feat(online-agent): persist workers and defer engineering placeholders

active-runtime/app/agent_event_bus.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from hashlib import sha256
 from pathlib import Path
 import json
 from typing import Any
+from message_handoff import stable_event_id
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -55,13 +56,19 @@ class AgentEventBus:
         payload: dict[str, Any],
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        event_id = "evt_" + sha256(
-            json.dumps(
-                {"kind": kind, "source": source, "summary": summary, "payload": payload},
-                sort_keys=True,
-                ensure_ascii=False,
-            ).encode("utf-8")
-        ).hexdigest()[:16]
+        event_id = stable_event_id(
+            source=source, target=target, message_type=kind, payload=payload,
+            tenant_id=(payload.get('tenant_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            user_id=(payload.get('user_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            project_id=(payload.get('project_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            conversation_id=(payload.get('conversation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            task_id=(payload.get('task_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            run_id=(payload.get('run_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            correlation_id=(payload.get('correlation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            causation_id=(payload.get('causation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            sequence=(payload.get('sequence') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            idempotency_key=(payload.get('idempotency_key') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+        )
         event = AgentEvent(event_id, kind, source, target, summary, payload, correlation_id=correlation_id)
         self._write("pending", event.to_dict())
         self._audit("created", event.to_dict())

active-runtime/app/agent_event_observability_bridge.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
     def __init__(self, hooks: AgentObservabilityHooks | None = None):
         self.hooks = hooks or AgentObservabilityHooks()
 
-    def consume(self, event: dict):
+    def consume(self, event: dict, *, actor=None, trace=None):
         kind = event.get("kind")
         payload = event.get("payload", {})
         if kind == "agent_started":
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
                 visible_scope=payload.get("scope", "self"),
                 entry_agent=payload.get("agent", "unknown"),
                 execution_id=event.get("id"),
+                actor=actor,
+                trace=trace,
             )
         if kind == "agent_delegated":
             return self.hooks.delegate(event["execution_id"], payload.get("agent", "unknown"))

active-runtime/app/agent_observability.py

@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ class AgentExecutionRecord:
     status: str = "completed"
     started_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
     ended_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    trace_id: str | None = None
+    span_id: str | None = None
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
 
     def to_dict(self):
         return asdict(self)

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_api.py

@@ -9,25 +9,49 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
+from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
 from .agent_observability_dashboard import AgentObservabilityDashboard
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext, authorize_scope
 
 store = AgentObservabilityStore()
 dashboard = AgentObservabilityDashboard(store.load())
 
 
-def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any]):
-    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**payload)
+def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None):
+    scoped = any(payload.get(name) is not None for name in (
+        "trace_id", "span_id", "tenant_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id"
+    ))
+    values = dict(payload)
+    if scoped:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+        trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(trusted, trace.scope)
+        bound = {
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": trace.parent_span_id, "correlation_id": trace.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": trace.causation_id, "tenant_id": trace.scope.tenant_id,
+            "user_id": trace.scope.user_id, "project_id": trace.scope.project_id,
+            "conversation_id": trace.scope.conversation_id, "task_id": trace.task_id,
+            "claim_id": trace.claim_id, "run_id": trace.scope.run_id, "message_id": trace.message_id,
+        }
+        for name, authoritative in bound.items():
+            if values.get(name) not in (None, authoritative):
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:" + name)
+            values[name] = authoritative
+    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**values)
     return {"status": "ok", "record": store.append(record)}
 
 
-def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user"):
-    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role)
+def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None):
+    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role, actor=actor)
+    visible = AgentObservability()
+    visible.records = [AgentExecutionRecord(**record) for record in records]
     return {
         "status": "ok",
         "records": records,
-        "summary": store.load().summary(user_id if role != "owner" else None),
+        "summary": visible.summary(None),
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_hooks.py

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    TraceContext,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -36,6 +41,7 @@ class AgentRunContext:
     input_tokens: int = 0
     output_tokens: int = 0
     status: str = "running"
+    trace: TraceContext | None = None
 
     def delegate(self, agent_name: str) -> None:
         if agent_name not in self.path:
@@ -59,7 +65,19 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
         visible_scope: str,
         entry_agent: str,
         execution_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if execution_id is not None and execution_id in self.active:
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
+        if trace is not None:
+            if actor is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            authorize_scope(trusted_actor, trace.scope)
+            if trace.scope.user_id is not None and trace.scope.user_id != user_id:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:user_id")
         run = AgentRunContext(
             execution_id=execution_id or f"exec_{uuid4().hex[:12]}",
             user_id=user_id,
@@ -67,6 +85,7 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             entry_agent=entry_agent,
             path=[entry_agent],
             used_hermes=entry_agent.lower() == "hermes",
+            trace=trace,
         )
         self.active[run.execution_id] = run
         return {"status": "started", "execution_id": run.execution_id, "run": run.__dict__}
@@ -106,6 +125,18 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             status=status,
             started_at=run.started_at,
             ended_at=ended_at,
+            trace_id=run.trace.trace_id if run.trace else None,
+            span_id=run.trace.span_id if run.trace else None,
+            parent_span_id=run.trace.parent_span_id if run.trace else None,
+            correlation_id=run.trace.correlation_id if run.trace else None,
+            causation_id=run.trace.causation_id if run.trace else None,
+            tenant_id=run.trace.scope.tenant_id if run.trace else None,
+            project_id=run.trace.scope.project_id if run.trace else None,
+            conversation_id=run.trace.scope.conversation_id if run.trace else None,
+            task_id=run.trace.task_id if run.trace else None,
+            claim_id=run.trace.claim_id if run.trace else None,
+            run_id=run.trace.scope.run_id if run.trace else None,
+            message_id=run.trace.message_id if run.trace else None,
         )
         return {"status": "stored", "record": self.store.append(record)}
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_store.py

@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 class AgentObservabilityStore:
@@ -23,6 +29,11 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
     def append(self, record: AgentExecutionRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
         path = self.records_dir / f"{record.execution_id}.json"
         data = record.to_dict()
+        if path.exists():
+            existing = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if existing == data:
+                return existing
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
         path.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
         return data
 
@@ -33,8 +44,36 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
             observability.records.append(AgentExecutionRecord(**raw))
         return observability
 
-    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user") -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         records = [record.to_dict() for record in self.load().records]
+        scoped = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is not None]
+        legacy = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is None]
+        if actor is not None:
+            trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            visible: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+            for record in scoped:
+                try:
+                    authorize_scope(
+                        trusted,
+                        GovernanceScope(
+                            "tenant",
+                            tenant_id=record.get("tenant_id"),
+                            user_id=record.get("user_id"),
+                            project_id=record.get("project_id"),
+                            conversation_id=record.get("conversation_id"),
+                            run_id=record.get("run_id"),
+                        ),
+                    )
+                except GovernanceError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(record)
+            if trusted.privileged:
+                visible.extend(legacy)
+            else:
+                visible.extend(record for record in legacy if record.get("user_id") == trusted.scope.user_id)
+            return visible
+        # Caller-supplied role remains a legacy compatibility path only.
+        records = legacy
         if role == "owner":
             return records
         if role == "group_admin" and group_id:

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py

@@ -0,0 +1,722 @@
+"""Owner-controlled CAS-bound execution-envelope rebind for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+This service exists for a narrow recovery case: a Task was projected/claimed with a read-only
+source_capture envelope before its already-registered deterministic plan became authoritative.
+
+It never creates Tasks/Jobs/branches and never accepts arbitrary metadata patches. It only replaces
+metadata.execution + the derived execution_projection for the same governed binding, after an
+official NEEDS_REWORK transition has returned the Task to QUEUED with no active lease.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+AUTHORIZATION_ID_ENV = "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID"
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _require_string(
+    value: object,
+    code: str,
+    pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+    value = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def _required_authorization_id() -> str:
+    value = os.environ.get(AUTHORIZATION_ID_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISSING")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionRebindRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    expected_old_execution_digest: str
+    expected_new_execution_digest: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    reason: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ExecutionRebindRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status",
+            "expected_revision",
+            "expected_attempt",
+            "previous_verification_sha256",
+            "expected_old_execution_digest",
+            "expected_new_execution_digest",
+            "authorization_id",
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "reason",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        if status != "QUEUED":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID", 400)
+
+        revision = value["expected_revision"]
+        attempt = value["expected_attempt"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(revision, int)
+            or isinstance(revision, bool)
+            or revision < 0
+            or not isinstance(attempt, int)
+            or isinstance(attempt, bool)
+            or attempt < 1
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_INTEGER_INVALID", 400)
+
+        verification = _require_string(
+            value["previous_verification_sha256"], "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID"
+        )
+        old_digest = _require_string(
+            value["expected_old_execution_digest"], "OLD_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"
+        )
+        new_digest = _require_string(
+            value["expected_new_execution_digest"], "NEW_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"
+        )
+        for digest, code in (
+            (verification, "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID"),
+            (old_digest, "OLD_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+            (new_digest, "NEW_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+        ):
+            if SHA_RE.fullmatch(digest) is None:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+        if old_digest == new_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DIGEST_UNCHANGED", 400)
+
+        authorization = _require_string(
+            value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE
+        )
+        key = _require_string(value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        reason = _require_string(value["reason"], "EXECUTION_REBIND_REASON_INVALID")
+        if len(reason) > 512:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_REASON_INVALID", 400)
+
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            revision,
+            attempt,
+            verification,
+            old_digest,
+            new_digest,
+            authorization,
+            key,
+            reason,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "expected_old_execution_digest": self.expected_old_execution_digest,
+            "expected_new_execution_digest": self.expected_new_execution_digest,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+        }
+
+
+class CanonicalBridgeExecutionResolver:
+    """Resolve the already-registered plan from the canonical governed Bridge."""
+
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, control_token: str) -> None:
+        self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token = control_token
+
+    def __call__(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        required_capabilities: Sequence[str],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "required_capabilities": list(required_capabilities),
+            },
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.base_url + "/v2/execution-envelope",
+            method="POST",
+            data=body,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self.control_token,
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                raw = response.read()
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read()
+            status = exc.code
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502)
+        if status != 200:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(
+                str(value.get("error") or "CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESOLUTION_FAILED"),
+                502 if status >= 500 else 409,
+            )
+        return dict(value)
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindStore:
+    """Official owner-controlled mutation with CAS, plan resolution and durable audit."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path: Path,
+        resolver: Callable[[str, Sequence[str]], Mapping[str, Any]],
+    ) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+        self.resolver = resolver
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        table: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {
+            str(row["name"]): row
+            for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _json_value(raw: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            return dict(raw)
+        if not isinstance(raw, str):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409)
+        return dict(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _verification_hash(raw: object) -> str:
+        if raw in (None, ""):
+            value: object = {}
+        elif isinstance(raw, str):
+            try:
+                value = json.loads(raw)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_VERIFICATION_INVALID", 409) from exc
+        else:
+            value = raw
+        return _sha(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _metadata_column(columns: Mapping[str, sqlite3.Row]) -> str:
+        for name in ("metadata_json", "metadata"):
+            if name in columns:
+                return name
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_METADATA_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required_capabilities(
+        task: sqlite3.Row,
+        columns: Mapping[str, sqlite3.Row],
+        old_execution: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> list[str]:
+        for field in ("required_capabilities_json", "required_capabilities"):
+            if field not in columns:
+                continue
+            raw = task[field]
+            if raw in (None, ""):
+                continue
+            if isinstance(raw, str):
+                try:
+                    value = json.loads(raw)
+                except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                    value = [item for item in raw.split(",") if item.strip()]
+            else:
+                value = raw
+            if isinstance(value, list) and all(isinstance(item, str) for item in value):
+                return [item.strip() for item in value if item.strip()]
+        value = old_execution.get("capability_scope")
+        if isinstance(value, list) and all(isinstance(item, str) for item in value):
+            return [item for item in value if item]
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_CAPABILITIES_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event_table(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+    ) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = {
+            row["name"]
+            for row in connection.execute(
+                "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'"
+            )
+        }
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name not in tables:
+                continue
+            columns = ExecutionRebindStore._columns(connection, name)
+            if "task_id" in columns and ("event_type" in columns or "type" in columns):
+                return name, columns
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _insert_event(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = ExecutionRebindStore._event_table(connection)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {"task_id": task_id}
+        if "event_type" in columns:
+            values["event_type"] = "TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+        else:
+            values["type"] = "TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+        payload_text = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "owner-control"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "owner-control"
+        names = list(values)
+        quoted = ",".join('"' + name + '"' for name in names)
+        placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in names)
+        connection.execute(
+            f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({quoted}) VALUES ({placeholders})',
+            tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_rebind_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_execution_rebinds (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_verification_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              old_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              new_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              reason TEXT NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id,idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    def _load_and_validate(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ) -> tuple[sqlite3.Row, dict[str, sqlite3.Row], str, dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+        columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+        required = {
+            "task_id",
+            "status",
+            "attempt",
+            "revision",
+            "claimed_by",
+            "lease_token_hash",
+            "lease_expires_at",
+            "verification_json",
+        }
+        if not required.issubset(columns):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_SCHEMA_EXECUTION_REBIND_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        metadata_column = self._metadata_column(columns)
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+            (task_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if task is None:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+
+        if (
+            str(task["status"]) != request.expected_status
+            or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+            or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+        if task["lease_token_hash"] not in (None, "") or task["lease_expires_at"] not in (None, ""):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409)
+
+        verification_sha = self._verification_hash(task["verification_json"])
+        if verification_sha != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+
+        metadata = self._json_value(
+            task[metadata_column],
+            "TASK_METADATA_INVALID",
+        )
+        execution = metadata.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EXECUTION_METADATA_MISSING", 409)
+        old_execution = validate_execution_envelope(dict(execution))
+        if old_execution["execution_digest"] != request.expected_old_execution_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_OLD_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+        if old_execution.get("action") != "source_capture":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_SOURCE_CAPTURE_REQUIRED", 409)
+
+        projection = metadata.get("execution_projection")
+        if isinstance(projection, Mapping):
+            projected_digest = str(projection.get("execution_digest") or "")
+            if projected_digest and projected_digest != request.expected_old_execution_digest:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_PROJECTION_DRIFT", 409)
+        return task, columns, metadata_column, metadata, old_execution
+
+    def rebind(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        required_authorization = _required_authorization_id()
+        if request.authorization_id != required_authorization:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+
+        request_sha = _sha(request.public())
+
+        # Idempotent replay must win before CAS validation because a successful
+        # rebind necessarily increments the Task revision and changes the persisted envelope.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._ensure_rebind_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_execution_rebinds WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": int(replay["attempt"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "old_execution_digest": replay["old_execution_digest"],
+                    "new_execution_digest": replay["new_execution_digest"],
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+        # Read/CAS snapshot first. Canonical Bridge resolution happens outside the DB write lock.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            task, columns, _, _, old_execution = self._load_and_validate(
+                connection, task_id, request
+            )
+            capabilities = self._required_capabilities(task, columns, old_execution)
+
+        binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(old_execution)
+        resolved = dict(self.resolver(task_id, capabilities))
+        new_execution = validate_execution_envelope(resolved, binding=binding)
+        if new_execution.get("action") != "deterministic":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN_REQUIRED", 409)
+        if new_execution["execution_digest"] != request.expected_new_execution_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_NEW_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+        if new_execution["execution_digest"] == old_execution["execution_digest"]:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DIGEST_UNCHANGED", 409)
+
+        # Re-read under BEGIN IMMEDIATE and apply only if the exact snapshot is unchanged.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_rebind_table(connection)
+
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_execution_rebinds WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": int(replay["attempt"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "old_execution_digest": replay["old_execution_digest"],
+                    "new_execution_digest": replay["new_execution_digest"],
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+            task, columns, metadata_column, metadata, current_old = self._load_and_validate(
+                connection, task_id, request
+            )
+            if current_old["execution_digest"] != old_execution["execution_digest"]:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_OLD_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+
+            new_metadata = dict(metadata)
+            new_metadata["execution"] = new_execution
+            new_metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+                "schema": "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1",
+                "task_id": binding.task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+            }
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            previous_claimed_by = task["claimed_by"]
+
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                f"""
+                UPDATE tasks
+                   SET "{metadata_column}"=?, revision=?, claimed_by=NULL,
+                       lease_token_hash=NULL, lease_expires_at=NULL
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS ? AND lease_token_hash IS NULL AND lease_expires_at IS NULL
+                """,
+                (
+                    json.dumps(new_metadata, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    applied_revision,
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    previous_claimed_by,
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+            event_payload = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-execution-rebind.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "reason": request.reason,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                "old_execution_digest": old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "new_execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "old_action": old_execution.get("action"),
+                "new_action": new_execution.get("action"),
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "previous_claimed_by": previous_claimed_by,
+                "stale_claim_normalized": previous_claimed_by not in (None, ""),
+            }
+            self._insert_event(connection, task_id, event_payload)
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_execution_rebinds(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,
+                  previous_verification_sha256,old_execution_digest,new_execution_digest,
+                  expected_revision,applied_revision,attempt,reason,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                    old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                    new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    request.reason,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "old_execution_digest": old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "new_execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: ExecutionRebindStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        data = json.dumps(
+            dict(value), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.control_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        )
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self._json(
+                {"status": "ok", "service": "aios-agent-task-execution-rebind"},
+                200,
+            )
+        else:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/execution-rebind", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            self._json({"error": "CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID"}, 400)
+            return
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID"}, 413)
+            return
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError
+            request = ExecutionRebindRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            if self.store is None:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            result = self.store.rebind(match.group(1), request)
+            self._json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except ExecutionRebindError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def load_control_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    _required_authorization_id()
+    token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(
+                Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+                / "agent_task_control_token"
+            ),
+        )
+    )
+    token = load_control_token(token_path)
+    bridge = os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL",
+        "http://127.0.0.1:18892",
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_PORT", "18942"))
+    ExecutionRebindHandler.store = ExecutionRebindStore(
+        db,
+        CanonicalBridgeExecutionResolver(bridge, token),
+    )
+    ExecutionRebindHandler.control_token = token
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), ExecutionRebindHandler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+"""Owner-controlled, CAS-bound retry extension for exhausted Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV = "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID"
+
+
+class RetryExtensionError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _required_authorization_id() -> str:
+    value = os.environ.get(AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISSING")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _require_string(value: object, code: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    value = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RetryExtensionRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    expected_max_attempts: int
+    next_max_attempts: int
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "RetryExtensionRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status", "expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts",
+            "next_max_attempts", "previous_verification_sha256", "authorization_id", "idempotency_key",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        if status != "FAILED":
+            raise RetryExtensionError("EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID", 400)
+        ints: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for field in ("expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts", "next_max_attempts"):
+            item = value[field]
+            if not isinstance(item, int) or isinstance(item, bool) or item < 0:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_INTEGER_INVALID", 400)
+            ints[field] = item
+        if ints["expected_attempt"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"]:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_NOT_EXHAUSTED", 409)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"] + 1:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_MUST_BE_BOUNDED_ONE_STEP", 400)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] > 50:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_LIMIT_EXCEEDED", 400)
+        verification = _require_string(value["previous_verification_sha256"], "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID")
+        if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", verification) is None:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID", 400)
+        authorization = _require_string(value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        key = _require_string(value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            ints["expected_revision"],
+            ints["expected_attempt"],
+            ints["expected_max_attempts"],
+            ints["next_max_attempts"],
+            verification,
+            authorization,
+            key,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "expected_max_attempts": self.expected_max_attempts,
+            "next_max_attempts": self.next_max_attempts,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+        }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionStore:
+    """Owns the official mutation. Direct/manual DB edits remain forbidden."""
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(connection: sqlite3.Connection, table: str) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {str(row["name"]): row for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')}
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = {
+            row["name"]
+            for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")
+        }
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name not in tables:
+                continue
+            columns = RetryExtensionStore._columns(connection, name)
+            if "task_id" in columns and ("event_type" in columns or "type" in columns):
+                return name, columns
+        raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _verification_hash(raw: object) -> str:
+        if raw in (None, ""):
+            value: object = {}
+        elif isinstance(raw, str):
+            try:
+                value = json.loads(raw)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_VERIFICATION_INVALID", 409) from exc
+        else:
+            value = raw
+        return _sha(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_extension_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_retry_extensions (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_verification_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              next_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id, idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _insert_event(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = RetryExtensionStore._event_table(connection)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {"task_id": task_id}
+        if "event_type" in columns:
+            values["event_type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        else:
+            values["type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        payload_text = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "owner-control"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "owner-control"
+        names = list(values)
+        sql = f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({",".join(f"""\"{name}\"""" for name in names)}) VALUES ({",".join("?" for _ in names)})'
+        connection.execute(sql, tuple(values[name] for name in names))
+
+    def extend(self, task_id: str, request: RetryExtensionRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        required_authorization_id = _required_authorization_id()
+        if request.authorization_id != required_authorization_id:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        request_payload = request.public()
+        request_sha = _sha(request_payload)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_extension_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_retry_extensions WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                    "max_attempts": int(replay["next_max_attempts"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "previous_verification_sha256": replay["previous_verification_sha256"],
+                }
+
+            columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+            required = {
+                "task_id", "status", "attempt", "max_attempts", "revision", "claimed_by",
+                "lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at", "verification_json",
+            }
+            if not required.issubset(columns):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_SCHEMA_RETRY_EXTENSION_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+            task = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if task is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            actual_verification_sha = self._verification_hash(task["verification_json"])
+            if actual_verification_sha != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+            if (
+                task["status"] != request.expected_status
+                or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+                or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+                or int(task["max_attempts"]) != request.expected_max_attempts
+            ):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+            for lease_field in ("lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at"):
+                if lease_field in columns and task[lease_field] not in (None, ""):
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409)
+
+            previous_claimed_by = task["claimed_by"]
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE tasks
+                   SET status='QUEUED', max_attempts=?, revision=?, claimed_by=NULL,
+                       lease_token_hash=NULL, lease_expires_at=NULL
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=? AND max_attempts=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS ?
+                   AND lease_token_hash IS NULL AND lease_expires_at IS NULL
+                """,
+                (
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    previous_claimed_by,
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+            event_payload = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-retry-extension.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                "previous_max_attempts": request.expected_max_attempts,
+                "next_max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "previous_claimed_by": previous_claimed_by,
+                "stale_terminal_claim_normalized": previous_claimed_by not in (None, ""),
+            }
+            self._insert_event(connection, task_id, event_payload)
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_retry_extensions(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,previous_verification_sha256,
+                  previous_max_attempts,next_max_attempts,expected_revision,applied_revision,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "idempotent": False,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+            }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: RetryExtensionStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        data = json.dumps(dict(value), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.control_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        )
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self._json({"status": "ok", "service": "aios-agent-task-retry-extension"}, 200)
+        else:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/retry-extension", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            self._json({"error": "CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID"}, 400)
+            return
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID"}, 413)
+            return
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError
+            request = RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            if self.store is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            result = self.store.extend(match.group(1), request)
+            self._json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except RetryExtensionError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def load_control_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    _required_authorization_id()
+    token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials")) / "agent_task_control_token"),
+        )
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT", "18941"))
+    RetryExtensionHandler.store = RetryExtensionStore(db)
+    RetryExtensionHandler.control_token = load_control_token(token_path)
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), RetryExtensionHandler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_capability_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+"""Canonical fail-closed capability semantics for task eligibility."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Iterable
+
+
+_TASK_ALIASES: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "repository_read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "git.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repo.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "test_execution": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "git.test": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test.execute": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "governed_git_write": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch", "governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.git.write": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch", "governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "shell": frozenset({"runtime.shell"}),
+    "git": frozenset({"runtime.git"}),
+    "python": frozenset({"runtime.python"}),
+    "code.read": frozenset({"legacy.code.read"}),
+    "code.review": frozenset({"legacy.code.review"}),
+    "code.write": frozenset({"legacy.code.write"}),
+    "code.write.patch": frozenset({"legacy.code.write.patch"}),
+    "test.python": frozenset({"legacy.test.python"}),
+    "test.shell.allowlisted": frozenset({"legacy.test.shell.allowlisted"}),
+    "git.commit": frozenset({"legacy.git.commit"}),
+    "git.diff.read": frozenset({"legacy.git.diff.read"}),
+    "git.force_push": frozenset({"legacy.git.force_push"}),
+    "deploy.production": frozenset({"legacy.deploy.production"}),
+    "secret.transform": frozenset({"legacy.secret.transform"}),
+    "secure_file_transformer": frozenset({"legacy.secure_file_transformer"}),
+    "runtime.shadow": frozenset({"legacy.runtime.shadow"}),
+    "review.security": frozenset({"legacy.review.security"}),
+    "review.api-contract": frozenset({"legacy.review.api-contract"}),
+    "gpu.train": frozenset({"legacy.gpu.train"}),
+    "agent.runtime.hermes": frozenset({"agent.runtime.hermes"}),
+    "agent.runtime.openclaw": frozenset({"agent.runtime.openclaw"}),
+}
+
+_WORKER_ALIASES: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "git.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repo.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repository_read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "git.test": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test.execute": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test_execution": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "governed.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.git.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.git.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "shell": frozenset({"runtime.shell"}),
+    "git": frozenset({"runtime.git"}),
+    "python": frozenset({"runtime.python"}),
+    "code.read": frozenset({"legacy.code.read"}),
+    "code.review": frozenset({"legacy.code.review"}),
+    "code.write": frozenset({"legacy.code.write"}),
+    "code.write.patch": frozenset({"legacy.code.write.patch"}),
+    "test.python": frozenset({"legacy.test.python"}),
+    "test.shell.allowlisted": frozenset({"legacy.test.shell.allowlisted"}),
+    "git.commit": frozenset({"legacy.git.commit"}),
+    "git.diff.read": frozenset({"legacy.git.diff.read"}),
+    "git.force_push": frozenset({"legacy.git.force_push"}),
+    "deploy.production": frozenset({"legacy.deploy.production"}),
+    "secret.transform": frozenset({"legacy.secret.transform"}),
+    "secure_file_transformer": frozenset({"legacy.secure_file_transformer"}),
+    "runtime.shadow": frozenset({"legacy.runtime.shadow"}),
+    "review.security": frozenset({"legacy.review.security"}),
+    "review.api-contract": frozenset({"legacy.review.api-contract"}),
+    "gpu.train": frozenset({"legacy.gpu.train"}),
+    "agent.runtime.hermes": frozenset({"agent.runtime.hermes"}),
+    "agent.runtime.openclaw": frozenset({"agent.runtime.openclaw"}),
+}
+
+_UNKNOWN_PREFIX = "exact:"
+
+
+def _clean(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise ValueError("capability must be a string")
+    text = value.strip().lower()
+    if not text:
+        raise ValueError("capability must not be empty")
+    return text
+
+
+def normalize_required_capabilities(values: Iterable[object]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """Map task-facing names to one semantic vocabulary.
+
+    Unknown names remain explicit exact requirements. They are never treated
+    as wildcards or granted by a failed normalization.
+    """
+
+    result: set[str] = set()
+    for value in values:
+        text = _clean(value)
+        if "*" in text:
+            result.add(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX + text)
+        else:
+            result.update(_TASK_ALIASES.get(text, frozenset({_UNKNOWN_PREFIX + text})))
+    return frozenset(result)
+
+
+def normalize_worker_capabilities(values: Iterable[object]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """Map registered worker names to effective semantic capabilities."""
+
+    result: set[str] = set()
+    for value in values:
+        text = _clean(value)
+        if "*" in text:
+            continue
+        mapped = _WORKER_ALIASES.get(text)
+        if mapped is not None:
+            result.update(mapped)
+    if {
+        "governed.git.write.branch",
+        "governed.git.write.file",
+    }.issubset(result):
+        result.add("governed.git.write")
+    return frozenset(result)
+
+
+def has_capabilities(
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+) -> bool:
+    """Return the single eligibility decision used by poll and claim."""
+
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_capabilities)
+    effective = normalize_worker_capabilities(worker_capabilities)
+    if any(value.startswith(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX) for value in required):
+        return False
+    return required.issubset(effective)
+
+
+def required_capabilities_subset(
+    granted_requirements: Iterable[object],
+    required_requirements: Iterable[object],
+) -> bool:
+    """Check semantic capability containment for delegation constraints."""
+    granted = normalize_required_capabilities(granted_requirements)
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_requirements)
+    if any(value.startswith(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX) for value in granted | required):
+        return False
+    return required.issubset(granted)
+
+
+def normalized_capability_matrix(
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Expose non-secret decision evidence for tests and diagnostics."""
+
+    worker_values = tuple(worker_capabilities)
+    required_values = tuple(required_capabilities)
+    worker = normalize_worker_capabilities(worker_values)
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_values)
+    return {
+        "worker_effective": sorted(worker),
+        "task_required": sorted(required),
+        "eligible": has_capabilities(worker_values, required_values),
+    }

active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 import os
 from pathlib import Path
 import secrets
+import re
 from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 
 
@@ -21,9 +22,14 @@ class CredentialLease:
     scopes: tuple[str, ...]
     provider: str
     state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    scope_type: str = "system"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
 
     def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state}
+        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state, "scope_type": self.scope_type, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id, "project_id": self.project_id, "run_id": self.run_id}
 
 
 class FileCredentialProvider:
@@ -43,11 +49,19 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
         self._leases: dict[str, CredentialLease] = {}
 
-    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if repository != "aios/aios" or not target_branch.startswith("agent/") or generation < 1 or not 1 <= lease_seconds <= 86400:
             raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if scope_type == "tenant":
+            if not tenant_id:
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        elif scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any((tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)):
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
         now = self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__)
+        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__, "ACTIVE", scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
         self._leases[lease.lease_id] = lease
         return lease.as_dict()
 
@@ -64,7 +78,39 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         lease = self._get(lease_id)
         if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
             raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
-        return self.provider.environment(lease)
+        environment = self.provider.environment(lease)
+        for key, value in environment.items():
+            upper = str(key).upper()
+            if not isinstance(value, str):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            sensitive = any(marker in upper for marker in ("CREDENTIAL", "TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "PRIVATE_KEY", "API_KEY"))
+            if re.search(r"(?i)bearer\s+\S+|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]", value):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            if sensitive and upper.endswith("_FILE"):
+                candidate = Path(value)
+                credential_root = Path("/run/credentials")
+                try:
+                    resolved = candidate.resolve(strict=False)
+                except OSError as exc:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY") from exc
+                if not candidate.is_absolute() or not (resolved == credential_root or credential_root in resolved.parents):
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive and upper.endswith("_REFERENCE"):
+                if re.fullmatch(r"(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}", value) is None:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive:
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        return environment
+
+    def authorize(self, lease_id: str, *, task_id: str, operation: str, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE" or lease.task_id != task_id or operation not in lease.scopes:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        requested = (scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
+        actual = (lease.scope_type, lease.tenant_id, lease.user_id, lease.project_id, lease.run_id)
+        if requested != actual:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        return self.environment(lease_id)
 
     def status(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return self._get(lease_id).as_dict()

