probe

active-runtime/app/agent_event_bus.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from hashlib import sha256
 from pathlib import Path
 import json
 from typing import Any
+from message_handoff import stable_event_id
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -55,13 +56,19 @@ class AgentEventBus:
         payload: dict[str, Any],
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        event_id = "evt_" + sha256(
-            json.dumps(
-                {"kind": kind, "source": source, "summary": summary, "payload": payload},
-                sort_keys=True,
-                ensure_ascii=False,
-            ).encode("utf-8")
-        ).hexdigest()[:16]
+        event_id = stable_event_id(
+            source=source, target=target, message_type=kind, payload=payload,
+            tenant_id=(payload.get('tenant_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            user_id=(payload.get('user_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            project_id=(payload.get('project_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            conversation_id=(payload.get('conversation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            task_id=(payload.get('task_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            run_id=(payload.get('run_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            correlation_id=(payload.get('correlation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            causation_id=(payload.get('causation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            sequence=(payload.get('sequence') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            idempotency_key=(payload.get('idempotency_key') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+        )
         event = AgentEvent(event_id, kind, source, target, summary, payload, correlation_id=correlation_id)
         self._write("pending", event.to_dict())
         self._audit("created", event.to_dict())

active-runtime/app/agent_event_observability_bridge.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
     def __init__(self, hooks: AgentObservabilityHooks | None = None):
         self.hooks = hooks or AgentObservabilityHooks()
 
-    def consume(self, event: dict):
+    def consume(self, event: dict, *, actor=None, trace=None):
         kind = event.get("kind")
         payload = event.get("payload", {})
         if kind == "agent_started":
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
                 visible_scope=payload.get("scope", "self"),
                 entry_agent=payload.get("agent", "unknown"),
                 execution_id=event.get("id"),
+                actor=actor,
+                trace=trace,
             )
         if kind == "agent_delegated":
             return self.hooks.delegate(event["execution_id"], payload.get("agent", "unknown"))

active-runtime/app/agent_observability.py

@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ class AgentExecutionRecord:
     status: str = "completed"
     started_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
     ended_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    trace_id: str | None = None
+    span_id: str | None = None
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
 
     def to_dict(self):
         return asdict(self)

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_api.py

@@ -9,25 +9,49 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
+from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
 from .agent_observability_dashboard import AgentObservabilityDashboard
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext, authorize_scope
 
 store = AgentObservabilityStore()
 dashboard = AgentObservabilityDashboard(store.load())
 
 
-def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any]):
-    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**payload)
+def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None):
+    scoped = any(payload.get(name) is not None for name in (
+        "trace_id", "span_id", "tenant_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id"
+    ))
+    values = dict(payload)
+    if scoped:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+        trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(trusted, trace.scope)
+        bound = {
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": trace.parent_span_id, "correlation_id": trace.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": trace.causation_id, "tenant_id": trace.scope.tenant_id,
+            "user_id": trace.scope.user_id, "project_id": trace.scope.project_id,
+            "conversation_id": trace.scope.conversation_id, "task_id": trace.task_id,
+            "claim_id": trace.claim_id, "run_id": trace.scope.run_id, "message_id": trace.message_id,
+        }
+        for name, authoritative in bound.items():
+            if values.get(name) not in (None, authoritative):
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:" + name)
+            values[name] = authoritative
+    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**values)
     return {"status": "ok", "record": store.append(record)}
 
 
-def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user"):
-    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role)
+def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None):
+    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role, actor=actor)
+    visible = AgentObservability()
+    visible.records = [AgentExecutionRecord(**record) for record in records]
     return {
         "status": "ok",
         "records": records,
-        "summary": store.load().summary(user_id if role != "owner" else None),
+        "summary": visible.summary(None),
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_hooks.py

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    TraceContext,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -36,6 +41,7 @@ class AgentRunContext:
     input_tokens: int = 0
     output_tokens: int = 0
     status: str = "running"
+    trace: TraceContext | None = None
 
     def delegate(self, agent_name: str) -> None:
         if agent_name not in self.path:
@@ -59,7 +65,19 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
         visible_scope: str,
         entry_agent: str,
         execution_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if execution_id is not None and execution_id in self.active:
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
+        if trace is not None:
+            if actor is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            authorize_scope(trusted_actor, trace.scope)
+            if trace.scope.user_id is not None and trace.scope.user_id != user_id:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:user_id")
         run = AgentRunContext(
             execution_id=execution_id or f"exec_{uuid4().hex[:12]}",
             user_id=user_id,
@@ -67,6 +85,7 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             entry_agent=entry_agent,
             path=[entry_agent],
             used_hermes=entry_agent.lower() == "hermes",
+            trace=trace,
         )
         self.active[run.execution_id] = run
         return {"status": "started", "execution_id": run.execution_id, "run": run.__dict__}
@@ -106,6 +125,18 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             status=status,
             started_at=run.started_at,
             ended_at=ended_at,
+            trace_id=run.trace.trace_id if run.trace else None,
+            span_id=run.trace.span_id if run.trace else None,
+            parent_span_id=run.trace.parent_span_id if run.trace else None,
+            correlation_id=run.trace.correlation_id if run.trace else None,
+            causation_id=run.trace.causation_id if run.trace else None,
+            tenant_id=run.trace.scope.tenant_id if run.trace else None,
+            project_id=run.trace.scope.project_id if run.trace else None,
+            conversation_id=run.trace.scope.conversation_id if run.trace else None,
+            task_id=run.trace.task_id if run.trace else None,
+            claim_id=run.trace.claim_id if run.trace else None,
+            run_id=run.trace.scope.run_id if run.trace else None,
+            message_id=run.trace.message_id if run.trace else None,
         )
         return {"status": "stored", "record": self.store.append(record)}
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_store.py

@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 class AgentObservabilityStore:
@@ -23,6 +29,11 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
     def append(self, record: AgentExecutionRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
         path = self.records_dir / f"{record.execution_id}.json"
         data = record.to_dict()
+        if path.exists():
+            existing = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if existing == data:
+                return existing
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
         path.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
         return data
 
@@ -33,8 +44,36 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
             observability.records.append(AgentExecutionRecord(**raw))
         return observability
 
-    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user") -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         records = [record.to_dict() for record in self.load().records]
+        scoped = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is not None]
+        legacy = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is None]
+        if actor is not None:
+            trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            visible: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+            for record in scoped:
+                try:
+                    authorize_scope(
+                        trusted,
+                        GovernanceScope(
+                            "tenant",
+                            tenant_id=record.get("tenant_id"),
+                            user_id=record.get("user_id"),
+                            project_id=record.get("project_id"),
+                            conversation_id=record.get("conversation_id"),
+                            run_id=record.get("run_id"),
+                        ),
+                    )
+                except GovernanceError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(record)
+            if trusted.privileged:
+                visible.extend(legacy)
+            else:
+                visible.extend(record for record in legacy if record.get("user_id") == trusted.scope.user_id)
+            return visible
+        # Caller-supplied role remains a legacy compatibility path only.
+        records = legacy
         if role == "owner":
             return records
         if role == "group_admin" and group_id:

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""HTTP API for AIOS external-agent online task distribution.
+
+The service is intended to bind to loopback and be published through the
+existing TLS reverse proxy. Control operations use a server-managed control
+Bearer token. Agents receive individual Bearer tokens at registration; only
+token hashes are persisted.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+from aios_agent_task_protocol import TaskProtocolError, TaskStore
+
+
+MAX_BODY = 1024 * 1024
+TASK_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class APIConfig:
+    db_path: Path
+    control_token_path: Path
+    host: str = "127.0.0.1"
+    port: int = 18940
+    token_pepper: str = ""
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_env(cls) -> "APIConfig":
+        return cls(
+            db_path=Path(os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB",
+                "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3",
+            )),
+            control_token_path=Path(os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+                "/run/credentials/aios-agent-task-api.service/control_token",
+            )),
+            host=os.getenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_HOST", "127.0.0.1"),
+            port=int(os.getenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_PORT", "18940")),
+            token_pepper=os.getenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_TOKEN_PEPPER", ""),
+        )
+
+
+class AgentTaskApplication:
+    def __init__(self, config: APIConfig) -> None:
+        self.config = config
+        self.store = TaskStore(
+            config.db_path,
+            token_pepper=config.token_pepper,
+        )
+
+    def _control_token(self) -> str:
+        path = self.config.control_token_path
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            raise TaskProtocolError("CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+        value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID", 503)
+        return value
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _bearer(headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> str:
+        value = str(headers.get("Authorization") or "")
+        if not value.startswith("Bearer "):
+            return ""
+        return value[7:].strip()
+
+    def authenticate_control(self, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> None:
+        supplied = self._bearer(headers)
+        expected = self._control_token()
+        if not supplied or not hmac.compare_digest(supplied, expected):
+            raise TaskProtocolError("UNAUTHORIZED", 401)
+
+    def authenticate_agent(self, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self.store.authenticate_agent(self._bearer(headers))
+
+    def principal(self, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any] | None]:
+        supplied = self._bearer(headers)
+        if not supplied:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("UNAUTHORIZED", 401)
+        try:
+            expected = self._control_token()
+        except TaskProtocolError:
+            expected = ""
+        if expected and hmac.compare_digest(supplied, expected):
+            return "control", None
+        return "agent", self.store.authenticate_agent(supplied)
+
+    def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "status": "ok",
+            "schema": "aios.agent-task.v1",
+            "task_states": [
+                "QUEUED", "CLAIMED", "RUNNING", "VERIFYING",
+                "SUCCEEDED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED", "CANCELLED",
+            ],
+            "lease_recovery": True,
+            "atomic_claim": True,
+            "idempotent_result_submission": True,
+            "server_side_verification_required": True,
+            "plaintext_credentials_persisted": False,
+        }
+
+    def register_agent(self, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.authenticate_control(headers)
+        return self.store.register_agent(
+            agent_id=str(body.get("agent_id") or ""),
+            agent_type=str(body.get("agent_type") or ""),
+            agent_version=str(body.get("agent_version") or ""),
+            capabilities=body.get("capabilities") or [],
+            metadata=body.get("metadata") if isinstance(body.get("metadata"), Mapping) else {},
+        )
+
+    def create_task(self, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.authenticate_control(headers)
+        return self.store.create_task(
+            task_id=str(body.get("task_id") or "") or None,
+            goal=str(body.get("goal") or ""),
+            instructions=str(body.get("instructions") or ""),
+            success_criteria=body.get("success_criteria"),
+            required_capabilities=body.get("required_capabilities") or [],
+            constraints=body.get("constraints") if isinstance(body.get("constraints"), Mapping) else {},
+            metadata=body.get("metadata") if isinstance(body.get("metadata"), Mapping) else {},
+            deadline=str(body.get("deadline") or "") or None,
+            priority=body.get("priority", 0),
+            max_attempts=body.get("max_attempts", 3),
+            idempotency_key=str(body.get("idempotency_key") or ""),
+        )
+
+    def poll(self, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        agent = self.authenticate_agent(headers)
+        tasks = self.store.poll_tasks(
+            agent_id=agent["agent_id"],
+            limit=int(body.get("limit", 20)),
+        )
+        return {"agent_id": agent["agent_id"], "tasks": tasks}
+
+    def claim(self, task_id: str, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        agent = self.authenticate_agent(headers)
+        return self.store.claim_task(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            agent_id=agent["agent_id"],
+            lease_seconds=int(body.get("lease_seconds", 300)),
+        )
+
+    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        agent = self.authenticate_agent(headers)
+        return self.store.heartbeat(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            agent_id=agent["agent_id"],
+            lease_token=str(body.get("lease_token") or ""),
+            progress=body.get("progress") if isinstance(body.get("progress"), Mapping) else {},
+            lease_seconds=int(body.get("lease_seconds", 300)),
+        )
+
+    def result(self, task_id: str, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        agent = self.authenticate_agent(headers)
+        result = body.get("result")
+        if not isinstance(result, Mapping):
+            raise TaskProtocolError("RESULT_INVALID", 400)
+        return self.store.submit_result(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            agent_id=agent["agent_id"],
+            lease_token=str(body.get("lease_token") or ""),
+            idempotency_key=str(body.get("idempotency_key") or ""),
+            result=result,
+        )
+
+    def verify(self, task_id: str, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.authenticate_control(headers)
+        return self.store.verify_task(
+            task_id=task_id,
+            decision=str(body.get("decision") or ""),
+            verification=body.get("verification") if isinstance(body.get("verification"), Mapping) else {},
+        )
+
+    def cancel(self, task_id: str, headers: Mapping[str, str], body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.authenticate_control(headers)
+        return self.store.cancel_task(task_id=task_id, reason=str(body.get("reason") or ""))
+
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        kind, agent = self.principal(headers)
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        if kind == "agent" and task.get("claimed_by") != agent["agent_id"]:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("FORBIDDEN", 403)
+        return task
+
+    def events(self, task_id: str, headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.authenticate_control(headers)
+        return {"task_id": task_id, "events": self.store.get_events(task_id)}
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    app: AgentTaskApplication | None = None
+    server_version = "AIOSAgentTaskAPI/1"
+
+    def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _headers(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {key: value for key, value in self.headers.items()}
+
+    def _json(self, value: Any, status: int = 200) -> None:
+        payload = json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(payload)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(payload)
+
+    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            size = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID", 400) from exc
+        if size < 0 or size > MAX_BODY:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE", 413)
+        raw = self.rfile.read(size) if size else b"{}"
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("JSON_INVALID", 400) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, dict):
+            raise TaskProtocolError("JSON_OBJECT_REQUIRED", 400)
+        return value
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _task_route(path: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
+        match = re.fullmatch(
+            r"/v1/tasks/([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179})(?:/(claim|heartbeat|result|verify|cancel|events))?",
+            path,
+        )
+        if match:
+            return match.group(1), match.group(2)
+        return "", None
+
+    def _run(self, callback) -> None:
+        try:
+            callback()
+        except TaskProtocolError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.http_status)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            self._json({"error": "INTERNAL_ERROR", "detail": type(exc).__name__}, 500)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        def action() -> None:
+            if self.app is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            path = urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+            if path == "/health":
+                self._json(self.app.health())
+                return
+            task_id, suffix = self._task_route(path)
+            if task_id and suffix is None:
+                self._json(self.app.get_task(task_id, self._headers()))
+                return
+            if task_id and suffix == "events":
+                self._json(self.app.events(task_id, self._headers()))
+                return
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+        self._run(action)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        def action() -> None:
+            if self.app is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            path = urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+            body = self._body()
+            if path == "/v1/agents/register":
+                self._json(self.app.register_agent(self._headers(), body), 201)
+                return
+            if path == "/v1/tasks":
+                self._json(self.app.create_task(self._headers(), body), 201)
+                return
+            if path == "/v1/tasks/poll":
+                self._json(self.app.poll(self._headers(), body))
+                return
+            task_id, suffix = self._task_route(path)
+            if not task_id:
+                self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+                return
+            if suffix == "claim":
+                self._json(self.app.claim(task_id, self._headers(), body))
+            elif suffix == "heartbeat":
+                self._json(self.app.heartbeat(task_id, self._headers(), body))
+            elif suffix == "result":
+                self._json(self.app.result(task_id, self._headers(), body))
+            elif suffix == "verify":
+                self._json(self.app.verify(task_id, self._headers(), body))
+            elif suffix == "cancel":
+                self._json(self.app.cancel(task_id, self._headers(), body))
+            else:
+                self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+        self._run(action)
+
+
+def serve(config: APIConfig | None = None) -> None:
+    config = config or APIConfig.from_env()
+    application = AgentTaskApplication(config)
+    Handler.app = application
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((config.host, config.port), Handler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py

