Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
Codex 633c8308f5 chore(worktree): ignore registered child worktrees 2026-07-21 15:13:48 +08:00
OpenClaw Git Writer 6cd0f5aa0a acceptance: openclaw git writer TASK-CODEX-GITOPS-SECRET-ACL-AND-IDENTITY-HARDENING-20260715T004818UTC8-FINAL 2026-07-15 01:06:10 +08:00
OpenClaw Git Writer e6c4bef736 acceptance: openclaw git writer TASK-CODEX-GITOPS-SECRET-ACL-AND-IDENTITY-HARDENING-20260715T004818UTC8 2026-07-15 01:03:21 +08:00
AIOS OpenClaw Migration 6483e34892 test(OpenClaw): isolated worktree migration acceptance 20260715T001652UTC8 2026-07-15 00:32:53 +08:00
openclaw b05eb1babe task(codex): execute isolated worktree migration 20260715T001652UTC8 2026-07-15 00:17:28 +08:00
openclaw a8581699f2 task(openclaw): migrate GitOps to isolated worktrees 20260714T233742UTC8 2026-07-14 23:32:52 +08:00
openclaw cc9cada5df feat(gitops): add unified systemd runtime identity drop-in 2026-07-14 23:32:18 +08:00
openclaw dbed29c8c7 feat(gitops): add task environment preflight 2026-07-14 23:32:12 +08:00
openclaw 24f7e4ecc3 feat(gitops): add per-task worktree lifecycle script 2026-07-14 23:31:59 +08:00
openclaw b588bf8fb2 feat(gitops): add isolated worktree bootstrap script 2026-07-14 23:31:43 +08:00
openclaw f300033138 fix(gitops): correct default ACL runtime user 2026-07-14 23:31:32 +08:00
openclaw 7308c9c0c1 feat(gitops): add isolated worktree governance policy 2026-07-14 23:31:21 +08:00
openclaw 48290bd620 chore(gitops): start isolated worktree and unified identity governance 2026-07-14 23:30:07 +08:00
19 changed files with 539 additions and 1336 deletions
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
"created_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
"schema_version": 1,
"state_writer": "openclaw",
"work_units": [
{
"fallback": "codex",
"gate": "R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY",
"id": "R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER",
"primary": "openclaw",
"status": "READY",
"track": "R_RUNNER"
},
{
"fallback": "codex",
"gate": "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE",
"id": "P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE",
"primary": "openclaw",
"status": "READY",
"track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
},
{
"fallback": "openclaw",
"gate": "P1_REPAIR3_CODE",
"id": "P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK",
"primary": "codex",
"status": "READY",
"track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
}
]
}
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
{
"adaptive_dispatch": {
"codex_first": [
"complex_code",
"security_boundary",
"architecture",
"high_risk_review",
"strong_model_materially_better"
],
"default_orchestrator": "openclaw",
"dual_required": [
"release_gate",
"crypto_or_identity_change",
"production_migration_or_rollback"
],
"max_attempts_per_work_unit": 2,
"on_timeout": [
"mark_TIMEOUT",
"preserve_logs",
"switch_agent"
],
"openclaw_first": [
"quality_close",
"large_or_repetitive",
"long_running",
"infra_or_git_inventory",
"cost_sensitive"
],
"single_state_writer_lease_required": true,
"strict_role_partition": false,
"timeout_can_pass": false
},
"authoritative_state": {
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
"baseline": "V1R4C6",
"production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
"release": "paused",
"repair3": {
"base": "8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575",
"candidate": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
"commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4",
"exact4": "PASS",
"result": "49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045"
},
"runner": {
"artifact_sha256": "85c472c05a1e55a5899b215d3cd41df53912787de529ac9cb3d5308da4158130",
"commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
"live": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
"offline": "PASS",
"result": "e789632e359e9232d8ae081e7c4f23ed7b615a9d"
}
},
"contract_id": "V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT",
"facts_policy": {
"accept": [
"committed_git_tree",
"full_oid",
"worktree_bare_gitea_oid_match",
"test_log_with_rc",
"immutable_digest",
"result_only_commit",
"live_evidence"
],
"reject": [
"verbal_claim",
"readme_only",
"local_only_commit",
"environment_variable_as_secret_ref",
"compile_only",
"timeout_as_pass",
"unrelated_repo",
"fabricated_evidence"
]
},
"forbidden_git": [
"reset",
"amend",
"rebase",
"force_push",
"direct_main_push",
"direct_bare_ref_mutation",
"unapproved_gitea_db_mutation",
"reuse_accident_worktree",
"delete_live_worktree_to_clear_collision"
],
"generated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
"handoff": {
"ack": "CONTRACT_ACK=<full_contract_commit_oid>",
"advance": "independent_verification_required",
"all_agents_match": true
},
"join_gate": {
"requires": [
"RUNNER_RECOVERED",
"B3_PASS",
"B4_PASS",
"INTEGRATION_PASS"
]
},
"model_policy": {
"codex": "strongest_model_actually_available_in_runtime",
"gpt_5_6": "use_only_if_exposed",
"no_unverified_model_claims": true,
"openclaw_default": "DeepSeek V4 Flash"
},
"owner_authorization": {
"adaptive_agent_assignment_authorized": true,
"agent_substitution_authorized": true,
"autonomous_execution": true,
"may_bypass_release_controls": false,
"may_bypass_secret_controls": false,
"may_fabricate_evidence": false,
"user_step_by_step_confirmation_required": false
},
"release_gates": [
"MAIN_MERGE",
"STAGING_AND_CANARY",
"PRODUCTION"
],
"schema_version": 3,
"state_rules": [
"tracks_run_parallel",
"runner_block_does_not_block_offline_work_or_evidence_inventory",
"join_requires_both_tracks",
"failure_stops_dependents",
"production_remains_V1R4C6_paused_until_production_pass"
],
"status": "ACTIVE",
"tracks": {
"P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN": {
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
"parallel": true,
"repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
"repair3_commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4"
},
"R_RUNNER": {
"commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
"current": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
"fallback": "codex",
"parallel": true,
"primary": "openclaw",
"required": [
"artifact_verified",
"approved_secret_provider_contract",
"owner_probe_verified",
"service_healthy",
"heartbeat_healthy",
"gateway_auth",
"durable_task_create_read_cancel",
"execution_channel",
"live_rollback"
]
}
}
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
"baseline": "V1R4C6",
"contract_branch": "task/governance/v2r1-personal-weixin-production-contract-20260717",
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
"dispatch_commit": null,
"production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
"release": "paused",
"repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
"runner": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
"schema_version": 1,
"single_state_writer": "openclaw",
"updated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00"
}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# Codex V2R1 adaptive execution
CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
Execute P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK now:
- read-only verify Repair3 e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4
- read-only verify RESULT 49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045
- verify lineage from 8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575, exact4, tests, Gitleaks and RESULT-only scope
- do not modify Repair3 code in this unit
Act as fallback for OpenClaw only on timeout/unavailability. Use GPT-5.6 only if actually exposed; otherwise strongest visible model. Prefer OpenClaw when quality is comparable or volume is high; prefer Codex for complex/security-critical work.
Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
Report:
CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=codex STATUS=<status> IMPLEMENTATION=<oid-or-NONE> RESULT=<oid-or-NONE> OID_MATCH=<YES-or-NO> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
# 执行 GitOps 独立 Worktree 与统一运行身份迁移
```yaml
task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
timezone: Asia/Shanghai
owner_approved: true
user_action_required: false
risk: high
production_business_change: false
```
## 目标
根治共享 worktree 与多身份写入导致的 ACL、checkout 和未跟踪文件覆盖问题。
实施:
1. 统一 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入身份为 `aiman:gitops`;
2. 统一 `UMask=0002`;
3. 为 GitOps 根目录设置 setgid 与默认 ACL;
4. 建立 bare repo 和每任务独立 worktree;
5. 启用任务启动前自检;
6. 验证 OpenClaw 与 ChatGPT 并发任务互不干扰;
7. 保留原共享 workspace 作为只读回滚源,禁止智能体继续在其中切换分支。
## 强制通知
收到任务后立即微信通知 Owner:
```text
【任务已接收】GitOps独立worktree与统一运行身份迁移开始。将暂停写入服务、建立独立任务工作树并验证并发执行;生产业务版本不变。
```
任务结束后无论 PASS、BLOCKED 或 ROLLED_BACK,立即微信汇报结果并记录 message_id。
## 1. 变更前检查与封存
```bash
set -euo pipefail
cd /data/aios-gitops/workspace
pwd
id
umask
git status --short --branch
git rev-parse HEAD
systemctl list-units --type=service --all | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
```
将工作区未提交内容完整提交到非 main 证据分支或 stash,禁止 `git clean -fd`。
记录当前运行服务、用户、组、umask、PID、工作区 HEAD 和未跟踪文件清单。
## 2. 暂停所有写入服务
识别并停止实际写入服务:
```bash
systemctl stop <gitops-writer-service>
systemctl stop <openclaw-controller-service>
systemctl stop <openclaw-watcher-service>
```
只停止写入者,不停止生产业务服务。记录每条命令和退出码。
## 3. 安装统一运行身份 drop-in
对每个 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入服务安装:
```text
config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf
```
目标:
```yaml
User: aiman
Group: gitops
SupplementaryGroups: gitops
UMask: 0002
```
执行:
```bash
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl cat <service>
```
不得让服务继续以 root 写 workspace。
## 4. 初始化 bare repo 与独立 worktree 根目录
执行治理补丁中的脚本:
```bash
bash scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh
```
验收:
```yaml
bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
owner: aiman
group: gitops
directory_mode: 2775
default_acl: inherited
```
## 5. 创建 controller 独立 worktree
以 `aiman`、`umask 0002` 执行:
```bash
sudo -u aiman -g gitops bash -lc '
umask 0002
cd /data/aios-gitops
scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh create controller controller-runtime origin/main
'
```
将 controller/watcher 的工作目录改为:
```text
/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/controller-runtime
```
## 6. 启用任务启动前自检
每个任务在执行前必须运行:
```bash
scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh
```
任何一项失败时不得开始任务:
- 用户不是 aiman;
- 不在 gitops 组;
- umask 不是 0002;
- 使用共享 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`;
- worktree 不干净;
- task/result/git dir 不可写;
- 存在 Git lock。
## 7. 启动服务
```bash
systemctl start <gitops-writer-service>
systemctl start <openclaw-controller-service>
systemctl start <openclaw-watcher-service>
```
验证:
```bash
systemctl show <service> -p User -p Group -p UMask -p WorkingDirectory
ps -eo user,group,pid,cmd | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
```
## 8. 并发验收
创建两个独立任务:
```text
OpenClaw: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-<timestamp>
ChatGPT: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-CHATGPT-<timestamp>
```
分别使用:
```text
/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/<task-id>
/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/<task-id>
```
两个任务同时执行:
1. 写各自 `.agent/tasks/<agent>/`;
2. 写各自 `.agent/results/<agent>/`;
3. 创建深层子目录,验证默认 ACL;
4. commit;
5. push;
6. 不切换共享 workspace 分支。
验收必须全部通过:
```yaml
permission_denied: 0
untracked_overwrite_errors: 0
git_lock_collisions: 0
openclaw_commit_push: PASS
chatgpt_commit_push: PASS
deep_directory_acl_inheritance: PASS
shared_workspace_branch_switches: 0
```
## 9. 回滚
若迁移失败:
1. 停止新服务;
2. 保留失败 worktree 供审计;
3. 恢复 systemd drop-in 备份;
4. `daemon-reload`;
5. 恢复原服务状态;
6. 不删除 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`;
7. 生产业务保持不变。
## 10. 结果文件
提交:
```text
.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md
```
首段必须包含:
```yaml
status: PASS | BLOCKED | ROLLED_BACK
task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
timezone: Asia/Shanghai
user_action_required: false
runtime_identity:
user:
group:
umask:
bare_repo:
worktree_root:
controller_worktree:
services:
default_acl:
preflight:
concurrency_test:
openclaw_branch:
openclaw_commit:
chatgpt_branch:
chatgpt_commit:
permission_denied_count:
untracked_overwrite_count:
git_lock_collision_count:
owner_notifications:
received_message_id:
terminal_message_id:
rollback:
remaining_risks:
next_step:
```
提交并推送到独立执行分支。禁止直接推 main。
## 完成微信模板
PASS:
```text
【任务完成】GitOps独立worktree迁移已通过。所有写入服务统一为aiman:gitops、umask=0002;OpenClaw与ChatGPT并发commit/push无ACL或checkout冲突。生产业务版本未变化。
```
阻塞:
```text
【任务阻塞】GitOps独立worktree迁移未通过。原因=<具体服务/权限/并发验收>;已保留原workspace和回滚能力,生产业务未变化。
```
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# OpenClaw V2R1 adaptive orchestration
CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
You are default orchestrator and sole authoritative state writer.