active-runtime/app/aios_external_agent_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+"""Credential-isolated external Agent runtime executor for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+Task payloads never choose commands. A root-owned runtime profile chooses the executable and
+I/O mode. The Online Agent worker writes a hash-bound request into an exchange directory; this
+uncredentialed process executes Hermes/OpenClaw and returns a bounded, sanitized result.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+REQUEST_SCHEMA = "aios.external-agent-runtime.request.v1"
+RESULT_SCHEMA = "aios.external-agent-runtime.result.v1"
+PROFILE_SCHEMA = "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1"
+SUPPORTED_RUNTIMES = frozenset({"hermes", "openclaw"})
+REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,254}$")
+RUNTIME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{2,31}$")
+SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
+)
+SECRET_ENV_MARKERS = (
+    "TOKEN",
+    "SECRET",
+    "PASSWORD",
+    "CREDENTIAL",
+    "AUTHORIZATION",
+    "PRIVATE_KEY",
+    "API_KEY",
+)
+PROFILE_ENV_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{1,63}$")
+PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{2,127}$")
+PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{1,63}$")
+PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAMES = frozenset({"OPENAI_API_KEY"})
+PROFILE_FIXED_ENV_DENY = frozenset(
+    {
+        "PATH",
+        "HOME",
+        "NO_COLOR",
+        "LC_ALL",
+        "LANG",
+        "LD_PRELOAD",
+        "LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
+        "PYTHONPATH",
+        "NODE_OPTIONS",
+        "BASH_ENV",
+        "SHELL",
+        "IFS",
+    }
+)
+MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 256 * 1024
+MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 128 * 1024
+MAX_PROFILE_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+MAX_CREDENTIAL_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT = Path("/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d")
+DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT = Path("/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor")
+ALLOWED_EXECUTABLE_ROOTS = (
+    Path("/usr/bin"),
+    Path("/usr/local/bin"),
+    Path("/opt/aios/bin"),
+    Path("/opt/hermes"),
+    Path("/opt/openclaw"),
+    Path("/opt/aios-hermes-agent"),
+    Path("/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering"),
+)
+
+
+class ExternalAgentRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def sanitize_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return SENSITIVE_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", str(value))
+
+
+def _bounded_text(value: str, limit: int = MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES) -> str:
+    data = sanitize_text(value).encode("utf-8", "replace")
+    if len(data) <= limit:
+        return data.decode("utf-8", "replace")
+    marker = b"\n...[TRUNCATED]...\n"
+    half = max(1, (limit - len(marker)) // 2)
+    return (data[:half] + marker + data[-half:]).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+
+
+def _safe_runtime(value: object) -> str:
+    runtime = str(value or "").strip().lower()
+    if RUNTIME_RE.fullmatch(runtime) is None or runtime not in SUPPORTED_RUNTIMES:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED")
+    return runtime
+
+
+def _assert_no_secret_env() -> None:
+    leaked = sorted(
+        key
+        for key, value in os.environ.items()
+        if value and any(marker in key.upper() for marker in SECRET_ENV_MARKERS)
+    )
+    # CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY itself is systemd metadata; the directory is expected to be hidden.
+    leaked = [key for key in leaked if key != "CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"]
+    if leaked:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+            "EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_ENV_EXPOSED:" + ",".join(leaked)
+        )
+
+
+def _safe_executable(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.startswith("/"):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTABLE_ABSOLUTE_REQUIRED")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    else:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    if not resolved.is_file() or not os.access(resolved, os.X_OK):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTABLE_INVALID")
+    if not any(resolved == root or root in resolved.parents for root in ALLOWED_EXECUTABLE_ROOTS):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTABLE_ROOT_DENY")
+    return str(resolved)
+
+
+def _safe_profile_script(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.startswith("/"):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SCRIPT_ABSOLUTE_REQUIRED")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    else:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    if not resolved.is_file():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SCRIPT_INVALID")
+    if not any(resolved == root or root in resolved.parents for root in ALLOWED_EXECUTABLE_ROOTS):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SCRIPT_ROOT_DENY")
+    return str(resolved)
+
+
+def _profile_environment(value: object) -> tuple[tuple[str, str], ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_INVALID")
+    result: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    for raw_name, raw_value in value.items():
+        if not isinstance(raw_name, str) or PROFILE_ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(raw_name) is None:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_NAME_INVALID")
+        if raw_name in PROFILE_FIXED_ENV_DENY:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_NAME_DENY")
+        if any(marker in raw_name.upper() for marker in SECRET_ENV_MARKERS):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_SECRET_ENV_DENY")
+        if not isinstance(raw_value, str) or "\x00" in raw_value or "\n" in raw_value or "\r" in raw_value:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_VALUE_INVALID")
+        if len(raw_value) > 4096:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_VALUE_TOO_LARGE")
+        result.append((raw_name, raw_value))
+    return tuple(sorted(result))
+
+
+def _profile_credential_environment(
+    value: object,
+) -> tuple[tuple[str, str, str, str], ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_ENV_INVALID")
+    result: list[tuple[str, str, str, str]] = []
+    for raw_env_name, raw_spec in value.items():
+        if (
+            not isinstance(raw_env_name, str)
+            or raw_env_name not in PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAMES
+            or PROFILE_ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(raw_env_name) is None
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAME_DENY")
+        if not isinstance(raw_spec, Mapping):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_SPEC_INVALID")
+        credential = raw_spec.get("credential")
+        fmt = str(raw_spec.get("format") or "dotenv")
+        key = raw_spec.get("key")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(credential, str)
+            or PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_NAME_RE.fullmatch(credential) is None
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_NAME_INVALID")
+        if fmt not in {"dotenv", "raw"}:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_FORMAT_INVALID")
+        if fmt == "dotenv":
+            if not isinstance(key, str) or PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_INVALID")
+        elif key is not None:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_UNEXPECTED")
+        result.append((raw_env_name, credential, fmt, str(key or "")))
+    return tuple(sorted(result))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RuntimeProfile:
+    runtime: str
+    argv: tuple[str, ...]
+    input_mode: str
+    output_mode: str
+    timeout_seconds: int
+    max_output_bytes: int
+    environment: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...]
+    credential_env: tuple[tuple[str, str, str, str], ...]
+
+    @classmethod
+    def load(
+        cls,
+        runtime: str,
+        profile_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT,
+    ) -> "RuntimeProfile":
+        runtime = _safe_runtime(runtime)
+        root = Path(profile_root)
+        if root.is_symlink():
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ROOT_SYMLINK_DENY")
+        path = root / f"{runtime}.json"
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size > MAX_PROFILE_BYTES:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_UNAVAILABLE")
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != PROFILE_SCHEMA:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_INVALID")
+        if _safe_runtime(value.get("runtime")) != runtime:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_RUNTIME_MISMATCH")
+        argv = value.get("argv")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(argv, Sequence)
+            or isinstance(argv, (str, bytes))
+            or not argv
+            or not all(isinstance(item, str) and item and "\x00" not in item for item in argv)
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ARGV_INVALID")
+        executable = _safe_executable(argv[0])
+        normalized = [executable, *list(argv[1:])]
+        if any(item in {"sh", "bash", "-c", "--command"} for item in normalized[1:]):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SHELL_MODE_DENY")
+        joined_argv = " ".join(normalized)
+        if re.search(r"(?i)(token|secret|password|api[_-]?key|authorization)\s*[:=]", joined_argv):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_SECRET_ARG_DENY")
+        if Path(executable).name in {"node", "nodejs"}:
+            if len(normalized) < 2 or normalized[1].startswith("-"):
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_NODE_SCRIPT_REQUIRED")
+            normalized[1] = _safe_profile_script(normalized[1])
+            if any(item in {"-e", "--eval", "-p", "--print", "-r", "--require"} for item in normalized[1:]):
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_NODE_CODE_MODE_DENY")
+        input_mode = str(value.get("input_mode") or "stdin_text")
+        output_mode = str(value.get("output_mode") or "stdout_text")
+        if input_mode not in {"stdin_text", "stdin_json", "file_json"}:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_INPUT_MODE_INVALID")
+        if output_mode not in {"stdout_text", "stdout_json", "file_json"}:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_MODE_INVALID")
+        timeout = int(value.get("timeout_seconds") or 900)
+        max_output = int(value.get("max_output_bytes") or MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES)
+        if not 1 <= timeout <= 3600:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+        if not 1024 <= max_output <= MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_INVALID")
+        environment = _profile_environment(value.get("environment"))
+        credential_env = _profile_credential_environment(value.get("credential_env"))
+        return cls(
+            runtime,
+            tuple(normalized),
+            input_mode,
+            output_mode,
+            timeout,
+            max_output,
+            environment,
+            credential_env,
+        )
+
+
+def validate_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if value.get("schema") != REQUEST_SCHEMA:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    request_id = str(value.get("request_id") or "")
+    if REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id) is None:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+    runtime = _safe_runtime(value.get("runtime"))
+    task_id = str(value.get("task_id") or "")
+    execution_digest = str(value.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    if not task_id or not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}", task_id):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", execution_digest) is None:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    payload = value.get("payload")
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
+    encoded = canonical(payload)
+    if len(encoded) > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE")
+    goal = payload.get("goal")
+    instructions = payload.get("instructions")
+    if not isinstance(goal, str) or not goal.strip():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_GOAL_REQUIRED")
+    if instructions is not None and not isinstance(instructions, str):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+    return {
+        "schema": REQUEST_SCHEMA,
+        "request_id": request_id,
+        "runtime": runtime,
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution_digest,
+        "payload": dict(payload),
+    }
+
+
+def render_prompt(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    goal = str(payload.get("goal") or "").strip()
+    instructions = str(payload.get("instructions") or "").strip()
+    criteria = payload.get("success_criteria") or []
+    constraints = payload.get("constraints") or {}
+    lines = [
+        "AIOS Online Agent Task",
+        "",
+        "Goal:",
+        goal,
+    ]
+    if instructions:
+        lines.extend(["", "Instructions:", instructions])
+    if criteria:
+        lines.extend(["", "Success criteria:", json.dumps(criteria, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)])
+    if constraints:
+        lines.extend(["", "Constraints:", json.dumps(constraints, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)])
+    lines.extend([
+        "",
+        "Return the final task result only. Do not claim repository, production, credential, or control-plane side effects unless they are explicitly represented in the task payload.",
+    ])
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def _argv_with_files(
+    profile: RuntimeProfile,
+    input_path: Path,
+    output_path: Path,
+    prompt: str,
+) -> list[str]:
+    replacements = {
+        "{input_json}": str(input_path),
+        "{output_json}": str(output_path),
+        "{prompt}": prompt,
+    }
+    result = []
+    for item in profile.argv:
+        for marker, replacement in replacements.items():
+            item = item.replace(marker, replacement)
+        result.append(item)
+    if profile.input_mode == "file_json" and not any("{input_json}" in item for item in profile.argv):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_INPUT_PLACEHOLDER_REQUIRED")
+    if profile.output_mode == "file_json" and not any("{output_json}" in item for item in profile.argv):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_PLACEHOLDER_REQUIRED")
+    return result
+
+
+def _credential_environment(profile: RuntimeProfile) -> dict[str, str]:
+    if not profile.credential_env:
+        return {}
+    raw_root = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
+    if not raw_root or not raw_root.startswith("/"):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_DIRECTORY_MISSING")
+    root = Path(raw_root)
+    if root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_DIRECTORY_INVALID")
+    result: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for env_name, credential, fmt, key in profile.credential_env:
+        path = root / credential
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_FILE_INVALID")
+        try:
+            if path.stat().st_size > MAX_CREDENTIAL_BYTES:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOO_LARGE")
+            raw = path.read_bytes()
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_READ_FAILED") from exc
+        if b"\x00" in raw:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_CONTENT_INVALID")
+        try:
+            text = raw.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_CONTENT_INVALID") from exc
+        selected = ""
+        if fmt == "raw":
+            selected = text.strip()
+        else:
+            found = False
+            for line in text.splitlines():
+                candidate = line.strip()
+                if not candidate or candidate.startswith("#"):
+                    continue
+                if candidate.startswith("export "):
+                    candidate = candidate[7:].lstrip()
+                if "=" not in candidate:
+                    continue
+                candidate_key, candidate_value = candidate.split("=", 1)
+                if candidate_key.strip() != key:
+                    continue
+                if found:
+                    raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_DUPLICATE")
+                selected = candidate_value.strip()
+                if len(selected) >= 2 and selected[0] == selected[-1] and selected[0] in {"'", '"'}:
+                    selected = selected[1:-1]
+                found = True
+            if not found:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_MISSING")
+        if not selected or "\x00" in selected or "\n" in selected or "\r" in selected:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE_INVALID")
+        if len(selected) > MAX_CREDENTIAL_BYTES:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE_TOO_LARGE")
+        result[env_name] = selected
+    return result
+
+
+def _parse_output(
+    profile: RuntimeProfile,
+    stdout: str,
+    output_path: Path,
+) -> tuple[str, object]:
+    if profile.output_mode == "file_json":
+        if output_path.is_symlink() or not output_path.is_file():
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_FILE_MISSING")
+        raw = output_path.read_bytes()
+        if len(raw) > profile.max_output_bytes:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE")
+        text = raw.decode("utf-8", "replace")
+        try:
+            parsed = json.loads(text)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+        return _bounded_text(text, profile.max_output_bytes), parsed
+    if len(stdout.encode("utf-8", "replace")) > profile.max_output_bytes:
+        stdout = _bounded_text(stdout, profile.max_output_bytes)
+    if profile.output_mode == "stdout_json":
+        try:
+            parsed = json.loads(stdout)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+        return _bounded_text(stdout, profile.max_output_bytes), parsed
+    return _bounded_text(stdout, profile.max_output_bytes), None
+
+
+def execute_request(
+    request_path: Path,
+    result_path: Path,
+    *,
+    profile_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT,
+) -> None:
+    _assert_no_secret_env()
+    if request_path.is_symlink() or not request_path.is_file():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_FILE_INVALID")
+    raw_request = request_path.read_bytes()
+    if len(raw_request) > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
+    try:
+        request = validate_request(json.loads(raw_request.decode("utf-8")))
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+    profile = RuntimeProfile.load(request["runtime"], profile_root)
+
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix=f"aios-{request['runtime']}-") as temporary:
+        temp_root = Path(temporary)
+        (temp_root / "home").mkdir()
+        input_path = temp_root / "input.json"
+        output_path = temp_root / "output.json"
+        input_path.write_bytes(canonical(request["payload"]))
+        prompt = render_prompt(request["payload"])
+        argv = _argv_with_files(profile, input_path, output_path, prompt)
+
+        stdin_data = None
+        if profile.input_mode == "stdin_json":
+            stdin_data = canonical(request["payload"]).decode("utf-8")
+        elif profile.input_mode == "stdin_text":
+            stdin_data = prompt
+
+        child_env = {
+            "PATH": "/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/bin",
+            "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8",
+            "LANG": "C.UTF-8",
+            "HOME": str(temp_root / "home"),
+            "NO_COLOR": "1",
+        }
+        child_env.update(dict(profile.environment))
+        child_env.update(_credential_environment(profile))
+
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        try:
+            completed = subprocess.run(
+                argv,
+                input=stdin_data,
+                capture_output=True,
+                text=True,
+                check=False,
+                shell=False,
+                timeout=profile.timeout_seconds,
+                cwd=str(temp_root),
+                env=child_env,
+            )
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_TIMEOUT") from exc
+
+        if completed.returncode != 0:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+                f"EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROCESS_FAILED:{completed.returncode}:"
+                + _bounded_text(completed.stderr, 2048)
+            )
+
+        output_text, output_json = _parse_output(profile, completed.stdout, output_path)
+        result: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "schema": RESULT_SCHEMA,
+            "request_id": request["request_id"],
+            "request_sha256": sha256(canonical(request)),
+            "runtime": request["runtime"],
+            "task_id": request["task_id"],
+            "execution_digest": request["execution_digest"],
+            "exit_code": completed.returncode,
+            "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+            "output_text": output_text,
+            "output_sha256": sha256(output_text.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+            "stderr_sha256": sha256(completed.stderr.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+            "credential_material_exposed": False,
+            "control_plane_access_granted": False,
+        }
+        if output_json is not None:
+            result["output_json"] = output_json
+        result["result_sha256"] = sha256(canonical(result))
+        result_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{result_path.name}.", dir=result_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                json.dump(result, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                handle.write("\n")
+                handle.flush()
+                os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+            os.replace(name, result_path)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(name):
+                os.unlink(name)
+
+
+class ExternalAgentExchange:
+    """Worker-side idempotent request/result exchange."""
+
+    def __init__(self, root: Path = DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+
+    def execute(
+        self,
+        *,
+        request_id: str,
+        runtime: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        execution_digest: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+        timeout_seconds: int = 1800,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request = validate_request(
+            {
+                "schema": REQUEST_SCHEMA,
+                "request_id": request_id,
+                "runtime": runtime,
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "execution_digest": execution_digest,
+                "payload": dict(payload),
+            }
+        )
+        requests = self.root / "requests"
+        results = self.root / "results"
+        failed = self.root / "failed"
+        for directory in (requests, results, failed):
+            directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        request_path = requests / f"{request_id}.json"
+        result_path = results / f"{request_id}.json"
+        failed_path = failed / f"{request_id}.json"
+        request_sha = sha256(canonical(request))
+
+        if result_path.is_file():
+            return self._validated_result(result_path, request, request_sha)
+        if failed_path.is_file():
+            value = json.loads(failed_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+                str(value.get("error") or "EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_FAILED")
+            )
+
+        if request_path.exists():
+            try:
+                existing = json.loads(request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXISTING_REQUEST_INVALID") from exc
+            if sha256(canonical(existing)) != request_sha:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_ID_CONFLICT")
+        else:
+            fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{request_path.name}.", dir=requests)
+            try:
+                os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+                with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                    json.dump(request, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                    handle.write("\n")
+                    handle.flush()
+                    os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+                os.replace(name, request_path)
+            finally:
+                if os.path.exists(name):
+                    os.unlink(name)
+
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            if result_path.is_file():
+                return self._validated_result(result_path, request, request_sha)
+            if failed_path.is_file():
+                try:
+                    value = json.loads(failed_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+                except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                    value = {"error": "EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_FAILED"}
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+                    str(value.get("error") or "EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_FAILED")
+                )
+            time.sleep(0.25)
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validated_result(
+        result_path: Path,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        request_sha: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(result_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RESULT_INVALID") from exc
+        if (
+            not isinstance(value, Mapping)
+            or value.get("schema") != RESULT_SCHEMA
+            or value.get("request_id") != request["request_id"]
+            or value.get("request_sha256") != request_sha
+            or value.get("runtime") != request["runtime"]
+            or value.get("task_id") != request["task_id"]
+            or value.get("execution_digest") != request["execution_digest"]
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RESULT_BINDING_INVALID")
+        material = dict(value)
+        declared = str(material.pop("result_sha256", ""))
+        if declared != sha256(canonical(material)):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RESULT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        return dict(value)
+
+
+def serve(
+    root: Path = DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT,
+    profile_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT,
+) -> None:
+    _assert_no_secret_env()
+    root = Path(root)
+    for directory in (root / "requests", root / "results", root / "failed"):
+        directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    while True:
+        for request_path in sorted((root / "requests").glob("*.json")):
+            if request_path.is_symlink():
+                continue
+            result_path = root / "results" / request_path.name
+            failed_path = root / "failed" / request_path.name
+            try:
+                execute_request(request_path, result_path, profile_root=profile_root)
+                request_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                failed_path.write_text(
+                    json.dumps(
+                        {"error": sanitize_text(str(exc) or type(exc).__name__)},
+                        ensure_ascii=False,
+                        sort_keys=True,
+                    )
+                    + "\n",
+                    encoding="utf-8",
+                )
+                request_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        time.sleep(0.25)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    import argparse
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--root", default=str(DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT))
+    parser.add_argument("--profile-root", default=str(DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT))
+    parser.add_argument("--request")
+    parser.add_argument("--result")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.request and args.result:
+        execute_request(
+            Path(args.request),
+            Path(args.result),
+            profile_root=Path(args.profile_root),
+        )
+    else:
+        serve(Path(args.root), Path(args.profile_root))

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""Uncredentialed deterministic executor for governed Online Agent changes.
+
+This process never receives Agent/Owner/Bridge credentials and never writes Git refs.
+It operates only on an exchange bundle and returns hash-bound changed files + test evidence.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import errno
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import tarfile
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+ALLOWED_PROGRAMS = {"/usr/bin/python3", "/usr/bin/git", "/bin/true", "/usr/bin/true"}
+MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
+SECRET_ENV_TOKENS = ("TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "CREDENTIAL", "AUTHORIZATION", "PRIVATE_KEY")
+REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,254}$")
+SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*bearer\s+\S+|authorization\s+bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
+)
+
+
+class IsolatedExecutorError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def safe_relative(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("/"):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if ".." in path.parts or "." in path.parts or any(part in {"", ".git"} for part in path.parts):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    return path.as_posix()
+
+
+def resolve_under(root: Path, relative: str) -> Path:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    path = (root / safe_relative(relative)).resolve(strict=False)
+    if path == root or root not in path.parents:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_ESCAPE")
+    return path
+
+
+def _credential_exposure(directory: Path) -> str | None:
+    """Return an exposure code; EACCES is the intended credential isolation proof."""
+    try:
+        if not directory.exists():
+            return None
+        if directory.is_symlink():
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_SYMLINK"
+        if os.access(directory, os.R_OK):
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_ACCESSIBLE"
+        if directory.is_dir():
+            for child in directory.iterdir():
+                if child.is_file() and os.access(child, os.R_OK):
+                    return "CREDENTIAL_FILE_ACCESSIBLE"
+    except PermissionError:
+        return None
+    return None
+
+
+def assert_uncredentialed() -> None:
+    credentials = Path("/run/credentials")
+    candidates = {credentials}
+    credentials_directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+    candidates.add(credentials_directory)
+    leaked = sorted(
+        key for key, value in os.environ.items()
+        if value
+        and (any(token in key.upper() for token in SECRET_ENV_TOKENS) or SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE.search(str(value)))
+    )
+    if leaked:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CREDENTIAL_ENV_EXPOSED:" + ",".join(leaked))
+    for directory in candidates:
+        exposure = _credential_exposure(directory)
+        if exposure is not None:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError(exposure)
+    # In the intended PrivateNetwork namespace host loopback services are unreachable.
+    try:
+        probe = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno in {errno.EACCES, errno.EPERM, errno.EAFNOSUPPORT}:
+            return
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("NETWORK_ISOLATION_PROBE_FAILED") from exc
+    probe.settimeout(0.15)
+    try:
+        if probe.connect_ex(("127.0.0.1", 18892)) == 0:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("GOVERNED_BRIDGE_REACHABLE")
+    finally:
+        probe.close()
+
+
+def extract_source(archive: Path, root: Path) -> None:
+    if archive.is_symlink() or not archive.is_file() or archive.stat().st_size > MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_INVALID")
+    with tarfile.open(archive, "r:gz") as tf:
+        for member in tf.getmembers():
+            path = Path(member.name)
+            if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or ".git" in path.parts:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+            if member.issym() or member.islnk():
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_LINK_DENY")
+        tf.extractall(root, filter="data")
+
+
+def run_command(item: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    argv = item.get("argv")
+    if not isinstance(argv, Sequence) or isinstance(argv, (str, bytes)) or not argv:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_INVALID")
+    argv = [str(part) for part in argv]
+    if argv[0] not in ALLOWED_PROGRAMS:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_PROGRAM_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/python3" and "-m" in argv:
+        index = argv.index("-m")
+        if index + 1 >= len(argv) or argv[index + 1] not in {"pytest", "py_compile"}:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("PYTHON_MODULE_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/git" and any(
+        token in {"push", "update-ref", "commit", "merge", "rebase", "reset", "clean", "branch"}
+        for token in argv[1:]
+    ):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("GIT_MUTATION_DENY")
+    timeout = int(item.get("timeout_seconds") or 300)
+    if not 1 <= timeout <= 1800:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+    cwd = root if item.get("cwd", ".") == "." else resolve_under(root, str(item.get("cwd")))
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        cwd=cwd,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
+    )
+    result = {
+        "label": str(item.get("label") or "command"),
+        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
+        "stdout_sha256": sha256(completed.stdout.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "stderr_sha256": sha256(completed.stderr.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+    }
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError(
+            "COMMAND_FAILED:" + result["label"] + ":" + str(completed.returncode)
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def apply_changes(request: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> list[str]:
+    changes = request.get("change_set")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not changes:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    changed: list[str] = []
+    for change in changes:
+        if not isinstance(change, Mapping):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_INVALID")
+        relative = safe_relative(change.get("path"))
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        current = path.read_bytes() if path.is_file() else None
+        expected = change.get("expected_sha256")
+        if expected is not None and (current is None or sha256(current) != expected):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_DRIFT:" + relative)
+        operation = change.get("operation")
+        if operation == "write_file":
+            content = change.get("content")
+            if not isinstance(content, str):
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("WRITE_CONTENT_INVALID")
+            path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "replace_text":
+            if current is None:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_SOURCE_MISSING")
+            old = str(change.get("old"))
+            new = str(change.get("new"))
+            count = int(change.get("count", 1))
+            text = current.decode("utf-8")
+            if text.count(old) != count:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_COUNT_INVALID:" + relative)
+            path.write_text(text.replace(old, new), encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "delete_file":
+            if path.exists():
+                path.unlink()
+        else:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_OPERATION_INVALID")
+        changed.append(relative)
+    return sorted(set(changed))
+
+
+def changed_bundle(root: Path, changed: list[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    files = []
+    for relative in changed:
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        if path.exists():
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGED_FILE_TOO_LARGE:" + relative)
+            files.append({
+                "path": relative,
+                "deleted": False,
+                "sha256": sha256(data),
+                "content_b64": base64.b64encode(data).decode("ascii"),
+            })
+        else:
+            files.append({"path": relative, "deleted": True, "sha256": None, "content_b64": None})
+    return files
+
+
+def execute_request(request_path: Path, result_path: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    request = json.loads(request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if request.get("schema") != "aios.isolated-execution.request.v1":
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    request_id = request.get("request_id")
+    if not isinstance(request_id, str) or not REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+    source_archive = Path(str(request.get("source_archive") or ""))
+    if not source_archive.is_absolute():
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+    expected_archive_sha = str(request.get("source_archive_sha256") or "")
+    if sha256(source_archive.read_bytes()) != expected_archive_sha:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_SHA_MISMATCH")
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-isolated-executor-") as temporary:
+        root = Path(temporary) / "workspace"
+        root.mkdir()
+        extract_source(source_archive, root)
+        changed = apply_changes(request, root)
+        commands = [
+            run_command(item, root)
+            for item in request.get("verification", [])
+            if isinstance(item, Mapping)
+        ]
+        result = {
+            "schema": "aios.isolated-execution.result.v1",
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "request_sha256": sha256(canonical(request)),
+            "changed_files": changed_bundle(root, changed),
+            "verification": commands,
+            "credential_isolation": {
+                "credential_env_absent": True,
+                "credential_mount_inaccessible": True,
+                "governed_bridge_unreachable": True,
+            },
+        }
+        result["result_sha256"] = sha256(canonical(result))
+        temporary_result = result_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary_result.write_text(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")), encoding="utf-8")
+        os.replace(temporary_result, result_path)
+
+
+def serve(root: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    requests = root / "requests"
+    results = root / "results"
+    failed = root / "failed"
+    for path in (requests, results, failed):
+        path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    while True:
+        for request in sorted(requests.glob("*.json")):
+            if request.is_symlink():
+                continue
+            result = results / request.name
+            try:
+                execute_request(request, result)
+                request.unlink()
+            except Exception as exc:
+                (failed / request.name).write_text(
+                    json.dumps({"error": str(exc) or type(exc).__name__}, sort_keys=True),
+                    encoding="utf-8",
+                )
+                request.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    import argparse
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--root", default="/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor")
+    parser.add_argument("--request")
+    parser.add_argument("--result")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.request and args.result:
+        execute_request(Path(args.request), Path(args.result))
+    else:
+        serve(Path(args.root))

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_checkpoint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+"""Durable checkpoint journal for the generic Online Agent worker.
+
+The JSON task state remains a fast cache.  This SQLite journal is the durable,
+append-only evidence used for restart/resume/replay decisions.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+PHASE_ORDER = {
+    "claimed": 10,
+    "workspace_prepared": 20,
+    "verification_passed": 30,
+    "agent_runtime_done": 40,
+    "source_capture_done": 40,
+    "commit_done": 40,
+    "reconciliation_required": 45,
+    "result_pending": 50,
+    "result_submitted": 60,
+}
+
+
+class CheckpointError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CheckpointBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    attempt: int
+    execution_digest: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+
+    def material(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "attempt": self.attempt,
+            "execution_digest": self.execution_digest,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "repository": self.repository,
+            "base_oid": self.base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid,
+            "target_branch": self.target_branch,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def binding_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.material())
+
+
+class CheckpointStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoints(
+                  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  repository TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  base_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  expected_branch_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  target_branch TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  PRIMARY KEY(task_id, attempt, sequence)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_task_latest
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt DESC, sequence DESC);
+                CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_exact_replay
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt, phase, payload_sha256);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _phase_order(phase: str) -> int:
+        try:
+            return PHASE_ORDER[phase]
+        except KeyError as exc:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_INVALID") from exc
+
+    def append(
+        self,
+        binding: CheckpointBinding,
+        phase: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        order = self._phase_order(phase)
+        payload_value = dict(payload)
+        payload_sha = sha256_json(payload_value)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND phase=? AND payload_sha256=?
+                """,
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, phase, payload_sha),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                connection.commit()
+                return dict(replay)
+
+            head = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoint_heads WHERE task_id=?",
+                (binding.task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if head is not None:
+                head_attempt = int(head["attempt"])
+                head_order = int(head["phase_order"])
+                if binding.attempt < head_attempt:
+                    raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_ATTEMPT_REGRESSION")
+                if binding.attempt == head_attempt:
+                    if head["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_EXECUTION_DIGEST_CONFLICT")
+                    if head["binding_sha256"] != binding.binding_sha256:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+                    if order < head_order and phase != "reconciliation_required":
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_REGRESSION")
+                    sequence = int(head["sequence"]) + 1
+                else:
+                    sequence = 1
+            else:
+                sequence = 1
+
+            created_at = now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoints(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,job_id,
+                  repository,base_oid,expected_branch_oid,target_branch,generation,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_json,payload_sha256,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.job_id,
+                    binding.repository,
+                    binding.base_oid,
+                    binding.expected_branch_oid,
+                    binding.target_branch,
+                    binding.generation,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    canonical(payload_value).decode("utf-8"),
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_sha256,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                  attempt=excluded.attempt,
+                  sequence=excluded.sequence,
+                  phase=excluded.phase,
+                  phase_order=excluded.phase_order,
+                  execution_digest=excluded.execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256=excluded.binding_sha256,
+                  payload_sha256=excluded.payload_sha256,
+                  updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoints WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND sequence=?",
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            return dict(row)
+
+    def latest(self, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=?
+                 ORDER BY attempt DESC, sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def latest_for_attempt(self, task_id: str, attempt: int) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=?
+                 ORDER BY sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id, attempt),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def verify_latest_binding(self, binding: CheckpointBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        value = self.latest(binding.task_id)
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        if int(value["attempt"]) > binding.attempt:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_FUTURE_ATTEMPT")
+        # A previous attempt may be reused only when the immutable execution/scope binding matches.
+        if value["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+            return None
+        expected = CheckpointBinding(
+            task_id=value["task_id"],
+            attempt=int(value["attempt"]),
+            execution_digest=value["execution_digest"],
+            job_id=value["job_id"],
+            repository=value["repository"],
+            base_oid=value["base_oid"],
+            expected_branch_oid=value["expected_branch_oid"],
+            target_branch=value["target_branch"],
+            generation=int(value["generation"]),
+        )
+        current_scope = binding.material()
+        historical_scope = expected.material()
+        current_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        historical_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        if sha256_json(current_scope) != sha256_json(historical_scope):
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return value

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_compact_map.py

@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+"""Bounded read-only repository interface map for governed Online Agent analysis.
+
+The compact map intentionally returns symbols and short source excerpts rather than a
+source archive. It is designed for control-plane consumers that cannot safely ingest a
+multi-megabyte repository snapshot.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ast
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1"
+MAX_RESULT_BYTES = 120 * 1024
+TARGET_RESULT_BYTES = 108 * 1024
+MAX_MODULES = 40
+MAX_SYMBOLS = 80
+MAX_TESTS = 40
+MAX_EXCERPTS = 25
+MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS = 1200
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+ROOTS = (
+    "active-runtime/app",
+    "runtime/agent-os",
+    "tests",
+    "db/migrations",
+    "migrations",
+    "deploy/systemd",
+    "docs/task-plane",
+    "docs/superpowers/specs",
+)
+SUFFIXES = {".py", ".sql", ".service", ".md", ".json", ".yaml", ".yml"}
+
+DEFAULT_TERMS = {
+    "agent", "worker", "fleet", "scheduler", "scheduling", "task", "claim", "lease",
+    "heartbeat", "capacity", "concurrency", "priority", "fairness", "queue", "retry",
+    "backoff", "circuit", "health", "liveness", "scope", "tenant", "project", "trace",
+    "message", "checkpoint", "recovery", "idempotency", "dispatch", "assignment",
+}
+FLEET_CONTRACT_TERMS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION": ("agent", "register", "worker", "capability", "version"),
+    "FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING": ("capacity", "slot", "concurrency", "scheduler", "queue"),
+    "FLEET_FAIRNESS": ("fair", "priority", "queue", "tenant", "project", "starvation"),
+    "FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION": ("failure", "health", "liveness", "timeout", "circuit", "poison"),
+    "FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT": ("reassign", "assignment", "claim", "lease", "retry", "worker"),
+    "FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION": ("tenant", "project", "scope", "conversation", "task", "run"),
+    "FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH": ("idempot", "dispatch", "claim", "lease", "result", "attempt"),
+    "FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY": ("checkpoint", "resume", "recover", "retry", "cleanup", "receipt"),
+}
+
+MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONTRACT_TERMS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "MODEL_PROVIDER_REGISTRY": ("model", "provider", "registry", "endpoint", "capability"),
+    "MODEL_SELECTION_POLICY": ("model", "select", "route", "policy", "capability"),
+    "MODEL_VERSION_PINNING": ("model", "version", "pin", "revision", "snapshot"),
+    "MODEL_BUDGET_ACCOUNTING": ("budget", "token", "cost", "quota", "usage"),
+    "MODEL_FALLBACK_POLICY": ("fallback", "retry", "route", "provider", "model"),
+    "MODEL_SCOPE_ISOLATION": ("tenant", "project", "scope", "policy", "model"),
+    "MODEL_CREDENTIAL_BOUNDARY": ("credential", "secret", "provider", "tool", "token"),
+    "MODEL_TRACE_AUDIT": ("trace", "audit", "model", "provider", "request"),
+    "MODEL_EVALUATION_GATE": ("eval", "evaluation", "approval", "quality", "gate"),
+    "MODEL_ROUTING_RESILIENCE": ("route", "retry", "fallback", "timeout", "health"),
+}
+
+PROFILE_CLASSIFICATION = {
+    "fleet": "P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+    "model_governance": "MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+}
+
+MODEL_PROFILE_MARKERS = {
+    "model", "provider", "llm", "inference", "routing", "router", "budget",
+    "token", "cost", "quota", "fallback", "evaluation", "eval", "approval",
+    "version", "pinning",
+}
+SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^'\"\s,;]+)"
+)
+SQL_TABLE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?is)\bcreate\s+table\s+(?:if\s+not\s+exists\s+)?[\"`[]?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*)"
+)
+
+
+class CompactInterfaceMapError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _sha(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _bounded_excerpt(text: str, start_line: int, end_line: int) -> str:
+    lines = text.splitlines()
+    start = max(0, start_line - 2)
+    end = min(len(lines), max(end_line + 1, start + 1))
+    excerpt = "\n".join(lines[start:end])
+    excerpt = SENSITIVE_RE.sub("<redacted-sensitive-source-pattern>", excerpt)
+    if len(excerpt) > MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS:
+        excerpt = excerpt[: MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS - 1] + "…"
+    return excerpt
+
+
+def _signal_terms(signals: Sequence[str]) -> set[str]:
+    terms = set(DEFAULT_TERMS)
+    for signal in signals:
+        if not isinstance(signal, str):
+            continue
+        terms.update(
+            token.lower()
+            for token in re.findall(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,63}", signal)
+        )
+    return set(sorted(terms)[:96])
+
+
+def _profile(source_signals: Sequence[str]) -> str:
+    tokens: set[str] = set()
+    for signal in source_signals:
+        if not isinstance(signal, str):
+            continue
+        tokens.update(
+            token.lower()
+            for token in re.findall(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,63}", signal)
+        )
+    model_score = len(tokens & MODEL_PROFILE_MARKERS)
+    return "model_governance" if model_score >= 2 else "fleet"
+
+
+def _contract_terms(profile: str) -> Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]]:
+    if profile == "model_governance":
+        return MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONTRACT_TERMS
+    if profile == "fleet":
+        return FLEET_CONTRACT_TERMS
+    raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_PROFILE_INVALID")
+
+
+def _candidate_files(root: Path, terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    candidates: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for relative_root in ROOTS:
+        directory = (root / relative_root).resolve(strict=False)
+        if directory == root or root not in directory.parents:
+            raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not directory.is_dir() or directory.is_symlink():
+            continue
+        for path in sorted(directory.rglob("*")):
+            if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.suffix.lower() not in SUFFIXES:
+                continue
+            resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+            if root not in resolved.parents:
+                raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_PATH_ESCAPE")
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                continue
+            relative = path.relative_to(root).as_posix()
+            text = data.decode("utf-8", "ignore")
+            searchable = (relative + "\n" + text[:384000]).lower()
+            matched = sorted(term for term in terms if term in searchable)
+            if not matched:
+                continue
+            path_bonus = sum(3 for term in terms if term in relative.lower())
+            test_bonus = 3 if relative.startswith("tests/") else 0
+            score = min(250, len(matched) + path_bonus + test_bonus)
+            candidates.append(
+                {
+                    "path": relative,
+                    "sha256": _sha(data),
+                    "bytes": len(data),
+                    "score": score,
+                    "text": text,
+                    "suffix": path.suffix.lower(),
+                }
+            )
+    candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (-item["score"], item["path"]))
+    return candidates
+
+
+def _python_symbols(item: Mapping[str, Any], terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        tree = ast.parse(str(item["text"]), filename=str(item["path"]))
+    except SyntaxError:
+        return []
+    result: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    class Visitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.stack: list[str] = []
+
+        def _record(self, node: ast.AST, kind: str, name: str) -> None:
+            qualified = ".".join([*self.stack, name]) if self.stack else name
+            haystack = f"{item['path']} {qualified}".lower()
+            score = sum(3 if term in haystack else 0 for term in terms)
+            if name.startswith("test_"):
+                score += 12
+            result.append(
+                {
+                    "path": item["path"],
+                    "symbol": qualified,
+                    "kind": kind,
+                    "line": int(getattr(node, "lineno", 1)),
+                    "end_line": int(getattr(node, "end_lineno", getattr(node, "lineno", 1))),
+                    "score": score + int(item["score"]),
+                }
+            )
+
+        def visit_ClassDef(self, node: ast.ClassDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "class", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_AsyncFunctionDef(self, node: ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "async_function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+    Visitor().visit(tree)
+    return result
+
+
+def _surface_ref(symbol: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return f"{symbol['path']}::{symbol['symbol']}"
+
+
+def _contract_map(
+    symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    modules: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    contract_terms: Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    module_paths = [str(item["path"]) for item in modules]
+    for contract, terms in contract_terms.items():
+        scored: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+        for symbol in symbols:
+            haystack = _surface_ref(symbol).lower()
+            score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in haystack)
+            if score:
+                scored.append((score, _surface_ref(symbol)))
+        scored.sort(key=lambda item: (-item[0], item[1]))
+        surfaces = [value for _, value in scored[:6]]
+        if not surfaces:
+            for path in module_paths:
+                score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in path.lower())
+                if score:
+                    surfaces.append(path)
+                if len(surfaces) == 6:
+                    break
+        result[contract] = {
+            "status": "PARTIAL" if surfaces else "GAP",
+            "surfaces": surfaces,
+        }
+    return result
+
+
+def _gap_evidence(
+    symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    profile: str,
+) -> tuple[list[str], list[str], list[str]]:
+    haystack = "\n".join(_surface_ref(item).lower() for item in symbols)
+
+    if profile == "model_governance":
+        invariants = [
+            "Online Task claim/heartbeat remains the authoritative worker ownership boundary.",
+            "Provider/model credentials remain outside uncredentialed planner/executor processes.",
+            "P0-A tenant/project scope and P0-C trace/audit lineage must constrain model routing.",
+            "P1 retry/checkpoint semantics remain authoritative for model-call execution recovery.",
+        ]
+        failure_windows: list[str] = []
+        if "provider" not in haystack and "model" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No first-class model/provider registry surface detected.")
+        if "budget" not in haystack and "cost" not in haystack and "quota" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit durable model budget/cost/quota accounting surface detected.")
+        if "fallback" not in haystack and "route" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit model fallback/routing policy surface detected.")
+        if "eval" not in haystack and "approval" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit evaluation/approval gate surface detected for model changes.")
+        if "version" not in haystack and "pin" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit model-version pinning surface detected.")
+        desired = (
+            ("trace", "P0-C trace/audit lineage"),
+            ("scope", "P0-A tenant/project scope isolation"),
+            ("credential", "P0-C credential governance"),
+            ("checkpoint", "P1 durable execution recovery"),
+            ("message", "P0-B MessageEnvelope/handoff"),
+            ("retry", "P1 retry/idempotency"),
+        )
+    else:
+        invariants = [
+            "Online Task claim/heartbeat remains the authoritative worker ownership boundary.",
+            "Governed mutation remains separated from read-only analysis and requires WriterLease.",
+            "P1 attempt-aware result idempotency and durable checkpoint recovery are reusable fleet primitives.",
+            "Scope/trace/message lineage must remain attached when work is scheduled or reassigned.",
+        ]
+        failure_windows = []
+        if "scheduler" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No first-class durable fleet scheduler symbol detected; worker-local polling may still be the scheduling mechanism.")
+        if "capacity" not in haystack and "slot" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit durable worker-capacity/slot primitive detected.")
+        if "fair" not in haystack and "starvation" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit fairness/starvation policy symbol detected.")
+        if "circuit" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit circuit-breaker primitive detected for repeated worker/task failures.")
+        if "reassign" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit worker-reassignment primitive detected beyond lease expiry/retry semantics.")
+        desired = (
+            ("checkpoint", "P1 durable checkpoint/resume"),
+            ("message", "P0-B MessageEnvelope/handoff"),
+            ("trace", "P0-C trace correlation"),
+            ("scope", "P0-A scope isolation"),
+            ("lease", "claim/WriterLease ownership"),
+            ("heartbeat", "worker liveness"),
+            ("idempot", "retry-safe dispatch/result"),
+        )
+
+    reuse_points: list[str] = []
+    for token, label in desired:
+        match = next((item for item in symbols if token in _surface_ref(item).lower()), None)
+        if match is not None:
+            reuse_points.append(f"{label}: {_surface_ref(match)}")
+    return invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points
+
+
+def _trim_to_budget(value: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def size() -> int:
+        return len(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
+
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and value["bounded_excerpts"]:
+        value["bounded_excerpts"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["functions"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["functions"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["classes"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["classes"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["tests"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["tests"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["modules"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["modules"].pop()
+    final_size = size()
+    if final_size > MAX_RESULT_BYTES:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_RESULT_TOO_LARGE")
+    value["result_bytes"] = final_size
+    return value
+
+
+def build_compact_interface_map(
+    worktree: Path,
+    source_signals: Sequence[str],
+    *,
+    source_commit: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    root = Path(worktree)
+    if not root.is_dir() or root.is_symlink():
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_WORKTREE_INVALID")
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", source_commit) is None:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SOURCE_COMMIT_INVALID")
+
+    profile = _profile(source_signals)
+    terms = _signal_terms(source_signals)
+    candidates = _candidate_files(root, terms)
+    if not candidates:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_EMPTY")
+
+    module_candidates = candidates[:MAX_MODULES]
+    modules = [
+        {
+            "path": item["path"],
+            "sha256": item["sha256"],
+            "bytes": item["bytes"],
+            "score": item["score"],
+        }
+        for item in module_candidates
+    ]
+
+    symbols: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    tables: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    systemd_units: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for item in candidates:
+        if item["suffix"] == ".py":
+            symbols.extend(_python_symbols(item, terms))
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".sql":
+            for table in SQL_TABLE_RE.findall(str(item["text"])):
+                tables.append({"path": item["path"], "table": table, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".service":
+            systemd_units.append({"path": item["path"], "unit": Path(str(item["path"])).name, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    all_symbols = list(symbols)
+    test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][: min(MAX_TESTS, 24)]
+    non_test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if item not in test_symbols
+    ][: max(0, MAX_SYMBOLS - len(test_symbols))]
+    symbols = [*test_symbols, *non_test_symbols]
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    classes = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] == "class"
+    ]
+    functions = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] in {"function", "async_function"} and not str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ]
+    tests = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][:MAX_TESTS]
+
+    excerpts: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    by_path = {str(item["path"]): item for item in candidates}
+    for symbol in symbols:
+        if len(excerpts) == MAX_EXCERPTS:
+            break
+        item = by_path.get(str(symbol["path"]))
+        if item is None:
+            continue
+        excerpt = _bounded_excerpt(str(item["text"]), int(symbol["line"]), int(symbol["end_line"]))
+        if not excerpt.strip():
+            continue
+        excerpts.append(
+            {
+                "path": symbol["path"],
+                "symbol": symbol["symbol"],
+                "sha256": item["sha256"],
+                "excerpt": excerpt,
+            }
+        )
+
+    invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points = _gap_evidence(all_symbols, profile)
+    result = {
+        "schema": SCHEMA,
+        "profile": profile,
+        "classification": PROFILE_CLASSIFICATION[profile],
+        "source_commit": source_commit,
+        "implementation_map": {
+            "modules": modules,
+            "classes": classes[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "functions": functions[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "tables": tables[:40],
+            "systemd_units": systemd_units[:20],
+            "tests": tests,
+            "current_invariants": invariants,
+            "failure_windows": failure_windows,
+            "reuse_points": reuse_points,
+        },
+        "bounded_excerpts": excerpts,
+        "contracts": _contract_map(all_symbols, modules, _contract_terms(profile)),
+    }
+    return _trim_to_budget(result)

