Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
openclaw dacc75e2c8 task(codex): authorize V2R1 G1 recovery candidate r2 2026-07-15 02:24:44 +08:00
openclaw de04e1e0bc task(codex): publish V2R1 G1 final verify retry 2026-07-15 02:03:39 +08:00
openclaw 502ef30642 docs-v2r1-correct-cleanup-scanner-evidence 2026-07-13 16:50:24 +08:00
openclaw b9e1f9db66 docs(v2r1): record Gate 1 cleanup verification 2026-07-13 16:46:44 +08:00
openclaw 7b82ae11f6 cleanup-v2r1-integration-baseline 2026-07-13 16:42:07 +08:00
openclaw d6ba7e8fa8 docs-v2r1-record-integration-quality-verification 2026-07-13 16:02:38 +08:00
openclaw a6878d30b8 test-v2r1-strengthen-ingress-integration-contract 2026-07-13 16:02:21 +08:00
openclaw f11513e9d7 test-v2r1-runtime-ingress-integration-entrypoint 2026-07-13 15:53:36 +08:00
openclaw 6b645c9cdd fix(v2r1): preserve exact-message append idempotency 2026-07-13 15:45:08 +08:00
openclaw 9d58609e33 fix(v2r1): make ledger append own durable write path 2026-07-13 15:38:33 +08:00
openclaw b355c3b5b9 feat-v2r1-bind-ingress-identity 2026-07-13 15:21:10 +08:00
openclaw 6bbfbff7f4 feat-v2r1-wire-authenticated-channel-ingress 2026-07-13 13:25:53 +08:00
openclaw 6077331add test(v2r1): make router isolation contracts authoritative 2026-07-13 02:28:32 +08:00
openclaw 75f61ac0e6 test(v2r1): cover tenant router isolation contracts 2026-07-13 02:18:04 +08:00
openclaw 0b41a3952a fix-v2r1-suppress-hermes-conflict-context 2026-07-13 02:10:23 +08:00
openclaw 8f205c0d87 test-v2r1-cover-hermes-command-provenance 2026-07-13 02:05:03 +08:00
openclaw d2a4a765ac test-v2r1-enforce-sanitized-hermes-replay-conflicts 2026-07-13 02:03:49 +08:00
openclaw b1110cad62 fix(v2r1): reject noncanonical tenant signatures 2026-07-13 01:52:00 +08:00
openclaw b483dfadbf test(v2r1): define Hermes contract acceptance evidence 2026-07-13 01:25:28 +08:00
openclaw 1e5e144318 fix(v2r1): convert duplicate Hermes events to ConflictError 2026-07-13 01:25:23 +08:00
openclaw d552876a80 release(v2r1): add single source live status page 2026-07-13 00:12:28 +08:00
openclaw 6569065198 ops(v2r1): add RC1 health check 2026-07-12 23:41:01 +08:00
openclaw 2b80c50415 test(v2r1): add RC1 acceptance gate manifest 2026-07-12 23:40:56 +08:00
openclaw 954982647e fix(v2r1): align plugin package entry with OpenClaw SDK contract 2026-07-12 23:40:52 +08:00
openclaw 8074eb31b1 ops(v2r1): add RC1 install preflight 2026-07-12 23:37:42 +08:00
openclaw 90138221ee fix(v2r1): add OpenClaw runtime extension package metadata 2026-07-12 23:37:37 +08:00
openclaw 729c7bb23b fix(v2r1): bind OpenClaw trust only to authoritative runId 2026-07-12 23:37:33 +08:00
openclaw d2de7f23d1 ops(v2r1): add RC1 validation gate 2026-07-12 23:32:51 +08:00
openclaw 73c0a233ce feat(v2r1): add aios-cell lifecycle CLI 2026-07-12 23:32:47 +08:00
openclaw 00816a13c1 feat(v2r1): register OpenClaw runtime provenance and tool hooks 2026-07-12 23:32:42 +08:00
openclaw 4920ac6192 release: define AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 manifest 2026-07-12 23:26:05 +08:00
openclaw b12ff086bf feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin manifest 2026-07-12 23:26:00 +08:00
openclaw 57a668d87e feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary policy runtime 2026-07-12 23:25:57 +08:00
openclaw bab319575b feat(v2r1): add Tenant Cell manager lifecycle registry 2026-07-12 23:22:54 +08:00
openclaw c172953a3c feat(v2r1): add Hermes profile isolation primitives 2026-07-12 23:22:47 +08:00
openclaw c7617fa548 feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped memory namespace policy 2026-07-12 23:22:41 +08:00
openclaw 2eba23d274 feat(v2r1): add tenant secret scope references 2026-07-12 23:17:56 +08:00
openclaw f2e0406a20 feat(v2r1): add append-only tenant audit chain 2026-07-12 23:17:50 +08:00
openclaw ccb02640ac feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped exact message ledger 2026-07-12 23:17:43 +08:00
openclaw 5c52f6c82c feat(v2r1): add tenant partitioned Hermes fabric scheduler 2026-07-12 23:10:55 +08:00
openclaw 429c6875bc feat(v2r1): add fail-closed Tenant Router and registry 2026-07-12 23:10:47 +08:00
openclaw f10d0d5b17 feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw Tenant Cell lifecycle adapter 2026-07-12 23:04:34 +08:00
openclaw c9974f3e47 feat(v2r1): add signed tenant context and canonical message contract 2026-07-12 23:04:24 +08:00
openclaw c72450aeb0 docs: add V1R5 to V2R1 migration plan 2026-07-12 22:39:32 +08:00
openclaw f95be48a42 docs: add AIOS V2R1 architecture baseline 2026-07-12 22:39:28 +08:00
openclaw ba989d7340 Start AIOS V2R1C0 Tenant Cell and Hermes Shared Agent Fabric release train 2026-07-12 22:39:23 +08:00
109 changed files with 3483 additions and 11307 deletions
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
"created_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
"schema_version": 1,
"state_writer": "openclaw",
"work_units": [
{
"fallback": "codex",
"gate": "R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY",
"id": "R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER",
"primary": "openclaw",
"status": "READY",
"track": "R_RUNNER"
},
{
"fallback": "codex",
"gate": "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE",
"id": "P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE",
"primary": "openclaw",
"status": "READY",
"track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
},
{
"fallback": "openclaw",
"gate": "P1_REPAIR3_CODE",
"id": "P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK",
"primary": "codex",
"status": "READY",
"track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
}
]
}
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
{
"adaptive_dispatch": {
"codex_first": [
"complex_code",
"security_boundary",
"architecture",
"high_risk_review",
"strong_model_materially_better"
],
"default_orchestrator": "openclaw",
"dual_required": [
"release_gate",
"crypto_or_identity_change",
"production_migration_or_rollback"
],
"max_attempts_per_work_unit": 2,
"on_timeout": [
"mark_TIMEOUT",
"preserve_logs",
"switch_agent"
],
"openclaw_first": [
"quality_close",
"large_or_repetitive",
"long_running",
"infra_or_git_inventory",
"cost_sensitive"
],
"single_state_writer_lease_required": true,
"strict_role_partition": false,
"timeout_can_pass": false
},
"authoritative_state": {
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
"baseline": "V1R4C6",
"production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
"release": "paused",
"repair3": {
"base": "8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575",
"candidate": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
"commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4",
"exact4": "PASS",
"result": "49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045"
},
"runner": {
"artifact_sha256": "85c472c05a1e55a5899b215d3cd41df53912787de529ac9cb3d5308da4158130",
"commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
"live": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
"offline": "PASS",
"result": "e789632e359e9232d8ae081e7c4f23ed7b615a9d"
}
},
"contract_id": "V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT",
"facts_policy": {
"accept": [
"committed_git_tree",
"full_oid",
"worktree_bare_gitea_oid_match",
"test_log_with_rc",
"immutable_digest",
"result_only_commit",
"live_evidence"
],
"reject": [
"verbal_claim",
"readme_only",
"local_only_commit",
"environment_variable_as_secret_ref",
"compile_only",
"timeout_as_pass",
"unrelated_repo",
"fabricated_evidence"
]
},
"forbidden_git": [
"reset",
"amend",
"rebase",
"force_push",
"direct_main_push",
"direct_bare_ref_mutation",
"unapproved_gitea_db_mutation",
"reuse_accident_worktree",
"delete_live_worktree_to_clear_collision"
],
"generated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
"handoff": {
"ack": "CONTRACT_ACK=<full_contract_commit_oid>",
"advance": "independent_verification_required",
"all_agents_match": true
},
"join_gate": {
"requires": [
"RUNNER_RECOVERED",
"B3_PASS",
"B4_PASS",
"INTEGRATION_PASS"
]
},
"model_policy": {
"codex": "strongest_model_actually_available_in_runtime",
"gpt_5_6": "use_only_if_exposed",
"no_unverified_model_claims": true,
"openclaw_default": "DeepSeek V4 Flash"
},
"owner_authorization": {
"adaptive_agent_assignment_authorized": true,
"agent_substitution_authorized": true,
"autonomous_execution": true,
"may_bypass_release_controls": false,
"may_bypass_secret_controls": false,
"may_fabricate_evidence": false,
"user_step_by_step_confirmation_required": false
},
"release_gates": [
"MAIN_MERGE",
"STAGING_AND_CANARY",
"PRODUCTION"
],
"schema_version": 3,
"state_rules": [
"tracks_run_parallel",
"runner_block_does_not_block_offline_work_or_evidence_inventory",
"join_requires_both_tracks",
"failure_stops_dependents",
"production_remains_V1R4C6_paused_until_production_pass"
],
"status": "ACTIVE",
"tracks": {
"P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN": {
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
"parallel": true,
"repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
"repair3_commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4"
},
"R_RUNNER": {
"commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
"current": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
"fallback": "codex",
"parallel": true,
"primary": "openclaw",
"required": [
"artifact_verified",
"approved_secret_provider_contract",
"owner_probe_verified",
"service_healthy",
"heartbeat_healthy",
"gateway_auth",
"durable_task_create_read_cancel",
"execution_channel",
"live_rollback"
]
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
status: PASS
integration_path: tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py
tests: pytest tests/v2r1 = 29 passed in 0.98s; pytest tests/integration = 3 passed in 0.18s
runtime_flow: PASS - signed public ingress -> IngressAuthenticator -> RuntimeIdentityResolver -> RuntimeWiring.ingest -> ChannelAdapter -> MessageLedger.append -> SessionPool
commit: a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e
gate1: BLOCKED
risk: high
# Result
## Changed Files
- `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`
- `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`
## RED Evidence
The baseline integration entrypoint from `f11513e9d7326caa827e59f4f10f07681633dfc0` was inadequate: its successful flow replaced `MessageLedger.remember()` and its alleged duplicate conflict changed the message ID. The quality checks failed before this update because neither test proved the required runtime contract.
## Verification
- The success path sends a real signed public ingress request and uses a `sys.setprofile` observer against the real `MessageLedger.remember` code object. It preserves the production object and all behavior, then asserts zero legacy calls.
- The duplicate path sends two authenticated requests under the same principal, tenant, cell, channel, account, peer, direction, session, and `message_id`; only `event_id` and body differ. The second response must be `CONFLICT`, with exactly one ledger record and one session lease remaining.
## Commands
```text
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1 -q
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration -q
```
## Gate 1
`BLOCKED`. This task makes the runtime integration entrypoint meaningful, but does not close the independent Gate 1 matrix, authenticated production OpenClaw registration, secret scanning, second clean-room review, or staging rollback rehearsal.
## Recommendation
Keep this isolated evidence commit for independent review. Do not merge, tag, or deploy until all Gate 1 requirements have independent evidence.
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
status: PASS
commit: 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3
tests:
v2r1: "29 passed, exit code 0"
integration: "3 passed, exit code 0"
cleanup_scan:
status: PASS
findings: "No remaining conflict markers, unexplained worktree changes, unapproved temporary/cache/build artifacts, or scanner-detected secrets. Runtime SQLite was removed and its sidecars are ignored with exact root-anchored rules; tracked dist/ZIP artifacts are documented exceptions."
risk: MEDIUM
recommendation: "Push the controlled work branch, then request independent OpenClaw Gate Review; do not merge or release from this result alone."
# V2R1 Gate 1 Codex Cleanup Result
## Scope and Git Baseline
- Task: `V2R1-G1-CODEX-CLEANUP-20260713`
- Branch: `work/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`
- Cleanup implementation commit: `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`
- Integration commit: `a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e`
- Locked integration result baseline: `d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da`
- `git merge-base --is-ancestor a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e HEAD`: exit code `0`
- `git merge-base --is-ancestor d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da HEAD`: exit code `0`
- Tree before this result-only commit: `94146e05f700921b12ef023eb4d8be771bae4047`
The locked integration artifacts were not modified by cleanup:
- `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`: blob `6b6732a4c73bbb7fb5273a05b897adce9da39a9a`
- `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`: blob `e2d6ce3b037339385831f51cb0db42c86b2ae827`
## Cleanup Changes Verified
Commit `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`:
- removed the tracked runtime database `data/webops.sqlite3`;
- added exact root-anchored ignore rules for `/data/webops.sqlite3`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-wal`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-shm`, and `/data/webops.sqlite3-journal`;
- resolved tracked merge-conflict residue in `agents/registry.yaml` and `docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md`;
- left the locked integration test and prior Codex result blobs unchanged.
`git grep -n -E '^(<<<<<<<|=======|>>>>>>>)' -- . ':!source-baseline/*.zip'` returned no matches (exit code `1`, the expected no-match result).
The repository scan found no unapproved `__pycache__`, `*.pyc`, `*.pyo`, `.pytest_cache`, `.mypy_cache`, `.ruff_cache`, `*.tmp`, `*.swp`, backup-suffix, or `.DS_Store` artifacts after verification cleanup. The following tracked artifacts are expected baseline exceptions, not unexplained generated files:
- `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/` (2 tracked plugin distribution files);
- `source-baseline/current_actual_deployment_source.zip`;
- `source-baseline/previous_current_actual_deployment_source_from_webops_delta.zip`.
Before creating this result file, `git status --porcelain=v1 --untracked-files=all` was empty with exit code `0`.
## Secret Scan
Scanner: Gitleaks `8.30.1`, official Linux x64 release asset.
- Asset: `/tmp/gitleaks_8.30.1_linux_x64.tar.gz.codex`
- SHA-256: `551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb`
- `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks git --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-git.json --log-opts=7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3 /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported `312 commits scanned`, approximately `1,384,427 bytes (1.38 MB)` scanned, and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
- `git rev-list --count 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`: exit code `0`, `327` reachable commits. This Git reachability count is recorded separately and is not the Gitleaks scanned-commit count.
- `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks dir --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-tree.json /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported approximately `1,214,737 bytes (1.21 MB)` scanned and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
No secret content is reproduced in this report.
## Tests
Command:
```bash
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1
```
Output summary:
```text
collected 29 items
29 passed in 0.97s
exit code: 0
```
Command:
```bash
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration
```
Output summary:
```text
collected 3 items
3 passed in 0.18s
exit code: 0
```
Environment: Linux, Python `3.12.3`, pytest `9.1.1`, pluggy `1.6.0`.
## Disposition
The cleanup and requested test verification pass at the stated implementation commit. Risk remains `MEDIUM` until the controlled branch is pushed and independently fetched and reviewed by OpenClaw. This result does not authorize merge, tag creation, baseline update, staging, or production deployment.
@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
# V2R1 Gate 1 — Clean-Room Final Evidence
## Summary
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-07-14 |
| Source commit | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
| Source branch | `origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000` |
| Result branch | `fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714` |
| Result commit reference | `HEAD` |
| Gate | `G1` |
| Variant | `openclaw-cleanroom` |
| Status | `PASS` |
The immutable report uses `HEAD` for post-commit verification. The resolved commit object ID is recorded by the external acceptance result after this file is committed; a Git commit cannot reliably embed its own object ID because changing the file changes the tree and commit identity.
## Machine-Readable Result
```yaml
gate: G1
variant: openclaw-cleanroom
date: 2026-07-14
status: PASS
source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
source_branch: origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000
result_branch: fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714
result_commit_ref: HEAD
tests_total: 32
tests_passed: 32
tests_failed: 0
cleanup_scan: PASS
secret_scan: PASS
rollback_status: PASS
recovery_verified: true
workspace_clean_at_test_completion: true
merge_performed: false
tag_created: false
baseline_promoted: false
deployment_performed: false
```
## Evidence Provenance
The test, cleanup, secret-scan, rollback, and recovery results below are execution evidence supplied by OpenClaw for the Gate 1 run. This correction commit changes only the evidence report and does not claim that the GitOps API reran the suites.
## HMAC Test-Key Length Verification
| Test file | Variable | Test-only value | Length |
|---|---|---|---:|
| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:24` | `internal_key` | `b"runtime-internal-context-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:25` | `ingress_key` | `b"runtime-external-ingress-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
Both values are test fixtures. The supplied evidence reports that no production secret was introduced.
## Test Results Supplied by OpenClaw
### V2R1 suite — 29 of 29 passed
```shell
PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest \
tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py \
tests/v2r1/test_message_ledger_append.py \
tests/v2r1/test_router_isolation.py \
tests/v2r1/test_runtime_identity_binding.py \
tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py \
tests/v2r1/test_tenant_context.py -v
# Reported result: 29 passed, exit code 0
```
### Integration suite — 3 of 3 passed
```shell
PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py -v
# Reported result: 3 passed, exit code 0
```
**Reported total: 32 of 32 passed.**
## Cleanup, Security, and Recovery Evidence
| Check | Supplied result |
|---|---|
| Conflict-marker scan | PASS |
| Cleanup scan | PASS |
| Secret scan | PASS |
| Legitimate hardcoded test keys | Two 39-byte fixtures in `test_runtime_wiring.py` |
| Rollback rehearsal | PASS; 13 of 13 core tests reported after rollback to `6077331` |
| Recovery verification | PASS |
## Deployment State
| Operation | Performed |
|---|---|
| Merge | No |
| Tag creation | No |
| Baseline promotion | No |
| Staging deployment | No |
| Production deployment | No |
## Post-Commit Verification
Run from the repository root after the commit is created:
```shell
set -eu
SOURCE=502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
RESULT_FILE=.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
git rev-parse HEAD
test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" = "1"
test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD)" = "$RESULT_FILE"
git ls-tree -r HEAD -- "$RESULT_FILE"
python3 - "$RESULT_FILE" <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
import re
import sys
path = Path(sys.argv[1])
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
encoded_tokens = [
[84, 66, 68],
[80, 69, 78, 68, 73, 78, 71],
[84, 79, 68, 79],
[70, 73, 88, 77, 69],
[91, 123, 99, 111, 109, 109, 105, 116, 125, 93],
]
tokens = ["".join(chr(value) for value in item) for item in encoded_tokens]
angle_token = re.compile(chr(60) + r"[^>\n]+" + chr(62))
hits = [token for token in tokens if token in text]
if angle_token.search(text):
hits.append("angle-delimited-token")
if hits:
print("TOKEN_SCAN=FAIL", hits)
raise SystemExit(1)
print("TOKEN_SCAN=PASS")
PY
```
## Acceptance Conditions
Gate 1 is eligible to proceed only when the external acceptance record confirms all of the following against the resolved `HEAD` commit:
- the commit exists and has source commit `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` as its parent;
- exactly this one report file changed;
- the committed report contains no unresolved legacy token;
- the result tree is not identical to rejected commit `71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390`;
- no merge, tag, baseline promotion, or deployment occurred.
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
"baseline": "V1R4C6",
"contract_branch": "task/governance/v2r1-personal-weixin-production-contract-20260717",
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
"dispatch_commit": null,
"production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
"release": "paused",
"repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
"runner": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
"schema_version": 1,
"single_state_writer": "openclaw",
"updated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00"
}
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
# Codex task: apply and verify AIOS Orchestrator Gateway v1
Contract: `cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc`
Use the strongest actually available Codex model for the initial security review.
If unavailable or timed out, record TIMEOUT/NOT_EXECUTED and let OpenClaw run
the deterministic test path. Do not count a timeout as PASS.
## Apply
1. Create a new clean append-only branch and isolated worktree.
2. Validate the delivery tarball and `SHA256SUMS`.
3. Run the external `scripts/apply_gateway_patch.sh` with `SOURCE_DIR` and
`WORKTREE`; do not alter unrelated paths.
4. Review all added code, especially:
- exact contract and optimistic state-version checks;
- event/decision idempotency;
- SQLite leases and retry behavior;
- Workspace Agent `202` asynchronous callback flow;
- Responses background creation and polling;
- file-inbox and Git-ref polling;
- traversal/symlink protections;
- OpenClaw lifecycle synchronization;
- systemd sandbox;
- install and rollback transactions.
## Tests
Run from the final source tree:
- Python compile for all gateway and helper files;
- unit tests;
- JSON schema/config parsing;
- Bash syntax;
- `systemd-analyze verify`;
- event duplicate and payload-conflict tests;
- stale state-version rejection;
- lease/double-claim test;
- Workspace trigger failure and Responses fallback;
- response queued/in-progress/completed polling;
- file-inbox recovery after HTTP failure;
- Git-ref initial baseline and subsequent-change event;
- task start/end and project summary synchronization;
- dispatch traversal and symlink rejection;
- retry/backoff/dead-letter;
- install dry-run;
- rollback test in an isolated fixture;
- `git diff --check`;
- full repository tests;
- final Gitleaks.
## Commit and review
1. Create an append-only implementation commit.
2. Push without force.
3. Confirm `WORKTREE_OID == BARE_OID == GITEA_OID`.
4. Create an independent RESULT-only branch and exact-one result commit.
5. Record the source bundle SHA-256, implementation OID, RESULT OID, tests,
Gitleaks, systemd validation and remaining external configuration blockers.
## Forbidden
No reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation,
secret disclosure, fabricated test result, production deployment or B3 evidence
fabrication.
Success:
`GATEWAY_CODE_REVIEW=PASS IMPLEMENTATION=<oid> RESULT=<oid> OID_MATCH=YES`
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# Codex V2R1 adaptive execution
CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
Execute P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK now:
- read-only verify Repair3 e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4
- read-only verify RESULT 49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045
- verify lineage from 8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575, exact4, tests, Gitleaks and RESULT-only scope
- do not modify Repair3 code in this unit
Act as fallback for OpenClaw only on timeout/unavailability. Use GPT-5.6 only if actually exposed; otherwise strongest visible model. Prefer OpenClaw when quality is comparable or volume is high; prefer Codex for complex/security-critical work.
Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
Report:
CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=codex STATUS=<status> IMPLEMENTATION=<oid-or-NONE> RESULT=<oid-or-NONE> OID_MATCH=<YES-or-NO> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
---
task_id: TASK-CODEX-V2R1-G1-FINAL-VERIFY-RETRY-20260715T010807UTC8
owner: CODEX
source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
rejected_commits:
- 7a2f16ee72e944737a9f6995e511ef176413ae6b
- b1d3439ee9e66b5eed1c94595a22bc630d893b6e
- 38320044b54c172c28877a81f291478267dd7b9e
- 7fd63b55f27b23658ea26e2a39d949c7b1e91dda
- 71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390
candidate:
branch: work/codex/v2r1-g1-recovery-candidate-20260715T010807UTC8
exact_parent: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
sole_added_file: .agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-RECOVERY-CANDIDATE-20260715T010807UTC8.md
gates:
tests: "29+3"
conflict_count: 0
tracked_sqlite_count: 0
exact_four_webops_ignores: true
gitleaks_version: 8.30.1
gitleaks_git_findings: 0
gitleaks_dir_findings: 0
hmac: "39+39"
placeholder_count: 0
mandatory_result_fields:
- status
- commit
- tests
- cleanup_scan
- risk
- recommendation
final_verification:
branch: review/codex/v2r1-g1-final-verify-retry-20260715T010807UTC8
sole_added_file: .agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-G1-CODEX-FINAL-VERIFY-RETRY-20260713.md
required_fields:
- status
- source_commit
- candidate_commit
- qualifying_candidates
- placeholder_count
- mandatory_fields
- tests
- gitleaks
- hmac
- cleanup_scan
- rollback
- deployment
- workspace_clean
- risk
- recommendation
prohibitions:
- force push
- code modification
- test modification
- configuration modification
- deployment modification
- merge
- tag
- baseline modification
- staging modification
- production modification
failure_policy: fail_closed
---
# CODEX V2R1 G1 final verification retry
Select and verify only a qualifying recovery candidate rooted at the fixed source commit. Reject every commit listed in `rejected_commits`. The candidate commit must have the exact parent and sole added file declared above and must pass every candidate gate. The final verification branch must add only its declared result file and must contain every required field.
Do not modify code, tests, configuration, deployment state, baselines, staging, or production. Do not merge, tag, or force-push. On any mismatch, ambiguity, missing field, nonzero finding, dirty workspace, or failed gate, stop and report failure without advancing.
## Execution amendment: recovery candidate r2
- rejected_candidate: 78c22cbfb95cb252b671c5ffe3b34bf4944aee2d
- rejection_reason: placeholder_count=1; exact angle-placeholder hit from the documented conflict regex
- replacement_branch: work/codex/v2r1-g1-recovery-candidate-20260715T010807UTC8-r2
- replacement_parent: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
- sole_added_file: .agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-RECOVERY-CANDIDATE-20260715T010807UTC8.md
- history_policy: no force push and no history rewrite
- original_candidate_policy: retained and rejected
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
# OpenClaw task: deploy and supervise AIOS Orchestrator Gateway v1
Contract: `cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc`
You are the default orchestrator and deployment supervisor.
## Preconditions
- Codex has applied and independently reviewed this source bundle on a clean,
append-only branch.
- Implementation and RESULT OIDs are identical across worktree, bare repo and
Gitea.
- Final Gitleaks and repository tests are PASS.
- No force push, reset, amend or rebase occurred.
## Responsibilities
1. Validate the source bundle SHA-256 and `SHA256SUMS`.
2. Review the generated systemd service, poll timer, tmpfiles and sysusers files.
3. Install through `scripts/install_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh`.
4. Configure one or both central-model channels:
- published Workspace Agent API channel with `agtch_...` trigger ID and a
Workspace Agent access token stored outside Git; or
- Responses API fallback with an approved model and API key stored outside Git.
5. Publish the callback endpoint securely and configure the Workspace Agent
action from `workspace-agent/orchestrator-decision-action.openapi.yaml`.
6. Confirm that the Workspace Agent instructions match
`workspace-agent/CENTRAL_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS.md`.
7. Enable both:
- the continuously running gateway service;
- the independent `aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer`.
8. Verify HTTP event ingestion, file-inbox polling, Git-ref polling,
Workspace Agent trigger acceptance, callback decision, Responses background
polling fallback, dispatch queue generation, retry leases and loop guards.
9. Verify OpenClaw receives and synchronizes:
- TASK_DISPATCHED
- TASK_STARTED
- TASK_ENDED
- PROJECT_SUMMARY
- PROJECT_COMPLETED
10. Run a harmless bootstrap work unit through OpenClaw and Codex and confirm
duplicate event submission is idempotent.
11. Run rollback, reinstall and heartbeat/health verification.
12. Create one RESULT-only review recording exact commits, artifact digest,
tests, systemd security, polling recovery, lifecycle synchronization and
rollback.
## Fail-closed boundaries
- Do not put Workspace Agent tokens, API keys, callback tokens or gateway
credentials in Git, logs, command arguments or RESULT files.
- Do not claim the gateway resolves the existing B3 credential/raw-wire blocker.
- Do not advance B4 or production merely because this gateway is healthy.
- Do not bypass owner/admin production release approvals.
- Do not use reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push or bare-ref edits.
## Required final status
Success:
`ORCHESTRATOR_GATEWAY_LIVE=PASS POLLING=PASS OPENCLAW_SYNC=PASS ROLLBACK=PASS`
Blocker:
`ORCHESTRATOR_GATEWAY_LIVE=BLOCKED reason=<stable_reason>`
Keep `BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED` until the
existing production contract advances all release gates.
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# OpenClaw V2R1 adaptive orchestration
CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
You are default orchestrator and sole authoritative state writer.
Execute immediately:
1. R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER: discover approved provider metadata and owner-probe source without reading or outputting secrets. Environment variables alone are not approved secret refs.
2. P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE: inventory approved restricted B3 evidence locations; validate existing facts; never synthesize evidence.
3. Independently verify Codex results before advancing.
Prefer OpenClaw for comparable-quality, large, repetitive, long-running, infrastructure and cost-sensitive work. Prefer Codex strongest actually available model for complex code, security boundaries, architecture and high-risk review. On timeout mark TIMEOUT and switch agent; never infer PASS.
Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
Report:
CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=openclaw STATUS=<status> COMMIT=<oid-or-NONE> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
+4
View File
@@ -11,3 +11,7 @@ runtime/tmp/
runtime/cache/
logs/
config/test_write_perms
/data/webops.sqlite3
/data/webops.sqlite3-wal
/data/webops.sqlite3-shm
/data/webops.sqlite3-journal
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# AIOS Codex automatic command watcher
The watcher polls the governed `commands/active` queue without a chat trigger. It uses SQLite transactions for exclusive leases, records the exact command digest, rejects contract drift, retries transient failures, dead-letters exhausted work, and resumes from the last durable phase so an end-event retry does not execute a work unit twice.
Commands are JSON documents validated by `schemas/codex-command.schema.json`. `acceptance_probe` is the only built-in action and has no external side effect. Production `codex` work requires an administrator-provisioned absolute executor path; the instruction is passed on standard input, never argv or environment. The executor receives a sanitized environment and must obtain credentials through its approved file or exec provider. If the executor is absent, the task fails closed and follows the retry/dead-letter policy.
The watcher provides at-most-once execution. It writes the `EXECUTING` phase before launching an external executor; if the host dies after an external effect but before a result is durably recorded, recovery does not replay the work and instead dead-letters the ambiguity for human review. Start and end event JSON is persisted before transmission, so response-loss retries reuse the exact event ID and payload and are deduplicated by the Gateway.
Lifecycle evidence is appended to `/var/log/aios-codex-watcher/audit.jsonl` as `CODEX_AUTO_CLAIM`, `TASK_STARTED`, `TASK_EXECUTED`, `TASK_ENDED`, and `EVENT_POSTED`. Inputs, tokens, stdout, and stderr are not logged; only result digests are retained.
Install from a reviewed commit with `sudo scripts/install_aios_codex_watcher.sh`. The installer creates a content-addressed release, atomically updates `current`, writes a receipt, and enables the five-second systemd timer. The existing Gateway inbound token file is referenced in place and never copied.
-107
View File
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
# AIOS Orchestrator Gateway v0.2
This component turns the current passive GPT orchestration pattern into a
durable, unattended loop:
```text
Gitea/OpenClaw/Codex event
-> HTTP event endpoint or polled file inbox
-> durable SQLite state machine
-> Workspace Agent API trigger
-> strict callback decision
-> Responses API background fallback and polling
-> OpenClaw/Codex dispatch queues
-> start/end/result events
-> next orchestration cycle
```
## Reliability mechanisms
The gateway does not depend on one timer, webhook or model call:
- HTTP event ingestion.
- Periodic file-inbox polling for missed webhooks and offline producers.
- Local bare-Git ref polling for `main`, governance, patch and result refs.
- Workspace Agent retries with a stable event `Idempotency-Key`.
- Workspace Agent callback timeout and Responses API background fallback.
- Responses status polling until completion or fail-closed terminal status.
- SQLite optimistic state versions, idempotency records and processing leases.
- Exponential retry with a maximum retry count and dead-letter state.
- Same-blocker and maximum-hop guards to stop non-progress loops.
- A systemd timer runs `--poll-once` as an independent reliability watchdog.
Workspace Agent trigger runs are asynchronous and do not expose a retrievable
final response. The central Workspace Agent must therefore call the
`submit_orchestration_decision` action.
## OpenClaw synchronization
Every lifecycle stage is durably written to the OpenClaw synchronization queue:
- `TASK_DISPATCHED`
- `TASK_STARTED`
- `TASK_ENDED`
- `DECISION_APPLIED`
- `PROJECT_SUMMARY`
- `PROJECT_COMPLETED`
An optional authenticated OpenClaw HTTP endpoint can receive the same records.
A failed HTTP delivery remains in the lifecycle retry queue. OpenClaw remains
the default project-status synchronizer and authoritative progress presenter.
## Agent execution contract
Each dispatched JSON envelope contains:
- exact contract commit;
- source event;
- clean base commit;
- primary and fallback agent;
- allowed paths;
- required checks;
- forbidden operations;
- completion event callback format.
OpenClaw and Codex must send a `work_unit_started` event before execution and a
`work_unit_completed`, `work_unit_blocked`, or `work_unit_failed` event when
they stop. This guarantees that OpenClaw can synchronize every task start,
finish, and overall project summary.
## Security
- Model and callback credentials are read only from root-owned secret files.
- Credentials never enter Git, dispatch payloads or logs.
- The gateway runs as a dedicated unprivileged user.
- Dispatch and sync paths are protected against traversal and symlink targets.
- All state changes require the exact contract commit and current state version.
- Production evidence, credentials and approvals stay fail-closed.
- Git history operations remain controlled by the committed governance contract.
## Deployment sequence
1. Apply this source bundle to a clean append-only branch.
2. Run unit, repository, shell, JSON, systemd and Gitleaks checks.
3. Configure one or both model channels:
- published Workspace Agent API channel and Workspace Agent access token;
- Responses API key and approved fallback model.
4. Publish the decision callback as a Workspace Agent action or MCP tool.
5. Install the service through `scripts/install_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh`.
6. Run `scripts/verify_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh`.
7. Submit a harmless event and verify:
- trigger acceptance;
- strict decision callback;
- dispatch file;
- OpenClaw task-start/task-end/project-summary synchronization;
- duplicate idempotency;
- polling recovery after suppressing the HTTP webhook.
The installer copies an explicit gateway-only allowlist into a release directory
named by its SHA-256 digest, atomically updates `/opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway/current`,
and persists `/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/install-receipt.json` with the
current and previous release. `--dry-run` performs source validation and emits
`AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_INSTALL_DRY_RUN=PASS` without changing installed state.
Rollback reads that root-owned `0600` receipt, verifies both release directory
names and `SOURCE_DIGEST` files, coordinates the gateway and poll units, and
atomically switches `current` to the previous release. Repeating the same
rollback is a no-op and emits `NOOP_ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK`.
+89
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
"""Append-only audit chain for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
from typing import Any
from .tenant_context import canonical_json, isoformat, require_ident
class AuditLog:
def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
self.database = str(database)
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
payload TEXT NOT NULL,
previous_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
event_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
)
"""
)
def append(self, *, tenant_id: str, trace_id: str, event_type: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
trace_id = require_ident("trace_id", trace_id)
event_type = require_ident("event_type", event_type)
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
previous = db.execute(
"SELECT event_hash FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1"
).fetchone()
previous_hash = previous[0] if previous else "GENESIS"
body = {
"tenant_id": tenant_id,
"trace_id": trace_id,
"event_type": event_type,
"payload": payload,
"previous_hash": previous_hash,
"created_at": isoformat(),
}
digest = hashlib.sha256(
canonical_json(body)
).hexdigest()
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO audit_events VALUES(NULL,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(
tenant_id,
trace_id,
event_type,
json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False),
previous_hash,
digest,
body["created_at"],
),
)
return digest
def verify(self) -> bool:
previous = "GENESIS"
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
rows = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id,trace_id,event_type,payload,previous_hash,event_hash,created_at "
"FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq"
)
for row in rows:
body = {
"tenant_id": row[0],
"trace_id": row[1],
"event_type": row[2],
"payload": json.loads(row[3]),
"previous_hash": row[4],
"created_at": row[6],
}
if row[4] != previous:
return False
digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(body)).hexdigest()
if digest != row[5]:
return False
previous = digest
return True
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
"""AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell lifecycle CLI primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import json
from pathlib import Path
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class CellRecord:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
version: str
state: str
config_digest: str
created_at: str
class CellManager:
def __init__(self, registry: str | Path) -> None:
self.registry = Path(registry)
self.registry.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if not self.registry.exists():
self.registry.write_text("{\"cells\":{}}\n", encoding="utf-8")
def _load(self) -> dict:
return json.loads(self.registry.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
def _save(self, value: dict) -> None:
self.registry.write_text(
json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
def create(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, version: str, digest: str) -> CellRecord:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
data = self._load()
if tenant_id in data["cells"]:
raise ValidationError("tenant already has a cell")
record = CellRecord(
tenant_id,
cell_id,
version,
"created",
digest,
datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
)
data["cells"][tenant_id] = record.__dict__
self._save(data)
return record
def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> CellRecord:
data = self._load()
item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
if not item:
raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
return CellRecord(**item)
def transition(self, tenant_id: str, state: str) -> CellRecord:
allowed = {"created", "starting", "healthy", "upgrading", "rollback", "failed"}
if state not in allowed:
raise ValidationError("invalid cell state")
data = self._load()
item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
if not item:
raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
item["state"] = state
self._save(data)
return CellRecord(**item)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
"""The only V2R1 ingress adapter: verified context to routed ledger record."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
from threading import RLock
from typing import Callable, Mapping, Any
from .message_ledger import LedgerRecord, MessageLedger
from .router import Route, TenantRouter
from .session_pool import SessionLease, SessionPool
from .tenant_context import CanonicalMessage, TenantContext, utc_now
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class IngressResult:
record: LedgerRecord
route: Route
session: SessionLease
class ChannelAdapter:
"""Fail-closed runtime ingress composition.
The adapter intentionally accepts no tenant or Cell authority outside the
signed context and TenantRouter. A process lock keeps rollback handling
deterministic for a single runtime while SQLite protects cross-process
ledger writes.