@@ -0,0 +1,722 @@
+"""Owner-controlled CAS-bound execution-envelope rebind for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+This service exists for a narrow recovery case: a Task was projected/claimed with a read-only
+source_capture envelope before its already-registered deterministic plan became authoritative.
+
+It never creates Tasks/Jobs/branches and never accepts arbitrary metadata patches. It only replaces
+metadata.execution + the derived execution_projection for the same governed binding, after an
+official NEEDS_REWORK transition has returned the Task to QUEUED with no active lease.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+AUTHORIZATION_ID_ENV = "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID"
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _require_string(
+    value: object,
+    code: str,
+    pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+    value = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def _required_authorization_id() -> str:
+    value = os.environ.get(AUTHORIZATION_ID_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISSING")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionRebindRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    expected_old_execution_digest: str
+    expected_new_execution_digest: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    reason: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ExecutionRebindRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status",
+            "expected_revision",
+            "expected_attempt",
+            "previous_verification_sha256",
+            "expected_old_execution_digest",
+            "expected_new_execution_digest",
+            "authorization_id",
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "reason",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        if status != "QUEUED":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID", 400)
+
+        revision = value["expected_revision"]
+        attempt = value["expected_attempt"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(revision, int)
+            or isinstance(revision, bool)
+            or revision < 0
+            or not isinstance(attempt, int)
+            or isinstance(attempt, bool)
+            or attempt < 1
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_INTEGER_INVALID", 400)
+
+        verification = _require_string(
+            value["previous_verification_sha256"], "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID"
+        )
+        old_digest = _require_string(
+            value["expected_old_execution_digest"], "OLD_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"
+        )
+        new_digest = _require_string(
+            value["expected_new_execution_digest"], "NEW_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"
+        )
+        for digest, code in (
+            (verification, "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID"),
+            (old_digest, "OLD_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+            (new_digest, "NEW_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+        ):
+            if SHA_RE.fullmatch(digest) is None:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+        if old_digest == new_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DIGEST_UNCHANGED", 400)
+
+        authorization = _require_string(
+            value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE
+        )
+        key = _require_string(value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        reason = _require_string(value["reason"], "EXECUTION_REBIND_REASON_INVALID")
+        if len(reason) > 512:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_REASON_INVALID", 400)
+
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            revision,
+            attempt,
+            verification,
+            old_digest,
+            new_digest,
+            authorization,
+            key,
+            reason,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "expected_old_execution_digest": self.expected_old_execution_digest,
+            "expected_new_execution_digest": self.expected_new_execution_digest,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+        }
+
+
+class CanonicalBridgeExecutionResolver:
+    """Resolve the already-registered plan from the canonical governed Bridge."""
+
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, control_token: str) -> None:
+        self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token = control_token
+
+    def __call__(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        required_capabilities: Sequence[str],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "required_capabilities": list(required_capabilities),
+            },
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.base_url + "/v2/execution-envelope",
+            method="POST",
+            data=body,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self.control_token,
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                raw = response.read()
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read()
+            status = exc.code
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502)
+        if status != 200:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(
+                str(value.get("error") or "CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESOLUTION_FAILED"),
+                502 if status >= 500 else 409,
+            )
+        return dict(value)
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindStore:
+    """Official owner-controlled mutation with CAS, plan resolution and durable audit."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path: Path,
+        resolver: Callable[[str, Sequence[str]], Mapping[str, Any]],
+    ) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+        self.resolver = resolver
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        table: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {
+            str(row["name"]): row
+            for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _json_value(raw: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            return dict(raw)
+        if not isinstance(raw, str):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409)
+        return dict(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _verification_hash(raw: object) -> str:
+        if raw in (None, ""):
+            value: object = {}
+        elif isinstance(raw, str):
+            try:
+                value = json.loads(raw)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_VERIFICATION_INVALID", 409) from exc
+        else:
+            value = raw
+        return _sha(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _metadata_column(columns: Mapping[str, sqlite3.Row]) -> str:
+        for name in ("metadata_json", "metadata"):
+            if name in columns:
+                return name
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_METADATA_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required_capabilities(
+        task: sqlite3.Row,
+        columns: Mapping[str, sqlite3.Row],
+        old_execution: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> list[str]:
+        for field in ("required_capabilities_json", "required_capabilities"):
+            if field not in columns:
+                continue
+            raw = task[field]
+            if raw in (None, ""):
+                continue
+            if isinstance(raw, str):
+                try:
+                    value = json.loads(raw)
+                except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                    value = [item for item in raw.split(",") if item.strip()]
+            else:
+                value = raw
+            if isinstance(value, list) and all(isinstance(item, str) for item in value):
+                return [item.strip() for item in value if item.strip()]
+        value = old_execution.get("capability_scope")
+        if isinstance(value, list) and all(isinstance(item, str) for item in value):
+            return [item for item in value if item]
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_CAPABILITIES_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event_table(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+    ) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = {
+            row["name"]
+            for row in connection.execute(
+                "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'"
+            )
+        }
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name not in tables:
+                continue
+            columns = ExecutionRebindStore._columns(connection, name)
+            if "task_id" in columns and ("event_type" in columns or "type" in columns):
+                return name, columns
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _insert_event(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = ExecutionRebindStore._event_table(connection)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {"task_id": task_id}
+        if "event_type" in columns:
+            values["event_type"] = "TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+        else:
+            values["type"] = "TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+        payload_text = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "owner-control"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "owner-control"
+        names = list(values)
+        quoted = ",".join('"' + name + '"' for name in names)
+        placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in names)
+        connection.execute(
+            f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({quoted}) VALUES ({placeholders})',
+            tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_rebind_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_execution_rebinds (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_verification_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              old_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              new_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              reason TEXT NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id,idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    def _load_and_validate(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ) -> tuple[sqlite3.Row, dict[str, sqlite3.Row], str, dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+        columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+        required = {
+            "task_id",
+            "status",
+            "attempt",
+            "revision",
+            "claimed_by",
+            "lease_token_hash",
+            "lease_expires_at",
+            "verification_json",
+        }
+        if not required.issubset(columns):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_SCHEMA_EXECUTION_REBIND_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        metadata_column = self._metadata_column(columns)
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+            (task_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if task is None:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+
+        if (
+            str(task["status"]) != request.expected_status
+            or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+            or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+        if task["lease_token_hash"] not in (None, "") or task["lease_expires_at"] not in (None, ""):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409)
+
+        verification_sha = self._verification_hash(task["verification_json"])
+        if verification_sha != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+
+        metadata = self._json_value(
+            task[metadata_column],
+            "TASK_METADATA_INVALID",
+        )
+        execution = metadata.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EXECUTION_METADATA_MISSING", 409)
+        old_execution = validate_execution_envelope(dict(execution))
+        if old_execution["execution_digest"] != request.expected_old_execution_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_OLD_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+        if old_execution.get("action") != "source_capture":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_SOURCE_CAPTURE_REQUIRED", 409)
+
+        projection = metadata.get("execution_projection")
+        if isinstance(projection, Mapping):
+            projected_digest = str(projection.get("execution_digest") or "")
+            if projected_digest and projected_digest != request.expected_old_execution_digest:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_PROJECTION_DRIFT", 409)
+        return task, columns, metadata_column, metadata, old_execution
+
+    def rebind(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        required_authorization = _required_authorization_id()
+        if request.authorization_id != required_authorization:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+
+        request_sha = _sha(request.public())
+
+        # Idempotent replay must win before CAS validation because a successful
+        # rebind necessarily increments the Task revision and changes the persisted envelope.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._ensure_rebind_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_execution_rebinds WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": int(replay["attempt"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "old_execution_digest": replay["old_execution_digest"],
+                    "new_execution_digest": replay["new_execution_digest"],
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+        # Read/CAS snapshot first. Canonical Bridge resolution happens outside the DB write lock.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            task, columns, _, _, old_execution = self._load_and_validate(
+                connection, task_id, request
+            )
+            capabilities = self._required_capabilities(task, columns, old_execution)
+
+        binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(old_execution)
+        resolved = dict(self.resolver(task_id, capabilities))
+        new_execution = validate_execution_envelope(resolved, binding=binding)
+        if new_execution.get("action") != "deterministic":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN_REQUIRED", 409)
+        if new_execution["execution_digest"] != request.expected_new_execution_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_NEW_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+        if new_execution["execution_digest"] == old_execution["execution_digest"]:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DIGEST_UNCHANGED", 409)
+
+        # Re-read under BEGIN IMMEDIATE and apply only if the exact snapshot is unchanged.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_rebind_table(connection)
+
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_execution_rebinds WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": int(replay["attempt"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "old_execution_digest": replay["old_execution_digest"],
+                    "new_execution_digest": replay["new_execution_digest"],
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+            task, columns, metadata_column, metadata, current_old = self._load_and_validate(
+                connection, task_id, request
+            )
+            if current_old["execution_digest"] != old_execution["execution_digest"]:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_OLD_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+
+            new_metadata = dict(metadata)
+            new_metadata["execution"] = new_execution
+            new_metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+                "schema": "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1",
+                "task_id": binding.task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+            }
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            previous_claimed_by = task["claimed_by"]
+
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                f"""
+                UPDATE tasks
+                   SET "{metadata_column}"=?, revision=?, claimed_by=NULL,
+                       lease_token_hash=NULL, lease_expires_at=NULL
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS ? AND lease_token_hash IS NULL AND lease_expires_at IS NULL
+                """,
+                (
+                    json.dumps(new_metadata, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    applied_revision,
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    previous_claimed_by,
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+            event_payload = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-execution-rebind.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "reason": request.reason,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                "old_execution_digest": old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "new_execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "old_action": old_execution.get("action"),
+                "new_action": new_execution.get("action"),
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "previous_claimed_by": previous_claimed_by,
+                "stale_claim_normalized": previous_claimed_by not in (None, ""),
+            }
+            self._insert_event(connection, task_id, event_payload)
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_execution_rebinds(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,
+                  previous_verification_sha256,old_execution_digest,new_execution_digest,
+                  expected_revision,applied_revision,attempt,reason,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                    old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                    new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    request.reason,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "old_execution_digest": old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "new_execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: ExecutionRebindStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        data = json.dumps(
+            dict(value), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.control_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        )
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self._json(
+                {"status": "ok", "service": "aios-agent-task-execution-rebind"},
+                200,
+            )
+        else:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/execution-rebind", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            self._json({"error": "CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID"}, 400)
+            return
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID"}, 413)
+            return
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError
+            request = ExecutionRebindRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            if self.store is None:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            result = self.store.rebind(match.group(1), request)
+            self._json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except ExecutionRebindError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def load_control_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    _required_authorization_id()
+    token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(
+                Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+                / "agent_task_control_token"
+            ),
+        )
+    )
+    token = load_control_token(token_path)
+    bridge = os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL",
+        "http://127.0.0.1:18892",
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_PORT", "18942"))
+    ExecutionRebindHandler.store = ExecutionRebindStore(
+        db,
+        CanonicalBridgeExecutionResolver(bridge, token),
+    )
+    ExecutionRebindHandler.control_token = token
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), ExecutionRebindHandler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_protocol.py

@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Durable online task protocol for external AIOS agents.
+
+The store is deliberately independent from Git/Gitea mutation. It provides a
+small durable state machine for publishing work, atomic claim/lease ownership,
+heartbeat, idempotent result submission, explicit server-side verification,
+lease recovery, and audit events.
+
+No plaintext agent credential or task lease token is persisted.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import secrets
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable, Mapping
+import uuid
+
+from aios_capability_contract import has_capabilities
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    ExecutionProjectionError,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+
+TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset({"SUCCEEDED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED", "CANCELLED"})
+ACTIVE_LEASE_STATES = frozenset({"CLAIMED", "RUNNING"})
+TASK_STATES = frozenset({
+    "QUEUED", "CLAIMED", "RUNNING", "VERIFYING",
+    "SUCCEEDED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED", "CANCELLED",
+})
+VERIFY_DECISIONS = frozenset({"SUCCEEDED", "NEEDS_REWORK", "FAILED"})
+
+
+GOVERNED_WRITE_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({
+    "governed.write.branch",
+    "governed.write.file",
+})
+EXECUTION_PROJECTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1"
+
+
+def _validate_write_execution_binding(
+    task_id: str,
+    required_capabilities: list[str],
+    metadata: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> None:
+    required = set(required_capabilities)
+    if not required.intersection(GOVERNED_WRITE_CAPABILITIES):
+        return
+    execution = metadata.get("execution")
+    projection = metadata.get("execution_projection")
+    if not isinstance(execution, Mapping) or not isinstance(projection, Mapping):
+        raise TaskProtocolError("GOVERNED_EXECUTION_BINDING_REQUIRED", 409)
+    try:
+        canonical = validate_execution_envelope(dict(execution))
+    except (ExecutionProjectionError, TypeError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
+        raise TaskProtocolError("EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID", 409) from exc
+    if canonical.get("task_id") != task_id:
+        raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT", 409)
+    if set(canonical.get("capability_scope") or ()) != required:
+        raise TaskProtocolError("EXECUTION_CAPABILITY_SCOPE_CONFLICT", 409)
+    if (
+        projection.get("schema") != EXECUTION_PROJECTION_SCHEMA
+        or projection.get("task_id") != task_id
+        or projection.get("job_id") != canonical.get("job_id")
+        or projection.get("execution_digest") != canonical.get("execution_digest")
+    ):
+        raise TaskProtocolError("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_INVALID", 409)
+
+
+class TaskProtocolError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, http_status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.http_status = http_status
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class Principal:
+    kind: str
+    identifier: str
+
+
+def utcnow() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def iso(value: datetime) -> str:
+    return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def parse_time(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+    if not value:
+        return None
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def digest_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _string_list(value: Iterable[object] | None, field: str, *, max_items: int = 128) -> list[str]:
+    if value is None:
+        return []
+    if isinstance(value, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(value, Iterable):
+        raise TaskProtocolError(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for item in value:
+        text = str(item).strip()
+        if not text or len(text) > 160:
+            raise TaskProtocolError(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+        result.append(text)
+        if len(result) > max_items:
+            raise TaskProtocolError(field.upper() + "_TOO_LARGE", 400)
+    return sorted(set(result))
+
+
+def _json_object(value: object | None, field: str, *, max_bytes: int = 128 * 1024) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if value is None:
+        return {}
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise TaskProtocolError(field.upper() + "_INVALID", 400)
+    result = dict(value)
+    if len(canonical_json(result).encode("utf-8")) > max_bytes:
+        raise TaskProtocolError(field.upper() + "_TOO_LARGE", 413)
+    return result
+
+
+def _criteria(value: object | None) -> list[Any]:
+    if value is None:
+        return []
+    if isinstance(value, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(value, list):
+        raise TaskProtocolError("SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID", 400)
+    if len(value) > 128:
+        raise TaskProtocolError("SUCCESS_CRITERIA_TOO_LARGE", 413)
+    if len(canonical_json(value).encode("utf-8")) > 128 * 1024:
+        raise TaskProtocolError("SUCCESS_CRITERIA_TOO_LARGE", 413)
+    return list(value)
+
+
+class TaskStore:
+    """SQLite-backed durable task store.
+
+    SQLite BEGIN IMMEDIATE serializes claims so two agents cannot successfully
+    claim the same queued task. WAL mode allows concurrent readers.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        path: str | Path,
+        *,
+        now: Callable[[], datetime] = utcnow,
+        token_pepper: str = "",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.now = now
+        self.token_pepper = token_pepper
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=10, isolation_level=None)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=10000")
+        return connection
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agents (
+                    agent_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    agent_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    agent_version TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    capabilities_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    last_seen_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tasks (
+                    task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    goal TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    instructions TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    success_criteria_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    required_capabilities_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    constraints_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    deadline TEXT,
+                    priority INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    attempt INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    claimed_by TEXT,
+                    lease_token_hash TEXT,
+                    lease_expires_at TEXT,
+                    result_json TEXT,
+                    result_digest TEXT,
+                    result_idempotency_key TEXT,
+                    verification_json TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    FOREIGN KEY(claimed_by) REFERENCES agents(agent_id)
+                );
+
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS idempotency (
+                    scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    key TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    response_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(scope, key)
+                );
+
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS events (
+                    event_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+                    task_id TEXT,
+                    agent_id TEXT,
+                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tasks_queue
+                ON tasks(status, priority DESC, created_at);
+
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tasks_lease
+                ON tasks(status, lease_expires_at);
+
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_events_task
+                ON events(task_id, event_id);
+                """
+            )
+
+    def _token_hash(self, token: str) -> str:
+        return hashlib.sha256((self.token_pepper + "\0" + token).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _row_task(row: sqlite3.Row, *, include_result: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "task_id": row["task_id"],
+            "goal": row["goal"],
+            "instructions": row["instructions"],
+            "success_criteria": json.loads(row["success_criteria_json"]),
+            "required_capabilities": json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"]),
+            "constraints": json.loads(row["constraints_json"]),
+            "metadata": json.loads(row["metadata_json"]),
+            "deadline": row["deadline"],
+            "priority": row["priority"],
+            "max_attempts": row["max_attempts"],
+            "attempt": row["attempt"],
+            "status": row["status"],
+            "claimed_by": row["claimed_by"],
+            "lease_expires_at": row["lease_expires_at"],
+            "revision": row["revision"],
+            "created_at": row["created_at"],
+            "updated_at": row["updated_at"],
+        }
+        if include_result:
+            value["result"] = json.loads(row["result_json"]) if row["result_json"] else None
+            value["verification"] = (
+                json.loads(row["verification_json"]) if row["verification_json"] else None
+            )
+        return value
+
+    def _event(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        event_type: str,
+        *,
+        task_id: str | None = None,
+        agent_id: str | None = None,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO events(task_id,agent_id,event_type,payload_json,created_at)"
+            " VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+            (task_id, agent_id, event_type, canonical_json(dict(payload or {})), iso(self.now())),
+        )
+
+    def register_agent(
+        self,
+        *,
+        agent_id: str,
+        agent_type: str,
+        agent_version: str,
+        capabilities: Iterable[object],
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        agent_id = agent_id.strip()
+        agent_type = agent_type.strip()
+        agent_version = agent_version.strip()
+        if not agent_id or len(agent_id) > 160 or not agent_type or not agent_version:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("AGENT_IDENTITY_INVALID", 400)
+        caps = _string_list(capabilities, "capabilities")
+        meta = _json_object(metadata, "metadata")
+        token = "agt_" + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        now = iso(self.now())
+        try:
+            with self._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO agents(agent_id,agent_type,agent_version,capabilities_json,"
+                    "metadata_json,token_hash,status,created_at,last_seen_at)"
+                    " VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (
+                        agent_id,
+                        agent_type,
+                        agent_version,
+                        canonical_json(caps),
+                        canonical_json(meta),
+                        self._token_hash(token),
+                        "ACTIVE",
+                        now,
+                        now,
+                    ),
+                )
+                self._event(
+                    connection,
+                    "AGENT_REGISTERED",
+                    agent_id=agent_id,
+                    payload={"agent_type": agent_type, "agent_version": agent_version},
+                )
+                connection.commit()
+        except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("AGENT_ALREADY_EXISTS", 409) from exc
+        return {
+            "agent_id": agent_id,
+            "agent_type": agent_type,
+            "agent_version": agent_version,
+            "capabilities": caps,
+            "agent_token": token,
+            "credential_returned_once": True,
+        }
+
+    def authenticate_agent(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not token:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("UNAUTHORIZED", 401)
+        token_hash = self._token_hash(token)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM agents WHERE token_hash=? AND status='ACTIVE'",
+                (token_hash,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("UNAUTHORIZED", 401)
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE agents SET last_seen_at=? WHERE agent_id=?",
+                (iso(self.now()), row["agent_id"]),
+            )
+            return {
+                "agent_id": row["agent_id"],
+                "agent_type": row["agent_type"],
+                "agent_version": row["agent_version"],
+                "capabilities": json.loads(row["capabilities_json"]),
+                "metadata": json.loads(row["metadata_json"]),
+            }
+
+    def _idempotent_lookup(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        *,
+        scope: str,
+        key: str,
+        payload_digest: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT payload_digest,response_json FROM idempotency WHERE scope=? AND key=?",
+            (scope, key),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return None
+        if not hmac.compare_digest(row["payload_digest"], payload_digest):
+            raise TaskProtocolError("IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+        return json.loads(row["response_json"])
+
+    def _idempotent_store(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        *,
+        scope: str,
+        key: str,
+        payload_digest: str,
+        response: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO idempotency(scope,key,payload_digest,response_json,created_at)"
+            " VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+            (scope, key, payload_digest, canonical_json(dict(response)), iso(self.now())),
+        )
+
+    def create_task(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str | None,
+        goal: str,
+        instructions: str,
+        success_criteria: object | None,
+        required_capabilities: Iterable[object] | None = None,
+        constraints: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        deadline: str | None = None,
+        priority: int = 0,
+        max_attempts: int = 3,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = (task_id or ("task-" + uuid.uuid4().hex)).strip()
+        goal = goal.strip()
+        instructions = instructions.strip()
+        idempotency_key = idempotency_key.strip()
+        if not task_id or len(task_id) > 180 or not goal or not instructions:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_BINDING_INVALID", 400)
+        if not idempotency_key or len(idempotency_key) > 160:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", 400)
+        if not isinstance(priority, int) or isinstance(priority, bool) or not -100 <= priority <= 100:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("PRIORITY_INVALID", 400)
+        if not isinstance(max_attempts, int) or isinstance(max_attempts, bool) or not 1 <= max_attempts <= 20:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("MAX_ATTEMPTS_INVALID", 400)
+        parsed_deadline = parse_time(deadline)
+        if parsed_deadline and parsed_deadline <= self.now():
+            raise TaskProtocolError("DEADLINE_INVALID", 400)
+        criteria = _criteria(success_criteria)
+        required = _string_list(required_capabilities, "required_capabilities")
+        constraints_value = _json_object(constraints, "constraints")
+        metadata_value = _json_object(metadata, "metadata")
+        _validate_write_execution_binding(task_id, required, metadata_value)
+        payload = {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "goal": goal,
+            "instructions": instructions,
+            "success_criteria": criteria,
+            "required_capabilities": required,
+            "constraints": constraints_value,
+            "metadata": metadata_value,
+            "deadline": iso(parsed_deadline) if parsed_deadline else None,
+            "priority": priority,
+            "max_attempts": max_attempts,
+        }
+        payload_digest = digest_json(payload)
+        now = iso(self.now())
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = self._idempotent_lookup(
+                connection,
+                scope="create_task",
+                key=idempotency_key,
+                payload_digest=payload_digest,
+            )
+            if replay is not None:
+                connection.commit()
+                return {**replay, "idempotent": True}
+            try:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO tasks(task_id,goal,instructions,success_criteria_json,"
+                    "required_capabilities_json,constraints_json,metadata_json,deadline,priority,"
+                    "max_attempts,attempt,status,revision,created_at,updated_at)"
+                    " VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (
+                        task_id,
+                        goal,
+                        instructions,
+                        canonical_json(criteria),
+                        canonical_json(required),
+                        canonical_json(constraints_value),
+                        canonical_json(metadata_value),
+                        payload["deadline"],
+                        priority,
+                        max_attempts,
+                        0,
+                        "QUEUED",
+                        1,
+                        now,
+                        now,
+                    ),
+                )
+            except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_ID_CONFLICT", 409) from exc
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            result = self._row_task(row)
+            self._idempotent_store(
+                connection,
+                scope="create_task",
+                key=idempotency_key,
+                payload_digest=payload_digest,
+                response=result,
+            )
+            self._event(connection, "TASK_CREATED", task_id=task_id, payload={"priority": priority})
+            connection.commit()
+            return result
+
+    def _expire_locked(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        now_dt = self.now()
+        now = iso(now_dt)
+        rows = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE status IN ('QUEUED','CLAIMED','RUNNING')"
+        ).fetchall()
+        for row in rows:
+            deadline = parse_time(row["deadline"])
+            if deadline is not None and deadline <= now_dt:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE tasks SET status='EXPIRED',lease_token_hash=NULL,"
+                    "lease_expires_at=NULL,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                    (now, row["task_id"]),
+                )
+                self._event(connection, "TASK_EXPIRED", task_id=row["task_id"])
+                continue
+            if row["status"] in ACTIVE_LEASE_STATES:
+                lease_expires = parse_time(row["lease_expires_at"])
+                if lease_expires is not None and lease_expires <= now_dt:
+                    if row["attempt"] >= row["max_attempts"]:
+                        next_state = "FAILED"
+                    else:
+                        next_state = "QUEUED"
+                    if next_state == "FAILED":
+                        connection.execute(
+                            "UPDATE tasks SET status=?,lease_token_hash=NULL,"
+                            "lease_expires_at=NULL,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                            (next_state, now, row["task_id"]),
+                        )
+                    else:
+                        connection.execute(
+                            "UPDATE tasks SET status=?,claimed_by=NULL,lease_token_hash=NULL,"
+                            "lease_expires_at=NULL,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                            (next_state, now, row["task_id"]),
+                        )
+                    self._event(
+                        connection,
+                        "LEASE_EXPIRED",
+                        task_id=row["task_id"],
+                        agent_id=row["claimed_by"],
+                        payload={"next_state": next_state, "attempt": row["attempt"]},
+                    )
+
+    def expire_leases(self) -> int:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            before = connection.total_changes
+            self._expire_locked(connection)
+            changed = connection.total_changes - before
+            connection.commit()
+            return changed
+
+    def poll_tasks(self, *, agent_id: str, limit: int = 20) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if not 1 <= int(limit) <= 100:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("LIMIT_INVALID", 400)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._expire_locked(connection)
+            agent = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT capabilities_json FROM agents WHERE agent_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'",
+                (agent_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if agent is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("AGENT_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            capabilities = json.loads(agent["capabilities_json"])
+            rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE status='QUEUED' ORDER BY priority DESC,created_at ASC"
+            ).fetchall()
+            result = []
+            for row in rows:
+                required = json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"])
+                if has_capabilities(capabilities, required):
+                    result.append(self._row_task(row, include_result=False))
+                    if len(result) >= int(limit):
+                        break
+            connection.commit()
+            return result
+
+    def _agent_capabilities(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection, agent_id: str) -> set[str]:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT capabilities_json FROM agents WHERE agent_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'",
+            (agent_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("AGENT_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        return set(json.loads(row["capabilities_json"]))
+
+    def claim_task(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        lease_seconds: int = 300,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not isinstance(lease_seconds, int) or isinstance(lease_seconds, bool) or not 30 <= lease_seconds <= 3600:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("LEASE_SECONDS_INVALID", 400)
+        lease_token = "lease_" + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._expire_locked(connection)
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            if row["status"] != "QUEUED":
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_CLAIMABLE", 409)
+            capabilities = self._agent_capabilities(connection, agent_id)
+            required = json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"])
+            if not has_capabilities(capabilities, required):
+                raise TaskProtocolError("AGENT_CAPABILITY_MISMATCH", 403)
+            attempt = int(row["attempt"]) + 1
+            if attempt > int(row["max_attempts"]):
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_ATTEMPTS_EXHAUSTED", 409)
+            expires = self.now() + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)
+            now = iso(self.now())
+            updated = connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET status='CLAIMED',claimed_by=?,lease_token_hash=?,"
+                "lease_expires_at=?,attempt=?,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? "
+                "WHERE task_id=? AND status='QUEUED'",
+                (
+                    agent_id,
+                    self._token_hash(lease_token),
+                    iso(expires),
+                    attempt,
+                    now,
+                    task_id,
+                ),
+            )
+            if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_CLAIM_CONFLICT", 409)
+            self._event(
+                connection,
+                "TASK_CLAIMED",
+                task_id=task_id,
+                agent_id=agent_id,
+                payload={"attempt": attempt, "lease_expires_at": iso(expires)},
+            )
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                **self._row_task(row, include_result=False),
+                "lease_token": lease_token,
+                "lease_token_returned_once": True,
+            }
+
+    def _validate_lease(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        lease_token: str,
+        allowed_states: frozenset[str] = ACTIVE_LEASE_STATES,
+    ) -> sqlite3.Row:
+        self._expire_locked(connection)
+        row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        if row["status"] not in allowed_states:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE", 409)
+        if row["claimed_by"] != agent_id:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_LEASE_OWNER_MISMATCH", 403)
+        if not row["lease_token_hash"] or not hmac.compare_digest(
+            row["lease_token_hash"], self._token_hash(lease_token)
+        ):
+            raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_LEASE_TOKEN_INVALID", 403)
+        expires = parse_time(row["lease_expires_at"])
+        if expires is None or expires <= self.now():
+            raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_LEASE_EXPIRED", 409)
+        return row
+
+    def heartbeat(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        lease_token: str,
+        progress: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        lease_seconds: int = 300,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not 30 <= int(lease_seconds) <= 3600:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("LEASE_SECONDS_INVALID", 400)
+        progress_value = _json_object(progress, "progress", max_bytes=64 * 1024)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._validate_lease(
+                connection,
+                task_id=task_id,
+                agent_id=agent_id,
+                lease_token=lease_token,
+            )
+            expires = self.now() + timedelta(seconds=int(lease_seconds))
+            now = iso(self.now())
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET status='RUNNING',lease_expires_at=?,revision=revision+1,"
+                "updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                (iso(expires), now, task_id),
+            )
+            self._event(
+                connection,
+                "TASK_HEARTBEAT",
+                task_id=task_id,
+                agent_id=agent_id,
+                payload={"progress": progress_value, "lease_expires_at": iso(expires)},
+            )
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            connection.commit()
+            return self._row_task(row, include_result=False)
+
+    def submit_result(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        agent_id: str,
+        lease_token: str,
+        idempotency_key: str,
+        result: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        idempotency_key = idempotency_key.strip()
+        if not idempotency_key or len(idempotency_key) > 160:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", 400)
+        result_value = _json_object(result, "result", max_bytes=1024 * 1024)
+        result_digest = digest_json(result_value)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            if row["result_idempotency_key"] == idempotency_key:
+                if not row["result_digest"] or not hmac.compare_digest(row["result_digest"], result_digest):
+                    raise TaskProtocolError("IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {**self._row_task(row), "idempotent": True}
+            self._validate_lease(
+                connection,
+                task_id=task_id,
+                agent_id=agent_id,
+                lease_token=lease_token,
+            )
+            now = iso(self.now())
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET status='VERIFYING',result_json=?,result_digest=?,"
+                "result_idempotency_key=?,lease_token_hash=NULL,lease_expires_at=NULL,"
+                "revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                (
+                    canonical_json(result_value),
+                    result_digest,
+                    idempotency_key,
+                    now,
+                    task_id,
+                ),
+            )
+            self._event(
+                connection,
+                "RESULT_SUBMITTED",
+                task_id=task_id,
+                agent_id=agent_id,
+                payload={"result_digest": result_digest, "idempotency_key": idempotency_key},
+            )
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            connection.commit()
+            return self._row_task(row)
+
+    def verify_task(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        decision: str,
+        verification: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        decision = decision.strip().upper()
+        if decision not in VERIFY_DECISIONS:
+            raise TaskProtocolError("VERIFICATION_DECISION_INVALID", 400)
+        verification_value = _json_object(verification, "verification")
+        verification_value = {"decision": decision, **verification_value}
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            if row["status"] != "VERIFYING":
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_VERIFYING", 409)
+            if decision == "SUCCEEDED":
+                next_state = "SUCCEEDED"
+            elif decision == "FAILED":
+                next_state = "FAILED"
+            elif int(row["attempt"]) >= int(row["max_attempts"]):
+                next_state = "FAILED"
+                verification_value["reason"] = verification_value.get(
+                    "reason", "MAX_ATTEMPTS_EXHAUSTED"
+                )
+            else:
+                next_state = "QUEUED"
+            now = iso(self.now())
+            if next_state in {"SUCCEEDED", "FAILED"}:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE tasks SET status=?,lease_token_hash=NULL,"
+                    "lease_expires_at=NULL,verification_json=?,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? "
+                    "WHERE task_id=?",
+                    (next_state, canonical_json(verification_value), now, task_id),
+                )
+            else:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE tasks SET status=?,claimed_by=NULL,lease_token_hash=NULL,"
+                    "lease_expires_at=NULL,verification_json=?,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? "
+                    "WHERE task_id=?",
+                    (next_state, canonical_json(verification_value), now, task_id),
+                )
+            self._event(
+                connection,
+                "TASK_VERIFIED",
+                task_id=task_id,
+                agent_id=row["claimed_by"],
+                payload={"decision": decision, "next_state": next_state},
+            )
+            updated = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            connection.commit()
+            return self._row_task(updated)
+
+    def cancel_task(self, *, task_id: str, reason: str = "") -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            if row["status"] in TERMINAL_STATES:
+                connection.commit()
+                return self._row_task(row)
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET status='CANCELLED',lease_token_hash=NULL,"
+                "lease_expires_at=NULL,revision=revision+1,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                (iso(self.now()), task_id),
+            )
+            self._event(connection, "TASK_CANCELLED", task_id=task_id, payload={"reason": reason})
+            updated = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            connection.commit()
+            return self._row_task(updated)
+
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.expire_leases()
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise TaskProtocolError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            return self._row_task(row)
+
+    def get_events(self, task_id: str, *, limit: int = 200) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            rows = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM events WHERE task_id=? ORDER BY event_id DESC LIMIT ?",
+                (task_id, max(1, min(int(limit), 1000))),
+            ).fetchall()
+            return [
+                {
+                    "event_id": row["event_id"],
+                    "task_id": row["task_id"],
+                    "agent_id": row["agent_id"],
+                    "event_type": row["event_type"],
+                    "payload": json.loads(row["payload_json"]),
+                    "created_at": row["created_at"],
+                }
+                for row in reversed(rows)
+            ]