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_execution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+"""Canonical governed execution projection for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+The durable governed binding is authoritative.  Natural-language task fields and
+worker configuration are never allowed to invent repository, ref, generation, or
+idempotency coordinates.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+EXECUTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.execution.v2"
+PROJECTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = ("main", "master", "refs/", "tags/", "tag/", "release/", "baseline/", "production/")
+MUTATION_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic"})
+READ_ONLY_ACTIONS = frozenset({"source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+SUPPORTED_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic", "source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS = frozenset({"hermes", "openclaw"})
+MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+
+
+class ExecutionProjectionError(RuntimeError):
+    """A canonical fail-closed projection or validation error."""
+
+
+class OnlineTaskProjectionClient:
+    """Official HTTP projection client using only a control credential reference."""
+
+    def __init__(self, api_base: str, control_token_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.api_base = api_base.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token_path = Path(control_token_path)
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        path = self.control_token_path
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def create(
+        self,
+        projected_task: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding: "GovernedExecutionBinding",
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = dict(projected_task)
+        payload = _canonical(body).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.api_base + "/v1/tasks",
+            method="POST",
+            data=payload,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self._token(),
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read(8192).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+            try:
+                error = json.loads(raw).get("error")
+            except (AttributeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                error = "HTTP_ERROR"
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError(f"ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_FAILED:{exc.code}:{error}") from exc
+        except (OSError, urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if status not in {200, 201} or not isinstance(result, dict):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        if result.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or result.get("status") not in {"QUEUED", "VERIFYING", "SUCCEEDED"}:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        metadata = result.get("metadata")
+        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        returned_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        submitted_metadata = _object(body.get("metadata"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        submitted_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(submitted_metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        if _canonical(returned_execution) != _canonical(submitted_execution):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> None:
+    raise ExecutionProjectionError(code)
+
+
+def _object(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error(code)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        _error(code)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _task_id(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if TASK_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, code)
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _branch(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    if BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(value) is None or value.startswith(PROTECTED_PREFIXES):
+        _error("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _generation(value: object) -> int:
+    if not isinstance(value, int) or isinstance(value, bool) or value < 1:
+        _error("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _source_signals(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Normalize untrusted natural-language hints before they enter a signed envelope."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for item in value:
+        if not isinstance(item, str):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        text = " ".join(item.split()).strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        # Projection may accept long task prose, but execution envelopes stay bounded.
+        text = text[:512].rstrip()
+        if text not in result:
+            result.append(text)
+        if len(result) == 16:
+            break
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+def _agent_runtime_input(value: object) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_REQUIRED")
+    raw = dict(value)
+    allowed = {"goal", "instructions", "success_criteria", "constraints"}
+    if set(raw) - allowed:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    goal = _string(raw.get("goal"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_GOAL_REQUIRED")
+    instructions = raw.get("instructions", "")
+    if not isinstance(instructions, str):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+    criteria = raw.get("success_criteria", [])
+    if not isinstance(criteria, list) or len(criteria) > 32:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+    normalized_criteria: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for item in criteria:
+        if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criterion_id = _string(item.get("id"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        description = _string(
+            item.get("description"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID"
+        )
+        normalized_criteria.append(
+            {"id": criterion_id[:120], "description": description[:1000]}
+        )
+    constraints = raw.get("constraints", {})
+    if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+    sensitive_markers = ("token", "secret", "password", "credential", "authorization", "api_key", "apikey")
+    for key in constraints:
+        lowered = str(key).lower()
+        if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SECRET_FIELD_DENY")
+    normalized = {
+        "goal": goal[:12000],
+        "instructions": instructions[:32000],
+        "success_criteria": normalized_criteria,
+        "constraints": dict(constraints),
+    }
+    if len(_canonical(normalized).encode("utf-8")) > MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_TOO_LARGE")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _capabilities(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    result = tuple(sorted({_string(item, "CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID") for item in value}))
+    if any(len(item) > 120 for item in result):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedExecutionBinding":
+        data = dict(value)
+        task_id = _task_id(data.get("task_id"))
+        job_id = _string(data.get("job_id"), "JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+        if TASK_RE.fullmatch(job_id) is None:
+            _error("JOB_ID_INVALID")
+        repository = _string(data.get("repository"), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            _error("WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY")
+        base_oid = _oid(data.get("base_oid"), "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        expected = _oid(data.get("expected_branch_oid"), "EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        target = _branch(data.get("target_branch"))
+        mode = _string(data.get("branch_mode"), "BRANCH_MODE_MISSING")
+        if mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            _error("BRANCH_MODE_INVALID")
+        generation = _generation(data.get("generation"))
+        if mode == "CREATE_NEW" and expected != base_oid:
+            _error("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+        key = _string(data.get("idempotency_key"), "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        if KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+            _error("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        return cls(task_id, job_id, repository, base_oid, expected, target, mode, generation, key)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def binding_from_bootstrap(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def validate_execution_envelope(
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding | None = None,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    envelope = dict(value)
+    if envelope.get("schema") != EXECUTION_SCHEMA:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA_VALIDATION")
+    candidate = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(envelope)
+    if binding is not None and candidate != binding:
+        comparisons = (
+            (candidate.task_id, binding.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.job_id, binding.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.repository, binding.repository, "WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.base_oid, binding.base_oid, "WRONG_BASE_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.expected_branch_oid, binding.expected_branch_oid, "WRONG_EXPECTED_HEAD_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.target_branch, binding.target_branch, "WRONG_BRANCH_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.generation, binding.generation, "WRONG_GENERATION_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.branch_mode, binding.branch_mode, "BRANCH_MODE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.idempotency_key, binding.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        )
+        for actual, expected, code in comparisons:
+            if actual != expected:
+                _error(code)
+    action = _string(envelope.get("action"), "EXECUTION_ACTION_MISSING")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capability_scope = _capabilities(envelope.get("capability_scope"))
+    if worker_capabilities is not None and not set(capability_scope).issubset(set(worker_capabilities)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    workspace = _object(envelope.get("workspace"), "WORKSPACE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    if workspace.get("authority_git_dir") != "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git" or workspace.get("read_only_repository") is not True:
+        _error("WORKSPACE_POLICY_DENY")
+    governance = _object(envelope.get("governance"), "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    governed_coordinates = (
+        (governance.get("task_id"), candidate.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("job_id"), candidate.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("idempotency_key"), candidate.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+    )
+    for actual_coordinate, expected_coordinate, code in governed_coordinates:
+        if actual_coordinate != expected_coordinate:
+            _error(code)
+    commit_key = _string(governance.get("commit_idempotency_key"), "COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(commit_key) is None:
+        _error("COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if governance.get("writer_lease") is not (action in MUTATION_ACTIONS):
+        _error("WRITER_LEASE_POLICY_DENY")
+    for field in ("main_write", "production_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "force_push", "protected_ref_bypass"):
+        if governance.get(field, False) is not False:
+            _error("POLICY_DENY")
+    changes = envelope.get("change_set")
+    verification = envelope.get("verification")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not isinstance(verification, list):
+        _error("EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_INVALID")
+    if action == "source_capture":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY")
+        signals = list(_source_signals(envelope.get("source_signals") or []))
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") != signals:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") not in (None, {}):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_RUNTIME_INPUT_DENY")
+    elif action == "agent_runtime":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_MUTATION_DENY")
+        adapter = str(envelope.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = _agent_runtime_input(envelope.get("runtime_input"))
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") != runtime_input:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_NOT_CANONICAL")
+        required_runtime_capability = f"agent.runtime.{adapter}"
+        if required_runtime_capability not in capability_scope:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_REQUIRED")
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") not in (None, []):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SOURCE_SIGNALS_DENY")
+    elif not changes:
+        _error("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    declared = str(envelope.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    material = {key: item for key, item in envelope.items() if key != "execution_digest"}
+    actual = _digest(material)
+    if declared != actual:
+        _error("EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    return {**material, "execution_digest": actual}
+
+
+def project_execution_envelope(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    *,
+    required_capabilities: Sequence[str] = (),
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(execution_request or {})
+    action = str(request.get("action") or "source_capture")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capabilities = _capabilities(request.get("capability_scope", required_capabilities))
+    governance = {
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+        "commit_idempotency_key": str(request.get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{binding.task_id}-commit-g{binding.generation}"),
+        "writer_lease": action in MUTATION_ACTIONS,
+        "main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "tag_write": False,
+        "baseline_write": False,
+        "force_push": False,
+        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
+    }
+    supplied_governance = request.get("governance")
+    if supplied_governance is not None:
+        governance.update(_object(supplied_governance, "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED"))
+    material: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema": EXECUTION_SCHEMA,
+        **binding.public(),
+        "action": action,
+        "adapter": str(
+            request.get("adapter")
+            or ("deterministic" if action == "deterministic" else "source_capture")
+        ),
+        "capability_scope": list(capabilities),
+        "change_set": list(request.get("change_set") or []),
+        "verification": list(request.get("verification") or []),
+        "source_signals": list(_source_signals(request.get("source_signals") or [])) if action == "source_capture" else [],
+        "runtime_input": _agent_runtime_input(request.get("runtime_input")) if action == "agent_runtime" else {},
+        "governance": governance,
+        "workspace": {
+            "authority_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+            "read_only_repository": True,
+            "cleanup_policy": "always",
+        },
+    }
+    envelope = {**material, "execution_digest": _digest(material)}
+    return validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding)
+
+
+def project_online_task(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    task_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(task_request)
+    required = _capabilities(request.get("required_capabilities"))
+    execution_value = dict(execution_request or {})
+    if str(execution_value.get("action") or "source_capture") == "agent_runtime":
+        adapter = str(execution_value.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = execution_value.get("runtime_input")
+        if runtime_input is None:
+            runtime_input = {
+                "goal": request.get("goal"),
+                "instructions": request.get("instructions") or "",
+                "success_criteria": request.get("success_criteria") or [],
+                "constraints": request.get("constraints") or {},
+            }
+        execution_value["runtime_input"] = runtime_input
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        execution_value,
+        required_capabilities=required,
+    )
+    metadata = dict(request.get("metadata") or {})
+    if "execution" in metadata:
+        validate_execution_envelope(_object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"), binding=binding)
+        if metadata["execution"] != execution:
+            _error("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_CONFLICT")
+    metadata["execution"] = execution
+    metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+        "schema": PROJECTION_SCHEMA,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+    }
+    return {
+        **request,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "metadata": metadata,
+        "required_capabilities": list(required),
+        "idempotency_key": str(request.get("idempotency_key") or f"online-task:{binding.idempotency_key}"),
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_task_execution(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+    metadata = task.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) and "execution" in metadata:
+        value = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+            worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities,
+        )
+        return value, "persisted"
+    projected = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {"action": "source_capture", "capability_scope": task.get("required_capabilities") or []},
+        required_capabilities=task.get("required_capabilities") or [],
+    )
+    validate_execution_envelope(projected, binding=binding, worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities)
+    return projected, "recovered_projection"

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_plan_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+"""Durable, authority-bound deterministic execution plans for Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _task_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    readable = "".join(ch if ch.isalnum() or ch in "._-" else "-" for ch in task_id).strip("-")[:72] or "task"
+    return readable + "-" + hashlib.sha256(task_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:24]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionPlanRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    source_head_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    plan_digest: str
+    execution: dict[str, Any]
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1",
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": self.source_head_oid,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "plan_digest": self.plan_digest,
+            "execution": dict(self.execution),
+        }
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanStore:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    def _path(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _lock(self, task_id: str):
+        path = self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".lock")
+        with path.open("a+b") as handle:
+            fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            try:
+                yield
+            finally:
+                fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _source_head(binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> str:
+        return binding.expected_branch_oid if binding.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING" else binding.base_oid
+
+    def _read(self, task_id: str) -> ExecutionPlanRecord | None:
+        path = self._path(task_id)
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            return None
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        execution = value.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        return ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=str(value.get("task_id") or ""),
+            job_id=str(value.get("job_id") or ""),
+            source_head_oid=str(value.get("source_head_oid") or ""),
+            generation=int(value.get("generation") or 0),
+            idempotency_key=str(value.get("idempotency_key") or ""),
+            plan_digest=str(value.get("plan_digest") or ""),
+            execution=dict(execution),
+        )
+
+    def register(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock(binding.task_id):
+            return self._register_locked(binding, request)
+
+    def _register_locked(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        if request.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or request.get("job_id") != binding.job_id:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if int(request.get("generation") or 0) != binding.generation:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_GENERATION_CONFLICT")
+        source_head = str(request.get("source_head_oid") or "")
+        if source_head != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_CONFLICT")
+        key = str(request.get("idempotency_key") or "")
+        if len(key) < 8:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+        execution_request = request.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution_request, Mapping) or execution_request.get("action") != "deterministic":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_DETERMINISTIC_REQUIRED")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, execution_request)
+        material = {
+            "task_id": binding.task_id,
+            "job_id": binding.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": source_head,
+            "generation": binding.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": key,
+            "execution": dict(execution_request),
+        }
+        plan_digest = _digest(material)
+        existing = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        expected_previous = request.get("expected_previous_plan_digest")
+        if existing is not None:
+            if existing.idempotency_key == key:
+                if existing.plan_digest != plan_digest:
+                    raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                return {**existing.public(), "idempotent": True, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+            if expected_previous != existing.plan_digest:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            if existing.source_head_oid != source_head:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_STALE_REPLACEMENT_DENY")
+        elif expected_previous not in (None, ""):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+
+        record = ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=binding.task_id,
+            job_id=binding.job_id,
+            source_head_oid=source_head,
+            generation=binding.generation,
+            idempotency_key=key,
+            plan_digest=plan_digest,
+            execution=dict(execution_request),
+        )
+        path = self._path(binding.task_id)
+        temporary = path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary.write_text(
+            json.dumps(record.public(), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        temporary.replace(path)
+        return {**record.public(), "idempotent": False, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+
+    def resolve(self, binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        record = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        if record is None:
+            return None
+        if (
+            record.task_id != binding.task_id
+            or record.job_id != binding.job_id
+            or record.generation != binding.generation
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if record.source_head_oid != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_DRIFT")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, record.execution)
+        return {
+            "execution": dict(record.execution),
+            "plan_digest": record.plan_digest,
+            "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"],
+        }

active-runtime/app/aios_worker_availability_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+"""Self-healing availability guard for persistent Online Agent workers.
+
+The guard never claims Tasks and never writes Task/Job/Git databases. It only:
+- ensures required worker/executor systemd units are enabled + active;
+- checks worker-owned liveness JSON written by the real poll/heartbeat loop;
+- restarts an active worker only when its liveness is stale;
+- honors an explicit maintenance inhibit file;
+- writes a bounded status JSON under /run for observability.
+
+Idle liveness is the successful poll loop itself. Busy liveness is refreshed by the
+Task lease-heartbeat thread, so long-running Tasks are not mistaken for hung workers.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import shlex
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.worker-availability.status.v1"
+DEFAULT_WORKER_UNITS = (
+    "aios-online-agent-worker-20260815.service",
+    "aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service",
+    "aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service",
+)
+DEFAULT_DEPENDENCY_UNITS = (
+    "aios-external-agent-executor.service",
+)
+DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT = Path("/run/aios-worker-availability")
+DEFAULT_STATUS = DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT / "status.json"
+DEFAULT_RECOVERY = DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT / "recovery.json"
+DEFAULT_INHIBIT = DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT / "maintenance.lock"
+DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS = 90
+DEFAULT_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS = 60
+DEFAULT_STARTUP_WAIT_SECONDS = 10
+ACCEPTED_ENABLED_STATES = frozenset({"enabled", "enabled-runtime", "static", "indirect", "generated"})
+
+
+class AvailabilityGuardError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class UnitSnapshot:
+    unit: str
+    role: str
+    load_state: str
+    active_state: str
+    unit_file_state: str
+    enabled_ok: bool
+    liveness_path: str | None = None
+    liveness_state: str | None = None
+    last_seen_epoch: float | None = None
+    liveness_age_seconds: float | None = None
+    fresh: bool | None = None
+    action: str = "NONE"
+    detail: str | None = None
+
+
+class Systemd:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        runner: Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.runner = runner or subprocess.run
+
+    def _run(self, args: Sequence[str], *, check: bool = False) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+        result = self.runner(
+            ["/usr/bin/systemctl", *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+            timeout=20,
+        )
+        if check and result.returncode != 0:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError(
+                "SYSTEMD_COMMAND_FAILED:"
+                + ":".join(args)
+                + ":"
+                + str(result.returncode)
+            )
+        return result
+
+    def property(self, unit: str, name: str) -> str:
+        result = self._run(["show", unit, f"--property={name}", "--value"])
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            return ""
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def environment(self, unit: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+        text = self.property(unit, "Environment")
+        result: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for item in shlex.split(text):
+            if "=" not in item:
+                continue
+            key, value = item.split("=", 1)
+            result[key] = value
+        return result
+
+    def enable(self, unit: str) -> None:
+        self._run(["enable", unit], check=True)
+
+    def start(self, unit: str) -> None:
+        self._run(["start", unit], check=True)
+
+    def restart(self, unit: str) -> None:
+        self._run(["restart", unit], check=True)
+
+
+def _atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o755)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise AvailabilityGuardError("STATUS_PATH_SYMLINK_REJECTED")
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o644)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump(value, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2)
+            handle.write("\n")
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+        os.chmod(path, 0o644)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def _load_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        return None
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return None
+    return dict(value) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else None
+
+
+def _state_root(environment: Mapping[str, str], unit: str) -> Path:
+    explicit = environment.get("AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT")
+    if explicit:
+        return Path(explicit)
+    fallbacks = {
+        "aios-online-agent-worker-20260815.service": Path(
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815"
+        ),
+        "aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service": Path(
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes"
+        ),
+        "aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service": Path(
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw"
+        ),
+    }
+    if unit not in fallbacks:
+        raise AvailabilityGuardError("WORKER_STATE_ROOT_UNAVAILABLE:" + unit)
+    return fallbacks[unit]
+
+
+def _liveness_path(environment: Mapping[str, str], unit: str) -> Path:
+    explicit = environment.get("AIOS_WORKER_LIVENESS_PATH")
+    if explicit:
+        return Path(explicit)
+    return _state_root(environment, unit) / "worker-liveness.json"
+
+
+class AvailabilityGuard:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        systemd: Systemd | None = None,
+        worker_units: Sequence[str] = DEFAULT_WORKER_UNITS,
+        dependency_units: Sequence[str] = DEFAULT_DEPENDENCY_UNITS,
+        status_path: Path = DEFAULT_STATUS,
+        recovery_path: Path = DEFAULT_RECOVERY,
+        inhibit_path: Path = DEFAULT_INHIBIT,
+        max_stale_seconds: int = DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS,
+        restart_cooldown_seconds: int = DEFAULT_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS,
+        startup_wait_seconds: int = DEFAULT_STARTUP_WAIT_SECONDS,
+        now_fn: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+        sleep_fn: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.systemd = systemd or Systemd()
+        self.worker_units = tuple(worker_units)
+        self.dependency_units = tuple(dependency_units)
+        self.status_path = Path(status_path)
+        self.recovery_path = Path(recovery_path)
+        self.inhibit_path = Path(inhibit_path)
+        self.max_stale_seconds = int(max_stale_seconds)
+        self.restart_cooldown_seconds = int(restart_cooldown_seconds)
+        self.startup_wait_seconds = int(startup_wait_seconds)
+        self.now_fn = now_fn
+        self.sleep_fn = sleep_fn
+        if self.max_stale_seconds < 15:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("MAX_STALE_SECONDS_TOO_SMALL")
+        if self.restart_cooldown_seconds < 15:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("RESTART_COOLDOWN_TOO_SMALL")
+        if self.startup_wait_seconds < 0 or self.startup_wait_seconds > 60:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("STARTUP_WAIT_INVALID")
+
+    def _recovery_state(self) -> dict[str, float]:
+        value = _load_json(self.recovery_path) or {}
+        raw = value.get("last_restart_epoch")
+        if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            return {}
+        result: dict[str, float] = {}
+        for unit, epoch in raw.items():
+            try:
+                result[str(unit)] = float(epoch)
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                continue
+        return result
+
+    def _save_recovery_state(self, state: Mapping[str, float]) -> None:
+        _atomic_json(
+            self.recovery_path,
+            {
+                "schema": "aios.worker-availability.recovery.v1",
+                "last_restart_epoch": dict(state),
+            },
+        )
+
+    def _basic_snapshot(self, unit: str, role: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, bool]:
+        load = self.systemd.property(unit, "LoadState")
+        active = self.systemd.property(unit, "ActiveState")
+        enabled = self.systemd.property(unit, "UnitFileState")
+        return load, active, enabled, enabled in ACCEPTED_ENABLED_STATES
+
+    def _ensure_enabled_active(self, unit: str, role: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+        load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, role)
+        if load != "loaded":
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("REQUIRED_UNIT_NOT_LOADED:" + unit)
+        action = "NONE"
+        if not enabled_ok:
+            self.systemd.enable(unit)
+            action = "ENABLE"
+        if active != "active":
+            self.systemd.start(unit)
+            action = "START" if action == "NONE" else "ENABLE_START"
+        return action, active == "active"
+
+    def _wait_for_liveness(self, path: Path) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        deadline = self.now_fn() + self.startup_wait_seconds
+        while True:
+            value = _load_json(path)
+            if value is not None:
+                try:
+                    epoch = float(value.get("last_seen_epoch"))
+                except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                    epoch = 0.0
+                if epoch > 0 and self.now_fn() - epoch <= self.max_stale_seconds:
+                    return value
+            if self.now_fn() >= deadline:
+                return value
+            self.sleep_fn(0.5)
+
+    def run(self, *, heal: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = self.now_fn()
+        if self.inhibit_path.exists():
+            result = {
+                "schema": SCHEMA,
+                "status": "MAINTENANCE_INHIBITED",
+                "generated_at_epoch": now,
+                "maintenance_inhibit": str(self.inhibit_path),
+                "workers": [],
+                "dependencies": [],
+                "all_fresh": False,
+                "actions": [],
+            }
+            _atomic_json(self.status_path, result)
+            return result
+
+        actions: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        dependencies: list[UnitSnapshot] = []
+        for unit in self.dependency_units:
+            load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "dependency")
+            action = "NONE"
+            if heal:
+                if load != "loaded":
+                    raise AvailabilityGuardError("REQUIRED_UNIT_NOT_LOADED:" + unit)
+                if not enabled_ok:
+                    self.systemd.enable(unit)
+                    action = "ENABLE"
+                if active != "active":
+                    self.systemd.start(unit)
+                    action = "START" if action == "NONE" else "ENABLE_START"
+                if action != "NONE":
+                    actions.append({"unit": unit, "action": action})
+                load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "dependency")
+            dependencies.append(
+                UnitSnapshot(
+                    unit=unit,
+                    role="dependency",
+                    load_state=load,
+                    active_state=active,
+                    unit_file_state=enabled,
+                    enabled_ok=enabled_ok,
+                    fresh=(active == "active"),
+                    action=action,
+                )
+            )
+
+        recovery = self._recovery_state()
+        workers: list[UnitSnapshot] = []
+        for unit in self.worker_units:
+            load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "worker")
+            environment = self.systemd.environment(unit) if load == "loaded" else {}
+            path = _liveness_path(environment, unit) if load == "loaded" else None
+            action = "NONE"
+
+            if heal:
+                if load != "loaded":
+                    raise AvailabilityGuardError("REQUIRED_UNIT_NOT_LOADED:" + unit)
+                if not enabled_ok:
+                    self.systemd.enable(unit)
+                    action = "ENABLE"
+                if active != "active":
+                    self.systemd.start(unit)
+                    action = "START" if action == "NONE" else "ENABLE_START"
+                    actions.append({"unit": unit, "action": action})
+                    if path is not None:
+                        self._wait_for_liveness(path)
+                load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "worker")
+
+            live = _load_json(path) if path is not None else None
+            last_seen: float | None = None
+            state: str | None = None
+            age: float | None = None
+            fresh = False
+            detail: str | None = None
+            if live is not None:
+                state = str(live.get("state") or "")
+                try:
+                    last_seen = float(live.get("last_seen_epoch"))
+                except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                    last_seen = None
+                if last_seen is not None:
+                    age = max(0.0, now - last_seen)
+                    fresh = age <= self.max_stale_seconds
+                if live.get("agent_id") in (None, ""):
+                    fresh = False
+                    detail = "LIVENESS_AGENT_ID_MISSING"
+            else:
+                detail = "LIVENESS_MISSING"
+
+            if heal and active == "active" and not fresh:
+                previous = float(recovery.get(unit, 0.0))
+                if now - previous >= self.restart_cooldown_seconds:
+                    self.systemd.restart(unit)
+                    recovery[unit] = now
+                    action = "RESTART_STALE"
+                    actions.append({"unit": unit, "action": action})
+                    if path is not None:
+                        live = self._wait_for_liveness(path)
+                    load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "worker")
+                    if live is not None:
+                        state = str(live.get("state") or "")
+                        try:
+                            last_seen = float(live.get("last_seen_epoch"))
+                        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                            last_seen = None
+                        if last_seen is not None:
+                            age = max(0.0, self.now_fn() - last_seen)
+                            fresh = age <= self.max_stale_seconds
+                            detail = None if fresh else "LIVENESS_STALE_AFTER_RESTART"
+                else:
+                    detail = "RESTART_COOLDOWN_ACTIVE"
+
+            workers.append(
+                UnitSnapshot(
+                    unit=unit,
+                    role="worker",
+                    load_state=load,
+                    active_state=active,
+                    unit_file_state=enabled,
+                    enabled_ok=enabled_ok,
+                    liveness_path=str(path) if path is not None else None,
+                    liveness_state=state,
+                    last_seen_epoch=last_seen,
+                    liveness_age_seconds=age,
+                    fresh=bool(active == "active" and enabled_ok and fresh),
+                    action=action,
+                    detail=detail,
+                )
+            )
+
+        if heal:
+            self._save_recovery_state(recovery)
+
+        all_fresh = (
+            all(item.active_state == "active" and item.enabled_ok and item.fresh for item in workers)
+            and all(item.active_state == "active" for item in dependencies)
+        )
+        result = {
+            "schema": SCHEMA,
+            "status": "HEALTHY" if all_fresh else "DEGRADED",
+            "generated_at_epoch": self.now_fn(),
+            "max_stale_seconds": self.max_stale_seconds,
+            "maintenance_inhibit": str(self.inhibit_path),
+            "workers": [asdict(item) for item in workers],
+            "dependencies": [asdict(item) for item in dependencies],
+            "all_fresh": all_fresh,
+            "actions": actions,
+        }
+        _atomic_json(self.status_path, result)
+        return result
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    mode = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    mode.add_argument("--heal", action="store_true")
+    mode.add_argument("--check", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--status-file", default=str(DEFAULT_STATUS))
+    parser.add_argument("--recovery-file", default=str(DEFAULT_RECOVERY))
+    parser.add_argument("--inhibit-file", default=str(DEFAULT_INHIBIT))
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--max-stale-seconds",
+        type=int,
+        default=int(
+            os.environ.get(
+                "AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_MAX_STALE_SECONDS",
+                str(DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS),
+            )
+        ),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--restart-cooldown-seconds",
+        type=int,
+        default=int(
+            os.environ.get(
+                "AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS",
+                str(DEFAULT_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS),
+            )
+        ),
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    guard = AvailabilityGuard(
+        status_path=Path(args.status_file),
+        recovery_path=Path(args.recovery_file),
+        inhibit_path=Path(args.inhibit_file),
+        max_stale_seconds=args.max_stale_seconds,
+        restart_cooldown_seconds=args.restart_cooldown_seconds,
+    )
+    try:
+        result = guard.run(heal=args.heal)
+    except AvailabilityGuardError as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAILED", "error": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 20
+    print(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
+    if args.check and not result.get("all_fresh"):
+        return 10
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/message_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import datetime as dt
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+UTC = dt.timezone.utc
+_ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY = frozenset({"public", "tenant", "project", "private", "run"})
+_PRIVILEGED = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "message.admin", "task.admin"})
+
+
+class HandoffError(RuntimeError):
+    code = "HANDOFF_ERROR"
+
+
+class MessageScopeMismatch(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"
+
+
+class ConfidentialityScopeDenied(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"
+
+
+class MessageExpired(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_EXPIRED"
+
+
+class SequenceGap(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT"
+
+
+class SequenceConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_CONFLICT"
+
+
+class IdempotencyConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"
+
+
+def _utcnow() -> dt.datetime:
+    return dt.datetime.now(UTC)
+
+
+def _iso(value: dt.datetime | str | None) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    parsed = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00")) if isinstance(value, str) else value
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=UTC)
+    return parsed.astimezone(UTC).isoformat()
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _tuple_scope(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({str(item).strip() for item in value if str(item).strip()}))
+
+
+_SECRET_KEY = re.compile(r"(?i)(?:token|secret|password|private[_-]?key|api[_-]?key)")
+_SECRET_VALUE = re.compile(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{8,}|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+")
+_SAFE_REFERENCE = re.compile(r"^(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+
+
+def assert_payload_secret_safe(value: Any, *, key: str = "") -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for child_key, child in value.items():
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=str(child_key))
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        for child in value:
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=key)
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (bytes, bytearray)):
+        raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        if _SECRET_VALUE.search(value):
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        if _SECRET_KEY.search(key) and value and _SAFE_REFERENCE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DeliveryContext:
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_actor(cls, actor: Any) -> "DeliveryContext":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            if isinstance(actor, Mapping):
+                return actor.get(name)
+            return getattr(actor, name, None)
+        return cls(
+            tenant_id=_clean(get("tenant_id")),
+            user_id=_clean(get("user_id")),
+            project_id=_clean(get("project_id")),
+            conversation_id=_clean(get("conversation_id")),
+            run_id=_clean(get("run_id")),
+            capabilities=_tuple_scope(get("capabilities") or get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & _PRIVILEGED)
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MessageEnvelope:
+    source: str
+    target: str
+    message_type: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    sequence: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    capability_scope: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    confidentiality_scope: str = "private"
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = dataclasses.field(default_factory=lambda: _iso(_utcnow()) or "")
+    envelope_id: str = ""
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        assert_payload_secret_safe(self.payload)
+        for field in ("source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key", "tenant_id", "user_id",
+                      "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, field, _clean(getattr(self, field)) if field not in {
+                "source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key"
+            } else (_clean(getattr(self, field)) or ""))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capability_scope", _tuple_scope(self.capability_scope))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "confidentiality_scope", (_clean(self.confidentiality_scope) or "private").lower())
+        object.__setattr__(self, "expires_at", _iso(self.expires_at))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "created_at", _iso(self.created_at) or "")
+        if not self.source or not self.target or not self.message_type or not self.idempotency_key:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_IDENTITY_REQUIRED")
+        if not isinstance(self.sequence, int) or self.sequence < 1:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_MUST_BE_POSITIVE")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope not in _ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope != "public" and self.tenant_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TENANT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and self.project_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PROJECT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and self.user_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_USER_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope == "run" and self.run_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_RUN_REQUIRED")
+        expected = stable_event_id(
+            source=self.source, target=self.target, message_type=self.message_type, payload=self.payload,
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id, user_id=self.user_id, project_id=self.project_id,
+            conversation_id=self.conversation_id, task_id=self.task_id, run_id=self.run_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id, causation_id=self.causation_id,
+            sequence=self.sequence, idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
+        )
+        if self.envelope_id and self.envelope_id != expected:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_ID_MISMATCH")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "envelope_id", expected)
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return _sha(self.payload)
+
+    @property
+    def stream_key(self) -> str:
+        return _sha({
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "source": self.source, "target": self.target,
+            "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "run_id": self.run_id,
+        })
+
+    def is_expired(self, *, now: dt.datetime | None = None) -> bool:
+        if self.expires_at is None:
+            return False
+        return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at) <= (now or _utcnow()).astimezone(UTC)
+
+    def as_record(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "envelope_id": self.envelope_id, "stream_key": self.stream_key, "source": self.source,
+            "target": self.target, "message_type": self.message_type, "payload_json": _canonical(self.payload),
+            "payload_sha256": self.payload_sha256, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "project_id": self.project_id, "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id, "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id, "sequence": self.sequence,
+            "capability_scope_json": _canonical(self.capability_scope),
+            "confidentiality_scope": self.confidentiality_scope, "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at, "created_at": self.created_at,
+        }
+
+
+def stable_event_id(*, source: Any, target: Any, message_type: Any, payload: Any,
+                    tenant_id: Any = None, user_id: Any = None, project_id: Any = None,
+                    conversation_id: Any = None, task_id: Any = None, run_id: Any = None,
+                    correlation_id: Any = None, causation_id: Any = None,
+                    sequence: Any = None, idempotency_key: Any = None) -> str:
+    assert_payload_secret_safe(payload)
+    material = {
+        "source": _clean(source), "target": _clean(target), "message_type": _clean(message_type),
+        "payload_sha256": _sha(payload), "tenant_id": _clean(tenant_id), "user_id": _clean(user_id),
+        "project_id": _clean(project_id), "conversation_id": _clean(conversation_id),
+        "task_id": _clean(task_id), "run_id": _clean(run_id), "causation_id": _clean(causation_id),
+        "sequence": sequence, "idempotency_key": _clean(idempotency_key),
+    }
+    # Preserve historical envelope IDs for legacy rows that predate correlation_id.
+    if _clean(correlation_id) is not None:
+        material["correlation_id"] = _clean(correlation_id)
+    return _sha(material)
+
+
+def bind_envelope_scope(envelope: MessageEnvelope, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return envelope
+    if ctx.tenant_id is None:
+        if envelope.tenant_id is not None:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(MessageScopeMismatch.code)
+        return envelope
+    updates: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for field in ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id"):
+        trusted = getattr(ctx, field)
+        requested = getattr(envelope, field)
+        if requested is not None and requested != trusted:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:{field}")
+        if requested is None and trusted is not None:
+            updates[field] = trusted
+    if not updates:
+        return envelope
+    data = dataclasses.asdict(envelope)
+    data.update(updates)
+    data["envelope_id"] = ""
+    return MessageEnvelope(**data)
+
+
+def authorize_delivery(actor: Any, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> None:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return
+    if not set(envelope.capability_scope).issubset(set(ctx.capabilities)):
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:capability")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "public":
+        return
+    if ctx.tenant_id != envelope.tenant_id:
+        raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:tenant_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and ctx.project_id != envelope.project_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:project_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and ctx.user_id != envelope.user_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:user_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "run" and ctx.run_id != envelope.run_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:run_id")
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  correlation_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);
+"""
+
+
+class DurableHandoffStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            columns = {str(row[1]) for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(message_handoff)")}
+            if "correlation_id" not in columns:
+                conn.execute("ALTER TABLE message_handoff ADD COLUMN correlation_id TEXT")
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_lineage "
+                "ON message_handoff(correlation_id, causation_id)"
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return conn
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _from_row(row: sqlite3.Row) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        return MessageEnvelope(
+            source=row["source"], target=row["target"], message_type=row["message_type"],
+            payload=json.loads(row["payload_json"]), tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], user_id=row["user_id"],
+            project_id=row["project_id"], conversation_id=row["conversation_id"], task_id=row["task_id"],
+            run_id=row["run_id"], correlation_id=row["correlation_id"],
+            causation_id=row["causation_id"], sequence=int(row["sequence"]),
+            capability_scope=tuple(json.loads(row["capability_scope_json"])),
+            confidentiality_scope=row["confidentiality_scope"], idempotency_key=row["idempotency_key"],
+            expires_at=row["expires_at"], created_at=row["created_at"], envelope_id=row["envelope_id"],
+        )
+
+    def put(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        if envelope.is_expired():
+            raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+        record = envelope.as_record()
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(replay)
+                if existing.envelope_id != envelope.envelope_id or existing.payload_sha256 != envelope.payload_sha256:
+                    raise IdempotencyConflict(IdempotencyConflict.code)
+                conn.commit()
+                return "REPLAY", existing
+            seq = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND sequence=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if seq is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(seq)
+                if existing.envelope_id == envelope.envelope_id:
+                    conn.commit()
+                    return "REPLAY", existing
+                raise SequenceConflict(SequenceConflict.code)
+            maximum = int(conn.execute(
+                "SELECT COALESCE(MAX(sequence),0) FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key,),
+            ).fetchone()[0])
+            expected = maximum + 1
+            if envelope.sequence != expected:
+                raise SequenceGap(f"{SequenceGap.code}:expected={expected}:actual={envelope.sequence}")
+            columns = tuple(record)
+            placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in columns)
+            conn.execute(
+                f"INSERT INTO message_handoff ({','.join(columns)}) VALUES ({placeholders})",
+                tuple(record[column] for column in columns),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            return "CREATED", envelope
+
+    def get(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise KeyError(envelope_id)
+            envelope = self._from_row(row)
+            if envelope.is_expired():
+                conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,))
+                conn.commit()
+                raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+            authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+            return envelope
+
+    def pending(self, *, target: str, actor: Any, limit: int = 100) -> list[MessageEnvelope]:
+        if not 1 <= limit <= 1000:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PENDING_LIMIT_INVALID")
+        visible: list[MessageEnvelope] = []
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            rows = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE target=? AND status='PENDING' ORDER BY created_at, sequence LIMIT ?",
+                (target, limit),
+            ).fetchall()
+            for row in rows:
+                envelope = self._from_row(row)
+                if envelope.is_expired():
+                    conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope.envelope_id,))
+                    continue
+                try:
+                    authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+                except HandoffError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(envelope)
+            conn.commit()
+        return visible
+
+    def mark_delivered(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='DELIVERED', delivered_at=? "
+                "WHERE envelope_id=? AND status='PENDING'",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+    def acknowledge(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='ACKED', acked_at=? WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+
+class HandoffFabric:
+    def __init__(self, store: DurableHandoffStore) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+
+    def publish(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope, *, actor: Any | None = None) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        return self.store.put(bind_envelope_scope(envelope, actor) if actor is not None else envelope)

