docs(owner-gate): document owner maintenance gate

baseline/current.json

@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@
 {
- "current_baseline": "V1R4C5",
- "previous_baseline": "V1R4C3",
- "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T02:17:31+08:00",
- "git": "a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704",
- "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
- "promotion_reason": "V1R4C5 reliability, watcher cleanup, user data isolation gate, and admin workbench read-only preparation; memory search remains disabled",
- "constraints": {
-   "memory_search_enabled": false,
-   "force_push_allowed": false,
-   "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval": true
- }
+ "current_baseline": "V1R4C3",
+ "previous_baseline": "V1R3C1",
+ "promoted_at": "2026-07-09T17:44:57+08:00",
+ "git": "f5435e308794c737f3e39de3f6b79807486943c3",
+ "promoted_by": "openclaw",
+ "promotion_reason": "V1R4C3 autonomous operations, search gateway, task center, owner gate, and blocker self-optimization baseline promotion"
 }

commands/owner-requests/CMD-20260710-memory-index-rebuild.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+cmd_id: CMD-20260710-memory-index-rebuild
+operation: memory.index.rebuild
+risk: medium
+permission: OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL
+status: pending_owner_gate
+reason: Memory search is disabled because existing embedding index metadata does not match the current embedding provider configuration.
+requested_by: codex-chartgpt-bridge
+requested_at: "2026-07-10T08:00:00+08:00"
+command_key: openclaw.memory.index.force
+args:
+  force: true
+safety:
+  destructive: false
+  arbitrary_shell: false
+  credential_mutation: false
+  provider_mutation: false
+  external_network_write: false
+  production_data_delete: false
+  baseline_or_tag_mutation: false
+  main_branch_direct_write: false
+owner_gate:
+  required: true
+  approval_model: protected_branch_merge_or_signed_owner_commit
+  approved_by: null
+  approved_at: null
+  approval_commit: null
+execution:
+  runner: owner-maintenance-runner
+  lock_key: memory-index-rebuild
+  timeout_seconds: 1800
+  executed_by: null
+  executed_at: null
+  exit_code: null
+acceptance:
+  commands:
+    - openclaw memory search "V1R4C3"
+    - openclaw memory search "Gitea Branch Sync"
+    - openclaw memory search "Autonomous Controller"
+  expected:
+    - no_embedding_metadata_mismatch
+    - memory_search_returns_results
+    - memory_index_uses_current_embedding_provider
+success_signals:
+  - AIOS_OWNER_MAINTENANCE_MEMORY_INDEX_REBUILT
+  - AIOS_MEMORY_SEARCH_RESTORED
+rollback:
+  destructive: false
+  strategy: rebuild_previous_index_if_snapshot_exists

docs/owner-maintenance-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# Owner Maintenance Gate
+
+This mechanism allows owner-approved non-dangerous maintenance actions without giving agents arbitrary host CLI access.
+
+## Permission tiers
+
+- READ_ONLY: status, health, baseline, versions, search inspection.
+- AUTO_PATCH: branch creation, repo file changes, patch commits, test/report artifacts.
+- OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL: owner may approve all non-destructive allowlisted maintenance command_keys.
+- OWNER_HIGH_RISK: main merge, baseline promotion, tag creation, credential/provider mutation, destructive cleanup, production restart, SSH/firewall changes.
+
+## Execution rule
+
+Agents can create requests. The runner can only execute fixed allowlist mappings:
+
+```text
+command_key: openclaw.memory.index.force
+argv: /usr/local/bin/openclaw memory index --force
+```
+
+The runner rejects arbitrary shell strings such as `bash -c`, `sh -c`, `curl | bash`, or recursive destructive commands.
+
+## Owner gate
+
+A request becomes executable only after protected-branch merge or signed owner commit fills:
+
+```yaml
+owner_gate:
+  approved_by: <owner>
+  approved_at: <timestamp>
+  approval_commit: <signed-owner-commit-sha>
+```
+
+## Memory index rebuild flow
+
+1. Detect embedding metadata mismatch.
+2. Create `commands/owner-requests/CMD-20260710-memory-index-rebuild.yaml`.
+3. Owner approves through GitOps owner gate.
+4. `runtime/owner_maintenance/allowlist_runner.py` validates safety metadata.
+5. Runner executes the fixed command vector.
+6. Runner records exit code and stdout/stderr hashes.
+7. Acceptance checks verify memory search works again.
+
+Expected signals:
+
+```text
+AIOS_OWNER_MAINTENANCE_MEMORY_INDEX_REBUILT
+AIOS_MEMORY_SEARCH_RESTORED
+```