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+"""Owner-controlled, CAS-bound retry extension for exhausted Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV = "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID"
+
+
+class RetryExtensionError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _required_authorization_id() -> str:
+    value = os.environ.get(AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISSING")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _require_string(value: object, code: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    value = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RetryExtensionRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    expected_max_attempts: int
+    next_max_attempts: int
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "RetryExtensionRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status", "expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts",
+            "next_max_attempts", "previous_verification_sha256", "authorization_id", "idempotency_key",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        if status != "FAILED":
+            raise RetryExtensionError("EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID", 400)
+        ints: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for field in ("expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts", "next_max_attempts"):
+            item = value[field]
+            if not isinstance(item, int) or isinstance(item, bool) or item < 0:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_INTEGER_INVALID", 400)
+            ints[field] = item
+        if ints["expected_attempt"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"]:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_NOT_EXHAUSTED", 409)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"] + 1:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_MUST_BE_BOUNDED_ONE_STEP", 400)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] > 50:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_LIMIT_EXCEEDED", 400)
+        verification = _require_string(value["previous_verification_sha256"], "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID")
+        if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", verification) is None:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID", 400)
+        authorization = _require_string(value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        key = _require_string(value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            ints["expected_revision"],
+            ints["expected_attempt"],
+            ints["expected_max_attempts"],
+            ints["next_max_attempts"],
+            verification,
+            authorization,
+            key,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "expected_max_attempts": self.expected_max_attempts,
+            "next_max_attempts": self.next_max_attempts,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+        }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionStore:
+    """Owns the official mutation. Direct/manual DB edits remain forbidden."""
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(connection: sqlite3.Connection, table: str) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {str(row["name"]): row for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')}
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = {
+            row["name"]
+            for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")
+        }
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name not in tables:
+                continue
+            columns = RetryExtensionStore._columns(connection, name)
+            if "task_id" in columns and ("event_type" in columns or "type" in columns):
+                return name, columns
+        raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _verification_hash(raw: object) -> str:
+        if raw in (None, ""):
+            value: object = {}
+        elif isinstance(raw, str):
+            try:
+                value = json.loads(raw)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_VERIFICATION_INVALID", 409) from exc
+        else:
+            value = raw
+        return _sha(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_extension_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_retry_extensions (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_verification_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              next_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id, idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _insert_event(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = RetryExtensionStore._event_table(connection)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {"task_id": task_id}
+        if "event_type" in columns:
+            values["event_type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        else:
+            values["type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        payload_text = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "owner-control"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "owner-control"
+        names = list(values)
+        sql = f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({",".join(f"""\"{name}\"""" for name in names)}) VALUES ({",".join("?" for _ in names)})'
+        connection.execute(sql, tuple(values[name] for name in names))
+
+    def extend(self, task_id: str, request: RetryExtensionRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        required_authorization_id = _required_authorization_id()
+        if request.authorization_id != required_authorization_id:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        request_payload = request.public()
+        request_sha = _sha(request_payload)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_extension_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_retry_extensions WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                    "max_attempts": int(replay["next_max_attempts"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "previous_verification_sha256": replay["previous_verification_sha256"],
+                }
+
+            columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+            required = {
+                "task_id", "status", "attempt", "max_attempts", "revision", "claimed_by",
+                "lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at", "verification_json",
+            }
+            if not required.issubset(columns):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_SCHEMA_RETRY_EXTENSION_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+            task = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if task is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            actual_verification_sha = self._verification_hash(task["verification_json"])
+            if actual_verification_sha != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+            if (
+                task["status"] != request.expected_status
+                or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+                or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+                or int(task["max_attempts"]) != request.expected_max_attempts
+            ):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+            for lease_field in ("lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at"):
+                if lease_field in columns and task[lease_field] not in (None, ""):
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409)
+
+            previous_claimed_by = task["claimed_by"]
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE tasks
+                   SET status='QUEUED', max_attempts=?, revision=?, claimed_by=NULL,
+                       lease_token_hash=NULL, lease_expires_at=NULL
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=? AND max_attempts=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS ?
+                   AND lease_token_hash IS NULL AND lease_expires_at IS NULL
+                """,
+                (
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    previous_claimed_by,
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+            event_payload = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-retry-extension.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                "previous_max_attempts": request.expected_max_attempts,
+                "next_max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "previous_claimed_by": previous_claimed_by,
+                "stale_terminal_claim_normalized": previous_claimed_by not in (None, ""),
+            }
+            self._insert_event(connection, task_id, event_payload)
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_retry_extensions(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,previous_verification_sha256,
+                  previous_max_attempts,next_max_attempts,expected_revision,applied_revision,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "idempotent": False,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+            }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: RetryExtensionStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        data = json.dumps(dict(value), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.control_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        )
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self._json({"status": "ok", "service": "aios-agent-task-retry-extension"}, 200)
+        else:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/retry-extension", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            self._json({"error": "CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID"}, 400)
+            return
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID"}, 413)
+            return
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError
+            request = RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            if self.store is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            result = self.store.extend(match.group(1), request)
+            self._json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except RetryExtensionError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def load_control_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    _required_authorization_id()
+    token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials")) / "agent_task_control_token"),
+        )
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT", "18941"))
+    RetryExtensionHandler.store = RetryExtensionStore(db)
+    RetryExtensionHandler.control_token = load_control_token(token_path)
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), RetryExtensionHandler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_supervisor_coordinator_projection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,655 @@
+"""CAS-bound projection from an unprivileged planner to a host coordinator."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+from aios_agent_task_initial_execution_projection import (
+    InitialExecutionProjectionError,
+    InitialExecutionProjectionStore,
+    JOB_RE,
+    KEY_RE,
+    MAX_BODY,
+    SHA_RE,
+    TASK_RE,
+    _canonical,
+    _now,
+    _required_authorization_id,
+    _require_string,
+    _sha,
+    load_control_token,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+
+RUNTIME_CAPABILITY = "agent.runtime.openclaw"
+COORDINATOR_CAPABILITY = "engineering.autonomous"
+COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES = [RUNTIME_CAPABILITY, COORDINATOR_CAPABILITY]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    expected_metadata_sha256: str
+    expected_required_capabilities_sha256: str
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    expected_planner_result_sha256: str
+    expected_old_execution_digest: str
+    expected_new_execution_digest: str
+    expected_job_id: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    reason: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(
+        cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]
+    ) -> "SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status",
+            "expected_revision",
+            "expected_attempt",
+            "expected_metadata_sha256",
+            "expected_required_capabilities_sha256",
+            "previous_verification_sha256",
+            "expected_planner_result_sha256",
+            "expected_old_execution_digest",
+            "expected_new_execution_digest",
+            "expected_job_id",
+            "authorization_id",
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "reason",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400
+            )
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        revision = value["expected_revision"]
+        attempt = value["expected_attempt"]
+        if (
+            status != "QUEUED"
+            or not isinstance(revision, int)
+            or isinstance(revision, bool)
+            or revision < 2
+            or not isinstance(attempt, int)
+            or isinstance(attempt, bool)
+            or attempt < 1
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_STATE_INVALID", 400
+            )
+        names = (
+            "expected_metadata_sha256",
+            "expected_required_capabilities_sha256",
+            "previous_verification_sha256",
+            "expected_planner_result_sha256",
+            "expected_old_execution_digest",
+            "expected_new_execution_digest",
+        )
+        digests = {
+            name: _require_string(value[name], name.upper() + "_INVALID", SHA_RE)
+            for name in names
+        }
+        job_id = _require_string(value["expected_job_id"], "JOB_ID_INVALID", JOB_RE)
+        authorization_id = _require_string(
+            value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE
+        )
+        idempotency_key = _require_string(
+            value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE
+        )
+        reason = _require_string(value["reason"], "PROJECTION_REASON_INVALID")
+        if len(reason) > 512:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("PROJECTION_REASON_INVALID", 400)
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            revision,
+            attempt,
+            digests["expected_metadata_sha256"],
+            digests["expected_required_capabilities_sha256"],
+            digests["previous_verification_sha256"],
+            digests["expected_planner_result_sha256"],
+            digests["expected_old_execution_digest"],
+            digests["expected_new_execution_digest"],
+            job_id,
+            authorization_id,
+            idempotency_key,
+            reason,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "expected_metadata_sha256": self.expected_metadata_sha256,
+            "expected_required_capabilities_sha256": self.expected_required_capabilities_sha256,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "expected_planner_result_sha256": self.expected_planner_result_sha256,
+            "expected_old_execution_digest": self.expected_old_execution_digest,
+            "expected_new_execution_digest": self.expected_new_execution_digest,
+            "expected_job_id": self.expected_job_id,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+        }
+
+
+class CanonicalCoordinatorExecutionResolver:
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, control_token: str) -> None:
+        self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token = control_token
+
+    def __call__(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        expected_job_id: str,
+        runtime_input: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "job_id": expected_job_id,
+            "required_capabilities": COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES,
+            "execution": {
+                "action": "agent_runtime",
+                "adapter": "openclaw",
+                "capability_scope": COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES,
+                "runtime_input": dict(runtime_input),
+            },
+        }
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.base_url + "/v2/execution-envelope",
+            method="POST",
+            data=_canonical(body),
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self.control_token,
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                raw, status = response.read(), response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw, status = exc.read(), exc.code
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "CANONICAL_COORDINATOR_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502
+            ) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "CANONICAL_COORDINATOR_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502
+            )
+        if status != 200:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                str(value.get("error") or "CANONICAL_COORDINATOR_EXECUTION_FAILED"),
+                502 if status >= 500 else 409,
+            )
+        return dict(value)
+
+
+class SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionStore(InitialExecutionProjectionStore):
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path: Path,
+        resolver: Callable[[str, str, Mapping[str, Any]], Mapping[str, Any]],
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(db_path, resolver)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        self.coordinator_resolver = resolver
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_supervisor_coordinator_projections (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              expected_job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              planner_result_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              old_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              new_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id,idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _planner_event_chain(
+        cls, connection: sqlite3.Connection, task_id: str
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = cls._event_table(connection)
+        ordering = "event_id" if "event_id" in columns else "rowid"
+        rows = connection.execute(
+            f'SELECT event_type,payload_json FROM "{table}" '
+            f'WHERE task_id=? ORDER BY {ordering}',
+            (task_id,),
+        ).fetchall()
+        events = [str(row[0]) for row in rows]
+        try:
+            projection = len(events) - 1 - events[::-1].index(
+                "TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZED"
+            )
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_PROJECTION_EVENT_MISSING", 409
+            ) from exc
+        tail = events[projection + 1 :]
+        if (
+            len(tail) < 4
+            or tail[0] != "TASK_CLAIMED"
+            or tail.count("TASK_CLAIMED") != 1
+            or tail.count("RESULT_SUBMITTED") != 1
+            or tail.count("TASK_VERIFIED") != 1
+            or tail[-1] != "TASK_VERIFIED"
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_EVENT_CHAIN_INVALID", 409
+            )
+        result = tail.index("RESULT_SUBMITTED")
+        if (
+            not any(event == "TASK_HEARTBEAT" for event in tail[1:result])
+            or any(
+                event not in {
+                    "TASK_CLAIMED",
+                    "TASK_HEARTBEAT",
+                    "RESULT_SUBMITTED",
+                    "TASK_VERIFIED",
+                }
+                for event in tail
+            )
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_EVENT_CHAIN_INVALID", 409
+            )
+        verification_event = json.loads(rows[-1][1])
+        if (
+            verification_event.get("decision") != "NEEDS_REWORK"
+            or verification_event.get("next_state") != "QUEUED"
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_NEEDS_REWORK_EVENT_REQUIRED", 409
+            )
+
+    def _load(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionRequest,
+    ) -> tuple[sqlite3.Row, dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        if task is None:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        if (
+            task["status"] != request.expected_status
+            or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+            or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409
+            )
+        if (
+            task["claimed_by"] not in (None, "")
+            or task["lease_token_hash"] not in (None, "")
+            or task["lease_expires_at"] not in (None, "")
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409
+            )
+        metadata = self._json_value(task["metadata_json"], "TASK_METADATA_INVALID")
+        capabilities = self._json_value(
+            task["required_capabilities_json"], "TASK_CAPABILITIES_INVALID"
+        )
+        result = self._json_value(task["result_json"], "PLANNER_RESULT_INVALID")
+        verification = self._json_value(
+            task["verification_json"], "PLANNER_VERIFICATION_INVALID"
+        )
+        if (
+            not isinstance(metadata, Mapping)
+            or not isinstance(capabilities, list)
+            or not isinstance(result, Mapping)
+            or not isinstance(verification, Mapping)
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_STATE_INVALID", 409
+            )
+        metadata, result, verification = dict(metadata), dict(result), dict(verification)
+        if _sha(metadata) != request.expected_metadata_sha256:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("TASK_METADATA_DRIFT", 409)
+        if _sha(capabilities) != request.expected_required_capabilities_sha256:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("TASK_CAPABILITIES_DRIFT", 409)
+        if _sha(result) != request.expected_planner_result_sha256:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("PLANNER_RESULT_DRIFT", 409)
+        if _sha(verification) != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("PLANNER_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+        old = metadata.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(old, Mapping):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("TASK_EXECUTION_METADATA_MISSING", 409)
+        old_execution = validate_execution_envelope(dict(old))
+        if (
+            old_execution.get("action") != "agent_runtime"
+            or old_execution.get("adapter") != "openclaw"
+            or old_execution.get("capability_scope") != [RUNTIME_CAPABILITY]
+            or old_execution.get("execution_digest")
+            != request.expected_old_execution_digest
+            or capabilities != [RUNTIME_CAPABILITY]
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_EXECUTION_CONTRACT_INVALID", 409
+            )
+        expected_result = {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "job_id": request.expected_job_id,
+            "status": "SUCCEEDED",
+            "execution_mode": "agent_runtime",
+            "agent_runtime": "openclaw",
+            "execution_digest": request.expected_old_execution_digest,
+            "control_plane_access_granted_to_runtime": False,
+            "credential_material_exposed": False,
+            "secret_material_exposed": False,
+            "changed_files": [],
+            "writer_lease": "NONE",
+            "direct_main_write": False,
+            "production_write": False,
+            "force_push": False,
+            "protected_ref_bypass": False,
+        }
+        if any(result.get(name) != expected for name, expected in expected_result.items()):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_RESULT_CONTRACT_INVALID", 409
+            )
+        if verification.get("decision") != "NEEDS_REWORK":
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_NEEDS_REWORK_REQUIRED", 409
+            )
+        self._planner_event_chain(connection, task_id)
+        return task, metadata, result
+
+    def project(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionRequest,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        if request.authorization_id != _required_authorization_id():
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        request_sha = _sha(request.public())
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._ensure_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_supervisor_coordinator_projections "
+                "WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": replay["attempt"],
+                    "revision": replay["applied_revision"],
+                    "execution_digest": replay["new_execution_digest"],
+                    "required_capabilities": COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES,
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            task, _, result = self._load(connection, task_id, request)
+            runtime_input = self._runtime_input(task)
+        resolved = dict(
+            self.coordinator_resolver(task_id, request.expected_job_id, runtime_input)
+        )
+        binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(resolved)
+        if binding.task_id != task_id or binding.job_id != request.expected_job_id:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("GOVERNED_BINDING_CONFLICT", 409)
+        result_binding = {
+            name: result.get(name)
+            for name in (
+                "task_id",
+                "job_id",
+                "repository",
+                "base_oid",
+                "expected_branch_oid",
+                "target_branch",
+                "generation",
+            )
+        }
+        expected_binding = {
+            "task_id": binding.task_id,
+            "job_id": binding.job_id,
+            "repository": binding.repository,
+            "base_oid": binding.base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": binding.expected_branch_oid,
+            "target_branch": binding.target_branch,
+            "generation": binding.generation,
+        }
+        if result_binding != expected_binding:
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_PLANNER_BINDING_CONFLICT", 409
+            )
+        execution = validate_execution_envelope(resolved, binding=binding)
+        if (
+            execution.get("action") != "agent_runtime"
+            or execution.get("adapter") != "openclaw"
+            or execution.get("capability_scope") != COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES
+            or execution.get("change_set") != []
+            or execution.get("verification") != []
+            or execution.get("governance", {}).get("writer_lease") is not False
+            or execution.get("execution_digest") != request.expected_new_execution_digest
+        ):
+            raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_ENVELOPE_INVALID", 409
+            )
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_table(connection)
+            task, metadata, _ = self._load(connection, task_id, request)
+            new_metadata = dict(metadata)
+            new_metadata["execution"] = execution
+            new_metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+                "schema": "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "job_id": request.expected_job_id,
+                "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+            }
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE tasks SET metadata_json=?,required_capabilities_json=?,
+                    revision=?,updated_at=?
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS NULL AND lease_token_hash IS NULL
+                   AND lease_expires_at IS NULL AND metadata_json=?
+                   AND required_capabilities_json=? AND result_json=?
+                   AND verification_json=?
+                """,
+                (
+                    json.dumps(new_metadata, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    json.dumps(COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    applied_revision,
+                    _now(),
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    task["metadata_json"],
+                    task["required_capabilities_json"],
+                    task["result_json"],
+                    task["verification_json"],
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise InitialExecutionProjectionError(
+                    "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409
+                )
+            event = {
+                "schema": "aios.supervisor-coordinator-projection.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "job_id": request.expected_job_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "reason": request.reason,
+                "old_execution_digest": request.expected_old_execution_digest,
+                "new_execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+                "required_capabilities": COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES,
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "credential_forwarded_to_planner": False,
+                "writer_lease": False,
+                "main_write": False,
+                "production_write": False,
+            }
+            table, columns = self._event_table(connection)
+            values = {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "event_type": "TASK_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZED",
+                "payload_json": json.dumps(event, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                "created_at": _now(),
+                "agent_id": "owner-control",
+            }
+            names = [name for name in values if name in columns]
+            connection.execute(
+                f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({",".join(chr(34)+name+chr(34) for name in names)}) '
+                f'VALUES ({",".join("?" for _ in names)})',
+                tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_supervisor_coordinator_projections(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,
+                  expected_job_id,planner_result_sha256,old_execution_digest,
+                  new_execution_digest,expected_revision,applied_revision,
+                  attempt,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.expected_job_id,
+                    request.expected_planner_result_sha256,
+                    request.expected_old_execution_digest,
+                    execution["execution_digest"],
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+                "required_capabilities": COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES,
+                "credential_forwarded_to_planner": False,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def send_json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        raw = _canonical(dict(value))
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(raw)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self.send_json(
+                {"status": "ok", "service": "aios-supervisor-coordinator-projection"},
+                200,
+            )
+        else:
+            self.send_json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(
+            r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/supervisor-coordinator-projection", self.path
+        )
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        if match is None:
+            self.send_json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if (
+            not header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            or not hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        ):
+            self.send_json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+            if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+                raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID", 413)
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or self.store is None:
+                raise InitialExecutionProjectionError("REQUEST_INVALID", 400)
+            request = SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            result = self.store.project(match.group(1), request)
+            self.send_json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except InitialExecutionProjectionError as exc:
+            self.send_json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+            self.send_json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    credential = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(
+                Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+                / "agent_task_control_token"
+            ),
+        )
+    )
+    token = load_control_token(credential)
+    bridge = os.environ.get("AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18892")
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    Handler.control_token = token
+    Handler.store = SupervisorCoordinatorProjectionStore(
+        db, CanonicalCoordinatorExecutionResolver(bridge, token)
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_PORT", "18944"))
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), Handler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_all_modified_files_packager.py

