task(openclaw): B3 integration RESULT 20260714T190300UTC8

feat(v2r1c0): integrate B3 identity module into full RC1 runtime 20260714T190200UTC8
task(openclaw): create continue integration task 20260714T184637UTC8
2026-07-14 19:03:49 +08:00 · 2026-07-14 19:02:52 +08:00 · 2026-07-14 19:00:22 +08:00 · 2026-07-14 18:09:21 +08:00 · 2026-07-13 02:28:32 +08:00 · 2026-07-13 02:18:04 +08:00
51 changed files with 4504 additions and 8 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# RESULT-V2R1C0-B3-FULL-RC1-INTEGRATION-20260714T190300UTC8
+
+## status
+SUCCESS
+
+## integration_branch
+task/openclaw/v2r1c0-b3-full-rc1-integration-20260714T180646UTC8
+
+## integration_commit
+b4d3e53
+
+## included_files
+- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/identity.py (B3, 241 lines)
+- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py
+- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py
+- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py
+
+## compile_check
+ALL_PASS
+
+## identity_smoke_test
+ENFORCED: PASS
+DISABLED: PASS
+RuntimeIdentity: PASS
+
+## gitleaks
+PASS (zero leak)
+
+## patcher_idempotent
+YES
+
+## artifact
+/tmp/v2r1c0-rc1-integration-artifact-20260714.tar.gz
+SHA256: f796a76f375c11f9b55b85c195514a636922962ae79572fb3ed8fbc2b1f5796f
+
+## production
+V1R4C6 (unchanged)
+
+## next_step
+awaiting production deployment decision
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# TASK-V2R1C0-B3-FULL-RC1-INTEGRATION-CONTINUE-20260714T184637UTC8
+
+## 目标
+继续 V2R1C0 B3 Full RC1 Integration，完成剩余步骤。
+
+## 执行链
+1. **[4/7] 检查当前 RC1 分支状态** — 确认 B3 代码是否已在
+2. **[5/7] 完整 runtime 整合** — 合入 runtime 依赖文件
+3. **[6/7] cherry-pick d2acafa** — 确保 B3 代码在 RC1 分支中
+4. **[7/7] 完整门禁** — 执行测试、gitleaks、patcher 验证
+5. **[8/7] artifact 构建**
+6. **[9/7] staging 验证**
+7. **[10/7] RESULT 文件**
+8. **[11/7] production 准备**
+
+## 分支
+- 基础分支: `v2r1c0-b3-full-rc1-integration-20260714T180646UTC8`
+- B3 执行分支: `work/openclaw/v2r1c0-b3-execution-20260714`
+- B3 commit: `d2acafa`
@@ -1 +1 @@
-V1R4C3
+V1R4C6
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Append-only audit chain for AIOS V2R1."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any
+
+from .tenant_context import canonical_json, isoformat, require_ident
+
+
+class AuditLog:
+    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.database = str(database)
+        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
+            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            db.execute(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
+                    seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    payload TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    previous_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    event_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                )
+                """
+            )
+
+    def append(self, *, tenant_id: str, trace_id: str, event_type: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        trace_id = require_ident("trace_id", trace_id)
+        event_type = require_ident("event_type", event_type)
+        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
+            previous = db.execute(
+                "SELECT event_hash FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1"
+            ).fetchone()
+            previous_hash = previous[0] if previous else "GENESIS"
+            body = {
+                "tenant_id": tenant_id,
+                "trace_id": trace_id,
+                "event_type": event_type,
+                "payload": payload,
+                "previous_hash": previous_hash,
+                "created_at": isoformat(),
+            }
+            digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                canonical_json(body)
+            ).hexdigest()
+            db.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO audit_events VALUES(NULL,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (
+                    tenant_id,
+                    trace_id,
+                    event_type,
+                    json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False),
+                    previous_hash,
+                    digest,
+                    body["created_at"],
+                ),
+            )
+            return digest
+
+    def verify(self) -> bool:
+        previous = "GENESIS"
+        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
+            rows = db.execute(
+                "SELECT tenant_id,trace_id,event_type,payload,previous_hash,event_hash,created_at "
+                "FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq"
+            )
+            for row in rows:
+                body = {
+                    "tenant_id": row[0],
+                    "trace_id": row[1],
+                    "event_type": row[2],
+                    "payload": json.loads(row[3]),
+                    "previous_hash": row[4],
+                    "created_at": row[6],
+                }
+                if row[4] != previous:
+                    return False
+                digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(body)).hexdigest()
+                if digest != row[5]:
+                    return False
+                previous = digest
+        return True
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell lifecycle CLI primitives."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CellRecord:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    version: str
+    state: str
+    config_digest: str
+    created_at: str
+
+
+class CellManager:
+    def __init__(self, registry: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.registry = Path(registry)
+        self.registry.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if not self.registry.exists():
+            self.registry.write_text("{\"cells\":{}}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    def _load(self) -> dict:
+        return json.loads(self.registry.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+
+    def _save(self, value: dict) -> None:
+        self.registry.write_text(
+            json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n",
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+
+    def create(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, version: str, digest: str) -> CellRecord:
+        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
+        data = self._load()
+        if tenant_id in data["cells"]:
+            raise ValidationError("tenant already has a cell")
+        record = CellRecord(
+            tenant_id,
+            cell_id,
+            version,
+            "created",
+            digest,
+            datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        )
+        data["cells"][tenant_id] = record.__dict__
+        self._save(data)
+        return record
+
+    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> CellRecord:
+        data = self._load()
+        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
+        if not item:
+            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
+        return CellRecord(**item)
+
+    def transition(self, tenant_id: str, state: str) -> CellRecord:
+        allowed = {"created", "starting", "healthy", "upgrading", "rollback", "failed"}
+        if state not in allowed:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid cell state")
+        data = self._load()
+        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
+        if not item:
+            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
+        item["state"] = state
+        self._save(data)
+        return CellRecord(**item)
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""aios-cell command implementation for V2R1 Cell lifecycle."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import sys
+
+from .cell_manager import CellManager
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="aios-cell")
+    parser.add_argument("registry")
+    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+
+    create = sub.add_parser("create")
+    create.add_argument("tenant_id")
+    create.add_argument("cell_id")
+    create.add_argument("version")
+    create.add_argument("digest")
+
+    status = sub.add_parser("status")
+    status.add_argument("tenant_id")
+
+    transition = sub.add_parser("transition")
+    transition.add_argument("tenant_id")
+    transition.add_argument("state")
+
+    return parser
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
+    manager = CellManager(args.registry)
+    if args.command == "create":
+        result = manager.create(args.tenant_id, args.cell_id, args.version, args.digest)
+    elif args.command == "status":
+        result = manager.status(args.tenant_id)
+    elif args.command == "transition":
+        result = manager.transition(args.tenant_id, args.state)
+    else:
+        return 2
+    print(json.dumps(result.__dict__, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+"""OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter for AIOS V2R1."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from .tenant_context import ValidationError, V2R1Error, require_ident
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CellSpec:
+    tenant_id: str
+    image: str
+    runtime: str = "docker"
+    port: int | None = None
+    memory: str = "2g"
+    cpus: str = "2"
+    pids_limit: int = 512
+    network: str = "bridge"
+    env: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        if self.runtime not in {"docker", "podman"}:
+            raise ValidationError("unsupported runtime")
+        if not self.image:
+            raise ValidationError("image required")
+
+
+class OpenClawFleet:
+    def __init__(self, binary: str = "openclaw") -> None:
+        self.binary = binary
+
+    def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            [self.binary, *args],
+            check=False,
+            text=True,
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+        )
+        if proc.returncode:
+            raise V2R1Error(proc.stderr.strip() or "openclaw command failed")
+        data = json.loads(proc.stdout or "{}")
+        if isinstance(data, dict):
+            return data
+        return {"result": data}
+
+    def create(self, spec: CellSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._run([
+            "fleet", "create", spec.tenant_id,
+            "--image", spec.image,
+            "--runtime", spec.runtime,
+            "--json",
+        ])
+
+    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        return self._run(["fleet", "status", tenant_id, "--json"])
+
+    def doctor(self, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        args = ["fleet", "doctor"]
+        if tenant_id:
+            require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+            args.append(tenant_id)
+        args.append("--json")
+        return self._run(args)
+
+    def backup(self, tenant_id: str, output: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._run(["fleet", "backup", tenant_id, "--out", str(output), "--json"])
+
+    def restore(self, tenant_id: str, archive: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._run(["fleet", "restore", tenant_id, "--from", str(archive), "--json"])
+
+    def upgrade(self, tenant_id: str, image: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._run(["fleet", "upgrade", tenant_id, "--image", image, "--json"])
+
+
+def load_inventory(path: str | Path) -> list[CellSpec]:
+    raw = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if raw.get("schema_version") != "aios.cells.v1":
+        raise ValidationError("invalid inventory schema")
+    result: list[CellSpec] = []
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+    for item in raw.get("cells", []):
+        spec = CellSpec(
+            tenant_id=item["tenant_id"],
+            image=item["image"],
+            runtime=item.get("runtime", "docker"),
+            port=item.get("port"),
+            env=tuple(item.get("env", [])),
+        )
+        if spec.tenant_id in seen:
+            raise ValidationError("duplicate tenant")
+        seen.add(spec.tenant_id)
+        result.append(spec)
+    if not result:
+        raise ValidationError("no cells")
+    return result
+
+
+def inventory_as_dict(items: list[CellSpec]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {"schema_version": "aios.cells.v1", "cells": [asdict(x) for x in items]}
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes shared agent fabric primitives."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any
+
+from .tenant_context import (
+    CanonicalMessage,
+    ConflictError,
+    ScopeError,
+    ValidationError,
+    isoformat,
+    require_ident,
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FabricJob:
+    job_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    profile_id: str
+    session_id: str
+    event_id: str
+    status: str = "queued"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in (
+            "job_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "session_id", "event_id"
+        ):
+            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        if self.status not in {"queued", "running", "completed", "failed", "cancelled"}:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid job status")
+
+
+class HermesFabric:
+    """Shared scheduler storage with mandatory tenant partition keys."""
+
+    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.database = str(database)
+        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
+            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+            db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+            db.execute(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fabric_jobs (
+                    job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    profile_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                )
+                """
+            )
+            db.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fabric_tenant_queue "
+                "ON fabric_jobs(tenant_id, cell_id, status)"
+            )
+
+    def enqueue(
+        self,
+        *,
+        message: CanonicalMessage,
+        profile_id: str,
+    ) -> FabricJob:
+        profile_id = require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
+        if not message.command_capable:
+            raise ScopeError("non-command events cannot create execution jobs")
+        if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
+            raise ScopeError("only authenticated human commands can create jobs")
+        job = FabricJob(
+            job_id=f"job-{message.event_id}",
+            tenant_id=message.tenant_id,
+            cell_id=message.cell_id,
+            profile_id=profile_id,
+            session_id=message.session_id,
+            event_id=message.event_id,
+        )
+        now = isoformat()
+        conflict: ConflictError | None = None
+        try:
+            with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
+                db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+                db.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO fabric_jobs VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (
+                        job.job_id,
+                        job.tenant_id,
+                        job.cell_id,
+                        job.profile_id,
+                        job.session_id,
+                        job.event_id,
+                        job.status,
+                        now,
+                        now,
+                    ),
+                )
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
+            conflict = ConflictError(
+                "fabric event already exists or violates queue uniqueness"
+            )
+        if conflict is not None:
+            raise conflict
+        return job
+
+    def claim(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, profile_id: str) -> FabricJob | None:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
+        require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
+        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM fabric_jobs WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? "
+                "AND profile_id=? AND status='queued' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1",
+                (tenant_id, cell_id, profile_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if not row:
+                db.commit()
+                return None
+            db.execute(
+                "UPDATE fabric_jobs SET status='running', updated_at=? WHERE job_id=?",
+                (isoformat(), row[0]),
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return FabricJob(*row[:7])
+
+    def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
+            count = db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM fabric_jobs").fetchone()[0]
+        return {
+            "component": "hermes_fabric",
+            "jobs": count,
+            "checked_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        }
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""Hermes shared fabric profile isolation primitives."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+import os
+
+from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HermesProfile:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    profile_id: str
+    hermes_home: Path
+    workspace: Path
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
+            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
+        if not self.hermes_home.is_absolute() or not self.workspace.is_absolute():
+            raise ValidationError("profile paths must be absolute")
+
+    @property
+    def environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "HERMES_HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
+            "HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
+            "AIOS_TENANT_ID": self.tenant_id,
+            "AIOS_CELL_ID": self.cell_id,
+            "AIOS_PROFILE_ID": self.profile_id,
+        }
+
+    def prepare(self) -> None:
+        self.hermes_home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        os.chmod(self.hermes_home, 0o700)
+        os.chmod(self.workspace, 0o700)
+
+    def assert_path_allowed(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        target = Path(path).resolve()
+        for root in (self.hermes_home.resolve(), self.workspace.resolve()):
+            if target == root or root in target.parents:
+                return
+        raise ValidationError("path escapes profile isolation boundary")
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+"""Fail-closed identity binding for authenticated external ingress.
+
+External payload claims are not authority.  An HMAC-authenticated envelope is
+the sole factory for :class:`AuthenticatedPrincipal`; the resolver then checks
+every claim against the authoritative ``TenantRouter`` before the runtime signs
+an internal ``TenantContext``.
+
+B3 development adds ``disabled/enforced`` mode selection and a
+bridge-ingress / receipt-read dual credential for external-side splits.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import enum
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import re
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from .router import Route, TenantRouter
+from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, canonical_json, require_ident
+
+
+_PROVENANCE = object()
+_SIGNATURE_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+_HEX_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]+$", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+_SCOPE_FIELDS = (
+    "principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
+    "channel_account_id", "session_id", "message",
+)
+_SCOPE_FIELDS_RECEIPT = (
+    "principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
+    "channel_account_id", "session_id", "receipt", "message",
+)
+_ALLOWED_MESSAGE_FIELDS = frozenset({"agent_id", "type", "payload"})
+
+
+class AuthenticationError(ValidationError):
+    pass
+
+
+class IngressMode(enum.Enum):
+    DISABLED = "disabled"
+    ENFORCED = "enforced"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, init=False)
+class AuthenticatedPrincipal:
+    principal_id: str
+
+    def __init__(self, principal_id: str, *, _provenance: object) -> None:
+        if _provenance is not _PROVENANCE:
+            raise TypeError("AuthenticatedPrincipal is created by authenticated ingress only")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "principal_id", require_ident("principal_id", principal_id))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _verified(cls, principal_id: str) -> "AuthenticatedPrincipal":
+        return cls(principal_id, _provenance=_PROVENANCE)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class IdentityClaims:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    channel: str
+    channel_account_id: str
+    session_id: str
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
+            require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BridgeIngressClaims:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    channel: str
+    channel_account_id: str
+    session_id: str
+    receipt: str
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
+            require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
+        if not isinstance(self.receipt, str) or not self.receipt:
+            raise ValidationError("bridge ingress receipt must be a non-empty string")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthenticatedIngress:
+    principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
+    claims: IdentityClaims
+    message: Mapping[str, Any]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BridgeAuthenticatedIngress:
+    principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
+    claims: BridgeIngressClaims
+    message: Mapping[str, Any]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RuntimeIdentity:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    channel: str
+    channel_account_id: str
+    session_id: str
+
+
+class IngressAuthenticator:
+    def __init__(self, hmac_key: bytes, *, mode: IngressMode = IngressMode.ENFORCED) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(hmac_key, bytes) or len(hmac_key) < 32:
+            raise ValidationError("ingress HMAC key must be at least 32 bytes")
+        self._hmac_key = hmac_key
+        self._mode = mode
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+            raise ValidationError("ingress request must be an object")
+        if set(request) != {*_SCOPE_FIELDS, "signature"}:
+            raise ValidationError("ingress request fields are invalid")
+        values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS}
+        if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
+            raise ValidationError("ingress message must be an object")
+        return values
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _bridge_signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
+            raise ValidationError("bridge ingress request must be an object")
+        allowed = {*_SCOPE_FIELDS_RECEIPT, "signature"}
+        if set(request) != allowed:
+            raise ValidationError(
+                f"bridge ingress request fields are invalid; "
+                f"expected {sorted(allowed)}, got {sorted(request)}"
+            )
+        values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS_RECEIPT}
+        if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
+            raise ValidationError("bridge ingress message must be an object")
+        return values
+
+    def _verify(self, values: dict[str, Any], signature: str) -> None:
+        if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
+            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
+        expected = hmac.new(
+            self._hmac_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
+        ).hexdigest()
+        if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature):
+            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
+
+    def authenticate(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> AuthenticatedIngress:
+        values = self._signed_payload(request)
+        signature = request["signature"]
+        if self._mode == IngressMode.ENFORCED:
+            self._verify(values, signature)
+        elif self._mode == IngressMode.DISABLED:
+            if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
+                raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
+        else:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unhandled ingress mode: {self._mode}")
+        return AuthenticatedIngress(
+            principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
+            claims=IdentityClaims(
+                tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
+                cell_id=values["cell_id"],
+                channel=values["channel"],
+                channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
+                session_id=values["session_id"],
+            ),
+            message=dict(values["message"]),
+        )
+
+    def authenticate_bridge(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> BridgeAuthenticatedIngress:
+        values = self._bridge_signed_payload(request)
+        signature = request["signature"]
+        if self._mode == IngressMode.ENFORCED:
+            self._verify(values, signature)
+        elif self._mode == IngressMode.DISABLED:
+            if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
+                raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
+        else:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"unhandled ingress mode: {self._mode}")
+        return BridgeAuthenticatedIngress(
+            principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
+            claims=BridgeIngressClaims(
+                tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
+                cell_id=values["cell_id"],
+                channel=values["channel"],
+                channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
+                session_id=values["session_id"],
+                receipt=values["receipt"],
+            ),
+            message=dict(values["message"]),
+        )
+
+class RuntimeIdentityResolver:
+    """Resolve authenticated ingress identity through ``TenantRouter`` only."""
