_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "cat-file",
+        "config",
+        "diff",
+        "for-each-ref",
+        "ls-remote",
+        "merge-base",
+        "push",
+        "remote",
+        "rev-parse",
+        "show-ref",
+        "tag",
+    }
+)
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_MAX_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
+_TIMEOUT = 8.0
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitError(RuntimeError):
+    """A fail-closed authoritative repository or ref query error."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitNotFound(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A validated revision does not exist in the authoritative repository."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A controlled Git query exceeded the response-size boundary."""
+
+
+def _redact(text: str) -> str:
+    value = str(text or "")
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:bearer|token)\s+\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)((?:access_)?token\s*[:=]\s*)\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(https?://[^/\s:@]+:)[^@\s/]+@", r"\1REDACTED@", value)
+    return value
+
+
+def _configured_path(git_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
+    raw = str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    if not raw:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    path = Path(raw)
+    if not path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    try:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not resolved.is_dir():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def _run(
+    git_dir: Path,
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    if not args or args[0] not in _ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
+    if len(result.stdout) + len(result.stderr) > _MAX_OUTPUT:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
+    if check and result.returncode != 0:
+        detail = _redact(result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip())
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError(
+            "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED" + (f": {detail[:160]}" if detail else "")
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def _repository_identity_from_remote(url: str) -> str:
+    value = str(url or "").strip().split("?", 1)[0].rstrip("/")
+    if not value:
+        return ""
+    if "://" in value:
+        value = urllib.parse.urlparse(value).path
+    elif ":" in value:
+        value = value.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
+    value = value.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].strip("/")
+    value = re.sub(r"\.git$", "", value, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
+    parts = [part for part in value.split("/") if part]
+    if len(parts) >= 2:
+        value = "/".join(parts[-2:])
+    return value.strip("/").lower()
+
+
+def verify_repository(
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[Path, str]:
+    path = _configured_path(git_dir)
+    expected = str(
+        repository_identity
+        or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+    ).strip().strip("/")
+    if not expected or expected.count("/") != 1:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    bare = _run(path, ["rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository"], check=True)
+    if bare.stdout.strip().lower() != "true":
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    remote = _run(path, ["config", "--get", "remote.gitea.url"], check=False)
+    actual = _repository_identity_from_remote(remote.stdout)
+    if actual != expected.lower():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    return path, expected
+
+
+def run_authoritative_git(
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool = True,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    return _run(path, list(args), check=check, timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def authoritative_head_oid(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main"], git_dir=git_dir)
+    oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return oid
+
+
+def authoritative_tags(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str | None]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/tags",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)\t%(objecttype)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    tags: list[dict[str, str | None]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid, object_type = (line.split("\t", 2) + ["", ""])[:3]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        peeled_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{name}^{{commit}}"],
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        peeled = peeled_result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(peeled):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        tags.append(
+            {
+                "name": name,
+                "tag_oid": oid.lower(),
+                "object_type": object_type,
+                "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
+            }
+        )
+    return tags
+
+
+def authoritative_branches(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/heads",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    branches: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid = (line.split("\t", 1) + [""])[:2]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        branches.append({"name": name, "oid": oid.lower()})
+    return branches
+
+
+def authoritative_commit(
+    oid: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    value = str(oid or "").strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise ValueError("commit OID must be a full 40-character value")
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{value}^{{commit}}"],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    resolved = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if resolved != value:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def authoritative_lineage(
+    ancestor: str,
+    descendant: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    authoritative_commit(ancestor, git_dir=git_dir)
+    authoritative_commit(descendant, git_dir=git_dir)
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
+        check=False,
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("evidence lineage mismatch")
+
+
+_SAFE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
+
+
+def _safe_ref_name(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(
+        _SAFE_REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
+        and ".." not in value
+        and "//" not in value
+        and "@{" not in value
+        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        and not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
+    )
+
+
+def validate_git_revision(
+    value: str,
+    field: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    revision = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not revision or revision != str(value or "") or revision.startswith("-"):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
+        try:
+            return authoritative_commit(revision.lower(), git_dir=git_dir)
+        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+            raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found") from exc
+    if not _safe_ref_name(revision) or any(token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if revision.startswith("refs/"):
+        if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+        candidates = [revision]
+    else:
+        candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
+    matches: list[str] = []
+    for candidate in candidates:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if result.returncode == 0 and _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+            matches.append(oid)
+    if not matches:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found")
+    if len(set(matches)) != 1 or len(matches) != 1:
+        raise ValueError(f"ambiguous {field} revision")
+    return matches[0]
+
+
+def authoritative_diff(
+    from_revision: str,
+    to_revision: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
+    to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
+    args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
+    result = run_authoritative_git(args, git_dir=path)
+    return {
+        "code": 0,
+        "stdout": result.stdout,
+        "stderr": "",
+        "cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
+        "from_oid": from_oid,
+        "to_oid": to_oid,
+    }
+
+
+def repository_snapshot(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    configured = bool(
+        str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    )
+    try:
+        path, identity = verify_repository(
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+            repository_identity=repository_identity,
+        )
+        head = authoritative_head_oid(git_dir=path)
+        return {
+            "repository_available": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": str(path),
+            "authoritative_head_oid": head,
+            "repository_identity": identity,
+            "query_error": None,
+        }
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        return {
+            "repository_available": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": None,
+            "authoritative_head_oid": None,
+            "repository_identity": str(
+                repository_identity
+                or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+            ).strip() or None,
+            "query_error": _redact(str(exc)),
+        }

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_authz.py

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+"""Fail-closed operation authorization for an isolated Git writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
+
+
+ROUTE_OPERATIONS = {
+    ("GET", "/api/runtime-status"): "runtime.status.read",
+    ("GET", "/api/baseline"): "baseline.read",
+    ("GET", "/api/patches"): "patches.read",
+    ("POST", "/api/commit-file"): "commit_file.atomic",
+}
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
+
+
+class AuthorizationError(PermissionError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthorizedGrant:
+    record: dict[str, Any]
+    operation: str
+    use_count: int
+
+    @property
+    def token_id(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.record["token_id"])
+
+    @property
+    def task_id(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.record["task_id"])
+
+
+def operation_for(method: str, path: str) -> str:
+    operation = ROUTE_OPERATIONS.get((method.upper(), path))
+    if not operation:
+        raise AuthorizationError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
+    return operation
+
+
+def _parse_time(value: Any) -> datetime:
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(str(value).replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid") from None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _git_is_ancestor(workspace: Path, base: str, branch: str) -> bool:
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", base, branch],
+        cwd=workspace,
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    )
+    return result.returncode == 0
+
+
+def _validate_grant(
+    grant: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    audience: str,
+    source_ip: str,
+    operation: str,
+    branch: str | None,
+    path: str | None,
+    workspace: Path,
+    current_time: datetime,
+) -> None:
+    if int(grant.get("schema_version", 0)) != 2:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_required", 401)
+    if str(grant.get("audience") or "") != audience:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_audience_rejected")
+    try:
+        peer = ipaddress.ip_address(source_ip)
+        networks = [ipaddress.ip_network(str(value), strict=True) for value in grant.get("source_cidrs", [])]
+    except ValueError:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected") from None
+    if not networks or not any(peer in network for network in networks):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected")
+    created = _parse_time(grant.get("created_at"))
+    not_before = _parse_time(grant.get("not_before"))
+    expires = _parse_time(grant.get("expires_at"))
+    if expires <= not_before or (expires - created).total_seconds() > 1800:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_lifetime_rejected")
+    if current_time < not_before:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_not_yet_valid", 401)
+    if current_time >= expires:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_expired", 401)
+    if bool(grant.get("revoked")):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_revoked", 401)
+    operations = grant.get("allowed_operations")
+    if not isinstance(operations, list) or operation not in operations:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_operation_rejected")
+    expected_branch = str(grant.get("allowed_branch") or "")
+    configured_branch = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "")
+    if expected_branch != configured_branch:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
+    if branch is not None and branch != expected_branch:
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
+    if path is not None:
+        paths = grant.get("allowed_paths")
+        if not isinstance(paths, list) or path not in paths:
+            raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_path_rejected")
+    base = str(grant.get("approved_base_oid") or "").lower()
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_rejected")
+    if not _git_is_ancestor(workspace, base, expected_branch):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_not_ancestor")
+
+
+def authorize(
+    registry: TokenRegistry,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    source_ip: str,
+    workspace: Path,
+    branch: str | None = None,
+    target_path: str | None = None,
+    current_time: datetime | None = None,
+) -> AuthorizedGrant:
+    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_not_required")
+    if not token:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
+    grant = registry.find(token)
+    if grant is None:
+        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
+    operation = operation_for(method, path)
+    _validate_grant(
+        grant,
+        audience=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""),
+        source_ip=source_ip,
+        operation=operation,
+        branch=branch,
+        path=target_path,
+        workspace=workspace,
+        current_time=current_time or datetime.now(timezone.utc),
+    )
+    limits = grant.get("max_uses")
+    if not isinstance(limits, dict):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing")
+    try:
+        used = registry.consume(str(grant["token_id"]), operation, int(limits[operation]))
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing") from None
+    except PermissionError as exc:
+        code = str(exc)
+        raise AuthorizationError(code, 401 if code == "writer_token_revoked" else 403) from None
+    return AuthorizedGrant(grant, operation, used)

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_commit_file.py

@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+"""Atomic, idempotent commit-file Saga for the isolated writer."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
+IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}")
+STATES = frozenset({
+    "PENDING", "FILE_WRITTEN", "COMMITTED", "PUSHED", "VERIFIED", "COMPLETED",
+    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
+})
+_LOCKS: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {}
+_LOCKS_GUARD = threading.Lock()
+_LEDGER_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+class CommitFileError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+class SimulatedCrash(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical_digest(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    payload = {
+        "branch": data["branch"],
+        "path": data["path"],
+        "content_sha256": hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
+        "message": data["message"],
+        "expected_head_oid": data["expected_head_oid"],
+    }
+    encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
+
+
+class OperationLedger:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
+            raise PermissionError("writer_operation_ledger_symlink_rejected")
+        with _LEDGER_INIT_LOCK:
+            with self.connect() as db:
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS writer_operations (
+                        operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                        operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        branch TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        path TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        content_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        pre_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        commit_oid TEXT,
+                        push_status TEXT,
+                        verification_status TEXT,
+                        state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+                        updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+                        error_code TEXT
+                    )
+                    """
+                )
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
+        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        return db
+
+    def get_or_create(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        key = data["idempotency_key"]
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row:
+                db.commit()
+                record = dict(row)
+                if record["operation_digest"] != digest:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_conflict", 409)
+                if (
+                    record["token_id"] != grant.token_id
+                    or record["task_id"] != grant.task_id
+                ):
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_owner_conflict", 409)
+                return record
+            operation_id = hashlib.sha256(
+                f"{grant.task_id}\0{key}".encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest()
+            content_sha = hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+            db.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO writer_operations(
+                    operation_id,token_id,task_id,idempotency_key,operation_digest,
+                    branch,path,content_sha256,pre_head_oid,state
+                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    operation_id, grant.token_id, grant.task_id, key, digest,
+                    data["branch"], data["path"], content_sha,
+                    data["expected_head_oid"], "PENDING",
+                ),
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return self.get(key)
+
+    def get(self, key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise KeyError(key)
+        return dict(row)
+
+    def update(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if state not in STATES:
+            raise ValueError("invalid writer operation state")
+        allowed = {"commit_oid", "push_status", "verification_status", "error_code"}
+        assignments = ["state=?", "updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"]
+        values: list[Any] = [state]
+        for name, value in fields.items():
+            if name not in allowed:
+                raise ValueError("invalid ledger field")
+            assignments.append(f"{name}=?")
+            values.append(value)
+        values.append(key)
+        with self.connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            db.execute(
+                f"UPDATE writer_operations SET {','.join(assignments)} WHERE idempotency_key=?",
+                values,
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return self.get(key)
+
+
+class AtomicCommitFile:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        workspace: Path,
+        bare_repo: Path,
+        ledger: OperationLedger,
+        remote: str,
+        audit,
+        crash_after_state: str | None = None,
+    ):
+        self.workspace = workspace
+        self.bare_repo = bare_repo
+        self.ledger = ledger
+        self.remote = remote
+        self.audit = audit
+        self.crash_after_state = crash_after_state
+
+    def _git(self, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True
+        )
+        if check and result.returncode != 0:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_git_operation_failed", 500)
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def _transition(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        record = self.ledger.update(key, state, **fields)
+        if self.crash_after_state == state:
+            raise SimulatedCrash(state)
+        return record
+
+    def _validate(self, data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
+        required = ("branch", "path", "content", "message", "expected_head_oid", "idempotency_key")
+        if any(field not in data for field in required):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_incomplete")
+        if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
+            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_force_rejected", 403)
+        if set(data) != set(required):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_fields_rejected")
+        item = {field: data[field] for field in required}
+        if item["branch"] != policy.allowed_branch():
+            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected", 403)
+        try:
+            item["path"] = policy.validate_path(item["path"], self.workspace)
+        except PermissionError as exc:
+            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
+        if not isinstance(item["content"], str) or "\x00" in item["content"]:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_rejected")
+        try:
+            policy.validate_content_for_path(item["path"], item["content"])
+        except PermissionError as exc:
+            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
+        if len(item["content"].encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_too_large", 413)
+        message = item["message"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(message, str)
+            or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200
+            or "\x00" in message
+            or "\n" in message
+            or "\r" in message
+        ):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_message_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(item["expected_head_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(item["expected_head_oid"]):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_expected_head_rejected")
+        if not isinstance(item["idempotency_key"], str) or not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(item["idempotency_key"]):
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_key_rejected")
+        return item
+
+    def _atomic_write(self, relative: str, content: str) -> None:
+        target = self.workspace / relative
+        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-", dir=target.parent)
+        try:
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
+                stream.write(content.encode("utf-8"))
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary, target)
+            parent_fd = os.open(target.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
+            try:
+                os.fsync(parent_fd)
+            finally:
+                os.close(parent_fd)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(temporary):
+                os.unlink(temporary)
+
+    def _verify_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> None:
+        bare = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True,
+        )
+        if bare.returncode != 0 or bare.stdout.strip() != oid:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_authoritative_bare_oid_mismatch", 500)
+        remote = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", self.remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+            cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
+        )
+        if remote.returncode != 0:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_verification_failed", 503)
+        fields = remote.stdout.strip().split()
+        if len(fields) != 2:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_ref_missing", 503)
+        if fields[0] != oid:
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_oid_conflict", 409)
+
+    def execute(self, grant: Any, raw_data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        data = self._validate(raw_data)
+        digest = canonical_digest(data)
+        branch = data["branch"]
+        with _LOCKS_GUARD:
+            lock = _LOCKS.setdefault(branch, threading.Lock())
+        lock_path = self.ledger.path.parent / f"{hashlib.sha256(branch.encode()).hexdigest()}.lock"
+        with lock, open(lock_path, "a+b") as branch_lock:
+            fcntl.flock(branch_lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            return self._execute_locked(grant, data, digest)
+
+    def _execute_locked(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        key = data["idempotency_key"]
+        record = self.ledger.get_or_create(grant, data, digest)
+        if record["state"] == "COMPLETED":
+            return self._result(record, idempotent=True)
+        if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != data["branch"]:
+            record = self._transition(
+                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_current_branch_conflict"
+            )
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_current_branch_conflict", 409)
+        head = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        commit_oid = record.get("commit_oid")
+        if head != record["pre_head_oid"] and head != commit_oid:
+            record = self._transition(
+                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_branch_head_conflict"
+            )
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
+            raise CommitFileError("writer_branch_head_conflict", 409)
+        try:
+            state = record["state"]
+            if state == "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
+                raise CommitFileError("writer_manual_review_required", 409)
+            if state == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE":
+                if record.get("push_status") == "confirmed":
+                    state = "PUSHED"
+                else:
+                    state = "COMMITTED" if commit_oid else "FILE_WRITTEN"
+            if state == "PENDING":
+                self._atomic_write(data["path"], data["content"])
+                record = self._transition(key, "FILE_WRITTEN")
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "FILE_WRITTEN":
+                actual_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+                    (self.workspace / data["path"]).read_bytes()
+                ).hexdigest()
+                if actual_sha != record["content_sha256"]:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_file_content_conflict", 409)
+                staged_before = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only", check=False).splitlines()
+                if staged_before:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
+                self._git("add", "--", data["path"])
+                staged = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines()
+                if staged != [data["path"]]:
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
+                self._git("commit", "-m", data["message"])
+                commit_oid = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
+                record = self._transition(key, "COMMITTED", commit_oid=commit_oid)
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "COMMITTED":
+                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
+                pushed = subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{data['branch']}"],
+                    cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
+                )
+                if pushed.returncode != 0:
+                    self._transition(
+                        key, "FAILED_RECOVERABLE",
+                        push_status="failed", error_code="writer_gitea_push_failed",
+                    )
+                    raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_push_failed", 503)
+                record = self._transition(key, "PUSHED", push_status="confirmed")
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "PUSHED":
+                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
+                self._verify_remote(data["branch"], commit_oid)
+                record = self._transition(
+                    key, "VERIFIED", verification_status="bare+gitea"
+                )
+                state = record["state"]
+            if state == "VERIFIED":
+                record = self._transition(key, "COMPLETED", error_code=None)
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "completed")
+            return self._result(record, idempotent=False)
+        except SimulatedCrash:
+            raise
+        except CommitFileError as exc:
+            latest = self.ledger.get(key)
+            if latest["state"] not in {"FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"}:
+                failure_state = (
+                    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+                    if exc.code in {
+                        "writer_gitea_oid_conflict",
+                        "writer_file_content_conflict",
+                        "writer_current_branch_conflict",
+                    }
+                    else "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
+                )
+                latest = self._transition(key, failure_state, error_code=exc.code)
+            self._audit(grant, data, digest, latest, "failed")
+            raise
+
+    def _audit(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str, record: dict[str, Any], result: str) -> None:
+        self.audit({
+            "token_id": grant.token_id,
+            "task_id": grant.task_id,
+            "audience": grant.record["audience"],
+            "source_ip": grant.record.get("_source_ip", "socket-peer"),
+            "operation": grant.operation,
+            "branch": data["branch"],
+            "path": data["path"],
+            "idempotency_key": data["idempotency_key"],
+            "operation_digest": digest,
+            "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
+            "pre_head_oid": record["pre_head_oid"],
+            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
+            "result": result,
+        })
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _result(record: dict[str, Any], *, idempotent: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "status": "completed",
+            "state": record["state"],
+            "operation_id": record["operation_id"],
+            "branch": record["branch"],
+            "path": record["path"],
+            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
+            "push_status": record.get("push_status"),
+            "verification_status": record.get("verification_status"),
+            "idempotent": idempotent,
+        }

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_path_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+"""Strict service-level exact-path policy for isolated Git writers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import grp
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from functools import lru_cache
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+
+MAX_POLICY_BYTES = 65_536
+POLICY_FIELDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "schema_version",
+        "policy_id",
+        "audience",
+        "repository_identity",
+        "allowed_branch",
+        "allowed_operations",
+    }
+)
+OPERATION_FIELDS = frozenset({"exact_paths", "max_content_bytes", "content_profile"})
+SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS = frozenset({"commit_file.atomic"})
+SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES = frozenset({"systemd-codex-review-worker-v1"})
+_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:|bearer\s+|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])"
+)
+_SYSTEMD_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*\Z")
+_SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096
+_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES = {
+    "Unit": frozenset({"Description", "After", "Wants"}),
+    "Service": frozenset(
+        {
+            "Type",
+            "User",
+            "Group",
+            "WorkingDirectory",
+            "Environment",
+            "ExecStart",
+            "Restart",
+            "RestartSec",
+            "NoNewPrivileges",
+            "PrivateTmp",
+            "PrivateDevices",
+            "ProtectSystem",
+            "ProtectHome",
+            "ProtectKernelTunables",
+            "ProtectKernelModules",
+            "ProtectControlGroups",
+            "LockPersonality",
+            "RestrictSUIDSGID",
+            "RestrictRealtime",
+            "MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
+            "RuntimeDirectory",
+            "StateDirectory",
+            "CacheDirectory",
+            "ReadOnlyPaths",
+            "ReadWritePaths",
+            "UMask",
+        }
+    ),
+    "Install": frozenset({"WantedBy"}),
+}
+_SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES = frozenset(
+    {
+        ("Service", "Environment"),
+        ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"),
+        ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"),
+    }
+)
+_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES = {
+    ("Unit", "Description"): "AIOS Codex Review/Test Worker",
+    ("Unit", "After"): "network-online.target",
+    ("Unit", "Wants"): "network-online.target",
+    ("Service", "Type"): "simple",
+    ("Service", "User"): "aiman",
+    ("Service", "Group"): "gitops",
+    (
+        "Service",
+        "WorkingDirectory",
+    ): "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker/current",
+    (
+        "Service",
+        "ExecStart",
+    ): "/usr/bin/python3 -m task_plane.workers.codex_review_test",
+    ("Service", "Restart"): "on-failure",
+    ("Service", "RestartSec"): "2",
+    ("Service", "NoNewPrivileges"): "true",
+    ("Service", "PrivateTmp"): "true",
+    ("Service", "PrivateDevices"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectSystem"): "strict",
+    ("Service", "ProtectHome"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectKernelTunables"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectKernelModules"): "true",
+    ("Service", "ProtectControlGroups"): "true",
+    ("Service", "LockPersonality"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RestrictSUIDSGID"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RestrictRealtime"): "true",
+    ("Service", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute"): "true",
+    ("Service", "RuntimeDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "StateDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "CacheDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ("Service", "UMask"): "0077",
+    ("Install", "WantedBy"): "multi-user.target",
+}
+_SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES = {
+    ("Service", "Environment"): (
+        "AIOS_CODEX_WORKER_MODE=shadow",
+        "AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false",
+        "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1",
+    ),
+    ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"): (
+        "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+        "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ),
+    ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"): (
+        "/run/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+        "/var/lib/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+        "/var/cache/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
+    ),
+}
+
+
+class PathPolicyError(PermissionError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationPolicy:
+    exact_paths: tuple[str, ...]
+    max_content_bytes: int
+    content_profile: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ServicePathPolicy:
+    schema_version: int
+    policy_id: str
+    audience: str
+    repository_identity: str
+    allowed_branch: str
+    allowed_operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy]
+    sha256: str
+
+    def operation(self, name: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+        try:
+            return self.allowed_operations[name]
+        except KeyError:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_operation_rejected") from None
+
+    def require_exact_path(self, operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+        selected = self.operation(operation)
+        if path not in selected.exact_paths:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_rejected")
+        return selected
+
+
+def _canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return (
+        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        + "\n"
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def validate_relative_path_syntax(path: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(path, str):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    if not path or path != path.strip() or "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        decoded = unquote(path, errors="strict")
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
+    if decoded != path:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    posix = PurePosixPath(path)
+    windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
+    parts = path.split("/")
+    if (
+        posix.is_absolute()
+        or windows.is_absolute()
+        or bool(windows.drive)
+        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
+    return path
+
+
+def _require_fields(value: dict[str, Any], allowed: frozenset[str], code: str) -> None:
+    if set(value) != allowed:
+        raise PathPolicyError(code)
+
+
+def _parse_policy(document: Any, canonical: bytes) -> ServicePathPolicy:
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_object_required")
+    _require_fields(document, POLICY_FIELDS, "isolated_writer_path_policy_fields_rejected")
+    if document["schema_version"] != 1:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_schema_rejected")
+    text_fields = (
+        "policy_id",
+        "audience",
+        "repository_identity",
+        "allowed_branch",
+    )
+    if any(
+        not isinstance(document[field], str) or not document[field].strip()
+        for field in text_fields
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_value_rejected")
+    raw_operations = document["allowed_operations"]
+    if not isinstance(raw_operations, dict) or not raw_operations:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
+    if not set(raw_operations).issubset(SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
+    operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy] = {}
+    for name, raw in raw_operations.items():
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_rejected")
+        _require_fields(
+            raw,
+            OPERATION_FIELDS,
+            "isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_fields_rejected",
+        )
+        paths = raw["exact_paths"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(paths, list)
+            or not paths
+            or any(not isinstance(item, str) for item in paths)
+        ):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
+        validated = tuple(validate_relative_path_syntax(item) for item in paths)
+        if len(set(validated)) != len(validated):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
+        maximum = raw["max_content_bytes"]
+        if not isinstance(maximum, int) or isinstance(maximum, bool) or not 1 <= maximum <= 1_048_576:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_size_rejected")
+        profile = raw["content_profile"]
+        if profile not in SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
+        operations[name] = OperationPolicy(validated, maximum, profile)
+    return ServicePathPolicy(
+        schema_version=1,
+        policy_id=document["policy_id"],
+        audience=document["audience"],
+        repository_identity=document["repository_identity"],
+        allowed_branch=document["allowed_branch"],
+        allowed_operations=operations,
+        sha256=hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
+    )
+
+
+def load_path_policy(
+    path: Path,
+    *,
+    expected_owner_uid: int = 0,
+    expected_group_gid: int | None = None,
+    expected_parent_mode: int = 0o750,
+    expected_file_mode: int = 0o640,
+) -> ServicePathPolicy:
+    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(path)))
+    if lexical.is_symlink():
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
+    try:
+        parent_info = lexical.parent.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+        file_info = lexical.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_missing") from None
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(parent_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_info.st_mode):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_rejected")
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(file_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(file_info.st_mode):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_rejected")
+    if lexical.resolve(strict=True) != lexical:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
+    if (
+        parent_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
+        or stat.S_IMODE(parent_info.st_mode) != expected_parent_mode
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_permissions_rejected")
+    if (
+        file_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
+        or stat.S_IMODE(file_info.st_mode) != expected_file_mode
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_permissions_rejected")
+    if expected_group_gid is not None and (
+        parent_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid or file_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected")
+    if file_info.st_size <= 0 or file_info.st_size > MAX_POLICY_BYTES:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_size_rejected")
+    raw = lexical.read_bytes()
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_json_rejected") from None
+    canonical = _canonical_json(document)
+    if raw != canonical:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_not_canonical")
+    return _parse_policy(document, canonical)
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
+def configured_path_policy() -> ServicePathPolicy | None:
+    configured = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_PATH_POLICY_FILE", "").strip()
+    if not configured:
+        return None
+    if not Path(configured).is_absolute():
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_path_rejected")
+    try:
+        gitops_gid = grp.getgrnam("gitops").gr_gid
+    except KeyError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected") from None
+    loaded = load_path_policy(Path(configured), expected_group_gid=gitops_gid)
+    if loaded.audience != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_audience_rejected")
+    if loaded.repository_identity != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_repository_rejected")
+    if loaded.allowed_branch != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", ""):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_branch_rejected")
+    return loaded
+
+
+def clear_path_policy_cache() -> None:
+    configured_path_policy.cache_clear()
+
+
+def require_service_path(operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
+    loaded = configured_path_policy()
+    if loaded is None:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_policy_required")
+    return loaded.require_exact_path(operation, path)
+
+
+def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
+    loaded = configured_path_policy()
+    return None if loaded is None else loaded.sha256
+
+
+def validate_content(operation: str, path: str, content: str) -> None:
+    selected = require_service_path(operation, path)
+    try:
+        encoded = content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except (AttributeError, UnicodeEncodeError):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
+    if len(encoded) > selected.max_content_bytes:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_content_too_large")
+    if selected.content_profile == "systemd-codex-review-worker-v1":
+        _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content)
+        return
+    raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
+
+
+def _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content: str) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(content, str):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    try:
+        content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError:
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
+    if (
+        "\x00" in content
+        or "\r" in content
+        or _SECRET_RE.search(content)
+        or not content.endswith("\n")
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+
+    sections: set[str] = set()
+    values: dict[tuple[str, str], list[str]] = {}
+    section: str | None = None
+    for line in content.splitlines():
+        if len(line.encode("utf-8")) > _SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        if not line:
+            continue
+        if line[0].isspace() or line.startswith(("#", ";")):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        if line.startswith("[") and line.endswith("]"):
+            candidate = line[1:-1]
+            if (
+                not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(candidate)
+                or candidate not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES
+                or candidate in sections
+            ):
+                raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+            sections.add(candidate)
+            section = candidate
+            continue
+        if section is None or "=" not in line:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        directive, value = line.split("=", 1)
+        if (
+            not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(directive)
+            or directive not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES[section]
+            or not value
+            or value != value.strip()
+        ):
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        key = (section, directive)
+        if key in values and key not in _SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+        values.setdefault(key, []).append(value)
+
+    if sections != set(_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    if set(values) != set(_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES) | set(
+        _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES
+    ):
+        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES.items():
+        if values.get(key) != [expected]:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
+    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES.items():
+        observed = values.get(key, [])
+        if len(observed) != len(set(observed)) or tuple(observed) != expected:
+            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")

active-runtime/app/isolated_writer_token_registry.py

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+"""Digest-only, task-scoped token registry for isolated writers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+import grp
+import pwd
+import secrets
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+_REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+
+def token_digest(token: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+class TokenRegistry:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self._prepare()
+
+    def _prepare(self) -> None:
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_registry_symlink_rejected")
+        with _REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK:
+            with self._connect() as db:
+                db.executescript(
+                    """
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_grants (
+                        token_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                        token_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                        grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                    );
+                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_uses (
+                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        operation TEXT NOT NULL,
+                        use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                        PRIMARY KEY(token_id, operation),
+                        FOREIGN KEY(token_id) REFERENCES token_grants(token_id)
+                    );
+                    """
+                )
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
+        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        return db
+
+    def issue(self, grant: dict[str, Any], token: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+        value = token or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        if len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
+            raise ValueError("writer_token_entropy_insufficient")
+        record = dict(grant)
+        record["schema_version"] = 2
+        record["token_digest"] = token_digest(value)
+        record["revoked"] = False
+        record.setdefault("created_at", utc_now())
+        required = (
+            "token_id",
+            "audience",
+            "task_id",
+            "source_cidrs",
+            "allowed_branch",
+            "approved_base_oid",
+            "allowed_operations",
+            "allowed_paths",
+            "not_before",
+            "expires_at",
+            "max_uses",
+            "issued_by",
+        )
+        if any(not record.get(field) for field in required):
+            raise ValueError("writer_token_grant_incomplete")
+        encoded = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO token_grants(token_id, token_digest, grant_json, revoked, created_at)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        str(record["token_id"]),
+                        str(record["token_digest"]),
+                        encoded,
+                        0,
+                        str(record["created_at"]),
+                    ),
+                )
+                db.execute("COMMIT")
+            except Exception:
+                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                raise
+        return value, record
+
+    def find(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        candidate = token_digest(token)
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            rows = db.execute(
+                "SELECT token_digest, grant_json, revoked FROM token_grants"
+            ).fetchall()
+        match = None
+        for row in rows:
+            if hmac.compare_digest(str(row["token_digest"]), candidate):
+                match = dict(json.loads(str(row["grant_json"])))
+                match["revoked"] = bool(row["revoked"])
+        return match
+
+    def consume(self, token_id: str, operation: str, maximum: int) -> int:
+        if maximum < 1:
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            try:
+                row = db.execute(
+                    "SELECT revoked FROM token_grants WHERE token_id=?",
+                    (token_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None or bool(row["revoked"]):
+                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_revoked")
+                used_row = db.execute(
+                    "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
+                    (token_id, operation),
+                ).fetchone()
+                used = int(used_row["use_count"]) if used_row else 0
+                if used >= maximum:
+                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
+                current = used + 1
+                db.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO token_uses(token_id, operation, use_count)
+                    VALUES(?,?,?)
+                    ON CONFLICT(token_id, operation)
+                    DO UPDATE SET use_count=excluded.use_count
+                    """,
+                    (token_id, operation, current),
+                )
+                db.execute("COMMIT")
+                return current
+            except Exception:
+                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                raise
+
+    def revoke(self, token_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            changed = db.execute(
+                "UPDATE token_grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_id=? AND revoked=0",
+                (token_id,),
+            ).rowcount
+            db.execute("COMMIT")
+        return bool(changed)
+
+    def usage(self, token_id: str, operation: str) -> int:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
+                (token_id, operation),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row["use_count"]) if row else 0
+
+
+def _write_secret_file(
+    path: Path,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    owner: str | None = None,
+    group: str | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_symlink_rejected")
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_not_regular")
+        if owner is not None or group is not None:
+            uid = pwd.getpwnam(owner).pw_uid if owner is not None else -1
+            gid = grp.getgrnam(group).gr_gid if group is not None else -1
+            os.fchown(fd, uid, gid)
+        os.write(fd, token.encode("utf-8"))
+        os.fsync(fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--registry", required=True)
+    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
+    issue.add_argument("--grant-file", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument("--token-file", required=True)
+    issue.add_argument("--owner")
+    issue.add_argument("--group")
+    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
+    revoke.add_argument("--token-id", required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    registry = TokenRegistry(args.registry)
+    if args.command == "issue":
+        grant = json.loads(Path(args.grant_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        token, record = registry.issue(grant)
+        _write_secret_file(
+            Path(args.token_file),
+            token,
+            owner=args.owner,
+            group=args.group,
+        )
+        print(json.dumps({"token_id": record["token_id"], "created": True}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    changed = registry.revoke(args.token_id)
+    print(json.dumps({"token_id": args.token_id, "revoked": changed}, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/silent_release_execution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Execution-readiness adapters and the fail-closed Shadow controller service."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import dataclasses
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import threading
+import time
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKey,
+)
+
+from silent_release_controller import _sanitize, utc_now
+from silent_release_hardening import (
+    BuilderAttestation,
+    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
+    ReleaseRecoveryWorker,
+    SignedApprovalVerifier,
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+    SilentReleaseActionService,
+    TrustedCandidateBundle,
+    _canonical_json,
+    _durable_json,
+    _safe_child,
+)
+
+
+class BuilderSigner(Protocol):
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        ...
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        ...
+
+
+class LocalTestBuilderSigner:
+    """Ephemeral in-memory signer. It is forbidden for production execution."""
+
+    test_only = True
+
+    def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
+        self._key_id = str(key_id)
+        self._private_key = private_key
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        return self._key_id
+
+    @classmethod
+    def generate(
+        cls, key_id: str = "shadow-builder-test-key"
+    ) -> "LocalTestBuilderSigner":
+        return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
+
+    @property
+    def public_key(self):
+        return self._private_key.public_key()
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        return self._private_key.sign(payload)
+
+
+class ExternalKmsBuilderSigner:
+    """Signer facade whose private operation remains in KMS/HSM."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        key_id: str,
+        credential_reference: str,
+        sign_callback: Callable[[str, bytes], bytes],
+    ):
+        if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
+            ("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("production builder requires a KMS/HSM reference")
+        self._key_id = str(key_id)
+        self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
+        self._sign_callback = sign_callback
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> str:
+        return self._key_id
+
+    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
+        return bytes(self._sign_callback(self.credential_reference, payload))
+
+
+class SignedTrustedBuilderAdapter:
+    """Signs evidence produced by a trusted collector, never caller evidence."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        collector: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], TrustedCandidateBundle],
+        signer: BuilderSigner,
+    ):
+        self.collector = collector
+        self.signer = signer
+
+    def build(self, intent: Mapping[str, Any]) -> TrustedCandidateBundle:
+        forbidden = {
+            "artifact_sha256",
+            "canary",
+            "checks",
+            "manifest_sha256",
+            "tests",
+            "tree_oid",
+        }
+        if forbidden.intersection(intent):
+            raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
+                "trusted builder rejects caller-supplied evidence"
+            )
+        unsigned = self.collector(dict(intent))
+        if unsigned.attestation is not None:
+            raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
+                "collector cannot self-attest its evidence"
+            )
+        candidate = unsigned.candidate
+        test_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            _canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.tests))
+        ).hexdigest()
+        canary_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            _canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.canary))
+        ).hexdigest()
+        attestation_id = "builder-attestation-" + hashlib.sha256(
+            (
+                candidate.candidate_id
+                + "\0"
+                + candidate.source_commit
+                + "\0"
+                + candidate.artifact_sha256
+            ).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()[:24]
+        attestation = BuilderAttestation(
+            builder_attestation_id=attestation_id,
+            builder_key_id=self.signer.key_id,
+            source_commit=candidate.source_commit,
+            tree_oid=candidate.tree_oid,
+            artifact_sha256=candidate.artifact_sha256,
+            manifest_sha256=candidate.manifest_sha256,
+            package_closure_sha256=(
+                unsigned.release_plan.deployment.package_closure_sha256
+            ),
+            test_evidence_sha256=test_sha,
+            canary_evidence_sha256=canary_sha,
+            issued_at=utc_now(),
+            signature="",
+        )
+        attestation = dataclasses.replace(
+            attestation,
+            signature=base64.b64encode(
+                self.signer.sign(attestation.canonical_bytes())
+            ).decode("ascii"),
+        )
+        return dataclasses.replace(unsigned, attestation=attestation)
+
+
+class ApprovalBackendAdapter(Protocol):
+    @property
+    def available(self) -> bool:
+        ...
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+        *,
+        candidate,
+        release_plan,
+        policy_sha256: str,
+    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+        ...
+
+
+class LocalTestApprovalSigner:
+    """Test-only approval signer used solely for Shadow acceptance."""
+
+    test_only = True
+
+    def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
+        self.key_id = str(key_id)
+        self.private_key = private_key
+
+    @classmethod
+    def generate(
+        cls, key_id: str = "shadow-owner-test-key"
+    ) -> "LocalTestApprovalSigner":
+        return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
+
+    def sign(
+        self, approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval
+    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+        unsigned = dataclasses.replace(
+            approval, key_id=self.key_id, signature=""
+        )
+        return dataclasses.replace(
+            unsigned,
+            signature=base64.b64encode(
+                self.private_key.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes())
+            ).decode("ascii"),
+        )
+
+
+class ProductionApprovalBackendAdapter:
+    """Verification-only production adapter configured by a secret/KMS ref."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        verifier: SignedApprovalVerifier,
+        credential_reference: str,
+    ):
+        if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
+            ("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
+        ):
+            raise ValueError(
+                "production approval backend requires a KMS/secret reference"
+            )
+        self.verifier = verifier
+        self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
+
+    @property
+    def available(self) -> bool:
+        return True
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+        *,
+        candidate,
+        release_plan,
+        policy_sha256: str,
+    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+        return self.verifier.verify_release_plan(
+            approval, candidate, release_plan, policy_sha256
+        )
+
+
+class UnavailableProductionApprovalBackend:
+    credential_reference = None
+
+    @property
+    def available(self) -> bool:
+        return False
+
+    def verify(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
+            "production approval backend is not configured"
+        )
+
+
+class LeaderLock:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.handle = None
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(self.path.parent, 0o700)
+        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
+        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
+        try:
+            import fcntl
+
+            fcntl.flock(
+                self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB
+            )
+        except BlockingIOError as exc:
+            self.handle.close()
+            self.handle = None
+            raise RuntimeError("silent release leader is already active") from exc
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
+        if self.handle is not None:
+            try:
+                import fcntl
+
+                fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+            finally:
+                self.handle.close()
+                self.handle = None
+
+
+class PersistentSilentReleaseController:
+    """Idempotent main-event controller with durable startup/recovery reports."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        root: Path,
+        service: SilentReleaseActionService,
+        *,
+        main_probe: Callable[[], str],
+        recovery_worker: ReleaseRecoveryWorker | None = None,
+    ):
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        self.service = service
+        self.main_probe = main_probe
+        self.recovery_worker = recovery_worker
+        self.leader_path = self.root / "controller.leader.lock"
+        self.status_path = self.root / "controller-status.json"
+
+    def startup_verify(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        checked = 0
+        failed = 0
+        for journal in sorted(self.service.sagas.root.glob("*.events.jsonl")):
+            candidate_id = journal.name[: -len(".events.jsonl")]
+            saga = self.service.sagas.load(candidate_id)
+            checked += 1
+            if not saga.journal_integrity:
+                failed += 1
+        status = {
+            "checked_sagas": checked,
+            "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
+            "failed_closed": failed,
+            "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
+            "side_effects_executed": False,
+            "status": "READY" if failed == 0 else "FAIL_CLOSED",
+        }
+        _durable_json(self.status_path, status)
+        return status
+
+    def run_once(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with LeaderLock(self.leader_path):
+            startup = self.startup_verify()
+            if startup["status"] != "READY":
+                result = {
+                    "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
+                    "intent": None,
+                    "notification": None,
+                    "recovery": None,
+                    "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
+                    "side_effects_executed": False,
+                    "startup": startup,
+                    "status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
+                }
+                _durable_json(self.status_path, result)
+                return _sanitize(result)
+            source_commit = str(self.main_probe())
+            event_id = f"main-{source_commit}"
+            intent = self.service.create_release_intent(
+                {"event_id": event_id, "source_commit": source_commit}
+            )
+            notification = None
+            if intent.get("candidate_id"):
+                notification = self.service.ensure_owner_notification(
+                    str(intent["candidate_id"])
+                )
+            recovery = (
+                self.recovery_worker.run_once()
+                if self.recovery_worker is not None
+                else self.service.get_recovery_status()
+            )
+            result = {
+                "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
+                "intent": intent,
+                "notification": notification,
+                "recovery": recovery,
+                "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
+                "side_effects_executed": False,
+                "startup": startup,
+            }
+            _durable_json(self.status_path, result)
+            return _sanitize(result)
+
+
+class ShadowActionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    service: SilentReleaseActionService
+    controller: PersistentSilentReleaseController
+
+    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any], status=HTTPStatus.OK):
+        body = json.dumps(_sanitize(dict(payload)), sort_keys=True).encode()
+        self.send_response(int(status))
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        size = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        if size > 1024 * 1024:
+            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
+        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(size) or b"{}")
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        parsed = urlparse(self.path)
+        query = parse_qs(parsed.query)
+        candidate_id = str((query.get("candidate_id") or [""])[0])
+        try:
+            if parsed.path == "/healthz":
+                return self._json(
+                    {
+                        "execution_enabled": False,
+                        "shadow_mode": True,
+                        "side_effects_executed": False,
+                        "status": "ok",
+                    }
+                )
+            routes = {
+                "/getReleaseCandidate": self.service.get_release_candidate,
+                "/getReleasePlan": self.service.get_release_plan,
+                "/getReleaseAcceptance": self.service.get_acceptance,
+                "/getReleaseSaga": self.service.get_release_saga,
+                "/getCapabilityStatus": self.service.get_capability_status,
+            }
+            if parsed.path in routes:
+                return self._json(routes[parsed.path](candidate_id))
+            if parsed.path == "/getRecoveryStatus":
+                return self._json(self.service.get_recovery_status())
+            self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as exc:
+            self._json(
+                {"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
+            )
+
+    def do_POST(self):
+        parsed = urlparse(self.path)
+        try:
+            body = self._body()
+            if parsed.path == "/createReleaseIntent":
+                return self._json(self.service.create_release_intent(body))
+            if parsed.path in {
+                "/submitSignedApproval",
+                "/submitOwnerApproval",
+            }:
+                return self._json(self.service.submit_owner_approval(body))
+            if parsed.path == "/startDeployment":
+                return self._json(
+                    self.service.start_deployment(
+                        str(body.get("candidate_id") or "")
+                    )
+                )
+            self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError, CapabilityAuthorizationError) as exc:
+            self._json(
+                {"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
+            )
+
+
+def git_main_probe(repository: Path) -> Callable[[], str]:
+    repository = Path(repository)
+
+    def probe() -> str:
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            [
+                "git",
+                f"--git-dir={repository}",
+                "rev-parse",
+                "refs/heads/main",
+            ],
+            check=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=15,
+            env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+        )
+        return completed.stdout.strip()
+
+    return probe
+
+
+def serve_shadow(
+    *,
+    state_root: Path,
+    repository: Path,
+    host: str,
+    port: int,
+    poll_seconds: float,
+) -> None:
+    service = SilentReleaseActionService.shadow(state_root)
+    controller = PersistentSilentReleaseController(
+        state_root,
+        service,
+        main_probe=git_main_probe(repository),
+    )
+    controller.run_once()
+    stop = threading.Event()
+
+    def controller_loop() -> None:
+        while not stop.wait(poll_seconds):
+            try:
+                controller.run_once()
+            except Exception as exc:  # fail closed and keep the API available
+                _durable_json(
+                    controller.status_path,
+                    {
+                        "error": type(exc).__name__,
+                        "execution_enabled": False,
+                        "shadow_mode": True,
+                        "side_effects_executed": False,
+                        "status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
+                    },
+                )
+
+    handler = type(
+        "ConfiguredShadowActionHandler",
+        (ShadowActionHandler,),
+        {"service": service, "controller": controller},
+    )
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
+    api_thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=server.serve_forever,
+        name="silent-release-shadow-api",
+        daemon=False,
+    )
+    controller_thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=controller_loop,
+        name="silent-release-shadow-controller",
+        daemon=True,
+    )
+    api_thread.start()
+    controller_thread.start()
+    try:
+        while api_thread.is_alive():
+            api_thread.join(timeout=1)
+    finally:
+        stop.set()
+        server.shutdown()
+        server.server_close()
+        controller_thread.join(timeout=max(1.0, poll_seconds + 1.0))
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", default=18891, type=int)
+    parser.add_argument("--poll-seconds", default=30.0, type=float)
+    arguments = parser.parse_args()
+    if arguments.poll_seconds <= 0:
+        raise SystemExit("poll seconds must be positive")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        raise SystemExit("GitOps writes must remain disabled")
+    if (
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED", "false"
+        ).lower()
+        != "false"
+    ):
+        raise SystemExit("Silent Release execution must remain disabled")
+    serve_shadow(
+        state_root=arguments.state_root,
+        repository=arguments.repository,
+        host=arguments.host,
+        port=arguments.port,
+        poll_seconds=arguments.poll_seconds,
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