"""
def __init__(
self,
*,
router: TenantRouter,
ledger: MessageLedger,
session_pool: SessionPool,
signing_key: bytes,
clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
) -> None:
self._router = router
self._ledger = ledger
self._session_pool = session_pool
self._signing_key = signing_key
self._clock = clock
self._lock = RLock()
def ingest(self, *, token: str, message: Mapping[str, Any]) -> IngressResult:
with self._lock:
context = TenantContext.verify(token, self._signing_key, now=self._clock())
canonical = CanonicalMessage.from_mapping(message)
canonical.assert_context(context)
route = self._router.assert_context_route(context)
self._router.assert_message_route(canonical)
self._session_pool.assert_available(context, route)
existed = self._ledger.matches(canonical)
record = self._ledger.append(canonical)
try:
lease = self._session_pool.acquire(context, route)
except Exception:
if not existed:
self._ledger.remove(record)
raise
return IngressResult(record=record, route=route, session=lease)
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
"""aios-cell command implementation for V2R1 Cell lifecycle."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import sys
from .cell_manager import CellManager
def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="aios-cell")
parser.add_argument("registry")
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
create = sub.add_parser("create")
create.add_argument("tenant_id")
create.add_argument("cell_id")
create.add_argument("version")
create.add_argument("digest")
status = sub.add_parser("status")
status.add_argument("tenant_id")
transition = sub.add_parser("transition")
transition.add_argument("tenant_id")
transition.add_argument("state")
return parser
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
manager = CellManager(args.registry)
if args.command == "create":
result = manager.create(args.tenant_id, args.cell_id, args.version, args.digest)
elif args.command == "status":
result = manager.status(args.tenant_id)
elif args.command == "transition":
result = manager.transition(args.tenant_id, args.state)
else:
return 2
print(json.dumps(result.__dict__, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
"""OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
from typing import Any, Mapping
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, V2R1Error, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class CellSpec:
tenant_id: str
image: str
runtime: str = "docker"
port: int | None = None
memory: str = "2g"
cpus: str = "2"
pids_limit: int = 512
network: str = "bridge"
env: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
if self.runtime not in {"docker", "podman"}:
raise ValidationError("unsupported runtime")
if not self.image:
raise ValidationError("image required")
class OpenClawFleet:
def __init__(self, binary: str = "openclaw") -> None:
self.binary = binary
def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
proc = subprocess.run(
[self.binary, *args],
check=False,
text=True,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
)
if proc.returncode:
raise V2R1Error(proc.stderr.strip() or "openclaw command failed")
data = json.loads(proc.stdout or "{}")
if isinstance(data, dict):
return data
return {"result": data}
def create(self, spec: CellSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run([
"fleet", "create", spec.tenant_id,
"--image", spec.image,
"--runtime", spec.runtime,
"--json",
])
def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
return self._run(["fleet", "status", tenant_id, "--json"])
def doctor(self, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
args = ["fleet", "doctor"]
if tenant_id:
require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
args.append(tenant_id)
args.append("--json")
return self._run(args)
def backup(self, tenant_id: str, output: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run(["fleet", "backup", tenant_id, "--out", str(output), "--json"])
def restore(self, tenant_id: str, archive: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run(["fleet", "restore", tenant_id, "--from", str(archive), "--json"])
def upgrade(self, tenant_id: str, image: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run(["fleet", "upgrade", tenant_id, "--image", image, "--json"])
def load_inventory(path: str | Path) -> list[CellSpec]:
raw = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if raw.get("schema_version") != "aios.cells.v1":
raise ValidationError("invalid inventory schema")
result: list[CellSpec] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for item in raw.get("cells", []):
spec = CellSpec(
tenant_id=item["tenant_id"],
image=item["image"],
runtime=item.get("runtime", "docker"),
port=item.get("port"),
env=tuple(item.get("env", [])),
)
if spec.tenant_id in seen:
raise ValidationError("duplicate tenant")
seen.add(spec.tenant_id)
result.append(spec)
if not result:
raise ValidationError("no cells")
return result
def inventory_as_dict(items: list[CellSpec]) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {"schema_version": "aios.cells.v1", "cells": [asdict(x) for x in items]}
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes shared agent fabric primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from contextlib import closing
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
from typing import Any
from .tenant_context import (
CanonicalMessage,
ConflictError,
ScopeError,
ValidationError,
isoformat,
require_ident,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class FabricJob:
job_id: str
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
profile_id: str
session_id: str
event_id: str
status: str = "queued"
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
for name in (
"job_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "session_id", "event_id"
):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
if self.status not in {"queued", "running", "completed", "failed", "cancelled"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid job status")
class HermesFabric:
"""Shared scheduler storage with mandatory tenant partition keys."""
def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
self.database = str(database)
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
db.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fabric_jobs (
job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
profile_id TEXT NOT NULL,
session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
)
"""
)
db.execute(
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fabric_tenant_queue "
"ON fabric_jobs(tenant_id, cell_id, status)"
)
def enqueue(
self,
*,
message: CanonicalMessage,
profile_id: str,
) -> FabricJob:
profile_id = require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
if not message.command_capable:
raise ScopeError("non-command events cannot create execution jobs")
if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
raise ScopeError("only authenticated human commands can create jobs")
job = FabricJob(
job_id=f"job-{message.event_id}",
tenant_id=message.tenant_id,
cell_id=message.cell_id,
profile_id=profile_id,
session_id=message.session_id,
event_id=message.event_id,
)
now = isoformat()
conflict: ConflictError | None = None
try:
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO fabric_jobs VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(
job.job_id,
job.tenant_id,
job.cell_id,
job.profile_id,
job.session_id,
job.event_id,
job.status,
now,
now,
),
)
except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
conflict = ConflictError(
"fabric event already exists or violates queue uniqueness"
)
if conflict is not None:
raise conflict
return job
def claim(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, profile_id: str) -> FabricJob | None:
require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
row = db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM fabric_jobs WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? "
"AND profile_id=? AND status='queued' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1",
(tenant_id, cell_id, profile_id),
).fetchone()
if not row:
db.commit()
return None
db.execute(
"UPDATE fabric_jobs SET status='running', updated_at=? WHERE job_id=?",
(isoformat(), row[0]),
)
db.commit()
return FabricJob(*row[:7])
def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
count = db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM fabric_jobs").fetchone()[0]
return {
"component": "hermes_fabric",
"jobs": count,
"checked_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
}
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""Hermes shared fabric profile isolation primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
import os
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HermesProfile:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
profile_id: str
hermes_home: Path
workspace: Path
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if not self.hermes_home.is_absolute() or not self.workspace.is_absolute():
raise ValidationError("profile paths must be absolute")
@property
def environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
"HERMES_HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
"HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
"AIOS_TENANT_ID": self.tenant_id,
"AIOS_CELL_ID": self.cell_id,
"AIOS_PROFILE_ID": self.profile_id,
}
def prepare(self) -> None:
self.hermes_home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
os.chmod(self.hermes_home, 0o700)
os.chmod(self.workspace, 0o700)
def assert_path_allowed(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
target = Path(path).resolve()
for root in (self.hermes_home.resolve(), self.workspace.resolve()):
if target == root or root in target.parents:
return
raise ValidationError("path escapes profile isolation boundary")
+158
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
"""Fail-closed identity binding for authenticated external ingress.
External payload claims are not authority. An HMAC-authenticated envelope is
the sole factory for :class:`AuthenticatedPrincipal`; the resolver then checks
every claim against the authoritative ``TenantRouter`` before the runtime signs
an internal ``TenantContext``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import hashlib
import hmac
import re
from typing import Any, Mapping
from .router import Route, TenantRouter
from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, canonical_json, require_ident
_PROVENANCE = object()
_SIGNATURE_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
_SCOPE_FIELDS = (
"principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
"channel_account_id", "session_id", "message",
)
class AuthenticationError(ValidationError):
"""Authentication or identity resolution failed without disclosing scope."""
@dataclass(frozen=True, init=False)
class AuthenticatedPrincipal:
"""A principal which only the verified envelope factory can create."""
principal_id: str
def __init__(self, principal_id: str, *, _provenance: object) -> None:
if _provenance is not _PROVENANCE:
raise TypeError("AuthenticatedPrincipal is created by authenticated ingress only")
object.__setattr__(self, "principal_id", require_ident("principal_id", principal_id))
@classmethod
def _verified(cls, principal_id: str) -> "AuthenticatedPrincipal":
return cls(principal_id, _provenance=_PROVENANCE)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class IdentityClaims:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
session_id: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthenticatedIngress:
principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
claims: IdentityClaims
message: Mapping[str, Any]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RuntimeIdentity:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
principal_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
session_id: str
class IngressAuthenticator:
"""Verify a canonical HMAC envelope before any identity lookup occurs."""
def __init__(self, hmac_key: bytes) -> None:
if not isinstance(hmac_key, bytes) or len(hmac_key) < 32:
raise ValidationError("ingress HMAC key must be at least 32 bytes")
self._hmac_key = hmac_key
@staticmethod
def _signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
raise ValidationError("ingress request must be an object")
if set(request) != {*_SCOPE_FIELDS, "signature"}:
raise ValidationError("ingress request fields are invalid")
values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS}
if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
raise ValidationError("ingress message must be an object")
return values
def authenticate(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> AuthenticatedIngress:
values = self._signed_payload(request)
signature = request["signature"]
if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
expected = hmac.new(
self._hmac_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
).hexdigest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature):
raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
return AuthenticatedIngress(
principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
claims=IdentityClaims(
tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
cell_id=values["cell_id"],
channel=values["channel"],
channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
session_id=values["session_id"],
),
message=dict(values["message"]),
)
class RuntimeIdentityResolver:
"""Resolve authenticated ingress identity through ``TenantRouter`` only."""
def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
self._router = router
def resolve(
self, principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal, claims: IdentityClaims
) -> RuntimeIdentity:
if not isinstance(principal, AuthenticatedPrincipal):
raise AuthenticationError("untrusted principal type")
try:
route: Route = self._router.resolve(
channel=claims.channel,
channel_account_id=claims.channel_account_id,
principal_id=principal.principal_id,
session_id=claims.session_id,
)
except (ScopeError, ValidationError) as exc:
raise AuthenticationError("identity is not registered") from None
expected = (
claims.tenant_id, claims.cell_id, claims.channel,
claims.channel_account_id, principal.principal_id, claims.session_id,
)
actual = (
route.tenant_id, route.cell_id, route.channel,
route.channel_account_id, route.principal_id, route.session_id,
)
if actual != expected:
raise AuthenticationError("identity claims do not match authoritative route")
return RuntimeIdentity(
tenant_id=route.tenant_id,
cell_id=route.cell_id,
principal_id=route.principal_id,
channel=route.channel,
channel_account_id=route.channel_account_id,
session_id=route.session_id or "",
)
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
"""Tenant-scoped memory namespace and access policy for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import PurePosixPath
from typing import Literal
from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, require_ident
MemoryKind = Literal["session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MemoryScope:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
profile_id: str
session_id: str | None
kind: MemoryKind
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if self.session_id is not None:
require_ident("session_id", self.session_id)
if self.kind not in {"session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid memory kind")
if self.kind == "session" and self.session_id is None:
raise ValidationError("session memory requires session_id")
@property
def namespace(self) -> str:
parts = ["tenant", self.tenant_id, "cell", self.cell_id]
if self.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
parts.extend(["profile", self.profile_id])
if self.kind == "session":
parts.extend(["session", str(self.session_id)])
parts.extend(["memory", self.kind])
return str(PurePosixPath(*parts))
def assert_access(self, requested: "MemoryScope", *, write: bool = False) -> None:
if self.tenant_id != requested.tenant_id:
raise ScopeError("cross-tenant memory access denied")
if self.cell_id != requested.cell_id:
raise ScopeError("cross-cell memory access denied")
if requested.kind == "shared_artifact":
if write:
raise ScopeError("shared artifacts are immutable")
return
if self.profile_id != requested.profile_id and requested.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
raise ScopeError("cross-profile memory access denied")
if requested.kind == "session" and self.session_id != requested.session_id:
raise ScopeError("cross-session memory access denied")
def qualify_memory_key(scope: MemoryScope, key: str) -> str:
key = require_ident("memory_key", key)
return f"{scope.namespace}/{key}"
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
"""Tenant-scoped append-only message ledger and exact quote resolver."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import timedelta
from contextlib import closing
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
from typing import Iterable
from .tenant_context import (
CanonicalMessage,
ConflictError,
ScopeError,
ValidationError,
isoformat,
normalize_message_id,
parse_time,
utc_now,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LedgerRecord:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
peer_id: str
direction: str
message_id: str
event_id: str
body: str
occurred_at: str
expires_at: str
class MessageLedger:
"""Exact-ID ledger.
The resolver never uses time windows, prefixes, similarity, or nearest-message
fallbacks. Ambiguity and absence fail closed.
"""
def __init__(self, database: str | Path, *, ttl_days: int = 7) -> None:
if not 1 <= ttl_days <= 365:
raise ValidationError("ttl_days must be between 1 and 365")
self.database = Path(database)
self.ttl_days = ttl_days
self.database.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._initialize()
try:
os.chmod(self.database, 0o600)
except OSError:
pass
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
db = sqlite3.connect(str(self.database), timeout=30)
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
db.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
return db
def _initialize(self) -> None:
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
db.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_ledger (
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
channel TEXT NOT NULL,
channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
direction TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(direction IN ('inbound','outbound','internal')),
message_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_id TEXT NOT NULL,
body TEXT NOT NULL,
occurred_at TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(
tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
peer_id, direction, message_id
),
UNIQUE(tenant_id, cell_id, event_id)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_reply_lookup ON message_ledger(
tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
peer_id, message_id, expires_at
);
"""
)
def append(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
"""Append one exact message through the runtime write path.
This is intentionally the owner of validation, idempotency, and the
immediate SQLite transaction. Runtime callers must not depend on the
legacy ``remember`` compatibility name.
"""
message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
now = utc_now()
expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(days=self.ttl_days))
key = (
message.tenant_id,
message.cell_id,
message.channel,
message.channel_account_id,
message.peer_id,
message.direction,
message_id,
)
storage_error: ConflictError | None = None
try:
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT event_id, body, occurred_at, expires_at FROM message_ledger "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
"AND peer_id=? AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
key,
).fetchone()
if existing:
if existing["body"] != message.body:
db.rollback()
raise ConflictError("message ID collision with different content")
db.commit()
return LedgerRecord(
*key, existing["event_id"], existing["body"],
existing["occurred_at"], existing["expires_at"],
)
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO message_ledger VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires, isoformat(now)),
)
db.commit()
except sqlite3.Error:
storage_error = ConflictError("ledger storage unavailable")
if storage_error is not None:
# Raise outside the sqlite exception handler so callers cannot inspect
# a driver exception through __cause__ or __context__.
raise storage_error
return LedgerRecord(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires)
def remember(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
"""Backward-compatible API wrapper for callers outside the runtime path."""
return self.append(message)
def matches(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> bool:
"""Whether this exact message is already durably represented."""
message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT event_id, body FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND "
"cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? "
"AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
(
message.tenant_id, message.cell_id, message.channel,
message.channel_account_id, message.peer_id, message.direction,
message_id,
),
).fetchone()
return bool(row and row["event_id"] == message.event_id and row["body"] == message.body)
def remove(self, record: LedgerRecord) -> None:
"""Compensate a newly appended record if a later ingress step fails."""
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
db.execute(
"DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND "
"channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? AND direction=? "
"AND message_id=? AND event_id=?",
(
record.tenant_id, record.cell_id, record.channel,
record.channel_account_id, record.peer_id, record.direction,
record.message_id, record.event_id,
),
)
def resolve_quote(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> str:
if message.quoted_body is not None:
return message.quoted_body
if message.reply_to_message_id is None:
raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
reply_id = normalize_message_id(
message.reply_to_message_id,
field_name="reply_to_message_id",
)
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
rows = db.execute(
"SELECT direction, body, event_id FROM message_ledger "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
"AND peer_id=? AND message_id=? AND expires_at>?",
(
message.tenant_id,
message.cell_id,
message.channel,
message.channel_account_id,
message.peer_id,
reply_id,
isoformat(),
),
).fetchall()
if len(rows) == 1:
return str(rows[0]["body"])
if len(rows) > 1:
raise ConflictError("ambiguous reply ID across message directions")
raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
def purge_expired(self) -> int:
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
cursor = db.execute(
"DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE expires_at<=?", (isoformat(),)
)
return cursor.rowcount
def integrity_check(self) -> str:
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
return str(db.execute("PRAGMA integrity_check").fetchone()[0])
def count(self) -> int:
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
return int(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_ledger").fetchone()[0])
+336
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
"""Authoritative tenant registry and fail-closed message router."""
from __future__ import annotations
from contextlib import contextmanager
from contextlib import closing
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
import sqlite3
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable, Iterator
from .tenant_context import (
CanonicalMessage,
ConflictError,
ScopeError,
TenantContext,
ValidationError,
isoformat,
parse_time,
require_ident,
utc_now,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Route:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
principal_id: str
session_id: str | None
class TenantRouter:
"""SQLite-backed routing registry.
Channel accounts are authoritative tenant ownership boundaries. Principal and
session bindings may narrow a route, but can never move traffic to another
tenant or Cell.
"""
def __init__(
self, database: str | Path, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now
) -> None:
self.database = str(database)
self._clock = clock
self._initialize()
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
connection = sqlite3.connect(self.database, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
return connection
@contextmanager
def _transaction(self) -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
connection = self._connect()
try:
connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
yield connection
connection.execute("COMMIT")
except Exception:
connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
finally:
connection.close()
def _initialize(self) -> None:
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
db.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants (
tenant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(status IN ('active','suspended','retired')),
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channel_routes (
channel TEXT NOT NULL,
channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id),
FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_routes (
channel TEXT NOT NULL,
channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
FOREIGN KEY(channel, channel_account_id)
REFERENCES channel_routes(channel, channel_account_id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_bindings (
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(tenant_id, session_id),
FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_session_expiry
ON session_bindings(expires_at);
"""
)
def register_tenant(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
now = isoformat(self._clock())
with self._transaction() as db:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
).fetchone()
if row:
if row["cell_id"] != cell_id:
raise ConflictError("tenant already bound to another cell")
db.execute(
"UPDATE tenants SET status='active', updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
(now, tenant_id),
)
return
conflict = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id FROM tenants WHERE cell_id=?", (cell_id,)
).fetchone()
if conflict:
raise ConflictError("cell already belongs to another tenant")
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO tenants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
(tenant_id, cell_id, "active", now, now),
)
def set_tenant_status(self, tenant_id: str, status: str) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
if status not in {"active", "suspended", "retired"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid tenant status")
with self._transaction() as db:
cursor = db.execute(
"UPDATE tenants SET status=?, updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
(status, isoformat(self._clock()), tenant_id),
)
if cursor.rowcount != 1:
raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
def bind_channel(
self,
*,
tenant_id: str,
channel: str,
channel_account_id: str,
) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
with self._transaction() as db:
tenant = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
).fetchone()
if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active":
raise ValidationError("tenant is not active")
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM channel_routes "
"WHERE channel=? AND channel_account_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id),
).fetchone()
if existing:
if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != tenant["cell_id"]:
raise ConflictError("channel account already belongs to another tenant")
return
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO channel_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
(channel, channel_account_id, tenant_id, tenant["cell_id"], isoformat(self._clock())),
)
def bind_principal(
self,
*,
tenant_id: str,
channel: str,
channel_account_id: str,
principal_id: str,
) -> None:
principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
route = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
if route.tenant_id != tenant_id:
raise ScopeError("principal cannot cross tenant boundary")
with self._transaction() as db:
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
"channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
).fetchone()
if existing:
if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != route.cell_id:
raise ConflictError("principal route conflict")
return
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO principal_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(
channel,
channel_account_id,
principal_id,
tenant_id,
route.cell_id,
isoformat(self._clock()),
),
)
def bind_session(
self,
*,
tenant_id: str,
session_id: str,
cell_id: str,
principal_id: str,
ttl_seconds: int = 86400,
) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
if not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= 31 * 86400:
raise ValidationError("invalid session TTL")
now = self._clock()
expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
with self._transaction() as db:
tenant = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
).fetchone()
if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active" or tenant["cell_id"] != cell_id:
raise ScopeError("session cell does not match tenant")
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, principal_id FROM session_bindings "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
(tenant_id, session_id),
).fetchone()
if existing and (
existing["cell_id"] != cell_id or existing["principal_id"] != principal_id
):
raise ConflictError("session is already bound to another principal or cell")
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO session_bindings VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?) "
"ON CONFLICT(tenant_id,session_id) DO UPDATE SET expires_at=excluded.expires_at",
(tenant_id, session_id, cell_id, principal_id, expires, isoformat(now)),
)
def resolve_channel(self, channel: str, channel_account_id: str) -> Route:
channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT r.tenant_id, r.cell_id, t.status FROM channel_routes r "
"JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=r.tenant_id "
"WHERE r.channel=? AND r.channel_account_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id),
).fetchone()
if not row:
raise ScopeError("unknown channel account")
if row["status"] != "active":
raise ScopeError("tenant is not active")
return Route(row["tenant_id"], row["cell_id"], channel, channel_account_id, "", None)
def resolve(
self,
*,
channel: str,
channel_account_id: str,
principal_id: str,
session_id: str | None = None,
) -> Route:
principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
base = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
principal = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
"channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
).fetchone()
if principal and (
principal["tenant_id"] != base.tenant_id or principal["cell_id"] != base.cell_id
):
raise ScopeError("principal route violates channel ownership")
if session_id is not None:
session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
session = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, principal_id, expires_at FROM session_bindings "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
(base.tenant_id, session_id),
).fetchone()
if not session:
raise ScopeError("unknown session")
if parse_time(session["expires_at"]) <= self._clock():
raise ScopeError("session expired")
if session["cell_id"] != base.cell_id or session["principal_id"] != principal_id:
raise ScopeError("session scope mismatch")
return Route(
base.tenant_id,
base.cell_id,
channel,
channel_account_id,
principal_id,
session_id,
)
def assert_message_route(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> Route:
route = self.resolve(
channel=message.channel,
channel_account_id=message.channel_account_id,
principal_id=message.principal_id,
session_id=message.session_id,
)
if message.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or message.cell_id != route.cell_id:
raise ScopeError("message claims do not match authoritative route")
return route
def assert_context_route(self, context: TenantContext) -> Route:
route = self.resolve(
channel=context.channel,
channel_account_id=context.channel_account_id,
principal_id=context.principal_id,
session_id=context.session_id,
)
if context.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or context.cell_id != route.cell_id:
raise ScopeError("context claims do not match authoritative route")
return route
+136
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
"""V2R1 runtime composition root for authenticated channel ingress."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
from .channel_adapter import ChannelAdapter, IngressResult
from .identity import (
AuthenticationError,
IngressAuthenticator,
RuntimeIdentity,
RuntimeIdentityResolver,
)
from .message_ledger import MessageLedger
from .router import TenantRouter
from .session_pool import SessionPool
from .tenant_context import ConflictError, ScopeError, TenantContext, ValidationError, utc_now
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RuntimeIngressResponse:
"""Sanitised boundary response; no exception text crosses external ingress."""
status: str
result: IngressResult | None = None
class RuntimeWiring:
"""Own the only external-to-runtime identity binding and message path.
The request accepted by :meth:`ingest` is an HMAC-authenticated envelope;
tenant, cell, channel, account, session, principal, and message claims are
signed together. The envelope is then resolved against ``TenantRouter``.
Only that resolved identity can mint the short-lived internal context passed
to ``ChannelAdapter``.
"""
def __init__(
self,
*,
router: TenantRouter,
ledger: MessageLedger,
session_pool: SessionPool,
channel_adapter: ChannelAdapter,
identity_resolver: RuntimeIdentityResolver,
ingress_authenticator: IngressAuthenticator,
internal_signing_key: bytes,
clock: Callable[[], datetime],
) -> None:
self.router = router
self.ledger = ledger
self.session_pool = session_pool
self.channel_adapter = channel_adapter
self.identity_resolver = identity_resolver
self._ingress_authenticator = ingress_authenticator
self._internal_signing_key = internal_signing_key
self._clock = clock
@classmethod
def create(
cls,
root: str | Path,
*,
signing_key: bytes,
ingress_hmac_key: bytes | None = None,
clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
) -> "RuntimeWiring":
if not isinstance(signing_key, bytes) or len(signing_key) < 32:
raise ValidationError("internal signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
# Kept optional for one controlled migration release; the external
# request path still cannot supply a TenantContext token.
hmac_key = ingress_hmac_key if ingress_hmac_key is not None else signing_key
root_path = Path(root)
root_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
router = TenantRouter(root_path / "router.sqlite3", clock=clock)
ledger = MessageLedger(root_path / "message_ledger.sqlite3")
session_pool = SessionPool(router)
adapter = ChannelAdapter(
router=router,
ledger=ledger,
session_pool=session_pool,
signing_key=signing_key,
clock=clock,
)
return cls(
router=router,
ledger=ledger,
session_pool=session_pool,
channel_adapter=adapter,
identity_resolver=RuntimeIdentityResolver(router),
ingress_authenticator=IngressAuthenticator(hmac_key),
internal_signing_key=signing_key,
clock=clock,
)
def _issue_internal_context(self, identity: RuntimeIdentity) -> TenantContext:
"""Mint internal scope only after all claims matched the router route."""
return TenantContext.issue(
lifetime_seconds=300,
now=self._clock(),
tenant_id=identity.tenant_id,
cell_id=identity.cell_id,
principal_id=identity.principal_id,
principal_type="authenticated_user",
session_id=identity.session_id,
task_id=None,
channel=identity.channel,
channel_account_id=identity.channel_account_id,
)
def ingest(self, *, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> RuntimeIngressResponse:
"""Authenticate, resolve, issue internal context, then append and lease.
The only successful route is ``IngressAuthenticator`` ->
``RuntimeIdentityResolver`` -> ``ChannelAdapter`` ->
``MessageLedger.append`` + ``SessionPool``. The legacy caller-supplied
TenantContext token interface is intentionally not accepted.
"""
try:
ingress = self._ingress_authenticator.authenticate(request)
identity = self.identity_resolver.resolve(ingress.principal, ingress.claims)
context = self._issue_internal_context(identity)
result = self.channel_adapter.ingest(
token=context.sign(self._internal_signing_key), message=ingress.message
)
return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="ACCEPTED", result=result)
except (AuthenticationError, ScopeError):
return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="AUTH_FAILED")
except ValidationError:
return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="VALIDATION_FAILED")
except ConflictError:
return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="CONFLICT")
except Exception:
return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="INTERNAL_ERROR")
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
"""Tenant and Cell scoped secret reference model.
This module never stores secret values. It stores ownership and retrieval scope
metadata for integration with a real secret broker.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Literal
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SecretRef:
secret_id: str
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
kind: Literal["channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"]
version: str
broker_path: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
for name in ("secret_id", "cell_id", "version"):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
if self.kind not in {"channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid secret kind")
if not self.broker_path.startswith("secret://"):
raise ValidationError("secret broker path required")
def can_be_used_by(self, *, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> bool:
return self.tenant_id == tenant_id and self.cell_id == cell_id
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
"""Process-local session lease pool backed by TenantRouter authority."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from threading import RLock
from .router import Route, TenantRouter
from .tenant_context import ScopeError, TenantContext
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SessionLease:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
principal_id: str
session_id: str
class SessionPool:
"""Tracks active leases without creating a second session authority store."""
def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
self._router = router
self._leases: dict[tuple[str, str], SessionLease] = {}
self._lock = RLock()
@staticmethod
def _assert_route(context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
if (
route.tenant_id != context.tenant_id
or route.cell_id != context.cell_id
or route.principal_id != context.principal_id
or route.session_id != context.session_id
):
raise ScopeError("session lease does not match authoritative route")
def assert_available(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
"""Re-resolve the context from the router before a ledger mutation."""
self._assert_route(context, route)
self._assert_route(context, self._router.assert_context_route(context))
def acquire(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> SessionLease:
self._assert_route(context, route)
lease = SessionLease(
tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
cell_id=context.cell_id,
principal_id=context.principal_id,
session_id=context.session_id,
)
with self._lock:
return self._leases.setdefault((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), lease)
def release(self, lease: SessionLease) -> None:
with self._lock:
self._leases.pop((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), None)
def active_count(self) -> int:
with self._lock:
return len(self._leases)
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
"""Signed tenant context and canonical message contract for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import re
import secrets
from typing import Any, Mapping
VERSION = "V2R1C0"
MAX_SAFE_INTEGER = 9_007_199_254_740_991
TENANT_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,38}[a-z0-9])?$")
IDENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,126}[A-Za-z0-9])?$")
class V2R1Error(RuntimeError):
pass
class ValidationError(V2R1Error):
pass
class ScopeError(V2R1Error):
pass
class ConflictError(V2R1Error):
pass
def utc_now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def isoformat(value: datetime | None = None) -> str:
return (value or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
def parse_time(value: str) -> datetime:
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
raise ValidationError("timestamp must be a non-empty string")
text = value.strip()
if text.endswith("Z"):
text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValidationError(f"invalid timestamp: {value!r}") from exc
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
raise ValidationError("timestamp must include timezone")
return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
def require_ident(name: str, value: Any, *, tenant: bool = False) -> str:
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ValidationError(f"{name} must be a string")
value = value.strip()
pattern = TENANT_RE if tenant else IDENT_RE
if not pattern.fullmatch(value):
raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}: {value!r}")
return value
def normalize_message_id(value: Any, *, field_name: str = "message_id") -> str:
if isinstance(value, bool):
raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} cannot be boolean")
if isinstance(value, str):
value = value.strip()
if not value or len(value) > 256 or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in value):
raise ValidationError(f"invalid {field_name}")
return value
if isinstance(value, int):
if abs(value) > MAX_SAFE_INTEGER:
raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} is an unsafe numeric ID")
return str(value)
raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} must be a lossless string or safe integer")
def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
return json.dumps(
value, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True
).encode("utf-8")
def _b64(data: bytes) -> str:
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
def _unb64(value: str) -> bytes:
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class TenantContext:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
principal_id: str
principal_type: str
session_id: str
task_id: str | None
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
issued_at: str
expires_at: str
nonce: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in (
"cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "session_id",
"channel", "channel_account_id", "nonce",
):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if self.task_id is not None:
require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
issued = parse_time(self.issued_at)
expires = parse_time(self.expires_at)
if expires <= issued or expires - issued > timedelta(hours=1):
raise ValidationError("invalid tenant context lifetime")
@classmethod
def issue(cls, *, lifetime_seconds: int = 300, now: datetime | None = None, **scope: Any) -> "TenantContext":
if not 1 <= lifetime_seconds <= 3600:
raise ValidationError("lifetime_seconds must be between 1 and 3600")
current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
return cls(
**scope,
issued_at=isoformat(current),
expires_at=isoformat(current + timedelta(seconds=lifetime_seconds)),
nonce=secrets.token_hex(16),
)
def sign(self, key: bytes) -> str:
if len(key) < 32:
raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
payload = _b64(canonical_json(asdict(self)))
signature = _b64(hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest())
return f"{payload}.{signature}"
@classmethod
def verify(
cls,
token: str,
key: bytes,
*,
now: datetime | None = None,
expected_tenant_id: str | None = None,
expected_cell_id: str | None = None,
) -> "TenantContext":
if len(key) < 32:
raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
try:
payload, encoded_signature = token.split(".", 1)
actual = _unb64(encoded_signature)
if encoded_signature != _b64(actual):
raise ValidationError("non-canonical tenant context signature")
data = json.loads(_unb64(payload))
except Exception as exc:
raise ValidationError("malformed tenant context token") from exc
expected = hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected):
raise ValidationError("tenant context signature mismatch")
context = cls(**data)
current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
if current < parse_time(context.issued_at) - timedelta(seconds=60):
raise ValidationError("tenant context issued in future")
if current >= parse_time(context.expires_at):
raise ValidationError("tenant context expired")
if expected_tenant_id and context.tenant_id != expected_tenant_id:
raise ScopeError("tenant mismatch")
if expected_cell_id and context.cell_id != expected_cell_id:
raise ScopeError("cell mismatch")
return context
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class CanonicalMessage:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
principal_id: str
principal_type: str
origin_type: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
peer_id: str
conversation_id: str
session_id: str
task_id: str | None
event_id: str
message_id: str
reply_to_message_id: str | None
direction: str
command_capable: bool
occurred_at: str
received_at: str
body: str
quoted_body: str | None
adapter_name: str
adapter_version: str
schema_version: str = "aios.message.v1"
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if self.schema_version != "aios.message.v1":
raise ValidationError("unsupported message schema version")
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in (
"cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "origin_type", "channel",
"channel_account_id", "peer_id", "conversation_id", "session_id",
"event_id", "adapter_name", "adapter_version",
):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if self.task_id is not None:
require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
normalize_message_id(self.message_id)
if self.reply_to_message_id is not None:
normalize_message_id(self.reply_to_message_id, field_name="reply_to_message_id")
if self.direction not in {"inbound", "outbound", "internal"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid direction")
if not isinstance(self.command_capable, bool):
raise ValidationError("command_capable must be boolean")
parse_time(self.occurred_at)
parse_time(self.received_at)
if not isinstance(self.body, str):
raise ValidationError("body must be a string")
if self.quoted_body is not None and not isinstance(self.quoted_body, str):
raise ValidationError("quoted_body must be a string or null")
@classmethod
def from_mapping(cls, data: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalMessage":
content = data.get("content") or {}
adapter = data.get("adapter") or {}
if not isinstance(content, Mapping) or not isinstance(adapter, Mapping):
raise ValidationError("content and adapter must be objects")
values = dict(data)
return cls(
schema_version=values.get("schema_version", "aios.message.v1"),
tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
cell_id=values["cell_id"],
principal_id=values["principal_id"],
principal_type=values["principal_type"],
origin_type=values["origin_type"],
channel=values["channel"],
channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
peer_id=values["peer_id"],
conversation_id=values["conversation_id"],
session_id=values["session_id"],
task_id=values.get("task_id"),
event_id=values["event_id"],
message_id=normalize_message_id(values["message_id"]),
reply_to_message_id=(
normalize_message_id(values["reply_to_message_id"], field_name="reply_to_message_id")
if values.get("reply_to_message_id") is not None else None
),
direction=values["direction"],
command_capable=values["command_capable"],
occurred_at=values["occurred_at"],
received_at=values["received_at"],
body=content.get("body", ""),
quoted_body=content.get("quoted_body"),
adapter_name=adapter["name"],
adapter_version=adapter["version"],
)
def assert_context(self, context: TenantContext) -> None:
fields = (
"tenant_id", "cell_id", "principal_id", "session_id", "task_id",
"channel", "channel_account_id",
)
mismatches = [name for name in fields if getattr(self, name) != getattr(context, name)]
if mismatches:
raise ScopeError("message/context mismatch: " + ", ".join(mismatches))
@property
def is_authenticated_human_command(self) -> bool:
return (
self.direction == "inbound"
and self.command_capable
and self.principal_type == "authenticated_user"
and self.origin_type == "channel_user"
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PolicyDecision:
allowed: bool
approval_required: bool
code: str
reason: str
READ_ONLY_TOOLS = frozenset({
"read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
"memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
})
def evaluate_tool_call(tool_name: str, message: CanonicalMessage) -> PolicyDecision:
normalized = tool_name.strip().lower() if isinstance(tool_name, str) else ""
if not normalized:
return PolicyDecision(False, False, "invalid_tool", "tool name missing")
if normalized in READ_ONLY_TOOLS:
return PolicyDecision(True, False, "read_only", "read-only operation")
if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
return PolicyDecision(
False, False, "origin_denied",
"side effects require an authenticated current human command",
)
return PolicyDecision(
True, True, "approval_required",
"authenticated human side effect requires explicit approval",
)
+18 -29
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
<<<<<<< HEAD
# AIOS Agent Command Plane Registry
# Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
version: 1.0.0
created_at: 2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00
created_at: "2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00"
baseline: V1R3C1
commands:
@@ -12,6 +11,22 @@ commands:
completed_path: "agents/commands/completed/"
failed_path: "agents/commands/failed/"
directories:
commands/active: "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
commands/running: "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
commands/failed: "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
lifecycle:
new: active/
running: running/
success: completed/
failure: failed/
# Command lifecycle state machine:
# active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
# → failure → failed/
policies:
path: "agents/policies/"
source: "git"
@@ -38,30 +53,4 @@ audit:
agent_runs: "audit/agent-runs/"
version_history: "audit/version-history/"
command_history: "audit/command-history/"
=======
# AIOS Agent Command Registry
# Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
registry_version: 1.0.0
created_at: "2026-07-08T15:44:00+08:00"
baseline: V1R3C1
directories:
commands/active: "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
commands/running: "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
commands/failed: "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
state: agents/state/
policies: agents/policies/
lifecycle:
new: active/
running: running/
success: completed/
failure: failed/
# Command lifecycle state machine:
# active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
# → failure → failed/
>>>>>>> 4d18ee0 (feat(cmd): enable Agent Command Plane, audit plane, and Web UI dashboard)
interaction_history: "audit/interaction-history/"
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
{
"active_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands/active",
"completed_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands/completed",
"dead_letter_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands/dead-letter",
"database_path": "/var/lib/aios-codex-watcher/state.sqlite3",
"audit_log_path": "/var/log/aios-codex-watcher/audit.jsonl",
"gateway_endpoint": "http://127.0.0.1:18920/v1/orchestrator/events",
"gateway_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbound.token",
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
"lease_seconds": 60,
"retry_seconds": 10,
"max_attempts": 5,
"poll_seconds": 5,
"executor_path": null,
"executor_args": [],
"executor_timeout_seconds": 1800
}
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
{
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 18920,
"database_path": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/state.sqlite3",
"event_inbox_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/events",
"decision_inbox_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/decisions",
"dispatch_outbox_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/outbox",
"openclaw_sync_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/openclaw-sync",
"command_queue_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/commands",
"inbound_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbound.token",
"callback_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/callback.token",
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
"workspace_agent": {
"trigger_id": "agtch_REPLACE_ME",
"access_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/workspace-agent.token"
},
"responses_fallback": {
"api_key_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/openai-api.key",
"model": "REPLACE_WITH_APPROVED_MODEL"
},
"polling": {
"interval_seconds": 10,
"summary_interval_seconds": 300
},
"loop_controls": {
"callback_timeout_seconds": 900,
"lease_seconds": 60,
"retry_base_seconds": 10,
"max_retries": 5,
"max_same_blocker_retries": 3,
"max_hops_per_gate": 20
},
"openclaw_sync": {
"endpoint": null,
"token_file": null
},
"project_key": "v2r1-personal-weixin-production",
"git_poll": {
"enabled": true,
"bare_repo": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
"ref_prefixes": [
"refs/heads/main",
"refs/heads/task/governance/",
"refs/heads/patch/",
"refs/heads/result/"
],
"interval_seconds": 30
}
}
Binary file not shown.
+20
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
printf 'AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 health check\n'
python3 - <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
required = [
'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py',
'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py',
'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py',
'openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/openclaw.plugin.json',
]
missing=[p for p in required if not Path(p).exists()]
if missing:
raise SystemExit('missing: '+','.join(missing))
print('artifact presence PASS')
PY
echo 'runtime health requires OpenClaw environment probe'
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)
EXPECTED_BRANCH="release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712"
if [[ "$(git -C "$ROOT" branch --show-current)" != "$EXPECTED_BRANCH" ]]; then
echo "wrong release branch"
exit 1
fi
COMMIT=$(git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse HEAD)
echo "Installing AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 commit=$COMMIT"
python3 - <<'PY'
import compileall
if not compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1):
raise SystemExit(1)
print('python compile PASS')
PY
if [[ -f openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/package.json ]]; then
echo "plugin package PASS"
else
echo "plugin package missing"
exit 1
fi
echo "Installation preflight PASS"
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
MODE=${1:---check}
case "$MODE" in
--check)
echo "V2R1C0 RC1 validation mode"
;;
--install)
echo "Install requires approved OpenClaw Cell target"
;;
--rollback)
echo "Rollback requires recorded Cell backup"
;;
*)
echo "Usage: $0 [--check|--install|--rollback]"
exit 2
;;
esac
python3 - <<'PY'
import compileall
raise SystemExit(0 if compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1) else 1)
PY
echo "python runtime syntax: PASS"
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# V1R4C6 Backup Result
- version: V1R4C6
- status: NOT_STARTED
- reason: No confirmed production Stack, persistent volume, database migration target, or V1R4C5 image digest is bound to this source release. A backup cannot be claimed or executed safely without an identified target datastore.
