fix(codex): restore hardened WeChat send backend lineage

chore(orchestration): dispatch adaptive OpenClaw and Codex work units
chore(governance): refresh adaptive dual-agent production contract
2026-07-18 03:00:32 +08:00 · 2026-07-17 22:13:38 +08:00 · 2026-07-17 22:13:38 +08:00 · 2026-07-17 22:04:03 +08:00 · 2026-07-17 21:24:20 +08:00 · 2026-07-14 01:33:53 +08:00
42 changed files with 7456 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
+  "schema_version": 1,
+  "state_writer": "openclaw",
+  "work_units": [
+    {
+      "fallback": "codex",
+      "gate": "R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY",
+      "id": "R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER",
+      "primary": "openclaw",
+      "status": "READY",
+      "track": "R_RUNNER"
+    },
+    {
+      "fallback": "codex",
+      "gate": "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE",
+      "id": "P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE",
+      "primary": "openclaw",
+      "status": "READY",
+      "track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
+    },
+    {
+      "fallback": "openclaw",
+      "gate": "P1_REPAIR3_CODE",
+      "id": "P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK",
+      "primary": "codex",
+      "status": "READY",
+      "track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
+    }
+  ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+{
+  "adaptive_dispatch": {
+    "codex_first": [
+      "complex_code",
+      "security_boundary",
+      "architecture",
+      "high_risk_review",
+      "strong_model_materially_better"
+    ],
+    "default_orchestrator": "openclaw",
+    "dual_required": [
+      "release_gate",
+      "crypto_or_identity_change",
+      "production_migration_or_rollback"
+    ],
+    "max_attempts_per_work_unit": 2,
+    "on_timeout": [
+      "mark_TIMEOUT",
+      "preserve_logs",
+      "switch_agent"
+    ],
+    "openclaw_first": [
+      "quality_close",
+      "large_or_repetitive",
+      "long_running",
+      "infra_or_git_inventory",
+      "cost_sensitive"
+    ],
+    "single_state_writer_lease_required": true,
+    "strict_role_partition": false,
+    "timeout_can_pass": false
+  },
+  "authoritative_state": {
+    "b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
+    "b4": "NOT_STARTED",
+    "baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
+    "release": "paused",
+    "repair3": {
+      "base": "8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575",
+      "candidate": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
+      "commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4",
+      "exact4": "PASS",
+      "result": "49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045"
+    },
+    "runner": {
+      "artifact_sha256": "85c472c05a1e55a5899b215d3cd41df53912787de529ac9cb3d5308da4158130",
+      "commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
+      "live": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
+      "offline": "PASS",
+      "result": "e789632e359e9232d8ae081e7c4f23ed7b615a9d"
+    }
+  },
+  "contract_id": "V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT",
+  "facts_policy": {
+    "accept": [
+      "committed_git_tree",
+      "full_oid",
+      "worktree_bare_gitea_oid_match",
+      "test_log_with_rc",
+      "immutable_digest",
+      "result_only_commit",
+      "live_evidence"
+    ],
+    "reject": [
+      "verbal_claim",
+      "readme_only",
+      "local_only_commit",
+      "environment_variable_as_secret_ref",
+      "compile_only",
+      "timeout_as_pass",
+      "unrelated_repo",
+      "fabricated_evidence"
+    ]
+  },
+  "forbidden_git": [
+    "reset",
+    "amend",
+    "rebase",
+    "force_push",
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "direct_bare_ref_mutation",
+    "unapproved_gitea_db_mutation",
+    "reuse_accident_worktree",
+    "delete_live_worktree_to_clear_collision"
+  ],
+  "generated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
+  "handoff": {
+    "ack": "CONTRACT_ACK=<full_contract_commit_oid>",
+    "advance": "independent_verification_required",
+    "all_agents_match": true
+  },
+  "join_gate": {
+    "requires": [
+      "RUNNER_RECOVERED",
+      "B3_PASS",
+      "B4_PASS",
+      "INTEGRATION_PASS"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model_policy": {
+    "codex": "strongest_model_actually_available_in_runtime",
+    "gpt_5_6": "use_only_if_exposed",
+    "no_unverified_model_claims": true,
+    "openclaw_default": "DeepSeek V4 Flash"
+  },
+  "owner_authorization": {
+    "adaptive_agent_assignment_authorized": true,
+    "agent_substitution_authorized": true,
+    "autonomous_execution": true,
+    "may_bypass_release_controls": false,
+    "may_bypass_secret_controls": false,
+    "may_fabricate_evidence": false,
+    "user_step_by_step_confirmation_required": false
+  },
+  "release_gates": [
+    "MAIN_MERGE",
+    "STAGING_AND_CANARY",
+    "PRODUCTION"
+  ],
+  "schema_version": 3,
+  "state_rules": [
+    "tracks_run_parallel",
+    "runner_block_does_not_block_offline_work_or_evidence_inventory",
+    "join_requires_both_tracks",
+    "failure_stops_dependents",
+    "production_remains_V1R4C6_paused_until_production_pass"
+  ],
+  "status": "ACTIVE",
+  "tracks": {
+    "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN": {
+      "b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
+      "b4": "NOT_STARTED",
+      "parallel": true,
+      "repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
+      "repair3_commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4"
+    },
+    "R_RUNNER": {
+      "commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
+      "current": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
+      "fallback": "codex",
+      "parallel": true,
+      "primary": "openclaw",
+      "required": [
+        "artifact_verified",
+        "approved_secret_provider_contract",
+        "owner_probe_verified",
+        "service_healthy",
+        "heartbeat_healthy",
+        "gateway_auth",
+        "durable_task_create_read_cancel",
+        "execution_channel",
+        "live_rollback"
+      ]
+    }
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# V2R1 Gate 1 — Clean-Room Final Evidence
+
+## Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Date | 2026-07-14 |
+| Source commit | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
+| Source branch | `origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000` |
+| Result branch | `fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714` |
+| Result commit reference | `HEAD` |
+| Gate | `G1` |
+| Variant | `openclaw-cleanroom` |
+| Status | `PASS` |
+
+The immutable report uses `HEAD` for post-commit verification. The resolved commit object ID is recorded by the external acceptance result after this file is committed; a Git commit cannot reliably embed its own object ID because changing the file changes the tree and commit identity.
+
+## Machine-Readable Result
+
+```yaml
+gate: G1
+variant: openclaw-cleanroom
+date: 2026-07-14
+status: PASS
+source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
+source_branch: origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000
+result_branch: fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714
+result_commit_ref: HEAD
+tests_total: 32
+tests_passed: 32
+tests_failed: 0
+cleanup_scan: PASS
+secret_scan: PASS
+rollback_status: PASS
+recovery_verified: true
+workspace_clean_at_test_completion: true
+merge_performed: false
+tag_created: false
+baseline_promoted: false
+deployment_performed: false
+```
+
+## Evidence Provenance
+
+The test, cleanup, secret-scan, rollback, and recovery results below are execution evidence supplied by OpenClaw for the Gate 1 run. This correction commit changes only the evidence report and does not claim that the GitOps API reran the suites.
+
+## HMAC Test-Key Length Verification
+
+| Test file | Variable | Test-only value | Length |
+|---|---|---|---:|
+| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:24` | `internal_key` | `b"runtime-internal-context-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
+| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:25` | `ingress_key` | `b"runtime-external-ingress-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
+
+Both values are test fixtures. The supplied evidence reports that no production secret was introduced.
+
+## Test Results Supplied by OpenClaw
+
+### V2R1 suite — 29 of 29 passed
+
+```shell
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest \
+  tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_message_ledger_append.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_router_isolation.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_runtime_identity_binding.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_tenant_context.py -v
+# Reported result: 29 passed, exit code 0
+```
+
+### Integration suite — 3 of 3 passed
+
+```shell
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py -v
+# Reported result: 3 passed, exit code 0
+```
+
+**Reported total: 32 of 32 passed.**
+
+## Cleanup, Security, and Recovery Evidence
+
+| Check | Supplied result |
+|---|---|
+| Conflict-marker scan | PASS |
+| Cleanup scan | PASS |
+| Secret scan | PASS |
+| Legitimate hardcoded test keys | Two 39-byte fixtures in `test_runtime_wiring.py` |
+| Rollback rehearsal | PASS; 13 of 13 core tests reported after rollback to `6077331` |
+| Recovery verification | PASS |
+
+## Deployment State
+
+| Operation | Performed |
+|---|---|
+| Merge | No |
+| Tag creation | No |
+| Baseline promotion | No |
+| Staging deployment | No |
+| Production deployment | No |
+
+## Post-Commit Verification
+
+Run from the repository root after the commit is created:
+
+```shell
+set -eu
+
+SOURCE=502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
+RESULT_FILE=.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
+
+git rev-parse HEAD
+
+test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" = "1"
+test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD)" = "$RESULT_FILE"
+
+git ls-tree -r HEAD -- "$RESULT_FILE"
+
+python3 - "$RESULT_FILE" <<'PY'
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sys
+
+path = Path(sys.argv[1])
+text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+encoded_tokens = [
+    [84, 66, 68],
+    [80, 69, 78, 68, 73, 78, 71],
+    [84, 79, 68, 79],
+    [70, 73, 88, 77, 69],
+    [91, 123, 99, 111, 109, 109, 105, 116, 125, 93],
+]
+tokens = ["".join(chr(value) for value in item) for item in encoded_tokens]
+angle_token = re.compile(chr(60) + r"[^>\n]+" + chr(62))
+
+hits = [token for token in tokens if token in text]
+if angle_token.search(text):
+    hits.append("angle-delimited-token")
+
+if hits:
+    print("TOKEN_SCAN=FAIL", hits)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+print("TOKEN_SCAN=PASS")
+PY
+```
+
+## Acceptance Conditions
+
+Gate 1 is eligible to proceed only when the external acceptance record confirms all of the following against the resolved `HEAD` commit:
+
+- the commit exists and has source commit `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` as its parent;
+- exactly this one report file changed;
+- the committed report contains no unresolved legacy token;
+- the result tree is not identical to rejected commit `71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390`;
+- no merge, tag, baseline promotion, or deployment occurred.
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
+  "b4": "NOT_STARTED",
+  "baseline": "V1R4C6",
+  "contract_branch": "task/governance/v2r1-personal-weixin-production-contract-20260717",
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "dispatch_commit": null,
+  "production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
+  "release": "paused",
+  "repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
+  "runner": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
+  "schema_version": 1,
+  "single_state_writer": "openclaw",
+  "updated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Codex V2R1 adaptive execution
+CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
+Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
+Execute P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK now:
+- read-only verify Repair3 e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4
+- read-only verify RESULT 49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045
+- verify lineage from 8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575, exact4, tests, Gitleaks and RESULT-only scope
+- do not modify Repair3 code in this unit
+Act as fallback for OpenClaw only on timeout/unavailability. Use GPT-5.6 only if actually exposed; otherwise strongest visible model. Prefer OpenClaw when quality is comparable or volume is high; prefer Codex for complex/security-critical work.
+Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
+Report:
+CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=codex STATUS=<status> IMPLEMENTATION=<oid-or-NONE> RESULT=<oid-or-NONE> OID_MATCH=<YES-or-NO> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
+Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# OpenClaw V2R1 adaptive orchestration
+CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
+Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
+You are default orchestrator and sole authoritative state writer.
+Execute immediately:
+1. R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER: discover approved provider metadata and owner-probe source without reading or outputting secrets. Environment variables alone are not approved secret refs.
+2. P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE: inventory approved restricted B3 evidence locations; validate existing facts; never synthesize evidence.
+3. Independently verify Codex results before advancing.
+Prefer OpenClaw for comparable-quality, large, repetitive, long-running, infrastructure and cost-sensitive work. Prefer Codex strongest actually available model for complex code, security boundaries, architecture and high-risk review. On timeout mark TIMEOUT and switch agent; never infer PASS.
+Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
+Report:
+CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=openclaw STATUS=<status> COMMIT=<oid-or-NONE> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
+Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
@@ -1 +1 @@
-V1R4C3
+V1R4C6
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
 {
- "current_baseline": "V1R4C3",
- "previous_baseline": "V1R3C1",
- "promoted_at": "2026-07-09T17:44:57+08:00",
- "git": "f5435e308794c737f3e39de3f6b79807486943c3",
- "promoted_by": "openclaw",
- "promotion_reason": "V1R4C3 autonomous operations, search gateway, task center, owner gate, and blocker self-optimization baseline promotion"
-}
+    "current_baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C5",
+    "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T21:00:00+08:00",
+    "git": "e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd",
+    "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
+    "promotion_reason": "V1R4C6 admin search agent integration, search gateway, agent platform, VERSION bump, merge tests deploy pipeline — not yet deployed to production",
+    "constraints": {
+        "memory_search_enabled": false,
+        "force_push_allowed": false,
+        "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval": true
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# V1R4C6 Backup Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- status: NOT_STARTED
+- reason: No confirmed production Stack, persistent volume, database migration target, or V1R4C5 image digest is bound to this source release. A backup cannot be claimed or executed safely without an identified target datastore.
+- prohibited_actions_not_performed: production database deletion; persistent-volume deletion; docker system prune --volumes; direct copy of live database files.
+- required_before_resume: confirmed Stack identity and its documented backup/restore command.
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# V1R4C6 Deployment Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
+- tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
+- image_repository: UNRESOLVED
+- image_digest: UNRESOLVED
+- previous_image_digest: UNRESOLVED
+- portainer_environment: UNRESOLVED
+- portainer_stack: UNRESOLVED
+- deployment_action: NOT_EXECUTED
+- reason: No source-to-image-to-Portainer-Stack mapping exists. Existing Portainer containers and known Docker workloads do not expose a V1R4C6/e204 deployment target or Portainer stack labels. The active GitOps API is a direct systemd Python process, not a Portainer-managed Docker Stack.
+- rollback_status: NOT_APPLICABLE_NO_CHANGE
+- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# V1R4C6 Production Preflight Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- started_at_utc: 2026-07-11T16:57:04.0596039Z
+- source_tag_object: 356a8a8c1860b94b7d61a456c29228c88e57d963
+- source_tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
+- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
+- tag_to_source_relation: tag commit is direct parent of source commit (verified)
+- production_host_identifier: cn-network-mkt (hw / 1.95.164.183)
+- host_preflight: Docker 29.5.3; root filesystem 29 percent used; memory available approximately 56 GiB
+- GitOps_runtime: active at /data/aios-gitops/workspace via aios-gitops-model-api.service
+- runtime_base: current_baseline V1R4C6; previous_baseline V1R4C5; git e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd; service status ok
+- Portainer discovery: Portainer instances are reachable on ubuntu-admin and ubuntu-aihost, but no confirmed Portainer Environment/Stack maps to V1R4C6 or e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd.
+- source_build_contract: target source contains only deploy/gitea/docker-compose.yml and no application Dockerfile/Containerfile or V1R4C6 image repository declaration.
+- status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# V1R4C6 Rollback Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- rollback_required: No
+- rollback_executed: No
+- reason: No container, Stack, database, image, or production configuration was changed during this run.
+- captured_v1r4c5_digest: UNRESOLVED because no matching current production Stack was confirmed.
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# V1R4C6 Verification Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- healthcheck_result: GitOps adapter /health = 200 and /api/base = 200; this verifies the control-plane API only, not a V1R4C6 production deployment.
+- gate_a_result: NOT_RUN (production admin workbench target and authenticated test path unresolved)
+- gate_b_result: NOT_RUN (production Search Gateway target/provider binding unresolved)
+- gate_c_result: NOT_RUN (production Agent Platform target/runtime request path unresolved)
+- runtime_acceptance_result: NOT_RUN (0/8; cannot reuse non-production results)
+- critical_control_plane_finding: gitea-branch-consistency-sentinel is failed with five Git-ref-to-Gitea-metadata drift entries and autonomous safe mode emitted. This is a hard safety gate failure.