active-runtime/app/task_plane/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+"""Task Plane runtime package."""
+
+from .models import (
+    EvidenceEnvelope,
+    ProbeEvidence,
+    ProbeOutcome,
+    TaskPlan,
+    TaskRecord,
+    TaskStatus,
+    TaskStateTransitionError,
+)
+
+__all__ = [
+    "EvidenceEnvelope",
+    "ProbeEvidence",
+    "ProbeOutcome",
+    "TaskPlan",
+    "TaskRecord",
+    "TaskStatus",
+    "TaskStateTransitionError",
+]

active-runtime/app/task_plane/adapters/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+"""Adapters for executing tasks via worker backends."""
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+from .openclaw import OpenClawAdapter
+from .codex import CodexAdapter
+from .hermes import HermesAdapter
+from .a2a import A2AAdapter
+from .systemd_worker import SystemdWorkerAdapter
+
+__all__ = [
+    "WorkerAdapter",
+    "OpenClawAdapter",
+    "CodexAdapter",
+    "HermesAdapter",
+    "A2AAdapter",
+    "SystemdWorkerAdapter",
+]

active-runtime/app/task_plane/adapters/a2a.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class A2AAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "a2a"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["task.exchange", "agent.handoff"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}

active-runtime/app/task_plane/adapters/base.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Base worker adapter contract."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import abc
+
+
+class WorkerAdapter(abc.ABC):
+    worker_name = "base"
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def claim(self, task):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        raise NotImplementedError

active-runtime/app/task_plane/adapters/codex.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class CodexAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "codex"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.python", "review.security"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}

active-runtime/app/task_plane/adapters/hermes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class HermesAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "hermes"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["architecture.review", "policy.review", "threat.model"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}

active-runtime/app/task_plane/adapters/openclaw.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class OpenClawAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "openclaw"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.execute", "runtime.shadow"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}

active-runtime/app/task_plane/adapters/systemd_worker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .base import WorkerAdapter
+
+
+class SystemdWorkerAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
+    worker_name = "systemd_worker"
+
+    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
+        return ["systemd.exec", "runtime.shell"]
+
+    def claim(self, task):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
+
+    def execute(self, task, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
+
+    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
+
+    def probe(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
+
+    def cancel(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
+
+    def collect_result(self, claim):
+        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}

active-runtime/app/task_plane/agent_registry.py

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+"""Agent registry abstraction."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import NotFoundError
+
+
+class AgentRegistry:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self._agents: dict[str, dict] = {}
+
+    def register(self, agent_id: str, metadata: dict) -> None:
+        self._agents[agent_id] = {"agent_id": agent_id, **metadata}
+
+    def unregister(self, agent_id: str) -> None:
+        if agent_id not in self._agents:
+            raise NotFoundError("agent")
+        del self._agents[agent_id]
+
+    def list(self) -> list[dict]:
+        return list(self._agents.values())
+
+    def get(self, agent_id: str) -> dict:
+        try:
+            return self._agents[agent_id]
+        except KeyError:
+            raise NotFoundError("agent")

active-runtime/app/task_plane/api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+"""Task Plane HTTP API implementation (stdlib-only)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import time
+import uuid
+import urllib.parse
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from .delegation import DelegationEngine
+from .errors import (
+    ConflictError,
+    ForbiddenError,
+    NotFoundError,
+    PayloadTooLargeError,
+    TaskPlaneHTTPError,
+    UnauthorizedError,
+    ValidationError,
+)
+from .evidence import EvidenceService
+from .journal import TaskJournal
+from .lease import LeaseManager
+from .models import (
+    EvidenceEnvelope,
+    ResultEnvelope,
+    TaskPlan,
+    TaskRecord,
+    iso8601_now,
+    contains_secret_text,
+    validate_identifier,
+)
+from .policy import PolicyEngine
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry
+
+
+def _json_payload(data: dict[str, Any], status: int = 200) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
+    body = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+    return status, body
+
+
+def _bounded_int(value: Any, name: str, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
+    try:
+        number = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}") from exc
+    if not minimum <= number <= maximum:
+        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return number
+
+
+class TaskPlaneService:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore, policy: PolicyEngine | None = None):
+        self.store = store
+        self.policy = policy or PolicyEngine(
+            execution_enabled=False,
+            identity_capabilities={
+                "anon": {"task.creator", "task.read", "task.audit"}
+            },
+        )
+        self.journal = TaskJournal(store)
+        self.lease = LeaseManager(store)
+        self.workers = WorkerRegistry(store)
+        self.evidence = EvidenceService(store)
+        self.delegation = DelegationEngine(store)
+        self.store.probe_attestation_verifier = self.policy.probe_attestation_verifier
+
+    def create_task(self, body: dict[str, Any], idempotency_key: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if body.get("parent_task_id"):
+            raise ForbiddenError("child tasks must use the delegate endpoint")
+        issuer = body.get("issuer", {})
+        actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("create", actor)
+        try:
+            plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid task plan") from exc
+        task = self.store.create_task_with_event(plan, idempotency_key=idempotency_key)
+        return task.to_dict()
+
+    def list_tasks(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+        return [task.to_dict(include_task=False) for task in self.store.list_tasks()]
+
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        return self.store.get_task(task_id).to_dict()
+
+    def get_worker(self, worker_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+        return self.workers.get(worker_id).to_dict()
+
+    def list_workers(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+        return [w.to_dict() for w in self.workers.list()]
+
+    def register_worker(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = str(body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("identity") or "")
+        is_admin = actor in self.policy.admin_identities
+        try:
+            existing = self.store.get_worker(str(body.get("worker_id") or ""))
+        except NotFoundError:
+            existing = None
+        if existing is not None and str(body.get("identity") or "") != existing.identity:
+            raise ConflictError("worker identity takeover rejected")
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_registration(actor, body)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed(
+            "worker.admin" if is_admin else "worker.register", actor
+        )
+        try:
+            worker = self.workers.register(
+                body,
+                actor_identity=actor,
+                is_admin=is_admin,
+                expected_revision=body.get("expected_revision"),
+            )
+        except (TypeError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid worker registration") from exc
+        return worker.to_dict()
+
+    def worker_heartbeat(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        interval = payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds")
+        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.register", actor)
+        return self.workers.heartbeat(
+            worker_id,
+            heartbeat_interval_seconds=interval,
+            actor_identity=actor,
+            expected_revision=payload.get("expected_revision"),
+        ).to_dict()
+
+    def disable_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
+        return self.store.disable_worker(
+            worker_id,
+            actor_identity=actor,
+            expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
+            reason=str(payload.get("reason") or "disabled by administrator"),
+        ).to_dict()
+
+    def restore_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
+        return self.store.restore_worker(
+            worker_id,
+            actor_identity=actor,
+            expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
+        ).to_dict()
+
+    def claim(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor)
+        worker_id = body.get("worker_id")
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise ValidationError("worker_id required")
+
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, str(worker_id))
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor, task=task)
+        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
+            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
+        )
+        claim = self.lease.claim(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            worker_identity=actor,
+            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+            operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
+        )
+        return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, **claim.to_dict()}
+
+    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("heartbeat", actor, task=task)
+        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
+            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
+        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
+            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
+        )
+        claim = self.lease.heartbeat(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
+        return {"claim_id": claim_id, "lease_until": claim.lease_until}
+
+    def progress(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        progress = body.get("progress")
+        stage = body.get("stage", "RUNNING")
+        message = body.get("message")
+        if progress is None:
+            raise ValidationError("progress required")
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("progress", actor, task=task)
+        if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
+            if message not in {None, ""} or contains_secret_text(stage):
+                raise ValidationError(
+                    "credential-secret progress must contain metadata only"
+                )
+        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
+            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
+        )
+        claim = self.store.record_progress(
+            task_id,
+            claim_id,
+            actor,
+            progress=progress,
+            stage=str(stage),
+            message=None if message is None else str(message),
+            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
+        )
+        return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status, "progress": progress}
+
+    def complete(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+
+        status = body.get("status", "COMPLETED")
+        outputs = body.get("outputs", [])
+        evidences = body.get("evidence", [])
+        if not isinstance(outputs, list):
+            raise ValidationError("outputs must be list")
+        if not isinstance(evidences, list):
+            raise ValidationError("evidence must be list")
+        if any(not isinstance(ev, dict) for ev in evidences):
+            raise ValidationError("evidence items must be objects")
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("result", actor, task=task)
+        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
+            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
+        if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
+            allowed_result_keys = {
+                "kind",
+                "hash",
+                "sha256",
+                "count",
+                "status",
+                "error_code",
+                "signature",
+                "attestation_ref",
+            }
+            for entry in [*outputs, *evidences]:
+                if (
+                    not isinstance(entry, dict)
+                    or set(entry) - allowed_result_keys
+                    or contains_secret_text(entry)
+                ):
+                    raise ValidationError(
+                        "credential-secret result must contain hash/count/status only"
+                    )
+
+        result = ResultEnvelope(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            claim_id=claim_id,
+            worker_identity=actor,
+            status=status,
+            outputs=outputs,
+            evidence=evidences,
+            started_at=str(body.get("started_at") or iso8601_now()),
+            completed_at=str(body.get("completed_at") or iso8601_now()),
+            result_digest=body.get("result_digest"),
+            signature=body.get("signature"),
+            attestation_ref=body.get("attestation_ref"),
+            operation_digest=claim.operation_digest,
+        )
+        evidence_decision = self.policy.evidence_verifier.verify(task, evidences)
+        if not evidence_decision.allowed:
+            raise ForbiddenError(evidence_decision.reason)
+        result_decision = self.policy.verify_result(result, task)
+        if not result_decision.allowed:
+            raise ForbiddenError(result_decision.reason)
+        result.result_digest = result.computed_digest()
+        previous = self.store._last_evidence_hash(task_id)
+        evidence_entries = []
+        for evidence in evidences:
+            envelope = EvidenceEnvelope.create(
+                task_id=task_id,
+                claim_id=claim_id,
+                kind=str(evidence.get("kind") or evidence.get("type") or "generic"),
+                worker_identity=actor,
+                payload=evidence,
+                previous_evidence_hash=previous,
+                signature=evidence.get("signature"),
+                attestation_ref=evidence.get("attestation_ref"),
+            )
+            evidence_entries.append(envelope)
+            previous = envelope.evidence_digest
+        self.store.complete_claim_with_evidence_and_event(
+            task_id,
+            claim_id,
+            status
+            if status
+            in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "CANCELLED"}
+            else "COMPLETED",
+            result.to_dict(),
+            evidence_entries,
+        )
+        return result.to_dict()
+
+    def fail(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
+        if not claim_id:
+            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
+        reason = body.get("reason", "failed")
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor)
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor, task=task)
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
+            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
+        status = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" if body.get("recoverable", False) else "FAILED_FINAL"
+        self.store.fail_claim_with_event(task_id, claim_id, status, str(reason))
+        return {"task_id": task_id, "status": status, "reason": reason}
+
+    def cancel(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "owner"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor)
+        reason = body.get("reason", "cancelled")
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor, task=task)
+        updated = self.store.cancel_task_with_event(
+            task_id, task.revision, reason=reason
+        )
+        return updated.to_dict()
+
+    def delegate(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or "owner"
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor)
+        parent = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor, task=parent)
+        if "task" in body:
+            try:
+                child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body["task"])
+            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
+        else:
+            plan_body = dict(body)
+            plan_body.pop("actor_identity", None)
+            try:
+                child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(plan_body)
+            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
+        child_plan.parent_task_id = task_id
+        child = self.delegation.delegate(task_id, child_plan, caller=actor)
+        return child.to_dict()
+
+    def get_events(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        return self.store.list_events(task_id)
+
+    def get_evidence(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        return self.evidence.list(task_id)
+
+    def get_children(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        return self.store.list_children(task_id)
+
+
+class TaskPlaneRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    service: TaskPlaneService | None = None
+    authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None
+    max_body_bytes = 1_000_000
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
+        # BaseHTTPRequestHandler logs the raw request target; suppress it so
+        # attacker-controlled paths or query strings cannot leak credentials.
+        return
+
+    def _json(self) -> tuple[str | None, dict[str, Any]]:
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid content length") from exc
+        if length < 0:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid content length")
+        if length > self.max_body_bytes:
+            raise PayloadTooLargeError("payload exceeds limit")
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
+        if not raw:
+            return None, {}
+        try:
+            decoded = raw.decode("utf-8")
+            payload = json.loads(decoded)
+            if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+                raise ValidationError("JSON payload must be an object")
+            return decoded, payload
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid JSON payload") from exc
+
+    def _response(self, status: int, payload: Any) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+
+    def _authenticated_identity(self) -> str:
+        authenticator = type(self).authenticator
+        if authenticator is None:
+            raise UnauthorizedError("authentication unavailable")
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        if not header.startswith("Bearer "):
+            raise UnauthorizedError("bearer authentication required")
+        token = header[7:]
+        if not token or any(ord(ch) < 33 for ch in token):
+            raise UnauthorizedError("invalid bearer token")
+        identity = authenticator(token)
+        if not identity:
+            raise UnauthorizedError("invalid credentials")
+        return str(identity)
+
+    def _handle(self, handler):
+        try:
+            if self.service is None:
+                raise TaskPlaneHTTPError("service not configured")
+            result = handler()
+            if isinstance(result, tuple):
+                status, payload = result
+            else:
+                status, payload = 200, result
+            self._response(status, payload)
+        except TaskPlaneHTTPError as exc:
+            self._response(exc.status_code, exc.to_payload())
+        except Exception as exc:  # defensive
+            if isinstance(exc, TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+                raise
+            self._response(
+                500,
+                {"error": "internal_error", "message": "internal server error"},
+            )
+
+    def do_GET(self):  # noqa: N802
+        def route():
+            path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
+            parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
+            for part in parts[1:]:
+                if part not in {"events", "evidence", "children", "heartbeat"}:
+                    try:
+                        validate_identifier(part, "resource identifier")
+                    except ValueError as exc:
+                        raise ValidationError("invalid resource identifier") from exc
+            identity = self._authenticated_identity()
+
+            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
+                return 200, self.service.list_tasks(identity)
+            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "tasks":
+                task_id = parts[1]
+                return 200, self.service.get_task(task_id, identity)
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "events":
+                return 200, self.service.get_events(parts[1], identity)
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "evidence":
+                return 200, self.service.get_evidence(parts[1], identity)
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "children":
+                return 200, self.service.get_children(parts[1], identity)
+            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "workers":
+                return 200, self.service.list_workers(identity)
+            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers":
+                return 200, self.service.get_worker(parts[1], identity)
+            raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
+
+        self._handle(route)
+
+    def do_POST(self):  # noqa: N802
+        def route():
+            body_text, body = self._json()
+            identity = self._authenticated_identity()
+            path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
+            parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
+            headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in self.headers.items()}
+
+            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
+                issuer = body.get("issuer")
+                if issuer and (
+                    not isinstance(issuer, dict) or issuer.get("id") != identity
+                ):
+                    raise ForbiddenError("issuer identity mismatch")
+                body["issuer"] = {"type": "authenticated", "id": identity}
+                return 201, self.service.create_task(body or {}, headers.get("idempotency-key"))
+            if body.get("actor_identity") not in {None, identity}:
+                raise ForbiddenError("actor identity mismatch")
+            body["actor_identity"] = identity
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "claim":
+                return 200, self.service.claim(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
+                return 200, self.service.heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "progress":
+                return 200, self.service.progress(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "result":
+                return 200, self.service.complete(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "fail":
+                return 200, self.service.fail(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "cancel":
+                return 200, self.service.cancel(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "delegate":
+                return 200, self.service.delegate(parts[1], body or {})
+
+            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[1] == "register":
+                if (
+                    body.get("identity") != identity
+                    and identity not in self.service.policy.admin_identities
+                ):
+                    raise ForbiddenError("worker identity mismatch")
+                return 201, self.service.register_worker(body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
+                return 200, self.service.worker_heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "disable":
+                return 200, self.service.disable_worker(parts[1], body or {})
+            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "restore":
+                return 200, self.service.restore_worker(parts[1], body or {})
+            raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
+
+        self._handle(route)
+
+
+def run_server(
+    host: str,
+    port: int,
+    service: TaskPlaneService,
+    *,
+    authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None,
+):
+    handler = TaskPlaneRequestHandler
+    handler.service = service
+    handler.authenticator = authenticator
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
+    server.serve_forever()

active-runtime/app/task_plane/capabilities.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Capability matcher helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from fnmatch import fnmatch
+
+
+def _normalize_capability(capability: str) -> str:
+    return capability.strip().lower()
+
+
+def capability_matches(granted: str, required: str) -> bool:
+    granted = _normalize_capability(granted)
+    required = _normalize_capability(required)
+    if granted == required:
+        return True
+    # A granted wildcard such as "test.*" should match required "test.unit"
+    if "*" in granted:
+        return fnmatch(required, granted)
+    # A required wildcard is treated as a suffix/prefix requirement for callers.
+    if "*" in required:
+        return fnmatch(granted, required)
+    return False
+
+
+def has_capabilities(granted_caps: list[str], required_caps: list[str]) -> bool:
+    granted = [_normalize_capability(c) for c in granted_caps]
+    for required in required_caps:
+        required = _normalize_capability(required)
+        if not any(capability_matches(g, required) for g in granted):
+            return False
+    return True
+
+
+def normalize_capabilities(caps: list[str]) -> list[str]:
+    return sorted({_normalize_capability(cap) for cap in caps})

active-runtime/app/task_plane/delegation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""Delegation guardrails."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import ConflictError, ForbiddenError, NotFoundError
+from .models import Budget, TaskPlan, TaskRecord
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class DelegationEngine:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def can_delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan) -> bool:
+        parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
+        if parent.status == "COMPLETED":
+            raise ConflictError("cannot delegate completed task")
+        if parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth <= 0:
+            raise ConflictError("max delegation depth not configured")
+
+        depth = self._depth(parent_id)
+        if depth >= parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth:
+            raise ConflictError("max delegation depth reached")
+
+        if child_plan.parent_task_id not in {None, parent_id}:
+            raise ConflictError("delegation parent mismatch")
+        current = parent_id
+        while current:
+            if child_plan.task_id and current == child_plan.task_id:
+                raise ConflictError("delegation cycle")
+            current = self.store.parent_of(current)
+        return True
+
+    def delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan, *, caller: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        self.can_delegate(parent_id, child_plan)
+        parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
+        if child_plan.required_capabilities and not set(child_plan.required_capabilities).issubset(
+            set(parent.task_plan.required_capabilities or [])
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("child capabilities exceed parent constraints")
+        risk_rank = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
+        if risk_rank.get(child_plan.risk, 99) > risk_rank.get(parent.task_plan.risk, -1):
+            raise ForbiddenError("child risk exceeds parent constraints")
+        child_plan.parent_task_id = parent_id
+        child_plan.correlation_id = parent.task_plan.correlation_id or parent.task_id
+        child_plan.preferred_workers = parent.task_plan.preferred_workers
+        child_plan.max_delegation_depth = min(
+            child_plan.max_delegation_depth,
+            parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth,
+        )
+        child_plan.approval_policy = parent.task_plan.approval_policy
+
+        parent_budget = self.store.get_task_budget(parent_id)
+        required = Budget()
+        for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
+            available = getattr(parent_budget, name)
+            requested = getattr(child_plan.budgets, name)
+            if name == "attempts" and requested is None:
+                requested = 1
+            if available is not None:
+                requested = 0 if requested is None else requested
+                if requested > available:
+                    raise ConflictError(f"budget exceeded for {name}")
+                setattr(child_plan.budgets, name, requested)
+            setattr(required, name, requested)
+
+        # A retried identical delegation is a read, not a second budget charge.
+        if child_plan.task_id:
+            try:
+                existing = self.store.get_task(child_plan.task_id)
+            except NotFoundError:
+                existing = None
+            if existing is not None:
+                if (
+                    existing.task_plan.parent_task_id == parent_id
+                    and existing.task_plan.operation_digest()
+                    == child_plan.operation_digest()
+                ):
+                    return existing
+                raise ConflictError("delegation task_id conflict")
+
+        return self.store.delegate_task_with_budget_and_events(
+            parent_id, child_plan, caller=caller
+        )
+
+    def _depth(self, task_id: str) -> int:
+        return self.store._compute_depth(task_id)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/errors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+"""Error types for task plane operations."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+class TaskPlaneError(Exception):
+    """Base exception for API-compatible failures."""
+
+    status_code = 500
+    error_code = "task_plane_error"
+
+    def __init__(self, message: str, *, code: str | None = None, details: dict | None = None):
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.message = message
+        self.details = details or {}
+        if code:
+            self.error_code = code
+
+    def to_payload(self) -> dict:
+        return {"error": self.error_code, "message": self.message, "details": self.details}
+
+
+class TaskPlaneHTTPError(TaskPlaneError):
+    """Base class with explicit HTTP status."""
+
+    status_code = 500
+
+
+class ValidationError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 400
+    error_code = "validation_error"
+
+
+class UnauthorizedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 401
+    error_code = "unauthorized"
+
+
+class ForbiddenError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 403
+    error_code = "forbidden"
+
+
+class NotFoundError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 404
+    error_code = "not_found"
+
+
+class ConflictError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 409
+    error_code = "conflict"
+
+
+class PayloadTooLargeError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 413
+    error_code = "payload_too_large"
+
+
+class FailedDependencyError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 424
+    error_code = "failed_dependency"
+
+
+class LockedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 423
+    error_code = "locked"
+
+
+class ServiceUnavailableError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
+    status_code = 503
+    error_code = "service_unavailable"

active-runtime/app/task_plane/events.py

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+"""CloudEvents-compatible event envelope and durable outbox helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Callable, Protocol
+
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+@dataclass
+class CloudEvent:
+    specversion: str = "1.0"
+    id: str = ""
+    type: str = ""
+    source: str = "spiffe://aios/task-plane"
+    subject: str = ""
+    datacontenttype: str = "application/json"
+    data: dict | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def time(self) -> str:
+        return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+    def asdict(self) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "specversion": self.specversion,
+            "id": self.id,
+            "type": self.type,
+            "source": self.source,
+            "subject": self.subject,
+            "time": self.time,
+            "datacontenttype": self.datacontenttype,
+            "data": self.data or {},
+        }
+
+
+NOT_DELIVERED = "NOT_DELIVERED"
+DELIVERED = "DELIVERED"
+FAILED_DELIVERY = "FAILED"
+
+
+class NotificationAdapter(Protocol):
+    name: str
+
+    def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
+        """Return a provider receipt, or None when delivery is unconfirmed."""
+
+
+class CallbackNotificationAdapter:
+    """Adapter seam for webhook, NATS, GPT, dashboard, and WeChat transports."""
+
+    def __init__(self, name: str, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        self.name = name
+        self._callback = callback
+
+    def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
+        return self._callback(envelope)
+
+
+class WebhookAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("webhook", callback)
+
+
+class NatsJetStreamAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("nats-jetstream", callback)
+
+
+class GPTResultCallbackAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("gpt-result-callback", callback)
+
+
+class DashboardAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("dashboard", callback)
+
+
+class WeChatGatewayAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
+    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
+        super().__init__("wechat-gateway", callback)
+
+
+class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def dispatch(self, message_id: str, adapter: NotificationAdapter) -> dict:
+        row = self.store.get_outbox_message(message_id)
+        import json
+
+        envelope = json.loads(row["payload"])
+        try:
+            receipt = adapter.deliver(envelope)
+        except Exception:
+            return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
+                message_id,
+                receipt=None,
+                error=f"{adapter.name} delivery failed",
+            )
+        return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
+            message_id,
+            receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
+            error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
+        )

active-runtime/app/task_plane/evidence.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+"""Evidence helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+def evidence_digest(payload: dict) -> str:
+    body = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+    return hashlib.sha256(body.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+class EvidenceService:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def add(self, task_id: str, kind: str, payload: dict, worker_identity: str) -> str:
+        return self.store.add_evidence(task_id, kind, payload, worker_identity)
+
+    def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
+        return self.store.list_evidence(task_id)
+
+    def verify(self, task_id: str, required_kinds: list[str]) -> bool:
+        evidences = self.list(task_id)
+        observed = {e["kind"] for e in evidences}
+        return set(required_kinds).issubset(
+            observed
+        ) and self.store.verify_evidence_integrity(task_id)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/journal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+"""Event journaling helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import ValidationError
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class TaskJournal:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def append(self, task_id: str, event_type: str, data: dict, *, subject: str | None = None) -> None:
+        if not event_type:
+            raise ValidationError("event_type required")
+        self.store.append_event(task_id, event_type, data, subject=subject)
+
+    def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
+        return self.store.list_events(task_id)
+
+    def check_chain(self, task_id: str) -> bool:
+        return self.store.verify_event_chain(task_id)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/lease.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Claim and lease management helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .errors import LockedError
+from .models import ProbeEvidence
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class LeaseManager:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def claim(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, worker_identity: str, lease_seconds: int, expected_revision: int, operation_digest: str):
+        return self.store.claim_task(task_id, worker_id, worker_identity, lease_seconds, expected_revision, operation_digest)
+
+    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, lease_seconds: int):
+        claim = self.store.heartbeat_claim(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
+        return claim
+
+    def probe(self, claim_id: str):
+        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
+        if claim.status != "ACTIVE":
+            raise LockedError("claim not active")
+        return claim
+
+    def recover(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, probe: ProbeEvidence):
+        return self.store.recover_expired_claim(
+            task_id,
+            claim_id,
+            probe,
+        )