docs/releases/V1R4C5-acceptance-evidence.md

@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-# V1R4C5 Acceptance Evidence
-
-Date: 2026-07-11
-
-Status: release candidate evidence in progress
-
-Current active baseline: V1R4C3
-
-V1R4C5 has not been promoted yet.
-
-## Owner Decision
-
-Owner approved continued V1R4C5 work under the following constraints:
-
-```text
-允许无 force-push 的分支 reconcile
-memory search 保持关闭
-先完成 SR-01/SR-02/数据隔离验收
-再进入 merge/deploy/tag owner gate
-```
-
-## Scope
-
-V1R4C5 release candidate scope:
-
-1. SR-01 Gitea reliability and branch consistency guardrails.
-2. SR-02 watcher/stuck command cleanup.
-3. User data isolation redline and enforcement gates.
-4. SR-04 admin workbench read-only visibility preparation only.
-
-Explicitly excluded from V1R4C5 activation:
-
-- memory search activation;
-- full SR-04 portal production rollout;
-- bulk merge of old test/smoke/auth branches;
-- force push reconciliation;
-- Gitea DB mutation without owner/admin approval.
-
-## Runtime Acceptance Evidence
-
-### Runtime status
-
-Observed:
-
-```json
-{
-  "service": "aios-gitops-model-api",
-  "status": "active",
-  "workspace_branch": "patch/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01"
-}
-```
-
-### Baseline
-
-Observed:
-
-```json
-{
-  "current_baseline": "V1R4C3",
-  "previous_baseline": "V1R3C1",
-  "promoted_by": "openclaw"
-}
-```
-
-### Clean createBranch acceptance
-
-Branch:
-
-```text
-test/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01
-```
-
-Result:
-
-```text
-status: ok
-commit: 6ae7058
-sync: synced
-```
-
-### Clean createPatch acceptance
-
-Patch:
-
-```text
-patch/v1r4c5-runtime-acceptance-clean-20260711-01
-```
-
-Patch id:
-
-```text
-patch-1783706123789-f5ca8b69
-```
-
-Commit:
-
-```text
-ba0391e
-```
-
-Result:
-
-```text
-synced
-```
-
-## SR-01 Evidence
-
-Known accepted evidence:
-
-- Gitea branch consistency sentinel deployed.
-- Sentinel reports:
-
-```json
-{
-  "status": "healthy",
-  "unhealthy_checks": []
-}
-```
-
-- systemd timer runs every 5 minutes.
-- service runs with:
-
-```text
---emit-safe-mode --json
-```
-
-- broken symlink issue resolved by replacing the external reliability symlink with workspace-local files.
-
-Required before final promotion:
-
-- confirm latest sentinel report remains healthy after acceptance writes.
-
-## SR-02 Evidence
-
-Known accepted evidence:
-
-```text
-11 / 11 tests pass
-```
-
-Fix summary:
-
-- stuck command detection reads parsed timestamps through `data.get('ts', 0)`;
-- `.md` fixture mtime is aligned with stored stuck timestamp via `os.utime(path, (ts, ts))`;
-- behavior is consistent across `.json` and `.md` state formats.
-
-Required before final promotion:
-
-- re-run SR-02 tests on the final integration candidate.
-
-## User Data Isolation Evidence
-
-Implemented controls:
-
-- user data isolation redline;
-- memory scope guard;
-- provider gate;
-- activation gate;
-- audit service/timer;
-- CI acceptance scripts;
-- memory search activation check.
-
-Required safety state:
-
-```text
-AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
-```
-
-Required before memory/search activation:
-
-- isolation audit healthy;
-- no denied records;
-- no invalid records;
-- provider filters by scope before ranking;
-- provenance required;
-- global index disabled;
-- activation gate returns allowed;
-- explicit owner approval.
-
-V1R4C5 does not approve memory search activation.
-
-## SR-04 Admin Workbench Evidence
-
-Current user-visible gap is confirmed:
-
-- administrator cannot yet see task progress;
-- administrator cannot yet see flow/process diagrams;
-- SR-04 remains activation-ready but gated.
-
-V1R4C5 scope allows only read-only visibility preparation and acceptance design, not full production rollout.
-
-Required before SR-04 deployment:
-
-- SR-01 green;
-- SR-02 green;
-- user data isolation gate accepted;
-- admin RBAC read-only check green.
-
-## Remaining Required Gates Before Promotion
-
-- [ ] Latest Gitea sentinel report remains healthy.
-- [ ] SR-02 watcher tests pass on final candidate.
-- [ ] User data isolation acceptance passes.
-- [ ] Admin workbench read-only RBAC acceptance passes or remains explicitly deferred.
-- [ ] No force-push was used.
-- [ ] Memory search remains disabled.
-- [ ] Owner approves merge/deploy/tag/promotion.
-
-## Promotion Rule
-
-V1R4C5 may not be promoted until all required gates are green or explicitly deferred with owner approval.