+- no_unresolved_critical_errors: false
+- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# 微信文本-图片缓存隔离事故报告
+
+## 结论
+
+本次事故已经按最新备份链路回滚并完成第二轮评审修复。`3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a` 进一步修复了英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本误入图片路径的问题，`706c0b0` 则是后续最小修复提交。当前文档只记录证据、部署和验收边界，不把“真实 owner inbound 已完成”写成结论。
+
+## 现象
+
+- 纯文本消息被误答成旧图片回复，属于 stale-image reply on pure text。
+- 现场证据显示 `types=1` 且 `hasMedia=false`，但后续又进入 `message_type=image`、`image_count=0`、`implicit_image_message`，最终落到 `cached_image_expired`。
+- 这说明“诊断文本”被误判成图片意图后，又继承了 sender 级旧图缓存。
+
+## 根因
+
+- `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py:768-839` 把文本意图判断和缓存回退放在同一条链上。
+- `looksLikeHermesImageFollowup()` 会把含图片关键字的诊断文本推进 image intent。
+- `resolveHermesFollowupImageContext()` 随后会读取 sender 级缓存；一旦缓存命中失败或过期，就会落到 `cached_image_expired`，从而让纯文本沾上旧图上下文。
+- `handleHermesImplicitImage()` 继续把消息送入 `handleHermes(..., "implicit_image_message")`，所以误判会沿着同一条图片处理通道传播。
+
+## 护栏不变量
+
+- 图片处理上下文必须来自当前消息图片、已确认的引用图片，或精确匹配的缓存图片 ID；缺少这三类证据时，纯文本不能进入 `handleHermesImplicitImage()`。
+- 未确认的引用文本不能继承 sender 级旧图缓存，必须返回 `referenced_image_not_confirmed`。
+- 只有精确缓存图片 ID 命中且缓存仍有效时，才允许走 `resolveHermesCachedImageEntry()` 的 `cached_image_matched` 路径。
+- `/hermes` 这类 slash 路径保持原有分流，slash/channel 面不变。
+- 这次修复的守卫目标，是把中英文诊断文本、未确认引用文本与图片缓存回退拆开，避免再把普通文本提升成图片意图。
+
+## TDD 与幂等性
+
+- `66d637fc0364a617c7b9fd8cd9baa68fb0368675`（`fix(weixin): isolate text from stale image cache`）引入了隔离修复和 `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`。
+- `2de29c59bb946cc3db3e14e8a06270391ede8401`（`fix(weixin): add process-only runtime patch mode`）继续收紧 process-only 运行模式，保持回放幂等。
+- `3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a`（`fix(weixin): require confirmed image reference context`）补齐英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本用例，并把图片引用收紧到已确认上下文。
+- 用户实测的 TDD 路径为 RED `8 PASS / 1 FAIL`，随后 GREEN `9 PASS`。
+- 最小修复提交为 `706c0b0`，对应 quoted pure text 的最后一层收敛修复。
+- 第二轮回归结果为 `8 PASS`；node check 同样通过，重复应用补丁保持幂等。
+- 生产 npm 分发侧本身缺少 `tsconfig/tests`，baseline 与 patched 共享这一限制，所以这里不把分发目录的缺口当成回归点；验收以 node check 和 8 tests 为准。
+
+## 用户实测补充
+
+- 普通文本两项为 PASS。
+- quoted pure text 为 FAIL，日志证据包含 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE`、quoted id、`implicit_image_message`、`referenced_image_unresolved`。
+- 这组证据说明 quoted pure text 没有被当成真正的图片 follow-up，且没有越过引用确认边界。
+
+## 回滚与备份
+
+- 回滚按最新备份执行，基线指向 `/data/aios-gitops/runtime/latest-backup-dir.txt` 所示的最新备份目录。
+- 备份路径链路按供给证据记录为 `T064506Z`、`T074212Z`、`T081658Z`。
+- 第一轮恢复后的部署过程哈希记录为 `e9625d12` 和 `c00c58f8`。
+- v2 部署备份为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-text-cache-isolation-20260711T094908Z`。
+- v2 部署文件哈希为 TS `024c6498284d1871b048f6157d5d3dbd4d34e54b53a05afd744b00458ceeb79f`、JS `d73b15d6752056192a1d1939b04107334419785b41175b39f1cbc1132ac65c47`；slash/channel 口径保持不变。
+- 首次部署因为 `-- No entries --` 门禁误判而回滚，随后纠正部署在线，PID 为 `2496603`。
+- 在线修复后的 hashes 为 `86dfe...` / `a9b854...`，`channel 4` accounts healthy，cache unchanged。
+
+## 主线合并与生产发布
+
+- 主线 fast-forward source rev 为 `9269e819972c2e709e0c27bed7eab590da6961c9`，本次不 tag、不 baseline。
+- 生产发布结论为 PASS，release dir 为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-mainline-release-20260711T181842Z`。
+- old PID 为 `2655072`，new PID 为 `2656106`。
+- TS hash 为 `86dfe4543c4414bc86778a4b218c244a742a139c66e3c9f19cf6f0de871234c3`，JS hash 为 `a9b854015108020458ce6f31b9d9187eff82e170c4c214259b0afb9be6a7336f`。
+- `18789` 监听，`channel 4` accounts healthy，`error_count=0`，cache unchanged。
+- 一次参数门禁失败已回滚，且不影响最终发布。
+- owner quoted-text live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## 运行态验证
+
+- 第一轮 gateway PID 由 `4025932` 变为 `1723576`；v2 部署后由 `1723576` 变为 `1876713`。
+- v2 现场/供给证据为 `active`、监听 `18789`、`error_count=0`、`channel gate pass`、`cache preserved`。
+- 最终 read-only gate 通过，说明部署后运行态未出现新的插件错误，channel 状态和缓存均保持预期。
+- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## 未完成的真实验收
+
+- owner 纯文本
+- diagnostic text
+- genuine image-followup message
+- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance
+
+以上四类消息仍需要由 owner 真实 inbound 到达，才能把这次“文本隔离”结论升格为完整的线上接受；本报告明确保留该项为 pending，不把它们写成已经完成。
+
+## 引用文字语义修复与发布（2026-07-12）
+
+- 后续 owner 实测证明图片误路由已消失，但模型在没有被引正文时根据 `chat_id/message_id/timestamp` 编造解释，因此图片隔离 PASS、语义验收 FAIL。
+- 现场 payload 的 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE` 只有 quoted ID 与时间字段，没有 `text_item`；session transcript 又没有原始 Weixin 数字 message ID，不能精确回表。
+- 出站 `clientId` 与引用的 19 位数字 `msg_id` 格式不同，发送 API 也不返回服务端 message ID。本次明确禁止 recent-message、时间窗口、session 顺序和近似 ID 猜测。
+- `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab` 增加证据优先处理：payload 明确含 `text_item.text` 时才构造引用上下文；引用存在但正文缺失时，经标准 dispatcher 确定性回复“无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。”，并在模型 dispatch 前返回。
+- TDD 先出现两项预期 RED（quoted-text resolver 不存在），最终 GREEN 为 `17 passed`；`py_compile`、`git diff --check`、`node --check` 均通过。
+- Scratch 双跑验证只改变 `src/messaging/process-message.ts` 与 `dist/src/messaging/process-message.js`，第二次应用 diff 为 0；slash/channel 文件保持不变。
+- 主线为 `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab`，生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-failclosed-release-20260712T054451Z`。
+- 发布后 PID 从 `2656106` 变为 `3670157`；TS hash 为 `1a73e735e9c8fb40a1f82d2a66bc022396c8105ed989aac95e11b66326e9fdf1`，JS hash 为 `1c76bf6ec3b45021e68b932cbf52222ba2130a867b95e41d7a91f261b991a304`。
+- `18789`、4 个 Weixin accounts、post-start error 0 和图片 cache unchanged 均通过。新的 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## Owner 引用文字 Fail-Closed 验收（2026-07-12）
+
+- Owner 引用一条微信未提供正文的文字消息并发送“是什么意思”，收到固定回复“无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。”。
+- 日志窗口为 `2026-07-12 14:06:23.424-14:06:23.893 +08:00`：入站 `types=1`、`bodyLen=6`、`hasMedia=false`，出站 `textLen=20` 且发送成功。
+- 同一窗口 `model-fetch=0`、`implicit_image_message=0`、Hermes route=0，`quoted_text_unavailable=1` 且 `quoted_message_id=present`。
+- 该证据确认无正文引用不会进入模型猜测或图片缓存路径。Owner quoted-text no-body live acceptance 为 **PASS**。
+- 微信 payload 明确携带 `text_item.text` 时的 grounded explanation 和 genuine image follow-up 仍作为独立兼容性验收项保留。
+
+## 可见引用摘要解析修复（2026-07-12）
+
+- Owner 进一步确认微信客户端能够显示被引用正文，因此上一节的“未提供正文”只适用于旧 resolver 的观察结果，不代表协议 payload 没有可用文本。
+- 根因是插件 `inbound.ts` 已将协议字段 `ref_msg.title` 定义为引用摘要并拼入 `ctx.Body`，而 `extractHermesReferencedText()` 只读取 `ref_msg.message_item.text_item.text`，导致客户端可见摘要被错误丢弃。
+- `13c2a182860131abcad0f5a70ae8263477578588` 在真实 `text_item.text` 缺失时，仅从 reference envelope 读取 `ref_msg.title`；不会读取 `message_item.title` 或任意嵌套通用 `title`，也不改变图片、slash 或 channel 路由。
+- TDD 先得到 `18 passed / 1 failed`，失败项为可见 `ref_msg.title` 仍落到 `quoted_text_unavailable`；修复后为 `19 passed`，`py_compile`、`node --check` 与 `git diff --check` 通过。
+- 生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-title-resolution-20260712T155112+0800`，PID 从 `3859376` 变为 `3860863`，post-start error 为 0，图片 cache unchanged。
+- 部署后 TS hash 为 `8e77ce61214688a2507b07f0cf1ee85401b58198b8271bebd69efc2681872726`，JS hash 为 `663db8d30a5cd5eb80fe46cf941cce6e6f5d04cb7e4b8d9b4d0086d87faba290`。
+- 可见正文引用的 owner live acceptance 尚待下一条真实微信消息确认；预期日志必须命中 `quoted_text_resolved`，且同一窗口不得出现 `quoted_text_unavailable` 或图片路由。
+
+## 安全说明
+
+- 本次仅更新本报告，没有修改代码、runtime、services 或 secrets。
+- 报告里没有任何凭据、密钥或原始敏感 ID。
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+# V1R4C5 Acceptance Evidence
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: release candidate evidence in progress
+
+Current active baseline: V1R4C3
+
+V1R4C5 has not been promoted yet.
+
+## Owner Decision
+
+Owner approved continued V1R4C5 work under the following constraints:
+
+```text
+允许无 force-push 的分支 reconcile
+memory search 保持关闭
+先完成 SR-01/SR-02/数据隔离验收
+再进入 merge/deploy/tag owner gate
+```
+
+## Scope
+
+V1R4C5 release candidate scope:
+
+1. SR-01 Gitea reliability and branch consistency guardrails.
+2. SR-02 watcher/stuck command cleanup.
+3. User data isolation redline and enforcement gates.
+4. SR-04 admin workbench read-only visibility preparation only.
+
+Explicitly excluded from V1R4C5 activation:
+
+- memory search activation;
+- full SR-04 portal production rollout;
+- bulk merge of old test/smoke/auth branches;
+- force push reconciliation;
+- Gitea DB mutation without owner/admin approval.
+
+## Runtime Acceptance Evidence
+
+### Runtime status
+
+Observed:
+
+```json
+{
+  "service": "aios-gitops-model-api",
+  "status": "active",
+  "workspace_branch": "patch/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01"
+}
+```
+
+### Baseline
+
+Observed:
+
+```json
+{
+  "current_baseline": "V1R4C3",
+  "previous_baseline": "V1R3C1",
+  "promoted_by": "openclaw"
+}
+```
+
+### Clean createBranch acceptance
+
+Branch:
+
+```text
+test/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01
+```
+
+Result:
+
+```text
+status: ok
+commit: 6ae7058
+sync: synced
+```
+
+### Clean createPatch acceptance
+
+Patch:
+
+```text
+patch/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01
+```
+
+Patch id:
+
+```text
+patch-1783706123789-f5ca8b69
+```
+
+Commit:
+
+```text
+ba0391e
+```
+
+Result:
+
+```text
+synced
+```
+
+## SR-01 Evidence
+
+Known accepted evidence:
+
+- Gitea branch consistency sentinel deployed.
+- Sentinel reports:
+
+```json
+{
+  "status": "healthy",
+  "unhealthy_checks": []
+}
+```
+
+- systemd timer runs every 5 minutes.
+- service runs with:
+
+```text
+--emit-safe-mode --json
+```
+
+- broken symlink issue resolved by replacing the external reliability symlink with workspace-local files.
+
+Required before final promotion:
+
+- confirm latest sentinel report remains healthy after acceptance writes.
+
+## SR-02 Evidence
+
+Known accepted evidence:
+
+```text
+11 / 11 tests pass
+```
+
+Fix summary:
+
+- stuck command detection reads parsed timestamps through `data.get('ts', 0)`;
+- `.md` fixture mtime is aligned with stored stuck timestamp via `os.utime(path, (ts, ts))`;
+- behavior is consistent across `.json` and `.md` state formats.
+
+Required before final promotion:
+
+- re-run SR-02 tests on the final integration candidate.
+
+## User Data Isolation Evidence
+
+Implemented controls:
+
+- user data isolation redline;
+- memory scope guard;
+- provider gate;
+- activation gate;
+- audit service/timer;
+- CI acceptance scripts;
+- memory search activation check.
+
+Required safety state:
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+Required before memory/search activation:
+
+- isolation audit healthy;
+- no denied records;
+- no invalid records;
+- provider filters by scope before ranking;
+- provenance required;
+- global index disabled;
+- activation gate returns allowed;
+- explicit owner approval.
+
+V1R4C5 does not approve memory search activation.
+
+## SR-04 Admin Workbench Evidence
+
+Current user-visible gap is confirmed:
+
+- administrator cannot yet see task progress;
+- administrator cannot yet see flow/process diagrams;
+- SR-04 remains activation-ready but gated.
+
+V1R4C5 scope allows only read-only visibility preparation and acceptance design, not full production rollout.
+
+Required before SR-04 deployment:
+
+- SR-01 green;
+- SR-02 green;
+- user data isolation gate accepted;
+- admin RBAC read-only check green.
+
+## Remaining Required Gates Before Promotion
+
+- [ ] Latest Gitea sentinel report remains healthy.
+- [ ] SR-02 watcher tests pass on final candidate.
+- [ ] User data isolation acceptance passes.
+- [ ] Admin workbench read-only RBAC acceptance passes or remains explicitly deferred.
+- [ ] No force-push was used.
+- [ ] Memory search remains disabled.
+- [ ] Owner approves merge/deploy/tag/promotion.
+
+## Promotion Rule
+
+V1R4C5 may not be promoted until all required gates are green or explicitly deferred with owner approval.
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# V1R4C5 Final Owner Approval
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: approved for final promotion
+
+## Owner Decision
+
+Owner approved final V1R4C5 promotion.
+
+Memory search must remain disabled.
+
+```text
+允许最终晋升
+继续保持 memory search 关闭
+```
+
+## Promotion Scope
+
+Approved for V1R4C5:
+
+1. SR-01 Gitea reliability and branch consistency guardrails.
+2. SR-02 watcher/stuck command cleanup.
+3. User data isolation redline and enforcement gates.
+4. SR-04 admin workbench read-only visibility preparation only.
+
+## Explicit Non-Activation
+
+The following are not approved by this promotion:
+
+```text
+memory search activation
+full cross-session memory recall
+global vector index
+full SR-04 production portal rollout beyond read-only/admin visibility preparation
+bulk merge of old test/smoke/auth branches
+force-push based reconciliation
+```
+
+## Required Runtime State
+
+Memory remains disabled:
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+If a provider or deployment attempts to enable memory/search, it must be blocked unless a future owner approval explicitly allows it after the user-data isolation activation gate returns allowed.
+
+## Final Promotion Rule
+
+V1R4C5 may proceed to tag/promotion under owner gate.
+
+If any final gate fails, promotion must stop and memory/search must remain disabled.
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# V1R4C5 Release to Main Reconcile Plan
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: reconcile preparation
+
+## Objective
+
+Bring the V1R4C5 release state back into `main` without rewriting history and without moving the immutable V1R4C5 tag.
+
+## Source of Truth
+
+Release baseline:
+
+```text
+V1R4C5
+```
+
+Promotion commit:
+
+```text
+a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+```
+
+Tag:
+
+```text
+V1R4C5
+```
+
+Tag policy:
+
+```text
+immutable
+```
+
+## Reconcile Rules
+
+Allowed:
+
+- normal merge commits;
+- fast-forward where possible;
+- conflict resolution with review;
+- updating main to contain released C5 state.
+
+Forbidden:
+
+- force-push;
+- tag movement;
+- rewriting release history;
+- importing V1R4C6 feature code into this reconcile.
+
+## Expected Included C5 Content
+
+- SR-01 Gitea reliability guardrails.
+- Gitea branch consistency sentinel.
+- SR-02 watcher state cleanup.
+- User Data Isolation gate.
+- Reliability governance documents.
+- Admin Workbench read-only preparation records.
+
+## Expected Excluded Content
+
+Do not include:
+
+- V1R4C6 Admin Workbench implementation code.
+- SR-03 Search Gateway implementation.
+- Agent Platform integration.
+- Memory search activation.
+- Global vector index.
+
+## Validation Before Main Merge
+
+Required:
+
+```text
+getBaseline.current_baseline == V1R4C5
+V1R4C5 tag unchanged
+memory search disabled
+Gitea sentinel healthy
+SR-02 tests pass
+main merge does not include V1R4C6 branches
+```
+
+## Post Merge Validation
+
+Run:
+
+```text
+getRuntimeStatus
+getBaseline
+createBranch
+createPatch
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```text
+main contains V1R4C5 release state
+active baseline remains V1R4C5
+```
+
+## Owner Gate
+
+Normal merge to `main` may proceed after validation.
+
+No tag creation or baseline promotion is required because V1R4C5 is already promoted.
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# V1R4C6 Acceptance Checklist
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Base baseline: V1R4C5
+
+Promotion blocked until every mandatory gate is green.
+
+## Global Preflight
+
+- [ ] `getRuntimeStatus.status == active`
+- [ ] `getBaseline.current_baseline == V1R4C5`
+- [ ] `getBaseline.git == a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704`
+- [ ] `AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO` points to `/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git`
+- [ ] Gitea consistency sentinel reports `healthy`
+- [ ] `AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false`
+- [ ] no force-push used
+
+## Gate A — Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+### Route/API
+
+- [ ] `/portal/me/aios/manifest` returns authenticated module manifest
+- [ ] `/portal/me/aios/dashboard` returns admin-authorized dashboard data
+- [ ] `/portal/me/aios/health` returns system health data
+- [ ] failed/empty backend data produces explicit empty/error state
+
+### UI
+
+- [ ] admin sees task progress
+- [ ] admin sees process/flow diagram entry
+- [ ] admin sees system health
+- [ ] admin sees authorized agent observability
+- [ ] user does not see admin-only modules
+- [ ] admin does not see owner-only modules without owner role
+
+### Isolation
+
+- [ ] no cross-user data
+- [ ] no cross-project data
+- [ ] no cross-session data
+- [ ] no cross-tenant/group data
+
+Gate A result: `PASS / FAIL / DEFER`
+
+## Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+### Provider Binding
+
+- [ ] real provider configured and reachable
+- [ ] provider errors return safe non-memory fallback
+- [ ] timeout/retry/circuit-breaker behavior verified
+
+### Scope and Provenance
+
+- [ ] scope filter occurs before ranking
+- [ ] provenance returned for accepted results
+- [ ] denied/out-of-scope content never reaches ranking or summary
+- [ ] global memory/vector index disabled
+- [ ] memory search remains disabled
+
+### Audit
+
+- [ ] search request scope is logged without leaking content
+- [ ] provider/fallback decision is auditable
+- [ ] denied scope mismatch is auditable
+
+Gate B result: `PASS / FAIL / DEFER`
+
+## Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+### Event Bus
+
+- [ ] event envelope includes tenant/group, user, project, session and agent scope
+- [ ] cross-scope subscribers cannot receive events
+- [ ] failed delivery is observable and retry-bounded
+
+### GPT Message Plane
+
+- [ ] message envelope includes scope and provenance
+- [ ] messages cannot cross user/project/session boundaries
+- [ ] denied messages do not forward content
+
+### Controller Dispatch
+
+- [ ] dispatch stops when autonomous safe mode is active
+- [ ] consequential actions require owner gate
+- [ ] duplicate dispatch is idempotent or rejected
+- [ ] stuck state cleanup remains green
+
+### Observability
+
+- [ ] admin can see platform status without unrestricted content access
+- [ ] failures and queue state are visible
+
+Gate C result: `PASS / FAIL / DEFER`
+
+## Combined Runtime Acceptance
+
+Run after integration and deployment:
+
+```text
+getRuntimeStatus
+getBaseline
+createBranch
+createPatch
+```
+
+Expected before promotion:
+
+```text
+runtime = active
+baseline = V1R4C5
+write branch = committed + synced
+write patch = committed + synced
+```
+
+## Rollback Validation
+
+- [ ] Group A can disable workbench routes/menu entries
+- [ ] Group B can disable provider binding and use safe non-memory fallback
+- [ ] Group C can disable expanded dispatch
+- [ ] all rollback modes preserve `AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false`
+
+## Release Decision
+
+V1R4C6 is tag-ready only when:
+
+```text
+Global preflight PASS
+AND Gate A PASS
+AND Gate B PASS
+AND Gate C PASS
+AND combined runtime acceptance PASS
+```
+
+Any failed mandatory gate blocks tag, deployment promotion, and baseline promotion.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# V1R4C6 Acceptance Evidence
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+## Merge
+
+- **PR #6** (merge commit `ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec`): V1R4C6 release-candidate control artifacts merged to main.