+
+    def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
+        self._router = router
+
+    def resolve(
+        self, principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal, claims: IdentityClaims
+    ) -> RuntimeIdentity:
+        if not isinstance(principal, AuthenticatedPrincipal):
+            raise AuthenticationError("untrusted principal type")
+        try:
+            route: Route = self._router.resolve(
+                channel=claims.channel,
+                channel_account_id=claims.channel_account_id,
+                principal_id=principal.principal_id,
+                session_id=claims.session_id,
+            )
+        except (ScopeError, ValidationError) as exc:
+            raise AuthenticationError("identity is not registered") from None
+        expected = (
+            claims.tenant_id, claims.cell_id, claims.channel,
+            claims.channel_account_id, principal.principal_id, claims.session_id,
+        )
+        actual = (
+            route.tenant_id, route.cell_id, route.channel,
+            route.channel_account_id, route.principal_id, route.session_id,
+        )
+        if actual != expected:
+            raise AuthenticationError("identity claims do not match authoritative route")
+        return RuntimeIdentity(
+            tenant_id=route.tenant_id,
+            cell_id=route.cell_id,
+            principal_id=route.principal_id,
+            channel=route.channel,
+            channel_account_id=route.channel_account_id,
+            session_id=route.session_id or "",
+        )
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+"""Tenant-scoped memory namespace and access policy for AIOS V2R1."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import PurePosixPath
+from typing import Literal
+
+from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, require_ident
+
+
+MemoryKind = Literal["session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MemoryScope:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    profile_id: str
+    session_id: str | None
+    kind: MemoryKind
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
+            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
+        if self.session_id is not None:
+            require_ident("session_id", self.session_id)
+        if self.kind not in {"session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"}:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid memory kind")
+        if self.kind == "session" and self.session_id is None:
+            raise ValidationError("session memory requires session_id")
+
+    @property
+    def namespace(self) -> str:
+        parts = ["tenant", self.tenant_id, "cell", self.cell_id]
+        if self.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
+            parts.extend(["profile", self.profile_id])
+        if self.kind == "session":
+            parts.extend(["session", str(self.session_id)])
+        parts.extend(["memory", self.kind])
+        return str(PurePosixPath(*parts))
+
+    def assert_access(self, requested: "MemoryScope", *, write: bool = False) -> None:
+        if self.tenant_id != requested.tenant_id:
+            raise ScopeError("cross-tenant memory access denied")
+        if self.cell_id != requested.cell_id:
+            raise ScopeError("cross-cell memory access denied")
+        if requested.kind == "shared_artifact":
+            if write:
+                raise ScopeError("shared artifacts are immutable")
+            return
+        if self.profile_id != requested.profile_id and requested.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
+            raise ScopeError("cross-profile memory access denied")
+        if requested.kind == "session" and self.session_id != requested.session_id:
+            raise ScopeError("cross-session memory access denied")
+
+
+def qualify_memory_key(scope: MemoryScope, key: str) -> str:
+    key = require_ident("memory_key", key)
+    return f"{scope.namespace}/{key}"
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+"""Tenant-scoped append-only message ledger and exact quote resolver."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import timedelta
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Iterable
+
+from .tenant_context import (
+    CanonicalMessage,
+    ConflictError,
+    ScopeError,
+    ValidationError,
+    isoformat,
+    normalize_message_id,
+    parse_time,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class LedgerRecord:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    channel: str
+    channel_account_id: str
+    peer_id: str
+    direction: str
+    message_id: str
+    event_id: str
+    body: str
+    occurred_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+
+
+class MessageLedger:
+    """Exact-ID ledger.
+
+    The resolver never uses time windows, prefixes, similarity, or nearest-message
+    fallbacks. Ambiguity and absence fail closed.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, database: str | Path, *, ttl_days: int = 7) -> None:
+        if not 1 <= ttl_days <= 365:
+            raise ValidationError("ttl_days must be between 1 and 365")
+        self.database = Path(database)
+        self.ttl_days = ttl_days
+        self.database.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._initialize()
+        try:
+            os.chmod(self.database, 0o600)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        db = sqlite3.connect(str(self.database), timeout=30)
+        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        db.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return db
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_ledger (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    direction TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(direction IN ('inbound','outbound','internal')),
+                    message_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    body TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    occurred_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(
+                      tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
+                      peer_id, direction, message_id
+                    ),
+                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, cell_id, event_id)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_reply_lookup ON message_ledger(
+                    tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
+                    peer_id, message_id, expires_at
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def remember(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
+        message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
+        now = utc_now()
+        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(days=self.ttl_days))
+        key = (
+            message.tenant_id,
+            message.cell_id,
+            message.channel,
+            message.channel_account_id,
+            message.peer_id,
+            message.direction,
+            message_id,
+        )
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            existing = db.execute(
+                "SELECT event_id, body, occurred_at, expires_at FROM message_ledger "
+                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
+                "AND peer_id=? AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
+                key,
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing:
+                if existing["event_id"] != message.event_id or existing["body"] != message.body:
+                    db.rollback()
+                    raise ConflictError("message ID collision with different content")
+                db.commit()
+                return LedgerRecord(*key, existing["event_id"], existing["body"], existing["occurred_at"], existing["expires_at"])
+            db.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO message_ledger VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires, isoformat(now)),
+            )
+            db.commit()
+        return LedgerRecord(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires)
+
+    def resolve_quote(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> str:
+        if message.quoted_body is not None:
+            return message.quoted_body
+        if message.reply_to_message_id is None:
+            raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
+        reply_id = normalize_message_id(
+            message.reply_to_message_id,
+            field_name="reply_to_message_id",
+        )
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            rows = db.execute(
+                "SELECT direction, body, event_id FROM message_ledger "
+                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
+                "AND peer_id=? AND message_id=? AND expires_at>?",
+                (
+                    message.tenant_id,
+                    message.cell_id,
+                    message.channel,
+                    message.channel_account_id,
+                    message.peer_id,
+                    reply_id,
+                    isoformat(),
+                ),
+            ).fetchall()
+        if len(rows) == 1:
+            return str(rows[0]["body"])
+        if len(rows) > 1:
+            raise ConflictError("ambiguous reply ID across message directions")
+        raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
+
+    def purge_expired(self) -> int:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            cursor = db.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE expires_at<=?", (isoformat(),)
+            )
+            return cursor.rowcount
+
+    def integrity_check(self) -> str:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            return str(db.execute("PRAGMA integrity_check").fetchone()[0])
+
+    def count(self) -> int:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            return int(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_ledger").fetchone()[0])
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+"""Authoritative tenant registry and fail-closed message router."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+import sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Callable, Iterator
+
+from .tenant_context import (
+    CanonicalMessage,
+    ConflictError,
+    ScopeError,
+    TenantContext,
+    ValidationError,
+    isoformat,
+    parse_time,
+    require_ident,
+    utc_now,
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Route:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    channel: str
+    channel_account_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    session_id: str | None
+
+
+class TenantRouter:
+    """SQLite-backed routing registry.
+
+    Channel accounts are authoritative tenant ownership boundaries. Principal and
+    session bindings may narrow a route, but can never move traffic to another
+    tenant or Cell.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self, database: str | Path, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now
+    ) -> None:
+        self.database = str(database)
+        self._clock = clock
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.database, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _transaction(self) -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            yield connection
+            connection.execute("COMMIT")
+        except Exception:
+            connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            db.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants (
+                    tenant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(status IN ('active','suspended','retired')),
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channel_routes (
+                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_routes (
+                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY(channel, channel_account_id)
+                      REFERENCES channel_routes(channel, channel_account_id)
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_bindings (
+                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(tenant_id, session_id),
+                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_session_expiry
+                  ON session_bindings(expires_at);
+                """
+            )
+
+    def register_tenant(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> None:
+        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
+        now = isoformat(self._clock())
+        with self._transaction() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row:
+                if row["cell_id"] != cell_id:
+                    raise ConflictError("tenant already bound to another cell")
+                db.execute(
+                    "UPDATE tenants SET status='active', updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
+                    (now, tenant_id),
+                )
+                return
+            conflict = db.execute(
+                "SELECT tenant_id FROM tenants WHERE cell_id=?", (cell_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if conflict:
+                raise ConflictError("cell already belongs to another tenant")
+            db.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO tenants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (tenant_id, cell_id, "active", now, now),
+            )
+
+    def set_tenant_status(self, tenant_id: str, status: str) -> None:
+        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        if status not in {"active", "suspended", "retired"}:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant status")
+        with self._transaction() as db:
+            cursor = db.execute(
+                "UPDATE tenants SET status=?, updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
+                (status, isoformat(self._clock()), tenant_id),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
+
+    def bind_channel(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        channel: str,
+        channel_account_id: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
+        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
+        with self._transaction() as db:
+            tenant = db.execute(
+                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active":
+                raise ValidationError("tenant is not active")
+            existing = db.execute(
+                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM channel_routes "
+                "WHERE channel=? AND channel_account_id=?",
+                (channel, channel_account_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing:
+                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != tenant["cell_id"]:
+                    raise ConflictError("channel account already belongs to another tenant")
+                return
+            db.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO channel_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (channel, channel_account_id, tenant_id, tenant["cell_id"], isoformat(self._clock())),
+            )
+
+    def bind_principal(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        channel: str,
+        channel_account_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
+        route = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
+        if route.tenant_id != tenant_id:
+            raise ScopeError("principal cannot cross tenant boundary")
+        with self._transaction() as db:
+            existing = db.execute(
+                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
+                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
+                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing:
+                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != route.cell_id:
+                    raise ConflictError("principal route conflict")
+                return
+            db.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (
+                    channel,
+                    channel_account_id,
+                    principal_id,
+                    tenant_id,
+                    route.cell_id,
+                    isoformat(self._clock()),
+                ),
+            )
+
+    def bind_session(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: str,
+        session_id: str,
+        cell_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        ttl_seconds: int = 86400,
+    ) -> None:
+        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
+        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
+        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
+        if not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= 31 * 86400:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid session TTL")
+        now = self._clock()
+        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
+        with self._transaction() as db:
+            tenant = db.execute(
+                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active" or tenant["cell_id"] != cell_id:
+                raise ScopeError("session cell does not match tenant")
+            existing = db.execute(
+                "SELECT cell_id, principal_id FROM session_bindings "
+                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
+                (tenant_id, session_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing and (
+                existing["cell_id"] != cell_id or existing["principal_id"] != principal_id
+            ):
+                raise ConflictError("session is already bound to another principal or cell")
+            db.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO session_bindings VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?) "
+                "ON CONFLICT(tenant_id,session_id) DO UPDATE SET expires_at=excluded.expires_at",
+                (tenant_id, session_id, cell_id, principal_id, expires, isoformat(now)),
+            )
+
+    def resolve_channel(self, channel: str, channel_account_id: str) -> Route:
+        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
+        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            row = db.execute(
+                "SELECT r.tenant_id, r.cell_id, t.status FROM channel_routes r "
+                "JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=r.tenant_id "
+                "WHERE r.channel=? AND r.channel_account_id=?",
+                (channel, channel_account_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if not row:
+            raise ScopeError("unknown channel account")
+        if row["status"] != "active":
+            raise ScopeError("tenant is not active")
+        return Route(row["tenant_id"], row["cell_id"], channel, channel_account_id, "", None)
+
+    def resolve(
+        self,
+        *,
+        channel: str,
+        channel_account_id: str,
+        principal_id: str,
+        session_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> Route:
+        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
+        base = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
+        with self._connect() as db:
+            principal = db.execute(
+                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
+                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
+                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if principal and (
+                principal["tenant_id"] != base.tenant_id or principal["cell_id"] != base.cell_id
+            ):
+                raise ScopeError("principal route violates channel ownership")
+            if session_id is not None:
+                session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
+                session = db.execute(
+                    "SELECT cell_id, principal_id, expires_at FROM session_bindings "
+                    "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
+                    (base.tenant_id, session_id),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if not session:
+                    raise ScopeError("unknown session")
+                if parse_time(session["expires_at"]) <= self._clock():
+                    raise ScopeError("session expired")
+                if session["cell_id"] != base.cell_id or session["principal_id"] != principal_id:
+                    raise ScopeError("session scope mismatch")
+        return Route(
+            base.tenant_id,
+            base.cell_id,
+            channel,
+            channel_account_id,
+            principal_id,
+            session_id,
+        )
+
+    def assert_message_route(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> Route:
+        route = self.resolve(
+            channel=message.channel,
+            channel_account_id=message.channel_account_id,
+            principal_id=message.principal_id,
+            session_id=message.session_id,
+        )
+        if message.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or message.cell_id != route.cell_id:
+            raise ScopeError("message claims do not match authoritative route")
+        return route
+
+    def assert_context_route(self, context: TenantContext) -> Route:
+        route = self.resolve(
+            channel=context.channel,
+            channel_account_id=context.channel_account_id,
+            principal_id=context.principal_id,
+            session_id=context.session_id,
+        )
+        if context.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or context.cell_id != route.cell_id:
+            raise ScopeError("context claims do not match authoritative route")
+        return route
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+"""Tenant and Cell scoped secret reference model.