@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Canonical AIOS all-modified-files evidence packager.
+
+The bundle contract is intentionally compatible with the historical
+aios_package_all_modified_files_v1.sh output while keeping secret scanning in
+version-controlled, tested code.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import zipfile
+from typing import Iterable
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+
+# A PEM private-key finding requires the complete PEM header. Source code,
+# tests, docs, or error text containing only "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY" are not
+# credentials and must not be rejected.
+PEM_PRIVATE_KEY_RE = re.compile(
+    rb"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+BEARER_RE = re.compile(
+    rb"authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+KEY_VALUE_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
+    rb"(?:password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*[^\s,;]{12,}",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+
+DOCUMENT_SUFFIXES = {".md", ".rst", ".adoc", ".txt"}
+DOCUMENT_PREFIXES = (
+    "README",
+    "CHANGELOG",
+    "RUNBOOK",
+    "ADR",
+    "ARCHITECTURE",
+    "DEPLOYMENT",
+    "TROUBLESHOOTING",
+)
+
+
+class PackagerError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def secret_finding(data: bytes) -> str | None:
+    if PEM_PRIVATE_KEY_RE.search(data):
+        return "PEM_PRIVATE_KEY"
+    if BEARER_RE.search(data):
+        return "AUTHORIZATION_BEARER"
+    if KEY_VALUE_SECRET_RE.search(data):
+        return "KEY_VALUE_SECRET"
+    return None
+
+
+def scan_secret(data: bytes, label: str) -> None:
+    finding = secret_finding(data)
+    if finding is not None:
+        raise PackagerError(
+            f"MODIFIED_FILES_SECRET_SCAN_MATCH:{finding}:{label}"
+        )
+
+
+def git_bytes(git_dir: Path, oid: str, path: str) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return subprocess.check_output(
+            [
+                "/usr/bin/git",
+                f"--git-dir={git_dir}",
+                "show",
+                f"{oid}:{path}",
+            ],
+            timeout=30,
+        )
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc:
+        raise PackagerError(
+            "MODIFIED_FILES_GIT_SHOW_FAILED:" + path
+        ) from exc
+
+
+def git_text(git_dir: Path, *args: str) -> str:
+    try:
+        return subprocess.check_output(
+            ["/usr/bin/git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
+            text=True,
+            timeout=30,
+        )
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc:
+        raise PackagerError(
+            "MODIFIED_FILES_GIT_COMMAND_FAILED:" + " ".join(args)
+        ) from exc
+
+
+def validate_lineage(git_dir: Path, base: str, candidate: str) -> None:
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(base) is None or OID_RE.fullmatch(candidate) is None:
+        raise PackagerError("MODIFIED_FILES_OID_INVALID")
+    for oid in (base, candidate):
+        try:
+            subprocess.run(
+                [
+                    "/usr/bin/git",
+                    f"--git-dir={git_dir}",
+                    "cat-file",
+                    "-e",
+                    f"{oid}^{{commit}}",
+                ],
+                check=True,
+                timeout=30,
+            )
+        except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc:
+            raise PackagerError("MODIFIED_FILES_COMMIT_MISSING:" + oid) from exc
+    if subprocess.run(
+        [
+            "/usr/bin/git",
+            f"--git-dir={git_dir}",
+            "merge-base",
+            "--is-ancestor",
+            base,
+            candidate,
+        ],
+        check=False,
+        timeout=30,
+    ).returncode != 0:
+        raise PackagerError("MODIFIED_FILES_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+
+
+def safe_destination(root: Path, relative: str) -> Path:
+    path = Path(relative)
+    if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
+        raise PackagerError("MODIFIED_FILE_PATH_INVALID:" + relative)
+    destination = root / path
+    destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    return destination
+
+
+def is_document_path(path: str) -> bool:
+    value = Path(path)
+    if path.startswith("docs/"):
+        return True
+    if value.suffix.lower() in DOCUMENT_SUFFIXES:
+        return True
+    upper = value.name.upper()
+    return any(upper.startswith(prefix) for prefix in DOCUMENT_PREFIXES)
+
+
+def diff_entries(
+    git_dir: Path,
+    base: str,
+    candidate: str,
+    before_root: Path,
+    after_root: Path,
+) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
+    raw = git_text(
+        git_dir,
+        "diff",
+        "--name-status",
+        "-M",
+        "-C",
+        base,
+        candidate,
+    )
+    entries: list[dict[str, object]] = []
+    for line in raw.splitlines():
+        if not line.strip():
+            continue
+        parts = line.split("\t")
+        status = parts[0]
+        code = status[0]
+        old_path: str | None = None
+        new_path: str | None = None
+        if code in {"R", "C"}:
+            if len(parts) != 3:
+                raise PackagerError(
+                    "MODIFIED_FILES_DIFF_PARSE_INVALID:" + line
+                )
+            old_path, new_path = parts[1], parts[2]
+        else:
+            if len(parts) != 2:
+                raise PackagerError(
+                    "MODIFIED_FILES_DIFF_PARSE_INVALID:" + line
+                )
+            new_path = parts[1] if code != "D" else None
+            old_path = parts[1] if code != "A" else None
+
+        entry: dict[str, object] = {"status": status}
+        if old_path is not None:
+            entry["previous_path"] = old_path
+            before = git_bytes(git_dir, base, old_path)
+            scan_secret(before, "before:" + old_path)
+            safe_destination(before_root, old_path).write_bytes(before)
+            entry["before_sha256"] = sha256(before)
+            entry["before_bytes"] = len(before)
+        if new_path is not None:
+            entry["path"] = new_path
+            after = git_bytes(git_dir, candidate, new_path)
+            scan_secret(after, "after:" + new_path)
+            safe_destination(after_root, new_path).write_bytes(after)
+            entry["after_sha256"] = sha256(after)
+            entry["after_bytes"] = len(after)
+        entry["deleted"] = code == "D"
+        entry["added"] = code == "A"
+        entry["renamed"] = code == "R"
+        entry["copied"] = code == "C"
+        entries.append(entry)
+    return entries
+
+
+def execution_entries(
+    extra_root: Path | None,
+    execution_root: Path,
+) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
+    if extra_root is None or not extra_root.exists():
+        return []
+    if extra_root.is_symlink() or not extra_root.is_dir():
+        raise PackagerError("EXTRA_FILES_DIR_INVALID")
+
+    entries: list[dict[str, object]] = []
+    for path in sorted(extra_root.rglob("*")):
+        if path.is_symlink():
+            raise PackagerError(
+                "EXTRA_FILE_SYMLINK_REJECTED:" + str(path)
+            )
+        if not path.is_file():
+            continue
+        relative = path.relative_to(extra_root).as_posix()
+        data = path.read_bytes()
+        scan_secret(data, "execution:" + relative)
+        safe_destination(execution_root, relative).write_bytes(data)
+        entries.append(
+            {
+                "path": relative,
+                "sha256": sha256(data),
+                "bytes": len(data),
+            }
+        )
+    return entries
+
+
+def write_checksums(bundle: Path) -> None:
+    checks: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    for path in sorted(bundle.rglob("*")):
+        if path.is_file() and path.name != "checksums.sha256":
+            checks.append(
+                (
+                    sha256(path.read_bytes()),
+                    path.relative_to(bundle).as_posix(),
+                )
+            )
+    (bundle / "checksums.sha256").write_text(
+        "".join(f"{digest}  {name}\n" for digest, name in checks),
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+
+def verify_checksums(bundle: Path) -> None:
+    checksum_path = bundle / "checksums.sha256"
+    for line in checksum_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+        digest, relative = line.split("  ", 1)
+        path = bundle / relative
+        if not path.is_file() or sha256(path.read_bytes()) != digest:
+            raise PackagerError(
+                "MODIFIED_FILES_CHECKSUM_CLOSURE_INVALID:" + relative
+            )
+
+
+def build_bundle(
+    *,
+    git_dir: Path,
+    base: str,
+    candidate: str,
+    task_id: str,
+    extra_dir: Path | None = None,
+    output_root: Path | None = None,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    if TASK_RE.fullmatch(task_id) is None:
+        raise PackagerError("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    validate_lineage(git_dir, base, candidate)
+
+    timestamp = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).strftime(
+        "%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ"
+    )
+    safe_task = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+", "-", task_id).strip("-")
+    if output_root is None:
+        output_root = Path(
+            tempfile.mkdtemp(
+                prefix=f"aios-modified-files-bundle-{safe_task}-{timestamp}-",
+                dir="/var/tmp",
+            )
+        )
+    else:
+        output_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    bundle = output_root / "bundle"
+    before_root = bundle / "repo" / "before"
+    after_root = bundle / "repo" / "after"
+    execution_root = bundle / "execution"
+    before_root.mkdir(parents=True)
+    after_root.mkdir(parents=True)
+    execution_root.mkdir(parents=True)
+
+    changes = diff_entries(
+        git_dir,
+        base,
+        candidate,
+        before_root,
+        after_root,
+    )
+    execution_files = execution_entries(extra_dir, execution_root)
+
+    document_changes = [
+        entry
+        for entry in changes
+        if is_document_path(
+            str(entry.get("path") or entry.get("previous_path") or "")
+        )
+    ]
+    execution_documents = [
+        entry
+        for entry in execution_files
+        if is_document_path(str(entry["path"]))
+    ]
+
+    documents_index = {
+        "schema": "aios.modified-documents.index.v1",
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "base_oid": base,
+        "candidate_oid": candidate,
+        "repository_documents": document_changes,
+        "execution_documents": execution_documents,
+        "repository_document_count": len(document_changes),
+        "execution_document_count": len(execution_documents),
+    }
+    (bundle / "documents-index.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps(documents_index, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    manifest = {
+        "schema": "aios.all-modified-files.bundle.v1",
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "base_oid": base,
+        "candidate_oid": candidate,
+        "generated_at": (
+            now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        ).isoformat(),
+        "changed_file_count": len(changes),
+        "execution_file_count": len(execution_files),
+        "repository_document_count": len(document_changes),
+        "execution_document_count": len(execution_documents),
+        "changes": changes,
+        "execution_files": execution_files,
+    }
+    (bundle / "all-modified-files-manifest.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps(manifest, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    write_checksums(bundle)
+    verify_checksums(bundle)
+
+    zip_name = (
+        f"AIOS_{task_id}_ALL_MODIFIED_FILES_{candidate[:12]}.zip"
+        .replace("/", "-")
+    )
+    zip_path = output_root / zip_name
+    with zipfile.ZipFile(
+        zip_path,
+        "w",
+        compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED,
+    ) as archive:
+        for path in sorted(bundle.rglob("*")):
+            if path.is_symlink():
+                raise PackagerError(
+                    "BUNDLE_SYMLINK_REJECTED:" + str(path)
+                )
+            if path.is_file():
+                archive.write(
+                    path,
+                    arcname=path.relative_to(bundle).as_posix(),
+                )
+
+    zip_sha = sha256(zip_path.read_bytes())
+    summary = {
+        "schema": "aios.all-modified-files.bundle-summary.v1",
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "base_oid": base,
+        "candidate_oid": candidate,
+        "bundle_path": str(zip_path),
+        "bundle_sha256": zip_sha,
+        "changed_file_count": len(changes),
+        "execution_file_count": len(execution_files),
+        "repository_document_count": len(document_changes),
+        "execution_document_count": len(execution_documents),
+    }
+    (output_root / "ALL_MODIFIED_FILES_BUNDLE.json").write_text(
+        json.dumps(summary, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    return summary
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("base")
+    parser.add_argument("candidate")
+    parser.add_argument("task_id")
+    parser.add_argument("extra_dir", nargs="?")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--authority-git-dir",
+        default=os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR",
+            "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+        ),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("--output-root")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    try:
+        summary = build_bundle(
+            git_dir=Path(args.authority_git_dir),
+            base=args.base,
+            candidate=args.candidate,
+            task_id=args.task_id,
+            extra_dir=Path(args.extra_dir) if args.extra_dir else None,
+            output_root=(
+                Path(args.output_root) if args.output_root else None
+            ),
+        )
+    except PackagerError as exc:
+        print("FATAL:" + str(exc))
+        return 20
+
+    print("ALL_MODIFIED_FILES_BUNDLE=PASS")
+    print("ALL_MODIFIED_FILES_BUNDLE_PATH=" + str(summary["bundle_path"]))
+    print("ALL_MODIFIED_FILES_BUNDLE_SHA256=" + str(summary["bundle_sha256"]))
+    print("CHANGED_FILE_COUNT=" + str(summary["changed_file_count"]))
+    print("EXECUTION_FILE_COUNT=" + str(summary["execution_file_count"]))
+    print(
+        "REPOSITORY_DOCUMENT_COUNT="
+        + str(summary["repository_document_count"])
+    )
+    print(
+        "EXECUTION_DOCUMENT_COUNT="
+        + str(summary["execution_document_count"])
+    )
+    print(
+        "ALL_MODIFIED_FILES_EVIDENCE="
+        + str(Path(str(summary["bundle_path"])).parent)
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_authority_git_executor.py