+- **Result**: PASS
+  - 10 files (1440 lines) added: release docs, patch records, ops commands, version metadata
+  - No V1R4C6 tag created
+  - No baseline promotion
+  - Memory search remains disabled
+  - Force-push remains disabled
+
+## Verified State (post-merge)
+
+| Check                    | Result |
+|--------------------------|--------|
+| main HEAD                | ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec |
+| V1R4C5 tag               | Still at d457ac396147043ed5d0a3fd8b44bcb10f48bceb (not moved) |
+| V1R4C6 tag               | absent |
+| baseline/current.json    | current_baseline = V1R4C5, git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704 |
+| memory_search_enabled    | false |
+| force_push_allowed       | false |
+| versions/V1R4C5.json     | exists |
+| versions/V1R4C6.json     | exists |
+
+## Gates
+
+| Gate                         | Status  | Notes                          |
+|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| control artifacts merge      | PASS    | PR #6 merged to main           |
+| Gate A — Admin Workbench     | NOT RUN | Engineering integration pending|
+| Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway| NOT RUN | Engineering integration pending|
+| Gate C — Agent Platform      | NOT RUN | Engineering integration pending|
+| tests                        | NOT RUN | No test suite executed         |
+| artifact digest              | NOT CREATED | No build performed          |
+| deployment                   | NOT RUN | No deploy performed            |
+| production verification      | NOT RUN | No production verification     |
+
+## Rollback
+
+Revert command (creates new branch and PR, non-destructive):
+
+```bash
+git revert -m 1 ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec
+```
+
+## Current Overall Status
+
+**BLOCKED / INTEGRATION PENDING** — all engineering gates remain unexecuted.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# V1R4C6 Blocker: Baseline Visibility Discrepancy
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: blocking merge/deploy/tag
+
+## Summary
+
+OpenClaw/operator reported V1R4C5 baseline promotion completed successfully, but the ChatGPT GitOps action view still reports the active baseline as V1R4C3.
+
+V1R4C6 must not proceed to merge/deploy/tag until this view is reconciled.
+
+## Operator Reported State
+
+Reported by operator:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+previous_baseline = V1R4C3
+promotion_git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+promoted_by = openclaw/admin
+memory_search_enabled = false
+force_push_allowed = false
+gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval = true
+```
+
+## ChatGPT GitOps Action Observed State
+
+Observed through `getBaseline`:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C3
+previous_baseline = V1R3C1
+git = f5435e308794c737f3e39de3f6b79807486943c3
+promoted_by = openclaw
+```
+
+Observed through `listVersions`:
+
+```text
+V1R4C5 tag exists
+versions_dir does not list canonical V1R4C5.json
+workspace_branch = release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+```
+
+## Risk
+
+If V1R4C6 proceeds while different controllers disagree on the active baseline, the release may be built against the wrong base and post-deployment verification may be invalid.
+
+## Required Reconciliation
+
+Before continuing V1R4C6:
+
+1. Confirm the GitOps API used by ChatGPT reads the same `baseline/current.json` updated by OpenClaw.
+2. Confirm the API service has reloaded or refreshed baseline state.
+3. Confirm canonical `versions/V1R4C5.json` is visible to the action runtime or intentionally explain why it is not required.
+4. Re-run:
+
+```text
+getBaseline
+listVersions
+getRuntimeStatus
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```text
+getBaseline.current_baseline = V1R4C5
+listVersions.tags contains V1R4C5
+memory search remains disabled
+```
+
+## Hard Stop
+
+Do not create V1R4C6 tag.
+Do not promote V1R4C6 baseline.
+Do not deploy V1R4C6.
+Do not enable memory search.
+
+Proceed only after baseline visibility is reconciled.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# V1R4C6 Context Isolation Recovery and Resume Decision
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: approved to resume merge/deploy/verification; stop before tag/promotion
+
+## Recovery Evidence
+
+The unrelated OpenClaw/WeChat report was traced to notification/task isolation weaknesses rather than GitOps baseline corruption.
+
+Actions completed:
+
+1. The legacy `AIOS每日自治报告` cron was disabled and retained for forensic review.
+2. The expired `2026-07-06-reminder` cron was archived and deleted after confirming no pending dependency.
+3. Pending notification queue depth was verified as zero.
+4. Unknown/unscoped queued message count was verified as zero.
+5. A scoped V1R4C6 WeChat test notification was sent successfully.
+
+The test notification included:
+
+```text
+task_id = V1R4C6-integration
+release_id = V1R4C6
+branch = release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+baseline = V1R4C5
+correlation_id = 70308f5e243ab81d
+```
+
+No recipient identifier, token, cookie, or unrelated message content is stored in this release record.
+
+## Resume Decision
+
+V1R4C6 may resume:
+
+```text
+merge
+component tests
+security/isolation tests
+deployment
+production verification
+release evidence updates
+```
+
+V1R4C6 must still stop before:
+
+```text
+Git tag creation
+baseline promotion
+memory search activation
+```
+
+## Required Execution Context
+
+Before every OpenClaw execution or WeChat notification, assert:
+
+```text
+task_id = V1R4C6-integration
+release_id = V1R4C6
+branch = release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+baseline = V1R4C5
+memory_search_enabled = false
+```
+
+Any mismatch re-enters safe mode and blocks execution/notification.
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+```text
+no force-push
+no Gitea DB mutation
+no V1R4C5 tag movement
+no global memory/vector index
+no cross-user/project/session notification or task data
+```
+
+## Owner Gate
+
+After Gate A, Gate B, Gate C, deployment verification, runtime acceptance, and Gitea sentinel checks pass, OpenClaw must request explicit owner approval through the scoped WeChat channel for both:
+
+1. Create V1R4C6 Git tag.
+2. Promote active baseline from V1R4C5 to V1R4C6.
+
+Ambiguous acknowledgements do not count as approval.
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+# V1R4C6 Integration Merge Matrix
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: integration-ready
+
+Base baseline: V1R4C5
+
+Base baseline git: `a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704`
+
+## Release Objective
+
+Deliver three capability groups in one controlled release train:
+
+1. Admin Workbench and Portal AIOS read-only rollout.
+2. SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding.
+3. Agent Platform Integration.
+
+This is a bundled release train, not an uncontrolled bulk merge. Each group has an independent acceptance gate and rollback switch.
+
+## Group A — Admin Workbench and Portal AIOS
+
+| Branch | Capability | Decision |
+|---|---|---|
+| `feature/v1r4c4-sr04-admin-workbench-visibility-20260711` | Admin workbench task progress and process visibility | integrate |
+| `feature/v1r4c4-sr04-portal-aios-visibility-20260710` | Portal AIOS route/menu visibility | integrate |
+| `patch/user-portal-me-route-diagnostics-20260709` | `/portal/me/aios/manifest`, dashboard and health route contract | integrate after route review |
+| `patch/user-portal-rbac-ops-dashboard` | Admin/group-admin RBAC dashboard | integrate after RBAC review |
+| `patch/agent-observability-webui` | Agent observability UI | integrate read-only |
+| `patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706` | GitOps dashboard UI | integrate only if not superseded by the newer workbench implementation |
+
+### Required user-visible result
+
+Administrators can see:
+
+- task progress;
+- task/flow/process diagram entry;
+- system health;
+- authorized agent observability;
+- explicit empty/error states.
+
+### Security constraints
+
+- Read-only first.
+- RBAC is enforced server-side and client-side.
+- No cross-user, cross-project, cross-session, or cross-tenant data exposure.
+- Owner-only modules remain hidden from non-owner administrators.
+
+## Group B — SR-03 Search Gateway Real Provider Binding
+
+| Branch | Capability | Decision |
+|---|---|---|
+| `feature/v1r4c4-sr02-search-gateway-resilience-20260710` | Gateway resilience and safe fallback | integrate |
+| `patch/search-gateway-governed-general-capability` | Governed provider binding and policy surface | integrate after scope review |
+| `patch/gitops-change-archive-audit` | Change/archive audit evidence | integrate or retain as supporting audit module |
+
+### Required result
+
+- Real provider binding works.
+- Query scope is enforced before ranking.
+- Accepted records include provenance.
+- Provider failure falls back to `text-only`, `no-memory`, or `scoped-only`.
+- Global memory/vector indexes are not used.
+
+### Security constraints
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+Search Gateway provider binding must not implicitly enable memory search.
+
+## Group C — Agent Platform Integration
+
+| Branch | Capability | Decision |
+|---|---|---|
+| `patch/agent-event-bus-unified` | Unified scoped agent event bus | integrate |
+| `patch/agent-gpt-message-plane` | Scoped Agent/GPT message plane | integrate |
+| `patch/autonomous-controller-dispatch-20260709` | Autonomous controller dispatch | integrate behind safe-mode gate |
+| `patch/self-evolution-agent-orchestration-policy` | Agent orchestration and governance policy | integrate |
+| `patch/aios-autonomous-orchestrator-architecture-review-v1` | Architecture record | integrate as documentation or mark superseded after review |
+
+### Required result
+
+- Agent event and message envelopes include user/project/session scope.
+- Controller dispatch stops when autonomous safe mode is active.
+- Consequential actions remain owner-gated.
+- Observability is available before autonomous expansion.
+
+## Explicitly Excluded
+
+Do not merge or activate in V1R4C6:
+
+- memory search activation;
+- global vector index;
+- cross-session/global recall;
+- unscoped search or message delivery;
+- old test/smoke/auth-only branches;
+- old V1R2/V1R3 promotion requests;
+- force-push reconciliation;
+- Gitea database mutation.
+
+## Merge and Deployment Order
+
+```text
+1. Verify V1R4C5 baseline and bare-repo configuration.
+2. Integrate Group A read-only workbench/portal surface.
+3. Run Group A RBAC and visibility acceptance.
+4. Integrate Group B provider binding under isolation gate.
+5. Run Group B scope/provenance/fallback acceptance.
+6. Integrate Group C event/message/dispatch capabilities.
+7. Run Group C scope/safe-mode/owner-gate acceptance.
+8. Run combined runtime acceptance.
+9. Prepare V1R4C6 tag and promotion request.
+10. Stop for owner confirmation before tag/promotion.
+```
+
+## Combined Acceptance
+
+Required:
+
+```text
+getRuntimeStatus -> active
+getBaseline -> V1R4C5 before promotion
+createBranch -> committed and synced
+createPatch -> committed and synced
+Gitea branch sentinel -> healthy
+memory search -> disabled
+```
+
+## Rollback Switches
+
+- Group A: disable new workbench routes/menu entries.
+- Group B: disable real provider binding and use safe non-memory fallback.
+- Group C: disable expanded dispatch and keep event/message plane observational.
+- Memory search remains disabled in all rollback modes.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# V1R4C6 Release Acceptance Checklist
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+## Gate A — Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+| Check                          | Status  | Notes                          |
+|--------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| Admin workbench RBAC read-only | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Portal AIOS manifest route     | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Portal AIOS dashboard route    | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Flow/process diagram renders   | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Portal AIOS health route       | NOT RUN |                                |
+
+## Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+| Check                              | Status  | Notes                          |
+|------------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| Provider binding correctness       | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Scope-before-ranking validation    | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Provenance correctness             | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Fallback to disabled provider      | NOT RUN |                                |
+
+## Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+| Check                              | Status  | Notes                          |
+|------------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| Event scope isolation               | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Message plane scope isolation       | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Dispatch safe-mode respects control | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Owner gate for consequential ops    | NOT RUN |                                |
+
+## Final Deployment Gates
+
+| Check                     | Status    | Notes                          |
+|---------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------|
+| Tag V1R4C6                | NO        | Requires owner approval        |
+| Baseline promotion        | NO        | Requires owner approval        |
+| Memory search enabled     | NO        | Requires future owner approval |
+
+## Active Constraints
+
+- AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED: false
+- Force-push: forbidden
+- Gitea DB mutation: owner approval required
+- Memory search: disabled (future owner approval required for enable)
+
+## Artifact
+
+- **PR #6 merge commit**: `ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec`
+- **Source baseline**: V1R4C5 (commit a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704)
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# V1R4C6 Release Gate Status
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: integration pending — release-candidate control artifacts merged, engineering gates not yet executed
+
+## Completed
+
+- V1R4C5 baseline verified as active base.
+- GitOps API and public API return:
+  - current_baseline: V1R4C5
+  - previous_baseline: V1R4C3
+  - git: a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+- GitOps bare repository path corrected to active `aios.git`.
+- V1R4C6 merge matrix created.
+- V1R4C6 acceptance checklist created.
+- V1R4C6 acceptance evidence created.
+- PR #6: control artifacts merge — PASS
+
+## Result Summary
+
+| Item                    | Status    |
+|-------------------------|-----------|
+| control artifacts merge | PASS       |
+| Gate A                  | NOT RUN   |
+| Gate B                  | NOT RUN   |
+| Gate C                  | NOT RUN   |
+| tests                   | NOT RUN   |
+| artifact                | NOT CREATED |
+| deployment              | NOT RUN   |
+| production verification | NOT RUN   |
+| tag created             | NO        |
+| baseline promoted       | NO        |
+| memory search enabled   | NO        |
+| **overall**             | **BLOCKED / INTEGRATION PENDING** |
+
+## Verified Artifact
+
+- **PR #6 merge commit**: `ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec`
+- **Current baseline**: V1R4C5
+- **V1R4C6 tag**: absent
+- **Memory search**: disabled
+- **Force-push**: disabled
+
+## Remaining Gates (not yet executed)
+
+### Gate A — Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+- merge candidate review;
+- RBAC acceptance;
+- task progress visibility;
+- flow diagram visibility;
+- health/observability validation.
+
+### Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+- provider binding validation;
+- scope-before-ranking validation;
+- provenance validation;
+- fallback validation.
+
+### Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+- event scope validation;
+- message plane scope validation;
+- dispatch safe-mode validation;
+- owner gate validation.
+
+## Release Stop Point
+
+After Gates A/B/C pass:
+
+```text
+prepare V1R4C6 tag
+        ↓
+owner confirmation required
+        ↓
+tag creation
+        ↓
+baseline promotion
+```
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+Remain:
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+memory search disabled
+force-push forbidden
+gitea DB mutation requires owner approval
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Resolve explicit quoted text safely and fail closed without a model call when Weixin omits the quoted body.
+
+**Architecture:** Add pure JS/TS reference-text helpers and one process hook guard to the existing patcher. Keep the patch surface limited to generated `process-message.ts/js`; do not introduce a persistent cache or modify send/monitor/API modules.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Python patch generator, TypeScript/JavaScript, Node test harness, pytest.
+
+## Global Constraints
+
+- Sub-agents use `gpt-5.3-codex-spark`.
+- No force push, tag, baseline promotion, credential persistence, recent-message fallback, or approximate text matching.
+- Existing confirmed image and ordinary text behavior must remain unchanged.
+
+---
+
+### Task 1: Add Quoted Text Resolver With TDD
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
+- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Produces: `extractHermesReferencedText(items)` and `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` in TS and JS helper templates.
+
+- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `ref_msg.message_item.type=1` and explicit `text_item.text="被引用的正文"`; assert `reason="quoted_text_resolved"`, `handled=false`, and a prompt containing only delimited quoted/current text.
+- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `type=0`, quoted ID, no text, and no confirmed image; assert `reason="quoted_text_unavailable"`, `handled=true`, and exact deterministic `replyText`.
+- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py -k 'quoted_text'` and record expected RED because the resolver is absent.
+- [ ] Implement the smallest recursive explicit-text extractor. Accept only known referenced text fields; cap each extracted string at 4000 characters and reject blank values.
+- [ ] Implement the resolver in both TS and JS templates. Do not read session history, image latest cache, timestamps, or metadata values.
+- [ ] Re-run the focused tests and record GREEN.
+- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): fail closed on unavailable quoted text`.
+
+### Task 2: Guard The Real Process Hook
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
+- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Consumes: `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)`.
+- Produces: process hook behavior that replies deterministically or replaces only the ordinary text prompt.
+
+- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test that stubs the ordinary model dispatch and reply function. For type 0 without text, assert reply called once and model called zero times.
+- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test for explicit quoted text. Assert model called once with delimited context and no message metadata.
+- [ ] Add regression assertions for plain text, current image, and exact quoted image.
+- [ ] Run focused tests and record RED for the missing guard.
+- [ ] Insert the resolver after reference/image evidence extraction and before ordinary model dispatch. Confirmed image references must bypass the text fail-closed branch.
+- [ ] Emit structured reason-only diagnostics without message bodies.
+- [ ] Run focused tests and record GREEN.
+- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): guard quoted text model dispatch`.
+
+### Task 3: Idempotence, Review, And Release
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `docs/incidents/WEIXIN_TEXT_IMAGE_CACHE_ISOLATION_20260711.md`
+
+- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py` and require all tests pass.
+- [ ] Run `python3 -m py_compile fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`.
+- [ ] Run `git diff --check`.
+- [ ] Apply `--process-only` twice to a scratch production-plugin copy and require identical second-run hashes; require slash/channel files unchanged.
+- [ ] Obtain independent spec and code review.
+- [ ] Update the incident document with RED/GREEN evidence, main revision, production hashes, rollback directory, and owner live acceptance state.
+- [ ] Merge by non-force fast-forward from a clean main-based branch, deploy only the two generated process-message files, restart only `openclaw-gateway.service`, and verify service, port 18789, four accounts, zero post-start errors, and unchanged image cache.
+- [ ] Owner live acceptance: quote a type 0 text message and verify deterministic no-body response; quote a payload that includes explicit text and verify grounded explanation.
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Design
+
+## Goal
+
+Prevent quoted-text questions from being answered with invented message metadata when Weixin does not provide the quoted body. Preserve normal text and confirmed image behavior.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- A quoted text event can arrive as `ref_msg.message_item.type=0` with only `msg_id` and timestamps.