+
+This module never stores secret values. It stores ownership and retrieval scope
+metadata for integration with a real secret broker.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Literal
+
+from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SecretRef:
+    secret_id: str
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    kind: Literal["channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"]
+    version: str
+    broker_path: str
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        for name in ("secret_id", "cell_id", "version"):
+            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        if self.kind not in {"channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"}:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid secret kind")
+        if not self.broker_path.startswith("secret://"):
+            raise ValidationError("secret broker path required")
+
+    def can_be_used_by(self, *, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> bool:
+        return self.tenant_id == tenant_id and self.cell_id == cell_id
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+"""Signed tenant context and canonical message contract for AIOS V2R1."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import re
+import secrets
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+VERSION = "V2R1C0"
+MAX_SAFE_INTEGER = 9_007_199_254_740_991
+TENANT_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,38}[a-z0-9])?$")
+IDENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,126}[A-Za-z0-9])?$")
+
+
+class V2R1Error(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class ValidationError(V2R1Error):
+    pass
+
+
+class ScopeError(V2R1Error):
+    pass
+
+
+class ConflictError(V2R1Error):
+    pass
+
+
+def utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def isoformat(value: datetime | None = None) -> str:
+    return (value or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def parse_time(value: str) -> datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ValidationError("timestamp must be a non-empty string")
+    text = value.strip()
+    if text.endswith("Z"):
+        text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ValidationError(f"invalid timestamp: {value!r}") from exc
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValidationError("timestamp must include timezone")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def require_ident(name: str, value: Any, *, tenant: bool = False) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise ValidationError(f"{name} must be a string")
+    value = value.strip()
+    pattern = TENANT_RE if tenant else IDENT_RE
+    if not pattern.fullmatch(value):
+        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}: {value!r}")
+    return value
+
+
+def normalize_message_id(value: Any, *, field_name: str = "message_id") -> str:
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} cannot be boolean")
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.strip()
+        if not value or len(value) > 256 or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in value):
+            raise ValidationError(f"invalid {field_name}")
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, int):
+        if abs(value) > MAX_SAFE_INTEGER:
+            raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} is an unsafe numeric ID")
+        return str(value)
+    raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} must be a lossless string or safe integer")
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _b64(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _unb64(value: str) -> bytes:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TenantContext:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    principal_type: str
+    session_id: str
+    task_id: str | None
+    channel: str
+    channel_account_id: str
+    issued_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    nonce: str
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        for name in (
+            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "session_id",
+            "channel", "channel_account_id", "nonce",
+        ):
+            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
+        if self.task_id is not None:
+            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
+        issued = parse_time(self.issued_at)
+        expires = parse_time(self.expires_at)
+        if expires <= issued or expires - issued > timedelta(hours=1):
+            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant context lifetime")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def issue(cls, *, lifetime_seconds: int = 300, now: datetime | None = None, **scope: Any) -> "TenantContext":
+        if not 1 <= lifetime_seconds <= 3600:
+            raise ValidationError("lifetime_seconds must be between 1 and 3600")
+        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        return cls(
+            **scope,
+            issued_at=isoformat(current),
+            expires_at=isoformat(current + timedelta(seconds=lifetime_seconds)),
+            nonce=secrets.token_hex(16),
+        )
+
+    def sign(self, key: bytes) -> str:
+        if len(key) < 32:
+            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
+        payload = _b64(canonical_json(asdict(self)))
+        signature = _b64(hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest())
+        return f"{payload}.{signature}"
+
+    @classmethod
+    def verify(
+        cls,
+        token: str,
+        key: bytes,
+        *,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+        expected_tenant_id: str | None = None,
+        expected_cell_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> "TenantContext":
+        if len(key) < 32:
+            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
+        try:
+            payload, encoded_signature = token.split(".", 1)
+            actual = _unb64(encoded_signature)
+            if encoded_signature != _b64(actual):
+                raise ValidationError("non-canonical tenant context signature")
+            data = json.loads(_unb64(payload))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise ValidationError("malformed tenant context token") from exc
+        expected = hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
+        if not hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected):
+            raise ValidationError("tenant context signature mismatch")
+        context = cls(**data)
+        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+        if current < parse_time(context.issued_at) - timedelta(seconds=60):
+            raise ValidationError("tenant context issued in future")
+        if current >= parse_time(context.expires_at):
+            raise ValidationError("tenant context expired")
+        if expected_tenant_id and context.tenant_id != expected_tenant_id:
+            raise ScopeError("tenant mismatch")
+        if expected_cell_id and context.cell_id != expected_cell_id:
+            raise ScopeError("cell mismatch")
+        return context
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CanonicalMessage:
+    tenant_id: str
+    cell_id: str
+    principal_id: str
+    principal_type: str
+    origin_type: str
+    channel: str
+    channel_account_id: str
+    peer_id: str
+    conversation_id: str
+    session_id: str
+    task_id: str | None
+    event_id: str
+    message_id: str
+    reply_to_message_id: str | None
+    direction: str
+    command_capable: bool
+    occurred_at: str
+    received_at: str
+    body: str
+    quoted_body: str | None
+    adapter_name: str
+    adapter_version: str
+    schema_version: str = "aios.message.v1"
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if self.schema_version != "aios.message.v1":
+            raise ValidationError("unsupported message schema version")
+        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
+        for name in (
+            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "origin_type", "channel",
+            "channel_account_id", "peer_id", "conversation_id", "session_id",
+            "event_id", "adapter_name", "adapter_version",
+        ):
+            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
+        if self.task_id is not None:
+            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
+        normalize_message_id(self.message_id)
+        if self.reply_to_message_id is not None:
+            normalize_message_id(self.reply_to_message_id, field_name="reply_to_message_id")
+        if self.direction not in {"inbound", "outbound", "internal"}:
+            raise ValidationError("invalid direction")
+        if not isinstance(self.command_capable, bool):
+            raise ValidationError("command_capable must be boolean")
+        parse_time(self.occurred_at)
+        parse_time(self.received_at)
+        if not isinstance(self.body, str):
+            raise ValidationError("body must be a string")
+        if self.quoted_body is not None and not isinstance(self.quoted_body, str):
+            raise ValidationError("quoted_body must be a string or null")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, data: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalMessage":
+        content = data.get("content") or {}
+        adapter = data.get("adapter") or {}
+        if not isinstance(content, Mapping) or not isinstance(adapter, Mapping):
+            raise ValidationError("content and adapter must be objects")
+        values = dict(data)
+        return cls(
+            schema_version=values.get("schema_version", "aios.message.v1"),
+            tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
+            cell_id=values["cell_id"],
+            principal_id=values["principal_id"],
+            principal_type=values["principal_type"],
+            origin_type=values["origin_type"],
+            channel=values["channel"],
+            channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
+            peer_id=values["peer_id"],
+            conversation_id=values["conversation_id"],
+            session_id=values["session_id"],
+            task_id=values.get("task_id"),
+            event_id=values["event_id"],
+            message_id=normalize_message_id(values["message_id"]),
+            reply_to_message_id=(
+                normalize_message_id(values["reply_to_message_id"], field_name="reply_to_message_id")
+                if values.get("reply_to_message_id") is not None else None
+            ),
+            direction=values["direction"],
+            command_capable=values["command_capable"],
+            occurred_at=values["occurred_at"],
+            received_at=values["received_at"],
+            body=content.get("body", ""),
+            quoted_body=content.get("quoted_body"),
+            adapter_name=adapter["name"],
+            adapter_version=adapter["version"],
+        )
+
+    def assert_context(self, context: TenantContext) -> None:
+        fields = (
+            "tenant_id", "cell_id", "principal_id", "session_id", "task_id",
+            "channel", "channel_account_id",
+        )
+        mismatches = [name for name in fields if getattr(self, name) != getattr(context, name)]
+        if mismatches:
+            raise ScopeError("message/context mismatch: " + ", ".join(mismatches))
+
+    @property
+    def is_authenticated_human_command(self) -> bool:
+        return (
+            self.direction == "inbound"
+            and self.command_capable
+            and self.principal_type == "authenticated_user"
+            and self.origin_type == "channel_user"
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    approval_required: bool
+    code: str
+    reason: str
+
+
+READ_ONLY_TOOLS = frozenset({
+    "read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
+    "memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
+})
+
+
+def evaluate_tool_call(tool_name: str, message: CanonicalMessage) -> PolicyDecision:
+    normalized = tool_name.strip().lower() if isinstance(tool_name, str) else ""
+    if not normalized:
+        return PolicyDecision(False, False, "invalid_tool", "tool name missing")
+    if normalized in READ_ONLY_TOOLS:
+        return PolicyDecision(True, False, "read_only", "read-only operation")
+    if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
+        return PolicyDecision(
+            False, False, "origin_denied",
+            "side effects require an authenticated current human command",
+        )
+    return PolicyDecision(
+        True, True, "approval_required",
+        "authenticated human side effect requires explicit approval",
+    )
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
 {
- "current_baseline": "V1R4C3",
- "previous_baseline": "V1R3C1",
- "promoted_at": "2026-07-09T17:44:57+08:00",
- "git": "f5435e308794c737f3e39de3f6b79807486943c3",
- "promoted_by": "openclaw",
- "promotion_reason": "V1R4C3 autonomous operations, search gateway, task center, owner gate, and blocker self-optimization baseline promotion"
-}
+    "current_baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C5",
+    "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T21:00:00+08:00",
+    "git": "e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd",
+    "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
+    "promotion_reason": "V1R4C6 admin search agent integration, search gateway, agent platform, VERSION bump, merge tests deploy pipeline — not yet deployed to production",
+    "constraints": {
+        "memory_search_enabled": false,
+        "force_push_allowed": false,
+        "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval": true
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+printf 'AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 health check\n'
+
+python3 - <<'PY'
+from pathlib import Path
+required = [
+ 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py',
+ 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py',
+ 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py',
+ 'openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/openclaw.plugin.json',
+]
+missing=[p for p in required if not Path(p).exists()]
+if missing:
+    raise SystemExit('missing: '+','.join(missing))
+print('artifact presence PASS')
+PY
+
+echo 'runtime health requires OpenClaw environment probe'
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)
+EXPECTED_BRANCH="release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712"
+
+if [[ "$(git -C "$ROOT" branch --show-current)" != "$EXPECTED_BRANCH" ]]; then
+  echo "wrong release branch"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+COMMIT=$(git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse HEAD)
+echo "Installing AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 commit=$COMMIT"
+
+python3 - <<'PY'
+import compileall
+if not compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1):
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print('python compile PASS')
+PY
+
+if [[ -f openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/package.json ]]; then
+  echo "plugin package PASS"
+else
+  echo "plugin package missing"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "Installation preflight PASS"
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+MODE=${1:---check}
+
+case "$MODE" in
+  --check)
+    echo "V2R1C0 RC1 validation mode"
+    ;;
+  --install)
+    echo "Install requires approved OpenClaw Cell target"
+    ;;
+  --rollback)
+    echo "Rollback requires recorded Cell backup"
+    ;;
+  *)
+    echo "Usage: $0 [--check|--install|--rollback]"
+    exit 2
+    ;;
+esac
+
+python3 - <<'PY'
+import compileall
+raise SystemExit(0 if compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1) else 1)
+PY
+
+echo "python runtime syntax: PASS"
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# AIOS V1R5 to V2R1 Migration Plan
+
+## Goal
+
+Move from shared Gateway assumptions to Tenant Cell isolation.
+
+## Order
+
+1. Establish Tenant Registry and signed Tenant Context.
+2. Implement Tenant Router.
+3. Implement OpenClaw Cell lifecycle management.
+4. Introduce canonical message envelope.
+5. Add provenance and execution policy enforcement.
+6. Migrate Hermes into shared fabric with isolated profiles.
+7. Migrate memory, secrets and audit storage.
+
+## Do Not
+
+- Do not modify Hermes first.
+- Do not share production credentials across tenants.
+- Do not treat workspace separation as a sandbox.
+- Do not allow unknown message origins to execute tools.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+Each migration stage requires automated tests and runtime evidence before promotion.
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# AIOS V2R1 OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric Architecture
+
+## Status
+
+Release train: V2R1C0
+
+Purpose: replace shared runtime trust assumptions with tenant-isolated Cell architecture.
+
+## Principles
+
+1. OpenClaw Gateway is a trust boundary.
+2. Each production tenant receives an isolated Cell.
+3. Hermes provides shared scheduling/fabric capability but not shared tenant state.
+4. Tenant identity, origin, session and task scope are mandatory in every event.
+5. Unknown provenance fails closed.
+
+## Target Components
+
+- Tenant Router
+- OpenClaw Cell Manager
+- Canonical Message Envelope
+- Tenant Inbox/Outbox Ledger
+- Secret Scope Manager
+- Memory Namespace Manager
+- Hermes Profile Worker Fabric
+- Sandbox Execution Layer
+- Audit Event Pipeline
+
+## Migration Order
+
+Phase 1: Tenant Router + Cell Manager
+
+Phase 2: Canonical Message and Policy Layer
+
+Phase 3: Hermes Shared Agent Fabric
+
+Phase 4: Memory, Secret and Audit isolation
+
+Phase 5: Production tenant migration
+
+## Release Gate
+
+A V2R1 production release requires:
+
+- tenant isolation tests passed
+- message provenance tests passed
+- runtime commit matches release commit
+- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspection passed
+- rollback verified
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+# V1R4C5 Acceptance Evidence
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: release candidate evidence in progress
+
+Current active baseline: V1R4C3
+
+V1R4C5 has not been promoted yet.
+
+## Owner Decision
+
+Owner approved continued V1R4C5 work under the following constraints:
+
+```text
+允许无 force-push 的分支 reconcile
+memory search 保持关闭
+先完成 SR-01/SR-02/数据隔离验收
+再进入 merge/deploy/tag owner gate
+```
+
+## Scope
+
+V1R4C5 release candidate scope:
+
+1. SR-01 Gitea reliability and branch consistency guardrails.
+2. SR-02 watcher/stuck command cleanup.
+3. User data isolation redline and enforcement gates.
+4. SR-04 admin workbench read-only visibility preparation only.
+
+Explicitly excluded from V1R4C5 activation:
+
+- memory search activation;
+- full SR-04 portal production rollout;
+- bulk merge of old test/smoke/auth branches;
+- force push reconciliation;
+- Gitea DB mutation without owner/admin approval.
+
+## Runtime Acceptance Evidence
+
+### Runtime status
+
+Observed:
+
+```json
+{
+  "service": "aios-gitops-model-api",
+  "status": "active",
+  "workspace_branch": "patch/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01"
+}
+```
+
+### Baseline
+
+Observed:
+
+```json
+{
+  "current_baseline": "V1R4C3",
+  "previous_baseline": "V1R3C1",
+  "promoted_by": "openclaw"
+}
+```
+
+### Clean createBranch acceptance
+
+Branch:
+
+```text
+test/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01
+```
+
+Result:
+
+```text
+status: ok
+commit: 6ae7058
+sync: synced
+```
+
+### Clean createPatch acceptance
+
+Patch:
+
+```text
+patch/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01
+```
+
+Patch id:
+
+```text
+patch-1783706123789-f5ca8b69
+```
+
+Commit:
+
+```text
+ba0391e
+```
+
+Result:
+
+```text
+synced
+```
+
+## SR-01 Evidence
+
+Known accepted evidence:
+
+- Gitea branch consistency sentinel deployed.
+- Sentinel reports:
+
+```json
+{
+  "status": "healthy",
+  "unhealthy_checks": []
+}
+```
+
+- systemd timer runs every 5 minutes.
+- service runs with:
+
+```text
+--emit-safe-mode --json
+```
+
+- broken symlink issue resolved by replacing the external reliability symlink with workspace-local files.
+
+Required before final promotion:
+
+- confirm latest sentinel report remains healthy after acceptance writes.
+
+## SR-02 Evidence
+
+Known accepted evidence:
+
+```text
+11 / 11 tests pass
+```
+
+Fix summary:
+
+- stuck command detection reads parsed timestamps through `data.get('ts', 0)`;
+- `.md` fixture mtime is aligned with stored stuck timestamp via `os.utime(path, (ts, ts))`;
+- behavior is consistent across `.json` and `.md` state formats.
+
+Required before final promotion:
+
+- re-run SR-02 tests on the final integration candidate.
+
+## User Data Isolation Evidence
+
+Implemented controls:
+
+- user data isolation redline;
+- memory scope guard;
+- provider gate;
+- activation gate;
+- audit service/timer;
+- CI acceptance scripts;
+- memory search activation check.
+
+Required safety state:
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+Required before memory/search activation:
+
+- isolation audit healthy;
+- no denied records;
+- no invalid records;
+- provider filters by scope before ranking;
+- provenance required;
+- global index disabled;
+- activation gate returns allowed;
+- explicit owner approval.
+
+V1R4C5 does not approve memory search activation.
+
+## SR-04 Admin Workbench Evidence
+
+Current user-visible gap is confirmed:
+
+- administrator cannot yet see task progress;
+- administrator cannot yet see flow/process diagrams;
+- SR-04 remains activation-ready but gated.
+
+V1R4C5 scope allows only read-only visibility preparation and acceptance design, not full production rollout.
+
+Required before SR-04 deployment:
+
+- SR-01 green;
+- SR-02 green;
+- user data isolation gate accepted;
+- admin RBAC read-only check green.
+
+## Remaining Required Gates Before Promotion
+
+- [ ] Latest Gitea sentinel report remains healthy.
+- [ ] SR-02 watcher tests pass on final candidate.
+- [ ] User data isolation acceptance passes.
+- [ ] Admin workbench read-only RBAC acceptance passes or remains explicitly deferred.
+- [ ] No force-push was used.
+- [ ] Memory search remains disabled.
+- [ ] Owner approves merge/deploy/tag/promotion.
+
+## Promotion Rule
+
+V1R4C5 may not be promoted until all required gates are green or explicitly deferred with owner approval.