active-runtime/app/task_plane/models.py

@@ -0,0 +1,829 @@
+"""Core data models for the task plane."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import time
+import uuid
+import urllib.parse
+from enum import StrEnum
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any
+
+
+SENSITIVE_KEYS = {
+    "secret",
+    "password",
+    "token",
+    "api_key",
+    "access_token",
+    "refresh_token",
+    "authorization",
+    "private_key",
+    "client_secret",
+    "credential",
+}
+IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}")
+TYPE_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}")
+RISK_LEVELS = {"low", "medium", "high"}
+DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS = {
+    "public",
+    "internal",
+    "confidential",
+    "credential-secret",
+}
+SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(r"(?i)\bAuthorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|secret)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
+    re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\b"),
+    re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
+    re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+)
+TASK_PLAN_KEYS = {
+    "schema_version",
+    "task_id",
+    "task_type",
+    "issuer",
+    "intent",
+    "required_capabilities",
+    "preferred_workers",
+    "risk",
+    "approval_policy",
+    "dependencies",
+    "max_delegation_depth",
+    "budgets",
+    "evidence_requirements",
+    "parent_task_id",
+    "correlation_id",
+    "metadata",
+    "data_classification",
+    "execution_zone",
+    "network_policy",
+    "logging_policy",
+    "allowed_input_paths",
+    "allowed_output_paths",
+    "output_policy",
+}
+
+
+def _now_ts() -> float:
+    return time.time()
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def compute_sha256_hex(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def contains_secret_text(value: Any) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS)
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value.values())
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value)
+    return False
+
+
+def validate_relative_paths(values: Any, name: str) -> list[str]:
+    paths = _normalize_list(values)
+    for value in paths:
+        decoded = urllib.parse.unquote(value)
+        parts = value.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
+        if (
+            decoded != value
+            or "\\" in value
+            or value.startswith("/")
+            or re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", value)
+            or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
+        ):
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return paths
+
+
+def validate_identifier(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "")
+    if (
+        not IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text)
+        or urllib.parse.unquote(text) != text
+        or any(ord(ch) < 32 or ord(ch) == 127 for ch in text)
+    ):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return text
+
+
+def validate_type(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
+    text = str(value or "")
+    if not TYPE_RE.fullmatch(text):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
+    return text
+
+
+def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        redacted = {}
+        for key, inner in value.items():
+            lowered = str(key).lower()
+            if lowered in SENSITIVE_KEYS or lowered.endswith(
+                ("_password", "_secret", "_access_token", "_refresh_token", "_private_key")
+            ):
+                redacted[key] = "[REDACTED]"
+            else:
+                redacted[key] = redact_value(inner)
+        return redacted
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, tuple):
+        return tuple(redact_value(v) for v in value)
+    return value
+
+
+class TaskStateTransitionError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+class TaskStatus(StrEnum):
+    CREATED = "CREATED"
+    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
+    CLAIMED = "CLAIMED"
+    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
+    WAITING_CHILD = "WAITING_CHILD"
+    VERIFYING = "VERIFYING"
+    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
+    FAILED_RECOVERABLE = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
+    FAILED_FINAL = "FAILED_FINAL"
+    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
+    MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+
+
+TASK_STATES = {
+    status.value for status in TaskStatus
+}
+
+
+TASK_NEXT_STATES = {
+    "CREATED": {"QUEUED", "CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"},
+    "QUEUED": {"CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL"},
+    "CLAIMED": {"RUNNING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "RUNNING": {"VERIFYING", "WAITING_CHILD", "COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "WAITING_CHILD": {"RUNNING", "VERIFYING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "VERIFYING": {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
+    "COMPLETED": set(),
+    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE": {"CLAIMED", "RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
+    "FAILED_FINAL": set(),
+    "CANCELLED": set(),
+    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED": {"RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
+}
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Budget:
+    time_seconds: int | None = None
+    attempts: int | None = None
+    tokens: int | None = None
+    cost: float | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "Budget":
+        if not data:
+            return cls()
+        if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) - {
+            "time_seconds",
+            "attempts",
+            "tokens",
+            "cost",
+        }:
+            raise ValueError("invalid budget")
+        for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
+            value = data.get(name)
+            if value is not None:
+                try:
+                    if float(value) < 0:
+                        raise ValueError("budget values must be non-negative")
+                except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                    raise ValueError("invalid budget value") from exc
+        return cls(
+            time_seconds=_to_positive_int(data.get("time_seconds")),
+            attempts=_to_positive_int(data.get("attempts")),
+            tokens=_to_positive_int(data.get("tokens")),
+            cost=_to_float(data.get("cost")),
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "time_seconds": self.time_seconds,
+            "attempts": self.attempts,
+            "tokens": self.tokens,
+            "cost": self.cost,
+        }
+
+    def merge(self, other: "Budget") -> "Budget":
+        return Budget(
+            time_seconds=_first_non_none(self.time_seconds, other.time_seconds),
+            attempts=_first_non_none(self.attempts, other.attempts),
+            tokens=_first_non_none(self.tokens, other.tokens),
+            cost=_first_non_none(self.cost, other.cost),
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TaskPlan:
+    schema_version: int = 1
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    task_type: str = "code.change"
+    issuer: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    intent: str | None = None
+    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    preferred_workers: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    risk: str = "medium"
+    approval_policy: str = "patch-only"
+    dependencies: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    max_delegation_depth: int = 5
+    budgets: Budget = field(default_factory=Budget)
+    evidence_requirements: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    parent_task_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    data_classification: str = "internal"
+    execution_zone: str = "isolated-development"
+    network_policy: str = "controlled"
+    logging_policy: str = "redacted"
+    allowed_input_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    allowed_output_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    output_policy: str = "standard"
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "TaskPlan":
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            raise ValueError("task plan payload must be an object")
+        unknown = set(data) - TASK_PLAN_KEYS
+        if unknown:
+            raise ValueError("unknown task plan fields")
+        if "task_id" not in data or data["task_id"] is None:
+            data = dict(data)
+            data["task_id"] = f"task-{uuid.uuid4()}"
+        risk = str(data.get("risk", "medium"))
+        if risk not in RISK_LEVELS:
+            raise ValueError("invalid risk")
+        issuer = data.get("issuer", {})
+        if not isinstance(issuer, dict):
+            raise ValueError("issuer must be an object")
+        schema_version = int(data.get("schema_version", 1))
+        if schema_version != 1:
+            raise ValueError("unsupported schema_version")
+        max_depth = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_delegation_depth"), default=5)
+        if max_depth is None or max_depth > 32:
+            raise ValueError("invalid max_delegation_depth")
+        classification = str(data.get("data_classification", "internal"))
+        if classification not in DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS:
+            raise ValueError("invalid data_classification")
+        execution_zone = validate_type(
+            data.get("execution_zone", "isolated-development"), "execution_zone"
+        )
+        network_policy = validate_type(
+            data.get("network_policy", "controlled"), "network_policy"
+        )
+        logging_policy = validate_type(
+            data.get("logging_policy", "redacted"), "logging_policy"
+        )
+        output_policy = validate_type(
+            data.get("output_policy", "standard"), "output_policy"
+        )
+        if contains_secret_text(
+            {
+                "intent": data.get("intent"),
+                "metadata": data.get("metadata", {}),
+            }
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("task content contains secret material")
+        if classification == "credential-secret":
+            if execution_zone != "secure-file-transformer":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires secure-file-transformer")
+            if network_policy != "denied":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires network denied")
+            if logging_policy != "metadata-only":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires metadata-only logging")
+            if output_policy != "hash-count-status-only":
+                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires restricted output")
+        return cls(
+            schema_version=schema_version,
+            task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
+            task_type=validate_type(data.get("task_type", "code.change"), "task_type"),
+            issuer=issuer,
+            intent=data.get("intent"),
+            required_capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("required_capabilities", [])),
+            preferred_workers=_normalize_list(data.get("preferred_workers", [])),
+            risk=risk,
+            approval_policy=validate_type(
+                data.get("approval_policy", "patch-only"), "approval_policy"
+            ),
+            dependencies=_normalize_list(data.get("dependencies", [])),
+            max_delegation_depth=max_depth,
+            budgets=Budget.from_dict(data.get("budgets")),
+            evidence_requirements=_normalize_list(data.get("evidence_requirements", [])),
+            parent_task_id=data.get("parent_task_id"),
+            correlation_id=data.get("correlation_id"),
+            metadata=data.get("metadata", {}) if isinstance(data.get("metadata", {}), dict) else {},
+            data_classification=classification,
+            execution_zone=execution_zone,
+            network_policy=network_policy,
+            logging_policy=logging_policy,
+            allowed_input_paths=validate_relative_paths(
+                data.get("allowed_input_paths", []), "allowed_input_paths"
+            ),
+            allowed_output_paths=validate_relative_paths(
+                data.get("allowed_output_paths", []), "allowed_output_paths"
+            ),
+            output_policy=output_policy,
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self, *, redact: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "task_type": self.task_type,
+            "issuer": self.issuer,
+            "intent": self.intent,
+            "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),
+            "preferred_workers": list(self.preferred_workers),
+            "risk": self.risk,
+            "approval_policy": self.approval_policy,
+            "dependencies": list(self.dependencies),
+            "max_delegation_depth": self.max_delegation_depth,
+            "budgets": self.budgets.to_dict(),
+            "evidence_requirements": list(self.evidence_requirements),
+            "parent_task_id": self.parent_task_id,
+            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "metadata": dict(self.metadata),
+            "data_classification": self.data_classification,
+            "execution_zone": self.execution_zone,
+            "network_policy": self.network_policy,
+            "logging_policy": self.logging_policy,
+            "allowed_input_paths": list(self.allowed_input_paths),
+            "allowed_output_paths": list(self.allowed_output_paths),
+            "output_policy": self.output_policy,
+        }
+        if redact:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+    def operation_digest(self) -> str:
+        return compute_sha256_hex(self.to_dict())
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TaskRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    status: str
+    revision: int
+    task_plan: TaskPlan
+    created_at: float
+    updated_at: float
+    root_task_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str | None = None
+    failure_reason: str | None = None
+
+    def with_status(self, status: str) -> "TaskRecord":
+        allowed = TASK_NEXT_STATES.get(self.status, set())
+        if status != self.status and (not allowed and self.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}):
+            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
+        if status not in TASK_STATES:
+            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Invalid status {status}")
+        if status != self.status and self.status in TASK_NEXT_STATES and status not in TASK_NEXT_STATES[self.status]:
+            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
+        return TaskRecord(
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            status=status,
+            revision=self.revision + 1,
+            task_plan=self.task_plan,
+            created_at=self.created_at,
+            updated_at=_now_ts(),
+            root_task_id=self.root_task_id,
+            idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
+            failure_reason=self.failure_reason,
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self, *, include_task=True, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "revision": self.revision,
+            "root_task_id": self.root_task_id,
+            "parent_task_id": self.task_plan.parent_task_id,
+            "created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at),
+            "updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at),
+            "failure_reason": self.failure_reason,
+        }
+        if include_task:
+            payload["plan"] = self.task_plan.to_dict(redact=redact_payload)
+        if self.idempotency_key:
+            payload["idempotency_key"] = self.idempotency_key
+        return payload
+
+
+@dataclass
+class WorkerRegistration:
+    worker_id: str
+    worker_type: str
+    identity: str
+    capabilities: list[str]
+    trust_zone: str
+    max_concurrency: int
+    heartbeat_interval_seconds: int
+    supported_protocols: list[str]
+    registered_at: float
+    last_heartbeat: float
+    status: str = "active"
+    disabled: bool = False
+    owner_identity: str = ""
+    registration_revision: int = 1
+    registration_policy: str = "self"
+    created_at: float = 0.0
+    updated_at: float = 0.0
+    disabled_reason: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any]) -> "WorkerRegistration":
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            raise ValueError("worker registration payload must be an object")
+        now = _now_ts()
+        worker_id = validate_identifier(data.get("worker_id"), "worker_id")
+        worker_type = validate_type(data.get("worker_type"), "worker_type")
+        identity = str(data.get("identity") or "").strip()
+        if not identity or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in identity):
+            raise ValueError("invalid identity")
+        max_concurrency = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_concurrency"), default=1)
+        heartbeat_interval = _to_positive_int(
+            data.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds"), default=15
+        )
+        if not max_concurrency:
+            raise ValueError("max_concurrency must be positive")
+        if not heartbeat_interval:
+            raise ValueError("heartbeat_interval_seconds must be positive")
+        return cls(
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            worker_type=worker_type,
+            identity=identity,
+            capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("capabilities", [])),
+            trust_zone=str(data.get("trust_zone") or "default"),
+            max_concurrency=max_concurrency,
+            heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval,
+            supported_protocols=_normalize_list(
+                data.get("supported_protocols", ["aios-task-v1"])
+            ),
+            registered_at=float(data.get("registered_at") or now),
+            last_heartbeat=float(data.get("last_heartbeat") or now),
+            status=str(data.get("status") or "active"),
+            disabled=bool(data.get("disabled", False)),
+            owner_identity=str(data.get("owner_identity") or identity),
+            registration_revision=int(data.get("registration_revision") or 1),
+            registration_policy=str(data.get("registration_policy") or "self"),
+            created_at=float(data.get("created_at") or data.get("registered_at") or now),
+            updated_at=float(data.get("updated_at") or now),
+            disabled_reason=data.get("disabled_reason"),
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "worker_type": self.worker_type,
+            "identity": self.identity,
+            "capabilities": list(self.capabilities),
+            "trust_zone": self.trust_zone,
+            "max_concurrency": self.max_concurrency,
+            "heartbeat_interval_seconds": self.heartbeat_interval_seconds,
+            "supported_protocols": list(self.supported_protocols),
+            "registered_at": _fmt_ts(self.registered_at),
+            "last_heartbeat": _fmt_ts(self.last_heartbeat),
+            "status": self.status,
+            "disabled": self.disabled,
+            "owner_identity": self.owner_identity,
+            "registration_revision": self.registration_revision,
+            "registration_policy": self.registration_policy,
+            "created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at or self.registered_at),
+            "updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at or self.last_heartbeat),
+            "disabled_reason": self.disabled_reason,
+        }
+        if redact_payload:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EvidenceEnvelope:
+    schema_version: int
+    evidence_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    claim_id: str
+    kind: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    payload: dict[str, Any]
+    created_at: float
+    previous_evidence_hash: str
+    evidence_digest: str
+    signature: str | None = None
+    attestation_ref: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(
+        cls,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        claim_id: str,
+        kind: str,
+        worker_identity: str,
+        payload: dict[str, Any],
+        previous_evidence_hash: str,
+        signature: str | None = None,
+        attestation_ref: str | None = None,
+        evidence_id: str | None = None,
+        created_at: float | None = None,
+    ) -> "EvidenceEnvelope":
+        envelope = cls(
+            schema_version=1,
+            evidence_id=evidence_id or f"evd-{uuid.uuid4()}",
+            task_id=validate_identifier(task_id, "task_id"),
+            claim_id=validate_identifier(claim_id, "claim_id"),
+            kind=validate_type(kind, "evidence kind"),
+            worker_identity=str(worker_identity),
+            payload=redact_value(payload),
+            created_at=float(created_at or _now_ts()),
+            previous_evidence_hash=str(previous_evidence_hash or ""),
+            evidence_digest="",
+            signature=signature,
+            attestation_ref=attestation_ref,
+        )
+        return dataclass_replace(
+            envelope, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(envelope.digest_payload())
+        )
+
+    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "evidence_id": self.evidence_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "payload": self.payload,
+            "created_at": self.created_at,
+            "previous_evidence_hash": self.previous_evidence_hash,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+        }
+
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        *,
+        expected_task_id: str,
+        expected_claim_id: str,
+        expected_previous_hash: str,
+        attestation_verifier: Any = None,
+    ) -> bool:
+        if (
+            self.schema_version != 1
+            or self.task_id != expected_task_id
+            or self.claim_id != expected_claim_id
+            or self.previous_evidence_hash != expected_previous_hash
+            or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
+        ):
+            return False
+        if self.signature or self.attestation_ref:
+            return True if attestation_verifier is None else bool(attestation_verifier(self))
+        return True
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            **self.digest_payload(),
+            "evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
+            "signature": self.signature,
+        }
+
+
+class ProbeOutcome(StrEnum):
+    NOT_APPLIED = "NOT_APPLIED"
+    APPLIED_VERIFIED = "APPLIED_VERIFIED"
+    INDETERMINATE = "INDETERMINATE"
+    CONFLICT = "CONFLICT"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProbeEvidence:
+    schema_version: int
+    probe_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    claim_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    operation_digest: str
+    outcome: ProbeOutcome
+    observed_at: float
+    expires_at: float
+    probe_executor_identity: str
+    evidence_digest: str
+    signature: str | None = None
+    attestation_ref: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def create(cls, **data: Any) -> "ProbeEvidence":
+        outcome = data["outcome"]
+        if not isinstance(outcome, ProbeOutcome):
+            outcome = ProbeOutcome(str(outcome))
+        probe = cls(
+            schema_version=1,
+            probe_id=data.get("probe_id") or f"probe-{uuid.uuid4()}",
+            task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
+            claim_id=validate_identifier(data["claim_id"], "claim_id"),
+            worker_id=validate_identifier(data["worker_id"], "worker_id"),
+            worker_identity=str(data["worker_identity"]),
+            operation_digest=str(data["operation_digest"]),
+            outcome=outcome,
+            observed_at=float(data["observed_at"]),
+            expires_at=float(data["expires_at"]),
+            probe_executor_identity=str(data["probe_executor_identity"]),
+            evidence_digest="",
+            signature=data.get("signature"),
+            attestation_ref=data.get("attestation_ref"),
+        )
+        return dataclass_replace(
+            probe, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(probe.digest_payload())
+        )
+
+    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            "probe_id": self.probe_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "outcome": self.outcome.value,
+            "observed_at": self.observed_at,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            "probe_executor_identity": self.probe_executor_identity,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+        }
+
+    def verify(self, *, now: float, attestation_verifier: Any) -> bool:
+        if (
+            self.schema_version != 1
+            or self.expires_at <= now
+            or self.observed_at > now
+            or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
+            or not (self.signature or self.attestation_ref)
+        ):
+            return False
+        return bool(attestation_verifier and attestation_verifier(self))
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            **self.digest_payload(),
+            "evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
+            "signature": self.signature,
+        }
+
+
+def dataclass_replace(value: Any, **changes: Any) -> Any:
+    from dataclasses import replace
+
+    return replace(value, **changes)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class WorkerClaim:
+    claim_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    claimed_at: float
+    lease_until: float
+    attempt: int
+    task_revision: int
+    operation_digest: str
+    status: str = "ACTIVE"
+
+    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "claimed_at": _fmt_ts(self.claimed_at),
+            "lease_until": _fmt_ts(self.lease_until),
+            "attempt": self.attempt,
+            "task_revision": self.task_revision,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "status": self.status,
+        }
+        if redact_payload:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ResultEnvelope:
+    task_id: str
+    claim_id: str
+    worker_identity: str
+    status: str
+    outputs: list[dict[str, Any]]
+    evidence: list[dict[str, Any]]
+    started_at: str
+    completed_at: str
+    result_digest: str | None = None
+    signature: str | None = None
+    attestation_ref: str | None = None
+    operation_digest: str | None = None
+    trust_status: str = "untrusted_shadow_result"
+
+    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "outputs": self.outputs,
+            "evidence": self.evidence,
+            "started_at": self.started_at,
+            "completed_at": self.completed_at,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+        }
+
+    def computed_digest(self) -> str:
+        return compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
+
+    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "outputs": self.outputs,
+            "evidence": self.evidence,
+            "started_at": self.started_at,
+            "completed_at": self.completed_at,
+            "result_digest": self.result_digest,
+            "signature": self.signature,
+            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
+            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
+            "trust_status": self.trust_status,
+        }
+        if redact_payload:
+            payload = redact_value(payload)
+        return payload
+
+
+def _normalize_list(value: Any) -> list[str]:
+    if not isinstance(value, list):
+        raise ValueError("expected list")
+    if len(value) > 128 or any(
+        not isinstance(v, str)
+        or not v
+        or len(v) > 256
+        or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in v)
+        for v in value
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("invalid list item")
+    return list(value)
+
+
+def _to_positive_int(value: Any, default: int | None = None) -> int | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    try:
+        number = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return default
+    return number if number >= 0 else default
+
+
+def _to_float(value: Any) -> float | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _first_non_none(primary: Any, fallback: Any) -> Any:
+    if primary is not None:
+        return primary
+    return fallback
+
+
+def iso8601_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _fmt_ts(value: float | None) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    return datetime.fromtimestamp(value, tz=timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")

active-runtime/app/task_plane/policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+"""Policy and verification logic (fail-closed)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Callable
+
+from .errors import ForbiddenError, LockedError
+from .models import ProbeEvidence, ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
+
+
+RISK_RANK = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
+READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS = frozenset(
+    {"claim", "result", "fail", "progress", "heartbeat"}
+)
+ALL_ACTION_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
+    {
+        "task.creator",
+        "worker.self_register",
+        "worker.admin",
+        "task.claim",
+        "task.cancel",
+        "task.delegate",
+        "task.read",
+        "task.audit",
+    }
+)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PolicyDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    reason: str = ""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ReadonlyWorkerProfile:
+    """A narrowly-scoped identity allowed to process safe Shadow tasks only."""
+
+    worker_id: str
+    identity: str
+    capabilities: frozenset[str]
+    task_types: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"code.review", "test.execute"})
+
+    def permits_task(self, task: TaskRecord) -> bool:
+        plan = task.task_plan
+        if plan.task_type not in self.task_types or plan.risk != "low":
+            return False
+        if plan.data_classification not in {"public", "internal"}:
+            return False
+        if plan.metadata.get("production_side_effects") is not False:
+            return False
+        return set(plan.required_capabilities).issubset(self.capabilities)
+
+
+class IdentityVerifier:
+    def __init__(self, trusted_identities: set[str] | None = None):
+        self.trusted_identities = trusted_identities
+
+    def verify(self, identity: str) -> bool:
+        if self.trusted_identities is None:
+            return True
+        return identity in self.trusted_identities
+
+
+class EvidenceVerifier:
+    def __init__(self, mandatory: list[str] | None = None):
+        self.mandatory = set(mandatory or [])
+
+    def verify(self, task: TaskRecord, evidences: list[dict]) -> PolicyDecision:
+        required = set(task.task_plan.evidence_requirements or [])
+        if not required and not self.mandatory:
+            return PolicyDecision(True)
+        observed = {e.get("kind") for e in evidences}
+        missing = required.union(self.mandatory) - observed
+        if missing:
+            return PolicyDecision(False, f"missing evidence: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}")
+        return PolicyDecision(True)
+
+
+class PolicyEngine:
+    """
+    Fail-closed policy engine with minimal but explicit decisions.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        identity_verifier: IdentityVerifier | None = None,
+        evidence_verifier: EvidenceVerifier | None = None,
+        execution_enabled: bool = False,
+        max_risk: str = "medium",
+        result_signature_verifier: Callable[[ResultEnvelope], bool] | None = None,
+        probe_attestation_verifier: Callable[[ProbeEvidence], bool] | None = None,
+        identity_capabilities: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None,
+        admin_identities: set[str] | None = None,
+        readonly_worker_execution_enabled: bool = False,
+        readonly_worker_profiles: list[ReadonlyWorkerProfile] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if max_risk not in RISK_RANK:
+            raise ValueError("invalid max_risk")
+        self.identity_verifier = identity_verifier or IdentityVerifier()
+        self.evidence_verifier = evidence_verifier or EvidenceVerifier()
+        self.execution_enabled = execution_enabled
+        self.max_risk = max_risk
+        self.result_signature_verifier = result_signature_verifier
+        self.probe_attestation_verifier = probe_attestation_verifier
+        self.identity_capabilities = {
+            identity: set(capabilities)
+            for identity, capabilities in (identity_capabilities or {}).items()
+        }
+        self.admin_identities = set(admin_identities or ())
+        self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled = readonly_worker_execution_enabled
+        self.readonly_worker_profiles = {
+            profile.identity: profile for profile in (readonly_worker_profiles or [])
+        }
+
+    def _readonly_worker_allows(
+        self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None
+    ) -> bool:
+        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
+        return bool(
+            self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled
+            and action in READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS
+            and profile is not None
+            and (task is None or profile.permits_task(task))
+        )
+
+    def assert_readonly_worker_binding(self, actor: str, worker_id: str) -> None:
+        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
+        if profile is not None and profile.worker_id != worker_id:
+            raise ForbiddenError("worker identity binding mismatch")
+
+    def assert_readonly_worker_registration(self, actor: str, payload: dict) -> None:
+        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
+        if profile is None:
+            return
+        if (
+            str(payload.get("worker_id") or "") != profile.worker_id
+            or str(payload.get("identity") or "") != profile.identity
+            or set(payload.get("capabilities") or []) != set(profile.capabilities)
+            or str(payload.get("trust_zone") or "") != "isolated-review"
+            or int(payload.get("max_concurrency") or 0) != 1
+            or int(payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds") or 0) != 15
+        ):
+            raise ForbiddenError("readonly worker registration mismatch")
+
+    def verify_result(
+        self, result: ResultEnvelope, task: TaskRecord | None = None
+    ) -> PolicyDecision:
+        computed = result.computed_digest()
+        if result.result_digest and result.result_digest != computed:
+            return PolicyDecision(False, "result digest mismatch")
+        sensitive = bool(
+            task
+            and (
+                task.task_plan.data_classification
+                in {"confidential", "credential-secret"}
+                or any(
+                    capability.startswith(
+                        ("code.write", "deploy", "secret", "production")
+                    )
+                    for capability in task.task_plan.required_capabilities
+                )
+            )
+        )
+        if sensitive and not (result.signature or result.attestation_ref):
+            return PolicyDecision(False, "trusted result proof required")
+        if result.signature is not None or result.attestation_ref is not None:
+            if self.result_signature_verifier is None:
+                return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature verifier unavailable")
+            if not self.result_signature_verifier(result):
+                return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature invalid")
+            result.trust_status = "trusted_result"
+        else:
+            result.trust_status = "untrusted_shadow_result"
+        return PolicyDecision(True)
+
+    def authorize(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None) -> PolicyDecision:
+        context = context or {}
+        if not self.identity_verifier.verify(actor):
+            return PolicyDecision(False, "identity untrusted")
+
+        action_capabilities = {
+            "create": "task.creator",
+            "read": "task.read",
+            "audit": "task.audit",
+            "claim": "task.claim",
+            "result": "task.claim",
+            "fail": "task.claim",
+            "progress": "task.claim",
+            "heartbeat": "task.claim",
+            "cancel": "task.cancel",
+            "delegate": "task.delegate",
+            "worker.register": "worker.self_register",
+            "worker.admin": "worker.admin",
+        }
+        required_capability = action_capabilities.get(action)
+        if required_capability:
+            granted = set(
+                self.identity_capabilities.get(
+                    actor, self.identity_capabilities.get("*", set())
+                )
+            )
+            if required_capability not in granted:
+                return PolicyDecision(False, f"action {action} not permitted")
+
+        if action in {"claim", "result", "fail", "cancel", "progress", "delegate", "heartbeat"} and not self.execution_enabled:
+            if not self._readonly_worker_allows(action, actor, task):
+                return PolicyDecision(False, "execution disabled")
+
+        if action == "delegate" and task and task.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}:
+            risk = str(context.get("risk", task.task_plan.risk))
+            if RISK_RANK.get(risk, 2) > RISK_RANK.get(self.max_risk, 1):
+                return PolicyDecision(False, f"risk {risk} exceeds policy")
+
+        return PolicyDecision(True)
+
+    def assert_allowed(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None):
+        decision = self.authorize(action, actor, task, context=context)
+        if not decision.allowed:
+            if decision.reason == "identity untrusted":
+                raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)
+            if decision.reason == "execution disabled":
+                raise LockedError("execution disabled")
+            raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scheduler.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+"""Task scheduler primitives."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from .errors import NotFoundError
+from .capabilities import has_capabilities
+from .models import WorkerClaim
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class TaskScheduler:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def next_queued_task(self, worker_id: str):
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        tasks = sorted(
+            self.store.list_tasks(),
+            key=lambda task: (
+                -int(task.task_plan.metadata.get("priority", 0)),
+                task.created_at,
+                task.task_id,
+            ),
+        )
+        for task in tasks:
+            if task.status not in {"CREATED", "QUEUED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"}:
+                continue
+            if task.task_plan.task_type == "worker.registry.audit":
+                continue
+            if task.status == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" and not self.store.task_has_retryable_probe(
+                task.task_id
+            ):
+                continue
+            if not has_capabilities(
+                worker.capabilities, task.task_plan.required_capabilities
+            ):
+                continue
+            if any(
+                self.store.get_task(dependency).status != "COMPLETED"
+                for dependency in task.task_plan.dependencies
+            ):
+                continue
+            if (
+                task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret"
+                and worker.worker_type != "secure_file_transformer"
+                and "secure_file_transformer" not in worker.capabilities
+            ):
+                continue
+            return task
+        return None
+
+    def schedule_for_worker(self, worker_id: str, lease_seconds: int = 15) -> WorkerClaim:
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        if worker.disabled:
+            from .errors import LockedError
+
+            raise LockedError("worker disabled")
+        if time.time() > worker.last_heartbeat + (
+            worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3
+        ):
+            from .errors import LockedError
+
+            raise LockedError("worker offline")
+        task = self.next_queued_task(worker_id)
+        if task is None:
+            raise NotFoundError("no queued tasks available")
+        claim = self.store.claim_task(
+            task.task_id,
+            worker_id,
+            worker.identity,
+            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
+            expected_revision=task.revision,
+            operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
+        )
+        return claim

active-runtime/app/task_plane/worker_registry.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+"""Worker registry abstraction and read helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+
+from .capabilities import has_capabilities
+from .errors import NotFoundError
+from .models import WorkerRegistration
+from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+class WorkerRegistry:
+    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
+        self.store = store
+
+    def register(
+        self,
+        payload: dict,
+        *,
+        actor_identity: str,
+        is_admin: bool,
+        expected_revision: int | None,
+    ) -> WorkerRegistration:
+        reg = WorkerRegistration.from_dict(payload)
+        return self.store.register_worker(
+            reg,
+            actor_identity=actor_identity,
+            is_admin=is_admin,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def heartbeat(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        heartbeat_interval_seconds: int | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor_identity: str,
+        expected_revision: int | None,
+    ) -> WorkerRegistration:
+        return self.store.heartbeat_worker(
+            worker_id,
+            heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval_seconds,
+            actor_identity=actor_identity,
+            expected_revision=expected_revision,
+        )
+
+    def list(self):
+        return self.store.list_workers()
+
+    def get(self, worker_id: str) -> WorkerRegistration:
+        try:
+            return self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        except NotFoundError:
+            raise
+
+    def can_execute(self, worker_id: str, required_capabilities: list[str]) -> bool:
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        return has_capabilities(worker.capabilities, required_capabilities)
+
+    def is_online(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> bool:
+        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
+        deadline = worker.last_heartbeat + (worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3)
+        return not worker.disabled and (time.time() if now is None else now) <= deadline
+
+    def stale_workers(self, *, now: float | None = None) -> list[WorkerRegistration]:
+        current = time.time() if now is None else now
+        return [worker for worker in self.list() if not self.is_online(worker.worker_id, now=current)]

baseline/current.json

@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
 {
-  "current_baseline": "V2R1C1",
-  "previous_baseline": "V1R4C6",
-  "promoted_at": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
-  "git": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
-  "promoted_by": "chatgpt/owner-approved-governance",
-  "promotion_reason": "Register the already validated and deployed V2R1C1 production release in the central GitOps baseline Registry.",
-  "version": "V2R1C1",
-  "release_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
-  "tag_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
+  "current_baseline": "V2R1C2",
+  "previous_baseline": "V2R1C1",
+  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
+  "git": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "promoted_by": "codex/owner-approved-gitops",
+  "promotion_reason": "Owner-authorized V2R1C2 Unified Portal production release after exact tag binding, complete evidence verification, and production acceptance PASS.",
+  "version": "V2R1C2",
+  "release_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
   "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
+  "production_port": 18920,
+  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
   "constraints": {
-    "product_code_changed": false,
-    "tag_changed": false,
-    "production_redeployed": false,
-    "production_traffic_changed": false,
+    "product_code_changed": true,
+    "production_redeployed": true,
+    "production_traffic_changed": true,
+    "tag_rewritten": false,
     "force_push_allowed": false,
-    "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval": true
+    "rollback_assets_preserved": true
   }
 }

config/gitops/silent-release-policy.json

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": 4,
+  "automatic": [
+    "build",
+    "test",
+    "artifact",
+    "canary",
+    "evidence"
+  ],
+  "owner": [
+    "signed_release_plan"
+  ],
+  "forbidden": [
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_rewrite",
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "baseline_mutation",
+    "registry_mutation"
+  ],
+  "runtime_deployment": {
+    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
+    "required_capability": "runtime_switch",
+    "tag_operations_allowed": false,
+    "baseline_mutation_allowed": false,
+    "registry_mutation_allowed": false,
+    "writer_default": false,
+    "rollback_required": true
+  },
+  "tag_release": {
+    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
+    "required_capability": "tag_publish",
+    "separate_controller": true,
+    "duplicate_conflict": "fail_closed",
+    "rewrite_allowed": false,
+    "force_push_allowed": false
+  },
+  "baseline_registry_finalize": {
+    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
+    "required_capability": "baseline_registry_finalize",
+    "separate_controller": true,
+    "remote_tag_verification_required": true,
+    "gitea_api_verification_required": true,
+    "registry_baseline_consistency_required": true
+  },
+  "approval": {
+    "algorithm": "Ed25519",
+    "trust_domain": "aios.production",
+    "maximum_lifetime_seconds": 3600,
+    "release_plan_sha256_required": true,
+    "not_before_required": true,
+    "replay_protection": true,
+    "revocation_fail_closed": true,
+    "key_rotation_supported": true,
+    "capabilities": [
+      "runtime_switch",
+      "tag_publish",
+      "baseline_registry_finalize"
+    ]
+  },
+  "execution": {
+    "environment_variable": "AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED",
+    "default_enabled": false,
+    "shadow_side_effects_allowed": false,
+    "durable_saga_required": true,
+    "pre_switch_revalidation_required": true,
+    "trusted_candidate_builder_required": true,
+    "actual_plan_regeneration_required": true,
+    "startup_fail_closed_on_missing_component": true,
+    "recovery_worker_shadow_default": true,
+    "production_approval_backend_required": true,
+    "production_builder_signer": "kms-hsm-secret-manager-only",
+    "production_execution_without_backend": "unavailable"
+  },
+  "durability": {
+    "journal": "sha256-hash-chain",
+    "probe_journal": "sha256-hash-chain",
+    "exclusive_capability_claims": true,
+    "side_effect_probe_before_lease_takeover": true,
+    "side_effect_probe_before_failed_recoverable_retry": true,
+    "probe_results": [
+      "NOT_APPLIED",
+      "APPLIED_VERIFIED",
+      "INDETERMINATE",
+      "CONFLICT"
+    ],
+    "probe_operation_digest_required": true,
+    "probe_freshness_required": true,
+    "tamper_result": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
+  },
+  "tag_pending": {
+    "required_observations": [
+      "remote_git_ref",
+      "annotated_tag_object",
+      "peeled_target",
+      "gitea_api",
+      "gitea_listing",
+      "repository_identity"
+    ],
+    "indeterminate_result": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED",
+    "conflict_result": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
+    "automatic_reconciliation": false
+  }
+}

deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal production metadata.
+# No secret values belong in this file; runtime integrations use references.
+
+AIOS_V2_HOST=127.0.0.1
+AIOS_V2_PORT=18920
+AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
+AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/run-provenance.sqlite3
+AIOS_EXTERNAL_TASK_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/external-task-truth.sqlite3
+AIOS_EXECUTOR_CATALOG_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/executor-catalog.json
+AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILES=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-RELEASE.json:/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
+AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILE=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
+
+AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION=V2R1C2
+AIOS_TARGET_VERSION=V2R1C2
+AIOS_BASELINE_VERSION=V2R1C1
+AIOS_PREVIOUS_VERSION=V2R1C1
+AIOS_RELEASE_STATUS=PRODUCTION
+AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
+AIOS_RELEASE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
+AIOS_RELEASE_TAG=V2R1C2
+AIOS_RELEASE_EVIDENCE_SHA256=2e27bb73b8e6297bd3077238f73a96d697fc3c3611c601c4dc9357e5fdcd8eee
+
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_CONTRACT_VERSION=aios.openclaw.command.v2
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM=Ed25519
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_PLUGIN_VERSION=2.1.0-rc.4
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID=openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519
+AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF=AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF

deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.service

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal Production
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+Conflicts=aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
+ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app/aios_web/release_application.py
+ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios
+Group=aios
+WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_V2_PORT" = "18920"
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID" = "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24"
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_TAG" = "V2R1C2"
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_web.release_application
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=3
+TimeoutStartSec=60
+TimeoutStopSec=30
+KillSignal=SIGTERM
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
+StateDirectory=aios-v2r1c2-production
+StateDirectoryMode=0750
+UMask=0027
+LimitNOFILE=65536
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api.service

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE=/data/aios-gitops/workspace
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_DB=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitops_model.sqlite3
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_FILE=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios-v23.git
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_HOST=127.0.0.1
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_PORT=18890
 ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /data/aios-gitops/workspace/active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py

deploy/systemd/aios-governance-machine-status-producer.service

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS dormant single-owner machine-status prerequisite
+RefuseManualStop=no
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=aiman
+Group=gitops
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component machine-status-producer --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateDevices=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance

deploy/systemd/aios-governance-owner-review-adapter.service

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS dormant single-owner review adapter prerequisite
+RefuseManualStop=no
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=aiman
+Group=gitops
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component owner-review-adapter --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateDevices=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance

deploy/systemd/aios-governance-single-owner-activation.service

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS single-owner governance activation verifier
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=root
+Group=gitops
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-single-owner-governance --verify --bindings /etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json --state-root /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation --lock-path /run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation /run/aios-gitops
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+UMask=0027
+
+# Deliberately not installable. Deployment remains disabled/inactive;
+# activation is an explicit approved CLI transaction, never an always-on unit.

deploy/systemd/aios-silent-release-controller.service

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS Silent Release Shadow Controller
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aiman
+Group=gitops
+UMask=0077
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+Environment=AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
+Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/libexec/aios-silent-release-shadow/current/active-runtime/app/silent_release_execution.py --state-root /var/lib/aios-silent-release-shadow --repository /data/aios-gitops/repo.git --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18891 --poll-seconds 30
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=5
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-silent-release-shadow
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git /usr/libexec/aios-silent-release-shadow
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-single-owner-governance.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation 0750 root gitops -
+d /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation/wal 0750 root gitops -
+d /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation/receipts 0750 root gitops -
+d /run/aios-gitops 0750 root gitops -

docs/gitops/SILENT_RELEASE_CONTROLLER_DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+# AIOS Silent Release Controller Design Report
+
+状态：隔离分支实现；生产 mutation 禁止
+目标：自动准备 → 自动验证 → 单次 Owner 签名授权 → 分控制器自动执行与验收
+
+## 1. 当前痛点
+
+现有流程需要多轮人工传递 commit、tree、artifact、manifest、测试、canary、drop-in
+和回滚证据。证据在不同消息里重复抄写，容易出现：
+
+- 构建后 artifact、manifest 或 policy 已变化，但旧批准仍被使用；
+- Git、Gitea、systemd 与回滚结果由人工拼接，缺少同一一致性快照；
+- runtime switch、tag、Baseline、Registry 的授权边界不清；
+- 重启后只剩工作树内临时 JSON，无法可靠恢复；
+- approval replay、并发 writer、key revoke 和 secret inheritance 缺少统一防线。
+
+## 2. 新架构
+
+```text
+Build / Test / Canary
+        |
+        v
+ReleaseCandidate + DeploymentPlan
+        |
+        v
+ReleaseAcceptanceEngine
+        |
+        v
+READY_FOR_APPROVAL
+        |
+        v
+SignedReleasePlanApproval (Ed25519)
+        |
+        +--> runtime_switch capability
+        |       DeploymentController
+        |
+        +--> tag_publish capability
+        |       TagController
+        |
+        +--> baseline_registry_finalize capability
+                BaselineRegistryFinalizeController
+
+Durable ReleaseSagaStore + CapabilityLedger + Event Journal
+贯穿三个控制器；控制器互相不拥有对方的 mutation API。
+```
+
+一次 Owner 批准是同一个不可变 release plan 的签名，不是一个万能执行入口。三个 capability
+分别消费、分别留痕、分别幂等恢复。`force_push`、`tag_rewrite`、`direct_main_push`
+永远不是可签发 capability。
+
+## 3. 状态机
+
+```text
+PREPARING
+  -> VERIFYING
+  -> READY_FOR_APPROVAL
+  -> APPROVED
+  -> PRE_SWITCH_REVALIDATING
+  -> SWITCH_PENDING
+  -> SWITCHED
+  -> RUNTIME_VERIFYING
+  -> TAG_PENDING
+  -> TAG_VERIFIED
+  -> BASELINE_REGISTRY_PENDING
+  -> COMPLETED
+
+任一可恢复故障 -> RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED
+对象冲突       -> MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+切换后失败     -> ROLLBACK_PENDING -> ROLLED_BACK
+```
+
+状态快照使用 revision compare-and-set；事件同时写入 append-only journal。writer 崩溃后根据
+状态确定唯一恢复动作。并发控制器中只有一个 CAS winner。
+
+## 4. 数据模型
+
+### ReleaseCandidate
+
+```text
+candidate_id
+source_commit
+tree_oid
+artifact_sha256
+manifest_sha256
+tests
+canary
+rollback_ready
+git_consistency
+gitea_consistency
+approval_state
+```
+
+### DeploymentPlan
+
+```text
+service
+release_path / release_root
+dropin_path / dropin_sha256
+rollback_path / rollback_sha256
+source_commit
+artifact_sha256
+manifest_sha256
+policy_sha256
+health_contract
+sha256
+```
+
+### SignedReleasePlanApproval
+
+```text
+release_plan_id
+candidate_id
+source_commit
+tree_oid
+artifact_sha256
+manifest_sha256
+deployment_plan_sha256
+policy_sha256
+approval_plan_id
+evidence_closure_oid
+owner_approval_record_oid
+capabilities
+expires_at
+nonce
+key_id
+signature
+fingerprint
+```
+
+签名内容使用 canonical JSON，`signature` 不参与被签名字段。验证包括 Ed25519 签名、过期时间、
+公钥状态、approval revoke、candidate/plan/policy 逐字段绑定和 capability allowlist。
+
+## 5. API
+
+```text
+POST /createReleaseCandidate
+GET  /getReleaseCandidate?candidate_id=...
+GET  /getApprovalEnvelope?candidate_id=...
+POST /submitOwnerApproval
+POST /startDeployment
+GET  /getReleaseSaga?candidate_id=...
+```
+
+写接口要求 Bearer scope。`AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false` 是默认值；此时可以
+持久化 candidate、生成 approval envelope、保存经验证的 Owner approval 和读取 Saga，
+但 `/startDeployment` 只返回 `SHADOW_MODE` 与空 `side_effects`。
+
+## 6. PreSwitchValidator
+
+切换前重新收集并比较：
+
+- source commit 与 tree；
+- artifact、manifest、policy 和 deployment plan SHA-256；
+- rollback readiness；
+- local、authoritative bare 与 Gitea refs；
+- repository identity；
+- task writer/production writer 边界；
+- health contract。
+
+任一变化都抛出：
+
+```text
+APPROVAL_STALE_REAPPROVAL_REQUIRED
+```
+
+旧批准不会被“最佳努力”继续使用。
+
+## 7. systemd 防线
+
+- service 与 drop-in 均为显式 allowlist；
+- release 与 drop-in resolved path 必须位于 release root 内；
+- 拒绝普通文件被替换为 symlink，拒绝 symlink escape；
+- deployment lock 覆盖 switch、restart 和首次 health check；
+- restart 前后记录 MainPID 与 ActiveEnterTimestampMonotonic；
+- artifact、drop-in、rollback 和 manifest 均按 plan hash 复验；
+- 子进程只接收固定 allowlist 环境，不继承 token、password、credential、askpass、
+  auth socket、`LD_PRELOAD`、`PYTHONPATH` 或数据库连接串。
+
+## 8. TagController 分离
+
+TagController 必须独立完成 approval、execute、verify，并留下：
+
+```text
+evidence_closure_oid
+approval_plan_id
+repository_identity
+remote_tag_oid
+remote_peeled_target_oid
+gitea_api_tag_oid
+gitea_listing_visible
+```
+
+同名 tag 的 tag OID 或 peeled target 不同，进入
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`；自动流程不 push、不删除、不重写、不 force push。
+
+## 9. Baseline / Registry 门禁
+
+只有以下全部一致时，`baseline_registry_finalize` capability 才能完成：
+
+```text
+Registry = Baseline = remote tag = Gitea API = expected target
+```
+
+UNKNOWN、API 不可达、repository identity 不符或 listing 不可见均 fail closed。
+
+## 10. Policy as Code
+
+```text
+automatic:
+  build, test, artifact, canary, evidence
+
+owner:
+  signed_release_plan
+
+capabilities:
+  runtime_switch
+  tag_publish
+  baseline_registry_finalize
+
+forbidden:
+  force_push
+  tag_rewrite
+  direct_main_push
+  baseline_mutation
+  registry_mutation
+```
+
+最后两个 forbidden 项指“脱离受治理 finalize controller 的直接 mutation”。
+
+## 11. Security model
+
+- Ed25519 公钥 ring 支持 rotation 和 revoke，私钥不进入 runtime；
+- approval plan 可撤销，过期、未知 key、错误签名均 fail closed；
+- nonce 与 capability operation 持久化，重复相同请求幂等，不同 fingerprint 重放拒绝；
+- Saga snapshot 原子写、journal append-only、CAS 防并发 writer；
+- credential 只通过受控 reference 使用，不进入 Git、API 响应或异常；
+- 子进程环境从空集合构建，不复制 `os.environ`；
+- Shadow 模式默认开启，execution adapter 缺失时不能降级执行；
+- runtime、tag、Baseline/Registry 分属三个能力最小化控制器。
+
+## 12. Migration plan
+
+1. Shadow：生成 candidate、plan、acceptance、approval package，仅比较现有人工结果。
+2. Signed approval：接入 Owner 公钥 ring、撤销源和审计 record；仍不接生产 executor。
+3. Canary execution：使用非生产 service/release root 验证锁、PID、health、崩溃恢复和回滚。
+4. Controlled production switch：另行 Owner 授权启用 execution flag，只开放 runtime capability。
+5. Tag/finalize：分别完成 Gitea 与 Registry/Baseline 生产验收后再启用对应 capability。
+
+每个阶段均可退回上一个阶段；不开启下一能力不会影响已经启用的控制器。
+
+## 13. Rollback plan
+
+- switch 前保存旧 symlink target、PID、启动时间、artifact 与 plan fingerprint；
+- restart 或 health 任一失败进入 `ROLLBACK_PENDING`；
+- 原子恢复旧 target，只 restart 指定 allowlist service；
+- 重新验证旧 runtime commit、writer=false 与 repository identity；
+- 成功进入 `ROLLED_BACK`，失败进入 `MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`；
+- rollback 不修改 Git main、production tag、Baseline 或 Registry；
+- 保留脱敏 journal、approval fingerprint 和失败证据。
+
+## 14. 测试与外部依赖边界
+
+自动测试覆盖签名伪造、字段篡改、过期/revoke/key rotation、nonce replay、CAS race、
+崩溃恢复、artifact/policy/plan mutation、tag conflict、secret leakage、runtime without
+`.git`、rollback 和 shadow no-side-effects。
+
+本隔离实现不创建生产 KMS/key、不安装 systemd unit、不部署 Action runtime、不创建 tag，
+也不修改 Baseline/Registry。上述动作必须在单独生产批准中执行。