active-runtime/app/message_handoff_adapters.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from message_handoff import MessageEnvelope
+
+
+def _get(value: Any, *names: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    for name in names:
+        if isinstance(value, Mapping) and name in value:
+            return value[name]
+        if hasattr(value, name):
+            return getattr(value, name)
+    return default
+
+
+def agent_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                            idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(event, "payload", "data", default={}) or {}
+    target = target or _get(event, "target", "recipient")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", "producer", "agent_id", default="agent-event")),
+        target=str(target),
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "event_type", "type", "message_type", default="agent.event")),
+        payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default="")) or f"agent-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=_get(event, "causation_id"),
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def taskplane_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str, sequence: int = 1,
+                                idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    data = _get(event, "data", "payload", default={}) or {}
+    event_id = str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default=""))
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", default="task-plane")),
+        target=target,
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "type", "event_type", default="task.event")),
+        payload=dict(data),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or event_id or f"task-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=event_id or None,
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def legacy_message_to_envelope(message: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                               idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(message, "payload", "data", "body", "content", default={})
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping):
+        payload = {"value": payload}
+    target = target or _get(message, "target", "recipient", "receiver")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    source = _get(message, "source", "sender", "agent_id", default="legacy-message-bus")
+    kind = _get(message, "message_type", "type", "kind", default="legacy.message")
+    identifier = _get(message, "id", "message_id", "event_id")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(source), target=str(target), message_type=str(kind), payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or (str(identifier) if identifier else f"legacy:{sequence}"),
+        causation_id=str(identifier) if identifier else None,
+        **scope,
+    )

active-runtime/app/search_agent_adapter.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from typing import Any
 
 from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
         domain_profiles: list[str] | None = None,
         user_scope: str = "public",
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         payload = {
             "query": query,
@@ -59,7 +63,11 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
             "session_profile": context.session_profile,
             "correlation_id": correlation_id,
         }
-        return self.orchestrator.execute(payload)
+        if actor is None and trace is None:
+            # Preserve adapter compatibility; the governed orchestrator itself
+            # still fails closed when trusted context is absent.
+            return self.orchestrator.execute(payload)
+        return self.orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 class OpenClawSearchClient(SearchGatewayAgentAdapter):

active-runtime/app/search_gateway.py

@@ -13,10 +13,18 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
 from typing import Any, Protocol
 from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .search_profile_resolver import DomainQueryProfileRegistry, SearchProfile, SearchProfileResolver
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -156,13 +164,25 @@ class SearchPolicyGuard:
 
 
 class SearchGateway:
-    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None):
+    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.providers = providers or []
+        self.governance_store = governance_store
         self.profile_resolver = SearchProfileResolver()
         self.planner = QueryPlanner()
         self.guard = SearchPolicyGuard()
 
-    def search(self, request: SearchRequest) -> SearchResponse:
+    def search(self, request: SearchRequest, *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> SearchResponse:
+        trusted_actor: GovernanceActor | None = None
+        if self.governance_store is not None:
+            if actor is None or trace is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            if request.requester != trusted_actor.identity:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="requester")
+            if request.correlation_id is not None and request.correlation_id not in {
+                trace.trace_id, trace.correlation_id
+            }:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION", field="correlation_id")
         request_id = request.correlation_id or f"search_{uuid4().hex[:12]}"
         profile = self.profile_resolver.resolve(request.group_profile, request.user_profile, request.session_profile)
         expanded_queries = self.planner.expand(request, profile)
@@ -184,14 +204,60 @@ class SearchGateway:
         attempts: list[SearchProviderAttempt] = []
         providers = self._ordered_providers(profile)
         for provider in providers:
+            if request.authorized_sources and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_DENY"))
+                continue
+            if request.user_scope != "public" and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_REQUIRED"))
+                continue
             try:
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    assert trusted_actor is not None and trace is not None
+                    input_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {"query": request.query, "intent": request.intent, "provider": provider.name},
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    invocation_key = hashlib.sha256(
+                        f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}:{provider.name}:{input_digest}".encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    authorization = self.governance_store.authorize_tool(
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        tool_name=f"search.{provider.name}",
+                        trace=trace,
+                        requested_scope=trace.scope,
+                        input_digest=input_digest,
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                    )
+                    if authorization.get("idempotent"):
+                        raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_REPLAY")
                 provider_evidence, attempt = provider.search(request, expanded_queries)
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    result_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {
+                                "evidence": [item.to_dict() for item in provider_evidence],
+                                "attempt": attempt.to_dict(),
+                            },
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    self.governance_store.record_tool_receipt(
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                        result_digest=result_digest,
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        trace=trace,
+                    )
                 evidence.extend(provider_evidence)
                 attempts.append(attempt)
                 if provider_evidence:
                     break
-            except Exception as exc:
-                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason=str(exc)))
+            except GovernanceError:
+                raise
+            except Exception:
+                # Provider exceptions may contain URLs, tokens, or local paths.
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason="PROVIDER_FAILURE"))
 
         if evidence:
             return SearchResponse(

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_api.py

@@ -7,27 +7,29 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway import SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 from .search_gateway_dashboard import SearchGatewayDashboard
 
 
-gateway = SearchGateway()
+orchestrator = SearchGatewayOrchestrator()
 dashboard = SearchGatewayDashboard()
 
 
-def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = SearchRequest(**payload)
-    return gateway.search(request).to_dict()
+def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 def get_search_gateway_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
     return {
         "module": "search-gateway",
         "status": "ready",
-        "providers_configured": len(gateway.providers),
+        "providers_configured": len(orchestrator.gateway.providers),
         "policy_guard": "enabled",
         "profile_customization": "enabled",
         "fallback_required_when_provider_unavailable": True,
+        "governance": "required",
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_orchestrator.py

@@ -3,24 +3,49 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any
+import os
 
 from .search_audit_store import SearchAuditStore
 from .search_event_bridge import SearchEventBridge
 from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
 from .search_provider_registry import SearchProviderRegistry
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    ToolDescriptor,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
-    def __init__(self):
+    def __init__(self, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.registry = SearchProviderRegistry()
         self.audit = SearchAuditStore()
         self.events = SearchEventBridge()
-        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered())
+        self.governance = governance_store or GovernanceStore(
+            os.environ.get("AIOS_SEARCH_GOVERNANCE_DB", "runtime/search-governance.sqlite3")
+        )
+        registrar = GovernanceActor(
+            "search-runtime-bootstrap", GovernanceScope("system"), ("system.admin",)
+        )
+        for provider in self.registry.ordered():
+            self.governance.register_tool(
+                ToolDescriptor(
+                    f"search.{provider.name}", "tool", GovernanceScope("global"), ("tool.search",)
+                ),
+                registrar,
+            )
+        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered(), governance_store=self.governance)
 
-    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceError
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        self.governance.record_trace(trace, actor)
         request = SearchRequest(**payload)
         self.events.search_started(request.to_dict())
-        response = self.gateway.search(request)
+        response = self.gateway.search(request, actor=actor, trace=trace)
         result = response.to_dict()
         for attempt in result.get("attempts", []):
             self.events.provider_attempted(result["request_id"], attempt)
@@ -35,6 +60,7 @@ class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
             "registry": self.registry.status(),
             "audit": "enabled",
             "events": "enabled",
+            "governance": "required",
         }
 
 

active-runtime/app/task_plane/events.py

@@ -106,3 +106,8 @@ class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
             receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
             error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
         )
+
+# R4.2 P0-B compatibility adapter.
+def to_handoff_envelope(event, *, target, sequence=1, idempotency_key=None, **scope):
+    from message_handoff_adapters import taskplane_event_to_envelope
+    return taskplane_event_to_envelope(event, target=target, sequence=sequence, idempotency_key=idempotency_key, **scope)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/fleet.py

@@ -0,0 +1,911 @@
+"""Durable multi-agent fleet scheduling for TaskPlane.
+
+The fleet layer decides *which* eligible worker should receive *which* queued task.
+It never replaces TaskPlane claim/lease ownership: callers must still perform the
+authoritative TaskPlane claim CAS after a reservation is returned.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import math
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS = 30
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD = 3
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 15 * 60
+MAX_SLOTS = 128
+
+
+class FleetError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class FleetConflict(FleetError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _text(value: object, default: str = "") -> str:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    return str(value).strip() or default
+
+
+def _int(value: object, default: int, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID")
+    try:
+        result = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID") from exc
+    if result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _float(value: object, default: float, minimum: float, maximum: float) -> float:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    try:
+        result = float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_INVALID") from exc
+    if not math.isfinite(result) or result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _mapping(value: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value
+    if hasattr(value, "to_dict"):
+        data = value.to_dict()
+        if isinstance(data, Mapping):
+            return data
+    if hasattr(value, "__dict__"):
+        return vars(value)
+    return {}
+
+
+def _attr(value: object, name: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value.get(name, default)
+    return getattr(value, name, default)
+
+
+def _task_plan(task: object) -> object:
+    return _attr(task, "task_plan", _attr(task, "plan", task))
+
+
+def _task_id(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "task_id", _attr(_task_plan(task), "task_id", "")))
+
+
+def _task_status(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "status", "")).upper()
+
+
+def _task_revision(task: object) -> int:
+    return _int(_attr(task, "revision", 0), 0, 0, 2**31 - 1)
+
+
+def _task_created_at(task: object) -> float:
+    value = _attr(task, "created_at", _attr(task, "updated_at", 0.0))
+    try:
+        return float(value or 0.0)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return 0.0
+
+
+def _task_required_capabilities(task: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "required_capabilities", ())
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+def _task_metadata(task: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "metadata", {})
+    return value if isinstance(value, Mapping) else {}
+
+
+def _task_scope_key(task: object) -> str:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    scope_type = _text(_attr(plan, "scope_type", "legacy"), "legacy")
+    tenant = _text(_attr(plan, "tenant_id", ""))
+    project = _text(_attr(plan, "project_id", ""))
+    user = _text(_attr(plan, "user_id", ""))
+    if scope_type == "tenant":
+        return "tenant:" + tenant + "|project:" + (project or "*")
+    if scope_type == "system":
+        return "system"
+    return "legacy:" + (user or "*")
+
+
+def _worker_id(worker: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(worker, "worker_id", ""))
+
+
+def _worker_capabilities(worker: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    value = _attr(worker, "capabilities", ())
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        value = value.keys()
+    if not isinstance(value, Iterable) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetWorkerPolicy:
+    worker_id: str
+    max_slots: int = 1
+    failure_domain: str = "default"
+    weight: float = 1.0
+    labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None
+    revision: int = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetDispatchDecision:
+    reservation_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    task_revision: int
+    scope_key: str
+    failure_domain: str
+    reserved_until: float
+    score: tuple[float, float, float, str]
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "reservation_id": self.reservation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "task_revision": self.task_revision,
+            "scope_key": self.scope_key,
+            "failure_domain": self.failure_domain,
+            "reserved_until": self.reserved_until,
+            "score": list(self.score),
+        }
+
+
+class FleetStateStore:
+    """Small durable fleet journal colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database."""
+
+    def __init__(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection, lock: threading.RLock | None = None) -> None:
+        self.conn = connection
+        self.lock = lock or threading.RLock()
+        self._savepoint_counter = 0
+        self._ensure_schema()
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _transaction(self):
+        with self.lock:
+            self._savepoint_counter += 1
+            name = f"fleet_{threading.get_ident()}_{self._savepoint_counter}"
+            self.conn.execute(f"SAVEPOINT {name}")
+            try:
+                yield
+            except Exception:
+                self.conn.execute(f"ROLLBACK TO {name}")
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+                raise
+            else:
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+
+    def _ensure_schema(self) -> None:
+        with self.lock:
+            self.conn.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_capacity (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    max_slots INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    weight REAL NOT NULL,
+                    labels_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_scope_state (
+                    scope_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    virtual_finish REAL NOT NULL,
+                    dispatch_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    last_dispatched_at REAL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_dispatches (
+                    reservation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    scope_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    reserved_until REAL NOT NULL,
+                    claim_id TEXT,
+                    created_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_fleet_dispatch_worker_state
+                    ON fleet_dispatches(worker_id, state, reserved_until);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_failures (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    consecutive_failures INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    circuit_open_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_task_worker_failures (
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    blocked_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(task_id, worker_id)
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def configure_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        *,
+        max_slots: int = 1,
+        failure_domain: str = "default",
+        weight: float = 1.0,
+        labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_ID_REQUIRED")
+        max_slots = _int(max_slots, 1, 1, MAX_SLOTS)
+        weight = _float(weight, 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+        failure_domain = _text(failure_domain, "default")
+        normalized_labels = {
+            _text(k): _text(v)
+            for k, v in dict(labels or {}).items()
+            if _text(k) and _text(v)
+        }
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT revision FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current = int(row[0]) if row else 0
+            if expected_revision is not None and current != int(expected_revision):
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_POLICY_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            revision = current + 1
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_capacity(
+                    worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    max_slots=excluded.max_slots,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    weight=excluded.weight,
+                    labels_json=excluded.labels_json,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    worker_id,
+                    max_slots,
+                    failure_domain,
+                    weight,
+                    json.dumps(normalized_labels, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    revision,
+                    now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id, max_slots, failure_domain, weight, normalized_labels, revision
+        )
+
+    def worker_policy(self, worker_id: str) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision
+                FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return FleetWorkerPolicy(worker_id=worker_id)
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id=str(row[0]),
+            max_slots=int(row[1]),
+            failure_domain=str(row[2]),
+            weight=float(row[3]),
+            labels=json.loads(row[4] or "{}"),
+            revision=int(row[5]),
+        )
+
+    def _cleanup_expired(self, now: float) -> None:
+        self.conn.execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+               SET state='EXPIRED', updated_at=?
+             WHERE state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until<=?
+            """,
+            (now, now),
+        )
+
+    def reserved_slots(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        with self.lock:
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT COUNT(*) FROM fleet_dispatches
+                 WHERE worker_id=? AND state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until>?
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    def scope_virtual_finish(self, scope_key: str) -> float:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+
+    def reserve(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        task_revision: int,
+        scope_key: str,
+        failure_domain: str,
+        score: tuple[float, float, float, str],
+        reservation_seconds: int,
+        now: float,
+        scope_weight: float,
+    ) -> FleetDispatchDecision:
+        reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        reservation_id = "fleet-" + _sha(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "worker_id": worker_id,
+                "task_revision": task_revision,
+                "scope_key": scope_key,
+            }
+        )[:32]
+        reserved_until = now + reservation_seconds
+        with self._transaction():
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            existing = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT reservation_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                       reserved_until,state
+                  FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE task_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            # Capacity is rechecked inside the same durable reservation transaction.
+            # This closes the cross-thread/process race between eligibility scoring and reserve.
+            policy_row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT max_slots FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            max_slots = int(policy_row[0]) if policy_row else 1
+            if existing and str(existing[6]) in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"} and float(existing[5]) > now:
+                if str(existing[1]) != worker_id or int(existing[2]) != task_revision:
+                    raise FleetConflict("FLEET_TASK_ALREADY_RESERVED")
+                return FleetDispatchDecision(
+                    str(existing[0]), task_id, worker_id, task_revision, str(existing[3]),
+                    str(existing[4]), float(existing[5]), score
+                )
+
+            claim_columns = {
+                str(row[1])
+                for row in self.conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(claims)").fetchall()
+            }
+            active_claims = 0
+            if {"worker_id", "status"}.issubset(claim_columns):
+                sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'"
+                params: list[Any] = [worker_id]
+                if "lease_expires_at" in claim_columns:
+                    sql += " AND lease_expires_at>?"
+                    params.append(now)
+                row = self.conn.execute(sql, tuple(params)).fetchone()
+                active_claims = int(row[0] if row else 0)
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT COUNT(*) FROM fleet_dispatches
+                 WHERE worker_id=? AND task_id<>?
+                   AND state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until>?
+                """,
+                (worker_id, task_id, now),
+            ).fetchone()
+            active_reservations = int(row[0] if row else 0)
+            if active_claims + active_reservations >= max_slots:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_CAPACITY_EXHAUSTED")
+
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_dispatches(
+                    reservation_id,task_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                    state,reserved_until,claim_id,created_at,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,'RESERVED',?,NULL,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    reservation_id=excluded.reservation_id,
+                    worker_id=excluded.worker_id,
+                    task_revision=excluded.task_revision,
+                    scope_key=excluded.scope_key,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    state='RESERVED',
+                    reserved_until=excluded.reserved_until,
+                    claim_id=NULL,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+                    failure_domain, reserved_until, now, now,
+                ),
+            )
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish,dispatch_count,revision FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current_finish = float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+            dispatch_count = int(row[1]) if row else 0
+            revision = int(row[2]) if row else 0
+            next_finish = max(current_finish, 0.0) + 1.0 / max(scope_weight, 0.05)
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_scope_state(
+                    scope_key,virtual_finish,dispatch_count,last_dispatched_at,revision
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(scope_key) DO UPDATE SET
+                    virtual_finish=excluded.virtual_finish,
+                    dispatch_count=excluded.dispatch_count,
+                    last_dispatched_at=excluded.last_dispatched_at,
+                    revision=excluded.revision
+                """,
+                (scope_key, next_finish, dispatch_count + 1, now, revision + 1),
+            )
+        return FleetDispatchDecision(
+            reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+            failure_domain, reserved_until, score
+        )
+
+    def bind_claim(self, reservation_id: str, claim_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT state FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE reservation_id=?",
+                (reservation_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_FOUND")
+            if str(row[0]) not in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"}:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_ACTIVE")
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+                   SET state='CLAIMED', claim_id=?, updated_at=?
+                 WHERE reservation_id=?
+                """,
+                (claim_id, now, reservation_id),
+            )
+
+    def release(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        *,
+        state: str = "RELEASED",
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if state not in {"RELEASED", "COMPLETED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED"}:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_STATE_INVALID")
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE fleet_dispatches SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                (state, now, task_id),
+            )
+
+    def worker_circuit_open(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT circuit_open_until FROM fleet_worker_failures WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def task_worker_blocked(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT blocked_until FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def record_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        threshold: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD,
+        base_circuit_seconds: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        threshold = _int(threshold, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD, 1, 20)
+        base_circuit_seconds = _int(base_circuit_seconds, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT consecutive_failures,revision FROM fleet_worker_failures
+                 WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            failures = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            open_until = None
+            if failures >= threshold:
+                exponent = min(failures - threshold, 8)
+                open_until = now + min(
+                    MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, base_circuit_seconds * (2**exponent)
+                )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=excluded.consecutive_failures,
+                    circuit_open_until=excluded.circuit_open_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, failures, open_until, _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now),
+            )
+        return {
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "consecutive_failures": failures,
+            "circuit_open_until": open_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+    def record_worker_success(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,0,NULL,NULL,1,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=0,
+                    circuit_open_until=NULL,
+                    last_failure_class=NULL,
+                    revision=revision+1,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            )
+
+    def record_task_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        quarantine_seconds: int = 60,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        quarantine_seconds = _int(quarantine_seconds, 60, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT failure_count,revision FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            count = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            blocked_until = now + quarantine_seconds
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_task_worker_failures(
+                    task_id,worker_id,failure_count,blocked_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id,worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    failure_count=excluded.failure_count,
+                    blocked_until=excluded.blocked_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id, worker_id, count, blocked_until,
+                    _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "failure_count": count,
+            "blocked_until": blocked_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+
+class FleetScheduler:
+    """Deterministic capacity/fairness scheduler over existing TaskPlane records."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: Any,
+        workers: Any,
+        *,
+        now_fn: Any = time.time,
+        reservation_seconds: int = DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self.workers = workers
+        self.now_fn = now_fn
+        self.reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        connection = getattr(store, "conn", None)
+        if not isinstance(connection, sqlite3.Connection):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASKPLANE_SQLITE_CONNECTION_REQUIRED")
+        lock = getattr(store, "_lock", None)
+        self.state = FleetStateStore(connection, lock)
+
+    def configure_worker(self, worker_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        return self.state.configure_worker(worker_id, **kwargs)
+
+    def _online(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        method = getattr(self.workers, "is_online", None)
+        if not callable(method):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_REGISTRY_ONLINE_CHECK_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            return bool(method(worker_id, now=now))
+        except TypeError:
+            return bool(method(worker_id))
+
+    def _worker_record(self, worker_id: str) -> object:
+        getter = getattr(self.store, "get_worker", None)
+        if not callable(getter):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_LOOKUP_REQUIRED")
+        return getter(worker_id)
+
+    def _active_claims(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        # The TaskPlane store owns one SQLite connection in the current runtime.
+        # Fleet reads must share its lock just like fleet writes do, otherwise two
+        # concurrent pullers can issue overlapping operations on the same handle.
+        with self.state.lock:
+            columns = {
+                str(row[1])
+                for row in self.store.conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(claims)").fetchall()
+            }
+            required = {"worker_id", "status"}
+            if not required.issubset(columns):
+                raise FleetError("FLEET_CLAIMS_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED")
+            sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'"
+            params: list[Any] = [worker_id]
+            if "lease_expires_at" in columns:
+                sql += " AND lease_expires_at>?"
+                params.append(now)
+            row = self.store.conn.execute(sql, tuple(params)).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _labels_match(policy: FleetWorkerPolicy, task: object) -> bool:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        affinity = metadata.get("fleet_affinity_labels") or {}
+        if affinity and not isinstance(affinity, Mapping):
+            return False
+        labels = dict(policy.labels or {})
+        for key, value in dict(affinity).items():
+            if labels.get(_text(key)) != _text(value):
+                return False
+        avoid = metadata.get("fleet_avoid_failure_domains") or []
+        if isinstance(avoid, Sequence) and not isinstance(avoid, (str, bytes)):
+            if policy.failure_domain in {_text(item) for item in avoid}:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+    def _eligible_worker(self, worker_id: str, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[bool, int, FleetWorkerPolicy]:
+        if not self._online(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        worker = self._worker_record(worker_id)
+        policy = self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        if self.state.worker_circuit_open(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if self.state.task_worker_blocked(_task_id(task), worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if not self._labels_match(policy, task):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        required = _task_required_capabilities(task)
+        capabilities = _worker_capabilities(worker)
+        if required and not required.issubset(capabilities):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        active = self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+        reserved = self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+        load = active + reserved
+        if load >= policy.max_slots:
+            return False, load, policy
+        return True, load, policy
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _task_priority(task: object, now: float) -> float:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        base = _int(metadata.get("fleet_priority"), 0, -100, 100)
+        created = _task_created_at(task)
+        waited = max(0.0, now - created) if created > 0 else 0.0
+        aging = min(100.0, waited / 60.0)
+        return float(base) + aging
+
+    def _task_score(self, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[float, float, float, str]:
+        scope = _task_scope_key(task)
+        virtual_finish = self.state.scope_virtual_finish(scope)
+        priority = self._task_priority(task, now)
+        return (virtual_finish, -priority, _task_created_at(task), _task_id(task))
+
+    def _tasks(self, actor_context: Any = None) -> list[object]:
+        lister = getattr(self.store, "list_tasks", None)
+        if not callable(lister):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASK_LIST_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            tasks = lister(actor_context)
+        except TypeError:
+            tasks = lister()
+        return [
+            task for task in tasks
+            if _task_status(task) in {"CREATED", "QUEUED"}
+            and _task_id(task)
+        ]
+
+    def rank_for_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        *,
+        actor_context: Any = None,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> list[object]:
+        """Return fleet-ranked tasks without reserving or claiming anything."""
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        if not worker_id:
+            return []
+        ranked: list[object] = []
+        for task in self._tasks(actor_context):
+            eligible, _, _ = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+            if eligible:
+                ranked.append(task)
+        return sorted(ranked, key=lambda task: self._task_score(task, now))
+
+    def reserve_for_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        task: object,
+        *,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> FleetDispatchDecision:
+        """Reserve exactly one already-ranked task, rechecking eligibility and capacity."""
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        eligible, _, policy = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+        if not eligible:
+            raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_NOT_ELIGIBLE")
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        scope_weight = _float(metadata.get("fleet_scope_weight"), 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+        return self.state.reserve(
+            task_id=_task_id(task),
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            task_revision=_task_revision(task),
+            scope_key=_task_scope_key(task),
+            failure_domain=policy.failure_domain,
+            score=self._task_score(task, now),
+            reservation_seconds=self.reservation_seconds,
+            now=now,
+            scope_weight=scope_weight,
+        )
+
+    def select(
+        self,
+        worker_ids: Sequence[str],
+        *,
+        actor_context: Any = None,
+        limit: int = 1,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> list[FleetDispatchDecision]:
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        limit = _int(limit, 1, 1, 100)
+        worker_ids = tuple(dict.fromkeys(_text(item) for item in worker_ids if _text(item)))
+        tasks = sorted(self._tasks(actor_context), key=lambda task: self._task_score(task, now))
+        decisions: list[FleetDispatchDecision] = []
+        local_load: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for task in tasks:
+            if len(decisions) >= limit:
+                break
+            candidates: list[tuple[int, float, str, FleetWorkerPolicy]] = []
+            for worker_id in worker_ids:
+                eligible, load, policy = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+                if not eligible:
+                    continue
+                effective_load = local_load.get(worker_id, load)
+                if effective_load >= policy.max_slots:
+                    continue
+                candidates.append(
+                    (
+                        effective_load,
+                        -policy.weight,
+                        worker_id,
+                        policy,
+                    )
+                )
+            if not candidates:
+                continue
+            candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (item[0], item[1], item[2]))
+            _, _, worker_id, policy = candidates[0]
+            score = self._task_score(task, now)
+            metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+            scope_weight = _float(metadata.get("fleet_scope_weight"), 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+            try:
+                decision = self.state.reserve(
+                    task_id=_task_id(task),
+                    worker_id=worker_id,
+                    task_revision=_task_revision(task),
+                    scope_key=_task_scope_key(task),
+                    failure_domain=policy.failure_domain,
+                    score=score,
+                    reservation_seconds=self.reservation_seconds,
+                    now=now,
+                    scope_weight=scope_weight,
+                )
+            except FleetConflict:
+                continue
+            local_load[worker_id] = local_load.get(
+                worker_id,
+                self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+                + self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+                - 1,
+            ) + 1
+            decisions.append(decision)
+        return decisions

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scheduler.py

@@ -74,3 +74,203 @@ class TaskScheduler:
             operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
         )
         return claim
+
+# R4.2 P2 durable multi-agent fleet scheduling public surface.
+from .fleet import (
+    FleetConflict,
+    FleetDispatchDecision,
+    FleetError,
+    FleetScheduler,
+    FleetStateStore,
+    FleetWorkerPolicy,
+)
+# R4.2 P2-B fleet-aware pull scheduling.
+#
+# The original TaskScheduler remains the security oracle and claim-CAS implementation.
+# Fleet ordering only controls the order presented to that oracle.
+import inspect as _fleet_inspect
+import threading as _fleet_threading
+from collections.abc import Mapping as _FleetMapping
+
+from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry as _FleetWorkerRegistry
+from .errors import NotFoundError as _FleetNotFoundError
+
+_LegacyTaskScheduler = TaskScheduler
+_LegacyScheduleParameters = _fleet_inspect.signature(
+    _LegacyTaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker
+).parameters
+_LegacyNextParameters = _fleet_inspect.signature(
+    _LegacyTaskScheduler.next_queued_task
+).parameters
+
+
+class _FleetOrderedStoreProxy:
+    def __init__(self, delegate, tasks):
+        self._delegate = delegate
+        self._tasks = tuple(tasks)
+
+    def list_tasks(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return list(self._tasks)
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name):
+        return getattr(self._delegate, name)
+
+
+def _fleet_claim_field(claim, name, default=None):
+    if isinstance(claim, _FleetMapping):
+        return claim.get(name, default)
+    return getattr(claim, name, default)
+
+
+class TaskScheduler(_LegacyTaskScheduler):
+    """Fleet-integrated pull scheduler preserving legacy security and claim semantics."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        store = getattr(self, "store", args[0] if args else None)
+        if store is None:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_SCHEDULER_STORE_REQUIRED")
+        registry = getattr(self, "workers", None)
+        if registry is None:
+            registry = _FleetWorkerRegistry(store)
+        self.fleet_scheduler = FleetScheduler(store, registry)
+        self._fleet_local = _fleet_threading.local()
+
+    def _fleet_legacy_next(self, worker_id, tasks, *args, **kwargs):
+        proxy = _FleetOrderedStoreProxy(self.store, tasks)
+        legacy = _LegacyTaskScheduler(proxy)
+        legacy_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyNextParameters:
+            legacy_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        return legacy.next_queued_task(worker_id, *args, **legacy_kwargs)
+
+    def next_queued_task(self, worker_id, *args, **kwargs):
+        actor_context = kwargs.get(
+            "actor_context", getattr(self._fleet_local, "actor_context", None)
+        )
+
+        # Preserve legacy fail-closed worker checks before fleet ordering.
+        probe_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyNextParameters:
+            probe_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        legacy_probe = _LegacyTaskScheduler(self.store).next_queued_task(
+            worker_id, *args, **probe_kwargs
+        )
+        if legacy_probe is None:
+            return None
+
+        ranked = self.fleet_scheduler.rank_for_worker(
+            worker_id, actor_context=actor_context
+        )
+        # Preserve FleetScheduler fairness order. The legacy scheduler is used
+        # only as a fail-closed security oracle: present one fleet-ranked task
+        # at a time so its internal sort cannot reorder across scopes.
+        # Keep the legacy priority dimension ahead of Fleet fairness for
+        # compatibility with existing TaskPlane scheduling contracts; the
+        # Fleet order remains authoritative among equal-priority tasks.
+        def _legacy_priority(task):
+            plan = getattr(task, "task_plan", task)
+            metadata = getattr(plan, "metadata", {}) or {}
+            if not isinstance(metadata, _FleetMapping):
+                return 0
+            try:
+                return int(metadata.get("priority", 0))
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                return 0
+
+        ranked = sorted(ranked, key=lambda task: -_legacy_priority(task))
+        for ranked_candidate in ranked:
+            try:
+                candidate = self._fleet_legacy_next(
+                    worker_id, [ranked_candidate], *args, **kwargs
+                )
+            except _FleetNotFoundError:
+                continue
+            if candidate is None:
+                continue
+
+            ranked_id = getattr(
+                ranked_candidate,
+                "task_id",
+                getattr(getattr(ranked_candidate, "task_plan", None), "task_id", None),
+            )
+            candidate_id = getattr(
+                candidate,
+                "task_id",
+                getattr(getattr(candidate, "task_plan", None), "task_id", None),
+            )
+            if candidate_id != ranked_id:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_LEGACY_ORACLE_ORDER_VIOLATION")
+
+            try:
+                decision = self.fleet_scheduler.reserve_for_worker(
+                    worker_id, candidate
+                )
+            except FleetConflict:
+                continue
+            self._fleet_local.pending = decision
+            return candidate
+        return None
+
+    def schedule_for_worker(self, worker_id, *args, **kwargs):
+        actor_context = kwargs.get("actor_context")
+        legacy_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyScheduleParameters:
+            legacy_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        self._fleet_local.actor_context = actor_context
+        self._fleet_local.pending = None
+        try:
+            claim = _LegacyTaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker(
+                self, worker_id, *args, **legacy_kwargs
+            )
+            decision = getattr(self._fleet_local, "pending", None)
+            if claim is None:
+                if decision is not None:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                return None
+            if decision is not None:
+                claim_id = _fleet_claim_field(claim, "claim_id")
+                claim_task_id = _fleet_claim_field(claim, "task_id", decision.task_id)
+                if not claim_id:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                    raise FleetError("FLEET_CLAIM_ID_REQUIRED")
+                if claim_task_id != decision.task_id:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                    raise FleetConflict("FLEET_CLAIM_TASK_MISMATCH")
+                self.fleet_scheduler.state.bind_claim(
+                    decision.reservation_id, str(claim_id)
+                )
+            return claim
+        except Exception:
+            decision = getattr(self._fleet_local, "pending", None)
+            if decision is not None:
+                self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                    decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                )
+            raise
+        finally:
+            self._fleet_local.pending = None
+            self._fleet_local.actor_context = None
+
+    def record_worker_failure(self, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_worker_failure(
+            worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+        )
+
+    def record_worker_success(self, worker_id, **kwargs):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_worker_success(
+            worker_id, **kwargs
+        )
+
+    def quarantine_task_worker(
+        self, task_id, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+    ):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_task_worker_failure(
+            task_id, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+        )