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# V1R4C5 Final Owner Approval
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: approved for final promotion
+
+## Owner Decision
+
+Owner approved final V1R4C5 promotion.
+
+Memory search must remain disabled.
+
+```text
+允许最终晋升
+继续保持 memory search 关闭
+```
+
+## Promotion Scope
+
+Approved for V1R4C5:
+
+1. SR-01 Gitea reliability and branch consistency guardrails.
+2. SR-02 watcher/stuck command cleanup.
+3. User data isolation redline and enforcement gates.
+4. SR-04 admin workbench read-only visibility preparation only.
+
+## Explicit Non-Activation
+
+The following are not approved by this promotion:
+
+```text
+memory search activation
+full cross-session memory recall
+global vector index
+full SR-04 production portal rollout beyond read-only/admin visibility preparation
+bulk merge of old test/smoke/auth branches
+force-push based reconciliation
+```
+
+## Required Runtime State
+
+Memory remains disabled:
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+If a provider or deployment attempts to enable memory/search, it must be blocked unless a future owner approval explicitly allows it after the user-data isolation activation gate returns allowed.
+
+## Final Promotion Rule
+
+V1R4C5 may proceed to tag/promotion under owner gate.
+
+If any final gate fails, promotion must stop and memory/search must remain disabled.
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# V1R4C5 Release to Main Reconcile Plan
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: reconcile preparation
+
+## Objective
+
+Bring the V1R4C5 release state back into `main` without rewriting history and without moving the immutable V1R4C5 tag.
+
+## Source of Truth
+
+Release baseline:
+
+```text
+V1R4C5
+```
+
+Promotion commit:
+
+```text
+a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+```
+
+Tag:
+
+```text
+V1R4C5
+```
+
+Tag policy:
+
+```text
+immutable
+```
+
+## Reconcile Rules
+
+Allowed:
+
+- normal merge commits;
+- fast-forward where possible;
+- conflict resolution with review;
+- updating main to contain released C5 state.
+
+Forbidden:
+
+- force-push;
+- tag movement;
+- rewriting release history;
+- importing V1R4C6 feature code into this reconcile.
+
+## Expected Included C5 Content
+
+- SR-01 Gitea reliability guardrails.
+- Gitea branch consistency sentinel.
+- SR-02 watcher state cleanup.
+- User Data Isolation gate.
+- Reliability governance documents.
+- Admin Workbench read-only preparation records.
+
+## Expected Excluded Content
+
+Do not include:
+
+- V1R4C6 Admin Workbench implementation code.
+- SR-03 Search Gateway implementation.
+- Agent Platform integration.
+- Memory search activation.
+- Global vector index.
+
+## Validation Before Main Merge
+
+Required:
+
+```text
+getBaseline.current_baseline == V1R4C5
+V1R4C5 tag unchanged
+memory search disabled
+Gitea sentinel healthy
+SR-02 tests pass
+main merge does not include V1R4C6 branches
+```
+
+## Post Merge Validation
+
+Run:
+
+```text
+getRuntimeStatus
+getBaseline
+createBranch
+createPatch
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```text
+main contains V1R4C5 release state
+active baseline remains V1R4C5
+```
+
+## Owner Gate
+
+Normal merge to `main` may proceed after validation.
+
+No tag creation or baseline promotion is required because V1R4C5 is already promoted.
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# V1R4C6 Acceptance Checklist
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Base baseline: V1R4C5
+
+Promotion blocked until every mandatory gate is green.
+
+## Global Preflight
+
+- [ ] `getRuntimeStatus.status == active`
+- [ ] `getBaseline.current_baseline == V1R4C5`
+- [ ] `getBaseline.git == a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704`
+- [ ] `AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO` points to `/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git`
+- [ ] Gitea consistency sentinel reports `healthy`
+- [ ] `AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false`
+- [ ] no force-push used
+
+## Gate A — Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+### Route/API
+
+- [ ] `/portal/me/aios/manifest` returns authenticated module manifest
+- [ ] `/portal/me/aios/dashboard` returns admin-authorized dashboard data
+- [ ] `/portal/me/aios/health` returns system health data
+- [ ] failed/empty backend data produces explicit empty/error state
+
+### UI
+
+- [ ] admin sees task progress
+- [ ] admin sees process/flow diagram entry
+- [ ] admin sees system health
+- [ ] admin sees authorized agent observability
+- [ ] user does not see admin-only modules
+- [ ] admin does not see owner-only modules without owner role
+
+### Isolation
+
+- [ ] no cross-user data
+- [ ] no cross-project data
+- [ ] no cross-session data
+- [ ] no cross-tenant/group data
+
+Gate A result: `PASS / FAIL / DEFER`
+
+## Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+### Provider Binding
+
+- [ ] real provider configured and reachable
+- [ ] provider errors return safe non-memory fallback
+- [ ] timeout/retry/circuit-breaker behavior verified
+
+### Scope and Provenance
+
+- [ ] scope filter occurs before ranking
+- [ ] provenance returned for accepted results
+- [ ] denied/out-of-scope content never reaches ranking or summary
+- [ ] global memory/vector index disabled
+- [ ] memory search remains disabled
+
+### Audit
+
+- [ ] search request scope is logged without leaking content
+- [ ] provider/fallback decision is auditable
+- [ ] denied scope mismatch is auditable
+
+Gate B result: `PASS / FAIL / DEFER`
+
+## Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+### Event Bus
+
+- [ ] event envelope includes tenant/group, user, project, session and agent scope
+- [ ] cross-scope subscribers cannot receive events
+- [ ] failed delivery is observable and retry-bounded
+
+### GPT Message Plane
+
+- [ ] message envelope includes scope and provenance
+- [ ] messages cannot cross user/project/session boundaries
+- [ ] denied messages do not forward content
+
+### Controller Dispatch
+
+- [ ] dispatch stops when autonomous safe mode is active
+- [ ] consequential actions require owner gate
+- [ ] duplicate dispatch is idempotent or rejected
+- [ ] stuck state cleanup remains green
+
+### Observability
+
+- [ ] admin can see platform status without unrestricted content access
+- [ ] failures and queue state are visible
+
+Gate C result: `PASS / FAIL / DEFER`
+
+## Combined Runtime Acceptance
+
+Run after integration and deployment:
+
+```text
+getRuntimeStatus
+getBaseline
+createBranch
+createPatch
+```
+
+Expected before promotion:
+
+```text
+runtime = active
+baseline = V1R4C5
+write branch = committed + synced
+write patch = committed + synced
+```
+
+## Rollback Validation
+
+- [ ] Group A can disable workbench routes/menu entries
+- [ ] Group B can disable provider binding and use safe non-memory fallback
+- [ ] Group C can disable expanded dispatch
+- [ ] all rollback modes preserve `AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false`
+
+## Release Decision
+
+V1R4C6 is tag-ready only when:
+
+```text
+Global preflight PASS
+AND Gate A PASS
+AND Gate B PASS
+AND Gate C PASS
+AND combined runtime acceptance PASS
+```
+
+Any failed mandatory gate blocks tag, deployment promotion, and baseline promotion.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# V1R4C6 Acceptance Evidence
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+## Merge
+
+- **PR #6** (merge commit `ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec`): V1R4C6 release-candidate control artifacts merged to main.
+- **Result**: PASS
+  - 10 files (1440 lines) added: release docs, patch records, ops commands, version metadata
+  - No V1R4C6 tag created
+  - No baseline promotion
+  - Memory search remains disabled
+  - Force-push remains disabled
+
+## Verified State (post-merge)
+
+| Check                    | Result |
+|--------------------------|--------|
+| main HEAD                | ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec |
+| V1R4C5 tag               | Still at d457ac396147043ed5d0a3fd8b44bcb10f48bceb (not moved) |
+| V1R4C6 tag               | absent |
+| baseline/current.json    | current_baseline = V1R4C5, git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704 |
+| memory_search_enabled    | false |
+| force_push_allowed       | false |
+| versions/V1R4C5.json     | exists |
+| versions/V1R4C6.json     | exists |
+
+## Gates
+
+| Gate                         | Status  | Notes                          |
+|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| control artifacts merge      | PASS    | PR #6 merged to main           |
+| Gate A — Admin Workbench     | NOT RUN | Engineering integration pending|
+| Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway| NOT RUN | Engineering integration pending|
+| Gate C — Agent Platform      | NOT RUN | Engineering integration pending|
+| tests                        | NOT RUN | No test suite executed         |
+| artifact digest              | NOT CREATED | No build performed          |
+| deployment                   | NOT RUN | No deploy performed            |
+| production verification      | NOT RUN | No production verification     |
+
+## Rollback
+
+Revert command (creates new branch and PR, non-destructive):
+
+```bash
+git revert -m 1 ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec
+```
+
+## Current Overall Status
+
+**BLOCKED / INTEGRATION PENDING** — all engineering gates remain unexecuted.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# V1R4C6 Blocker: Baseline Visibility Discrepancy
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: blocking merge/deploy/tag
+
+## Summary
+
+OpenClaw/operator reported V1R4C5 baseline promotion completed successfully, but the ChatGPT GitOps action view still reports the active baseline as V1R4C3.
+
+V1R4C6 must not proceed to merge/deploy/tag until this view is reconciled.
+
+## Operator Reported State
+
+Reported by operator:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+previous_baseline = V1R4C3
+promotion_git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+promoted_by = openclaw/admin
+memory_search_enabled = false
+force_push_allowed = false
+gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval = true
+```
+
+## ChatGPT GitOps Action Observed State
+
+Observed through `getBaseline`:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C3
+previous_baseline = V1R3C1
+git = f5435e308794c737f3e39de3f6b79807486943c3
+promoted_by = openclaw
+```
+
+Observed through `listVersions`:
+
+```text
+V1R4C5 tag exists
+versions_dir does not list canonical V1R4C5.json
+workspace_branch = release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+```
+
+## Risk
+
+If V1R4C6 proceeds while different controllers disagree on the active baseline, the release may be built against the wrong base and post-deployment verification may be invalid.
+
+## Required Reconciliation
+
+Before continuing V1R4C6:
+
+1. Confirm the GitOps API used by ChatGPT reads the same `baseline/current.json` updated by OpenClaw.
+2. Confirm the API service has reloaded or refreshed baseline state.
+3. Confirm canonical `versions/V1R4C5.json` is visible to the action runtime or intentionally explain why it is not required.
+4. Re-run:
+
+```text
+getBaseline
+listVersions
+getRuntimeStatus
+```
+
+Required result:
+
+```text
+getBaseline.current_baseline = V1R4C5
+listVersions.tags contains V1R4C5
+memory search remains disabled
+```
+
+## Hard Stop
+
+Do not create V1R4C6 tag.
+Do not promote V1R4C6 baseline.
+Do not deploy V1R4C6.
+Do not enable memory search.
+
+Proceed only after baseline visibility is reconciled.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# V1R4C6 Context Isolation Recovery and Resume Decision
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: approved to resume merge/deploy/verification; stop before tag/promotion
+
+## Recovery Evidence
+
+The unrelated OpenClaw/WeChat report was traced to notification/task isolation weaknesses rather than GitOps baseline corruption.
+
+Actions completed:
+
+1. The legacy `AIOS每日自治报告` cron was disabled and retained for forensic review.
+2. The expired `2026-07-06-reminder` cron was archived and deleted after confirming no pending dependency.
+3. Pending notification queue depth was verified as zero.
+4. Unknown/unscoped queued message count was verified as zero.
+5. A scoped V1R4C6 WeChat test notification was sent successfully.
+
+The test notification included:
+
+```text
+task_id = V1R4C6-integration
+release_id = V1R4C6
+branch = release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+baseline = V1R4C5
+correlation_id = 70308f5e243ab81d
+```
+
+No recipient identifier, token, cookie, or unrelated message content is stored in this release record.
+
+## Resume Decision
+
+V1R4C6 may resume:
+
+```text
+merge
+component tests
+security/isolation tests
+deployment
+production verification
+release evidence updates
+```
+
+V1R4C6 must still stop before:
+
+```text
+Git tag creation
+baseline promotion
+memory search activation
+```
+
+## Required Execution Context
+
+Before every OpenClaw execution or WeChat notification, assert:
+
+```text
+task_id = V1R4C6-integration
+release_id = V1R4C6
+branch = release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+baseline = V1R4C5
+memory_search_enabled = false
+```
+
+Any mismatch re-enters safe mode and blocks execution/notification.
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+```text
+no force-push
+no Gitea DB mutation
+no V1R4C5 tag movement
+no global memory/vector index
+no cross-user/project/session notification or task data
+```
+
+## Owner Gate
+
+After Gate A, Gate B, Gate C, deployment verification, runtime acceptance, and Gitea sentinel checks pass, OpenClaw must request explicit owner approval through the scoped WeChat channel for both:
+
+1. Create V1R4C6 Git tag.
+2. Promote active baseline from V1R4C5 to V1R4C6.
+
+Ambiguous acknowledgements do not count as approval.
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+# V1R4C6 Integration Merge Matrix
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: integration-ready
+
+Base baseline: V1R4C5
+
+Base baseline git: `a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704`
+
+## Release Objective
+
+Deliver three capability groups in one controlled release train:
+
+1. Admin Workbench and Portal AIOS read-only rollout.
+2. SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding.
+3. Agent Platform Integration.
+
+This is a bundled release train, not an uncontrolled bulk merge. Each group has an independent acceptance gate and rollback switch.
+
+## Group A — Admin Workbench and Portal AIOS
+
+| Branch | Capability | Decision |
+|---|---|---|
+| `feature/v1r4c4-sr04-admin-workbench-visibility-20260711` | Admin workbench task progress and process visibility | integrate |
+| `feature/v1r4c4-sr04-portal-aios-visibility-20260710` | Portal AIOS route/menu visibility | integrate |
+| `patch/user-portal-me-route-diagnostics-20260709` | `/portal/me/aios/manifest`, dashboard and health route contract | integrate after route review |
+| `patch/user-portal-rbac-ops-dashboard` | Admin/group-admin RBAC dashboard | integrate after RBAC review |
+| `patch/agent-observability-webui` | Agent observability UI | integrate read-only |
+| `patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706` | GitOps dashboard UI | integrate only if not superseded by the newer workbench implementation |
+
+### Required user-visible result
+
+Administrators can see:
+
+- task progress;
+- task/flow/process diagram entry;
+- system health;
+- authorized agent observability;
+- explicit empty/error states.
+
+### Security constraints
+
+- Read-only first.
+- RBAC is enforced server-side and client-side.
+- No cross-user, cross-project, cross-session, or cross-tenant data exposure.
+- Owner-only modules remain hidden from non-owner administrators.
+
+## Group B — SR-03 Search Gateway Real Provider Binding
+
+| Branch | Capability | Decision |
+|---|---|---|
+| `feature/v1r4c4-sr02-search-gateway-resilience-20260710` | Gateway resilience and safe fallback | integrate |
+| `patch/search-gateway-governed-general-capability` | Governed provider binding and policy surface | integrate after scope review |
+| `patch/gitops-change-archive-audit` | Change/archive audit evidence | integrate or retain as supporting audit module |
+
+### Required result
+
+- Real provider binding works.
+- Query scope is enforced before ranking.
+- Accepted records include provenance.
+- Provider failure falls back to `text-only`, `no-memory`, or `scoped-only`.
+- Global memory/vector indexes are not used.
+
+### Security constraints
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+```
+
+Search Gateway provider binding must not implicitly enable memory search.
+
+## Group C — Agent Platform Integration
+
+| Branch | Capability | Decision |
+|---|---|---|
+| `patch/agent-event-bus-unified` | Unified scoped agent event bus | integrate |
+| `patch/agent-gpt-message-plane` | Scoped Agent/GPT message plane | integrate |
+| `patch/autonomous-controller-dispatch-20260709` | Autonomous controller dispatch | integrate behind safe-mode gate |
+| `patch/self-evolution-agent-orchestration-policy` | Agent orchestration and governance policy | integrate |
+| `patch/aios-autonomous-orchestrator-architecture-review-v1` | Architecture record | integrate as documentation or mark superseded after review |
+
+### Required result
+
+- Agent event and message envelopes include user/project/session scope.
+- Controller dispatch stops when autonomous safe mode is active.
+- Consequential actions remain owner-gated.
+- Observability is available before autonomous expansion.