@@ -94,6 +94,91 @@ class AuthorityGitExecutor:
         self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(path), base_oid])
         return path
 
+    def recover_failed_detached_worktree_exact(
+        self,
+        *,
+        path: Path,
+        expected_oid: str,
+        stale_oid: str,
+        target_ref: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        """Recreate one exact clean, detached, single-attempt worktree at its durable head."""
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(stale_oid, "stale_oid")
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(target_ref):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        if self.read_ref(target_ref) is not None:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        if (
+            not path.is_absolute()
+            or path.parent != self.worktree_root
+            or path.name in {"", ".", ".."}
+            or path.is_symlink()
+            or not path.is_dir()
+        ):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+        head = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if head.returncode != 0 or head.stdout.strip() != stale_oid or stale_oid == expected_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_HEAD_INVALID")
+        symbolic = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if symbolic.returncode != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_NOT_DETACHED")
+        status = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "status", "--porcelain=v1", "--untracked-files=all"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if status.returncode != 0 or status.stdout:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_NOT_CLEAN")
+        parents = self._git(["rev-list", "--parents", "-n", "1", stale_oid]).split()
+        if parents != [stale_oid, expected_oid]:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+        registered = [
+            line.removeprefix("worktree ")
+            for line in self._git(["worktree", "list", "--porcelain"]).splitlines()
+            if line.startswith("worktree ")
+        ]
+        if registered.count(str(path)) != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_REGISTRATION_INVALID")
+        self._git(["worktree", "remove", "--force", str(path)])
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_REMOVE_FAILED")
+        recreated = self.create_detached_worktree(expected_oid, path.name, path.parent)
+        readback = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(recreated), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        detached = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(recreated), "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if readback.returncode != 0 or readback.stdout.strip() != expected_oid or detached.returncode != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return stale_oid
+
+    def create_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_base_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        _oid(expected_base_oid, "expected_base_oid")
+        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        current = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if current is not None:
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return new_oid
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_base_oid, new_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        self._git(["update-ref", branch, new_oid, "0" * 40])
+        readback = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
     def advance_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
         if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
             raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")

active-runtime/app/aios_autonomous_control_plane.py

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+"""Unified autonomous control-plane primitives.
+
+This is deliberately a library, not another daemon. Task API, workers and host
+recovery code consume the same Admission -> Invariant -> Repair semantics.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from enum import Enum
+import re
+from typing import Callable, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+from aios_capability_contract import (
+    capability_contract,
+    has_capabilities,
+    normalize_required_capabilities,
+    normalize_worker_capabilities,
+    registered_capability,
+    validate_capability_contract_registry,
+)
+
+
+class FailureClass(str, Enum):
+    CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_ERROR = "CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_ERROR"
+    CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_ERROR = "CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_ERROR"
+    DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE = "DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE"
+    POLICY_DENIED = "POLICY_DENIED"
+    RESOURCE_UNAVAILABLE = "RESOURCE_UNAVAILABLE"
+    WORKER_CRASH = "WORKER_CRASH"
+    LEASE_LOST = "LEASE_LOST"
+    BUSINESS_PERMANENT = "BUSINESS_PERMANENT"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+
+
+class RepairLevel(int, Enum):
+    AUTO_LOCAL = 0
+    AUTO_REPAIR_TASK = 1
+    OWNER_APPROVAL = 2
+    MANUAL = 3
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class InvariantResult:
+    name: str
+    passed: bool
+    detail: str = ""
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AdmissionDecision:
+    admitted: bool
+    state: str
+    invariants: tuple[InvariantResult, ...]
+    failure_class: FailureClass | None = None
+    repair_level: RepairLevel | None = None
+    repair_action: str | None = None
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.runtime-admission.decision.v1",
+            "admitted": self.admitted,
+            "state": self.state,
+            "invariants": [item.as_dict() for item in self.invariants],
+            "failure_class": None if self.failure_class is None else self.failure_class.value,
+            "repair_level": None if self.repair_level is None else int(self.repair_level),
+            "repair_action": self.repair_action,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RepairDecision:
+    failure_class: FailureClass
+    level: RepairLevel
+    action: str
+    consumes_business_attempt: bool
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "failure_class": self.failure_class.value,
+            "level": int(self.level),
+            "action": self.action,
+            "consumes_business_attempt": self.consumes_business_attempt,
+        }
+
+
+def classify_failure(error: object, *, phase: str = "") -> FailureClass:
+    text = (str(error) + " " + str(phase)).lower()
+    if any(token in text for token in (
+        "credential", "permission denied", "token registry", "secret", "unauthorized"
+    )):
+        return FailureClass.CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_ERROR
+    if any(token in text for token in (
+        "transport", "unavailable", "timeout", "connection", "bad gateway", "http_5"
+    )):
+        return FailureClass.DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE
+    if any(token in text for token in (
+        "capability", "eligible", "matcher", "contract"
+    )):
+        return FailureClass.CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_ERROR
+    if any(token in text for token in (
+        "policy", "forbidden", "approval required", "not authorized"
+    )):
+        return FailureClass.POLICY_DENIED
+    if any(token in text for token in ("lease lost", "lease_expired", "heartbeat_failed")):
+        return FailureClass.LEASE_LOST
+    if any(token in text for token in ("out of memory", "disk full", "resource")):
+        return FailureClass.RESOURCE_UNAVAILABLE
+    if any(token in text for token in ("worker crash", "process exited", "signal")):
+        return FailureClass.WORKER_CRASH
+    if any(token in text for token in ("invalid release", "business permanent")):
+        return FailureClass.BUSINESS_PERMANENT
+    return FailureClass.UNKNOWN
+
+
+def repair_for_failure(failure: FailureClass) -> RepairDecision:
+    table = {
+        FailureClass.CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_ERROR: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.AUTO_REPAIR_TASK,
+            "create_same_lineage_capability_contract_repair", False,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_ERROR: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.AUTO_REPAIR_TASK,
+            "restore_service_private_credential_projection", False,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.AUTO_LOCAL,
+            "retry_dependency_health_and_resume", False,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.RESOURCE_UNAVAILABLE: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.AUTO_LOCAL,
+            "heal_runtime_resource_and_resume", False,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.WORKER_CRASH: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.AUTO_LOCAL,
+            "restart_worker_and_resume_same_lineage", False,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.LEASE_LOST: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.AUTO_LOCAL,
+            "recover_lease_and_resume_same_lineage", False,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.POLICY_DENIED: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.OWNER_APPROVAL,
+            "request_bound_owner_authorization", False,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.BUSINESS_PERMANENT: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.MANUAL,
+            "terminal_business_failure", True,
+        ),
+        FailureClass.UNKNOWN: RepairDecision(
+            failure, RepairLevel.AUTO_REPAIR_TASK,
+            "create_diagnostic_repair_task", False,
+        ),
+    }
+    return table[failure]
+
+
+def _probe(
+    name: str,
+    probes: Mapping[str, Callable[[], bool]],
+) -> InvariantResult:
+    fn = probes.get(name)
+    if fn is None:
+        return InvariantResult(name, False, "PROBE_MISSING")
+    try:
+        passed = bool(fn())
+    except Exception as exc:
+        return InvariantResult(name, False, "PROBE_ERROR:" + type(exc).__name__)
+    return InvariantResult(name, passed, "PASS" if passed else "NOT_READY")
+
+
+def runtime_admission(
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    requested_operations: Sequence[str] = (),
+    probes: Mapping[str, Callable[[], bool]] | None = None,
+) -> AdmissionDecision:
+    """Admission is evaluated before claim; failures do not consume attempts."""
+
+    worker_values = tuple(worker_capabilities)
+    required_values = tuple(required_capabilities)
+    probe_map = probes or {}
+    invariants: list[InvariantResult] = []
+
+    registry = validate_capability_contract_registry()
+    invariants.append(InvariantResult(
+        "capability_contract_registry",
+        bool(registry.get("valid")),
+        "PASS" if registry.get("valid") else "REGISTRY_INVALID",
+    ))
+
+    task_known = all(registered_capability(item) for item in required_values)
+    worker_known = all(registered_capability(item, worker=True) for item in worker_values)
+    invariants.extend((
+        InvariantResult("task_capabilities_registered", task_known, "PASS" if task_known else "UNKNOWN_TASK_CAPABILITY"),
+        InvariantResult("worker_capabilities_registered", worker_known, "PASS" if worker_known else "UNKNOWN_WORKER_CAPABILITY"),
+    ))
+
+    capability_match = (
+        task_known
+        and worker_known
+        and has_capabilities(worker_values, required_values)
+    )
+    invariants.append(InvariantResult(
+        "capability_match",
+        capability_match,
+        "PASS" if capability_match else "WORKER_NOT_ELIGIBLE",
+    ))
+
+    normalized = normalize_required_capabilities(required_values)
+    contracts = [
+        capability_contract(item)
+        for item in normalized
+        if not str(item).startswith("exact:")
+    ]
+    contracts = [item for item in contracts if item is not None]
+
+    forbidden: set[str] = set()
+    dependencies: set[str] = set()
+    health: set[str] = set()
+    for contract in contracts:
+        forbidden.update(contract.forbidden)
+        dependencies.update(contract.dependencies)
+        health.update(contract.health_requirements)
+
+    requested = {str(item).strip().lower() for item in requested_operations if str(item).strip()}
+    forbidden_hit = sorted(requested & {item.lower() for item in forbidden})
+    invariants.append(InvariantResult(
+        "forbidden_operations_absent",
+        not forbidden_hit,
+        "PASS" if not forbidden_hit else "FORBIDDEN:" + ",".join(forbidden_hit),
+    ))
+
+    for name in sorted(dependencies | health):
+        invariants.append(_probe(name, probe_map))
+
+    failed = [item for item in invariants if not item.passed]
+    if not failed:
+        return AdmissionDecision(
+            True,
+            "EXECUTION_READY",
+            tuple(invariants),
+        )
+
+    details = " ".join(item.name + ":" + item.detail for item in failed)
+    failure = classify_failure(details, phase="admission")
+    if any(item.name == "forbidden_operations_absent" and not item.passed for item in failed):
+        failure = FailureClass.POLICY_DENIED
+    elif any("credential" in item.name for item in failed):
+        failure = FailureClass.CREDENTIAL_PROJECTION_ERROR
+    elif any(item.name in {"capability_contract_registry", "task_capabilities_registered", "worker_capabilities_registered", "capability_match"} for item in failed):
+        failure = FailureClass.CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_ERROR
+    elif any(item.name in dependencies or item.name in health for item in failed):
+        failure = FailureClass.DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE
+
+    repair = repair_for_failure(failure)
+    return AdmissionDecision(
+        False,
+        "EXECUTION_READY_FAILED",
+        tuple(invariants),
+        failure,
+        repair.level,
+        repair.action,
+    )
+
+
+def system_invariant_snapshot(
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    requested_operations: Sequence[str] = (),
+    probes: Mapping[str, Callable[[], bool]] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    decision = runtime_admission(
+        worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities,
+        required_capabilities=required_capabilities,
+        requested_operations=requested_operations,
+        probes=probes,
+    )
+    return {
+        "schema": "aios.system-invariants.v1",
+        "status": "HEALTHY" if decision.admitted else "DEGRADED",
+        "execution_ready": decision.admitted,
+        "admission": decision.as_dict(),
+    }

active-runtime/app/aios_caller_admission_projection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+"""Private Unix-socket caller projection and rehydration client.
+
+The broker response body is deliberately public metadata only. The short-lived
+credential projection is delivered in a private response header, consumed
+inside the model API process, and never returned by an HTTP API or persisted.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import http.client
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import socket
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+CALLER = "chatgpt-governed-implementer-singlehost"
+SCOPE = "release:candidate"
+GOVERNED_TASK_SCOPE = "governed-task:project"
+PROJECTED_SCOPES = frozenset({GOVERNED_TASK_SCOPE, SCOPE})
+CREDENTIAL_HEADER = "X-AIOS-Caller-Projection-Credential"
+
+
+class CallerProjectionError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 503) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProjectionResult:
+    public: dict[str, Any]
+    credential_loaded: bool
+
+
+class _UnixHTTPConnection(http.client.HTTPConnection):
+    def __init__(self, socket_path: Path, timeout: float) -> None:
+        super().__init__("localhost", timeout=timeout)
+        self.socket_path = socket_path
+
+    def connect(self) -> None:
+        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        sock.settimeout(self.timeout)
+        try:
+            sock.connect(str(self.socket_path))
+        except Exception:
+            sock.close()
+            raise
+        self.sock = sock
+
+
+class CallerProjectionClient:
+    def __init__(self, socket_path: Path, *, timeout: float = 2.0) -> None:
+        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path)
+        self.timeout = timeout
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _idempotency_key(caller: str, scope: str) -> str:
+        digest = hashlib.sha256((caller + "\0" + scope).encode()).hexdigest()
+        return "caller-projection-" + digest[:32] + "-v1"
+
+    def rehydrate(
+        self,
+        caller: str,
+        scope: str,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> ProjectionResult:
+        if caller != CALLER:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("CALLER_MISMATCH", 403)
+        if scope not in PROJECTED_SCOPES:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("SCOPE_MISMATCH", 403)
+        body = {
+            "caller": caller,
+            "scope": scope,
+            "idempotency_key": self._idempotency_key(caller, scope),
+            "request": dict(request or {}),
+        }
+        connection = _UnixHTTPConnection(self.socket_path, self.timeout)
+        try:
+            connection.request(
+                "POST",
+                "/v1/project-caller",
+                body=json.dumps(body, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode(),
+                headers={
+                    "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                    "Accept": "application/json",
+                    "X-AIOS-Account": caller,
+                },
+            )
+            response = connection.getresponse()
+            status = response.status
+            raw = response.read()
+            credential = response.getheader(CREDENTIAL_HEADER, "")
+        except (OSError, TimeoutError, http.client.HTTPException) as exc:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_BROKER_UNAVAILABLE", 503) from exc
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 503) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 503)
+        if status != 200:
+            code = str(value.get("error") or "PROJECTION_DENIED")
+            raise CallerProjectionError(code, 403 if status < 500 else 503)
+        if any(
+            str(key).lower() in {
+                "credential",
+                "credential_material",
+                "token",
+                "bearer",
+                "secret",
+                "password",
+            }
+            for key in value
+        ):
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_SECRET_FIELD_REJECTED", 503)
+        if value.get("caller") != CALLER or value.get("scope") != scope:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_BINDING_INVALID", 503)
+        if value.get("projection_state") != "ACKED":
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_STATE_INVALID", 503)
+        if value.get("credential_state") != "REHYDRATED":
+            raise CallerProjectionError("CREDENTIAL_REHYDRATION_INVALID", 503)
+        if value.get("rehydration_state") not in {"GENERATED", "RECOVERED"}:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("REHYDRATION_STATE_INVALID", 503)
+        effective_scopes = value.get("effective_scopes")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(effective_scopes, list)
+            or len(effective_scopes) != len(set(effective_scopes))
+            or not all(isinstance(item, str) for item in effective_scopes)
+            or scope not in effective_scopes
+            or not set(effective_scopes).issubset(PROJECTED_SCOPES)
+        ):
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_SCOPE_INVALID", 503)
+        if value.get("secret_exposed") is not False:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("PROJECTION_SECRET_EXPOSURE", 503)
+        if not isinstance(credential, str) or len(credential) < 32:
+            raise CallerProjectionError("CREDENTIAL_REHYDRATION_MISSING", 503)
+        return ProjectionResult(public=dict(value), credential_loaded=True)