active-runtime/app/trace_tool_credential_governance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,759 @@
+"""Scope-bound governance for traces, Tool/MCP calls, and credentials.
+
+This module deliberately stores references and audit metadata only.  Secret
+material remains in the configured credential provider boundary.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+
+SCOPE_FIELDS = ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id")
+PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "governance.admin"})
+REFERENCE_RE = re.compile(r"^(systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,179}$")
+
+
+class GovernanceError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, *, field: str | None = None) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code if field is None else f"{code}:{field}")
+        self.code = code
+        self.field = field
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _scope_tuple(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({_clean(item) for item in value if _clean(item)}))
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _identifier(value: Any, code: str) -> str:
+    text = _clean(value)
+    if text is None or IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text) is None:
+        raise GovernanceError(code)
+    return text
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceScope:
+    """Explicit resource scope; system/global resources never get fake tenants."""
+
+    scope_type: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "scope_type", (_clean(self.scope_type) or "").lower())
+        for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _clean(getattr(self, name)))
+        if self.scope_type == "tenant":
+            if self.tenant_id is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED")
+        elif self.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_NON_TENANT_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        elif self.scope_type == "legacy":
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        else:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_TYPE_INVALID")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceScope":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+        declared = _clean(get("scope_type"))
+        tenant_id = _clean(get("tenant_id"))
+        return cls(
+            scope_type=declared or ("tenant" if tenant_id else "legacy"),
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            user_id=get("user_id"),
+            project_id=get("project_id"),
+            conversation_id=get("conversation_id"),
+            run_id=get("run_id"),
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceActor:
+    identity: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "identity", _identifier(self.identity, "GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.capabilities))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceActor":
+        if isinstance(value, cls):
+            return value
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID")
+        return cls(
+            identity=value.get("identity") or value.get("actor_id") or value.get("user_id"),
+            scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(value),
+            capabilities=_scope_tuple(value.get("capabilities") or value.get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES)
+
+
+def authorize_scope(actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], resource: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    resource = resource if isinstance(resource, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(resource)
+    if actor.privileged:
+        return
+    if resource.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SYSTEM_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+    if resource.scope_type == "legacy":
+        if actor.scope.scope_type != "legacy":
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        return
+    if actor.scope.scope_type != "tenant":
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field="scope_type")
+    for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+        expected = getattr(resource, name)
+        actual = getattr(actor.scope, name)
+        if expected is not None and expected != actual:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field=name)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TraceContext:
+    trace_id: str
+    span_id: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "trace_id", _identifier(self.trace_id, "TRACE_ID_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "span_id", _identifier(self.span_id, "TRACE_SPAN_ID_INVALID"))
+        for name in ("parent_span_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id"):
+            value = _clean(getattr(self, name))
+            if value is not None and IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_IDENTIFIER_INVALID", field=name)
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, value)
+
+    def child(self, *, span_id: str, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], **lineage: Any) -> "TraceContext":
+        authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        for name in ("trace_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id", "correlation_id"):
+            supplied = _clean(lineage.get(name))
+            expected = getattr(self, name)
+            if supplied is not None and expected is not None and supplied != expected:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field=name)
+        requested_scope = lineage.pop("scope", self.scope)
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != self.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return TraceContext(
+            trace_id=self.trace_id,
+            span_id=span_id,
+            parent_span_id=self.span_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id,
+            causation_id=_clean(lineage.get("causation_id")) or self.span_id,
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            claim_id=self.claim_id,
+            message_id=self.message_id,
+            scope=self.scope,
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "span_id": self.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": self.parent_span_id,
+            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "message_id": self.message_id,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+def bind_trace_lineage(
+    *,
+    actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+    task: Any,
+    message: Any,
+    trace_id: str,
+    span_id: str,
+    parent: TraceContext | None = None,
+) -> TraceContext:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    task_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(task)
+    message_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(message)
+    if task_scope != message_scope:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    authorize_scope(actor, task_scope)
+
+    def get(value: Any, name: str) -> Any:
+        return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+    task_id = _clean(get(task, "task_id"))
+    message_task = _clean(get(message, "task_id"))
+    if task_id and message_task and task_id != message_task:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    context = TraceContext(
+        trace_id=trace_id,
+        span_id=span_id,
+        parent_span_id=parent.span_id if parent else None,
+        correlation_id=_clean(get(task, "correlation_id")) or _clean(get(message, "correlation_id")),
+        causation_id=_clean(get(message, "causation_id")) or (parent.span_id if parent else None),
+        task_id=task_id or message_task,
+        claim_id=_clean(get(task, "claim_id")) or _clean(get(message, "claim_id")),
+        message_id=_clean(get(message, "envelope_id")) or _clean(get(message, "id")),
+        scope=task_scope,
+    )
+    if parent is not None:
+        if parent.trace_id != context.trace_id or parent.scope != context.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY")
+        if parent.task_id and context.task_id and parent.task_id != context.task_id:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    return context
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ToolDescriptor:
+    name: str
+    kind: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    credential_ref: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "name", _identifier(self.name, "TOOL_NAME_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "kind", (_clean(self.kind) or "").lower())
+        if self.kind not in {"tool", "mcp"}:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_KIND_INVALID")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "required_capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.required_capabilities))
+        if self.credential_ref is not None and REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref) is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CredentialGrant:
+    grant_id: str
+    credential_ref: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    operations: tuple[str, ...]
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    tool_name: str | None = None
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "grant_id", _identifier(self.grant_id, "CREDENTIAL_GRANT_ID_INVALID"))
+        if REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref or "") is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "operations", _scope_tuple(self.operations))
+        if not self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_OPERATIONS_REQUIRED")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+            if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+
+    def authorize(
+        self,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None = None,
+        tool_name: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> str:
+        try:
+            authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        except GovernanceError as exc:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field=exc.field) from exc
+        if operation not in self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="operation")
+        if self.task_id is not None and self.task_id != _clean(task_id):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="task_id")
+        if self.tool_name is not None and self.tool_name != _clean(tool_name):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="tool_name")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            expiry = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00")).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            if current >= expiry:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="expires_at")
+        return self.credential_ref
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "grant_id": self.grant_id,
+            "credential_ref": self.credential_ref,
+            "operations": list(self.operations),
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_schema_metadata (
+  singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK(singleton=1),
+  schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tools (
+  name TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+  scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  required_capabilities_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  credential_ref TEXT,
+  descriptor_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_trace_spans (
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  parent_span_id TEXT,
+  context_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  context_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  PRIMARY KEY(trace_id, span_id)
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_credential_grants (
+  grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  grant_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tool_invocations (
+  invocation_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tool_name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  claim_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL,
+  receipt_sha256 TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_audit_evidence (
+  sequence INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  evidence_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  action TEXT NOT NULL,
+  actor_identity TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT,
+  span_id TEXT,
+  resource_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  outcome TEXT NOT NULL,
+  details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  previous_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  evidence_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+"""
+
+
+class GovernanceStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            has_metadata = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT 1 FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='governance_schema_metadata'"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if has_metadata:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is not None and int(row[0]) != 1:
+                    raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED")
+            connection.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO governance_schema_metadata(singleton,schema_version) VALUES(1,1)"
+                )
+            connection.commit()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _connection(self):
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            yield connection
+            connection.commit()
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def _audit(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        *,
+        action: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor,
+        resource_id: str,
+        outcome: str,
+        trace: TraceContext | None,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        previous = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT evidence_sha256 FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence DESC LIMIT 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        previous_sha = str(previous[0]) if previous else ""
+        created_at = _now()
+        material = {
+            "action": action,
+            "actor_identity": actor.identity,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id if trace else None,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id if trace else None,
+            "resource_id": resource_id,
+            "outcome": outcome,
+            "details": dict(details),
+            "previous_sha256": previous_sha,
+            "created_at": created_at,
+        }
+        digest = _sha(material)
+        evidence_id = "gev-" + digest[:32]
+        connection.execute(
+            """INSERT INTO governance_audit_evidence
+               (evidence_id,action,actor_identity,trace_id,span_id,resource_id,outcome,
+                details_json,previous_sha256,evidence_sha256,created_at)
+               VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+            (
+                evidence_id, action, actor.identity, material["trace_id"], material["span_id"],
+                resource_id, outcome, _canonical(material["details"]), previous_sha, digest, created_at,
+            ),
+        )
+        return {"evidence_id": evidence_id, "evidence_sha256": digest, **material}
+
+    def record_trace(self, trace: TraceContext, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        context = trace.as_dict()
+        digest = _sha(context)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            if trace.parent_span_id:
+                parent = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT context_json FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                    (trace.trace_id, trace.parent_span_id),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if parent is None:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="parent_span_id")
+                parent_context = json.loads(parent[0])
+                if GovernanceScope.from_value(parent_context) != trace.scope:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_trace_spans VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, trace.parent_span_id, _canonical(context), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TRACE_RECORDED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}", outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"context_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def register_tool(self, descriptor: ToolDescriptor, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        public = {
+            "name": descriptor.name,
+            "kind": descriptor.kind,
+            "required_capabilities": list(descriptor.required_capabilities),
+            "credential_ref": descriptor.credential_ref,
+            **descriptor.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT descriptor_sha256 FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (descriptor.name,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_DESCRIPTOR_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_tools VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (descriptor.name, descriptor.kind, _canonical(descriptor.scope.as_dict()),
+                 _canonical(descriptor.required_capabilities), descriptor.credential_ref, digest),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_REGISTERED", actor=actor, resource_id=descriptor.name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=None, details={"descriptor_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_tool(
+        self,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        tool_name: str,
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        requested_scope: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any],
+        input_digest: str,
+        invocation_key: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", input_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INPUT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        if trace.task_id is None or trace.claim_id is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="active_claim")
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != trace.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION")
+        authorize_scope(actor, requested_scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            persisted_trace = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if persisted_trace is None or persisted_trace[0] != _sha(trace.as_dict()):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="trace")
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (tool_name,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            descriptor_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(json.loads(row["scope_json"]))
+            if descriptor_scope.scope_type == "tenant" and descriptor_scope != requested_scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            required = set(json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"]))
+            if not required.issubset(set(actor.capabilities)):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            request_sha = _sha({
+                "tool_name": tool_name, "input_digest": input_digest,
+                "task_id": trace.task_id, "claim_id": trace.claim_id,
+                "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+                "scope": requested_scope.as_dict(),
+            })
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                if replay["status"] != "VERIFIED":
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+                return {
+                    "tool_name": tool_name, "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+                    "span_id": trace.span_id, "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+                    "status": "VERIFIED", "receipt_sha256": replay["receipt_sha256"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+            created_at = _now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """INSERT INTO governed_tool_invocations
+                   (invocation_key,request_sha256,tool_name,task_id,claim_id,trace_id,span_id,
+                    status,receipt_sha256,created_at,updated_at)
+                   VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                (invocation_key, request_sha, tool_name, trace.task_id, trace.claim_id,
+                 trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, "AUTHORIZED", None, created_at, created_at),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor, resource_id=tool_name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"input_sha256": input_digest, "scope_sha256": _sha(requested_scope.as_dict()),
+                         "invocation_key": invocation_key},
+            )
+        return {
+            "tool_name": tool_name,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+            "status": "AUTHORIZED",
+            "credential_required": row["credential_ref"] is not None,
+            "evidence": evidence,
+        }
+
+    def record_tool_receipt(
+        self,
+        *,
+        invocation_key: str,
+        result_digest: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", result_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None or row["trace_id"] != trace.trace_id or row["span_id"] != trace.span_id:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_BINDING_INVALID")
+            if row["status"] == "VERIFIED":
+                if row["receipt_sha256"] != result_digest:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_CONFLICT")
+                return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "idempotent": True}
+            if row["status"] != "AUTHORIZED":
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE governed_tool_invocations SET status='VERIFIED',receipt_sha256=?,updated_at=? "
+                "WHERE invocation_key=? AND status='AUTHORIZED'",
+                (result_digest, _now(), invocation_key),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=row["tool_name"], outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"invocation_key": invocation_key, "result_sha256": result_digest},
+            )
+        return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def store_grant(self, grant: CredentialGrant, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        public = grant.public()
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_sha256 FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant.grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_GRANT_CONFLICT")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_credential_grants VALUES (?,?,?,?)",
+                (grant.grant_id, _canonical(public), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_GRANT_STORED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant.grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=None,
+                details={"grant_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"grant": public, "grant_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_credential(
+        self,
+        *,
+        grant_id: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None,
+        tool_name: str | None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_json FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+            raw = json.loads(row[0])
+            grant = CredentialGrant(
+                grant_id=raw["grant_id"], credential_ref=raw["credential_ref"],
+                scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(raw), operations=tuple(raw["operations"]),
+                task_id=raw.get("task_id"), tool_name=raw.get("tool_name"),
+                expires_at=raw.get("expires_at"),
+            )
+            if trace.scope != grant.scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="trace_scope")
+            reference = grant.authorize(
+                actor, operation=operation, task_id=task_id, tool_name=tool_name, now=now
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"operation": operation, "task_id": task_id, "tool_name": tool_name,
+                         "credential_ref_sha256": _sha(reference)},
+            )
+        return {"credential_ref": reference, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def verify_audit_chain(self, required_actions: Iterable[str] = ()) -> bool:
+        ordered_actions: list[str] = []
+        previous = ""
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            rows = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence").fetchall()
+        for row in rows:
+            details = json.loads(row["details_json"])
+            material = {
+                "action": row["action"], "actor_identity": row["actor_identity"],
+                "trace_id": row["trace_id"], "span_id": row["span_id"],
+                "resource_id": row["resource_id"], "outcome": row["outcome"],
+                "details": details, "previous_sha256": row["previous_sha256"],
+                "created_at": row["created_at"],
+            }
+            if row["previous_sha256"] != previous or row["evidence_sha256"] != _sha(material):
+                return False
+            previous = row["evidence_sha256"]
+            ordered_actions.append(row["action"])
+        position = 0
+        for required in required_actions:
+            try:
+                position = ordered_actions.index(required, position) + 1
+            except ValueError:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "CredentialGrant", "GovernanceActor", "GovernanceError", "GovernanceScope",
+    "GovernanceStore", "ToolDescriptor", "TraceContext", "authorize_scope",
+    "bind_trace_lineage",
+]

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes-config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+providers:
+  oneapi:
+    name: oneapi
+    base_url: http://172.18.0.2:3000/v1
+    key_env: OPENAI_API_KEY
+    default_model: deepseek-v4-flash
+model:
+  provider: oneapi
+  name: deepseek-v4-flash

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/local/bin/hermes",
+    "run",
+    "--non-interactive"
+  ],
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "hermes",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 900
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes.profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/opt/aios-hermes-agent/hermes-agent/.venv/bin/hermes",
+    "-z",
+    "{prompt}",
+    "--provider",
+    "oneapi",
+    "-m",
+    "deepseek-v4-flash",
+    "--no-restore-cwd"
+  ],
+  "credential_env": {
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY": {
+      "credential": "aios-external-agent-oneapi-env",
+      "format": "dotenv",
+      "key": "ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN"
+    }
+  },
+  "environment": {
+    "HERMES_HOME": "/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes-home"
+  },
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "hermes",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 180
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw-config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+  "tools": {
+    "profile": "minimal"
+  },
+  "memory": {
+    "search": {
+      "enabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "agents": {
+    "defaults": {
+      "workspace": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace",
+      "model": {
+        "primary": "openai/deepseek-v4-flash"
+      },
+      "thinkingDefault": "off"
+    },
+    "entries": {
+      "main": {
+        "default": true,
+        "workspace": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "models": {
+    "providers": {
+      "openai": {
+        "baseUrl": "http://172.18.0.2:3000/v1",
+        "api": "openai-completions",
+        "models": [
+          {
+            "id": "deepseek-v4-flash",
+            "name": "deepseek-v4-flash",
+            "contextWindow": 32768,
+            "maxTokens": 256
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/local/bin/openclaw",
+    "run",
+    "--non-interactive"
+  ],
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "openclaw",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 900
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw.profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/bin/node",
+    "/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering/v2026.7.2-beta.7/openclaw.mjs",
+    "agent",
+    "--local",
+    "--json",
+    "--agent",
+    "main",
+    "--thinking",
+    "off",
+    "--message",
+    "{prompt}",
+    "--model",
+    "openai/deepseek-v4-flash",
+    "--timeout",
+    "180"
+  ],
+  "credential_env": {
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY": {
+      "credential": "aios-external-agent-oneapi-env",
+      "format": "dotenv",
+      "key": "ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN"
+    }
+  },
+  "environment": {
+    "OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH": "/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw-config.json",
+    "OPENCLAW_HOME": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-home",
+    "OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-state"
+  },
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_json",
+  "runtime": "openclaw",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 240
+}

db/migrations/20260817_message_handoff.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+-- R4.2 P0-B durable Message/Handoff Fabric.
+-- Forward-only. The existing 20260707 message_outbox remains a compatibility source.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-execution-rebind.service

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task execution-rebind API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-execution-rebind.env
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_PORT=18942
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-retry-extension.service

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task retry-extension API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-retry-extension.env
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT=18941
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-external-agent-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS credential-isolated external Agent runtime executor
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-executor
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_external_agent_runtime.py --root /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor --profile-root /etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+IPAddressDeny=127.0.0.0/8
+IPAddressDeny=::1/128
+IPAddressAllow=172.18.0.2/32
+LoadCredential=aios-external-agent-oneapi-env:/data/agent/secrets/oneapi-model-ready.env
+InaccessiblePaths=/etc/aios-gitops
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/agent/secrets
+ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d
+ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios-hermes-agent
+ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS Hermes Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-hermes-worker-cn-network-mkt
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=external-agent-runtime-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-18.1-hermes-runtime
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.hermes
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=hermes
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-isolated-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS uncredentialed deterministic Planner/Executor
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-executor
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py --root /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateNetwork=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+IPAddressDeny=any
+IPAddressAllow=localhost
+InaccessiblePaths=/run/credentials
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS governed Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=trusted-online-engineering-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-17.2-durable
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=git.read,git.test,governed.write.branch,governed.write.file
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_ISOLATED_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS OpenClaw Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-openclaw-worker-cn-network-mkt
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=external-agent-runtime-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-18.1-openclaw-runtime
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-worker-availability-guard.service

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS persistent Online Agent worker availability guard
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=root
+Group=root
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_MAX_STALE_SECONDS=90
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS=60
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_worker_availability_guard.py --heal
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
+ReadWritePaths=/run/aios-worker-availability
+UMask=0022

deploy/systemd/aios-worker-availability-guard.timer

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Periodically ensure AIOS Online Agent workers remain available
+
+[Timer]
+OnBootSec=15s
+OnUnitActiveSec=30s
+AccuracySec=5s
+RandomizedDelaySec=3s
+Persistent=true
+Unit=aios-worker-availability-guard.service
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target

deploy/sysusers.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+g aios-executor-exchange -
+u aios-engineering-executor - "AIOS isolated engineering executor" /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor /usr/sbin/nologin
+m aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange
+m aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-external-agent-runtime.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/requests 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/results 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/failed 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-state 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-home 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/workspaces 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/workspaces 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d 0755 root root -

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/requests 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/results 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/failed 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/sources 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-worker-availability.conf

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+d /run/aios-worker-availability 0755 root root -

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p0c-trace-tool-credential-governance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# R4.2 P0-C Trace / Tool-MCP / Credential Governance
+
+## Status boundary
+
+This change is a candidate implementation on the governed P0-C branch. It does
+not promote protected `main`, deploy Production, or assert that all R4.2 target
+architecture is complete.
+
+## Scope model
+
+Governance resources use an explicit `scope_type`:
+
+- `tenant` requires `tenant_id` and may narrow to user, project,
+  conversation, and run;
+- `system` and `global` prohibit tenant ownership fields;
+- `legacy` preserves unscoped historical records without inventing ownership.
+
+System and global tools therefore never receive a synthetic tenant merely to
+satisfy a tenant-oriented schema.
+
+## Trace lineage
+
+`TaskPlan` and `MessageEnvelope` scope is bound to a `TraceContext`. The trace
+records `trace_id`, `span_id`, parent span, correlation, causation, task,
+message, and the canonical P0-A scope. Child spans must keep the parent's trace,
+task, and scope. Privileged visibility does not permit cross-scope trace
+splicing.
+
+`MessageEnvelope.correlation_id` is persisted and identity-bound. Existing
+handoff databases are upgraded in place with an idempotent column migration;
+legacy rows retain their prior event IDs because a null correlation field is
+not added to the historical identity material.
+
+Observability keeps its legacy presentation fields, but new governed records
+also carry immutable trace and scope fields. Scoped records require a trusted
+server actor for queries. A repeated execution ID is an idempotent replay only
+when the complete record matches; conflicting overwrites are denied.
+
+## Tool and MCP governance
+
+`ToolDescriptor` binds a tool or MCP server to:
+
+- an explicit resource scope;
+- required actor capabilities;
+- an optional credential reference.
+
+Invocation authorization requires exact propagation of the trace scope and a
+capability superset. Unknown tools, cross-tenant calls, scope substitution, and
+non-privileged access to system/global resources fail closed. Every successful
+registration and invocation appends hash-chained audit evidence.
+
+## Credential governance
+
+Credentials are represented only by references whose schemes are
+`systemd-credential`, `vault`, or `secret-manager`. Raw bearer tokens, passwords,
+and arbitrary values are rejected. Grants are bound to scope, operation, task,
+tool, and expiry. Public/audit records contain a reference hash where disclosure
+is unnecessary; secret material is never persisted by this module.
+
+The existing runtime credential broker remains backward compatible for system
+leases, adds explicit tenant/system/global invariants, and rejects providers
+that attempt to return raw token/secret/password environment values instead of
+file/reference indirection.
+
+## Durable evidence
+
+The SQLite governance store is restart-safe and idempotently initializes four
+tables: governed tools, trace spans, credential grants, and audit evidence.
+Audit entries form a SHA-256 chain. Acceptance requires the chain to verify and
+contain the required actions; missing evidence is not treated as success.
+
+## Acceptance tests
+
+The candidate must pass:
+
+- `TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY`;
+- `TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY`;
+- `AUDIT_EVIDENCE_COMPLETENESS`;
+- P0-A scope and P0-B handoff regression suites;
+- Python compilation, `git diff --check`, and a diff-scoped secret scan.
+
+The repository-wide baseline currently has seven unrelated failures in the
+isolated host environment (five stale continuation-contract fixtures and two
+host-permission fixtures). The same seven failures reproduce at the untouched
+`a642b045775b9154a00ae78543037fbef4fb447b` base; they are not suppressed or
+modified by P0-C.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p1-durable-execution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# R4.2 P1 — Durable Online Agent Execution
+
+Status: candidate implementation. This document does not imply protected-main promotion or Production deployment.
+
+## State model
+
+The generic worker uses two local durable layers:
+
+1. `tasks/<task_id>.json`: atomic fast-state cache for compatibility and quick restart.
+2. `checkpoints.sqlite3`: append-only attempt/phase journal with `synchronous=FULL`.
+
+Checkpoint identity is bound to:
+
+- task_id
+- attempt
+- execution_digest
+- job_id
+- repository
+- base_oid
+- expected_branch_oid
+- target_branch
+- generation
+
+A checkpoint from another repository/branch/generation is never reused.
+
+Phases are monotonic within an attempt:
+
+`claimed → workspace_prepared → verification_passed → source_capture_done|commit_done → result_pending → result_submitted`
+
+`reconciliation_required` is an explicit recovery phase.
+
+## Attempt-aware result idempotency
+
+Result submission idempotency keys include the official Task attempt and the execution digest. The same
+attempt reuses the same key after a timeout/restart; a later official attempt cannot collide with an
+earlier result.
+
+Before submitting a result the worker durably writes `result_pending`, including the result hash and
+idempotency key. After a successful or exact-idempotency-reconciled API response it writes
+`result_submitted`.
+
+A 409 is accepted only if the Task API already contains the exact same result body and the Task is
+VERIFYING/SUCCEEDED. A conflicting result remains a hard failure.
+
+## Resume rules
+
+- `source_capture_done` and `result_pending` may be reused across later official attempts only when the
+  execution/scope binding is identical. This avoids repeating read-only source capture.
+- A deterministic task that crashed before governed commit replays from a new clean detached worktree.
+  This is safe because there is no external side effect yet.
+- `commit_done` is never recommitted. Recovery requires exact Job receipt OID convergence plus exactly
+  one ACTIVE WriterLease whose `current_head_oid` equals the governed commit.
+- delayed Git visibility remains `RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`, preserving an explicit recovery entry.
+
+## Crash cleanup
+
+On worker startup, stale `task-*` workspaces under the configured workspace root are removed before
+polling begins. The path boundary is verified before deletion.
+
+## Contracts
+
+P1 gates include:
+
+- CHECKPOINT_DURABLE_WRITE
+- RESUME_FROM_CHECKPOINT
+- RETRY_IDEMPOTENT_NO_DUPLICATE_SIDE_EFFECT
+- CRASH_RECOVERY_CONVERGENCE
+- WORKER_RESTART_RESUME
+- CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_ISOLATION
+- RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE
+- WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_RECOVERY
+- LEASE_RENEWAL_RECOVERY
+
+WriterLease and governed Job authority remain in the existing Bridge/GitOps durable stores; the worker
+checkpoint DB is not a competing authority for Git state.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-agent-fleet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Agent Fleet / Multi-Agent Scheduling / Fault Isolation
+
+P2 adds a durable fleet decision layer inside TaskPlane without replacing TaskPlane claim/lease
+ownership. Worker registration/heartbeat remains authoritative for liveness. TaskPlane claim CAS
+remains authoritative for ownership. Probe-before-reassignment remains mandatory after an expired
+lease. P1 checkpoint/result replay remains authoritative after worker restart.
+
+`FleetScheduler` adds durable worker capacity slots, weighted scope fairness, starvation aging,
+affinity/anti-affinity labels, worker circuit breakers, per-task/worker quarantine and idempotent
+dispatch reservations. Fleet state is colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database and is
+created idempotently; no new daemon or database is introduced.
+
+A fleet reservation is only a scheduling decision. It does not claim a Task. Callers must perform
+the normal TaskPlane claim and may then bind the returned claim ID to the reservation. This preserves
+the existing ownership and recovery invariants.
+
+Failure recovery never bypasses probe evidence. When TaskPlane recovery places work back in a
+claimable state, P2 may quarantine the failed worker and prefer another worker/failure domain.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Compact Interface Map Runtime
+
+## Purpose
+
+The persistent Online Agent already supports the canonical read-only `source_capture` action, but
+its `SourceCaptureExecutor` always returns an `aios.engineering.source-snapshot.v2` tar.gz+base64
+payload. That is correct for implementation source transfer, but too large for control-plane
+consumers that only need a bounded implementation map.
+
+P2 adds a new **adapter**, not a new execution action:
+
+```text
+action=source_capture
+adapter=compact_interface_map
+```
+
+This preserves the existing execution-v2 schema and Bridge policy:
+
+- read-only repository;
+- no change set;
+- no verification commands;
+- `writer_lease=false`;
+- no branch or commit;
+- existing capability and execution-digest validation.
+
+## Compact map contract
+
+`aios_online_agent_compact_map.py` scans only approved repository roots and source suffixes. It
+returns:
+
+- at most 40 relevant modules;
+- at most 80 selected Python symbols in total;
+- at most 40 test symbols;
+- at most 25 excerpts;
+- at most 1200 characters per excerpt;
+- SQL table names;
+- systemd unit names;
+- current invariants, failure windows and reuse points;
+- P2 fleet contract-to-surface mappings.
+
+The result is hard-bounded to 120 KiB and contains no source archive or `payload_b64`.
+
+Source excerpts apply a conservative sensitive-pattern redaction before result construction.
+
+## P2 contracts
+
+The map supplies evidence surfaces for:
+
+- `FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION`
+- `FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING`
+- `FLEET_FAIRNESS`
+- `FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT`
+- `FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH`
+- `FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY`
+
+Missing first-class scheduling/fleet primitives are reported as gaps rather than invented.
+
+## Result
+
+When the adapter is selected, the worker returns:
+
+```text
+status=SUCCEEDED
+classification=P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED
+execution_mode=compact_interface_map
+writer_lease=NONE
+```
+
+The existing `source_capture_done` / P1 checkpoint/retry path is reused, so the compact analysis
+inherits attempt-aware result idempotency and restart-safe result submission.
+
+## Governance
+
+This capability is runtime infrastructure only. The implementation candidate may use a governed
+branch/WriterLease for its own code change, but any task executed through `compact_interface_map`
+is read-only and must not create a WriterLease, branch, commit, protected-ref write, or Production
+side effect.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2b-fleet-order-preservation-repair.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# R4.2 P2-B Fleet Order Preservation Repair
+
+P2-C live acceptance exposed a real integration defect in the verified P2-B candidate. The fleet
+scheduler correctly produced durable cross-scope fairness order, but the integration passed the
+entire ranked list to the legacy scheduler. The legacy scheduler then applied its own priority /
+created_at / task_id sort and silently discarded fleet ordering.
+
+The repair preserves the legacy scheduler as the fail-closed security oracle while changing how it
+is called: one fleet-ranked candidate is presented at a time. A candidate rejected by legacy
+security/policy advances to the next fleet candidate. A candidate returned by the oracle must have
+the same task ID as the candidate presented, otherwise execution fails closed.
+
+Task ownership remains unchanged: the original schedule_for_worker/claim_task CAS remains
+authoritative, and a fleet reservation is still only bound after the claim succeeds.
+
+This repair does not modify FleetScheduler state semantics, capacity, WriterLease, checkpoint,
+protected refs or Production behavior.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2b-fleet-runtime-integration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# R4.2 P2-B Fleet Runtime Integration
+
+P2-B connects the verified P2 fleet primitives to the existing TaskPlane pull scheduler without
+replacing its security or ownership logic.
+
+The integration uses two stages. `FleetScheduler.rank_for_worker()` performs only read-only
+capacity/fairness/fault-isolation ranking. The original `TaskScheduler.next_queued_task()` is then
+run over that ordered list and remains the fail-closed security oracle for worker liveness,
+capabilities, data classification, execution zone and other existing policy checks. Only a task
+accepted by the original scheduler receives a short durable fleet reservation.
+
+The original `TaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker()` remains the sole claim path and continues to call
+the existing TaskPlane `claim_task` CAS. After a successful claim, the claim ID is bound to the
+fleet reservation. A claim error releases the reservation. A fleet reservation is never treated as
+task ownership.
+
+P2-B also makes the reservation capacity check atomic inside the fleet SQLite transaction so two
+concurrent pullers cannot oversubscribe the same worker slot. Circuit and task/worker quarantine
+state are enforced on the real pull path. Explicit execution-failure signals can be recorded through
+the integrated scheduler's failure/success/quarantine methods; policy/claim failures are not
+automatically mislabeled as worker crashes.
+
+No new daemon, database or production write path is introduced.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-generic-compact-interface-map-profiles.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Generic Compact Interface-Map Profiles
+
+The compact interface-map runtime is a reusable read-only control-plane capability. It keeps the
+canonical `source_capture` action and `compact_interface_map` adapter, but selects a bounded semantic
+profile from the task's source signals.
+
+The existing `fleet` profile remains backward compatible and returns
+`P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED` with the `FLEET_*` contracts.
+
+The new `model_governance` profile is selected when model/provider/routing/budget/evaluation terms
+are present. It returns `MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED` and model-specific contracts for
+provider registry, selection policy, version pinning, budget accounting, fallback, scope isolation,
+credential boundary, trace/audit, evaluation gates and routing resilience.
+
+Profile and classification are emitted by the compact-map module and revalidated by the worker
+before result submission. Unknown or mismatched profile/classification pairs fail closed.
+
+No new Bridge action, daemon, database, WriterLease, mutation path or credential surface is added.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-hermes-openclaw-online-agent-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Hermes / OpenClaw Online Agent Runtime
+
+## Goal
+
+Promote Hermes and OpenClaw from shadow-only adapter descriptions to real Online Agent workers
+without creating a second Task/claim protocol.
+
+Both workers reuse the existing P1/P2 Online Agent lifecycle:
+
+```text
+Online Task projected
+→ capability-filtered poll
+→ automatic claim
+→ heartbeat
+→ durable checkpoint
+→ external Agent execution
+→ attempt-aware result submission
+→ official verification
+```
+
+They do **not** change the existing TaskPlane `OpenClawAdapter/HermesAdapter` shadow contract. Those
+adapters remain side-effect-free compatibility surfaces.
+
+## Execution action
+
+The canonical execution envelope adds a read-only action:
+
+```text
+action=agent_runtime
+adapter=hermes | openclaw
+```
+
+The action requires capability `agent.runtime.<adapter>`, has an empty change set, no verification
+commands, and `writer_lease=false`.
+
+`project_online_task()` copies only bounded task fields into the signed execution envelope:
+
+- goal;
+- instructions;
+- success criteria;
+- non-secret constraints.
+
+The task may not choose a command, executable, URL, credential path, environment, or shell string.
+
+## Worker separation
+
+The generic engineering worker defaults to:
+
+```text
+AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=deterministic,source_capture,compact_interface_map,codex
+```
+
+so it skips Hermes/OpenClaw tasks before claim.
+
+Dedicated services advertise:
+
+```text
+Hermes:
+  AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.hermes
+  AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=hermes
+
+OpenClaw:
+  AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.openclaw
+  AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=openclaw
+```
+
+This makes adapter selection a pre-claim capability/fleet decision instead of a post-claim failure.
+
+## Credential-isolated executor
+
+The Online Agent worker itself still owns only Task API/Bridge coordination credentials. It writes
+a hash-bound request to `/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor`.
+
+`aios-external-agent-executor.service` runs as the existing uncredentialed engineering executor user.
+It has:
+
+- one provider-only `LoadCredential` projection for the model-ready OneAPI environment;
+- `/etc/aios-gitops`, `/data/aios-gitops`, and the original provider-secret directory inaccessible;
+- no repository path;
+- no shell execution;
+- loopback denied, preventing direct access to the AIOS Task/Bridge control plane;
+- only the staging OneAPI container address allowed for the installed Agent runtime/provider;
+- only the exchange directory writable.
+
+The root-owned runtime profile in `/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/<runtime>.json` decides the
+absolute executable, fixed non-secret environment, provider-only credential mapping, and I/O mode.
+A task cannot override any of these values. The profile may select `OPENAI_API_KEY` only from the
+systemd credential named `aios-external-agent-oneapi-env`; it cannot name a credential, inject an
+environment variable, or carry an inline secret. The runtime executor parses only the selected
+`ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN` entry and does not expose the source file or other provider tiers to the
+child.
+
+## Runtime profile
+
+A profile supports:
+
+- `argv`: fixed argv, absolute allowlisted executable;
+- `input_mode`: `stdin_text`, `stdin_json`, or `file_json`;
+- `output_mode`: `stdout_text`, `stdout_json`, or `file_json`;
+- timeout;
+- bounded output size.
+
+`{input_json}` and `{output_json}` placeholders are allowed only for file modes. `{prompt}` is a
+root-profile-only argv placeholder populated from the bounded, signed task projection.
+
+The repository includes the staging profile templates validated against the installed Hermes
+v0.20.0 and OpenClaw v2026.7.2-beta.7 CLIs. Before activation, the Agent must re-run the actual
+`--help`/version probes and install the profiles and static configs root-owned. If the installed
+CLI differs, update only the root-owned profile/config projection and record the observed command;
+do not modify the Task contract to compensate.
+
+The provider projection is staging-only and uses the existing model-ready OneAPI source. It is not
+an AIOS Task, Bridge, GitOps, SSH, or Writer credential. Live activation remains blocked if the
+model-ready source cannot be projected through systemd or if the selected provider credential is
+missing/quota-invalid. This worker never passes API keys through task metadata or arbitrary
+environment variables.
+
+## Retry/restart
+
+The external request ID is deterministic over Task/Job/execution digest/runtime. The exchange keeps
+the request/result across worker restart. A repeated attempt with the exact execution digest reuses
+the durable external result instead of invoking the Agent twice.
+
+The normal P1 result idempotency/checkpoint path remains authoritative for Task result submission.
+
+## Result
+
+Successful execution returns:
+
+```text
+status=SUCCEEDED
+classification=EXTERNAL_AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCEEDED
+execution_mode=agent_runtime
+agent_runtime=hermes | openclaw
+writer_lease=NONE
+changed_files=[]
+credential_material_exposed=false
+control_plane_access_granted_to_runtime=false
+```
+
+This first runtime version is intentionally read-only with respect to the repository. Engineering
+changes continue to use assistant-authored deterministic plans and governed WriterLease/commit.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-owner-controlled-execution-rebind.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Owner-Controlled Same-Binding Execution Rebind
+
+## Purpose
+
+`aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py` closes a projection/plan race without replacing the Task,
+Governed Job, target branch, generation, or idempotency lineage.
+
+The only supported transition is:
+
+```text
+official NEEDS_REWORK
+→ Task QUEUED with no active lease
+→ persisted source_capture envelope
+→ canonical Bridge resolves an already-registered deterministic plan
+→ CAS-bound metadata.execution + execution_projection replacement
+→ audit event
+→ normal worker claim
+```
+
+The service rejects arbitrary metadata patches. It derives the new envelope from canonical Bridge
+`/v2/execution-envelope`, validates every governed binding coordinate against the persisted envelope,
+requires `source_capture → deterministic`, requires exact old/new execution digests supplied by the
+Owner recovery request, and increments the Task revision under `BEGIN IMMEDIATE`.
+
+It records `TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED` and an idempotent `task_execution_rebinds` receipt.
+No Task/Job/branch replacement is created and the worker still performs the real claim/heartbeat,
+WriterLease and governed commit.
+
+The endpoint is loopback-only:
+
+`POST /v1/tasks/{task_id}/execution-rebind`
+
+and requires the existing Owner control credential plus
+`AIOS_AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID`.
+
+Direct/manual Task database edits remain forbidden; the service is the audited mutation boundary.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-worker-availability-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+# AIOS Worker Availability Runtime
+
+## Priority
+
+This runtime exists to make the already verified Online Agent execution path continuously usable
+without repeated human intervention.
+
+The system already proved that generic, Hermes and OpenClaw workers can claim and complete real
+Online Tasks. The remaining availability defect was operational: evidence-freeze workflows left the
+worker services stopped, while registry `ACTIVE` records remained stale.
+
+The availability contract therefore separates:
+
+```text
+AUTO_CLAIM_MECHANISM=VERIFIED
+CURRENT_WORKER_AVAILABILITY=<fresh runtime state>
+```
+
+A historical successful claim is not current liveness.
+
+## Source of truth for idle liveness
+
+An idle worker may have no Task lease heartbeat. Therefore Task heartbeat alone cannot prove that
+the worker is continuously polling.
+
+`aios_online_agent_worker.py` now writes:
+
+```text
+<AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT>/worker-liveness.json
+```
+
+on:
+
+- process start: `STARTING`;
+- every successful poll: `POLL_OK`;
+- poll failure: `POLL_FAILED`;
+- every successful Task lease heartbeat while executing: `BUSY`.
+
+The file contains:
+
+- agent ID/type/version;
+- process PID;
+- monotonically increasing local sequence;
+- `last_seen_epoch`;
+- poll/heartbeat intervals;
+- current Task/stage while busy.
+
+The liveness file is worker-owned observability state only. It does not write or mutate Task, Job,
+Git, WriterLease or registry databases.
+
+## Self-healing guard
+
+`aios-worker-availability-guard.timer` invokes a root-owned oneshot guard every 30 seconds.
+
+The guard manages:
+
+```text
+aios-online-agent-worker-20260815.service
+aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service
+aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service
+```
+
+and the required external runtime dependency:
+
+```text
+aios-external-agent-executor.service
+```
+
+For each worker:
+
+1. missing systemd unit → fail closed;
+2. disabled → `systemctl enable`;
+3. inactive → `systemctl start`;
+4. active but liveness older than 90 seconds → restart;
+5. repeated stale restart within 60 seconds → do not restart again; report degraded.
+
+Long-running Tasks are safe because the Task lease-heartbeat thread refreshes `BUSY` liveness.
+
+The guard never claims a Task and never touches Task/Job/Git databases.
+
+## Maintenance inhibit
+
+Planned maintenance creates:
+
+```text
+/run/aios-worker-availability/maintenance.lock
+```
+
+While this file exists the guard performs no start/restart actions and reports:
+
+```text
+MAINTENANCE_INHIBITED
+```
+
+Maintenance tooling must remove the file when done. This prevents the self-healer from fighting
+intentional service changes.
+
+## Status
+
+The guard writes:
+
+```text
+/run/aios-worker-availability/status.json
+```
+
+with current worker/dependency states, liveness ages and recovery actions.
+
+A worker is currently available only when:
+
+```text
+systemd load_state=loaded
+systemd active_state=active
+unit enabled/static
+worker-liveness.json present
+last_seen_age <= 90s
+```
+
+Registry `ACTIVE` without fresh poll/busy liveness is not sufficient.
+
+## Boot/restart behavior
+
+The timer is:
+
+```text
+OnBootSec=15s
+OnUnitActiveSec=30s
+Persistent=true
+```
+
+Therefore reboot, manual stop left behind by another workflow, process crash, and hung poll loop are
+all repaired without requiring a human to notice and intervene.
+
+Normal worker units retain their own `Restart=always`; the availability guard handles the cases that
+`Restart=always` cannot, especially a deliberate `systemctl stop` left after an evidence workflow.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+The live acceptance requires all of the following:
+
+```text
+guard timer active/enabled
+external executor active/enabled
+generic worker active/enabled + fresh liveness
+Hermes worker active/enabled + fresh liveness
+OpenClaw worker active/enabled + fresh liveness
+```
+
+Then a new read-only Online Task is projected through canonical Bridge `18892`.
+
+Success requires:
+
+```text
+TASK_CREATED
+→ generic worker auto claim
+→ TASK_HEARTBEAT
+→ RESULT_SUBMITTED
+→ official TASK_VERIFIED(SUCCEEDED)
+```
+
+After the Task, the services must remain active and liveness must continue advancing. The acceptance
+also stops a worker intentionally once and proves the guard starts it again with a new fresh
+liveness sequence.
+
+Only after these gates may current status be upgraded from:
+
+```text
+OVERALL=PARTIAL
+```
+
+to:
+
+```text
+PERSISTENT_WORKER_LIVENESS=VERIFIED
+NEW_TASK_AUTO_CONSUMPTION=VERIFIED
+WORKER_AVAILABILITY_RUNTIME=VERIFIED_CANDIDATE
+```
+
+Protected main and Production remain out of scope.
+
+
+## Forced source-capture projection compatibility
+
+The deployed canonical Bridge currently projects a default `source_capture` envelope even when a
+governed binding request asks for binding-only behavior. This must not be allowed to make always-on
+workers consume engineering Tasks before their deterministic plan is registered.
+
+The worker therefore distinguishes a real read-only source capture from an engineering placeholder:
+
+```text
+source_capture
++ capability_scope contains governed.write.branch or governed.write.file
+= PENDING_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN
+```
+
+For such a placeholder the worker:
+
+1. re-resolves through the canonical plan registry **without replaying the stale source-capture
+   envelope**;
+2. if no deterministic plan exists, emits `TASK_SKIPPED_PENDING_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN` and does not
+   claim;
+3. if the registered canonical envelope is deterministic and the governed binding still matches,
+   uses that deterministic envelope and claims normally.
+
+A real read-only source-capture Task with only `git.read`/`git.test` still replays its exact persisted
+payload and remains claimable.
+
+This makes persistent workers safe with the currently deployed Bridge while preserving the same
+Task/Job binding. No Task DB rewrite, cancellation, replacement Task, fake NEEDS_REWORK, or
+pre-claim metadata mutation is required.
+
+A later Bridge cleanup may implement true binding-only projection, but Worker Availability does not
+depend on that cleanup.

