diagnosis: record admin workbench visibility gap for SR-04

commands/owner-requests/CMD-20260710-memory-index-rebuild.yaml

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-cmd_id: CMD-20260710-memory-index-rebuild
-operation: memory.index.rebuild
-risk: medium
-permission: OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL
-status: pending_owner_gate
-reason: Memory search is disabled because existing embedding index metadata does not match the current embedding provider configuration.
-requested_by: codex-chartgpt-bridge
-requested_at: "2026-07-10T08:00:00+08:00"
-command_key: openclaw.memory.index.force
-args:
-  force: true
-safety:
-  destructive: false
-  arbitrary_shell: false
-  credential_mutation: false
-  provider_mutation: false
-  external_network_write: false
-  production_data_delete: false
-  baseline_or_tag_mutation: false
-  main_branch_direct_write: false
-owner_gate:
-  required: true
-  approval_model: protected_branch_merge_or_signed_owner_commit
-  approved_by: null
-  approved_at: null
-  approval_commit: null
-execution:
-  runner: owner-maintenance-runner
-  lock_key: memory-index-rebuild
-  timeout_seconds: 1800
-  executed_by: null
-  executed_at: null
-  exit_code: null
-acceptance:
-  commands:
-    - openclaw memory search "V1R4C3"
-    - openclaw memory search "Gitea Branch Sync"
-    - openclaw memory search "Autonomous Controller"
-  expected:
-    - no_embedding_metadata_mismatch
-    - memory_search_returns_results
-    - memory_index_uses_current_embedding_provider
-success_signals:
-  - AIOS_OWNER_MAINTENANCE_MEMORY_INDEX_REBUILT
-  - AIOS_MEMORY_SEARCH_RESTORED
-rollback:
-  destructive: false
-  strategy: rebuild_previous_index_if_snapshot_exists

docs/owner-maintenance-gate.md

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# Owner Maintenance Gate
-
-This mechanism allows owner-approved non-dangerous maintenance actions without giving agents arbitrary host CLI access.
-
-## Permission tiers
-
-- READ_ONLY: status, health, baseline, versions, search inspection.
-- AUTO_PATCH: branch creation, repo file changes, patch commits, test/report artifacts.
-- OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL: owner may approve all non-destructive allowlisted maintenance command_keys.
-- OWNER_HIGH_RISK: main merge, baseline promotion, tag creation, credential/provider mutation, destructive cleanup, production restart, SSH/firewall changes.
-
-## Execution rule
-
-Agents can create requests. The runner can only execute fixed allowlist mappings:
-
-```text
-command_key: openclaw.memory.index.force
-argv: /usr/local/bin/openclaw memory index --force
-```
-
-The runner rejects arbitrary shell strings such as `bash -c`, `sh -c`, `curl | bash`, or recursive destructive commands.
-
-## Owner gate
-
-A request becomes executable only after protected-branch merge or signed owner commit fills:
-
-```yaml
-owner_gate:
-  approved_by: <owner>
-  approved_at: <timestamp>
-  approval_commit: <signed-owner-commit-sha>
-```
-
-## Memory index rebuild flow
-
-1. Detect embedding metadata mismatch.
-2. Create `commands/owner-requests/CMD-20260710-memory-index-rebuild.yaml`.
-3. Owner approves through GitOps owner gate.
-4. `runtime/owner_maintenance/allowlist_runner.py` validates safety metadata.
-5. Runner executes the fixed command vector.
-6. Runner records exit code and stdout/stderr hashes.
-7. Acceptance checks verify memory search works again.
-
-Expected signals:
-
-```text
-AIOS_OWNER_MAINTENANCE_MEMORY_INDEX_REBUILT
-AIOS_MEMORY_SEARCH_RESTORED
-```