Execute immediately:
1. R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER: discover approved provider metadata and owner-probe source without reading or outputting secrets. Environment variables alone are not approved secret refs.
2. P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE: inventory approved restricted B3 evidence locations; validate existing facts; never synthesize evidence.
3. Independently verify Codex results before advancing.
Prefer OpenClaw for comparable-quality, large, repetitive, long-running, infrastructure and cost-sensitive work. Prefer Codex strongest actually available model for complex code, security boundaries, architecture and high-risk review. On timeout mark TIMEOUT and switch agent; never infer PASS.
Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
Report:
CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=openclaw STATUS=<status> COMMIT=<oid-or-NONE> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
+5
View File
@@ -11,3 +11,8 @@ runtime/tmp/
runtime/cache/
logs/
config/test_write_perms
# BEGIN AIOS REGISTERED CHILD WORKTREES (V2R1C1 2026-07-21)
/TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-20260715T060254UTC8/
/TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-20260715T061051UTC8/
# END AIOS REGISTERED CHILD WORKTREES (V2R1C1 2026-07-21)
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
version: 1
policy_id: gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8
runtime_identity:
user: aiman
group: gitops
umask: "0002"
prohibit_root_workspace_writes: true
repository:
source_worktree: /data/aios-gitops/workspace
bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
remote: origin
worktrees:
controller: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller
task_pattern: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/{agent}/{task_id}
allowed_agents:
- openclaw
- chatgpt
- controller
require_clean_start: true
remove_after_successful_push: true
retain_on_failure: true
permissions:
owner: aiman
group: gitops
directory_mode: "2775"
file_mode: "0664"
default_acl:
user:aiman: rwx
group:gitops: rwx
apply_to:
- /data/aios-gitops
- /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
preflight:
required_user: aiman
required_group: gitops
required_umask: "0002"
require_writable_git_dir: true
require_writable_task_dir: true
require_writable_result_dir: true
reject_shared_source_worktree: true
reject_existing_git_lock: true
notifications:
owner_on_received: required
owner_on_terminal: required
preferred_channel: weixin
redact_secrets: true
rollback:
preserve_source_worktree: true
remove_created_worktrees: true
restore_service_dropins: true
restore_service_state: true
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# Install as a systemd drop-in for GitOps/OpenClaw writer services.
# Example: /etc/systemd/system/<service>.service.d/10-runtime-identity.conf
[Service]
User=aiman
Group=gitops
SupplementaryGroups=gitops
UMask=0002
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops
Environment=AIOS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
Environment=AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees
Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_USER=aiman
Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP=gitops
Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_UMASK=0002
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
TASK-CODEX-GITOPS-SECRET-ACL-AND-IDENTITY-HARDENING-20260715T004818UTC8-FINAL
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
TASK-CODEX-GITOPS-SECRET-ACL-AND-IDENTITY-HARDENING-20260715T004818UTC8
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"id": "patch-1784043007770-e97206c3",
"patch_name": "gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8",
"branch": "patch/gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8",
"risk": "high",
"description": "Root-cause remediation for recurring ACL and shared-worktree failures: unified aiman:gitops runtime identity, UMask=0002, inherited default ACLs, per-task isolated Git worktrees, startup preflight, migration/rollback scripts, systemd drop-in templates, audit evidence, and an OpenClaw execution task. No production business deployment in this patch.",
"created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
"created_at": "2026-07-14T15:30:07Z"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"type": "branch",
"branch": "task/codex/gitops-isolated-worktree-migration-20260715T001652UTC8",
"base": "patch/gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8",
"created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
"created_at": "2026-07-14T16:17:28Z",
"direct_main_push": false,
"owner_approval_required": true
}
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
# OpenClaw isolated-worktree acceptance
branch: `agent/openclaw/gitops-isolated-worktree-migration-20260715T001652UTC8`
base: `b05eb1babe9c657e8776c09eec71302166902cc3`
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="${AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT:-/data/aios-gitops}"
SOURCE="${AIOS_SOURCE_WORKTREE:-$ROOT/workspace}"
BARE="${AIOS_BARE_REPO:-$ROOT/repo.git}"
WORKTREES="${AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT:-$ROOT/worktrees}"
RUNTIME_USER="${AIOS_RUNTIME_USER:-aiman}"
RUNTIME_GROUP="${AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP:-gitops}"
if [[ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "ERROR: bootstrap must run as root" >&2
exit 2
fi
getent passwd "$RUNTIME_USER" >/dev/null