docs/task-plane/r42-p0b-message-handoff-fabric.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# R4.2 P0-B — Durable Message / Handoff Fabric
+
+Status: candidate implementation; not evidence of protected-main merge or Production deployment.
+
+`MessageEnvelope` is the single durable handoff identity and carries source/target/type, tenant/user/
+project/conversation/task/run scope, causation, sequence, capability scope, confidentiality scope,
+idempotency key, expiry and delivery state.
+
+Identity includes **target + scope + sequence + idempotency key + payload hash**, fixing the existing
+AgentEventBus target collision. Server ActorContext is authoritative; caller scope may narrow but may
+not widen/forge trusted tenant/user/project/conversation/run fields.
+
+`DurableHandoffStore` provides SQLite durability in the current runtime. Each logical stream has
+unique `(stream_key, idempotency_key)` and `(stream_key, sequence)`. Exact retry returns `REPLAY`;
+changed payload under the same key is rejected; sequence gaps are rejected; expired messages are not
+delivered.
+
+Confidentiality scopes:
+
+- public: no tenant requirement
+- tenant: same tenant
+- project: same tenant + project
+- private: same tenant + project + user
+- run: same tenant + project + user + run
+
+Required `capability_scope` must be present on the authenticated delivery actor unless the actor is
+explicitly administrative.
+
+Compatibility adapters convert AgentEventBus events, TaskPlane CloudEvents and legacy Agent OS
+MessageBus messages into the durable envelope. Existing message_outbox remains intact as a migration
+source; P0-B does not delete or silently rewrite it.
+
+Required gates:
+`MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY`, `MESSAGE_TARGET_COLLISION_DENY`, `MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_REPLAY`,
+`MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT`, `MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE`,
+`HANDOFF_CROSS_TENANT_DENY`, plus existing P0-A TaskPlane scope/security regressions.
+
+SQLite remains current runtime persistence. PostgreSQL remains a separate migration gate.

runtime/agent-os/message_bus.py

@@ -48,3 +48,8 @@ class MessageBus:
         messages = list(self.queue)
         self.queue.clear()
         return messages
+
+# R4.2 P0-B compatibility adapter.
+def to_handoff_envelope(message, *, target=None, sequence=1, idempotency_key=None, **scope):
+    from message_handoff_adapters import legacy_message_to_envelope
+    return legacy_message_to_envelope(message, target=target, sequence=sequence, idempotency_key=idempotency_key, **scope)

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_fleet.py

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+ACTIVE_RUNTIME = ROOT / "active-runtime"
+if str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME))
+
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+
+from app.task_plane.fleet import FleetConflict, FleetScheduler
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Plan:
+    task_id: str
+    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda:["code.read"])
+    metadata: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
+    scope_type: str = "tenant"
+    tenant_id: str = "tenant-a"
+    project_id: str | None = "project-a"
+    user_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Task:
+    task_id: str
+    revision: int = 1
+    status: str = "QUEUED"
+    created_at: float = 1.0
+    task_plan: Plan | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self):
+        if self.task_plan is None:
+            self.task_plan=Plan(self.task_id)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Worker:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: list[str]=field(default_factory=lambda:["code.read"])
+
+
+class Store:
+    def __init__(self, path=":memory:"):
+        self.conn=sqlite3.connect(path,check_same_thread=False)
+        self._lock=threading.RLock()
+        self.conn.executescript("""
+        CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS claims(
+          claim_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,task_id TEXT,worker_id TEXT,status TEXT,lease_expires_at REAL
+        );
+        """)
+        self.tasks=[]
+        self.workers={}
+
+    def list_tasks(self,_ctx=None):
+        return list(self.tasks)
+
+    def get_worker(self,worker_id):
+        return self.workers[worker_id]
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.online=set()
+    def is_online(self,worker_id,now=None):
+        return worker_id in self.online
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fleet():
+    store=Store(); registry=Registry()
+    for wid in ("w-a","w-b","w-c"):
+        store.workers[wid]=Worker(wid)
+        registry.online.add(wid)
+    scheduler=FleetScheduler(store,registry,now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-a",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-a",weight=1)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-b",max_slots=2,failure_domain="zone-b",weight=1)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-c",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-c",weight=2)
+    return store,registry,scheduler
+
+
+def test_FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION_capacity_policy_is_durable(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    policy=scheduler.state.worker_policy("w-b")
+    assert policy.max_slots==2 and policy.failure_domain=="zone-b"
+    reloaded=type(scheduler)(store, scheduler.workers, now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    assert reloaded.state.worker_policy("w-b").max_slots==2
+
+
+def test_FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING_does_not_oversubscribe_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1"),Task("task-2"),Task("task-3")]
+    decisions=scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=3,now=1000.0)
+    assert [d.worker_id for d in decisions]==["w-a"]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING_accounts_for_active_claims(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.conn.execute(
+      "INSERT INTO claims VALUES ('claim-1','other','w-a','ACTIVE',2000)"
+    )
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    assert scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=1,now=1000.0)==[]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAIRNESS_scope_virtual_finish_prevents_hot_scope_monopoly(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[
+      Task("a1",created_at=1,task_plan=Plan("a1",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p-a")),
+      Task("a2",created_at=2,task_plan=Plan("a2",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p-a")),
+      Task("b1",created_at=3,task_plan=Plan("b1",tenant_id="tenant-b",project_id="p-b")),
+    ]
+    first=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    assert first.task_id=="a1"
+    scheduler.state.release("a1",state="COMPLETED",now=1000.1)
+    store.tasks=[task for task in store.tasks if task.task_id!="a1"]
+    second=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.2)[0]
+    assert second.task_id=="b1"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION_opens_worker_circuit_after_threshold(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    for _ in range(3):
+        scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",now=1000.0)
+    assert scheduler.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.0)
+    assert scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=1,now=1001.0)==[]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT_avoids_quarantined_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    scheduler.state.record_task_worker_failure(
+      "task-1","w-a","lease_expired",quarantine_seconds=60,now=1000.0
+    )
+    decision=scheduler.select(["w-a","w-b"],limit=1,now=1001.0)[0]
+    assert decision.worker_id=="w-b"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION_uses_tenant_project_fairness_keys(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[
+      Task("a",task_plan=Plan("a",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p")),
+      Task("b",task_plan=Plan("b",tenant_id="tenant-b",project_id="p")),
+    ]
+    decisions=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=2,now=1000.0)
+    assert {d.scope_key for d in decisions}=={
+      "tenant:tenant-a|project:p","tenant:tenant-b|project:p"
+    }
+
+
+def test_FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH_replay_same_task_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    one=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    # Reservation remains authoritative; a conflicting second worker cannot steal it.
+    with pytest.raises(FleetConflict):
+        scheduler.state.reserve(
+            task_id="task-1",worker_id="w-c",task_revision=1,
+            scope_key=one.scope_key,failure_domain="zone-c",score=one.score,
+            reservation_seconds=30,now=1001.0,scope_weight=1.0,
+        )
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY_worker_success_closes_circuit(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    for _ in range(3):
+        scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",now=1000.0)
+    scheduler.state.record_worker_success("w-a",now=1001.0)
+    assert not scheduler.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.1)
+
+
+def test_affinity_and_failure_domain_anti_affinity(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-b",max_slots=2,failure_domain="zone-b",labels={"gpu":"false"})
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-c",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-c",labels={"gpu":"true"})
+    task=Task("gpu-task")
+    task.task_plan.metadata={
+      "fleet_affinity_labels":{"gpu":"true"},
+      "fleet_avoid_failure_domains":["zone-b"],
+    }
+    store.tasks=[task]
+    decision=scheduler.select(["w-b","w-c"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    assert decision.worker_id=="w-c"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY_state_survives_sqlite_restart(tmp_path):
+    path=tmp_path/"task-plane.sqlite3"
+    first=Store(str(path)); registry=Registry()
+    first.workers["w-a"]=Worker("w-a"); registry.online.add("w-a")
+    scheduler=FleetScheduler(first,registry,now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-a",max_slots=3,failure_domain="zone-a")
+    scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",threshold=1,now=1000.0)
+    first.conn.close()
+
+    second=Store(str(path)); second.workers["w-a"]=Worker("w-a")
+    resumed=FleetScheduler(second,registry,now_fn=lambda:1001.0)
+    assert resumed.state.worker_policy("w-a").max_slots==3
+    assert resumed.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.0)

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_fleet_order_preservation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+ACTIVE_RUNTIME = ROOT / "active-runtime"
+if str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME))
+
+from app.task_plane.scheduler import TaskScheduler
+
+
+def _security_contract():
+    path = Path(__file__).with_name("test_task_plane_security_contract.py")
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("p2b_order_security_contract", path)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def _create_task(service, contract, task_id, tenant, project):
+    return service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "issuer": {"type": "agent", "id": contract.ADMIN_IDENTITY},
+            "required_capabilities": ["code.read"],
+            "scope_type": "tenant",
+            "tenant_id": tenant,
+            "project_id": project,
+            "metadata": {"fleet_priority": 0},
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def _task_id(claim):
+    return getattr(
+        claim,
+        "task_id",
+        claim.get("task_id") if isinstance(claim, dict) else None,
+    )
+
+
+def test_P2B_FLEET_ORDER_is_preserved_through_legacy_claim_oracle():
+    contract = _security_contract()
+    service = contract._service()
+    service.register_worker(contract._worker_payload(max_concurrency=3))
+    worker_id = contract.WORKER_ID
+
+    scheduler = TaskScheduler(service.store)
+    scheduler.fleet_scheduler.configure_worker(
+        worker_id, max_slots=3, failure_domain="zone-a"
+    )
+
+    _create_task(service, contract, "p2b-order-a1", "tenant-a", "project-a")
+    _create_task(service, contract, "p2b-order-a2", "tenant-a", "project-a")
+    _create_task(service, contract, "p2b-order-b1", "tenant-b", "project-b")
+
+    first = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+    second = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+
+    assert _task_id(first) == "p2b-order-a1"
+    assert _task_id(second) == "p2b-order-b1"
+
+    rows = service.store.conn.execute(
+        "SELECT scope_key,dispatch_count FROM fleet_scope_state ORDER BY scope_key"
+    ).fetchall()
+    assert len(rows) >= 2

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_fleet_runtime_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+ACTIVE_RUNTIME = ROOT / "active-runtime"
+if str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME))
+
+from app.task_plane.fleet import FleetConflict, FleetScheduler
+from app.task_plane.errors import NotFoundError
+from app.task_plane.scheduler import TaskScheduler
+
+
+def _security_contract():
+    path = Path(__file__).with_name("test_task_plane_security_contract.py")
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("p2b_security_contract", path)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_P2B_REAL_DISPATCH_claim_binds_fleet_reservation_and_circuit():
+    contract = _security_contract()
+    service = contract._service()
+    service.register_worker(contract._worker_payload(max_concurrency=2))
+    worker_id = contract.WORKER_ID
+
+    service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-p2b-real-1",
+            "issuer": {"type": "agent", "id": contract.ADMIN_IDENTITY},
+            "required_capabilities": ["code.read"],
+        }
+    )
+
+    scheduler = TaskScheduler(service.store)
+    scheduler.fleet_scheduler.configure_worker(
+        worker_id,
+        max_slots=2,
+        failure_domain="zone-real",
+        labels={"runtime": "task-plane"},
+    )
+    first = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+    assert first is not None
+    assert first.task_id == "task-p2b-real-1"
+
+    row = service.store.conn.execute(
+        "SELECT state,claim_id,worker_id FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE task_id=?",
+        ("task-p2b-real-1",),
+    ).fetchone()
+    assert tuple(row) == ("CLAIMED", first.claim_id, worker_id)
+
+    # A real circuit blocks the actual scheduler even though one capacity slot remains.
+    failure_now = time.time()
+    scheduler.record_worker_failure(
+        worker_id, "runtime_crash", threshold=1, now=failure_now
+    )
+    service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-p2b-real-2",
+            "issuer": {"type": "agent", "id": contract.ADMIN_IDENTITY},
+            "required_capabilities": ["code.read"],
+        }
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError, match="no queued tasks available"):
+        scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+
+    scheduler.record_worker_success(worker_id, now=failure_now + 1.0)
+    second = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+    assert second is not None
+    assert second.task_id == "task-p2b-real-2"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Plan:
+    task_id: str
+    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: ["code.read"])
+    metadata: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
+    scope_type: str = "tenant"
+    tenant_id: str = "tenant-a"
+    project_id: str | None = "project-a"
+    user_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Task:
+    task_id: str
+    revision: int = 1
+    status: str = "QUEUED"
+    created_at: float = 1.0
+    task_plan: Plan | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self):
+        if self.task_plan is None:
+            self.task_plan = Plan(self.task_id)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Worker:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: ["code.read"])
+
+
+class Store:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.conn.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE claims("
+            "claim_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,task_id TEXT,worker_id TEXT,status TEXT,"
+            "lease_expires_at REAL)"
+        )
+        self.tasks = []
+        self.workers = {}
+
+    def list_tasks(self, _ctx=None):
+        return list(self.tasks)
+
+    def get_worker(self, worker_id):
+        return self.workers[worker_id]
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.online = set()
+
+    def is_online(self, worker_id, now=None):
+        return worker_id in self.online
+
+
+def _fleet():
+    store = Store()
+    registry = Registry()
+    store.workers["w-a"] = Worker("w-a")
+    registry.online.add("w-a")
+    fleet = FleetScheduler(store, registry, now_fn=lambda: 1000.0)
+    fleet.configure_worker("w-a", max_slots=1, failure_domain="zone-a")
+    return store, fleet
+
+
+def test_P2B_CAPACITY_RESERVATION_is_atomic_under_concurrent_pullers():
+    store, fleet = _fleet()
+    tasks = [Task("task-a"), Task("task-b")]
+    store.tasks = tasks
+    barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+    outcomes = []
+
+    def reserve(task):
+        barrier.wait()
+        try:
+            fleet.reserve_for_worker("w-a", task, now=1000.0)
+            outcomes.append("reserved")
+        except FleetConflict:
+            outcomes.append("conflict")
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=reserve, args=(task,)) for task in tasks]
+    for thread in threads:
+        thread.start()
+    for thread in threads:
+        thread.join()
+
+    assert sorted(outcomes) == ["conflict", "reserved"]
+    assert fleet.state.reserved_slots("w-a", 1000.0) == 1
+
+
+def test_P2B_RANK_is_read_only_until_legacy_security_accepts_candidate():
+    store, fleet = _fleet()
+    store.tasks = [Task("task-a"), Task("task-b")]
+    ranked = fleet.rank_for_worker("w-a", now=1000.0)
+    assert [task.task_id for task in ranked] == ["task-a", "task-b"]
+    assert fleet.state.reserved_slots("w-a", 1000.0) == 0

tests/test_agent_event_bus.py

@@ -20,3 +20,12 @@ def test_unified_event_flow():
 
     dashboard = AgentEventDashboard(bus).overview()
     assert dashboard["audit"]["enabled"] is True
+
+
+def test_target_changes_event_identity(tmp_path):
+    bus = AgentEventBus(tmp_path)
+    first = bus.publish('test', 'same', 'user-a', 'same summary', {'value': 1})
+    second = bus.publish('test', 'same', 'user-b', 'same summary', {'value': 1})
+    first_id = first.get('id') if isinstance(first, dict) else getattr(first, 'id', first)
+    second_id = second.get('id') if isinstance(second, dict) else getattr(second, 'id', second)
+    assert first_id != second_id

tests/test_agent_runtime_capability_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_capability_contract import (  # noqa: E402
+    has_capabilities,
+    normalize_required_capabilities,
+    normalize_worker_capabilities,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("runtime", ["hermes", "openclaw"])
+def test_runtime_capability_is_known_to_task_and_worker_vocabulary(runtime: str) -> None:
+    capability = f"agent.runtime.{runtime}"
+    assert normalize_required_capabilities([capability]) == frozenset({capability})
+    assert normalize_worker_capabilities([capability]) == frozenset({capability})
+    assert has_capabilities([capability], [capability]) is True
+
+
+def test_runtime_capabilities_are_isolated_between_workers() -> None:
+    assert has_capabilities(["agent.runtime.hermes"], ["agent.runtime.openclaw"]) is False
+    assert has_capabilities(["agent.runtime.openclaw"], ["agent.runtime.hermes"]) is False
+
+
+def test_unknown_runtime_capability_remains_fail_closed() -> None:
+    assert has_capabilities(["agent.runtime.hermes"], ["agent.runtime.unknown"]) is False

tests/test_agent_task_execution_rebind.py

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_agent_task_execution_rebind import (
+    ExecutionRebindError,
+    ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ExecutionRebindStore,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+AUTHORIZATION="owner-execution-rebind-20260818"
+TASK_ID="task-rebind-a"
+JOB_ID="job-rebind-a"
+BASE="a"*40
+BRANCH="agent/task-rebind-a"
+IDEMPOTENCY="task-rebind-a-binding-v1"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _auth(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv(
+        "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID",
+        AUTHORIZATION,
+    )
+
+
+def canon(value):
+    return hashlib.sha256(
+        json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(",",":")).encode()
+    ).hexdigest()
+
+
+def binding():
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+        "task_id":TASK_ID,
+        "job_id":JOB_ID,
+        "repository":"aios/aios",
+        "base_oid":BASE,
+        "expected_branch_oid":BASE,
+        "target_branch":BRANCH,
+        "branch_mode":"CREATE_NEW",
+        "generation":1,
+        "idempotency_key":IDEMPOTENCY,
+    })
+
+
+def old_envelope():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action":"source_capture",
+            "adapter":"compact_interface_map",
+            "capability_scope":[
+                "git.read","git.test","governed.write.branch","governed.write.file"
+            ],
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def new_envelope():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action":"deterministic",
+            "adapter":"deterministic",
+            "capability_scope":[
+                "git.read","git.test","governed.write.branch","governed.write.file"
+            ],
+            "change_set":[
+                {
+                    "path":"active-runtime/app/example.py",
+                    "operation":"write_file",
+                    "content":"VALUE=1\\n",
+                }
+            ],
+            "verification":[
+                {
+                    "label":"unit",
+                    "argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-m","pytest","-q"],
+                    "cwd":".",
+                    "timeout_seconds":120,
+                }
+            ],
+            "governance":{
+                "commit_idempotency_key":"task-rebind-a-commit-v1",
+            },
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def make_db(tmp_path, *, status="QUEUED", revision=5, attempt=2, lease=False):
+    path=tmp_path/"state.sqlite3"
+    con=sqlite3.connect(path)
+    con.executescript("""
+    CREATE TABLE tasks(
+      task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+      status TEXT NOT NULL,
+      attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      claimed_by TEXT,
+      lease_token_hash TEXT,
+      lease_expires_at TEXT,
+      verification_json TEXT,
+      result_json TEXT,
+      metadata_json TEXT,
+      required_capabilities_json TEXT
+    );
+    CREATE TABLE task_events(
+      event_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+      task_id TEXT,
+      event_type TEXT,
+      agent_id TEXT,
+      payload_json TEXT,
+      created_at TEXT
+    );
+    """)
+    verification={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"WRONG_ENVELOPE_BEFORE_PLAN"}
+    old=old_envelope()
+    metadata={
+        "execution":old,
+        "execution_projection":{
+            "schema":"aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1",
+            "task_id":TASK_ID,
+            "job_id":JOB_ID,
+            "execution_digest":old["execution_digest"],
+        },
+        "preserved":{"value":"unchanged"},
+    }
+    con.execute(
+        "INSERT INTO tasks VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+        (
+            TASK_ID,status,attempt,3,revision,
+            "previous-worker" if not lease else "active-worker",
+            "lease-hash" if lease else None,
+            "2099-01-01T00:00:00Z" if lease else None,
+            json.dumps(verification),
+            json.dumps({"status":"SUCCEEDED"}),
+            json.dumps(metadata),
+            json.dumps([
+                "git.read","git.test","governed.write.branch","governed.write.file"
+            ]),
+        ),
+    )
+    con.commit();con.close()
+    return path,verification
+
+
+def request(verification, *, revision=5, old=None, new=None, key="rebind-task-a-v1"):
+    old=old or old_envelope()
+    new=new or new_envelope()
+    return ExecutionRebindRequest.from_mapping({
+        "expected_status":"QUEUED",
+        "expected_revision":revision,
+        "expected_attempt":2,
+        "previous_verification_sha256":canon(verification),
+        "expected_old_execution_digest":old["execution_digest"],
+        "expected_new_execution_digest":new["execution_digest"],
+        "authorization_id":AUTHORIZATION,
+        "idempotency_key":key,
+        "reason":"projection-before-plan race recovery",
+    })
+
+
+def resolver(_task_id,_caps):
+    return new_envelope()
+
+
+def test_rebind_cas_updates_only_execution_projection_and_audits(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    result=ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(
+        TASK_ID,request(verification)
+    )
+    assert result["status"]=="QUEUED"
+    assert result["revision"]==6
+    assert result["idempotent"] is False
+
+    con=sqlite3.connect(path)
+    row=con.execute(
+        "SELECT status,attempt,revision,claimed_by,metadata_json FROM tasks"
+    ).fetchone()
+    assert row[:4]==("QUEUED",2,6,None)
+    metadata=json.loads(row[4])
+    assert metadata["preserved"]=={"value":"unchanged"}
+    assert metadata["execution"]["action"]=="deterministic"
+    assert metadata["execution"]["execution_digest"]==new_envelope()["execution_digest"]
+    assert metadata["execution_projection"]["execution_digest"]==new_envelope()["execution_digest"]
+
+    event=con.execute(
+        "SELECT event_type,payload_json FROM task_events"
+    ).fetchone()
+    assert event[0]=="TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+    payload=json.loads(event[1])
+    assert payload["old_action"]=="source_capture"
+    assert payload["new_action"]=="deterministic"
+    assert payload["stale_claim_normalized"] is True
+    assert con.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_execution_rebinds").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_rebind_idempotent_replay(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    store=ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver)
+    req=request(verification)
+    first=store.rebind(TASK_ID,req)
+    second=store.rebind(TASK_ID,req)
+    assert first["idempotent"] is False
+    assert second["idempotent"] is True
+    assert second["new_execution_digest"]==first["new_execution_digest"]
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_active_lease(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path,lease=True)
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_verification_drift(tmp_path):
+    path,_=make_db(tmp_path)
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_VERIFICATION_DRIFT"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(
+            TASK_ID,request({"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"other"})
+        )
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_nonqueued_task(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path,status="VERIFYING")
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_non_deterministic_canonical_resolution(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    def wrong(_task,_caps):
+        return old_envelope()
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN_REQUIRED"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,wrong).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_binding_drift(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    different=project_execution_envelope(
+        GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+            "task_id":TASK_ID,
+            "job_id":"job-other",
+            "repository":"aios/aios",
+            "base_oid":BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid":BASE,
+            "target_branch":BRANCH,
+            "branch_mode":"CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation":1,
+            "idempotency_key":IDEMPOTENCY,
+        }),
+        {
+            "action":"deterministic",
+            "capability_scope":["git.read"],
+            "change_set":[{"path":"x.py","operation":"write_file","content":"x=1\\n"}],
+        },
+    )
+    def wrong(_task,_caps):
+        return different
+    with pytest.raises(Exception):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,wrong).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_request_is_narrow_and_digest_bound():
+    verification={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK"}
+    data=request(verification).public()
+    data["arbitrary_metadata"]={"x":1}
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_FIELDS_INVALID"):
+        ExecutionRebindRequest.from_mapping(data)
+
+
+def test_execution_rebind_unit_is_unprivileged_and_owner_credential_bound():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-execution-rebind.service").read_text()
+    assert "User=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "Group=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:" in unit
+    assert "Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892" in unit
+    assert "RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET" in unit
+    assert "User=root" not in unit

tests/test_agent_task_retry_extension.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import hashlib, json, sqlite3, sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+from aios_agent_task_retry_extension import RetryExtensionRequest, RetryExtensionStore, RetryExtensionError
+
+AUTHORIZATION_ID="owner-scheme-a-20260817"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _authorization_id(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID", AUTHORIZATION_ID)
+
+
+def canon(v):
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(v,sort_keys=True,separators=(",",":")).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def db(tmp_path):
+    p=tmp_path/"state.sqlite3"
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    c.executescript("""
+    CREATE TABLE tasks(
+      task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,status TEXT,attempt INTEGER,max_attempts INTEGER,revision INTEGER,
+      claimed_by TEXT,lease_token_hash TEXT,lease_expires_at TEXT,verification_json TEXT,result_json TEXT
+    );
+    CREATE TABLE task_events(
+      event_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,task_id TEXT,event_type TEXT,agent_id TEXT,
+      payload_json TEXT,created_at TEXT
+    );
+    """)
+    verification={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"BASE_OID_BINDING_INVALID"}
+    c.execute("INSERT INTO tasks VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+              ("task-a","FAILED",10,10,41,None,None,None,json.dumps(verification),json.dumps({"status":"FAILED"})))
+    c.commit(); c.close()
+    return p,verification
+
+
+def request(v):
+    return RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping({
+      "expected_status":"FAILED","expected_revision":41,"expected_attempt":10,"expected_max_attempts":10,
+      "next_max_attempts":11,"previous_verification_sha256":canon(v),
+      "authorization_id":AUTHORIZATION_ID,"idempotency_key":"retry-task-a-attempt11",
+    })
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_cas_and_audit(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    out=RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+    assert out["status"]=="QUEUED" and out["max_attempts"]==11 and out["revision"]==42
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute("select status,attempt,max_attempts,revision from tasks").fetchone()==("QUEUED",10,11,42)
+    event=c.execute("select event_type,payload_json from task_events").fetchone()
+    assert event[0]=="TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+    assert json.loads(event[1])["authorization_id"]=="owner-scheme-a-20260817"
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_idempotent_replay(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path); store=RetryExtensionStore(p); req=request(v)
+    first=store.extend("task-a",req); second=store.extend("task-a",req)
+    assert first["idempotent"] is False and second["idempotent"] is True
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute("select count(*) from task_retry_extensions").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_normalizes_stale_terminal_claim_without_active_lease(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    c.execute("update tasks set claimed_by='previous-worker'")
+    c.commit(); c.close()
+    out=RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+    assert out["status"]=="QUEUED"
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute(
+        "select claimed_by,lease_token_hash,lease_expires_at from tasks"
+    ).fetchone()==(None,None,None)
+    payload=json.loads(c.execute("select payload_json from task_events").fetchone()[0])
+    assert payload["previous_claimed_by"]=="previous-worker"
+    assert payload["stale_terminal_claim_normalized"] is True
+    assert c.execute("select count(*) from task_events").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_verification_drift_denied(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    bad=request({"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"other"})
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_VERIFICATION_DRIFT"):
+        RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",bad)
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_authorization_id_mismatch_rejected(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID", "other-owner-id")
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH"):
+        RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_bounded_one_step():
+    v={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK"}
+    data={
+      "expected_status":"FAILED","expected_revision":41,"expected_attempt":10,"expected_max_attempts":10,
+      "next_max_attempts":12,"previous_verification_sha256":canon(v),
+      "authorization_id":"owner-scheme-a-20260817","idempotency_key":"retry-task-a-attempt11",
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_MUST_BE_BOUNDED_ONE_STEP"):
+        RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping(data)
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_unit_is_unprivileged_and_requires_owner_binding():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-retry-extension.service").read_text()
+    assert "User=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "Group=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:" in unit
+    assert "EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-retry-extension.env" in unit
+    assert "User=root" not in unit

