evidence: close live activation hardening candidate

governance: harden single-owner live activation
feat(governance): add fail-closed live activation
2026-07-29 12:30:10 +08:00 · 2026-07-29 12:28:37 +08:00 · 2026-07-29 11:27:04 +08:00 · 2026-07-29 04:00:00 +08:00
31 changed files with 3512 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS dormant single-owner machine-status prerequisite
+RefuseManualStop=no
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=aiman
+Group=gitops
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component machine-status-producer --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateDevices=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS dormant single-owner review adapter prerequisite
+RefuseManualStop=no
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=aiman
+Group=gitops
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
+Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component owner-review-adapter --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateDevices=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS single-owner governance activation verifier
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=root
+Group=gitops
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-single-owner-governance --verify --bindings /etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json --state-root /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation --lock-path /run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation /run/aios-gitops
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+UMask=0027
+
+# Deliberately not installable. Deployment remains disabled/inactive;
+# activation is an explicit approved CLI transaction, never an always-on unit.
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation 0750 root gitops -
+d /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation/wal 0750 root gitops -
+d /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation/receipts 0750 root gitops -
+d /run/aios-gitops 0750 root gitops -
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729/artifacts/hardening-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf/live-activation-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf.tar.gz",
+  "artifact_sha256": "32bc49c207ec454b6fd81b0484f5b257bb789481b37175995029a2ec78cc62fa",
+  "copied_live_db_acceptance": "PASS",
+  "implementation_commit_oid": "71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf",
+  "implementation_tree_oid": "3cc61bfbf69cbe0a24d54a0e53a6c50bcc130066",
+  "independent_validator": "ALLOW_CANDIDATE",
+  "production_mutation": false,
+  "result": "PASS",
+  "rollback_artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729/artifacts/hardening-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf/live-activation-rollback-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf.tar.gz",
+  "rollback_artifact_sha256": "4efe1ea73d4fd72e5364fc91a16ad5e9d1e6ebe78d8aa466f7b11c4915b08403",
+  "runtime_source_sha256": {
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/activation.py": "48846a58fa3afb2b7c8ffe6e88504a9333863932df867f33ba0321ad3bac6003",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/gitea_protected_branch.py": "00775efe3f3d631d88379eff4ed2dcfaf386a2fa43111abe961e75109e80d768",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/journal.py": "a8f121245e04487d99c99fb03ada83f0c907723f8eb18552872ff46dcf5a7873",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/state_machine.py": "0b08a2c378d143cb9031a25132afc7b7d825bdc03d11efe10610341d4b70167e",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/validator.py": "754639846cb15cb997d612a1fe0ceb0224ddef5bbc3ccac9802a3747f122dac1"
+  },
+  "subtests_passed": 17,
+  "task_id": "AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729",
+  "test_evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/tasks/AIOS-SINGLE-OWNER-GOVERNANCE-ACTIVATION-20260729/artifacts/hardening-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf/test-evidence-71def340e7cc34f4f19918dcf8d3c847abbe4fbf.json",
+  "test_evidence_sha256": "c1633732767f3f051ffb01404d12d05a6168a4b01b91efdb34a64988d6dee684",
+  "tests_failed": 0,
+  "tests_passed": 90
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# AIOS Single-Owner Governance Prerequisites
+
+This package is a dormant candidate produced under the PR #29 prerequisite
+authorization. It validates exact-head Owner approvals and machine gates,
+models protection-policy compare-and-swap with compensation, builds evidence,
+and exercises every mutation path only against disposable fixtures.
+
+The prerequisite shadow services remain static and refuse live mutation. This
+branch adds a separate, one-shot activation executor with `--plan`,
+`--activate`, `--verify`, `--rollback`, and `--status` commands. It is not an
+always-on writer and never enables global GitOps writes.
+
+The executor is fail-closed: every consequential command is bound to an exact
+approval merge, governance OID, evidence closure, Owner review, component
+digests, full branch-protection snapshot, operation ID, and plan ID. It writes
+a fsynced WAL before the single-row SQLite CAS, verifies the full applied row,
+and only rolls back with a target-to-previous CAS. Audit records are
+hash-chained and credentials are redacted.
+
+## Hardening Contract
+
+Fresh activation is authorized only before the approved `expires_at` instant.
+An already-recorded `PREPARED` transaction may recover after expiry only to
+reach a safe terminal state using the same exact bindings; `--verify` and
+`--rollback` remain available for that recorded transaction after expiry.
+`ROLLED_BACK` and `FAILED` are terminal states and must never be replayed as a
+new activation.
+
+The approved execution binding must pin the implementation commit and its
+exact tree, the installed hashes of the five runtime source files
+(`activation.py`, `gitea_protected_branch.py`, `journal.py`, `validator.py`,
+and `state_machine.py`), and independent SHA-256 values for the deployment
+artifact, rollback artifact, and test evidence. It must also bind an evidence
+closure that is a commit with the exact direct parent and exactly one approved
+closure file, including that file's Git blob OID and SHA-256.
+
+Every required machine status is accepted only when its exact status record,
+creator identity, producer provenance, target URL, description digest, head
+OID, state, and observation time match the approved binding. A fixture status
+or a dormant self-check is not machine-status producer provenance.
+
+This contract hardens validation; it does not authorize deployment. The
+existing governed approval rules still apply, and installation remains
+disabled and inactive until the required merged approval authorizes one
+explicit execution.
+
+Installation must remain disabled and inactive until a merged
+`SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_LIVE_ACTIVATION_IMPLEMENTATION_AND_EXECUTION`
+approval authorizes one explicit execution. The approved runtime paths are
+`/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation/` and
+`/run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock`.
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "properties": {
+    "activation_approval_merge_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "activation_approval_pr_number": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+    "activation_manifest_blob_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "activation_manifest_path": {"pattern": "^approvals/.+\\.json$", "type": "string"},
+    "activation_manifest_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "artifact_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+    "artifact_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "approval_db_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "approval_request_head_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "backend": {"enum": ["file", "sqlite"]},
+    "backend_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "branch": {"const": "governance/approvals"},
+    "evidence_closure_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "evidence_closure_path": {"pattern": "^(?!/)(?!.*\\.\\.).+", "type": "string"},
+    "evidence_closure_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "evidence_git_dir": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "executor": {"not": {"const": "owner"}, "type": "string"},
+    "expected_branch_protection_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_governance_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_state_machine_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expected_validator_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "expires_at": {"format": "date-time", "type": "string"},
+    "forbidden_operations": {"additionalProperties": {"const": false}, "type": "object"},
+    "governance_git_dir": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "governance_ref": {"const": "refs/heads/governance/approvals"},
+    "implementation_commit_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "implementation_tree_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "machine_status_producer_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+    "machine_status_producer_name": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "machine_checks": {
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "aios/branch-protection": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/evidence-closure": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/secret-scan": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/state-machine": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"},
+        "aios/validator": {"$ref": "#/$defs/machineCheck"}
+      },
+      "required": ["aios/branch-protection", "aios/evidence-closure", "aios/secret-scan", "aios/state-machine", "aios/validator"],
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    "observed_evidence_closure_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "observed_governance_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+    "observed_owner_review_oid": {"type": ["integer", "string"]},
+    "observed_state_machine_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "observed_validator_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "operation_id": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "owner_review_oid": {"type": ["integer", "string"]},
+    "repo_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+    "requester": {"not": {"const": "owner"}, "type": "string"},
+    "rollback_artifact_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+    "rollback_artifact_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "runtime_sources": {
+      "items": {
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "properties": {
+          "git_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+          "runtime_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+          "sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"}
+        },
+        "required": ["git_path", "runtime_path", "sha256"],
+        "type": "object"
+      },
+      "maxItems": 5,
+      "minItems": 5,
+      "type": "array"
+    },
+    "state_machine_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "target_branch_protection": {"type": "object"},
+    "task_id": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "test_evidence_path": {"pattern": "^/", "type": "string"},
+    "test_evidence_sha256": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$", "type": "string"},
+    "validator_path": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+    "wip": {"const": false}
+  },
+  "$defs": {
+    "machineCheck": {
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "head_oid": {"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$", "type": "string"},
+        "status_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+        "creator_id": {"minimum": 1, "type": "integer"},
+        "creator_login": {"minLength": 1, "type": "string"},
+        "state": {"const": "success"}
+      },
+      "required": ["state", "head_oid", "status_id", "creator_id", "creator_login"],
+      "type": "object"
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "task_id", "operation_id", "expected_governance_oid", "observed_governance_oid",
+    "expected_validator_sha256", "observed_validator_sha256", "validator_path",
+    "expected_state_machine_sha256", "observed_state_machine_sha256", "state_machine_path",
+    "expected_branch_protection_sha256", "expected_gitea_schema_sha256",
+    "activation_approval_merge_oid", "activation_approval_pr_number", "approval_request_head_oid",
+    "activation_manifest_path", "activation_manifest_blob_oid", "activation_manifest_sha256",
+    "evidence_closure_oid", "observed_evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_git_dir",
+    "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+    "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+    "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path", "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+    "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+    "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+    "owner_review_oid", "observed_owner_review_oid", "approval_db_path", "expires_at",
+    "governance_git_dir", "governance_ref", "machine_checks", "forbidden_operations",
+    "target_branch_protection", "backend", "backend_path", "repo_id", "branch",
+    "requester", "executor", "wip"
+  ],
+  "title": "AIOS Single Owner Live Activation Bindings",
+  "type": "object"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+"""Dormant single-owner governance activation prerequisites."""
+
+from .models import (
+    ApprovalContext,
+    GovernanceState,
+    MachineGate,
+    ProtectionSnapshot,
+    Review,
+)
+from .validator import SingleOwnerApprovalValidator, ValidationDenied
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ApprovalContext",
+    "GovernanceState",
+    "MachineGate",
+    "ProtectionSnapshot",
+    "Review",
+    "SingleOwnerApprovalValidator",
+    "ValidationDenied",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,860 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+from typing import Any, Iterator, Mapping, Protocol
+
+try:
+    import fcntl
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover
+    fcntl = None
+
+from .gitea_protected_branch import (
+    CASConflict,
+    FileProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    calculate_snapshot_sha256,
+)
+from .journal import JournalStore, atomic_write_json, read_json, redact, sha256_json
+from . import state_machine as state_machine_module
+from . import validator as validator_module
+
+
+DEFAULT_STATE_ROOT = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation")
+DEFAULT_LOCK_PATH = Path("/run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock")
+LIVE_GITEA_DB = Path("/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db")
+LIVE_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT = Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
+HEX40 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+HEX64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+REQUIRED_BINDINGS = {
+    "task_id",
+    "operation_id",
+    "expected_governance_oid",
+    "expected_validator_sha256",
+    "expected_state_machine_sha256",
+    "expected_branch_protection_sha256",
+    "activation_approval_merge_oid",
+    "evidence_closure_oid",
+    "owner_review_oid",
+    "observed_governance_oid",
+    "observed_validator_sha256",
+    "observed_state_machine_sha256",
+    "observed_evidence_closure_oid",
+    "observed_owner_review_oid",
+    "approval_request_head_oid",
+    "activation_approval_pr_number",
+    "expires_at",
+    "validator_path",
+    "state_machine_path",
+    "governance_git_dir",
+    "governance_ref",
+    "evidence_git_dir",
+    "approval_db_path",
+    "expected_gitea_schema_sha256",
+    "backend",
+    "backend_path",
+    "repo_id",
+    "branch",
+    "activation_manifest_path",
+    "activation_manifest_blob_oid",
+    "activation_manifest_sha256",
+    "implementation_commit_oid",
+    "implementation_tree_oid",
+    "runtime_sources",
+    "artifact_path",
+    "artifact_sha256",
+    "rollback_artifact_path",
+    "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+    "test_evidence_path",
+    "test_evidence_sha256",
+    "evidence_closure_path",
+    "evidence_closure_sha256",
+    "machine_status_producer_id",
+    "machine_status_producer_name",
+}
+REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS = {
+    "aios/validator",
+    "aios/state-machine",
+    "aios/branch-protection",
+    "aios/secret-scan",
+    "aios/evidence-closure",
+}
+REQUIRED_RUNTIME_GIT_PATHS = {
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/activation.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/gitea_protected_branch.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/journal.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/state_machine.py",
+    "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/validator.py",
+}
+
+
+class InjectedCrash(BaseException):
+    pass
+
+
+class Adapter(Protocol):
+    def read_current(self) -> dict[str, Any]: ...
+    def calculate_snapshot_sha256(self, snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str: ...
+    def apply_atomic(self, expected_sha256: str, target: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]: ...
+    def verify_applied(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool: ...
+    def rollback_atomic(self, expected_target_sha256: str, previous: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]: ...
+    def verify_rollback(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool: ...