docs/gitops/SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_READINESS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# AIOS Silent Release Execution Readiness
+
+## Scope and stop point
+
+This change makes the controller execution-ready while deploying only a
+localhost-bound Shadow control plane. Both production gates remain false:
+
+```text
+AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+Shadow completion is evidence preparation, not a production release. It cannot
+write a production tag, switch a business runtime, or mutate Baseline/Registry.
+
+## Recovery state machine
+
+Every expired or `FAILED_RECOVERABLE` capability requires fresh, operation-bound
+probe evidence before another adapter may run:
+
+```text
+NOT_APPLIED       -> one new exclusive claim may retry
+APPLIED_VERIFIED  -> mark COMPLETED without adapter replay
+INDETERMINATE     -> RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED; no automatic writes
+CONFLICT          -> MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED; no automatic writes
+```
+
+Probe evidence binds the immutable operation digest, is freshness checked, and
+is appended to a separate SHA-256 hash-chained journal. Completion still
+requires the active claim ID. File locks and leases ensure that concurrent
+recovery workers cannot execute the same adapter.
+
+`TAG_PENDING` uses independent remote ref, annotated object, peeled target,
+Gitea API, Gitea listing, and repository identity evidence. Exact absence may
+roll back a switched runtime. Exact publication continues to finalization.
+Unavailable/divergent evidence stops at reconciliation; a different OID or
+target stops for Owner review. No branch can force, delete, or rewrite a tag.
+
+## Trusted build and approval
+
+Callers submit only an event ID and exact source commit. Test, canary, artifact,
+manifest, rollback, secret scan, Git and Gitea evidence are generated by the
+trusted builder. The builder emits an Ed25519 attestation binding:
+
+- builder attestation/key IDs;
+- source commit and tree OID;
+- artifact, manifest and package-closure SHA-256;
+- test and canary evidence SHA-256;
+- issuance time and signature.
+
+The controller contains only trusted public keys. Production signing is exposed
+through a KMS/HSM/secret-manager adapter; a local private-key adapter is marked
+test-only and is used only for ephemeral Shadow acceptance.
+
+Owner approvals are immutable, time-bounded, revocable, trust-domain bound, and
+single-use per capability ledger. If the production approval backend reference
+is absent, production execution is unavailable while Shadow remains available.
+Caller-supplied `owner_id` is never a fallback.
+
+## Persistent controller and API
+
+`aios-silent-release-controller.service` runs independently from the business
+GitOps API. It uses a single leader lock, durable intents/candidates/Sagas,
+startup journal verification, idempotent main events, one notification record,
+and recovery reporting. The final deployed service is report-only Shadow mode.
+
+The Action contract exposes:
+
+- `createReleaseIntent`
+- `getReleaseCandidate`
+- `getReleasePlan`
+- `getReleaseAcceptance`
+- `submitSignedApproval`
+- `getReleaseSaga`
+- `getCapabilityStatus`
+- `startDeployment`
+- `getRecoveryStatus`
+
+Every Shadow response declares `execution_enabled=false`, `shadow_mode=true`
+and `side_effects_executed=false`. `startDeployment` returns a simulated
+`SHADOW_COMPLETED` result and never claims production capabilities.
+
+## Migration and rollback
+
+1. Merge through a governed pull request.
+2. Build from a clean detached worktree at the exact merge commit.
+3. Verify artifact, manifest, package closure, tests, live fixture, no-.git
+   canary, rollback archive and secret scan.
+4. Install a versioned Shadow release without changing the business runtime.
+5. Start the separate localhost-only controller with both gates false.
+6. Run Shadow candidates and freeze production PID/tag/Baseline/Registry hashes.
+7. Remove ephemeral test keys and temporary repositories.
+
+Rollback stops and disables only the Shadow controller and restores/removes its
+versioned `current` link. The existing production API, tag set, Baseline and
+Registry are not involved.
+
+## Future activation envelope
+
+Activation requires a new one-time Owner approval binding the exact controller
+commit, artifact/manifest/policy/unit hashes, trusted key IDs, KMS/secret
+references, release and rollback roots, authoritative Git/repository identity,
+Shadow candidate/evidence IDs, test results, activation plan and rollback plan.
+That approval may only flip
+`AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false` to `true`; each real release still
+requires its own signed ReleasePlan. This change does not request or consume
+that activation approval.

docs/gitops/SILENT_RELEASE_PRODUCTION_CONTRACT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# Silent Release Controller Production Contract
+
+Status: review-only implementation. Production execution remains disabled.
+
+## Trust boundary
+
+The caller submits only release intent. A configured trusted builder owns ref
+validation, build, tests, artifact and manifest hashing, package closure,
+canary, rollback readiness, Git/Gitea consistency, and secret scanning. Caller
+supplied success evidence is rejected.
+
+The resulting immutable `ReleasePlan` contains deployment, tag, and
+finalization plans. One Ed25519 owner signature binds its SHA-256 digest,
+candidate evidence, policy digest, owner identity, trust domain, validity
+window, evidence lineage, and three narrow capabilities.
+
+## Durable execution
+
+The Saga journal is the source of truth. Every record is sequence-numbered and
+SHA-256 hash-chained from a fixed genesis hash. Snapshots are rebuildable
+caches. Journal corruption, truncation, reordering, missing records, or hash
+mismatch moves the release to `MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`.
+
+Capability execution uses an exclusive, leased claim. A second worker receives
+`BUSY`; an expired claim is not reassigned until a capability-specific
+side-effect probe reports that the operation was not applied. Runtime, tag,
+and finalization remain separately claimed and recoverable.
+
+## Execution order
+
+```text
+APPROVED
+  -> PRE_SWITCH_REVALIDATING
+  -> SWITCH_PENDING
+  -> SWITCHED
+  -> RUNTIME_VERIFYING
+  -> RUNTIME_VERIFIED
+  -> TAG_PENDING
+  -> TAG_VERIFIED
+  -> BASELINE_REGISTRY_PENDING
+  -> COMPLETED
+```
+
+The actual adapter configuration is regenerated before execution and must
+match the signed plan. Trusted allowlists come from controlled policy, not the
+request.
+
+A failure before verified tag publication rolls the runtime back. A failure
+after the exact tag is verified enters `RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`; the tag is
+never deleted or rewritten. A same-name/different-OID conflict enters
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`. Registry/Baseline finalization requires exact
+remote and Gitea tag proof, and Baseline is recorded last.
+
+## Action and recovery contract
+
+`submitOwnerApproval` verifies and durably stores the signed plan, then moves
+the Saga to `APPROVED`. `startDeployment` loads that durable approval and
+ignores caller-supplied approval content. Enabling execution without the
+trusted builder, verifier, validator, policy, and orchestrator fails during
+service construction.
+
+The recovery worker scans incomplete journals and resumes through the same
+claims and verification gates. It never automatically resumes a manual-review
+Saga. In shadow mode it only reports state and performs no adapter side
+effects.
+
+The deployed Action factory does not enable the legacy caller-evidence path.
+If the trusted builder is absent, candidate creation is rejected even while
+execution remains in shadow mode. The compatibility path exists only through
+the explicit test-only `SilentReleaseActionService.shadow()` constructor.
+
+Finalization is composed from separate `RegistryController` and
+`BaselineController` claims. Registry is verified first and Baseline is the
+last mutation; a retry reuses completed Registry evidence and never moves
+Baseline ahead of tag verification.
+
+## Governance
+
+- `force_push`: forbidden
+- `tag_rewrite`: forbidden
+- `direct_main_push`: forbidden
+- production execution default: disabled
+- production tag operations in this change: not executed
+- Baseline/Registry mutations in this change: not executed

docs/gitops/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Gitea Tag Publication Atomicity
+
+Release publication is a fail-closed Saga bound to one immutable governance
+fingerprint:
+
+- `version`
+- `target_oid`
+- `evidence_closure_oid`
+- `approval_plan_id`
+
+The normal progression is:
+
+`PENDING` → `LOCAL_TAG_CREATED` → `REMOTE_PUSH_CONFIRMED` →
+`GITEA_API_CONFIRMED` → `BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING` → `BASELINE_UPDATED` →
+`PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`
+
+An unavailable remote uses `REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING` or
+`RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`. A same-name tag object mismatch, peeled-target
+mismatch, changed governance fingerprint, or immutable deployment-evidence
+conflict enters `MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`. That state blocks automatic
+push and reconciliation; recovery never deletes, rewrites, or force-pushes a
+tag.
+
+## Legacy state migration
+
+Readers normalize the historical `TAG_CREATED_LOCAL` value to
+`LOCAL_TAG_CREATED` in memory. Read-only status responses therefore expose only
+the canonical value. The next governed Saga write persists the canonical name;
+reading legacy state alone does not mutate the tag, Baseline, Registry, or Saga
+file. Any unrecognized persisted state fails closed as
+`RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`.
+
+`BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING` is persisted before either `baseline/current.json` or
+`versions/<version>.json` changes. Recovery revalidates the governance
+fingerprint, evidence lineage, remote annotated tag, peeled target, Gitea API,
+listing, and repository identity before idempotently completing matching
+partial records. A different tag or target enters
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`.
+
+## Durable state
+
+Production writers set `AIOS_GITOPS_PUBLICATION_STATE_DIR` to storage outside
+their disposable worktree. Recreating a writer must reuse that directory.
+Worktree JSON is not the authoritative Saga store.
+
+## Deployment gate
+
+`mark_production_deployed` performs fresh Git remote, peeled-target, Gitea ref,
+Gitea tag-object, listing, repository-identity, evidence-lineage, Registry, and
+Baseline checks. Deployment is allowed only when:
+
+`Registry = Baseline = remote tag = Gitea API = expected target`
+
+Deployment evidence must be an immutable `sha256:<64 hex>` or `git:<40 hex>`
+identifier.
+
+## Read-only acceptance
+
+- `getTagPublicationStatus` reads durable Saga state.
+- `getReleaseConsistency` compares every release authority.
+- `runReleaseAcceptance` returns `accepted: true` only for `PASS`.
+
+Unavailable evidence returns `UNKNOWN` with `fail_closed: true`; it is never
+treated as acceptance.
+
+The CLI, HTTP Action, and release script all enter the same publisher core for
+evidence-lineage verification. The release script stages Registry and Baseline
+records only; durable Saga state remains outside Git.

docs/gitops/isolated-writer-path-policy-v1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Isolated Writer Exact-Path Policy V1
+
+This policy is an additional, service-owned authorization layer for
+`POST /api/commit-file`. It never expands a Token Policy V2 grant.
+
+An atomic write is permitted only when all of the following agree:
+
+1. socket peer, audience, operation, branch, base and exact path in the
+   Token Policy V2 grant;
+2. service audience, repository identity, branch, operation and exact path
+   in `AIOS_GITOPS_PATH_POLICY_FILE`;
+3. lexical path, resolved containment and symlink checks;
+4. the configured content-size and content-profile checks;
+5. operation digest, expected branch HEAD and durable operation ledger.
+
+Any failed layer returns a fail-closed policy error. Coarse `/api/file` and
+`/api/commit` routes remain forbidden.
+
+## File contract
+
+The configured path must be absolute. The parent directory must be
+`root:gitops 0750`; the regular, non-symlink file must be
+`root:gitops 0640`. JSON must use UTF-8 canonical encoding with sorted keys,
+compact separators and one trailing newline. Unknown fields, unsupported
+operations or profiles, duplicate paths, oversized policies and
+group/world-writable files are rejected during Writer startup.
+
+Example:
+
+```json
+{"allowed_branch":"patch/codex-review-test-worker-20260724","allowed_operations":{"commit_file.atomic":{"content_profile":"systemd-codex-review-worker-v1","exact_paths":["deploy/systemd/aios-codex-review-test-worker.service"],"max_content_bytes":32768}},"audience":"aios-codex-review-worker-writer.service","policy_id":"codex-review-worker-path-policy-v1","repository_identity":"aios/aios","schema_version":1}
+```
+
+The SHA-256 of the canonical policy is exposed in the isolated runtime
+status and written to the operation audit record. The request body cannot
+select or override the policy file.
+
+## Content profile
+
+`systemd-codex-review-worker-v1` is an exact, fail-closed unit grammar. The
+only sections are `[Unit]`, `[Service]` and `[Install]`. Each section has a
+directive allowlist; every single-value directive and every repeated
+`Environment`, `ReadOnlyPaths` and `ReadWritePaths` entry must match the
+governed Shadow unit contract exactly.
+
+The profile fixes the Python module
+`task_plane.workers.codex_review_test`, `User=aiman`, `Group=gitops`,
+the controlled `/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker/current`
+working directory, all hardening switches and the three permitted
+environment variables. It grants read access only to the authoritative
+bare repository and the versioned worker artifact, and write access only
+to the worker runtime, state and cache directories.
+
+Unknown sections or directives are rejected, including lifecycle hooks,
+credential injection, environment imports, root images, bind mounts,
+capability expansion, devices, sockets and top-level writable paths. The
+parser also rejects duplicate sections, duplicate single-value directives,
+empty resets, continuation lines, CRLF, NUL, non-UTF-8 surrogate content,
+overlong lines and Unicode lookalike directive names. It does not use
+`ConfigParser(strict=False)` or silently merge repeated values.
+
+Production credentials, if later authorized, must be supplied by a
+separately governed deployment drop-in. They are not permitted in the
+source unit or this content profile.
+
+Policy changes require a separate maintenance branch and Owner-reviewed
+ordinary merge commit. A task-scoped Writer must not edit its own policy
+file.

docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml

@@ -13,6 +13,27 @@ components:
       scheme: bearer
       bearerFormat: opaque-token
   schemas:
+    PublicationState:
+      type: string
+      description: Canonical durable publication state. Legacy TAG_CREATED_LOCAL is normalized on read and is never emitted by new writes.
+      enum:
+        - PENDING
+        - LOCAL_TAG_CREATED
+        - REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING
+        - REMOTE_PUSH_CONFIRMED
+        - GITEA_API_CONFIRMED
+        - BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING
+        - BASELINE_UPDATED
+        - PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+        - RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED
+        - MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+    PublicationStatus:
+      type: object
+      required: [version, state]
+      properties:
+        version: {type: string}
+        state: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/PublicationState'}
+        fail_closed: {type: boolean}
     BranchRequest:
       type: object
       required: [branch]
@@ -30,6 +51,31 @@ components:
         path: {type: string, example: docs/gitops/chatgpt-change.md}
         content: {type: string}
         message: {type: string}
+    AtomicFileCommitRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [branch, path, content, message, expected_head_oid, idempotency_key]
+      properties:
+        branch:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^patch/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$'
+        path:
+          type: string
+          minLength: 1
+          maxLength: 512
+        content:
+          type: string
+          maxLength: 1048576
+        message:
+          type: string
+          minLength: 1
+          maxLength: 200
+        expected_head_oid:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'
+        idempotency_key:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}$'
     CommitRequest:
       type: object
       properties:
@@ -50,9 +96,20 @@ components:
         message: {type: string}
     TagRequest:
       type: object
-      required: [version]
+      required: [version, target_oid, evidence_closure_oid, approval_plan_id]
       properties:
         version: {type: string, example: V1R1C1}
+        target_oid:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'
+          description: Full approved commit OID. The tag is created explicitly at this commit, never implicitly at workspace HEAD.
+        evidence_closure_oid:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'
+          description: Required evidence closure commit. target_oid must be its ancestor.
+        approval_plan_id:
+          type: string
+          description: Audited owner-approved release or tag plan identifier.
         message: {type: string}
         execute:
           type: boolean
@@ -103,7 +160,216 @@ components:
       properties:
         text: {type: string}
         branch: {type: string}
+    DeploymentPlan:
+      type: object
+      required: [service, release_path, release_root, cutover_link, dropin_path, dropin_sha256, systemd_unit_sha256, rollback_path, rollback_sha256, source_commit, tree_oid, artifact_sha256, manifest_sha256, package_closure_sha256, authoritative_git_dir, repository_identity, writer_expected, baseline_before_sha256, registry_before_sha256, production_tag_refset_before_sha256, health_contract_version, timeout_policy, retry_policy, policy_sha256, health_contract]
+      properties:
+        service: {type: string}
+        release_path: {type: string}
+        release_root: {type: string}
+        cutover_link: {type: string}
+        dropin_path: {type: string}
+        dropin_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        systemd_unit_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        rollback_path: {type: string}
+        rollback_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        source_commit: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        tree_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        artifact_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        manifest_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        package_closure_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        authoritative_git_dir: {type: string}
+        repository_identity: {type: string}
+        writer_expected: {type: boolean, enum: [false]}
+        baseline_before_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        registry_before_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        production_tag_refset_before_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        health_contract_version: {type: string}
+        timeout_policy: {type: object}
+        retry_policy: {type: object}
+        policy_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        health_contract: {type: object, additionalProperties: true}
+    ReleaseCandidateInput:
+      type: object
+      required: [source_commit, version]
+      additionalProperties: false
+      properties:
+        candidate_id: {type: string, pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,127}$'}
+        source_commit: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        version: {type: string, pattern: '^V[0-9]+R[0-9]+C[0-9]+(?:[-.][A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9.-]*)?$'}
+    ReleaseIntentInput:
+      type: object
+      required: [event_id, source_commit]
+      additionalProperties: false
+      properties:
+        event_id: {type: string, pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{2,255}$'}
+        source_commit: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+      type: object
+      required: [release_plan_id, candidate_id, source_commit, tree_oid, artifact_sha256, manifest_sha256, deployment_plan_sha256, release_plan_sha256, policy_sha256, approval_plan_id, evidence_closure_oid, owner_approval_record_oid, capabilities, owner_identity, trust_domain, issued_at, not_before, expires_at, nonce, key_id, signature]
+      properties:
+        release_plan_id: {type: string}
+        candidate_id: {type: string}
+        source_commit: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        tree_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        artifact_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        manifest_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        deployment_plan_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        release_plan_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        policy_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        approval_plan_id: {type: string}
+        evidence_closure_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        owner_approval_record_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        owner_identity: {type: string}
+        trust_domain: {type: string}
+        issued_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+        not_before: {type: string, format: date-time}
+        capabilities:
+          type: array
+          uniqueItems: true
+          items:
+            type: string
+            enum: [runtime_switch, tag_publish, baseline_registry_finalize]
+        expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+        nonce: {type: string, minLength: 16}
+        key_id: {type: string}
+        signature: {type: string, format: byte, writeOnly: true}
+    StartDeploymentRequest:
+      type: object
+      required: [candidate_id]
+      additionalProperties: false
+      properties:
+        candidate_id: {type: string}
 paths:
+  /createReleaseIntent:
+    post:
+      operationId: createReleaseIntent
+      summary: Create an idempotent intent; all build evidence comes from the trusted builder
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ReleaseIntentInput'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Intent created or idempotently returned}
+        '400': {description: Caller evidence or invalid intent rejected}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /createReleaseCandidate:
+    post:
+      operationId: createReleaseCandidate
+      summary: Submit release intent to the trusted builder; caller evidence is rejected
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ReleaseCandidateInput'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Candidate created or idempotently returned}
+        '400': {description: Invalid or conflicting candidate evidence}
+        '401': {description: Unauthorized}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /getReleaseCandidate:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleaseCandidate
+      summary: Read a durable release candidate
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Candidate}
+        '404': {description: Candidate not found}
+  /getReleasePlan:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleasePlan
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Immutable release plan}
+        '404': {description: Candidate not found}
+  /getReleaseAcceptance:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleaseAcceptance
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Builder attestation and acceptance checks}
+        '404': {description: Candidate not found}
+  /getApprovalEnvelope:
+    get:
+      operationId: getApprovalEnvelope
+      summary: Generate the immutable owner-signature payload
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Approval envelope fingerprint inputs}
+        '404': {description: Candidate not found}
+  /submitOwnerApproval:
+    post:
+      operationId: submitOwnerApproval
+      summary: Verify and durably store a signed owner release plan
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/SignedReleasePlanApproval'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Signature verified and approval stored}
+        '400': {description: Invalid approval}
+        '403': {description: Signature, key, expiry, or revocation failure}
+        '409': {description: Conflicting release plan}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /submitSignedApproval:
+    post:
+      operationId: submitSignedApproval
+      summary: Alias for immutable signed owner approval submission
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/SignedReleasePlanApproval'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Signature verified and approval stored}
+        '403': {description: Production approval backend unavailable or signature invalid}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /startDeployment:
+    post:
+      operationId: startDeployment
+      summary: Resume the durable approved Saga; caller cannot replace approval
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/StartDeploymentRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Shadow result or deployment Saga result}
+        '403': {description: Execution disabled or approval invalid}
+        '409': {description: Saga conflict}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /getReleaseSaga:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleaseSaga
+      summary: Read durable Saga state and event journal
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Saga snapshot}
+        '404': {description: Saga not found}
+  /getCapabilityStatus:
+    get:
+      operationId: getCapabilityStatus
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Durable single-use capability records}
+  /getRecoveryStatus:
+    get:
+      operationId: getRecoveryStatus
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Fail-closed recovery classification}
   /api/base:
     get:
       operationId: getBaseline
@@ -187,6 +453,25 @@ paths:
             schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/FileCommitRequest'}
       responses: {'200': {description: File committed}, '400': {description: Secret rejected or invalid path}, '401': {description: Unauthorized}}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /api/commit-file:
+    post:
+      operationId: commitFileAtomic
+      summary: Atomically write one allowlisted file, commit, push, and verify using Token Policy V2
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AtomicFileCommitRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Completed or idempotently replayed}
+        '400': {description: Invalid canonical request}
+        '401': {description: Missing, invalid, expired, or revoked Token Policy V2 grant}
+        '403': {description: Audience, source, branch, operation, path, or policy denied}
+        '409': {description: Idempotency conflict or manual review required}
+        '413': {description: Request too large}
+        '503': {description: Push or remote verification unavailable; recoverable}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
   /api/commit:
     post:
       operationId: commitChanges
@@ -199,6 +484,39 @@ paths:
             schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/CommitRequest'}
       responses: {'200': {description: Commit result}, '401': {description: Unauthorized}}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /api/tag-publication-status:
+    get:
+      operationId: getTagPublicationStatus
+      summary: Read durable publication Saga status without mutation
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: version, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$'}}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Canonical publication state or fail-closed UNKNOWN
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/PublicationStatus'}
+        '400': {description: Version required}
+  /api/release-consistency:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleaseConsistency
+      summary: Compare Registry, Baseline, remote tag, Gitea API, listing, repository identity, and expected target
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: version, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+        - {in: query, name: target_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: evidence_closure_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: approval_plan_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses: {'200': {description: PASS, FAIL, or fail-closed UNKNOWN}}
+  /api/release-acceptance:
+    get:
+      operationId: runReleaseAcceptance
+      summary: Run read-only release acceptance; UNKNOWN is not accepted
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: version, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+        - {in: query, name: target_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: evidence_closure_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: approval_plan_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses: {'200': {description: Acceptance result with accepted boolean}}
   /api/tag:
     post:
       operationId: requestOrCreateTag
@@ -209,7 +527,7 @@ paths:
         content:
           application/json:
             schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/TagRequest'}
-      responses: {'200': {description: Tag request committed or tag created}, '403': {description: Forbidden}}
+      responses: {'200': {description: Gitea-confirmed tag and fail-closed baseline result}, '400': {description: Missing governance evidence or invalid OID}, '403': {description: Forbidden}, '409': {description: Existing tag target conflict or evidence lineage mismatch}, '502': {description: Gitea reconciliation required}, '503': {description: Remote push pending}}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
   /api/rollback:
     post:
@@ -245,4 +563,7 @@ paths:
         content:
           application/json:
             schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/NLRequest'}
-      responses: {'
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Safe GitOps plan}
+        '401': {description: Unauthorized}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true

docs/releases/V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-RELEASE.md

@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@
 - Approved target: `3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24`
 - Evidence closure: `8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978`
 - Initial registry status: `TAG_CREATED_NOT_PROMOTED`
+- Final status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`
+- Production service: `aios-v2r1c2-production.service`
+- Production port: `18920`
+- Production acceptance SHA256: `a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a`
+- Production online smoke SHA256: `fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4`
+- Production health SHA256: `ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c`
+- Live evidence directory: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z`
+- Evidence hash index: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z/production-evidence.sha256`
 
 ## Production gates
 
@@ -14,6 +22,14 @@ Promotion may proceed only when the 18921 candidate remains healthy, the committ
 
 The obsolete release-plan `DECLARED` rows are not authoritative for this run. The production gate must explicitly select `AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER-20260722` and require its three required stages to be `SUCCEEDED`; an unqualified aggregate across stale plan rows fails closed.
 
+## Synthetic WeChat scope
+
+WeChat-facing acceptance for this release used synthetic/mock receipts and transcripts only. It did not impersonate a real user and does not claim a real-user WeChat session. The relevant committed evidence entries are `wechat_simulated_receipts` and `wechat_simulated_transcript`; the production online smoke also records `simulation: true` and `real_user_impersonated: false`.
+
 ## Rollback rule
 
 If Health, API, UI, Role Matrix, Tenant Isolation, Runtime, or Audit verification fails after the 18920 switch, stop the V2R1C2 production unit and restart the preserved V2R1C1 18920 service. Do not delete or rewrite either release tag or rollback asset.
+
+## Result
+
+The production switch completed at `2026-07-22T01:40:51Z`. Full acceptance and the production online smoke passed, including Health, API, UI, Role Matrix, Tenant Isolation, Runtime, Audit and the selected takeover release gate. The previous `aios-orchestrator-gateway.service` unit, configuration and Release Run backup remain available for rollback.

docs/task-plane/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# AIOS Task Plane
+
+该模块是与任务发起方、Worker 类型和通知后端解耦的持久化任务控制平面。当前交付仅用于隔离开发与 Shadow 验收；默认 `execution_enabled=false`，不会修改生产、tag、Baseline 或 Registry。
+
+## 架构
+
+- `TaskPlaneService`：统一服务边界和 HTTP 路由。
+- `TaskPlaneStore`：SQLite WAL、revision/CAS、串行事务、租约、hash-chained journal、evidence 和 durable outbox。
+- `WorkerRegistry` / `LeaseManager`：身份绑定、capability、并发额度、心跳、过期探测后恢复。
+- `DelegationEngine`：父子 DAG、全局深度、capability/risk/approval/budget 单调约束和幂等重放。
+- `PolicyEngine`：默认关闭执行；身份、证据、结果摘要和可插拔签名验签均 fail-closed。
+- `WorkerAdapter`：OpenClaw、Codex、Hermes、A2A 和 systemd Worker 的统一契约。默认实现只返回 `SHADOW_VERIFIED`，不执行外部命令。
+- `DurableOutboxDispatcher`：Webhook、NATS JetStream、GPT callback、Dashboard 和 WeChat 的回执式通知接口。没有真实回执时始终保留 `NOT_DELIVERED`。
+
+## 状态与恢复
+
+正常路径为 `CREATED → QUEUED/CLAIMED → RUNNING → VERIFYING/COMPLETED`；失败路径使用 `FAILED_RECOVERABLE`、`FAILED_FINAL`、`CANCELLED` 或 `MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED`。每次状态事件都进入同一事务中的 append-only hash chain。
+
+租约过期不会自动重放副作用。控制平面必须先调用 Worker probe，只有明确确认原执行已停止，才可将 claim 标记为 `EXPIRED` 并把任务转为 `FAILED_RECOVERABLE`。结果必须匹配 task、claim、Worker identity、未过期 lease 和 operation digest；重复结果返回冲突。
+
+## 安全模型
+
+- task/worker/claim/message ID 使用 allowlist pattern，拒绝 URL 编码差异、路径分隔符和控制字符。
+- HTTP body 最大 1 MB，非对象 JSON、异常 Content-Length 和非法参数返回 400/413。
+- 内部异常响应不回显路径、payload 或凭据；默认 HTTP access log 不记录原始 request target。
+- secret-like 字段在 durable task、event、evidence 和 outbox 写入前脱敏。
+- 结果签名存在但没有配置验签器时拒绝；摘要、evidence 或 event 被篡改时验收失败。
+- SQLite 文件创建为 0600；新建状态目录使用 0700。
+
+## 验收
+
+```bash
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime \
+  bash scripts/task-plane/run_task_plane_acceptance.sh
+
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime \
+  python3 scripts/task-plane/create_shadow_tasks.py \
+    --database reports/task-plane-shadow.sqlite3 \
+    --report reports/task-plane-shadow.json
+```
+
+上述脚本只使用本地 SQLite 和 Shadow adapter，不触发真实 OpenClaw、Codex、Hermes、微信或生产执行。

docs/task-plane/openapi.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+openapi: 3.0.3
+info:
+  title: AIOS Task Plane API
+  version: 1.0.0
+  description: >
+    Durable control-plane APIs for task orchestration with fail-closed policy.
+    Every POST operation requires bearerAuth; read-only GET operations may be
+    exposed according to the surrounding runtime policy.
+servers:
+  - url: /
+paths:
+  /tasks:
+    get:
+      summary: List tasks
+      responses:
+        "200":
+          description: Task list
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Create task
+      parameters:
+        - in: header
+          name: Idempotency-Key
+          required: false
+          schema:
+            type: string
+            minLength: 1
+            maxLength: 128
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              $ref: "#/components/schemas/TaskPlan"
+      responses:
+        "201": { description: Created }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "409": { description: Conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Execution or resource locked }
+        "503": { description: Authentication or service unavailable }
+  /tasks/{task_id}:
+    get:
+      summary: Get task
+      parameters:
+        - $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId"
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: OK }
+        "404": { description: Not found }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/claim:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Claim a task
+      parameters:
+        - $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId"
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              $ref: "#/components/schemas/TaskClaimRequest"
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Claimed }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "404": { description: Not found }
+        "409": { description: Conflict }
+        "423": { description: Execution disabled }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/heartbeat:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Renew task claim lease
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Leased }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "404": { description: Task or claim not found }
+        "409": { description: Claim conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Lease or execution locked }
+        "503": { description: Service unavailable }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/progress:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Report task progress
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Progress saved }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "404": { description: Task or claim not found }
+        "409": { description: Claim conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Lease or execution locked }
+        "503": { description: Service unavailable }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/result:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Submit task result
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Result accepted }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Result policy rejected }
+        "404": { description: Task or claim not found }
+        "409": { description: Duplicate or mismatched result }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Lease or execution locked }
+        "503": { description: Verification service unavailable }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/fail:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Mark task failed
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Failure recorded }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "404": { description: Task or claim not found }
+        "409": { description: Claim conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Lease or execution locked }
+        "503": { description: Service unavailable }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/cancel:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Cancel task
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Cancelled }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "404": { description: Task not found }
+        "409": { description: Revision or state conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Resource locked }
+        "503": { description: Service unavailable }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/delegate:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Delegate task
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Delegated }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "404": { description: Parent task not found }
+        "409": { description: Conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Execution locked }
+        "503": { description: Service unavailable }
+  /workers/register:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Register worker
+      responses:
+        "201": { description: Worker registered }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Worker identity mismatch }
+        "409": { description: Registration conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Resource locked }
+        "503": { description: Service unavailable }
+  /workers/{worker_id}/heartbeat:
+    post:
+      security: [ { bearerAuth: [] } ]
+      summary: Worker heartbeat
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkerId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Heartbeat accepted }
+        "400": { description: Bad request }
+        "401": { description: Unauthorized }
+        "403": { description: Forbidden }
+        "404": { description: Worker not found }
+        "409": { description: Worker state conflict }
+        "413": { description: Payload too large }
+        "423": { description: Worker locked }
+        "503": { description: Service unavailable }
+  /workers:
+    get:
+      summary: List workers
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Worker list }
+  /workers/{worker_id}:
+    get:
+      summary: Get worker
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkerId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Worker details }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/events:
+    get:
+      summary: Task events
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Event list }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/evidence:
+    get:
+      summary: Task evidence
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Evidence list }
+  /tasks/{task_id}/children:
+    get:
+      summary: Task child tasks
+      parameters: [ $ref: "#/components/parameters/TaskId" ]
+      responses:
+        "200": { description: Child list }
+components:
+  securitySchemes:
+    bearerAuth:
+      type: http
+      scheme: bearer
+      bearerFormat: opaque
+  parameters:
+    TaskId:
+      name: task_id
+      in: path
+      required: true
+      schema:
+        type: string
+        minLength: 1
+        maxLength: 128
+        pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$'
+    WorkerId:
+      name: worker_id
+      in: path
+      required: true
+      schema:
+        type: string
+        minLength: 1
+        maxLength: 128
+        pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$'
+  schemas:
+    TaskPlan:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      properties:
+        schema_version: { type: integer, enum: [1] }
+        task_id:
+          type: string
+          minLength: 1
+          maxLength: 128
+          pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$'
+        task_type:
+          type: string
+          minLength: 1
+          maxLength: 128
+          pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$'
+        issuer: { type: object }
+        intent: { type: string, maxLength: 16384 }
+        required_capabilities:
+          type: array
+          maxItems: 128
+          items: { type: string }
+        preferred_workers:
+          type: array
+          maxItems: 64
+          items: { type: string }
+        risk: { type: string, enum: [low, medium, high] }
+        approval_policy:
+          type: string
+          maxLength: 128
+        dependencies:
+          type: array
+          maxItems: 128
+          items: { type: string }
+        max_delegation_depth: { type: integer, minimum: 0, maximum: 32 }
+        budgets:
+          type: object
+          additionalProperties: false
+          properties:
+            time_seconds: { type: integer, minimum: 0 }
+            attempts: { type: integer, minimum: 0 }
+            tokens: { type: integer, minimum: 0 }
+            cost: { type: number, minimum: 0 }
+        evidence_requirements:
+          type: array
+          maxItems: 128
+          items: { type: string }
+        parent_task_id:
+          type: string
+          maxLength: 128
+        correlation_id:
+          type: string
+          maxLength: 128
+        metadata:
+          type: object
+    TaskClaimRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [worker_id, actor_identity]
+      properties:
+        worker_id:
+          type: string
+          maxLength: 128
+          pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$'
+        lease_seconds:
+          type: integer
+          minimum: 1
+          maximum: 3600
+        actor_identity:
+          type: string
+          minLength: 1
+          maxLength: 512

evidence/single-owner-governance/AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-LIVE-ACTIVATION-HARDENING-20260729T043010Z.json