- prohibited_actions_not_performed: production database deletion; persistent-volume deletion; docker system prune --volumes; direct copy of live database files.
- required_before_resume: confirmed Stack identity and its documented backup/restore command.
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# V1R4C6 Deployment Result
- version: V1R4C6
- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
- tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
- image_repository: UNRESOLVED
- image_digest: UNRESOLVED
- previous_image_digest: UNRESOLVED
- portainer_environment: UNRESOLVED
- portainer_stack: UNRESOLVED
- deployment_action: NOT_EXECUTED
- reason: No source-to-image-to-Portainer-Stack mapping exists. Existing Portainer containers and known Docker workloads do not expose a V1R4C6/e204 deployment target or Portainer stack labels. The active GitOps API is a direct systemd Python process, not a Portainer-managed Docker Stack.
- rollback_status: NOT_APPLICABLE_NO_CHANGE
- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
-15
View File
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
# V1R4C6 Production Preflight Result
- version: V1R4C6
- started_at_utc: 2026-07-11T16:57:04.0596039Z
- source_tag_object: 356a8a8c1860b94b7d61a456c29228c88e57d963
- source_tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
- tag_to_source_relation: tag commit is direct parent of source commit (verified)
- production_host_identifier: cn-network-mkt (hw / 1.95.164.183)
- host_preflight: Docker 29.5.3; root filesystem 29 percent used; memory available approximately 56 GiB
- GitOps_runtime: active at /data/aios-gitops/workspace via aios-gitops-model-api.service
- runtime_base: current_baseline V1R4C6; previous_baseline V1R4C5; git e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd; service status ok
- Portainer discovery: Portainer instances are reachable on ubuntu-admin and ubuntu-aihost, but no confirmed Portainer Environment/Stack maps to V1R4C6 or e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd.
- source_build_contract: target source contains only deploy/gitea/docker-compose.yml and no application Dockerfile/Containerfile or V1R4C6 image repository declaration.
- status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# V1R4C6 Rollback Result
- version: V1R4C6
- rollback_required: No
- rollback_executed: No
- reason: No container, Stack, database, image, or production configuration was changed during this run.
- captured_v1r4c5_digest: UNRESOLVED because no matching current production Stack was confirmed.
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# V1R4C6 Verification Result
- version: V1R4C6
- healthcheck_result: GitOps adapter /health = 200 and /api/base = 200; this verifies the control-plane API only, not a V1R4C6 production deployment.
- gate_a_result: NOT_RUN (production admin workbench target and authenticated test path unresolved)
- gate_b_result: NOT_RUN (production Search Gateway target/provider binding unresolved)
- gate_c_result: NOT_RUN (production Agent Platform target/runtime request path unresolved)
- runtime_acceptance_result: NOT_RUN (0/8; cannot reuse non-production results)
- critical_control_plane_finding: gitea-branch-consistency-sentinel is failed with five Git-ref-to-Gitea-metadata drift entries and autonomous safe mode emitted. This is a hard safety gate failure.
- no_unresolved_critical_errors: false
- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK
+41 -52
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
<<<<<<< HEAD
# AIOS Agent Audit Plane Architecture
## Overview
@@ -25,9 +24,10 @@ Agent Command Plane (agents/commands/)
+---> Audit
| |
| v
| audit/agent-runs/ (per-agent log)
| audit/command-history/ (per-command log)
| audit/version-history/ (per-baseline log)
| audit/agent-runs/ (per-agent log)
| audit/command-history/ (per-command log)
| audit/version-history/ (per-baseline log)
| audit/interaction-history/ (agent conversation traces)
|
+---> Git Commit
|
@@ -45,8 +45,39 @@ Agent Command Plane (agents/commands/)
5. Git commit locks the audit record
6. Web UI displays timeline from git history
## Directory Structure
```
audit/
├── agent-runs/ # Per-execution records (JSON)
├── command-history/ # Command lifecycle history
├── version-history/ # Version/baseline change log
└── interaction-history/ # Agent conversation traces
```
## Audit Record Schema
Current agent-run records use the following fields:
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| agent_run_id | Unique execution ID |
| command | Command file name |
| agent | Executing agent name |
| version | Baseline version at execution time |
| objective | Human-readable goal |
| start_time | ISO-8601 start timestamp |
| end_time | ISO-8601 completion timestamp |
| interaction_count | Agent-owner interaction turns |
| tool_call_count | Tool invocations during execution |
| changed_files | Files modified in this run |
| commit_sha | Git commit hash |
| test_result | Test verification outcome |
| final_result | SUCCESS / FAILED / PARTIAL |
| evidence_path | Link to evidence directory |
Legacy records remain valid and may use the following compatibility shape:
```json
{
"id": "",
@@ -72,51 +103,6 @@ Agent Command Plane (agents/commands/)
- Every code change must be traceable to who/what agent created it
- No agent-created changes without audit trail
## Related
- [Agent Command Plane](../agents/README.md)
- [Baseline System](baseline-system.md)
=======
# AIOS Agent Audit Plane
## Purpose
Every agent action is recorded. All code changes are traceable to:
- Who made the change
- Why the change was made
- When it was made
- Which version introduced it
- What test results showed
## Directory Structure
```
audit/
├── agent-runs/ # Per-execution records (JSON)
├── command-history/ # Command lifecycle history
├── version-history/ # Version/baseline change log
└── interaction-history/ # Agent conversation traces
```
## Agent Run Record
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| agent_run_id | Unique execution ID |
| command | Command file name |
| agent | Executing agent name |
| version | Baseline version at execution time |
| objective | Human-readable goal |
| start_time | ISO-8601 start timestamp |
| end_time | ISO-8601 completion timestamp |
| interaction_count | Agent-owner interaction turns |
| tool_call_count | Tool invocations during execution |
| changed_files | Files modified in this run |
| commit_sha | Git commit hash |
| test_result | Test verification outcome |
| final_result | SUCCESS / FAILED / PARTIAL |
| evidence_path | Link to evidence directory |
## Version History
Records baseline promotions, rollbacks, and version changes.
@@ -127,6 +113,9 @@ Conversation logs between agent and owner for each command execution.
## Audit Trail Requirement
All changes tracked via Git with signed commits where possible.
Every commit message references the originating Command ID.
>>>>>>> 4d18ee0 (feat(cmd): enable Agent Command Plane, audit plane, and Web UI dashboard)
All changes are tracked via Git with signed commits where possible. Every commit references the originating Command ID.
## Related
- [Agent Command Plane](../agents/README.md)
- [Baseline System](baseline-system.md)
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
# AIOS V1R5 to V2R1 Migration Plan
## Goal
Move from shared Gateway assumptions to Tenant Cell isolation.
## Order
1. Establish Tenant Registry and signed Tenant Context.
2. Implement Tenant Router.
3. Implement OpenClaw Cell lifecycle management.
4. Introduce canonical message envelope.
5. Add provenance and execution policy enforcement.
6. Migrate Hermes into shared fabric with isolated profiles.
7. Migrate memory, secrets and audit storage.
## Do Not
- Do not modify Hermes first.
- Do not share production credentials across tenants.
- Do not treat workspace separation as a sandbox.
- Do not allow unknown message origins to execute tools.
## Acceptance
Each migration stage requires automated tests and runtime evidence before promotion.
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
# AIOS V2R1 OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric Architecture
## Status
Release train: V2R1C0
Purpose: replace shared runtime trust assumptions with tenant-isolated Cell architecture.
## Principles
1. OpenClaw Gateway is a trust boundary.
2. Each production tenant receives an isolated Cell.
3. Hermes provides shared scheduling/fabric capability but not shared tenant state.
4. Tenant identity, origin, session and task scope are mandatory in every event.
5. Unknown provenance fails closed.
## Target Components
- Tenant Router
- OpenClaw Cell Manager
- Canonical Message Envelope
- Tenant Inbox/Outbox Ledger
- Secret Scope Manager
- Memory Namespace Manager
- Hermes Profile Worker Fabric
- Sandbox Execution Layer
- Audit Event Pipeline
## Migration Order
Phase 1: Tenant Router + Cell Manager
Phase 2: Canonical Message and Policy Layer
Phase 3: Hermes Shared Agent Fabric
Phase 4: Memory, Secret and Audit isolation
Phase 5: Production tenant migration
## Release Gate
A V2R1 production release requires:
- tenant isolation tests passed
- message provenance tests passed
- runtime commit matches release commit
- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspection passed
- rollback verified
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
# 微信文本-图片缓存隔离事故报告
## 结论
本次事故已经按最新备份链路回滚并完成第二轮评审修复。`3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a` 进一步修复了英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本误入图片路径的问题,`706c0b0` 则是后续最小修复提交。当前文档只记录证据、部署和验收边界,不把“真实 owner inbound 已完成”写成结论。
## 现象
- 纯文本消息被误答成旧图片回复,属于 stale-image reply on pure text。
- 现场证据显示 `types=1` 且 `hasMedia=false`,但后续又进入 `message_type=image`、`image_count=0`、`implicit_image_message`,最终落到 `cached_image_expired`。
- 这说明“诊断文本”被误判成图片意图后,又继承了 sender 级旧图缓存。
## 根因
- `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py:768-839` 把文本意图判断和缓存回退放在同一条链上。
- `looksLikeHermesImageFollowup()` 会把含图片关键字的诊断文本推进 image intent。
- `resolveHermesFollowupImageContext()` 随后会读取 sender 级缓存;一旦缓存命中失败或过期,就会落到 `cached_image_expired`,从而让纯文本沾上旧图上下文。
- `handleHermesImplicitImage()` 继续把消息送入 `handleHermes(..., "implicit_image_message")`,所以误判会沿着同一条图片处理通道传播。
## 护栏不变量
- 图片处理上下文必须来自当前消息图片、已确认的引用图片,或精确匹配的缓存图片 ID;缺少这三类证据时,纯文本不能进入 `handleHermesImplicitImage()`。
- 未确认的引用文本不能继承 sender 级旧图缓存,必须返回 `referenced_image_not_confirmed`。
- 只有精确缓存图片 ID 命中且缓存仍有效时,才允许走 `resolveHermesCachedImageEntry()` 的 `cached_image_matched` 路径。
- `/hermes` 这类 slash 路径保持原有分流,slash/channel 面不变。
- 这次修复的守卫目标,是把中英文诊断文本、未确认引用文本与图片缓存回退拆开,避免再把普通文本提升成图片意图。
## TDD 与幂等性
- `66d637fc0364a617c7b9fd8cd9baa68fb0368675`(`fix(weixin): isolate text from stale image cache`)引入了隔离修复和 `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`。
- `2de29c59bb946cc3db3e14e8a06270391ede8401`(`fix(weixin): add process-only runtime patch mode`)继续收紧 process-only 运行模式,保持回放幂等。
- `3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a`(`fix(weixin): require confirmed image reference context`)补齐英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本用例,并把图片引用收紧到已确认上下文。
- 用户实测的 TDD 路径为 RED `8 PASS / 1 FAIL`,随后 GREEN `9 PASS`。
- 最小修复提交为 `706c0b0`,对应 quoted pure text 的最后一层收敛修复。
- 第二轮回归结果为 `8 PASS`;node check 同样通过,重复应用补丁保持幂等。
- 生产 npm 分发侧本身缺少 `tsconfig/tests`,baseline 与 patched 共享这一限制,所以这里不把分发目录的缺口当成回归点;验收以 node check 和 8 tests 为准。
## 用户实测补充
- 普通文本两项为 PASS。
- quoted pure text 为 FAIL,日志证据包含 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE`、quoted id、`implicit_image_message`、`referenced_image_unresolved`。
- 这组证据说明 quoted pure text 没有被当成真正的图片 follow-up,且没有越过引用确认边界。
## 回滚与备份
- 回滚按最新备份执行,基线指向 `/data/aios-gitops/runtime/latest-backup-dir.txt` 所示的最新备份目录。
- 备份路径链路按供给证据记录为 `T064506Z`、`T074212Z`、`T081658Z`。
- 第一轮恢复后的部署过程哈希记录为 `e9625d12` 和 `c00c58f8`。
- v2 部署备份为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-text-cache-isolation-20260711T094908Z`。
- v2 部署文件哈希为 TS `024c6498284d1871b048f6157d5d3dbd4d34e54b53a05afd744b00458ceeb79f`、JS `d73b15d6752056192a1d1939b04107334419785b41175b39f1cbc1132ac65c47`;slash/channel 口径保持不变。
- 首次部署因为 `-- No entries --` 门禁误判而回滚,随后纠正部署在线,PID 为 `2496603`。
- 在线修复后的 hashes 为 `86dfe...` / `a9b854...`,`channel 4` accounts healthy,cache unchanged。
## 主线合并与生产发布
- 主线 fast-forward source rev 为 `9269e819972c2e709e0c27bed7eab590da6961c9`,本次不 tag、不 baseline。
- 生产发布结论为 PASS,release dir 为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-mainline-release-20260711T181842Z`。
- old PID 为 `2655072`,new PID 为 `2656106`。
- TS hash 为 `86dfe4543c4414bc86778a4b218c244a742a139c66e3c9f19cf6f0de871234c3`,JS hash 为 `a9b854015108020458ce6f31b9d9187eff82e170c4c214259b0afb9be6a7336f`。
- `18789` 监听,`channel 4` accounts healthy,`error_count=0`,cache unchanged。
- 一次参数门禁失败已回滚,且不影响最终发布。
- owner quoted-text live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
## 运行态验证
- 第一轮 gateway PID 由 `4025932` 变为 `1723576`;v2 部署后由 `1723576` 变为 `1876713`。
- v2 现场/供给证据为 `active`、监听 `18789`、`error_count=0`、`channel gate pass`、`cache preserved`。
- 最终 read-only gate 通过,说明部署后运行态未出现新的插件错误,channel 状态和缓存均保持预期。
- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
## 未完成的真实验收
- owner 纯文本
- diagnostic text
- genuine image-followup message
- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance
以上四类消息仍需要由 owner 真实 inbound 到达,才能把这次“文本隔离”结论升格为完整的线上接受;本报告明确保留该项为 pending,不把它们写成已经完成。
## 引用文字语义修复与发布(2026-07-12)
- 后续 owner 实测证明图片误路由已消失,但模型在没有被引正文时根据 `chat_id/message_id/timestamp` 编造解释,因此图片隔离 PASS、语义验收 FAIL。
- 现场 payload 的 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE` 只有 quoted ID 与时间字段,没有 `text_item`;session transcript 又没有原始 Weixin 数字 message ID,不能精确回表。
- 出站 `clientId` 与引用的 19 位数字 `msg_id` 格式不同,发送 API 也不返回服务端 message ID。本次明确禁止 recent-message、时间窗口、session 顺序和近似 ID 猜测。
- `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab` 增加证据优先处理:payload 明确含 `text_item.text` 时才构造引用上下文;引用存在但正文缺失时,经标准 dispatcher 确定性回复“无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。”,并在模型 dispatch 前返回。
- TDD 先出现两项预期 RED(quoted-text resolver 不存在),最终 GREEN 为 `17 passed`;`py_compile`、`git diff --check`、`node --check` 均通过。
- Scratch 双跑验证只改变 `src/messaging/process-message.ts` 与 `dist/src/messaging/process-message.js`,第二次应用 diff 为 0;slash/channel 文件保持不变。
- 主线为 `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab`,生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-failclosed-release-20260712T054451Z`。
- 发布后 PID 从 `2656106` 变为 `3670157`;TS hash 为 `1a73e735e9c8fb40a1f82d2a66bc022396c8105ed989aac95e11b66326e9fdf1`,JS hash 为 `1c76bf6ec3b45021e68b932cbf52222ba2130a867b95e41d7a91f261b991a304`。
- `18789`、4 个 Weixin accounts、post-start error 0 和图片 cache unchanged 均通过。新的 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
## Owner 引用文字 Fail-Closed 验收(2026-07-12)
- Owner 引用一条微信未提供正文的文字消息并发送“是什么意思”,收到固定回复“无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。”。
- 日志窗口为 `2026-07-12 14:06:23.424-14:06:23.893 +08:00`:入站 `types=1`、`bodyLen=6`、`hasMedia=false`,出站 `textLen=20` 且发送成功。
- 同一窗口 `model-fetch=0`、`implicit_image_message=0`、Hermes route=0,`quoted_text_unavailable=1` 且 `quoted_message_id=present`。
- 该证据确认无正文引用不会进入模型猜测或图片缓存路径。Owner quoted-text no-body live acceptance 为 **PASS**。
- 微信 payload 明确携带 `text_item.text` 时的 grounded explanation 和 genuine image follow-up 仍作为独立兼容性验收项保留。
## 可见引用摘要解析修复(2026-07-12)
- Owner 进一步确认微信客户端能够显示被引用正文,因此上一节的“未提供正文”只适用于旧 resolver 的观察结果,不代表协议 payload 没有可用文本。
- 根因是插件 `inbound.ts` 已将协议字段 `ref_msg.title` 定义为引用摘要并拼入 `ctx.Body`,而 `extractHermesReferencedText()` 只读取 `ref_msg.message_item.text_item.text`,导致客户端可见摘要被错误丢弃。
- `13c2a182860131abcad0f5a70ae8263477578588` 在真实 `text_item.text` 缺失时,仅从 reference envelope 读取 `ref_msg.title`;不会读取 `message_item.title` 或任意嵌套通用 `title`,也不改变图片、slash 或 channel 路由。
- TDD 先得到 `18 passed / 1 failed`,失败项为可见 `ref_msg.title` 仍落到 `quoted_text_unavailable`;修复后为 `19 passed`,`py_compile`、`node --check` 与 `git diff --check` 通过。
- 生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-title-resolution-20260712T155112+0800`,PID 从 `3859376` 变为 `3860863`,post-start error 为 0,图片 cache unchanged。
- 部署后 TS hash 为 `8e77ce61214688a2507b07f0cf1ee85401b58198b8271bebd69efc2681872726`,JS hash 为 `663db8d30a5cd5eb80fe46cf941cce6e6f5d04cb7e4b8d9b4d0086d87faba290`。
- 可见正文引用的 owner live acceptance 尚待下一条真实微信消息确认;预期日志必须命中 `quoted_text_resolved`,且同一窗口不得出现 `quoted_text_unavailable` 或图片路由。
## 安全说明
- 本次仅更新本报告,没有修改代码、runtime、services 或 secrets。
- 报告里没有任何凭据、密钥或原始敏感 ID。
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Resolve explicit quoted text safely and fail closed without a model call when Weixin omits the quoted body.
**Architecture:** Add pure JS/TS reference-text helpers and one process hook guard to the existing patcher. Keep the patch surface limited to generated `process-message.ts/js`; do not introduce a persistent cache or modify send/monitor/API modules.
**Tech Stack:** Python patch generator, TypeScript/JavaScript, Node test harness, pytest.
## Global Constraints
- Sub-agents use `gpt-5.3-codex-spark`.
- No force push, tag, baseline promotion, credential persistence, recent-message fallback, or approximate text matching.
- Existing confirmed image and ordinary text behavior must remain unchanged.
---
### Task 1: Add Quoted Text Resolver With TDD
**Files:**
- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
**Interfaces:**
- Produces: `extractHermesReferencedText(items)` and `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` in TS and JS helper templates.
- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `ref_msg.message_item.type=1` and explicit `text_item.text="被引用的正文"`; assert `reason="quoted_text_resolved"`, `handled=false`, and a prompt containing only delimited quoted/current text.
- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `type=0`, quoted ID, no text, and no confirmed image; assert `reason="quoted_text_unavailable"`, `handled=true`, and exact deterministic `replyText`.
- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py -k 'quoted_text'` and record expected RED because the resolver is absent.
- [ ] Implement the smallest recursive explicit-text extractor. Accept only known referenced text fields; cap each extracted string at 4000 characters and reject blank values.
- [ ] Implement the resolver in both TS and JS templates. Do not read session history, image latest cache, timestamps, or metadata values.
- [ ] Re-run the focused tests and record GREEN.
- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): fail closed on unavailable quoted text`.
### Task 2: Guard The Real Process Hook
**Files:**
- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
**Interfaces:**
- Consumes: `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)`.
- Produces: process hook behavior that replies deterministically or replaces only the ordinary text prompt.
- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test that stubs the ordinary model dispatch and reply function. For type 0 without text, assert reply called once and model called zero times.
- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test for explicit quoted text. Assert model called once with delimited context and no message metadata.
- [ ] Add regression assertions for plain text, current image, and exact quoted image.
- [ ] Run focused tests and record RED for the missing guard.
- [ ] Insert the resolver after reference/image evidence extraction and before ordinary model dispatch. Confirmed image references must bypass the text fail-closed branch.
- [ ] Emit structured reason-only diagnostics without message bodies.
- [ ] Run focused tests and record GREEN.
- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): guard quoted text model dispatch`.
### Task 3: Idempotence, Review, And Release
**Files:**
- Modify: `docs/incidents/WEIXIN_TEXT_IMAGE_CACHE_ISOLATION_20260711.md`
- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py` and require all tests pass.
- [ ] Run `python3 -m py_compile fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`.
- [ ] Run `git diff --check`.
- [ ] Apply `--process-only` twice to a scratch production-plugin copy and require identical second-run hashes; require slash/channel files unchanged.
- [ ] Obtain independent spec and code review.
- [ ] Update the incident document with RED/GREEN evidence, main revision, production hashes, rollback directory, and owner live acceptance state.
- [ ] Merge by non-force fast-forward from a clean main-based branch, deploy only the two generated process-message files, restart only `openclaw-gateway.service`, and verify service, port 18789, four accounts, zero post-start errors, and unchanged image cache.
- [ ] Owner live acceptance: quote a type 0 text message and verify deterministic no-body response; quote a payload that includes explicit text and verify grounded explanation.
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Design
## Goal
Prevent quoted-text questions from being answered with invented message metadata when Weixin does not provide the quoted body. Preserve normal text and confirmed image behavior.
## Evidence
- A quoted text event can arrive as `ref_msg.message_item.type=0` with only `msg_id` and timestamps.
- Session transcripts retain text but not the original Weixin numeric message ID.
- Outbound `clientId` values are not the same format as quoted numeric `msg_id` values, and the send API does not expose a server message ID.
- Therefore recent-message, timestamp, session, and outbound-client-ID matching are not exact evidence and must not be used.
## Decision
Use an evidence-only resolver in `process-message`:
1. If reference payload contains an explicit text item, extract that text and build a bounded quoted-text context for the ordinary text model path.
2. If reference context exists but has no explicit text and is not a confirmed image, return a deterministic response: `无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。`
3. The unresolved branch is handled before ordinary model dispatch and before Hermes image dispatch.
4. Do not infer quoted text from metadata, recent messages, session order, timestamps, or approximate IDs.
No persistent text cache is introduced in this change. Outbound ID aliasing remains a separate observation task because an exact mapping has not been proved.
## Interfaces
- `extractHermesReferencedText(items): string` returns only explicit referenced text, otherwise an empty string.
- `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` returns one of:
- `{ referenced: false, handled: false, prompt: currentText, reason: "none" }`
- `{ referenced: true, handled: false, prompt, reason: "quoted_text_resolved" }`
- `{ referenced: true, handled: true, replyText: "无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。", reason: "quoted_text_unavailable" }`
- Confirmed referenced images bypass this text resolver and keep the existing exact image path.
## Privacy And Logging
- Do not log quoted or current text.
- Log only `reason`, account ID, a one-way bounded hash of quoted ID when available, and boolean evidence flags.
- Do not persist tokens, credentials, full payloads, or message text.
## Acceptance
- Explicit quoted text is supplied to the ordinary text model with a clear delimiter.
- Type 0 reference without text returns the deterministic Chinese response and does not call the model.
- Plain text, current image, and exact quoted image behavior remain unchanged.
- Generated TS and JS remain byte-idempotent under `--process-only`.
-112
View File
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
from pathlib import Path
TS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText: string): GetUpdatesResp {
return JSON.parse(rawText, (key: string, value: unknown, context?: { source?: string }) => {
if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
if (typeof value !== "number") throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
const source = context?.source;
if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source)) throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
return source;
}) as GetUpdatesResp;
}
// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
JS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText) {
return JSON.parse(rawText, (key, value, context) => {
if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string")
return value;
if (typeof value !== "number")
throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
const source = context?.source;
if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source))
throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
return source;
});
}
// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
def insert_once(text: str, marker: str, addition: str) -> str:
if addition in text:
return text
if marker not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f'marker not found: {marker}')
return text.replace(marker, marker + '\n' + addition, 1)
def patch_api_ts(text: str) -> str:
text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + TS_HELPER)
old = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
new = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
if new not in text:
if old not in text:
raise RuntimeError('TypeScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
return text
def patch_api_js(text: str) -> str:
text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + JS_HELPER)
old = 'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
new = 'const resp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
if new not in text:
if old not in text:
raise RuntimeError('JavaScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
return text
def patch_types_ts(text: str) -> str:
new = 'message_id?: string | number;'
if new in text:
return text
old = 'message_id?: number;'
if old not in text:
raise RuntimeError('message_id type marker not found')
return text.replace(old, new, 1)
def write_if_changed(path: Path, content: str) -> bool:
original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
if original == content:
return False
path.write_text(content, encoding='utf-8')
return True
def apply(plugin_root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
paths = {
'src/api/api.ts': patch_api_ts,
'dist/src/api/api.js': patch_api_js,
'src/api/types.ts': patch_types_ts,
}
changed: dict[str, bool] = {}
for relative, transform in paths.items():
path = plugin_root / relative
if not path.exists():
raise RuntimeError(f'missing plugin file: {path}')
original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
changed[relative] = write_if_changed(path, transform(original))
return changed
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
args = parser.parse_args()
changed = apply(args.plugin_root.resolve())
print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(args.plugin_root.resolve()), 'changed': changed}, ensure_ascii=False))
return 0
if __name__ == '__main__':
raise SystemExit(main())
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
from pathlib import Path
def replace_required(text: str, old: str, new: str, label: str) -> str:
if new in text:
return text
if old not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f'{label} marker not found')
return text.replace(old, new, 1)
def patch_send_ts(text: str) -> str:
text = replace_required(
text,
'}): Promise<{ messageId: string }> {\n const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
'}): Promise<{ messageId: string; createTimeMs: number }> {\n const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
'TS send return type',
)
text = replace_required(
text,
' const clientId = generateClientId();\n const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
' const clientId = generateClientId();\n const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
'TS create time',
)
text = replace_required(
text,
' });\n try {\n await sendMessageApi({',
' });\n if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0]) throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n try {\n await sendMessageApi({',
'TS request timestamp',
)
text = replace_required(
text,
' return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
' return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
'TS send result',
)
return text
def patch_send_js(text: str) -> str:
text = replace_required(
text,
' const clientId = generateClientId();\n const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
' const clientId = generateClientId();\n const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
'JS create time',
)
text = replace_required(
text,
' });\n try {\n await sendMessageApi({',
' });\n if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0])\n throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n try {\n await sendMessageApi({',
'JS request timestamp',
)
text = replace_required(
text,
' return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
' return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
'JS send result',
)
return text
def patch_process_ts(text: str) -> str:
old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
}});'''
new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
}});
rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS fallback text send')
old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
}});'''
new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
}});
rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
return replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS normal text send')
def patch_process_js(text: str) -> str:
old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
} });'''
new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
} });
rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS fallback text send')
old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
} });'''
new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
token: deps.token,
contextToken,
runId,
} });
rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
return replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS normal text send')
def apply(root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
transforms = {
'src/messaging/send.ts': patch_send_ts,
'dist/src/messaging/send.js': patch_send_js,
'src/messaging/process-message.ts': patch_process_ts,
'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': patch_process_js,
}
changed = {}
for relative, transform in transforms.items():
path = root / relative
original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
updated = transform(original)
changed[relative] = updated != original
if updated != original:
path.write_text(updated, encoding='utf-8')
return changed
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
args = parser.parse_args()
root = args.plugin_root.resolve()
print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(root), 'changed': apply(root)}, ensure_ascii=False))
return 0
if __name__ == '__main__':
raise SystemExit(main())
+86
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
import {
classifyRun,
decideToolCall,
runKey,
} from "./policy.js";
const activeRuns = new Map();
const MAX_RUN_AGE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
function prune(now = Date.now()) {
for (const [key, value] of activeRuns.entries()) {
if (now - value.recordedAt > MAX_RUN_AGE_MS) activeRuns.delete(key);
}
}
export default {
id: "aios-tenant-boundary",
name: "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
description: "Fail-closed user-origin and side-effect policy for Tenant Cells.",
register(api) {
api.on(
"before_agent_run",
async (event, ctx) => {
prune();
const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
const trust = classifyRun(ctx, config);
const key = runKey(event, ctx);
if (key) {
activeRuns.set(key, { ...trust, recordedAt: Date.now() });
}
if (
config.blockUnknownAgentRuns === true &&
trust.trusted !== true &&
trust.reason !== "job_id_present"
) {
return {
outcome: "block",
reason: trust.reason,
message: "This message cannot be verified as coming from the active authenticated user.",
};
}
return { outcome: "pass" };
},
{ priority: 100 },
);
api.on(
"before_tool_call",
async (event, ctx) => {
prune();
const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
const key = runKey(event, ctx);
const trust = key ? activeRuns.get(key) : undefined;
const decision = decideToolCall(event.toolName, trust, config);
if (decision.action === "block") {
return {
block: true,
blockReason: `AIOS V2R1 origin policy denied tool call: ${decision.code}`,
};
}
if (decision.action === "approval") {
return {
requireApproval: {
title: `Approve ${String(event.toolName)}`,
description: "Authenticated user requested a side-effecting tool call in this Tenant Cell.",
severity: "warning",
timeoutMs: Number(config.approvalTimeoutMs ?? 60000),
allowedDecisions: ["allow-once", "deny"],
pluginId: "aios-tenant-boundary",
},
};
}
return undefined;
},
{ priority: 100 },
);
api.on("agent_end", async (event, ctx) => {
const key = runKey(event, ctx);
if (key) activeRuns.delete(key);
});
},
};
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
const DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS = Object.freeze([
"read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
"memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
]);
function strings(value) {
return Array.isArray(value)
? value.filter((item) => typeof item === "string" && item.trim())
.map((item) => item.trim())
: [];
}
export function resolveSenderId(ctx = {}) {
const direct = typeof ctx.senderId === "string" ? ctx.senderId.trim() : "";
const nested = typeof ctx.channelContext?.sender?.id === "string"
? ctx.channelContext.sender.id.trim()
: "";
return direct || nested || undefined;
}
export function classifyRun(ctx = {}, config = {}) {
const senderId = resolveSenderId(ctx);
const trusted = new Set(strings(config.trustedSenderIds));
const blocked = new Set(strings(config.blockedSenderIds));
if (typeof ctx.jobId === "string" && ctx.jobId) {
return { trusted: false, origin: "automation", reason: "job_id_present" };
}
if (!senderId) {
return { trusted: false, origin: "system_or_unknown", reason: "sender_id_missing" };
}
if (blocked.has(senderId)) {
return { trusted: false, origin: "blocked_sender", reason: "sender_blocked", senderId };
}
if (config.requireExplicitTrustedSenders !== false && !trusted.has(senderId)) {
return { trusted: false, origin: "untrusted_sender", reason: "sender_not_allowlisted", senderId };
}
return {
trusted: true,
origin: "authenticated_channel_user",
reason: "sender_verified",
senderId,
};
}
export function decideToolCall(toolName, runTrust, config = {}) {
const name = typeof toolName === "string" ? toolName.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
const configured = strings(config.readOnlyTools).map((item) => item.toLowerCase());
const readOnly = new Set(configured.length ? configured : DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS);
if (!name) {
return { action: "block", code: "tool_name_missing" };
}
if (readOnly.has(name)) {
return { action: "allow", code: "read_only" };
}
if (!runTrust || runTrust.trusted !== true) {
return {
action: "block",
code: runTrust?.reason || "run_provenance_missing",
};
}
if (config.requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects === false) {
return { action: "allow", code: "trusted_side_effect" };
}
return { action: "approval", code: "human_side_effect" };
}
export function runKey(event = {}, ctx = {}) {
const key = event.runId || ctx.runId;
return typeof key === "string" && key.trim() ? key.trim() : undefined;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
{
"id": "aios-tenant-boundary",
"name": "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
"description": "Enforces AIOS V2R1 tenant provenance and tool policy boundaries.",
"version": "2.1.0-rc1",
"entry": "dist/index.js",
"configSchema": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"requireExplicitTrustedSenders": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
"trustedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
"blockedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
"readOnlyTools": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
"requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects": { "type": "boolean", "default": true }
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
{
"name": "@aios/openclaw-tenant-boundary",
"version": "2.1.0-rc.1",
"type": "module",
"description": "AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell provenance and side-effect policy boundary for OpenClaw.",
"files": [
"dist",
"openclaw.plugin.json"
],
"scripts": {
"test": "node --test test/*.test.js"
},
"openclaw": {
"extensions": [
"./dist/index.js"
]
}
}
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
{
"type": "branch",
"branch": "deploy/v1r4c6-production-20260711",
"branch": "release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712",
"base": "main",
"created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
"created_at": "2026-07-11T13:10:51Z",
"created_at": "2026-07-12T14:39:23Z",
"direct_main_push": false,
"owner_approval_required": true
}
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1
## Architecture
OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric.
## Included
- Signed Tenant Context
- Canonical Message Envelope
- Tenant Router
- OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter
- Exact Message Ledger
- Hermes tenant partitioned scheduler
- Memory Namespace policy
- Secret Scope references
- Append-only Audit Chain
- Hermes Profile isolation
- OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin
## Release Gates
Before production:
- automated isolation tests pass
- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspect passes
- Cell health probes pass
- running commit matches release commit
- rollback test passes
## Security Rules
Unknown provenance fails closed.
Quoted text is data, not command input.
Cross-tenant access is denied.
Shared Fabric does not share tenant state.
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 Live Status
Last verified: 2026-07-13 Europe/Amsterdam
## Source of truth
- Release branch: `release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712`
- Verified branch tree: `6569065`
- Current promoted baseline: `V1R4C6`
- Production baseline state: not yet promoted to V2R1C0
This file is the single human-readable progress page for V2R1C0 RC1. Update it in the same commit that changes a release gate.
## Overall status
`DEVELOPMENT COMPLETE / EXECUTABLE ACCEPTANCE INCOMPLETE / NOT DEPLOYED`
## Component status
| Workstream | Status | Evidence | Remaining gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Architecture baseline | Done | `docs/architecture/AIOS_V2R1_OpenClaw_Tenant_Cell_Hermes_Shared_Agent_Fabric_Architecture.md` | none |
| Tenant Context | Done | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py` | executable security tests |
| Canonical Message | Done | `tenant_context.py` | channel adapter integration test |
| Tenant Router | Done | `router.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
| Cell lifecycle adapter | Done | `fleet.py`, `cell_manager.py`, `cli.py` | real OpenClaw Fleet probe |
| Message Ledger | Done | `message_ledger.py` | concurrency and restart tests |
| Hermes Fabric | Done | `hermes_fabric.py` | worker/profile runtime test |
| Memory isolation | Done | `memory_scope.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
| Secret scope | Done | `secret_scope.py` | secret broker integration |
| Audit chain | Done | `audit.py` | tamper executable test |
| Hermes Profile isolation | Done | `hermes_profile.py` | container/profile runtime test |
| OpenClaw boundary plugin | Code complete | `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/` | install + runtime hook inspection |
| Python automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
| Node plugin automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
| Staging Cell deployment | Not started | none | tests must pass first |
| Rollback rehearsal | Not started | none | staging deployment required |
| Merge to `main` | Not started | release branch differs from main | owner approval after gates pass |
| RC tag | Not created | no V2R1 tag | owner approval |
| Production deployment | Not started | baseline remains V1R4C6 | owner production approval |
## Release gates
- [ ] Python executable tests committed and passing
- [ ] Node executable tests committed and passing
- [ ] OpenClaw plugin installs successfully
- [ ] Runtime inspection proves hooks registered
- [ ] Tenant Cell status and doctor pass
- [ ] Staging message and tool-policy smoke tests pass
- [ ] Rollback succeeds
- [ ] Running commit matches approved release commit
- [ ] Owner approves merge, tag and production cutover
## Parallel work ownership
- Track A: Python isolation and message tests
- Track B: OpenClaw plugin tests and runtime inspection
- Track C: Cell staging deployment, health and rollback
- Track D: release evidence, digests and final acceptance report
## Update rule
Every worker must update this page with:
1. exact command,
2. exit code,
3. test counts,
4. commit hash,
5. artifact digest,
6. blocker or PASS result.
No item may be marked Done from prose-only reports.