+- Session transcripts retain text but not the original Weixin numeric message ID.
+- Outbound `clientId` values are not the same format as quoted numeric `msg_id` values, and the send API does not expose a server message ID.
+- Therefore recent-message, timestamp, session, and outbound-client-ID matching are not exact evidence and must not be used.
+
+## Decision
+
+Use an evidence-only resolver in `process-message`:
+
+1. If reference payload contains an explicit text item, extract that text and build a bounded quoted-text context for the ordinary text model path.
+2. If reference context exists but has no explicit text and is not a confirmed image, return a deterministic response: `无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。`
+3. The unresolved branch is handled before ordinary model dispatch and before Hermes image dispatch.
+4. Do not infer quoted text from metadata, recent messages, session order, timestamps, or approximate IDs.
+
+No persistent text cache is introduced in this change. Outbound ID aliasing remains a separate observation task because an exact mapping has not been proved.
+
+## Interfaces
+
+- `extractHermesReferencedText(items): string` returns only explicit referenced text, otherwise an empty string.
+- `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` returns one of:
+  - `{ referenced: false, handled: false, prompt: currentText, reason: "none" }`
+  - `{ referenced: true, handled: false, prompt, reason: "quoted_text_resolved" }`
+  - `{ referenced: true, handled: true, replyText: "无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。", reason: "quoted_text_unavailable" }`
+- Confirmed referenced images bypass this text resolver and keep the existing exact image path.
+
+## Privacy And Logging
+
+- Do not log quoted or current text.
+- Log only `reason`, account ID, a one-way bounded hash of quoted ID when available, and boolean evidence flags.
+- Do not persist tokens, credentials, full payloads, or message text.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+- Explicit quoted text is supplied to the ordinary text model with a clear delimiter.
+- Type 0 reference without text returns the deterministic Chinese response and does not call the model.
+- Plain text, current image, and exact quoted image behavior remain unchanged.
+- Generated TS and JS remain byte-idempotent under `--process-only`.
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+apiVersion: aios.gitops/v1
+kind: ExecutionOrder
+metadata:
+  name: openclaw-v1r4c6-merge-tests-deploy
+  date: 2026-07-11
+  owner_approval:
+    branch: request/openclaw-v1r4c6-merge-deploy-20260711
+    file: approvals/openclaw-v1r4c6-merge-deploy-owner-approval.yaml
+    commit: 4653f92
+spec:
+  objective: >-
+    Integrate the approved V1R4C6 Admin Workbench, Search Gateway, and Agent Platform
+    changes into a clean candidate based on the latest main, execute all mandatory gates,
+    merge to main only after success, then deploy and verify production.
+  confirmation_policy: no_additional_confirmation_required
+  source:
+    primary_branch: release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+    supporting_domains:
+      - admin-workbench-portal-aios
+      - search-gateway-governance
+      - agent-platform-integration
+  target:
+    integration_branch: integration/v1r4c6-merge-deploy-20260711-01
+    final_branch: main
+    release_version: V1R4C6
+  execution:
+    - id: preflight
+      actions:
+        - fetch_all_refs_and_tags
+        - verify_workspace_clean
+        - reset_integration_candidate_to_latest_main
+        - verify_baseline_is_V1R4C5
+        - verify_memory_search_enabled_is_false
+        - verify_V1R4C5_tag_unchanged
+        - record_main_head_and_source_head
+      stop_conditions:
+        - dirty_workspace
+        - missing_source_branch
+        - baseline_not_V1R4C5
+        - protected_setting_changed
+    - id: semantic-diff-review
+      actions:
+        - compute_three_dot_diff_from_main_to_primary_branch
+        - classify_changes_by_admin_search_agent_domains
+        - detect_duplicate_control_artifacts_already_merged_by_PR_6
+        - preserve_PR_7_NOT_RUN_status_until_tests_execute
+        - reject_reversion_of_V1R4C5_baseline_metadata
+        - reject_enablement_of_memory_search
+      output:
+        - execution/evidence/v1r4c6-semantic-diff-report.md
+    - id: merge-candidate
+      actions:
+        - merge_primary_branch_into_integration_candidate_without_fast_forward
+        - resolve_text_conflicts_by_preserving_latest_main_control_metadata
+        - preserve_source_business_functionality_when_not_conflicting_with_safety_controls
+        - commit_resolved_candidate
+      forbidden:
+        - force_push
+        - direct_commit_to_main
+        - bypass_branch_protection
+        - bypass_owner_gate
+        - weaken_rbac_or_scope_isolation
+        - mark_unexecuted_tests_as_passed
+    - id: gate-a-admin
+      required_checks:
+        - admin_workbench_routes_and_assets_load
+        - portal_aios_manifest_dashboard_health_endpoints
+        - server_side_and_frontend_rbac
+        - empty_error_and_loading_states
+        - tenant_user_project_session_isolation
+    - id: gate-b-search
+      required_checks:
+        - real_provider_binding_or_explicit_safe_fallback
+        - timeout_limited_retry_and_safe_fallback
+        - scope_filter_before_ranking
+        - provenance_in_results
+        - provider_and_fallback_audit
+        - unauthorized_results_never_enter_ranking_or_summary
+        - memory_search_remains_disabled
+    - id: gate-c-agent
+      required_checks:
+        - unified_agent_event_bus
+        - scoped_agent_gpt_message_plane
+        - autonomous_controller_dispatch
+        - safe_mode_stops_dispatch_and_change
+        - high_risk_actions_remain_owner_gated
+        - duplicate_dispatch_is_idempotent_or_rejected
+        - queue_failure_retry_observability
+    - id: runtime-and-regression
+      actions:
+        - run_getRuntimeStatus
+        - run_getBaseline
+        - run_createBranch_smoke_test
+        - run_createPatch_smoke_test
+        - run_full_regression_suite
+        - run_deployment_preflight_health_checks
+      expected:
+        reads: "200 OK with service, status, workspace_branch"
+        writes: "200 OK with branch, commit, rev, sync_status"
+    - id: promote-main
+      conditions:
+        - gate_a_passed
+        - gate_b_passed
+        - gate_c_passed
+        - runtime_acceptance_passed
+        - regression_passed
+        - deployment_preflight_passed
+      actions:
+        - open_or_update_merge_request_from_integration_candidate_to_main
+        - merge_without_rewriting_history
+        - record_new_main_head
+        - update_versions_V1R4C6_json_to_release_ready_or_active_baseline_as_policy_requires
+        - update_baseline_current_json_only_after_successful_promotion
+        - create_V1R4C6_tag_according_to_repository_tag_semantics
+    - id: deploy-and-verify
+      actions:
+        - trigger_direct_deployment_from_new_main
+        - verify_service_health
+        - verify_admin_search_agent_smoke_paths
+        - verify_runtime_status_and_baseline_after_deploy
+        - verify_rollback_artifact_and_previous_baseline_are_available
+        - publish_production_verification_report
+  failure_policy:
+    mode: fail_closed
+    on_any_failure:
+      - stop_pipeline
+      - do_not_update_main
+      - do_not_create_or_move_release_tag
+      - do_not_deploy
+      - preserve_integration_branch_for_forensics
+      - commit_failure_evidence_and_exact_blocker
+  reporting:
+    required_files:
+      - execution/evidence/v1r4c6-semantic-diff-report.md
+      - execution/evidence/gate-a-admin-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/gate-b-search-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/gate-c-agent-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/runtime-acceptance-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/regression-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/deployment-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/production-verification-result.md
+    final_summary_fields:
+      - source_head
+      - integration_head
+      - main_head_before
+      - main_head_after
+      - merge_commit
+      - release_tag
+      - deployment_id
+      - gate_results
+      - production_health
+      - rollback_ready
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+TS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
+const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText: string): GetUpdatesResp {
+  return JSON.parse(rawText, (key: string, value: unknown, context?: { source?: string }) => {
+    if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
+    if (typeof value !== "number") throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
+    const source = context?.source;
+    if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source)) throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
+    return source;
+  }) as GetUpdatesResp;
+}
+// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
+
+JS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
+const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText) {
+    return JSON.parse(rawText, (key, value, context) => {
+        if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string")
+            return value;
+        if (typeof value !== "number")
+            throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
+        const source = context?.source;
+        if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source))
+            throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
+        return source;
+    });
+}
+// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
+
+
+def insert_once(text: str, marker: str, addition: str) -> str:
+    if addition in text:
+        return text
+    if marker not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError(f'marker not found: {marker}')
+    return text.replace(marker, marker + '\n' + addition, 1)
+
+
+def patch_api_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + TS_HELPER)
+    old = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
+    new = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
+    if new not in text:
+        if old not in text:
+            raise RuntimeError('TypeScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
+        text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_api_js(text: str) -> str:
+    text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + JS_HELPER)
+    old = 'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
+    new = 'const resp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
+    if new not in text:
+        if old not in text:
+            raise RuntimeError('JavaScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
+        text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_types_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    new = 'message_id?: string | number;'
+    if new in text:
+        return text
+    old = 'message_id?: number;'
+    if old not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError('message_id type marker not found')
+    return text.replace(old, new, 1)
+
+
+def write_if_changed(path: Path, content: str) -> bool:
+    original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+    if original == content:
+        return False
+    path.write_text(content, encoding='utf-8')
+    return True
+
+
+def apply(plugin_root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    paths = {
+        'src/api/api.ts': patch_api_ts,
+        'dist/src/api/api.js': patch_api_js,
+        'src/api/types.ts': patch_types_ts,
+    }
+    changed: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    for relative, transform in paths.items():
+        path = plugin_root / relative
+        if not path.exists():
+            raise RuntimeError(f'missing plugin file: {path}')
+        original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+        changed[relative] = write_if_changed(path, transform(original))
+    return changed
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    changed = apply(args.plugin_root.resolve())
+    print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(args.plugin_root.resolve()), 'changed': changed}, ensure_ascii=False))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def replace_required(text: str, old: str, new: str, label: str) -> str:
+    if new in text:
+        return text
+    if old not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError(f'{label} marker not found')
+    return text.replace(old, new, 1)
+
+
+def patch_send_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '}): Promise<{ messageId: string }> {\n  const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
+        '}): Promise<{ messageId: string; createTimeMs: number }> {\n  const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
+        'TS send return type',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  const clientId = generateClientId();\n  const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        '  const clientId = generateClientId();\n  const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n  const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        'TS create time',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  });\n  try {\n    await sendMessageApi({',
+        '  });\n  if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0]) throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n  req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n  try {\n    await sendMessageApi({',
+        'TS request timestamp',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        '  return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        'TS send result',
+    )
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_send_js(text: str) -> str:
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    const clientId = generateClientId();\n    const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        '    const clientId = generateClientId();\n    const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n    const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        'JS create time',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    });\n    try {\n        await sendMessageApi({',
+        '    });\n    if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0])\n        throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n    req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n    try {\n        await sendMessageApi({',
+        'JS request timestamp',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        '    return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        'JS send result',
+    )
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_process_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                token: deps.token,
+                contextToken,
+                runId,
+              }});'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                token: deps.token,
+                contextToken,
+                runId,
+              }});
+              rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS fallback text send')
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+              baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+              token: deps.token,
+              contextToken,
+              runId,
+            }});'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+              baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+              token: deps.token,
+              contextToken,
+              runId,
+            }});
+            rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    return replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS normal text send')
+
+
+def patch_process_js(text: str) -> str:
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                                token: deps.token,
+                                contextToken,
+                                runId,
+                            } });'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                                token: deps.token,
+                                contextToken,
+                                runId,
+                            } });
+                        rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS fallback text send')
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                            baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                            token: deps.token,
+                            contextToken,
+                            runId,
+                        } });'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                            baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                            token: deps.token,
+                            contextToken,
+                            runId,
+                        } });
+                    rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    return replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS normal text send')
+
+
+def apply(root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    transforms = {
+        'src/messaging/send.ts': patch_send_ts,
+        'dist/src/messaging/send.js': patch_send_js,
+        'src/messaging/process-message.ts': patch_process_ts,
+        'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': patch_process_js,
+    }
+    changed = {}
+    for relative, transform in transforms.items():
+        path = root / relative
+        original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+        updated = transform(original)
+        changed[relative] = updated != original
+        if updated != original:
+            path.write_text(updated, encoding='utf-8')
+    return changed
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    root = args.plugin_root.resolve()
+    print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(root), 'changed': apply(root)}, ensure_ascii=False))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
+# CMD-20260711-v1r4c6-integrate-deploy-verify
+
+## Goal
+
+Perform the actual controlled integration, deployment, and verification for V1R4C6.
+
+V1R4C6 includes:
+
+1. Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS read-only rollout.
+2. SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding.
+3. Agent Platform Integration.
+
+Stop before V1R4C6 Git tag creation and baseline promotion. Those operations require owner confirmation.
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+memory search remains disabled
+no global vector index
+no force-push
+no V1R4C5 tag movement
+no Gitea DB mutation
+no secret plaintext in Git, logs, or reports
+```
+
+If any mandatory security or reliability check fails, stop deployment and report the blocker. Do not bypass the gate.
+
+## Verified Base
+
+Required before starting:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+previous_baseline = V1R4C3
+baseline_git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO = /data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git
+runtime = active
+```
+
+## Phase 0 — Preflight and Backup
+
+```bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT=/data/aios-gitops/workspace
+SOURCE_RELEASE=release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+EXEC_BRANCH=release/v1r4c6-integration-exec-20260711
+
+cd "$ROOT"
+git fetch origin --tags --prune
+
+git status --short
+
+test -f baseline/current.json
+python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+p = Path('baseline/current.json')
+d = json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
+assert d['current_baseline'] == 'V1R4C5', d
+assert d['previous_baseline'] == 'V1R4C3', d
+assert d['git'] == 'a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704', d
+assert d.get('constraints', {}).get('memory_search_enabled') is False, d
+print('baseline preflight: PASS')
+PY
+
+test -d /data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git
+
+BACKUP=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/backups/v1r4c6-predeploy-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)
+mkdir -p "$BACKUP"
+cp -a baseline/current.json "$BACKUP/current.json"
+cp -a versions/V1R4C5.json "$BACKUP/V1R4C5.json"
+
+if git show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/heads/$EXEC_BRANCH"; then
+  git checkout "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+  git pull --ff-only origin "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+else
+  git checkout -b "$EXEC_BRANCH" "origin/$SOURCE_RELEASE"
+  git push -u origin "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+fi
+```
+
+Never use `git push --force` or `git tag -f`.
+
+## Phase 1 — Merge Group A: Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+Merge in this order:
+
+```bash
+git merge --no-ff origin/feature/v1r4c4-sr04-admin-workbench-visibility-20260711 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): admin workbench visibility preparation'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/feature/v1r4c4-sr04-portal-aios-visibility-20260710 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): portal AIOS visibility preparation'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/user-portal-me-route-diagnostics-20260709 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): portal AIOS routes and RBAC manifest'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/user-portal-rbac-ops-dashboard \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): portal RBAC operations dashboard'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/agent-observability-webui \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): agent observability web UI'
+```
+
+Before merging `patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706`, compare overlap:
+
+```bash
+git diff --stat HEAD..origin/patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706
+```
+
+Merge only if it adds required functionality not already present. Otherwise record it as superseded.
+
+### Conflict Policy
+
+Do not auto-resolve conflicts in:
+
+```text
+auth/RBAC configuration
+user/session/tenant isolation
+search provider configuration
+safe-mode/controller dispatch
+systemd units
+baseline/current.json
+versions/*.json
+```
+
+For those files, stop and report conflict paths.
+
+### Group A Tests
+
+Run at minimum:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m pytest -q \
+  tests/test_portal_aios_frontend_contract.py \
+  tests/test_portal_aios_module_registry.py \
+  tests/test_portal_aios_navigation.py \
+  tests/test_portal_integration_health.py \
+  tests/test_portal_system_health_adapter.py
+```
+
+Run any additional portal/RBAC/dashboard tests discovered under `tests/`.
+
+## Phase 2 — Merge Group B: SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+```bash
+git merge --no-ff origin/feature/v1r4c4-sr02-search-gateway-resilience-20260710 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): search gateway resilience metadata'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/search-gateway-governed-general-capability \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): governed search gateway provider binding'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/gitops-change-archive-audit \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): search and GitOps audit evidence'
+```
+
+### Group B Security Review
+
+Verify before deployment:
+
+```text
+scope filtering occurs before ranking
+provenance is attached to accepted results
+out-of-scope records never reach ranking or summarization
+fallback is text-only, no-memory, or scoped-only
+global memory/vector index is disabled
+memory search remains disabled
+provider credentials are secret references only
+```
+
+Reject any code path that silently broadens search scope.
+
+### Group B Tests
+
+Discover and run all search/provider/isolation tests:
+
+```bash
+find tests -maxdepth 2 -type f \
+  \( -iname '*search*' -o -iname '*provider*' -o -iname '*scope*' -o -iname '*isolation*' \) \
+  -print
+```
+
+Then run the discovered files with `python3 -m pytest -q`.
+
+Also run:
+
+```bash
+bash ops/ci/run-user-data-isolation-acceptance.sh
+```
+
+If that script is not present after merge, stop: the data-isolation gate is mandatory.
+
+## Phase 3 — Merge Group C: Agent Platform
+
+```bash
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/agent-event-bus-unified \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): unified scoped agent event bus'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/agent-gpt-message-plane \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): scoped agent GPT message plane'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/autonomous-controller-dispatch-20260709 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): autonomous controller dispatch with gates'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/self-evolution-agent-orchestration-policy \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): self-evolution orchestration policy'
+```
+
+Review `patch/aios-autonomous-orchestrator-architecture-review-v1`:
+
+- merge if it contains a current architecture record not already present;
+- otherwise mark it superseded in the release report.
+
+### Group C Security Review
+
+Verify:
+
+```text
+event envelope includes tenant/group, user, project, session, agent, source and provenance
+message plane rejects cross-scope delivery
+denied messages never forward body/content
+controller dispatch checks autonomous safe mode before mutation
+consequential actions remain owner-gated
+duplicate dispatch is idempotent or rejected
+queue/retry behavior is bounded and observable
+```
+
+### Group C Tests
+
+Discover and run agent/event/message/dispatch/controller tests:
+
+```bash
+find tests -maxdepth 2 -type f \
+  \( -iname '*agent*' -o -iname '*event*' -o -iname '*message*' -o -iname '*dispatch*' -o -iname '*autonomous_controller*' \) \
+  -print
+```
+
+Run all discovered files with `python3 -m pytest -q`.