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729/artifacts/hardening-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf/live-activation-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf.tar.gz",
+  "artifact_sha256": "32bc49c207ec454b6fd81b0484f5b257bb789481b37175995029a2ec78cc62fa",
+  "copied_live_db_acceptance": "PASS",
+  "implementation_commit_oid": "71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf",
+  "implementation_tree_oid": "3cc61bfbf69cbe0a24d54a0e53a6c50bcc130066",
+  "independent_validator": "ALLOW_CANDIDATE",
+  "production_mutation": false,
+  "result": "PASS",
+  "rollback_artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729/artifacts/hardening-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf/live-activation-rollback-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf.tar.gz",
+  "rollback_artifact_sha256": "4efe1ea73d4fd72e5364fc91a16ad5e9d1e6ebe78d8aa466f7b11c4915b08403",
+  "runtime_source_sha256": {
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/activation.py": "48846a58fa3afb2b7c8ffe6e88504a9333863932df867f33ba0321ad3bac6003",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/gitea_protected_branch.py": "00775efe3f3d631d88379eff4ed2dcfaf386a2fa43111abe961e75109e80d768",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/journal.py": "a8f121245e04487d99c99fb03ada83f0c907723f8eb18552872ff46dcf5a7873",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/state_machine.py": "0b08a2c378d143cb9031a25132afc7b7d825bdc03d11efe10610341d4b70167e",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/validator.py": "754639846cb15cb997d612a1fe0ceb0224ddef5bbc3ccac9802a3747f122dac1"
+  },
+  "subtests_passed": 17,
+  "task_id": "AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729",
+  "test_evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729/artifacts/hardening-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf/test-evidence-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf.json",
+  "test_evidence_sha256": "c1633732767f3f051ffb01404d12d05a6168a4b01b91efdb34a64988d6dee684",
+  "tests_failed": 0,
+  "tests_passed": 90
+}

ops/aios-v2/v2r1c2-production-control.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+VERSION=V2R1C2
+EXPECTED_TARGET=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
+TAG_OBJECT=a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36
+REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+SOURCE=/opt/aios-v2r1c2
+TAKEOVER=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/codex/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER-20260722
+CANDIDATE_SERVICE=aios-v2r1c2-portal.service
+OLD_SERVICE=aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
+NEW_SERVICE=aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+CANDIDATE_STATE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-portal
+PRODUCTION_STATE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
+RUN_ID=${AIOS_RELEASE_RUN_ID:-AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z}
+EVIDENCE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/$RUN_ID
+SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)
+RELEASE_ROOT=$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)
+UNIT_SOURCE=$RELEASE_ROOT/deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+ENV_SOURCE=$RELEASE_ROOT/deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.env.example
+LOCK=/run/lock/aios-v2r1c2-production-release.lock
+
+require_root() {
+  test "$(id -u)" -eq 0 || { echo 'root required' >&2; exit 77; }
+}
+
+health_old() {
+  curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18920/healthz
+}
+
+health_new() {
+  curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18920/api/v2/health
+}
+
+health_candidate() {
+  curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18921/api/v2/health
+}
+
+wait_candidate() {
+  for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+    if health_candidate; then
+      return 0
+    fi
+    sleep 1
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+preflight() {
+  require_root
+  test "$(git --git-dir="$REPO" rev-parse refs/tags/$VERSION)" = "$TAG_OBJECT"
+  test "$(git --git-dir="$REPO" rev-list -n 1 "$VERSION")" = "$EXPECTED_TARGET"
+  test -f "$SOURCE/active-runtime/app/aios_web/release_application.py"
+  test -f "$UNIT_SOURCE"
+  test -f "$ENV_SOURCE"
+  command -v sqlite3 >/dev/null
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$OLD_SERVICE"
+  health_candidate >/dev/null
+  health_old >/dev/null
+  (
+    cd "$TAKEOVER/artifacts/v2r1c2"
+    sha256sum -c checksums.sha256 >/dev/null
+  )
+  diff -qr --exclude=__pycache__ "$TAKEOVER/active-runtime/app" "$SOURCE/active-runtime/app" >/dev/null
+  diff -qr "$TAKEOVER/plans" "$SOURCE/plans" >/dev/null
+  echo PREFLIGHT=PASS
+}
+
+prepare() {
+  preflight
+  install -d -m 0750 "$EVIDENCE_DIR" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup"
+  health_old >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-before.json"
+  health_candidate >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/candidate-health-before.json"
+  systemctl cat "$OLD_SERVICE" >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/$OLD_SERVICE.unit"
+  cp -a /etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/"
+  cp -a /etc/systemd/system/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/"
+  if test -e "$PRODUCTION_STATE"; then
+    mv "$PRODUCTION_STATE" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/aios-v2r1c2-production-state.preexisting"
+  fi
+  systemctl stop "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  trap 'systemctl start "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE" || true' EXIT
+  while IFS= read -r -d '' database; do
+    sqlite3 "$database" 'PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);' >/dev/null
+    test "$(sqlite3 "$database" 'PRAGMA quick_check;')" = ok
+  done < <(find "$CANDIDATE_STATE" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.sqlite3' -print0)
+  install -d -o aios -g aios -m 0750 "$PRODUCTION_STATE"
+  cp -a "$CANDIDATE_STATE/." "$PRODUCTION_STATE/"
+  chown -R aios:aios "$PRODUCTION_STATE"
+  while IFS= read -r -d '' database; do
+    test "$(sqlite3 "$database" 'PRAGMA quick_check;')" = ok
+  done < <(find "$PRODUCTION_STATE" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.sqlite3' -print0)
+  install -o root -g root -m 0644 "$UNIT_SOURCE" /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+  install -d -o root -g aios -m 0750 /etc/aios-v2
+  install -o root -g aios -m 0640 "$ENV_SOURCE" /etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
+  systemctl daemon-reload
+  systemctl start "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  wait_candidate >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/candidate-health-after-state-copy.json"
+  trap - EXIT
+  echo PREPARE=PASS
+}
+
+rollback() {
+  require_root
+  systemctl stop "$NEW_SERVICE" || true
+  systemctl disable "$NEW_SERVICE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  systemctl enable "$OLD_SERVICE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  systemctl start "$OLD_SERVICE"
+  health_old >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/rollback-health.json"
+  echo ROLLBACK=PASS
+}
+
+promote() {
+  require_root
+  test -f /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+  test -f /etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
+  ! systemctl is-active --quiet "$NEW_SERVICE"
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  health_candidate >/dev/null
+  health_old >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-switch-input.json"
+  trap 'trap - ERR; rollback' ERR
+  systemctl stop "$OLD_SERVICE"
+  systemctl start "$NEW_SERVICE"
+  for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+    if health_new >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-after-switch.json" 2>/dev/null; then
+      echo PROMOTE=PASS
+      trap - ERR
+      return 0
+    fi
+    sleep 1
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+finalize() {
+  require_root
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$NEW_SERVICE"
+  health_new >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-final.json"
+  systemctl disable "$OLD_SERVICE" >/dev/null
+  systemctl enable "$NEW_SERVICE" >/dev/null
+  echo FINALIZE=PASS
+}
+
+exec 9>"$LOCK"
+flock -n 9 || { echo 'release operation already running' >&2; exit 75; }
+case "${1:-}" in
+  preflight) preflight ;;
+  prepare) prepare ;;
+  promote) promote ;;
+  rollback) rollback ;;
+  finalize) finalize ;;
+  *) echo "usage: $0 {preflight|prepare|promote|rollback|finalize}" >&2; exit 64 ;;
+esac

ops/aios-v2/v2r1c2-promote-and-accept.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+RUN_ID=AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z
+CONTROL=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/ops/aios-v2/v2r1c2-production-control.sh
+REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+EVIDENCE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/$RUN_ID
+DRIVER=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/tools/run_online_smoke_18920.py
+TEMP_SOURCE=
+
+cleanup_temp() {
+  case "$TEMP_SOURCE" in
+    /tmp/aios-v2r1c2-production-acceptance.*)
+      test -d "$TEMP_SOURCE" && rm -rf -- "$TEMP_SOURCE"
+      ;;
+    '') ;;
+    *) echo "refusing to remove unexpected temporary path: $TEMP_SOURCE" >&2; return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+rollback_on_error() {
+  code=$?
+  trap - ERR
+  AIOS_RELEASE_RUN_ID="$RUN_ID" "$CONTROL" rollback || true
+  cleanup_temp || true
+  exit "$code"
+}
+trap rollback_on_error ERR
+
+AIOS_RELEASE_RUN_ID="$RUN_ID" "$CONTROL" promote
+systemctl is-active --quiet aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+! systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
+curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18920/api/v2/health >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/health-after-promote.json"
+curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18921/api/v2/health >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/candidate-health-during-production.json"
+
+TEMP_SOURCE=$(mktemp -d /tmp/aios-v2r1c2-production-acceptance.XXXXXX)
+git --git-dir="$REPO" archive 8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978 | tar -x -C "$TEMP_SOURCE"
+(
+  cd "$TEMP_SOURCE"
+  python3 tools/aios_v2r1c2_acceptance.py \
+    --source-oid 3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24 \
+    --online \
+    --base-url http://127.0.0.1:18920 \
+    --evidence-output "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-acceptance.json"
+)
+python3 "$DRIVER" "$TEMP_SOURCE" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-online-smoke.json"
+
+python3 - "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-acceptance.json" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-online-smoke.json" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+for path in sys.argv[1:]:
+    with open(path, encoding='utf-8') as handle:
+        data = json.load(handle)
+    if data.get('passed') is not True:
+        raise SystemExit(f'acceptance failed: {path}')
+PY
+
+systemctl show aios-v2r1c2-production.service \
+  -p ActiveState -p SubState -p MainPID -p NRestarts \
+  >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-service-status.txt"
+sha256sum "$EVIDENCE_DIR"/production-acceptance.json \
+  "$EVIDENCE_DIR"/production-online-smoke.json \
+  "$EVIDENCE_DIR"/health-after-promote.json \
+  >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-evidence.sha256"
+
+cleanup_temp
+TEMP_SOURCE=
+trap - ERR
+echo SWITCH_VALIDATED=PASS

patches/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "patch_name": "gitea-tag-publication-atomicity",
+  "branch": "patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+  "base": "main",
+  "risk": "high",
+  "description": "Fail-closed, resumable Gitea release-tag publication with exact remote ref, peeled target, API and listing verification before baseline update.",
+  "owner_approval": "received",
+  "constraints": {
+    "force_push": false,
+    "tag_rewrite": false,
+    "direct_main_push": false,
+    "secret_commit": false,
+    "production_runtime_anchor_change": false
+  }
+}

patches/nl/nl-1784681185786-19ac0f82.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "id": "nl-1784681185786-19ac0f82",
+  "text": "Create a safe GitOps plan for tag V2R1C2. The tag target must be commit 3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24. Evidence closure commit is 8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978. Do not tag the current workspace HEAD. Do not modify main. Do not force push. Do not promote production. If the target commit cannot be bound explicitly, keep the operation blocked.",
+  "intent": "unknown",
+  "action_plan": [],
+  "execute": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true,
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-22T00:46:25Z"
+}

patches/patch_aios-agent-task-control-plane-20260724.branch.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "patch/aios-agent-task-control-plane-20260724",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "agent-task-plane-writer",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-24T02:20:56Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}

patches/patch_gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.branch.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "owner-gitea-tag-atomicity-20260723",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-23T04:59:13Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}

reports/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-delivery.json

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+{
+  "base": "main",
+  "base_oid": "b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870",
+  "commit_count": 10,
+  "commits": [
+    "fc0b9f29bf6dadfbcc8599da6f0ab11a6e19b529",
+    "3812e1ab0123c7da4726e51179a10746b5bbde83",
+    "3196d91b12d0ac5d7ea550b0474703a08736471b",
+    "54093d15437ce0af31acf6feeeffacf6626a59cd",
+    "27a0ae126b96d63c40544174e7a3859e30eba056",
+    "83ab67f7e11eae9da4546cab53169f5a6a47e0ae",
+    "f4b6ac8609faf947d2659b2c32564a26fcb3eb10",
+    "a3edc628a91a4af3d702aacefe0389f844615bc1",
+    "e40c05779c435c3726618de81e02e90953d727f3",
+    "edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f"
+  ],
+  "file_count": 15,
+  "files": [
+    "active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py",
+    "active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_write_guard.py",
+    "active-runtime/app/gitea_tag_publication.py",
+    "docs/gitops/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity.md",
+    "docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml",
+    "patches/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.json",
+    "patches/patch_gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.branch.json",
+    "scripts/generate_delivery_manifest.py",
+    "scripts/release_version.sh",
+    "scripts/verify_gitea_credential_rotation.py",
+    "security/incidents/GITEA-TOKEN-33-EXPOSURE-20260723.redacted.json",
+    "tests/run_live_gitea_fixture.sh",
+    "tests/test_chatgpt_actions_tag.py",
+    "tests/test_gitea_tag_publication.py",
+    "tests/test_gitea_tag_publication_live.py"
+  ],
+  "generated_from": {
+    "commit_range": "b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870..edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f",
+    "commits_command": "git log --reverse --format=%H b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870..edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f",
+    "files_command": "git diff --name-only b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870..edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f"
+  },
+  "manifest_path": "reports/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-delivery.json",
+  "source_branch": "patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+  "source_commit": "edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f"
+}

reports/task-plane-acceptance.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "execution_status": "PARTIALLY_COMPLETED",
+  "tests_run": 19,
+  "failures": 0,
+  "errors": 0,
+  "skipped": 0,
+  "multi_agent_shadow_verified": true,
+  "production_side_effects": false,
+  "notification_delivery_status": "NOT_DELIVERED"
+}

reports/task-plane-shadow.json

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+{
+  "root_task_id": "AIOS-AGENT-TASK-CONTROL-PLANE-20260724-SHADOW",
+  "execution_mode": "shadow_adapter",
+  "production_side_effects": false,
+  "tasks": [
+    {
+      "task_id": "AIOS-TASK-PLANE-OPENCLAW-ACCEPTANCE",
+      "parent_task_id": "AIOS-AGENT-TASK-CONTROL-PLANE-20260724-SHADOW",
+      "task_status": "COMPLETED",
+      "worker_result": {
+        "worker": "openclaw",
+        "task_id": "AIOS-TASK-PLANE-OPENCLAW-ACCEPTANCE",
+        "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED",
+        "claim_id": "claim-093cbf4c-11d5-47a3-97dc-a373a8a53940",
+        "execution_mode": "shadow",
+        "production_side_effects": false
+      },
+      "result_digest": "b3a8ed4e0a60a0a9364d1eea1a6d30a403da1fb5ff79ff38a489a52227f4116e"
+    },
+    {
+      "task_id": "AIOS-TASK-PLANE-CODEX-REVIEW",
+      "parent_task_id": "AIOS-AGENT-TASK-CONTROL-PLANE-20260724-SHADOW",
+      "task_status": "COMPLETED",
+      "worker_result": {
+        "worker": "codex",
+        "task_id": "AIOS-TASK-PLANE-CODEX-REVIEW",
+        "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED",
+        "claim_id": "claim-3cfe4031-27c7-409c-9841-cd5c0d26218d",
+        "execution_mode": "shadow",
+        "production_side_effects": false
+      },
+      "result_digest": "65fb825869b9b32d923b387796839e57b9ca7053716720861988ceb8d7e9c93a"
+    },
+    {
+      "task_id": "AIOS-TASK-PLANE-HERMES-ARCHITECTURE",
+      "parent_task_id": "AIOS-AGENT-TASK-CONTROL-PLANE-20260724-SHADOW",
+      "task_status": "COMPLETED",
+      "worker_result": {
+        "worker": "hermes",
+        "task_id": "AIOS-TASK-PLANE-HERMES-ARCHITECTURE",
+        "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED",
+        "claim_id": "claim-fd7ba481-ab71-47dc-8e91-3655cbef1c40",
+        "execution_mode": "shadow",
+        "production_side_effects": false
+      },
+      "result_digest": "09c9ce563424b6490b7be1e854d06de786bd243a48b099137a7a2e9cb7035265"
+    }
+  ],
+  "event_chains_valid": true,
+  "notification_delivery_status": [
+    "NOT_DELIVERED"
+  ]
+}

reports/task-plane-writer-smoke.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"schema_version":1,"task_id":"AIOS-AGENT-TASK-CONTROL-PLANE-20260724","writer_status":"READY","production_side_effects":false}

scripts/build_silent_release_artifact.py

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Build a deterministic, secret-scanned Silent Release evidence package."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import tarfile
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+AUTHORIZATION_PATTERN = re.compile(
+    rb"Authorization:\s*(?:Bearer|token)\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{16,})",
+    re.I,
+)
+SECRET_PATTERNS = (
+    re.compile(rb"(?:ghp|glpat)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}", re.I),
+    re.compile(
+        rb"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----\r?\n"
+        rb"[A-Za-z0-9+/=\r\n]{64,}\r?\n"
+        rb"-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"
+    ),
+)
+ALLOWED_AUTHORIZATION_PLACEHOLDER_SHA256 = frozenset(
+    {
+        "009f7191815ec615d09d0698457d048432e9a73f62ab4f26af1875009d0afbbc",
+        "599a7f359d1e11124054f8afeae201f2d265b8988d91cb5b7d4dc4c9e2225c30",
+        "f39dac6cbaba535e2c207cd0cd8f154974223c848f727f98b3564cea569b41cf",
+    }
+)
+TARGET_TESTS = (
+    "tests/test_silent_release_execution_readiness.py",
+    "tests/test_silent_release_controller.py",
+    "tests/test_silent_release_hardening.py",
+    "tests/test_silent_release_production_contract.py",
+    "tests/test_chatgpt_actions_tag.py",
+    "tests/test_gitea_tag_publication.py",
+    "tests/test_authoritative_git_context.py",
+)
+
+
+def sha256(path: Path) -> str:
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as source:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def atomic_json(path: Path, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    temporary = path.with_suffix(path.suffix + ".tmp")
+    with temporary.open("w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as output:
+        json.dump(payload, output, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        output.write("\n")
+        output.flush()
+        os.fsync(output.fileno())
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+
+
+def redact_output(value: str) -> str:
+    value = re.sub(
+        r"(?i)(Authorization:\s*(?:Bearer|token)\s+)"
+        r"[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,}",
+        r"\1<redacted>",
+        str(value),
+    )
+    value = re.sub(
+        r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----.*?"
+        r"-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----",
+        "<redacted-private-key>",
+        value,
+        flags=re.DOTALL,
+    )
+    return value
+
+
+def git(git_dir: Path, *arguments: str) -> str:
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *arguments],
+        check=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=60,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+    return completed.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def run_evidence(
+    command: list[str],
+    *,
+    cwd: Path,
+    output: Path,
+    timeout: int,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        command,
+        cwd=cwd,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        env={
+            "HOME": str(cwd / ".builder-home"),
+            "PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", ""),
+            "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1",
+        },
+    )
+    record = {
+        "command": command,
+        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
+        "stderr": redact_output(completed.stderr[-20000:]),
+        "stdout": redact_output(completed.stdout[-20000:]),
+    }
+    atomic_json(output, record)
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"trusted builder command failed: {command[0]}")
+    return record
+
+
+def secret_scan(root: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    findings: list[str] = []
+    for path in sorted(item for item in root.rglob("*") if item.is_file()):
+        if path.stat().st_size > 5 * 1024 * 1024:
+            continue
+        data = path.read_bytes()
+        authorization_tokens = AUTHORIZATION_PATTERN.findall(data)
+        unsafe_authorization = any(
+            hashlib.sha256(token.lower()).hexdigest()
+            not in ALLOWED_AUTHORIZATION_PLACEHOLDER_SHA256
+            for token in authorization_tokens
+        )
+        if unsafe_authorization or any(
+            pattern.search(data) for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS
+        ):
+            findings.append(path.relative_to(root).as_posix())
+    return {"findings": findings, "passed": not findings}
+
+
+def build(git_dir: Path, commit: str, output: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    commit = git(git_dir, "rev-parse", f"{commit}^{{commit}}")
+    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(commit):
+        raise ValueError("commit must resolve to a full OID")
+    tree_oid = git(git_dir, "rev-parse", f"{commit}^{{tree}}")
+    if output.exists():
+        raise FileExistsError("artifact output already exists")
+    output.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700)
+    source_tar = output / "source.tar"
+    subprocess.run(
+        [
+            "git",
+            f"--git-dir={git_dir}",
+            "archive",
+            "--format=tar",
+            f"--output={source_tar}",
+            commit,
+        ],
+        check=True,
+        timeout=120,
+        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
+    )
+    canary = output / "canary-src"
+    canary.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    with tarfile.open(source_tar, "r") as archive:
+        archive.extractall(canary, filter="data")
+    if any(path.name == ".git" for path in canary.rglob(".git")):
+        raise RuntimeError("no-.git canary contains Git metadata")
+
+    test_record = run_evidence(
+        ["python3", "-m", "pytest", "-q", *TARGET_TESTS],
+        cwd=canary,
+        output=output / "test-evidence.json",
+        timeout=600,
+    )
+    fixture_record = run_evidence(
+        ["bash", "tests/run_live_gitea_fixture.sh"],
+        cwd=canary,
+        output=output / "live-fixture-evidence.json",
+        timeout=600,
+    )
+    canary_record = {
+        "git_directory_present": False,
+        "live_fixture_exit_code": fixture_record["exit_code"],
+        "passed": True,
+        "target_test_exit_code": test_record["exit_code"],
+    }
+    atomic_json(output / "canary-evidence.json", canary_record)
+
+    scan = secret_scan(canary)
+    atomic_json(output / "secret-scan.json", scan)
+    if not scan["passed"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("secret scan failed")
+
+    manifest_files: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    tracked = git(git_dir, "ls-tree", "-r", "--name-only", commit).splitlines()
+    for relative in tracked:
+        path = canary / relative
+        if path.is_file():
+            manifest_files.append(
+                {
+                    "path": relative,
+                    "sha256": sha256(path),
+                    "size": path.stat().st_size,
+                }
+            )
+    manifest = {
+        "commit": commit,
+        "file_count": len(manifest_files),
+        "files": manifest_files,
+        "tree_oid": tree_oid,
+    }
+    atomic_json(output / "manifest.json", manifest)
+    shutil.copyfile(source_tar, output / "rollback-source.tar")
+
+    closure = {
+        "artifact_sha256": sha256(source_tar),
+        "canary_evidence_sha256": sha256(output / "canary-evidence.json"),
+        "commit": commit,
+        "live_fixture_evidence_sha256": sha256(
+            output / "live-fixture-evidence.json"
+        ),
+        "manifest_sha256": sha256(output / "manifest.json"),
+        "no_git_canary": True,
+        "rollback_artifact_sha256": sha256(
+            output / "rollback-source.tar"
+        ),
+        "secret_scan_sha256": sha256(output / "secret-scan.json"),
+        "test_evidence_sha256": sha256(output / "test-evidence.json"),
+        "tree_oid": tree_oid,
+    }
+    atomic_json(output / "package-closure.json", closure)
+    closure["package_closure_sha256"] = sha256(
+        output / "package-closure.json"
+    )
+    checksummed = sorted(
+        path
+        for path in output.iterdir()
+        if path.is_file() and path.name != "checksums.sha256"
+    )
+    with (output / "checksums.sha256").open(
+        "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n"
+    ) as checksums:
+        for path in checksummed:
+            checksums.write(f"{sha256(path)}  {path.name}\n")
+    return closure
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--git-dir", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--commit", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--output", required=True, type=Path)
+    arguments = parser.parse_args()
+    result = build(
+        arguments.git_dir.resolve(),
+        arguments.commit,
+        arguments.output.resolve(),
+    )
+    print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

scripts/fault-injection/task_plane_faults.py

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Deterministic, local-only fault injection for Task Plane recovery."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import time
+from unittest import mock
+
+from app.task_plane.api import TaskPlaneService
+from app.task_plane.policy import PolicyEngine
+from app.task_plane.store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--database", required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    store = TaskPlaneStore(args.database)
+    service = TaskPlaneService(
+        store, policy=PolicyEngine(execution_enabled=True)
+    )
+    identity = "spiffe://aios/agent/codex/fault-injection"
+    service.register_worker(
+        {
+            "worker_id": "codex-fault-injection",
+            "worker_type": "codex",
+            "identity": identity,
+            "capabilities": ["test.execute"],
+            "trust_zone": "isolated-shadow",
+            "max_concurrency": 1,
+            "heartbeat_interval_seconds": 1,
+            "supported_protocols": ["aios-task-v1"],
+        }
+    )
+    task = service.create_task(
+        {"task_id": "task-fault-expired-lease", "required_capabilities": ["test.execute"]}
+    )
+    claim = service.claim(
+        task["task_id"],
+        {
+            "worker_id": "codex-fault-injection",
+            "actor_identity": identity,
+            "lease_seconds": 1,
+        },
+    )
+    with mock.patch("app.task_plane.store._now", return_value=time.time() + 5):
+        recovered = store.recover_expired_claim(
+            task["task_id"], claim["claim_id"], probe_confirms_stopped=True
+        )
+    output = {
+        "fault": "expired_lease",
+        "recovered_status": recovered.status,
+        "event_chain_valid": store.verify_event_chain(task["task_id"]),
+        "production_side_effects": False,
+    }
+    print(json.dumps(output, sort_keys=True))
+    store.close()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

scripts/generate_delivery_manifest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Generate the delivery file list from Git instead of hand-maintained counts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def git(root: Path, *args: str) -> list[str]:
+    output = subprocess.check_output(
+        ["git", *args], cwd=root, text=True, encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    return [line for line in output.splitlines() if line]
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--base", default="main")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--output",
+        default="reports/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-delivery.json",
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    root = Path(
+        subprocess.check_output(
+            ["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], text=True, encoding="utf-8"
+        ).strip()
+    )
+    output = Path(args.output)
+    if output.is_absolute() or ".." in output.parts:
+        raise SystemExit("output must remain inside the repository")
+    output_path = root / output
+    output_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    base_oid = git(root, "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{args.base}^{{commit}}")[0]
+    source_commit = git(root, "rev-parse", "--verify", "HEAD^{commit}")[0]
+    source_branch = git(root, "symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD")[0]
+    commit_range = f"{base_oid}..{source_commit}"
+    commits = git(root, "log", "--reverse", "--format=%H", commit_range)
+    files = [
+        path
+        for path in git(root, "diff", "--name-only", commit_range)
+        if path != output.as_posix()
+    ]
+    payload = {
+        "base": args.base,
+        "base_oid": base_oid,
+        "source_branch": source_branch,
+        "source_commit": source_commit,
+        "commit_count": len(commits),
+        "commits": commits,
+        "file_count": len(files),
+        "files": files,
+        "manifest_path": output.as_posix(),
+        "generated_from": {
+            "commit_range": commit_range,
+            "files_command": f"git diff --name-only {commit_range}",
+            "commits_command": f"git log --reverse --format=%H {commit_range}",
+        },
+    }
+    output_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

scripts/release_version.sh

@@ -1,23 +1,53 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-VERSION="${1:?version required, e.g. V1R1C0}"
-MESSAGE="${2:-release $VERSION}"
-if ! echo "$VERSION" | grep -Eq '^V[0-9]+R[0-9]+C[0-9]+$'; then echo "ERROR: version must match VxRxCx"; exit 1; fi
-cd "${AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE:-/data/aios-gitops/workspace}"
-git checkout main
-git pull origin main || true
-git tag -a "$VERSION" -m "$MESSAGE" || true
-git push origin "$VERSION" || true
-python3 - <<PY
-import json, datetime
-from pathlib import Path
-p=Path('baseline/current.json')
-if p.exists(): d=json.loads(p.read_text())
-else: p.parent.mkdir(exist_ok=True); d={}
-d['active_version']='$VERSION'; d['active_tag']='$VERSION'; d['updated_at']=datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).isoformat(); d['update_mode']='git_patch_only'
-p.write_text(json.dumps(d, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
-PY
-git add baseline/current.json || true
-git commit -m "release($VERSION): update active baseline" || true
-git push origin main || true
-echo "RELEASE_DONE $VERSION"
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+VERSION="${1:?version required, e.g. V2R1C4}"
+TARGET_OID="${2:?target_oid required}"
+EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID="${3:?evidence_closure_oid required}"
+APPROVAL_PLAN_ID="${4:?approval_plan_id required}"
+WORKSPACE="${AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE:-/data/aios-gitops/workspace}"
+TAG_REMOTE="${AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE:-gitea}"
+BRANCH_REMOTE="${AIOS_GITOPS_BRANCH_REMOTE:-gitea}"
+
+case "$VERSION" in
+  V[0-9]*R[0-9]*C[0-9]*) ;;
+  *) echo "ERROR: version must match VxRxCx" >&2; exit 64 ;;
+esac
+
+for value in "$TARGET_OID" "$EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID"; do
+  [[ "$value" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]] || {
+    echo "ERROR: target and evidence OIDs must be full lowercase 40-character OIDs" >&2
+    exit 64
+  }
+done
+
+[[ -n "$APPROVAL_PLAN_ID" ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: approval_plan_id is required" >&2
+  exit 64
+}
+
+cd "$WORKSPACE"
+BRANCH="$(git symbolic-ref --quiet --short HEAD)" || {
+  echo "ERROR: release must run on an isolated branch, not detached HEAD" >&2
+  exit 65
+}
+case "$BRANCH" in
+  main|master) echo "ERROR: direct main/master release writes are forbidden" >&2; exit 65 ;;
+esac
+
+python3 "$WORKSPACE/active-runtime/app/gitea_tag_publication.py" publish \
+  --workspace "$WORKSPACE" \
+  --remote "$TAG_REMOTE" \
+  --version "$VERSION" \
+  --target-oid "$TARGET_OID" \
+  --evidence-closure-oid "$EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID" \
+  --approval-plan-id "$APPROVAL_PLAN_ID"
+
+git add -- "baseline/current.json" "versions/$VERSION.json"
+if ! git diff --cached --quiet; then
+  git commit -m "release($VERSION): record Gitea-confirmed baseline"
+fi
+
+# No force, no main push, and no ignored failure.
+git push "$BRANCH_REMOTE" "HEAD:refs/heads/$BRANCH"
+echo "RELEASE_BASELINE_UPDATED $VERSION branch=$BRANCH"

scripts/run_silent_release_shadow_acceptance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Run two zero-side-effect Silent Release candidates in Shadow mode."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import dataclasses
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sys
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
+    Ed25519PrivateKey,
+)
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app"))
+
+from silent_release_controller import ReleaseCandidate, ReleaseState  # noqa: E402
+from silent_release_execution import (  # noqa: E402
+    LocalTestApprovalSigner,
+    LocalTestBuilderSigner,
+    PersistentSilentReleaseController,
+    SignedTrustedBuilderAdapter,
+)
+from silent_release_hardening import (  # noqa: E402
+    ApprovalKeyRing,
+    ApprovalRevocationStore,
+    BuilderAttestationVerifier,
+    DeploymentPlan,
+    FinalizationPlan,
+    ReleasePlan,
+    SignedApprovalVerifier,
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+    SilentReleaseActionService,
+    TagPlan,
+    TagPublicationProbeEvidence,
+    TrustedCandidateBundle,
+    TrustedReleasePolicy,
+    classify_tag_publication,
+)
+
+
+def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as source:
+        for block in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            digest.update(block)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def write_json(path: Path, value: object) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    temporary = path.with_suffix(path.suffix + ".tmp")
+    temporary.write_text(
+        json.dumps(value, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    temporary.replace(path)
+
+
+def oid(seed: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha1(seed.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def candidate_id(event_id: str, source_commit: str) -> str:
+    return "rc-shadow-" + hashlib.sha256(
+        f"{event_id}\0{source_commit}".encode("utf-8")
+    ).hexdigest()[:20]
+
+
+def make_plan(arguments: argparse.Namespace, candidate: str) -> ReleasePlan:
+    version = "shadow-" + candidate.removeprefix("rc-shadow-")
+    tag_oid = oid("tag:" + candidate)
+    approval_plan_id = "shadow-plan-" + candidate.removeprefix("rc-shadow-")
+    release_path = str(Path(arguments.release_path))
+    previous_baseline = arguments.baseline_before_sha256
+    return ReleasePlan(
+        deployment=DeploymentPlan(
+            service="aios-silent-release-controller",
+            release_path=release_path,
+            release_root=str(Path(release_path).parent.parent),
+            cutover_link=str(Path(release_path).parent.parent / "current"),
+            dropin_path=str(
+                Path(release_path)
+                / "deploy"
+                / "systemd"
+                / "aios-silent-release-controller.service"
+            ),
+            dropin_sha256=arguments.systemd_unit_sha256,
+            systemd_unit_sha256=arguments.systemd_unit_sha256,
+            rollback_path=str(Path(arguments.rollback_artifact)),
+            rollback_sha256=arguments.artifact_sha256,
+            source_commit=arguments.source_commit,
+            tree_oid=arguments.tree_oid,
+            artifact_sha256=arguments.artifact_sha256,
+            manifest_sha256=arguments.manifest_sha256,
+            package_closure_sha256=arguments.package_closure_sha256,
+            authoritative_git_dir=str(Path(arguments.repository)),
+            repository_identity=arguments.repository_identity,
+            writer_expected=False,
+            baseline_before_sha256=previous_baseline,
+            registry_before_sha256=arguments.registry_before_sha256,
+            production_tag_refset_before_sha256=(
+                arguments.tag_refset_before_sha256
+            ),
+            health_contract_version="shadow-health/v1",
+            timeout_policy={"health_seconds": 10},
+            retry_policy={"health_attempts": 1},
+            policy_sha256=arguments.policy_sha256,
+            health_contract={
+                "execution_enabled": False,
+                "shadow_mode": True,
+                "side_effects_executed": False,
+            },
+        ),
+        tag=TagPlan(
+            version=version,
+            tag_type="annotated",
+            expected_tag_oid=tag_oid,
+            expected_target_oid=arguments.source_commit,
+            evidence_closure_oid=arguments.source_commit,
+            approval_plan_id=approval_plan_id,
+            repository_identity=arguments.repository_identity,
+            gitea_owner="aios",
+            gitea_repository="aios",
+            current_remote_tag_oid=None,
+            remote_absent_evidence_sha256=hashlib.sha256(
+                f"shadow-only:{candidate}".encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest(),
+            verification_contract="shadow-no-tag-write/v1",
+        ),
+        finalization=FinalizationPlan(
+            version=version,
+            expected_tag_oid=tag_oid,
+            expected_target_oid=arguments.source_commit,
+            expected_previous_baseline_sha256=previous_baseline,
+            registry_expected_record={
+                "shadow_only": True,
+                "target_oid": arguments.source_commit,
+            },
+            baseline_expected_record={
+                "shadow_only": True,
+                "target_oid": arguments.source_commit,
+            },
+            final_consistency_contract="shadow-no-finalization/v1",
+        ),
+        policy_sha256=arguments.policy_sha256,
+    )
+
+
+def make_candidate(
+    arguments: argparse.Namespace, event_id: str
+) -> ReleaseCandidate:
+    return ReleaseCandidate(
+        candidate_id=candidate_id(event_id, arguments.source_commit),
+        source_commit=arguments.source_commit,
+        tree_oid=arguments.tree_oid,
+        artifact_sha256=arguments.artifact_sha256,
+        manifest_sha256=arguments.manifest_sha256,
+        tests={"passed": True, "source": "trusted-artifact-evidence"},
+        canary={"passed": True, "without_git": True},
+        rollback_ready=True,
+        git_consistency={"consistent": True},
+        gitea_consistency={"consistent": True},
+        approval_state="PENDING",
+        state=ReleaseState.READY_FOR_APPROVAL,
+    )
+
+
+def sign_approval(
+    service: SilentReleaseActionService,
+    signer: LocalTestApprovalSigner,
+    candidate: str,
+    nonce_suffix: str,
+) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+    release_candidate = service.candidates.load(candidate)
+    plan = service.release_plans.load(candidate)
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    unsigned = SignedReleasePlanApproval(
+        release_plan_id="shadow-release-" + candidate.removeprefix("rc-"),
+        candidate_id=candidate,
+        source_commit=release_candidate.source_commit,
+        tree_oid=release_candidate.tree_oid,
+        artifact_sha256=release_candidate.artifact_sha256,
+        manifest_sha256=release_candidate.manifest_sha256,
+        deployment_plan_sha256=plan.deployment.sha256,
+        release_plan_sha256=plan.sha256,
+        policy_sha256=plan.policy_sha256,
+        approval_plan_id=plan.tag.approval_plan_id,
+        evidence_closure_oid=plan.tag.evidence_closure_oid,
+        owner_approval_record_oid=oid("shadow-owner:" + candidate),
+        capabilities=(
+            "runtime_switch",
+            "tag_publish",
+            "baseline_registry_finalize",
+        ),
+        owner_identity="owner:shadow-acceptance-test",
+        trust_domain="aios.shadow",
+        issued_at=now.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        not_before=now.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        expires_at=(now + timedelta(minutes=10))
+        .isoformat()
+        .replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        nonce="shadow-nonce-" + nonce_suffix,
+        key_id=signer.key_id,
+        signature="",
+    )
+    return signer.sign(unsigned)
+
+
+def tag_probe_results(plan: TagPlan) -> dict[str, str]:
+    exact = TagPublicationProbeEvidence(
+        repository_identity=plan.repository_identity,
+        remote_reachable=True,
+        gitea_api_reachable=True,
+        gitea_listing_reachable=True,
+        remote_tag_oid=plan.expected_tag_oid,
+        annotated_tag_object_oid=plan.expected_tag_oid,
+        remote_peeled_target_oid=plan.expected_target_oid,
+        gitea_api_tag_oid=plan.expected_tag_oid,
+        gitea_api_peeled_target_oid=plan.expected_target_oid,
+        gitea_listing_visible=True,
+        gitea_listing_tag_oid=plan.expected_tag_oid,
+        gitea_listing_peeled_target_oid=plan.expected_target_oid,
+        observed_at=1,
+    )
+    absent = dataclasses.replace(
+        exact,
+        remote_tag_oid=None,
+        annotated_tag_object_oid=None,
+        remote_peeled_target_oid=None,
+        gitea_api_tag_oid=None,
+        gitea_api_peeled_target_oid=None,
+        gitea_listing_visible=False,
+        gitea_listing_tag_oid=None,
+        gitea_listing_peeled_target_oid=None,
+    )
+    indeterminate = dataclasses.replace(exact, gitea_api_reachable=False)
+    conflict = dataclasses.replace(exact, remote_tag_oid=oid("conflict"))
+    return {
+        "APPLIED_VERIFIED": classify_tag_publication(exact, plan).value,
+        "CONFLICT": classify_tag_publication(conflict, plan).value,
+        "INDETERMINATE": classify_tag_publication(
+            indeterminate, plan
+        ).value,
+        "NOT_APPLIED": classify_tag_publication(absent, plan).value,
+    }
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    value = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    value.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
+    value.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
+    value.add_argument("--release-path", required=True, type=Path)
+    value.add_argument("--rollback-artifact", required=True, type=Path)
+    value.add_argument("--source-commit", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--tree-oid", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--artifact-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--manifest-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--package-closure-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--policy-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--systemd-unit-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--baseline-before-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--registry-before-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--tag-refset-before-sha256", required=True)
+    value.add_argument("--repository-identity", default="aios/aios")
+    value.add_argument("--output", required=True, type=Path)
+    return value
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    arguments = parser().parse_args()
+    if sha256_file(arguments.rollback_artifact) != arguments.artifact_sha256:
+        raise SystemExit("rollback artifact hash mismatch")
+    unit_path = (
+        arguments.release_path
+        / "deploy"
+        / "systemd"
+        / "aios-silent-release-controller.service"
+    )
+    if sha256_file(unit_path) != arguments.systemd_unit_sha256:
+        raise SystemExit("systemd unit hash mismatch")
+
+    builder_signer = LocalTestBuilderSigner.generate()
+    builder_public = builder_signer.public_key.public_bytes(
+        serialization.Encoding.Raw,
+        serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
+    )
+    owner_private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+    owner_public = owner_private.public_key().public_bytes(
+        serialization.Encoding.Raw,
+        serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
+    )
+    owner_signer = LocalTestApprovalSigner(
+        "shadow-owner-ephemeral", owner_private
+    )
+
+    def collector(intent):
+        event_id = str(intent["event_id"])
+        candidate = make_candidate(arguments, event_id)
+        return TrustedCandidateBundle(
+            candidate=candidate,
+            release_plan=make_plan(arguments, candidate.candidate_id),
+            checks={
+                "authoritative_git": True,
+                "artifact": True,
+                "canary": True,
+                "gitea": True,
+                "manifest": True,
+                "package_closure": True,
+                "rollback": True,
+                "secret_scan": True,
+                "tests": True,
+            },
+        )
+
+    release_root = str(arguments.release_path.parent.parent)
+    dropin = str(
+        arguments.release_path
+        / "deploy"
+        / "systemd"
+        / "aios-silent-release-controller.service"
+    )
+    policy = TrustedReleasePolicy(
+        services=frozenset({"aios-silent-release-controller"}),
+        release_roots=frozenset({release_root}),
+        cutover_links=frozenset({str(Path(release_root) / "current")}),
+        dropin_paths=frozenset({dropin}),
+        authoritative_git_dirs=frozenset({str(arguments.repository)}),
+        repository_identities=frozenset(
+            {arguments.repository_identity}
+        ),
+    )
+    verifier = SignedApprovalVerifier(
+        ApprovalKeyRing({"shadow-owner-ephemeral": owner_public}),
+        ApprovalRevocationStore(arguments.state_root / "revocations"),
+        allowed_trust_domains={"aios.shadow"},
+    )
+    service = SilentReleaseActionService(
+        arguments.state_root,
+        execution_enabled=False,
+        approval_verifier=verifier,
+        candidate_builder=SignedTrustedBuilderAdapter(
+            collector, builder_signer
+        ),
+        builder_attestation_verifier=BuilderAttestationVerifier(
+            {builder_signer.key_id: builder_public}
+        ),
+        trusted_policy=policy,
+        expected_repository=arguments.repository_identity,
+        policy_sha256=arguments.policy_sha256,
+    )
+
+    first_event = "main-" + arguments.source_commit
+    first = service.create_release_intent(
+        {
+            "event_id": first_event,
+            "source_commit": arguments.source_commit,
+        }
+    )
+    first_duplicate = service.create_release_intent(
+        {
+            "event_id": first_event,
+            "source_commit": arguments.source_commit,
+        }
+    )
+    first_notification = service.ensure_owner_notification(
+        first["candidate_id"]
+    )
+    repeated_notification = service.ensure_owner_notification(
+        first["candidate_id"]
+    )
+    first_approval = sign_approval(
+        service, owner_signer, first["candidate_id"], "candidate-one"
+    )
+    first_submit = service.submit_owner_approval(
+        first_approval.to_dict()
+    )
+    first_submit_repeated = service.submit_owner_approval(
+        first_approval.to_dict()
+    )
+    first_start = service.start_deployment(first["candidate_id"])
+
+    second = service.create_release_intent(
+        {
+            "event_id": "shadow-indeterminate-" + arguments.source_commit,
+            "source_commit": arguments.source_commit,
+        }
+    )
+    second_plan = service.release_plans.load(second["candidate_id"])
+    probe_results = tag_probe_results(second_plan.tag)
+
+    first_controller = PersistentSilentReleaseController(
+        arguments.state_root,
+        service,
+        main_probe=lambda: arguments.source_commit,
+    )
+    controller_first = first_controller.run_once()
+    controller_restarted = PersistentSilentReleaseController(
+        arguments.state_root,
+        service,
+        main_probe=lambda: arguments.source_commit,
+    ).run_once()
+
+    report = {
+        "approval_backend": "ephemeral-shadow-test-only",
+        "artifact_sha256": arguments.artifact_sha256,
+        "builder_attestation": "VERIFIED",
+        "candidate_count": 2,
+        "candidates": [
+            {
+                "candidate_id": first["candidate_id"],
+                "duplicate_intent_idempotent": first_duplicate["idempotent"],
+                "notification_idempotent": (
+                    repeated_notification["idempotent"]
+                ),
+                "notification_initial_idempotent": (
+                    first_notification["idempotent"]
+                ),
+                "replayed_approval_status": (
+                    first_submit_repeated["status"]
+                ),
+                "shadow_start": first_start,
+                "signed_approval_status": first_submit["status"],
+            },
+            {
+                "candidate_id": second["candidate_id"],
+                "tag_publication_probe": "INDETERMINATE",
+            },
+        ],
+        "controller_restart_idempotent": (
+            controller_restarted["intent"]["idempotent"]
+        ),
+        "controller_restart_notification_idempotent": (
+            controller_restarted["notification"]["idempotent"]
+        ),
+        "controller_status": controller_first["startup"]["status"],
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+        "manifest_sha256": arguments.manifest_sha256,
+        "package_closure_sha256": arguments.package_closure_sha256,
+        "private_key_files_written": False,
+        "production_tag": "NOT_EXECUTED",
+        "repository_identity": arguments.repository_identity,
+        "shadow_mode": True,
+        "side_effects_executed": False,
+        "source_commit": arguments.source_commit,
+        "tag_probe_outcomes": probe_results,
+        "tree_oid": arguments.tree_oid,
+    }
+    write_json(arguments.output, report)
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "candidate_count": 2,
+                "execution_enabled": False,
+                "output": str(arguments.output),
+                "shadow_mode": True,
+                "side_effects_executed": False,
+                "status": "SHADOW_ACCEPTANCE_PASSED",
+            },
+            sort_keys=True,
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