+
+## Explicitly Excluded
+
+Do not merge or activate in V1R4C6:
+
+- memory search activation;
+- global vector index;
+- cross-session/global recall;
+- unscoped search or message delivery;
+- old test/smoke/auth-only branches;
+- old V1R2/V1R3 promotion requests;
+- force-push reconciliation;
+- Gitea database mutation.
+
+## Merge and Deployment Order
+
+```text
+1. Verify V1R4C5 baseline and bare-repo configuration.
+2. Integrate Group A read-only workbench/portal surface.
+3. Run Group A RBAC and visibility acceptance.
+4. Integrate Group B provider binding under isolation gate.
+5. Run Group B scope/provenance/fallback acceptance.
+6. Integrate Group C event/message/dispatch capabilities.
+7. Run Group C scope/safe-mode/owner-gate acceptance.
+8. Run combined runtime acceptance.
+9. Prepare V1R4C6 tag and promotion request.
+10. Stop for owner confirmation before tag/promotion.
+```
+
+## Combined Acceptance
+
+Required:
+
+```text
+getRuntimeStatus -> active
+getBaseline -> V1R4C5 before promotion
+createBranch -> committed and synced
+createPatch -> committed and synced
+Gitea branch sentinel -> healthy
+memory search -> disabled
+```
+
+## Rollback Switches
+
+- Group A: disable new workbench routes/menu entries.
+- Group B: disable real provider binding and use safe non-memory fallback.
+- Group C: disable expanded dispatch and keep event/message plane observational.
+- Memory search remains disabled in all rollback modes.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# V1R4C6 Release Acceptance Checklist
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+## Gate A — Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+| Check                          | Status  | Notes                          |
+|--------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| Admin workbench RBAC read-only | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Portal AIOS manifest route     | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Portal AIOS dashboard route    | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Flow/process diagram renders   | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Portal AIOS health route       | NOT RUN |                                |
+
+## Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+| Check                              | Status  | Notes                          |
+|------------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| Provider binding correctness       | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Scope-before-ranking validation    | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Provenance correctness             | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Fallback to disabled provider      | NOT RUN |                                |
+
+## Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+| Check                              | Status  | Notes                          |
+|------------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
+| Event scope isolation               | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Message plane scope isolation       | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Dispatch safe-mode respects control | NOT RUN |                                |
+| Owner gate for consequential ops    | NOT RUN |                                |
+
+## Final Deployment Gates
+
+| Check                     | Status    | Notes                          |
+|---------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------|
+| Tag V1R4C6                | NO        | Requires owner approval        |
+| Baseline promotion        | NO        | Requires owner approval        |
+| Memory search enabled     | NO        | Requires future owner approval |
+
+## Active Constraints
+
+- AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED: false
+- Force-push: forbidden
+- Gitea DB mutation: owner approval required
+- Memory search: disabled (future owner approval required for enable)
+
+## Artifact
+
+- **PR #6 merge commit**: `ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec`
+- **Source baseline**: V1R4C5 (commit a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704)
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# V1R4C6 Release Gate Status
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+Status: integration pending — release-candidate control artifacts merged, engineering gates not yet executed
+
+## Completed
+
+- V1R4C5 baseline verified as active base.
+- GitOps API and public API return:
+  - current_baseline: V1R4C5
+  - previous_baseline: V1R4C3
+  - git: a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+- GitOps bare repository path corrected to active `aios.git`.
+- V1R4C6 merge matrix created.
+- V1R4C6 acceptance checklist created.
+- V1R4C6 acceptance evidence created.
+- PR #6: control artifacts merge — PASS
+
+## Result Summary
+
+| Item                    | Status    |
+|-------------------------|-----------|
+| control artifacts merge | PASS       |
+| Gate A                  | NOT RUN   |
+| Gate B                  | NOT RUN   |
+| Gate C                  | NOT RUN   |
+| tests                   | NOT RUN   |
+| artifact                | NOT CREATED |
+| deployment              | NOT RUN   |
+| production verification | NOT RUN   |
+| tag created             | NO        |
+| baseline promoted       | NO        |
+| memory search enabled   | NO        |
+| **overall**             | **BLOCKED / INTEGRATION PENDING** |
+
+## Verified Artifact
+
+- **PR #6 merge commit**: `ae49bf0fa35b0f599a96a4d12644576447f39cec`
+- **Current baseline**: V1R4C5
+- **V1R4C6 tag**: absent
+- **Memory search**: disabled
+- **Force-push**: disabled
+
+## Remaining Gates (not yet executed)
+
+### Gate A — Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+- merge candidate review;
+- RBAC acceptance;
+- task progress visibility;
+- flow diagram visibility;
+- health/observability validation.
+
+### Gate B — SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+- provider binding validation;
+- scope-before-ranking validation;
+- provenance validation;
+- fallback validation.
+
+### Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+- event scope validation;
+- message plane scope validation;
+- dispatch safe-mode validation;
+- owner gate validation.
+
+## Release Stop Point
+
+After Gates A/B/C pass:
+
+```text
+prepare V1R4C6 tag
+        ↓
+owner confirmation required
+        ↓
+tag creation
+        ↓
+baseline promotion
+```
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+Remain:
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+memory search disabled
+force-push forbidden
+gitea DB mutation requires owner approval
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+apiVersion: aios.gitops/v1
+kind: ExecutionOrder
+metadata:
+  name: openclaw-v1r4c6-merge-tests-deploy
+  date: 2026-07-11
+  owner_approval:
+    branch: request/openclaw-v1r4c6-merge-deploy-20260711
+    file: approvals/openclaw-v1r4c6-merge-deploy-owner-approval.yaml
+    commit: 4653f92
+spec:
+  objective: >-
+    Integrate the approved V1R4C6 Admin Workbench, Search Gateway, and Agent Platform
+    changes into a clean candidate based on the latest main, execute all mandatory gates,
+    merge to main only after success, then deploy and verify production.
+  confirmation_policy: no_additional_confirmation_required
+  source:
+    primary_branch: release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+    supporting_domains:
+      - admin-workbench-portal-aios
+      - search-gateway-governance
+      - agent-platform-integration
+  target:
+    integration_branch: integration/v1r4c6-merge-deploy-20260711-01
+    final_branch: main
+    release_version: V1R4C6
+  execution:
+    - id: preflight
+      actions:
+        - fetch_all_refs_and_tags
+        - verify_workspace_clean
+        - reset_integration_candidate_to_latest_main
+        - verify_baseline_is_V1R4C5
+        - verify_memory_search_enabled_is_false
+        - verify_V1R4C5_tag_unchanged
+        - record_main_head_and_source_head
+      stop_conditions:
+        - dirty_workspace
+        - missing_source_branch
+        - baseline_not_V1R4C5
+        - protected_setting_changed
+    - id: semantic-diff-review
+      actions:
+        - compute_three_dot_diff_from_main_to_primary_branch
+        - classify_changes_by_admin_search_agent_domains
+        - detect_duplicate_control_artifacts_already_merged_by_PR_6
+        - preserve_PR_7_NOT_RUN_status_until_tests_execute
+        - reject_reversion_of_V1R4C5_baseline_metadata
+        - reject_enablement_of_memory_search
+      output:
+        - execution/evidence/v1r4c6-semantic-diff-report.md
+    - id: merge-candidate
+      actions:
+        - merge_primary_branch_into_integration_candidate_without_fast_forward
+        - resolve_text_conflicts_by_preserving_latest_main_control_metadata
+        - preserve_source_business_functionality_when_not_conflicting_with_safety_controls
+        - commit_resolved_candidate
+      forbidden:
+        - force_push
+        - direct_commit_to_main
+        - bypass_branch_protection
+        - bypass_owner_gate
+        - weaken_rbac_or_scope_isolation
+        - mark_unexecuted_tests_as_passed
+    - id: gate-a-admin
+      required_checks:
+        - admin_workbench_routes_and_assets_load
+        - portal_aios_manifest_dashboard_health_endpoints
+        - server_side_and_frontend_rbac
+        - empty_error_and_loading_states
+        - tenant_user_project_session_isolation
+    - id: gate-b-search
+      required_checks:
+        - real_provider_binding_or_explicit_safe_fallback
+        - timeout_limited_retry_and_safe_fallback
+        - scope_filter_before_ranking
+        - provenance_in_results
+        - provider_and_fallback_audit
+        - unauthorized_results_never_enter_ranking_or_summary
+        - memory_search_remains_disabled
+    - id: gate-c-agent
+      required_checks:
+        - unified_agent_event_bus
+        - scoped_agent_gpt_message_plane
+        - autonomous_controller_dispatch
+        - safe_mode_stops_dispatch_and_change
+        - high_risk_actions_remain_owner_gated
+        - duplicate_dispatch_is_idempotent_or_rejected
+        - queue_failure_retry_observability
+    - id: runtime-and-regression
+      actions:
+        - run_getRuntimeStatus
+        - run_getBaseline
+        - run_createBranch_smoke_test
+        - run_createPatch_smoke_test
+        - run_full_regression_suite
+        - run_deployment_preflight_health_checks
+      expected:
+        reads: "200 OK with service, status, workspace_branch"
+        writes: "200 OK with branch, commit, rev, sync_status"
+    - id: promote-main
+      conditions:
+        - gate_a_passed
+        - gate_b_passed
+        - gate_c_passed
+        - runtime_acceptance_passed
+        - regression_passed
+        - deployment_preflight_passed
+      actions:
+        - open_or_update_merge_request_from_integration_candidate_to_main
+        - merge_without_rewriting_history
+        - record_new_main_head
+        - update_versions_V1R4C6_json_to_release_ready_or_active_baseline_as_policy_requires
+        - update_baseline_current_json_only_after_successful_promotion
+        - create_V1R4C6_tag_according_to_repository_tag_semantics
+    - id: deploy-and-verify
+      actions:
+        - trigger_direct_deployment_from_new_main
+        - verify_service_health
+        - verify_admin_search_agent_smoke_paths
+        - verify_runtime_status_and_baseline_after_deploy
+        - verify_rollback_artifact_and_previous_baseline_are_available
+        - publish_production_verification_report
+  failure_policy:
+    mode: fail_closed
+    on_any_failure:
+      - stop_pipeline
+      - do_not_update_main
+      - do_not_create_or_move_release_tag
+      - do_not_deploy
+      - preserve_integration_branch_for_forensics
+      - commit_failure_evidence_and_exact_blocker
+  reporting:
+    required_files:
+      - execution/evidence/v1r4c6-semantic-diff-report.md
+      - execution/evidence/gate-a-admin-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/gate-b-search-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/gate-c-agent-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/runtime-acceptance-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/regression-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/deployment-result.md
+      - execution/evidence/production-verification-result.md
+    final_summary_fields:
+      - source_head
+      - integration_head
+      - main_head_before
+      - main_head_after
+      - merge_commit
+      - release_tag
+      - deployment_id
+      - gate_results
+      - production_health
+      - rollback_ready
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import {
+  classifyRun,
+  decideToolCall,
+  runKey,
+} from "./policy.js";
+
+const activeRuns = new Map();
+const MAX_RUN_AGE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+function prune(now = Date.now()) {
+  for (const [key, value] of activeRuns.entries()) {
+    if (now - value.recordedAt > MAX_RUN_AGE_MS) activeRuns.delete(key);
+  }
+}
+
+export default {
+  id: "aios-tenant-boundary",
+  name: "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
+  description: "Fail-closed user-origin and side-effect policy for Tenant Cells.",
+
+  register(api) {
+    api.on(
+      "before_agent_run",
+      async (event, ctx) => {
+        prune();
+        const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
+        const trust = classifyRun(ctx, config);
+        const key = runKey(event, ctx);
+        if (key) {
+          activeRuns.set(key, { ...trust, recordedAt: Date.now() });
+        }
+
+        if (
+          config.blockUnknownAgentRuns === true &&
+          trust.trusted !== true &&
+          trust.reason !== "job_id_present"
+        ) {
+          return {
+            outcome: "block",
+            reason: trust.reason,
+            message: "This message cannot be verified as coming from the active authenticated user.",
+          };
+        }
+        return { outcome: "pass" };
+      },
+      { priority: 100 },
+    );
+
+    api.on(
+      "before_tool_call",
+      async (event, ctx) => {
+        prune();
+        const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
+        const key = runKey(event, ctx);
+        const trust = key ? activeRuns.get(key) : undefined;
+        const decision = decideToolCall(event.toolName, trust, config);
+
+        if (decision.action === "block") {
+          return {
+            block: true,
+            blockReason: `AIOS V2R1 origin policy denied tool call: ${decision.code}`,
+          };
+        }
+        if (decision.action === "approval") {
+          return {
+            requireApproval: {
+              title: `Approve ${String(event.toolName)}`,
+              description: "Authenticated user requested a side-effecting tool call in this Tenant Cell.",
+              severity: "warning",
+              timeoutMs: Number(config.approvalTimeoutMs ?? 60000),
+              allowedDecisions: ["allow-once", "deny"],
+              pluginId: "aios-tenant-boundary",
+            },
+          };
+        }
+        return undefined;
+      },
+      { priority: 100 },
+    );
+
+    api.on("agent_end", async (event, ctx) => {
+      const key = runKey(event, ctx);
+      if (key) activeRuns.delete(key);
+    });
+  },
+};
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+const DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS = Object.freeze([
+  "read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
+  "memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
+]);
+
+function strings(value) {
+  return Array.isArray(value)
+    ? value.filter((item) => typeof item === "string" && item.trim())
+        .map((item) => item.trim())
+    : [];
+}
+
+export function resolveSenderId(ctx = {}) {
+  const direct = typeof ctx.senderId === "string" ? ctx.senderId.trim() : "";
+  const nested = typeof ctx.channelContext?.sender?.id === "string"
+    ? ctx.channelContext.sender.id.trim()
+    : "";
+  return direct || nested || undefined;
+}
+
+export function classifyRun(ctx = {}, config = {}) {
+  const senderId = resolveSenderId(ctx);
+  const trusted = new Set(strings(config.trustedSenderIds));
+  const blocked = new Set(strings(config.blockedSenderIds));
+
+  if (typeof ctx.jobId === "string" && ctx.jobId) {
+    return { trusted: false, origin: "automation", reason: "job_id_present" };
+  }
+  if (!senderId) {
+    return { trusted: false, origin: "system_or_unknown", reason: "sender_id_missing" };
+  }
+  if (blocked.has(senderId)) {
+    return { trusted: false, origin: "blocked_sender", reason: "sender_blocked", senderId };
+  }
+  if (config.requireExplicitTrustedSenders !== false && !trusted.has(senderId)) {
+    return { trusted: false, origin: "untrusted_sender", reason: "sender_not_allowlisted", senderId };
+  }
+  return {
+    trusted: true,
+    origin: "authenticated_channel_user",
+    reason: "sender_verified",
+    senderId,
+  };
+}
+
+export function decideToolCall(toolName, runTrust, config = {}) {
+  const name = typeof toolName === "string" ? toolName.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
+  const configured = strings(config.readOnlyTools).map((item) => item.toLowerCase());
+  const readOnly = new Set(configured.length ? configured : DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS);
+  if (!name) {
+    return { action: "block", code: "tool_name_missing" };
+  }
+  if (readOnly.has(name)) {
+    return { action: "allow", code: "read_only" };
+  }
+  if (!runTrust || runTrust.trusted !== true) {
+    return {
+      action: "block",
+      code: runTrust?.reason || "run_provenance_missing",
+    };
+  }
+  if (config.requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects === false) {
+    return { action: "allow", code: "trusted_side_effect" };
+  }
+  return { action: "approval", code: "human_side_effect" };
+}
+
+export function runKey(event = {}, ctx = {}) {
+  const key = event.runId || ctx.runId;
+  return typeof key === "string" && key.trim() ? key.trim() : undefined;
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "id": "aios-tenant-boundary",
+  "name": "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
+  "description": "Enforces AIOS V2R1 tenant provenance and tool policy boundaries.",
+  "version": "2.1.0-rc1",
+  "entry": "dist/index.js",
+  "configSchema": {
+    "type": "object",
+    "additionalProperties": false,
+    "properties": {
+      "requireExplicitTrustedSenders": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
+      "trustedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
+      "blockedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
+      "readOnlyTools": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
+      "requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects": { "type": "boolean", "default": true }
+    }
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "name": "@aios/openclaw-tenant-boundary",
+  "version": "2.1.0-rc.1",
+  "type": "module",
+  "description": "AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell provenance and side-effect policy boundary for OpenClaw.",
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "openclaw.plugin.json"
+  ],
+  "scripts": {
+    "test": "node --test test/*.test.js"
+  },
+  "openclaw": {
+    "extensions": [
+      "./dist/index.js"
+    ]
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
+# CMD-20260711-v1r4c6-integrate-deploy-verify
+
+## Goal
+
+Perform the actual controlled integration, deployment, and verification for V1R4C6.