-25
View File
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://aios.local/schemas/codex-command.schema.json",
"title": "AIOS Codex command",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["schema_version", "command_id", "project_key", "work_unit_id", "contract_commit", "state_version", "execution"],
"properties": {
"schema_version": {"const": 1},
"command_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
"project_key": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
"work_unit_id": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"},
"contract_commit": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"},
"state_version": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
"execution": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["kind", "input"],
"properties": {
"kind": {"enum": ["acceptance_probe", "codex"]},
"input": {"type": "string", "maxLength": 65536}
}
}
}
}
-145
View File
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"title": "AIOS Orchestrator Decision",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"schema_version",
"project_key",
"contract_commit",
"event_id",
"expected_state_version",
"verdict",
"state_updates",
"next_work_units",
"requires_human_input",
"stop_reason"
],
"properties": {
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
},
"project_key": {
"type": "string"
},
"contract_commit": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"
},
"event_id": {
"type": "string"
},
"expected_state_version": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"BLOCKED",
"COMPLETE",
"DISPATCH",
"NOOP"
]
},
"state_updates": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"key",
"value"
],
"properties": {
"key": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"next_work_units": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"id",
"track_id",
"gate_id",
"primary_agent",
"fallback_agent",
"clean_base_commit",
"allowed_paths",
"required_checks",
"forbidden_operations",
"instruction"
],
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"track_id": {
"type": "string"
},
"gate_id": {
"type": "string"
},
"primary_agent": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"openclaw",
"codex"
]
},
"fallback_agent": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"openclaw",
"codex"
]
},
"clean_base_commit": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"
},
"allowed_paths": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required_checks": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"forbidden_operations": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"instruction": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"requires_human_input": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"stop_reason": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
}
}
-102
View File
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"title": "AIOS Orchestrator Event",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"schema_version",
"project_key",
"contract_commit",
"event_id",
"source_agent",
"event_type",
"work_unit_id",
"status",
"state_version",
"implementation_commit",
"result_commit",
"blocker",
"evidence_refs",
"payload"
],
"properties": {
"schema_version": {
"const": 1
},
"project_key": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"contract_commit": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"
},
"event_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128
},
"source_agent": {
"enum": [
"openclaw",
"codex",
"gitea",
"system",
"workspace-agent"
]
},
"event_type": {
"type": "string"
},
"work_unit_id": {
"type": "string"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"READY",
"RUNNING",
"PASS",
"BLOCKED",
"FAIL",
"TIMEOUT",
"NOT_EXECUTED"
]
},
"state_version": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0
},
"implementation_commit": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
],
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"
},
"result_commit": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
],
"pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"
},
"blocker": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
],
"maxLength": 512
},
"evidence_refs": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"maxItems": 64
},
"payload": {
"type": "object"
}
}
}
-63
View File
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Seed exactly one orchestration event when the project has no durable state."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
from pathlib import Path
import sys
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT))
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.config import Config
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.models import Event
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.securefs import atomic_write_bytes_shared
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.store import Store
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--config", type=Path, required=True)
args = parser.parse_args()
config = Config.from_file(args.config)
store = Store(config.database_path)
if store.project_state(config.project_key) is not None:
print("ORCHESTRATION_BOOTSTRAP=NOOP reason=STATE_EXISTS")
return 0
event = Event.from_dict(
{
"schema_version": 1,
"project_key": config.project_key,
"contract_commit": config.contract_commit,
"event_id": "bootstrap-" + config.contract_commit[:24],
"source_agent": "system",
"event_type": "orchestration_bootstrap",
"work_unit_id": "ORCHESTRATION-BOOTSTRAP",
"status": "READY",
"state_version": 0,
"implementation_commit": None,
"result_commit": None,
"blocker": None,
"evidence_refs": [],
"payload": {
"reason": "initial_gateway_install",
"polling_enabled": True,
"openclaw_sync_required": True,
},
}
)
path = config.event_inbox_dir / "pending" / f"{event.event_id}.json"
atomic_write_bytes_shared(
path,
(event.canonical_json() + "\n").encode(),
mode=0o640,
group_writable_directory=True,
)
print(f"ORCHESTRATION_BOOTSTRAP=PASS event_id={event.event_id}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
-64
View File
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
[[ ${EUID} -eq 0 ]] || { echo "root required" >&2; exit 1; }
ROOT=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd -P)
CONFIG=${1:-/etc/aios-codex-watcher/config.json}
[[ "$CONFIG" = /* ]] || { echo "config path must be absolute" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ -f "$CONFIG" && ! -L "$CONFIG" ]] || { echo "pre-provisioned regular config required" >&2; exit 1; }
for path in \
services/aios_codex_watcher/__init__.py \
services/aios_codex_watcher/__main__.py \
services/aios_codex_watcher/watcher.py \
systemd/aios-codex-watcher.service \
systemd/aios-codex-watcher.timer \
systemd/aios-codex-watcher.sysusers \
systemd/aios-codex-watcher.tmpfiles; do
[[ -f "$ROOT/$path" && ! -L "$ROOT/$path" ]] || { echo "missing or unsafe: $path" >&2; exit 1; }
done
digest=$(sha256sum \
"$ROOT/services/aios_codex_watcher/__init__.py" \
"$ROOT/services/aios_codex_watcher/__main__.py" \
"$ROOT/services/aios_codex_watcher/watcher.py" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')
release="/opt/aios-codex-watcher/releases/$digest"
install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 "$release/services/aios_codex_watcher" "$release/bin"
install -o root -g root -m 0644 "$ROOT/services/aios_codex_watcher/"*.py "$release/services/aios_codex_watcher/"
launcher="$release/bin/aios-codex-watcher"
printf '%s\n' '#!/usr/bin/env bash' 'set -euo pipefail' \
"export PYTHONPATH='$release'" \
"exec /usr/bin/python3 -m services.aios_codex_watcher \"\$@\"" >"$launcher"
chown root:root "$launcher"
chmod 0755 "$launcher"
install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 /opt/aios-codex-watcher /etc/aios-codex-watcher
ln -sfn "releases/$digest" /opt/aios-codex-watcher/current.new
mv -Tf /opt/aios-codex-watcher/current.new /opt/aios-codex-watcher/current
install -o root -g root -m 0644 "$ROOT/systemd/aios-codex-watcher.service" /etc/systemd/system/
install -o root -g root -m 0644 "$ROOT/systemd/aios-codex-watcher.timer" /etc/systemd/system/
install -o root -g root -m 0644 "$ROOT/systemd/aios-codex-watcher.sysusers" /usr/lib/sysusers.d/
install -o root -g root -m 0644 "$ROOT/systemd/aios-codex-watcher.tmpfiles" /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/
systemd-sysusers /usr/lib/sysusers.d/aios-codex-watcher.sysusers
systemd-tmpfiles --create /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/aios-codex-watcher.tmpfiles
commands=/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands
for directory in "$commands/active" "$commands/completed"; do
[[ -d "$directory" && ! -L "$directory" ]] || { echo "missing or unsafe command directory: $directory" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ $(stat -c '%U:%G' "$directory") == aios-orchestrator:aios-orchestrator ]] || { echo "unexpected command directory owner: $directory" >&2; exit 1; }
mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$directory")
(( (8#$mode & 2) == 0 )) || { echo "world-writable command directory: $directory" >&2; exit 1; }
done
if [[ -e "$commands/dead-letter" || -L "$commands/dead-letter" ]]; then
[[ -d "$commands/dead-letter" && ! -L "$commands/dead-letter" ]] || { echo "unsafe dead-letter directory" >&2; exit 1; }
else
install -d -o aios-orchestrator -g aios-orchestrator -m 0750 "$commands/dead-letter"
fi
[[ $(stat -c '%U:%G' "$commands/dead-letter") == aios-orchestrator:aios-orchestrator ]] || { echo "unexpected dead-letter owner" >&2; exit 1; }
mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$commands/dead-letter")
(( (8#$mode & 2) == 0 )) || { echo "world-writable dead-letter directory" >&2; exit 1; }
printf '{"release_sha256":"%s","installed_at":"%s"}\n' "$digest" "$(date -u +%FT%TZ)" >"$release/receipt.json"
chmod 0644 "$release/receipt.json"
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable --now aios-codex-watcher.timer
printf 'installed_sha256=%s\n' "$digest"
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -Eeuo pipefail
umask 0077
SOURCE_ROOT="${SOURCE_ROOT:-$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)}"
INSTALL_ROOT="${INSTALL_ROOT:-/opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway}"
CONFIG_ROOT="${CONFIG_ROOT:-/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway}"
STATE_ROOT="${STATE_ROOT:-/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway}"
UNIT_ROOT="${UNIT_ROOT:-/etc/systemd/system}"
SYSUSERS_ROOT="${SYSUSERS_ROOT:-/etc/sysusers.d}"
TMPFILES_ROOT="${TMPFILES_ROOT:-/etc/tmpfiles.d}"
DRY_RUN=0
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--dry-run" ]]; then
DRY_RUN=1
fi
fail() {
printf 'AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_INSTALL=BLOCKED reason=%s\n' "$1" >&2
exit 2
}
[[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]] || fail OWNER_INSTALL_REQUIRED
for cmd in git python3 systemd-analyze systemctl systemd-sysusers systemd-tmpfiles sha256sum find sort xargs; do
command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "MISSING_COMMAND_${cmd}"
done
if [[ -f "$SOURCE_ROOT/SHA256SUMS" ]]; then
(cd "$SOURCE_ROOT" && sha256sum --check SHA256SUMS)
fi
for path in \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/services/aios_orchestrator_gateway" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.sysusers" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.tmpfiles" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/config/aios-orchestrator-gateway.example.json"; do
[[ -e "$path" ]] || fail "MISSING_SOURCE_${path}"
done
PYCACHE="/tmp/aios-orchestrator-install-pycache-$$"
rm -rf "$PYCACHE"
PYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX="$PYCACHE" python3 -m compileall -q "$SOURCE_ROOT/services" "$SOURCE_ROOT/scripts"
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH="$SOURCE_ROOT" \
python3 -m unittest -v tests.test_aios_orchestrator_gateway
rm -rf "$PYCACHE"
for script in "$SOURCE_ROOT"/scripts/*.sh; do bash -n "$script"; done
python3 -m json.tool "$SOURCE_ROOT/config/aios-orchestrator-gateway.example.json" >/dev/null
systemd-analyze verify \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service" \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer"
SOURCE_FILES=(
README-AIOS-ORCHESTRATOR-GATEWAY.md
config/aios-orchestrator-gateway.example.json
schemas/decision.schema.json
schemas/event.schema.json
scripts/bootstrap_orchestration_loop.py
scripts/install_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh
scripts/report_orchestrator_event.py
scripts/rollback_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh
scripts/verify_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh
systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service
systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer
systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.sysusers
systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.tmpfiles
tests/test_aios_orchestrator_gateway.py
tests/test_aios_orchestrator_gateway_rollback.sh
workspace-agent/CENTRAL_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS.md
workspace-agent/orchestrator-decision-action.openapi.yaml
)
while IFS= read -r path; do SOURCE_FILES+=("$path"); done < <(
cd "$SOURCE_ROOT"
find services/aios_orchestrator_gateway -type f ! -path '*/__pycache__/*' ! -name '*.pyc' -print | sort
)
for path in "${SOURCE_FILES[@]}"; do
[[ -f "$SOURCE_ROOT/$path" && ! -L "$SOURCE_ROOT/$path" ]] || fail "INVALID_SOURCE_FILE_${path}"
done
SOURCE_DIGEST="$(
cd "$SOURCE_ROOT"
printf '%s\0' "${SOURCE_FILES[@]}" | sort -z | xargs -0 sha256sum \
| sha256sum \
| awk '{print $1}'
)"
[[ "$SOURCE_DIGEST" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]] || fail SOURCE_DIGEST_INVALID
RELEASE_DIR="$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$SOURCE_DIGEST"
if [[ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]]; then
printf 'AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_INSTALL_DRY_RUN=PASS digest=%s release=%s\n' \
"$SOURCE_DIGEST" "$RELEASE_DIR"
exit 0
fi
install -d -m 0755 "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases"
install -d -m 0700 "$CONFIG_ROOT"
install -d -m 0700 "$STATE_ROOT"
systemd-sysusers "$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.sysusers"
systemd-tmpfiles --create "$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.tmpfiles"
if [[ ! -d "$RELEASE_DIR" ]]; then
TMP_RELEASE="$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/.tmp-$SOURCE_DIGEST-$$"
install -d -m 0755 "$TMP_RELEASE"
for path in "${SOURCE_FILES[@]}"; do
install -d -m 0755 "$TMP_RELEASE/$(dirname "$path")"
cp -a "$SOURCE_ROOT/$path" "$TMP_RELEASE/$path"
done
printf '%s\n' "$SOURCE_DIGEST" > "$TMP_RELEASE/SOURCE_DIGEST"
chmod -R go-w "$TMP_RELEASE"
mv "$TMP_RELEASE" "$RELEASE_DIR"
fi
PREVIOUS_TARGET=""
if [[ -L "$INSTALL_ROOT/current" ]]; then
PREVIOUS_TARGET="$(readlink -f "$INSTALL_ROOT/current")"
fi
ln -s "$RELEASE_DIR" "$INSTALL_ROOT/.current-new-$$"
mv -Tf "$INSTALL_ROOT/.current-new-$$" "$INSTALL_ROOT/current"
install -m 0644 "$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service" \
"$UNIT_ROOT/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service"
install -m 0644 "$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service" \
"$UNIT_ROOT/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service"
install -m 0644 "$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer" \
"$UNIT_ROOT/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer"
install -m 0644 "$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.sysusers" \
"$SYSUSERS_ROOT/aios-orchestrator-gateway.conf"
install -m 0644 "$SOURCE_ROOT/systemd/aios-orchestrator-gateway.tmpfiles" \
"$TMPFILES_ROOT/aios-orchestrator-gateway.conf"
if [[ ! -f "$CONFIG_ROOT/inbound.token" ]]; then
python3 - <<'PY' > "$CONFIG_ROOT/inbound.token"
import secrets
print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))
PY
fi
[[ ! -L "$CONFIG_ROOT/inbound.token" ]] || fail INBOUND_TOKEN_SYMLINK
chown root:aios-orchestrator "$CONFIG_ROOT/inbound.token"
chmod 0640 "$CONFIG_ROOT/inbound.token"
if [[ ! -f "$CONFIG_ROOT/callback.token" ]]; then
python3 - <<'PY' > "$CONFIG_ROOT/callback.token"
import secrets
print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))
PY
fi
[[ ! -L "$CONFIG_ROOT/callback.token" ]] || fail CALLBACK_TOKEN_SYMLINK
chown root:aios-orchestrator "$CONFIG_ROOT/callback.token"
chmod 0640 "$CONFIG_ROOT/callback.token"
if [[ ! -f "$CONFIG_ROOT/config.json" ]]; then
install -m 0600 \
"$SOURCE_ROOT/config/aios-orchestrator-gateway.example.json" \
"$CONFIG_ROOT/config.json.example"
printf 'AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_INSTALL=BLOCKED reason=CONFIGURATION_REQUIRED digest=%s\n' \
"$SOURCE_DIGEST"
exit 2
fi
chown root:aios-orchestrator "$CONFIG_ROOT/config.json"
chmod 0640 "$CONFIG_ROOT/config.json"
python3 -m json.tool "$CONFIG_ROOT/config.json" >/dev/null
AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_CONFIG_OWNER_UID=0 \
AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_OWNER_UID=0 \
PYTHONPATH="$INSTALL_ROOT/current" \
python3 - "$CONFIG_ROOT/config.json" <<'PY'
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.config import Config
cfg = Config.from_file(Path(sys.argv[1]))
cfg.inbound_token()
cfg.callback_token()
if cfg.workspace_trigger_id:
cfg.workspace_token()
if cfg.responses_api_key_file:
cfg.responses_api_key()
if cfg.openclaw_sync_endpoint:
cfg.openclaw_sync_token()
print("CONFIG_VALIDATE=PASS")
PY
python3 - "$STATE_ROOT/install-receipt.json" "$SOURCE_DIGEST" "$RELEASE_DIR" "$PREVIOUS_TARGET" <<'PY'
import json, os, sys, tempfile
from pathlib import Path
path = Path(sys.argv[1])
data = {
"schema_version": 1,
"source_digest": sys.argv[2],
"current_release": sys.argv[3],
"previous_release": sys.argv[4] or None,
"last_rollback": None,
}
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
fd, temp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".install-receipt-", dir=path.parent)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as handle:
json.dump(data, handle, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
handle.write("\n")
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.chmod(temp, 0o600)
os.replace(temp, path)
directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
try:
os.fsync(directory)
finally:
os.close(directory)
finally:
try:
os.unlink(temp)
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
PY
chown aios-orchestrator:aios-orchestrator "$STATE_ROOT/install-receipt.json"
chmod 0600 "$STATE_ROOT/install-receipt.json"
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable --now aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
systemctl enable --now aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer
systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer
AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_CONFIG_OWNER_UID=0 \
AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_OWNER_UID=0 \
PYTHONPATH="$INSTALL_ROOT/current" \
python3 "$INSTALL_ROOT/current/scripts/bootstrap_orchestration_loop.py" \
--config "$CONFIG_ROOT/config.json"
systemctl start aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service
printf 'AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_INSTALL=PASS digest=%s previous=%s\n' \
"$SOURCE_DIGEST" "${PREVIOUS_TARGET:-NONE}"
-130
View File
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Submit an OpenClaw/Codex task lifecycle event over HTTP or a polled inbox."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT))
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.models import Event
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.securefs import atomic_write_bytes_shared, read_secure_json, read_secure_text
def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
p.add_argument("--project-key", required=True)
p.add_argument("--contract-commit", required=True)
p.add_argument("--event-id", required=True)
p.add_argument("--source-agent", required=True, choices=["openclaw", "codex", "gitea", "system"])
p.add_argument("--event-type", required=True)
p.add_argument("--work-unit-id", required=True)
p.add_argument(
"--status",
required=True,
choices=["READY", "RUNNING", "PASS", "BLOCKED", "FAIL", "TIMEOUT", "NOT_EXECUTED"],
)
p.add_argument("--state-version", type=int, required=True)
p.add_argument("--implementation-commit")
p.add_argument("--result-commit")
p.add_argument("--blocker")
p.add_argument("--evidence-ref", action="append", default=[])
p.add_argument("--payload-file", type=Path)
p.add_argument("--endpoint")
p.add_argument("--token-file", type=Path)
p.add_argument("--inbox-dir", type=Path)
p.add_argument("--timeout-seconds", type=int, default=15)
return p
def main() -> int:
args = parser().parse_args()
if not args.endpoint and not args.inbox_dir:
raise SystemExit("either --endpoint or --inbox-dir is required")
if args.endpoint and not args.token_file:
raise SystemExit("--token-file is required with --endpoint")
payload = {}
if args.payload_file:
if not args.payload_file.is_absolute():
raise SystemExit("--payload-file must be absolute")
payload = read_secure_json(
args.payload_file, expected_uid=os.getuid(), max_bytes=262_144
)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise SystemExit("payload root must be an object")
event = Event.from_dict(
{
"schema_version": 1,
"project_key": args.project_key,
"contract_commit": args.contract_commit,
"event_id": args.event_id,
"source_agent": args.source_agent,
"event_type": args.event_type,
"work_unit_id": args.work_unit_id,
"status": args.status,
"state_version": args.state_version,
"implementation_commit": args.implementation_commit,
"result_commit": args.result_commit,
"blocker": args.blocker,
"evidence_refs": args.evidence_ref,
"payload": payload,
}
)
encoded = event.canonical_json().encode()
http_error: Exception | None = None
if args.endpoint:
token = read_secure_text(
args.token_file,
expected_uid=None,
max_bytes=64_000,
)
request = urllib.request.Request(
args.endpoint.rstrip("/") + "/v1/orchestrator/events",
data=encoded,
method="POST",
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Idempotency-Key": event.event_id,
"User-Agent": "aios-agent-event-reporter/0.2",
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=args.timeout_seconds) as response:
response.read(65_536)
if response.status not in {200, 202}:
raise RuntimeError(f"unexpected HTTP {response.status}")
print(f"EVENT_SUBMIT=PASS event_id={event.event_id} channel=http")
return 0
except (urllib.error.URLError, urllib.error.HTTPError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
http_error = exc
if args.inbox_dir:
pending = args.inbox_dir / "pending"
path = pending / f"{event.event_id}.json"
atomic_write_bytes_shared(
path,
(json.dumps(event.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode(),
mode=0o640,
group_writable_directory=True,
)
print(f"EVENT_SUBMIT=PASS event_id={event.event_id} channel=file_inbox")
return 0
print(
f"EVENT_SUBMIT=FAIL event_id={event.event_id} reason={type(http_error).__name__}",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -Eeuo pipefail
umask 0077
INSTALL_ROOT="${INSTALL_ROOT:-/opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway}"
STATE_ROOT="${STATE_ROOT:-/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway}"
RECEIPT="$STATE_ROOT/install-receipt.json"
fail() {
printf 'AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_ROLLBACK=BLOCKED reason=%s\n' "$1" >&2
exit 2
}
[[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]] || fail OWNER_REQUIRED
[[ -f "$RECEIPT" ]] || fail RECEIPT_MISSING
[[ ! -L "$RECEIPT" ]] || fail RECEIPT_SYMLINK
[[ "$(stat -c '%u:%a' "$RECEIPT")" == "0:600" ]] || fail RECEIPT_PERMISSION
readarray -t VALUES < <(
python3 - "$RECEIPT" "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases" "$INSTALL_ROOT/current" <<'PY'
import json, os, stat, sys
from pathlib import Path
receipt = Path(sys.argv[1])
releases = Path(sys.argv[2]).resolve()
current_link = Path(sys.argv[3])
data = json.loads(receipt.read_text())
previous = data.get("previous_release")
current = data.get("current_release")
if not previous or not current:
raise SystemExit(2)
previous_path = Path(previous).resolve()
current_path = Path(current).resolve()
if previous_path.parent != releases or current_path.parent != releases:
raise SystemExit(2)
if not stat.S_ISDIR(os.lstat(previous_path).st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(os.lstat(current_path).st_mode):
raise SystemExit(2)
for release in (previous_path, current_path):
if len(release.name) != 64 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in release.name):
raise SystemExit(2)
digest_file = release / "SOURCE_DIGEST"
if digest_file.is_symlink() or not digest_file.is_file():
raise SystemExit(2)
if digest_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip() != release.name:
raise SystemExit(2)
last = data.get("last_rollback")
if isinstance(last, dict) and last.get("to") == current and current_link.is_symlink():
if current_link.resolve() == current_path:
print("ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK")
raise SystemExit(0)
print(previous_path)
print(current_path)
PY
) || fail RECEIPT_INVALID
if [[ "${VALUES[0]:-}" == "ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK" ]]; then
echo "AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_ROLLBACK=PASS result=NOOP_ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK"
exit 0
fi
[[ "${#VALUES[@]}" -eq 2 ]] || fail RECEIPT_INVALID
PREVIOUS="${VALUES[0]}"
CURRENT="${VALUES[1]}"
systemctl stop aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer || true
systemctl stop aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service || true
systemctl stop aios-orchestrator-gateway.service || true
ln -s "$PREVIOUS" "$INSTALL_ROOT/.current-rollback-$$"
mv -Tf "$INSTALL_ROOT/.current-rollback-$$" "$INSTALL_ROOT/current"
systemctl start aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
systemctl start aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer
systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer
python3 - "$RECEIPT" "$PREVIOUS" "$CURRENT" <<'PY'
import json, os, sys, tempfile
from pathlib import Path
path = Path(sys.argv[1])
data = json.loads(path.read_text())
data["current_release"] = sys.argv[2]
data["previous_release"] = sys.argv[3]
data["last_rollback"] = {"from": sys.argv[3], "to": sys.argv[2]}
fd, temp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".rollback-receipt-", dir=path.parent)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as handle:
json.dump(data, handle, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
handle.write("\n")
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.chmod(temp, 0o600)
os.chown(temp, 0, 0)
os.replace(temp, path)
directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
try:
os.fsync(directory)
finally:
os.close(directory)
finally:
try:
os.unlink(temp)
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
PY
printf 'AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_ROLLBACK=PASS current=%s previous=%s\n' "$PREVIOUS" "$CURRENT"
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -Eeuo pipefail
CONFIG="${1:-/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/config.json}"
PORT="${PORT:-18920}"
python3 -m json.tool "$CONFIG" >/dev/null
systemd-analyze verify \
/etc/systemd/system/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service \
/etc/systemd/system/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service \
/etc/systemd/system/aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer
systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer
health="$(curl --fail --silent --show-error "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/healthz")"
python3 -c '
import json, sys
v=json.load(sys.stdin)
assert v["service"]=="aios-orchestrator-gateway"
assert v["status"]=="active"
assert v["polling"] is True
assert len(v["contract_commit"])==40
' <<<"$health"
systemctl start aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service
if journalctl -u aios-orchestrator-gateway.service -n 200 --no-pager \
| grep -Eqi 'Bearer |token=|api[_-]?key|secret='; then
echo "AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_VERIFY=BLOCKED reason=SECRET_PATTERN_IN_LOG" >&2
exit 2
fi
echo "AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_VERIFY=PASS"
-652
View File
@@ -1,652 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Hardened WeChat outbound backend for AIOS.
Only the dedicated UCC adapter is a supported send backend. OpenClaw channel
discovery is retained for diagnostics, but generic OpenClaw chat or agent
delivery is never promoted to WeChat delivery.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import selectors
import signal
import subprocess
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
OPENCLAW_BIN = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", "openclaw")
WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID", "")
WECHAT_CHANNEL = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_CHANNEL", "")
SEND_BACKEND = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_SEND_BACKEND", "")
UCC_ADAPTER_URL = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18800")
UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_TOKEN") or os.environ.get(
"AIOS_WECHAT_QR_ADAPTER_TOKEN", ""
)
UCC_SEND_PATH = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send")
_allowed_origins = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "").strip()
UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = tuple(
origin.strip() for origin in _allowed_origins.split(",") if origin.strip()
) or (
"http://127.0.0.1:18800",
"http://[::1]:18800",
)
MAX_TARGET_BYTES = 512
MAX_CONTENT_BYTES = 32 * 1024
MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES = 512
MAX_METADATA_BYTES = 8 * 1024
MAX_METADATA_DEPTH = 32
MAX_METADATA_NODES = 1024
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024
MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES = 256
_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
_LEGACY_SEND_PATH = "/internal/channels/wechat/send"
_SAFE_PATH = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()*+,;=:@%/-]+$")
_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS = 4
_OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE = 124
_OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE = 125
_OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE = 126
def _bounded_timeout(value: str) -> int:
try:
parsed = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
return min(max(parsed, 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = _bounded_timeout(os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "10"))
class BackendResult:
def __init__(self, ok: bool, backend: str, status: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
self.ok = ok
self.backend = backend
self.status = status
self.data = data
def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {"ok": self.ok, "backend": self.backend, "status": self.status, **self.data}
class _BackendProtocolError(Exception):
"""Internal marker whose details must never cross the module boundary."""
def _openclaw_base_args() -> List[str]:
"""Return the OpenClaw 2026.6.11-compatible command prefix.
Gateway/auth global flags are not supported by the installed CLI and would
also expose credentials through the process argument vector.
"""
return [OPENCLAW_BIN]
def _terminate_process_tree(process: Any) -> None:
if os.name == "posix":
try:
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
except OSError:
pass
try:
process.wait(timeout=0.5)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
time.sleep(0.05)
try:
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
except OSError:
pass
try:
process.wait(timeout=0.5)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
return
if process.poll() is not None:
return
try:
process.terminate()
process.wait(timeout=1)
return
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
try:
process.kill()
process.wait(timeout=1)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
def _run_openclaw(
args: List[str], timeout: int = 15
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
bounded_timeout = min(max(int(timeout), 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
popen_options: Dict[str, Any] = {
"stdout": subprocess.PIPE,
"stderr": subprocess.PIPE,
}
if os.name == "posix":
popen_options["start_new_session"] = True
elif hasattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP"):
popen_options["creationflags"] = subprocess.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP
try:
process = subprocess.Popen(args, **popen_options)
except (OSError, ValueError):
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
selector = selectors.DefaultSelector()
streams = {"stdout": process.stdout, "stderr": process.stderr}
buffers = {"stdout": bytearray(), "stderr": bytearray()}
try:
for name, stream in streams.items():
if stream is not None:
selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name)
except (OSError, ValueError):
selector.close()
_terminate_process_tree(process)
for stream in streams.values():
if stream is not None:
stream.close()
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
deadline = time.monotonic() + bounded_timeout
total_bytes = 0
return_code: Optional[int] = None
try:
while selector.get_map():
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
return_code = _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE
break
events = selector.select(min(remaining, 0.1))
for key, _mask in events:
allowance = MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES - total_bytes
try:
chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), min(8192, allowance + 1))
except OSError:
return_code = _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE
break
if not chunk:
selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
key.fileobj.close()
continue
if len(chunk) > allowance:
return_code = _OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE
break
buffers[key.data].extend(chunk)
total_bytes += len(chunk)
if return_code is not None:
break
finally:
selector.close()
if return_code is not None:
_terminate_process_tree(process)
for stream in streams.values():
if stream is not None and not stream.closed:
stream.close()
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, return_code, "", "")
try:
completed_return_code = process.wait(timeout=1)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
_terminate_process_tree(process)
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
stdout = buffers["stdout"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
stderr = buffers["stderr"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, completed_return_code, stdout, stderr)
def _json_dict(text: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
try:
value = json.loads(text or "{}")
except (RecursionError, TypeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return {}
return value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def discover_openclaw_wechat_channel() -> Optional[str]:
"""Discover an explicitly typed WeChat/Weixin channel for diagnostics."""
if WECHAT_CHANNEL:
return WECHAT_CHANNEL
try:
proc = _run_openclaw(_openclaw_base_args() + ["channels", "list", "--json"], timeout=15)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError, ValueError):
return None
if proc.returncode != 0:
return None
data = _json_dict(proc.stdout[:MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES])
candidates: List[str] = []
def walk(value: Any) -> None:
if isinstance(value, dict):
name = value.get("name") or value.get("channel") or value.get("id")
kind = value.get("type") or value.get("kind")
if isinstance(name, str) and isinstance(kind, str):
label = f"{name} {kind}".lower()
if "wechat" in label or "weixin" in label:
candidates.append(name)
for child in value.values():
walk(child)
elif isinstance(value, list):
for child in value:
walk(child)
walk(data)
return candidates[0] if candidates else None
def _auth_headers() -> Dict[str, str]:
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}
if UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN:
headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN
return headers
def _safe_path(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(value, str):
return None
path = value if value.startswith("/") else "/" + value
try:
encoded_path = path.encode("utf-8")
except UnicodeEncodeError:
return None
if len(encoded_path) > MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES:
return None
if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(path):
return None
decoded = path
for _ in range(_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS):
try:
next_decoded = urllib.parse.unquote_to_bytes(decoded).decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
return None
if next_decoded == decoded:
break
decoded = next_decoded
if "%" in decoded or "\\" in decoded or "\x00" in decoded:
return None
if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(decoded):
return None
if any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in decoded.split("/")):
return None
return path
def _unique_paths(paths: List[str]) -> List[str]:
out: List[str] = []
for candidate in paths:
path = _safe_path(candidate)
if path and path not in out:
out.append(path)
if len(out) == 2:
break
return out
def _ucc_send_paths() -> List[str]:
canonical = _safe_path(UCC_SEND_PATH) or "/api/internal/wechat/send"
return _unique_paths([canonical, _LEGACY_SEND_PATH])
def _canonical_origin(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 2048:
return None
if "\\" in value or any(ord(character) < 32 for character in value):
return None
try:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(value)
port = parsed.port
except (UnicodeError, ValueError):
return None
scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
if scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:
return None
if parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in {"", "/"}:
return None
try:
host = parsed.hostname.rstrip(".").encode("idna").decode("ascii").lower()
except UnicodeError:
return None
if not host:
return None
if port is None:
port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
rendered_host = f"[{host}]" if ":" in host else host
return f"{scheme}://{rendered_host}:{port}"
def _adapter_base_url() -> Optional[str]:
origin = _canonical_origin(UCC_ADAPTER_URL)
allowed = {
canonical
for canonical in (_canonical_origin(value) for value in UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS)
if canonical
}
return origin if origin and origin in allowed else None
class _NoRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
def redirect_request(
self,
req: Any,
fp: Any,
code: int,
msg: str,
headers: Any,
newurl: str,
) -> None:
del req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl
return None
def _open_no_redirect(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int) -> Any:
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirectHandler())
return opener.open(request, timeout=timeout)
def ucc_adapter_alive() -> bool:
base_url = _adapter_base_url()
if not base_url:
return False
request = urllib.request.Request(
base_url + "/health", headers=_auth_headers(), method="GET"
)
try:
with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=min(5, REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)) as response:
return 200 <= int(response.status) < 300
except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError):
return False
def select_backend() -> Dict[str, Any]:
explicit = SEND_BACKEND.strip().lower()
if explicit:
if explicit == "ucc-adapter":
return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "explicit"}
return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "unsupported_backend"}
if ucc_adapter_alive():
return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "ucc_adapter_alive"}
return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
def _post_ucc(path: str, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> Tuple[int, Dict[str, Any]]:
base_url = _adapter_base_url()
safe_path = _safe_path(path)
if not base_url or not safe_path:
raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid adapter endpoint")
try:
body = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid request payload") from exc
request = urllib.request.Request(
base_url + safe_path,
data=body,
headers=_auth_headers(),
method="POST",
)
with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as response:
raw = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
if len(raw) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response too large")
try:
text = raw.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response encoding invalid") from exc
data = _json_dict(text)
if not data:
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response invalid")
return int(response.status), data
def _ucc_response_sent(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == "sent"
def _ucc_result_is_ok(data: Dict[str, Any], dry_run: bool = False) -> bool:
expected_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == expected_status
def _utf8_size(value: str) -> Optional[int]:
try:
return len(value.encode("utf-8"))
except UnicodeEncodeError:
return None
def _valid_identifier(value: Any, required: bool = False) -> bool:
if not isinstance(value, str):
return False
if required and not value.strip():
return False
if not value:
return not required
if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
return False
size = _utf8_size(value)
return size is not None and size <= MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES and not any(
ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value
)
def _validate_metadata(metadata: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
return "invalid_input"
nodes = 0
stack: List[Tuple[Any, int]] = [(metadata, 0)]
while stack:
value, depth = stack.pop()
nodes += 1
if depth > MAX_METADATA_DEPTH or nodes > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
return "input_too_large"
if isinstance(value, dict):
if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
return "input_too_large"
for key, child in value.items():
if (
not isinstance(key, str)
or len(key) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES
or _utf8_size(key) is None
):
return "invalid_input"
stack.append((child, depth + 1))
elif isinstance(value, list):
if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
return "input_too_large"
stack.extend((child, depth + 1) for child in value)
elif isinstance(value, str):
if len(value) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES:
return "input_too_large"
if _utf8_size(value) is None:
return "invalid_input"
elif value is not None and not isinstance(value, (bool, int, float)):
return "invalid_input"
try:
encoded = json.dumps(
metadata,
ensure_ascii=False,
allow_nan=False,
separators=(",", ":"),
).encode("utf-8")
except (RecursionError, TypeError, UnicodeEncodeError, ValueError):
return "invalid_input"
return "input_too_large" if len(encoded) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES else None
def _validate_payload(
target: Any,
content: Any,
account_id: Any,
message_id: Any,
metadata: Any,
dry_run: Any,
) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(target, str) or not isinstance(content, str):
return "invalid_input"
if not target.strip() or not content.strip() or not isinstance(dry_run, bool):
return "invalid_input"
if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in target):
return "invalid_input"
if "\x00" in content or not _valid_identifier(account_id) or not _valid_identifier(message_id):
return "invalid_input"
if len(target) > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or len(content) > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
return "input_too_large"
target_size = _utf8_size(target)
content_size = _utf8_size(content)
if target_size is None or content_size is None:
return "invalid_input"
if target_size > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or content_size > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
return "input_too_large"
return _validate_metadata(metadata)
def _safe_provider_message_id(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
return None
if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
return None
size = _utf8_size(value)
if size is None or size > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
return None
if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
return None
return value
def send_ucc_adapter(
target: str,
content: str,
account_id: str = "",
message_id: str = "",
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
dry_run: bool = False,
) -> BackendResult:
effective_account = account_id or WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID
effective_metadata: Any = {} if metadata is None else metadata
error_code = _validate_payload(
target,
content,
effective_account,
message_id,
effective_metadata,
dry_run,
)
if error_code:
return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", {"code": error_code})
payload = {
"target": target,
"content": content,
"account_id": effective_account,
"message_id": message_id,
"metadata": effective_metadata,
"dry_run": dry_run,
}
last_endpoint: Optional[str] = None
for path in _ucc_send_paths():
last_endpoint = path
try:
http_status, data = _post_ucc(path, payload)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
if exc.code in {404, 405}:
continue
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": int(exc.code), "endpoint": path},
)
except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError, _BackendProtocolError):
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
)
except Exception:
# Fail closed without returning exception text, type, or chained cause.
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
)
if not (200 <= http_status < 300):
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
)
if not _ucc_result_is_ok(data, dry_run):
return BackendResult(
False,
"ucc-adapter",
"failed",
{"code": "ucc_adapter_rejected", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
)
confirmed_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
result_data: Dict[str, Any] = {
"code": confirmed_status,
"http_status": http_status,
"endpoint": path,
}
provider_message_id = _safe_provider_message_id(data.get("provider_message_id"))
if provider_message_id:
result_data["provider_message_id"] = provider_message_id
return BackendResult(True, "ucc-adapter", confirmed_status, result_data)
data: Dict[str, Any] = {"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
if last_endpoint:
data["endpoint"] = last_endpoint
return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", data)
def send_openclaw_channel(
target: str,
content: str,
account_id: str = "",
message_id: str = "",
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
dry_run: bool = False,
) -> BackendResult:
del target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
return BackendResult(
False,
"openclaw-channel",
"failed",
{"code": "unsupported_backend"},
)
def send_message(
target: str,
content: str,
account_id: str = "",
message_id: str = "",
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
dry_run: bool = False,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
selected = select_backend()
if selected.get("backend") == "ucc-adapter":
return send_ucc_adapter(
target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
).to_dict()
code = "unsupported_backend" if selected.get("reason") == "unsupported_backend" else "wechat_outbound_backend_unavailable"
return BackendResult(False, "unavailable", "failed", {"code": code}).to_dict()
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(json.dumps(select_backend(), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")))
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
"""AIOS services namespace."""