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def exclusive_lock(path: Path) -> Iterator[None]:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o640)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+        yield
+    finally:
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+def _require_hex(name: str, value: object, lengths: tuple[int, ...]) -> None:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) not in lengths or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]+", value):
+        raise RuntimeError(f"{name.upper()}_INVALID")
+
+
+def _sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    if not path.is_absolute() or not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("VERIFIED_COMPONENT_PATH_INVALID")
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as handle:
+        for block in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            digest.update(block)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def _git(git_dir: Path, *args: str) -> str:
+    if not git_dir.is_absolute() or not git_dir.exists() or git_dir.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_OBJECT_STORE_INVALID")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_EVIDENCE_VERIFICATION_FAILED")
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def _git_raw(git_dir: Path, *args: str) -> bytes:
+    if not git_dir.is_absolute() or not git_dir.exists() or git_dir.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_OBJECT_STORE_INVALID")
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args], capture_output=True, check=False
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("GIT_EVIDENCE_VERIFICATION_FAILED")
+    return result.stdout
+
+
+def _parse_utc(value: object) -> datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise RuntimeError("EXPIRY_INVALID")
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("EXPIRY_INVALID") from exc
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("EXPIRY_INVALID")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _approved_execution_binding(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "task_id": bindings["task_id"],
+        "operation_id": bindings["operation_id"],
+        "expected_validator_sha256": bindings["expected_validator_sha256"],
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256": bindings["expected_state_machine_sha256"],
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256": bindings["expected_branch_protection_sha256"],
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": bindings["expected_gitea_schema_sha256"],
+        "target_branch_protection_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(
+            bindings["target_branch_protection"]
+        ),
+        "evidence_closure_oid": bindings["evidence_closure_oid"],
+        "evidence_closure_path": bindings["evidence_closure_path"],
+        "evidence_closure_sha256": bindings["evidence_closure_sha256"],
+        "implementation_commit_oid": bindings["implementation_commit_oid"],
+        "implementation_tree_oid": bindings["implementation_tree_oid"],
+        "runtime_sources": bindings["runtime_sources"],
+        "artifact_path": bindings["artifact_path"],
+        "artifact_sha256": bindings["artifact_sha256"],
+        "rollback_artifact_path": bindings["rollback_artifact_path"],
+        "rollback_artifact_sha256": bindings["rollback_artifact_sha256"],
+        "test_evidence_path": bindings["test_evidence_path"],
+        "test_evidence_sha256": bindings["test_evidence_sha256"],
+        "machine_status_producer_id": bindings["machine_status_producer_id"],
+        "machine_status_producer_name": bindings["machine_status_producer_name"],
+        "backend": bindings["backend"],
+        "repo_id": bindings["repo_id"],
+        "branch": bindings["branch"],
+        "requester": bindings["requester"],
+        "executor": bindings["executor"],
+        "forbidden_operations": bindings["forbidden_operations"],
+    }
+
+
+def _same_path(left: Path, right: Path) -> bool:
+    try:
+        return left.resolve(strict=True) == right.resolve(strict=True) and os.path.samefile(left, right)
+    except (FileNotFoundError, OSError):
+        return False
+
+
+def _verify_authority_paths(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if bindings["backend"] != "sqlite":
+        return
+    approval_db = Path(str(bindings["approval_db_path"]))
+    backend_db = Path(str(bindings["backend_path"]))
+    if not _same_path(approval_db, backend_db):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_DB_BACKEND_DB_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    live = _same_path(backend_db, LIVE_GITEA_DB)
+    if live:
+        if not _same_path(Path(str(bindings["governance_git_dir"])), LIVE_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT):
+            raise RuntimeError("AUTHORITATIVE_GOVERNANCE_GIT_REQUIRED")
+        if not _same_path(Path(str(bindings["evidence_git_dir"])), LIVE_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT):
+            raise RuntimeError("AUTHORITATIVE_EVIDENCE_GIT_REQUIRED")
+        return
+    acceptance_root = os.environ.get("AIOS_GOVERNANCE_ACTIVATION_ACCEPTANCE_ROOT")
+    if not acceptance_root:
+        raise RuntimeError("NON_LIVE_SQLITE_BACKEND_DENIED")
+    root = Path(acceptance_root).resolve(strict=True)
+    if not str(root).startswith("/run/aios-live-activation-acceptance-"):
+        raise RuntimeError("ACCEPTANCE_ROOT_INVALID")
+    for path in (approval_db, backend_db, Path(str(bindings["governance_git_dir"])), Path(str(bindings["evidence_git_dir"]))):
+        try:
+            path.resolve(strict=True).relative_to(root)
+        except (FileNotFoundError, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACCEPTANCE_AUTHORITY_ESCAPE_DENIED") from exc
+
+
+def _load_approved_manifest(bindings: Mapping[str, Any], git_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    path = str(bindings["activation_manifest_path"])
+    if not path.startswith("approvals/") or not path.endswith(".json") or ".." in Path(path).parts:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_PATH_INVALID")
+    merge_oid = str(bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"])
+    blob_oid = _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", f"{merge_oid}:{path}")
+    if blob_oid != bindings["activation_manifest_blob_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_BLOB_MISMATCH")
+    raw_result = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", "show", f"{merge_oid}:{path}"],
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    if raw_result.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_READ_FAILED")
+    if hashlib.sha256(raw_result.stdout).hexdigest() != bindings["activation_manifest_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+    try:
+        manifest = json.loads(raw_result.stdout)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_INVALID") from exc
+    if not isinstance(manifest, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_MANIFEST_INVALID")
+    return manifest
+
+
+def _require_approval_unexpired(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if _utc_now() >= _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"]):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+
+
+def _safe_git_path(value: object) -> str:
+    path = str(value)
+    if not path or Path(path).is_absolute() or ".." in Path(path).parts:
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_GIT_PATH_INVALID")
+    return path
+
+
+def _verify_approved_entities(bindings: Mapping[str, Any], git_dir: Path) -> None:
+    implementation_oid = str(bindings["implementation_commit_oid"])
+    _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-e", f"{implementation_oid}^{{commit}}")
+    if _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", f"{implementation_oid}^{{tree}}") != bindings["implementation_tree_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("IMPLEMENTATION_TREE_MISMATCH")
+    sources = bindings["runtime_sources"]
+    if not isinstance(sources, list) or not sources:
+        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCES_INVALID")
+    seen_git: set[str] = set()
+    seen_runtime: set[str] = set()
+    loaded_runtime_paths = {
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/activation.py": Path(__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/gitea_protected_branch.py": Path(__import__(SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter.__module__, fromlist=["x"]).__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/journal.py": Path(__import__(JournalStore.__module__, fromlist=["x"]).__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/state_machine.py": Path(state_machine_module.__file__).resolve(),
+        "services/aios-single-owner-governance/aios_single_owner_governance/validator.py": Path(validator_module.__file__).resolve(),
+    }
+    for source in sources:
+        if not isinstance(source, dict) or set(source) != {"git_path", "runtime_path", "sha256"}:
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        git_path = _safe_git_path(source["git_path"])
+        runtime_path = str(source["runtime_path"])
+        _require_hex("runtime_source_sha256", source["sha256"], (64,))
+        if git_path in seen_git or runtime_path in seen_runtime:
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_BINDING_DUPLICATE")
+        seen_git.add(git_path)
+        seen_runtime.add(runtime_path)
+        if Path(runtime_path).resolve() != loaded_runtime_paths.get(git_path):
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_PATH_MISMATCH")
+        if hashlib.sha256(_git_raw(git_dir, "show", f"{implementation_oid}:{git_path}")).hexdigest() != source["sha256"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("IMPLEMENTATION_SOURCE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+        if _sha256_file(Path(runtime_path)) != source["sha256"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if seen_git != REQUIRED_RUNTIME_GIT_PATHS:
+        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_SET_MISMATCH")
+    for prefix in ("artifact", "rollback_artifact", "test_evidence"):
+        if _sha256_file(Path(str(bindings[f"{prefix}_path"]))) != bindings[f"{prefix}_sha256"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_ENTITY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+
+    closure_oid = str(bindings["evidence_closure_oid"])
+    if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", closure_oid) != "commit":
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_NOT_COMMIT")
+    parents = _git(git_dir, "rev-list", "--parents", "-n", "1", closure_oid).split()
+    if parents != [closure_oid, implementation_oid]:
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_PARENT_MISMATCH")
+    closure_path = _safe_git_path(bindings["evidence_closure_path"])
+    if hashlib.sha256(_git_raw(git_dir, "show", f"{closure_oid}:{closure_path}")).hexdigest() != bindings["evidence_closure_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+    if _git(git_dir, "diff", "--name-status", implementation_oid, closure_oid) != f"A\t{closure_path}":
+        raise RuntimeError("EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DIFF_INVALID")
+
+
+def _verify_external_evidence(
+    bindings: Mapping[str, Any], *, require_unexpired: bool = True
+) -> None:
+    _verify_authority_paths(bindings)
+    validator_sha = _sha256_file(Path(str(bindings["validator_path"])))
+    state_machine_sha = _sha256_file(Path(str(bindings["state_machine_path"])))
+    if validator_sha != bindings["expected_validator_sha256"] or validator_sha != bindings["observed_validator_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("VALIDATOR_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+    if state_machine_sha != bindings["expected_state_machine_sha256"] or state_machine_sha != bindings["observed_state_machine_sha256"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_MACHINE_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
+
+    governance_git_dir = Path(str(bindings["governance_git_dir"]))
+    governance_oid = _git(governance_git_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", str(bindings["governance_ref"]))
+    if governance_oid != bindings["expected_governance_oid"] or governance_oid != bindings["observed_governance_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_GOVERNANCE_OID_DENIED")
+    merge_oid = str(bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"])
+    _git(governance_git_dir, "cat-file", "-e", f"{merge_oid}^{{commit}}")
+    if subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={governance_git_dir}", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", merge_oid, governance_oid],
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+    ).returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_NOT_IN_GOVERNANCE_REF")
+    manifest = _load_approved_manifest(bindings, governance_git_dir)
+    if manifest.get("approval_type") != "SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_LIVE_ACTIVATION_IMPLEMENTATION_AND_EXECUTION":
+        raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_TYPE_MISMATCH")
+    if manifest.get("execution_binding") != _approved_execution_binding(bindings):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+    if manifest.get("execution_binding_sha256") != sha256_json(manifest["execution_binding"]):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+    if manifest.get("expires_at") != bindings["expires_at"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_EXPIRY_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+
+    manifest_bound_fields = (
+        "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+        "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path",
+        "rollback_artifact_sha256", "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+        "evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+        "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+    )
+    if any(manifest.get(field) != bindings[field] for field in manifest_bound_fields):
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVED_ARTIFACT_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+
+    evidence_git_dir = Path(str(bindings["evidence_git_dir"]))
+    evidence_oid = str(bindings["evidence_closure_oid"])
+    if evidence_oid != bindings["observed_evidence_closure_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DENIED")
+    _verify_approved_entities(bindings, evidence_git_dir)
+
+    db_path = Path(str(bindings["approval_db_path"]))
+    if not db_path.is_absolute() or not db_path.is_file() or db_path.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_DATABASE_INVALID")
+    expiry = _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"])
+    if require_unexpired:
+        _require_approval_unexpired(bindings)
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{db_path}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        pr = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT pr.issue_id,pr.has_merged,pr.merged_commit_id,pr.merged_unix,i.is_closed "
+            "FROM pull_request pr JOIN issue i ON i.id=pr.issue_id "
+            "WHERE i.repo_id=? AND pr.\"index\"=? AND pr.base_branch=?",
+            (int(bindings["repo_id"]), int(bindings["activation_approval_pr_number"]), str(bindings["branch"])),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if pr is None or int(pr["has_merged"]) != 1 or int(pr["is_closed"]) != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_PR_NOT_MERGED")
+        if pr["merged_commit_id"] != bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"]:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_MERGE_MISMATCH")
+        if int(pr["merged_unix"] or 0) <= 0 or datetime.fromtimestamp(int(pr["merged_unix"]), timezone.utc) > expiry:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_MERGED_AFTER_EXPIRY")
+        review = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT r.id,r.type,r.reviewer_id,r.commit_id,r.stale,r.dismissed,r.created_unix,u.lower_name "
+            "FROM review r JOIN user u ON u.id=r.reviewer_id WHERE r.id=? AND r.issue_id=?",
+            (int(bindings["owner_review_oid"]), int(pr["issue_id"])),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if review is None or int(review["id"]) != int(bindings["observed_owner_review_oid"]):
+            raise RuntimeError("WRONG_APPROVAL_OID_DENIED")
+        if (
+            int(review["type"]) != 1
+            or int(review["reviewer_id"]) != 2
+            or review["lower_name"] != "owner"
+            or review["commit_id"] != bindings["approval_request_head_oid"]
+            or int(review["stale"]) != 0
+            or int(review["dismissed"]) != 0
+            or datetime.fromtimestamp(int(review["created_unix"]), timezone.utc) >= expiry
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError("OWNER_APPROVAL_INVALID")
+        statuses = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT cs.id,cs.context,cs.state,cs.sha,cs.creator_id,u.lower_name AS creator_login "
+            "FROM commit_status cs LEFT JOIN user u ON u.id=cs.creator_id "
+            "WHERE cs.repo_id=? AND cs.sha=? ORDER BY cs.id DESC",
+            (int(bindings["repo_id"]), str(bindings["approval_request_head_oid"])),
+        ).fetchall()
+        observed: dict[str, sqlite3.Row] = {}
+        for row in statuses:
+            if row["context"] in REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS:
+                observed.setdefault(row["context"], row)
+        if set(observed) != REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS:
+            raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_SET_MISMATCH")
+        for context, row in observed.items():
+            if row["state"] != "success" or row["sha"] != bindings["approval_request_head_oid"]:
+                raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_FAILED")
+            if (
+                int(row["creator_id"] or 0) != int(bindings["machine_status_producer_id"])
+                or row["creator_login"] != bindings["machine_status_producer_name"]
+            ):
+                raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_PRODUCER_MISMATCH")
+            expected = bindings["machine_checks"][context]
+            actual = {
+                "state": row["state"], "head_oid": row["sha"], "status_id": int(row["id"]),
+                "creator_id": int(row["creator_id"]), "creator_login": row["creator_login"],
+            }
+            if expected != actual:
+                raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+
+
+def validate_bindings(
+    bindings: Mapping[str, Any], *, require_unexpired: bool = True
+) -> None:
+    missing = sorted(REQUIRED_BINDINGS - set(bindings))
+    if missing:
+        raise RuntimeError("MISSING_BINDINGS:" + ",".join(missing))
+    for name in (
+        "expected_governance_oid",
+        "activation_approval_merge_oid",
+        "evidence_closure_oid",
+        "implementation_commit_oid",
+        "implementation_tree_oid",
+    ):
+        _require_hex(name, bindings[name], (40,))
+    for name in (
+        "expected_validator_sha256",
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256",
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256",
+        "observed_validator_sha256",
+        "observed_state_machine_sha256",
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256",
+        "activation_manifest_sha256",
+        "artifact_sha256",
+        "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+        "test_evidence_sha256",
+        "evidence_closure_sha256",
+    ):
+        _require_hex(name, bindings[name], (64,))
+    _require_hex("activation_manifest_blob_oid", bindings["activation_manifest_blob_oid"], (40, 64))
+    if not isinstance(bindings["owner_review_oid"], (int, str)) or str(bindings["owner_review_oid"]).strip() == "":
+        raise RuntimeError("OWNER_REVIEW_OID_INVALID")
+    if bindings["governance_ref"] != "refs/heads/governance/approvals":
+        raise RuntimeError("GOVERNANCE_REF_INVALID")
+    if bindings["branch"] != "governance/approvals":
+        raise RuntimeError("BRANCH_BINDING_DENIED")
+    if bindings["backend"] not in {"file", "sqlite"}:
+        raise RuntimeError("UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_BACKEND")
+    if bindings["observed_governance_oid"] != bindings["expected_governance_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_GOVERNANCE_OID_DENIED")
+    if bindings["observed_evidence_closure_oid"] != bindings["evidence_closure_oid"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DENIED")
+    if str(bindings["observed_owner_review_oid"]) != str(bindings["owner_review_oid"]):
+        raise RuntimeError("WRONG_APPROVAL_OID_DENIED")
+    if bindings.get("requester") == "owner":
+        raise RuntimeError("REQUESTER_SELF_APPROVAL_DENIED")
+    if bindings.get("executor") == "owner":
+        raise RuntimeError("EXECUTOR_SELF_APPROVAL_DENIED")
+    if bindings.get("wip") is not False:
+        raise RuntimeError("WIP_BLOCKED")
+    checks = bindings.get("machine_checks")
+    if not isinstance(checks, dict) or set(checks) != REQUIRED_MACHINE_CONTEXTS:
+        raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_GATE_SET_MISMATCH")
+    if not isinstance(bindings["machine_status_producer_id"], int) or bindings["machine_status_producer_id"] < 1:
+        raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_STATUS_PRODUCER_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(bindings["machine_status_producer_name"], str) or not bindings["machine_status_producer_name"]:
+        raise RuntimeError("MACHINE_STATUS_PRODUCER_INVALID")
+    for context, check in checks.items():
+        if (
+            not isinstance(check, dict)
+            or set(check) != {"state", "head_oid", "status_id", "creator_id", "creator_login"}
+            or check.get("state") != "success"
+            or check.get("head_oid") != bindings["approval_request_head_oid"]
+            or not isinstance(check.get("status_id"), int)
+            or check.get("status_id") < 1
+            or check.get("creator_id") != bindings["machine_status_producer_id"]
+            or check.get("creator_login") != bindings["machine_status_producer_name"]
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"MACHINE_GATE_FAILED:{context}")
+    forbidden = bindings.get("forbidden_operations", {})
+    if any(bool(value) for value in forbidden.values()):
+        raise RuntimeError("FORBIDDEN_OPERATION_REQUESTED")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        raise RuntimeError("GLOBAL_GITOPS_WRITES_MUST_REMAIN_FALSE")
+    if not isinstance(bindings.get("target_branch_protection"), dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("TARGET_BRANCH_PROTECTION_REQUIRED")
+    _verify_external_evidence(bindings, require_unexpired=require_unexpired)
+
+
+def binding_payload_hash(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    stable = dict(bindings)
+    stable.pop("crash_at", None)
+    return sha256_json(redact(stable))
+
+
+def plan_id(bindings: Mapping[str, Any], previous: Mapping[str, Any], target: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    stable = dict(bindings)
+    stable.pop("crash_at", None)
+    return sha256_json(
+        {
+            "bindings": redact(stable),
+            "previous": dict(previous),
+            "target": dict(target),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+class ActivationEngine:
+    def __init__(self, adapter: Adapter, state_root: Path, lock_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.adapter = adapter
+        self.journal = JournalStore(state_root)
+        self.lock_path = lock_path
+
+    def plan(self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        validate_bindings(bindings)
+        previous = self.adapter.read_current()
+        previous_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous)
+        if previous_sha != bindings["expected_branch_protection_sha256"]:
+            raise CASConflict("EXPECTED_BRANCH_PROTECTION_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+        target = dict(bindings["target_branch_protection"])
+        # Validate without writing by using the public target validator through a
+        # disposable comparison: adapters enforce the same checks again in CAS.