docs/proposals/V1R4C4-SR04-admin-workbench-visibility-gap.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# V1R4C4 SR-04: Admin Workbench Visibility Gap
+
+Status: confirmed user-visible gap
+
+Decision state: activation-ready, gated behind reliability and isolation controls
+
+Current baseline: V1R4C3
+
+Date: 2026-07-11
+
+## User Report
+
+An administrator still cannot see newly expected functions in the workbench, including:
+
+- task progress;
+- process/flow diagrams;
+- new AIOS operational modules.
+
+## Current Diagnosis
+
+This is not currently classified as a browser cache issue or a single RBAC defect.
+
+The active baseline remains V1R4C3. Relevant workbench/portal/UI capability branches exist but have not been merged into the deployed baseline.
+
+Observed relevant candidate branches include:
+
+```text
+feature/v1r4c4-sr04-portal-aios-visibility-20260710
+patch/user-portal-me-route-diagnostics-20260709
+patch/user-portal-rbac-ops-dashboard
+patch/agent-observability-webui
+patch/autonomous-controller-dispatch-20260709
+patch/agent-event-bus-unified
+patch/agent-gpt-message-plane
+```
+
+Therefore, the administrator-visible gap is currently expected until SR-04 is merged and deployed.
+
+## Root Cause Category
+
+```text
+backend / governance capabilities exist or are staged
+        ↓
+admin workbench integration remains outside active baseline
+        ↓
+menu/routes/API contract not deployed to production workbench
+        ↓
+admin cannot see task progress or flow diagrams
+```
+
+## Required Admin Workbench Surface
+
+SR-04 must expose administrator-visible operational functions in the workbench.
+
+Minimum expected surfaces:
+
+1. Task progress view.
+2. Flow/process diagram view.
+3. Agent/operation status view.
+4. System health view.
+5. Search/governance module visibility where permitted.
+6. Owner/admin approval and gate status where permitted.
+
+## Required API/Contract Checks
+
+Before deployment, confirm workbench routes are backed by APIs or adapters for:
+
+```text
+task progress
+workflow graph / process diagram
+agent activity / observability
+system health
+governance / owner gate state
+```
+
+Existing portal candidates indicate related routes may include:
+
+```text
+/portal/me/aios/manifest
+/portal/me/aios/dashboard
+/portal/me/aios/health
+```
+
+Admin workbench must not rely on backend existence alone. The frontend menu, route registration, data adapters, and RBAC visibility must all be verified.
+
+## RBAC Requirements
+
+Administrator users must see admin-authorized modules, but not owner-only modules unless also owner-authorized.
+
+Required role checks:
+
+```text
+user
+  -> user-authorized modules only
+
+group_admin / admin
+  -> task progress, operations, health, agent/flow visibility
+
+owner
+  -> governance, architecture, approval, owner gate
+```
+
+## Gate Status
+
+SR-04 remains blocked from production merge/deploy until reliability gates are complete.
+
+Required before SR-04 deployment:
+
+1. SR-01 Gitea reliability sentinel remains healthy.
+2. SR-02 watcher cleanup is integrated and accepted.
+3. User-data isolation gate is accepted or explicitly scoped so SR-04 cannot expose cross-user/task data.
+4. Runtime acceptance is green.
+5. Admin workbench acceptance is green.
+
+## Admin Workbench Acceptance
+
+After deployment, verify as an administrator:
+
+- Workbench shows task progress.
+- Workbench shows flow/process diagram entry.
+- Workbench APIs return valid data.
+- Admin can see admin modules.
+- Admin cannot see owner-only modules unless authorized.
+- Empty states are explicit, not silent disappearance.
+- Missing backend data surfaces as a clear status message.
+
+## Interim Product Conclusion
+
+The current user-visible issue is a deployment/integration gap:
+
+```text
+SR-04 needed
+but still gated
+```
+
+The correct fix is controlled SR-04 integration after reliability and isolation gates, not ad hoc frontend exposure.
+
+## Recommended Next Step
+
+Prepare SR-04 admin workbench integration as the next visible-feature task immediately after SR-01/SR-02/security isolation gates are accepted.
+
+If administrator workbench visibility becomes urgent, create a narrow read-only admin workbench slice that exposes only already-authorized, non-cross-user data and still passes the user-data isolation gate.

patches/feature_v1r4c4-owner-maintenance-gate-v2-20260710.branch.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "type": "branch",
-  "branch": "feature/v1r4c4-owner-maintenance-gate-v2-20260710",
-  "base": "main",
-  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
-  "created_at": "2026-07-10T10:32:35Z",
-  "direct_main_push": false,
-  "owner_approval_required": true
-}

policies/owner-maintenance-gate.yaml

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-version: 1
-name: owner-maintenance-gate
-baseline: V1R4C3
-created_at: "2026-07-10"
-purpose: Owner-controlled non-dangerous maintenance permissions without arbitrary host CLI access.
-
-principles:
-  - agents_may_detect_and_request
-  - owner_may_approve_non_dangerous_actions
-  - runner_executes_only_allowlisted_command_keys
-  - no_arbitrary_shell
-  - protected_branch_merge_is_default_owner_gate
-  - every_execution_must_be_audited
-
-permission_tiers:
-  READ_ONLY:
-    agent_allowed: true
-    owner_allowed: true
-    requires_owner_gate: false
-  AUTO_PATCH:
-    agent_allowed: true
-    owner_allowed: true
-    requires_owner_gate: false
-  OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL:
-    description: Owner may execute all non-destructive allowlisted maintenance command_keys after owner gate approval.
-    agent_allowed: false
-    owner_allowed: true
-    requires_owner_gate: true
-    approval_model: protected_branch_merge_or_signed_owner_commit
-  OWNER_HIGH_RISK:
-    description: main merge, baseline promotion, tag creation, credential/provider mutation, destructive cleanup, production restart, SSH/firewall mutation.
-    agent_allowed: false
-    owner_allowed: true
-    requires_owner_gate: true
-    extra_review_required: true
-
-safety_classification:
-  non_dangerous_requirements:
-    destructive: false
-    arbitrary_shell: false
-    credential_mutation: false
-    provider_mutation: false
-    external_network_write: false
-    production_data_delete: false
-    baseline_or_tag_mutation: false
-    main_branch_direct_write: false
-    command_key_must_be_allowlisted: true
-  always_high_risk:
-    - merge_to_main
-    - baseline_promotion
-    - tag_creation
-    - credential_rotation
-    - embedding_provider_change
-    - database_delete_or_drop
-    - rm_recursive_or_force
-    - service_restart_production
-    - firewall_or_ssh_config_change
-    - arbitrary_bash_or_shell
-
-allowlist:
-  openclaw.memory.index.force:
-    permission: OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL
-    risk: medium
-    destructive: false
-    command_vector:
-      - /usr/local/bin/openclaw
-      - memory
-      - index
-      - --force
-    timeout_seconds: 1800
-    lock_key: memory-index-rebuild
-    acceptance:
-      - openclaw memory search "V1R4C3"
-      - openclaw memory search "Gitea Branch Sync"
-      - openclaw memory search "Autonomous Controller"
-    success_signals:
-      - AIOS_OWNER_MAINTENANCE_MEMORY_INDEX_REBUILT
-      - AIOS_MEMORY_SEARCH_RESTORED
-
-status: proposed