active-runtime/app/aios_capability_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+"""Canonical fail-closed capability semantics for task eligibility."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Iterable
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from typing import Any
+
+
+_TASK_ALIASES: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "repository_read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "git.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repo.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "test_execution": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "git.test": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test.execute": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "governed_git_write": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch", "governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.git.write": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch", "governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "shell": frozenset({"runtime.shell"}),
+    "git": frozenset({"runtime.git"}),
+    "python": frozenset({"runtime.python"}),
+    "code.read": frozenset({"legacy.code.read"}),
+    "code.review": frozenset({"legacy.code.review"}),
+    "code.write": frozenset({"legacy.code.write"}),
+    "code.write.patch": frozenset({"legacy.code.write.patch"}),
+    "test.python": frozenset({"legacy.test.python"}),
+    "test.shell.allowlisted": frozenset({"legacy.test.shell.allowlisted"}),
+    "git.commit": frozenset({"legacy.git.commit"}),
+    "git.diff.read": frozenset({"legacy.git.diff.read"}),
+    "git.force_push": frozenset({"legacy.git.force_push"}),
+    "deploy.production": frozenset({"legacy.deploy.production"}),
+    "secret.transform": frozenset({"legacy.secret.transform"}),
+    "secure_file_transformer": frozenset({"legacy.secure_file_transformer"}),
+    "runtime.shadow": frozenset({"legacy.runtime.shadow"}),
+    "review.security": frozenset({"legacy.review.security"}),
+    "review.api-contract": frozenset({"legacy.review.api-contract"}),
+    "gpu.train": frozenset({"legacy.gpu.train"}),
+    "agent.runtime.hermes": frozenset({"agent.runtime.hermes"}),
+    "agent.runtime.openclaw": frozenset({"agent.runtime.openclaw"}),
+    "engineering.autonomous": frozenset({"engineering.autonomous"}),
+    "release:candidate": frozenset({"release:candidate"}),
+}
+
+_WORKER_ALIASES: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "git.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repo.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repository_read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "git.test": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test.execute": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test_execution": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "governed.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.git.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.git.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "shell": frozenset({"runtime.shell"}),
+    "git": frozenset({"runtime.git"}),
+    "python": frozenset({"runtime.python"}),
+    "code.read": frozenset({"legacy.code.read"}),
+    "code.review": frozenset({"legacy.code.review"}),
+    "code.write": frozenset({"legacy.code.write"}),
+    "code.write.patch": frozenset({"legacy.code.write.patch"}),
+    "test.python": frozenset({"legacy.test.python"}),
+    "test.shell.allowlisted": frozenset({"legacy.test.shell.allowlisted"}),
+    "git.commit": frozenset({"legacy.git.commit"}),
+    "git.diff.read": frozenset({"legacy.git.diff.read"}),
+    "git.force_push": frozenset({"legacy.git.force_push"}),
+    "deploy.production": frozenset({"legacy.deploy.production"}),
+    "secret.transform": frozenset({"legacy.secret.transform"}),
+    "secure_file_transformer": frozenset({"legacy.secure_file_transformer"}),
+    "runtime.shadow": frozenset({"legacy.runtime.shadow"}),
+    "review.security": frozenset({"legacy.review.security"}),
+    "review.api-contract": frozenset({"legacy.review.api-contract"}),
+    "gpu.train": frozenset({"legacy.gpu.train"}),
+    "agent.runtime.hermes": frozenset({"agent.runtime.hermes"}),
+    "agent.runtime.openclaw": frozenset({"agent.runtime.openclaw"}),
+    "engineering.autonomous": frozenset({"engineering.autonomous"}),
+    "release:candidate": frozenset({"release:candidate"}),
+}
+
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CapabilityContract:
+    """Versioned runtime contract attached to one canonical semantic capability."""
+
+    name: str
+    min_version: int = 1
+    max_version: int = 1
+    permissions: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    forbidden: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    dependencies: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    health_requirements: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+# This registry is the semantic source of truth. Alias tables below are retained
+# as compatibility adapters; startup/tests validate every alias target against
+# this registry so a name cannot be accepted in one layer and be unknown in
+# another.
+_CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS: dict[str, CapabilityContract] = {
+    "repo.read": CapabilityContract("repo.read", permissions=("repository_read",)),
+    "test.execute": CapabilityContract("test.execute", permissions=("test_execution",)),
+    "governed.git.write.branch": CapabilityContract(
+        "governed.git.write.branch",
+        permissions=("governed_branch_write",),
+        dependencies=("writer_lease", "governed_gitops"),
+    ),
+    "governed.git.write.file": CapabilityContract(
+        "governed.git.write.file",
+        permissions=("governed_file_write",),
+        dependencies=("writer_lease", "governed_gitops"),
+    ),
+    "governed.git.write": CapabilityContract(
+        "governed.git.write",
+        permissions=("governed_git_write",),
+        dependencies=("writer_lease", "governed_gitops"),
+    ),
+    "runtime.shell": CapabilityContract("runtime.shell", permissions=("runtime_shell",)),
+    "runtime.git": CapabilityContract("runtime.git", permissions=("runtime_git",)),
+    "runtime.python": CapabilityContract("runtime.python", permissions=("runtime_python",)),
+    "legacy.code.read": CapabilityContract("legacy.code.read"),
+    "legacy.code.review": CapabilityContract("legacy.code.review"),
+    "legacy.code.write": CapabilityContract("legacy.code.write"),
+    "legacy.code.write.patch": CapabilityContract("legacy.code.write.patch"),
+    "legacy.test.python": CapabilityContract("legacy.test.python"),
+    "legacy.test.shell.allowlisted": CapabilityContract("legacy.test.shell.allowlisted"),
+    "legacy.git.commit": CapabilityContract("legacy.git.commit"),
+    "legacy.git.diff.read": CapabilityContract("legacy.git.diff.read"),
+    "legacy.git.force_push": CapabilityContract(
+        "legacy.git.force_push",
+        forbidden=("protected_ref_bypass",),
+    ),
+    "legacy.deploy.production": CapabilityContract(
+        "legacy.deploy.production",
+        permissions=("production_deploy",),
+        dependencies=("owner_approval", "deployment_controller"),
+        health_requirements=("approval_envelope_verified", "runtime_acceptance_available"),
+    ),
+    "legacy.secret.transform": CapabilityContract("legacy.secret.transform"),
+    "legacy.secure_file_transformer": CapabilityContract("legacy.secure_file_transformer"),
+    "legacy.runtime.shadow": CapabilityContract("legacy.runtime.shadow"),
+    "legacy.review.security": CapabilityContract("legacy.review.security"),
+    "legacy.review.api-contract": CapabilityContract("legacy.review.api-contract"),
+    "legacy.gpu.train": CapabilityContract("legacy.gpu.train"),
+    "agent.runtime.hermes": CapabilityContract(
+        "agent.runtime.hermes",
+        dependencies=("hermes_runtime",),
+        health_requirements=("worker_liveness",),
+    ),
+    "agent.runtime.openclaw": CapabilityContract(
+        "agent.runtime.openclaw",
+        dependencies=("openclaw_runtime",),
+        health_requirements=("worker_liveness",),
+    ),
+    "engineering.autonomous": CapabilityContract(
+        "engineering.autonomous",
+        dependencies=("agent_task_control_plane",),
+        health_requirements=("worker_liveness",),
+    ),
+    "release:candidate": CapabilityContract(
+        "release:candidate",
+        min_version=1,
+        max_version=1,
+        permissions=("prepare_release",),
+        forbidden=(
+            "production_deploy",
+            "submit_owner_approval",
+            "tag_publish",
+            "baseline_registry_finalize",
+            "runtime_switch",
+        ),
+        dependencies=(
+            "credential_projection",
+            "trusted_builder",
+        ),
+        health_requirements=(
+            "authenticated_probe",
+            "release_api_health",
+            "worker_liveness",
+        ),
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def capability_contract(name: object) -> CapabilityContract | None:
+    """Return the contract for one canonical or registered capability name."""
+
+    text = _clean(name)
+    direct = _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS.get(text)
+    if direct is not None:
+        return direct
+    mapped = _TASK_ALIASES.get(text) or _WORKER_ALIASES.get(text)
+    if mapped is None or len(mapped) != 1:
+        return None
+    return _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS.get(next(iter(mapped)))
+
+
+def registered_capability(name: object, *, worker: bool = False) -> bool:
+    """Fail-closed validation used by registration/task admission."""
+
+    text = _clean(name)
+    if "*" in text:
+        return False
+    aliases = _WORKER_ALIASES if worker else _TASK_ALIASES
+    mapped = aliases.get(text)
+    if mapped is None:
+        return text in _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS
+    return all(item in _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS for item in mapped)
+
+
+def validate_capability_contract_registry() -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Prove alias/contract closure and contract safety invariants."""
+
+    alias_targets: set[str] = set()
+    for mapping in (_TASK_ALIASES, _WORKER_ALIASES):
+        for values in mapping.values():
+            alias_targets.update(values)
+    missing = sorted(alias_targets - set(_CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS))
+    invalid_versions = sorted(
+        name
+        for name, contract in _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS.items()
+        if contract.min_version < 1 or contract.max_version < contract.min_version
+    )
+    permission_forbidden_overlap = sorted(
+        name
+        for name, contract in _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS.items()
+        if set(contract.permissions) & set(contract.forbidden)
+    )
+    return {
+        "schema": "aios.capability-contract-registry.v1",
+        "contract_count": len(_CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS),
+        "missing_alias_targets": missing,
+        "invalid_versions": invalid_versions,
+        "permission_forbidden_overlap": permission_forbidden_overlap,
+        "valid": not missing and not invalid_versions and not permission_forbidden_overlap,
+    }
+
+
+def capability_contract_snapshot() -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+    return {
+        name: contract.as_dict()
+        for name, contract in sorted(_CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS.items())
+    }
+
+
+_UNKNOWN_PREFIX = "exact:"
+
+
+def _clean(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise ValueError("capability must be a string")
+    text = value.strip().lower()
+    if not text:
+        raise ValueError("capability must not be empty")
+    return text
+
+
+def normalize_required_capabilities(values: Iterable[object]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """Map task-facing names to one semantic vocabulary.
+
+    Unknown names remain explicit exact requirements. They are never treated
+    as wildcards or granted by a failed normalization.
+    """
+
+    result: set[str] = set()
+    for value in values:
+        text = _clean(value)
+        if "*" in text:
+            result.add(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX + text)
+        else:
+            mapped = _TASK_ALIASES.get(text)
+            if mapped is None or any(item not in _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS for item in mapped):
+                result.add(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX + text)
+            else:
+                result.update(mapped)
+    return frozenset(result)
+
+
+def normalize_worker_capabilities(values: Iterable[object]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """Map registered worker names to effective semantic capabilities."""
+
+    result: set[str] = set()
+    for value in values:
+        text = _clean(value)
+        if "*" in text:
+            continue
+        mapped = _WORKER_ALIASES.get(text)
+        if mapped is not None and all(item in _CAPABILITY_CONTRACTS for item in mapped):
+            result.update(mapped)
+    if {
+        "governed.git.write.branch",
+        "governed.git.write.file",
+    }.issubset(result):
+        result.add("governed.git.write")
+    return frozenset(result)
+
+
+def has_capabilities(
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+) -> bool:
+    """Return the single eligibility decision used by poll and claim."""
+
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_capabilities)
+    effective = normalize_worker_capabilities(worker_capabilities)
+    if any(value.startswith(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX) for value in required):
+        return False
+    return required.issubset(effective)
+
+
+def required_capabilities_subset(
+    granted_requirements: Iterable[object],
+    required_requirements: Iterable[object],
+) -> bool:
+    """Check semantic capability containment for delegation constraints."""
+    granted = normalize_required_capabilities(granted_requirements)
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_requirements)
+    if any(value.startswith(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX) for value in granted | required):
+        return False
+    return required.issubset(granted)
+
+
+def normalized_capability_matrix(
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Expose non-secret decision evidence for tests and diagnostics."""
+
+    worker_values = tuple(worker_capabilities)
+    required_values = tuple(required_capabilities)
+    worker = normalize_worker_capabilities(worker_values)
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_values)
+    return {
+        "worker_effective": sorted(worker),
+        "task_required": sorted(required),
+        "eligible": has_capabilities(worker_values, required_values),
+    }

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2.py

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
     "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
     "createGovernedTask",
     "acquireWriterLease",
+    "bootstrapWriterLease",
+    "renewWriterLease",
     "commitFileGoverned",
     "commitFilesGoverned",
     "getGitOpsJob",
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
 OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
     "createGovernedTask": ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key"),
     "acquireWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
+    "bootstrapWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
+    "renewWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
     "commitFileGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "path", "content_base64", "message"),
     "commitFilesGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "files", "message"),
     "getGitOpsJob": ("job_id",),
@@ -46,6 +50,49 @@ OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
     "getControlPlaneSnapshot": (),
 }
 
+BRIDGE_OPERATION_CONTRACTS = {
+    "acquireWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["acquireWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "create_target_branch", "worktree_mode", "cas_ref_update_required",
+        ),
+    },
+    "bootstrapWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["bootstrapWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "create_target_branch", "worktree_mode", "cas_ref_update_required",
+            "recovered", "bootstrapped", "runtime_rehydrated",
+            "durable_branch_lease_present", "idempotent",
+        ),
+    },
+    "renewWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease/renew",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["renewWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "recovered", "bootstrapped", "runtime_rehydrated",
+            "durable_branch_lease_present", "idempotent",
+        ),
+    },
+    "commitFileGoverned": {
+        "method": "POST", "path": "/v2/commit-file",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFileGoverned"],
+        "response_fields": ("job_id", "commit_oid", "commit_visible", "branch_mode", "target_branch", "generation"),
+    },
+    "commitFilesGoverned": {
+        "method": "POST", "path": "/v2/commit-files",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFilesGoverned"],
+        "response_fields": ("job_id", "commit_oid", "commit_visible", "branch_mode", "target_branch", "generation"),
+    },
+}
+
 
 class RuntimeDriftError(RuntimeError):
     pass
@@ -122,6 +169,14 @@ class BridgeV2Adapter:
             "legacy_writes_enabled": False,
             "governed_writes_enabled": True,
             "operations": list(BRIDGE_OPERATIONS),
+            "operation_contracts": {
+                operation: {
+                    **contract,
+                    "required_fields": list(contract["required_fields"]),
+                    "response_fields": list(contract["response_fields"]),
+                }
+                for operation, contract in BRIDGE_OPERATION_CONTRACTS.items()
+            },
             "force_push": False,
             "main_write": False,
             "tag_write": False,
@@ -151,6 +206,8 @@ class BridgeV2Adapter:
 
     def createGovernedTask(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createGovernedTask", request)
     def acquireWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("acquireWriterLease", request)
+    def bootstrapWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("bootstrapWriterLease", request)
+    def renewWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("renewWriterLease", request)
     def commitFileGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFileGoverned", request)
     def commitFilesGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFilesGoverned", request)
     def getGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getGitOpsJob", request)

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_executor.py

@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ class AuthorityPort(Protocol):
     def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
     def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
     def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+    def create_task_branch_cas(self, branch: str, expected_base: str, new: str) -> str: ...
     def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
 
 
 class RemotePort(Protocol):
     def repository_identity(self) -> str: ...
+    def push_new_exact(self, branch: str, new: str) -> None: ...
     def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None: ...
     def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
     def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
@@ -103,6 +105,9 @@ class AuthorityGitAdapter:
     def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
         return self.executor.ancestry_check(older, newer)
 
+    def create_task_branch_cas(self, branch: str, expected_base: str, new: str) -> str:
+        return self.executor.create_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected_base, new)
+
     def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str:
         return self.executor.advance_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected, new)
 
@@ -152,7 +157,7 @@ class DetachedGitWorkspace:
     def materialize_files(self, files: Mapping[str, bytes]) -> None:
         dirty = self._dirty_paths()
         expected_paths = set(files)
-        if dirty and dirty != expected_paths:
+        if dirty and not dirty.issubset(expected_paths):
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_DIRTY_SCOPE_MISMATCH")
         for relative, content in files.items():
             target = (self.path / relative).resolve()
@@ -258,6 +263,15 @@ class GiteaContinuationRemote:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_GIT_READBACK_INVALID")
         return oid
 
+    def push_new_exact(self, branch: str, new: str) -> None:
+        self._require_projected()
+        self.repository_identity()
+        if self.read_git_ref(branch) is not None:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        _run(["git", "push", self.remote_name, f"{new}:refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
+        if self.read_git_ref(branch) != new:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+
     def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None:
         self._require_projected()
         self.repository_identity()
@@ -329,6 +343,7 @@ class ContinuationPermissions:
 @dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
 class ContinuationRuntimeBinding:
     request: WriterLeaseRequestV2
+    job_id: str
     workspace_path: Path
     lease_not_before: datetime
     lease_expires_at: datetime
@@ -389,13 +404,20 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
     def observe_generation(self, branch: str, generation: int) -> None:
         self._observed_generations[branch] = max(generation, self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0))
 
-    def _max_generation(self, branch: str) -> int:
+    def _max_generation(self, branch: str, *, exclude_job_id: str | None = None) -> int:
         observed = self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0)
         with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
-                (branch,),
-            ).fetchone()
+            if exclude_job_id is None:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
+                    (branch,),
+                ).fetchone()
+            else:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases "
+                    "WHERE branch=? AND job_id!=?",
+                    (branch, exclude_job_id),
+                ).fetchone()
         durable = int(row["generation"] or 0)
         return max(observed, durable)
 
@@ -404,6 +426,7 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
         return {
             "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
             "task_id": request.task_id,
+            "job_id": request.job_id,
             "repository": request.repository,
             "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
             "base_oid": request.base_oid,
@@ -413,10 +436,21 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "lease_seconds": request.lease_seconds,
         }
 
-    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding) -> None:
+    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, *, job_id: str | None = None) -> None:
         request = binding.request
-        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(self._request_mapping(request), self.authority)
-        if normalized != {**self._request_mapping(request), "create_target_branch": False, "worktree_mode": "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True}:
+        request_mapping = self._request_mapping(request)
+        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(request_mapping, self.authority)
+        expected_normalized = {
+            **request_mapping,
+            "create_target_branch": request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW",
+            "worktree_mode": (
+                "detached_at_base_oid"
+                if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW"
+                else "detached_at_expected_head"
+            ),
+            "cas_ref_update_required": True,
+        }
+        if normalized != expected_normalized:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("CONTINUATION_NORMALIZATION_INVALID")
         if not binding.original_receipt_valid or not binding.original_grant_consumed:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("ORIGINAL_GRANT_LINEAGE_INVALID")
@@ -426,7 +460,7 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
         if now >= binding.lease_expires_at:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_EXPIRED")
-        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch):
+        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch, exclude_job_id=job_id):
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
         if not self.workspace.is_detached():
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
@@ -452,57 +486,102 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "generation": request.generation,
         }
 
-    def execute(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit) -> dict[str, object]:
-        payload = commit.payload()
-        submitted = self.controller.submit(self._job_request(binding, commit, payload), payload=payload)
-        current = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
+    def execute(
+        self,
+        binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding,
+        commit: ContinuationCommit,
+        *,
+        before_complete: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        commit.payload()
+        if not binding.job_id or binding.request.job_id != binding.job_id:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("RUNTIME_LINEAGE_MISSING_JOB_ID")
+        current = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+        current_state = JobState(current["state"])
+        if current_state == JobState.COMPLETED:
             return self.controller.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        self._validate_preflight(binding)
+        if current_state == JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED:
+            receipt = json.loads(str(current["receipt_json"] or "{}"))
+            commit_oid = str(receipt.get("authority_oid") or "")
+            if not OID_RE.fullmatch(commit_oid):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GOVERNED_COMMIT_OID_INVALID")
+            if before_complete is not None:
+                before_complete(commit_oid)
+            return self.controller.advance(
+                binding.job_id,
+                JobState.COMPLETED,
+                side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+                receipt=receipt,
+            ).as_dict()
+        self._validate_preflight(binding, job_id=binding.job_id)
         request = binding.request
         projected = False
         try:
             self.credential.project()
             projected = True
-            row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REQUESTED:
+            row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+            state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.REQUESTED:
                 self.controller.advance(
-                    submitted.job_id,
+                    binding.job_id,
                     JobState.AUTHORIZED,
                     side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED",
                     receipt={"task_id": request.task_id, "original_grant_consumed": True},
+                    expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
                 )
-                row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
                 self.controller.lease_job(
-                    submitted.job_id,
-                    lease_id=f"lease-{submitted.job_id}",
+                    binding.job_id,
+                    lease_id=f"lease-{binding.job_id}",
                     lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
                     current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
                     generation=request.generation,
                     lease_expires_at=binding.lease_expires_at.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
                     expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
                 )
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY")
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.LEASED:
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY,
+                                        side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.WORKTREE_READY:
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING,
+                                        side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
+            elif state != JobState.EXECUTING:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("JOB_EXECUTION_STATE_INVALID")
             new_oid = self.workspace.commit_files(commit.files, commit.message)
             if not OID_RE.fullmatch(new_oid) or not self.authority.is_ancestor(request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
                 raise ContinuationExecutionError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
-            authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
+            if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW":
+                authority_oid = self.authority.create_task_branch_cas(request.target_branch, request.base_oid, new_oid)
+            else:
+                authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
             if authority_oid != new_oid:
                 raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
             self.controller.advance(
-                submitted.job_id,
+                binding.job_id,
                 JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
                 side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED",
                 receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "force_push": False},
             )
             try:
-                self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
-                self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW":
+                    self.remote.push_new_exact(request.target_branch, new_oid)
+                else:
+                    self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
             except Exception:
-                return self._remote_pending(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
-            return self._finish_remote_verification(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+                return self._remote_pending(binding.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+            return self._finish_remote_verification(
+                binding.job_id,
+                authority_oid,
+                new_oid,
+                before_complete=before_complete,
+            )
         finally:
             if projected:
                 self.credential.revoke()
@@ -525,7 +604,14 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
         )
         return result.as_dict()
 
-    def _finish_remote_verification(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    def _finish_remote_verification(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        authority_oid: str,
+        new_oid: str,
+        *,
+        before_complete: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
         row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
         branch = row["branch"]
         request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
@@ -542,8 +628,20 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "reconciliation_decision": decision.action.value,
             "force_push": False,
         }
-        self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt)
-        return self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt).as_dict()
+        self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        )
+        if before_complete is not None:
+            before_complete(new_oid)
+        return self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.COMPLETED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        ).as_dict()
 
     def reconcile(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
         row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_lease.py