+        from .gitea_protected_branch import validate_target
+
+        validate_target(previous, target)
+        result = {
+            "status": "PLAN_READY",
+            "task_id": bindings["task_id"],
+            "operation_id": bindings["operation_id"],
+            "plan_id": plan_id(bindings, previous, target),
+            "payload_hash": binding_payload_hash(bindings),
+            "previous_sha256": previous_sha,
+            "target_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(target),
+        }
+        return result
+
+    def _recover(self, record: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        current = self.adapter.read_current()
+        current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(current)
+        previous_sha = record["previous_sha256"]
+        target_sha = record["target_sha256"]
+        if record["phase"] == "PREPARED":
+            if current_sha == previous_sha:
+                return {**record, "recovery": "RESUME_BEFORE_APPLY"}
+            if current_sha == target_sha:
+                record = {**record, "phase": "APPLIED", "recovery": "RESUME_AFTER_APPLY"}
+                self.journal.write(record["operation_id"], record)
+                return record
+            raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+        if record["phase"] in {"APPLIED", "COMMITTED"} and current_sha not in {target_sha, previous_sha}:
+            raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+        return record
+
+    def _ensure_closure(self, record: dict[str, Any], event: str) -> None:
+        expected_sha = (
+            record["target_sha256"] if record["phase"] == "COMMITTED" else record["previous_sha256"]
+        )
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current()) != expected_sha:
+            raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+        atomic_write_json(
+            self.journal.root / "current-snapshot.json",
+            record["target"] if record["phase"] == "COMMITTED" else record["previous"],
+        )
+        atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "rollback-snapshot.json", record["previous"])
+        self.journal.write_receipt(record["operation_id"], record)
+        if not self.journal.audit.has_event(record["operation_id"], event):
+            payload = {"event": event}
+            if event == "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED":
+                payload.update(
+                    payload_hash=record["payload_hash"],
+                    target_sha256=record["target_sha256"],
+                )
+            self.journal.audit.append(record["operation_id"], payload)
+        atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "state.json", record)
+
+    def activate(self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any], supplied_plan_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with exclusive_lock(self.lock_path):
+            self.journal.audit.verify()
+            operation_id = str(bindings["operation_id"])
+            payload_hash = binding_payload_hash(bindings)
+            record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+            if record:
+                if record.get("payload_hash") != payload_hash:
+                    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+                if record.get("plan_id") != supplied_plan_id:
+                    raise RuntimeError("PLAN_ID_MISMATCH")
+                if record.get("phase") == "ROLLED_BACK":
+                    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_TERMINAL_ROLLED_BACK")
+                if record.get("phase") == "FAILED":
+                    raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_TERMINAL_FAILED")
+                prepared_at = _parse_utc(record.get("prepared_at"))
+                if prepared_at >= _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("RECOVERY_AUTHORIZATION_INVALID")
+                record = self._recover(record)
+                if record["phase"] == "COMMITTED":
+                    self._ensure_closure(record, "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED")
+                    return {"status": "ALREADY_COMMITTED", **record}
+            else:
+                validate_bindings(bindings)
+                planned = self.plan(bindings)
+                if supplied_plan_id != planned["plan_id"]:
+                    raise RuntimeError("PLAN_ID_MISMATCH")
+            previous = self.adapter.read_current()
+            target = dict(bindings["target_branch_protection"])
+            if record is None:
+                if calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous) != planned["previous_sha256"]:
+                    raise CASConflict("PREPARED_BOUNDARY_SNAPSHOT_CHANGED")
+                prepared_at = _utc_now()
+                if prepared_at >= _parse_utc(bindings["expires_at"]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+                record = {
+                    "task_id": bindings["task_id"],
+                    "operation_id": operation_id,
+                    "transaction_id": operation_id,
+                    "payload_hash": payload_hash,
+                    "plan_id": supplied_plan_id,
+                    "phase": "PREPARED",
+                    "prepared_at": prepared_at.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+                    "previous": previous,
+                    "target": target,
+                    "previous_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous),
+                    "target_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(target),
+                    "activation_approval_merge_oid": bindings["activation_approval_merge_oid"],
+                    "evidence_closure_oid": bindings["evidence_closure_oid"],
+                    "owner_review_oid": bindings["owner_review_oid"],
+                }
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "current-snapshot.json", previous)
+                atomic_write_json(self.journal.root / "rollback-snapshot.json", previous)
+            crash_at = bindings.get("crash_at")
+            if crash_at == "before_apply":
+                raise InjectedCrash("before_apply")
+            try:
+                current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+                if current_sha == record["previous_sha256"]:
+                    applied = self.adapter.apply_atomic(record["previous_sha256"], record["target"])
+                    record["target"] = applied
+                    record["target_sha256"] = calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied)
+                elif current_sha != record["target_sha256"]:
+                    raise CASConflict("CAS_CONFLICT")
+                if crash_at == "during_apply":
+                    raise InjectedCrash("during_apply")
+                record["phase"] = "APPLIED"
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                if crash_at == "after_apply_before_receipt":
+                    raise InjectedCrash("after_apply_before_receipt")
+                if not self.adapter.verify_applied(record["target_sha256"]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("POST_ACTIVATION_VERIFY_FAILED")
+                record["phase"] = "COMMITTED"
+                record["single_owner_policy_active"] = True
+                record["break_glass_active"] = False
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                if crash_at == "after_commit_wal":
+                    raise InjectedCrash("after_commit_wal")
+                self._ensure_closure(record, "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED")
+                return {"status": "ACTIVATED", **record}
+            except InjectedCrash:
+                raise
+            except Exception as exc:
+                failure = {**record, "phase": "FAILED", "error": type(exc).__name__}
+                current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+                if current_sha == record["target_sha256"]:
+                    self.adapter.rollback_atomic(record["target_sha256"], record["previous"])
+                    if not self.adapter.verify_rollback(record["previous_sha256"]):
+                        raise RuntimeError("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED") from exc
+                    failure["phase"] = "ROLLED_BACK"
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, failure)
+                self.journal.write_receipt(operation_id, failure)
+                self.journal.audit.append(operation_id, {"event": failure["phase"], "error": type(exc).__name__})
+                raise
+
+    def verify(self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any], operation_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+        if not record:
+            raise RuntimeError("TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND")
+        if record.get("payload_hash") != binding_payload_hash(bindings):
+            raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+        self.journal.audit.verify()
+        current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+        passed = record.get("phase") == "COMMITTED" and current_sha == record.get("target_sha256")
+        if not passed:
+            raise RuntimeError("ACTIVATION_VERIFY_FAILED")
+        return {"status": "VERIFIED", "operation_id": operation_id, "target_sha256": current_sha}
+
+    def rollback(
+        self, bindings: Mapping[str, Any], operation_id: str, supplied_plan_id: str
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with exclusive_lock(self.lock_path):
+            self.journal.audit.verify()
+            record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+            if not record:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND")
+            if record.get("payload_hash") != binding_payload_hash(bindings):
+                raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_PAYLOAD_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+            if record.get("plan_id") != supplied_plan_id:
+                raise RuntimeError("PLAN_ID_MISMATCH")
+            for field in (
+                "activation_approval_merge_oid",
+                "evidence_closure_oid",
+                "owner_review_oid",
+            ):
+                if str(record.get(field)) != str(bindings[field]):
+                    raise RuntimeError("ROLLBACK_AUTHORIZATION_MISMATCH_DENIED")
+            current_sha = calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.adapter.read_current())
+            if current_sha == record["previous_sha256"]:
+                record["phase"] = "ROLLED_BACK"
+                record["single_owner_policy_active"] = False
+                self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+                self._ensure_closure(record, "ACTIVATION_ROLLED_BACK")
+                return {"status": "ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK", "operation_id": operation_id}
+            if current_sha != record["target_sha256"]:
+                raise RuntimeError("MANUAL_INTERVENTION_REQUIRED")
+            self.adapter.rollback_atomic(record["target_sha256"], record["previous"])
+            if not self.adapter.verify_rollback(record["previous_sha256"]):
+                raise RuntimeError("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED")
+            if bindings.get("crash_at") == "after_rollback_cas":
+                raise InjectedCrash("after_rollback_cas")
+            record["phase"] = "ROLLED_BACK"
+            record["single_owner_policy_active"] = False
+            self.journal.write(operation_id, record)
+            if bindings.get("crash_at") == "after_rollback_wal":
+                raise InjectedCrash("after_rollback_wal")
+            self._ensure_closure(record, "ACTIVATION_ROLLED_BACK")
+            return {"status": "ROLLED_BACK", "operation_id": operation_id}
+
+    def status(self, operation_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        audit_head = self.journal.audit.verify()
+        if operation_id:
+            record = self.journal.load(operation_id)
+            if not record:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND")
+            return {"status": "OK", "audit_head": audit_head, "transaction": record}
+        state_path = self.journal.root / "state.json"
+        return {
+            "status": "OK",
+            "audit_head": audit_head,
+            "state": read_json(state_path) if state_path.exists() else None,
+            "transactions": list(self.journal.iter_transactions()),
+        }
+
+
+def load_bindings(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return read_json(path)
+
+
+def adapter_from_bindings(bindings: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Adapter:
+    backend = bindings.get("backend", "file")
+    backend_path = Path(str(bindings.get("backend_path", "")))
+    if not backend_path.is_absolute():
+        raise RuntimeError("BACKEND_PATH_MUST_BE_ABSOLUTE")
+    if backend == "file":
+        return FileProtectedBranchAdapter(backend_path)
+    if backend == "sqlite":
+        return SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter(
+            backend_path,
+            repo_id=int(bindings.get("repo_id", 1)),
+            branch=str(bindings.get("branch", "governance/approvals")),
+            expected_schema_sha256=str(bindings["expected_gitea_schema_sha256"]),
+        )
+    raise RuntimeError("UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_BACKEND")
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    action = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    for name in ("plan", "activate", "verify", "rollback", "status"):
+        action.add_argument(f"--{name}", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--bindings", type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--plan-id")
+    parser.add_argument("--transaction")
+    parser.add_argument("--state-root", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_STATE_ROOT)
+    parser.add_argument("--lock-path", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_LOCK_PATH)
+    return parser
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
+    if args.status and args.bindings is None:
+        # Status without bindings is intentionally limited to durable local state.