runtime/owner_maintenance/allowlist_runner.py

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Owner maintenance allowlist runner.
-
-Executes only approved command_key mappings. It never runs arbitrary shell strings.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import hashlib
-import json
-import subprocess
-import sys
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-try:
-    import yaml  # type: ignore
-except Exception:
-    yaml = None
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AllowedCommand:
-    command_key: str
-    argv: tuple[str, ...]
-    permission: str
-    risk: str
-    destructive: bool
-    timeout_seconds: int
-
-
-ALLOWED_COMMANDS: dict[str, AllowedCommand] = {
-    "openclaw.memory.index.force": AllowedCommand(
-        command_key="openclaw.memory.index.force",
-        argv=("/usr/local/bin/openclaw", "memory", "index", "--force"),
-        permission="OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL",
-        risk="medium",
-        destructive=False,
-        timeout_seconds=1800,
-    ),
-}
-
-DENY_FLAGS = {
-    "arbitrary_shell",
-    "credential_mutation",
-    "provider_mutation",
-    "external_network_write",
-    "production_data_delete",
-    "baseline_or_tag_mutation",
-    "main_branch_direct_write",
-}
-
-
-def sha256_text(value: str) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")).hexdigest()
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def load_request(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    if yaml is None:
-        raise RuntimeError("PyYAML is required to load owner request YAML")
-    data = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if not isinstance(data, dict):
-        raise ValueError("owner request must be a YAML object")
-    return data
-
-
-def validate_request(req: dict[str, Any]) -> AllowedCommand:
-    command_key = req.get("command_key")
-    if command_key not in ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
-        raise PermissionError(f"command_key is not allowlisted: {command_key}")
-    allowed = ALLOWED_COMMANDS[command_key]
-    if req.get("permission") != allowed.permission:
-        raise PermissionError("request permission does not match allowlist")
-    safety = req.get("safety", {})
-    if not isinstance(safety, dict):
-        raise PermissionError("safety metadata is required")
-    if bool(safety.get("destructive", True)) != allowed.destructive:
-        raise PermissionError("destructive flag does not match allowlist")
-    denied = [flag for flag in DENY_FLAGS if safety.get(flag) is True]
-    if denied:
-        raise PermissionError(f"denied safety flags: {denied}")
-    gate = req.get("owner_gate", {})
-    if not isinstance(gate, dict) or gate.get("required") is not True:
-        raise PermissionError("owner_gate.required must be true")
-    if not gate.get("approved_by") or not gate.get("approved_at") or not gate.get("approval_commit"):
-        raise PermissionError("owner approval fields are required before execution")
-    return allowed
-
-
-def run_allowed_command(allowed: AllowedCommand, dry_run: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    if dry_run:
-        return {"dry_run": True, "argv": list(allowed.argv), "exit_code": None}
-    proc = subprocess.run(
-        list(allowed.argv),
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        timeout=allowed.timeout_seconds,
-    )
-    return {
-        "dry_run": False,
-        "argv": list(allowed.argv),
-        "exit_code": proc.returncode,
-        "executed_at": utc_now(),
-        "stdout_sha256": sha256_text(proc.stdout),
-        "stderr_sha256": sha256_text(proc.stderr),
-    }
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run an owner-approved allowlisted maintenance request")
-    parser.add_argument("request", type=Path)
-    parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
-    args = parser.parse_args()
-    try:
-        req = load_request(args.request)
-        allowed = validate_request(req)
-        result = run_allowed_command(allowed, dry_run=args.dry_run)
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "ok", "command_key": allowed.command_key, "result": result}, indent=2))
-        return 0 if result.get("exit_code") in (None, 0) else int(result["exit_code"])
-    except Exception as exc:
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "error", "error": str(exc)}, indent=2), file=sys.stderr)
-        return 1
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())