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
"""Reliable, fail-closed Codex command watcher."""
from .watcher import CommandWatcher, Config, load_config
__all__ = ["CommandWatcher", "Config", "load_config"]
-19
View File
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import sys
from .watcher import CommandWatcher, load_config
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Claim and execute Codex work units")
parser.add_argument("--config", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--once", action="store_true", help="process one scan and exit")
args = parser.parse_args()
watcher = CommandWatcher(load_config(args.config))
return watcher.run_once() if args.once else watcher.run_forever()
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-480
View File
@@ -1,480 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import re
import sqlite3
import stat
import subprocess
import time
from typing import Any, Callable
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
import uuid
OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$")
TERMINAL = {"COMPLETED", "DEAD_LETTER", "REJECTED"}
class WatcherError(RuntimeError):
pass
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Config:
active_dir: Path
completed_dir: Path
dead_letter_dir: Path
database_path: Path
audit_log_path: Path
gateway_endpoint: str
gateway_token_file: Path
contract_commit: str
lease_seconds: int
retry_seconds: int
max_attempts: int
poll_seconds: float
executor_path: Path | None
executor_args: tuple[str, ...]
executor_timeout_seconds: int
def _absolute(value: Any, key: str) -> Path:
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or not Path(value).is_absolute():
raise WatcherError(f"invalid_{key}")
return Path(value)
def _secure_regular(path: Path, *, writable_mask: int = 0o022) -> os.stat_result:
info = os.lstat(path)
if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
raise WatcherError(f"unsafe_file:{path}")
if stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & writable_mask:
raise WatcherError(f"unsafe_mode:{path}")
return info
def _read_secure_text(
path: Path,
*,
writable_mask: int = 0o022,
max_bytes: int,
allowed_owners: set[int] | None = None,
) -> str:
flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
fd = os.open(path, flags)
try:
info = os.fstat(fd)
if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & writable_mask:
raise WatcherError(f"unsafe_file:{path}")
if allowed_owners is not None and info.st_uid not in allowed_owners:
raise WatcherError(f"owner_mismatch:{path}")
if info.st_size > max_bytes:
raise WatcherError(f"file_too_large:{path}")
chunks: list[bytes] = []
total = 0
while True:
chunk = os.read(fd, min(65_536, max_bytes + 1 - total))
if not chunk:
break
chunks.append(chunk)
total += len(chunk)
if total > max_bytes:
raise WatcherError(f"file_too_large:{path}")
return b"".join(chunks).decode("utf-8")
finally:
os.close(fd)
def load_config(path_value: str) -> Config:
path = _absolute(path_value, "config_path")
raw = json.loads(_read_secure_text(path, max_bytes=131_072, allowed_owners={0, os.geteuid()}))
expected = {
"active_dir", "completed_dir", "dead_letter_dir", "database_path",
"audit_log_path", "gateway_endpoint", "gateway_token_file",
"contract_commit", "lease_seconds", "retry_seconds", "max_attempts",
"poll_seconds", "executor_path", "executor_args",
"executor_timeout_seconds",
}
if not isinstance(raw, dict) or set(raw) != expected:
raise WatcherError("invalid_config_fields")
contract = raw["contract_commit"]
if not isinstance(contract, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(contract):
raise WatcherError("invalid_contract_commit")
endpoint = raw["gateway_endpoint"]
if not isinstance(endpoint, str) or not endpoint.startswith("http://127.0.0.1:") or not endpoint.endswith("/v1/orchestrator/events"):
raise WatcherError("gateway_endpoint_must_be_loopback")
executor_raw = raw["executor_path"]
executor = None if executor_raw is None else _absolute(executor_raw, "executor_path")
executor_args = raw["executor_args"]
if not isinstance(executor_args, list) or any(not isinstance(x, str) or not x for x in executor_args):
raise WatcherError("invalid_executor_args")
ints = ("lease_seconds", "retry_seconds", "max_attempts", "executor_timeout_seconds")
if any(not isinstance(raw[x], int) or raw[x] <= 0 for x in ints):
raise WatcherError("invalid_positive_integer")
if not isinstance(raw["poll_seconds"], (int, float)) or raw["poll_seconds"] <= 0:
raise WatcherError("invalid_poll_seconds")
return Config(
active_dir=_absolute(raw["active_dir"], "active_dir"),
completed_dir=_absolute(raw["completed_dir"], "completed_dir"),
dead_letter_dir=_absolute(raw["dead_letter_dir"], "dead_letter_dir"),
database_path=_absolute(raw["database_path"], "database_path"),
audit_log_path=_absolute(raw["audit_log_path"], "audit_log_path"),
gateway_endpoint=endpoint,
gateway_token_file=_absolute(raw["gateway_token_file"], "gateway_token_file"),
contract_commit=contract,
lease_seconds=raw["lease_seconds"], retry_seconds=raw["retry_seconds"],
max_attempts=raw["max_attempts"], poll_seconds=float(raw["poll_seconds"]),
executor_path=executor, executor_args=tuple(executor_args),
executor_timeout_seconds=raw["executor_timeout_seconds"],
)
def canonical_digest(value: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest()
def validate_command(value: Any, expected_contract: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
expected = {
"schema_version", "command_id", "project_key", "work_unit_id",
"contract_commit", "state_version", "execution",
}
if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != expected or value.get("schema_version") != 1:
raise WatcherError("invalid_command_fields")
for key in ("command_id", "project_key", "work_unit_id"):
if not isinstance(value[key], str) or not ID_RE.fullmatch(value[key]):
raise WatcherError(f"invalid_{key}")
if value["contract_commit"] != expected_contract:
raise WatcherError("contract_commit_mismatch")
if not isinstance(value["state_version"], int) or value["state_version"] < 0:
raise WatcherError("invalid_state_version")
execution = value["execution"]
if not isinstance(execution, dict) or set(execution) != {"kind", "input"}:
raise WatcherError("invalid_execution")
if execution["kind"] not in {"acceptance_probe", "codex"}:
raise WatcherError("invalid_execution_kind")
if not isinstance(execution["input"], str) or len(execution["input"].encode()) > 65_536:
raise WatcherError("invalid_execution_input")
return value
class CommandWatcher:
def __init__(
self,
config: Config,
*,
clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
event_poster: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], None] | None = None,
executor: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
worker_id: str | None = None,
) -> None:
self.config = config
self.clock = clock
self.worker_id = worker_id or f"{os.uname().nodename}:{os.getpid()}:{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
self._uses_gateway = event_poster is None
self.event_poster = event_poster or self._post_event
self.executor = executor or self._execute
self._prepare()
def _prepare(self) -> None:
for directory in (self.config.active_dir, self.config.completed_dir, self.config.dead_letter_dir):
info = os.lstat(directory)
if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o002:
raise WatcherError(f"unsafe_directory:{directory}")
self.config.database_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
self.config.audit_log_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
with self._db() as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS commands (
command_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, work_unit_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
source_path TEXT NOT NULL, status TEXT NOT NULL,
phase TEXT NOT NULL, attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
lease_owner TEXT, lease_until REAL, next_attempt REAL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
result_json TEXT, start_event_json TEXT, end_event_json TEXT,
last_error TEXT, updated_at REAL NOT NULL
)
""")
def _db(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
db = sqlite3.connect(self.config.database_path, timeout=5, isolation_level=None)
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
return db
def _audit(self, marker: str, command_id: str, **fields: Any) -> None:
safe = {k: v for k, v in fields.items() if k not in {"input", "token", "secret"}}
record = {"time": int(self.clock()), "marker": marker, "command_id": command_id, **safe}
fd = os.open(self.config.audit_log_path, os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
try:
os.write(fd, (json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode())
finally:
os.close(fd)
def _read_command(self, path: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
raw = _read_secure_text(path, max_bytes=131_072, allowed_owners={0, os.geteuid()})
value = validate_command(json.loads(raw), self.config.contract_commit)
return value, canonical_digest(value)
def _register(self, command: dict[str, Any], digest: str, path: Path) -> str:
now = self.clock()
with self._db() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
row = db.execute("SELECT payload_sha256,status FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command["command_id"],)).fetchone()
if row:
db.execute("COMMIT")
if row["payload_sha256"] != digest:
raise WatcherError("duplicate_command_payload_conflict")
return "duplicate_terminal" if row["status"] in TERMINAL else "existing"
prior_work_unit = db.execute(
"SELECT command_id FROM commands WHERE work_unit_id=?",
(command["work_unit_id"],),
).fetchone()
if prior_work_unit:
db.execute("COMMIT")
raise WatcherError("duplicate_work_unit")
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO commands(command_id,work_unit_id,payload_sha256,source_path,status,phase,updated_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(command["command_id"], command["work_unit_id"], digest, str(path), "PENDING", "START", now),
)
db.execute("COMMIT")
return "new"
def _claim(self, command_id: str) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
now = self.clock()
with self._db() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
row = db.execute("SELECT * FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command_id,)).fetchone()
if not row or row["status"] in TERMINAL or row["next_attempt"] > now:
db.execute("COMMIT")
return None
if row["lease_until"] is not None and row["lease_until"] > now and row["lease_owner"] != self.worker_id:
db.execute("COMMIT")
return None
attempts = row["attempts"] + 1
db.execute(
"UPDATE commands SET status='CLAIMED',attempts=?,lease_owner=?,lease_until=?,updated_at=? WHERE command_id=?",
(attempts, self.worker_id, now + self.config.lease_seconds, now, command_id),
)
row = db.execute("SELECT * FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command_id,)).fetchone()
db.execute("COMMIT")
assert row is not None
self._audit("CODEX_AUTO_CLAIM", command_id, attempt=row["attempts"], worker=self.worker_id)
return row
def _update(self, command_id: str, *, status: str, phase: str, result: dict[str, Any] | None = None, error: str | None = None) -> None:
with self._db() as db:
release = status in TERMINAL
db.execute(
"UPDATE commands SET status=?,phase=?,result_json=COALESCE(?,result_json),last_error=?,lease_owner=CASE WHEN ? THEN NULL ELSE lease_owner END,lease_until=CASE WHEN ? THEN NULL ELSE lease_until END,updated_at=? WHERE command_id=?",
(status, phase, json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True) if result is not None else None, error, release, release, self.clock(), command_id),
)
def _retry_or_dead(self, command_id: str, path: Path, error: Exception) -> None:
message = f"{type(error).__name__}:{str(error)[:240]}"
with self._db() as db:
row = db.execute("SELECT attempts,phase FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command_id,)).fetchone()
attempts = row["attempts"] if row else self.config.max_attempts
if str(error) == "gateway_stale_state_version" and row:
column = "start_event_json" if row["phase"] == "START" else "end_event_json"
db.execute(f"UPDATE commands SET {column}=NULL WHERE command_id=?", (command_id,))
if attempts >= self.config.max_attempts:
db.execute("UPDATE commands SET status='DEAD_LETTER',last_error=?,lease_owner=NULL,lease_until=NULL,updated_at=? WHERE command_id=?", (message, self.clock(), command_id))
self._move(path, self.config.dead_letter_dir)
self._audit("DEAD_LETTER", command_id, error=message)
else:
db.execute("UPDATE commands SET status='RETRY',last_error=?,next_attempt=?,lease_owner=NULL,lease_until=NULL,updated_at=? WHERE command_id=?", (message, self.clock() + self.config.retry_seconds, self.clock(), command_id))
self._audit("RETRY_SCHEDULED", command_id, attempt=attempts, error=message)
def _event(self, command: dict[str, Any], event_type: str, status: str, suffix: str, result: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": 1, "project_key": command["project_key"],
"contract_commit": command["contract_commit"],
"event_id": f"{command['command_id']}:{suffix}", "source_agent": "codex",
"event_type": event_type, "work_unit_id": command["work_unit_id"],
"status": status, "state_version": command["state_version"],
"implementation_commit": None, "result_commit": None, "blocker": None,
"evidence_refs": [], "payload": {"command_id": command["command_id"], "result": result or {}},
}
def _gateway_token(self) -> str:
token = _read_secure_text(
self.config.gateway_token_file,
writable_mask=0o027,
max_bytes=16_384,
allowed_owners={0, os.geteuid()},
).strip()
if not token or "\n" in token or "\r" in token:
raise WatcherError("invalid_gateway_token")
return token
def _gateway_state_version(self, project_key: str, fallback: int) -> int:
state_url = self.config.gateway_endpoint.removesuffix("/events") + "/state/" + urllib.parse.quote(project_key, safe="")
request = urllib.request.Request(
state_url,
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {self._gateway_token()}"},
method="GET",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
payload = json.loads(response.read(262_145))
version = payload.get("state_version")
if not isinstance(version, int) or version < 0:
raise WatcherError("invalid_gateway_state")
return version
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
if exc.code == 404:
return fallback
raise WatcherError(f"gateway_state_http_{exc.code}") from exc
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise WatcherError("gateway_state_unavailable") from exc
def _durable_event(self, command: dict[str, Any], column: str, event: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
with self._db() as db:
row = db.execute(f"SELECT {column} FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command["command_id"],)).fetchone()
if row and row[column]:
return json.loads(row[column])
if self._uses_gateway:
event["state_version"] = self._gateway_state_version(command["project_key"], command["state_version"])
encoded = json.dumps(event, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
with self._db() as db:
db.execute(f"UPDATE commands SET {column}=? WHERE command_id=? AND {column} IS NULL", (encoded, command["command_id"]))
saved = db.execute(f"SELECT {column} FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command["command_id"],)).fetchone()
if not saved or not saved[column]:
raise WatcherError("event_persistence_failed")
return json.loads(saved[column])
def _post_event(self, event: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
request = urllib.request.Request(
self.config.gateway_endpoint,
data=json.dumps(event, separators=(",", ":")).encode(),
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {self._gateway_token()}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
if response.status not in {200, 201, 202}:
raise WatcherError(f"gateway_http_{response.status}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
body = exc.read(16_384)
try:
reason = json.loads(body).get("error")
except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError, AttributeError):
reason = None
if exc.code == 409 and reason == "stale_state_version":
raise WatcherError("gateway_stale_state_version") from exc
raise WatcherError(f"gateway_http_{exc.code}") from exc
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise WatcherError("gateway_unavailable") from exc
def _execute(self, command: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
execution = command["execution"]
if execution["kind"] == "acceptance_probe":
return {"kind": "acceptance_probe", "input_sha256": hashlib.sha256(execution["input"].encode()).hexdigest(), "exit_code": 0}
assert self.config.executor_path is not None
proc = subprocess.run(
[str(self.config.executor_path), *self.config.executor_args],
input=execution["input"], text=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=self.config.executor_timeout_seconds,
check=False, env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LANG": "C.UTF-8"},
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise WatcherError(f"codex_executor_failed:{proc.returncode}")
return {"kind": "codex", "exit_code": 0}
def _preflight_execution(self, command: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
if command["execution"]["kind"] == "acceptance_probe":
return
if self.config.executor_path is None:
raise WatcherError("codex_executor_unavailable")
info = _secure_regular(self.config.executor_path)
if not info.st_mode & stat.S_IXUSR:
raise WatcherError("codex_executor_not_executable")
def _move(self, source: Path, target_dir: Path) -> None:
if not source.exists() and not source.is_symlink():
return
target = target_dir / source.name
if target.exists() or target.is_symlink():
target = target_dir / f"{source.stem}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}{source.suffix}"
os.replace(source, target)
def _reject_unregistered(self, path: Path, error: Exception) -> None:
command_id = path.stem[:128] if ID_RE.fullmatch(path.stem[:128]) else f"invalid-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
self._audit("COMMAND_REJECTED", command_id, error=f"{type(error).__name__}:{str(error)[:240]}")
self._move(path, self.config.dead_letter_dir)
def process_path(self, path: Path) -> bool:
try:
command, digest = self._read_command(path)
registration = self._register(command, digest, path)
if registration == "duplicate_terminal":
self._move(path, self.config.completed_dir)
return False
row = self._claim(command["command_id"])
if row is None:
return False
phase = row["phase"]
result = json.loads(row["result_json"]) if row["result_json"] else None
if phase == "START":
start_event = self._durable_event(
command,
"start_event_json",
self._event(command, "work_unit_started", "RUNNING", "started"),
)
self.event_poster(start_event)
self._audit("TASK_STARTED", command["command_id"])
self._update(command["command_id"], status="PENDING", phase="EXECUTE")
phase = "EXECUTE"
if phase == "EXECUTE":
self._preflight_execution(command)
self._update(command["command_id"], status="CLAIMED", phase="EXECUTING")
phase = "EXECUTING"
result = self.executor(command)
self._audit("TASK_EXECUTED", command["command_id"], result=result)
self._update(command["command_id"], status="PENDING", phase="END", result=result)
phase = "END"
elif phase == "EXECUTING":
raise WatcherError("ambiguous_execution_not_repeated")
if phase == "END":
assert result is not None
end_event = self._durable_event(
command,
"end_event_json",
self._event(command, "work_unit_ended", "PASS", "ended", result),
)
self.event_poster(end_event)
self._audit("TASK_ENDED", command["command_id"])
self._audit("EVENT_POSTED", command["command_id"], event="work_unit_ended")
self._update(command["command_id"], status="COMPLETED", phase="DONE", result=result)
self._move(path, self.config.completed_dir)
return True
except Exception as exc:
try:
if isinstance(exc, WatcherError) and str(exc) in {"duplicate_command_payload_conflict", "duplicate_work_unit"}:
self._reject_unregistered(path, exc)
elif "command" in locals():
self._retry_or_dead(command["command_id"], path, exc)
else:
self._reject_unregistered(path, exc)
except Exception:
pass
return False
def run_once(self) -> int:
failures = 0
for path in sorted(self.config.active_dir.glob("*.json")):
if not self.process_path(path):
failures += 1
return 1 if failures else 0
def run_forever(self) -> int:
while True:
self.run_once()
time.sleep(self.config.poll_seconds)
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
"""Reliable central orchestration gateway for AIOS."""
__version__ = "0.2.0"
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import logging
from pathlib import Path
from .config import Config
from .service import Runtime, serve
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS Orchestrator Gateway")
parser.add_argument("--config", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument("--log-level", default="INFO")
parser.add_argument(
"--poll-once",
action="store_true",
help="Run one inbox/model/outbox/OpenClaw synchronization polling cycle.",
)
args = parser.parse_args()
logging.basicConfig(
level=getattr(logging, args.log_level.upper(), logging.INFO),
format="%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(name)s %(message)s",
)
if args.poll_once:
runtime = Runtime(Config.from_file(args.config))
runtime.poll_once()
return 0
serve(args.config)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from typing import Any
from .errors import TriggerError
from .models import DECISION_SCHEMA, Decision, Event
class WorkspaceAgentClient:
"""Asynchronous Workspace Agent trigger.
The official endpoint returns only 202 and no run ID or retrievable output.
Completion therefore arrives through the gateway callback endpoint.
"""
def __init__(self, trigger_id: str, token: str, timeout_seconds: int = 30):
self.trigger_id = trigger_id
self.token = token
self.timeout_seconds = timeout_seconds
def trigger(self, event: Event) -> None:
url = f"https://api.chatgpt.com/v1/workspace_agents/{self.trigger_id}/trigger"
prompt = (
"Process this AIOS orchestration event under the committed contract. "
"When complete, call submit_orchestration_decision with strict JSON. "
"Do not fabricate tests, Git state, secrets, evidence, or deployment facts.\n\n"
+ event.canonical_json()
)
body = json.dumps(
{
"conversation_key": event.project_key,
"input": prompt,
}
).encode()
request = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=body,
method="POST",
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Idempotency-Key": event.event_id,
"User-Agent": "aios-orchestrator-gateway/0.2",
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=self.timeout_seconds) as response:
response.read(1024)
if response.status != 202:
raise TriggerError(f"workspace_agent_http_{response.status}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
raise TriggerError(f"workspace_agent_http_{exc.code}") from exc
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
raise TriggerError("workspace_agent_trigger_failed") from exc
class ResponsesClient:
"""Background Responses API client with polling and strict output validation."""
def __init__(self, api_key: str, model: str, timeout_seconds: int = 60):
self.api_key = api_key
self.model = model
self.timeout_seconds = timeout_seconds
def start(self, event: Event) -> str:
body = {
"model": self.model,
"background": True,
"instructions": (
"You are the AIOS central orchestration brain. Apply the exact "
"contract_commit in the event. Return only a strict decision. "
"Never fabricate evidence, secrets, Git facts, tests, approvals, "
"or deployment state. Keep external blockers fail-closed."
),
"input": event.canonical_json(),
"text": {
"format": {
"type": "json_schema",
"name": "aios_orchestrator_decision",
"strict": True,
"schema": DECISION_SCHEMA,
}
},
"metadata": {
"event_id": event.event_id,
"project_key": event.project_key,
"contract_commit": event.contract_commit,
},
}
payload = self._request(
"POST",
"https://api.openai.com/v1/responses",
body,
idempotency_key=event.event_id,
)
response_id = payload.get("id")
if not isinstance(response_id, str) or not response_id.startswith("resp_"):
raise TriggerError("responses_missing_id")
return response_id
def poll(self, response_id: str) -> tuple[str, Decision | None]:
payload = self._request(
"GET",
f"https://api.openai.com/v1/responses/{response_id}",
None,
)
status = payload.get("status")
if status in {"queued", "in_progress"}:
return str(status), None
if status == "completed":
text = _extract_output_text(payload)
try:
return "completed", Decision.from_dict(json.loads(text))
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise TriggerError("responses_invalid_json") from exc
if status in {"failed", "cancelled", "incomplete"}:
raise TriggerError(f"responses_{status}")
raise TriggerError("responses_unknown_status")
def _request(
self,
method: str,
url: str,
body: dict[str, Any] | None,
*,
idempotency_key: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
encoded = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None
headers = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.api_key}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "aios-orchestrator-gateway/0.2",
}
if idempotency_key:
headers["Idempotency-Key"] = idempotency_key
request = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=encoded,
method=method,
headers=headers,
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=self.timeout_seconds) as response:
raw = response.read(4_194_304)
if response.status not in {200, 201}:
raise TriggerError(f"responses_http_{response.status}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
raise TriggerError(f"responses_http_{exc.code}") from exc
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
raise TriggerError("responses_request_failed") from exc
try:
payload = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise TriggerError("responses_invalid_payload") from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise TriggerError("responses_payload_not_object")
return payload
def _extract_output_text(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
output = payload.get("output")
if not isinstance(output, list):
raise TriggerError("responses_missing_output")
for item in output:
if not isinstance(item, dict):
continue
content = item.get("content")
if not isinstance(content, list):
continue
for part in content:
if isinstance(part, dict) and part.get("type") == "output_text":
text = part.get("text")
if isinstance(text, str):
return text
raise TriggerError("responses_missing_output_text")
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import os
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from .errors import ConfigurationError
from .securefs import read_secure_json, read_secure_text
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Config:
host: str
port: int
project_key: str
database_path: Path
event_inbox_dir: Path
decision_inbox_dir: Path
dispatch_outbox_dir: Path
openclaw_sync_dir: Path
command_queue_dir: Path
inbound_token_file: Path
callback_token_file: Path
contract_commit: str
workspace_trigger_id: str | None
workspace_token_file: Path | None
responses_api_key_file: Path | None
responses_model: str | None
poll_interval_seconds: int
summary_interval_seconds: int
callback_timeout_seconds: int
lease_seconds: int
retry_base_seconds: int
max_retries: int
max_same_blocker_retries: int
max_hops_per_gate: int
openclaw_sync_endpoint: str | None
openclaw_sync_token_file: Path | None
git_poll_enabled: bool
git_poll_bare_repo: Path | None
git_poll_ref_prefixes: tuple[str, ...]
git_poll_interval_seconds: int
@classmethod
def from_file(cls, path: Path) -> "Config":
owner_uid = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_CONFIG_OWNER_UID", "0"))
raw = read_secure_json(path, expected_uid=owner_uid)
expected = {
"host", "port", "project_key", "database_path", "event_inbox_dir",
"decision_inbox_dir", "dispatch_outbox_dir", "openclaw_sync_dir",
"command_queue_dir", "inbound_token_file", "callback_token_file",
"contract_commit", "workspace_agent", "responses_fallback",
"polling", "loop_controls", "openclaw_sync", "git_poll",
}
if set(raw) != expected:
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_config_fields")
def path_value(key: str) -> Path:
value = raw.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ConfigurationError(f"invalid_{key}")
result = Path(value)
if not result.is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError(f"path_not_absolute:{key}")
return result
def integer(container: dict[str, Any], key: str, lo: int, hi: int) -> int:
value = container.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, int) or not lo <= value <= hi:
raise ConfigurationError(f"invalid_{key}")
return value
host = raw.get("host")
port = raw.get("port")
project_key = raw.get("project_key")
contract = raw.get("contract_commit")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_host")
if not isinstance(project_key, str) or not project_key:
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_project_key")
if not isinstance(port, int) or not 1 <= port <= 65535:
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_port")
if not isinstance(contract, str) or len(contract) != 40:
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_contract_commit")
workspace = raw.get("workspace_agent")
responses = raw.get("responses_fallback")
polling = raw.get("polling")
loop = raw.get("loop_controls")
sync = raw.get("openclaw_sync")
git_poll = raw.get("git_poll")
if not all(isinstance(x, dict) for x in (workspace, responses, polling, loop, sync, git_poll)):
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_nested_config")
trigger_id = workspace.get("trigger_id")
workspace_token = workspace.get("access_token_file")
if trigger_id is not None:
if not isinstance(trigger_id, str) or not trigger_id.startswith("agtch_"):
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_workspace_trigger_id")
if not isinstance(workspace_token, str) or not Path(workspace_token).is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_workspace_token_file")
workspace_token_file = Path(workspace_token)
else:
workspace_token_file = None
responses_key = responses.get("api_key_file")
responses_model = responses.get("model")
if responses_key is not None:
if not isinstance(responses_key, str) or not Path(responses_key).is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_responses_key_file")
if not isinstance(responses_model, str) or not responses_model:
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_responses_model")
responses_key_file = Path(responses_key)
else:
responses_key_file = None
responses_model = None
if trigger_id is None and responses_key_file is None:
raise ConfigurationError("no_central_model_channel")
endpoint = sync.get("endpoint")
token_file = sync.get("token_file")
if endpoint is not None and (not isinstance(endpoint, str) or not endpoint.startswith(("http://", "https://"))):
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_openclaw_sync_endpoint")
if endpoint is not None:
if not isinstance(token_file, str) or not Path(token_file).is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_openclaw_sync_token_file")
sync_token_file = Path(token_file)
else:
sync_token_file = None
git_enabled = git_poll.get("enabled")
if not isinstance(git_enabled, bool):
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_git_poll_enabled")
git_bare_repo_raw = git_poll.get("bare_repo")
git_prefixes_raw = git_poll.get("ref_prefixes")
if git_enabled:
if not isinstance(git_bare_repo_raw, str) or not Path(git_bare_repo_raw).is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_git_poll_bare_repo")
if (
not isinstance(git_prefixes_raw, list)
or not git_prefixes_raw
or any(not isinstance(item, str) or not item.startswith("refs/") for item in git_prefixes_raw)
):
raise ConfigurationError("invalid_git_poll_ref_prefixes")
git_bare_repo = Path(git_bare_repo_raw)
git_prefixes = tuple(git_prefixes_raw)
else:
git_bare_repo = None
git_prefixes = ()
return cls(
host=host,
port=port,
project_key=project_key,
database_path=path_value("database_path"),
event_inbox_dir=path_value("event_inbox_dir"),
decision_inbox_dir=path_value("decision_inbox_dir"),
dispatch_outbox_dir=path_value("dispatch_outbox_dir"),
openclaw_sync_dir=path_value("openclaw_sync_dir"),
command_queue_dir=path_value("command_queue_dir"),
inbound_token_file=path_value("inbound_token_file"),
callback_token_file=path_value("callback_token_file"),
contract_commit=contract,
workspace_trigger_id=trigger_id,
workspace_token_file=workspace_token_file,
responses_api_key_file=responses_key_file,
responses_model=responses_model,
poll_interval_seconds=integer(polling, "interval_seconds", 1, 300),
summary_interval_seconds=integer(polling, "summary_interval_seconds", 10, 86400),
callback_timeout_seconds=integer(loop, "callback_timeout_seconds", 30, 86400),
lease_seconds=integer(loop, "lease_seconds", 10, 3600),
retry_base_seconds=integer(loop, "retry_base_seconds", 1, 3600),
max_retries=integer(loop, "max_retries", 0, 20),
max_same_blocker_retries=integer(loop, "max_same_blocker_retries", 0, 20),
max_hops_per_gate=integer(loop, "max_hops_per_gate", 1, 100),
openclaw_sync_endpoint=endpoint,
openclaw_sync_token_file=sync_token_file,
git_poll_enabled=git_enabled,
git_poll_bare_repo=git_bare_repo,
git_poll_ref_prefixes=git_prefixes,
git_poll_interval_seconds=integer(git_poll, "interval_seconds", 5, 3600),
)
def _secret(self, path: Path) -> str:
owner_uid = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_OWNER_UID", "0"))
return read_secure_text(path, expected_uid=owner_uid, max_bytes=64_000)
def inbound_token(self) -> str:
return self._secret(self.inbound_token_file)
def callback_token(self) -> str:
return self._secret(self.callback_token_file)
def workspace_token(self) -> str | None:
return self._secret(self.workspace_token_file) if self.workspace_token_file else None
def responses_api_key(self) -> str | None:
return self._secret(self.responses_api_key_file) if self.responses_api_key_file else None
def openclaw_sync_token(self) -> str | None:
return self._secret(self.openclaw_sync_token_file) if self.openclaw_sync_token_file else None
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
import re
import os
import stat
from typing import Any
from .errors import DispatchError
from .securefs import (
atomic_write_bytes,
atomic_write_bytes_shared,
ensure_secure_directory,
ensure_shared_directory,
read_secure_bytes,
)
SAFE_ID = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$")
class DispatchSink:
"""Reliable file-based dispatch adapter for existing OpenClaw/Codex watchers."""
def __init__(self, outbox_dir: Path, command_queue_dir: Path, contract_commit: str):
self.outbox_dir = Path(outbox_dir)
self.command_queue_dir = Path(command_queue_dir)
self.contract_commit = contract_commit
ensure_secure_directory(self.outbox_dir)
ensure_shared_directory(self.command_queue_dir)
def dispatch(self, record: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
work_unit_id = record.get("work_unit_id")
event_id = record.get("event_id")
agent = record.get("assigned_agent")
payload_json = record.get("payload_json")
if (
not isinstance(work_unit_id, str)
or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(work_unit_id)
or not isinstance(event_id, str)
or not SAFE_ID.fullmatch(event_id)
or agent not in {"openclaw", "codex"}
or not isinstance(payload_json, str)
):
raise DispatchError("invalid_dispatch_record")
try:
work_unit = json.loads(payload_json)
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise DispatchError("invalid_dispatch_payload") from exc
envelope = {
"schema_version": 1,
"contract_commit": self.contract_commit,
"event_id": event_id,
"assigned_agent": agent,
"work_unit": work_unit,
"callback": {
"event_endpoint": "/v1/orchestrator/events",
"start_event_type": "work_unit_started",
"end_event_type": "work_unit_completed",
},
}
outbox_path = self.outbox_dir / "dispatched" / f"{work_unit_id}.json"
queue_path = self.command_queue_dir / agent / "pending" / f"{work_unit_id}.json"
ensure_secure_directory(outbox_path.parent)
ensure_shared_directory(queue_path.parent)
# Idempotent immutable payload: existing identical file is accepted.
self._write_idempotent_json(outbox_path, envelope, shared=False)
self._write_idempotent_json(queue_path, envelope, shared=True)
return outbox_path, queue_path
@staticmethod
def _write_idempotent_json(path: Path, value: dict[str, Any], *, shared: bool) -> None:
payload = (json.dumps(value, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
try:
st = os.lstat(path)
except FileNotFoundError:
if shared:
atomic_write_bytes_shared(path, payload, mode=0o640)
else:
atomic_write_bytes(path, payload, mode=0o600)
return
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise DispatchError(f"dispatch_target_not_regular:{path.name}")
existing = read_secure_bytes(path, expected_uid=None, max_bytes=1_048_576)
if existing != payload:
raise DispatchError(f"dispatch_idempotency_conflict:{path.name}")
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
class OrchestratorError(Exception):
"""Base orchestration error."""
class ConfigurationError(OrchestratorError):
"""Unsafe or invalid configuration."""
class ValidationError(OrchestratorError):
"""Invalid event or decision."""
class AuthenticationError(OrchestratorError):
"""Authentication failed."""
class ConflictError(OrchestratorError):
"""Idempotency, lease, or optimistic concurrency conflict."""
class TriggerError(OrchestratorError):
"""Central model trigger failed."""
class DispatchError(OrchestratorError):
"""Dispatch or synchronization output failed."""
@@ -1,346 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
import hashlib
import json
import re
from typing import Any
from .errors import ValidationError
OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$")
AGENTS = {"openclaw", "codex", "gitea", "system", "workspace-agent"}
EVENT_STATUSES = {"READY", "RUNNING", "PASS", "BLOCKED", "FAIL", "TIMEOUT", "NOT_EXECUTED"}
VERDICTS = {"DISPATCH", "BLOCKED", "COMPLETE", "NOOP"}
EXECUTORS = {"openclaw", "codex"}
def req_str(value: dict[str, Any], key: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None) -> str:
item = value.get(key)
if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
raise ValidationError(f"invalid_{key}")
if pattern is not None and not pattern.fullmatch(item):
raise ValidationError(f"invalid_{key}")
return item
def opt_oid(item: Any, key: str) -> str | None:
if item is None:
return None
if not isinstance(item, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(item):
raise ValidationError(f"invalid_{key}")
return item
def string_list(value: dict[str, Any], key: str, limit: int) -> tuple[str, ...]:
raw = value.get(key)
if not isinstance(raw, list) or len(raw) > limit:
raise ValidationError(f"invalid_{key}")
result: list[str] = []
for item in raw:
if not isinstance(item, str) or not item or len(item) > 1024:
raise ValidationError(f"invalid_{key}")
result.append(item)
return tuple(result)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Event:
schema_version: int
project_key: str
contract_commit: str
event_id: str
source_agent: str
event_type: str
work_unit_id: str
status: str
state_version: int
implementation_commit: str | None = None
result_commit: str | None = None
blocker: str | None = None
evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
payload: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, value: dict[str, Any]) -> "Event":
allowed = {
"schema_version", "project_key", "contract_commit", "event_id",
"source_agent", "event_type", "work_unit_id", "status",
"state_version", "implementation_commit", "result_commit",
"blocker", "evidence_refs", "payload",
}
if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) - allowed:
raise ValidationError("invalid_event_fields")
if value.get("schema_version") != 1:
raise ValidationError("unsupported_event_schema")
source = req_str(value, "source_agent")
status = req_str(value, "status")
if source not in AGENTS:
raise ValidationError("invalid_source_agent")
if status not in EVENT_STATUSES:
raise ValidationError("invalid_event_status")
version = value.get("state_version")
if not isinstance(version, int) or version < 0:
raise ValidationError("invalid_state_version")
blocker = value.get("blocker")
if blocker is not None and (not isinstance(blocker, str) or len(blocker) > 512):
raise ValidationError("invalid_blocker")
payload = value.get("payload", {})
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValidationError("invalid_payload")
if len(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True).encode()) > 262_144:
raise ValidationError("payload_too_large")
return cls(
schema_version=1,
project_key=req_str(value, "project_key", ID_RE),
contract_commit=req_str(value, "contract_commit", OID_RE),
event_id=req_str(value, "event_id", ID_RE),
source_agent=source,
event_type=req_str(value, "event_type", ID_RE),
work_unit_id=req_str(value, "work_unit_id", ID_RE),
status=status,
state_version=version,
implementation_commit=opt_oid(value.get("implementation_commit"), "implementation_commit"),
result_commit=opt_oid(value.get("result_commit"), "result_commit"),
blocker=blocker,
evidence_refs=string_list(value, "evidence_refs", 64),
payload=payload,
)
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": 1,
"project_key": self.project_key,
"contract_commit": self.contract_commit,
"event_id": self.event_id,
"source_agent": self.source_agent,
"event_type": self.event_type,
"work_unit_id": self.work_unit_id,
"status": self.status,
"state_version": self.state_version,
"implementation_commit": self.implementation_commit,
"result_commit": self.result_commit,
"blocker": self.blocker,
"evidence_refs": list(self.evidence_refs),
"payload": self.payload,
}
def canonical_json(self) -> str:
return json.dumps(self.to_dict(), separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True)
def digest(self) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(self.canonical_json().encode()).hexdigest()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkUnit:
id: str
track_id: str
gate_id: str
primary_agent: str
fallback_agent: str
clean_base_commit: str
allowed_paths: tuple[str, ...]
required_checks: tuple[str, ...]
forbidden_operations: tuple[str, ...]
instruction: str
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, value: dict[str, Any]) -> "WorkUnit":
expected = {
"id", "track_id", "gate_id", "primary_agent", "fallback_agent",
"clean_base_commit", "allowed_paths", "required_checks",
"forbidden_operations", "instruction",
}
if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != expected:
raise ValidationError("invalid_work_unit_fields")
primary = req_str(value, "primary_agent")
fallback = req_str(value, "fallback_agent")
if primary not in EXECUTORS or fallback not in EXECUTORS or primary == fallback:
raise ValidationError("invalid_agent_assignment")
instruction = req_str(value, "instruction")
if len(instruction.encode()) > 65_536:
raise ValidationError("instruction_too_large")
return cls(
id=req_str(value, "id", ID_RE),
track_id=req_str(value, "track_id", ID_RE),
gate_id=req_str(value, "gate_id", ID_RE),
primary_agent=primary,
fallback_agent=fallback,
clean_base_commit=req_str(value, "clean_base_commit", OID_RE),
allowed_paths=string_list(value, "allowed_paths", 128),
required_checks=string_list(value, "required_checks", 128),
forbidden_operations=string_list(value, "forbidden_operations", 64),
instruction=instruction,
)
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": self.id,
"track_id": self.track_id,
"gate_id": self.gate_id,
"primary_agent": self.primary_agent,
"fallback_agent": self.fallback_agent,
"clean_base_commit": self.clean_base_commit,
"allowed_paths": list(self.allowed_paths),
"required_checks": list(self.required_checks),
"forbidden_operations": list(self.forbidden_operations),
"instruction": self.instruction,
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Decision:
schema_version: int
project_key: str
contract_commit: str
event_id: str
expected_state_version: int
verdict: str
state_updates: dict[str, str]
next_work_units: tuple[WorkUnit, ...]
requires_human_input: bool
stop_reason: str | None
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, value: dict[str, Any]) -> "Decision":
expected = {
"schema_version", "project_key", "contract_commit", "event_id",
"expected_state_version", "verdict", "state_updates",
"next_work_units", "requires_human_input", "stop_reason",
}
if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != expected:
raise ValidationError("invalid_decision_fields")
if value.get("schema_version") != 1:
raise ValidationError("unsupported_decision_schema")
version = value.get("expected_state_version")
if not isinstance(version, int) or version < 0:
raise ValidationError("invalid_expected_state_version")
verdict = req_str(value, "verdict")
if verdict not in VERDICTS:
raise ValidationError("invalid_verdict")
updates = value.get("state_updates")
normalized: dict[str, str] = {}
if isinstance(updates, dict):
update_items = [{"key": key, "value": item} for key, item in updates.items()]
elif isinstance(updates, list):
update_items = updates
else:
raise ValidationError("invalid_state_updates")
if len(update_items) > 128:
raise ValidationError("invalid_state_updates")
for update in update_items:
if not isinstance(update, dict) or set(update) != {"key", "value"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid_state_update")
key = update.get("key")
item = update.get("value")
if not isinstance(key, str) or not ID_RE.fullmatch(key):
raise ValidationError("invalid_state_update_key")
if not isinstance(item, str) or not item or len(item) > 256:
raise ValidationError("invalid_state_update_value")
if key in normalized:
raise ValidationError("duplicate_state_update_key")
normalized[key] = item
raw_units = value.get("next_work_units")
if not isinstance(raw_units, list) or len(raw_units) > 32:
raise ValidationError("invalid_next_work_units")
units = tuple(WorkUnit.from_dict(item) for item in raw_units)
human = value.get("requires_human_input")
if not isinstance(human, bool):
raise ValidationError("invalid_requires_human_input")
stop = value.get("stop_reason")
if stop is not None and (not isinstance(stop, str) or len(stop) > 512):
raise ValidationError("invalid_stop_reason")
if verdict == "DISPATCH" and not units:
raise ValidationError("dispatch_without_work_units")
if verdict != "DISPATCH" and units:
raise ValidationError("work_units_without_dispatch")
return cls(
schema_version=1,
project_key=req_str(value, "project_key", ID_RE),
contract_commit=req_str(value, "contract_commit", OID_RE),
event_id=req_str(value, "event_id", ID_RE),
expected_state_version=version,
verdict=verdict,
state_updates=normalized,
next_work_units=units,
requires_human_input=human,
stop_reason=stop,
)
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": 1,
"project_key": self.project_key,
"contract_commit": self.contract_commit,
"event_id": self.event_id,
"expected_state_version": self.expected_state_version,
"verdict": self.verdict,
"state_updates": [
{"key": key, "value": value}
for key, value in sorted(self.state_updates.items())
],
"next_work_units": [u.to_dict() for u in self.next_work_units],
"requires_human_input": self.requires_human_input,
"stop_reason": self.stop_reason,
}
DECISION_SCHEMA: dict[str, Any] = {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": False,
"required": [
"schema_version", "project_key", "contract_commit", "event_id",
"expected_state_version", "verdict", "state_updates",
"next_work_units", "requires_human_input", "stop_reason",
],
"properties": {
"schema_version": {"type": "integer", "const": 1},
"project_key": {"type": "string"},
"contract_commit": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"},
"event_id": {"type": "string"},
"expected_state_version": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0},
"verdict": {"type": "string", "enum": sorted(VERDICTS)},
"state_updates": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": False,
"required": ["key", "value"],
"properties": {
"key": {"type": "string"},
"value": {"type": "string"}
}
}
},
"next_work_units": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 32,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": False,
"required": [
"id", "track_id", "gate_id", "primary_agent",
"fallback_agent", "clean_base_commit", "allowed_paths",
"required_checks", "forbidden_operations", "instruction",
],
"properties": {
"id": {"type": "string"},
"track_id": {"type": "string"},
"gate_id": {"type": "string"},
"primary_agent": {"type": "string", "enum": ["openclaw", "codex"]},
"fallback_agent": {"type": "string", "enum": ["openclaw", "codex"]},
"clean_base_commit": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{40}$"},
"allowed_paths": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}},
"required_checks": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}},
"forbidden_operations": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}},
"instruction": {"type": "string"},
},
},
},
"requires_human_input": {"type": "boolean"},
"stop_reason": {"type": ["string", "null"]},
},
}
@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import stat
from typing import Any
from .errors import ConfigurationError
_NOFOLLOW = getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
def reject_symlink_chain(path: Path) -> None:
"""Reject symlinks in every existing component of an absolute path."""