+        journal = JournalStore(args.state_root)
+        result = {
+            "status": "OK",
+            "audit_head": journal.audit.verify(),
+            "transactions": list(journal.iter_transactions()),
+        }
+        print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+    if args.bindings is None:
+        raise SystemExit("--bindings is required")
+    bindings = load_bindings(args.bindings)
+    engine = ActivationEngine(adapter_from_bindings(bindings), args.state_root, args.lock_path)
+    if args.plan:
+        result = engine.plan(bindings)
+    elif args.activate:
+        if not args.plan_id:
+            raise SystemExit("--plan-id is required")
+        result = engine.activate(bindings, args.plan_id)
+    elif args.verify:
+        result = engine.verify(bindings, args.transaction or str(bindings["operation_id"]))
+    elif args.rollback:
+        if not args.plan_id:
+            raise SystemExit("--plan-id is required")
+        result = engine.rollback(
+            bindings, args.transaction or str(bindings["operation_id"]), args.plan_id
+        )
+    else:
+        result = engine.status(args.transaction)
+    print(json.dumps(redact(result), sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Mapping
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EvidenceClosure:
+    evidence: Mapping[str, str]
+    closure_sha256: str
+
+
+class ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder:
+    def build(self, evidence: Mapping[str, str]) -> EvidenceClosure:
+        required = {
+            "activation_prerequisites_commit_oid",
+            "activation_prerequisites_tree_oid",
+            "artifact_sha256",
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256",
+            "validator_sha256",
+            "state_machine_sha256",
+            "branch_protection_adapter_sha256",
+            "rollback_configuration_sha256",
+            "test_evidence_sha256",
+            "deployment_manifest_sha256",
+            "dormant_unit_manifest_sha256",
+            "dormant_deployment_evidence_sha256",
+        }
+        if set(evidence) != required:
+            raise ValueError("evidence set mismatch")
+        for value in evidence.values():
+            if len(value) != 40 and len(value) != 64:
+                raise ValueError("invalid evidence digest")
+        return EvidenceClosure(
+            dict(evidence), hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(evidence)).hexdigest()
+        )
+
+
+class ApprovalMirrorStatusVerifier:
+    def verify(
+        self,
+        expected_oid: str,
+        *,
+        gitea_oid: str,
+        quarantine_oid: str,
+        authoritative_oid: str,
+        controller_visible_oid: str,
+        fsck_connectivity: str,
+    ) -> bool:
+        return (
+            len(expected_oid) == 40
+            and {gitea_oid, quarantine_oid, authoritative_oid, controller_visible_oid}
+            == {expected_oid}
+            and fsck_connectivity == "PASS"
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import AbstractContextManager
+from pathlib import Path
+import shutil
+import tempfile
+
+from .models import ProtectionSnapshot
+from .protection import MemoryProtectionStore
+
+
+class DisposableGiteaFixture(AbstractContextManager):
+    def __init__(self, initial: ProtectionSnapshot) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="aios-governance-fixture-"))
+        self.protection = MemoryProtectionStore(initial)
+        self.destroyed = False
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> "DisposableGiteaFixture":
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
+        resolved = self.root.resolve()
+        if not resolved.name.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-"):
+            raise RuntimeError("fixture cleanup path guard failed")
+        shutil.rmtree(resolved)
+        self.destroyed = True
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from .journal import atomic_write_json, read_json, sha256_json
+
+
+class CASConflict(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class UnsafePolicy(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return sha256_json(dict(snapshot))
+
+
+def validate_target(previous: Mapping[str, Any], target: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if set(previous) != set(target):
+        raise UnsafePolicy("PROTECTION_ROW_SHAPE_CHANGED")
+    for field in ("id", "repo_id", "branch_name"):
+        if previous.get(field) != target.get(field):
+            raise UnsafePolicy(f"PROTECTION_IDENTITY_CHANGED:{field}")
+    if target.get("branch_name") != "governance/approvals":
+        raise UnsafePolicy("BRANCH_BINDING_DENIED")
+    if int(target.get("can_push", 1)) != 0:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("DIRECT_PUSH_MUST_REMAIN_DISABLED")
+    if int(target.get("required_approvals", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("EXACTLY_ONE_APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
+    if int(target.get("enable_approvals_whitelist", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("APPROVAL_WHITELIST_MUST_REMAIN_ENABLED")
+    if json.loads(target.get("approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds", "[]")) != [2]:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("OWNER_APPROVAL_WHITELIST_REQUIRED")
+    if int(target.get("enable_merge_whitelist", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("MERGE_WHITELIST_MUST_REMAIN_ENABLED")
+    if target.get("merge_whitelist_user_i_ds") != previous.get("merge_whitelist_user_i_ds"):
+        raise UnsafePolicy("MERGE_EXECUTOR_WHITELIST_CHANGE_DENIED")
+    if int(target.get("dismiss_stale_approvals", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("DISMISS_STALE_APPROVALS_REQUIRED")
+    if int(target.get("enable_status_check", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("STATUS_CHECKS_REQUIRED")
+    required_contexts = {
+        "aios/validator",
+        "aios/state-machine",
+        "aios/branch-protection",
+        "aios/secret-scan",
+        "aios/evidence-closure",
+    }
+    try:
+        contexts = set(json.loads(target.get("status_check_contexts", "[]")))
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("STATUS_CHECK_CONTEXTS_INVALID") from exc
+    if contexts != required_contexts:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("STATUS_CHECK_CONTEXTS_MISMATCH")
+    if int(target.get("block_on_rejected_reviews", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("REJECTED_REVIEWS_MUST_BLOCK")
+    if int(target.get("block_on_outdated_branch", 0)) != 1:
+        raise UnsafePolicy("OUTDATED_BRANCH_MUST_BLOCK")
+    if target.get("require_signed_commits") != previous.get("require_signed_commits"):
+        raise UnsafePolicy("SIGNATURE_POLICY_CHANGE_DENIED")
+
+
+class FileProtectedBranchAdapter:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = path
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot)
+
+    def read_current(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return read_json(self.path)
+
+    def compare_expected(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.read_current()) == expected_sha256
+
+    def apply_atomic(
+        self, expected_sha256: str, target: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        previous = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous) != expected_sha256:
+            raise CASConflict("CAS_CONFLICT")
+        validate_target(previous, target)
+        atomic_write_json(self.path, dict(target))
+        applied = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(target):
+            raise CASConflict("CAS_VERIFY_FAILED")
+        return applied
+
+    def verify_applied(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)
+
+    def rollback_atomic(
+        self, expected_target_sha256: str, previous: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        current = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(current) != expected_target_sha256:
+            raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_CONFLICT")
+        atomic_write_json(self.path, dict(previous))
+        restored = self.read_current()
+        if calculate_snapshot_sha256(restored) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous):
+            raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED")
+        return restored
+
+    def verify_rollback(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)
+
+
+class SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter:
+    ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS = (
+        "can_push",
+        "enable_merge_whitelist",
+        "merge_whitelist_user_i_ds",
+        "enable_status_check",
+        "status_check_contexts",
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist",
+        "approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds",
+        "required_approvals",
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews",
+        "block_on_official_review_requests",
+        "block_on_outdated_branch",
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals",
+        "ignore_stale_approvals",
+        "updated_unix",
+    )
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path: Path,
+        *,
+        repo_id: int = 1,
+        branch: str = "governance/approvals",
+        expected_schema_sha256: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.db_path = db_path
+        self.repo_id = repo_id
+        self.branch = branch
+        self.expected_schema_sha256 = expected_schema_sha256
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=10)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        return connection
+
+    def schema_sha256(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection | None = None) -> str:
+        own = connection is None
+        connection = connection or self._connect()
+        try:
+            rows = [dict(row) for row in connection.execute("PRAGMA table_info(protected_branch)")]
+            return sha256_json(rows)
+        finally:
+            if own:
+                connection.close()
+
+    def _check_schema(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(self.expected_schema_sha256, str) or len(self.expected_schema_sha256) != 64:
+            raise RuntimeError("GITEA_SCHEMA_FINGERPRINT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.schema_sha256(connection) != self.expected_schema_sha256:
+            raise RuntimeError("GITEA_SCHEMA_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH")
+
+    def _read(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM protected_branch WHERE repo_id=? AND branch_name=?",
+            (self.repo_id, self.branch),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_ROW_NOT_FOUND")
+        return dict(row)
+
+    def read_current(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._check_schema(connection)
+            return self._read(connection)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(snapshot)
+
+    def compare_expected(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return calculate_snapshot_sha256(self.read_current()) == expected_sha256
+
+    def apply_atomic(
+        self, expected_sha256: str, target: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._check_schema(connection)
+            previous = self._read(connection)
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous) != expected_sha256:
+                raise CASConflict("CAS_CONFLICT")
+            validate_target(previous, target)
+            values = dict(target)
+            values["updated_unix"] = int(values.get("updated_unix") or time.time())
+            assignments = ",".join(f"{field}=?" for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS)
+            parameters = [values[field] for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS]
+            parameters.extend((self.repo_id, self.branch))
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                f"UPDATE protected_branch SET {assignments} WHERE repo_id=? AND branch_name=?",
+                parameters,
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise CASConflict("CAS_ROWCOUNT_INVALID")
+            applied = self._read(connection)
+            expected_target = dict(target)
+            expected_target["updated_unix"] = values["updated_unix"]
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(expected_target):
+                raise CASConflict("CAS_VERIFY_FAILED")
+            connection.commit()
+            return applied
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def verify_applied(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)
+
+    def rollback_atomic(
+        self, expected_target_sha256: str, previous: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._check_schema(connection)
+            current = self._read(connection)
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(current) != expected_target_sha256:
+                raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_CONFLICT")
+            for field in ("id", "repo_id", "branch_name"):
+                if current.get(field) != previous.get(field):
+                    raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+            assignments = ",".join(f"{field}=?" for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS)
+            parameters = [previous[field] for field in self.ALLOWED_UPDATE_FIELDS]
+            parameters.extend((self.repo_id, self.branch))
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                f"UPDATE protected_branch SET {assignments} WHERE repo_id=? AND branch_name=?",
+                parameters,
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_ROWCOUNT_INVALID")
+            restored = self._read(connection)
+            if calculate_snapshot_sha256(restored) != calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous):
+                raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_VERIFY_FAILED")
+            connection.commit()
+            return restored
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def verify_rollback(self, expected_sha256: str) -> bool:
+        return self.compare_expected(expected_sha256)
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any, Iterable
+
+
+SENSITIVE_FRAGMENTS = (
+    "authorization",
+    "cookie",
+    "credential",
+    "password",
+    "private_key",
+    "secret",
+    "token",
+)
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def redact(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {
+            str(key): (
+                "[REDACTED]"
+                if any(fragment in str(key).lower() for fragment in SENSITIVE_FRAGMENTS)
+                else redact(item)
+            )
+            for key, item in value.items()
+        }
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [redact(item) for item in value]
+    if isinstance(value, tuple):
+        return [redact(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def ensure_state_directory(path: Path) -> None:
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_DIRECTORY_SYMLINK_DENIED")
+    path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    path.chmod(0o750)
+    mode = path.stat().st_mode & 0o777
+    if mode != 0o750:
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_DIRECTORY_MODE_INVALID")
+
+
+def atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: object) -> None:
+    ensure_state_directory(path.parent)
+    raw = json.dumps(redact(value), sort_keys=True, indent=2).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
+        dir=path.parent, prefix=f".{path.name}.", delete=False
+    ) as handle:
+        temporary = Path(handle.name)
+        handle.write(raw)
+        handle.flush()
+        os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+    temporary.chmod(0o640)
+    os.replace(temporary, path)
+    path.chmod(0o640)
+    directory_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY)
+    try:
+        os.fsync(directory_fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(directory_fd)
+
+
+def read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    raw = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        raise RuntimeError("STATE_DOCUMENT_NOT_OBJECT")
+    return raw
+
+
+class AuditChain:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = path
+
+    def _records(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if not self.path.exists():
+            return []
+        records: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        for line in self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+            if line.strip():
+                record = json.loads(line)
+                if not isinstance(record, dict):
+                    raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_RECORD_INVALID")
+                records.append(record)
+        return records
+
+    def verify(self) -> str:
+        previous = "0" * 64
+        for index, record in enumerate(self._records(), 1):
+            payload = record.get("payload")
+            if record.get("sequence") != index:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_SEQUENCE_INVALID")
+            if record.get("previous_event_hash") != previous:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_PREVIOUS_HASH_INVALID")
+            payload_hash = sha256_json(payload)
+            if record.get("payload_hash") != payload_hash:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_PAYLOAD_HASH_INVALID")
+            material = {
+                "sequence": index,
+                "previous_event_hash": previous,
+                "payload_hash": payload_hash,
+                "transaction_id": record.get("transaction_id"),
+            }
+            event_hash = sha256_json(material)
+            if record.get("event_hash") != event_hash:
+                raise RuntimeError("AUDIT_EVENT_HASH_INVALID")
+            previous = event_hash
+        return previous
+
+    def append(self, transaction_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        ensure_state_directory(self.path.parent)
+        previous = self.verify()
+        sequence = len(self._records()) + 1
+        clean_payload = redact(payload)
+        payload_hash = sha256_json(clean_payload)
+        material = {
+            "sequence": sequence,
+            "previous_event_hash": previous,
+            "payload_hash": payload_hash,
+            "transaction_id": transaction_id,
+        }
+        record = {
+            **material,
+            "payload": clean_payload,
+            "event_hash": sha256_json(material),
+        }
+        fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT, 0o640)
+        try:
+            os.write(fd, canonical_json(record) + b"\n")
+            os.fsync(fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+        self.path.chmod(0o640)
+        return record
+
+    def has_event(self, transaction_id: str, event: str) -> bool:
+        self.verify()
+        return any(
+            record.get("transaction_id") == transaction_id
+            and isinstance(record.get("payload"), dict)
+            and record["payload"].get("event") == event
+            for record in self._records()
+        )
+
+
+class JournalStore:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path) -> None:
+        self.root = root
+        self.wal = root / "wal"
+        self.receipts = root / "receipts"
+        ensure_state_directory(root)
+        ensure_state_directory(self.wal)
+        ensure_state_directory(self.receipts)
+        self.audit = AuditChain(root / "audit.jsonl")
+
+    def transaction_path(self, operation_id: str) -> Path:
+        if not operation_id or any(char not in "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789._-" for char in operation_id):
+            raise RuntimeError("OPERATION_ID_INVALID")
+        return self.wal / f"{operation_id}.json"
+
+    def receipt_path(self, operation_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.receipts / f"{operation_id}.json"
+
+    def load(self, operation_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        path = self.transaction_path(operation_id)
+        return read_json(path) if path.exists() else None
+
+    def write(self, operation_id: str, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        atomic_write_json(self.transaction_path(operation_id), value)
+
+    def write_receipt(self, operation_id: str, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        atomic_write_json(self.receipt_path(operation_id), value)
+
+    def iter_transactions(self) -> Iterable[dict[str, Any]]:
+        for path in sorted(self.wal.glob("*.json")):
+            yield read_json(path)
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+try:
+    import fcntl
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - exercised by Windows validation
+    fcntl = None
+    import msvcrt
+
+
+class MaintenanceLock:
+    """Process fence used only by fixture and later approved activation executors."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = path
+        self._handle = None
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> "MaintenanceLock":
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._handle = self.path.open("a+")
+        if fcntl is not None:
+            try:
+                fcntl.flock(self._handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+            except BlockingIOError:
+                self._handle.close()
+                self._handle = None
+                raise
+        else:
+            self._handle.seek(0)
+            try:
+                msvcrt.locking(self._handle.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_NBLCK, 1)
+            except OSError as exc:
+                self._handle.close()
+                self._handle = None
+                raise BlockingIOError("maintenance lock held") from exc
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb) -> None:
+        if self._handle is not None:
+            if fcntl is not None:
+                fcntl.flock(self._handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+            else:
+                self._handle.seek(0)
+                msvcrt.locking(self._handle.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_UNLCK, 1)
+            self._handle.close()
+            self._handle = None
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+class GovernanceState(str, Enum):
+    HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING = "HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING"
+    OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED = "OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED"
+    MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED = "MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED"
+    AUTO_MERGE_READY = "AUTO_MERGE_READY"
+    OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY = "OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Review:
+    reviewer: str
+    reviewer_id: int
+    state: str
+    head_oid: str
+    reviewed_at: datetime
+    stale: bool = False
+    dismissed: bool = False
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.reviewed_at.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("reviewed_at must be timezone-aware")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MachineGate:
+    context: str
+    state: str
+    head_oid: str
+    observed_at: datetime
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.observed_at.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("observed_at must be timezone-aware")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ApprovalContext:
+    current_head_oid: str
+    requester: str
+    executor: str
+    owner: str
+    owner_id: int
+    reviews: tuple[Review, ...]