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
     target_branch: str
     generation: int
     lease_seconds: int = 900
+    job_id: str = ""
 
     schema = "aios.task-writer-lease.v2"
     accepted_schemas = frozenset({"aios.task-writer-lease.v2", "aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2"})
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
     def validate(self, probe: BranchProbe) -> None:
         if not self.task_id or self.repository != "aios/aios":
             raise ContinuationError("request_identity_invalid")
+        if not self.job_id or not self.job_id.startswith("job-"):
+            raise ContinuationError("job_id_invalid")
         if self.branch_mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
             raise ContinuationError("branch_mode_invalid")
         _oid(self.base_oid, "base_oid")

active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 import os
 from pathlib import Path
 import secrets
+import re
 from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 
 
@@ -21,9 +22,14 @@ class CredentialLease:
     scopes: tuple[str, ...]
     provider: str
     state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    scope_type: str = "system"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
 
     def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state}
+        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state, "scope_type": self.scope_type, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id, "project_id": self.project_id, "run_id": self.run_id}
 
 
 class FileCredentialProvider:
@@ -43,11 +49,19 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
         self._leases: dict[str, CredentialLease] = {}
 
-    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if repository != "aios/aios" or not target_branch.startswith("agent/") or generation < 1 or not 1 <= lease_seconds <= 86400:
             raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if scope_type == "tenant":
+            if not tenant_id:
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        elif scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any((tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)):
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
         now = self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__)
+        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__, "ACTIVE", scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
         self._leases[lease.lease_id] = lease
         return lease.as_dict()
 
@@ -64,7 +78,39 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         lease = self._get(lease_id)
         if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
             raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
-        return self.provider.environment(lease)
+        environment = self.provider.environment(lease)
+        for key, value in environment.items():
+            upper = str(key).upper()
+            if not isinstance(value, str):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            sensitive = any(marker in upper for marker in ("CREDENTIAL", "TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "PRIVATE_KEY", "API_KEY"))
+            if re.search(r"(?i)bearer\s+\S+|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]", value):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            if sensitive and upper.endswith("_FILE"):
+                candidate = Path(value)
+                credential_root = Path("/run/credentials")
+                try:
+                    resolved = candidate.resolve(strict=False)
+                except OSError as exc:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY") from exc
+                if not candidate.is_absolute() or not (resolved == credential_root or credential_root in resolved.parents):
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive and upper.endswith("_REFERENCE"):
+                if re.fullmatch(r"(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}", value) is None:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive:
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        return environment
+
+    def authorize(self, lease_id: str, *, task_id: str, operation: str, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE" or lease.task_id != task_id or operation not in lease.scopes:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        requested = (scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
+        actual = (lease.scope_type, lease.tenant_id, lease.user_id, lease.project_id, lease.run_id)
+        if requested != actual:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        return self.environment(lease_id)
 
     def status(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return self._get(lease_id).as_dict()

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_job_controller.py

@@ -27,6 +27,19 @@ class ServiceUnavailable(JobError):
     pass
 
 
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class LeaseRenewalResult:
+    """Durable outcome of one writer-lease recovery attempt."""
+
+    renewed: bool
+    idempotent: bool
+    durable: bool
+    lease_expires_at: str | None
+
+    def __bool__(self) -> bool:
+        return self.renewed or self.idempotent
+
+
 class BindingConflict(JobError):
     pass
 
@@ -66,6 +79,14 @@ def utc_now() -> str:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
 
 
+def parse_utc(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
 def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
     return (
         json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n"
@@ -404,13 +425,16 @@ class GitOpsJobController:
         self.store._mirror(result)
         return self.store._receipt(result, duplicate=True)
 
-    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE") -> None:
+    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE", lease_expires_at: str | None = None) -> None:
         if len(current_head_oid) != 40 or generation < 1:
             raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
         try:
             with self.store._connect() as connection:
                 connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
+                if lease_expires_at is None:
+                    updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
+                else:
+                    updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,lease_expires_at=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, lease_expires_at, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
                 if updated.rowcount != 1:
                     raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
                 connection.commit()
@@ -419,6 +443,94 @@ class GitOpsJobController:
         except sqlite3.Error as exc:
             raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
 
+    def renew_lease(
+        self,
+        *,
+        branch: str,
+        lineage_anchor_oid: str,
+        current_head_oid: str,
+        generation: int,
+        lease_expires_at: str,
+    ) -> LeaseRenewalResult:
+        if (
+            not branch
+            or len(lineage_anchor_oid) != 40
+            or len(current_head_oid) != 40
+            or generation < 1
+            or not lease_expires_at.strip()
+        ):
+            raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            with self.store._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                rows = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT lease_id, revision, generation, state, lease_expires_at "
+                    "FROM branch_leases "
+                    "WHERE branch=? AND lineage_anchor_oid=? AND current_head_oid=? "
+                    "AND generation=? AND state='ACTIVE' ORDER BY revision DESC",
+                    (branch, lineage_anchor_oid, current_head_oid, generation),
+                ).fetchall()
+                if not rows:
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return LeaseRenewalResult(False, False, False, None)
+                if len(rows) != 1:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+                row = rows[0]
+                try:
+                    current_expires_at = parse_utc(str(row["lease_expires_at"]))
+                    requested_expires_at = parse_utc(lease_expires_at)
+                except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID") from exc
+                now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+                if requested_expires_at <= now:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+                if current_expires_at > now:
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return LeaseRenewalResult(
+                        False,
+                        True,
+                        True,
+                        str(row["lease_expires_at"]),
+                    )
+                updated = connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE branch_leases SET lease_expires_at=?,revision=revision+1 "
+                    "WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=? AND generation=? "
+                    "AND state='ACTIVE' AND lease_expires_at=?",
+                    (
+                        lease_expires_at,
+                        row["lease_id"],
+                        int(row["revision"]),
+                        generation,
+                        row["lease_expires_at"],
+                    ),
+                )
+                if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                    current = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT lease_expires_at, generation, state FROM branch_leases "
+                        "WHERE lease_id=?",
+                        (row["lease_id"],),
+                    ).fetchone()
+                    if (
+                        current is not None
+                        and int(current["generation"]) == generation
+                        and current["state"] == "ACTIVE"
+                        and parse_utc(str(current["lease_expires_at"])) > now
+                    ):
+                        connection.commit()
+                        return LeaseRenewalResult(
+                            False,
+                            True,
+                            True,
+                            str(current["lease_expires_at"]),
+                        )
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                connection.commit()
+                return LeaseRenewalResult(True, False, True, lease_expires_at)
+        except JobError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
     def advance(self, job_id: str, state: JobState, *, side_effect_state: str, receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, expected_revision: int | None = None) -> JobReceipt:
         return self._advance(
             job_id,

active-runtime/app/aios_governed_task_bootstrap.py

@@ -2,13 +2,20 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+import fcntl
 import hashlib
 import json
 from pathlib import Path
 import re
 from typing import Any, Mapping
 
-from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobStore
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobStore, sha256_json
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+    project_online_task,
+)
 
 OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
 BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
@@ -36,35 +43,161 @@ class GovernedTaskBinding:
         return {"task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "base_oid": self.base_oid, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid, "generation": self.generation, "branch_mode": self.branch_mode, "create_target_branch": self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW", "worktree_mode": "detached_at_base_oid" if self.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" else "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True, "idempotent": idempotent, "state": "BOUND", "job_id": self.job_id}
 
 
-def _safe(value: str) -> str:
+def _legacy_safe(value: str) -> str:
     return re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", value).strip("-")[:120] or "task"
 
 
+def _task_key(value: str) -> str:
+    readable = _legacy_safe(value)[:72]
+    return f"{readable}-{hashlib.sha256(value.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()[:24]}"
+
+
 class GovernedTaskBootstrap:
     def __init__(self, authority: Any, root: Path, *, remote_name: str, token_path: Path, ssh_key_path: Path, api_base: str = "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/api/v1") -> None:
-        self.authority = authority; self.root = Path(root); self.remote_name = remote_name; self.token_path = Path(token_path); self.ssh_key_path = Path(ssh_key_path); self.api_base = api_base; self.task_meta_root = self.root / "task-bindings"; self.job_root = self.root / "jobs"; self.task_meta_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True); self.job_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self.authority = authority; self.root = Path(root); self.remote_name = remote_name; self.token_path = Path(token_path); self.ssh_key_path = Path(ssh_key_path); self.api_base = api_base; self.task_meta_root = self.root / "task-bindings"; self.job_root = self.root / "jobs"; self.lock_root = self.root / "task-locks"; self.task_meta_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True); self.job_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True); self.lock_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
 
     def _store(self, task_id: str) -> tuple[JobStore, GitOpsJobController]:
-        root = self.job_root / _safe(task_id); store = JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads"); return store, GitOpsJobController(store)
+        legacy = self.job_root / _legacy_safe(task_id)
+        keyed = self.job_root / _task_key(task_id)
+        root = legacy if legacy.is_dir() and not keyed.exists() else keyed
+        store = JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads"); return store, GitOpsJobController(store)
 
     def _metadata(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
-        return self.task_meta_root / (_safe(task_id) + ".json")
+        return self.task_meta_root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    def _legacy_metadata(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.task_meta_root / (_legacy_safe(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _task_lock(self, task_id: str):
+        path = self.lock_root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".lock")
+        with path.open("a+b") as handle:
+            fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            try:
+                yield
+            finally:
+                fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _branch_lock(self, repository: str, target_branch: str):
+        key = hashlib.sha256((repository + "\0" + target_branch).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        path = self.lock_root / ("branch-" + key + ".lock")
+        with path.open("a+b") as handle:
+            fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            try:
+                yield
+            finally:
+                fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
 
     def _read_existing(self, task_id: str) -> GovernedTaskBinding | None:
         path = self._metadata(task_id)
+        if not path.exists():
+            path = self._legacy_metadata(task_id)
         if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink(): return None
-        return GovernedTaskBinding(**json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
+        binding = GovernedTaskBinding(**json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
+        if binding.task_id != task_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_KEY_COLLISION")
+        return binding
+
+    def get_binding(self, task_id: str) -> GovernedTaskBinding:
+        """Return the exact durable binding; never synthesize missing lineage."""
+        existing = self._read_existing(str(task_id))
+        if existing is None or not existing.job_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_MISSING")
+        return existing
+
+    def execution_binding(self, binding: GovernedTaskBinding) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+        expected = binding.expected_branch_oid
+        mode = binding.branch_mode
+        if mode == "CREATE_NEW":
+            current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + binding.target_branch)
+            if current is not None:
+                store, _ = self._store(binding.task_id)
+                with store._connect() as connection:
+                    rows = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT current_head_oid,generation,state,lineage_anchor_oid "
+                        "FROM branch_leases WHERE job_id=? AND branch=? AND state='ACTIVE' "
+                        "ORDER BY revision DESC",
+                        (binding.job_id, binding.target_branch),
+                    ).fetchall()
+                if len(rows) != 1:
+                    raise BootstrapError("SAME_JOB_CONTINUATION_LEASE_INVALID")
+                row = rows[0]
+                if (
+                    str(row["current_head_oid"] or "") != current
+                    or int(row["generation"] or 0) != binding.generation
+                    or str(row["lineage_anchor_oid"] or "") != binding.base_oid
+                ):
+                    raise BootstrapError("SAME_JOB_CONTINUATION_BINDING_INVALID")
+                expected = current
+                mode = "CONTINUE_EXISTING"
+        return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+            {
+                "task_id": binding.task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "repository": binding.repository,
+                "base_oid": binding.base_oid,
+                "expected_branch_oid": expected,
+                "target_branch": binding.target_branch,
+                "branch_mode": mode,
+                "generation": binding.generation,
+                "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+            }
+        )
+
+    def execution_envelope(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        *,
+        required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+        expected_job_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        binding = self.get_binding(task_id)
+        if expected_job_id and binding.job_id != expected_job_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        return project_execution_envelope(
+            self.execution_binding(binding),
+            execution_request,
+            required_capabilities=required_capabilities,
+        )
+
+    def online_task_projection(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        task_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+        *,
+        expected_job_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        binding = self.get_binding(task_id)
+        if expected_job_id and binding.job_id != expected_job_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        return project_online_task(self.execution_binding(binding), task_request, execution_request)
 
     def _write(self, binding: GovernedTaskBinding) -> None:
         path = self._metadata(binding.task_id); temporary = path.with_suffix(".tmp"); temporary.write_text(json.dumps(asdict(binding), sort_keys=True), encoding="utf-8"); temporary.replace(path)
 
     def create(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = str(request.get("task_id") or "")
+        if not task_id:
+            raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_INVALID")
+        repository = str(request.get("repository") or "")
+        target_branch = str(request.get("target_branch") or "")
+        with self._task_lock(task_id):
+            with self._branch_lock(repository, target_branch):
+                return self._create_locked(request)
+
+    def _create_locked(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
         values = {key: str(request[key]) for key in ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key")}
         if values["repository"] != "aios/aios" or not OID_RE.fullmatch(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_INVALID")
         if not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(values["target_branch"]): raise BootstrapError("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
         existing = self._read_existing(values["task_id"])
         if existing is not None:
-            if any(getattr(existing, key) != values[key] for key in ("repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description")): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+            if any(getattr(existing, key) != values[key] for key in ("repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key")): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+            optional = {"expected_branch_oid": existing.expected_branch_oid, "branch_mode": existing.branch_mode, "generation": existing.generation}
+            for key, durable in optional.items():
+                if key in request and str(request[key]) != str(durable): raise BootstrapError("TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT")
             return existing.response(idempotent=True)
         if not self.authority.commit_exists(values["base_oid"]): raise BootstrapError("BASE_COMMIT_NOT_FOUND")
         current = self.authority.read_ref("refs/heads/" + values["target_branch"])
@@ -74,8 +207,61 @@ class GovernedTaskBootstrap:
             if expected != values["base_oid"]: raise BootstrapError("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
         else:
             if expected != current: raise BootstrapError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT")
-            mode, generation = "CONTINUE_EXISTING", int(request.get("generation", 2))
-            if generation < 1: raise BootstrapError("GENERATION_INVALID")
+            parent_task_id = str(request.get("parent_task_id") or "")
+            parent_job_id = str(request.get("parent_job_id") or "")
+            if not parent_task_id or not parent_job_id:
+                raise BootstrapError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OWNERSHIP_REQUIRED")
+            parent = self._read_existing(parent_task_id)
+            if parent is None or parent.job_id != parent_job_id or parent.repository != values["repository"] or parent.target_branch != values["target_branch"]:
+                raise BootstrapError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OWNERSHIP_CONFLICT")
+            store, _ = self._store(parent_task_id)
+            with store._connect() as connection:
+                rows = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT current_head_oid,generation,state FROM branch_leases WHERE job_id=? AND branch=? AND state='ACTIVE' ORDER BY revision DESC",
+                    (parent_job_id, values["target_branch"]),
+                ).fetchall()
+            if len(rows) != 1 or str(rows[0]["current_head_oid"] or "") != current:
+                raise BootstrapError("EXISTING_BRANCH_OWNERSHIP_CONFLICT")
+            mode, generation = "CONTINUE_EXISTING", int(rows[0]["generation"]) + 1
+            if "generation" in request and int(request["generation"]) != generation:
+                raise BootstrapError("GENERATION_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        online_request = request.get("online_task")
+        execution_request = request.get("execution")
+        projection_required = (
+            online_request is not None
+            or execution_request is not None
+            or request.get("require_online_task_projection") is True
+        )
+        if projection_required:
+            if not isinstance(online_request, Mapping):
+                raise BootstrapError("ONLINE_TASK_REQUEST_INVALID")
+            if execution_request is not None and not isinstance(execution_request, Mapping):
+                raise BootstrapError("EXECUTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+            provisional_job_id = "job-" + sha256_json(
+                {"client_idempotency_key": values["idempotency_key"]}
+            )[:32]
+            try:
+                provisional_binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+                    {
+                        "task_id": values["task_id"],
+                        "job_id": provisional_job_id,
+                        "repository": values["repository"],
+                        "base_oid": values["base_oid"],
+                        "expected_branch_oid": expected,
+                        "target_branch": values["target_branch"],
+                        "branch_mode": mode,
+                        "generation": generation,
+                        "idempotency_key": values["idempotency_key"],
+                    }
+                )
+                project_online_task(
+                    provisional_binding,
+                    dict(online_request),
+                    dict(execution_request or {}),
+                )
+            except Exception as exc:
+                raise BootstrapError("EXECUTION_BINDING_INVALID") from exc
+
         payload = json.dumps(values, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
         _, controller = self._store(values["task_id"])
         receipt = controller.submit({"idempotency_key": values["idempotency_key"], "campaign_id": values["task_id"], "task_id": values["task_id"], "repository": values["repository"], "operation": "GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE", "branch": values["target_branch"], "expected_branch_oid": expected, "payload_digest": hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(), "lineage_anchor_oid": values["base_oid"]}, payload=payload)