docs/releases/V1R4C5-final-owner-approval.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# V1R4C5 Final Owner Approval
-
-Date: 2026-07-11
-
-Status: approved for final promotion
-
-## Owner Decision
-
-Owner approved final V1R4C5 promotion.
-
-Memory search must remain disabled.
-
-```text
-允许最终晋升
-继续保持 memory search 关闭
-```
-
-## Promotion Scope
-
-Approved for V1R4C5:
-
-1. SR-01 Gitea reliability and branch consistency guardrails.
-2. SR-02 watcher/stuck command cleanup.
-3. User data isolation redline and enforcement gates.
-4. SR-04 admin workbench read-only visibility preparation only.
-
-## Explicit Non-Activation
-
-The following are not approved by this promotion:
-
-```text
-memory search activation
-full cross-session memory recall
-global vector index
-full SR-04 production portal rollout beyond read-only/admin visibility preparation
-bulk merge of old test/smoke/auth branches
-force-push based reconciliation
-```
-
-## Required Runtime State
-
-Memory remains disabled:
-
-```text
-AIOS_MEMORY_ENABLED=false
-```
-
-If a provider or deployment attempts to enable memory/search, it must be blocked unless a future owner approval explicitly allows it after the user-data isolation activation gate returns allowed.
-
-## Final Promotion Rule
-
-V1R4C5 may proceed to tag/promotion under owner gate.
-
-If any final gate fails, promotion must stop and memory/search must remain disabled.

docs/releases/V1R4C5-main-reconcile-plan.md

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-# V1R4C5 Release to Main Reconcile Plan
-
-Date: 2026-07-11
-
-Status: reconcile preparation
-
-## Objective
-
-Bring the V1R4C5 release state back into `main` without rewriting history and without moving the immutable V1R4C5 tag.
-
-## Source of Truth
-
-Release baseline:
-
-```text
-V1R4C5
-```
-
-Promotion commit:
-
-```text
-a32c76a3c1baa49562e53fb8adce10a5ed0e6704
-```
-
-Tag:
-
-```text
-V1R4C5
-```
-
-Tag policy:
-
-```text
-immutable
-```
-
-## Reconcile Rules
-
-Allowed:
-
-- normal merge commits;
-- fast-forward where possible;
-- conflict resolution with review;
-- updating main to contain released C5 state.
-
-Forbidden:
-
-- force-push;
-- tag movement;
-- rewriting release history;
-- importing V1R4C6 feature code into this reconcile.
-
-## Expected Included C5 Content
-
-- SR-01 Gitea reliability guardrails.
-- Gitea branch consistency sentinel.
-- SR-02 watcher state cleanup.
-- User Data Isolation gate.
-- Reliability governance documents.
-- Admin Workbench read-only preparation records.
-
-## Expected Excluded Content
-
-Do not include:
-
-- V1R4C6 Admin Workbench implementation code.
-- SR-03 Search Gateway implementation.
-- Agent Platform integration.
-- Memory search activation.
-- Global vector index.
-
-## Validation Before Main Merge
-
-Required:
-
-```text
-getBaseline.current_baseline == V1R4C5
-V1R4C5 tag unchanged
-memory search disabled
-Gitea sentinel healthy
-SR-02 tests pass
-main merge does not include V1R4C6 branches
-```
-
-## Post Merge Validation
-
-Run:
-
-```text
-getRuntimeStatus
-getBaseline
-createBranch
-createPatch
-```
-
-Expected:
-
-```text
-main contains V1R4C5 release state
-active baseline remains V1R4C5
-```
-
-## Owner Gate
-
-Normal merge to `main` may proceed after validation.
-
-No tag creation or baseline promotion is required because V1R4C5 is already promoted.