tests/test_external_agent_online_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+APP=ROOT/"active-runtime/app"
+sys.path.insert(0,str(APP))
+
+from aios_external_agent_runtime import (
+    ExternalAgentRuntimeError,
+    RuntimeProfile,
+    execute_request,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    ExecutionProjectionError,
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_online_task,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+
+
+BASE="a"*40
+
+
+def binding(task_id="task-hermes-runtime"):
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+        "task_id":task_id,
+        "job_id":"job-"+task_id,
+        "repository":"aios/aios",
+        "base_oid":BASE,
+        "expected_branch_oid":BASE,
+        "target_branch":"agent/"+task_id,
+        "branch_mode":"CREATE_NEW",
+        "generation":1,
+        "idempotency_key":task_id+"-binding-v1",
+    })
+
+
+def task_request(task_id, runtime):
+    return {
+        "task_id":task_id,
+        "goal":"Summarize the requested operation.",
+        "instructions":"Return a concise result.",
+        "success_criteria":[{"id":"done","description":"A result is returned."}],
+        "constraints":{"network":"runtime-managed"},
+        "required_capabilities":[f"agent.runtime.{runtime}"],
+        "max_attempts":3,
+    }
+
+
+def projected(task_id="task-hermes-runtime", runtime="hermes"):
+    return project_online_task(
+        binding(task_id),
+        task_request(task_id,runtime),
+        {
+            "action":"agent_runtime",
+            "adapter":runtime,
+            "capability_scope":[f"agent.runtime.{runtime}"],
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def clear_secret_env(monkeypatch):
+    for key in list(os.environ):
+        upper=key.upper()
+        if any(marker in upper for marker in (
+            "TOKEN","SECRET","PASSWORD","CREDENTIAL","AUTHORIZATION","PRIVATE_KEY"
+        )):
+            monkeypatch.delenv(key,raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY","/definitely-not-present-aios-test")
+
+
+def make_helper(tmp_path):
+    helper=tmp_path/"runtime_helper.py"
+    helper.write_text(
+        "import json,sys\n"
+        "value=json.load(sys.stdin)\n"
+        "print(json.dumps({'answer':'ok','goal':value['goal']},sort_keys=True))\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    return helper
+
+
+def make_profile(tmp_path,runtime,helper):
+    root=tmp_path/"profiles";root.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+    (root/f"{runtime}.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps({
+            "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+            "runtime":runtime,
+            "argv":["/usr/bin/python3",str(helper)],
+            "input_mode":"stdin_json",
+            "output_mode":"stdout_json",
+            "timeout_seconds":30,
+            "max_output_bytes":65536,
+        }),
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    return root
+
+
+def make_text_request(tmp_path, runtime, payload=None):
+    request={
+        "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.request.v1",
+        "request_id":f"external-{runtime}-0123456789abcdef",
+        "runtime":runtime,
+        "task_id":f"task-{runtime}-runtime",
+        "execution_digest":"d"*64,
+        "payload":payload or {
+            "goal":"Return ok.",
+            "instructions":"No side effects.",
+            "success_criteria":[],
+            "constraints":{},
+        },
+    }
+    request_path=tmp_path/"request.json"
+    result_path=tmp_path/"result.json"
+    request_path.write_text(json.dumps(request),encoding="utf-8")
+    return request_path, result_path
+
+
+def test_agent_runtime_projection_is_read_only_and_task_bound():
+    value=projected()
+    execution=value["metadata"]["execution"]
+    assert execution["action"]=="agent_runtime"
+    assert execution["adapter"]=="hermes"
+    assert execution["runtime_input"]["goal"]==value["goal"]
+    assert execution["runtime_input"]["instructions"]==value["instructions"]
+    assert execution["governance"]["writer_lease"] is False
+    assert execution["change_set"]==[]
+    assert execution["verification"]==[]
+    validate_execution_envelope(
+        execution,
+        binding=binding(),
+        worker_capabilities=["agent.runtime.hermes"],
+    )
+
+
+def test_agent_runtime_projection_requires_runtime_capability():
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionProjectionError,match="AGENT_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_REQUIRED"):
+        project_online_task(
+            binding(),
+            task_request("task-hermes-runtime","hermes"),
+            {
+                "action":"agent_runtime",
+                "adapter":"hermes",
+                "capability_scope":["git.read"],
+            },
+        )
+
+
+def test_agent_runtime_projection_rejects_mutation():
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionProjectionError,match="AGENT_RUNTIME_MUTATION_DENY"):
+        project_online_task(
+            binding(),
+            task_request("task-hermes-runtime","hermes"),
+            {
+                "action":"agent_runtime",
+                "adapter":"hermes",
+                "capability_scope":["agent.runtime.hermes"],
+                "change_set":[{"path":"x.py","operation":"write_file","content":"x=1\n"}],
+            },
+        )
+
+
+def test_agent_runtime_projection_rejects_secret_constraint_keys():
+    request=task_request("task-hermes-runtime","hermes")
+    request["constraints"]={"api_token":"do-not-project"}
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionProjectionError,match="AGENT_RUNTIME_SECRET_FIELD_DENY"):
+        project_online_task(
+            binding(),
+            request,
+            {
+                "action":"agent_runtime",
+                "adapter":"hermes",
+                "capability_scope":["agent.runtime.hermes"],
+            },
+        )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("runtime",["hermes","openclaw"])
+def test_external_executor_runs_root_owned_profile_without_shell(tmp_path,monkeypatch,runtime):
+    clear_secret_env(monkeypatch)
+    helper=make_helper(tmp_path)
+    profile_root=make_profile(tmp_path,runtime,helper)
+    request={
+        "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.request.v1",
+        "request_id":f"external-{runtime}-0123456789abcdef",
+        "runtime":runtime,
+        "task_id":f"task-{runtime}-runtime",
+        "execution_digest":"d"*64,
+        "payload":{
+            "goal":"Return ok.",
+            "instructions":"No side effects.",
+            "success_criteria":[],
+            "constraints":{},
+        },
+    }
+    request_path=tmp_path/"request.json"
+    result_path=tmp_path/"result.json"
+    request_path.write_text(json.dumps(request),encoding="utf-8")
+    execute_request(request_path,result_path,profile_root=profile_root)
+    result=json.loads(result_path.read_text())
+    assert result["runtime"]==runtime
+    assert result["exit_code"]==0
+    assert result["output_json"]["answer"]=="ok"
+    assert result["credential_material_exposed"] is False
+    assert result["control_plane_access_granted"] is False
+
+
+def test_runtime_profile_rejects_shell_mode(tmp_path):
+    root=tmp_path/"profiles";root.mkdir()
+    (root/"hermes.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+        "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+        "runtime":"hermes",
+        "argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-c","print('x')"],
+        "input_mode":"stdin_text",
+        "output_mode":"stdout_text",
+    }))
+    with pytest.raises(ExternalAgentRuntimeError,match="EXTERNAL_AGENT_SHELL_MODE_DENY"):
+        RuntimeProfile.load("hermes",root)
+
+
+def test_external_executor_projects_only_selected_provider_credential(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    clear_secret_env(monkeypatch)
+    helper=tmp_path/"credential_helper.py"
+    helper.write_text(
+        "import os\n"
+        "value=os.environ.get('OPENAI_API_KEY','')\n"
+        "print('AIOS_PROVIDER_PROJECTED_OK' if value == 'test-provider-key' else 'AIOS_PROVIDER_PROJECTED_FAIL')\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    profile_root=tmp_path/"profiles";profile_root.mkdir()
+    (profile_root/"hermes.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+        "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+        "runtime":"hermes",
+        "argv":["/usr/bin/python3",str(helper)],
+        "input_mode":"stdin_text",
+        "output_mode":"stdout_text",
+        "environment":{"RUNTIME_PROFILE_MARKER":"staging"},
+        "credential_env":{
+            "OPENAI_API_KEY":{
+                "credential":"provider.env",
+                "format":"dotenv",
+                "key":"ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN",
+            }
+        },
+    }),encoding="utf-8")
+    credential_dir=tmp_path/"credentials";credential_dir.mkdir()
+    (credential_dir/"provider.env").write_text(
+        "ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN=test-provider-key\nOTHER_PROVIDER_TOKEN=not-projected\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY",str(credential_dir))
+    request_path,result_path=make_text_request(tmp_path,"hermes")
+    execute_request(request_path,result_path,profile_root=profile_root)
+    result=json.loads(result_path.read_text())
+    assert "AIOS_PROVIDER_PROJECTED_OK" in result["output_text"]
+    assert "test-provider-key" not in result["output_text"]
+    assert result["credential_material_exposed"] is False
+
+
+def test_runtime_profile_rejects_credential_path_traversal(tmp_path):
+    root=tmp_path/"profiles";root.mkdir()
+    (root/"hermes.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+        "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+        "runtime":"hermes",
+        "argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-V"],
+        "input_mode":"stdin_text",
+        "output_mode":"stdout_text",
+        "credential_env":{
+            "OPENAI_API_KEY":{
+                "credential":"../provider.env",
+                "format":"dotenv",
+                "key":"ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN",
+            }
+        },
+    }),encoding="utf-8")
+    with pytest.raises(ExternalAgentRuntimeError,match="EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_NAME_INVALID"):
+        RuntimeProfile.load("hermes",root)
+
+
+def test_runtime_profile_prompt_placeholder_is_root_owned(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    clear_secret_env(monkeypatch)
+    helper=tmp_path/"prompt_helper.py"
+    helper.write_text(
+        "import sys\n"
+        "print('AIOS_PROMPT_PLACEHOLDER_OK' if 'Goal:' in sys.argv[1] else 'AIOS_PROMPT_PLACEHOLDER_FAIL')\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    profile_root=tmp_path/"profiles";profile_root.mkdir()
+    (profile_root/"hermes.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+        "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+        "runtime":"hermes",
+        "argv":["/usr/bin/python3",str(helper),"{prompt}"],
+        "input_mode":"stdin_text",
+        "output_mode":"stdout_text",
+    }),encoding="utf-8")
+    request_path,result_path=make_text_request(tmp_path,"hermes")
+    execute_request(request_path,result_path,profile_root=profile_root)
+    result=json.loads(result_path.read_text())
+    assert "AIOS_PROMPT_PLACEHOLDER_OK" in result["output_text"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("runtime,capability",[
+    ("hermes","agent.runtime.hermes"),
+    ("openclaw","agent.runtime.openclaw"),
+])
+def test_worker_external_adapter_builds_readonly_result(monkeypatch,tmp_path,runtime,capability):
+    mapped=projected(f"task-{runtime}-runtime",runtime)
+    envelope=worker.ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(
+        mapped,
+        worker_capabilities=(capability,),
+    )
+    class FakeExchange:
+        def __init__(self,*args,**kwargs): pass
+        def execute(self,**kwargs):
+            return {
+                "schema":"aios.external-agent-runtime.result.v1",
+                "request_id":kwargs["request_id"],
+                "request_sha256":"e"*64,
+                "runtime":runtime,
+                "task_id":kwargs["task_id"],
+                "execution_digest":kwargs["execution_digest"],
+                "exit_code":0,
+                "duration_ms":10,
+                "output_text":"done",
+                "output_sha256":"f"*64,
+                "stderr_sha256":"0"*64,
+                "credential_material_exposed":False,
+                "control_plane_access_granted":False,
+                "result_sha256":"1"*64,
+            }
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"ExternalAgentExchange",FakeExchange)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"audit",lambda *a,**k:None)
+    executor=worker.HermesExecutor() if runtime=="hermes" else worker.OpenClawExecutor()
+    execution=executor.execute(envelope,tmp_path)
+    result=worker.build_agent_runtime_result(envelope.task_id,envelope,execution)
+    assert result["status"]=="SUCCEEDED"
+    assert result["classification"]=="EXTERNAL_AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCEEDED"
+    assert result["execution_mode"]=="agent_runtime"
+    assert result["agent_runtime"]==runtime
+    assert result["writer_lease"]=="NONE"
+    assert result["changed_files"]==[]
+    assert result["control_plane_access_granted_to_runtime"] is False
+
+
+def test_worker_adapter_filter_defaults_exclude_external_runtimes():
+    assert "hermes" not in worker.WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS
+    assert "openclaw" not in worker.WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS
+
+
+def test_external_executor_systemd_has_no_control_credentials_or_repository_access():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-external-agent-executor.service").read_text()
+    assert "User=aios-engineering-executor" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential=aios-external-agent-oneapi-env:/data/agent/secrets/oneapi-model-ready.env" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredentialEncrypted" not in unit
+    assert "InaccessiblePaths=/run/credentials" not in unit
+    assert "InaccessiblePaths=/etc/aios-gitops" in unit
+    assert "InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops" in unit
+    assert "InaccessiblePaths=/data/agent/secrets" in unit
+    assert "IPAddressDeny=127.0.0.0/8" in unit
+    assert "IPAddressDeny=::1/128" in unit
+    assert "IPAddressAllow=172.18.0.2/32" in unit
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "unit_name,capability,adapter,state_root",
+    [
+        (
+            "aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service",
+            "agent.runtime.hermes",
+            "hermes",
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes",
+        ),
+        (
+            "aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service",
+            "agent.runtime.openclaw",
+            "openclaw",
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw",
+        ),
+    ],
+)
+def test_dedicated_worker_units_are_capability_and_adapter_scoped(
+    unit_name,capability,adapter,state_root
+):
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd"/unit_name).read_text()
+    assert f"Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES={capability}" in unit
+    assert f"Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS={adapter}" in unit
+    assert f"Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT={state_root}" in unit
+    assert "AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:" in unit
+
+
+def test_example_profiles_are_non_authoritative_examples_only():
+    for runtime in ("hermes","openclaw"):
+        value=json.loads(
+            (ROOT/"config/external-agent-runtime.d"/f"{runtime}.example.json").read_text()
+        )
+        assert value["schema"]=="aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1"
+        assert value["runtime"]==runtime
+        assert value["input_mode"]=="stdin_text"
+        assert value["output_mode"]=="stdout_text"
+
+
+def test_staging_profiles_are_provider_only_and_root_profile_bound():
+    hermes=json.loads((ROOT/"config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes.profile.json").read_text())
+    openclaw=json.loads((ROOT/"config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw.profile.json").read_text())
+    for runtime,value in (("hermes",hermes),("openclaw",openclaw)):
+        assert value["runtime"]==runtime
+        assert set(value["credential_env"])=={"OPENAI_API_KEY"}
+        assert value["credential_env"]["OPENAI_API_KEY"]["credential"]=="aios-external-agent-oneapi-env"
+        assert "OPENAI_API_KEY" not in value.get("environment",{})

tests/test_isolated_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import hashlib,json,os,tarfile,sys,tempfile
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+import aios_isolated_executor as mod
+
+def make_archive(tmp_path):
+    root=tmp_path/"src"; root.mkdir()
+    (root/"hello.py").write_text("VALUE = 1\n")
+    archive=tmp_path/"source.tgz"
+    with tarfile.open(archive,"w:gz") as tf: tf.add(root/"hello.py",arcname="hello.py")
+    return archive
+
+def test_isolated_executor_applies_hash_bound_change(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    archive=make_archive(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY",raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(mod,"assert_uncredentialed",lambda:None)
+    request={
+      "schema":"aios.isolated-execution.request.v1",
+      "request_id":"task-req-0000000000000000",
+      "source_archive":str(archive),
+      "source_archive_sha256":mod.sha256(archive.read_bytes()),
+      "change_set":[{
+        "path":"hello.py","operation":"replace_text","old":"VALUE = 1","new":"VALUE = 2","count":1,
+        "expected_sha256":mod.sha256(b"VALUE = 1\n")
+      }],
+      "verification":[{"label":"compile","argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-m","py_compile","hello.py"],"cwd":".","timeout_seconds":30}]
+    }
+    req=tmp_path/"req.json"; res=tmp_path/"res.json"
+    req.write_text(json.dumps(request))
+    mod.execute_request(req,res)
+    out=json.loads(res.read_text())
+    assert out["request_id"]=="task-req-0000000000000000"
+    assert out["credential_isolation"]["credential_env_absent"] is True
+    changed=out["changed_files"][0]
+    assert changed["path"]=="hello.py" and changed["deleted"] is False
+
+def test_isolated_executor_source_drift_denied(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    archive=make_archive(tmp_path); monkeypatch.setattr(mod,"assert_uncredentialed",lambda:None)
+    request={
+      "schema":"aios.isolated-execution.request.v1","request_id":"task-req-0000000000000001",
+      "source_archive":str(archive),
+      "source_archive_sha256":mod.sha256(archive.read_bytes()),
+      "change_set":[{"path":"hello.py","operation":"write_file","content":"x\n","expected_sha256":"0"*64}],
+      "verification":[]
+    }
+    req=tmp_path/"req.json"; res=tmp_path/"res.json"; req.write_text(json.dumps(request))
+    with pytest.raises(mod.IsolatedExecutorError,match="SOURCE_DRIFT"):
+        mod.execute_request(req,res)
+
+def test_credential_boundary_eacces_is_accepted(monkeypatch):
+    class DeniedDirectory:
+        def exists(self): return True
+        def is_symlink(self): return False
+        def is_dir(self): return True
+        def iterdir(self): raise PermissionError(13,"permission denied")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(mod.os,"access",lambda *_args,**_kwargs:False)
+    assert mod._credential_exposure(DeniedDirectory()) is None
+
+def test_systemd_unit_has_no_credentials_and_private_network():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-isolated-executor.service").read_text()
+    assert "PrivateNetwork=true" in unit
+    assert "InaccessiblePaths=/run/credentials" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential" not in unit
+    assert "SupplementaryGroups=gitops" not in unit

tests/test_message_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime as dt
+import pathlib
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+APP = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "active-runtime" / "app"
+if str(APP) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(APP))
+
+from message_handoff import (
+    ConfidentialityScopeDenied,
+    DeliveryContext,
+    DurableHandoffStore,
+    HandoffFabric,
+    IdempotencyConflict,
+    MessageEnvelope,
+    MessageExpired,
+    MessageScopeMismatch,
+    SequenceGap,
+    authorize_delivery,
+    bind_envelope_scope,
+    stable_event_id,
+)
+
+
+def actor(**overrides):
+    values = dict(
+        tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a", project_id="project-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a", run_id="run-a",
+        capabilities=("task.read", "message.read"),
+    )
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return DeliveryContext(**values)
+
+
+def envelope(**overrides):
+    values = dict(
+        source="agent-a", target="agent-b", message_type="handoff.request", payload={"value": 1},
+        tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a", project_id="project-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a", task_id="task-a", run_id="run-a",
+        sequence=1, idempotency_key="idem-1", capability_scope=("message.read",),
+        confidentiality_scope="private",
+    )
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return MessageEnvelope(**values)
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_TARGET_COLLISION_DENY():
+    a = stable_event_id(source="a", target="user-a", message_type="event", payload={"x": 1},
+                        tenant_id="tenant-a", sequence=1, idempotency_key="same")
+    b = stable_event_id(source="a", target="user-b", message_type="event", payload={"x": 1},
+                        tenant_id="tenant-a", sequence=1, idempotency_key="same")
+    assert a != b
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY():
+    with pytest.raises(MessageScopeMismatch, match="MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        bind_envelope_scope(envelope(tenant_id="tenant-b"), actor())
+
+
+def test_HANDOFF_CROSS_TENANT_DENY(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    env = envelope()
+    store.put(env)
+    with pytest.raises(MessageScopeMismatch, match="MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        store.get(env.envelope_id, actor=actor(tenant_id="tenant-b"))
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE():
+    with pytest.raises(ConfidentialityScopeDenied, match="MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"):
+        authorize_delivery(actor(project_id="project-b"), envelope(confidentiality_scope="project"))
+    with pytest.raises(ConfidentialityScopeDenied, match="MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"):
+        authorize_delivery(actor(), envelope(capability_scope=("message.read", "secret.read")))
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_REPLAY(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    env = envelope()
+    assert store.put(env)[0] == "CREATED"
+    status, replay = store.put(env)
+    assert status == "REPLAY"
+    assert replay.envelope_id == env.envelope_id
+    with pytest.raises(IdempotencyConflict, match="MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"):
+        store.put(envelope(payload={"value": 2}))
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    store.put(envelope(sequence=1, idempotency_key="one"))
+    with pytest.raises(SequenceGap, match="MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT"):
+        store.put(envelope(sequence=3, idempotency_key="three"))
+
+
+def test_sequence_advances_and_scope_filters_pending(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    store.put(envelope(sequence=1, idempotency_key="one"))
+    store.put(envelope(sequence=2, idempotency_key="two", payload={"value": 2}))
+    assert [item.sequence for item in store.pending(target="agent-b", actor=actor())] == [1, 2]
+    assert store.pending(target="agent-b", actor=actor(tenant_id="tenant-b")) == []
+
+
+def test_expired_message_rejected(tmp_path):
+    expired = (dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) - dt.timedelta(seconds=1)).isoformat()
+    with pytest.raises(MessageExpired, match="MESSAGE_EXPIRED"):
+        DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3").put(envelope(expires_at=expired))
+
+
+def test_server_actor_binding_fills_scope_and_recomputes_identity():
+    public = MessageEnvelope(
+        source="agent-a", target="agent-b", message_type="handoff.request", payload={"value": 1},
+        sequence=1, idempotency_key="bind-1", confidentiality_scope="public",
+    )
+    bound = bind_envelope_scope(public, actor())
+    assert (bound.tenant_id, bound.user_id, bound.project_id, bound.run_id) == (
+        "tenant-a", "user-a", "project-a", "run-a"
+    )
+    assert bound.envelope_id != public.envelope_id
+
+
+def test_handoff_fabric_publish_is_durable(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    status, env = HandoffFabric(store).publish(envelope(), actor=actor())
+    assert status == "CREATED"
+    assert store.get(env.envelope_id, actor=actor()).payload == {"value": 1}

tests/test_online_agent_agent_runtime_replay.py

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (  # noqa: E402
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker  # noqa: F401,E402
+from aios_online_agent_worker import WorkerSupervisor  # noqa: E402
+
+
+BASE = "a" * 40
+
+
+def test_agent_runtime_replays_the_durable_envelope_to_bridge(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        worker,
+        "WORKER_CAPABILITIES",
+        tuple(sorted((*worker.WORKER_CAPABILITIES, "agent.runtime.hermes"))),
+    )
+    binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+        {
+            "task_id": "r42-agent-runtime-replay-test-20260818",
+            "job_id": "job-agent-runtime-replay-test",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "base_oid": BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+            "target_branch": "agent/agent-runtime-replay-test",
+            "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation": 1,
+            "idempotency_key": "agent-runtime-replay-test-v1",
+        }
+    )
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {
+            "action": "agent_runtime",
+            "adapter": "hermes",
+            "capability_scope": ["agent.runtime.hermes"],
+            "change_set": [],
+            "runtime_input": {
+                "goal": "replay the exact durable runtime envelope",
+                "instructions": "return the bounded sentinel",
+                "success_criteria": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "sentinel",
+                        "description": "return the bounded sentinel",
+                    }
+                ],
+                "constraints": {
+                    "provider_boundary": "provider-credential-only",
+                    "change_set": [],
+                    "writer_lease": False,
+                },
+            },
+        },
+    )
+    task = {
+        **binding.public(),
+        "required_capabilities": ["agent.runtime.hermes"],
+        "metadata": {"execution": execution},
+    }
+
+    class Bridge:
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.calls: list[object] = []
+
+        def project_execution(self, _task: object, projection_input: object = None):
+            self.calls.append(projection_input)
+            return 200, dict(projection_input or {})
+
+    supervisor = object.__new__(WorkerSupervisor)
+    supervisor.bridge = Bridge()
+    resolved, source = supervisor.resolve_envelope(task)
+
+    assert source == "persisted_verified"
+    assert resolved.action == "agent_runtime"
+    assert resolved.adapter == "hermes"
+    assert resolved.digest == execution["execution_digest"]
+    assert supervisor.bridge.calls == [execution]

tests/test_online_agent_checkpoint_phases.py

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from aios_online_agent_checkpoint import CheckpointBinding, CheckpointStore
+
+
+def _binding() -> CheckpointBinding:
+    return CheckpointBinding(
+        task_id="checkpoint-agent-runtime-test-20260818",
+        attempt=1,
+        execution_digest="a" * 64,
+        job_id="job-checkpoint-agent-runtime-test-20260818",
+        repository="aios/aios",
+        base_oid="b" * 40,
+        expected_branch_oid="b" * 40,
+        target_branch="agent/checkpoint-agent-runtime-test-20260818",
+        generation=1,
+    )
+
+
+def test_agent_runtime_checkpoint_phase_is_durable_before_result(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = CheckpointStore(tmp_path / "checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    binding = _binding()
+    phases = [
+        "claimed",
+        "workspace_prepared",
+        "verification_passed",
+        "agent_runtime_done",
+        "result_pending",
+        "result_submitted",
+    ]
+
+    rows = [
+        store.append(binding, phase, {"phase": phase, "task_id": binding.task_id})
+        for phase in phases
+    ]
+
+    assert [row["phase"] for row in rows] == phases
+    assert [int(row["phase_order"]) for row in rows] == [10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60]
+    latest = store.latest_for_attempt(binding.task_id, binding.attempt)
+    assert latest is not None
+    assert latest["phase"] == "result_submitted"
+    assert latest["payload"] == {"phase": "result_submitted", "task_id": binding.task_id}
+
+
+def test_agent_runtime_checkpoint_append_is_idempotent(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = CheckpointStore(tmp_path / "checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    binding = _binding()
+    payload = {"phase": "agent_runtime_done", "result": {"status": "SUCCEEDED"}}
+
+    first = store.append(binding, "agent_runtime_done", payload)
+    replay = store.append(binding, "agent_runtime_done", payload)
+
+    assert replay["sequence"] == first["sequence"]
+    assert replay["payload_sha256"] == first["payload_sha256"]

tests/test_online_agent_compact_interface_map.py

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import json
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+APP = ROOT / "active-runtime/app"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(APP))
+
+from aios_online_agent_compact_map import (
+    MAX_RESULT_BYTES,
+    build_compact_interface_map,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    ExecutionProjectionError,
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+from aios_online_agent_worker import (
+    CompactInterfaceMapExecutor,
+    ExecutionEnvelope,
+    build_compact_interface_map_result,
+)
+
+
+BASE = "68b95fea0d9af3b52269e79b7cf878254f191b61"
+
+
+def make_repo(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
+    root = tmp_path / "repo"
+    (root / "active-runtime/app").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "tests").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "db/migrations").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "deploy/systemd").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "active-runtime/app/fleet.py").write_text(
+        """
+class WorkerRegistry:
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id, capabilities):
+        return {"worker_id": worker_id, "capabilities": capabilities}
+
+class TaskScheduler:
+    def claim_next(self, tenant_id, capacity):
+        return None
+
+def recover_assignment(task_id, worker_id):
+    return task_id, worker_id
+
+TOKEN = "fixturetok"
+""".strip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "active-runtime/app/checkpoint.py").write_text(
+        """
+class CheckpointStore:
+    def resume(self, task_id, attempt):
+        return None
+""".strip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "tests/test_fleet.py").write_text(
+        """
+def test_scheduler_fairness():
+    assert True
+
+def test_worker_reassignment():
+    assert True
+""".strip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "db/migrations/20260817_fleet.sql").write_text(
+        "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS worker_slots (worker_id TEXT, capacity INTEGER);\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "deploy/systemd/aios-fleet-worker.service").write_text(
+        "[Service]\nExecStart=/usr/bin/true\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    return root
+
+
+def binding() -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+        {
+            "task_id": "r42-p2-agent-fleet-interface-map-20260817",
+            "job_id": "job-2c451360f78ef595e41663e3b444a8fb",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "base_oid": BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+            "target_branch": "agent/r42-p2-agent-fleet-interface-map-20260817",
+            "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation": 1,
+            "idempotency_key": "r42-p2-agent-fleet-interface-map-68b95fe-v1",
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def envelope_mapping():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action": "source_capture",
+            "adapter": "compact_interface_map",
+            "capability_scope": ["git.read", "git.test"],
+            "source_signals": [
+                "worker registry scheduler capacity fairness fault isolation",
+                "checkpoint resume retry scope trace message",
+            ],
+        },
+        required_capabilities=["git.read", "git.test"],
+    )
+
+
+def task_for(envelope):
+    return {
+        "task_id": envelope["task_id"],
+        "metadata": {"execution": envelope},
+        "required_capabilities": ["git.read", "git.test"],
+    }
+
+
+def test_compact_map_bounds_and_surfaces(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(
+        root,
+        ["worker scheduler capacity fairness checkpoint recovery"],
+        source_commit=BASE,
+    )
+    encoded = json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+    assert result["schema"] == "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1"
+    assert len(encoded) <= MAX_RESULT_BYTES
+    assert len(result["implementation_map"]["modules"]) <= 40
+    assert len(result["bounded_excerpts"]) <= 25
+    assert len(result["implementation_map"]["tests"]) <= 40
+    assert any(item["symbol"] == "WorkerRegistry" for item in result["implementation_map"]["classes"])
+    assert any(item["table"] == "worker_slots" for item in result["implementation_map"]["tables"])
+    assert any(item["unit"] == "aios-fleet-worker.service" for item in result["implementation_map"]["systemd_units"])
+
+
+def test_compact_map_redacts_sensitive_source_patterns(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(root, ["token fleet"], source_commit=BASE)
+    excerpts = json.dumps(result["bounded_excerpts"], ensure_ascii=False)
+    assert "fixturetok" not in excerpts
+
+
+def test_compact_execution_projection_is_read_only():
+    envelope = envelope_mapping()
+    assert envelope["action"] == "source_capture"
+    assert envelope["adapter"] == "compact_interface_map"
+    assert envelope["governance"]["writer_lease"] is False
+    assert envelope["change_set"] == []
+    assert envelope["verification"] == []
+    validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding(), worker_capabilities=["git.read", "git.test"])
+
+
+def test_compact_execution_rejects_mutation():
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionProjectionError, match="SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY"):
+        project_execution_envelope(
+            binding(),
+            {
+                "action": "source_capture",
+                "adapter": "compact_interface_map",
+                "change_set": [{"path": "x.py", "operation": "write_file", "content": "x=1\n"}],
+            },
+        )
+
+
+def test_worker_accepts_compact_adapter_and_builds_result(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker, "audit", lambda *args, **kwargs: None)
+    mapped = envelope_mapping()
+    envelope = ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(
+        task_for(mapped),
+        worker_capabilities=("git.read", "git.test"),
+    )
+    execution = CompactInterfaceMapExecutor().execute(envelope, root)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map_result(envelope.task_id, envelope, execution)
+    assert result["status"] == "SUCCEEDED"
+    assert result["classification"] == "P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED"
+    assert result["execution_mode"] == "compact_interface_map"
+    assert result["writer_lease"] == "NONE"
+    assert "source_snapshot" not in result
+    assert result["result_bytes"] <= 120 * 1024
+    assert result["source_commit"] == BASE
+
+
+def test_compact_contract_keys_are_complete(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(root, ["fleet worker scheduler retry"], source_commit=BASE)
+    assert set(result["contracts"]) == {
+        "FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION",
+        "FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING",
+        "FLEET_FAIRNESS",
+        "FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION",
+        "FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT",
+        "FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION",
+        "FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH",
+        "FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY",
+    }
+
+
+def test_compact_result_has_no_source_archive(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(root, ["fleet"], source_commit=BASE)
+    serialized = json.dumps(result)
+    assert "payload_b64" not in serialized
+    assert "tar.gz+base64" not in serialized
+
+
+def test_create_new_retries_discard_known_policy_reconciliation_marker(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    task_id = "r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime-20260817"
+    job_id = "job-74d0982f616a7f2653ef346144139044"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker, "STATE_ROOT", tmp_path / "worker-state")
+    state_path = worker.task_state_path(task_id)
+    state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    state_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "execution_digest": "old-digest",
+                "phase": "reconciliation_required",
+                "attempt": 16,
+                "job_id": job_id,
+                "details": {
+                    "api_status": 503,
+                    "error": "SECRET_LIKE_PAYLOAD_REJECTED",
+                },
+            }
+        ),
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    assert worker.load_task_state(
+        task_id,
+        "new-digest",
+        attempt=18,
+        continuation_head_oid=None,
+        continuation_job_id=job_id,
+        commit_idempotency_key="r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime-commit-v1",
+    ) is None

tests/test_online_agent_compact_interface_map_profiles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+import json
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+APP = ROOT / "active-runtime/app"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(APP))
+
+from aios_online_agent_compact_map import build_compact_interface_map
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+from aios_online_agent_worker import build_compact_interface_map_result
+
+
+def _repo(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
+    root = tmp_path / "repo"
+    (root / "active-runtime/app").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "tests").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "active-runtime/app/model_router.py").write_text(
+        """
+class ProviderRegistry:
+    def register_provider(self, provider_id, model_version):
+        return provider_id, model_version
+
+class ModelRouter:
+    def select_model(self, tenant_id, budget_tokens, fallback_provider):
+        return fallback_provider
+
+def record_model_cost(trace_id, token_count, cost_usd):
+    return trace_id, token_count, cost_usd
+
+def evaluate_model_version(model_id, version, approval_gate):
+    return approval_gate
+""".strip() + "\\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "tests/test_model_router.py").write_text(
+        """
+def test_model_budget_and_fallback():
+    assert True
+""".strip() + "\\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    return root
+
+
+def _envelope(base_oid: str):
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        base_oid=base_oid,
+        job_id="job-model-governance",
+        repository="aios/aios",
+        expected_branch_oid=base_oid,
+        target_branch="agent/model-governance-map",
+        generation=1,
+        digest="e" * 64,
+    )
+
+
+def test_model_governance_profile_contracts_and_classification(tmp_path):
+    root = _repo(tmp_path)
+    value = build_compact_interface_map(
+        root,
+        [
+            "model provider registry routing budget token cost fallback",
+            "evaluation approval version pinning tenant project credential trace",
+        ],
+        source_commit="a" * 40,
+    )
+    assert value["profile"] == "model_governance"
+    assert value["classification"] == "MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED"
+    assert set(value["contracts"]) == {
+        "MODEL_PROVIDER_REGISTRY",
+        "MODEL_SELECTION_POLICY",
+        "MODEL_VERSION_PINNING",
+        "MODEL_BUDGET_ACCOUNTING",
+        "MODEL_FALLBACK_POLICY",
+        "MODEL_SCOPE_ISOLATION",
+        "MODEL_CREDENTIAL_BOUNDARY",
+        "MODEL_TRACE_AUDIT",
+        "MODEL_EVALUATION_GATE",
+        "MODEL_ROUTING_RESILIENCE",
+    }
+    assert "FLEET_FAIRNESS" not in value["contracts"]
+
+
+def test_fleet_profile_is_backward_compatible(tmp_path):
+    root = _repo(tmp_path)
+    value = build_compact_interface_map(
+        root,
+        ["agent fleet scheduler worker capacity fairness"],
+        source_commit="b" * 40,
+    )
+    assert value["profile"] == "fleet"
+    assert value["classification"] == "P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED"
+    assert "FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION" in value["contracts"]
+
+
+def test_worker_binds_model_profile_to_model_classification():
+    interface_map = {
+        "schema": "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1",
+        "profile": "model_governance",
+        "classification": "MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+        "source_commit": "c" * 40,
+        "implementation_map": {"modules": [], "classes": [], "functions": [], "tests": []},
+        "bounded_excerpts": [],
+        "contracts": {"MODEL_PROVIDER_REGISTRY": {"status": "GAP", "surfaces": []}},
+        "result_bytes": 512,
+    }
+    result = build_compact_interface_map_result(
+        "r42-model-governance-interface-map-20260818",
+        _envelope("c" * 40),
+        {"interface_map": interface_map},
+    )
+    assert result["classification"] == "MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED"
+    assert result["interface_map_profile"] == "model_governance"
+    assert result["writer_lease"] == "NONE"
+
+
+def test_worker_rejects_profile_classification_mismatch():
+    interface_map = {
+        "schema": "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1",
+        "profile": "model_governance",
+        "classification": "P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+        "source_commit": "c" * 40,
+        "implementation_map": {"modules": [], "classes": [], "functions": [], "tests": []},
+        "bounded_excerpts": [],
+        "contracts": {},
+        "result_bytes": 512,
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(worker.WorkerError, match="COMPACT_INTERFACE_MAP_PROFILE_BINDING_INVALID"):
+        build_compact_interface_map_result(
+            "r42-model-governance-interface-map-20260818",
+            _envelope("c" * 40),
+            {"interface_map": interface_map},
+        )