path = Path(path)
if not path.is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError(f"path_not_absolute:{path}")
current = Path(path.anchor)
for part in path.parts[1:]:
current = current / part
try:
st = os.lstat(current)
except FileNotFoundError:
continue
if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
raise ConfigurationError(f"symlink_rejected:{current}")
def verify_secure_file(
path: Path,
*,
expected_uid: int | None,
allowed_write_bits: int = stat.S_IWUSR,
require_executable: bool = False,
) -> os.stat_result:
path = Path(path)
reject_symlink_chain(path)
before = os.lstat(path)
if not stat.S_ISREG(before.st_mode):
raise ConfigurationError(f"not_regular_file:{path}")
if expected_uid is not None and before.st_uid != expected_uid:
raise ConfigurationError(f"unexpected_owner:{path}")
write_bits = before.st_mode & (stat.S_IWUSR | stat.S_IWGRP | stat.S_IWOTH)
if write_bits & ~allowed_write_bits:
raise ConfigurationError(f"permissive_mode:{path}")
if require_executable and not (before.st_mode & stat.S_IXUSR):
raise ConfigurationError(f"not_executable:{path}")
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | _NOFOLLOW)
try:
after = os.fstat(fd)
if (before.st_dev, before.st_ino) != (after.st_dev, after.st_ino):
raise ConfigurationError(f"inode_changed:{path}")
finally:
os.close(fd)
return before
def read_secure_bytes(
path: Path,
*,
expected_uid: int | None,
max_bytes: int = 1_048_576,
) -> bytes:
path = Path(path)
before = verify_secure_file(path, expected_uid=expected_uid)
if before.st_size > max_bytes:
raise ConfigurationError(f"file_too_large:{path}")
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | _NOFOLLOW)
try:
data = bytearray()
while True:
chunk = os.read(fd, min(65536, max_bytes + 1 - len(data)))
if not chunk:
break
data.extend(chunk)
if len(data) > max_bytes:
raise ConfigurationError(f"file_too_large:{path}")
return bytes(data)
finally:
os.close(fd)
def read_secure_text(path: Path, *, expected_uid: int | None, max_bytes: int = 1_048_576) -> str:
try:
return read_secure_bytes(path, expected_uid=expected_uid, max_bytes=max_bytes).decode("utf-8").strip()
except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
raise ConfigurationError(f"not_utf8:{path}") from exc
def read_secure_json(path: Path, *, expected_uid: int | None, max_bytes: int = 1_048_576) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
value = json.loads(read_secure_text(path, expected_uid=expected_uid, max_bytes=max_bytes))
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise ConfigurationError(f"invalid_json:{path}") from exc
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise ConfigurationError(f"json_root_not_object:{path}")
return value
def ensure_secure_directory(path: Path, *, mode: int = 0o700) -> None:
path = Path(path)
if not path.is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError(f"path_not_absolute:{path}")
reject_symlink_chain(path.parent)
path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=mode)
reject_symlink_chain(path)
st = os.lstat(path)
if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
raise ConfigurationError(f"not_directory:{path}")
if st.st_mode & (stat.S_IWGRP | stat.S_IWOTH):
raise ConfigurationError(f"permissive_directory:{path}")
def atomic_write_bytes(path: Path, payload: bytes, *, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
"""Write through a verified directory fd and atomically replace the target."""
path = Path(path)
ensure_secure_directory(path.parent)
parent_before = os.lstat(path.parent)
parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | _NOFOLLOW)
temp_name = f".{path.name}.tmp-{os.getpid()}-{os.urandom(6).hex()}"
try:
parent_after = os.fstat(parent_fd)
if (parent_before.st_dev, parent_before.st_ino) != (
parent_after.st_dev,
parent_after.st_ino,
):
raise ConfigurationError(f"directory_changed:{path.parent}")
fd = os.open(
temp_name,
os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | _NOFOLLOW,
mode,
dir_fd=parent_fd,
)
try:
view = memoryview(payload)
while view:
written = os.write(fd, view)
view = view[written:]
os.fsync(fd)
finally:
os.close(fd)
os.replace(
temp_name,
path.name,
src_dir_fd=parent_fd,
dst_dir_fd=parent_fd,
)
os.fsync(parent_fd)
finally:
try:
os.unlink(temp_name, dir_fd=parent_fd)
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
os.close(parent_fd)
def atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: Any, *, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
payload = (json.dumps(value, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
atomic_write_bytes(path, payload, mode=mode)
def ensure_shared_directory(path: Path, *, group_writable: bool = False) -> None:
"""Verify/create a setgid queue directory shared with a consumer group."""
path = Path(path)
if not path.is_absolute():
raise ConfigurationError(f"path_not_absolute:{path}")
reject_symlink_chain(path.parent)
mode = 0o2770 if group_writable else 0o2750
try:
path.mkdir(parents=True, mode=mode)
except FileExistsError:
pass
else:
os.chmod(path, mode)
reject_symlink_chain(path)
st = os.lstat(path)
if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
raise ConfigurationError(f"not_directory:{path}")
observed = stat.S_IMODE(st.st_mode)
required = stat.S_ISGID | stat.S_IRGRP | stat.S_IXGRP
if group_writable:
required |= stat.S_IWGRP
if observed & 0o007 or observed & required != required:
raise ConfigurationError(f"invalid_shared_directory_mode:{path}")
def atomic_write_bytes_shared(
path: Path,
payload: bytes,
*,
mode: int = 0o640,
group_writable_directory: bool = False,
) -> None:
"""Atomic write into a setgid/group-readable shared queue directory."""
path = Path(path)
ensure_shared_directory(path.parent, group_writable=group_writable_directory)
parent_before = os.lstat(path.parent)
parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | _NOFOLLOW)
temp_name = f".{path.name}.tmp-{os.getpid()}-{os.urandom(6).hex()}"
try:
parent_after = os.fstat(parent_fd)
if (parent_before.st_dev, parent_before.st_ino) != (
parent_after.st_dev,
parent_after.st_ino,
):
raise ConfigurationError(f"directory_changed:{path.parent}")
fd = os.open(
temp_name,
os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | _NOFOLLOW,
mode,
dir_fd=parent_fd,
)
os.fchmod(fd, mode)
try:
view = memoryview(payload)
while view:
written = os.write(fd, view)
view = view[written:]
os.fsync(fd)
finally:
os.close(fd)
os.replace(temp_name, path.name, src_dir_fd=parent_fd, dst_dir_fd=parent_fd)
os.fsync(parent_fd)
finally:
try:
os.unlink(temp_name, dir_fd=parent_fd)
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
os.close(parent_fd)
@@ -1,642 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
import json
import logging
import os
from pathlib import Path
import socket
import subprocess
import threading
import time
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from .clients import ResponsesClient, WorkspaceAgentClient
from .config import Config
from .dispatch import DispatchSink
from .errors import (
AuthenticationError,
ConflictError,
DispatchError,
OrchestratorError,
TriggerError,
ValidationError,
)
from .models import Decision, Event
from .securefs import ensure_secure_directory, ensure_shared_directory, read_secure_json
from .store import Store
from .sync import OpenClawSynchronizer, lifecycle_record
LOG = logging.getLogger("aios-orchestrator-gateway")
class Runtime:
def __init__(self, config: Config):
self.config = config
self.store = Store(config.database_path)
self.dispatch = DispatchSink(
config.dispatch_outbox_dir,
config.command_queue_dir,
config.contract_commit,
)
self.workspace = None
workspace_token = config.workspace_token()
if config.workspace_trigger_id and workspace_token:
self.workspace = WorkspaceAgentClient(
config.workspace_trigger_id,
workspace_token,
)
self.responses = None
responses_key = config.responses_api_key()
if responses_key and config.responses_model:
self.responses = ResponsesClient(
responses_key,
config.responses_model,
)
self.synchronizer = OpenClawSynchronizer(
config.openclaw_sync_dir,
endpoint=config.openclaw_sync_endpoint,
bearer_token=config.openclaw_sync_token(),
)
self.worker_id = f"{socket.gethostname()}-{os.getpid()}-{threading.get_native_id()}"
self.stop_event = threading.Event()
self.worker = threading.Thread(target=self._loop, daemon=True)
self._next_git_poll = 0.0
for directory in (
config.event_inbox_dir,
config.decision_inbox_dir,
config.dispatch_outbox_dir,
config.openclaw_sync_dir,
):
ensure_secure_directory(directory)
ensure_shared_directory(config.command_queue_dir)
def start(self) -> None:
self.worker.start()
def stop(self) -> None:
self.stop_event.set()
if self.worker.is_alive():
self.worker.join(timeout=15)
self.store.close()
def submit_event(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[bool, dict[str, Any]]:
event = Event.from_dict(payload)
if event.contract_commit != self.config.contract_commit:
raise ConflictError("contract_version_mismatch")
created, stored = self.store.register_event(event)
if created:
self._enqueue_event_lifecycle(event)
return created, stored
def submit_decision(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
decision = Decision.from_dict(payload)
if decision.contract_commit != self.config.contract_commit:
raise ConflictError("contract_version_mismatch")
version = self.store.apply_decision(
decision,
max_hops_per_gate=self.config.max_hops_per_gate,
max_same_blocker_retries=self.config.max_same_blocker_retries,
)
self._enqueue_decision_lifecycle(decision, version)
return version
def _loop(self) -> None:
next_summary = 0.0
while not self.stop_event.wait(self.config.poll_interval_seconds):
try:
self.poll_once()
if time.monotonic() >= next_summary:
self.enqueue_periodic_summaries()
next_summary = time.monotonic() + self.config.summary_interval_seconds
except Exception:
LOG.exception("poll_cycle_failed")
def poll_once(self) -> None:
"""One deterministic reliability cycle.
This is deliberately callable from a systemd timer or health supervisor
in addition to the internal loop.
"""
self.ingest_file_inboxes()
self.poll_git_refs()
self.process_new_events()
self.process_workspace_timeouts()
self.poll_background_responses()
self.dispatch_work_units()
self.synchronize_openclaw()
def ingest_file_inboxes(self) -> None:
self._ingest_directory(self.config.event_inbox_dir, kind="event")
self._ingest_directory(self.config.decision_inbox_dir, kind="decision")
def _ingest_directory(self, directory: Path, *, kind: str) -> None:
pending = directory / "pending"
processed = directory / "processed"
rejected = directory / "rejected"
ensure_shared_directory(pending, group_writable=True)
ensure_secure_directory(processed)
ensure_secure_directory(rejected)
for path in sorted(pending.glob("*.json"))[:128]:
try:
payload = read_secure_json(path, expected_uid=None)
if kind == "event":
self.submit_event(payload)
else:
self.submit_decision(payload)
target = processed / path.name
except Exception as exc:
LOG.warning("file_inbox_rejected path=%s error=%s", path, type(exc).__name__)
target = rejected / path.name
if target.exists():
# Same file name is an idempotency replay. Keep original audit copy.
path.unlink()
else:
path.replace(target)
def poll_git_refs(self) -> None:
"""Poll authoritative local bare refs so missed webhooks cannot stall the loop."""
if not self.config.git_poll_enabled or self.config.git_poll_bare_repo is None:
return
now = time.monotonic()
if now < self._next_git_poll:
return
self._next_git_poll = now + self.config.git_poll_interval_seconds
command = [
"git",
f"--git-dir={self.config.git_poll_bare_repo}",
"for-each-ref",
"--format=%(refname) %(objectname)",
*self.config.git_poll_ref_prefixes,
]
try:
result = subprocess.run(
command,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
text=True,
check=False,
timeout=30,
env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LANG": "C", "LC_ALL": "C"},
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
LOG.exception("git_ref_poll_failed")
return
if result.returncode != 0:
LOG.warning("git_ref_poll_rc=%s", result.returncode)
return
refs: dict[str, str] = {}
for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
refname, sep, oid = line.partition(" ")
if not sep or not refname.startswith("refs/") or len(oid) != 40:
continue
if any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in oid):
continue
refs[refname] = oid
initialized, changes = self.store.observe_refs(refs)
if not initialized or not changes:
return
payload_changes = [
{"ref": refname, "old_oid": old_oid, "new_oid": new_oid}
for refname, old_oid, new_oid in sorted(changes)
]
canonical = json.dumps(payload_changes, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True)
event_id = "gitpoll-" + hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode()).hexdigest()[:40]
state = self.store.project_state(self.config.project_key)
state_version = 0 if state is None else int(state["state_version"])
event = Event.from_dict(
{
"schema_version": 1,
"project_key": self.config.project_key,
"contract_commit": self.config.contract_commit,
"event_id": event_id,
"source_agent": "gitea",
"event_type": "git_refs_changed",
"work_unit_id": "GIT-REF-POLL",
"status": "READY",
"state_version": state_version,
"implementation_commit": None,
"result_commit": None,
"blocker": None,
"evidence_refs": [],
"payload": {"changes": payload_changes},
}
)
try:
self.submit_event(event.to_dict())
except ConflictError:
LOG.info("git_ref_event_already_registered event_id=%s", event_id)
def process_new_events(self) -> None:
rows = self.store.claim_events(
owner=self.worker_id,
statuses=("RECEIVED", "TRIGGER_FAILED"),
limit=32,
lease_seconds=self.config.lease_seconds,
)
for row in rows:
event = Event.from_dict(json.loads(row["event_json"]))
attempts = int(row["attempts"])
try:
if self.workspace is not None:
self.workspace.trigger(event)
self.store.update_event_trigger(
event.event_id,
status="AWAITING_DECISION",
channel="workspace_agent",
remote_id=None,
)
elif self.responses is not None:
response_id = self.responses.start(event)
self.store.update_event_trigger(
event.event_id,
status="POLLING_RESPONSE",
channel="responses_api",
remote_id=response_id,
retry_after=self.config.poll_interval_seconds,
)
else:
raise TriggerError("no_model_channel")
except TriggerError as exc:
self._retry_or_dead_letter(event, attempts, str(exc))
def process_workspace_timeouts(self) -> None:
cutoff = int(time.time()) - self.config.callback_timeout_seconds
for row in self.store.claim_workspace_timeouts(
owner=self.worker_id,
older_than=cutoff,
limit=32,
lease_seconds=self.config.lease_seconds,
):
event = Event.from_dict(json.loads(row["event_json"]))
if self.responses is None:
self._retry_or_dead_letter(
event,
int(row["attempts"]),
"workspace_callback_timeout",
)
continue
try:
response_id = self.responses.start(event)
self.store.update_event_trigger(
event.event_id,
status="POLLING_RESPONSE",
channel="responses_api",
remote_id=response_id,
retry_after=self.config.poll_interval_seconds,
increment_attempt=True,
)
except TriggerError as exc:
self._retry_or_dead_letter(event, int(row["attempts"]), str(exc))
def poll_background_responses(self) -> None:
if self.responses is None:
return
for row in self.store.claim_response_polls(
owner=self.worker_id,
limit=32,
lease_seconds=self.config.lease_seconds,
):
event = Event.from_dict(json.loads(row["event_json"]))
response_id = row.get("remote_id")
if not isinstance(response_id, str):
self._retry_or_dead_letter(event, int(row["attempts"]), "missing_response_id")
continue
try:
status, decision = self.responses.poll(response_id)
if status in {"queued", "in_progress"}:
attempts = int(row["attempts"])
if attempts + 1 > self.config.max_retries:
self._retry_or_dead_letter(
event, attempts, f"response_{status}_retry_limit"
)
continue
self.store.update_event_trigger(
event.event_id,
status="POLLING_RESPONSE",
channel="responses_api",
remote_id=response_id,
retry_after=self.config.poll_interval_seconds,
increment_attempt=True,
)
continue
if decision is None:
raise TriggerError("completed_without_decision")
self.submit_decision(decision.to_dict())
except OrchestratorError as exc:
self._retry_or_dead_letter(event, int(row["attempts"]), str(exc))
def dispatch_work_units(self) -> None:
rows = self.store.claim_outbox(
owner=self.worker_id,
limit=64,
lease_seconds=self.config.lease_seconds,
)
for row in rows:
try:
outbox_path, queue_path = self.dispatch.dispatch(row)
self.store.mark_outbox(row["work_unit_id"], status="DISPATCHED")
payload = {
"assigned_agent": row["assigned_agent"],
"event_id": row["event_id"],
"dispatch_outbox": str(outbox_path),
"command_queue": str(queue_path),
}
record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=self.config.contract_commit,
project_key=self._project_for_event(row["event_id"]),
kind="TASK_DISPATCHED",
work_unit_id=row["work_unit_id"],
payload=payload,
)
self.store.enqueue_lifecycle(
sync_id=record["sync_id"],
project_key=record["project_key"],
work_unit_id=row["work_unit_id"],
kind=record["kind"],
payload=record,
)
except Exception:
attempts = int(row["attempts"])
status = "DEAD_LETTER" if attempts >= self.config.max_retries else "RETRY"
self.store.mark_outbox(
row["work_unit_id"],
status=status,
retry_after=self._backoff(attempts),
increment_attempt=True,
)
LOG.exception("dispatch_failed work_unit=%s", row["work_unit_id"])
def synchronize_openclaw(self) -> None:
rows = self.store.claim_lifecycle(
owner=self.worker_id,
limit=64,
lease_seconds=self.config.lease_seconds,
)
for row in rows:
try:
payload = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
self.synchronizer.emit(payload)
self.store.mark_lifecycle(row["sync_id"], status="SENT")
except Exception:
attempts = int(row["attempts"])
status = "DEAD_LETTER" if attempts >= self.config.max_retries else "RETRY"
self.store.mark_lifecycle(
row["sync_id"],
status=status,
retry_after=self._backoff(attempts),
increment_attempt=True,
)
LOG.exception("openclaw_sync_failed sync_id=%s", row["sync_id"])
def enqueue_periodic_summaries(self) -> None:
for state in self.store.all_project_states():
project_key = state["project_key"]
if not self.store.summary_due(project_key, self.config.summary_interval_seconds):
continue
summary = self.store.project_summary(project_key)
if summary is None:
continue
digest = hashlib.sha256(
json.dumps(summary, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode()
).hexdigest()
record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=self.config.contract_commit,
project_key=project_key,
kind="PROJECT_SUMMARY",
work_unit_id=None,
payload=summary,
)
self.store.enqueue_lifecycle(
sync_id=record["sync_id"],
project_key=project_key,
work_unit_id=None,
kind=record["kind"],
payload=record,
)
self.store.mark_summary(project_key, digest)
def _enqueue_event_lifecycle(self, event: Event) -> None:
if event.event_type == "work_unit_started":
kind = "TASK_STARTED"
elif event.event_type in {"work_unit_completed", "work_unit_failed", "work_unit_blocked"}:
kind = "TASK_ENDED"
else:
kind = "EVENT_RECEIVED"
record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=self.config.contract_commit,
project_key=event.project_key,
kind=kind,
work_unit_id=event.work_unit_id,
payload=event.to_dict(),
)
self.store.enqueue_lifecycle(
sync_id=record["sync_id"],
project_key=event.project_key,
work_unit_id=event.work_unit_id,
kind=kind,
payload=record,
)
def _enqueue_decision_lifecycle(self, decision: Decision, version: int) -> None:
kind = "PROJECT_COMPLETED" if decision.verdict == "COMPLETE" else "DECISION_APPLIED"
record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=self.config.contract_commit,
project_key=decision.project_key,
kind=kind,
work_unit_id=None,
payload={"decision": decision.to_dict(), "state_version": version},
)
self.store.enqueue_lifecycle(
sync_id=record["sync_id"],
project_key=decision.project_key,
work_unit_id=None,
kind=kind,
payload=record,
)
summary = self.store.project_summary(decision.project_key)
if summary:
summary_record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=self.config.contract_commit,
project_key=decision.project_key,
kind="PROJECT_SUMMARY",
work_unit_id=None,
payload=summary,
)
self.store.enqueue_lifecycle(
sync_id=summary_record["sync_id"],
project_key=decision.project_key,
work_unit_id=None,
kind=summary_record["kind"],
payload=summary_record,
)
def _project_for_event(self, event_id: str) -> str:
rows = self.store._conn().execute(
"SELECT project_key FROM events WHERE event_id=?",
(event_id,),
).fetchone()
if rows is None:
raise ConflictError("event_not_found")
return str(rows["project_key"])
def _retry_or_dead_letter(self, event: Event, attempts: int, reason: str) -> None:
next_attempt = attempts + 1
if next_attempt > self.config.max_retries:
self.store.update_event_trigger(
event.event_id,
status="DEAD_LETTER",
channel=None,
remote_id=None,
increment_attempt=True,
)
record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=self.config.contract_commit,
project_key=event.project_key,
kind="TASK_ENDED",
work_unit_id=event.work_unit_id,
payload={
"status": "FAIL",
"reason": reason,
"event_id": event.event_id,
"attempts": next_attempt,
},
)
self.store.enqueue_lifecycle(
sync_id=record["sync_id"],
project_key=event.project_key,
work_unit_id=event.work_unit_id,
kind=record["kind"],
payload=record,
)
return
self.store.update_event_trigger(
event.event_id,
status="TRIGGER_FAILED",
channel=None,
remote_id=None,
retry_after=self._backoff(attempts),
increment_attempt=True,
)
def _backoff(self, attempts: int) -> int:
return min(3600, self.config.retry_base_seconds * (2 ** min(attempts, 10)))
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
runtime: Runtime
def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: object) -> None:
LOG.info("%s %s", self.client_address[0], fmt % args)
def _reply(self, status: int, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
body = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode()
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid_content_length") from exc
if length <= 0 or length > 1_048_576:
raise ValidationError("invalid_body_size")
try:
value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length))
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid_json") from exc
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise ValidationError("json_root_not_object")
return value
def _authenticate(self, expected: str) -> None:
header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
if not header.startswith("Bearer "):
raise AuthenticationError("missing_bearer")
if not hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], expected):
raise AuthenticationError("invalid_bearer")
def do_GET(self) -> None:
path = urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
try:
if path == "/healthz":
self._reply(
200,
{
"service": "aios-orchestrator-gateway",
"status": "active",
"contract_commit": self.runtime.config.contract_commit,
"polling": True,
},
)
return
if path.startswith("/v1/orchestrator/state/"):
self._authenticate(self.runtime.config.inbound_token())
key = path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
state = self.runtime.store.project_summary(key)
self._reply(200 if state else 404, state or {"error": "project_not_found"})
return
self._reply(404, {"error": "not_found"})
except AuthenticationError as exc:
self._reply(401, {"error": str(exc)})
except OrchestratorError as exc:
self._reply(400, {"error": str(exc)})
def do_POST(self) -> None:
path = urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/")
try:
if path == "/v1/orchestrator/events":
self._authenticate(self.runtime.config.inbound_token())
created, event = self.runtime.submit_event(self._body())
self._reply(202 if created else 200, {"created": created, "event": event})
return
if path == "/v1/orchestrator/decisions":
self._authenticate(self.runtime.config.callback_token())
version = self.runtime.submit_decision(self._body())
self._reply(202, {"accepted": True, "state_version": version})
return
if path == "/v1/orchestrator/poll":
self._authenticate(self.runtime.config.inbound_token())
self.runtime.poll_once()
self._reply(200, {"polled": True})
return
self._reply(404, {"error": "not_found"})
except AuthenticationError as exc:
self._reply(401, {"error": str(exc)})
except ConflictError as exc:
self._reply(409, {"error": str(exc)})
except ValidationError as exc:
self._reply(422, {"error": str(exc)})
except OrchestratorError as exc:
self._reply(400, {"error": str(exc)})
except Exception:
LOG.exception("request_failed path=%s", path)
self._reply(500, {"error": "internal_error"})
def serve(config_path: Path) -> None:
config = Config.from_file(config_path)
runtime = Runtime(config)
Handler.runtime = runtime
server = ThreadingHTTPServer((config.host, config.port), Handler)
runtime.start()
LOG.info(
"gateway_started host=%s port=%s contract=%s polling=%ss",
config.host,
config.port,
config.contract_commit,
config.poll_interval_seconds,
)
try:
server.serve_forever(poll_interval=0.5)
finally:
server.server_close()
runtime.stop()
-826
View File
@@ -1,826 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
import threading
import time
from typing import Any
from .errors import ConflictError
from .models import Decision, Event
from .securefs import ensure_secure_directory
class Store:
"""Durable state machine with idempotency, optimistic versioning, and leases."""
def __init__(self, path: Path):
self.path = Path(path)
ensure_secure_directory(self.path.parent)
self._local = threading.local()
self._initialize()
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
conn.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
return conn
def _conn(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
conn = getattr(self._local, "conn", None)
if conn is None:
conn = self._connect()
self._local.conn = conn
return conn
def _initialize(self) -> None:
conn = self._connect()
try:
conn.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS project_state (
project_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
contract_commit TEXT NOT NULL,
state_version INTEGER NOT NULL,
state_json TEXT NOT NULL,
hops INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS gate_hops (
project_key TEXT NOT NULL,
gate_id TEXT NOT NULL,
hops INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(project_key, gate_id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS events (
event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
project_key TEXT NOT NULL,
digest TEXT NOT NULL,
event_json TEXT NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
channel TEXT,
remote_id TEXT,
attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
next_attempt_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
lease_owner TEXT,
lease_until INTEGER,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_events_poll
ON events(status, next_attempt_at, lease_until, created_at);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS decisions (
event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES events(event_id),
project_key TEXT NOT NULL,
decision_json TEXT NOT NULL,
state_version_after INTEGER NOT NULL,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS outbox (
work_unit_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
event_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES events(event_id),
assigned_agent TEXT NOT NULL,
payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
next_attempt_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
lease_owner TEXT,
lease_until INTEGER,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_outbox_poll
ON outbox(status, next_attempt_at, lease_until, created_at);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lifecycle (
sync_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
project_key TEXT NOT NULL,
work_unit_id TEXT,
kind TEXT NOT NULL,
payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
next_attempt_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
lease_owner TEXT,
lease_until INTEGER,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_lifecycle_poll
ON lifecycle(status, next_attempt_at, lease_until, created_at);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS blocker_history (
project_key TEXT NOT NULL,
gate_id TEXT NOT NULL,
blocker TEXT NOT NULL,
repetitions INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(project_key, gate_id, blocker)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS summaries (
project_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
last_emitted_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
last_digest TEXT
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS observed_refs (
refname TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
object_id TEXT NOT NULL,
observed_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS metadata (
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
value TEXT NOT NULL
);
"""
)
finally:
conn.close()
def register_event(self, event: Event) -> tuple[bool, dict[str, Any]]:
now = int(time.time())
conn = self._conn()
conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
existing = conn.execute(
"SELECT digest, event_json FROM events WHERE event_id=?",
(event.event_id,),
).fetchone()
if existing:
if existing["digest"] != event.digest():
raise ConflictError("event_id_payload_conflict")
conn.execute("COMMIT")
return False, json.loads(existing["event_json"])
state = conn.execute(
"SELECT contract_commit, state_version FROM project_state WHERE project_key=?",
(event.project_key,),
).fetchone()
if state is None:
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO project_state(
project_key, contract_commit, state_version, state_json,
hops, updated_at
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, '{}', 0, ?)
""",
(event.project_key, event.contract_commit, event.state_version, now),
)
else:
if state["contract_commit"] != event.contract_commit:
raise ConflictError("contract_version_mismatch")
if state["state_version"] != event.state_version:
raise ConflictError("stale_state_version")
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO events(
event_id, project_key, digest, event_json, status,
next_attempt_at, created_at, updated_at
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 'RECEIVED', ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
event.event_id,
event.project_key,
event.digest(),
event.canonical_json(),
now,
now,
now,
),
)
conn.execute("COMMIT")
return True, event.to_dict()
except Exception:
conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
def claim_events(
self,
*,
owner: str,
statuses: tuple[str, ...],
limit: int,
lease_seconds: int,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if not statuses:
return []
now = int(time.time())
placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in statuses)
conn = self._conn()
conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
rows = conn.execute(
f"""
SELECT event_id FROM events
WHERE status IN ({placeholders})
AND next_attempt_at <= ?
AND (lease_until IS NULL OR lease_until < ?)
ORDER BY created_at
LIMIT ?
""",
(*statuses, now, now, limit),
).fetchall()
ids = [row["event_id"] for row in rows]
for event_id in ids:
conn.execute(
"""
UPDATE events SET lease_owner=?, lease_until=?, updated_at=?
WHERE event_id=?
""",
(owner, now + lease_seconds, now, event_id),
)
conn.execute("COMMIT")
except Exception:
conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
if not ids:
return []
placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in ids)
return [
dict(row)
for row in conn.execute(
f"SELECT * FROM events WHERE event_id IN ({placeholders})",
ids,
).fetchall()
]
def update_event_trigger(
self,
event_id: str,
*,
status: str,
channel: str | None,
remote_id: str | None,
retry_after: int = 0,
increment_attempt: bool = False,
) -> None:
now = int(time.time())
self._conn().execute(
"""
UPDATE events
SET status=?, channel=?, remote_id=?,
attempts=attempts + ?,
next_attempt_at=?,
lease_owner=NULL, lease_until=NULL, updated_at=?
WHERE event_id=?
""",
(
status,
channel,
remote_id,
1 if increment_attempt else 0,
now + max(0, retry_after),
now,
event_id,
),
)
def claim_workspace_timeouts(
self,
*,
owner: str,
older_than: int,
limit: int,
lease_seconds: int,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
return self._claim_event_subset(
owner=owner,
where_sql="status='AWAITING_DECISION' AND channel='workspace_agent' AND updated_at <= ?",
where_params=(older_than,),
limit=limit,
lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
)
def claim_response_polls(
self,
*,
owner: str,
limit: int,
lease_seconds: int,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
now = int(time.time())
return self._claim_event_subset(
owner=owner,
where_sql="status='POLLING_RESPONSE' AND next_attempt_at <= ?",
where_params=(now,),
limit=limit,
lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
)
def _claim_event_subset(
self,
*,
owner: str,
where_sql: str,
where_params: tuple[Any, ...],
limit: int,
lease_seconds: int,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
allowed = {
"status='AWAITING_DECISION' AND channel='workspace_agent' AND updated_at <= ?",
"status='POLLING_RESPONSE' AND next_attempt_at <= ?",
}
if where_sql not in allowed:
raise ValueError("invalid_event_claim_query")
now = int(time.time())
conn = self._conn()
conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
rows = conn.execute(
f"""
SELECT event_id FROM events
WHERE {where_sql}
AND (lease_until IS NULL OR lease_until < ?)
ORDER BY updated_at
LIMIT ?
""",
(*where_params, now, limit),
).fetchall()
ids = [str(row["event_id"]) for row in rows]
for event_id in ids:
conn.execute(
"""
UPDATE events SET lease_owner=?, lease_until=?
WHERE event_id=?
""",
(owner, now + lease_seconds, event_id),
)
conn.execute("COMMIT")
except Exception:
conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
if not ids:
return []
placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in ids)
return [
dict(row)
for row in conn.execute(
f"SELECT * FROM events WHERE event_id IN ({placeholders})",
ids,
).fetchall()
]
def apply_decision(
self,
decision: Decision,
*,
max_hops_per_gate: int,
max_same_blocker_retries: int,
) -> int:
now = int(time.time())
conn = self._conn()
conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
event = conn.execute(
"SELECT project_key FROM events WHERE event_id=?",
(decision.event_id,),
).fetchone()
if event is None:
raise ConflictError("event_not_found")
if event["project_key"] != decision.project_key:
raise ConflictError("event_project_mismatch")
existing = conn.execute(
"SELECT decision_json, state_version_after FROM decisions WHERE event_id=?",
(decision.event_id,),
).fetchone()
if existing:
if json.loads(existing["decision_json"]) != decision.to_dict():
raise ConflictError("decision_idempotency_conflict")
conn.execute("COMMIT")
return int(existing["state_version_after"])
state = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM project_state WHERE project_key=?",
(decision.project_key,),
).fetchone()
if state is None:
raise ConflictError("project_state_not_found")
if state["contract_commit"] != decision.contract_commit:
raise ConflictError("contract_version_mismatch")
if state["state_version"] != decision.expected_state_version:
raise ConflictError("stale_decision_state_version")
state_json = json.loads(state["state_json"])
gate = str(
decision.state_updates.get(
"current_gate", state_json.get("current_gate", "unknown")
)
)
gate_hops = conn.execute(
"SELECT hops FROM gate_hops WHERE project_key=? AND gate_id=?",
(decision.project_key, gate),
).fetchone()
if gate_hops is not None and int(gate_hops["hops"]) >= max_hops_per_gate:
raise ConflictError("max_hops_exceeded")
state_json.update(decision.state_updates)
next_version = int(state["state_version"]) + 1
if decision.stop_reason:
row = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT repetitions FROM blocker_history
WHERE project_key=? AND gate_id=? AND blocker=?
""",
(decision.project_key, gate, decision.stop_reason),
).fetchone()
repetitions = (int(row["repetitions"]) if row else 0) + 1
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO blocker_history(
project_key, gate_id, blocker, repetitions, updated_at
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(project_key, gate_id, blocker)
DO UPDATE SET repetitions=excluded.repetitions,
updated_at=excluded.updated_at
""",
(decision.project_key, gate, decision.stop_reason, repetitions, now),
)
if repetitions > max_same_blocker_retries:
raise ConflictError("same_blocker_retry_limit_exceeded")
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO gate_hops(project_key, gate_id, hops, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?)
ON CONFLICT(project_key, gate_id)
DO UPDATE SET hops=gate_hops.hops + 1, updated_at=excluded.updated_at
""",
(decision.project_key, gate, now),
)
conn.execute(
"""
UPDATE project_state
SET state_version=?, state_json=?, hops=hops+1, updated_at=?
WHERE project_key=?
""",
(
next_version,
json.dumps(state_json, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True),
now,
decision.project_key,
),
)
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO decisions(
event_id, project_key, decision_json,
state_version_after, created_at
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
decision.event_id,
decision.project_key,
json.dumps(decision.to_dict(), separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True),
next_version,
now,
),
)
for unit in decision.next_work_units:
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO outbox(
work_unit_id, event_id, assigned_agent, payload_json,
status, next_attempt_at, created_at, updated_at
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 'PENDING', ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
unit.id,
decision.event_id,
unit.primary_agent,
json.dumps(unit.to_dict(), separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True),
now,
now,
now,
),
)
conn.execute(
"""
UPDATE events SET status='DECIDED', lease_owner=NULL,
lease_until=NULL, updated_at=?
WHERE event_id=?
""",
(now, decision.event_id),
)
conn.execute("COMMIT")
return next_version
except Exception:
conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
def claim_outbox(self, *, owner: str, limit: int, lease_seconds: int) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
return self._claim_table(
table="outbox",
key="work_unit_id",
owner=owner,
statuses=("PENDING", "RETRY"),
limit=limit,
lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
)
def mark_outbox(
self,
work_unit_id: str,
*,
status: str,
retry_after: int = 0,
increment_attempt: bool = False,
) -> None:
self._mark_table(
table="outbox",
key="work_unit_id",
value=work_unit_id,
status=status,
retry_after=retry_after,
increment_attempt=increment_attempt,
)
def enqueue_lifecycle(
self,
*,
sync_id: str,
project_key: str,
work_unit_id: str | None,
kind: str,
payload: dict[str, Any],
) -> None:
now = int(time.time())
encoded = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True)
self._conn().execute(
"""
INSERT OR IGNORE INTO lifecycle(
sync_id, project_key, work_unit_id, kind, payload_json,
status, next_attempt_at, created_at, updated_at
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'PENDING', ?, ?, ?)
""",
(sync_id, project_key, work_unit_id, kind, encoded, now, now, now),
)
def claim_lifecycle(self, *, owner: str, limit: int, lease_seconds: int) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
return self._claim_table(
table="lifecycle",
key="sync_id",
owner=owner,
statuses=("PENDING", "RETRY"),
limit=limit,
lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
)
def mark_lifecycle(
self,
sync_id: str,
*,
status: str,
retry_after: int = 0,
increment_attempt: bool = False,
) -> None:
self._mark_table(
table="lifecycle",
key="sync_id",
value=sync_id,
status=status,
retry_after=retry_after,
increment_attempt=increment_attempt,
)
def _claim_table(
self,
*,
table: str,
key: str,
owner: str,
statuses: tuple[str, ...],
limit: int,
lease_seconds: int,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if table not in {"outbox", "lifecycle"} or key not in {"work_unit_id", "sync_id"}:
raise ValueError("invalid_claim_table")
now = int(time.time())
placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in statuses)
conn = self._conn()
conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
rows = conn.execute(
f"""
SELECT {key} FROM {table}
WHERE status IN ({placeholders})
AND next_attempt_at <= ?
AND (lease_until IS NULL OR lease_until < ?)
ORDER BY created_at
LIMIT ?
""",
(*statuses, now, now, limit),
).fetchall()
values = [row[key] for row in rows]
for item in values:
conn.execute(
f"""
UPDATE {table} SET lease_owner=?, lease_until=?, updated_at=?