+
+V1R4C6 includes:
+
+1. Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS read-only rollout.
+2. SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding.
+3. Agent Platform Integration.
+
+Stop before V1R4C6 Git tag creation and baseline promotion. Those operations require owner confirmation.
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+memory search remains disabled
+no global vector index
+no force-push
+no V1R4C5 tag movement
+no Gitea DB mutation
+no secret plaintext in Git, logs, or reports
+```
+
+If any mandatory security or reliability check fails, stop deployment and report the blocker. Do not bypass the gate.
+
+## Verified Base
+
+Required before starting:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+previous_baseline = V1R4C3
+baseline_git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO = /data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git
+runtime = active
+```
+
+## Phase 0 — Preflight and Backup
+
+```bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT=/data/aios-gitops/workspace
+SOURCE_RELEASE=release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711
+EXEC_BRANCH=release/v1r4c6-integration-exec-20260711
+
+cd "$ROOT"
+git fetch origin --tags --prune
+
+git status --short
+
+test -f baseline/current.json
+python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+p = Path('baseline/current.json')
+d = json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
+assert d['current_baseline'] == 'V1R4C5', d
+assert d['previous_baseline'] == 'V1R4C3', d
+assert d['git'] == 'a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704', d
+assert d.get('constraints', {}).get('memory_search_enabled') is False, d
+print('baseline preflight: PASS')
+PY
+
+test -d /data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git
+
+BACKUP=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/backups/v1r4c6-predeploy-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)
+mkdir -p "$BACKUP"
+cp -a baseline/current.json "$BACKUP/current.json"
+cp -a versions/V1R4C5.json "$BACKUP/V1R4C5.json"
+
+if git show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/heads/$EXEC_BRANCH"; then
+  git checkout "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+  git pull --ff-only origin "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+else
+  git checkout -b "$EXEC_BRANCH" "origin/$SOURCE_RELEASE"
+  git push -u origin "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+fi
+```
+
+Never use `git push --force` or `git tag -f`.
+
+## Phase 1 — Merge Group A: Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS
+
+Merge in this order:
+
+```bash
+git merge --no-ff origin/feature/v1r4c4-sr04-admin-workbench-visibility-20260711 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): admin workbench visibility preparation'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/feature/v1r4c4-sr04-portal-aios-visibility-20260710 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): portal AIOS visibility preparation'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/user-portal-me-route-diagnostics-20260709 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): portal AIOS routes and RBAC manifest'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/user-portal-rbac-ops-dashboard \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): portal RBAC operations dashboard'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/agent-observability-webui \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): agent observability web UI'
+```
+
+Before merging `patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706`, compare overlap:
+
+```bash
+git diff --stat HEAD..origin/patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706
+```
+
+Merge only if it adds required functionality not already present. Otherwise record it as superseded.
+
+### Conflict Policy
+
+Do not auto-resolve conflicts in:
+
+```text
+auth/RBAC configuration
+user/session/tenant isolation
+search provider configuration
+safe-mode/controller dispatch
+systemd units
+baseline/current.json
+versions/*.json
+```
+
+For those files, stop and report conflict paths.
+
+### Group A Tests
+
+Run at minimum:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m pytest -q \
+  tests/test_portal_aios_frontend_contract.py \
+  tests/test_portal_aios_module_registry.py \
+  tests/test_portal_aios_navigation.py \
+  tests/test_portal_integration_health.py \
+  tests/test_portal_system_health_adapter.py
+```
+
+Run any additional portal/RBAC/dashboard tests discovered under `tests/`.
+
+## Phase 2 — Merge Group B: SR-03 Search Gateway
+
+```bash
+git merge --no-ff origin/feature/v1r4c4-sr02-search-gateway-resilience-20260710 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): search gateway resilience metadata'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/search-gateway-governed-general-capability \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): governed search gateway provider binding'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/gitops-change-archive-audit \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): search and GitOps audit evidence'
+```
+
+### Group B Security Review
+
+Verify before deployment:
+
+```text
+scope filtering occurs before ranking
+provenance is attached to accepted results
+out-of-scope records never reach ranking or summarization
+fallback is text-only, no-memory, or scoped-only
+global memory/vector index is disabled
+memory search remains disabled
+provider credentials are secret references only
+```
+
+Reject any code path that silently broadens search scope.
+
+### Group B Tests
+
+Discover and run all search/provider/isolation tests:
+
+```bash
+find tests -maxdepth 2 -type f \
+  \( -iname '*search*' -o -iname '*provider*' -o -iname '*scope*' -o -iname '*isolation*' \) \
+  -print
+```
+
+Then run the discovered files with `python3 -m pytest -q`.
+
+Also run:
+
+```bash
+bash ops/ci/run-user-data-isolation-acceptance.sh
+```
+
+If that script is not present after merge, stop: the data-isolation gate is mandatory.
+
+## Phase 3 — Merge Group C: Agent Platform
+
+```bash
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/agent-event-bus-unified \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): unified scoped agent event bus'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/agent-gpt-message-plane \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): scoped agent GPT message plane'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/autonomous-controller-dispatch-20260709 \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): autonomous controller dispatch with gates'
+
+git merge --no-ff origin/patch/self-evolution-agent-orchestration-policy \
+  -m 'merge(v1r4c6): self-evolution orchestration policy'
+```
+
+Review `patch/aios-autonomous-orchestrator-architecture-review-v1`:
+
+- merge if it contains a current architecture record not already present;
+- otherwise mark it superseded in the release report.
+
+### Group C Security Review
+
+Verify:
+
+```text
+event envelope includes tenant/group, user, project, session, agent, source and provenance
+message plane rejects cross-scope delivery
+denied messages never forward body/content
+controller dispatch checks autonomous safe mode before mutation
+consequential actions remain owner-gated
+duplicate dispatch is idempotent or rejected
+queue/retry behavior is bounded and observable
+```
+
+### Group C Tests
+
+Discover and run agent/event/message/dispatch/controller tests:
+
+```bash
+find tests -maxdepth 2 -type f \
+  \( -iname '*agent*' -o -iname '*event*' -o -iname '*message*' -o -iname '*dispatch*' -o -iname '*autonomous_controller*' \) \
+  -print
+```
+
+Run all discovered files with `python3 -m pytest -q`.
+
+Re-run the SR-02 watcher/controller suite and require all tests to pass.
+
+## Phase 4 — Full Test and Static Validation
+
+```bash
+python3 -m compileall -q active-runtime scripts tests
+python3 -m pytest -q
+```
+
+If the full suite has unrelated historical failures, report them separately, but all V1R4C6-touched component tests must pass.
+
+Validate JSON/YAML configuration without printing secrets.
+
+Verify:
+
+```bash
+git diff --check
+git status --short
+```
+
+Commit integration result normally:
+
+```bash
+git add -A
+git commit -m 'release: integrate V1R4C6 admin search and agent platform'
+git push origin "$EXEC_BRANCH"
+```
+
+If no uncommitted changes remain because merge commits already captured everything, just push normally.
+
+## Phase 5 — Deploy to Staging/Production Runtime
+
+Use the existing deployment mechanism for this repository. Do not invent a new deployment path.
+
+Before restart/reload, identify changed services and frontend bundles from the merged diff.
+
+At minimum:
+
+1. Deploy backend modules under `active-runtime/app/`.
+2. Deploy portal frontend/navigation/proxy changes.
+3. Deploy Search Gateway provider binding using secret references.
+4. Deploy Agent Platform event/message/dispatch changes.
+5. Preserve existing Gitea sentinel and user-data isolation systemd controls.
+6. Keep `AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false`.
+
+Restart only affected services. Do not restart Gitea unless it independently fails health checks.
+
+After deployment, verify affected services are active and no restart loop exists.
+
+## Phase 6 — Actual Deployment Verification
+
+### Global
+
+```bash
+curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:18890/api/base | python3 -m json.tool
+curl -fsS https://cnnetmkt.top/api/base | python3 -m json.tool
+```
+
+Before V1R4C6 promotion both must still report V1R4C5.
+
+Verify Gitea sentinel remains healthy and memory search remains disabled.
+
+### Gate A — Portal/Admin Workbench
+
+Use an existing authenticated test mechanism or secret-backed admin session. Do not log cookies/tokens.
+
+Verify:
+
+```text
+/portal/me/aios/manifest
+/portal/me/aios/dashboard
+/portal/me/aios/health
+```
+
+For `user`, `group_admin/admin`, and `owner`, record only module names/status, not personal data.
+
+Required admin-visible functions:
+
+```text
+task progress
+process/flow diagram entry
+system health
+agent observability
+```
+
+Verify forbidden owner modules are hidden from non-owner admins.
+
+### Gate B — Search Gateway
+
+Execute scoped test queries using non-sensitive fixtures.
+
+Verify:
+
+```text
+real provider selected
+scope applied before ranking
+provenance returned
+out-of-scope fixture denied
+safe fallback works
+memory search remains disabled
+```
+
+### Gate C — Agent Platform
+
+Using synthetic non-sensitive events/messages:
+
+```text
+same-scope delivery succeeds
+cross-user/project/session delivery is denied
+denied payload body is not forwarded
+safe-mode blocks controller mutation
+owner-gated action remains pending approval
+duplicate dispatch is idempotent/rejected
+```
+
+## Phase 7 — Release Evidence
+
+Update:
+
+```text
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-acceptance-checklist.md
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-acceptance-evidence.md
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-release-gate-status.md
+versions/V1R4C6.json
+```
+
+Set each gate to PASS/FAIL with concrete test commands and results.
+
+Required final state before requesting owner confirmation:
+
+```text
+Gate A = PASS
+Gate B = PASS
+Gate C = PASS
+full touched-component tests = PASS
+runtime write acceptance = PASS
+Gitea sentinel = healthy
+memory search = disabled
+force-push used = no
+V1R4C6 tag = absent
+active baseline = V1R4C5
+```
+
+Commit and push evidence normally to `$EXEC_BRANCH`.
+
+## Stop Point — Owner Confirmation Required
+
+Do not create `V1R4C6` tag.
+Do not promote baseline to V1R4C6.
+Do not enable memory search.
+
+When all gates pass, notify the owner through the configured notification mechanism, preferably WeChat if configured. The notification must contain no secrets and must request confirmation for:
+
+```text
+Create V1R4C6 Git tag
+Promote active baseline from V1R4C5 to V1R4C6
+```
+
+Required report fields:
+
+```text
+Status
+Integration branch and HEAD
+Merged branches
+Skipped/superseded branches
+Gate A result
+Gate B result
+Gate C result
+Test totals
+Deployment services/build versions
+Portal/admin verification result
+Search provider verification result
+Agent platform verification result
+Gitea sentinel status
+Memory search status
+Active baseline
+V1R4C6 tag status
+Rollback readiness
+Owner confirmation required
+```
+
+If WeChat notification is not configured, write the exact notification message to:
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/runtime/state/V1R4C6-owner-confirmation-message.txt
+```
+
+and report that path.
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+# CMD-20260711-v1r4c6-run-to-owner-gate-wechat
+
+## Execution Mode
+
+Execute immediately using the existing V1R4C6 integration command:
+
+```text
+ops/openclaw/CMD-20260711-v1r4c6-integrate-deploy-verify.md
+```
+
+Continue through actual merge, tests, deployment, and production verification.
+
+Stop only at the owner gate for:
+
+```text
+V1R4C6 Git tag creation
+V1R4C6 baseline promotion
+```
+
+Do not ask the owner to perform routine engineering or deployment work.
+
+## Verified Starting State
+
+Required before starting:
+
+```text
+runtime = active
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+previous_baseline = V1R4C3
+baseline_git = a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
+AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO = /data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git
+memory_search_enabled = false
+force_push_allowed = false
+```
+
+If any starting condition differs, stop and send a WeChat blocker notification.
+
+## Required Work
+
+Complete all phases in the referenced command:
+
+1. Create/update the normal non-force-pushed integration execution branch.
+2. Merge and validate Admin Workbench / Portal AIOS.
+3. Merge and validate SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding.
+4. Merge and validate Agent Platform Integration.
+5. Run component and full touched-scope test suites.
+6. Deploy using the repository's existing deployment mechanism.
+7. Verify production routes, RBAC, scope isolation, provenance, safe mode, and owner gates.
+8. Update V1R4C6 release evidence and version metadata.
+9. Push all normal commits to origin.
+10. Keep V1R4C6 tag absent and baseline at V1R4C5 until owner approval.
+
+## Hard Constraints
+
+```text
+AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
+memory search remains disabled
+no global memory/vector index
+no force-push
+no tag rewrite
+no V1R4C5 tag movement
+no Gitea DB mutation
+no plaintext secrets in Git, logs, reports, or WeChat
+```
+
+Never bypass a failed security, isolation, RBAC, safe-mode, or owner gate.
+
+## WeChat Progress Notifications
+
+Use the configured OpenClaw WeChat notification channel.
+
+Send concise progress notifications at these milestones:
+
+### Notification 1 — Integration Started
+
+```text
+V1R4C6 集成已启动。
+范围：管理员工作台、SR-03 Search Gateway、Agent Platform。
+当前基线：V1R4C5。
+memory search 保持关闭。
+下一步：完成合并、测试和部署验证。
+```
+
+### Notification 2 — Gate A Complete
+
+Include only:
+
+```text
+Gate A result: PASS/FAIL
+Admin task progress visibility: PASS/FAIL
+Flow diagram visibility: PASS/FAIL
+RBAC/isolation: PASS/FAIL
+Blockers, if any
+```
+
+Do not include user records, tokens, cookies, or sensitive task content.
+
+### Notification 3 — Gate B Complete
+
+Include only:
+
+```text
+Gate B result: PASS/FAIL
+Real provider binding: PASS/FAIL
+Scope-before-ranking: PASS/FAIL
+Provenance: PASS/FAIL
+Safe fallback: PASS/FAIL
+Memory search: disabled
+Blockers, if any
+```
+
+### Notification 4 — Gate C Complete
+
+Include only:
+
+```text
+Gate C result: PASS/FAIL
+Event scope: PASS/FAIL
+Message plane scope: PASS/FAIL
+Safe-mode dispatch block: PASS/FAIL
+Owner gate: PASS/FAIL
+Blockers, if any
+```
+
+## Final WeChat Owner Authorization Request
+
+Send only after all mandatory gates and deployment verification pass.
+
+Use this message:
+
+```text
+V1R4C6 已完成实际合并、测试、部署和生产验证，现等待最终发布授权。
+
+版本范围：
+1. 管理员工作台 / Portal AIOS 上线
+2. SR-03 Search Gateway Real Provider Binding
+3. Agent Platform Integration
+
+验收结果：
+- Gate A（管理员工作台 / RBAC / 隔离）：PASS
+- Gate B（Provider / scope / provenance / fallback）：PASS
+- Gate C（Event Bus / Message Plane / Dispatch / Owner Gate）：PASS
+- Runtime 写链路：PASS
+- Gitea consistency sentinel：healthy
+- memory search：仍为 disabled
+- force-push：未使用
+- 当前 active baseline：V1R4C5
+- V1R4C6 tag：尚未创建
+
+请明确回复以下其中一项：
+A. 批准创建 V1R4C6 Git tag，并将 active baseline 从 V1R4C5 晋升至 V1R4C6。
+B. 暂不批准，保持 V1R4C5，并说明需要处理的问题。
+```
+
+## Authorization Rules
+
+Do not treat reactions, emojis, acknowledgements, or ambiguous replies as approval.
+
+Valid approval must explicitly authorize both:
+
+```text
+create V1R4C6 Git tag
+promote baseline V1R4C5 -> V1R4C6
+```
+
+If the owner approves only one operation, execute only the approved operation and stop before the other.
+
+Before executing a consequential operation, record authorization in:
+
+```text
+docs/releases/V1R4C6-owner-approval.md
+```
+
+Record only:
+
+```text
+approved operation(s)
+approved_at
+approval channel = wechat
+message/conversation identifier if available
+owner identity reference without copying personal message content
+memory search remains disabled
+```
+
+Do not store access tokens, cookies, phone numbers, or unrelated chat content.