+
+Re-run the SR-02 watcher/controller suite and require all tests to pass.
+
+## Phase 4 — Full Test and Static Validation
+
+```bash
+python3 -m compileall -q active-runtime scripts tests
+python3 -m pytest -q
+```
+
+If the full suite has unrelated historical failures, report them separately, but all V1R4C6-touched component tests must pass.
+
+Validate JSON/YAML configuration without printing secrets.
+
+Verify:
+
+```bash
+git diff --check
+git status --short
+```
+
+Commit integration result normally:
+
+```bash
+git add -A
+git commit -m 'release: integrate V1R4C6 admin search and agent platform'
+git push origin "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+```
+
+If no uncommitted changes remain because merge commits already captured everything, just push normally.
+
+## Phase 5 — Deploy to Staging/Production Runtime
+
+Use the existing deployment mechanism for this repository. Do not invent a new deployment path.
+
+Before restart/reload, identify changed services and frontend bundles from the merged diff.
+
+At minimum:
+
+1. Deploy backend modules under `active-runtime/app/`.
+2. Deploy portal frontend/navigation/proxy changes.
+3. Deploy Search Gateway provider binding using secret references.
+4. Deploy Agent Platform event/message/dispatch changes.
+5. Preserve existing Gitea sentinel and user-data isolation systemd controls.
+6. Keep `AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false`.
+
+Restart only affected services. Do not restart Gitea unless it independently fails health checks.
+
+After deployment, verify affected services are active and no restart loop exists.
+
+## Phase 6 — Actual Deployment Verification
+
+### Global
+
+```bash
+curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:18890/api/base | python3 -m json.tool
+curl -fsS https://cnnetmkt.top/api/base | python3 -m json.tool
+```
+
+Before V1R4C6 promotion both must still report V1R4C5.
+
+Verify Gitea sentinel remains healthy and memory search remains disabled.
+
+### Gate A — Portal/Admin Workbench
+
+Use an existing authenticated test mechanism or secret-backed admin session. Do not log cookies/tokens.
+
+Verify:
+
+```text
+/portal/me/aios/manifest
+/portal/me/aios/dashboard
+/portal/me/aios/health
+```
+
+For `user`, `group_admin/admin`, and `owner`, record only module names/status, not personal data.
+
+Required admin-visible functions:
+
+```text
+task progress
+process/flow diagram entry
+system health
+agent observability
+```
+
+Verify forbidden owner modules are hidden from non-owner admins.
+
+### Gate B — Search Gateway
+
+Execute scoped test queries using non-sensitive fixtures.
+
+Verify:
+
+```text
+real provider selected
+scope applied before ranking
+provenance returned
+out-of-scope fixture denied
+safe fallback works
+memory search remains disabled
+```
+
+### Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+Using synthetic non-sensitive events/messages:
+
+```text
+same-scope delivery succeeds
+cross-user/project/session delivery is denied
+denied payload body is not forwarded
+safe-mode blocks controller mutation
+owner-gated action remains pending approval
+duplicate dispatch is idempotent/rejected
+```
+
+## Phase 7 — Release Evidence
+
+Update:
+
+```text
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-acceptance-checklist.md
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-acceptance-evidence.md
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-release-gate-status.md
+versions/V1R4C6.json
+```
+
+Set each gate to PASS/FAIL with concrete test commands and results.
+
+Required final state before requesting owner confirmation:
+
+```text
+Gate A = PASS
+Gate B = PASS
+Gate C = PASS
+full touched-component tests = PASS
+runtime write acceptance = PASS
+Gitea sentinel = healthy
+memory search = disabled
+force-push used = no
+V1R4C6 tag = absent
+active baseline = V1R4C5
+```
+
+Commit and push evidence normally to `$EXEC_BRANCH`.
+
+## Stop Point — Owner Confirmation Required
+
+Do not create `V1R4C6` tag.
+Do not promote baseline to V1R4C6.
+Do not enable memory search.
+
+When all gates pass, notify the owner through the configured notification mechanism, preferably WeChat if configured. The notification must contain no secrets and must request confirmation for:
+
+```text
+Create V1R4C6 Git tag
+Promote active baseline from V1R4C5 to V1R4C6
+```
+
+Required report fields:
+
+```text
+Status
+Integration branch and HEAD
+Merged branches
+Skipped/superseded branches
+Gate A result
+Gate B result
+Gate C result
+Test totals
+Deployment services/build versions
+Portal/admin verification result
+Search provider verification result
+Agent platform verification result
+Gitea sentinel status
+Memory search status
+Active baseline
+V1R4C6 tag status
+Rollback readiness
+Owner confirmation required
+```
+
+If WeChat notification is not configured, write the exact notification message to:
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/runtime/state/V1R4C6-owner-confirmation-message.txt
+```
+
+and report that path.
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+# CMD-20260711-v1r4c6-run-to-owner-gate-wechat
+
+## Execution Mode
+
+Execute immediately using the existing V1R4C6 integration command:
+
+```text
+ops/openclaw/CMD-20260711-v1r4c6-integrate-deploy-verify.md
+```
+
+Continue through actual merge, tests, deployment, and production verification.
+
+Stop only at the owner gate for:
+
+```text
+V1R4C6 Git tag creation
+V1R4C6 baseline promotion
+```
+
+Do not ask the owner to perform routine engineering or deployment work.
+
+## Verified Starting State
+
+Required before starting:
+
+```text
+runtime = active
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+previous_baseline = V1R4C3
+baseline_git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO = /data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git
+memory_search_enabled = false
+force_push_allowed = false
+```
+
+If any starting condition differs, stop and send a WeChat blocker notification.
+
+## Required Work
+
+Complete all phases in the referenced command:
+
+1. Create/update the normal non-force-pushed integration execution branch.
+2. Merge and validate Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS.
+3. Merge and validate SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding.
+4. Merge and validate Agent Platform Integration.
+5. Run component and full touched-scope test suites.
+6. Deploy using the repository's existing deployment mechanism.
+7. Verify production routes, RBAC, scope isolation, provenance, safe mode, and owner gates.
+8. Update V1R4C6 release evidence and version metadata.
+9. Push all normal commits to origin.
+10. Keep V1R4C6 tag absent and baseline at V1R4C5 until owner approval.
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+memory search remains disabled
+no global memory/vector index
+no force-push
+no tag rewrite
+no V1R4C5 tag movement
+no Gitea DB mutation
+no plaintext secrets in Git, logs, reports, or WeChat
+```
+
+Never bypass a failed security, isolation, RBAC, safe-mode, or owner gate.
+
+## WeChat Progress Notifications
+
+Use the configured OpenClaw WeChat notification channel.
+
+Send concise progress notifications at these milestones:
+
+### Notification 1 — Integration Started
+
+```text
+V1R4C6 集成已启动。
+范围：管理员工作台、SR-03 Search Gateway、Agent Platform。
+当前基线：V1R4C5。
+memory search 保持关闭。
+下一步：完成合并、测试和部署验证。
+```
+
+### Notification 2 — Gate A Complete
+
+Include only:
+
+```text
+Gate A result: PASS/FAIL
+Admin task progress visibility: PASS/FAIL
+Flow diagram visibility: PASS/FAIL
+RBAC/isolation: PASS/FAIL
+Blockers, if any
+```
+
+Do not include user records, tokens, cookies, or sensitive task content.
+
+### Notification 3 — Gate B Complete
+
+Include only:
+
+```text
+Gate B result: PASS/FAIL
+Real provider binding: PASS/FAIL
+Scope-before-ranking: PASS/FAIL
+Provenance: PASS/FAIL
+Safe fallback: PASS/FAIL
+Memory search: disabled
+Blockers, if any
+```
+
+### Notification 4 — Gate C Complete
+
+Include only:
+
+```text
+Gate C result: PASS/FAIL
+Event scope: PASS/FAIL
+Message plane scope: PASS/FAIL
+Safe-mode dispatch block: PASS/FAIL
+Owner gate: PASS/FAIL
+Blockers, if any
+```
+
+## Final WeChat Owner Authorization Request
+
+Send only after all mandatory gates and deployment verification pass.
+
+Use this message:
+
+```text
+V1R4C6 已完成实际合并、测试、部署和生产验证，现等待最终发布授权。
+
+版本范围：
+1. 管理员工作台 / Portal AIOS 上线
+2. SR-03 Search Gateway Real Provider Binding
+3. Agent Platform Integration
+
+验收结果：
+- Gate A（管理员工作台 / RBAC / 隔离）：PASS
+- Gate B（Provider / scope / provenance / fallback）：PASS
+- Gate C（Event Bus / Message Plane / Dispatch / Owner Gate）：PASS
+- Runtime 写链路：PASS
+- Gitea consistency sentinel：healthy
+- memory search：仍为 disabled
+- force-push：未使用
+- 当前 active baseline：V1R4C5
+- V1R4C6 tag：尚未创建
+
+请明确回复以下其中一项：
+A. 批准创建 V1R4C6 Git tag，并将 active baseline 从 V1R4C5 晋升至 V1R4C6。
+B. 暂不批准，保持 V1R4C5，并说明需要处理的问题。
+```
+
+## Authorization Rules
+
+Do not treat reactions, emojis, acknowledgements, or ambiguous replies as approval.
+
+Valid approval must explicitly authorize both:
+
+```text
+create V1R4C6 Git tag
+promote baseline V1R4C5 -> V1R4C6
+```
+
+If the owner approves only one operation, execute only the approved operation and stop before the other.
+
+Before executing a consequential operation, record authorization in:
+
+```text
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-owner-approval.md
+```
+
+Record only:
+
+```text
+approved operation(s)
+approved_at
+approval channel = wechat
+message/conversation identifier if available
+owner identity reference without copying personal message content
+memory search remains disabled
+```
+
+Do not store access tokens, cookies, phone numbers, or unrelated chat content.
+
+## WeChat Failure Handling
+
+If the configured WeChat channel is unavailable:
+
+1. Do not claim that a message was sent.
+2. Stop before tag/promotion.
+3. Write the exact final authorization request to:
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/runtime/state/V1R4C6-owner-confirmation-message.txt
+```
+
+4. Write notification failure details to:
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/runtime/state/V1R4C6-wechat-notification-failure.json
+```
+
+5. Report the failure through the active GitOps task/status channel.
+
+## Final Stop Condition
+
+Before explicit owner authorization, final state must remain:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+V1R4C6 tag = absent
+memory search = disabled
+```
+
+After owner authorization, follow the existing tag confirmation and baseline promotion controls. Do not bypass consequential-operation confirmation layers.
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "deploy/v1r4c6-production-20260711",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-11T13:10:51Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "reconcile/v1r4c5-release-to-main-20260711",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-10T23:56:41Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "id": "patch-1783707996243-33717dfe",
+  "patch_name": "v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711",
+  "branch": "release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711",
+  "risk": "high",
+  "description": "V1R4C6 bundled integration release: Admin Workbench visibility, SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding, and Agent Platform Integration. Memory search remains disabled and user data isolation gates remain mandatory.",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-10T18:26:36Z"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Hardened WeChat outbound backend for AIOS.
+
+Only the dedicated UCC adapter is a supported send backend.  OpenClaw channel
+discovery is retained for diagnostics, but generic OpenClaw chat or agent
+delivery is never promoted to WeChat delivery.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import selectors
+import signal
+import subprocess
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
+
+
+OPENCLAW_BIN = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", "openclaw")
+WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID", "")
+WECHAT_CHANNEL = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_CHANNEL", "")
+SEND_BACKEND = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_SEND_BACKEND", "")
+UCC_ADAPTER_URL = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18800")
+UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_TOKEN") or os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_WECHAT_QR_ADAPTER_TOKEN", ""
+)
+UCC_SEND_PATH = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send")
+_allowed_origins = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "").strip()
+UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = tuple(
+    origin.strip() for origin in _allowed_origins.split(",") if origin.strip()
+) or (
+    "http://127.0.0.1:18800",
+    "http://[::1]:18800",
+)
+
+MAX_TARGET_BYTES = 512
+MAX_CONTENT_BYTES = 32 * 1024
+MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES = 512
+MAX_METADATA_BYTES = 8 * 1024
+MAX_METADATA_DEPTH = 32
+MAX_METADATA_NODES = 1024
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES = 256
+_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
+_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
+_LEGACY_SEND_PATH = "/internal/channels/wechat/send"
+_SAFE_PATH = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()*+,;=:@%/-]+$")
+_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS = 4
+_OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE = 124
+_OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE = 125
+_OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE = 126
+
+
+def _bounded_timeout(value: str) -> int:
+    try:
+        parsed = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+    return min(max(parsed, 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+
+
+REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = _bounded_timeout(os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "10"))
+
+
+class BackendResult:
+    def __init__(self, ok: bool, backend: str, status: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        self.ok = ok
+        self.backend = backend
+        self.status = status
+        self.data = data
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"ok": self.ok, "backend": self.backend, "status": self.status, **self.data}
+
+
+class _BackendProtocolError(Exception):
+    """Internal marker whose details must never cross the module boundary."""
+
+
+def _openclaw_base_args() -> List[str]:
+    """Return the OpenClaw 2026.6.11-compatible command prefix.
+
+    Gateway/auth global flags are not supported by the installed CLI and would
+    also expose credentials through the process argument vector.
+    """
+
+    return [OPENCLAW_BIN]
+
+
+def _terminate_process_tree(process: Any) -> None:
+    if os.name == "posix":
+        try:
+            os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        try:
+            process.wait(timeout=0.5)
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+            pass
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+        try:
+            os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        try:
+            process.wait(timeout=0.5)
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+            pass
+        return
+    if process.poll() is not None:
+        return
+    try:
+        process.terminate()
+        process.wait(timeout=1)
+        return
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        pass
+    try:
+        process.kill()
+        process.wait(timeout=1)
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        pass
+
+
+def _run_openclaw(
+    args: List[str], timeout: int = 15
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    bounded_timeout = min(max(int(timeout), 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+    popen_options: Dict[str, Any] = {
+        "stdout": subprocess.PIPE,
+        "stderr": subprocess.PIPE,
+    }
+    if os.name == "posix":
+        popen_options["start_new_session"] = True
+    elif hasattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP"):
+        popen_options["creationflags"] = subprocess.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP
+    try:
+        process = subprocess.Popen(args, **popen_options)
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
+
+    selector = selectors.DefaultSelector()
+    streams = {"stdout": process.stdout, "stderr": process.stderr}
+    buffers = {"stdout": bytearray(), "stderr": bytearray()}
+    try:
+        for name, stream in streams.items():
+            if stream is not None:
+                selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name)
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        selector.close()
+        _terminate_process_tree(process)
+        for stream in streams.values():
+            if stream is not None:
+                stream.close()
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
+
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + bounded_timeout
+    total_bytes = 0
+    return_code: Optional[int] = None
+    try:
+        while selector.get_map():
+            remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if remaining <= 0:
+                return_code = _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE
+                break
+            events = selector.select(min(remaining, 0.1))
+            for key, _mask in events:
+                allowance = MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES - total_bytes
+                try:
+                    chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), min(8192, allowance + 1))
+                except OSError:
+                    return_code = _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE
+                    break
+                if not chunk:
+                    selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
+                    key.fileobj.close()
+                    continue
+                if len(chunk) > allowance:
+                    return_code = _OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE
+                    break
+                buffers[key.data].extend(chunk)
+                total_bytes += len(chunk)
+            if return_code is not None:
+                break
+    finally:
+        selector.close()
+
+    if return_code is not None:
+        _terminate_process_tree(process)
+        for stream in streams.values():
+            if stream is not None and not stream.closed:
+                stream.close()
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, return_code, "", "")
+    try:
+        completed_return_code = process.wait(timeout=1)
+    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+        _terminate_process_tree(process)
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
+    stdout = buffers["stdout"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    stderr = buffers["stderr"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, completed_return_code, stdout, stderr)
+
+
+def _json_dict(text: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(text or "{}")
+    except (RecursionError, TypeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return {}
+    return value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
+
+
+def discover_openclaw_wechat_channel() -> Optional[str]:
+    """Discover an explicitly typed WeChat/Weixin channel for diagnostics."""