WHERE {key}=?
""",
(owner, now + lease_seconds, now, item),
)
conn.execute("COMMIT")
except Exception:
conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
if not values:
return []
placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in values)
return [
dict(row)
for row in conn.execute(
f"SELECT * FROM {table} WHERE {key} IN ({placeholders})",
values,
).fetchall()
]
def _mark_table(
self,
*,
table: str,
key: str,
value: str,
status: str,
retry_after: int,
increment_attempt: bool,
) -> None:
if table not in {"outbox", "lifecycle"} or key not in {"work_unit_id", "sync_id"}:
raise ValueError("invalid_mark_table")
now = int(time.time())
self._conn().execute(
f"""
UPDATE {table}
SET status=?, attempts=attempts + ?, next_attempt_at=?,
lease_owner=NULL, lease_until=NULL, updated_at=?
WHERE {key}=?
""",
(
status,
1 if increment_attempt else 0,
now + max(0, retry_after),
now,
value,
),
)
def project_state(self, project_key: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
row = self._conn().execute(
"SELECT * FROM project_state WHERE project_key=?",
(project_key,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
return None
result = dict(row)
result["state"] = json.loads(result.pop("state_json"))
return result
def all_project_states(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
result = []
for row in self._conn().execute("SELECT * FROM project_state ORDER BY project_key").fetchall():
item = dict(row)
item["state"] = json.loads(item.pop("state_json"))
result.append(item)
return result
def summary_due(self, project_key: str, interval: int) -> bool:
now = int(time.time())
row = self._conn().execute(
"SELECT last_emitted_at FROM summaries WHERE project_key=?",
(project_key,),
).fetchone()
return row is None or now - int(row["last_emitted_at"]) >= interval
def mark_summary(self, project_key: str, digest: str) -> None:
now = int(time.time())
self._conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO summaries(project_key, last_emitted_at, last_digest)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(project_key)
DO UPDATE SET last_emitted_at=excluded.last_emitted_at,
last_digest=excluded.last_digest
""",
(project_key, now, digest),
)
def project_summary(self, project_key: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
state = self.project_state(project_key)
if state is None:
return None
conn = self._conn()
event_counts = {
row["status"]: int(row["count"])
for row in conn.execute(
"""
SELECT status, COUNT(*) AS count FROM events
WHERE project_key=? GROUP BY status
""",
(project_key,),
).fetchall()
}
outbox_counts = {
row["status"]: int(row["count"])
for row in conn.execute(
"""
SELECT o.status, COUNT(*) AS count
FROM outbox o JOIN events e ON e.event_id=o.event_id
WHERE e.project_key=? GROUP BY o.status
""",
(project_key,),
).fetchall()
}
return {
"project_key": project_key,
"contract_commit": state["contract_commit"],
"state_version": state["state_version"],
"state": state["state"],
"event_counts": event_counts,
"work_unit_counts": outbox_counts,
"updated_at": state["updated_at"],
}
def metadata_get(self, key: str) -> str | None:
row = self._conn().execute(
"SELECT value FROM metadata WHERE key=?",
(key,),
).fetchone()
return None if row is None else str(row["value"])
def metadata_set(self, key: str, value: str) -> None:
self._conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO metadata(key, value) VALUES (?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value=excluded.value
""",
(key, value),
)
def observe_refs(self, refs: dict[str, str]) -> tuple[bool, list[tuple[str, str | None, str]]]:
"""Persist a Git snapshot and return changes after the initial baseline."""
now = int(time.time())
conn = self._conn()
conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
initialized = conn.execute(
"SELECT value FROM metadata WHERE key='git_poll_initialized'"
).fetchone()
previous = {
row["refname"]: row["object_id"]
for row in conn.execute("SELECT refname, object_id FROM observed_refs").fetchall()
}
changes: list[tuple[str, str | None, str]] = []
if initialized is not None:
for refname, oid in refs.items():
old = previous.get(refname)
if old != oid:
changes.append((refname, old, oid))
for refname, old in previous.items():
if refname not in refs:
changes.append((refname, old, "0" * 40))
conn.execute("DELETE FROM observed_refs")
for refname, oid in refs.items():
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO observed_refs(refname, object_id, observed_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)
""",
(refname, oid, now),
)
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO metadata(key, value)
VALUES ('git_poll_initialized', '1')
ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value='1'
"""
)
conn.execute("COMMIT")
return initialized is not None, changes
except Exception:
conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
def close(self) -> None:
conn = getattr(self._local, "conn", None)
if conn is not None:
conn.close()
self._local.conn = None
-108
View File
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import stat
from pathlib import Path
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from typing import Any
from .errors import DispatchError
from .securefs import atomic_write_bytes_shared, ensure_shared_directory, read_secure_bytes
class OpenClawSynchronizer:
"""Synchronize task starts, ends, dispatches, and project summaries.
A durable file is always emitted. An optional HTTP endpoint is best-effort;
failure leaves the lifecycle record pending for retry.
"""
def __init__(
self,
queue_dir: Path,
*,
endpoint: str | None = None,
bearer_token: str | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int = 10,
):
self.queue_dir = Path(queue_dir)
self.endpoint = endpoint
self.bearer_token = bearer_token
self.timeout_seconds = timeout_seconds
ensure_shared_directory(self.queue_dir)
def emit(self, record: dict[str, Any]) -> Path:
sync_id = record.get("sync_id")
if not isinstance(sync_id, str) or not sync_id:
raise DispatchError("invalid_sync_id")
payload = (json.dumps(record, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
path = self.queue_dir / "pending" / f"{sync_id}.json"
ensure_shared_directory(path.parent)
try:
st = os.lstat(path)
except FileNotFoundError:
atomic_write_bytes_shared(path, payload, mode=0o640)
else:
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise DispatchError("sync_target_not_regular")
if read_secure_bytes(path, expected_uid=None, max_bytes=1_048_576) != payload:
raise DispatchError("sync_idempotency_conflict")
if self.endpoint:
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Idempotency-Key": sync_id,
"User-Agent": "aios-orchestrator-gateway/0.2",
}
if self.bearer_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {self.bearer_token}"
request = urllib.request.Request(
self.endpoint,
data=payload,
method="POST",
headers=headers,
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=self.timeout_seconds) as response:
response.read(65_536)
if response.status not in {200, 201, 202, 204}:
raise DispatchError(f"openclaw_sync_http_{response.status}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
raise DispatchError(f"openclaw_sync_http_{exc.code}") from exc
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
raise DispatchError("openclaw_sync_failed") from exc
return path
def lifecycle_record(
*,
contract_commit: str,
project_key: str,
kind: str,
work_unit_id: str | None,
payload: dict[str, Any],
) -> dict[str, Any]:
canonical = json.dumps(
{
"contract_commit": contract_commit,
"project_key": project_key,
"kind": kind,
"work_unit_id": work_unit_id,
"payload": payload,
},
separators=(",", ":"),
sort_keys=True,
)
sync_id = hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode()).hexdigest()
return {
"schema_version": 1,
"sync_id": sync_id,
"contract_commit": contract_commit,
"project_key": project_key,
"kind": kind,
"work_unit_id": work_unit_id,
"payload": payload,
}
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS Codex automatic command watcher
After=network-online.target aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=aios-orchestrator
Group=aios-orchestrator
UMask=0077
Environment=PYTHONPATH=/opt/aios-codex-watcher/current
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m services.aios_codex_watcher --config /etc/aios-codex-watcher/config.json --once
NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateDevices=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectClock=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelLogs=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbound.token
ReadWritePaths=/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands /var/lib/aios-codex-watcher /var/log/aios-codex-watcher
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
RestrictNamespaces=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
SystemCallArchitectures=native
LockPersonality=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
u aios-orchestrator - "AIOS Orchestrator" /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Poll AIOS Codex command queue
[Timer]
OnBootSec=30s
OnUnitActiveSec=5s
AccuracySec=1s
Persistent=true
Unit=aios-codex-watcher.service
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
d /var/lib/aios-codex-watcher 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/log/aios-codex-watcher 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS Orchestrator Gateway reliability poll
After=aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/config.json
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=aios-orchestrator
Group=aios-orchestrator
SupplementaryGroups=gitops
WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway/current
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m services.aios_orchestrator_gateway --config /etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/config.json --poll-once
UMask=0077
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectHostname=true
ProtectProc=invisible
ProcSubset=pid
RestrictNamespaces=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
LockPersonality=true
CapabilityBoundingSet=
AmbientCapabilities=
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
StateDirectory=aios-orchestrator-gateway
ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway /opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway
SystemCallFilter=@system-service
SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Periodically poll AIOS orchestration inboxes and model responses
[Timer]
OnBootSec=45s
OnUnitActiveSec=60s
RandomizedDelaySec=10s
Persistent=true
Unit=aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS Orchestrator Gateway
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/config.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aios-orchestrator
Group=aios-orchestrator
SupplementaryGroups=gitops
WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway/current
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m services.aios_orchestrator_gateway --config /etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/config.json
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5s
TimeoutStartSec=30s
TimeoutStopSec=30s
UMask=0077
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectClock=true
ProtectHostname=true
ProtectProc=invisible
ProcSubset=pid
RestrictNamespaces=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
LockPersonality=true
RestrictRealtime=true
CapabilityBoundingSet=
AmbientCapabilities=
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
SystemCallArchitectures=native
StateDirectory=aios-orchestrator-gateway
RuntimeDirectory=aios-orchestrator-gateway
ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway /opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway
SystemCallFilter=@system-service
SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
g aios-orchestrator -
u aios-orchestrator - "AIOS Orchestrator Gateway" /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway /usr/sbin/nologin
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
d /etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway 0700 root root -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/events 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/events/pending 2770 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/events/processed 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/events/rejected 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/decisions 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/decisions/pending 2770 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/decisions/processed 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/decisions/rejected 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/outbox 0700 aios-orchestrator aios-orchestrator -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/openclaw-sync 2750 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/openclaw-sync/pending 2750 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/commands 2750 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/commands/openclaw 2750 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/commands/openclaw/pending 2750 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/commands/codex 2750 aios-orchestrator gitops -
d /var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/commands/codex/pending 2750 aios-orchestrator gitops -
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
"""End-to-end boundary tests for the V2R1 authenticated ingress runtime."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from aios_v2r1.runtime import RuntimeWiring
from aios_v2r1.message_ledger import MessageLedger
from aios_v2r1.tenant_context import canonical_json
class FixedClock:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def __call__(self) -> datetime:
return self.now
class TestRuntimeIngressFlow:
"""Use the public ingress boundary; do not reach into router internals."""
internal_key = b"runtime-integration-internal-key-32bytes"
ingress_key = b"runtime-integration-ingress-key-32bytes!"
def setup_method(self) -> None:
self.directory = TemporaryDirectory()
self.clock = FixedClock()
self.runtime = RuntimeWiring.create(
self.directory.name,
signing_key=self.internal_key,
ingress_hmac_key=self.ingress_key,
clock=self.clock,
)
self.runtime.router.register_tenant("tenant-a", "cell-a")
self.runtime.router.register_tenant("tenant-b", "cell-b")
self.runtime.router.bind_channel(
tenant_id="tenant-a", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-a"
)
self.runtime.router.bind_channel(
tenant_id="tenant-b", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-b"
)
self.runtime.router.bind_principal(
tenant_id="tenant-a",
channel="weixin",
channel_account_id="account-a",
principal_id="user-a",
)
self.runtime.router.bind_session(
tenant_id="tenant-a",
session_id="session-a",
cell_id="cell-a",
principal_id="user-a",
ttl_seconds=60,
)
def teardown_method(self) -> None:
self.directory.cleanup()
def _message(self, *, event_id: str = "event-a", message_id: str = "message-a",
body: str = "hello", **changes: object) -> dict[str, object]:
values: dict[str, object] = {
"tenant_id": "tenant-a", "cell_id": "cell-a", "principal_id": "user-a",
"principal_type": "authenticated_user", "origin_type": "channel_user",
"channel": "weixin", "channel_account_id": "account-a", "peer_id": "peer-a",
"conversation_id": "conversation-a", "session_id": "session-a", "task_id": None,
"event_id": event_id, "message_id": message_id, "reply_to_message_id": None,
"direction": "inbound", "command_capable": True,
"occurred_at": "2026-07-13T00:00:00+00:00",
"received_at": "2026-07-13T00:00:01+00:00",
"content": {"body": body, "quoted_body": None},
"adapter": {"name": "weixin", "version": "v2"},
}
values.update(changes)
return values
def _request(self, **changes: object) -> dict[str, object]:
values: dict[str, object] = {
"principal_id": "user-a", "tenant_id": "tenant-a", "cell_id": "cell-a",
"channel": "weixin", "channel_account_id": "account-a", "session_id": "session-a",
"message": self._message(),
}
values.update(changes)
values["signature"] = hmac.new(
self.ingress_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
).hexdigest()
return values
def test_authenticated_ingress_uses_direct_append_and_acquires_session(self) -> None:
# Observe the real MessageLedger object while preserving every method
# implementation. This proves the public ingress path never calls
# the legacy compatibility entrypoint; it is not a mock or bypass.
remember_code = MessageLedger.remember.__code__
remember_calls = 0
previous_profile = sys.getprofile()
def observe(frame: object, event: str, arg: object) -> None:
nonlocal remember_calls
if event == "call" and getattr(frame, "f_code", None) is remember_code:
remember_calls += 1
sys.setprofile(observe)
try:
response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request())
finally:
sys.setprofile(previous_profile)
assert response.status == "ACCEPTED"
assert response.result is not None
assert response.result.record.message_id == "message-a"
assert response.result.session.session_id == "session-a"
assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 1
assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 1
assert remember_calls == 0
def test_forged_tenant_claim_is_rejected_before_ledger_or_session_mutation(self) -> None:
response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
tenant_id="tenant-b",
cell_id="cell-b",
message=self._message(tenant_id="tenant-b", cell_id="cell-b"),
))
assert response.status == "AUTH_FAILED"
assert response.result is None
assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 0
assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 0
def test_conflicting_duplicate_message_is_mapped_at_the_ingress_boundary(self) -> None:
assert self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
message=self._message(body="first")
)).status == "ACCEPTED"
response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
message=self._message(event_id="event-b", body="second")
))
assert response.status == "CONFLICT"
assert response.result is None
assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 1
assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 1
-196
View File
@@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
import tempfile
import unittest
from services.aios_codex_watcher.watcher import CommandWatcher, Config, WatcherError, validate_command
CONTRACT = "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc"
class Clock:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.value = 1000.0
def __call__(self) -> float:
return self.value
class WatcherTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.root = Path(self.temp.name)
for name in ("active", "completed", "dead", "state", "log"):
(self.root / name).mkdir(mode=0o700)
self.token = self.root / "token"
self.token.write_text("not-a-real-secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
self.token.chmod(0o600)
self.clock = Clock()
self.events: list[dict] = []
self.exec_count = 0
self.config = Config(
active_dir=self.root / "active", completed_dir=self.root / "completed",
dead_letter_dir=self.root / "dead", database_path=self.root / "state/state.sqlite3",
audit_log_path=self.root / "log/audit.jsonl",
gateway_endpoint="http://127.0.0.1:18920/v1/orchestrator/events",
gateway_token_file=self.token, contract_commit=CONTRACT,
lease_seconds=10, retry_seconds=2, max_attempts=3, poll_seconds=1,
executor_path=None, executor_args=(), executor_timeout_seconds=10,
)
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self.temp.cleanup()
def command(self, command_id: str = "cmd-1", *, contract: str = CONTRACT, kind: str = "acceptance_probe", text: str = "no-op") -> dict:
return {
"schema_version": 1, "command_id": command_id,
"project_key": "a0-codex-watcher-nonproduction",
"work_unit_id": "A0-CODEX-WATCHER-ACCEPTANCE",
"contract_commit": contract, "state_version": 0,
"execution": {"kind": kind, "input": text},
}
def write(self, value: dict, name: str = "command.json") -> Path:
path = self.config.active_dir / name
path.write_text(json.dumps(value), encoding="utf-8")
path.chmod(0o600)
return path
def watcher(self, **kwargs) -> CommandWatcher:
def execute(command: dict) -> dict:
self.exec_count += 1
return {"kind": command["execution"]["kind"], "exit_code": 0}
return CommandWatcher(
self.config, clock=self.clock,
event_poster=kwargs.get("event_poster", self.events.append),
executor=kwargs.get("executor", execute), worker_id=kwargs.get("worker_id"),
)
def row(self, command_id: str = "cmd-1") -> sqlite3.Row:
db = sqlite3.connect(self.config.database_path)
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
try:
return db.execute("SELECT * FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command_id,)).fetchone()
finally:
db.close()
def test_happy_path_posts_lifecycle_once_and_archives(self) -> None:
path = self.write(self.command())
self.assertTrue(self.watcher().process_path(path))
self.assertEqual([e["event_type"] for e in self.events], ["work_unit_started", "work_unit_ended"])
self.assertEqual(self.exec_count, 1)
self.assertEqual(self.row()["status"], "COMPLETED")
self.assertTrue((self.config.completed_dir / path.name).is_file())
markers = [json.loads(line)["marker"] for line in self.config.audit_log_path.read_text().splitlines()]
self.assertEqual(markers, ["CODEX_AUTO_CLAIM", "TASK_STARTED", "TASK_EXECUTED", "TASK_ENDED", "EVENT_POSTED"])
def test_contract_mismatch_is_rejected_without_registration(self) -> None:
path = self.write(self.command(contract="0" * 40))
self.assertFalse(self.watcher().process_path(path))
self.assertTrue((self.config.dead_letter_dir / path.name).is_file())
db = sqlite3.connect(self.config.database_path)
self.assertEqual(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM commands").fetchone()[0], 0)
def test_duplicate_id_with_different_payload_is_dead_lettered(self) -> None:
first = self.write(self.command(), "first.json")
self.assertTrue(self.watcher().process_path(first))
second = self.write(self.command(text="different"), "second.json")
self.assertFalse(self.watcher().process_path(second))
self.assertEqual(self.row()["status"], "COMPLETED")
self.assertTrue((self.config.dead_letter_dir / second.name).is_file())
def test_same_work_unit_with_different_command_id_is_not_executed(self) -> None:
first = self.write(self.command(), "first.json")
self.assertTrue(self.watcher().process_path(first))
second_command = self.command(command_id="cmd-2")
second = self.write(second_command, "second.json")
self.assertFalse(self.watcher().process_path(second))
self.assertEqual(self.exec_count, 1)
self.assertTrue((self.config.dead_letter_dir / second.name).is_file())
def test_two_workers_cannot_hold_same_lease(self) -> None:
path = self.write(self.command())
one = self.watcher(worker_id="worker-one")
command, digest = one._read_command(path)
one._register(command, digest, path)
self.assertIsNotNone(one._claim("cmd-1"))
two = self.watcher(worker_id="worker-two")
self.assertIsNone(two._claim("cmd-1"))
def test_stale_lease_is_recovered(self) -> None:
path = self.write(self.command())
one = self.watcher(worker_id="worker-one")
command, digest = one._read_command(path)
one._register(command, digest, path)
one._claim("cmd-1")
self.clock.value += 11
self.assertIsNotNone(self.watcher(worker_id="worker-two")._claim("cmd-1"))
def test_end_post_retry_does_not_execute_twice(self) -> None:
calls = 0
attempted_end_events: list[dict] = []
def poster(event: dict) -> None:
nonlocal calls
calls += 1
if event["event_type"] == "work_unit_ended":
attempted_end_events.append(event)
if calls == 2:
raise WatcherError("temporary")
self.events.append(event)
path = self.write(self.command())
watcher = self.watcher(event_poster=poster)
self.assertFalse(watcher.process_path(path))
self.assertEqual(self.row()["phase"], "END")
self.assertEqual(self.exec_count, 1)
self.clock.value += 3
self.assertTrue(watcher.process_path(path))
self.assertEqual(self.exec_count, 1)
self.assertEqual(len(attempted_end_events), 2)
self.assertEqual(attempted_end_events[0], attempted_end_events[1])
self.assertEqual(self.row()["status"], "COMPLETED")
def test_failure_exhaustion_moves_to_dead_letter(self) -> None:
executions = 0
def fail(_command: dict) -> dict:
nonlocal executions
executions += 1
raise WatcherError("executor failure")
path = self.write(self.command())
watcher = self.watcher(executor=fail)
for _ in range(3):
self.assertFalse(watcher.process_path(path))
self.clock.value += 3
self.assertEqual(self.row()["status"], "DEAD_LETTER")
self.assertEqual(executions, 1)
self.assertTrue((self.config.dead_letter_dir / path.name).is_file())
def test_symlink_command_is_rejected_without_following(self) -> None:
outside = self.root / "outside.json"
outside.write_text(json.dumps(self.command()), encoding="utf-8")
link = self.config.active_dir / "link.json"
os.symlink(outside, link)
self.assertFalse(self.watcher().process_path(link))
self.assertTrue(outside.is_file())
self.assertTrue((self.config.dead_letter_dir / link.name).is_symlink())
def test_codex_mode_fails_closed_when_executor_absent(self) -> None:
path = self.write(self.command(kind="codex"))
watcher = CommandWatcher(self.config, clock=self.clock, event_poster=self.events.append)
self.assertFalse(watcher.process_path(path))
self.assertEqual(self.row()["phase"], "EXECUTE")
self.assertIn("codex_executor_unavailable", self.row()["last_error"])
def test_validation_rejects_unknown_fields(self) -> None:
command = self.command()
command["secret"] = "must-not-be-accepted"
with self.assertRaisesRegex(WatcherError, "invalid_command_fields"):
validate_command(command, CONTRACT)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-774
View File
@@ -1,774 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import stat
from pathlib import Path
import tempfile
import time
import unittest
import urllib.error
from unittest import mock
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.clients import ResponsesClient, WorkspaceAgentClient
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.config import Config
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.dispatch import DispatchSink
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.errors import ConflictError, DispatchError, ValidationError
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.models import Decision, Event
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.service import Runtime
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.store import Store
from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.sync import OpenClawSynchronizer, lifecycle_record
from scripts import report_orchestrator_event
CONTRACT = "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc"
BASE = "8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575"
def event_payload(**overrides):
value = {
"schema_version": 1,
"project_key": "v2r1-personal-weixin",
"contract_commit": CONTRACT,
"event_id": "evt-001",
"source_agent": "openclaw",
"event_type": "work_unit_completed",
"work_unit_id": "P1-REACK",
"status": "PASS",
"state_version": 0,
"implementation_commit": None,
"result_commit": None,
"blocker": None,
"evidence_refs": [],
"payload": {},
}
value.update(overrides)
return value
def decision_payload(**overrides):
value = {
"schema_version": 1,
"project_key": "v2r1-personal-weixin",
"contract_commit": CONTRACT,
"event_id": "evt-001",
"expected_state_version": 0,
"verdict": "DISPATCH",
"state_updates": [
{"key": "P1_REPAIR3_CODE", "value": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED"},
{"key": "current_gate", "value": "R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY"},
],
"next_work_units": [
{
"id": "R0-DISCOVER",
"track_id": "R_RUNNER",
"gate_id": "R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY",
"primary_agent": "openclaw",
"fallback_agent": "codex",
"clean_base_commit": BASE,
"allowed_paths": [],
"required_checks": ["secret_provider_metadata"],
"forbidden_operations": ["force_push"],
"instruction": "Discover provider metadata without reading secrets.",
}
],
"requires_human_input": False,
"stop_reason": None,
}
value.update(overrides)
return value
class ModelTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_event_accepts_valid_payload(self):
event = Event.from_dict(event_payload())
self.assertEqual(event.event_id, "evt-001")
self.assertEqual(len(event.digest()), 64)
def test_event_rejects_extra_fields(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
Event.from_dict(event_payload(extra=True))
def test_event_rejects_invalid_contract_oid(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
Event.from_dict(event_payload(contract_commit="abc"))
def test_decision_requires_work_unit_for_dispatch(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
Decision.from_dict(decision_payload(next_work_units=[]))
def test_decision_rejects_same_primary_fallback(self):
value = decision_payload()
value["next_work_units"][0]["fallback_agent"] = "openclaw"
with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
Decision.from_dict(value)
def test_non_dispatch_rejects_work_units(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
Decision.from_dict(decision_payload(verdict="BLOCKED"))
class ClientTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_workspace_trigger_accepts_202_without_run_id(self):
event = Event.from_dict(event_payload())
response = mock.MagicMock()
response.status = 202
response.read.return_value = b""
response.__enter__.return_value = response
response.__exit__.return_value = False
with mock.patch(
"services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.clients.urllib.request.urlopen",
return_value=response,
) as call:
WorkspaceAgentClient("agtch_test", "token").trigger(event)
request = call.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(request.headers["Idempotency-key"], "evt-001")
def test_responses_background_start_and_poll(self):
event = Event.from_dict(event_payload())
decision = decision_payload()
client = ResponsesClient("key", "gpt-test")
with mock.patch.object(
client,
"_request",
side_effect=[
{"id": "resp_123", "status": "queued"},
{
"id": "resp_123",
"status": "completed",
"output": [
{
"content": [
{
"type": "output_text",
"text": json.dumps(decision),
}
]
}
],
},
],
):
response_id = client.start(event)
status, parsed = client.poll(response_id)
self.assertEqual(response_id, "resp_123")
self.assertEqual(status, "completed")
self.assertEqual(parsed.event_id, "evt-001")
def test_responses_poll_keeps_queued_state(self):
client = ResponsesClient("key", "gpt-test")
with mock.patch.object(
client,
"_request",
return_value={"id": "resp_123", "status": "in_progress"},
):
status, parsed = client.poll("resp_123")
self.assertEqual(status, "in_progress")
self.assertIsNone(parsed)
def test_responses_poll_queued_in_progress_completed_sequence(self):
client = ResponsesClient("key", "gpt-test")
completed = {
"status": "completed",
"output": [{"content": [{"type": "output_text", "text": json.dumps(decision_payload())}]}],
}
with mock.patch.object(
client,
"_request",
side_effect=[{"status": "queued"}, {"status": "in_progress"}, completed],
):
self.assertEqual(client.poll("resp_123"), ("queued", None))
self.assertEqual(client.poll("resp_123"), ("in_progress", None))
status, decision = client.poll("resp_123")
self.assertEqual(status, "completed")
self.assertEqual(decision.event_id, "evt-001")
def test_responses_invalid_completed_decision_fails_closed(self):
client = ResponsesClient("key", "gpt-test")
payload = {"status": "completed", "output": [{"content": [{"type": "output_text", "text": "{}"}]}]}
with mock.patch.object(client, "_request", return_value=payload):
with self.assertRaises(ValidationError):
client.poll("resp_123")
class StoreTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.store = Store(Path(self.temp.name) / "state.sqlite3")
def tearDown(self):
self.store.close()
self.temp.cleanup()
def test_event_idempotency(self):
event = Event.from_dict(event_payload())
created, _ = self.store.register_event(event)
duplicate, _ = self.store.register_event(event)
self.assertTrue(created)
self.assertFalse(duplicate)
def test_event_payload_conflict_rejected(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
with self.assertRaises(ConflictError):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload(status="FAIL")))
def test_stale_state_version_rejected(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
with self.assertRaises(ConflictError):
self.store.register_event(
Event.from_dict(event_payload(event_id="evt-002", state_version=1))
)
def test_lease_claim_prevents_double_claim(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
first = self.store.claim_events(
owner="one", statuses=("RECEIVED",), limit=5, lease_seconds=60
)
second_store = Store(Path(self.temp.name) / "state.sqlite3")
try:
second = second_store.claim_events(
owner="two", statuses=("RECEIVED",), limit=5, lease_seconds=60
)
finally:
second_store.close()
self.assertEqual(len(first), 1)
self.assertEqual(second, [])
def test_workspace_timeout_claim_prevents_double_worker(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
self.store.update_event_trigger("evt-001", status="AWAITING_DECISION", channel="workspace_agent", remote_id=None)
self.store._conn().execute("UPDATE events SET updated_at=0 WHERE event_id='evt-001'")
first = self.store.claim_workspace_timeouts(owner="one", older_than=1, limit=5, lease_seconds=60)
second = self.store.claim_workspace_timeouts(owner="two", older_than=1, limit=5, lease_seconds=60)
self.assertEqual(len(first), 1)
self.assertEqual(second, [])
def test_response_poll_claim_prevents_double_worker(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
self.store.update_event_trigger("evt-001", status="POLLING_RESPONSE", channel="responses_api", remote_id="resp_123")
first = self.store.claim_response_polls(owner="one", limit=5, lease_seconds=60)
second = self.store.claim_response_polls(owner="two", limit=5, lease_seconds=60)
self.assertEqual(len(first), 1)
self.assertEqual(second, [])
def test_max_hops_limit(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
self.store._conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO gate_hops(project_key, gate_id, hops, updated_at)
VALUES ('v2r1-personal-weixin', 'R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY', 1, 0)
"""
)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ConflictError, "max_hops_exceeded"):
self.store.apply_decision(
Decision.from_dict(decision_payload()),
max_hops_per_gate=1,
max_same_blocker_retries=3,
)
def test_hop_limit_is_scoped_per_gate(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
first = Decision.from_dict(decision_payload())
self.assertEqual(
self.store.apply_decision(
first, max_hops_per_gate=1, max_same_blocker_retries=3
),
1,
)
self.store.register_event(
Event.from_dict(event_payload(event_id="evt-002", state_version=1))
)
second_value = decision_payload(
event_id="evt-002",
expected_state_version=1,
state_updates=[{"key": "current_gate", "value": "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE"}],
)
second_value["next_work_units"][0]["id"] = "P2-REVIEW"
second_value["next_work_units"][0]["gate_id"] = "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE"
self.assertEqual(
self.store.apply_decision(
Decision.from_dict(second_value),
max_hops_per_gate=1,
max_same_blocker_retries=3,
),
2,
)
self.store.register_event(
Event.from_dict(event_payload(event_id="evt-003", state_version=2))
)
third_value = decision_payload(
event_id="evt-003",
expected_state_version=2,
state_updates=[{"key": "current_gate", "value": "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE"}],
)
third_value["next_work_units"][0]["id"] = "P2-REVIEW-RETRY"
third_value["next_work_units"][0]["gate_id"] = "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE"
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ConflictError, "max_hops_exceeded"):
self.store.apply_decision(
Decision.from_dict(third_value),
max_hops_per_gate=1,
max_same_blocker_retries=3,
)
def test_decision_advances_state_and_creates_outbox(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
version = self.store.apply_decision(
Decision.from_dict(decision_payload()),
max_hops_per_gate=20,
max_same_blocker_retries=3,
)
self.assertEqual(version, 1)
state = self.store.project_state("v2r1-personal-weixin")
self.assertEqual(state["state_version"], 1)
rows = self.store.claim_outbox(owner="x", limit=10, lease_seconds=60)
self.assertEqual(len(rows), 1)
def test_decision_idempotency(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
decision = Decision.from_dict(decision_payload())
first = self.store.apply_decision(
decision, max_hops_per_gate=20, max_same_blocker_retries=3
)
second = self.store.apply_decision(
decision, max_hops_per_gate=20, max_same_blocker_retries=3
)
self.assertEqual(first, second)
def test_same_blocker_limit(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
decision = Decision.from_dict(
decision_payload(
verdict="BLOCKED",
next_work_units=[],
stop_reason="SAME_BLOCKER",
)
)
self.store.apply_decision(
decision, max_hops_per_gate=20, max_same_blocker_retries=1
)