tests/test_online_agent_durable_checkpoint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import json
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+APP=ROOT/"active-runtime/app"
+sys.path.insert(0,str(APP))
+
+from aios_online_agent_checkpoint import (
+    CheckpointBinding,
+    CheckpointError,
+    CheckpointStore,
+)
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+
+
+def binding(attempt: int = 1, *, tenant_head: str = "b"*40):
+    return CheckpointBinding(
+        task_id="task-p1-a",
+        attempt=attempt,
+        execution_digest="d"*64,
+        job_id="job-p1-a",
+        repository="aios/aios",
+        base_oid="a"*40,
+        expected_branch_oid=tenant_head,
+        target_branch="agent/task-p1-a",
+        generation=1,
+    )
+
+
+def test_CHECKPOINT_DURABLE_WRITE(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    first=store.append(binding(), "claimed", {"phase":"claimed","attempt":1})
+    second=store.append(binding(), "workspace_prepared", {"phase":"workspace_prepared","attempt":1})
+    assert first["sequence"] == 1
+    assert second["sequence"] == 2
+    latest=store.latest("task-p1-a")
+    assert latest["phase"]=="workspace_prepared"
+    assert latest["payload"]["attempt"]==1
+
+
+def test_CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_ISOLATION(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    store.append(binding(), "claimed", {"phase":"claimed"})
+    changed=CheckpointBinding(
+        task_id="task-p1-a",attempt=1,execution_digest="d"*64,job_id="job-p1-a",
+        repository="aios/other",base_oid="a"*40,expected_branch_oid="b"*40,
+        target_branch="agent/task-p1-a",generation=1,
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(CheckpointError,match="CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        store.append(changed,"workspace_prepared",{"phase":"workspace_prepared"})
+
+
+def test_RESUME_FROM_CHECKPOINT_across_attempt_same_binding(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    store.append(binding(1), "source_capture_done", {
+        "phase":"source_capture_done",
+        "attempt":1,
+        "result":{"status":"SUCCEEDED","classification":"NEEDS_REWORK_SOURCE_CAPTURE"},
+    })
+    resumed=store.verify_latest_binding(binding(2))
+    assert resumed is not None
+    assert resumed["attempt"]==1
+    assert resumed["phase"]=="source_capture_done"
+
+
+def test_checkpoint_new_attempt_can_start_from_claimed(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    store.append(binding(1),"result_submitted",{"phase":"result_submitted"})
+    cp=store.append(binding(2),"claimed",{"phase":"claimed"})
+    assert cp["attempt"]==2
+    assert cp["sequence"]==1
+
+
+def envelope():
+    return worker.ExecutionEnvelope(
+        task_id="task-p1-a",
+        job_id="job-p1-a",
+        repository="aios/aios",
+        base_oid="a"*40,
+        expected_branch_oid="b"*40,
+        target_branch="agent/task-p1-a",
+        branch_mode="CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+        generation=1,
+        idempotency_key="governed-p1-a",
+        action="source_capture",
+        adapter="source_capture",
+        capability_scope=("git.read","git.test"),
+        source_signals=(),
+        change_set=(),
+        verification=(),
+        governance={"task_id":"task-p1-a","job_id":"job-p1-a"},
+        workspace={},
+        digest="d"*64,
+    )
+
+
+def test_RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE_attempt_aware_key():
+    env=envelope()
+    result={"status":"SUCCEEDED","execution_digest":env.digest}
+    one=worker.result_idempotency_key(env.task_id,1,env,result)
+    two=worker.result_idempotency_key(env.task_id,2,env,result)
+    assert one != two
+    assert "-a1-result-" in one
+    assert "-a2-result-" in two
+    assert one == worker.result_idempotency_key(env.task_id,1,env,result)
+
+
+class RetryClient:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls=[]
+    def result(self,task_id,lease_token,key,result):
+        self.calls.append((task_id,key,dict(result)))
+        return (599,{"error":"SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE"}) if len(self.calls)==1 else (201,{"status":"VERIFYING"})
+    def get(self,task_id):
+        return 500,{}
+
+
+def test_RETRY_IDEMPOTENT_NO_DUPLICATE_SIDE_EFFECT_reuses_same_key(monkeypatch):
+    client=RetryClient()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker.time,"sleep",lambda _:None)
+    status,response=worker.submit_result_replay_safe(
+        client,"task-p1-a","lease-token-"+"x"*32,"stable-key",{"status":"SUCCEEDED"}
+    )
+    assert status==201
+    assert [item[1] for item in client.calls]==["stable-key","stable-key"]
+
+
+class ConflictClient:
+    def __init__(self,result):
+        self.result_value=result
+    def result(self,*args):
+        return 409,{"error":"IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"}
+    def get(self,task_id):
+        return 200,{"status":"VERIFYING","result":dict(self.result_value)}
+
+
+def test_RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE_reconciles_exact_result():
+    result={"status":"SUCCEEDED","value":1}
+    status,response=worker.submit_result_replay_safe(
+        ConflictClient(result),"task-p1-a","lease-token-"+"x"*32,"stable-key",result
+    )
+    assert status==200
+    assert response["idempotent"] is True
+    assert response["reconciled"] is True
+
+
+def test_RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE_rejects_conflicting_result():
+    status,response=worker.submit_result_replay_safe(
+        ConflictClient({"status":"SUCCEEDED","value":2}),
+        "task-p1-a","lease-token-"+"x"*32,"stable-key",
+        {"status":"SUCCEEDED","value":1},
+    )
+    assert status==409
+    assert response["error"]=="IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"
+
+
+def test_WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_RECOVERY(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    root=tmp_path/"workspaces"; root.mkdir()
+    stale=root/"task-old"; stale.mkdir(); (stale/"x").write_text("x")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"WORKSPACE_ROOT",root)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"STATE_ROOT",tmp_path/"state")
+    removed=worker.recover_stale_workspaces()
+    assert removed==1
+    assert not stale.exists()
+
+
+class LeaseBridge:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls=0
+    def call(self,route,body):
+        assert route=="/v2/writer-lease"
+        self.calls+=1
+        if self.calls==1:
+            return 599,{"error":"SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE"}
+        return 200,{
+            "lease_id":"lease-p1-a",
+            "job_id":"job-p1-a",
+            "task_id":"task-p1-a",
+            "repository":"aios/aios",
+            "base_oid":"a"*40,
+            "expected_branch_oid":"b"*40,
+            "branch_mode":"CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+            "generation":1,
+            "target_branch":"agent/task-p1-a",
+            "state":"ACTIVE",
+        }
+
+
+class LeaseHeartbeatStub:
+    def ensure(self):
+        return None
+
+
+def test_LEASE_RENEWAL_RECOVERY_retries_same_binding(monkeypatch):
+    env=envelope()
+    env=worker.ExecutionEnvelope(
+        task_id=env.task_id,job_id=env.job_id,repository=env.repository,
+        base_oid=env.base_oid,expected_branch_oid=env.expected_branch_oid,
+        target_branch=env.target_branch,branch_mode=env.branch_mode,generation=env.generation,
+        idempotency_key=env.idempotency_key,action=env.action,adapter=env.adapter,
+        capability_scope=env.capability_scope,source_signals=env.source_signals,
+        change_set=env.change_set,verification=env.verification,
+        governance={"task_id":env.task_id,"job_id":env.job_id,"lease_seconds":900},
+        workspace=env.workspace,digest=env.digest,
+    )
+    bridge=LeaseBridge()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker.time,"sleep",lambda _:None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"STATE_ROOT",Path("/tmp")/"aios-p1-test-state")
+    response=worker.acquire_writer_lease_replay_safe(env,bridge,LeaseHeartbeatStub())
+    assert response["lease_id"]=="lease-p1-a"
+    assert bridge.calls==2

tests/test_online_agent_placeholder_plan_deferral.py

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _state_paths(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    root=tmp_path/"worker-state"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"STATE_ROOT",root)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"WORKER_LIVENESS_PATH",root/"worker-liveness.json")
+
+BASE="a"*40
+TASK_ID="task-worker-availability-placeholder"
+JOB_ID="job-worker-availability-placeholder"
+BRANCH="agent/task-worker-availability-placeholder"
+IDEMPOTENCY="task-worker-availability-placeholder-binding-v1"
+
+
+def binding():
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+        "task_id":TASK_ID,
+        "job_id":JOB_ID,
+        "repository":"aios/aios",
+        "base_oid":BASE,
+        "expected_branch_oid":BASE,
+        "target_branch":BRANCH,
+        "branch_mode":"CREATE_NEW",
+        "generation":1,
+        "idempotency_key":IDEMPOTENCY,
+    })
+
+
+def placeholder():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action":"source_capture",
+            "adapter":"source_capture",
+            "capability_scope":[
+                "git.read",
+                "git.test",
+                "governed.write.branch",
+                "governed.write.file",
+            ],
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def readonly_source_capture():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action":"source_capture",
+            "adapter":"source_capture",
+            "capability_scope":["git.read","git.test"],
+            "source_signals":["worker availability"],
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def deterministic():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action":"deterministic",
+            "adapter":"deterministic",
+            "capability_scope":[
+                "git.read",
+                "git.test",
+                "governed.write.branch",
+                "governed.write.file",
+            ],
+            "change_set":[{
+                "path":"active-runtime/app/example.py",
+                "operation":"write_file",
+                "content":"VALUE=1\\n",
+            }],
+            "verification":[{
+                "label":"unit",
+                "argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-m","pytest","-q"],
+                "cwd":".",
+                "timeout_seconds":120,
+            }],
+            "governance":{
+                "commit_idempotency_key":"task-worker-availability-placeholder-commit-v1",
+                "allowed_files":["active-runtime/app/example.py"],
+            },
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def task(execution):
+    return {
+        "task_id":TASK_ID,
+        "required_capabilities":list(execution["capability_scope"]),
+        "metadata":{
+            "execution":execution,
+            "execution_projection":{
+                "schema":"aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1",
+                "task_id":TASK_ID,
+                "job_id":JOB_ID,
+                "execution_digest":execution["execution_digest"],
+            },
+        },
+    }
+
+
+class FakeBridge:
+    def __init__(self,status,execution):
+        self.status=status
+        self.execution=execution
+        self.calls=[]
+
+    def project_execution(self,task_value,execution=None):
+        self.calls.append(execution)
+        return self.status,self.execution
+
+
+class FakeAgent:
+    def __init__(self,tasks):
+        self.tasks=tasks
+        self.claim_calls=[]
+
+    def poll(self):
+        return list(self.tasks)
+
+    def claim(self,task_id):
+        self.claim_calls.append(task_id)
+        return 500,{"error":"SHOULD_NOT_CLAIM"}
+
+
+def supervisor(bridge, agent=None):
+    value=object.__new__(worker.WorkerSupervisor)
+    value.bridge=bridge
+    value.agent=agent
+    return value
+
+
+def test_write_capable_source_capture_is_classified_as_placeholder():
+    envelope=worker.ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(
+        task(placeholder()),
+        worker_capabilities=tuple(placeholder()["capability_scope"]),
+    )
+    assert worker.source_capture_requires_deterministic_plan(envelope) is True
+
+
+def test_readonly_source_capture_is_not_placeholder():
+    envelope=worker.ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(
+        task(readonly_source_capture()),
+        worker_capabilities=tuple(readonly_source_capture()["capability_scope"]),
+    )
+    assert worker.source_capture_requires_deterministic_plan(envelope) is False
+
+
+def test_placeholder_without_registered_plan_is_skipped_before_claim():
+    persisted=placeholder()
+    bridge=FakeBridge(200,persisted)
+    agent=FakeAgent([task(persisted)])
+    sup=supervisor(bridge,agent)
+    assert sup.once()==0
+    assert bridge.calls==[None]
+    assert agent.claim_calls==[]
+
+
+def test_placeholder_with_missing_projection_is_skipped_before_claim():
+    persisted=placeholder()
+    bridge=FakeBridge(404,{"error":"TASK_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_MISSING"})
+    agent=FakeAgent([task(persisted)])
+    sup=supervisor(bridge,agent)
+    assert sup.once()==0
+    assert bridge.calls==[None]
+    assert agent.claim_calls==[]
+
+
+def test_registered_deterministic_plan_replaces_placeholder():
+    persisted=placeholder()
+    resolved=deterministic()
+    bridge=FakeBridge(200,resolved)
+    sup=supervisor(bridge)
+    envelope,source=sup.resolve_envelope(task(persisted))
+    assert source=="plan_registry_verified"
+    assert envelope.action=="deterministic"
+    assert envelope.digest==resolved["execution_digest"]
+    assert bridge.calls==[None]
+
+
+def test_real_readonly_source_capture_replays_exact_payload():
+    persisted=readonly_source_capture()
+    bridge=FakeBridge(200,persisted)
+    sup=supervisor(bridge)
+    envelope,source=sup.resolve_envelope(task(persisted))
+    assert source=="persisted_verified"
+    assert envelope.action=="source_capture"
+    assert envelope.digest==persisted["execution_digest"]
+    assert bridge.calls==[persisted]

tests/test_online_agent_plan_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import GovernedExecutionBinding
+from aios_online_agent_plan_store import ExecutionPlanStore, ExecutionPlanError
+
+BASE="a642b045775b9154a00ae78543037fbef4fb447b"
+HEAD="71523aef6e48b1e2fa516c456ca189b7a039104b"
+
+def binding(head=HEAD):
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+      "task_id":"task-plan-a","job_id":"job-plan-a","repository":"aios/aios","base_oid":BASE,
+      "expected_branch_oid":head,"target_branch":"agent/task-plan-a","branch_mode":"CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+      "generation":1,"idempotency_key":"governed-plan-a",
+    })
+
+def request():
+    return {
+      "schema":"aios.online-agent.plan.v1","task_id":"task-plan-a","job_id":"job-plan-a",
+      "source_head_oid":HEAD,"generation":1,"idempotency_key":"plan-task-a-v1",
+      "execution":{
+        "action":"deterministic",
+        "change_set":[{"path":"x.py","operation":"write_file","content":"x=1\n"}],
+        "verification":[{"label":"compile","argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-m","py_compile","x.py"],"cwd":".","timeout_seconds":30}],
+        "capability_scope":["git.read","git.test"],
+      }
+    }
+
+def test_plan_register_and_resolve(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path)
+    created=store.register(binding(),request())
+    assert created["idempotent"] is False
+    resolved=store.resolve(binding())
+    assert resolved["plan_digest"]==created["plan_digest"]
+    assert resolved["execution"]["action"]=="deterministic"
+
+def test_plan_is_idempotent(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path); req=request()
+    first=store.register(binding(),req); second=store.register(binding(),req)
+    assert second["idempotent"] is True
+    assert first["plan_digest"]==second["plan_digest"]
+
+def test_plan_source_head_drift_denied(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path); store.register(binding(),request())
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionPlanError,match="SOURCE_HEAD_DRIFT"):
+        store.resolve(binding("b"*40))
+
+def test_plan_replacement_requires_cas(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path); first=store.register(binding(),request())
+    changed=request(); changed["idempotency_key"]="plan-task-a-v2"
+    changed["execution"]["change_set"][0]["content"]="x=2\n"
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionPlanError,match="REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH"):
+        store.register(binding(),changed)
+    changed["expected_previous_plan_digest"]=first["plan_digest"]
+    second=store.register(binding(),changed)
+    assert second["plan_digest"]!=first["plan_digest"]

tests/test_online_agent_source_capture_replay.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+from aios_online_agent_worker import WorkerSupervisor
+
+
+BASE = "a" * 40
+
+
+def _binding() -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+        {
+            "task_id": "r42-source-capture-replay-test-20260818",
+            "job_id": "job-source-capture-replay-test",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "base_oid": BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+            "target_branch": "agent/source-capture-replay-test",
+            "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation": 1,
+            "idempotency_key": "source-capture-replay-test-v1",
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def test_source_capture_replays_the_durable_envelope_to_bridge():
+    binding = _binding()
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {
+            "action": "source_capture",
+            "adapter": "compact_interface_map",
+            "capability_scope": ["git.read", "git.test"],
+            "source_signals": ["model provider registry version pinning"],
+        },
+    )
+    task = {
+        **binding.public(),
+        "required_capabilities": ["git.read", "git.test"],
+        "metadata": {"execution": execution},
+    }
+
+    class Bridge:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.calls = []
+
+        def project_execution(self, _task, projection_input=None):
+            self.calls.append(projection_input)
+            return 200, dict(projection_input or {})
+
+    supervisor = object.__new__(WorkerSupervisor)
+    supervisor.bridge = Bridge()
+    resolved, source = supervisor.resolve_envelope(task)
+
+    assert source == "persisted_verified"
+    assert resolved.digest == execution["execution_digest"]
+    assert supervisor.bridge.calls == [execution]
+
+
+def test_deterministic_tasks_still_use_plan_registry_without_payload_replay():
+    binding = _binding()
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {
+            "action": "deterministic",
+            "adapter": "deterministic",
+            "capability_scope": [
+                "git.read",
+                "git.test",
+                "governed.write.branch",
+                "governed.write.file",
+            ],
+            "change_set": [
+                {
+                    "path": "active-runtime/app/example.py",
+                    "operation": "write_file",
+                    "content": "x",
+                }
+            ],
+        },
+    )
+    task = {
+        **binding.public(),
+        "required_capabilities": [
+            "git.read",
+            "git.test",
+            "governed.write.branch",
+            "governed.write.file",
+        ],
+        "metadata": {"execution": execution},
+    }
+
+    class Bridge:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.calls = []
+
+        def project_execution(self, _task, projection_input=None):
+            self.calls.append(projection_input)
+            return 200, dict(execution)
+
+    supervisor = object.__new__(WorkerSupervisor)
+    supervisor.bridge = Bridge()
+    resolved, source = supervisor.resolve_envelope(task)
+
+    assert source == "persisted_verified"
+    assert resolved.digest == execution["execution_digest"]
+    assert supervisor.bridge.calls == [None]

tests/test_trace_tool_credential_governance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from active_runtime.app.aios_credential_broker import CredentialBroker
+from active_runtime.app.agent_observability_hooks import AgentObservabilityHooks
+from active_runtime.app.message_handoff import DurableHandoffStore, MessageEnvelope
+from active_runtime.app.search_gateway import (
+    SearchEvidence,
+    SearchGateway,
+    SearchProviderAttempt,
+    SearchRequest,
+)
+from active_runtime.app.search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from active_runtime.app.trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    CredentialGrant,
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    ToolDescriptor,
+    TraceContext,
+    bind_trace_lineage,
+)
+
+
+TENANT_SCOPE = GovernanceScope(
+    "tenant",
+    tenant_id="tenant-a",
+    user_id="user-a",
+    project_id="project-a",
+    conversation_id="conversation-a",
+    run_id="run-a",
+)
+
+
+def actor(*capabilities: str, tenant_id: str = "tenant-a") -> GovernanceActor:
+    return GovernanceActor(
+        "actor-a",
+        GovernanceScope(
+            "tenant",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            user_id="user-a",
+            project_id="project-a",
+            conversation_id="conversation-a",
+            run_id="run-a",
+        ),
+        tuple(capabilities),
+    )
+
+
+def owner() -> GovernanceActor:
+    return GovernanceActor("owner-control", GovernanceScope("system"), ("system.admin",))
+
+
+def message(**changes):
+    values = dict(
+        source="task-plane",
+        target="worker-a",
+        message_type="tool.invoke",
+        payload={"query": "safe"},
+        sequence=1,
+        idempotency_key="message-a-1",
+        tenant_id="tenant-a",
+        user_id="user-a",
+        project_id="project-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a",
+        task_id="task-a",
+        run_id="run-a",
+        confidentiality_scope="run",
+    )
+    values.update(changes)
+    return MessageEnvelope(**values)
+
+
+def task(**changes):
+    value = {
+        "task_id": "task-a",
+        "claim_id": "claim-a",
+        "correlation_id": "correlation-a",
+        "scope_type": "tenant",
+        "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+        "user_id": "user-a",
+        "project_id": "project-a",
+        "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+        "run_id": "run-a",
+    }
+    value.update(changes)
+    return value
+
+
+def root_trace():
+    return bind_trace_lineage(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"),
+        task=task(),
+        message=message(),
+        trace_id="trace-a",
+        span_id="span-root",
+    )
+
+
+def test_trace_lineage_continuity_and_durable_restart(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    root = root_trace()
+    child = root.child(span_id="span-tool", actor=actor("tool.search"))
+    store.record_trace(root, actor("tool.search"))
+    store.record_trace(child, actor("tool.search"))
+
+    reopened = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    assert reopened.verify_audit_chain(("TRACE_RECORDED",))
+    assert child.trace_id == root.trace_id
+    assert child.parent_span_id == root.span_id
+    assert child.task_id == "task-a"
+    assert child.claim_id == "claim-a"
+
+
+def test_trace_lineage_continuity_rejects_task_change() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY"):
+        bind_trace_lineage(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"),
+            task=task(task_id="task-b"),
+            message=message(),
+            trace_id="trace-a",
+            span_id="span-root",
+        )
+
+
+def test_trace_scope_mismatch_deny() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        bind_trace_lineage(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"),
+            task=task(),
+            message=message(tenant_id="tenant-b"),
+            trace_id="trace-a",
+            span_id="span-root",
+        )
+
+
+def test_message_correlation_is_identity_bound() -> None:
+    first = message(correlation_id="correlation-a")
+    second = message(correlation_id="correlation-b")
+    assert first.envelope_id != second.envelope_id
+    assert first.as_record()["correlation_id"] == "correlation-a"
+
+
+def test_message_handoff_legacy_schema_migrates_without_changing_id(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    import sqlite3
+
+    path = tmp_path / "legacy.sqlite3"
+    legacy = message()
+    record = legacy.as_record()
+    record.pop("correlation_id")
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.executescript(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE message_handoff (
+              envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, stream_key TEXT NOT NULL, source TEXT NOT NULL,
+              target TEXT NOT NULL, message_type TEXT NOT NULL, payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+              payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL, tenant_id TEXT, user_id TEXT, project_id TEXT,
+              conversation_id TEXT, task_id TEXT, run_id TEXT, causation_id TEXT,
+              sequence INTEGER NOT NULL, capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+              confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL, idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              expires_at TEXT, created_at TEXT NOT NULL, status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+              delivered_at TEXT, acked_at TEXT,
+              UNIQUE(stream_key,idempotency_key), UNIQUE(stream_key,sequence)
+            );
+            """
+        )
+        columns = tuple(record)
+        connection.execute(
+            f"INSERT INTO message_handoff ({','.join(columns)}) VALUES ({','.join('?' for _ in columns)})",
+            tuple(record[name] for name in columns),
+        )
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(path)
+    loaded = store.get(
+        legacy.envelope_id,
+        actor={
+            "tenant_id": "tenant-a", "user_id": "user-a", "project_id": "project-a",
+            "conversation_id": "conversation-a", "run_id": "run-a",
+            "capabilities": [],
+        },
+    )
+    assert loaded.envelope_id == legacy.envelope_id
+    assert loaded.correlation_id is None
+
+
+def test_message_handoff_rejects_raw_credential_material(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY"):
+        message(payload={"value": "Bearer " + "x" * 24})
+    DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    import sqlite3
+    with sqlite3.connect(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3") as connection:
+        assert connection.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_handoff").fetchone()[0] == 0
+
+
+def test_tool_mcp_authz_deny_and_scope_propagation(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor("mcp.search", "mcp", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",)),
+        owner(),
+    )
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY"):
+        store.authorize_tool(
+            actor=actor(), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+            requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+            invocation_key="invoke-deny-capability",
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION"):
+        store.authorize_tool(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+            requested_scope=GovernanceScope("tenant", tenant_id="tenant-b"),
+            input_digest="a" * 64, invocation_key="invoke-deny-scope",
+        )
+
+    invocation = store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-search-a",
+    )
+    assert invocation["trace_id"] == "trace-a"
+    assert invocation["evidence"]["action"] == "TOOL_AUTHORIZED"
+
+
+def test_tool_requires_recorded_trace_and_receipt_is_idempotent(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor(
+            "mcp.search", "mcp", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",),
+            credential_ref="systemd-credential:search-provider-a",
+        ),
+        owner(),
+    )
+    trace = root_trace()
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY:trace"):
+        store.authorize_tool(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+            requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+            invocation_key="invoke-unrecorded",
+        )
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+    authorized = store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-replay-a",
+    )
+    assert authorized["credential_required"] is True
+    assert "credential_ref" not in authorized
+    receipt = store.record_tool_receipt(
+        invocation_key="invoke-replay-a", result_digest="b" * 64,
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), trace=trace,
+    )
+    assert receipt["status"] == "VERIFIED"
+    replay = store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-replay-a",
+    )
+    assert replay["idempotent"] is True
+    assert replay["receipt_sha256"] == "b" * 64
+    assert store.verify_audit_chain(
+        ("TRACE_RECORDED", "TOOL_AUTHORIZED", "TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED")
+    )
+
+
+def test_system_and_global_resources_do_not_use_fake_tenants(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="GOVERNANCE_NON_TENANT_SCOPE_INVALID"):
+        GovernanceScope("system", tenant_id="fake-tenant")
+
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    descriptor = ToolDescriptor("system.health", "tool", GovernanceScope("global"), ("system.admin",))
+    registered = store.register_tool(descriptor, owner())
+    assert registered["descriptor"]["scope_type"] == "global"
+    assert registered["descriptor"]["tenant_id"] is None
+
+
+def test_credential_scope_and_secret_exposure_deny(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    grant = CredentialGrant(
+        "grant-search-a",
+        "systemd-credential:search-provider-a",
+        TENANT_SCOPE,
+        ("search.invoke",),
+        task_id="task-a",
+        tool_name="mcp.search",
+        expires_at=(datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=5)).isoformat(),
+    )
+    stored = store.store_grant(grant, owner())
+    assert "secret" not in stored["grant"]
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY"):
+        store.authorize_credential(
+            grant_id=grant.grant_id,
+            actor=actor("tool.search", tenant_id="tenant-b"),
+            trace=trace,
+            operation="search.invoke",
+            task_id="task-a",
+            tool_name="mcp.search",
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY"):
+        CredentialGrant("grant-raw", "Bearer raw-secret", TENANT_SCOPE, ("search.invoke",))
+
+    authorized = store.authorize_credential(
+        grant_id=grant.grant_id,
+        actor=actor("tool.search"),
+        trace=trace,
+        operation="search.invoke",
+        task_id="task-a",
+        tool_name="mcp.search",
+    )
+    assert authorized["credential_ref"] == "systemd-credential:search-provider-a"
+    assert "credential_ref" not in authorized["evidence"]["details"]
+
+
+def test_audit_evidence_completeness_and_tamper_detection(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    path = tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3"
+    store = GovernanceStore(path)
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor("mcp.search", "mcp", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",)), owner()
+    )
+    store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-audit-a",
+    )
+    assert store.verify_audit_chain(("TRACE_RECORDED", "TOOL_REGISTERED", "TOOL_AUTHORIZED"))
+    assert not store.verify_audit_chain(("CREDENTIAL_AUTHORIZED",))
+
+    import sqlite3
+
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "UPDATE governance_audit_evidence SET outcome='DENY' WHERE sequence=1"
+        )
+    assert not GovernanceStore(path).verify_audit_chain()
+
+
+def test_observability_record_carries_governed_trace(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    from active_runtime.app.agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+
+    hooks = AgentObservabilityHooks(AgentObservabilityStore(tmp_path / "observability"))
+    trace = root_trace()
+    started = hooks.start(
+        "user-a", "project-a", "openclaw",
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), trace=trace,
+    )
+    record = hooks.finish(started["execution_id"])["record"]
+    assert record["trace_id"] == "trace-a"
+    assert record["tenant_id"] == "tenant-a"
+    assert record["task_id"] == "task-a"
+    assert record["message_id"] == message().envelope_id
+
+
+def test_active_runtime_credential_broker_scope_and_raw_secret_deny() -> None:
+    class Provider:
+        def environment(self, lease):
+            return {"ACCESS_TOKEN": "raw-secret"}
+
+    broker = CredentialBroker(Provider())
+    lease = broker.issue(
+        task_id="task-a", repository="aios/aios", target_branch="agent/task-a",
+        generation=1, scopes=("tool.invoke",), scope_type="tenant",
+        tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a", project_id="project-a", run_id="run-a",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY"):
+        broker.authorize(
+            lease["lease_id"], task_id="task-a", operation="tool.invoke",
+            scope_type="tenant", tenant_id="tenant-b", user_id="user-a",
+            project_id="project-a", run_id="run-a",
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY"):
+        broker.authorize(
+            lease["lease_id"], task_id="task-a", operation="tool.invoke",
+            scope_type="tenant", tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a",
+            project_id="project-a", run_id="run-a",
+        )
+
+
+def test_search_gateway_uses_governed_tool_boundary(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    class Provider:
+        name = "official_site"
+        called = False
+
+        def search(self, request, queries):
+            self.called = True
+            return (
+                [SearchEvidence("Official", "https://example.test", self.name, "safe")],
+                SearchProviderAttempt(self.name, "ok", 1),
+            )
+
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor("search.official_site", "tool", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",)),
+        owner(),
+    )
+    provider = Provider()
+    gateway = SearchGateway([provider], governance_store=store)
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+    response = gateway.search(
+        SearchRequest(
+            query="AIOS", requester="actor-a", correlation_id="trace-a",
+            authorized_sources=["official_site"],
+        ),
+        actor=actor("tool.search"),
+        trace=trace,
+    )
+    assert response.status == "found"
+    assert provider.called is True
+    assert store.verify_audit_chain(
+        ("TOOL_REGISTERED", "TRACE_RECORDED", "TOOL_AUTHORIZED", "TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED")
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY"):
+        gateway.search(
+            SearchRequest(query="AIOS", requester="forged", correlation_id="trace-a"),
+            actor=actor("tool.search"),
+            trace=trace,
+        )
+
+
+def test_search_gateway_redacts_provider_exception() -> None:
+    class Provider:
+        name = "general_web"
+
+        def search(self, request, queries):
+            raise RuntimeError("Bearer should-not-leak")
+
+    response = SearchGateway([Provider()]).search(SearchRequest(query="AIOS", requester="legacy"))
+    assert response.attempts[0].reason == "PROVIDER_FAILURE"
+    assert "should-not-leak" not in str(response.to_dict())
+
+
+def test_search_runtime_default_path_requires_governance(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    orchestrator = SearchGatewayOrchestrator(
+        governance_store=GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "search-governance.sqlite3")
+    )
+    assert orchestrator.status()["governance"] == "required"
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY"):
+        orchestrator.execute({"query": "AIOS", "requester": "actor-a"})
+
+
+def test_governance_newer_schema_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    import sqlite3
+    path = tmp_path / "newer.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE governance_schema_metadata(singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO governance_schema_metadata(singleton,schema_version) VALUES(1,999)"
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="GOVERNANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED"):
+        GovernanceStore(path)
+
+
+def test_changed_production_files_have_no_embedded_secret_material() -> None:
+    import re
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    paths = (
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_event_bus.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_event_observability_bridge.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability_api.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability_hooks.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability_store.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/message_handoff.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_agent_adapter.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_gateway.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_gateway_api.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_gateway_orchestrator.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/trace_tool_credential_governance.py",
+    )
+    patterns = (
+        re.compile(r"BEGIN (?:RSA|OPENSSH|EC) PRIVATE KEY"),
+        re.compile(r"Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{24,}"),
+    )
+    hits = [path for path in paths for pattern in patterns if pattern.search((root / path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))]
+    assert hits == []

tests/test_worker_availability_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_worker_availability_guard import AvailabilityGuard
+
+
+class FakeSystemd:
+    def __init__(self, roots, now=1000.0):
+        self.now=now
+        self.actions=[]
+        self.units={}
+        for unit,root in roots.items():
+            self.units[unit]={
+                "LoadState":"loaded",
+                "ActiveState":"active",
+                "UnitFileState":"enabled",
+                "Environment":f"AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT={root}",
+            }
+        self.units["aios-external-agent-executor.service"]={
+            "LoadState":"loaded",
+            "ActiveState":"active",
+            "UnitFileState":"enabled",
+            "Environment":"",
+        }
+
+    def property(self, unit, name):
+        return self.units.get(unit,{}).get(name,"")
+
+    def environment(self, unit):
+        raw=self.property(unit,"Environment")
+        result={}
+        for item in raw.split():
+            if "=" in item:
+                k,v=item.split("=",1)
+                result[k]=v
+        return result
+
+    def enable(self, unit):
+        self.actions.append((unit,"enable"))
+        self.units[unit]["UnitFileState"]="enabled"
+
+    def start(self, unit):
+        self.actions.append((unit,"start"))
+        self.units[unit]["ActiveState"]="active"
+        env=self.environment(unit)
+        if "AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT" not in env:
+            return
+        root=Path(env["AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT"])
+        root.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
+        (root/"worker-liveness.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+            "schema":"aios.online-agent.worker-liveness.v1",
+            "agent_id":"agent-"+unit,
+            "state":"POLL_OK",
+            "last_seen_epoch":self.now,
+        }),encoding="utf-8")
+
+    def restart(self, unit):
+        self.actions.append((unit,"restart"))
+        self.units[unit]["ActiveState"]="active"
+        env=self.environment(unit)
+        root=Path(env["AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT"])
+        root.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
+        (root/"worker-liveness.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+            "schema":"aios.online-agent.worker-liveness.v1",
+            "agent_id":"agent-"+unit,
+            "state":"POLL_OK",
+            "last_seen_epoch":self.now,
+        }),encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def make_guard(tmp_path, fake):
+    worker_units=tuple(
+        unit for unit in fake.units
+        if unit!="aios-external-agent-executor.service"
+    )
+    return AvailabilityGuard(
+        systemd=fake,
+        worker_units=worker_units,
+        dependency_units=("aios-external-agent-executor.service",),
+        status_path=tmp_path/"run/status.json",
+        recovery_path=tmp_path/"run/recovery.json",
+        inhibit_path=tmp_path/"run/maintenance.lock",
+        max_stale_seconds=90,
+        restart_cooldown_seconds=60,
+        startup_wait_seconds=0,
+        now_fn=lambda:fake.now,
+        sleep_fn=lambda _seconds:None,
+    )
+
+
+def write_liveness(root, now, *, state="POLL_OK"):
+    root.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
+    (root/"worker-liveness.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+        "schema":"aios.online-agent.worker-liveness.v1",
+        "agent_id":"agent",
+        "state":state,
+        "last_seen_epoch":now,
+    }),encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def test_healthy_workers_need_no_action(tmp_path):
+    roots={
+        "generic.service":tmp_path/"generic",
+        "hermes.service":tmp_path/"hermes",
+        "openclaw.service":tmp_path/"openclaw",
+    }
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    for root in roots.values():
+        write_liveness(root,fake.now)
+    result=make_guard(tmp_path,fake).run(heal=True)
+    assert result["status"]=="HEALTHY"
+    assert result["all_fresh"] is True
+    assert fake.actions==[]
+
+
+def test_inactive_worker_is_started_and_becomes_fresh(tmp_path):
+    roots={"generic.service":tmp_path/"generic"}
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    fake.units["generic.service"]["ActiveState"]="inactive"
+    result=make_guard(tmp_path,fake).run(heal=True)
+    assert ("generic.service","start") in fake.actions
+    assert result["all_fresh"] is True
+
+
+def test_disabled_worker_is_enabled_and_started(tmp_path):
+    roots={"generic.service":tmp_path/"generic"}
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    fake.units["generic.service"]["UnitFileState"]="disabled"
+    fake.units["generic.service"]["ActiveState"]="inactive"
+    result=make_guard(tmp_path,fake).run(heal=True)
+    assert ("generic.service","enable") in fake.actions
+    assert ("generic.service","start") in fake.actions
+    assert result["all_fresh"] is True
+
+
+def test_active_but_stale_worker_is_restarted(tmp_path):
+    roots={"generic.service":tmp_path/"generic"}
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    write_liveness(roots["generic.service"],fake.now-500)
+    result=make_guard(tmp_path,fake).run(heal=True)
+    assert ("generic.service","restart") in fake.actions
+    assert result["all_fresh"] is True
+    assert result["workers"][0]["action"]=="RESTART_STALE"
+
+
+def test_restart_cooldown_prevents_restart_storm(tmp_path):
+    roots={"generic.service":tmp_path/"generic"}
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    write_liveness(roots["generic.service"],fake.now-500)
+    guard=make_guard(tmp_path,fake)
+    guard.recovery_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
+    guard.recovery_path.write_text(json.dumps({
+        "schema":"aios.worker-availability.recovery.v1",
+        "last_restart_epoch":{"generic.service":fake.now-10},
+    }),encoding="utf-8")
+    result=guard.run(heal=True)
+    assert ("generic.service","restart") not in fake.actions
+    assert result["status"]=="DEGRADED"
+    assert result["workers"][0]["detail"]=="RESTART_COOLDOWN_ACTIVE"
+
+
+def test_maintenance_inhibit_disables_healing(tmp_path):
+    roots={"generic.service":tmp_path/"generic"}
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    fake.units["generic.service"]["ActiveState"]="inactive"
+    guard=make_guard(tmp_path,fake)
+    guard.inhibit_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
+    guard.inhibit_path.write_text("planned maintenance\n")
+    result=guard.run(heal=True)
+    assert result["status"]=="MAINTENANCE_INHIBITED"
+    assert fake.actions==[]
+
+
+def test_dependency_is_enabled_and_started(tmp_path):
+    roots={"generic.service":tmp_path/"generic"}
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    write_liveness(roots["generic.service"],fake.now)
+    fake.units["aios-external-agent-executor.service"]["UnitFileState"]="disabled"
+    fake.units["aios-external-agent-executor.service"]["ActiveState"]="inactive"
+    result=make_guard(tmp_path,fake).run(heal=True)
+    assert ("aios-external-agent-executor.service","enable") in fake.actions
+    assert ("aios-external-agent-executor.service","start") in fake.actions
+    assert result["all_fresh"] is True
+
+
+def test_check_reports_stale_without_mutation(tmp_path):
+    roots={"generic.service":tmp_path/"generic"}
+    fake=FakeSystemd(roots)
+    write_liveness(roots["generic.service"],fake.now-500)
+    result=make_guard(tmp_path,fake).run(heal=False)
+    assert result["status"]=="DEGRADED"
+    assert result["all_fresh"] is False
+    assert fake.actions==[]

tests/test_worker_availability_runtime_config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+
+
+def test_worker_source_has_idle_and_busy_liveness():
+    source=(ROOT/"active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py").read_text()
+    assert "aios.online-agent.worker-liveness.v1" in source
+    assert 'write_worker_liveness("POLL_OK"' in source
+    assert '"POLL_FAILED"' in source
+    assert 'write_worker_liveness("STARTING")' in source
+    assert '"BUSY"' in source
+    assert "last_seen_epoch" in source
+
+
+def test_guard_timer_is_persistent_and_frequent():
+    timer=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-worker-availability-guard.timer").read_text()
+    assert "OnBootSec=15s" in timer
+    assert "OnUnitActiveSec=30s" in timer
+    assert "Persistent=true" in timer
+    assert "WantedBy=timers.target" in timer
+
+
+def test_guard_service_has_no_network_or_credentials():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-worker-availability-guard.service").read_text()
+    assert "User=root" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential" not in unit
+    assert "RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX" in unit
+    assert "NoNewPrivileges=true" in unit
+    assert "ProtectSystem=strict" in unit
+    assert "ReadWritePaths=/run/aios-worker-availability" in unit
+    assert "AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_MAX_STALE_SECONDS=90" in unit
+
+
+def test_guard_manages_all_three_workers_and_external_executor():
+    source=(ROOT/"active-runtime/app/aios_worker_availability_guard.py").read_text()
+    for unit in (
+        "aios-online-agent-worker-20260815.service",
+        "aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service",
+        "aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service",
+        "aios-external-agent-executor.service",
+    ):
+        assert unit in source
+    assert "maintenance.lock" in source
+    assert "RESTART_STALE" in source
+
+
+def test_worker_defers_write_capable_source_capture_until_plan_exists():
+    source=(ROOT/"active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py").read_text()
+    assert "ENGINEERING_WRITE_CAPABILITIES" in source
+    assert "source_capture_requires_deterministic_plan" in source
+    assert "TASK_SKIPPED_PENDING_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN" in source
+    assert '"governed.write.branch"' in source
+    assert '"governed.write.file"' in source