scripts/task-plane/create_shadow_tasks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Create one authenticated, no-side-effect Task Plane Shadow task.
+
+The client deliberately has no worker, Git, deployment, or credential-writing
+capabilities.  Its token is accepted only from a protected file reference or
+stdin so that it cannot enter the process command line.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+MINIMUM_CLIENT_CAPABILITIES = (
+    "task.creator",
+    "task.read",
+    "task.events.read",
+    "task.evidence.read",
+)
+
+
+class ShadowClientError(RuntimeError):
+    """HTTP failure that intentionally carries no response body."""
+
+    def __init__(self, status: int):
+        super().__init__(f"shadow task request failed with HTTP {status}")
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _request_json(
+    base_url: str,
+    path: str,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    method: str = "GET",
+    payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    idempotency_key: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    headers = {
+        "Accept": "application/json",
+        "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
+    }
+    data = None
+    if payload is not None:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        data = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    if idempotency_key:
+        headers["Idempotency-Key"] = idempotency_key
+
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        base_url.rstrip("/") + path,
+        data=data,
+        headers=headers,
+        method=method,
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response:
+            body = response.read()
+            parsed = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8")) if body else {}
+            return response.status, parsed
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+        # Never read or print an error body: it could contain sensitive data.
+        raise ShadowClientError(error.code) from None
+    except urllib.error.URLError as error:
+        raise ShadowClientError(503) from error
+
+
+def run_shadow_client(
+    *,
+    base_url: str,
+    token: str,
+    task_id: str,
+    idempotency_key: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Create and read one deterministic Shadow task without executing it."""
+    create_status, _ = _request_json(
+        base_url,
+        "/tasks",
+        token,
+        method="POST",
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
+        payload={
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "task_type": "platform.shadow",
+            "risk": "low",
+            "approval_policy": "patch-only",
+            "metadata": {"production_side_effects": False},
+        },
+    )
+    task_status, task = _request_json(base_url, f"/tasks/{task_id}", token)
+    events_status, events = _request_json(base_url, f"/tasks/{task_id}/events", token)
+    evidence_status, evidence = _request_json(base_url, f"/tasks/{task_id}/evidence", token)
+    return {
+        "task_id": str(task.get("task_id", task_id)),
+        "status": str(task.get("status", "UNKNOWN")),
+        "event_count": len(events if isinstance(events, list) else events.get("events", [])),
+        "evidence_count": len(evidence if isinstance(evidence, list) else evidence.get("evidence", [])),
+        "http_statuses": {
+            "create": create_status,
+            "task": task_status,
+            "events": events_status,
+            "evidence": evidence_status,
+        },
+        "production_side_effects": False,
+    }
+
+
+def _reject_plaintext_token_argument(argv: list[str]) -> None:
+    if any(argument == "--token" or argument.startswith("--token=") for argument in argv):
+        raise SystemExit("plaintext token arguments are forbidden")
+
+
+def _read_token(args: argparse.Namespace) -> str:
+    if args.token_stdin:
+        token = sys.stdin.buffer.read().decode("utf-8").strip()
+    else:
+        token_file = args.token_file or os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_PLANE_TOKEN_FILE")
+        if not token_file:
+            raise SystemExit("runtime credential reference is required")
+        try:
+            token = Path(token_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        except OSError:
+            raise SystemExit("runtime credential reference is unavailable") from None
+    if not token:
+        raise SystemExit("runtime credential reference is unavailable")
+    return token
+
+
+def _write_report(path: Path, summary: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    encoded = (json.dumps(summary, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path.write_bytes(encoded)
+    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    argv = list(sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv)
+    _reject_plaintext_token_argument(argv)
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--base-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:18922")
+    token_group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
+    token_group.add_argument("--token-file", help="protected runtime credential reference")
+    token_group.add_argument("--token-stdin", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--task-id", default="AIOS-TASK-PLANE-SHADOW-CLIENT")
+    parser.add_argument("--idempotency-key", default="task-plane-shadow-client-v1")
+    parser.add_argument("--report", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    token = _read_token(args)
+    try:
+        summary = run_shadow_client(
+            base_url=args.base_url,
+            token=token,
+            task_id=args.task_id,
+            idempotency_key=args.idempotency_key,
+        )
+    except ShadowClientError as error:
+        print(f"http_status={error.status}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return error.status
+
+    report_sha256 = _write_report(args.report, summary)
+    print(f"task_id={summary['task_id']}")
+    print(f"status={summary['status']}")
+    print(f"event_count={summary['event_count']}")
+    print(f"evidence_count={summary['evidence_count']}")
+    print("http_statuses=" + json.dumps(summary["http_statuses"], sort_keys=True))
+    print(f"report_sha256={report_sha256}")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

scripts/task-plane/run_task_plane_acceptance.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+REPORT_PATH="${1:-reports/task-plane-acceptance.json}"
+mkdir -p "$(dirname "${REPORT_PATH}")"
+export TASKPLANE_REPORT="${REPORT_PATH}"
+export PYTHONPATH="${PYTHONPATH:-}:$(pwd)/active-runtime"
+
+python3 - <<'PY'
+import io
+import json
+import sys
+import unittest
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from contextlib import redirect_stdout
+
+report_path = Path(__import__('os').environ.get("TASKPLANE_REPORT", "reports/task-plane-acceptance.json"))
+stream = io.StringIO()
+
+loader = unittest.TestLoader()
+suite = loader.discover("tests/task_plane/public_interface", pattern="test_*.py")
+runner = unittest.TextTestRunner(stream=sys.stdout, verbosity=2)
+result = runner.run(suite)
+
+payload = {
+    "execution_status": "PARTIALLY_COMPLETED" if result.wasSuccessful() else "FAILED",
+    "tests_run": result.testsRun,
+    "failures": len(result.failures),
+    "errors": len(result.errors),
+    "skipped": len(result.skipped),
+    "multi_agent_shadow_verified": result.wasSuccessful(),
+    "production_side_effects": False,
+    "notification_delivery_status": "NOT_DELIVERED",
+}
+report_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+report_path.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+print(f"acceptance_report={report_path}")
+sys.exit(0 if result.wasSuccessful() else 1)
+PY

scripts/verify_gitea_credential_rotation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Verify a Gitea credential rotation without printing either credential."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import subprocess
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def token_at(path: Path, line: int) -> str:
+    lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
+    if line < 1 or line > len(lines) or not lines[line - 1].strip():
+        raise RuntimeError("credential reference has no configured token line")
+    return lines[line - 1].strip()
+
+
+def get(api: str, path: str, token: str) -> tuple[int, object | None]:
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        api.rstrip("/") + path,
+        headers={
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "Authorization": f"token {token}",
+            "User-Agent": "aios-gitops-credential-rotation-verifier/1",
+        },
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+            return response.status, json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        return exc.code, None
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--old-token-file", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--new-credential-file", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--new-token-line", type=int, default=2)
+    parser.add_argument("--api", default="http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1")
+    parser.add_argument("--repository", default="aios/aios")
+    parser.add_argument("--version", default="V2R1C2")
+    parser.add_argument("--workspace", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--remote", default="http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--branch",
+        default="patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    old_token = token_at(args.old_token_file, 1)
+    new_token = token_at(args.new_credential_file, args.new_token_line)
+    repo_path = f"/repos/{args.repository}"
+    old_status, _ = get(args.api, repo_path, old_token)
+    new_status, _ = get(args.api, repo_path, new_token)
+    encoded = urllib.parse.quote(args.version, safe="")
+    ref_status, ref = get(
+        args.api,
+        f"{repo_path}/git/refs/tags/{encoded}",
+        new_token,
+    )
+    listing_status, listing = get(
+        args.api,
+        f"{repo_path}/tags?limit=50&page=1",
+        new_token,
+    )
+    refs = ref if isinstance(ref, list) else [ref]
+    exact = [
+        item
+        for item in refs
+        if isinstance(item, dict)
+        and item.get("ref") in {
+            f"refs/tags/{args.version}",
+            f"tags/{args.version}",
+        }
+    ]
+    tag_oid = (
+        str(((exact[0].get("object") or {}).get("sha")) or "").lower()
+        if len(exact) == 1
+        else None
+    )
+    tag_status, tag = (
+        get(args.api, f"{repo_path}/git/tags/{tag_oid}", new_token)
+        if tag_oid
+        else (0, None)
+    )
+    peeled_target = (
+        str(((tag.get("object") or {}).get("sha")) or "").lower()
+        if isinstance(tag, dict)
+        else None
+    )
+    listing_target = None
+    if isinstance(listing, list):
+        for item in listing:
+            if item.get("name") == args.version:
+                listing_target = str(
+                    ((item.get("commit") or {}).get("sha")) or ""
+                ).lower()
+                break
+    remote = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            "git",
+            "-c",
+            f"safe.directory={args.workspace}",
+            "-c",
+            "credential.helper=!/usr/local/libexec/aios-gitea-credential",
+            "-c",
+            "credential.useHttpPath=true",
+            "-C",
+            str(args.workspace),
+            "ls-remote",
+            args.remote,
+            f"refs/heads/{args.branch}",
+        ],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    remote_oid = (
+        remote.stdout.split()[0].lower()
+        if remote.returncode == 0 and remote.stdout.split()
+        else None
+    )
+    result = {
+        "old_token_repository_http": old_status,
+        "new_token_repository_http": new_status,
+        "git_ls_remote_oid": remote_oid,
+        "gitea_ref_http": ref_status,
+        "gitea_tag_oid": tag_oid,
+        "gitea_tag_object_http": tag_status,
+        "gitea_peeled_target_oid": peeled_target,
+        "gitea_listing_http": listing_status,
+        "gitea_listing_target_oid": listing_target,
+        "credentials_printed": False,
+    }
+    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    passed = (
+        old_status in {401, 403}
+        and new_status == 200
+        and remote_oid is not None
+        and ref_status == 200
+        and tag_oid is not None
+        and tag_status == 200
+        and peeled_target is not None
+        and listing_status == 200
+        and listing_target is not None
+    )
+    return 0 if passed else 2
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

security/incidents/GITEA-TOKEN-33-EXPOSURE-20260723.redacted.json

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "exposure_window": {
+    "detected_at": "2026-07-23T13:40:23+08:00",
+    "revoked_at": "2026-07-23T13:40:56+08:00",
+    "start": "2026-07-23T12:00:00+08:00",
+    "start_accuracy": "bounded approximation; precise platform tool-log timestamp unavailable"
+  },
+  "gitea_tag_read_validation": {
+    "listing_target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+    "peeled_target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+    "tag_mutation_performed": false,
+    "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+    "version": "V2R1C2"
+  },
+  "impact_scope": "Gitea repository write access for gitops-bot; no evidence of unauthorized use observed during rotation checks",
+  "incident_id": "GITEA-TOKEN-33-EXPOSURE-20260723",
+  "log_handling": {
+    "credential_values_in_record": false,
+    "reason": "formal audit/tool logs must not be deleted",
+    "server_redacted_record_mode": "0640 root:gitops",
+    "source_tool_log_deleted": false
+  },
+  "new_credential_reference": "/etc/aios-gitops/credentials/gitea-git-http",
+  "new_token_validation": {
+    "after_revoke_repository_http": 200,
+    "before_revoke_repository_http": 200,
+    "git_ls_remote_oid": "54093d15437ce0af31acf6feeeffacf6626a59cd",
+    "idempotent_branch_push": true
+  },
+  "old_token_validation": {
+    "after_revoke_repository_http": 401,
+    "before_revoke_repository_http": 200
+  },
+  "production_tag_operation": "NOT_EXECUTED",
+  "replacement_token_record_id": 50,
+  "scope": "write:repository",
+  "token_id": 33
+}

services/aios-single-owner-governance/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# AIOS Single-Owner Governance Prerequisites
+
+This package is a dormant candidate produced under the PR #29 prerequisite
+authorization. It validates exact-head Owner approvals and machine gates,
+models protection-policy compare-and-swap with compensation, builds evidence,
+and exercises every mutation path only against disposable fixtures.
+
+The prerequisite shadow services remain static and refuse live mutation. This
+branch adds a separate, one-shot activation executor with `--plan`,
+`--activate`, `--verify`, `--rollback`, and `--status` commands. It is not an
+always-on writer and never enables global GitOps writes.
+
+The executor is fail-closed: every consequential command is bound to an exact
+approval merge, governance OID, evidence closure, Owner review, component
+digests, full branch-protection snapshot, operation ID, and plan ID. It writes
+a fsynced WAL before the single-row SQLite CAS, verifies the full applied row,
+and only rolls back with a target-to-previous CAS. Audit records are
+hash-chained and credentials are redacted.
+
+## Hardening Contract
+
+Fresh activation is authorized only before the approved `expires_at` instant.
+An already-recorded `PREPARED` transaction may recover after expiry only to
+reach a safe terminal state using the same exact bindings; `--verify` and
+`--rollback` remain available for that recorded transaction after expiry.
+`ROLLED_BACK` and `FAILED` are terminal states and must never be replayed as a
+new activation.
+
+The approved execution binding must pin the implementation commit and its
+exact tree, the installed hashes of the five runtime source files
+(`activation.py`, `gitea_protected_branch.py`, `journal.py`, `validator.py`,
+and `state_machine.py`), and independent SHA-256 values for the deployment
+artifact, rollback artifact, and test evidence. It must also bind an evidence
+closure that is a commit with the exact direct parent and exactly one approved
+closure file, including that file's Git blob OID and SHA-256.
+
+Every required machine status is accepted only when its exact status record,
+creator identity, producer provenance, target URL, description digest, head
+OID, state, and observation time match the approved binding. A fixture status
+or a dormant self-check is not machine-status producer provenance.
+
+This contract hardens validation; it does not authorize deployment. The
+existing governed approval rules still apply, and installation remains
+disabled and inactive until the required merged approval authorizes one
+explicit execution.
+
+Installation must remain disabled and inactive until a merged
+`SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_LIVE_ACTIVATION_IMPLEMENTATION_AND_EXECUTION`
+approval authorizes one explicit execution. The approved runtime paths are
+`/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation/` and
+`/run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock`.

services/aios-single-owner-governance/activation-bindings.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "properties": {
+    "activation_approval_merge_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "activation_approval_pr_number": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+    "activation_manifest_blob_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "activation_manifest_path": {"pattern": "^approvals/.+\\.json$", "type": "string"},
+    "activation_manifest_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "artifact_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+    "artifact_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "approval_db_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "approval_request_head_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "backend": {"enum": ["file", "sqlite"]},
+    "backend_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "branch": {"const": "governance/approvals"},
+    "evidence_closure_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "evidence_closure_path": {"pattern": "^(?!/)(?!.*\\.\\.).+", "type": "string"},
+    "evidence_closure_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "evidence_git_dir": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "executor": {"not": {"const": "owner"}, "type": "string"},
+    "expected_branch_protection_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_governance_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_state_machine_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_validator_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expires_at": {"format": "date-time", "type": "string"},
+    "forbidden_operations": {"additionalProperties": {"const": false}, "type": "object"},
+    "governance_git_dir": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "governance_ref": {"const": "refs/heads/governance/approvals"},
+    "implementation_commit_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "implementation_tree_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "machine_status_producer_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+    "machine_status_producer_name": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "machine_checks": {
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "aios/branch-protection": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/evidence-closure": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/secret-scan": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/state-machine": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/validator": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"}
+      },
+      "required": ["aios/branch-protection", "aios/evidence-closure", "aios/secret-scan", "aios/state-machine", "aios/validator"],
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    "observed_evidence_closure_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "observed_governance_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "observed_owner_review_oid": {"type": ["integer", "string"]},
+    "observed_state_machine_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "observed_validator_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "operation_id": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "owner_review_oid": {"type": ["integer", "string"]},
+    "repo_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+    "requester": {"not": {"const": "owner"}, "type": "string"},
+    "rollback_artifact_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+    "rollback_artifact_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "runtime_sources": {
+      "items": {
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "properties": {
+          "git_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+          "runtime_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+          "sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"}
+        },
+        "required": ["git_path", "runtime_path", "sha256"],
+        "type": "object"
+      },
+      "maxItems": 5,
+      "minItems": 5,
+      "type": "array"
+    },
+    "state_machine_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "target_branch_protection": {"type": "object"},
+    "task_id": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "test_evidence_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+    "test_evidence_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "validator_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "wip": {"const": false}
+  },
+  "$defs": {
+    "machineCheck": {
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "head_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+        "status_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+        "creator_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+        "creator_login": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+        "state": {"const": "success"}
+      },
+      "required": ["state", "head_oid", "status_id", "creator_id", "creator_login"],
+      "type": "object"
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "task_id", "operation_id", "expected_governance_oid", "observed_governance_oid",
+    "expected_validator_sha256", "observed_validator_sha256", "validator_path",
+    "expected_state_machine_sha256", "observed_state_machine_sha256", "state_machine_path",
+    "expected_branch_protection_sha256", "expected_gitea_schema_sha256",
+    "activation_approval_merge_oid", "activation_approval_pr_number", "approval_request_head_oid",
+    "activation_manifest_path", "activation_manifest_blob_oid", "activation_manifest_sha256",
+    "evidence_closure_oid", "observed_evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_git_dir",
+    "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+    "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+    "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path", "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+    "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+    "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+    "owner_review_oid", "observed_owner_review_oid", "approval_db_path", "expires_at",
+    "governance_git_dir", "governance_ref", "machine_checks", "forbidden_operations",
+    "target_branch_protection", "backend", "backend_path", "repo_id", "branch",
+    "requester", "executor", "wip"
+  ],
+  "title": "AIOS Single Owner Live Activation Bindings",
+  "type": "object"
+}

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+"""Dormant single-owner governance activation prerequisites."""
+
+from .models import (
+    ApprovalContext,
+    GovernanceState,
+    MachineGate,
+    ProtectionSnapshot,
+    Review,
+)
+from .validator import SingleOwnerApprovalValidator, ValidationDenied
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ApprovalContext",
+    "GovernanceState",
+    "MachineGate",
+    "ProtectionSnapshot",
+    "Review",
+    "SingleOwnerApprovalValidator",
+    "ValidationDenied",
+]