+
+    if WECHAT_CHANNEL:
+        return WECHAT_CHANNEL
+    try:
+        proc = _run_openclaw(_openclaw_base_args() + ["channels", "list", "--json"], timeout=15)
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    if proc.returncode != 0:
+        return None
+    data = _json_dict(proc.stdout[:MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES])
+    candidates: List[str] = []
+
+    def walk(value: Any) -> None:
+        if isinstance(value, dict):
+            name = value.get("name") or value.get("channel") or value.get("id")
+            kind = value.get("type") or value.get("kind")
+            if isinstance(name, str) and isinstance(kind, str):
+                label = f"{name} {kind}".lower()
+                if "wechat" in label or "weixin" in label:
+                    candidates.append(name)
+            for child in value.values():
+                walk(child)
+        elif isinstance(value, list):
+            for child in value:
+                walk(child)
+
+    walk(data)
+    return candidates[0] if candidates else None
+
+
+def _auth_headers() -> Dict[str, str]:
+    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}
+    if UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN:
+        headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN
+    return headers
+
+
+def _safe_path(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        return None
+    path = value if value.startswith("/") else "/" + value
+    try:
+        encoded_path = path.encode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeEncodeError:
+        return None
+    if len(encoded_path) > MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES:
+        return None
+    if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(path):
+        return None
+    decoded = path
+    for _ in range(_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS):
+        try:
+            next_decoded = urllib.parse.unquote_to_bytes(decoded).decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError:
+            return None
+        if next_decoded == decoded:
+            break
+        decoded = next_decoded
+    if "%" in decoded or "\\" in decoded or "\x00" in decoded:
+        return None
+    if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(decoded):
+        return None
+    if any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in decoded.split("/")):
+        return None
+    return path
+
+
+def _unique_paths(paths: List[str]) -> List[str]:
+    out: List[str] = []
+    for candidate in paths:
+        path = _safe_path(candidate)
+        if path and path not in out:
+            out.append(path)
+        if len(out) == 2:
+            break
+    return out
+
+
+def _ucc_send_paths() -> List[str]:
+    canonical = _safe_path(UCC_SEND_PATH) or "/api/internal/wechat/send"
+    return _unique_paths([canonical, _LEGACY_SEND_PATH])
+
+
+def _canonical_origin(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 2048:
+        return None
+    if "\\" in value or any(ord(character) < 32 for character in value):
+        return None
+    try:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(value)
+        port = parsed.port
+    except (UnicodeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
+    if scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:
+        return None
+    if parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in {"", "/"}:
+        return None
+    try:
+        host = parsed.hostname.rstrip(".").encode("idna").decode("ascii").lower()
+    except UnicodeError:
+        return None
+    if not host:
+        return None
+    if port is None:
+        port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
+    rendered_host = f"[{host}]" if ":" in host else host
+    return f"{scheme}://{rendered_host}:{port}"
+
+
+def _adapter_base_url() -> Optional[str]:
+    origin = _canonical_origin(UCC_ADAPTER_URL)
+    allowed = {
+        canonical
+        for canonical in (_canonical_origin(value) for value in UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS)
+        if canonical
+    }
+    return origin if origin and origin in allowed else None
+
+
+class _NoRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(
+        self,
+        req: Any,
+        fp: Any,
+        code: int,
+        msg: str,
+        headers: Any,
+        newurl: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        del req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl
+        return None
+
+
+def _open_no_redirect(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int) -> Any:
+    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirectHandler())
+    return opener.open(request, timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def ucc_adapter_alive() -> bool:
+    base_url = _adapter_base_url()
+    if not base_url:
+        return False
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        base_url + "/health", headers=_auth_headers(), method="GET"
+    )
+    try:
+        with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=min(5, REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)) as response:
+            return 200 <= int(response.status) < 300
+    except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError):
+        return False
+
+
+def select_backend() -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    explicit = SEND_BACKEND.strip().lower()
+    if explicit:
+        if explicit == "ucc-adapter":
+            return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "explicit"}
+        return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "unsupported_backend"}
+    if ucc_adapter_alive():
+        return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "ucc_adapter_alive"}
+    return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
+
+
+def _post_ucc(path: str, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> Tuple[int, Dict[str, Any]]:
+    base_url = _adapter_base_url()
+    safe_path = _safe_path(path)
+    if not base_url or not safe_path:
+        raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid adapter endpoint")
+    try:
+        body = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid request payload") from exc
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        base_url + safe_path,
+        data=body,
+        headers=_auth_headers(),
+        method="POST",
+    )
+    with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as response:
+        raw = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
+        if len(raw) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+            raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response too large")
+        try:
+            text = raw.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response encoding invalid") from exc
+        data = _json_dict(text)
+        if not data:
+            raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response invalid")
+        return int(response.status), data
+
+
+def _ucc_response_sent(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == "sent"
+
+
+def _ucc_result_is_ok(data: Dict[str, Any], dry_run: bool = False) -> bool:
+    expected_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
+    return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == expected_status
+
+
+def _utf8_size(value: str) -> Optional[int]:
+    try:
+        return len(value.encode("utf-8"))
+    except UnicodeEncodeError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _valid_identifier(value: Any, required: bool = False) -> bool:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        return False
+    if required and not value.strip():
+        return False
+    if not value:
+        return not required
+    if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
+        return False
+    size = _utf8_size(value)
+    return size is not None and size <= MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES and not any(
+        ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value
+    )
+
+
+def _validate_metadata(metadata: Any) -> Optional[str]:
+    if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
+        return "invalid_input"
+    nodes = 0
+    stack: List[Tuple[Any, int]] = [(metadata, 0)]
+    while stack:
+        value, depth = stack.pop()
+        nodes += 1
+        if depth > MAX_METADATA_DEPTH or nodes > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
+            return "input_too_large"
+        if isinstance(value, dict):
+            if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
+                return "input_too_large"
+            for key, child in value.items():
+                if (
+                    not isinstance(key, str)
+                    or len(key) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES
+                    or _utf8_size(key) is None
+                ):
+                    return "invalid_input"
+                stack.append((child, depth + 1))
+        elif isinstance(value, list):
+            if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
+                return "input_too_large"
+            stack.extend((child, depth + 1) for child in value)
+        elif isinstance(value, str):
+            if len(value) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES:
+                return "input_too_large"
+            if _utf8_size(value) is None:
+                return "invalid_input"
+        elif value is not None and not isinstance(value, (bool, int, float)):
+            return "invalid_input"
+    try:
+        encoded = json.dumps(
+            metadata,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            allow_nan=False,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+    except (RecursionError, TypeError, UnicodeEncodeError, ValueError):
+        return "invalid_input"
+    return "input_too_large" if len(encoded) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES else None
+
+
+def _validate_payload(
+    target: Any,
+    content: Any,
+    account_id: Any,
+    message_id: Any,
+    metadata: Any,
+    dry_run: Any,
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    if not isinstance(target, str) or not isinstance(content, str):
+        return "invalid_input"
+    if not target.strip() or not content.strip() or not isinstance(dry_run, bool):
+        return "invalid_input"
+    if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in target):
+        return "invalid_input"
+    if "\x00" in content or not _valid_identifier(account_id) or not _valid_identifier(message_id):
+        return "invalid_input"
+    if len(target) > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or len(content) > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
+        return "input_too_large"
+    target_size = _utf8_size(target)
+    content_size = _utf8_size(content)
+    if target_size is None or content_size is None:
+        return "invalid_input"
+    if target_size > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or content_size > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
+        return "input_too_large"
+    return _validate_metadata(metadata)
+
+
+def _safe_provider_message_id(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+        return None
+    if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
+        return None
+    size = _utf8_size(value)
+    if size is None or size > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
+        return None
+    if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
+        return None
+    return value
+
+
+def send_ucc_adapter(
+    target: str,
+    content: str,
+    account_id: str = "",
+    message_id: str = "",
+    metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    dry_run: bool = False,
+) -> BackendResult:
+    effective_account = account_id or WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID
+    effective_metadata: Any = {} if metadata is None else metadata
+    error_code = _validate_payload(
+        target,
+        content,
+        effective_account,
+        message_id,
+        effective_metadata,
+        dry_run,
+    )
+    if error_code:
+        return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", {"code": error_code})
+
+    payload = {
+        "target": target,
+        "content": content,
+        "account_id": effective_account,
+        "message_id": message_id,
+        "metadata": effective_metadata,
+        "dry_run": dry_run,
+    }
+    last_endpoint: Optional[str] = None
+    for path in _ucc_send_paths():
+        last_endpoint = path
+        try:
+            http_status, data = _post_ucc(path, payload)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            if exc.code in {404, 405}:
+                continue
+            return BackendResult(
+                False,
+                "ucc-adapter",
+                "failed",
+                {"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": int(exc.code), "endpoint": path},
+            )
+        except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError, _BackendProtocolError):
+            return BackendResult(
+                False,
+                "ucc-adapter",
+                "failed",
+                {"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            # Fail closed without returning exception text, type, or chained cause.
+            return BackendResult(
+                False,
+                "ucc-adapter",
+                "failed",
+                {"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
+            )
+
+        if not (200 <= http_status < 300):
+            return BackendResult(
+                False,
+                "ucc-adapter",
+                "failed",
+                {"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
+            )
+        if not _ucc_result_is_ok(data, dry_run):
+            return BackendResult(
+                False,
+                "ucc-adapter",
+                "failed",
+                {"code": "ucc_adapter_rejected", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
+            )
+        confirmed_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
+        result_data: Dict[str, Any] = {
+            "code": confirmed_status,
+            "http_status": http_status,
+            "endpoint": path,
+        }
+        provider_message_id = _safe_provider_message_id(data.get("provider_message_id"))
+        if provider_message_id:
+            result_data["provider_message_id"] = provider_message_id
+        return BackendResult(True, "ucc-adapter", confirmed_status, result_data)
+
+    data: Dict[str, Any] = {"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
+    if last_endpoint:
+        data["endpoint"] = last_endpoint
+    return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", data)
+
+
+def send_openclaw_channel(
+    target: str,
+    content: str,
+    account_id: str = "",
+    message_id: str = "",
+    metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    dry_run: bool = False,
+) -> BackendResult:
+    del target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
+    return BackendResult(
+        False,
+        "openclaw-channel",
+        "failed",
+        {"code": "unsupported_backend"},
+    )
+
+
+def send_message(
+    target: str,
+    content: str,
+    account_id: str = "",
+    message_id: str = "",
+    metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    dry_run: bool = False,
+) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    selected = select_backend()
+    if selected.get("backend") == "ucc-adapter":
+        return send_ucc_adapter(
+            target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
+        ).to_dict()
+    code = "unsupported_backend" if selected.get("reason") == "unsupported_backend" else "wechat_outbound_backend_unavailable"
+    return BackendResult(False, "unavailable", "failed", {"code": code}).to_dict()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    print(json.dumps(select_backend(), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")))
@@ -1,11 +1,20 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 import importlib.util
+import io
+import os
+import signal
+import subprocess
 import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
 from pathlib import Path
 from types import SimpleNamespace
 from unittest import TestCase
-from unittest.mock import patch
+from unittest.mock import Mock, call, patch


 BACKEND_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "wechat_send_backend.py"
@@ -80,6 +89,450 @@ class WechatSendBackendTests(TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(args[1]["content"], "hello")
        self.assertFalse(args[1]["dry_run"])

+    def test_ucc_auth_is_authorization_header_not_argv_or_output(self):
+        secret = "ucc-super-secret-token"
+
+        class Response:
+            status = 200
+
+            def __enter__(self):
+                return self
+
+            def __exit__(self, *_args):
+                return False
+
+            def read(self, _limit=-1):
+                return b'{"ok":true,"status":"sent"}'
+
+        urlopen = Mock(return_value=Response())
+        output = io.StringIO()
+        with (
+            patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", secret),
+            patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", urlopen),
+            redirect_stdout(output),
+            redirect_stderr(output),
+        ):
+            status, payload = self.backend._post_ucc(
+                "/api/internal/wechat/send", {"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello"}
+            )
+
+        request = urlopen.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), f"Bearer {secret}")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertEqual(payload, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, " ".join(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, output.getvalue())
+        self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
+
+    def test_ucc_paths_are_canonical_first_unique_and_bounded(self):
+        with patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"):
+            paths = self.backend._ucc_send_paths()
+
+        self.assertEqual(paths[0], "/api/internal/wechat/send")
+        self.assertLessEqual(len(paths), 2)
+        self.assertEqual(len(paths), len(set(paths)))
+        self.assertTrue(all(path.startswith("/") for path in paths))
+
+    def test_ucc_accepts_only_explicit_true_and_sent_when_not_dry_run(self):
+        self.assertTrue(self.backend._ucc_response_sent({"ok": True, "status": "sent"}))
+        for response in (
+            {"ok": 1, "status": "sent"},
+            {"ok": True, "status": "accepted"},
+            {"ok": False, "status": "sent"},
+            {"status": "sent"},
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(response=response):
+                self.assertFalse(self.backend._ucc_response_sent(response))
+
+    def test_ambiguous_canonical_failures_never_fallback(self):
+        secret = "raw-upstream-secret"
+        failures = (
+            TimeoutError(secret),
+            ConnectionError(secret),
+            self.backend._BackendProtocolError(secret),
+            RuntimeError(secret),
+        )
+        for failure in failures:
+            with self.subTest(failure=type(failure).__name__):
+                with (
+                    patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
+                    patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=failure) as post,
+                ):
+                    result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                        target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
+                    ).to_dict()
+
+                self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
+                self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_unavailable")
+                self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 1)
+                self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
+
+    def test_only_explicit_http_404_or_405_uses_legacy_fallback(self):
+        for http_status in (404, 405):
+            with self.subTest(http_status=http_status):
+                missing = urllib.error.HTTPError(
+                    "http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send",
+                    http_status,
+                    "not found",
+                    {},
+                    None,
+                )
+                with (
+                    patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
+                    patch.object(
+                        self.backend,
+                        "_post_ucc",
+                        side_effect=[missing, (200, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})],
+                    ) as post,
+                ):
+                    result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                        target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
+                    ).to_dict()
+
+                self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
+                self.assertEqual(result["endpoint"], "/internal/channels/wechat/send")
+                self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 2)
+
+    def test_non_not_found_http_error_never_falls_back(self):
+        denied = urllib.error.HTTPError(
+            "http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send", 401, "denied", {}, None
+        )
+        with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=denied) as post:
+            result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="chat-001", content="hello").to_dict()
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
+        post.assert_called_once()
+
+    def test_ucc_rejection_does_not_expose_raw_error_or_secret(self):
+        secret = "provider-password=secret-value"
+        with patch.object(
+            self.backend,
+            "_post_ucc",
+            return_value=(200, {"ok": False, "status": "failed", "error": secret}),
+        ):
+            result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
+            ).to_dict()
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_rejected")
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
+
+    def test_dry_run_requires_dry_run_status_and_never_reports_sent(self):
+        with patch.object(
+            self.backend,
+            "_post_ucc",
+            return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": "dry_run"}),
+        ):
+            result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=True
+            ).to_dict()
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], "dry_run")
+        self.assertNotEqual(result["status"], "sent")
+
+        for dry_run, upstream_status in ((True, "sent"), (False, "dry_run")):
+            with self.subTest(dry_run=dry_run, upstream_status=upstream_status):
+                with patch.object(
+                    self.backend,
+                    "_post_ucc",
+                    return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": upstream_status}),
+                ):
+                    rejected = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                        target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=dry_run
+                    ).to_dict()
+                self.assertFalse(rejected["ok"])
+                self.assertEqual(rejected["status"], "failed")
+
+    def test_invalid_provider_message_id_never_reverses_confirmed_send(self):
+        invalid_values = (
+            "\ud800",
+            "contains\x00control",
+            "x" * (self.backend.MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES + 1),
+            {"not": "a string"},
+        )
+        for provider_message_id in invalid_values:
+            with self.subTest(value=repr(provider_message_id)[:40]):
+                with patch.object(
+                    self.backend,
+                    "_post_ucc",
+                    return_value=(
+                        200,
+                        {
+                            "ok": True,
+                            "status": "sent",
+                            "provider_message_id": provider_message_id,
+                        },
+                    ),
+                ):
+                    result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                        target="chat-001", content="hello"
+                    ).to_dict()
+
+                self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
+                self.assertEqual(result["status"], "sent")
+                self.assertNotIn("provider_message_id", result)
+
+    def test_openclaw_2026_6_11_commands_have_no_unsupported_global_gateway(self):
+        completed = SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout='{"channels": []}')
+        with (
+            patch.object(self.backend, "OPENCLAW_BIN", "/usr/local/bin/openclaw"),
+            patch.object(self.backend, "_run_openclaw", return_value=completed) as run,
+        ):
+            self.assertIsNone(self.backend.discover_openclaw_wechat_channel())
+
+        command = run.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertEqual(command, ["/usr/local/bin/openclaw", "channels", "list", "--json"])
+        self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(command))
+
+    def test_openclaw_output_overflow_terminates_while_process_is_running(self):
+        writer = (
+            "import os,time;"
+            f"os.write(1,b'x'*{self.backend.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 4096});"
+            "time.sleep(10)"
+        )
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        completed = self.backend._run_openclaw([sys.executable, "-c", writer], timeout=4)
+        elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
+
+        self.assertLess(elapsed, 2.0)
+        self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
+        self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
+
+    def test_openclaw_timeout_returns_failure_and_terminates_promptly(self):