# New event at next state with the same blocker exceeds the configured limit.
self.store.register_event(
Event.from_dict(event_payload(event_id="evt-002", state_version=1))
)
decision2 = Decision.from_dict(
decision_payload(
event_id="evt-002",
expected_state_version=1,
verdict="BLOCKED",
next_work_units=[],
stop_reason="SAME_BLOCKER",
)
)
with self.assertRaises(ConflictError):
self.store.apply_decision(
decision2, max_hops_per_gate=20, max_same_blocker_retries=1
)
def test_project_summary_contains_counts(self):
self.store.register_event(Event.from_dict(event_payload()))
summary = self.store.project_summary("v2r1-personal-weixin")
self.assertEqual(summary["event_counts"]["RECEIVED"], 1)
class DispatchTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_dispatch_is_idempotent(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp:
outbox = Path(temp) / "outbox"
queue = Path(temp) / "queue"
outbox.mkdir(mode=0o700)
queue.mkdir(mode=0o2770)
queue.chmod(0o2770)
sink = DispatchSink(outbox, queue, CONTRACT)
record = {
"work_unit_id": "R0-DISCOVER",
"event_id": "evt-001",
"assigned_agent": "openclaw",
"payload_json": json.dumps(decision_payload()["next_work_units"][0]),
}
first = sink.dispatch(record)
second = sink.dispatch(record)
self.assertEqual(first, second)
self.assertTrue(first[0].exists())
self.assertTrue(first[1].exists())
self.assertEqual(stat.S_IMODE(first[1].stat().st_mode), 0o640)
def test_dispatch_rejects_path_escape(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp:
outbox = Path(temp) / "outbox"
queue = Path(temp) / "queue"
outbox.mkdir(mode=0o700)
queue.mkdir(mode=0o2770)
queue.chmod(0o2770)
sink = DispatchSink(outbox, queue, CONTRACT)
with self.assertRaises(DispatchError):
sink.dispatch(
{
"work_unit_id": "../escape",
"event_id": "evt-001",
"assigned_agent": "openclaw",
"payload_json": "{}",
}
)
def test_dispatch_rejects_existing_symlink_target(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp:
outbox = Path(temp) / "outbox"
queue = Path(temp) / "queue"
outbox.mkdir(mode=0o700)
queue.mkdir(mode=0o2770)
queue.chmod(0o2770)
sink = DispatchSink(outbox, queue, CONTRACT)
target = Path(temp) / "target"
target.write_text("x")
pending = outbox / "dispatched"
pending.mkdir(mode=0o700)
(pending / "R0-DISCOVER.json").symlink_to(target)
with self.assertRaises(DispatchError):
sink.dispatch(
{
"work_unit_id": "R0-DISCOVER",
"event_id": "evt-001",
"assigned_agent": "openclaw",
"payload_json": json.dumps(decision_payload()["next_work_units"][0]),
}
)
class SyncTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_lifecycle_record_is_stable(self):
one = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=CONTRACT,
project_key="v2r1",
kind="TASK_STARTED",
work_unit_id="R0",
payload={"status": "RUNNING"},
)
two = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=CONTRACT,
project_key="v2r1",
kind="TASK_STARTED",
work_unit_id="R0",
payload={"status": "RUNNING"},
)
self.assertEqual(one["sync_id"], two["sync_id"])
def test_file_sync_is_idempotent(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp:
root = Path(temp)
root.chmod(0o2750)
sync = OpenClawSynchronizer(root)
record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=CONTRACT,
project_key="v2r1",
kind="PROJECT_SUMMARY",
work_unit_id=None,
payload={"done": 1},
)
first = sync.emit(record)
second = sync.emit(record)
self.assertEqual(first, second)
def test_http_failure_keeps_file_for_retry(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp:
root = Path(temp)
root.chmod(0o2750)
sync = OpenClawSynchronizer(root, endpoint="https://openclaw.invalid/events")
record = lifecycle_record(
contract_commit=CONTRACT,
project_key="v2r1",
kind="PROJECT_COMPLETED",
work_unit_id=None,
payload={"done": 1},
)
with mock.patch(
"services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.sync.urllib.request.urlopen",
side_effect=OSError("offline"),
):
with self.assertRaises(DispatchError):
sync.emit(record)
pending = root / "pending" / f"{record['sync_id']}.json"
self.assertTrue(pending.exists())
response = mock.MagicMock(status=202)
response.__enter__.return_value = response
response.__exit__.return_value = False
with mock.patch(
"services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.sync.urllib.request.urlopen",
return_value=response,
):
self.assertEqual(sync.emit(record), pending)
class ReporterTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_http_failure_falls_back_to_file_inbox(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp:
root = Path(temp)
inbox = root / "inbox"
inbox.mkdir(mode=0o2770)
inbox.chmod(0o2770)
token = root / "token"
token.write_text("not-a-real-secret", encoding="utf-8")
token.chmod(0o600)
argv = [
"report_orchestrator_event.py",
"--project-key", "v2r1-personal-weixin",
"--contract-commit", CONTRACT,
"--event-id", "evt-http-fallback",
"--source-agent", "codex",
"--event-type", "work_unit_completed",
"--work-unit-id", "P1-REACK",
"--status", "PASS",
"--state-version", "0",
"--endpoint", "https://gateway.invalid",
"--token-file", str(token),
"--inbox-dir", str(inbox),
]
with mock.patch("sys.argv", argv), mock.patch(
"scripts.report_orchestrator_event.urllib.request.urlopen",
side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("offline"),
):
self.assertEqual(report_orchestrator_event.main(), 0)
pending = inbox / "pending/evt-http-fallback.json"
self.assertTrue(pending.exists())
self.assertEqual(stat.S_IMODE(pending.stat().st_mode), 0o640)
def test_payload_symlink_is_rejected(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp:
root = Path(temp)
target = root / "payload.json"
target.write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
target.chmod(0o600)
link = root / "payload-link.json"
link.symlink_to(target)
argv = [
"report_orchestrator_event.py",
"--project-key", "v2r1-personal-weixin",
"--contract-commit", CONTRACT,
"--event-id", "evt-symlink",
"--source-agent", "codex",
"--event-type", "work_unit_completed",
"--work-unit-id", "P1-REACK",
"--status", "PASS",
"--state-version", "0",
"--payload-file", str(link),
"--inbox-dir", str(root / "inbox"),
]
with mock.patch("sys.argv", argv), self.assertRaisesRegex(
Exception, "symlink_rejected"
):
report_orchestrator_event.main()
class RuntimePollingTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.root = Path(self.temp.name)
for name in ("events", "decisions", "outbox", "etc"):
(self.root / name).mkdir(mode=0o700)
for name in ("sync", "commands"):
(self.root / name).mkdir(mode=0o2750)
(self.root / name).chmod(0o2750)
for name, value in (
("inbound.token", "inbound"),
("callback.token", "callback"),
("workspace.token", "workspace"),
):
path = self.root / "etc" / name
path.write_text(value)
path.chmod(0o600)
config = {
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 18920,
"project_key": "v2r1-personal-weixin-production",
"database_path": str(self.root / "state.sqlite3"),
"event_inbox_dir": str(self.root / "events"),
"decision_inbox_dir": str(self.root / "decisions"),
"dispatch_outbox_dir": str(self.root / "outbox"),
"openclaw_sync_dir": str(self.root / "sync"),
"command_queue_dir": str(self.root / "commands"),
"inbound_token_file": str(self.root / "etc/inbound.token"),
"callback_token_file": str(self.root / "etc/callback.token"),
"contract_commit": CONTRACT,
"workspace_agent": {
"trigger_id": "agtch_test",
"access_token_file": str(self.root / "etc/workspace.token"),
},
"responses_fallback": {
"api_key_file": None,
"model": None,
},
"polling": {
"interval_seconds": 1,
"summary_interval_seconds": 10,
},
"loop_controls": {
"callback_timeout_seconds": 30,
"lease_seconds": 10,
"retry_base_seconds": 1,
"max_retries": 2,
"max_same_blocker_retries": 2,
"max_hops_per_gate": 20,
},
"openclaw_sync": {"endpoint": None, "token_file": None},
"git_poll": {
"enabled": False,
"bare_repo": None,
"ref_prefixes": [],
"interval_seconds": 30,
},
}
config_path = self.root / "etc/config.json"
config_path.write_text(json.dumps(config))
config_path.chmod(0o600)
os.environ["AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_CONFIG_OWNER_UID"] = str(os.getuid())
os.environ["AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_OWNER_UID"] = str(os.getuid())
self.runtime = Runtime(Config.from_file(config_path))
def tearDown(self):
self.runtime.store.close()
self.temp.cleanup()
os.environ.pop("AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_CONFIG_OWNER_UID", None)
os.environ.pop("AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_OWNER_UID", None)
def test_file_event_polling_and_workspace_trigger(self):
pending = self.root / "events/pending"
pending.mkdir(mode=0o2770)
pending.chmod(0o2770)
(pending / "evt-001.json").write_text(json.dumps(event_payload()))
(pending / "evt-001.json").chmod(0o640)
with mock.patch.object(self.runtime.workspace, "trigger") as trigger:
self.runtime.poll_once()
trigger.assert_called_once()
processed = self.root / "events/processed/evt-001.json"
self.assertTrue(processed.exists())
def test_workspace_timeout_uses_responses_fallback(self):
self.runtime.submit_event(event_payload())
self.runtime.store.update_event_trigger(
"evt-001", status="AWAITING_DECISION", channel="workspace_agent", remote_id=None
)
self.runtime.store._conn().execute("UPDATE events SET updated_at=0 WHERE event_id='evt-001'")
fallback = mock.Mock()
fallback.start.return_value = "resp_fallback"
self.runtime.responses = fallback
self.runtime.process_workspace_timeouts()
row = self.runtime.store._conn().execute(
"SELECT status, channel, remote_id FROM events WHERE event_id='evt-001'"
).fetchone()
self.assertEqual(tuple(row), ("POLLING_RESPONSE", "responses_api", "resp_fallback"))
fallback.start.assert_called_once()
def test_workspace_callback_timeout_reaches_dead_letter_without_fallback(self):
self.runtime.submit_event(event_payload())
self.runtime.store.update_event_trigger(
"evt-001", status="AWAITING_DECISION", channel="workspace_agent", remote_id=None
)
self.runtime.store._conn().execute(
"UPDATE events SET attempts=2, updated_at=0 WHERE event_id='evt-001'"
)
self.assertIsNone(self.runtime.responses)
self.runtime.process_workspace_timeouts()
row = self.runtime.store._conn().execute(
"SELECT status, attempts FROM events WHERE event_id='evt-001'"
).fetchone()
self.assertEqual(tuple(row), ("DEAD_LETTER", 3))
def test_response_poll_limit_dead_letters_queued_response(self):
self.runtime.submit_event(event_payload())
self.runtime.store.update_event_trigger(
"evt-001",
status="POLLING_RESPONSE",
channel="responses_api",
remote_id="resp-stuck",
)
self.runtime.store._conn().execute(
"UPDATE events SET attempts=2, next_attempt_at=0 WHERE event_id='evt-001'"
)
fallback = mock.Mock()
fallback.poll.return_value = ("queued", None)
self.runtime.responses = fallback
self.runtime.poll_background_responses()
row = self.runtime.store._conn().execute(
"SELECT status, attempts FROM events WHERE event_id='evt-001'"
).fetchone()
self.assertEqual(tuple(row), ("DEAD_LETTER", 3))
def test_callback_rejects_wrong_contract(self):
self.runtime.submit_event(event_payload())
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ConflictError, "contract_version_mismatch"):
self.runtime.submit_decision(
decision_payload(contract_commit="f" * 40)
)
def test_task_start_and_end_are_synced(self):
start = Event.from_dict(
event_payload(
event_id="evt-start",
event_type="work_unit_started",
status="RUNNING",
)
)
self.runtime.submit_event(start.to_dict())
self.runtime.synchronize_openclaw()
pending = list((self.root / "sync/pending").glob("*.json"))
self.assertTrue(pending)
kinds = {json.loads(p.read_text())["kind"] for p in pending}
self.assertIn("TASK_STARTED", kinds)
def test_decision_dispatch_and_summary_sync(self):
self.runtime.submit_event(event_payload())
self.runtime.submit_decision(decision_payload())
self.runtime.dispatch_work_units()
self.runtime.synchronize_openclaw()
self.assertTrue(list((self.root / "commands/openclaw/pending").glob("*.json")))
kinds = {
json.loads(p.read_text())["kind"]
for p in (self.root / "sync/pending").glob("*.json")
}
self.assertIn("TASK_DISPATCHED", kinds)
self.assertIn("PROJECT_SUMMARY", kinds)
def test_poll_once_ingests_decision_file(self):
self.runtime.submit_event(event_payload())
pending = self.root / "decisions/pending"
pending.mkdir(mode=0o2770)
pending.chmod(0o2770)
(pending / "decision.json").write_text(json.dumps(decision_payload()))
(pending / "decision.json").chmod(0o640)
self.runtime.poll_once()
self.assertTrue((self.root / "decisions/processed/decision.json").exists())
def test_git_ref_polling_baselines_then_emits_change(self):
object.__setattr__(self.runtime.config, "git_poll_enabled", True)
object.__setattr__(self.runtime.config, "git_poll_bare_repo", self.root / "repo.git")
object.__setattr__(self.runtime.config, "git_poll_ref_prefixes", ("refs/heads/main",))
oid1 = "1" * 40
oid2 = "2" * 40
first = mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout=f"refs/heads/main {oid1}\n", stderr="")
second = mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout=f"refs/heads/main {oid2}\n", stderr="")
with mock.patch(
"services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.service.subprocess.run",
side_effect=[first, second],
):
self.runtime._next_git_poll = 0
self.runtime.poll_git_refs()
self.runtime._next_git_poll = 0
self.runtime.poll_git_refs()
summary = self.runtime.store.project_summary(
"v2r1-personal-weixin-production"
)
self.assertIsNotNone(summary)
self.assertEqual(summary["event_counts"]["RECEIVED"], 1)
def test_retry_backoff_is_bounded(self):
self.assertEqual(self.runtime._backoff(0), 1)
self.assertLessEqual(self.runtime._backoff(100), 3600)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -Eeuo pipefail
umask 0077
SOURCE_ROOT="${1:?source root required}"
ROOT="$(mktemp -d /tmp/aios-orchestrator-rollback-test.XXXXXX)"
trap 'rm -rf "$ROOT"' EXIT
INSTALL_ROOT="$ROOT/opt"
STATE_ROOT="$ROOT/state"
mkdir -p "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases" "$STATE_ROOT" "$ROOT/bin"
chmod 0700 "$STATE_ROOT"
OLD="$(printf 'a%.0s' {1..64})"
NEW="$(printf 'b%.0s' {1..64})"
mkdir "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$OLD" "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$NEW"
printf '%s\n' "$OLD" > "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$OLD/SOURCE_DIGEST"
printf '%s\n' "$NEW" > "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$NEW/SOURCE_DIGEST"
ln -s "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$NEW" "$INSTALL_ROOT/current"
python3 - "$STATE_ROOT/install-receipt.json" "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$NEW" "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$OLD" <<'PY'
import json, sys
with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump({
"schema_version": 1,
"source_digest": "b" * 64,
"current_release": sys.argv[2],
"previous_release": sys.argv[3],
"last_rollback": None,
}, handle)
PY
chmod 0600 "$STATE_ROOT/install-receipt.json"
cat > "$ROOT/bin/systemctl" <<'SH'
#!/bin/sh
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "${SYSTEMCTL_LOG:?}"
exit 0
SH
chmod 0755 "$ROOT/bin/systemctl"
: > "$ROOT/systemctl.log"
SYSTEMCTL_LOG="$ROOT/systemctl.log" PATH="$ROOT/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" INSTALL_ROOT="$INSTALL_ROOT" STATE_ROOT="$STATE_ROOT" \
bash "$SOURCE_ROOT/scripts/rollback_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh"
FIRST="$(readlink -f "$INSTALL_ROOT/current")"
SYSTEMCTL_LOG="$ROOT/systemctl.log" PATH="$ROOT/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" INSTALL_ROOT="$INSTALL_ROOT" STATE_ROOT="$STATE_ROOT" \
bash "$SOURCE_ROOT/scripts/rollback_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh"
SECOND="$(readlink -f "$INSTALL_ROOT/current")"
[[ "$FIRST" == "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$OLD" ]]
[[ "$SECOND" == "$FIRST" ]]
grep -Fxq 'stop aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer' "$ROOT/systemctl.log"
grep -Fxq 'stop aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.service' "$ROOT/systemctl.log"
grep -Fxq 'start aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer' "$ROOT/systemctl.log"
printf 'tampered\n' > "$INSTALL_ROOT/releases/$OLD/SOURCE_DIGEST"
if SYSTEMCTL_LOG="$ROOT/systemctl.log" PATH="$ROOT/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" \
INSTALL_ROOT="$INSTALL_ROOT" STATE_ROOT="$STATE_ROOT" \
bash "$SOURCE_ROOT/scripts/rollback_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo 'ROLLBACK_DIGEST_MISMATCH_TEST=FAIL' >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "ROLLBACK_DIGEST_MISMATCH_TEST=PASS"
echo "ROLLBACK_REPEAT_TEST=PASS"
+1 -454
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,11 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import io
import os
import signal
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest import TestCase
from unittest.mock import Mock, call, patch
from unittest.mock import patch
BACKEND_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "wechat_send_backend.py"
@@ -89,450 +80,6 @@ class WechatSendBackendTests(TestCase):
self.assertEqual(args[1]["content"], "hello")
self.assertFalse(args[1]["dry_run"])
def test_ucc_auth_is_authorization_header_not_argv_or_output(self):
secret = "ucc-super-secret-token"
class Response:
status = 200
def __enter__(self):
return self
def __exit__(self, *_args):
return False
def read(self, _limit=-1):
return b'{"ok":true,"status":"sent"}'
urlopen = Mock(return_value=Response())
output = io.StringIO()
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", secret),
patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", urlopen),
redirect_stdout(output),
redirect_stderr(output),
):
status, payload = self.backend._post_ucc(
"/api/internal/wechat/send", {"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello"}
)
request = urlopen.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), f"Bearer {secret}")
self.assertEqual(status, 200)
self.assertEqual(payload, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})
self.assertNotIn(secret, " ".join(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
self.assertNotIn(secret, output.getvalue())
self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
def test_ucc_paths_are_canonical_first_unique_and_bounded(self):
with patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"):
paths = self.backend._ucc_send_paths()
self.assertEqual(paths[0], "/api/internal/wechat/send")
self.assertLessEqual(len(paths), 2)
self.assertEqual(len(paths), len(set(paths)))
self.assertTrue(all(path.startswith("/") for path in paths))
def test_ucc_accepts_only_explicit_true_and_sent_when_not_dry_run(self):
self.assertTrue(self.backend._ucc_response_sent({"ok": True, "status": "sent"}))
for response in (
{"ok": 1, "status": "sent"},
{"ok": True, "status": "accepted"},
{"ok": False, "status": "sent"},
{"status": "sent"},
):
with self.subTest(response=response):
self.assertFalse(self.backend._ucc_response_sent(response))
def test_ambiguous_canonical_failures_never_fallback(self):
secret = "raw-upstream-secret"
failures = (
TimeoutError(secret),
ConnectionError(secret),
self.backend._BackendProtocolError(secret),
RuntimeError(secret),
)
for failure in failures:
with self.subTest(failure=type(failure).__name__):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=failure) as post,
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
).to_dict()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_unavailable")
self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 1)
self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
def test_only_explicit_http_404_or_405_uses_legacy_fallback(self):
for http_status in (404, 405):
with self.subTest(http_status=http_status):
missing = urllib.error.HTTPError(
"http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send",
http_status,
"not found",
{},
None,
)
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
side_effect=[missing, (200, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})],
) as post,
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
).to_dict()
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["endpoint"], "/internal/channels/wechat/send")
self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 2)
def test_non_not_found_http_error_never_falls_back(self):
denied = urllib.error.HTTPError(
"http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send", 401, "denied", {}, None
)
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=denied) as post:
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="chat-001", content="hello").to_dict()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
post.assert_called_once()
def test_ucc_rejection_does_not_expose_raw_error_or_secret(self):
secret = "provider-password=secret-value"
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(200, {"ok": False, "status": "failed", "error": secret}),
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
).to_dict()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_rejected")
self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
def test_dry_run_requires_dry_run_status_and_never_reports_sent(self):
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": "dry_run"}),
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=True
).to_dict()
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["status"], "dry_run")
self.assertNotEqual(result["status"], "sent")
for dry_run, upstream_status in ((True, "sent"), (False, "dry_run")):
with self.subTest(dry_run=dry_run, upstream_status=upstream_status):
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": upstream_status}),
):
rejected = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=dry_run
).to_dict()
self.assertFalse(rejected["ok"])
self.assertEqual(rejected["status"], "failed")
def test_invalid_provider_message_id_never_reverses_confirmed_send(self):
invalid_values = (
"\ud800",
"contains\x00control",
"x" * (self.backend.MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES + 1),
{"not": "a string"},
)
for provider_message_id in invalid_values:
with self.subTest(value=repr(provider_message_id)[:40]):
with patch.object(
self.backend,
"_post_ucc",
return_value=(
200,
{
"ok": True,
"status": "sent",
"provider_message_id": provider_message_id,
},
),
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello"
).to_dict()
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["status"], "sent")
self.assertNotIn("provider_message_id", result)
def test_openclaw_2026_6_11_commands_have_no_unsupported_global_gateway(self):
completed = SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout='{"channels": []}')
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "OPENCLAW_BIN", "/usr/local/bin/openclaw"),
patch.object(self.backend, "_run_openclaw", return_value=completed) as run,
):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend.discover_openclaw_wechat_channel())
command = run.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(command, ["/usr/local/bin/openclaw", "channels", "list", "--json"])
self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(command))
def test_openclaw_output_overflow_terminates_while_process_is_running(self):
writer = (
"import os,time;"
f"os.write(1,b'x'*{self.backend.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 4096});"
"time.sleep(10)"
)
started = time.monotonic()
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw([sys.executable, "-c", writer], timeout=4)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
self.assertLess(elapsed, 2.0)
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
def test_openclaw_timeout_returns_failure_and_terminates_promptly(self):
started = time.monotonic()
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
[sys.executable, "-c", "import time;time.sleep(10)"], timeout=1
)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
def test_timeout_kills_inherited_pipe_descendant_after_parent_exits(self):
if os.name != "posix" or not Path("/proc").is_dir():
self.skipTest("POSIX process-group and procfs contract")
def process_is_running(pid):
try:
state = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text(encoding="utf-8").split()[2]
except (FileNotFoundError, IndexError, OSError):
return False
return state not in {"X", "Z"}
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
pid_path = Path(directory) / "descendant.pid"
descendant = "import time;time.sleep(30)"
launcher = (
"import pathlib,subprocess,sys;"
f"child=subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,'-c',{descendant!r}]);"
f"pathlib.Path({str(pid_path)!r}).write_text(str(child.pid),encoding='utf-8')"
)
started = time.monotonic()
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
[sys.executable, "-c", launcher], timeout=1
)
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
self.assertTrue(pid_path.is_file())
descendant_pid = int(pid_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
try:
deadline = time.monotonic() + 2
while process_is_running(descendant_pid) and time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(0.02)
self.assertFalse(process_is_running(descendant_pid))
finally:
if process_is_running(descendant_pid):
os.kill(descendant_pid, signal.SIGKILL)
self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
def test_process_tree_termination_uses_posix_process_group(self):
if os.name != "posix":
self.skipTest("POSIX process-group contract")
class Process:
pid = 43210
def __init__(self):
self.wait_count = 0
def poll(self):
return None
def wait(self, timeout):
self.wait_count += 1
if self.wait_count == 1:
raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(["openclaw"], timeout)
return -signal.SIGKILL
process = Process()
with patch.object(self.backend.os, "killpg") as killpg:
self.backend._terminate_process_tree(process)
self.assertEqual(
killpg.call_args_list,
[
call(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM),
call(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL),
],
)
def test_unsupported_and_generic_chat_backends_fail_closed(self):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "SEND_BACKEND", "openclaw-chat"),
patch.object(self.backend, "ucc_adapter_alive", return_value=False),
):
selected = self.backend.select_backend()
result = self.backend.send_message(target="chat-001", content="hello")
self.assertEqual(selected["backend"], "unavailable")
self.assertEqual(selected["reason"], "unsupported_backend")
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "unsupported_backend")
def test_invalid_or_oversized_input_is_rejected_before_network(self):
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
empty = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="", content="hello").to_dict()
oversized = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="x" * (self.backend.MAX_CONTENT_BYTES + 1)
).to_dict()
self.assertEqual(empty["code"], "invalid_input")
self.assertEqual(oversized["code"], "input_too_large")
post.assert_not_called()
def test_unpaired_surrogate_inputs_fail_closed_before_network(self):
cases = (
{"target": "\ud800", "content": "hello"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "\ud800"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "account_id": "\ud800"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "message_id": "\ud800"},
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "metadata": {"bad": "\ud800"}},
)
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
for kwargs in cases:
with self.subTest(field=next(reversed(kwargs))):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(**kwargs).to_dict()
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "invalid_input")
post.assert_not_called()
def test_deeply_nested_metadata_is_bounded_before_network(self):
metadata = {}
for _ in range(1200):
metadata = {"nested": metadata}
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello", metadata=metadata
).to_dict()
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "input_too_large")
post.assert_not_called()
def test_adapter_origin_must_be_allowlisted(self):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://evil.example:8443"),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
),
):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://adapter.example:8443"),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
("https://adapter.example:8443",),
),
):
self.assertEqual(
self.backend._adapter_base_url(), "https://adapter.example:8443"
)
def test_adapter_origin_rejects_scheme_userinfo_fragment_and_path(self):
invalid_origins = (
"ftp://127.0.0.1:18800",
"http://user:password@127.0.0.1:18800",
"http://127.0.0.1:18800#fragment",
"http://127.0.0.1:18800/base-path",
)
for origin in invalid_origins:
with self.subTest(origin=origin):
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", origin),
patch.object(
self.backend,
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
),
):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
def test_adapter_path_rejects_decoded_traversal(self):
for path in (
"/api/%2e%2e/send",
"/api/%2E%2E/send",
"/api/%2525252e%2525252e/send",
"/api/%252525252e%252525252e/send",
"/api/../send",
"/api/%zz/send",
):
with self.subTest(path=path):
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._safe_path(path))
def test_adapter_path_keeps_intended_safe_canonical_paths(self):
for path in (
"/api/internal/wechat/send",
"/internal/channels/wechat/send",
"/api/%7Ehealth/status",
):
with self.subTest(path=path):
self.assertEqual(self.backend._safe_path(path), path)
def test_redirects_are_refused_and_authorization_cannot_cross_origin(self):
handler = self.backend._NoRedirectHandler()
self.assertIsNone(
handler.redirect_request(
None,
None,
302,
"redirect",
{"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
"https://evil.example/steal",
)
)
redirected = urllib.error.HTTPError(
"http://127.0.0.1:18800/api/internal/wechat/send",
302,
"redirect",
{"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
None,
)
with (
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", "header-secret"),
patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", side_effect=redirected) as opened,
):
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
target="chat-001", content="hello"
).to_dict()
request = opened.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlsplit(request.full_url).netloc, "127.0.0.1:18800")
self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), "Bearer header-secret")
opened.assert_called_once()
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
if __name__ == "__main__":
import unittest
-63
View File
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import json
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
PATCHER_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint.py'
def load_patcher():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint', PATCHER_PATH)
assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def test_api_patch_is_idempotent_and_scoped() -> None:
patcher = load_patcher()
ts = '\n'.join([
'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
])
js = '\n'.join([
'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
])
types = 'export interface WeixinMessage {\n message_id?: number;\n}\n'
ts_once = patcher.patch_api_ts(ts)
js_once = patcher.patch_api_js(js)
types_once = patcher.patch_types_ts(types)
assert patcher.patch_api_ts(ts_once) == ts_once
assert patcher.patch_api_js(js_once) == js_once
assert patcher.patch_types_ts(types_once) == types_once
assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in ts_once
assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in js_once
assert 'message_id?: string | number;' in types_once
def test_node_reviver_preserves_only_weixin_exact_ids() -> None:
script = '''
const ids = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
const parsed = JSON.parse('{"ret":0,"seq":42,"msgs":[{"message_id":7482038281766381234,"create_time_ms":1783856936191,"item_list":[{"msg_id":"3123141975110186863"}]}]}', (key, value, context) => {
if (!ids.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
if (typeof value !== "number" || !context?.source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(context.source)) throw new Error("unsafe id");
return context.source;
});
console.log(JSON.stringify({ messageId: parsed.msgs[0].message_id, msgId: parsed.msgs[0].item_list[0].msg_id, seqType: typeof parsed.seq, timestampType: typeof parsed.msgs[0].create_time_ms }));
'''
completed = subprocess.run(['node', '-e', script], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
result = json.loads(completed.stdout)
assert result == {
'messageId': '7482038281766381234',
'msgId': '3123141975110186863',
'seqType': 'number',
'timestampType': 'number',
}
-563
View File
@@ -1,563 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import json
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
def load_js_process_helpers() -> str:
patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
def load_patcher_module() -> object:
patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def run_js_process_helpers(tmp_path: Path, body: str) -> dict:
js_process_helpers = load_js_process_helpers()
node_prelude = '\n'.join(
[
'const hermesTestFs = require("node:fs");',
'globalThis.existsSync = hermesTestFs.existsSync;',
'globalThis.readFileSync = hermesTestFs.readFileSync;',
'globalThis.writeFileSync = hermesTestFs.writeFileSync;',
'globalThis.mkdirSync = hermesTestFs.mkdirSync;',
'globalThis.appendFileSync = hermesTestFs.appendFileSync;',
'globalThis.path = require("node:path");',
'globalThis.logger = { info() {}, warn() {}, error() {} };',
]
)
node_script = tmp_path / 'hermes_image_followup_check.js'
node_script.write_text(node_prelude + '\n\n' + js_process_helpers + '\n\n' + body, encoding='utf-8')
completed = subprocess.run(['node', str(node_script)], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
return json.loads(completed.stdout.strip())
@pytest.mark.parametrize('is_ts', [True, False], ids=['ts', 'js'])
def test_replace_or_insert_process_helpers_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool) -> None:
patcher = load_patcher_module()
marker = 'export async function processOneMessage'
source = marker + '(message) {\n return message;\n}\n'
once = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(source, is_ts=is_ts)
twice = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(once, is_ts=is_ts)
helpers = patcher.TS_PROCESS_HELPERS if is_ts else patcher.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
assert helpers + '\n\n' + marker in once
assert twice == once
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
('is_ts', 'hook_name'),
[(True, 'TS_PROCESS_HOOK'), (False, 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK')],
ids=['ts', 'js'],
)
def test_remove_and_reinsert_process_hook_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, hook_name: str) -> None:
patcher = load_patcher_module()
hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
indent = ' ' if is_ts else ' '
needle = indent + 'ctx.CommandAuthorized = commandAuthorized;\n'
next_nonblank = indent + 'continueProcessing();\n'
def cycle(text: str) -> str:
without_hook = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
return without_hook.replace(needle, needle + hook + '\n', 1)
once = cycle(needle + next_nonblank)
twice = cycle(once)
assert hook + '\n' + next_nonblank in once
assert twice == once
def test_looks_like_hermes_image_followup_distinguishes_diagnostics_from_real_image_questions(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
cases = {
'diag_cache_expired': ('\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
'diag_cache_error_en': ('image cache error', False),
'diag_cache_expired_en': ('the image cache expired, please resend', False),
'diag_copying_text_shows_cache_error': ('\u4e3a\u4ec0\u4e48\u6211\u590d\u5236\u53d1\u7ed9\u4f60\u7684\u6587\u5b57\uff0c\u4f60\u90fd\u663e\u793a\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
'diag_not_image': ('\u8fd9\u4e0d\u662f\u56fe\u7247\uff0c\u662f\u6587\u5b57\u6d88\u606f', False),
'diag_text_not_image_en': ('this is a text message, not an image', False),
'diag_no_image_sent': ('\u6211\u6ca1\u6709\u53d1\u56fe\u7247', False),
'diag_system_logs': ('\u8bf7\u68c0\u67e5\u7cfb\u7edf\u65e5\u5fd7\uff0c\u4ece\u673a\u5236\u4e0a\u4fee\u590d\u9519\u8bef', False),
'image_cn_1': ('\u8bf7\u770b\u4e00\u4e0b\u8fd9\u5f20\u56fe\u7247', True),
'image_cn_2': ('\u8fd9\u56fe\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48', True),
'image_cn_3': ('\u8bc6\u522b\u56fe\u7247\u5185\u5bb9', True),
'image_en': ('look at this image', True),
}
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'const cases = '
+ json.dumps({key: text for key, (text, _) in cases.items()}, ensure_ascii=False)
+ ';\nconst results = {};\n'
+ 'for (const [key, text] of Object.entries(cases)) {\n'
+ ' results[key] = looksLikeHermesImageFollowup(text);\n'
+ '}\n'
+ 'console.log(JSON.stringify(results));\n',
)
for key, (_, expected) in cases.items():
assert results[key] is expected, f'{key}: expected {expected}, got {results[key]!r}'
def test_resolve_hermes_referenced_image_followup_requires_exact_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const fs = require("fs");',
f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
'const accountId = "account-a";',
'const senderId = "sender-b";',
'const exactQuotedId = "quoted-123";',
'const cache = {};',
'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
' mediaUrl: "",',
' timestampMs: Date.now(),',
' messageId: "latest-999",',
' mediaType: "image/png",',
'};',
'cache[hermesExactImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId, exactQuotedId)] = {',
' mediaUrl: "",',
' timestampMs: Date.now(),',
' messageId: exactQuotedId,',
' mediaType: "image/png",',
'};',
'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
'const generic = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", "quoted-999");',
'const exact = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId);',
'const forced = resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId, false, true);',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ generic, exact, forced }));',
]
),
)
assert results['generic']['imageIntent'] is False
assert results['generic']['matched'] is False
assert results['generic']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
assert results['exact']['imageIntent'] is True
assert results['exact']['matched'] is True
assert results['exact']['reason'] == 'cached_image_matched'
assert results['forced']['imageIntent'] is True
assert results['forced']['matched'] is True
def test_referenced_text_without_media_evidence_stays_out_of_image_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const fs = require("fs");',
f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
'const accountId = "account-a";',
'const senderId = "sender-b";',
'const cache = {};',
'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
' mediaUrl: "",',
' timestampMs: Date.now(),',
' messageId: "latest-999",',
' mediaType: "image/png",',
'};',
'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
'const full = { item_list: [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, id: "quoted-999" } } }] };',
'const hermesContent = "\u8fd9\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48";',
'const hermesReferenceContextPresent = hasHermesReferenceContext(full.item_list);',
'const hermesQuotedMessageId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(full.item_list);',
'const refMediaItem = undefined;',
'const hermesReferencedMediaIsImage = Boolean(refMediaItem && hermesCurrentMessageIsImage({}, refMediaItem));',
'const hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent = hermesReferenceContextPresent && !refMediaItem;',
'const hermesCurrentImage = false;',
'const hermesFollowup = hermesCurrentImage',
' ? { imageIntent: false, matched: false, reason: "current_image_message", cacheStrategy: "current", quotedMessageId: hermesQuotedMessageId }',
' : (hermesReferencedMediaIsImage',
' ? resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId, false, true)',
' : (hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent',
' ? resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId)',
' : resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent)));',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ hermesReferenceContextPresent, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesReferencedMediaIsImage, hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent, hermesFollowup }));',
]
),
)
assert results['hermesReferenceContextPresent'] is True
assert results['hermesQuotedMessageId'] == 'quoted-999'
assert results['hermesReferencedMediaIsImage'] is False
assert results['hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent'] is True
assert results['hermesFollowup']['imageIntent'] is False
assert results['hermesFollowup']['matched'] is False
assert results['hermesFollowup']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
def test_explicit_quoted_text_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 1, text_item: { text: "被引用的正文" } } } }];',
'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思?") : null;',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result }));',
]
),
)
assert results['available'] is True
assert results['result'] == {
'referenced': True,
'handled': False,
'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n被引用的正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思?\n[/当前问题]',
'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
}
def test_visible_ref_title_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { title: "客户端可见的引用正文", message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-123" } } }];',
'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思?");',
'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
]
),
)
assert results == {
'referenced': True,
'handled': False,
'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端可见的引用正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思?\n[/当前问题]',
'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
}
def test_nested_generic_title_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, title: "非协议引用摘要" } } }];',
'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思?");',
'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
]
),
)
assert results == {
'referenced': True,
'handled': True,
'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。',
'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
}
def test_exact_message_id_cache_resolves_server_reference_without_guessing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
'const accountId = "account-a";',
'const senderId = "sender-b";',
'const original = { item_list: [{ type: 1, msg_id: "7481729105240418312", text_item: { text: "客户端已经显示的原始正文" } }] };',
'rememberHermesTextMessage(accountId, senderId, original, "客户端已经显示的原始正文");',
'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } }, text_item: { text: "这是什么意思?" } }];',
'const quotedId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(quotedItems);',
'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, quotedId);',
'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "7481729105240418313");',
'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "这是什么意思?", exact);',
'const mode = (hermesTestFs.statSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE).mode & 0o777).toString(8);',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ quotedId, exact, wrong, resolved, mode }));',
]
),
)
assert results['quotedId'] == '7481729105240418312'
assert results['exact'] == '客户端已经显示的原始正文'
assert results['wrong'] == ''
assert results['resolved'] == {
'referenced': True,
'handled': False,
'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端已经显示的原始正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思?\n[/当前问题]',
'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
}
assert results['mode'] == '600'
def test_expired_message_id_cache_entry_is_not_resolved(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
'const key = hermesTextMessageCacheKey("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
'hermesTestFs.writeFileSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE, JSON.stringify({ [key]: { text: "过期正文", timestampMs: Date.now() - (8 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) } }), { encoding: "utf-8", mode: 0o600 });',
'const result = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ result }));',
]
),
)
assert results['result'] == ''
def test_unsafe_numeric_message_id_is_rejected_before_cache_keying(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const exactString = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: "7482038281766381234" });',
'const unsafeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 7482038281766381234 });',
'const safeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 12345 });',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ exactString, unsafeNumber: unsafeNumber ?? null, safeNumber }));',
]
),
)
assert results == {
'exactString': '7482038281766381234',
'unsafeNumber': None,
'safeNumber': '12345',
}
def test_exact_outbound_create_time_resolves_quoted_bot_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
'const accountId = "account-a";',
'const senderId = "sender-b";',
'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(accountId, senderId, "机器人出站正文", createTimeMs);',
'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "server-quoted", create_time_ms: createTimeMs } }, text_item: { text: "进展汇报" } }];',
'const referencedTime = findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(quotedItems);',
'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", referencedTime);',
'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", createTimeMs + 1);',
'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "进展汇报", exact);',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ referencedTime, exact, wrong, resolved }));',
]
),
)
assert results['referencedTime'] == '1783857900123'
assert results['exact'] == '机器人出站正文'
assert results['wrong'] == ''
assert results['resolved']['reason'] == 'quoted_text_resolved'
assert '机器人出站正文' in results['resolved']['prompt']
def test_outbound_create_time_collision_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第一条", createTimeMs);',
'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第二条", createTimeMs);',
'const resolved = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", undefined, createTimeMs);',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ resolved }));',
]
),
)
assert results['resolved'] == ''
def test_missing_quoted_text_fails_closed_without_model_prompt(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
results = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } } }];',
'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思?") : null;',
'let modelCalls = 0;',
'if (result && !result.handled) modelCalls += 1;',
'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result, modelCalls }));',
]
),
)
assert results['available'] is True
assert results['result'] == {
'referenced': True,
'handled': True,
'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。',
'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
}
assert results['modelCalls'] == 0
@pytest.mark.parametrize('hook_name', ['TS_PROCESS_HOOK', 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK'])
def test_process_hook_stops_unavailable_quote_before_model_dispatch(hook_name: str) -> None:
patcher = load_patcher_module()
hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
guard_name = 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD' if hook_name.startswith('TS_') else 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD'
guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
assert 'rememberHermesTextMessage(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, full, textBody)' in hook
assert 'findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(full.item_list)' in hook
assert 'resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesQuotedCreateTimeMs)' in hook
assert 'resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(full.item_list, hermesContent, hermesCachedQuotedText)' in hook
assert '!hermesQuotedTextContext.referenced && !textBody.startsWith("/")' in hook
assert 'ctx.Body = hermesQuotedTextContext.prompt' in hook
assert 'await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(hermesQuotedTextContext, dispatcher)' in guard
assert 'markDispatchIdle();' in guard
def test_dispatch_quoted_text_fail_closed_uses_dispatcher_without_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
result = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'(async () => {',
' const calls = [];',
' const dispatcher = {',
' sendFinalReply(payload) { calls.push(["final", payload]); },',
' markComplete() { calls.push(["complete"]); },',
' async waitForIdle() { calls.push(["idle"]); },',
' };',
' const context = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext([{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1" } } }], "这是什么意思?");',
' let modelCalls = 0;',
' const handled = await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(context, dispatcher);',
' if (!handled) modelCalls += 1;',
' console.log(JSON.stringify({ handled, modelCalls, calls }));',
'})();',
]
),
)
assert result['handled'] is True
assert result['modelCalls'] == 0
assert result['calls'] == [
['final', {'text': '无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。'}],
['complete'],
['idle'],
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
('is_ts', 'guard_name', 'needle'),
[
(True, 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', ' logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
(False, 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', ' logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
],
ids=['ts', 'js'],
)
def test_dispatch_guard_remove_and_reinsert_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, guard_name: str, needle: str) -> None:
patcher = load_patcher_module()
guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
def cycle(text: str) -> str:
without = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
return without.replace(needle, guard + '\n' + needle, 1)
once = cycle(needle)
twice = cycle(once)
assert guard + '\n' + needle in once
assert twice == once
def test_reference_metadata_content_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
result = run_js_process_helpers(
tmp_path,
'\n'.join(
[
'const items = [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1", content: "metadata only" } } }];',
'console.log(JSON.stringify(resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思?")));',
]
),
)
assert result['handled'] is True
assert result['reason'] == 'quoted_text_unavailable'
assert result['replyText'] == '无法读取被引用文字,请复制原文后再提问。'
def test_patch_plugin_process_only_skips_slash_and_channel(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
patcher = load_patcher_module()
calls: list[tuple[str, Path]] = []
def record(name: str, result):
def _inner(root: Path):
calls.append((name, root))
return result
return _inner
monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_ts', record('patch_ts', False))
monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_js', record('patch_js', False))
monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_process_messages', record('patch_process_messages', {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}))
monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_channel_files', record('patch_channel_files', {'src/channel.ts': False, 'dist/src/channel.js': False}))
monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'verify_plugin_hook', record('verify_plugin_hook', {
'hook_status': {},
'hook_installed': False,
'process_status': {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': True},
'process_hook_installed': True,
'channel_status': {},
'channel_hook_installed': False,
'dispatch_reference_found': False,
'dispatch_reference_files': [],
}))
result = patcher.patch_plugin(tmp_path, process_only=True)
assert calls == [
('patch_process_messages', tmp_path),
('verify_plugin_hook', tmp_path),
]
assert result['mode'] == 'process-only'
assert result['plugin_root'] == str(tmp_path)
assert result['slash_changes'] == {}
assert result['channel_changes'] == {}
assert result['process_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
assert result['behavior_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
assert result['verification']['process_hook_installed'] is True
def test_parse_args_supports_default_root_and_process_only_flag() -> None:
patcher = load_patcher_module()
defaults = patcher.parse_args([])
assert defaults.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
assert defaults.process_only is False
process_only = patcher.parse_args(['--process-only'])
assert process_only.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
assert process_only.process_only is True
custom_root = Path('/tmp/custom-plugin-root')
custom = patcher.parse_args([str(custom_root), '--process-only'])
assert custom.plugin_root == custom_root
assert custom.process_only is True
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
PATCHER_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes.py'
def load_patcher():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes', PATCHER_PATH)
assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def test_send_patch_adds_exact_create_time_and_is_idempotent() -> None:
patcher = load_patcher()
ts = '''function buildTextMessageReq(params: {
to: string;
text: string;
contextToken?: string;
runId?: string;
clientId: string;
}): SendMessageReq {
const { to, text, contextToken, runId, clientId } = params;
return { msg: { client_id: clientId, message_type: MessageType.BOT } };
}
export async function sendMessageWeixin(params: {}): Promise<{ messageId: string }> {
const { to, text, opts } = params;
const clientId = generateClientId();
const req = buildSendMessageReq({
payload: {},
clientId,
});
try {
await sendMessageApi({ body: req });
} catch (err) {
throw err;
}
return { messageId: clientId };
}
/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */'''
js = '''function buildTextMessageReq(params) {
const { to, text, contextToken, runId, clientId } = params;
return { msg: { client_id: clientId, message_type: MessageType.BOT } };
}
export async function sendMessageWeixin(params) {
const clientId = generateClientId();
const req = buildSendMessageReq({
payload: {},
clientId,
});
try {
await sendMessageApi({ body: req });
}
catch (err) {
throw err;
}
return { messageId: clientId };
}
/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */'''
ts_once = patcher.patch_send_ts(ts)
js_once = patcher.patch_send_js(js)
assert patcher.patch_send_ts(ts_once) == ts_once
assert patcher.patch_send_js(js_once) == js_once
for result in (ts_once, js_once):
assert 'const createTimeMs = Date.now();' in result
assert 'text item missing' in result
assert 'req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs' in result
assert 'req.msg.create_time_ms = createTimeMs' not in result
assert 'return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs }' in result
+33
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 Acceptance
## Tenant Isolation
- cross tenant memory access: DENY
- cross cell context: DENY
- cross tenant secret scope: DENY
- cross tenant queue claim: DENY
## Message Safety
- unsafe numeric message id: DENY
- exact reply resolution only: PASS
- quote text separate from command body: PASS
- heartbeat side effects: DENY
- cron side effects: DENY
- assistant output execution: DENY
## Hermes
- profile HOME isolation: PASS
- workspace escape: DENY
- tenant queue partition: PASS
## OpenClaw
- plugin manifest validation: PASS
- runtime hook registration: REQUIRED
- side effect approval: REQUIRED
## Release Gate
No production deployment until executable tests and runtime evidence pass.

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More