getent group "$RUNTIME_GROUP" >/dev/null
[[ -d "$SOURCE/.git" || -f "$SOURCE/.git" ]] || {
echo "ERROR: source worktree not found: $SOURCE" >&2
exit 3
}
install -d -o "$RUNTIME_USER" -g "$RUNTIME_GROUP" -m 2775 "$ROOT" "$WORKTREES"
install -d -o "$RUNTIME_USER" -g "$RUNTIME_GROUP" -m 2775 \
"$WORKTREES/openclaw" "$WORKTREES/chatgpt" "$WORKTREES/controller"
if [[ ! -d "$BARE" ]]; then
sudo -u "$RUNTIME_USER" -g "$RUNTIME_GROUP" git clone --bare "$SOURCE" "$BARE"
fi
chown -R "$RUNTIME_USER:$RUNTIME_GROUP" "$BARE" "$WORKTREES"
find "$BARE" "$WORKTREES" -type d -exec chmod 2775 {} +
find "$BARE" "$WORKTREES" -type f -exec chmod ug+rw {} +
setfacl -R -m "u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwX,g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwX,m::rwX" "$BARE" "$WORKTREES"
find "$BARE" "$WORKTREES" -type d -exec \
setfacl -m "d:u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwx,d:g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwx,d:m::rwx" {} +
cat <<EOF
bootstrap_status: PASS
root: $ROOT
source_worktree: $SOURCE
bare_repo: $BARE
worktree_root: $WORKTREES
runtime_user: $RUNTIME_USER
runtime_group: $RUNTIME_GROUP
EOF
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
EXPECTED_USER="${AIOS_RUNTIME_USER:-aiman}"
EXPECTED_GROUP="${AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP:-gitops}"
EXPECTED_UMASK="${AIOS_RUNTIME_UMASK:-0002}"
TASK_DIR="${AIOS_TASK_DIR:-.agent/tasks}"
RESULT_DIR="${AIOS_RESULT_DIR:-.agent/results}"
fail() {
echo "preflight_status: FAIL"
echo "reason: $1"
exit 1
}
USER_NOW="$(id -un)"
GROUPS_NOW="$(id -Gn)"
UMASK_NOW="$(umask)"
ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || true)"
GIT_DIR="$(git rev-parse --git-dir 2>/dev/null || true)"
BRANCH="$(git branch --show-current 2>/dev/null || true)"
[[ "$USER_NOW" == "$EXPECTED_USER" ]] || fail "runtime user is $USER_NOW, expected $EXPECTED_USER"
[[ " $GROUPS_NOW " == *" $EXPECTED_GROUP "* ]] || fail "runtime user is not in $EXPECTED_GROUP"
[[ "$UMASK_NOW" == "$EXPECTED_UMASK" || "$UMASK_NOW" == "002" ]] || fail "umask is $UMASK_NOW, expected $EXPECTED_UMASK"
[[ -n "$ROOT" ]] || fail "not inside a git worktree"
[[ "$ROOT" == /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/* ]] || fail "shared source worktree is prohibited: $ROOT"
[[ -w "$ROOT" ]] || fail "worktree root is not writable"
[[ -w "$GIT_DIR" ]] || fail "git dir is not writable: $GIT_DIR"
[[ ! -e "$GIT_DIR/index.lock" ]] || fail "git index lock exists"
install -d -m 2775 "$TASK_DIR" "$RESULT_DIR"
[[ -w "$TASK_DIR" ]] || fail "task directory is not writable: $TASK_DIR"
[[ -w "$RESULT_DIR" ]] || fail "result directory is not writable: $RESULT_DIR"
[[ -z "$(git status --porcelain)" ]] || fail "worktree is not clean at task start"
cat <<EOF
preflight_status: PASS
runtime_user: $USER_NOW
runtime_groups: $GROUPS_NOW
umask: $UMASK_NOW
worktree: $ROOT
git_dir: $GIT_DIR
branch: $BRANCH
workspace_clean: true
task_path_writable: true
result_path_writable: true
git_lock_present: false
EOF
+73
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ACTION="${1:-}"
AGENT="${2:-}"
TASK_ID="${3:-}"
BASE_REF="${4:-origin/main}"
ROOT="${AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT:-/data/aios-gitops}"
BARE="${AIOS_BARE_REPO:-$ROOT/repo.git}"
WORKTREES="${AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT:-$ROOT/worktrees}"
RUNTIME_USER="${AIOS_RUNTIME_USER:-aiman}"
RUNTIME_GROUP="${AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP:-gitops}"
usage() {
echo "usage: $0 create|remove <openclaw|chatgpt|controller> <task-id> [base-ref]" >&2
exit 64
}
[[ "$ACTION" =~ ^(create|remove)$ ]] || usage
[[ "$AGENT" =~ ^(openclaw|chatgpt|controller)$ ]] || usage
[[ "$TASK_ID" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$ ]] || {
echo "ERROR: invalid task id" >&2
exit 65
}
[[ "$(id -un)" == "$RUNTIME_USER" ]] || {
echo "ERROR: must run as $RUNTIME_USER" >&2
exit 66
}
[[ "$(id -gn)" == "$RUNTIME_GROUP" || " $(id -Gn) " == *" $RUNTIME_GROUP "* ]] || {
echo "ERROR: user must be in $RUNTIME_GROUP" >&2
exit 67
}
[[ "$(umask)" == "0002" || "$(umask)" == "002" ]] || {
echo "ERROR: umask must be 0002" >&2
exit 68
}
[[ -d "$BARE" ]] || {
echo "ERROR: bare repository missing: $BARE" >&2
exit 69
}
PATHNAME="$WORKTREES/$AGENT/$TASK_ID"
BRANCH="task/$AGENT/$TASK_ID"
case "$ACTION" in
create)
[[ ! -e "$PATHNAME" ]] || {
echo "ERROR: worktree already exists: $PATHNAME" >&2
exit 70
}
git --git-dir="$BARE" fetch --all --prune
git --git-dir="$BARE" worktree add -b "$BRANCH" "$PATHNAME" "$BASE_REF"
install -d -m 2775 "$PATHNAME/.agent/tasks/$AGENT" "$PATHNAME/.agent/results/$AGENT"
setfacl -m "u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwx,g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwx,m::rwx" "$PATHNAME"
find "$PATHNAME" -type d -exec chmod g+s {} +
find "$PATHNAME" -type d -exec \
setfacl -m "d:u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwx,d:g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwx,d:m::rwx" {} +
printf 'worktree: %s\nbranch: %s\nbase: %s\n' "$PATHNAME" "$BRANCH" "$BASE_REF"
;;
remove)
[[ -d "$PATHNAME" ]] || {
echo "ERROR: worktree not found: $PATHNAME" >&2
exit 71
}
[[ -z "$(git -C "$PATHNAME" status --porcelain)" ]] || {
echo "ERROR: worktree is not clean; retain for investigation" >&2
exit 72
}
git --git-dir="$BARE" worktree remove "$PATHNAME"
printf 'removed: %s\n' "$PATHNAME"
;;
esac
-652
View File
@@ -1,652 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Hardened WeChat outbound backend for AIOS.