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
+            [sys.executable, "-c", "import time;time.sleep(10)"], timeout=1
+        )
+        elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
+
+        self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
+        self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
+        self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
+        self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
+
+    def test_timeout_kills_inherited_pipe_descendant_after_parent_exits(self):
+        if os.name != "posix" or not Path("/proc").is_dir():
+            self.skipTest("POSIX process-group and procfs contract")
+
+        def process_is_running(pid):
+            try:
+                state = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text(encoding="utf-8").split()[2]
+            except (FileNotFoundError, IndexError, OSError):
+                return False
+            return state not in {"X", "Z"}
+
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+            pid_path = Path(directory) / "descendant.pid"
+            descendant = "import time;time.sleep(30)"
+            launcher = (
+                "import pathlib,subprocess,sys;"
+                f"child=subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,'-c',{descendant!r}]);"
+                f"pathlib.Path({str(pid_path)!r}).write_text(str(child.pid),encoding='utf-8')"
+            )
+            started = time.monotonic()
+            completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
+                [sys.executable, "-c", launcher], timeout=1
+            )
+            elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
+            self.assertTrue(pid_path.is_file())
+            descendant_pid = int(pid_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            try:
+                deadline = time.monotonic() + 2
+                while process_is_running(descendant_pid) and time.monotonic() < deadline:
+                    time.sleep(0.02)
+                self.assertFalse(process_is_running(descendant_pid))
+            finally:
+                if process_is_running(descendant_pid):
+                    os.kill(descendant_pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+
+        self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
+        self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
+
+    def test_process_tree_termination_uses_posix_process_group(self):
+        if os.name != "posix":
+            self.skipTest("POSIX process-group contract")
+
+        class Process:
+            pid = 43210
+
+            def __init__(self):
+                self.wait_count = 0
+
+            def poll(self):
+                return None
+
+            def wait(self, timeout):
+                self.wait_count += 1
+                if self.wait_count == 1:
+                    raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(["openclaw"], timeout)
+                return -signal.SIGKILL
+
+        process = Process()
+        with patch.object(self.backend.os, "killpg") as killpg:
+            self.backend._terminate_process_tree(process)
+
+        self.assertEqual(
+            killpg.call_args_list,
+            [
+                call(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM),
+                call(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL),
+            ],
+        )
+
+    def test_unsupported_and_generic_chat_backends_fail_closed(self):
+        with (
+            patch.object(self.backend, "SEND_BACKEND", "openclaw-chat"),
+            patch.object(self.backend, "ucc_adapter_alive", return_value=False),
+        ):
+            selected = self.backend.select_backend()
+            result = self.backend.send_message(target="chat-001", content="hello")
+
+        self.assertEqual(selected["backend"], "unavailable")
+        self.assertEqual(selected["reason"], "unsupported_backend")
+        self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["code"], "unsupported_backend")
+
+    def test_invalid_or_oversized_input_is_rejected_before_network(self):
+        with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
+            empty = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="", content="hello").to_dict()
+            oversized = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                target="chat-001", content="x" * (self.backend.MAX_CONTENT_BYTES + 1)
+            ).to_dict()
+
+        self.assertEqual(empty["code"], "invalid_input")
+        self.assertEqual(oversized["code"], "input_too_large")
+        post.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_unpaired_surrogate_inputs_fail_closed_before_network(self):
+        cases = (
+            {"target": "\ud800", "content": "hello"},
+            {"target": "chat-001", "content": "\ud800"},
+            {"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "account_id": "\ud800"},
+            {"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "message_id": "\ud800"},
+            {"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "metadata": {"bad": "\ud800"}},
+        )
+        with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
+            for kwargs in cases:
+                with self.subTest(field=next(reversed(kwargs))):
+                    result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(**kwargs).to_dict()
+                    self.assertEqual(result["code"], "invalid_input")
+        post.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_deeply_nested_metadata_is_bounded_before_network(self):
+        metadata = {}
+        for _ in range(1200):
+            metadata = {"nested": metadata}
+
+        with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
+            result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                target="chat-001", content="hello", metadata=metadata
+            ).to_dict()
+
+        self.assertEqual(result["code"], "input_too_large")
+        post.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_adapter_origin_must_be_allowlisted(self):
+        with (
+            patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://evil.example:8443"),
+            patch.object(
+                self.backend,
+                "UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
+                ("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
+            ),
+        ):
+            self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://adapter.example:8443"),
+            patch.object(
+                self.backend,
+                "UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
+                ("https://adapter.example:8443",),
+            ),
+        ):
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self.backend._adapter_base_url(), "https://adapter.example:8443"
+            )
+
+    def test_adapter_origin_rejects_scheme_userinfo_fragment_and_path(self):
+        invalid_origins = (
+            "ftp://127.0.0.1:18800",
+            "http://user:password@127.0.0.1:18800",
+            "http://127.0.0.1:18800#fragment",
+            "http://127.0.0.1:18800/base-path",
+        )
+        for origin in invalid_origins:
+            with self.subTest(origin=origin):
+                with (
+                    patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", origin),
+                    patch.object(
+                        self.backend,
+                        "UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
+                        ("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
+                    ),
+                ):
+                    self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
+
+    def test_adapter_path_rejects_decoded_traversal(self):
+        for path in (
+            "/api/%2e%2e/send",
+            "/api/%2E%2E/send",
+            "/api/%2525252e%2525252e/send",
+            "/api/%252525252e%252525252e/send",
+            "/api/../send",
+            "/api/%zz/send",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(path=path):
+                self.assertIsNone(self.backend._safe_path(path))
+
+    def test_adapter_path_keeps_intended_safe_canonical_paths(self):
+        for path in (
+            "/api/internal/wechat/send",
+            "/internal/channels/wechat/send",
+            "/api/%7Ehealth/status",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(path=path):
+                self.assertEqual(self.backend._safe_path(path), path)
+
+    def test_redirects_are_refused_and_authorization_cannot_cross_origin(self):
+        handler = self.backend._NoRedirectHandler()
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            handler.redirect_request(
+                None,
+                None,
+                302,
+                "redirect",
+                {"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
+                "https://evil.example/steal",
+            )
+        )
+
+        redirected = urllib.error.HTTPError(
+            "http://127.0.0.1:18800/api/internal/wechat/send",
+            302,
+            "redirect",
+            {"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
+            None,
+        )
+        with (
+            patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", "header-secret"),
+            patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", side_effect=redirected) as opened,
+        ):
+            result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
+                target="chat-001", content="hello"
+            ).to_dict()
+
+        request = opened.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlsplit(request.full_url).netloc, "127.0.0.1:18800")
+        self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), "Bearer header-secret")
+        opened.assert_called_once()
+        self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
+

 if __name__ == "__main__":
    import unittest
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+PATCHER_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint.py'
+
+
+def load_patcher():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint', PATCHER_PATH)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_api_patch_is_idempotent_and_scoped() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher()
+    ts = '\n'.join([
+        'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
+        'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
+        'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
+    ])
+    js = '\n'.join([
+        'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
+        'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
+        'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
+    ])
+    types = 'export interface WeixinMessage {\n  message_id?: number;\n}\n'
+
+    ts_once = patcher.patch_api_ts(ts)
+    js_once = patcher.patch_api_js(js)
+    types_once = patcher.patch_types_ts(types)
+
+    assert patcher.patch_api_ts(ts_once) == ts_once
+    assert patcher.patch_api_js(js_once) == js_once
+    assert patcher.patch_types_ts(types_once) == types_once
+    assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in ts_once
+    assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in js_once
+    assert 'message_id?: string | number;' in types_once
+
+
+def test_node_reviver_preserves_only_weixin_exact_ids() -> None:
+    script = '''
+const ids = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+const parsed = JSON.parse('{"ret":0,"seq":42,"msgs":[{"message_id":7482038281766381234,"create_time_ms":1783856936191,"item_list":[{"msg_id":"3123141975110186863"}]}]}', (key, value, context) => {
+  if (!ids.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
+  if (typeof value !== "number" || !context?.source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(context.source)) throw new Error("unsafe id");
+  return context.source;
+});
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ messageId: parsed.msgs[0].message_id, msgId: parsed.msgs[0].item_list[0].msg_id, seqType: typeof parsed.seq, timestampType: typeof parsed.msgs[0].create_time_ms }));
+'''
+    completed = subprocess.run(['node', '-e', script], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    result = json.loads(completed.stdout)
+    assert result == {
+        'messageId': '7482038281766381234',
+        'msgId': '3123141975110186863',
+        'seqType': 'number',
+        'timestampType': 'number',
+    }
@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+
+def load_js_process_helpers() -> str:
+    patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
+    assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
+
+
+
+def load_patcher_module() -> object:
+    patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
+    assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+
+def run_js_process_helpers(tmp_path: Path, body: str) -> dict:
+    js_process_helpers = load_js_process_helpers()
+    node_prelude = '\n'.join(
+        [
+            'const hermesTestFs = require("node:fs");',
+            'globalThis.existsSync = hermesTestFs.existsSync;',
+            'globalThis.readFileSync = hermesTestFs.readFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.writeFileSync = hermesTestFs.writeFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.mkdirSync = hermesTestFs.mkdirSync;',
+            'globalThis.appendFileSync = hermesTestFs.appendFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.path = require("node:path");',
+            'globalThis.logger = { info() {}, warn() {}, error() {} };',
+        ]
+    )
+    node_script = tmp_path / 'hermes_image_followup_check.js'
+    node_script.write_text(node_prelude + '\n\n' + js_process_helpers + '\n\n' + body, encoding='utf-8')
+    completed = subprocess.run(['node', str(node_script)], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    return json.loads(completed.stdout.strip())
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('is_ts', [True, False], ids=['ts', 'js'])
+def test_replace_or_insert_process_helpers_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    marker = 'export async function processOneMessage'
+    source = marker + '(message) {\n  return message;\n}\n'
+
+    once = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(source, is_ts=is_ts)
+    twice = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(once, is_ts=is_ts)
+    helpers = patcher.TS_PROCESS_HELPERS if is_ts else patcher.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
+
+    assert helpers + '\n\n' + marker in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ('is_ts', 'hook_name'),
+    [(True, 'TS_PROCESS_HOOK'), (False, 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK')],
+    ids=['ts', 'js'],
+)
+def test_remove_and_reinsert_process_hook_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, hook_name: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
+    indent = '  ' if is_ts else '    '
+    needle = indent + 'ctx.CommandAuthorized = commandAuthorized;\n'
+    next_nonblank = indent + 'continueProcessing();\n'
+
+    def cycle(text: str) -> str:
+        without_hook = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
+        return without_hook.replace(needle, needle + hook + '\n', 1)
+
+    once = cycle(needle + next_nonblank)
+    twice = cycle(once)
+
+    assert hook + '\n' + next_nonblank in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+
+def test_looks_like_hermes_image_followup_distinguishes_diagnostics_from_real_image_questions(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cases = {
+        'diag_cache_expired': ('\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
+        'diag_cache_error_en': ('image cache error', False),
+        'diag_cache_expired_en': ('the image cache expired, please resend', False),
+        'diag_copying_text_shows_cache_error': ('\u4e3a\u4ec0\u4e48\u6211\u590d\u5236\u53d1\u7ed9\u4f60\u7684\u6587\u5b57\uff0c\u4f60\u90fd\u663e\u793a\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
+        'diag_not_image': ('\u8fd9\u4e0d\u662f\u56fe\u7247\uff0c\u662f\u6587\u5b57\u6d88\u606f', False),
+        'diag_text_not_image_en': ('this is a text message, not an image', False),
+        'diag_no_image_sent': ('\u6211\u6ca1\u6709\u53d1\u56fe\u7247', False),
+        'diag_system_logs': ('\u8bf7\u68c0\u67e5\u7cfb\u7edf\u65e5\u5fd7\uff0c\u4ece\u673a\u5236\u4e0a\u4fee\u590d\u9519\u8bef', False),
+        'image_cn_1': ('\u8bf7\u770b\u4e00\u4e0b\u8fd9\u5f20\u56fe\u7247', True),
+        'image_cn_2': ('\u8fd9\u56fe\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48', True),
+        'image_cn_3': ('\u8bc6\u522b\u56fe\u7247\u5185\u5bb9', True),
+        'image_en': ('look at this image', True),
+    }
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        'const cases = '
+        + json.dumps({key: text for key, (text, _) in cases.items()}, ensure_ascii=False)
+        + ';\nconst results = {};\n'
+        + 'for (const [key, text] of Object.entries(cases)) {\n'
+        + '  results[key] = looksLikeHermesImageFollowup(text);\n'
+        + '}\n'
+        + 'console.log(JSON.stringify(results));\n',
+    )
+    for key, (_, expected) in cases.items():
+        assert results[key] is expected, f'{key}: expected {expected}, got {results[key]!r}'
+
+
+
+def test_resolve_hermes_referenced_image_followup_requires_exact_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const fs = require("fs");',
+                f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const exactQuotedId = "quoted-123";',
+                'const cache = {};',
+                'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: "latest-999",',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'cache[hermesExactImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId, exactQuotedId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: exactQuotedId,',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
+                'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
+                'const generic = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", "quoted-999");',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId);',
+                'const forced = resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId, false, true);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ generic, exact, forced }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['generic']['imageIntent'] is False
+    assert results['generic']['matched'] is False
+    assert results['generic']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
+    assert results['exact']['imageIntent'] is True
+    assert results['exact']['matched'] is True
+    assert results['exact']['reason'] == 'cached_image_matched'
+    assert results['forced']['imageIntent'] is True
+    assert results['forced']['matched'] is True
+
+
+
+def test_referenced_text_without_media_evidence_stays_out_of_image_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const fs = require("fs");',
+                f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const cache = {};',
+                'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: "latest-999",',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
+                'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
+                'const full = { item_list: [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, id: "quoted-999" } } }] };',
+                'const hermesContent = "\u8fd9\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48";',
+                'const hermesReferenceContextPresent = hasHermesReferenceContext(full.item_list);',
+                'const hermesQuotedMessageId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(full.item_list);',
+                'const refMediaItem = undefined;',
+                'const hermesReferencedMediaIsImage = Boolean(refMediaItem && hermesCurrentMessageIsImage({}, refMediaItem));',
+                'const hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent = hermesReferenceContextPresent && !refMediaItem;',
+                'const hermesCurrentImage = false;',
+                'const hermesFollowup = hermesCurrentImage',
+                '  ? { imageIntent: false, matched: false, reason: "current_image_message", cacheStrategy: "current", quotedMessageId: hermesQuotedMessageId }',
+                '  : (hermesReferencedMediaIsImage',
+                '      ? resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId, false, true)',
+                '      : (hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent',
+                '          ? resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId)',
+                '          : resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent)));',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ hermesReferenceContextPresent, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesReferencedMediaIsImage, hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent, hermesFollowup }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['hermesReferenceContextPresent'] is True
+    assert results['hermesQuotedMessageId'] == 'quoted-999'
+    assert results['hermesReferencedMediaIsImage'] is False
+    assert results['hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent'] is True
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['imageIntent'] is False
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['matched'] is False
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
+
+
+def test_explicit_quoted_text_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 1, text_item: { text: "被引用的正文" } } } }];',
+                'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？") : null;',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['available'] is True
+    assert results['result'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n被引用的正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+
+
+def test_visible_ref_title_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { title: "客户端可见的引用正文", message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-123" } } }];',
+                'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端可见的引用正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+
+
+def test_nested_generic_title_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, title: "非协议引用摘要" } } }];',
+                'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': True,
+        'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
+    }
+
+
+def test_exact_message_id_cache_resolves_server_reference_without_guessing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const original = { item_list: [{ type: 1, msg_id: "7481729105240418312", text_item: { text: "客户端已经显示的原始正文" } }] };',
+                'rememberHermesTextMessage(accountId, senderId, original, "客户端已经显示的原始正文");',
+                'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } }, text_item: { text: "这是什么意思？" } }];',
+                'const quotedId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(quotedItems);',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, quotedId);',
+                'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "7481729105240418313");',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "这是什么意思？", exact);',
+                'const mode = (hermesTestFs.statSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE).mode & 0o777).toString(8);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ quotedId, exact, wrong, resolved, mode }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['quotedId'] == '7481729105240418312'
+    assert results['exact'] == '客户端已经显示的原始正文'
+    assert results['wrong'] == ''
+    assert results['resolved'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端已经显示的原始正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+    assert results['mode'] == '600'
+
+
+def test_expired_message_id_cache_entry_is_not_resolved(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const key = hermesTextMessageCacheKey("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
+                'hermesTestFs.writeFileSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE, JSON.stringify({ [key]: { text: "过期正文", timestampMs: Date.now() - (8 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) } }), { encoding: "utf-8", mode: 0o600 });',
+                'const result = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ result }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['result'] == ''
+
+
+def test_unsafe_numeric_message_id_is_rejected_before_cache_keying(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const exactString = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: "7482038281766381234" });',
+                'const unsafeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 7482038281766381234 });',
+                'const safeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 12345 });',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ exactString, unsafeNumber: unsafeNumber ?? null, safeNumber }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'exactString': '7482038281766381234',
+        'unsafeNumber': None,
+        'safeNumber': '12345',
+    }
+
+
+def test_exact_outbound_create_time_resolves_quoted_bot_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(accountId, senderId, "机器人出站正文", createTimeMs);',
+                'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "server-quoted", create_time_ms: createTimeMs } }, text_item: { text: "进展汇报" } }];',
+                'const referencedTime = findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(quotedItems);',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", referencedTime);',
+                'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", createTimeMs + 1);',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "进展汇报", exact);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ referencedTime, exact, wrong, resolved }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['referencedTime'] == '1783857900123'
+    assert results['exact'] == '机器人出站正文'
+    assert results['wrong'] == ''
+    assert results['resolved']['reason'] == 'quoted_text_resolved'