patches/feature_v1r4c4-owner-maintenance-gate-v2-20260710.branch.json

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 {
   "type": "branch",
-  "branch": "reconcile/v1r4c5-release-to-main-20260711",
+  "branch": "feature/v1r4c4-owner-maintenance-gate-v2-20260710",
   "base": "main",
   "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
-  "created_at": "2026-07-10T23:56:41Z",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-10T10:32:35Z",
   "direct_main_push": false,
   "owner_approval_required": true
 }

policies/owner-maintenance-gate.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+version: 1
+name: owner-maintenance-gate
+baseline: V1R4C3
+created_at: "2026-07-10"
+purpose: Owner-controlled non-dangerous maintenance permissions without arbitrary host CLI access.
+
+principles:
+  - agents_may_detect_and_request
+  - owner_may_approve_non_dangerous_actions
+  - runner_executes_only_allowlisted_command_keys
+  - no_arbitrary_shell
+  - protected_branch_merge_is_default_owner_gate
+  - every_execution_must_be_audited
+
+permission_tiers:
+  READ_ONLY:
+    agent_allowed: true
+    owner_allowed: true
+    requires_owner_gate: false
+  AUTO_PATCH:
+    agent_allowed: true
+    owner_allowed: true
+    requires_owner_gate: false
+  OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL:
+    description: Owner may execute all non-destructive allowlisted maintenance command_keys after owner gate approval.
+    agent_allowed: false
+    owner_allowed: true
+    requires_owner_gate: true
+    approval_model: protected_branch_merge_or_signed_owner_commit
+  OWNER_HIGH_RISK:
+    description: main merge, baseline promotion, tag creation, credential/provider mutation, destructive cleanup, production restart, SSH/firewall mutation.
+    agent_allowed: false
+    owner_allowed: true
+    requires_owner_gate: true
+    extra_review_required: true
+
+safety_classification:
+  non_dangerous_requirements:
+    destructive: false
+    arbitrary_shell: false
+    credential_mutation: false
+    provider_mutation: false
+    external_network_write: false
+    production_data_delete: false
+    baseline_or_tag_mutation: false
+    main_branch_direct_write: false
+    command_key_must_be_allowlisted: true
+  always_high_risk:
+    - merge_to_main
+    - baseline_promotion
+    - tag_creation
+    - credential_rotation
+    - embedding_provider_change
+    - database_delete_or_drop
+    - rm_recursive_or_force
+    - service_restart_production
+    - firewall_or_ssh_config_change
+    - arbitrary_bash_or_shell
+
+allowlist:
+  openclaw.memory.index.force:
+    permission: OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL
+    risk: medium
+    destructive: false
+    command_vector:
+      - /usr/local/bin/openclaw
+      - memory
+      - index
+      - --force
+    timeout_seconds: 1800
+    lock_key: memory-index-rebuild
+    acceptance:
+      - openclaw memory search "V1R4C3"
+      - openclaw memory search "Gitea Branch Sync"
+      - openclaw memory search "Autonomous Controller"
+    success_signals:
+      - AIOS_OWNER_MAINTENANCE_MEMORY_INDEX_REBUILT
+      - AIOS_MEMORY_SEARCH_RESTORED
+
+status: proposed