+    machine_gates: tuple[MachineGate, ...]
+    required_machine_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+    expires_at: datetime
+    wip: bool
+    now: datetime = field(default_factory=lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.expires_at.tzinfo is None or self.now.tzinfo is None:
+            raise ValueError("approval timestamps must be timezone-aware")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProtectionSnapshot:
+    branch: str
+    required_approvals: int
+    approval_whitelist: tuple[str, ...]
+    merge_whitelist: tuple[str, ...]
+    dismiss_stale_approvals: bool
+    require_status_checks: bool
+    status_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+    direct_push: bool
+    force_push: bool
+    branch_deletion: bool
+    version: int
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "branch": self.branch,
+            "required_approvals": self.required_approvals,
+            "approval_whitelist": list(self.approval_whitelist),
+            "merge_whitelist": list(self.merge_whitelist),
+            "dismiss_stale_approvals": self.dismiss_stale_approvals,
+            "require_status_checks": self.require_status_checks,
+            "status_contexts": list(self.status_contexts),
+            "direct_push": self.direct_push,
+            "force_push": self.force_push,
+            "branch_deletion": self.branch_deletion,
+            "version": self.version,
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+class OperationDenied(PermissionError):
+    pass
+
+
+class DormantOperationGuard:
+    """Fail-closed operation boundary for the prerequisite deployment."""
+
+    DENIED = frozenset({
+        "protected_branch.direct_push",
+        "governance.direct_push",
+        "tag.direct_write",
+        "git.force_push",
+        "production.without_owner",
+        "branch_protection.live_update",
+        "single_owner_policy.activate",
+    })
+
+    def authorize(self, operation: str, *, fixture: bool = False) -> None:
+        if operation in self.DENIED or not fixture:
+            raise OperationDenied(operation)
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Protocol
+
+from .models import ProtectionSnapshot
+
+
+class CASConflict(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class DormantViolation(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def snapshot_sha256(snapshot: ProtectionSnapshot) -> str:
+    raw = json.dumps(snapshot.as_dict(), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+    return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+
+class ProtectionStore(Protocol):
+    fixture: bool
+
+    def read(self, branch: str) -> ProtectionSnapshot: ...
+    def compare_and_swap(
+        self, branch: str, expected_sha256: str, target: ProtectionSnapshot
+    ) -> bool: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProtectionPlan:
+    branch: str
+    expected_previous_sha256: str
+    previous: ProtectionSnapshot
+    target: ProtectionSnapshot
+    target_sha256: str
+
+
+class BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter:
+    """Candidate adapter. Mutations are restricted to disposable fixtures."""
+
+    def plan(
+        self,
+        current: ProtectionSnapshot,
+        target: ProtectionSnapshot,
+        expected_previous_sha256: str,
+    ) -> ProtectionPlan:
+        actual = snapshot_sha256(current)
+        if actual != expected_previous_sha256:
+            raise CASConflict("EXPECTED_PREVIOUS_SHA256_MISMATCH")
+        if current.branch != target.branch:
+            raise CASConflict("BRANCH_BINDING_MISMATCH")
+        if target.direct_push or target.force_push or target.branch_deletion:
+            raise DormantViolation("UNSAFE_TARGET_POLICY")
+        return ProtectionPlan(
+            current.branch, actual, current, target, snapshot_sha256(target)
+        )
+
+    def apply_fixture(self, store: ProtectionStore, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if not store.fixture:
+            raise DormantViolation("LIVE_PROTECTION_MUTATION_DENIED")
+        if not store.compare_and_swap(
+            plan.branch, plan.expected_previous_sha256, plan.target
+        ):
+            raise CASConflict("CONCURRENT_PROTECTION_CHANGE")
+        return store.read(plan.branch)
+
+    def rollback_fixture(self, store: ProtectionStore, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if not store.fixture:
+            raise DormantViolation("LIVE_PROTECTION_ROLLBACK_DENIED")
+        if not store.compare_and_swap(plan.branch, plan.target_sha256, plan.previous):
+            raise CASConflict("ROLLBACK_CONFLICT")
+        return store.read(plan.branch)
+
+
+class MemoryProtectionStore:
+    fixture = True
+
+    def __init__(self, snapshot: ProtectionSnapshot) -> None:
+        self._snapshot = snapshot
+
+    def read(self, branch: str) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if self._snapshot.branch != branch:
+            raise KeyError(branch)
+        return self._snapshot
+
+    def compare_and_swap(
+        self, branch: str, expected_sha256: str, target: ProtectionSnapshot
+    ) -> bool:
+        if self._snapshot.branch != branch:
+            return False
+        if snapshot_sha256(self._snapshot) != expected_sha256:
+            return False
+        self._snapshot = target
+        return True
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+
+from .models import ProtectionSnapshot
+from .protection import MemoryProtectionStore, ProtectionPlan, snapshot_sha256
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RollbackConfiguration:
+    branch: str
+    previous_sha256: str
+    target_sha256: str
+    payload: dict
+
+
+class RollbackConfigurationManager:
+    def build(self, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> RollbackConfiguration:
+        return RollbackConfiguration(
+            plan.branch,
+            plan.expected_previous_sha256,
+            plan.target_sha256,
+            {"previous": plan.previous.as_dict(), "target": plan.target.as_dict()},
+        )
+
+    def install_fixture(self, root: Path, config: RollbackConfiguration) -> Path:
+        if not root.name.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-"):
+            raise PermissionError("rollback configuration may only be installed in fixture root")
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        destination = root / "rollback-configuration.json"
+        raw = json.dumps(config.payload, sort_keys=True, indent=2).encode() + b"\n"
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(dir=root, prefix=".rollback.", delete=False) as handle:
+            handle.write(raw)
+            handle.flush()
+            temporary = Path(handle.name)
+        temporary.chmod(0o600)
+        temporary.replace(destination)
+        return destination
+
+    def verify(self, config: RollbackConfiguration, plan: ProtectionPlan) -> bool:
+        return (
+            config.previous_sha256 == snapshot_sha256(plan.previous)
+            and config.target_sha256 == snapshot_sha256(plan.target)
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ProtectionCompensationSaga:
+    adapter: object
+    store: MemoryProtectionStore
+    plan: ProtectionPlan
+    applied: bool = False
+    rolled_back: bool = False
+
+    def execute_fixture(self) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        result = self.adapter.apply_fixture(self.store, self.plan)
+        self.applied = True
+        return result
+
+    def compensate_fixture(self) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+        if not self.applied:
+            return self.store.read(self.plan.branch)
+        result = self.adapter.rollback_fixture(self.store, self.plan)
+        self.rolled_back = True
+        return result
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+
+
+def runtime_state(component: str, prior_invocations: int = 0) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "component": component,
+        "deployment_mode": "DORMANT_SHADOW_ONLY",
+        "enabled": False,
+        "active": False,
+        "production_routing": False,
+        "production_mutation": False,
+        "global_gitops_writes_enabled": False,
+        "prior_invocations": prior_invocations,
+        "restart_recovery": prior_invocations > 0,
+    }
+
+
+def checkpoint_state(component: str, root: Path) -> dict:
+    root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    destination = root / f"{component}.json"
+    prior = 0
+    if destination.exists():
+        previous = json.loads(destination.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if previous.get("component") != component or previous.get("deployment_mode") != "DORMANT_SHADOW_ONLY":
+            raise RuntimeError("checkpoint identity mismatch")
+        prior = int(previous.get("invocations", 0))
+    state = runtime_state(component, prior)
+    checkpoint = {**state, "invocations": prior + 1}
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", encoding="utf-8", dir=root, delete=False) as handle:
+        json.dump(checkpoint, handle, sort_keys=True)
+        handle.write("\n")
+        handle.flush()
+        temporary = Path(handle.name)
+    temporary.replace(destination)
+    return state
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--component", required=True, choices=("owner-review-adapter", "machine-status-producer"))
+    parser.add_argument("--self-check", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--activate", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--checkpoint-dir", type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    if args.activate:
+        parser.error("activation is not authorized by the prerequisites candidate")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        parser.error("candidate must remain disabled")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE", "false").lower() != "false":
+        parser.error("activation must remain inactive")
+    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
+        parser.error("production mutation must remain disabled")
+    state = (
+        checkpoint_state(args.component, args.checkpoint_dir)
+        if args.checkpoint_dir is not None
+        else runtime_state(args.component)
+    )
+    print(json.dumps(state, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+
+from .models import GovernanceState
+
+
+class InvalidTransition(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+_NEXT = {
+    GovernanceState.HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING: GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED,
+    GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED: GovernanceState.MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED,
+    GovernanceState.MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED: GovernanceState.AUTO_MERGE_READY,
+    GovernanceState.AUTO_MERGE_READY: GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY,
+}
+
+
+@dataclass
+class GovernanceStateMachine:
+    state: GovernanceState = GovernanceState.HUMAN_OWNER_APPROVAL_PENDING
+
+    def transition(self, target: GovernanceState) -> GovernanceState:
+        if _NEXT.get(self.state) != target:
+            raise InvalidTransition(f"{self.state.value}->{target.value}")
+        self.state = target
+        return self.state
+
+    def restore(self, checkpoint: GovernanceState) -> None:
+        if checkpoint not in GovernanceState:
+            raise InvalidTransition("unknown checkpoint")
+        self.state = checkpoint
+
+    def save_fixture(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        if not any(part.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-") for part in path.resolve().parts):
+            raise PermissionError("state checkpoint writes are fixture-only")
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", encoding="utf-8", dir=path.parent, delete=False) as handle:
+            json.dump({"state": self.state.value}, handle, sort_keys=True)
+            handle.write("\n")
+            handle.flush()
+            temporary = Path(handle.name)
+        temporary.replace(path)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def load_fixture(cls, path: Path) -> "GovernanceStateMachine":
+        if not any(part.startswith("aios-governance-fixture-") for part in path.resolve().parts):
+            raise PermissionError("state checkpoint reads are fixture-only")
+        raw = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        return cls(GovernanceState(raw["state"]))
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+
+class DormantStatusProducer(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class StatusRecord:
+    context: str
+    state: str
+    head_oid: str
+    observed_at: str
+
+
+class MachineStatusProducer:
+    def __init__(self, *, enabled: bool = False, fixture: bool = False) -> None:
+        self.enabled = enabled
+        self.fixture = fixture
+
+    def produce(self, context: str, state: str, head_oid: str) -> StatusRecord:
+        if not self.fixture:
+            raise DormantStatusProducer("LIVE_STATUS_PUBLICATION_DENIED")
+        if self.enabled:
+            raise DormantStatusProducer("DORMANT_CANDIDATE_MUST_NOT_BE_ENABLED")
+        if context not in {
+            "aios/machine-gates", "aios/secret-scan", "aios/evidence-closure"
+        }:
+            raise ValueError("unknown status context")
+        if state not in {"success", "failure"} or len(head_oid) != 40:
+            raise ValueError("invalid status record")
+        return StatusRecord(
+            context, state, head_oid,
+            datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from .models import ApprovalContext, Review
+
+
+class ValidationDenied(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ValidationResult:
+    owner_review: Review
+    machine_contexts: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+class SingleOwnerApprovalValidator:
+    """Pure candidate validator. It has no Gitea or production write path."""
+
+    def validate(self, context: ApprovalContext) -> ValidationResult:
+        if context.now >= context.expires_at:
+            raise ValidationDenied("APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+        if context.wip:
+            raise ValidationDenied("WIP_BLOCKED")
+        if context.requester == context.owner:
+            raise ValidationDenied("REQUESTER_SELF_APPROVAL")
+        if context.executor == context.owner:
+            raise ValidationDenied("EXECUTOR_SELF_APPROVAL")
+
+        approved = [review for review in context.reviews if review.state == "APPROVED"]
+        owner_reviews = [
+            review for review in approved
+            if review.reviewer == context.owner and review.reviewer_id == context.owner_id
+        ]
+        if len(owner_reviews) != 1:
+            raise ValidationDenied("OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
+        owner_review = owner_reviews[0]
+        if owner_review.stale:
+            raise ValidationDenied("STALE_OWNER_APPROVAL")
+        if owner_review.dismissed:
+            raise ValidationDenied("DISMISSED_OWNER_APPROVAL")
+        if owner_review.head_oid != context.current_head_oid:
+            raise ValidationDenied("OWNER_APPROVAL_NOT_LATEST_HEAD")
+        if owner_review.reviewed_at >= context.expires_at:
+            raise ValidationDenied("OWNER_APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+        if any(
+            review.state == "APPROVED"
+            and review.reviewer != context.owner
+            and review.reviewer_id != context.owner_id
+            for review in context.reviews
+        ):
+            # Non-owner approvals may exist for legacy mechanics, but never
+            # satisfy or replace the human authorization decision.
+            pass
+
+        gates = {gate.context: gate for gate in context.machine_gates}
+        if set(gates) != set(context.required_machine_contexts):
+            raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_SET_MISMATCH")
+        for gate in gates.values():
+            if gate.state != "success":
+                raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_FAILED")
+            if gate.head_oid != context.current_head_oid:
+                raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_NOT_LATEST_HEAD")
+            if gate.observed_at >= context.expires_at:
+                raise ValidationDenied("MACHINE_GATE_EXPIRED")
+        return ValidationResult(owner_review, tuple(sorted(gates)))
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[build-system]
+requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
+build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+
+[project]
+name = "aios-single-owner-governance"
+version = "0.1.0"
+requires-python = ">=3.11"
+dependencies = []
+
+[project.scripts]
+aios-single-owner-governance = "aios_single_owner_governance.activation:main"
+
+[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
+where = ["."]