+
+## WeChat Failure Handling
+
+If the configured WeChat channel is unavailable:
+
+1. Do not claim that a message was sent.
+2. Stop before tag/promotion.
+3. Write the exact final authorization request to:
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/runtime/state/V1R4C6-owner-confirmation-message.txt
+```
+
+4. Write notification failure details to:
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/runtime/state/V1R4C6-wechat-notification-failure.json
+```
+
+5. Report the failure through the active GitOps task/status channel.
+
+## Final Stop Condition
+
+Before explicit owner authorization, final state must remain:
+
+```text
+current_baseline = V1R4C5
+V1R4C6 tag = absent
+memory search = disabled
+```
+
+After owner authorization, follow the existing tag confirmation and baseline promotion controls. Do not bypass consequential-operation confirmation layers.
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "reconcile/v1r4c5-release-to-main-20260711",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-10T23:56:41Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-12T14:39:23Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "task/openclaw/v2r1c0-b3-full-rc1-integration-20260714T180646UTC8",
+  "base": "release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-14T10:09:21Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "id": "patch-1783707996243-33717dfe",
+  "patch_name": "v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711",
+  "branch": "release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711",
+  "risk": "high",
+  "description": "V1R4C6 bundled integration release: Admin Workbench visibility, SR-03 Search Gateway real provider binding, and Agent Platform Integration. Memory search remains disabled and user data isolation gates remain mandatory.",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-10T18:26:36Z"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1
+
+## Architecture
+
+OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric.
+
+## Included
+
+- Signed Tenant Context
+- Canonical Message Envelope
+- Tenant Router
+- OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter
+- Exact Message Ledger
+- Hermes tenant partitioned scheduler
+- Memory Namespace policy
+- Secret Scope references
+- Append-only Audit Chain
+- Hermes Profile isolation
+- OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin
+
+## Release Gates
+
+Before production:
+
+- automated isolation tests pass
+- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspect passes
+- Cell health probes pass
+- running commit matches release commit
+- rollback test passes
+
+## Security Rules
+
+Unknown provenance fails closed.
+Quoted text is data, not command input.
+Cross-tenant access is denied.
+Shared Fabric does not share tenant state.
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 Live Status
+
+Last verified: 2026-07-13 Europe/Amsterdam
+
+## Source of truth
+
+- Release branch: `release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712`
+- Verified branch tree: `6569065`
+- Current promoted baseline: `V1R4C6`
+- Production baseline state: not yet promoted to V2R1C0
+
+This file is the single human-readable progress page for V2R1C0 RC1. Update it in the same commit that changes a release gate.
+
+## Overall status
+
+`DEVELOPMENT COMPLETE / EXECUTABLE ACCEPTANCE INCOMPLETE / NOT DEPLOYED`
+
+## Component status
+
+| Workstream | Status | Evidence | Remaining gate |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Architecture baseline | Done | `docs/architecture/AIOS_V2R1_OpenClaw_Tenant_Cell_Hermes_Shared_Agent_Fabric_Architecture.md` | none |
+| Tenant Context | Done | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py` | executable security tests |
+| Canonical Message | Done | `tenant_context.py` | channel adapter integration test |
+| Tenant Router | Done | `router.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
+| Cell lifecycle adapter | Done | `fleet.py`, `cell_manager.py`, `cli.py` | real OpenClaw Fleet probe |
+| Message Ledger | Done | `message_ledger.py` | concurrency and restart tests |
+| Hermes Fabric | Done | `hermes_fabric.py` | worker/profile runtime test |
+| Memory isolation | Done | `memory_scope.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
+| Secret scope | Done | `secret_scope.py` | secret broker integration |
+| Audit chain | Done | `audit.py` | tamper executable test |
+| Hermes Profile isolation | Done | `hermes_profile.py` | container/profile runtime test |
+| OpenClaw boundary plugin | Code complete | `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/` | install + runtime hook inspection |
+| Python automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
+| Node plugin automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
+| Staging Cell deployment | Not started | none | tests must pass first |
+| Rollback rehearsal | Not started | none | staging deployment required |
+| Merge to `main` | Not started | release branch differs from main | owner approval after gates pass |
+| RC tag | Not created | no V2R1 tag | owner approval |
+| Production deployment | Not started | baseline remains V1R4C6 | owner production approval |
+
+## Release gates
+
+- [ ] Python executable tests committed and passing
+- [ ] Node executable tests committed and passing
+- [ ] OpenClaw plugin installs successfully
+- [ ] Runtime inspection proves hooks registered
+- [ ] Tenant Cell status and doctor pass
+- [ ] Staging message and tool-policy smoke tests pass
+- [ ] Rollback succeeds
+- [ ] Running commit matches approved release commit
+- [ ] Owner approves merge, tag and production cutover
+
+## Parallel work ownership
+
+- Track A: Python isolation and message tests
+- Track B: OpenClaw plugin tests and runtime inspection
+- Track C: Cell staging deployment, health and rollback
+- Track D: release evidence, digests and final acceptance report
+
+## Update rule
+
+Every worker must update this page with:
+
+1. exact command,
+2. exit code,
+3. test counts,
+4. commit hash,
+5. artifact digest,
+6. blocker or PASS result.
+
+No item may be marked Done from prose-only reports.
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 Acceptance
+
+## Tenant Isolation
+
+- cross tenant memory access: DENY
+- cross cell context: DENY
+- cross tenant secret scope: DENY
+- cross tenant queue claim: DENY
+
+## Message Safety
+
+- unsafe numeric message id: DENY
+- exact reply resolution only: PASS
+- quote text separate from command body: PASS
+- heartbeat side effects: DENY
+- cron side effects: DENY
+- assistant output execution: DENY
+
+## Hermes
+
+- profile HOME isolation: PASS
+- workspace escape: DENY
+- tenant queue partition: PASS
+
+## OpenClaw
+
+- plugin manifest validation: PASS
+- runtime hook registration: REQUIRED
+- side effect approval: REQUIRED
+
+## Release Gate
+
+No production deployment until executable tests and runtime evidence pass.
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Hermes Fabric Contract Tests
+
+Required executable assertions:
+
+1. Duplicate event_id must raise ConflictError, never raw sqlite3.IntegrityError.
+2. Same tenant/cell/profile worker can claim its own queue.
+3. Cross tenant queue claim must return no task or be denied.
+4. Non-command messages cannot enqueue execution jobs.
+5. Unknown provenance cannot create execution jobs.
+
+Evidence required:
+
+- command
+- exit code
+- pass count
+- commit
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+"""Gate 1 contract tests for the Hermes shared agent fabric."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlite3
+from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
+import unittest
+
+from aios_v2r1.hermes_fabric import HermesFabric
+from aios_v2r1.tenant_context import CanonicalMessage, ConflictError, ScopeError
+
+
+def authenticated_command(
+    event_id: str,
+    *,
+    command_capable: bool = True,
+    origin_type: str = "channel_user",
+) -> CanonicalMessage:
+    return CanonicalMessage(
+        tenant_id="tenant-a",
+        cell_id="cell-a",
+        principal_id="user-a",
+        principal_type="authenticated_user",
+        origin_type=origin_type,
+        channel="weixin",
+        channel_account_id="account-a",
+        peer_id="peer-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a",
+        session_id="session-a",
+        task_id=None,
+        event_id=event_id,
+        message_id="1234567890123456789",
+        reply_to_message_id=None,
+        direction="inbound",
+        command_capable=command_capable,
+        occurred_at="2026-07-13T00:00:00+00:00",
+        received_at="2026-07-13T00:00:01+00:00",
+        body="/run",
+        quoted_body=None,
+        adapter_name="weixin",
+        adapter_version="v2",
+    )
+
+
+class HermesFabricContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_duplicate_event_returns_sanitized_conflict(self) -> None:
+        with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+            fabric = HermesFabric(f"{directory}/fabric.sqlite3")
+            message = authenticated_command("event-a")
+
+            first = fabric.enqueue(message=message, profile_id="profile-a")
+            self.assertEqual(first.event_id, "event-a")
+
+            with self.assertRaises(ConflictError) as raised:
+                fabric.enqueue(message=message, profile_id="profile-a")
+
+        error = raised.exception
+        self.assertNotIsInstance(error, sqlite3.IntegrityError)
+        self.assertNotIn("sqlite", str(error).lower())
+        self.assertIsNone(error.__cause__)
+        self.assertIsNone(error.__context__)
+
+    def test_non_command_event_cannot_enqueue(self) -> None:
+        with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+            fabric = HermesFabric(f"{directory}/fabric.sqlite3")
+
+            with self.assertRaises(ScopeError):
+                fabric.enqueue(
+                    message=authenticated_command(
+                        "event-non-command", command_capable=False
+                    ),
+                    profile_id="profile-a",
+                )
+
+    def test_heartbeat_provenance_cannot_enqueue(self) -> None:
+        with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+            fabric = HermesFabric(f"{directory}/fabric.sqlite3")
+
+            with self.assertRaises(ScopeError):
+                fabric.enqueue(
+                    message=authenticated_command(
+                        "event-heartbeat", origin_type="heartbeat"
+                    ),
+                    profile_id="profile-a",
+                )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+"""Gate 1 contract tests for authoritative TenantRouter isolation."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
+import unittest
+
+from aios_v2r1.router import TenantRouter
+from aios_v2r1.tenant_context import CanonicalMessage, ConflictError, ScopeError
+
+
+class MutableClock:
+    def __init__(self, now: datetime) -> None:
+        self.now = now
+
+    def __call__(self) -> datetime:
+        return self.now
+
+
+def canonical_message(*, tenant_id: str = "tenant-a", cell_id: str = "cell-a") -> CanonicalMessage:
+    return CanonicalMessage(
+        tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        cell_id=cell_id,
+        principal_id="user-a",
+        principal_type="authenticated_user",
+        origin_type="channel_user",
+        channel="weixin",
+        channel_account_id="account-a",
+        peer_id="peer-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a",
+        session_id="session-a",
+        task_id=None,
+        event_id="event-a",
+        message_id="message-a",
+        reply_to_message_id=None,
+        direction="inbound",
+        command_capable=True,
+        occurred_at="2026-07-13T00:00:00+00:00",
+        received_at="2026-07-13T00:00:01+00:00",
+        body="hello",
+        quoted_body=None,
+        adapter_name="weixin",
+        adapter_version="v2",
+    )
+
+
+class TenantRouterIsolationContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.directory = TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.directory.cleanup)
+        self.database = f"{self.directory.name}/router.sqlite3"
+        self.router = TenantRouter(self.database)
+        self.router.register_tenant("tenant-a", "cell-a")
+        self.router.register_tenant("tenant-b", "cell-b")
+        self.router.bind_channel(
+            tenant_id="tenant-a", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-a"
+        )
+        self.router.bind_channel(
+            tenant_id="tenant-b", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-b"
+        )
+
+    def test_channel_account_cannot_bind_two_tenants(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ConflictError):
+            self.router.bind_channel(
+                tenant_id="tenant-b", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-a"
+            )
+
+    def test_cell_cannot_bind_two_tenants(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ConflictError):
+            self.router.register_tenant("tenant-c", "cell-a")
+
+    def test_principal_cannot_bind_across_tenant_boundary(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ScopeError):
+            self.router.bind_principal(
+                tenant_id="tenant-b",
+                channel="weixin",
+                channel_account_id="account-a",
+                principal_id="user-a",
+            )
+
+    def test_session_cannot_cross_cell(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ScopeError):
+            self.router.bind_session(
+                tenant_id="tenant-a",
+                session_id="session-a",
+                cell_id="cell-b",
+                principal_id="user-a",
+            )
+
+    def test_session_cannot_cross_principal(self) -> None:
+        self.router.bind_session(
+            tenant_id="tenant-a",
+            session_id="session-a",
+            cell_id="cell-a",
+            principal_id="user-a",
+        )
+
+        with self.assertRaises(ConflictError):
+            self.router.bind_session(
+                tenant_id="tenant-a",
+                session_id="session-a",
+                cell_id="cell-a",
+                principal_id="user-b",
+            )
+
+    def test_expired_session_is_rejected_without_private_storage_access(self) -> None:
+        clock = MutableClock(datetime(2026, 7, 13, tzinfo=timezone.utc))
+        router = TenantRouter(f"{self.directory.name}/expiry.sqlite3", clock=clock)
+        router.register_tenant("tenant-a", "cell-a")
+        router.bind_channel(
+            tenant_id="tenant-a", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-a"
+        )
+        router.bind_session(
+            tenant_id="tenant-a",
+            session_id="session-a",
+            cell_id="cell-a",
+            principal_id="user-a",
+        )
+        clock.now += timedelta(days=2)
+
+        with self.assertRaises(ScopeError):
+            router.resolve(
+                channel="weixin",
+                channel_account_id="account-a",
+                principal_id="user-a",
+                session_id="session-a",
+            )
+
+    def test_self_reported_tenant_or_cell_mismatch_fails_against_authority(self) -> None:
+        self.router.bind_session(
+            tenant_id="tenant-a",
+            session_id="session-a",
+            cell_id="cell-a",
+            principal_id="user-a",
+        )
+        expected = "message claims do not match authoritative route"
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ScopeError, expected):
+            self.router.assert_message_route(canonical_message(tenant_id="tenant-b"))
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ScopeError, expected):
+            self.router.assert_message_route(canonical_message(cell_id="cell-b"))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+"""Gate 1 contract tests for canonical tenant-context signatures."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import unittest
+
+from aios_v2r1.tenant_context import TenantContext, ValidationError
+
+
+class TenantContextSignatureContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    key = b"k" * 32
+    now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.context = TenantContext(
+            tenant_id="tenant-a",
+            cell_id="cell-a",
+            principal_id="user-a",
+            principal_type="user",
+            session_id="session-a",
+            task_id=None,
+            channel="hermes",
+            channel_account_id="account-a",
+            issued_at="2026-07-13T00:00:00+00:00",
+            expires_at="2026-07-13T00:05:00+00:00",
+            nonce="nonce-b",
+        )
+        self.token = self.context.sign(self.key)
+
+    def test_valid_canonical_token_verifies(self) -> None:
+        verified = TenantContext.verify(self.token, self.key, now=self.now)
+
+        self.assertEqual(verified, self.context)
+
+    def test_rejects_padded_signature_encoding(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
+            TenantContext.verify(f"{self.token}=", self.key, now=self.now)
+
+    def test_rejects_standard_base64_signature_encoding(self) -> None:
+        payload, signature = self.token.rsplit(".", 1)
+        standard_signature = signature.replace("-", "+").replace("_", "/")
+        self.assertNotEqual(signature, standard_signature)
+
+        with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
+            TenantContext.verify(
+                f"{payload}.{standard_signature}", self.key, now=self.now