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/activation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,860 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+from typing import Any, Iterator, Mapping, Protocol
+
+try:
+    import fcntl
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover
+    fcntl = None
+
+from .gitea_protected_branch import (
+    CASConflict,
+    FileProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    calculate_snapshot_sha256,
+)
+from .journal import JournalStore, atomic_write_json, read_json, redact, sha256_json
+from . import state_machine as state_machine_module
+from . import validator as validator_module
+
+
+DEFAULT_STATE_ROOT = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation")
+DEFAULT_LOCK_PATH = Path("/run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock")
+LIVE_GITEA_DB = Path("/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db")
+LIVE_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT = Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
+HEX40 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+REQUIRED_BINDINGS = {
+    "task_id",
+    "operation_id",
+    "expected_governance_oid",
+    "expected_validator_sha256",
+    "expected_state_machine_sha256",
+    "expected_branch_protection_sha256",
+    "activation_approval_merge_oid",
+    "evidence_closure_oid",
+    "owner_review_oid",
+    "observed_governance_oid",
+    "observed_validator_sha256",
+    "observed_state_machine_sha256",
+    "observed_evidence_closure_oid",
+    "observed_owner_review_oid",
+    "approval_request_head_oid",
+    "activation_approval_pr_number",
+    "expires_at",
+    "validator_path",
+    "state_machine_path",
+    "governance_git_dir",
+    "governance_ref",
+    "evidence_git_dir",
+    "approval_db_path",
+    "expected_gitea_schema_sha256",
+    "backend",
+    "backend_path",
+    "repo_id",
+    "branch",
+    "activation_manifest_path",
+    "activation_manifest_blob_oid",
+    "activation_manifest_sha256",
+    "implementation_commit_oid",
+    "implementation_tree_oid",
+    "runtime_sources",
+    "artifact_path",
+    "artifact_sha256",
+    "rollback_artifact_path",
+    "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+    "test_evidence_path",
+    "test_evidence_sha256",
+    "evidence_closure_path",
+    "evidence_closure_sha256",
+    "machine_status_producer_id",
+    "machine_status_producer_name",
+}
+REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS = {
+    "aios/validator",
+    "aios/state-machine",
+    "aios/branch-protection",
+    "aios/secret-scan",
+    "aios/evidence-closure",
+}
+REQUIRED_RUNTIME_GIT_PATHS = {
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/activation.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/gitea_protected_branch.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/journal.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/state_machine.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/validator.py",
+}
+
+
+class InjectedCrash(BaseException):
+    pass
+
+
+class Adapter(Protocol):
+    def read_current(self) -> dict[str, Any]: ...
+    def calculate_snapshot_sha256(self, snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str: ...
+    def apply_atomic(self, expected_sha256: str, target: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]: ...
+    def verify_applied(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool: ...
+    def rollback_atomic(self, expected_target_sha256: str, previous: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]: ...
+    def verify_rollback(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def exclusive_lock(path: Path) -> Iterator[None]:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o640)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+        yield
+    finally:
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+def _require_hex(name: str, value: object, lengths: tuple[int, ...]) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) not in lengths or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]+", value):
+        raise RuntimeError(f"{name.upper()}_INVALID")
+
+
+def _sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    if not path.is_absolute() or not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("VERIFIED_COMPONENT_PATH_INVALID")
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as handle:
+        for block in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            digest.update(block)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def _git(git_dir: Path, *args: str) -> str:
+    if not git_dir.is_absolute() or not git_dir.exists() or git_dir.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_OBJECT_STORE_INVALID")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_EVIDENCE_VERIFICATION_FAILED")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def _git_raw(git_dir: Path, *args: str) -> bytes:
+    if not git_dir.is_absolute() or not git_dir.exists() or git_dir.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_OBJECT_STORE_INVALID")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args], capture_output=True, check=False
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_EVIDENCE_VERIFICATION_FAILED")
+    return result.stdout
+
+
+def _parse_utc(value: object) -> datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise RuntimeError("EXPIRY_INVALID")
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("EXPIRY_INVALID") from exc
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("EXPIRY_INVALID")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _approved_execution_binding(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "task_id": bindings["task_id"],
+        "operation_id": bindings["operation_id"],
+        "expected_validator_sha256": bindings["expected_validator_sha256"],
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256": bindings["expected_state_machine_sha256"],
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256": bindings["expected_branch_protection_sha256"],
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": bindings["expected_gitea_schema_sha256"],
+        "target_branch_protection_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(
+            bindings["target_branch_protection"]
+        ),
+        "evidence_closure_oid": bindings["evidence_closure_oid"],
+        "evidence_closure_path": bindings["evidence_closure_path"],
+        "evidence_closure_sha256": bindings["evidence_closure_sha256"],
+        "implementation_commit_oid": bindings["implementation_commit_oid"],
+        "implementation_tree_oid": bindings["implementation_tree_oid"],
+        "runtime_sources": bindings["runtime_sources"],
+        "artifact_path": bindings["artifact_path"],
+        "artifact_sha256": bindings["artifact_sha256"],
+        "rollback_artifact_path": bindings["rollback_artifact_path"],
+        "rollback_artifact_sha256": bindings["rollback_artifact_sha256"],
+        "test_evidence_path": bindings["test_evidence_path"],
+        "test_evidence_sha256": bindings["test_evidence_sha256"],
+        "machine_status_producer_id": bindings["machine_status_producer_id"],
+        "machine_status_producer_name": bindings["machine_status_producer_name"],
+        "backend": bindings["backend"],
+        "repo_id": bindings["repo_id"],
+        "branch": bindings["branch"],
+        "requester": bindings["requester"],
+        "executor": bindings["executor"],
+        "forbidden_operations": bindings["forbidden_operations"],
+    }
+
+
+def _same_path(left: Path, right: Path) -> bool:
+    try:
+        return left.resolve(strict=True) == right.resolve(strict=True) and os.path.samefile(left, right)
+    except (FileNotFoundError, OSError):
+        return False
+
+
+def _verify_authority_paths(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if bindings["backend"] != "sqlite":
+        return
+    approval_db = Path(str(bindings["approval_db_path"]))
+    backend_db = Path(str(bindings["backend_path"]))
+    if not _same_path(approval_db, backend_db):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_DB_BACKEND_DB_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    live = _same_path(backend_db, LIVE_GITEA_DB)
+    if live:
+        if not _same_path(Path(str(bindings["governance_git_dir"])), LIVE_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT):
+            raise RuntimeError("AUTHORITATIVE_GOVERNANCE_GIT_REQUIRED")
+        if not _same_path(Path(str(bindings["evidence_git_dir"])), LIVE_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT):
+            raise RuntimeError("AUTHORITATIVE_EVIDENCE_GIT_REQUIRED")
+        return
+    acceptance_root = os.environ.get("AIOS_GOVERNANCE_ACTIVATION_ACCEPTANCE_ROOT")
+    if not acceptance_root:
+        raise RuntimeError("NON_LIVE_SQLITE_BACKEND_DENIED")
+    root = Path(acceptance_root).resolve(strict=True)
+    if not str(root).startswith("/run/aios-live-activation-acceptance-"):
+        raise RuntimeError("ACCEPTANCE_ROOT_INVALID")
+    for path in (approval_db, backend_db, Path(str(bindings["governance_git_dir"])), Path(str(bindings["evidence_git_dir"]))):
+        try:
+            path.resolve(strict=True).relative_to(root)
+        except (FileNotFoundError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACCEPTANCE_AUTHORITY_ESCAPE_DENIED") from exc
+
+
+def _load_approved_manifest(bindings: Mapping[str, Any], git_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    path = str(bindings["activation_manifest_path"])
+    if not path.startswith("approvals/") or not path.endswith(".json") or ".." in Path(path).parts:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_PATH_INVALID")
+    merge_oid = str(bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"])
+    blob_oid = _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", f"{merge_oid}:{path}")
+    if blob_oid != bindings["activation_manifest_blob_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_BLOB_MISMATCH")
+    raw_result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", "show", f"{merge_oid}:{path}"],
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if raw_result.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_READ_FAILED")
+    if hashlib.sha256(raw_result.stdout).hexdigest() != bindings["activation_manifest_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+    try:
+        manifest = json.loads(raw_result.stdout)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(manifest, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_INVALID")
+    return manifest
+
+
+def _require_approval_unexpired(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if _utc_now() >= _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"]):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+
+
+def _safe_git_path(value: object) -> str:
+    path = str(value)
+    if not path or Path(path).is_absolute() or ".." in Path(path).parts:
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_GIT_PATH_INVALID")
+    return path
+
+
+def _verify_approved_entities(bindings: Mapping[str, Any], git_dir: Path) -> None:
+    implementation_oid = str(bindings["implementation_commit_oid"])
+    _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-e", f"{implementation_oid}^{{commit}}")
+    if _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", f"{implementation_oid}^{{tree}}") != bindings["implementation_tree_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("IMPLEMENTATION_TREE_MISMATCH")
+    sources = bindings["runtime_sources"]
+    if not isinstance(sources, list) or not sources:
+        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCES_INVALID")
+    seen_git: set[str] = set()
+    seen_runtime: set[str] = set()
+    loaded_runtime_paths = {
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/activation.py": Path(__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/gitea_protected_branch.py": Path(__import__(SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter.__module__, fromlist=["x"]).__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/journal.py": Path(__import__(JournalStore.__module__, fromlist=["x"]).__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/state_machine.py": Path(state_machine_module.__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/validator.py": Path(validator_module.__file__).resolve(),
+    }
+    for source in sources:
+        if not isinstance(source, dict) or set(source) != {"git_path", "runtime_path", "sha256"}:
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        git_path = _safe_git_path(source["git_path"])
+        runtime_path = str(source["runtime_path"])
+        _require_hex("runtime_source_sha256", source["sha256"], (64,))
+        if git_path in seen_git or runtime_path in seen_runtime:
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_BINDING_DUPLICATE")
+        seen_git.add(git_path)
+        seen_runtime.add(runtime_path)
+        if Path(runtime_path).resolve() != loaded_runtime_paths.get(git_path):
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_PATH_MISMATCH")
+        if hashlib.sha256(_git_raw(git_dir, "show", f"{implementation_oid}:{git_path}")).hexdigest() != source["sha256"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("IMPLEMENTATION_SOURCE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        if _sha256_file(Path(runtime_path)) != source["sha256"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if seen_git != REQUIRED_RUNTIME_GIT_PATHS:
+        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_SET_MISMATCH")
+    for prefix in ("artifact", "rollback_artifact", "test_evidence"):
+        if _sha256_file(Path(str(bindings[f"{prefix}_path"]))) != bindings[f"{prefix}_sha256"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_ENTITY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+
+    closure_oid = str(bindings["evidence_closure_oid"])
+    if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", closure_oid) != "commit":
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_NOT_COMMIT")
+    parents = _git(git_dir, "rev-list", "--parents", "-n", "1", closure_oid).split()
+    if parents != [closure_oid, implementation_oid]:
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_PARENT_MISMATCH")
+    closure_path = _safe_git_path(bindings["evidence_closure_path"])
+    if hashlib.sha256(_git_raw(git_dir, "show", f"{closure_oid}:{closure_path}")).hexdigest() != bindings["evidence_closure_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+    if _git(git_dir, "diff", "--name-status", implementation_oid, closure_oid) != f"A\t{closure_path}":
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DIFF_INVALID")
+
+
+def _verify_external_evidence(
+    bindings: Mapping[str, Any], *, require_unexpired: bool = True
+) -> None:
+    _verify_authority_paths(bindings)
+    validator_sha = _sha256_file(Path(str(bindings["validator_path"])))
+    state_machine_sha = _sha256_file(Path(str(bindings["state_machine_path"])))
+    if validator_sha != bindings["expected_validator_sha256"] or validator_sha != bindings["observed_validator_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("VALIDATOR_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if state_machine_sha != bindings["expected_state_machine_sha256"] or state_machine_sha != bindings["observed_state_machine_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_MACHINE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+
+    governance_git_dir = Path(str(bindings["governance_git_dir"]))
+    governance_oid = _git(governance_git_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", str(bindings["governance_ref"]))
+    if governance_oid != bindings["expected_governance_oid"] or governance_oid != bindings["observed_governance_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_GOVERNANCE_OID_DENIED")
+    merge_oid = str(bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"])
+    _git(governance_git_dir, "cat-file", "-e", f"{merge_oid}^{{commit}}")
+    if subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={governance_git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", merge_oid, governance_oid],
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    ).returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_NOT_IN_GOVERNANCE_REF")
+    manifest = _load_approved_manifest(bindings, governance_git_dir)
+    if manifest.get("approval_type") != "SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_LIVE_ACTIVATION_IMPLEMENTATION_AND_EXECUTION":
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_TYPE_MISMATCH")
+    if manifest.get("execution_binding") != _approved_execution_binding(bindings):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    if manifest.get("execution_binding_sha256") != sha256_json(manifest["execution_binding"]):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+    if manifest.get("expires_at") != bindings["expires_at"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_EXPIRY_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+
+    manifest_bound_fields = (
+        "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+        "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path",
+        "rollback_artifact_sha256", "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+        "evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+        "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+    )
+    if any(manifest.get(field) != bindings[field] for field in manifest_bound_fields):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_ARTIFACT_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+
+    evidence_git_dir = Path(str(bindings["evidence_git_dir"]))
+    evidence_oid = str(bindings["evidence_closure_oid"])
+    if evidence_oid != bindings["observed_evidence_closure_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DENIED")
+    _verify_approved_entities(bindings, evidence_git_dir)
+
+    db_path = Path(str(bindings["approval_db_path"]))
+    if not db_path.is_absolute() or not db_path.is_file() or db_path.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_DATABASE_INVALID")
+    expiry = _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"])
+    if require_unexpired:
+        _require_approval_unexpired(bindings)
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{db_path}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        pr = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT pr.issue_id,pr.has_merged,pr.merged_commit_id,pr.merged_unix,i.is_closed "
+            "FROM pull_request pr JOIN issue i ON i.id=pr.issue_id "
+            "WHERE i.repo_id=? AND pr.\"index\"=? AND pr.base_branch=?",
+            (int(bindings["repo_id"]), int(bindings["activation_approval_pr_number"]), str(bindings["branch"])),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if pr is None or int(pr["has_merged"]) != 1 or int(pr["is_closed"]) != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_PR_NOT_MERGED")
+        if pr["merged_commit_id"] != bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_MERGE_MISMATCH")
+        if int(pr["merged_unix"] or 0) <= 0 or datetime.fromtimestamp(int(pr["merged_unix"]), timezone.utc) > expiry:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_MERGED_AFTER_EXPIRY")
+        review = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT r.id,r.type,r.reviewer_id,r.commit_id,r.stale,r.dismissed,r.created_unix,u.lower_name "
+            "FROM review r JOIN user u ON u.id=r.reviewer_id WHERE r.id=? AND r.issue_id=?",
+            (int(bindings["owner_review_oid"]), int(pr["issue_id"])),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if review is None or int(review["id"]) != int(bindings["observed_owner_review_oid"]):
+            raise RuntimeError("WRONG_APPROVAL_OID_DENIED")
+        if (
+            int(review["type"]) != 1
+            or int(review["reviewer_id"]) != 2
+            or review["lower_name"] != "owner"
+            or review["commit_id"] != bindings["approval_request_head_oid"]
+            or int(review["stale"]) != 0
+            or int(review["dismissed"]) != 0
+            or datetime.fromtimestamp(int(review["created_unix"]), timezone.utc) >= expiry
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("OWNER_APPROVAL_INVALID")
+        statuses = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT cs.id,cs.context,cs.state,cs.sha,cs.creator_id,u.lower_name AS creator_login "
+            "FROM commit_status cs LEFT JOIN user u ON u.id=cs.creator_id "
+            "WHERE cs.repo_id=? AND cs.sha=? ORDER BY cs.id DESC",
+            (int(bindings["repo_id"]), str(bindings["approval_request_head_oid"])),
+        ).fetchall()
+        observed: dict[str, sqlite3.Row] = {}
+        for row in statuses:
+            if row["context"] in REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS:
+                observed.setdefault(row["context"], row)
+        if set(observed) != REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS:
+            raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_SET_MISMATCH")
+        for context, row in observed.items():
+            if row["state"] != "success" or row["sha"] != bindings["approval_request_head_oid"]:
+                raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_FAILED")
+            if (
+                int(row["creator_id"] or 0) != int(bindings["machine_status_producer_id"])
+                or row["creator_login"] != bindings["machine_status_producer_name"]
+            ):
+                raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_PRODUCER_MISMATCH")
+            expected = bindings["machine_checks"][context]
+            actual = {
+                "state": row["state"], "head_oid": row["sha"], "status_id": int(row["id"]),
+                "creator_id": int(row["creator_id"]), "creator_login": row["creator_login"],
+            }
+            if expected != actual:
+                raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+
+
+def validate_bindings(
+    bindings: Mapping[str, Any], *, require_unexpired: bool = True
+) -> None:
+    missing = sorted(REQUIRED_BINDINGS - set(bindings))
+    if missing:
+        raise RuntimeError("MISSING_BINDINGS:" + ",".join(missing))
+    for name in (
+        "expected_governance_oid",
+        "activation_approval_merge_oid",
+        "evidence_closure_oid",
+        "implementation_commit_oid",
+        "implementation_tree_oid",
+    ):
+        _require_hex(name, bindings[name], (40,))
+    for name in (
+        "expected_validator_sha256",
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256",
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256",
+        "observed_validator_sha256",
+        "observed_state_machine_sha256",
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256",
+        "activation_manifest_sha256",
+        "artifact_sha256",
+        "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+        "test_evidence_sha256",
+        "evidence_closure_sha256",
+    ):
+        _require_hex(name, bindings[name], (64,))
+    _require_hex("activation_manifest_blob_oid", bindings["activation_manifest_blob_oid"], (40, 64))
+    if not isinstance(bindings["owner_review_oid"], (int, str)) or str(bindings["owner_review_oid"]).strip() == "":
+        raise RuntimeError("OWNER_REVIEW_OID_INVALID")
+    if bindings["governance_ref"] != "refs/heads/governance/approvals":
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_REF_INVALID")
+    if bindings["branch"] != "governance/approvals":
+        raise RuntimeError("BRANCH_BINDING_DENIED")
+    if bindings["backend"] not in {"file", "sqlite"}:
+        raise RuntimeError("UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_BACKEND")
+    if bindings["observed_governance_oid"] != bindings["expected_governance_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_GOVERNANCE_OID_DENIED")
+    if bindings["observed_evidence_closure_oid"] != bindings["evidence_closure_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DENIED")
+    if str(bindings["observed_owner_review_oid"]) != str(bindings["owner_review_oid"]):
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_APPROVAL_OID_DENIED")
+    if bindings.get("requester") == "owner":
+        raise RuntimeError("REQUESTER_SELF_APPROVAL_DENIED")
+    if bindings.get("executor") == "owner":
+        raise RuntimeError("EXECUTOR_SELF_APPROVAL_DENIED")
+    if bindings.get("wip") is not False:
+        raise RuntimeError("WIP_BLOCKED")
+    checks = bindings.get("machine_checks")
+    if not isinstance(checks, dict) or set(checks) != REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS:
+        raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_SET_MISMATCH")
+    if not isinstance(bindings["machine_status_producer_id"], int) or bindings["machine_status_producer_id"] < 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_STATUS_PRODUCER_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(bindings["machine_status_producer_name"], str) or not bindings["machine_status_producer_name"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_STATUS_PRODUCER_INVALID")
+    for context, check in checks.items():
+        if (
+            not isinstance(check, dict)
+            or set(check) != {"state", "head_oid", "status_id", "creator_id", "creator_login"}
+            or check.get("state") != "success"
+            or check.get("head_oid") != bindings["approval_request_head_oid"]
+            or not isinstance(check.get("status_id"), int)
+            or check.get("status_id") < 1
+            or check.get("creator_id") != bindings["machine_status_producer_id"]
+            or check.get("creator_login") != bindings["machine_status_producer_name"]
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"MACHINE_GATE_FAILED:{context}")
+    forbidden = bindings.get("forbidden_operations", {})
+    if any(bool(value) for value in forbidden.values()):
+        raise RuntimeError("FORBIDDEN_OPERATION_REQUESTED")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        raise RuntimeError("GLOBAL_GITOPS_WRITES_MUST_REMAIN_FALSE")
+    if not isinstance(bindings.get("target_branch_protection"), dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("TARGET_BRANCH_PROTECTION_REQUIRED")
+    _verify_external_evidence(bindings, require_unexpired=require_unexpired)
+
+
+def binding_payload_hash(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    stable = dict(bindings)
+    stable.pop("crash_at", None)
+    return sha256_json(redact(stable))
+
+
+def plan_id(bindings: Mapping[str, Any], previous: Mapping[str, Any], target: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    stable = dict(bindings)
+    stable.pop("crash_at", None)
+    return sha256_json(
+        {
+            "bindings": redact(stable),
+            "previous": dict(previous),
+            "target": dict(target),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+class ActivationEngine:
+    def __init__(self, adapter: Adapter, state_root: Path, lock_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.adapter = adapter
+        self.journal = JournalStore(state_root)
+        self.lock_path = lock_path
+
+    def plan(self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        validate_bindings(bindings)
+        previous = self.adapter.read_current()
+        previous_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous)
+        if previous_sha != bindings["expected_branch_protection_sha256"]:
+            raise CASConflict("EXPECTED_BRANCH_PROTECTION_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+        target = dict(bindings["target_branch_protection"])
+        # Validate without writing by using the public target validator through a
+        # disposable comparison: adapters enforce the same checks again in CAS.
+        from .gitea_protected_branch import validate_target
+
+        validate_target(previous, target)
+        result = {
+            "status": "PLAN_READY",
+            "task_id": bindings["task_id"],
+            "operation_id": bindings["operation_id"],
+            "plan_id": plan_id(bindings, previous, target),
+            "payload_hash": binding_payload_hash(bindings),
+            "previous_sha256": previous_sha,
+            "target_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(target),
+        }
+        return result
+
+    def _recover(self, record: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        current = self.adapter.read_current()
+        current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(current)
+        previous_sha = record["previous_sha256"]
+        target_sha = record["target_sha256"]
+        if record["phase"] == "PREPARED":
+            if current_sha == previous_sha:
+                return {**record, "recovery": "RESUME_BEFORE_APPLY"}
+            if current_sha == target_sha:
+                record = {**record, "phase": "APPLIED", "recovery": "RESUME_AFTER_APPLY"}
+                self.journal.write(record["operation_id"], record)
+                return record
+            raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+        if record["phase"] in {"APPLIED", "COMMITTED"} and current_sha not in {target_sha, previous_sha}:
+            raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+        return record
+
+    def _ensure_closure(self, record: dict[str, Any], event: str) -> None:
+        expected_sha = (
+            record["target_sha256"] if record["phase"] == "COMMITTED" else record["previous_sha256"]
+        )
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current()) != expected_sha:
+            raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+        atomic_write_json(
+            self.journal.root / "current-snapshot.json",
+            record["target"] if record["phase"] == "COMMITTED" else record["previous"],
+        )
+        atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "rollback-snapshot.json", record["previous"])
+        self.journal.write_receipt(record["operation_id"], record)
+        if not self.journal.audit.has_event(record["operation_id"], event):
+            payload = {"event": event}
+            if event == "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED":
+                payload.update(
+                    payload_hash=record["payload_hash"],
+                    target_sha256=record["target_sha256"],
+                )
+            self.journal.audit.append(record["operation_id"], payload)
+        atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "state.json", record)
+
+    def activate(self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any], supplied_plan_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with exclusive_lock(self.lock_path):
+            self.journal.audit.verify()
+            operation_id = str(bindings["operation_id"])
+            payload_hash = binding_payload_hash(bindings)
+            record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+            if record:
+                if record.get("payload_hash") != payload_hash:
+                    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+                if record.get("plan_id") != supplied_plan_id:
+                    raise RuntimeError("PLAN_ID_MISMATCH")
+                if record.get("phase") == "ROLLED_BACK":
+                    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_TERMINAL_ROLLED_BACK")
+                if record.get("phase") == "FAILED":
+                    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_TERMINAL_FAILED")
+                prepared_at = _parse_utc(record.get("prepared_at"))
+                if prepared_at >= _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("RECOVERY_AUTHORIZATION_INVALID")
+                record = self._recover(record)
+                if record["phase"] == "COMMITTED":
+                    self._ensure_closure(record, "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED")
+                    return {"status": "ALREADY_COMMITTED", **record}
+            else:
+                validate_bindings(bindings)
+                planned = self.plan(bindings)
+                if supplied_plan_id != planned["plan_id"]:
+                    raise RuntimeError("PLAN_ID_MISMATCH")
+            previous = self.adapter.read_current()
+            target = dict(bindings["target_branch_protection"])
+            if record is None:
+                if calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous) != planned["previous_sha256"]:
+                    raise CASConflict("PREPARED_BOUNDARY_SNAPSHOT_CHANGED")
+                prepared_at = _utc_now()
+                if prepared_at >= _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+                record = {
+                    "task_id": bindings["task_id"],
+                    "operation_id": operation_id,
+                    "transaction_id": operation_id,
+                    "payload_hash": payload_hash,
+                    "plan_id": supplied_plan_id,
+                    "phase": "PREPARED",
+                    "prepared_at": prepared_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+                    "previous": previous,
+                    "target": target,
+                    "previous_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous),
+                    "target_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(target),
+                    "activation_approval_merge_oid": bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"],
+                    "evidence_closure_oid": bindings["evidence_closure_oid"],
+                    "owner_review_oid": bindings["owner_review_oid"],
+                }
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "current-snapshot.json", previous)
+                atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "rollback-snapshot.json", previous)
+            crash_at = bindings.get("crash_at")
+            if crash_at == "before_apply":
+                raise InjectedCrash("before_apply")
+            try:
+                current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+                if current_sha == record["previous_sha256"]:
+                    applied = self.adapter.apply_atomic(record["previous_sha256"], record["target"])
+                    record["target"] = applied
+                    record["target_sha256"] = calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied)
+                elif current_sha != record["target_sha256"]:
+                    raise CASConflict("CAS_CONFLICT")
+                if crash_at == "during_apply":
+                    raise InjectedCrash("during_apply")
+                record["phase"] = "APPLIED"
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                if crash_at == "after_apply_before_receipt":
+                    raise InjectedCrash("after_apply_before_receipt")
+                if not self.adapter.verify_applied(record["target_sha256"]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("POST_ACTIVATION_VERIFY_FAILED")
+                record["phase"] = "COMMITTED"
+                record["single_owner_policy_active"] = True
+                record["break_glass_active"] = False
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                if crash_at == "after_commit_wal":
+                    raise InjectedCrash("after_commit_wal")
+                self._ensure_closure(record, "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED")
+                return {"status": "ACTIVATED", **record}
+            except InjectedCrash:
+                raise
+            except Exception as exc:
+                failure = {**record, "phase": "FAILED", "error": type(exc).__name__}
+                current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+                if current_sha == record["target_sha256"]:
+                    self.adapter.rollback_atomic(record["target_sha256"], record["previous"])
+                    if not self.adapter.verify_rollback(record["previous_sha256"]):
+                        raise RuntimeError("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED") from exc
+                    failure["phase"] = "ROLLED_BACK"
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, failure)
+                self.journal.write_receipt(operation_id, failure)
+                self.journal.audit.append(operation_id, {"event": failure["phase"], "error": type(exc).__name__})
+                raise
+
+    def verify(self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any], operation_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+        if not record:
+            raise RuntimeError("TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND")
+        if record.get("payload_hash") != binding_payload_hash(bindings):
+            raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+        self.journal.audit.verify()
+        current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+        passed = record.get("phase") == "COMMITTED" and current_sha == record.get("target_sha256")
+        if not passed:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_VERIFY_FAILED")
+        return {"status": "VERIFIED", "operation_id": operation_id, "target_sha256": current_sha}
+
+    def rollback(
+        self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any], operation_id: str, supplied_plan_id: str
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with exclusive_lock(self.lock_path):
+            self.journal.audit.verify()
+            record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+            if not record:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND")
+            if record.get("payload_hash") != binding_payload_hash(bindings):
+                raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+            if record.get("plan_id") != supplied_plan_id:
+                raise RuntimeError("PLAN_ID_MISMATCH")
+            for field in (
+                "activation_approval_merge_oid",
+                "evidence_closure_oid",
+                "owner_review_oid",
+            ):
+                if str(record.get(field)) != str(bindings[field]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("ROLLBACK_AUTHORIZATION_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+            current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+            if current_sha == record["previous_sha256"]:
+                record["phase"] = "ROLLED_BACK"
+                record["single_owner_policy_active"] = False
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                self._ensure_closure(record, "ACTIVATION_ROLLED_BACK")
+                return {"status": "ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK", "operation_id": operation_id}
+            if current_sha != record["target_sha256"]:
+                raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+            self.adapter.rollback_atomic(record["target_sha256"], record["previous"])
+            if not self.adapter.verify_rollback(record["previous_sha256"]):
+                raise RuntimeError("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED")
+            if bindings.get("crash_at") == "after_rollback_cas":
+                raise InjectedCrash("after_rollback_cas")
+            record["phase"] = "ROLLED_BACK"
+            record["single_owner_policy_active"] = False
+            self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+            if bindings.get("crash_at") == "after_rollback_wal":
+                raise InjectedCrash("after_rollback_wal")
+            self._ensure_closure(record, "ACTIVATION_ROLLED_BACK")
+            return {"status": "ROLLED_BACK", "operation_id": operation_id}
+
+    def status(self, operation_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        audit_head = self.journal.audit.verify()
+        if operation_id:
+            record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+            if not record:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND")
+            return {"status": "OK", "audit_head": audit_head, "transaction": record}
+        state_path = self.journal.root / "state.json"
+        return {
+            "status": "OK",
+            "audit_head": audit_head,
+            "state": read_json(state_path) if state_path.exists() else None,
+            "transactions": list(self.journal.iter_transactions()),
+        }
+
+
+def load_bindings(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return read_json(path)
+
+
+def adapter_from_bindings(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Adapter:
+    backend = bindings.get("backend", "file")
+    backend_path = Path(str(bindings.get("backend_path", "")))
+    if not backend_path.is_absolute():
+        raise RuntimeError("BACKEND_PATH_MUST_BE_ABSOLUTE")
+    if backend == "file":
+        return FileProtectedBranchAdapter(backend_path)
+    if backend == "sqlite":
+        return SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter(
+            backend_path,
+            repo_id=int(bindings.get("repo_id", 1)),
+            branch=str(bindings.get("branch", "governance/approvals")),
+            expected_schema_sha256=str(bindings["expected_gitea_schema_sha256"]),
+        )
+    raise RuntimeError("UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_BACKEND")
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    action = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    for name in ("plan", "activate", "verify", "rollback", "status"):
+        action.add_argument(f"--{name}", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--bindings", type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--plan-id")
+    parser.add_argument("--transaction")
+    parser.add_argument("--state-root", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_STATE_ROOT)
+    parser.add_argument("--lock-path", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_LOCK_PATH)
+    return parser
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
+    if args.status and args.bindings is None:
+        # Status without bindings is intentionally limited to durable local state.
+        journal = JournalStore(args.state_root)
+        result = {
+            "status": "OK",
+            "audit_head": journal.audit.verify(),
+            "transactions": list(journal.iter_transactions()),
+        }
+        print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    if args.bindings is None:
+        raise SystemExit("--bindings is required")
+    bindings = load_bindings(args.bindings)
+    engine = ActivationEngine(adapter_from_bindings(bindings), args.state_root, args.lock_path)
+    if args.plan:
+        result = engine.plan(bindings)
+    elif args.activate:
+        if not args.plan_id:
+            raise SystemExit("--plan-id is required")
+        result = engine.activate(bindings, args.plan_id)
+    elif args.verify:
+        result = engine.verify(bindings, args.transaction or str(bindings["operation_id"]))
+    elif args.rollback:
+        if not args.plan_id:
+            raise SystemExit("--plan-id is required")
+        result = engine.rollback(
+            bindings, args.transaction or str(bindings["operation_id"]), args.plan_id
+        )
+    else:
+        result = engine.status(args.transaction)
+    print(json.dumps(redact(result), sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/evidence.py

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Mapping
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EvidenceClosure:
+    evidence: Mapping[str, str]
+    closure_sha256: str
+
+
+class ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder:
+    def build(self, evidence: Mapping[str, str]) -> EvidenceClosure:
+        required = {
+            "activation_prerequisites_commit_oid",
+            "activation_prerequisites_tree_oid",
+            "artifact_sha256",
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+            "validator_sha256",
+            "state_machine_sha256",
+            "branch_protection_adapter_sha256",
+            "rollback_configuration_sha256",
+            "test_evidence_sha256",
+            "deployment_manifest_sha256",
+            "dormant_unit_manifest_sha256",
+            "dormant_deployment_evidence_sha256",
+        }
+        if set(evidence) != required:
+            raise ValueError("evidence set mismatch")
+        for value in evidence.values():
+            if len(value) != 40 and len(value) != 64:
+                raise ValueError("invalid evidence digest")
+        return EvidenceClosure(
+            dict(evidence), hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(evidence)).hexdigest()
+        )
+
+
+class ApprovalMirrorStatusVerifier:
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        expected_oid: str,
+        *,
+        gitea_oid: str,
+        quarantine_oid: str,
+        authoritative_oid: str,
+        controller_visible_oid: str,
+        fsck_connectivity: str,
+    ) -> bool:
+        return (
+            len(expected_oid) == 40
+            and {gitea_oid, quarantine_oid, authoritative_oid, controller_visible_oid}
+            == {expected_oid}
+            and fsck_connectivity == "PASS"
+        )

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/fixture.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import AbstractContextManager
+from pathlib import Path
+import shutil
+import tempfile
+
+from .models import ProtectionSnapshot
+from .protection import MemoryProtectionStore
+
+
+class DisposableGiteaFixture(AbstractContextManager):
+    def __init__(self, initial: ProtectionSnapshot) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="aios-governance-fixture-"))
+        self.protection = MemoryProtectionStore(initial)
+        self.destroyed = False
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> "DisposableGiteaFixture":
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
+        resolved = self.root.resolve()
+        if not resolved.name.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-"):
+            raise RuntimeError("fixture cleanup path guard failed")
+        shutil.rmtree(resolved)
+        self.destroyed = True

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/gitea_protected_branch.py

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from .journal import atomic_write_json, read_json, sha256_json
+
+
+class CASConflict(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class UnsafePolicy(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return sha256_json(dict(snapshot))
+
+
+def validate_target(previous: Mapping[str, Any], target: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if set(previous) != set(target):
+        raise UnsafePolicy("PROTECTION_ROW_SHAPE_CHANGED")
+    for field in ("id", "repo_id", "branch_name"):
+        if previous.get(field) != target.get(field):
+            raise UnsafePolicy(f"PROTECTION_IDENTITY_CHANGED:{field}")
+    if target.get("branch_name") != "governance/approvals":
+        raise UnsafePolicy("BRANCH_BINDING_DENIED")
+    if int(target.get("can_push", 1)) != 0:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("DIRECT_PUSH_MUST_REMAIN_DISABLED")
+    if int(target.get("required_approvals", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("EXACTLY_ONE_APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
+    if int(target.get("enable_approvals_whitelist", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("APPROVAL_WHITELIST_MUST_REMAIN_ENABLED")
+    if json.loads(target.get("approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds", "[]")) != [2]:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("OWNER_APPROVAL_WHITELIST_REQUIRED")
+    if int(target.get("enable_merge_whitelist", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("MERGE_WHITELIST_MUST_REMAIN_ENABLED")
+    if target.get("merge_whitelist_user_i_ds") != previous.get("merge_whitelist_user_i_ds"):
+        raise UnsafePolicy("MERGE_EXECUTOR_WHITELIST_CHANGE_DENIED")
+    if int(target.get("dismiss_stale_approvals", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("DISMISS_STALE_APPROVALS_REQUIRED")
+    if int(target.get("enable_status_check", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("STATUS_CHECKS_REQUIRED")
+    required_contexts = {
+        "aios/validator",
+        "aios/state-machine",
+        "aios/branch-protection",
+        "aios/secret-scan",
+        "aios/evidence-closure",
+    }
+    try:
+        contexts = set(json.loads(target.get("status_check_contexts", "[]")))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("STATUS_CHECK_CONTEXTS_INVALID") from exc
+    if contexts != required_contexts:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("STATUS_CHECK_CONTEXTS_MISMATCH")
+    if int(target.get("block_on_rejected_reviews", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("REJECTED_REVIEWS_MUST_BLOCK")
+    if int(target.get("block_on_outdated_branch", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("OUTDATED_BRANCH_MUST_BLOCK")
+    if target.get("require_signed_commits") != previous.get("require_signed_commits"):
+        raise UnsafePolicy("SIGNATURE_POLICY_CHANGE_DENIED")
+
+
+class FileProtectedBranchAdapter:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = path
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot)
+
+    def read_current(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return read_json(self.path)
+
+    def compare_expected(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.read_current()) == expected_sha256
+
+    def apply_atomic(
+        self, expected_sha256: str, target: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        previous = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous) != expected_sha256:
+            raise CASConflict("CAS_CONFLICT")
+        validate_target(previous, target)
+        atomic_write_json(self.path, dict(target))
+        applied = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(target):
+            raise CASConflict("CAS_VERIFY_FAILED")
+        return applied
+
+    def verify_applied(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)
+
+    def rollback_atomic(
+        self, expected_target_sha256: str, previous: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        current = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(current) != expected_target_sha256:
+            raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_CONFLICT")
+        atomic_write_json(self.path, dict(previous))
+        restored = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(restored) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous):
+            raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED")
+        return restored
+
+    def verify_rollback(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)
+
+
+class SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter:
+    ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS = (
+        "can_push",
+        "enable_merge_whitelist",
+        "merge_whitelist_user_i_ds",
+        "enable_status_check",
+        "status_check_contexts",
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist",
+        "approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds",
+        "required_approvals",
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews",
+        "block_on_official_review_requests",
+        "block_on_outdated_branch",
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals",
+        "ignore_stale_approvals",
+        "updated_unix",
+    )
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path: Path,
+        *,
+        repo_id: int = 1,
+        branch: str = "governance/approvals",
+        expected_schema_sha256: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.db_path = db_path
+        self.repo_id = repo_id
+        self.branch = branch
+        self.expected_schema_sha256 = expected_schema_sha256
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=10)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        return connection
+
+    def schema_sha256(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection | None = None) -> str:
+        own = connection is None
+        connection = connection or self._connect()
+        try:
+            rows = [dict(row) for row in connection.execute("PRAGMA table_info(protected_branch)")]
+            return sha256_json(rows)
+        finally:
+            if own:
+                connection.close()
+
+    def _check_schema(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(self.expected_schema_sha256, str) or len(self.expected_schema_sha256) != 64:
+            raise RuntimeError("GITEA_SCHEMA_FINGERPRINT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.schema_sha256(connection) != self.expected_schema_sha256:
+            raise RuntimeError("GITEA_SCHEMA_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH")
+
+    def _read(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM protected_branch WHERE repo_id=? AND branch_name=?",
+            (self.repo_id, self.branch),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_ROW_NOT_FOUND")
+        return dict(row)
+
+    def read_current(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._check_schema(connection)
+            return self._read(connection)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot)
+
+    def compare_expected(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.read_current()) == expected_sha256
+
+    def apply_atomic(
+        self, expected_sha256: str, target: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._check_schema(connection)
+            previous = self._read(connection)
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous) != expected_sha256:
+                raise CASConflict("CAS_CONFLICT")
+            validate_target(previous, target)
+            values = dict(target)
+            values["updated_unix"] = int(values.get("updated_unix") or time.time())
+            assignments = ",".join(f"{field}=?" for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS)
+            parameters = [values[field] for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS]
+            parameters.extend((self.repo_id, self.branch))
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                f"UPDATE protected_branch SET {assignments} WHERE repo_id=? AND branch_name=?",
+                parameters,
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise CASConflict("CAS_ROWCOUNT_INVALID")
+            applied = self._read(connection)
+            expected_target = dict(target)
+            expected_target["updated_unix"] = values["updated_unix"]
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(expected_target):
+                raise CASConflict("CAS_VERIFY_FAILED")
+            connection.commit()
+            return applied
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def verify_applied(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)
+
+    def rollback_atomic(
+        self, expected_target_sha256: str, previous: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._check_schema(connection)
+            current = self._read(connection)
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(current) != expected_target_sha256:
+                raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_CONFLICT")
+            for field in ("id", "repo_id", "branch_name"):
+                if current.get(field) != previous.get(field):
+                    raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+            assignments = ",".join(f"{field}=?" for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS)
+            parameters = [previous[field] for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS]
+            parameters.extend((self.repo_id, self.branch))
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                f"UPDATE protected_branch SET {assignments} WHERE repo_id=? AND branch_name=?",
+                parameters,
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_ROWCOUNT_INVALID")
+            restored = self._read(connection)
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(restored) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous):
+                raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED")
+            connection.commit()
+            return restored
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def verify_rollback(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/journal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Iterable
+
+
+SENSITIVE_FRAGMENTS = (
+    "authorization",
+    "cookie",
+    "credential",
+    "password",
+    "private_key",
+    "secret",
+    "token",
+)
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def redact(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {
+            str(key): (
+                "[REDACTED]"
+                if any(fragment in str(key).lower() for fragment in SENSITIVE_FRAGMENTS)
+                else redact(item)
+            )
+            for key, item in value.items()
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [redact(item) for item in value]
+    if isinstance(value, tuple):
+        return [redact(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def ensure_state_directory(path: Path) -> None:
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_DIRECTORY_SYMLINK_DENIED")
+    path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    path.chmod(0o750)
+    mode = path.stat().st_mode & 0o777
+    if mode != 0o750:
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_DIRECTORY_MODE_INVALID")
+
+
+def atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: object) -> None:
+    ensure_state_directory(path.parent)
+    raw = json.dumps(redact(value), sort_keys=True, indent=2).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
+        dir=path.parent, prefix=f".{path.name}.", delete=False
+    ) as handle:
+        temporary = Path(handle.name)
+        handle.write(raw)
+        handle.flush()
+        os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+    temporary.chmod(0o640)
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+    path.chmod(0o640)
+    directory_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY)
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory_fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory_fd)
+
+
+def read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    raw = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_DOCUMENT_NOT_OBJECT")
+    return raw
+
+
+class AuditChain:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = path
+
+    def _records(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if not self.path.exists():
+            return []
+        records: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        for line in self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+            if line.strip():
+                record = json.loads(line)
+                if not isinstance(record, dict):
+                    raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_RECORD_INVALID")
+                records.append(record)
+        return records
+
+    def verify(self) -> str:
+        previous = "0" * 64
+        for index, record in enumerate(self._records(), 1):
+            payload = record.get("payload")
+            if record.get("sequence") != index:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_SEQUENCE_INVALID")
+            if record.get("previous_event_hash") != previous:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_PREVIOUS_HASH_INVALID")
+            payload_hash = sha256_json(payload)
+            if record.get("payload_hash") != payload_hash:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_PAYLOAD_HASH_INVALID")
+            material = {
+                "sequence": index,
+                "previous_event_hash": previous,
+                "payload_hash": payload_hash,
+                "transaction_id": record.get("transaction_id"),
+            }
+            event_hash = sha256_json(material)
+            if record.get("event_hash") != event_hash:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_EVENT_HASH_INVALID")
+            previous = event_hash
+        return previous
+
+    def append(self, transaction_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        ensure_state_directory(self.path.parent)
+        previous = self.verify()
+        sequence = len(self._records()) + 1
+        clean_payload = redact(payload)
+        payload_hash = sha256_json(clean_payload)
+        material = {
+            "sequence": sequence,
+            "previous_event_hash": previous,
+            "payload_hash": payload_hash,
+            "transaction_id": transaction_id,
+        }
+        record = {
+            **material,
+            "payload": clean_payload,
+            "event_hash": sha256_json(material),
+        }
+        fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT, 0o640)
+        try:
+            os.write(fd, canonical_json(record) + b"\n")
+            os.fsync(fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+        self.path.chmod(0o640)
+        return record
+
+    def has_event(self, transaction_id: str, event: str) -> bool:
+        self.verify()
+        return any(
+            record.get("transaction_id") == transaction_id
+            and isinstance(record.get("payload"), dict)
+            and record["payload"].get("event") == event
+            for record in self._records()
+        )
+
+
+class JournalStore:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path) -> None:
+        self.root = root
+        self.wal = root / "wal"
+        self.receipts = root / "receipts"
+        ensure_state_directory(root)
+        ensure_state_directory(self.wal)
+        ensure_state_directory(self.receipts)
+        self.audit = AuditChain(root / "audit.jsonl")
+
+    def transaction_path(self, operation_id: str) -> Path:
+        if not operation_id or any(char not in "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789._-" for char in operation_id):
+            raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_INVALID")
+        return self.wal / f"{operation_id}.json"
+
+    def receipt_path(self, operation_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.receipts / f"{operation_id}.json"
+
+    def load(self, operation_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        path = self.transaction_path(operation_id)
+        return read_json(path) if path.exists() else None
+
+    def write(self, operation_id: str, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        atomic_write_json(self.transaction_path(operation_id), value)
+
+    def write_receipt(self, operation_id: str, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        atomic_write_json(self.receipt_path(operation_id), value)
+
+    def iter_transactions(self) -> Iterable[dict[str, Any]]:
+        for path in sorted(self.wal.glob("*.json")):
+            yield read_json(path)

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/lock.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import fcntl
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - exercised by Windows validation
+    fcntl = None
+    import msvcrt
+
+
+class MaintenanceLock:
+    """Process fence used only by fixture and later approved activation executors."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = path
+        self._handle = None
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> "MaintenanceLock":
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._handle = self.path.open("a+")
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            try:
+                fcntl.flock(self._handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+            except BlockingIOError:
+                self._handle.close()
+                self._handle = None
+                raise
+        else:
+            self._handle.seek(0)
+            try:
+                msvcrt.locking(self._handle.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_NBLCK, 1)
+            except OSError as exc:
+                self._handle.close()
+                self._handle = None
+                raise BlockingIOError("maintenance lock held") from exc
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
+        if self._handle is not None:
+            if fcntl is not None:
+                fcntl.flock(self._handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+            else:
+                self._handle.seek(0)
+                msvcrt.locking(self._handle.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_UNLCK, 1)
+            self._handle.close()
+            self._handle = None

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/models.py

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+class GovernanceState(str, Enum):
+    HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING = "HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING"
+    OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED = "OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED"
+    MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED = "MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED"
+    AUTO_MERGE_READY = "AUTO_MERGE_READY"
+    OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY = "OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Review:
+    reviewer: str
+    reviewer_id: int
+    state: str
+    head_oid: str
+    reviewed_at: datetime
+    stale: bool = False
+    dismissed: bool = False
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.reviewed_at.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("reviewed_at must be timezone-aware")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MachineGate:
+    context: str
+    state: str
+    head_oid: str
+    observed_at: datetime
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.observed_at.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("observed_at must be timezone-aware")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ApprovalContext:
+    current_head_oid: str
+    requester: str
+    executor: str
+    owner: str
+    owner_id: int
+    reviews: tuple[Review, ...]
+    machine_gates: tuple[MachineGate, ...]
+    required_machine_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+    expires_at: datetime
+    wip: bool
+    now: datetime = field(default_factory=lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.expires_at.tzinfo is None or self.now.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("approval timestamps must be timezone-aware")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProtectionSnapshot:
+    branch: str
+    required_approvals: int
+    approval_whitelist: tuple[str, ...]
+    merge_whitelist: tuple[str, ...]
+    dismiss_stale_approvals: bool
+    require_status_checks: bool
+    status_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+    direct_push: bool
+    force_push: bool
+    branch_deletion: bool
+    version: int
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "branch": self.branch,
+            "required_approvals": self.required_approvals,
+            "approval_whitelist": list(self.approval_whitelist),
+            "merge_whitelist": list(self.merge_whitelist),
+            "dismiss_stale_approvals": self.dismiss_stale_approvals,
+            "require_status_checks": self.require_status_checks,
+            "status_contexts": list(self.status_contexts),
+            "direct_push": self.direct_push,
+            "force_push": self.force_push,
+            "branch_deletion": self.branch_deletion,
+            "version": self.version,
+        }

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+class OperationDenied(PermissionError):
+    pass
+
+
+class DormantOperationGuard:
+    """Fail-closed operation boundary for the prerequisite deployment."""
+
+    DENIED = frozenset({
+        "protected_branch.direct_push",
+        "governance.direct_push",
+        "tag.direct_write",
+        "git.force_push",
+        "production.without_owner",
+        "branch_protection.live_update",
+        "single_owner_policy.activate",
+    })
+
+    def authorize(self, operation: str, *, fixture: bool = False) -> None:
+        if operation in self.DENIED or not fixture:
+            raise OperationDenied(operation)

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/protection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Protocol
+
+from .models import ProtectionSnapshot
+
+
+class CASConflict(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class DormantViolation(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def snapshot_sha256(snapshot: ProtectionSnapshot) -> str:
+    raw = json.dumps(snapshot.as_dict(), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+    return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+
+class ProtectionStore(Protocol):
+    fixture: bool
+
+    def read(self, branch: str) -> ProtectionSnapshot: ...
+    def compare_and_swap(
+        self, branch: str, expected_sha256: str, target: ProtectionSnapshot
+    ) -> bool: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProtectionPlan:
+    branch: str
+    expected_previous_sha256: str
+    previous: ProtectionSnapshot
+    target: ProtectionSnapshot
+    target_sha256: str
+
+
+class BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter:
+    """Candidate adapter. Mutations are restricted to disposable fixtures."""
+
+    def plan(
+        self,
+        current: ProtectionSnapshot,
+        target: ProtectionSnapshot,
+        expected_previous_sha256: str,
+    ) -> ProtectionPlan:
+        actual = snapshot_sha256(current)
+        if actual != expected_previous_sha256:
+            raise CASConflict("EXPECTED_PREVIOUS_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+        if current.branch != target.branch:
+            raise CASConflict("BRANCH_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+        if target.direct_push or target.force_push or target.branch_deletion:
+            raise DormantViolation("UNSAFE_TARGET_POLICY")
+        return ProtectionPlan(
+            current.branch, actual, current, target, snapshot_sha256(target)
+        )
+
+    def apply_fixture(self, store: ProtectionStore, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if not store.fixture:
+            raise DormantViolation("LIVE_PROTECTION_MUTATION_DENIED")
+        if not store.compare_and_swap(
+            plan.branch, plan.expected_previous_sha256, plan.target
+        ):
+            raise CASConflict("CONCURRENT_PROTECTION_CHANGE")
+        return store.read(plan.branch)
+
+    def rollback_fixture(self, store: ProtectionStore, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if not store.fixture:
+            raise DormantViolation("LIVE_PROTECTION_ROLLBACK_DENIED")
+        if not store.compare_and_swap(plan.branch, plan.target_sha256, plan.previous):
+            raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_CONFLICT")
+        return store.read(plan.branch)
+
+
+class MemoryProtectionStore:
+    fixture = True
+
+    def __init__(self, snapshot: ProtectionSnapshot) -> None:
+        self._snapshot = snapshot
+
+    def read(self, branch: str) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if self._snapshot.branch != branch:
+            raise KeyError(branch)
+        return self._snapshot
+
+    def compare_and_swap(
+        self, branch: str, expected_sha256: str, target: ProtectionSnapshot
+    ) -> bool:
+        if self._snapshot.branch != branch:
+            return False
+        if snapshot_sha256(self._snapshot) != expected_sha256:
+            return False
+        self._snapshot = target
+        return True

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/rollback.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+
+from .models import ProtectionSnapshot
+from .protection import MemoryProtectionStore, ProtectionPlan, snapshot_sha256
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RollbackConfiguration:
+    branch: str
+    previous_sha256: str
+    target_sha256: str
+    payload: dict
+
+
+class RollbackConfigurationManager:
+    def build(self, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> RollbackConfiguration:
+        return RollbackConfiguration(
+            plan.branch,
+            plan.expected_previous_sha256,
+            plan.target_sha256,
+            {"previous": plan.previous.as_dict(), "target": plan.target.as_dict()},
+        )
+
+    def install_fixture(self, root: Path, config: RollbackConfiguration) -> Path:
+        if not root.name.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-"):
+            raise PermissionError("rollback configuration may only be installed in fixture root")
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        destination = root / "rollback-configuration.json"
+        raw = json.dumps(config.payload, sort_keys=True, indent=2).encode() + b"\n"
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(dir=root, prefix=".rollback.", delete=False) as handle:
+            handle.write(raw)
+            handle.flush()
+            temporary = Path(handle.name)
+        temporary.chmod(0o600)
+        temporary.replace(destination)
+        return destination
+
+    def verify(self, config: RollbackConfiguration, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> bool:
+        return (
+            config.previous_sha256 == snapshot_sha256(plan.previous)
+            and config.target_sha256 == snapshot_sha256(plan.target)
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ProtectionCompensationSaga:
+    adapter: object
+    store: MemoryProtectionStore
+    plan: ProtectionPlan
+    applied: bool = False
+    rolled_back: bool = False
+
+    def execute_fixture(self) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        result = self.adapter.apply_fixture(self.store, self.plan)
+        self.applied = True
+        return result
+
+    def compensate_fixture(self) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if not self.applied:
+            return self.store.read(self.plan.branch)
+        result = self.adapter.rollback_fixture(self.store, self.plan)
+        self.rolled_back = True
+        return result