+include = ["aios_single_owner_governance*"]
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.models import (
+    ApprovalContext,
+    MachineGate,
+    ProtectionSnapshot,
+    Review,
+)
+
+HEAD = "a" * 40
+NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 28, 19, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+CONTEXTS = ("aios/machine-gates", "aios/secret-scan", "aios/evidence-closure")
+
+
+def owner_review(**changes) -> Review:
+    values = dict(
+        reviewer="owner", reviewer_id=2, state="APPROVED", head_oid=HEAD,
+        reviewed_at=NOW - timedelta(minutes=1), stale=False, dismissed=False,
+    )
+    values.update(changes)
+    return Review(**values)
+
+
+def gates(*, state="success", head_oid=HEAD):
+    return tuple(MachineGate(name, state, head_oid, NOW) for name in CONTEXTS)
+
+
+def context(**changes) -> ApprovalContext:
+    values = dict(
+        current_head_oid=HEAD, requester="agent", executor="merge-executor",
+        owner="owner", owner_id=2, reviews=(owner_review(),), machine_gates=gates(),
+        required_machine_contexts=CONTEXTS, expires_at=NOW + timedelta(hours=1),
+        wip=False, now=NOW,
+    )
+    values.update(changes)
+    return ApprovalContext(**values)
+
+
+def legacy_protection(version=1) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+    return ProtectionSnapshot(
+        "governance/approvals", 2, ("codex", "gpt"), ("codex", "gpt"),
+        True, False, (), False, False, False, version,
+    )
+
+def single_owner_protection(version=2) -> ProtectionSnapshot:
+    return ProtectionSnapshot(
+        "governance/approvals", 1, ("owner",), ("owner",), True, True,
+        CONTEXTS, False, False, False, version,
+    )
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import unittest
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.fixture import DisposableGiteaFixture
+from aios_single_owner_governance.protection import (
+    BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter,
+    DormantViolation,
+    snapshot_sha256,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.policy import DormantOperationGuard, OperationDenied
+
+from .helpers import legacy_protection, single_owner_protection
+
+
+class LiveStore:
+    fixture = False
+
+    def read(self, branch):
+        return legacy_protection()
+
+    def compare_and_swap(self, branch, expected_sha256, target):
+        raise AssertionError("live compare_and_swap must never be invoked")
+
+
+class DormantInvariantTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_live_protection_apply_and_rollback_are_denied(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old, new = legacy_protection(), single_owner_protection()
+        plan = adapter.plan(old, new, snapshot_sha256(old))
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantViolation):
+            adapter.apply_fixture(LiveStore(), plan)
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantViolation):
+            adapter.rollback_fixture(LiveStore(), plan)
+
+    def test_unsafe_policy_cannot_be_planned(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old = legacy_protection()
+        for unsafe in (
+            single_owner_protection().__class__(**{**single_owner_protection().as_dict(), "approval_whitelist": ("owner",), "merge_whitelist": ("owner",), "status_contexts": tuple(single_owner_protection().status_contexts), "direct_push": True}),
+            single_owner_protection().__class__(**{**single_owner_protection().as_dict(), "approval_whitelist": ("owner",), "merge_whitelist": ("owner",), "status_contexts": tuple(single_owner_protection().status_contexts), "force_push": True}),
+            single_owner_protection().__class__(**{**single_owner_protection().as_dict(), "approval_whitelist": ("owner",), "merge_whitelist": ("owner",), "status_contexts": tuple(single_owner_protection().status_contexts), "branch_deletion": True}),
+        ):
+            with self.assertRaises(DormantViolation):
+                adapter.plan(old, unsafe, snapshot_sha256(old))
+
+    def test_disposable_fixture_is_destroyed(self):
+        fixture = DisposableGiteaFixture(legacy_protection())
+        root = fixture.root
+        with fixture:
+            self.assertTrue(root.exists())
+        self.assertTrue(fixture.destroyed)
+        self.assertFalse(root.exists())
+
+    def test_permanent_and_pre_activation_writes_are_denied(self):
+        guard = DormantOperationGuard()
+        for operation in (
+            "protected_branch.direct_push",
+            "governance.direct_push",
+            "tag.direct_write",
+            "git.force_push",
+            "production.without_owner",
+            "branch_protection.live_update",
+            "single_owner_policy.activate",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(operation=operation), self.assertRaises(OperationDenied):
+                guard.authorize(operation)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.evidence import (
+    ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder,
+    ApprovalMirrorStatusVerifier,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.service import main, runtime_state
+from aios_single_owner_governance.status import (
+    DormantStatusProducer,
+    MachineStatusProducer,
+)
+
+from .helpers import HEAD
+
+
+class EvidenceStatusServiceTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_complete_evidence_set_builds_canonical_closure(self):
+        evidence = {
+            "activation_prerequisites_commit_oid": "a" * 40,
+            "activation_prerequisites_tree_oid": "b" * 40,
+            "artifact_sha256": "c" * 64,
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256": "d" * 64,
+            "validator_sha256": "e" * 64,
+            "state_machine_sha256": "f" * 64,
+            "branch_protection_adapter_sha256": "0" * 64,
+            "rollback_configuration_sha256": "1" * 64,
+            "test_evidence_sha256": "2" * 64,
+            "deployment_manifest_sha256": "3" * 64,
+            "dormant_unit_manifest_sha256": "4" * 64,
+            "dormant_deployment_evidence_sha256": "5" * 64,
+        }
+        closure = ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder().build(evidence)
+        self.assertEqual(len(closure.closure_sha256), 64)
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            ActivationEvidenceClosureBuilder().build({})
+
+    def test_mirror_verifier_requires_all_four_refs_and_fsck(self):
+        verifier = ApprovalMirrorStatusVerifier()
+        self.assertTrue(verifier.verify(
+            HEAD, gitea_oid=HEAD, quarantine_oid=HEAD,
+            authoritative_oid=HEAD, controller_visible_oid=HEAD,
+            fsck_connectivity="PASS",
+        ))
+        self.assertFalse(verifier.verify(
+            HEAD, gitea_oid=HEAD, quarantine_oid=HEAD,
+            authoritative_oid="b" * 40, controller_visible_oid=HEAD,
+            fsck_connectivity="PASS",
+        ))
+
+    def test_machine_status_is_fixture_only_and_dormant(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantStatusProducer):
+            MachineStatusProducer().produce("aios/machine-gates", "success", HEAD)
+        with self.assertRaises(DormantStatusProducer):
+            MachineStatusProducer(enabled=True, fixture=True).produce(
+                "aios/machine-gates", "success", HEAD
+            )
+        record = MachineStatusProducer(fixture=True).produce(
+            "aios/evidence-closure", "success", HEAD
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(record.head_oid, HEAD)
+
+    def test_service_self_check_is_dormant_and_activate_is_rejected(self):
+        output = io.StringIO()
+        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output):
+            self.assertEqual(main(["--component", "owner-review-adapter", "--self-check"]), 0)
+        state = json.loads(output.getvalue())
+        self.assertFalse(state["active"])
+        self.assertFalse(state["production_mutation"])
+        with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
+                main(["--component", "owner-review-adapter", "--activate"])
+
+    def test_write_flags_cannot_be_enabled(self):
+        for name in (
+            "AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED",
+            "AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE",
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(name=name), patch.dict(os.environ, {name: "true"}, clear=False):
+                with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+                    with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
+                        main(["--component", "machine-status-producer", "--self-check"])
+
+    def test_service_entrypoint_restart_recovery_across_processes(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-governance-fixture-") as root:
+            command = [
+                sys.executable, "-m", "aios_single_owner_governance.service",
+                "--component", "owner-review-adapter", "--self-check",
+                "--checkpoint-dir", root,
+            ]
+            first = subprocess.run(command, text=True, capture_output=True, check=True)
+            second = subprocess.run(command, text=True, capture_output=True, check=True)
+            first_state = json.loads(first.stdout)
+            second_state = json.loads(second.stdout)
+            self.assertFalse(first_state["restart_recovery"])
+            self.assertTrue(second_state["restart_recovery"])
+            self.assertEqual(second_state["prior_invocations"], 1)
+            self.assertFalse(second_state["production_mutation"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+import hashlib
+import os
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+import pytest
+from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator, ValidationError
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.activation import (
+    ActivationEngine,
+    InjectedCrash,
+    _verify_approved_entities,
+    validate_bindings,
+)
+import aios_single_owner_governance.validator as validator_module
+import aios_single_owner_governance.state_machine as state_machine_module
+import aios_single_owner_governance.activation as activation_module
+from aios_single_owner_governance.gitea_protected_branch import (
+    CASConflict,
+    FileProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter,
+    UnsafePolicy,
+    calculate_snapshot_sha256,
+    validate_target,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.journal import sha256_json
+
+
+MACHINE_CONTEXTS = {
+    "aios/validator",
+    "aios/state-machine",
+    "aios/branch-protection",
+    "aios/secret-scan",
+    "aios/evidence-closure",
+}
+
+
+def write_json(path: Path, value: object) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path.write_text(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def legacy_row() -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": 7,
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "branch_name": "governance/approvals",
+        "can_push": 0,
+        "enable_whitelist": 0,
+        "whitelist_user_i_ds": "null",
+        "whitelist_team_i_ds": "null",
+        "enable_merge_whitelist": 1,
+        "whitelist_deploy_keys": 0,
+        "merge_whitelist_user_i_ds": "[42,43]",
+        "merge_whitelist_team_i_ds": "null",
+        "enable_status_check": 0,
+        "status_check_contexts": "[]",
+        "enable_approvals_whitelist": 1,
+        "approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds": "[42,43]",
+        "approvals_whitelist_team_i_ds": "null",
+        "required_approvals": 2,
+        "block_on_rejected_reviews": 1,
+        "block_on_official_review_requests": 1,
+        "block_on_outdated_branch": 1,
+        "dismiss_stale_approvals": 1,
+        "ignore_stale_approvals": 0,
+        "require_signed_commits": 0,
+        "protected_file_patterns": "",
+        "unprotected_file_patterns": "",
+        "created_unix": 1,
+        "updated_unix": 10,
+    }
+
+
+def owner_row() -> dict:
+    row = legacy_row()
+    row.update(
+        {
+            "approvals_whitelist_user_i_ds": "[2]",
+            "required_approvals": 1,
+            "enable_status_check": 1,
+            "status_check_contexts": json.dumps(sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS), separators=(",", ":")),
+            "updated_unix": 11,
+        }
+    )
+    return row
+
+
+def git_output(git_dir: Path, *args: str, stdin: str | None = None) -> str:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args], input=stdin, text=True,
+        capture_output=True, check=True,
+        env={
+            **__import__("os").environ,
+            "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "Test", "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "test@example.invalid",
+            "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "Test", "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "test@example.invalid",
+        },
+    ).stdout.strip()
+
+
+def commit_files(
+    git_dir: Path, files: dict[str, str], message: str, *, parent: str | None = None
+) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    root: dict[str, object] = {}
+    for path, raw in files.items():
+        node = root
+        parts = path.split("/")
+        for directory in parts[:-1]:
+            node = node.setdefault(directory, {})  # type: ignore[assignment]
+        node[parts[-1]] = git_output(git_dir, "hash-object", "-w", "--stdin", stdin=raw)
+
+    def build_tree(node: dict[str, object]) -> str:
+        lines = []
+        for name in sorted(node):
+            value = node[name]
+            if isinstance(value, dict):
+                lines.append(f"040000 tree {build_tree(value)}\t{name}")
+            else:
+                lines.append(f"100644 blob {value}\t{name}")
+        return git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin="\n".join(lines) + "\n")
+
+    tree = build_tree(root)
+    args = ["commit-tree", tree]
+    if parent is not None:
+        args.extend(("-p", parent))
+    return git_output(git_dir, *args, stdin=message + "\n"), tree
+
+
+def evidence_fixture(tmp_path: Path, execution_binding: dict) -> dict:
+    git_dir = tmp_path / "evidence.git"
+    subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", str(git_dir)], capture_output=True, check=True)
+    package_root = Path(activation_module.__file__).resolve().parent
+    source_files: dict[str, str] = {}
+    runtime_sources = []
+    for name in (
+        "activation.py", "gitea_protected_branch.py", "journal.py",
+        "state_machine.py", "validator.py",
+    ):
+        source = package_root / name
+        raw = source.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        git_path = (
+            "services/aios-single-owner-governance/"
+            f"aios_single_owner_governance/{name}"
+        )
+        source_files[git_path] = raw
+        runtime_sources.append({
+            "git_path": git_path,
+            "runtime_path": str(source.resolve()),
+            "sha256": hashlib.sha256(source.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
+        })
+    implementation_oid, implementation_tree = commit_files(
+        git_dir, source_files, "implementation"
+    )
+    closure_path = "evidence/live-activation-closure.json"
+    closure_raw = '{"result":"PASS"}\n'
+    closure_oid, _ = commit_files(
+        git_dir, {**source_files, closure_path: closure_raw},
+        "closure", parent=implementation_oid
+    )
+    closure_sha = hashlib.sha256(closure_raw.encode()).hexdigest()
+    entities = {}
+    for name, raw in {
+        "artifact": b"approved-artifact\n",
+        "rollback_artifact": b"approved-rollback\n",
+        "test_evidence": b"approved-tests\n",
+    }.items():
+        path = tmp_path / "artifacts" / f"{name}.bin"
+        path.parent.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+        path.write_bytes(raw)
+        entities[f"{name}_path"] = str(path.resolve())
+        entities[f"{name}_sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+    head_oid = git_output(git_dir, "hash-object", "-w", "--stdin", stdin="head\n")
+    expiry = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)
+    producer_id = 99
+    producer_name = "trusted-machine-producer"
+    execution_binding = {
+        **execution_binding,
+        "evidence_closure_oid": closure_oid,
+        "evidence_closure_path": closure_path,
+        "evidence_closure_sha256": closure_sha,
+        "implementation_commit_oid": implementation_oid,
+        "implementation_tree_oid": implementation_tree,
+        "runtime_sources": runtime_sources,
+        "machine_status_producer_id": producer_id,
+        "machine_status_producer_name": producer_name,
+        **entities,
+    }
+    manifest = {
+        "approval_type": "SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_LIVE_ACTIVATION_IMPLEMENTATION_AND_EXECUTION",
+        "expires_at": expiry.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "execution_binding": execution_binding,
+        "execution_binding_sha256": sha256_json(execution_binding),
+        **{key: execution_binding[key] for key in (
+            "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+            "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path",
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256", "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+            "evidence_closure_oid", "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+            "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+        )},
+    }
+    manifest_raw = json.dumps(manifest, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n"
+    manifest_blob = git_output(git_dir, "hash-object", "-w", "--stdin", stdin=manifest_raw)