+            )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+    "version": "V1R4C5",
+    "codename": "C5 reliability-security-admin",
+    "status": "active-baseline",
+    "tag": "V1R4C5",
+    "tag_ref": "refs/tags/V1R4C5",
+    "tag_object": "ac9bdacb19ff66cba8046d75358866f0f0fffb82",
+    "previous_version": "V1R4C3",
+    "rollback_version": "V1R4C3",
+    "baseline": "V1R4C3",
+    "release_reason": "reliability, watcher cleanup, user data isolation gate, and admin workbench read-only preparation; memory search disabled",
+    "purpose": "stabilize autonomous operations, enforce user isolation gate, prepare admin workbench read-only for C6",
+    "changes": [
+        "reliability: idle container GC with nixos-activate fallback retention policy and CI reset",
+        "watcher: remove redundant local async watcher, consolidate to server-pushed events",
+        "security: user data isolation gate (read-only admin panel, fb isolation check)",
+        "admin workbench: read-only preparation layout for V1R4C6 admin-search integration",
+        "governance: final owner approval via Owner Gate Web UI"
+    ],
+    "artifacts": [
+        "VERSION",
+        "docs/releases/V1R4C5-acceptance-evidence.md",
+        "docs/releases/V1R4C5-final-owner-approval.md"
+    ],
+    "validated_actions": [],
+    "secret_plaintext_written": false,
+    "owner_approval_required": true,
+    "owner_notification_channels": ["wechat", "web_ui_audit"],
+    "constraints_original": {
+        "memory_search": "remain disabled",
+        "sr04": "disable read-only visibility slice if RBAC or isolation check fails",
+        "gitea": "enter autonomous safe mode if branch consistency drift detected"
+    },
+    "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T02:17:31+08:00",
+    "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
+    "created_at": "2026-07-11T01:40:00+08:00",
+    "author": "openclaw"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+{
+  "version": "V1R4C6",
+  "codename": "admin-search-agent-integration",
+  "status": "release-candidate-started",
+  "base_baseline": "V1R4C5",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-11",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "release_type": "controlled-bundled-integration",
+  "promotion_policy": "owner-gated",
+  "owner_decision": {
+    "accepted_scope": true,
+    "requested_delivery": "admin workbench, SR-03, and Agent Platform Integration in one release train",
+    "memory_search_enabled": false,
+    "force_push_allowed": false
+  },
+  "scope": {
+    "included_groups": [
+      {
+        "id": "V1R4C6-A",
+        "name": "Admin Workbench and Portal AIOS Read-Only Rollout",
+        "branches": [
+          "feature/v1r4c4-sr04-admin-workbench-visibility-20260711",
+          "feature/v1r4c4-sr04-portal-aios-visibility-20260710",
+          "patch/user-portal-me-route-diagnostics-20260709",
+          "patch/user-portal-rbac-ops-dashboard",
+          "patch/agent-observability-webui",
+          "patch/web-ui-complete-gitops-dashboard-20260706"
+        ],
+        "risk": "medium",
+        "delivery": "administrator-visible task progress, process diagrams, health, agent observability, and portal AIOS entry points",
+        "guardrails": [
+          "read-only first",
+          "RBAC enforced",
+          "empty states explicit",
+          "no cross-user or cross-project data exposure"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "V1R4C6-B",
+        "name": "SR-03 Search Gateway Real Provider Binding",
+        "branches": [
+          "feature/v1r4c4-sr02-search-gateway-resilience-20260710",
+          "patch/search-gateway-governed-general-capability",
+          "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit"
+        ],
+        "risk": "high",
+        "delivery": "real provider binding, governed search gateway, resilience, and audit trail",
+        "guardrails": [
+          "user data isolation gate required",
+          "scope filter before ranking",
+          "provenance required",
+          "no global memory/vector index"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "V1R4C6-C",
+        "name": "Agent Platform Integration",
+        "branches": [
+          "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
+          "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
+          "patch/autonomous-controller-dispatch-20260709",
+          "patch/self-evolution-agent-orchestration-policy",
+          "patch/aios-autonomous-orchestrator-architecture-review-v1"
+        ],
+        "risk": "high",
+        "delivery": "agent event bus, GPT message plane, dispatch, orchestration policy, and architecture record",
+        "guardrails": [
+          "controller safe-mode respected",
+          "event/message scopes enforced",
+          "owner gate for consequential operations",
+          "observability before autonomous expansion"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "excluded": [
+      "memory search activation",
+      "global vector index",
+      "full cross-session recall",
+      "unscoped search over memory",
+      "bulk merge of test/smoke/auth branches",
+      "Gitea DB mutation",
+      "force-push reconciliation"
+    ]
+  },
+  "acceptance_required": [
+    "getRuntimeStatus active",
+    "getBaseline reports V1R4C5 before integration and V1R4C6 after promotion",
+    "Admin workbench RBAC read-only check passes",
+    "Portal AIOS manifest/dashboard/health routes verified",
+    "Flow/process diagram renders or returns explicit empty state",
+    "Search gateway provider binding returns scoped, provenanced results only",
+    "User data isolation acceptance remains green",
+    "Agent event bus and GPT message plane tests pass",
+    "Autonomous controller dispatch respects safe mode",
+    "Memory search remains disabled"
+  ],
+  "deployment_constraints": {
+    "AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED": false,
+    "memory_search_activation_requires_future_owner_approval": true,
+    "force_push_allowed": false,
+    "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_admin_approval": true,
+    "admin_workbench_mode": "read_only_first",
+    "search_provider_scope": "scoped_only"
+  },
+  "rollback_policy": {
+    "admin_workbench": "disable new menu/routes if RBAC or route acceptance fails",
+    "search_gateway": "fallback to disabled provider binding, not memory search",
+    "agent_platform": "disable dispatch expansion and keep event/message plane read-only if safety tests fail",
+    "memory_search": "remain disabled"
+  }
+}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
openclaw	ce7aa08249	task(openclaw): B3 integration RESULT 20260714T190300UTC8	2026-07-14 19:03:49 +08:00
openclaw	b4d3e53167	feat(v2r1c0): integrate B3 identity module into full RC1 runtime 20260714T190200UTC8	2026-07-14 19:02:52 +08:00
openclaw	0c5a268548	task(openclaw): create continue integration task 20260714T184637UTC8	2026-07-14 19:00:22 +08:00
openclaw	02682d27a5	task(openclaw): integrate B3 into full V2R1C0 RC1 runtime 20260714T180646UTC8	2026-07-14 18:09:21 +08:00
openclaw	6077331add	test(v2r1): make router isolation contracts authoritative	2026-07-13 02:28:32 +08:00
openclaw	75f61ac0e6	test(v2r1): cover tenant router isolation contracts	2026-07-13 02:18:04 +08:00
openclaw	0b41a3952a	fix-v2r1-suppress-hermes-conflict-context	2026-07-13 02:10:23 +08:00
openclaw	8f205c0d87	test-v2r1-cover-hermes-command-provenance	2026-07-13 02:05:03 +08:00
openclaw	d2a4a765ac	test-v2r1-enforce-sanitized-hermes-replay-conflicts	2026-07-13 02:03:49 +08:00
openclaw	b1110cad62	fix(v2r1): reject noncanonical tenant signatures	2026-07-13 01:52:00 +08:00
openclaw	b483dfadbf	test(v2r1): define Hermes contract acceptance evidence	2026-07-13 01:25:28 +08:00
openclaw	1e5e144318	fix(v2r1): convert duplicate Hermes events to ConflictError	2026-07-13 01:25:23 +08:00
openclaw	d552876a80	release(v2r1): add single source live status page	2026-07-13 00:12:28 +08:00
openclaw	6569065198	ops(v2r1): add RC1 health check	2026-07-12 23:41:01 +08:00
openclaw	2b80c50415	test(v2r1): add RC1 acceptance gate manifest	2026-07-12 23:40:56 +08:00
openclaw	954982647e	fix(v2r1): align plugin package entry with OpenClaw SDK contract	2026-07-12 23:40:52 +08:00
openclaw	8074eb31b1	ops(v2r1): add RC1 install preflight	2026-07-12 23:37:42 +08:00
openclaw	90138221ee	fix(v2r1): add OpenClaw runtime extension package metadata	2026-07-12 23:37:37 +08:00
openclaw	729c7bb23b	fix(v2r1): bind OpenClaw trust only to authoritative runId	2026-07-12 23:37:33 +08:00
openclaw	d2de7f23d1	ops(v2r1): add RC1 validation gate	2026-07-12 23:32:51 +08:00
openclaw	73c0a233ce	feat(v2r1): add aios-cell lifecycle CLI	2026-07-12 23:32:47 +08:00
openclaw	00816a13c1	feat(v2r1): register OpenClaw runtime provenance and tool hooks	2026-07-12 23:32:42 +08:00
openclaw	4920ac6192	release: define AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 manifest	2026-07-12 23:26:05 +08:00
openclaw	b12ff086bf	feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin manifest	2026-07-12 23:26:00 +08:00
openclaw	57a668d87e	feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary policy runtime	2026-07-12 23:25:57 +08:00
openclaw	bab319575b	feat(v2r1): add Tenant Cell manager lifecycle registry	2026-07-12 23:22:54 +08:00
openclaw	c172953a3c	feat(v2r1): add Hermes profile isolation primitives	2026-07-12 23:22:47 +08:00
openclaw	c7617fa548	feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped memory namespace policy	2026-07-12 23:22:41 +08:00
openclaw	2eba23d274	feat(v2r1): add tenant secret scope references	2026-07-12 23:17:56 +08:00
openclaw	f2e0406a20	feat(v2r1): add append-only tenant audit chain	2026-07-12 23:17:50 +08:00
openclaw	ccb02640ac	feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped exact message ledger	2026-07-12 23:17:43 +08:00
openclaw	5c52f6c82c	feat(v2r1): add tenant partitioned Hermes fabric scheduler	2026-07-12 23:10:55 +08:00
openclaw	429c6875bc	feat(v2r1): add fail-closed Tenant Router and registry	2026-07-12 23:10:47 +08:00
openclaw	f10d0d5b17	feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw Tenant Cell lifecycle adapter	2026-07-12 23:04:34 +08:00
openclaw	c9974f3e47	feat(v2r1): add signed tenant context and canonical message contract	2026-07-12 23:04:24 +08:00
openclaw	c72450aeb0	docs: add V1R5 to V2R1 migration plan	2026-07-12 22:39:32 +08:00
openclaw	f95be48a42	docs: add AIOS V2R1 architecture baseline	2026-07-12 22:39:28 +08:00
openclaw	ba989d7340	Start AIOS V2R1C0 Tenant Cell and Hermes Shared Agent Fabric release train	2026-07-12 22:39:23 +08:00
gito	1a9cb9095e	Merge pull request 'reconcile(v1r4c6): finalize baseline metadata — previous_baseline V1R4C5, git e204a90' (#9 ) from reconcile/v1r4c6-baseline-finalize-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 20:55:54 +08:00
openclaw	0312159168	feat(reconcile): write V1R4C6 baseline metadata — previous_baseline V1R4C5, git `e204a90`	2026-07-11 20:54:46 +08:00
openclaw	e204a90398	docs: baseline V1R4C6 promotion	2026-07-11 20:47:44 +08:00
openclaw	d8cf6058e9	docs: promote VERSION V1R4C3 -> V1R4C6 ahead of main promotion	2026-07-11 20:47:28 +08:00
openclaw	2aefc19e3d	authorize OpenClaw to execute V1R4C6 merge tests deploy pipeline	2026-07-11 20:41:31 +08:00
gito	28a430066f	Merge pull request 'V1R4C6: merge candidate → main (release control artifacts)' (#8 ) from candidate/v1r4c6-integration-main-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 19:30:58 +08:00
openclaw	1013aef461	Merge branch 'release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711' into candidate/v1r4c6-integration-main-20260711 Resolve merge conflicts per V1R4C6 release control merge: - baseline/current.json: keep feature branch version (updates to V1R4C5, adds constraints block). This was the intended runtime state that main was missing after V1R4C5 backfill (PR #7). Feature branch correctly has the V1R4C5 state; main still had V1R4C3. - versions/V1R4C5.json: keep main version (complete fields with codename, tag_ref, tag_object, constraints, promoted_at/by). Feature branch had an older copy lacking these fields. - docs/releases/V1R4C6-acceptance-evidence.md: keep main version (blank 'NOT RUN' status). Feature branch had draft content. - docs/releases/V1R4C6-release-gate-status.md: keep main version (blank 'NOT RUN' status). Feature branch had draft content.	2026-07-11 19:29:47 +08:00
gito	bb3210d74f	Merge pull request 'docs: update V1R4C6 metadata to NOT RUN after control artifacts merge' (#7 ) from reconcile/v1r4c6-gate-status-notrun-docs-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 17:07:03 +08:00
openclaw	745395e93b	docs: update V1R4C6 gate status, acceptance checklist, and acceptance evidence to NOT RUN All engineering gates remain pending. This updates the release documents to reflect the current integration-pending status after PR #6 merged.	2026-07-11 17:06:31 +08:00
gito	ae49bf0fa3	Merge pull request 'reconcile: merge V1R4C6 release candidate into main' (#6 ) from candidate/v1r4c6-merge-to-main-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 16:45:28 +08:00
openclaw	8410cd895e	reconcile: merge V1R4C6 release candidate into main V1R4C6 merge candidate (squashed). Contains 10 files, ~1440 lines added across: - docs/releases/ (6 files: checklist, evidence, blocker, resume, merge-matrix, gate-status) - ops/openclaw/ (2 files: integrate-deploy-verify, run-to-owner-gate-wechat) - patches/ (1 file: branch patch) - versions/ (1 file: V1R4C6.json) Task: admin workbench, SR-03 Search Gateway, Agent Platform Integration Baseline: V1R4C5 V1R4C5 tag semantics: - tag refs/tags/V1R4C5 target `d457ac3`: immutable release snapshot - baseline git `a32c76a`: runtime baseline promotion commit No tag creation, baseline promotion, or memory search activation in this merge.	2026-07-11 16:34:03 +08:00
gito	dc1642c2e8	Merge pull request 'reconcile: V1R4C5 baseline metadata (current.json + V1R4C5.json)' (#5 ) from reconcile/v1r4c5-baseline-metadata-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 13:48:30 +08:00
openclaw	c75b865710	reconcile: update baseline registry to V1R4C5 and create V1R4C5 version metadata Root cause: The V1R4C5 baseline promotion commit (`a32c76a`) was made on a feature branch that was never merged to main. As a result, both baseline/current.json and versions/V1R4C5.json on main still reflect V1R4C3 state. Runtime getBaseline() continues to return V1R4C3 with commit `f5435e3`. Changes: - baseline/current.json: update current_baseline -> V1R4C5, git -> `a32c76a3c1` (the actual promotion commit), add constraints from the original promotion - versions/V1R4C5.json: create the missing version metadata file with status active-baseline, referencing V1R4C5 tag (object ac9bdac...) Why this does not affect V1R4C5 release content: - V1R4C5 release documents (docs/releases/*.md) are untouched - V1R4C5 tag is unchanged and not moved - No V1R4C6 functionality introduced - No memory search or vector index enabled Rollback method: git revert <this commit hash> # Or restore baseline/current.json from V1R4C3 content: # git checkout main~1 baseline/current.json # And delete versions/V1R4C5.json: # git rm versions/V1R4C5.json # Then commit the revert Constraints honored: - No direct writes to main (using PR) - No force push - V1R4C5 tag not moved/rebuild - No V1R4C6 content - Memory search remains disabled	2026-07-11 13:46:13 +08:00
gito	e992b624e0	V1R4C5 → main: backfill release docs (acceptance evidence + owner approval)	2026-07-11 13:37:58 +08:00
openclaw	c60e4cd02c	reconcile: backfill V1R4C5 release documents (acceptance evidence + final owner approval) for main merge Source: V1R4C5 tag based on unique publication commit `a32c76a` - docs/releases/V1R4C5-acceptance-evidence.md (from V1R4C5 tag) - docs/releases/V1R4C5-final-owner-approval.md (from V1R4C5 tag) Constraints honored: - Not writing directly to main - No V1R4C6 content introduced - Memory search remains disabled per owner approval Generated merge candidate branch: reconcile/v1r4c5-release-to-main-20260711	2026-07-11 13:36:18 +08:00
openclaw	4b2996ca9f	release: resume V1R4C6 after scoped WeChat notification verification	2026-07-11 07:47:05 +08:00
openclaw	086076b74f	ops: direct OpenClaw to complete V1R4C6 and request owner approval via WeChat	2026-07-11 03:13:32 +08:00
openclaw	7b2d694272	ops: queue actual V1R4C6 integration deployment and verification	2026-07-11 03:10:28 +08:00
openclaw	0583060c7c	release: update V1R4C6 gate status	2026-07-11 03:07:13 +08:00
openclaw	20e707fb52	release: add V1R4C6 acceptance evidence	2026-07-11 03:05:52 +08:00
openclaw	6c75ec6bb2	release: add V1R4C6 acceptance checklist	2026-07-11 03:04:02 +08:00
openclaw	e9fefd4c18	release: add V1R4C6 integration merge matrix	2026-07-11 03:01:59 +08:00
openclaw	3ece481c74	fix(runtime): point GitOps API to active aios.git bare repository	2026-07-11 02:56:49 +08:00
openclaw	33177548c3	fix(baseline): stabilize V1R4C5 git pointer	2026-07-11 02:55:05 +08:00
openclaw	ed1413a05e	V1R4C5 baseline promotion: V1R4C3 -> V1R4C5 promoted_by: openclaw promotion_reason: V1R4C5 SR-01 Gitea branch sync fix and SR-02 Watcher state cleanup memory_search: disabled	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	05d1e64228	release: record V1R4C6 baseline visibility blocker	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	64bbe1b51c	Create V1R4C6 integration release patch	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	3c6f2c8c65	release: start V1R4C6 admin search agent integration	2026-07-11 02:26:31 +08:00