Only the dedicated UCC adapter is a supported send backend. OpenClaw channel
discovery is retained for diagnostics, but generic OpenClaw chat or agent
delivery is never promoted to WeChat delivery.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import selectors
import signal
import subprocess
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
OPENCLAW_BIN = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", "openclaw")
WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID", "")
WECHAT_CHANNEL = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_CHANNEL", "")
SEND_BACKEND = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_SEND_BACKEND", "")
UCC_ADAPTER_URL = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18800")
UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_TOKEN") or os.environ.get(
"AIOS_WECHAT_QR_ADAPTER_TOKEN", ""
)
UCC_SEND_PATH = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send")
_allowed_origins = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "").strip()
UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = tuple(
origin.strip() for origin in _allowed_origins.split(",") if origin.strip()
) or (
"http://127.0.0.1:18800",
"http://[::1]:18800",
)
MAX_TARGET_BYTES = 512
MAX_CONTENT_BYTES = 32 * 1024
MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES = 512
MAX_METADATA_BYTES = 8 * 1024
MAX_METADATA_DEPTH = 32
MAX_METADATA_NODES = 1024
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024
MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES = 256
_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
_LEGACY_SEND_PATH = "/internal/channels/wechat/send"
_SAFE_PATH = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()*+,;=:@%/-]+$")
_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS = 4
_OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE = 124
_OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE = 125
_OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE = 126
def _bounded_timeout(value: str) -> int:
try:
parsed = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
return min(max(parsed, 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = _bounded_timeout(os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "10"))
class BackendResult:
def __init__(self, ok: bool, backend: str, status: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
self.ok = ok
self.backend = backend
self.status = status
self.data = data
def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {"ok": self.ok, "backend": self.backend, "status": self.status, **self.data}
class _BackendProtocolError(Exception):
"""Internal marker whose details must never cross the module boundary."""
def _openclaw_base_args() -> List[str]:
"""Return the OpenClaw 2026.6.11-compatible command prefix.
Gateway/auth global flags are not supported by the installed CLI and would
also expose credentials through the process argument vector.
"""
return [OPENCLAW_BIN]
def _terminate_process_tree(process: Any) -> None:
if os.name == "posix":
try:
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
except OSError:
pass
try:
process.wait(timeout=0.5)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
time.sleep(0.05)
try:
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
except OSError:
pass
try:
process.wait(timeout=0.5)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
return
if process.poll() is not None:
return
try:
process.terminate()
process.wait(timeout=1)
return
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
try:
process.kill()
process.wait(timeout=1)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
def _run_openclaw(
args: List[str], timeout: int = 15
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
bounded_timeout = min(max(int(timeout), 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
popen_options: Dict[str, Any] = {
"stdout": subprocess.PIPE,
"stderr": subprocess.PIPE,
}
if os.name == "posix":
popen_options["start_new_session"] = True
elif hasattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP"):
popen_options["creationflags"] = subprocess.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP
try:
process = subprocess.Popen(args, **popen_options)
except (OSError, ValueError):
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
selector = selectors.DefaultSelector()
streams = {"stdout": process.stdout, "stderr": process.stderr}
buffers = {"stdout": bytearray(), "stderr": bytearray()}
try:
for name, stream in streams.items():
if stream is not None:
selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name)
except (OSError, ValueError):
selector.close()
_terminate_process_tree(process)
for stream in streams.values():
if stream is not None:
stream.close()
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
deadline = time.monotonic() + bounded_timeout
total_bytes = 0
return_code: Optional[int] = None
try:
while selector.get_map():
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
return_code = _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE
break
events = selector.select(min(remaining, 0.1))
for key, _mask in events:
allowance = MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES - total_bytes
try:
chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), min(8192, allowance + 1))
except OSError:
return_code = _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE
break
if not chunk:
selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
key.fileobj.close()
continue
if len(chunk) > allowance:
return_code = _OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE
break
buffers[key.data].extend(chunk)
total_bytes += len(chunk)
if return_code is not None:
break
finally:
selector.close()
if return_code is not None:
_terminate_process_tree(process)
for stream in streams.values():
if stream is not None and not stream.closed:
stream.close()
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, return_code, "", "")
try:
completed_return_code = process.wait(timeout=1)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
_terminate_process_tree(process)
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
stdout = buffers["stdout"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
stderr = buffers["stderr"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, completed_return_code, stdout, stderr)
def _json_dict(text: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
try:
value = json.loads(text or "{}")
except (RecursionError, TypeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return {}
return value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def discover_openclaw_wechat_channel() -> Optional[str]:
"""Discover an explicitly typed WeChat/Weixin channel for diagnostics."""