+    leaf = git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin=f"100644 blob {manifest_blob}\tactivation.json\n")
+    approvals = git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin=f"040000 tree {leaf}\tsingle-owner\n")
+    tree = git_output(git_dir, "mktree", stdin=f"040000 tree {approvals}\tapprovals\n")
+    merge_oid = git_output(git_dir, "commit-tree", tree, stdin="approved\n")
+    git_output(git_dir, "update-ref", "refs/heads/governance/approvals", merge_oid)
+
+    db = tmp_path / "approval.db"
+    with sqlite3.connect(db) as connection:
+        connection.executescript(
+            "CREATE TABLE issue(id INTEGER,repo_id INTEGER,is_closed INTEGER);"
+            "CREATE TABLE pull_request(issue_id INTEGER,\"index\" INTEGER,base_branch TEXT,has_merged INTEGER,merged_commit_id TEXT,merged_unix INTEGER);"
+            "CREATE TABLE user(id INTEGER,lower_name TEXT);"
+            "CREATE TABLE review(id INTEGER,type INTEGER,reviewer_id INTEGER,issue_id INTEGER,commit_id TEXT,stale INTEGER,dismissed INTEGER,created_unix INTEGER);"
+            "CREATE TABLE commit_status(id INTEGER,repo_id INTEGER,state TEXT,sha TEXT,context TEXT,creator_id INTEGER);"
+        )
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO issue VALUES(10,1,1)")
+        merged_unix = int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp())
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO pull_request VALUES(10,31,'governance/approvals',1,?,?)", (merge_oid, merged_unix))
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO user VALUES(2,'owner')")
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO user VALUES(?,?)", (producer_id, producer_name))
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO review VALUES(52,1,2,10,?,0,0,?)",
+            (head_oid, int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp())),
+        )
+        machine_checks = {}
+        for index, context in enumerate(sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS), 101):
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO commit_status VALUES(?,1,'success',?,?,?)",
+                (index, head_oid, context, producer_id),
+            )
+            machine_checks[context] = {
+                "state": "success", "head_oid": head_oid, "status_id": index,
+                "creator_id": producer_id, "creator_login": producer_name,
+            }
+    return {
+        "git_dir": git_dir, "merge_oid": merge_oid, "closure_oid": closure_oid,
+        "head_oid": head_oid, "db": db, "expiry": expiry.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "manifest_path": "approvals/single-owner/activation.json",
+        "manifest_blob": manifest_blob,
+        "manifest_sha256": hashlib.sha256(manifest_raw.encode()).hexdigest(),
+        "execution_binding": execution_binding,
+        "machine_checks": machine_checks,
+        **execution_binding,
+    }
+
+
+def bindings(tmp_path: Path, adapter: FileProtectedBranchAdapter, **overrides) -> dict:
+    validator_path = Path(validator_module.__file__).resolve()
+    state_machine_path = Path(state_machine_module.__file__).resolve()
+    validator_sha = hashlib.sha256(validator_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+    state_machine_sha = hashlib.sha256(state_machine_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+    execution_binding = {
+        "task_id": "AIOS-LIVE-ACTIVATION-TEST",
+        "operation_id": "op-live-001",
+        "expected_validator_sha256": validator_sha,
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256": state_machine_sha,
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256": adapter.calculate_snapshot_sha256(legacy_row()),
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": "0" * 64,
+        "target_branch_protection_sha256": calculate_snapshot_sha256(owner_row()),
+        "backend": "file",
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "branch": "governance/approvals",
+        "requester": "agent",
+        "executor": "activation-executor",
+        "forbidden_operations": {
+            "main": False, "governance_direct": False, "integration": False,
+            "tags": False, "force_push": False,
+        },
+    }
+    evidence = evidence_fixture(tmp_path, execution_binding)
+    value = {
+        "task_id": "AIOS-LIVE-ACTIVATION-TEST",
+        "operation_id": "op-live-001",
+        "expected_governance_oid": evidence["merge_oid"],
+        "observed_governance_oid": evidence["merge_oid"],
+        "expected_validator_sha256": validator_sha,
+        "observed_validator_sha256": validator_sha,
+        "expected_state_machine_sha256": state_machine_sha,
+        "observed_state_machine_sha256": state_machine_sha,
+        "validator_path": str(validator_path),
+        "state_machine_path": str(state_machine_path),
+        "governance_git_dir": str(evidence["git_dir"].resolve()),
+        "governance_ref": "refs/heads/governance/approvals",
+        "evidence_git_dir": str(evidence["git_dir"].resolve()),
+        "approval_db_path": str(evidence["db"].resolve()),
+        "expected_branch_protection_sha256": adapter.calculate_snapshot_sha256(legacy_row()),
+        "activation_approval_merge_oid": evidence["merge_oid"],
+        "approval_request_head_oid": evidence["head_oid"],
+        "activation_approval_pr_number": 31,
+        "activation_manifest_path": evidence["manifest_path"],
+        "activation_manifest_blob_oid": evidence["manifest_blob"],
+        "activation_manifest_sha256": evidence["manifest_sha256"],
+        "expires_at": evidence["expiry"],
+        "evidence_closure_oid": evidence["closure_oid"],
+        "observed_evidence_closure_oid": evidence["closure_oid"],
+        **{key: evidence[key] for key in (
+            "implementation_commit_oid", "implementation_tree_oid", "runtime_sources",
+            "artifact_path", "artifact_sha256", "rollback_artifact_path",
+            "rollback_artifact_sha256", "test_evidence_path", "test_evidence_sha256",
+            "evidence_closure_path", "evidence_closure_sha256",
+            "machine_status_producer_id", "machine_status_producer_name",
+        )},
+        "owner_review_oid": 52,
+        "observed_owner_review_oid": 52,
+        "requester": "agent",
+        "executor": "activation-executor",
+        "wip": False,
+        "machine_checks": evidence["machine_checks"],
+        "forbidden_operations": {
+            "main": False,
+            "governance_direct": False,
+            "integration": False,
+            "tags": False,
+            "force_push": False,
+        },
+        "target_branch_protection": owner_row(),
+        "backend": "file",
+        "backend_path": str(adapter.path.resolve()),
+        "repo_id": 1,
+        "branch": "governance/approvals",
+        "expected_gitea_schema_sha256": "0" * 64,
+    }
+    value.update(overrides)
+    return value
+
+
+def harness(tmp_path: Path):
+    backend = tmp_path / "protected.json"
+    write_json(backend, legacy_row())
+    adapter = FileProtectedBranchAdapter(backend)
+    engine = ActivationEngine(adapter, tmp_path / "state", tmp_path / "run" / "activation.lock")
+    request = bindings(tmp_path, adapter)
+    return backend, adapter, engine, request
+
+
+def test_live_plan_success(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    result = engine.plan(request)
+    assert result["status"] == "PLAN_READY"
+    assert len(result["plan_id"]) == 64
+
+
+def test_activation_bindings_schema_matches_runtime_contract(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, _, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    schema_path = Path(activation_module.__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "activation-bindings.schema.json"
+    schema = json.loads(schema_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    Draft202012Validator.check_schema(schema)
+    validator = Draft202012Validator(schema)
+    validator.validate(request)
+    invalid = json.loads(json.dumps(request))
+    invalid["machine_checks"][sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]]["status_id"] = 0
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        validator.validate(invalid)
+
+
+def test_runtime_source_must_be_actual_loaded_module_not_decoy(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    source = Path(request["runtime_sources"][0]["runtime_path"])
+    decoy = tmp_path / "decoy.py"
+    decoy.write_bytes(source.read_bytes())
+    request["runtime_sources"][0]["runtime_path"] = str(decoy.resolve())
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="RUNTIME_SOURCE_PATH_MISMATCH"):
+        _verify_approved_entities(request, Path(request["evidence_git_dir"]))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path_field", ["artifact_path", "rollback_artifact_path", "test_evidence_path"])
+def test_approved_entity_digest_is_enforced(tmp_path: Path, path_field: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    Path(request[path_field]).write_bytes(b"tampered\n")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_ENTITY_DIGEST_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_evidence_closure_must_be_direct_child_commit(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    git_dir = Path(request["evidence_git_dir"])
+    unrelated, _ = commit_files(
+        git_dir,
+        {request["evidence_closure_path"]: '{"result":"PASS"}\n'},
+        "unrelated",
+    )
+    request["evidence_closure_oid"] = unrelated
+    request["observed_evidence_closure_oid"] = unrelated
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_pr_merge_after_expiry_is_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "UPDATE pull_request SET merged_unix=?",
+            (int(_parse_test_utc(request["expires_at"]).timestamp()) + 1,),
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="ACTIVATION_APPROVAL_MERGED_AFTER_EXPIRY"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def _parse_test_utc(value: str) -> datetime:
+    return datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+
+
+def test_machine_status_must_match_bound_producer_and_observed_row(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    context = sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]
+    request["machine_checks"][context]["status_id"] += 1000
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="MACHINE_GATE_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_latest_machine_status_from_unapproved_producer_is_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    context = sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute("INSERT INTO user VALUES(100,'untrusted-producer')")
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO commit_status VALUES(999,1,'success',?,?,100)",
+            (request["approval_request_head_oid"], context),
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="MACHINE_GATE_PRODUCER_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_live_activate_verify_status_success(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    activated = engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert activated["status"] == "ACTIVATED"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == owner_row()
+    assert engine.verify(request, request["operation_id"])["status"] == "VERIFIED"
+    assert engine.status(request["operation_id"])["transaction"]["phase"] == "COMMITTED"
+    assert (engine.journal.root / "current-snapshot.json").exists()
+    assert (engine.journal.root / "rollback-snapshot.json").exists()
+
+
+def test_live_rollback_success(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK"
+
+
+def test_terminal_rollback_cannot_be_reactivated(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="OPERATION_TERMINAL_ROLLED_BACK"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+
+
+def test_verify_and_rollback_remain_available_after_approval_expiry(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    future = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=2)
+
+    class FutureDateTime(datetime):
+        @classmethod
+        def now(cls, tz=None):
+            return future if tz is not None else future.replace(tzinfo=None)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(activation_module, "datetime", FutureDateTime)
+    assert engine.verify(request, request["operation_id"])["status"] == "VERIFIED"
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+
+
+def test_prepared_crash_can_recover_after_approval_expiry(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["crash_at"] = "before_apply"
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    with pytest.raises(InjectedCrash):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    request.pop("crash_at")
+    future = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=2)
+
+    class FutureDateTime(datetime):
+        @classmethod
+        def now(cls, tz=None):
+            return future if tz is not None else future.replace(tzinfo=None)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(activation_module, "datetime", FutureDateTime)
+    assert engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ACTIVATED"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == owner_row()
+
+
+def test_fresh_activation_rechecks_expiry_at_prepared_boundary(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    expiry = _parse_test_utc(request["expires_at"])
+    moments = iter((
+        expiry - timedelta(seconds=2),
+        expiry - timedelta(seconds=1),
+        expiry + timedelta(seconds=1),
+    ))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(activation_module, "_utc_now", lambda: next(moments))
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVAL_EXPIRED"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.load(request["operation_id"]) is None
+
+
+def test_fresh_activation_rejects_snapshot_drift_at_prepared_boundary(
+    tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    original_read = adapter.read_current
+    reads = 0
+
+    def drifting_read() -> dict:
+        nonlocal reads
+        reads += 1
+        if reads == 2:
+            drifted = original_read()
+            drifted["can_push"] = 1
+            drifted["updated_unix"] = 777
+            return drifted
+        return original_read()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(adapter, "read_current", drifting_read)
+    with pytest.raises(CASConflict, match="PREPARED_BOUNDARY_SNAPSHOT_CHANGED"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert original_read() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.load(request["operation_id"]) is None
+
+
+def test_rollback_uses_durable_authorization_after_live_status_rerun(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    context = sorted(MACHINE_CONTEXTS)[0]
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO commit_status VALUES(999,1,'success',?,?,?)",
+            (
+                request["approval_request_head_oid"], context,
+                request["machine_status_producer_id"],
+            ),
+        )
+    result = engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])
+    assert result["status"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+
+
+def test_missing_approval_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request.pop("owner_review_oid")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="MISSING_BINDINGS"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "value", "message"),
+    [
+        ("observed_owner_review_oid", 99, "WRONG_APPROVAL_OID_DENIED"),
+        ("observed_governance_oid", "f" * 40, "WRONG_GOVERNANCE_OID_DENIED"),
+        ("observed_evidence_closure_oid", "f" * 40, "WRONG_EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_DENIED"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_wrong_binding_denied(tmp_path: Path, field: str, value: object, message: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request[field] = value
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=message):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_cas_conflict_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    backend, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    changed = legacy_row()
+    changed["updated_unix"] = 12
+    write_json(backend, changed)
+    with pytest.raises(CASConflict):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("crash_at", ["before_apply", "during_apply", "after_apply_before_receipt", "after_commit_wal"])
+def test_process_crash_restart_recovery(tmp_path: Path, crash_at: str) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["crash_at"] = crash_at
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    with pytest.raises(InjectedCrash):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    request.pop("crash_at")
+    result = engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    expected_status = "ALREADY_COMMITTED" if crash_at == "after_commit_wal" else "ACTIVATED"
+    assert result["status"] == expected_status
+    assert adapter.read_current() == owner_row()
+    assert engine.journal.receipt_path(request["operation_id"]).exists()
+    assert engine.journal.audit.has_event(request["operation_id"], "SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_COMMITTED")
+
+
+def test_post_activation_verify_failure_rolls_back(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(adapter, "verify_applied", lambda _: False)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="POST_ACTIVATION_VERIFY_FAILED"):
+        engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.load(request["operation_id"])["phase"] == "ROLLED_BACK"
+
+
+def test_operation_id_idempotency(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ALREADY_COMMITTED"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("crash_at", ["after_rollback_cas", "after_rollback_wal"])