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+
+
+def runtime_state(component: str, prior_invocations: int = 0) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "component": component,
+        "deployment_mode": "DORMANT_SHADOW_ONLY",
+        "enabled": False,
+        "active": False,
+        "production_routing": False,
+        "production_mutation": False,
+        "global_gitops_writes_enabled": False,
+        "prior_invocations": prior_invocations,
+        "restart_recovery": prior_invocations > 0,
+    }
+
+
+def checkpoint_state(component: str, root: Path) -> dict:
+    root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    destination = root / f"{component}.json"
+    prior = 0
+    if destination.exists():
+        previous = json.loads(destination.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if previous.get("component") != component or previous.get("deployment_mode") != "DORMANT_SHADOW_ONLY":
+            raise RuntimeError("checkpoint identity mismatch")
+        prior = int(previous.get("invocations", 0))
+    state = runtime_state(component, prior)
+    checkpoint = {**state, "invocations": prior + 1}
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", encoding="utf-8", dir=root, delete=False) as handle:
+        json.dump(checkpoint, handle, sort_keys=True)
+        handle.write("\n")
+        handle.flush()
+        temporary = Path(handle.name)
+    temporary.replace(destination)
+    return state
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--component", required=True, choices=("owner-review-adapter", "machine-status-producer"))
+    parser.add_argument("--self-check", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--activate", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--checkpoint-dir", type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    if args.activate:
+        parser.error("activation is not authorized by the prerequisites candidate")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        parser.error("candidate must remain disabled")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE", "false").lower() != "false":
+        parser.error("activation must remain inactive")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        parser.error("production mutation must remain disabled")
+    state = (
+        checkpoint_state(args.component, args.checkpoint_dir)
+        if args.checkpoint_dir is not None
+        else runtime_state(args.component)
+    )
+    print(json.dumps(state, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/state_machine.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+
+from .models import GovernanceState
+
+
+class InvalidTransition(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+_NEXT = {
+    GovernanceState.HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING: GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED,
+    GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED: GovernanceState.MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED,
+    GovernanceState.MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED: GovernanceState.AUTO_MERGE_READY,
+    GovernanceState.AUTO_MERGE_READY: GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY,
+}
+
+
+@dataclass
+class GovernanceStateMachine:
+    state: GovernanceState = GovernanceState.HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING
+
+    def transition(self, target: GovernanceState) -> GovernanceState:
+        if _NEXT.get(self.state) != target:
+            raise InvalidTransition(f"{self.state.value}->{target.value}")
+        self.state = target
+        return self.state
+
+    def restore(self, checkpoint: GovernanceState) -> None:
+        if checkpoint not in GovernanceState:
+            raise InvalidTransition("unknown checkpoint")
+        self.state = checkpoint
+
+    def save_fixture(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        if not any(part.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-") for part in path.resolve().parts):
+            raise PermissionError("state checkpoint writes are fixture-only")
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", encoding="utf-8", dir=path.parent, delete=False) as handle:
+            json.dump({"state": self.state.value}, handle, sort_keys=True)
+            handle.write("\n")
+            handle.flush()
+            temporary = Path(handle.name)
+        temporary.replace(path)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def load_fixture(cls, path: Path) -> "GovernanceStateMachine":
+        if not any(part.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-") for part in path.resolve().parts):
+            raise PermissionError("state checkpoint reads are fixture-only")
+        raw = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        return cls(GovernanceState(raw["state"]))

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+
+class DormantStatusProducer(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class StatusRecord:
+    context: str
+    state: str
+    head_oid: str
+    observed_at: str
+
+
+class MachineStatusProducer:
+    def __init__(self, *, enabled: bool = False, fixture: bool = False) -> None:
+        self.enabled = enabled
+        self.fixture = fixture
+
+    def produce(self, context: str, state: str, head_oid: str) -> StatusRecord:
+        if not self.fixture:
+            raise DormantStatusProducer("LIVE_STATUS_PUBLICATION_DENIED")
+        if self.enabled:
+            raise DormantStatusProducer("DORMANT_CANDIDATE_MUST_NOT_BE_ENABLED")
+        if context not in {
+            "aios/machine-gates", "aios/secret-scan", "aios/evidence-closure"
+        }:
+            raise ValueError("unknown status context")
+        if state not in {"success", "failure"} or len(head_oid) != 40:
+            raise ValueError("invalid status record")
+        return StatusRecord(
+            context, state, head_oid,
+            datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        )

services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/validator.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from .models import ApprovalContext, Review
+
+
+class ValidationDenied(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ValidationResult:
+    owner_review: Review
+    machine_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+class SingleOwnerApprovalValidator:
+    """Pure candidate validator. It has no Gitea or production write path."""
+
+    def validate(self, context: ApprovalContext) -> ValidationResult:
+        if context.now >= context.expires_at:
+            raise ValidationDenied("APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+        if context.wip:
+            raise ValidationDenied("WIP_BLOCKED")
+        if context.requester == context.owner:
+            raise ValidationDenied("REQUESTER_SELF_APPROVAL")
+        if context.executor == context.owner:
+            raise ValidationDenied("EXECUTOR_SELF_APPROVAL")
+
+        approved = [review for review in context.reviews if review.state == "APPROVED"]
+        owner_reviews = [
+            review for review in approved
+            if review.reviewer == context.owner and review.reviewer_id == context.owner_id
+        ]
+        if len(owner_reviews) != 1:
+            raise ValidationDenied("OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
+        owner_review = owner_reviews[0]
+        if owner_review.stale:
+            raise ValidationDenied("STALE_OWNER_APPROVAL")
+        if owner_review.dismissed:
+            raise ValidationDenied("DISMISSED_OWNER_APPROVAL")
+        if owner_review.head_oid != context.current_head_oid:
+            raise ValidationDenied("OWNER_APPROVAL_NOT_LATEST_HEAD")
+        if owner_review.reviewed_at >= context.expires_at:
+            raise ValidationDenied("OWNER_APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+        if any(
+            review.state == "APPROVED"
+            and review.reviewer != context.owner
+            and review.reviewer_id != context.owner_id
+            for review in context.reviews
+        ):
+            # Non-owner approvals may exist for legacy mechanics, but never
+            # satisfy or replace the human authorization decision.
+            pass
+
+        gates = {gate.context: gate for gate in context.machine_gates}
+        if set(gates) != set(context.required_machine_contexts):
+            raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_SET_MISMATCH")
+        for gate in gates.values():
+            if gate.state != "success":
+                raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_FAILED")
+            if gate.head_oid != context.current_head_oid:
+                raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_NOT_LATEST_HEAD")
+            if gate.observed_at >= context.expires_at:
+                raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_EXPIRED")
+        return ValidationResult(owner_review, tuple(sorted(gates)))

services/aios-single-owner-governance/pyproject.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[build-system]
+requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
+build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+
+[project]
+name = "aios-single-owner-governance"
+version = "0.1.0"
+requires-python = ">=3.11"
+dependencies = []
+
+[project.scripts]
+aios-single-owner-governance = "aios_single_owner_governance.activation:main"
+
+[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
+where = ["."]
+include = ["aios_single_owner_governance*"]

tests/run_live_gitea_fixture.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+umask 077
+GITEA="${AIOS_GITEA_BINARY:-/data/aios-gitops/runtime/bin/gitea}"
+CONFIG="${AIOS_GITEA_CONFIG:-/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/custom/conf/app.ini}"
+WORKSPACE="${AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE:-$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)}"
+USER_NAME="tagatomicitytest$(date +%s)"
+TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/aios-gitea-live-test.XXXXXX)"
+
+cleanup() {
+  "$GITEA" --config "$CONFIG" admin user delete \
+    --username "$USER_NAME" --purge >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  rm -f "$TMP_DIR/token" "$TMP_DIR/create-output"
+  rmdir "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+"$GITEA" --config "$CONFIG" admin user create \
+  --username "$USER_NAME" \
+  --email "$USER_NAME@example.invalid" \
+  --random-password \
+  --must-change-password=false >"$TMP_DIR/create-output" 2>&1
+"$GITEA" --config "$CONFIG" admin user generate-access-token \
+  --username "$USER_NAME" \
+  --token-name live-temporary-repository-test \
+  --raw \
+  --scopes write:repository,write:user >"$TMP_DIR/token"
+chmod 600 "$TMP_DIR/token"
+
+cd "$WORKSPACE"
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TEST=1 \
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_OWNER="$USER_NAME" \
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE="$TMP_DIR/token" \
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE=1 \
+python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_gitea_tag_publication_live.py

tests/single_owner_governance/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+

tests/single_owner_governance/helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.models import (
+    ApprovalContext,
+    MachineGate,
+    ProtectionSnapshot,
+    Review,
+)
+
+HEAD = "a" * 40
+NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 28, 19, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+CONTEXTS = ("aios/machine-gates", "aios/secret-scan", "aios/evidence-closure")
+
+
+def owner_review(**changes) -> Review:
+    values = dict(
+        reviewer="owner", reviewer_id=2, state="APPROVED", head_oid=HEAD,
+        reviewed_at=NOW - timedelta(minutes=1), stale=False, dismissed=False,
+    )
+    values.update(changes)
+    return Review(**values)
+
+
+def gates(*, state="success", head_oid=HEAD):
+    return tuple(MachineGate(name, state, head_oid, NOW) for name in CONTEXTS)
+
+
+def context(**changes) -> ApprovalContext:
+    values = dict(
+        current_head_oid=HEAD, requester="agent", executor="merge-executor",
+        owner="owner", owner_id=2, reviews=(owner_review(),), machine_gates=gates(),
+        required_machine_contexts=CONTEXTS, expires_at=NOW + timedelta(hours=1),
+        wip=False, now=NOW,
+    )
+    values.update(changes)
+    return ApprovalContext(**values)
+
+
+def legacy_protection(version=1) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+    return ProtectionSnapshot(
+        "governance/approvals", 2, ("codex", "gpt"), ("codex", "gpt"),
+        True, False, (), False, False, False, version,
+    )
+
+def single_owner_protection(version=2) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+    return ProtectionSnapshot(
+        "governance/approvals", 1, ("owner",), ("owner",), True, True,
+        CONTEXTS, False, False, False, version,
+    )

tests/single_owner_governance/test_dormant_invariants.py

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import unittest
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.fixture import DisposableGiteaFixture
+from aios_single_owner_governance.protection import (
+    BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter,
+    DormantViolation,
+    snapshot_sha256,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.policy import DormantOperationGuard, OperationDenied
+
+from .helpers import legacy_protection, single_owner_protection
+
+
+class LiveStore:
+    fixture = False
+
+    def read(self, branch):
+        return legacy_protection()
+
+    def compare_and_swap(self, branch, expected_sha256, target):
+        raise AssertionError("live compare_and_swap must never be invoked")
+
+
+class DormantInvariantTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_live_protection_apply_and_rollback_are_denied(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old, new = legacy_protection(), single_owner_protection()
+        plan = adapter.plan(old, new, snapshot_sha256(old))
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantViolation):
+            adapter.apply_fixture(LiveStore(), plan)
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantViolation):
+            adapter.rollback_fixture(LiveStore(), plan)
+
+    def test_unsafe_policy_cannot_be_planned(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old = legacy_protection()
+        for unsafe in (
+            single_owner_protection().__class__(**{**single_owner_protection().as_dict(), "approval_whitelist": ("owner",), "merge_whitelist": ("owner",), "status_contexts": tuple(single_owner_protection().status_contexts), "direct_push": True}),
+            single_owner_protection().__class__(**{**single_owner_protection().as_dict(), "approval_whitelist": ("owner",), "merge_whitelist": ("owner",), "status_contexts": tuple(single_owner_protection().status_contexts), "force_push": True}),
+            single_owner_protection().__class__(**{**single_owner_protection().as_dict(), "approval_whitelist": ("owner",), "merge_whitelist": ("owner",), "status_contexts": tuple(single_owner_protection().status_contexts), "branch_deletion": True}),
+        ):
+            with self.assertRaises(DormantViolation):
+                adapter.plan(old, unsafe, snapshot_sha256(old))
+
+    def test_disposable_fixture_is_destroyed(self):
+        fixture = DisposableGiteaFixture(legacy_protection())
+        root = fixture.root
+        with fixture:
+            self.assertTrue(root.exists())
+        self.assertTrue(fixture.destroyed)
+        self.assertFalse(root.exists())
+
+    def test_permanent_and_pre_activation_writes_are_denied(self):
+        guard = DormantOperationGuard()
+        for operation in (
+            "protected_branch.direct_push",
+            "governance.direct_push",
+            "tag.direct_write",
+            "git.force_push",
+            "production.without_owner",
+            "branch_protection.live_update",
+            "single_owner_policy.activate",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(operation=operation), self.assertRaises(OperationDenied):
+                guard.authorize(operation)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/single_owner_governance/test_evidence_status_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.evidence import (
+    ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder,
+    ApprovalMirrorStatusVerifier,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.service import main, runtime_state
+from aios_single_owner_governance.status import (
+    DormantStatusProducer,
+    MachineStatusProducer,
+)
+
+from .helpers import HEAD
+
+
+class EvidenceStatusServiceTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_complete_evidence_set_builds_canonical_closure(self):
+        evidence = {
+            "activation_prerequisites_commit_oid": "a" * 40,
+            "activation_prerequisites_tree_oid": "b" * 40,
+            "artifact_sha256": "c" * 64,
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256": "d" * 64,
+            "validator_sha256": "e" * 64,
+            "state_machine_sha256": "f" * 64,
+            "branch_protection_adapter_sha256": "0" * 64,
+            "rollback_configuration_sha256": "1" * 64,
+            "test_evidence_sha256": "2" * 64,
+            "deployment_manifest_sha256": "3" * 64,
+            "dormant_unit_manifest_sha256": "4" * 64,
+            "dormant_deployment_evidence_sha256": "5" * 64,
+        }
+        closure = ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder().build(evidence)
+        self.assertEqual(len(closure.closure_sha256), 64)
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder().build({})
+
+    def test_mirror_verifier_requires_all_four_refs_and_fsck(self):
+        verifier = ApprovalMirrorStatusVerifier()
+        self.assertTrue(verifier.verify(
+            HEAD, gitea_oid=HEAD, quarantine_oid=HEAD,
+            authoritative_oid=HEAD, controller_visible_oid=HEAD,
+            fsck_connectivity="PASS",
+        ))
+        self.assertFalse(verifier.verify(
+            HEAD, gitea_oid=HEAD, quarantine_oid=HEAD,
+            authoritative_oid="b" * 40, controller_visible_oid=HEAD,
+            fsck_connectivity="PASS",
+        ))
+
+    def test_machine_status_is_fixture_only_and_dormant(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantStatusProducer):
+            MachineStatusProducer().produce("aios/machine-gates", "success", HEAD)
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantStatusProducer):
+            MachineStatusProducer(enabled=True, fixture=True).produce(
+                "aios/machine-gates", "success", HEAD
+            )
+        record = MachineStatusProducer(fixture=True).produce(
+            "aios/evidence-closure", "success", HEAD
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(record.head_oid, HEAD)
+
+    def test_service_self_check_is_dormant_and_activate_is_rejected(self):
+        output = io.StringIO()
+        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output):
+            self.assertEqual(main(["--component", "owner-review-adapter", "--self-check"]), 0)
+        state = json.loads(output.getvalue())
+        self.assertFalse(state["active"])
+        self.assertFalse(state["production_mutation"])
+        with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
+                main(["--component", "owner-review-adapter", "--activate"])
+
+    def test_write_flags_cannot_be_enabled(self):
+        for name in (
+            "AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED",
+            "AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(name=name), patch.dict(os.environ, {name: "true"}, clear=False):
+                with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+                    with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
+                        main(["--component", "machine-status-producer", "--self-check"])
+
+    def test_service_entrypoint_restart_recovery_across_processes(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-governance-fixture-") as root:
+            command = [
+                sys.executable, "-m", "aios_single_owner_governance.service",
+                "--component", "owner-review-adapter", "--self-check",
+                "--checkpoint-dir", root,
+            ]
+            first = subprocess.run(command, text=True, capture_output=True, check=True)
+            second = subprocess.run(command, text=True, capture_output=True, check=True)
+            first_state = json.loads(first.stdout)
+            second_state = json.loads(second.stdout)
+            self.assertFalse(first_state["restart_recovery"])
+            self.assertTrue(second_state["restart_recovery"])
+            self.assertEqual(second_state["prior_invocations"], 1)
+            self.assertFalse(second_state["production_mutation"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/single_owner_governance/test_live_activation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+import hashlib
+import os
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+import pytest
+from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator, ValidationError
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.activation import (
+    ActivationEngine,
+    InjectedCrash,
+    _verify_approved_entities,
+    validate_bindings,
+)
+import aios_single_owner_governance.validator as validator_module
+import aios_single_owner_governance.state_machine as state_machine_module
+import aios_single_owner_governance.activation as activation_module
+from aios_single_owner_governance.gitea_protected_branch import (
+    CASConflict,
+    FileProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    UnsafePolicy,
+    calculate_snapshot_sha256,
+    validate_target,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.journal import sha256_json
+
+
+MACHINE_CONTEXTS = {
+    "aios/validator",
+    "aios/state-machine",
+    "aios/branch-protection",
+    "aios/secret-scan",
+    "aios/evidence-closure",
+}
+
+
+def write_json(path: Path, value: object) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path.write_text(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def legacy_row() -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": 7,
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "branch_name": "governance/approvals",
+        "can_push": 0,
+        "enable_whitelist": 0,
+        "whitelist_user_i_ds": "null",
+        "whitelist_team_i_ds": "null",
+        "enable_merge_whitelist": 1,
+        "whitelist_deploy_keys": 0,
+        "merge_whitelist_user_i_ds": "[42,43]",
+        "merge_whitelist_team_i_ds": "null",
+        "enable_status_check": 0,
+        "status_check_contexts": "[]",
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist": 1,
+        "approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds": "[42,43]",
+        "approvals_whitelist_team_i_ds": "null",
+        "required_approvals": 2,
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews": 1,
+        "block_on_official_review_requests": 1,
+        "block_on_outdated_branch": 1,
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals": 1,
+        "ignore_stale_approvals": 0,
+        "require_signed_commits": 0,
+        "protected_file_patterns": "",
+        "unprotected_file_patterns": "",
+        "created_unix": 1,
+        "updated_unix": 10,
+    }
+
+
+def owner_row() -> dict:
+    row = legacy_row()
+    row.update(
+        {
+            "approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds": "[2]",
+            "required_approvals": 1,
+            "enable_status_check": 1,
+            "status_check_contexts": json.dumps(sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS), separators=(",", ":")),
+            "updated_unix": 11,
+        }
+    )
+    return row
+
+
+def git_output(git_dir: Path, *args: str, stdin: str | None = None) -> str:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args], input=stdin, text=True,
+        capture_output=True, check=True,
+        env={
+            **__import__("os").environ,
+            "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "Test", "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "test@example.invalid",
+            "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "Test", "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "test@example.invalid",
+        },
+    ).stdout.strip()
+
+
+def commit_files(
+    git_dir: Path, files: dict[str, str], message: str, *, parent: str | None = None
+) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    root: dict[str, object] = {}
+    for path, raw in files.items():
+        node = root
+        parts = path.split("/")
+        for directory in parts[:-1]:
+            node = node.setdefault(directory, {})  # type: ignore[assignment]
+        node[parts[-1]] = git_output(git_dir, "hash-object", "-w", "--stdin", stdin=raw)
+
+    def build_tree(node: dict[str, object]) -> str:
+        lines = []
+        for name in sorted(node):
+            value = node[name]
+            if isinstance(value, dict):
+                lines.append(f"040000 tree {build_tree(value)}\t{name}")
+            else:
+                lines.append(f"100644 blob {value}\t{name}")
+        return git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin="\n".join(lines) + "\n")
+
+    tree = build_tree(root)
+    args = ["commit-tree", tree]
+    if parent is not None:
+        args.extend(("-p", parent))
+    return git_output(git_dir, *args, stdin=message + "\n"), tree
+
+
+def evidence_fixture(tmp_path: Path, execution_binding: dict) -> dict:
+    git_dir = tmp_path / "evidence.git"
+    subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", str(git_dir)], capture_output=True, check=True)
+    package_root = Path(activation_module.__file__).resolve().parent
+    source_files: dict[str, str] = {}
+    runtime_sources = []
+    for name in (
+        "activation.py", "gitea_protected_branch.py", "journal.py",
+        "state_machine.py", "validator.py",
+    ):
+        source = package_root / name
+        raw = source.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        git_path = (
+            "services/aios-single-owner-governance/"
+            f"aios_single_owner_governance/{name}"
+        )
+        source_files[git_path] = raw
+        runtime_sources.append({
+            "git_path": git_path,
+            "runtime_path": str(source.resolve()),
+            "sha256": hashlib.sha256(source.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
+        })
+    implementation_oid, implementation_tree = commit_files(
+        git_dir, source_files, "implementation"
+    )
+    closure_path = "evidence/live-activation-closure.json"
+    closure_raw = '{"result":"PASS"}\n'
+    closure_oid, _ = commit_files(
+        git_dir, {**source_files, closure_path: closure_raw},
+        "closure", parent=implementation_oid
+    )
+    closure_sha = hashlib.sha256(closure_raw.encode()).hexdigest()
+    entities = {}
+    for name, raw in {
+        "artifact": b"approved-artifact\n",
+        "rollback_artifact": b"approved-rollback\n",
+        "test_evidence": b"approved-tests\n",
+    }.items():
+        path = tmp_path / "artifacts" / f"{name}.bin"
+        path.parent.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+        path.write_bytes(raw)
+        entities[f"{name}_path"] = str(path.resolve())
+        entities[f"{name}_sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+    head_oid = git_output(git_dir, "hash-object", "-w", "--stdin", stdin="head\n")
+    expiry = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)
+    producer_id = 99
+    producer_name = "trusted-machine-producer"
+    execution_binding = {
+        **execution_binding,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": closure_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_path": closure_path,
+        "evidence_closure_sha256": closure_sha,
+        "implementation_commit_oid": implementation_oid,
+        "implementation_tree_oid": implementation_tree,
+        "runtime_sources": runtime_sources,
+        "machine_status_producer_id": producer_id,
+        "machine_status_producer_name": producer_name,
+        **entities,
+    }
+    manifest = {
+        "approval_type": "SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_LIVE_ACTIVATION_IMPLEMENTATION_AND_EXECUTION",
+        "expires_at": expiry.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "execution_binding": execution_binding,
+        "execution_binding_sha256": sha256_json(execution_binding),
+        **{key: execution_binding[key] for key in (
+            "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+            "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path",
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256", "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+            "evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+            "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+        )},
+    }
+    manifest_raw = json.dumps(manifest, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n"
+    manifest_blob = git_output(git_dir, "hash-object", "-w", "--stdin", stdin=manifest_raw)
+    leaf = git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin=f"100644 blob {manifest_blob}\tactivation.json\n")
+    approvals = git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin=f"040000 tree {leaf}\tsingle-owner\n")
+    tree = git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin=f"040000 tree {approvals}\tapprovals\n")
+    merge_oid = git_output(git_dir, "commit-tree", tree, stdin="approved\n")
+    git_output(git_dir, "update-ref", "refs/heads/governance/approvals", merge_oid)
+
+    db = tmp_path / "approval.db"
+    with sqlite3.connect(db) as connection:
+        connection.executescript(
+            "CREATE TABLE issue(id INTEGER,repo_id INTEGER,is_closed INTEGER);"
+            "CREATE TABLE pull_request(issue_id INTEGER,\"index\" INTEGER,base_branch TEXT,has_merged INTEGER,merged_commit_id TEXT,merged_unix INTEGER);"
+            "CREATE TABLE user(id INTEGER,lower_name TEXT);"
+            "CREATE TABLE review(id INTEGER,type INTEGER,reviewer_id INTEGER,issue_id INTEGER,commit_id TEXT,stale INTEGER,dismissed INTEGER,created_unix INTEGER);"
+            "CREATE TABLE commit_status(id INTEGER,repo_id INTEGER,state TEXT,sha TEXT,context TEXT,creator_id INTEGER);"
+        )
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO issue VALUES(10,1,1)")
+        merged_unix = int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp())
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO pull_request VALUES(10,31,'governance/approvals',1,?,?)", (merge_oid, merged_unix))
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO user VALUES(2,'owner')")
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO user VALUES(?,?)", (producer_id, producer_name))
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO review VALUES(52,1,2,10,?,0,0,?)",
+            (head_oid, int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp())),
+        )
+        machine_checks = {}
+        for index, context in enumerate(sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS), 101):
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO commit_status VALUES(?,1,'success',?,?,?)",
+                (index, head_oid, context, producer_id),
+            )
+            machine_checks[context] = {
+                "state": "success", "head_oid": head_oid, "status_id": index,
+                "creator_id": producer_id, "creator_login": producer_name,
+            }
+    return {
+        "git_dir": git_dir, "merge_oid": merge_oid, "closure_oid": closure_oid,
+        "head_oid": head_oid, "db": db, "expiry": expiry.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "manifest_path": "approvals/single-owner/activation.json",
+        "manifest_blob": manifest_blob,
+        "manifest_sha256": hashlib.sha256(manifest_raw.encode()).hexdigest(),
+        "execution_binding": execution_binding,
+        "machine_checks": machine_checks,
+        **execution_binding,
+    }
+
+
+def bindings(tmp_path: Path, adapter: FileProtectedBranchAdapter, **overrides) -> dict:
+    validator_path = Path(validator_module.__file__).resolve()
+    state_machine_path = Path(state_machine_module.__file__).resolve()
+    validator_sha = hashlib.sha256(validator_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+    state_machine_sha = hashlib.sha256(state_machine_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+    execution_binding = {
+        "task_id": "AIOS-LIVE-ACTIVATION-TEST",
+        "operation_id": "op-live-001",
+        "expected_validator_sha256": validator_sha,
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256": state_machine_sha,
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256": adapter.calculate_snapshot_sha256(legacy_row()),
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": "0" * 64,
+        "target_branch_protection_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(owner_row()),
+        "backend": "file",
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "branch": "governance/approvals",
+        "requester": "agent",
+        "executor": "activation-executor",
+        "forbidden_operations": {
+            "main": False, "governance_direct": False, "integration": False,
+            "tags": False, "force_push": False,
+        },
+    }
+    evidence = evidence_fixture(tmp_path, execution_binding)
+    value = {
+        "task_id": "AIOS-LIVE-ACTIVATION-TEST",
+        "operation_id": "op-live-001",
+        "expected_governance_oid": evidence["merge_oid"],
+        "observed_governance_oid": evidence["merge_oid"],
+        "expected_validator_sha256": validator_sha,
+        "observed_validator_sha256": validator_sha,
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256": state_machine_sha,
+        "observed_state_machine_sha256": state_machine_sha,
+        "validator_path": str(validator_path),
+        "state_machine_path": str(state_machine_path),
+        "governance_git_dir": str(evidence["git_dir"].resolve()),
+        "governance_ref": "refs/heads/governance/approvals",
+        "evidence_git_dir": str(evidence["git_dir"].resolve()),
+        "approval_db_path": str(evidence["db"].resolve()),
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256": adapter.calculate_snapshot_sha256(legacy_row()),
+        "activation_approval_merge_oid": evidence["merge_oid"],
+        "approval_request_head_oid": evidence["head_oid"],
+        "activation_approval_pr_number": 31,
+        "activation_manifest_path": evidence["manifest_path"],
+        "activation_manifest_blob_oid": evidence["manifest_blob"],
+        "activation_manifest_sha256": evidence["manifest_sha256"],
+        "expires_at": evidence["expiry"],
+        "evidence_closure_oid": evidence["closure_oid"],
+        "observed_evidence_closure_oid": evidence["closure_oid"],
+        **{key: evidence[key] for key in (
+            "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+            "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path",
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256", "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+            "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+            "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+        )},
+        "owner_review_oid": 52,
+        "observed_owner_review_oid": 52,
+        "requester": "agent",
+        "executor": "activation-executor",
+        "wip": False,
+        "machine_checks": evidence["machine_checks"],
+        "forbidden_operations": {
+            "main": False,
+            "governance_direct": False,
+            "integration": False,
+            "tags": False,
+            "force_push": False,
+        },
+        "target_branch_protection": owner_row(),
+        "backend": "file",
+        "backend_path": str(adapter.path.resolve()),
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "branch": "governance/approvals",
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": "0" * 64,
+    }
+    value.update(overrides)
+    return value
+
+
+def harness(tmp_path: Path):
+    backend = tmp_path / "protected.json"
+    write_json(backend, legacy_row())
+    adapter = FileProtectedBranchAdapter(backend)
+    engine = ActivationEngine(adapter, tmp_path / "state", tmp_path / "run" / "activation.lock")
+    request = bindings(tmp_path, adapter)
+    return backend, adapter, engine, request
+
+
+def test_live_plan_success(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    result = engine.plan(request)
+    assert result["status"] == "PLAN_READY"
+    assert len(result["plan_id"]) == 64
+
+
+def test_activation_bindings_schema_matches_runtime_contract(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, _, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    schema_path = Path(activation_module.__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "activation-bindings.schema.json"
+    schema = json.loads(schema_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    Draft202012Validator.check_schema(schema)
+    validator = Draft202012Validator(schema)
+    validator.validate(request)
+    invalid = json.loads(json.dumps(request))
+    invalid["machine_checks"][sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]]["status_id"] = 0
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        validator.validate(invalid)
+
+
+def test_runtime_source_must_be_actual_loaded_module_not_decoy(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    source = Path(request["runtime_sources"][0]["runtime_path"])
+    decoy = tmp_path / "decoy.py"
+    decoy.write_bytes(source.read_bytes())
+    request["runtime_sources"][0]["runtime_path"] = str(decoy.resolve())
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="RUNTIME_SOURCE_PATH_MISMATCH"):
+        _verify_approved_entities(request, Path(request["evidence_git_dir"]))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path_field", ["artifact_path", "rollback_artifact_path", "test_evidence_path"])
+def test_approved_entity_digest_is_enforced(tmp_path: Path, path_field: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    Path(request[path_field]).write_bytes(b"tampered\n")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_ENTITY_DIGEST_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_evidence_closure_must_be_direct_child_commit(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    git_dir = Path(request["evidence_git_dir"])
+    unrelated, _ = commit_files(
+        git_dir,
+        {request["evidence_closure_path"]: '{"result":"PASS"}\n'},
+        "unrelated",
+    )
+    request["evidence_closure_oid"] = unrelated
+    request["observed_evidence_closure_oid"] = unrelated
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_pr_merge_after_expiry_is_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "UPDATE pull_request SET merged_unix=?",
+            (int(_parse_test_utc(request["expires_at"]).timestamp()) + 1,),
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_MERGED_AFTER_EXPIRY"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def _parse_test_utc(value: str) -> datetime:
+    return datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+
+
+def test_machine_status_must_match_bound_producer_and_observed_row(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    context = sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]
+    request["machine_checks"][context]["status_id"] += 1000
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="MACHINE_GATE_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_latest_machine_status_from_unapproved_producer_is_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    context = sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO user VALUES(100,'untrusted-producer')")
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO commit_status VALUES(999,1,'success',?,?,100)",
+            (request["approval_request_head_oid"], context),
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="MACHINE_GATE_PRODUCER_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_live_activate_verify_status_success(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    activated = engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert activated["status"] == "ACTIVATED"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == owner_row()
+    assert engine.verify(request, request["operation_id"])["status"] == "VERIFIED"
+    assert engine.status(request["operation_id"])["transaction"]["phase"] == "COMMITTED"
+    assert (engine.journal.root / "current-snapshot.json").exists()
+    assert (engine.journal.root / "rollback-snapshot.json").exists()
+
+
+def test_live_rollback_success(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK"
+
+
+def test_terminal_rollback_cannot_be_reactivated(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="OPERATION_TERMINAL_ROLLED_BACK"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+
+
+def test_verify_and_rollback_remain_available_after_approval_expiry(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    future = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=2)
+
+    class FutureDateTime(datetime):
+        @classmethod
+        def now(cls, tz=None):
+            return future if tz is not None else future.replace(tzinfo=None)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(activation_module, "datetime", FutureDateTime)
+    assert engine.verify(request, request["operation_id"])["status"] == "VERIFIED"
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+
+
+def test_prepared_crash_can_recover_after_approval_expiry(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["crash_at"] = "before_apply"
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    with pytest.raises(InjectedCrash):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    request.pop("crash_at")
+    future = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=2)
+
+    class FutureDateTime(datetime):
+        @classmethod
+        def now(cls, tz=None):
+            return future if tz is not None else future.replace(tzinfo=None)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(activation_module, "datetime", FutureDateTime)
+    assert engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ACTIVATED"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == owner_row()
+
+
+def test_fresh_activation_rechecks_expiry_at_prepared_boundary(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    expiry = _parse_test_utc(request["expires_at"])
+    moments = iter((
+        expiry - timedelta(seconds=2),
+        expiry - timedelta(seconds=1),
+        expiry + timedelta(seconds=1),
+    ))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(activation_module, "_utc_now", lambda: next(moments))
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVAL_EXPIRED"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.load(request["operation_id"]) is None
+
+
+def test_fresh_activation_rejects_snapshot_drift_at_prepared_boundary(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    original_read = adapter.read_current
+    reads = 0
+
+    def drifting_read() -> dict:
+        nonlocal reads
+        reads += 1
+        if reads == 2:
+            drifted = original_read()
+            drifted["can_push"] = 1
+            drifted["updated_unix"] = 777
+            return drifted
+        return original_read()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(adapter, "read_current", drifting_read)
+    with pytest.raises(CASConflict, match="PREPARED_BOUNDARY_SNAPSHOT_CHANGED"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert original_read() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.load(request["operation_id"]) is None
+
+
+def test_rollback_uses_durable_authorization_after_live_status_rerun(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    context = sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO commit_status VALUES(999,1,'success',?,?,?)",
+            (
+                request["approval_request_head_oid"], context,
+                request["machine_status_producer_id"],
+            ),
+        )
+    result = engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])
+    assert result["status"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+
+
+def test_missing_approval_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request.pop("owner_review_oid")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="MISSING_BINDINGS"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "value", "message"),
+    [
+        ("observed_owner_review_oid", 99, "WRONG_APPROVAL_OID_DENIED"),
+        ("observed_governance_oid", "f" * 40, "WRONG_GOVERNANCE_OID_DENIED"),
+        ("observed_evidence_closure_oid", "f" * 40, "WRONG_EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DENIED"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_wrong_binding_denied(tmp_path: Path, field: str, value: object, message: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request[field] = value
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=message):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_cas_conflict_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    backend, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    changed = legacy_row()
+    changed["updated_unix"] = 12
+    write_json(backend, changed)
+    with pytest.raises(CASConflict):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("crash_at", ["before_apply", "during_apply", "after_apply_before_receipt", "after_commit_wal"])
+def test_process_crash_restart_recovery(tmp_path: Path, crash_at: str) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["crash_at"] = crash_at
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    with pytest.raises(InjectedCrash):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    request.pop("crash_at")
+    result = engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    expected_status = "ALREADY_COMMITTED" if crash_at == "after_commit_wal" else "ACTIVATED"
+    assert result["status"] == expected_status
+    assert adapter.read_current() == owner_row()
+    assert engine.journal.receipt_path(request["operation_id"]).exists()
+    assert engine.journal.audit.has_event(request["operation_id"], "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED")
+
+
+def test_post_activation_verify_failure_rolls_back(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(adapter, "verify_applied", lambda _: False)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="POST_ACTIVATION_VERIFY_FAILED"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.load(request["operation_id"])["phase"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+
+
+def test_operation_id_idempotency(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ALREADY_COMMITTED"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("crash_at", ["after_rollback_cas", "after_rollback_wal"])
+def test_rollback_crash_restart_repairs_closure(tmp_path: Path, crash_at: str) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    request["crash_at"] = crash_at
+    with pytest.raises(InjectedCrash):
+        engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])
+    request.pop("crash_at")
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.receipt_path(request["operation_id"]).exists()
+    assert engine.journal.audit.has_event(request["operation_id"], "ACTIVATION_ROLLED_BACK")
+
+
+def test_operation_id_payload_mismatch_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    changed = dict(request)
+    approval_alias = tmp_path / "approval-alias.db"
+    os.link(request["approval_db_path"], approval_alias)
+    changed["approval_db_path"] = str(approval_alias)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="PAYLOAD_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.activate(changed, planned["plan_id"])
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "value"),
+    [("operation_id", "op-live-REPLAY"), ("task_id", "REPLAY-TASK")],
+)
+def test_approved_execution_binding_replay_denied(tmp_path: Path, field: str, value: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request[field] = value
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_expiry_must_come_from_approved_manifest(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["expires_at"] = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=12)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVAL_EXPIRY_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_target_snapshot_must_match_approved_manifest(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["target_branch_protection"] = {**owner_row(), "updated_unix": 99}
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_approval_database_must_be_backend_database(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    other_db = tmp_path / "other.db"
+    other_db.write_bytes(Path(request["approval_db_path"]).read_bytes())
+    request.update(backend="sqlite", backend_path=str(other_db.resolve()))
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVAL_DB_BACKEND_DB_IDENTITY_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_audit_chain_continuity_and_credential_redaction(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["api_token"] = "must-not-appear"
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert len(engine.journal.audit.verify()) == 64
+    raw = (engine.journal.root / "audit.jsonl").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "must-not-appear" not in raw
+    assert "[REDACTED]" not in raw  # only hashes/events are persisted to audit
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "mutation",
+    [
+        lambda request: request.update(requester="owner"),
+        lambda request: request.update(executor="owner"),
+        lambda request: request.update(wip=True),
+        lambda request: request.update(machine_checks={"anything": {"state": "success", "head_oid": request["approval_request_head_oid"]}}),
+        lambda request: request.update(forbidden_operations={"main": True}),
+        lambda request: request.update(forbidden_operations={"tags": True}),
+        lambda request: request.update(forbidden_operations={"force_push": True}),
+    ],
+)
+def test_negative_governance_acceptance(tmp_path: Path, mutation) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    mutation(request)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "mutation",
+    [
+        lambda target: target.update(enable_approvals_whitelist=0),
+        lambda target: target.update(enable_merge_whitelist=0),
+        lambda target: target.update(status_check_contexts="[]"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_unsafe_policy_enable_fields_denied(tmp_path: Path, mutation) -> None:
+    _, _, _, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    mutation(request["target_branch_protection"])
+    with pytest.raises(UnsafePolicy):
+        validate_target(legacy_row(), request["target_branch_protection"])
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid_owner", ["codex", "gpt"])
+def test_owner_review_must_come_from_gitea_database(tmp_path: Path, invalid_owner: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute("UPDATE user SET lower_name=? WHERE id=2", (invalid_owner,))
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="OWNER_APPROVAL_INVALID"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_stale_owner_review_denied_from_gitea_database(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute("UPDATE review SET stale=1 WHERE id=52")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="OWNER_APPROVAL_INVALID"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def create_sqlite_fixture(path: Path) -> None:
+    row = legacy_row()
+    columns = []
+    for key, value in row.items():
+        kind = "INTEGER" if isinstance(value, int) else "TEXT"
+        columns.append(f"{key} {kind}")
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.execute(f"CREATE TABLE protected_branch ({','.join(columns)})")
+        connection.execute(
+            f"INSERT INTO protected_branch ({','.join(row)}) VALUES ({','.join('?' for _ in row)})",
+            list(row.values()),
+        )
+
+
+def test_sqlite_full_row_cas_and_rollback(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    db = tmp_path / "gitea.db"
+    create_sqlite_fixture(db)
+    probe = SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter(db, expected_schema_sha256="0" * 64)
+    adapter = SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter(db, expected_schema_sha256=probe.schema_sha256())
+    previous = adapter.read_current()
+    applied = adapter.apply_atomic(calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous), owner_row())
+    assert applied == owner_row()
+    restored = adapter.rollback_atomic(calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied), previous)
+    assert restored == previous