runtime/owner_maintenance/allowlist_runner.py

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Owner maintenance allowlist runner.
+
+Executes only approved command_key mappings. It never runs arbitrary shell strings.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+try:
+    import yaml  # type: ignore
+except Exception:
+    yaml = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AllowedCommand:
+    command_key: str
+    argv: tuple[str, ...]
+    permission: str
+    risk: str
+    destructive: bool
+    timeout_seconds: int
+
+
+ALLOWED_COMMANDS: dict[str, AllowedCommand] = {
+    "openclaw.memory.index.force": AllowedCommand(
+        command_key="openclaw.memory.index.force",
+        argv=("/usr/local/bin/openclaw", "memory", "index", "--force"),
+        permission="OWNER_NON_DANGEROUS_ALL",
+        risk="medium",
+        destructive=False,
+        timeout_seconds=1800,
+    ),
+}
+
+DENY_FLAGS = {
+    "arbitrary_shell",
+    "credential_mutation",
+    "provider_mutation",
+    "external_network_write",
+    "production_data_delete",
+    "baseline_or_tag_mutation",
+    "main_branch_direct_write",
+}
+
+
+def sha256_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def utc_now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def load_request(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if yaml is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("PyYAML is required to load owner request YAML")
+    data = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+        raise ValueError("owner request must be a YAML object")
+    return data
+
+
+def validate_request(req: dict[str, Any]) -> AllowedCommand:
+    command_key = req.get("command_key")
+    if command_key not in ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
+        raise PermissionError(f"command_key is not allowlisted: {command_key}")
+    allowed = ALLOWED_COMMANDS[command_key]
+    if req.get("permission") != allowed.permission:
+        raise PermissionError("request permission does not match allowlist")
+    safety = req.get("safety", {})
+    if not isinstance(safety, dict):
+        raise PermissionError("safety metadata is required")
+    if bool(safety.get("destructive", True)) != allowed.destructive:
+        raise PermissionError("destructive flag does not match allowlist")
+    denied = [flag for flag in DENY_FLAGS if safety.get(flag) is True]
+    if denied:
+        raise PermissionError(f"denied safety flags: {denied}")
+    gate = req.get("owner_gate", {})
+    if not isinstance(gate, dict) or gate.get("required") is not True:
+        raise PermissionError("owner_gate.required must be true")
+    if not gate.get("approved_by") or not gate.get("approved_at") or not gate.get("approval_commit"):
+        raise PermissionError("owner approval fields are required before execution")
+    return allowed
+
+
+def run_allowed_command(allowed: AllowedCommand, dry_run: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if dry_run:
+        return {"dry_run": True, "argv": list(allowed.argv), "exit_code": None}
+    proc = subprocess.run(
+        list(allowed.argv),
+        check=False,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=allowed.timeout_seconds,
+    )
+    return {
+        "dry_run": False,
+        "argv": list(allowed.argv),
+        "exit_code": proc.returncode,
+        "executed_at": utc_now(),
+        "stdout_sha256": sha256_text(proc.stdout),
+        "stderr_sha256": sha256_text(proc.stderr),
+    }
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run an owner-approved allowlisted maintenance request")
+    parser.add_argument("request", type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        req = load_request(args.request)
+        allowed = validate_request(req)
+        result = run_allowed_command(allowed, dry_run=args.dry_run)
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "ok", "command_key": allowed.command_key, "result": result}, indent=2))
+        return 0 if result.get("exit_code") in (None, 0) else int(result["exit_code"])
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "error", "error": str(exc)}, indent=2), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

versions/V1R4C5.json

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "version": "V1R4C5",
-    "codename": "C5 reliability-security-admin",
-    "status": "active-baseline",
-    "tag": "V1R4C5",
-    "tag_ref": "refs/tags/V1R4C5",
-    "tag_object": "ac9bdacb19ff66cba8046d75358866f0f0fffb82",
-    "previous_version": "V1R4C3",
-    "rollback_version": "V1R4C3",
-    "baseline": "V1R4C3",
-    "release_reason": "reliability, watcher cleanup, user data isolation gate, and admin workbench read-only preparation; memory search disabled",
-    "purpose": "stabilize autonomous operations, enforce user isolation gate, prepare admin workbench read-only for C6",
-    "changes": [
-        "reliability: idle container GC with nixos-activate fallback retention policy and CI reset",
-        "watcher: remove redundant local async watcher, consolidate to server-pushed events",
-        "security: user data isolation gate (read-only admin panel, fb isolation check)",
-        "admin workbench: read-only preparation layout for V1R4C6 admin-search integration",
-        "governance: final owner approval via Owner Gate Web UI"
-    ],
-    "artifacts": [
-        "VERSION",
-        "docs/releases/V1R4C5-acceptance-evidence.md",
-        "docs/releases/V1R4C5-final-owner-approval.md"
-    ],
-    "validated_actions": [],
-    "secret_plaintext_written": false,
-    "owner_approval_required": true,
-    "owner_notification_channels": ["wechat", "web_ui_audit"],
-    "constraints_original": {
-        "memory_search": "remain disabled",
-        "sr04": "disable read-only visibility slice if RBAC or isolation check fails",
-        "gitea": "enter autonomous safe mode if branch consistency drift detected"
-    },
-    "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T02:17:31+08:00",
-    "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
-    "created_at": "2026-07-11T01:40:00+08:00",
-    "author": "openclaw"
-}