+def test_rollback_crash_restart_repairs_closure(tmp_path: Path, crash_at: str) -> None:
+    _, adapter, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    request["crash_at"] = crash_at
+    with pytest.raises(InjectedCrash):
+        engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])
+    request.pop("crash_at")
+    assert engine.rollback(request, request["operation_id"], planned["plan_id"])["status"] == "ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK"
+    assert adapter.read_current() == legacy_row()
+    assert engine.journal.receipt_path(request["operation_id"]).exists()
+    assert engine.journal.audit.has_event(request["operation_id"], "ACTIVATION_ROLLED_BACK")
+
+
+def test_operation_id_payload_mismatch_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    changed = dict(request)
+    approval_alias = tmp_path / "approval-alias.db"
+    os.link(request["approval_db_path"], approval_alias)
+    changed["approval_db_path"] = str(approval_alias)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="PAYLOAD_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.activate(changed, planned["plan_id"])
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "value"),
+    [("operation_id", "op-live-REPLAY"), ("task_id", "REPLAY-TASK")],
+)
+def test_approved_execution_binding_replay_denied(tmp_path: Path, field: str, value: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request[field] = value
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_expiry_must_come_from_approved_manifest(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["expires_at"] = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=12)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVAL_EXPIRY_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_target_snapshot_must_match_approved_manifest(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["target_branch_protection"] = {**owner_row(), "updated_unix": 99}
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVED_EXECUTION_BINDING_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_approval_database_must_be_backend_database(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    other_db = tmp_path / "other.db"
+    other_db.write_bytes(Path(request["approval_db_path"]).read_bytes())
+    request.update(backend="sqlite", backend_path=str(other_db.resolve()))
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="APPROVAL_DB_BACKEND_DB_IDENTITY_MISMATCH"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_audit_chain_continuity_and_credential_redaction(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    request["api_token"] = "must-not-appear"
+    planned = engine.plan(request)
+    engine.activate(request, planned["plan_id"])
+    assert len(engine.journal.audit.verify()) == 64
+    raw = (engine.journal.root / "audit.jsonl").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "must-not-appear" not in raw
+    assert "[REDACTED]" not in raw  # only hashes/events are persisted to audit
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "mutation",
+    [
+        lambda request: request.update(requester="owner"),
+        lambda request: request.update(executor="owner"),
+        lambda request: request.update(wip=True),
+        lambda request: request.update(machine_checks={"anything": {"state": "success", "head_oid": request["approval_request_head_oid"]}}),
+        lambda request: request.update(forbidden_operations={"main": True}),
+        lambda request: request.update(forbidden_operations={"tags": True}),
+        lambda request: request.update(forbidden_operations={"force_push": True}),
+    ],
+)
+def test_negative_governance_acceptance(tmp_path: Path, mutation) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    mutation(request)
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "mutation",
+    [
+        lambda target: target.update(enable_approvals_whitelist=0),
+        lambda target: target.update(enable_merge_whitelist=0),
+        lambda target: target.update(status_check_contexts="[]"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_unsafe_policy_enable_fields_denied(tmp_path: Path, mutation) -> None:
+    _, _, _, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    mutation(request["target_branch_protection"])
+    with pytest.raises(UnsafePolicy):
+        validate_target(legacy_row(), request["target_branch_protection"])
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid_owner", ["codex", "gpt"])
+def test_owner_review_must_come_from_gitea_database(tmp_path: Path, invalid_owner: str) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute("UPDATE user SET lower_name=? WHERE id=2", (invalid_owner,))
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="OWNER_APPROVAL_INVALID"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def test_stale_owner_review_denied_from_gitea_database(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    _, _, engine, request = harness(tmp_path)
+    with sqlite3.connect(request["approval_db_path"]) as connection:
+        connection.execute("UPDATE review SET stale=1 WHERE id=52")
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="OWNER_APPROVAL_INVALID"):
+        engine.plan(request)
+
+
+def create_sqlite_fixture(path: Path) -> None:
+    row = legacy_row()
+    columns = []
+    for key, value in row.items():
+        kind = "INTEGER" if isinstance(value, int) else "TEXT"
+        columns.append(f"{key} {kind}")
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.execute(f"CREATE TABLE protected_branch ({','.join(columns)})")
+        connection.execute(
+            f"INSERT INTO protected_branch ({','.join(row)}) VALUES ({','.join('?' for _ in row)})",
+            list(row.values()),
+        )
+
+
+def test_sqlite_full_row_cas_and_rollback(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    db = tmp_path / "gitea.db"
+    create_sqlite_fixture(db)
+    probe = SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter(db, expected_schema_sha256="0" * 64)
+    adapter = SQLiteProtectedBranchAdapter(db, expected_schema_sha256=probe.schema_sha256())
+    previous = adapter.read_current()
+    applied = adapter.apply_atomic(calculate_snapshot_sha256(previous), owner_row())
+    assert applied == owner_row()
+    restored = adapter.rollback_atomic(calculate_snapshot_sha256(applied), previous)
+    assert restored == previous
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.fixture import DisposableGiteaFixture
+from aios_single_owner_governance.lock import MaintenanceLock
+from aios_single_owner_governance.models import GovernanceState
+from aios_single_owner_governance.protection import (
+    BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter,
+    CASConflict,
+    MemoryProtectionStore,
+    snapshot_sha256,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.rollback import (
+    ProtectionCompensationSaga,
+    RollbackConfigurationManager,
+)
+from aios_single_owner_governance.state_machine import GovernanceStateMachine, InvalidTransition
+
+from .helpers import legacy_protection, single_owner_protection
+from .helpers import context
+from aios_single_owner_governance.validator import SingleOwnerApprovalValidator, ValidationDenied
+
+
+class StateCasRollbackTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_ordinary_owner_approved_merge_simulation(self):
+        result = SingleOwnerApprovalValidator().validate(context())
+        self.assertEqual(result.owner_review.reviewer, "owner")
+        machine = GovernanceStateMachine()
+        for target in (
+            GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED,
+            GovernanceState.MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED,
+            GovernanceState.AUTO_MERGE_READY,
+            GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY,
+        ):
+            machine.transition(target)
+        self.assertEqual(machine.state, GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY)
+
+    def test_validator_failure_is_stateless_and_recoverable(self):
+        validator = SingleOwnerApprovalValidator()
+        with self.assertRaises(ValidationDenied):
+            validator.validate(context(wip=True))
+        self.assertEqual(validator.validate(context()).owner_review.reviewer, "owner")
+
+    def test_state_machine_happy_path_and_restart_recovery(self):
+        machine = GovernanceStateMachine()
+        for target in (
+            GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED,
+            GovernanceState.MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED,
+            GovernanceState.AUTO_MERGE_READY,
+            GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY,
+        ):
+            machine.transition(target)
+        restarted = GovernanceStateMachine(machine.state)
+        self.assertEqual(restarted.state, GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVED_EXECUTION_READY)
+
+    def test_state_machine_rollback_to_checkpoint(self):
+        machine = GovernanceStateMachine()
+        machine.transition(GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED)
+        checkpoint = machine.state
+        machine.transition(GovernanceState.MACHINE_GATES_VERIFIED)
+        machine.restore(checkpoint)
+        self.assertEqual(machine.state, GovernanceState.OWNER_APPROVAL_VERIFIED)
+
+    def test_service_restart_from_each_checkpoint(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-governance-fixture-") as root:
+            checkpoint = Path(root) / "state.json"
+            for state in GovernanceState:
+                with self.subTest(state=state):
+                    GovernanceStateMachine(state).save_fixture(checkpoint)
+                    restarted = GovernanceStateMachine.load_fixture(checkpoint)
+                    self.assertEqual(restarted.state, state)
+
+    def test_invalid_transition_denied(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(InvalidTransition):
+            GovernanceStateMachine().transition(GovernanceState.AUTO_MERGE_READY)
+
+    def test_branch_protection_cas_success_and_rollback(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old, new = legacy_protection(), single_owner_protection()
+        plan = adapter.plan(old, new, snapshot_sha256(old))
+        store = MemoryProtectionStore(old)
+        self.assertEqual(adapter.apply_fixture(store, plan), new)
+        self.assertEqual(adapter.rollback_fixture(store, plan), old)
+
+    def test_branch_protection_cas_conflict_fails_closed(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old, changed, new = legacy_protection(), legacy_protection(7), single_owner_protection()
+        plan = adapter.plan(old, new, snapshot_sha256(old))
+        store = MemoryProtectionStore(changed)
+        with self.assertRaises(CASConflict):
+            adapter.apply_fixture(store, plan)
+
+    def test_partial_activation_recovery_saga(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old, new = legacy_protection(), single_owner_protection()
+        plan = adapter.plan(old, new, snapshot_sha256(old))
+        saga = ProtectionCompensationSaga(adapter, MemoryProtectionStore(old), plan)
+        saga.execute_fixture()
+        self.assertEqual(saga.compensate_fixture(), old)
+        self.assertTrue(saga.applied and saga.rolled_back)
+
+    def test_rollback_configuration_fixture_install(self):
+        adapter = BranchProtectionCASMigrationAdapter()
+        old, new = legacy_protection(), single_owner_protection()
+        plan = adapter.plan(old, new, snapshot_sha256(old))
+        manager = RollbackConfigurationManager()
+        config = manager.build(plan)
+        with DisposableGiteaFixture(old) as fixture:
+            path = manager.install_fixture(fixture.root, config)
+            self.assertTrue(path.exists())
+            self.assertTrue(manager.verify(config, plan))
+
+    def test_maintenance_lock_fences_concurrent_holder(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-governance-fixture-") as root:
+            path = Path(root) / "maintenance.lock"
+            with MaintenanceLock(path):
+                with self.assertRaises(BlockingIOError):
+                    with MaintenanceLock(path):
+                        pass
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import unittest
+
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+
+
+class SystemdContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_units_are_static_dormant_and_credential_free(self):
+        units = sorted(
+            unit for unit in (ROOT / "deploy" / "systemd").glob("aios-governance-*.service")
+            if unit.name != "aios-governance-single-owner-activation.service"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(len(units), 2)
+        for unit in units:
+            text = unit.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            with self.subTest(unit=unit.name):
+                self.assertIn("AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false", text)
+                self.assertIn("AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false", text)
+                self.assertIn("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false", text)
+                self.assertIn("ProtectSystem=strict", text)
+                self.assertNotIn("EnvironmentFile=", text)
+                self.assertNotIn("LoadCredential=", text)
+                self.assertNotIn("WantedBy=", text)
+                self.assertNotIn("[Install]", text)
+                self.assertIn("--checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance", text)
+                self.assertNotIn("/data/aios-gitops/production", text)
+
+    def test_activation_verifier_is_static_and_has_no_credential_or_install_hook(self):
+        unit = ROOT / "deploy" / "systemd" / "aios-governance-single-owner-activation.service"
+        text = unit.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false", text)
+        self.assertIn("--verify", text)
+        self.assertIn("ProtectSystem=strict", text)
+        self.assertNotIn("EnvironmentFile=", text)
+        self.assertNotIn("LoadCredential=", text)
+        self.assertNotIn("WantedBy=", text)
+        self.assertNotIn("[Install]", text)
+        self.assertNotIn("--activate", text)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import replace
+from datetime import timedelta
+import unittest
+
+from aios_single_owner_governance.models import Review
+from aios_single_owner_governance.validator import SingleOwnerApprovalValidator, ValidationDenied
+
+from .helpers import HEAD, NOW, context, gates, owner_review
+
+
+class ValidatorTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.validator = SingleOwnerApprovalValidator()
+
+    def denied(self, code, **changes):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValidationDenied) as caught:
+            self.validator.validate(context(**changes))
+        self.assertEqual(caught.exception.code, code)
+
+    def test_owner_current_head_and_machine_gates_pass(self):
+        result = self.validator.validate(context())
+        self.assertEqual(result.owner_review.reviewer, "owner")
+        self.assertEqual(len(result.machine_contexts), 3)
+
+    def test_requester_self_approval_denied(self):
+        self.denied("REQUESTER_SELF_APPROVAL", requester="owner")
+
+    def test_executor_self_approval_denied(self):
+        self.denied("EXECUTOR_SELF_APPROVAL", executor="owner")
+
+    def test_codex_as_owner_denied(self):
+        codex = owner_review(reviewer="codex", reviewer_id=42)
+        self.denied("OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUIRED", reviews=(codex,))
+
+    def test_gpt_as_owner_denied(self):
+        gpt = owner_review(reviewer="gpt", reviewer_id=43)
+        self.denied("OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUIRED", reviews=(gpt,))
+
+    def test_non_owner_approval_denied(self):
+        other = owner_review(reviewer="other", reviewer_id=77)
+        self.denied("OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUIRED", reviews=(other,))
+
+    def test_stale_owner_approval_denied(self):
+        self.denied("STALE_OWNER_APPROVAL", reviews=(owner_review(stale=True),))
+
+    def test_dismissed_owner_approval_denied(self):
+        self.denied("DISMISSED_OWNER_APPROVAL", reviews=(owner_review(dismissed=True),))
+
+    def test_old_head_owner_approval_denied(self):
+        self.denied("OWNER_APPROVAL_NOT_LATEST_HEAD", reviews=(owner_review(head_oid="b" * 40),))
+
+    def test_wip_denied(self):
+        self.denied("WIP_BLOCKED", wip=True)
+
+    def test_machine_gate_failure_denied(self):
+        self.denied("MACHINE_GATE_FAILED", machine_gates=gates(state="failure"))
+
+    def test_secret_scan_failure_denied(self):
+        failed = list(gates())
+        failed[1] = replace(failed[1], state="failure")
+        self.denied("MACHINE_GATE_FAILED", machine_gates=tuple(failed))
+
+    def test_machine_gate_wrong_head_denied(self):
+        self.denied("MACHINE_GATE_NOT_LATEST_HEAD", machine_gates=gates(head_oid="c" * 40))
+
+    def test_expired_request_denied(self):
+        self.denied("APPROVAL_EXPIRED", now=NOW + timedelta(hours=2))
+
+    def test_review_after_expiry_denied(self):
+        late = owner_review(reviewed_at=NOW + timedelta(hours=2))
+        self.denied("OWNER_APPROVAL_EXPIRED", reviews=(late,))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Codex Agent	310ab2af90	evidence: close live activation hardening candidate	2026-07-29 12:30:10 +08:00
Codex Agent	71def340e7	governance: harden single-owner live activation	2026-07-29 12:28:37 +08:00
Codex Agent	e1e438564c	feat(governance): add fail-closed live activation	2026-07-29 11:27:04 +08:00
AIOS Task-Bound Prerequisites Writer	fa038d17b2	governance: add dormant single-owner activation prerequisites	2026-07-29 04:00:00 +08:00