if WECHAT_CHANNEL:
return WECHAT_CHANNEL
try:
proc = _run_openclaw(_openclaw_base_args() + ["channels", "list", "--json"], timeout=15)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError, ValueError):
return None
if proc.returncode != 0:
return None
data = _json_dict(proc.stdout[:MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES])
candidates: List[str] = []
def walk(value: Any) -> None:
if isinstance(value, dict):
name = value.get("name") or value.get("channel") or value.get("id")
kind = value.get("type") or value.get("kind")
if isinstance(name, str) and isinstance(kind, str):
label = f"{name} {kind}".lower()
if "wechat" in label or "weixin" in label:
candidates.append(name)
for child in value.values():
walk(child)
elif isinstance(value, list):
for child in value:
walk(child)
walk(data)
return candidates[0] if candidates else None
def _auth_headers() -> Dict[str, str]:
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}
if UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN:
headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN
return headers
def _safe_path(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(value, str):
return None
path = value if value.startswith("/") else "/" + value
try:
encoded_path = path.encode("utf-8")
except UnicodeEncodeError:
return None
if len(encoded_path) > MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES:
return None
if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(path):
return None
decoded = path
for _ in range(_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS):
try:
next_decoded = urllib.parse.unquote_to_bytes(decoded).decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
return None
if next_decoded == decoded:
break
decoded = next_decoded
if "%" in decoded or "\\" in decoded or "\x00" in decoded:
return None
if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(decoded):
return None
if any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in decoded.split("/")):
return None
return path
def _unique_paths(paths: List[str]) -> List[str]:
out: List[str] = []
for candidate in paths:
path = _safe_path(candidate)
if path and path not in out:
out.append(path)
if len(out) == 2:
break
return out
def _ucc_send_paths() -> List[str]:
canonical = _safe_path(UCC_SEND_PATH) or "/api/internal/wechat/send"
return _unique_paths([canonical, _LEGACY_SEND_PATH])
def _canonical_origin(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 2048:
return None
if "\\" in value or any(ord(character) < 32 for character in value):
return None
try:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(value)
port = parsed.port
except (UnicodeError, ValueError):
return None
scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
if scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:
return None
if parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in {"", "/"}:
return None
try:
host = parsed.hostname.rstrip(".").encode("idna").decode("ascii").lower()
except UnicodeError:
return None
if not host:
return None
if port is None:
port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
rendered_host = f"[{host}]" if ":" in host else host
return f"{scheme}://{rendered_host}:{port}"
def _adapter_base_url() -> Optional[str]:
origin = _canonical_origin(UCC_ADAPTER_URL)
allowed = {
canonical
for canonical in (_canonical_origin(value) for value in UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS)
if canonical
}
return origin if origin and origin in allowed else None
class _NoRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
def redirect_request(
self,
req: Any,
fp: Any,
code: int,
msg: str,
headers: Any,
newurl: str,
) -> None:
del req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl
return None
def _open_no_redirect(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int) -> Any:
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirectHandler())
return opener.open(request, timeout=timeout)
def ucc_adapter_alive() -> bool:
base_url = _adapter_base_url()
if not base_url:
return False
request = urllib.request.Request(
base_url + "/health", headers=_auth_headers(), method="GET"
)
try:
with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=min(5, REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)) as response:
return 200 <= int(response.status) < 300
except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError):
return False
def select_backend() -> Dict[str, Any]:
explicit = SEND_BACKEND.strip().lower()
if explicit:
if explicit == "ucc-adapter":
return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "explicit"}
return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "unsupported_backend"}
if ucc_adapter_alive():
return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "ucc_adapter_alive"}
return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
def _post_ucc(path: str, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> Tuple[int, Dict[str, Any]]:
base_url = _adapter_base_url()
safe_path = _safe_path(path)
if not base_url or not safe_path:
raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid adapter endpoint")
try:
body = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid request payload") from exc
request = urllib.request.Request(
base_url + safe_path,
data=body,
headers=_auth_headers(),
method="POST",
)
with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as response:
raw = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
if len(raw) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response too large")
try:
text = raw.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response encoding invalid") from exc
data = _json_dict(text)
if not data:
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response invalid")
return int(response.status), data
def _ucc_response_sent(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == "sent"
def _ucc_result_is_ok(data: Dict[str, Any], dry_run: bool = False) -> bool:
expected_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == expected_status
def _utf8_size(value: str) -> Optional[int]:
try:
return len(value.encode("utf-8"))
except UnicodeEncodeError:
return None
def _valid_identifier(value: Any, required: bool = False) -> bool:
if not isinstance(value, str):
return False
if required and not value.strip():
return False
if not value:
return not required
if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
return False
size = _utf8_size(value)
return size is not None and size <= MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES and not any(
ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value
)
def _validate_metadata(metadata: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
return "invalid_input"
nodes = 0
stack: List[Tuple[Any, int]] = [(metadata, 0)]
while stack:
value, depth = stack.pop()
nodes += 1
if depth > MAX_METADATA_DEPTH or nodes > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
return "input_too_large"
if isinstance(value, dict):
if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
return "input_too_large"
for key, child in value.items():
if (
not isinstance(key, str)
or len(key) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES
or _utf8_size(key) is None
):
return "invalid_input"
stack.append((child, depth + 1))
elif isinstance(value, list):
if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
return "input_too_large"
stack.extend((child, depth + 1) for child in value)
elif isinstance(value, str):
if len(value) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES:
return "input_too_large"
if _utf8_size(value) is None:
return "invalid_input"
elif value is not None and not isinstance(value, (bool, int, float)):
return "invalid_input"
try:
encoded = json.dumps(
metadata,
ensure_ascii=False,
allow_nan=False,
separators=(",", ":"),
).encode("utf-8")
except (RecursionError, TypeError, UnicodeEncodeError, ValueError):
return "invalid_input"
return "input_too_large" if len(encoded) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES else None
def _validate_payload(
target: Any,
content: Any,
account_id: Any,
message_id: Any,
metadata: Any,
dry_run: Any,
) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(target, str) or not isinstance(content, str):
return "invalid_input"
if not target.strip() or not content.strip() or not isinstance(dry_run, bool):
return "invalid_input"
if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in target):
return "invalid_input"
if "\x00" in content or not _valid_identifier(account_id) or not _valid_identifier(message_id):
return "invalid_input"
if len(target) > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or len(content) > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
return "input_too_large"
target_size = _utf8_size(target)
content_size = _utf8_size(content)
if target_size is None or content_size is None:
return "invalid_input"
if target_size > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or content_size > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
return "input_too_large"
return _validate_metadata(metadata)
def _safe_provider_message_id(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
return None
if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
return None
size = _utf8_size(value)
if size is None or size > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
return None
if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
return None
return value
def send_ucc_adapter(
target: str,
content: str,
account_id: str = "",
message_id: str = "",
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
dry_run: bool = False,
) -> BackendResult:
effective_account = account_id or WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID
effective_metadata: Any = {} if metadata is None else metadata
error_code = _validate_payload(
target,
content,
effective_account,
message_id,
effective_metadata,
dry_run,
)
if error_code:
return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", {"code": error_code})
payload = {
"target": target,
"content": content,
"account_id": effective_account,
"message_id": message_id,
"metadata": effective_metadata,
"dry_run": dry_run,
}
last_endpoint: Optional[str] = None
for path in _ucc_send_paths():
last_endpoint = path
try:
http_status, data = _post_ucc(path, payload)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
if exc.code in {404, 405}:
continue
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": int(exc.code), "endpoint": path},
)
except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError, _BackendProtocolError):
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
)
except Exception:
# Fail closed without returning exception text, type, or chained cause.
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
)
if not (200 <= http_status < 300):
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
)
if not _ucc_result_is_ok(data, dry_run):
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_rejected", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
)
confirmed_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
result_data: Dict[str, Any] = {
"code": confirmed_status,
"http_status": http_status,
"endpoint": path,
}
provider_message_id = _safe_provider_message_id(data.get("provider_message_id"))
if provider_message_id:
result_data["provider_message_id"] = provider_message_id
return BackendResult(True, "ucc-adapter", confirmed_status, result_data)
data: Dict[str, Any] = {"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
if last_endpoint:
data["endpoint"] = last_endpoint
return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", data)
def send_openclaw_channel(
target: str,
content: str,
account_id: str = "",
message_id: str = "",
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
dry_run: bool = False,
) -> BackendResult:
del target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
return BackendResult(
False,
"openclaw-channel",
"failed",
{"code": "unsupported_backend"},
)
def send_message(
target: str,
content: str,
account_id: str = "",
message_id: str = "",
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
dry_run: bool = False,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
selected = select_backend()
if selected.get("backend") == "ucc-adapter":
return send_ucc_adapter(
target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
).to_dict()
code = "unsupported_backend" if selected.get("reason") == "unsupported_backend" else "wechat_outbound_backend_unavailable"
return BackendResult(False, "unavailable", "failed", {"code": code}).to_dict()
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(json.dumps(select_backend(), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")))
+1 -454
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,11 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import io
import os
import signal
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest import TestCase
from unittest.mock import Mock, call, patch
from unittest.mock import patch
BACKEND_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "wechat_send_backend.py"
@@ -89,450 +80,6 @@ class WechatSendBackendTests(TestCase):
self.assertEqual(args[1]["content"], "hello")
self.assertFalse(args[1]["dry_run"])
def test_ucc_auth_is_authorization_header_not_argv_or_output(self):
secret = "ucc-super-secret-token"
class Response:
status = 200
def __enter__(self):
return self
def __exit__(self, *_args):
return False
def read(self, _limit=-1):
return b'{"ok":true,"status":"sent"}'
urlopen = Mock(return_value=Response())
output = io.StringIO()
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", secret),
patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", urlopen),
redirect_stdout(output),
redirect_stderr(output),
):
status, payload = self.backend._post_ucc(
"/api/internal/wechat/send", {"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello"}
)
request = urlopen.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), f"Bearer {secret}")
self.assertEqual(status, 200)
self.assertEqual(payload, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})
self.assertNotIn(secret, " ".join(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
self.assertNotIn(secret, output.getvalue())
self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
def test_ucc_paths_are_canonical_first_unique_and_bounded(self):
with patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"):
paths = self.backend._ucc_send_paths()
self.assertEqual(paths[0], "/api/internal/wechat/send")
self.assertLessEqual(len(paths), 2)
self.assertEqual(len(paths), len(set(paths)))
self.assertTrue(all(path.startswith("/") for path in paths))
def test_ucc_accepts_only_explicit_true_and_sent_when_not_dry_run(self):
self.assertTrue(self.backend._ucc_response_sent({"ok": True, "status": "sent"}))
for response in (
{"ok": 1, "status": "sent"},
{"ok": True, "status": "accepted"},
{"ok": False, "status": "sent"},
{"status": "sent"},
):
with self.subTest(response=response):
self.assertFalse(self.backend._ucc_response_sent(response))
def test_ambiguous_canonical_failures_never_fallback(self):
secret = "raw-upstream-secret"
failures = (
TimeoutError(secret),
ConnectionError(secret),
self.backend._BackendProtocolError(secret),
RuntimeError(secret),
)
for failure in failures:
with self.subTest(failure=type(failure).__name__):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=failure) as post,
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
).to_dict()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_unavailable")
self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 1)
self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
def test_only_explicit_http_404_or_405_uses_legacy_fallback(self):
for http_status in (404, 405):
with self.subTest(http_status=http_status):
missing = urllib.error.HTTPError(
"http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send",
http_status,
"not found",
{},
None,
)
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
side_effect=[missing, (200, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})],
) as post,
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
).to_dict()
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["endpoint"], "/internal/channels/wechat/send")
self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 2)
def test_non_not_found_http_error_never_falls_back(self):
denied = urllib.error.HTTPError(
"http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send", 401, "denied", {}, None
)
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=denied) as post:
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="chat-001", content="hello").to_dict()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
post.assert_called_once()
def test_ucc_rejection_does_not_expose_raw_error_or_secret(self):
secret = "provider-password=secret-value"
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(200, {"ok": False, "status": "failed", "error": secret}),
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
).to_dict()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_rejected")
self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
def test_dry_run_requires_dry_run_status_and_never_reports_sent(self):
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": "dry_run"}),
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=True
).to_dict()
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["status"], "dry_run")
self.assertNotEqual(result["status"], "sent")
for dry_run, upstream_status in ((True, "sent"), (False, "dry_run")):
with self.subTest(dry_run=dry_run, upstream_status=upstream_status):
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": upstream_status}),
):
rejected = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=dry_run
).to_dict()
self.assertFalse(rejected["ok"])
self.assertEqual(rejected["status"], "failed")
def test_invalid_provider_message_id_never_reverses_confirmed_send(self):
invalid_values = (
"\ud800",
"contains\x00control",
"x" * (self.backend.MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES + 1),
{"not": "a string"},
)
for provider_message_id in invalid_values:
with self.subTest(value=repr(provider_message_id)[:40]):
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(
200,
{
"ok": True,
"status": "sent",
"provider_message_id": provider_message_id,
},
),
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello"
).to_dict()
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["status"], "sent")
self.assertNotIn("provider_message_id", result)
def test_openclaw_2026_6_11_commands_have_no_unsupported_global_gateway(self):