+    assert '机器人出站正文' in results['resolved']['prompt']
+
+
+def test_outbound_create_time_collision_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第一条", createTimeMs);',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第二条", createTimeMs);',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", undefined, createTimeMs);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ resolved }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['resolved'] == ''
+
+
+def test_missing_quoted_text_fails_closed_without_model_prompt(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } } }];',
+                'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？") : null;',
+                'let modelCalls = 0;',
+                'if (result && !result.handled) modelCalls += 1;',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result, modelCalls }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['available'] is True
+    assert results['result'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': True,
+        'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
+    }
+    assert results['modelCalls'] == 0
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('hook_name', ['TS_PROCESS_HOOK', 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK'])
+def test_process_hook_stops_unavailable_quote_before_model_dispatch(hook_name: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
+    guard_name = 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD' if hook_name.startswith('TS_') else 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD'
+    guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
+
+    assert 'rememberHermesTextMessage(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, full, textBody)' in hook
+    assert 'findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(full.item_list)' in hook
+    assert 'resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesQuotedCreateTimeMs)' in hook
+    assert 'resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(full.item_list, hermesContent, hermesCachedQuotedText)' in hook
+    assert '!hermesQuotedTextContext.referenced && !textBody.startsWith("/")' in hook
+    assert 'ctx.Body = hermesQuotedTextContext.prompt' in hook
+    assert 'await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(hermesQuotedTextContext, dispatcher)' in guard
+    assert 'markDispatchIdle();' in guard
+
+
+def test_dispatch_quoted_text_fail_closed_uses_dispatcher_without_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    result = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                '(async () => {',
+                '  const calls = [];',
+                '  const dispatcher = {',
+                '    sendFinalReply(payload) { calls.push(["final", payload]); },',
+                '    markComplete() { calls.push(["complete"]); },',
+                '    async waitForIdle() { calls.push(["idle"]); },',
+                '  };',
+                '  const context = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext([{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1" } } }], "这是什么意思？");',
+                '  let modelCalls = 0;',
+                '  const handled = await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(context, dispatcher);',
+                '  if (!handled) modelCalls += 1;',
+                '  console.log(JSON.stringify({ handled, modelCalls, calls }));',
+                '})();',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert result['handled'] is True
+    assert result['modelCalls'] == 0
+    assert result['calls'] == [
+        ['final', {'text': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。'}],
+        ['complete'],
+        ['idle'],
+    ]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ('is_ts', 'guard_name', 'needle'),
+    [
+        (True, 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', '  logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
+        (False, 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', '    logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
+    ],
+    ids=['ts', 'js'],
+)
+def test_dispatch_guard_remove_and_reinsert_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, guard_name: str, needle: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
+
+    def cycle(text: str) -> str:
+        without = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
+        return without.replace(needle, guard + '\n' + needle, 1)
+
+    once = cycle(needle)
+    twice = cycle(once)
+
+    assert guard + '\n' + needle in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+def test_reference_metadata_content_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    result = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1", content: "metadata only" } } }];',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？")));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert result['handled'] is True
+    assert result['reason'] == 'quoted_text_unavailable'
+    assert result['replyText'] == '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。'
+
+
+def test_patch_plugin_process_only_skips_slash_and_channel(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    calls: list[tuple[str, Path]] = []
+
+    def record(name: str, result):
+        def _inner(root: Path):
+            calls.append((name, root))
+            return result
+
+        return _inner
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_ts', record('patch_ts', False))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_js', record('patch_js', False))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_process_messages', record('patch_process_messages', {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_channel_files', record('patch_channel_files', {'src/channel.ts': False, 'dist/src/channel.js': False}))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'verify_plugin_hook', record('verify_plugin_hook', {
+        'hook_status': {},
+        'hook_installed': False,
+        'process_status': {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': True},
+        'process_hook_installed': True,
+        'channel_status': {},
+        'channel_hook_installed': False,
+        'dispatch_reference_found': False,
+        'dispatch_reference_files': [],
+    }))
+
+    result = patcher.patch_plugin(tmp_path, process_only=True)
+
+    assert calls == [
+        ('patch_process_messages', tmp_path),
+        ('verify_plugin_hook', tmp_path),
+    ]
+    assert result['mode'] == 'process-only'
+    assert result['plugin_root'] == str(tmp_path)
+    assert result['slash_changes'] == {}
+    assert result['channel_changes'] == {}
+    assert result['process_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
+    assert result['behavior_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
+    assert result['verification']['process_hook_installed'] is True
+
+
+
+def test_parse_args_supports_default_root_and_process_only_flag() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+
+    defaults = patcher.parse_args([])
+    assert defaults.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
+    assert defaults.process_only is False
+
+    process_only = patcher.parse_args(['--process-only'])
+    assert process_only.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
+    assert process_only.process_only is True
+
+    custom_root = Path('/tmp/custom-plugin-root')
+    custom = patcher.parse_args([str(custom_root), '--process-only'])
+    assert custom.plugin_root == custom_root
+    assert custom.process_only is True
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+PATCHER_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes.py'
+
+
+def load_patcher():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes', PATCHER_PATH)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_send_patch_adds_exact_create_time_and_is_idempotent() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher()
+    ts = '''function buildTextMessageReq(params: {
+  to: string;
+  text: string;
+  contextToken?: string;
+  runId?: string;
+  clientId: string;
+}): SendMessageReq {
+  const { to, text, contextToken, runId, clientId } = params;
+  return { msg: { client_id: clientId, message_type: MessageType.BOT } };
+}
+export async function sendMessageWeixin(params: {}): Promise<{ messageId: string }> {
+  const { to, text, opts } = params;
+  const clientId = generateClientId();
+  const req = buildSendMessageReq({
+    payload: {},
+    clientId,
+  });
+  try {
+    await sendMessageApi({ body: req });
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw err;
+  }
+  return { messageId: clientId };
+}
+
+/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */'''
+    js = '''function buildTextMessageReq(params) {
+    const { to, text, contextToken, runId, clientId } = params;
+    return { msg: { client_id: clientId, message_type: MessageType.BOT } };
+}
+export async function sendMessageWeixin(params) {
+    const clientId = generateClientId();
+    const req = buildSendMessageReq({
+        payload: {},
+        clientId,
+    });
+    try {
+        await sendMessageApi({ body: req });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        throw err;
+    }
+    return { messageId: clientId };
+}
+/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */'''
+
+    ts_once = patcher.patch_send_ts(ts)
+    js_once = patcher.patch_send_js(js)
+    assert patcher.patch_send_ts(ts_once) == ts_once
+    assert patcher.patch_send_js(js_once) == js_once
+    for result in (ts_once, js_once):
+        assert 'const createTimeMs = Date.now();' in result
+        assert 'text item missing' in result
+        assert 'req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs' in result
+        assert 'req.msg.create_time_ms = createTimeMs' not in result
+        assert 'return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs }' in result
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+    "version": "V1R4C5",
+    "codename": "C5 reliability-security-admin",
+    "status": "active-baseline",
+    "tag": "V1R4C5",
+    "tag_ref": "refs/tags/V1R4C5",
+    "tag_object": "ac9bdacb19ff66cba8046d75358866f0f0fffb82",
+    "previous_version": "V1R4C3",
+    "rollback_version": "V1R4C3",
+    "baseline": "V1R4C3",
+    "release_reason": "reliability, watcher cleanup, user data isolation gate, and admin workbench read-only preparation; memory search disabled",
+    "purpose": "stabilize autonomous operations, enforce user isolation gate, prepare admin workbench read-only for C6",
+    "changes": [
+        "reliability: idle container GC with nixos-activate fallback retention policy and CI reset",
+        "watcher: remove redundant local async watcher, consolidate to server-pushed events",
+        "security: user data isolation gate (read-only admin panel, fb isolation check)",
+        "admin workbench: read-only preparation layout for V1R4C6 admin-search integration",
+        "governance: final owner approval via Owner Gate Web UI"
+    ],
+    "artifacts": [
+        "VERSION",
+        "docs/releases/V1R4C5-acceptance-evidence.md",
+        "docs/releases/V1R4C5-final-owner-approval.md"
+    ],
+    "validated_actions": [],
+    "secret_plaintext_written": false,
+    "owner_approval_required": true,
+    "owner_notification_channels": ["wechat", "web_ui_audit"],
+    "constraints_original": {
+        "memory_search": "remain disabled",
+        "sr04": "disable read-only visibility slice if RBAC or isolation check fails",
+        "gitea": "enter autonomous safe mode if branch consistency drift detected"
+    },
+    "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T02:17:31+08:00",
+    "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
+    "created_at": "2026-07-11T01:40:00+08:00",
+    "author": "openclaw"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+{
+  "version": "V1R4C6",
+  "codename": "admin-search-agent-integration",
+  "status": "release-candidate-started",
+  "base_baseline": "V1R4C5",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-11",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "release_type": "controlled-bundled-integration",
+  "promotion_policy": "owner-gated",
+  "owner_decision": {
+    "accepted_scope": true,
+    "requested_delivery": "admin workbench, SR-03, and Agent Platform Integration in one release train",
+    "memory_search_enabled": false,
+    "force_push_allowed": false
+  },
+  "scope": {
+    "included_groups": [
+      {
+        "id": "V1R4C6-A",
+        "name": "Admin Workbench and Portal AIOS Read-Only Rollout",
+        "branches": [
+          "feature/v1r4c4-sr04-admin-workbench-visibility-20260711",
+          "feature/v1r4c4-sr04-portal-aios-visibility-20260710",
+          "patch/user-portal-me-route-diagnostics-20260709",
+          "patch/user-portal-rbac-ops-dashboard",
+          "patch/agent-observability-webui",
+          "patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706"
+        ],
+        "risk": "medium",
+        "delivery": "administrator-visible task progress, process diagrams, health, agent observability, and portal AIOS entry points",
+        "guardrails": [
+          "read-only first",
+          "RBAC enforced",
+          "empty states explicit",
+          "no cross-user or cross-project data exposure"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "V1R4C6-B",
+        "name": "SR-03 Search Gateway Real Provider Binding",
+        "branches": [
+          "feature/v1r4c4-sr02-search-gateway-resilience-20260710",
+          "patch/search-gateway-governed-general-capability",
+          "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit"
+        ],
+        "risk": "high",
+        "delivery": "real provider binding, governed search gateway, resilience, and audit trail",
+        "guardrails": [
+          "user data isolation gate required",
+          "scope filter before ranking",
+          "provenance required",
+          "no global memory/vector index"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "V1R4C6-C",
+        "name": "Agent Platform Integration",
+        "branches": [
+          "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
+          "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
+          "patch/autonomous-controller-dispatch-20260709",
+          "patch/self-evolution-agent-orchestration-policy",
+          "patch/aios-autonomous-orchestrator-architecture-review-v1"
+        ],
+        "risk": "high",
+        "delivery": "agent event bus, GPT message plane, dispatch, orchestration policy, and architecture record",
+        "guardrails": [
+          "controller safe-mode respected",
+          "event/message scopes enforced",
+          "owner gate for consequential operations",
+          "observability before autonomous expansion"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "excluded": [
+      "memory search activation",
+      "global vector index",
+      "full cross-session recall",
+      "unscoped search over memory",
+      "bulk merge of test/smoke/auth branches",
+      "Gitea DB mutation",
+      "force-push reconciliation"
+    ]
+  },
+  "acceptance_required": [
+    "getRuntimeStatus active",
+    "getBaseline reports V1R4C5 before integration and V1R4C6 after promotion",
+    "Admin workbench RBAC read-only check passes",
+    "Portal AIOS manifest/dashboard/health routes verified",
+    "Flow/process diagram renders or returns explicit empty state",
+    "Search gateway provider binding returns scoped, provenanced results only",
+    "User data isolation acceptance remains green",
+    "Agent event bus and GPT message plane tests pass",
+    "Autonomous controller dispatch respects safe mode",
+    "Memory search remains disabled"
+  ],
+  "deployment_constraints": {
+    "AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED": false,
+    "memory_search_activation_requires_future_owner_approval": true,
+    "force_push_allowed": false,
+    "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_admin_approval": true,
+    "admin_workbench_mode": "read_only_first",
+    "search_provider_scope": "scoped_only"
+  },
+  "rollback_policy": {
+    "admin_workbench": "disable new menu/routes if RBAC or route acceptance fails",
+    "search_gateway": "fallback to disabled provider binding, not memory search",
+    "agent_platform": "disable dispatch expansion and keep event/message plane read-only if safety tests fail",
+    "memory_search": "remain disabled"
+  }
+}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Codex	378cc4d56a	fix(codex): restore hardened WeChat send backend lineage	2026-07-18 03:00:32 +08:00
Codex	9195470ceb	chore(orchestration): dispatch adaptive OpenClaw and Codex work units	2026-07-17 22:13:38 +08:00
Codex	cbe33ecab8	chore(governance): refresh adaptive dual-agent production contract	2026-07-17 22:13:38 +08:00
Codex	e3fc48e5b9	chore(governance): refresh adaptive dual-agent production contract	2026-07-17 22:04:03 +08:00
Codex	ed3bcf76c7	chore(governance): add shared V2R1 production execution contract	2026-07-17 21:24:20 +08:00
openclaw	3cf9958cb9	integrate(gate1): replay accepted clean-room evidence onto current main	2026-07-14 01:33:53 +08:00
openclaw	6b70a33080	fix(weixin): resolve outbound quotes by exact create time	2026-07-12 21:41:10 +08:00
openclaw	8d23692320	fix(weixin): preserve exact server message ids	2026-07-12 19:58:26 +08:00
openclaw	33d3947da6	fix(weixin): resolve quotes from exact message id cache	2026-07-12 17:09:33 +08:00
openclaw	806163b8ba	docs(weixin): record visible quote parser release	2026-07-12 15:55:38 +08:00
openclaw	13c2a18286	fix(weixin): resolve visible quoted text summaries	2026-07-12 15:50:03 +08:00
openclaw	b8f10951ea	docs(weixin): record owner quoted text acceptance	2026-07-12 14:11:27 +08:00
openclaw	2fcf0879c6	docs(weixin): record quoted text fail-closed release	2026-07-12 13:46:14 +08:00
openclaw	1136b4186d	fix(weixin): fail closed on unavailable quoted text	2026-07-12 13:42:32 +08:00
openclaw	cca73ad52f	docs(weixin): design quoted text fail-closed handling	2026-07-12 13:42:32 +08:00
openclaw	424bf36c03	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/audit'	2026-07-12 12:57:36 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	9eb00da0c4	docs(weixin): record mainline production release	2026-07-12 02:21:21 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	9269e81997	docs(weixin): record quoted text reference fix	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	6642820aa0	fix(weixin): ignore unconfirmed text references	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	8374c6b1c7	docs(weixin): update confirmed image reference recovery	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	c8a3251834	fix(weixin): require confirmed image reference context	2026-07-12 01:18:25 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	2418f56273	docs(weixin): record text cache isolation recovery	2026-07-12 01:18:11 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	297582941f	fix(weixin): add process-only runtime patch mode	2026-07-12 01:18:11 +08:00
Steel Dan (AIOS)	958a61cbc4	fix(weixin): isolate text from stale image cache	2026-07-12 01:18:11 +08:00
V1R4C6 Deployment Audit	3096212919	audit: record V1R4C6 production deployment blocker	2026-07-12 00:57:05 +08:00
openclaw	aa2b091966	start V1R4C6 production deployment and verification	2026-07-11 21:10:51 +08:00
gito	1a9cb9095e	Merge pull request 'reconcile(v1r4c6): finalize baseline metadata — previous_baseline V1R4C5, git e204a90' (#9 ) from reconcile/v1r4c6-baseline-finalize-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 20:55:54 +08:00
openclaw	0312159168	feat(reconcile): write V1R4C6 baseline metadata — previous_baseline V1R4C5, git `e204a90`	2026-07-11 20:54:46 +08:00
openclaw	e204a90398	docs: baseline V1R4C6 promotion	2026-07-11 20:47:44 +08:00
openclaw	d8cf6058e9	docs: promote VERSION V1R4C3 -> V1R4C6 ahead of main promotion	2026-07-11 20:47:28 +08:00
openclaw	2aefc19e3d	authorize OpenClaw to execute V1R4C6 merge tests deploy pipeline	2026-07-11 20:41:31 +08:00
gito	28a430066f	Merge pull request 'V1R4C6: merge candidate → main (release control artifacts)' (#8 ) from candidate/v1r4c6-integration-main-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 19:30:58 +08:00
openclaw	1013aef461	Merge branch 'release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711' into candidate/v1r4c6-integration-main-20260711 Resolve merge conflicts per V1R4C6 release control merge: - baseline/current.json: keep feature branch version (updates to V1R4C5, adds constraints block). This was the intended runtime state that main was missing after V1R4C5 backfill (PR #7). Feature branch correctly has the V1R4C5 state; main still had V1R4C3. - versions/V1R4C5.json: keep main version (complete fields with codename, tag_ref, tag_object, constraints, promoted_at/by). Feature branch had an older copy lacking these fields. - docs/releases/V1R4C6-acceptance-evidence.md: keep main version (blank 'NOT RUN' status). Feature branch had draft content. - docs/releases/V1R4C6-release-gate-status.md: keep main version (blank 'NOT RUN' status). Feature branch had draft content.	2026-07-11 19:29:47 +08:00
gito	bb3210d74f	Merge pull request 'docs: update V1R4C6 metadata to NOT RUN after control artifacts merge' (#7 ) from reconcile/v1r4c6-gate-status-notrun-docs-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 17:07:03 +08:00
openclaw	745395e93b	docs: update V1R4C6 gate status, acceptance checklist, and acceptance evidence to NOT RUN All engineering gates remain pending. This updates the release documents to reflect the current integration-pending status after PR #6 merged.	2026-07-11 17:06:31 +08:00
gito	ae49bf0fa3	Merge pull request 'reconcile: merge V1R4C6 release candidate into main' (#6 ) from candidate/v1r4c6-merge-to-main-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 16:45:28 +08:00
openclaw	8410cd895e	reconcile: merge V1R4C6 release candidate into main V1R4C6 merge candidate (squashed). Contains 10 files, ~1440 lines added across: - docs/releases/ (6 files: checklist, evidence, blocker, resume, merge-matrix, gate-status) - ops/openclaw/ (2 files: integrate-deploy-verify, run-to-owner-gate-wechat) - patches/ (1 file: branch patch) - versions/ (1 file: V1R4C6.json) Task: admin workbench, SR-03 Search Gateway, Agent Platform Integration Baseline: V1R4C5 V1R4C5 tag semantics: - tag refs/tags/V1R4C5 target `d457ac3`: immutable release snapshot - baseline git `a32c76a`: runtime baseline promotion commit No tag creation, baseline promotion, or memory search activation in this merge.	2026-07-11 16:34:03 +08:00
gito	dc1642c2e8	Merge pull request 'reconcile: V1R4C5 baseline metadata (current.json + V1R4C5.json)' (#5 ) from reconcile/v1r4c5-baseline-metadata-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 13:48:30 +08:00
openclaw	c75b865710	reconcile: update baseline registry to V1R4C5 and create V1R4C5 version metadata Root cause: The V1R4C5 baseline promotion commit (`a32c76a`) was made on a feature branch that was never merged to main. As a result, both baseline/current.json and versions/V1R4C5.json on main still reflect V1R4C3 state. Runtime getBaseline() continues to return V1R4C3 with commit `f5435e3`. Changes: - baseline/current.json: update current_baseline -> V1R4C5, git -> `a32c76a3c1` (the actual promotion commit), add constraints from the original promotion - versions/V1R4C5.json: create the missing version metadata file with status active-baseline, referencing V1R4C5 tag (object ac9bdac...) Why this does not affect V1R4C5 release content: - V1R4C5 release documents (docs/releases/*.md) are untouched - V1R4C5 tag is unchanged and not moved - No V1R4C6 functionality introduced - No memory search or vector index enabled Rollback method: git revert <this commit hash> # Or restore baseline/current.json from V1R4C3 content: # git checkout main~1 baseline/current.json # And delete versions/V1R4C5.json: # git rm versions/V1R4C5.json # Then commit the revert Constraints honored: - No direct writes to main (using PR) - No force push - V1R4C5 tag not moved/rebuild - No V1R4C6 content - Memory search remains disabled	2026-07-11 13:46:13 +08:00
gito	e992b624e0	V1R4C5 → main: backfill release docs (acceptance evidence + owner approval)	2026-07-11 13:37:58 +08:00
openclaw	c60e4cd02c	reconcile: backfill V1R4C5 release documents (acceptance evidence + final owner approval) for main merge Source: V1R4C5 tag based on unique publication commit `a32c76a` - docs/releases/V1R4C5-acceptance-evidence.md (from V1R4C5 tag) - docs/releases/V1R4C5-final-owner-approval.md (from V1R4C5 tag) Constraints honored: - Not writing directly to main - No V1R4C6 content introduced - Memory search remains disabled per owner approval Generated merge candidate branch: reconcile/v1r4c5-release-to-main-20260711	2026-07-11 13:36:18 +08:00
openclaw	4b2996ca9f	release: resume V1R4C6 after scoped WeChat notification verification	2026-07-11 07:47:05 +08:00
openclaw	086076b74f	ops: direct OpenClaw to complete V1R4C6 and request owner approval via WeChat	2026-07-11 03:13:32 +08:00
openclaw	7b2d694272	ops: queue actual V1R4C6 integration deployment and verification	2026-07-11 03:10:28 +08:00
openclaw	0583060c7c	release: update V1R4C6 gate status	2026-07-11 03:07:13 +08:00
openclaw	20e707fb52	release: add V1R4C6 acceptance evidence	2026-07-11 03:05:52 +08:00
openclaw	6c75ec6bb2	release: add V1R4C6 acceptance checklist	2026-07-11 03:04:02 +08:00
openclaw	e9fefd4c18	release: add V1R4C6 integration merge matrix	2026-07-11 03:01:59 +08:00
openclaw	3ece481c74	fix(runtime): point GitOps API to active aios.git bare repository	2026-07-11 02:56:49 +08:00
openclaw	33177548c3	fix(baseline): stabilize V1R4C5 git pointer	2026-07-11 02:55:05 +08:00
openclaw	ed1413a05e	V1R4C5 baseline promotion: V1R4C3 -> V1R4C5 promoted_by: openclaw promotion_reason: V1R4C5 SR-01 Gitea branch sync fix and SR-02 Watcher state cleanup memory_search: disabled	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	05d1e64228	release: record V1R4C6 baseline visibility blocker	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	64bbe1b51c	Create V1R4C6 integration release patch	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	3c6f2c8c65	release: start V1R4C6 admin search agent integration	2026-07-11 02:26:31 +08:00