completed = SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout='{"channels": []}')
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "OPENCLAW_BIN", "/usr/local/bin/openclaw"),
patch.object(self.backend, "_run_openclaw", return_value=completed) as run,
):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend.discover_openclaw_wechat_channel())
command = run.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(command, ["/usr/local/bin/openclaw", "channels", "list", "--json"])
self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(command))
def test_openclaw_output_overflow_terminates_while_process_is_running(self):
writer = (
"import os,time;"
f"os.write(1,b'x'*{self.backend.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 4096});"
"time.sleep(10)"
)
started = time.monotonic()
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw([sys.executable, "-c", writer], timeout=4)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
self.assertLess(elapsed, 2.0)
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
def test_openclaw_timeout_returns_failure_and_terminates_promptly(self):
started = time.monotonic()
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
[sys.executable, "-c", "import time;time.sleep(10)"], timeout=1
)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
def test_timeout_kills_inherited_pipe_descendant_after_parent_exits(self):
if os.name != "posix" or not Path("/proc").is_dir():
self.skipTest("POSIX process-group and procfs contract")
def process_is_running(pid):
try:
state = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text(encoding="utf-8").split()[2]
except (FileNotFoundError, IndexError, OSError):
return False
return state not in {"X", "Z"}
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
pid_path = Path(directory) / "descendant.pid"
descendant = "import time;time.sleep(30)"
launcher = (
"import pathlib,subprocess,sys;"
f"child=subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,'-c',{descendant!r}]);"
f"pathlib.Path({str(pid_path)!r}).write_text(str(child.pid),encoding='utf-8')"
)
started = time.monotonic()
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
[sys.executable, "-c", launcher], timeout=1
)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
self.assertTrue(pid_path.is_file())
descendant_pid = int(pid_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
try:
deadline = time.monotonic() + 2
while process_is_running(descendant_pid) and time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(0.02)
self.assertFalse(process_is_running(descendant_pid))
finally:
if process_is_running(descendant_pid):
os.kill(descendant_pid, signal.SIGKILL)
self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
def test_process_tree_termination_uses_posix_process_group(self):
if os.name != "posix":
self.skipTest("POSIX process-group contract")
class Process:
pid = 43210
def __init__(self):
self.wait_count = 0
def poll(self):
return None
def wait(self, timeout):
self.wait_count += 1
if self.wait_count == 1:
raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(["openclaw"], timeout)
return -signal.SIGKILL
process = Process()
with patch.object(self.backend.os, "killpg") as killpg:
self.backend._terminate_process_tree(process)
self.assertEqual(
killpg.call_args_list,
[
call(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM),
call(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL),
],
)
def test_unsupported_and_generic_chat_backends_fail_closed(self):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "SEND_BACKEND", "openclaw-chat"),
patch.object(self.backend, "ucc_adapter_alive", return_value=False),
):
selected = self.backend.select_backend()
result = self.backend.send_message(target="chat-001", content="hello")
self.assertEqual(selected["backend"], "unavailable")
self.assertEqual(selected["reason"], "unsupported_backend")
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "unsupported_backend")
def test_invalid_or_oversized_input_is_rejected_before_network(self):
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
empty = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="", content="hello").to_dict()
oversized = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="x" * (self.backend.MAX_CONTENT_BYTES + 1)
).to_dict()
self.assertEqual(empty["code"], "invalid_input")
self.assertEqual(oversized["code"], "input_too_large")
post.assert_not_called()
def test_unpaired_surrogate_inputs_fail_closed_before_network(self):
cases = (
{"target": "\ud800", "content": "hello"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "\ud800"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "account_id": "\ud800"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "message_id": "\ud800"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "metadata": {"bad": "\ud800"}},
)
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
for kwargs in cases:
with self.subTest(field=next(reversed(kwargs))):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(**kwargs).to_dict()
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "invalid_input")
post.assert_not_called()
def test_deeply_nested_metadata_is_bounded_before_network(self):
metadata = {}
for _ in range(1200):
metadata = {"nested": metadata}
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", metadata=metadata
).to_dict()
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "input_too_large")
post.assert_not_called()
def test_adapter_origin_must_be_allowlisted(self):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://evil.example:8443"),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
),
):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://adapter.example:8443"),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
("https://adapter.example:8443",),
),
):
self.assertEqual(
self.backend._adapter_base_url(), "https://adapter.example:8443"
)
def test_adapter_origin_rejects_scheme_userinfo_fragment_and_path(self):
invalid_origins = (
"ftp://127.0.0.1:18800",
"http://user:password@127.0.0.1:18800",
"http://127.0.0.1:18800#fragment",
"http://127.0.0.1:18800/base-path",
)
for origin in invalid_origins:
with self.subTest(origin=origin):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", origin),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
),
):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
def test_adapter_path_rejects_decoded_traversal(self):
for path in (
"/api/%2e%2e/send",
"/api/%2E%2E/send",
"/api/%2525252e%2525252e/send",
"/api/%252525252e%252525252e/send",
"/api/../send",
"/api/%zz/send",
):
with self.subTest(path=path):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._safe_path(path))
def test_adapter_path_keeps_intended_safe_canonical_paths(self):
for path in (
"/api/internal/wechat/send",
"/internal/channels/wechat/send",
"/api/%7Ehealth/status",
):
with self.subTest(path=path):
self.assertEqual(self.backend._safe_path(path), path)
def test_redirects_are_refused_and_authorization_cannot_cross_origin(self):
handler = self.backend._NoRedirectHandler()
self.assertIsNone(
handler.redirect_request(
None,
None,
302,
"redirect",
{"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
"https://evil.example/steal",
)
)
redirected = urllib.error.HTTPError(
"http://127.0.0.1:18800/api/internal/wechat/send",
302,
"redirect",
{"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
None,
)
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", "header-secret"),
patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", side_effect=redirected) as opened,
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello"
).to_dict()
request = opened.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlsplit(request.full_url).netloc, "127.0.0.1:18800")
self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), "Bearer header-secret")
opened.assert_called_once()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
if __name__ == "__main__":
import unittest