active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_https_edge.py

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Disabled-by-default TLS edge for the read-only GPT Online Task ingress.
+
+The internal AIOS ingress remains loopback-only. This service is a separate edge
+that may bind non-loopback only when the owner explicitly approves it. It
+forwards only the tiny read-only ingress API and never proxies the canonical
+Bridge or Task API.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections import defaultdict, deque
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import secrets
+import ssl
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+UPSTREAM = "http://127.0.0.1:18945"
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+MAX_RESPONSE = 256 * 1024
+MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS = 32
+REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20
+RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS = 60
+RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS = 60
+RATE_BURST_REQUESTS = 15
+RATE_MAX_CLIENTS = 4096
+_AUDIT_SALT = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+PUBLIC_APPROVAL_ENV = "AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_BIND_APPROVED"
+PUBLIC_DOMAIN_ENV = "AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_DOMAIN"
+TASK_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^/v1/read-only-tasks(?:/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127})?$")
+
+
+def _client_pseudonym(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_AUDIT_SALT + value.encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()[:16]
+
+
+def audit(event: str, **fields: object) -> None:
+    safe = {
+        "event": event,
+        "ts_unix_ms": int(time.time() * 1000),
+    }
+    for key, value in fields.items():
+        if key in {"authorization", "body", "token", "cookie", "client_ip"}:
+            continue
+        safe[key] = value
+    print(
+        json.dumps(safe, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+        file=sys.stderr,
+        flush=True,
+    )
+
+
+class EdgeError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def public_bind_allowed(host: str, approval: str) -> str:
+    value = host.strip()
+    if value in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}:
+        return value
+    if approval != "1":
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_BIND_OWNER_APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
+    if value not in {"0.0.0.0", "::"}:
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_BIND_ADDRESS_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def validated_public_domain(value: str) -> str:
+    domain = value.strip().lower()
+    if not domain:
+        return ""
+    if len(domain) > 253 or re.fullmatch(
+        r"(?=.{1,253}\Z)(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?",
+        domain,
+    ) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_DOMAIN_INVALID")
+    return domain
+
+
+def validated_edge_identity(host: str, approval: str, domain: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    bind_host = public_bind_allowed(host, approval)
+    public_domain = validated_public_domain(domain)
+    if bind_host not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"} and not public_domain:
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_DOMAIN_REQUIRED")
+    return bind_host, public_domain
+
+
+def validate_tls_file(path: Path, *, key: bool) -> Path:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_TLS_FILE_INVALID")
+    size = path.stat().st_size
+    if size < 16 or size > 256 * 1024:
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_TLS_FILE_INVALID")
+    if key and (path.stat().st_mode & 0o077):
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_TLS_KEY_MODE_INVALID")
+    return path
+
+
+def build_tls_context(cert_path: Path, key_path: Path) -> ssl.SSLContext:
+    cert = validate_tls_file(cert_path, key=False)
+    key = validate_tls_file(key_path, key=True)
+    context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
+    context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
+    context.options |= ssl.OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+    context.load_cert_chain(certfile=str(cert), keyfile=str(key))
+    return context
+
+
+def allowed_route(method: str, raw_path: str) -> str:
+    parsed = urlsplit(raw_path)
+    if parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
+        raise EdgeError("QUERY_OR_FRAGMENT_DENY", 400)
+    path = parsed.path
+    if method == "GET" and path in {"/health", "/openapi.json"}:
+        return path
+    if method == "POST" and path == "/v1/read-only-tasks":
+        return path
+    if method == "GET" and TASK_PATH_RE.fullmatch(path):
+        return path
+    raise EdgeError("ROUTE_DENY", 404)
+
+
+def route_label(method: str, path: str) -> str:
+    if method == "GET" and path == "/health":
+        return "health"
+    if method == "GET" and path == "/openapi.json":
+        return "openapi"
+    if method == "POST" and path == "/v1/read-only-tasks":
+        return "task_create"
+    if method == "GET" and path.startswith("/v1/read-only-tasks/"):
+        return "task_status"
+    return "unknown"
+
+
+def forwarded_headers(headers: Mapping[str, str], *, body: bool) -> dict[str, str]:
+    result = {"Accept": "application/json"}
+    authorization = headers.get("Authorization")
+    if not isinstance(authorization, str) or not authorization.startswith("Bearer "):
+        raise EdgeError("AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED", 401)
+    token = authorization[7:]
+    if len(token) < 32 or len(token) > 4096 or any(ch.isspace() for ch in token):
+        raise EdgeError("AUTHORIZATION_INVALID", 401)
+    result["Authorization"] = authorization
+    if body:
+        content_type = headers.get("Content-Type", "")
+        if content_type.split(";", 1)[0].strip().lower() != "application/json":
+            raise EdgeError("CONTENT_TYPE_INVALID", 415)
+        result["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+    return result
+
+
+class RateLimiter:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        window_seconds: int = RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS,
+        limit: int = RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS,
+        burst: int = RATE_BURST_REQUESTS,
+        max_clients: int = RATE_MAX_CLIENTS,
+        now_fn=time.monotonic,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.window_seconds = window_seconds
+        self.limit = limit
+        self.burst = burst
+        self.max_clients = max_clients
+        self.now_fn = now_fn
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._events: dict[str, deque[float]] = defaultdict(deque)
+
+    def _prune_stale(self, cutoff: float) -> None:
+        stale = [
+            key
+            for key, events in self._events.items()
+            if not events or events[-1] <= cutoff
+        ]
+        for key in stale:
+            self._events.pop(key, None)
+
+    def allowed(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        now = self.now_fn()
+        cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
+        with self._lock:
+            if key not in self._events and len(self._events) >= self.max_clients:
+                self._prune_stale(cutoff)
+                if len(self._events) >= self.max_clients:
+                    return False
+            events = self._events[key]
+            while events and events[0] <= cutoff:
+                events.popleft()
+            if len(events) >= self.limit + self.burst:
+                return False
+            events.append(now)
+            return True
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Proxy:
+    upstream: str = UPSTREAM
+    timeout: int = REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+
+    def request(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        headers: Mapping[str, str],
+        body: bytes | None,
+    ) -> tuple[int, bytes, str]:
+        if self.upstream != UPSTREAM:
+            raise EdgeError("UPSTREAM_DRIFT_DENY", 503)
+        req = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.upstream + path,
+            method=method,
+            data=body,
+            headers=dict(headers),
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
+                raw = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE + 1)
+                status = response.status
+                content_type = response.headers.get("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read(MAX_RESPONSE + 1)
+            status = exc.code
+            content_type = exc.headers.get("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise EdgeError("UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE", 502) from exc
+        if len(raw) > MAX_RESPONSE:
+            raise EdgeError("UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE", 502)
+        if content_type.split(";", 1)[0].strip().lower() != "application/json":
+            raise EdgeError("UPSTREAM_CONTENT_TYPE_INVALID", 502)
+        return status, raw, "application/json"
+
+
+class EdgeServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    daemon_threads = True
+    request_queue_size = 64
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    proxy = Proxy()
+    limiter = RateLimiter()
+    concurrency = threading.BoundedSemaphore(MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)
+    expected_domain = ""
+
+    server_version = "AIOSGPTIngressEdge/1.0"
+    sys_version = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def respond_json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        raw = canonical(value)
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        self.send_header("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+        self.send_header("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'")
+        self.send_header("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(raw)
+
+    def send_proxy_response(self, status: int, raw: bytes, content_type: str) -> None:
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", content_type)
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+        self.send_header("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+        self.send_header("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'")
+        self.send_header("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(raw)
+
+    def client_key(self) -> str:
+        return str(self.client_address[0])
+
+    def validate_host(self) -> None:
+        if not self.expected_domain:
+            return
+        host = self.headers.get("Host", "").split(":", 1)[0].lower()
+        if not hmac.compare_digest(host, self.expected_domain):
+            raise EdgeError("HOST_HEADER_DENY", 421)
+
+    def body(self) -> bytes:
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "-1"))
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise EdgeError("CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID") from exc
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            raise EdgeError("REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID", 413)
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+        if len(raw) != length:
+            raise EdgeError("REQUEST_BODY_TRUNCATED", 400)
+        # Validate JSON at the edge so malformed bodies do not consume upstream work.
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise EdgeError("REQUEST_JSON_INVALID", 400) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise EdgeError("REQUEST_JSON_OBJECT_REQUIRED", 400)
+        return canonical(value)
+
+    def handle_proxy(self, method: str) -> None:
+        client_id = _client_pseudonym(self.client_key())
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        acquired = self.concurrency.acquire(blocking=False)
+        if not acquired:
+            audit("EDGE_BUSY", client_id=client_id, method=method)
+            self.respond_json({"error": "EDGE_BUSY"}, 503)
+            return
+        label = "unknown"
+        try:
+            self.validate_host()
+            path = allowed_route(method, self.path)
+            label = route_label(method, path)
+            if path == "/health" and method == "GET":
+                self.respond_json(
+                    {
+                        "status": "ok",
+                        "service": "aios-gpt-https-edge",
+                        "upstream": "loopback-readonly-ingress",
+                    },
+                    200,
+                )
+                audit(
+                    "EDGE_REQUEST",
+                    client_id=client_id,
+                    method=method,
+                    route=label,
+                    status=200,
+                    duration_ms=int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+                )
+                return
+            if not self.limiter.allowed(self.client_key()):
+                audit(
+                    "EDGE_RATE_LIMIT",
+                    client_id=client_id,
+                    method=method,
+                    route=label,
+                )
+                self.respond_json({"error": "RATE_LIMITED"}, 429)
+                return
+            has_body = method == "POST"
+            headers = forwarded_headers(self.headers, body=has_body)
+            body = self.body() if has_body else None
+            status, raw, content_type = self.proxy.request(
+                method,
+                path,
+                headers,
+                body,
+            )
+            self.send_proxy_response(status, raw, content_type)
+            audit(
+                "EDGE_REQUEST",
+                client_id=client_id,
+                method=method,
+                route=label,
+                status=status,
+                duration_ms=int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+            )
+        except EdgeError as exc:
+            audit(
+                "EDGE_REJECT",
+                client_id=client_id,
+                method=method,
+                route=label,
+                status=exc.status,
+                error=exc.code,
+            )
+            self.respond_json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        finally:
+            self.concurrency.release()
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        self.handle_proxy("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        self.handle_proxy("POST")
+
+    def do_PUT(self) -> None:
+        self.respond_json({"error": "METHOD_DENY"}, 405)
+
+    def do_PATCH(self) -> None:
+        self.respond_json({"error": "METHOD_DENY"}, 405)
+
+    def do_DELETE(self) -> None:
+        self.respond_json({"error": "METHOD_DENY"}, 405)
+
+    def do_CONNECT(self) -> None:
+        self.respond_json({"error": "METHOD_DENY"}, 405)
+
+    def do_OPTIONS(self) -> None:
+        self.respond_json({"error": "METHOD_DENY"}, 405)
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    host, public_domain = validated_edge_identity(
+        os.environ.get("AIOS_GPT_EDGE_HOST", "127.0.0.1"),
+        os.environ.get(PUBLIC_APPROVAL_ENV, "0"),
+        os.environ.get(PUBLIC_DOMAIN_ENV, ""),
+    )
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PORT", "18443"))
+    if not 1024 <= port <= 65535:
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_EDGE_PORT_INVALID")
+    Handler.expected_domain = public_domain
+
+    credentials = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+    cert_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_GPT_EDGE_TLS_CERT_FILE",
+            str(credentials / "tls_cert"),
+        )
+    )
+    key_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_GPT_EDGE_TLS_KEY_FILE",
+            str(credentials / "tls_key"),
+        )
+    )
+    context = build_tls_context(cert_path, key_path)
+
+    server = EdgeServer((host, port), Handler)
+    server.socket = context.wrap_socket(server.socket, server_side=True)
+    server.serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_https_edge_activation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,561 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Owner-approved activation/rollback controller for the AIOS GPT HTTPS edge.
+
+This controller never creates approval, TLS, or ingress credentials. It consumes
+owner-managed inputs, applies one exact public-bind overlay, verifies the live
+edge, and provides an idempotent rollback path.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import socket
+import ssl
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+APPROVAL_SCHEMA = "aios.gpt-https-edge.public-approval.v1"
+STATE_SCHEMA = "aios.gpt-https-edge.activation-state.v1"
+
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+APPROVAL_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}$")
+DOMAIN_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?=.{1,253}\Z)"
+    r"(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+"
+    r"[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?"
+)
+
+EDGE_UNIT = "aios-gpt-https-edge.service"
+INGRESS_UNIT = "aios-gpt-online-task-ingress.service"
+PUBLIC_HOST = "0.0.0.0"
+PUBLIC_PORT = 18443
+INGRESS_HEALTH = "http://127.0.0.1:18945/health"
+DROPIN_NAME = "zzzzzzzzzz-owner-approved-public.conf"
+
+
+class ActivationError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_bytes(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    return sha256_bytes(path.read_bytes())
+
+
+def parse_time(value: object, *, field: str) -> datetime:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_" + field.upper() + "_INVALID")
+    text = value.strip()
+    if text.endswith("Z"):
+        text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_" + field.upper() + "_INVALID") from exc
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_" + field.upper() + "_INVALID")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def validate_domain(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_DOMAIN_INVALID")
+    domain = value.strip().lower()
+    if DOMAIN_RE.fullmatch(domain) is None:
+        raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_DOMAIN_INVALID")
+    return domain
+
+
+def validate_root_file(
+    path: Path,
+    *,
+    exact_mode: int | None = None,
+    max_size: int = 256 * 1024,
+) -> Path:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise ActivationError("OWNER_FILE_INVALID")
+    info = path.stat()
+    if info.st_uid != 0 or info.st_gid != 0:
+        raise ActivationError("OWNER_FILE_OWNERSHIP_INVALID")
+    mode = stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)
+    if exact_mode is not None and mode != exact_mode:
+        raise ActivationError("OWNER_FILE_MODE_INVALID")
+    if info.st_size < 16 or info.st_size > max_size:
+        raise ActivationError("OWNER_FILE_SIZE_INVALID")
+    return path
+
+
+def certificate_dns_names(cert_path: Path) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    try:
+        decoded = ssl._ssl._test_decode_cert(str(cert_path))
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise ActivationError("TLS_CERT_DECODE_INVALID") from exc
+    names = [
+        value
+        for kind, value in decoded.get("subjectAltName", ())
+        if kind == "DNS"
+    ]
+    if not names:
+        for rdn in decoded.get("subject", ()):
+            for key, value in rdn:
+                if key == "commonName":
+                    names.append(value)
+    return tuple(names)
+
+
+def cert_matches_domain(cert_path: Path, domain: str) -> bool:
+    names = certificate_dns_names(cert_path)
+    try:
+        return bool(names) and any(ssl._dnsname_match(name, domain) for name in names)
+    except ssl.CertificateError:
+        return False
+
+
+def validate_tls_pair(
+    cert_path: Path,
+    key_path: Path,
+    domain: str,
+    *,
+    now_fn=time.time,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    validate_root_file(cert_path)
+    validate_root_file(key_path, exact_mode=0o600)
+    context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
+    context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
+    context.options |= ssl.OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+    try:
+        context.load_cert_chain(str(cert_path), str(key_path))
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise ActivationError("TLS_CERT_KEY_PAIR_INVALID") from exc
+    if not cert_matches_domain(cert_path, domain):
+        raise ActivationError("TLS_CERT_DOMAIN_MISMATCH")
+    decoded = ssl._ssl._test_decode_cert(str(cert_path))
+    not_after = decoded.get("notAfter")
+    if not not_after:
+        raise ActivationError("TLS_CERT_EXPIRY_MISSING")
+    remaining = ssl.cert_time_to_seconds(not_after) - now_fn()
+    if remaining < 7 * 86400:
+        raise ActivationError("TLS_CERT_EXPIRY_TOO_CLOSE")
+    return {
+        "cert_sha256": sha256_file(cert_path),
+        "remaining_days": int(remaining // 86400),
+    }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Approval:
+    approval_id: str
+    candidate_oid: str
+    domain: str
+    bind_host: str
+    port: int
+    tls_cert_sha256: str
+    owner: str
+    issued_at: datetime
+    not_before: datetime
+    expires_at: datetime
+    raw_sha256: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def load(
+        cls,
+        path: Path,
+        *,
+        candidate_oid: str,
+        cert_path: Path,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> "Approval":
+        validate_root_file(path, exact_mode=0o600, max_size=64 * 1024)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_JSON_INVALID")
+        allowed = {
+            "schema",
+            "approval_id",
+            "candidate_oid",
+            "domain",
+            "public_bind",
+            "bind_host",
+            "port",
+            "tls_cert_sha256",
+            "issued_at",
+            "not_before",
+            "expires_at",
+            "owner",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed or value.get("schema") != APPROVAL_SCHEMA:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_FIELDS_INVALID")
+
+        approval_id = value.get("approval_id")
+        if not isinstance(approval_id, str) or APPROVAL_ID_RE.fullmatch(approval_id) is None:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_ID_INVALID")
+        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(value.get("candidate_oid") or "")):
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_CANDIDATE_INVALID")
+        if value["candidate_oid"] != candidate_oid:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_CANDIDATE_MISMATCH")
+        if value.get("public_bind") is not True:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_PUBLIC_BIND_REQUIRED")
+        if value.get("bind_host") != PUBLIC_HOST or value.get("port") != PUBLIC_PORT:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_BINDING_INVALID")
+
+        cert_sha = str(value.get("tls_cert_sha256") or "")
+        if SHA_RE.fullmatch(cert_sha) is None:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_CERT_SHA_INVALID")
+        if not cert_path.is_file() or sha256_file(cert_path) != cert_sha:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_CERT_SHA_MISMATCH")
+
+        domain = validate_domain(value.get("domain"))
+        owner = value.get("owner")
+        if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner.strip() or len(owner) > 255:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_OWNER_INVALID")
+
+        issued_at = parse_time(value.get("issued_at"), field="issued_at")
+        not_before = parse_time(value.get("not_before"), field="not_before")
+        expires_at = parse_time(value.get("expires_at"), field="expires_at")
+        current = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        if not (issued_at <= not_before <= expires_at):
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_TIME_ORDER_INVALID")
+        if current < not_before:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_NOT_YET_VALID")
+        if current >= expires_at:
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_EXPIRED")
+        if expires_at - issued_at > __import__("datetime").timedelta(days=7):
+            raise ActivationError("APPROVAL_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG")
+
+        return cls(
+            approval_id=approval_id,
+            candidate_oid=candidate_oid,
+            domain=domain,
+            bind_host=PUBLIC_HOST,
+            port=PUBLIC_PORT,
+            tls_cert_sha256=cert_sha,
+            owner=owner.strip(),
+            issued_at=issued_at,
+            not_before=not_before,
+            expires_at=expires_at,
+            raw_sha256=sha256_file(path),
+        )
+
+
+def validate_release(release_root: Path) -> dict[str, Path]:
+    if release_root.is_symlink() or not release_root.is_dir():
+        raise ActivationError("IMMUTABLE_RELEASE_INVALID")
+    edge = release_root / "active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_https_edge.py"
+    controller = release_root / "active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_https_edge_activation.py"
+    for path in (edge, controller):
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            raise ActivationError("IMMUTABLE_RELEASE_INVALID")
+    return {"edge": edge, "controller": controller}
+
+
+def render_dropin(approval: Approval, release_root: Path) -> str:
+    app = release_root / "active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_https_edge.py"
+    return (
+        "[Service]\n"
+        f"Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_HOST={approval.bind_host}\n"
+        f"Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PORT={approval.port}\n"
+        "Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_BIND_APPROVED=1\n"
+        f"Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_DOMAIN={approval.domain}\n"
+        "ExecStart=\n"
+        f"ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B {app}\n"
+        f"ReadOnlyPaths={release_root}\n"
+    )
+
+
+def atomic_write(path: Path, data: str, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="." + path.name + ".", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(data)
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(name, path)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(name):
+            os.unlink(name)
+
+
+class Systemd:
+    def run(self, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+        return subprocess.run(
+            ["/usr/bin/systemctl", *args],
+            check=check,
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=30,
+        )
+
+    def active(self, unit: str) -> bool:
+        return self.run("is-active", "--quiet", unit, check=False).returncode == 0
+
+    def enabled(self, unit: str) -> bool:
+        return self.run("is-enabled", "--quiet", unit, check=False).returncode == 0
+
+    def show(self, unit: str, prop: str) -> str:
+        return self.run("show", unit, f"--property={prop}", "--value").stdout.strip()
+
+
+def require_ingress_ready(systemd: Systemd) -> None:
+    if not systemd.active(INGRESS_UNIT):
+        raise ActivationError("INGRESS_SERVICE_NOT_ACTIVE")
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(INGRESS_HEALTH, timeout=5) as response:
+            if response.status != 200:
+                raise ActivationError("INGRESS_HEALTH_FAILED")
+            value = json.loads(response.read().decode())
+    except ActivationError:
+        raise
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise ActivationError("INGRESS_HEALTH_FAILED") from exc
+    if value.get("status") != "ok":
+        raise ActivationError("INGRESS_HEALTH_FAILED")
+
+
+def tls_probe(domain: str, cert_path: Path, *, port: int = PUBLIC_PORT) -> None:
+    context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=str(cert_path))
+    context.check_hostname = True
+    context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+    try:
+        with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=5) as sock:
+            with context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=domain) as tls_sock:
+                if tls_sock.version() not in {"TLSv1.2", "TLSv1.3"}:
+                    raise ActivationError("EDGE_TLS_VERSION_INVALID")
+    except ActivationError:
+        raise
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise ActivationError("EDGE_TLS_PROBE_FAILED") from exc
+
+
+def receipt_for(
+    approval: Approval,
+    release_root: Path,
+    *,
+    state: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "schema": STATE_SCHEMA,
+        "state": state,
+        "approval_id": approval.approval_id,
+        "approval_sha256": approval.raw_sha256,
+        "candidate_oid": approval.candidate_oid,
+        "domain": approval.domain,
+        "bind_host": approval.bind_host,
+        "port": approval.port,
+        "tls_cert_sha256": approval.tls_cert_sha256,
+        "release_root": str(release_root),
+        "updated_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+    }
+
+
+def activate(
+    *,
+    approval: Approval,
+    release_root: Path,
+    cert_path: Path,
+    key_path: Path,
+    dropin_path: Path,
+    state_path: Path,
+    systemd: Systemd,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if os.geteuid() != 0:
+        raise ActivationError("ROOT_REQUIRED")
+    release = validate_release(release_root)
+    app = release["edge"]
+    require_ingress_ready(systemd)
+    validate_tls_pair(cert_path, key_path, approval.domain)
+
+    if state_path.is_file():
+        try:
+            existing = json.loads(state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except Exception:
+            existing = {}
+        if (
+            existing.get("schema") == STATE_SCHEMA
+            and existing.get("state") == "ACTIVE"
+            and existing.get("approval_sha256") == approval.raw_sha256
+            and existing.get("candidate_oid") == approval.candidate_oid
+            and systemd.active(EDGE_UNIT)
+        ):
+            return existing
+
+    dropin = render_dropin(approval, release_root)
+    modified = False
+    try:
+        atomic_write(dropin_path, dropin, mode=0o644)
+        modified = True
+        systemd.run("daemon-reload")
+        systemd.run("enable", EDGE_UNIT)
+        systemd.run("restart", EDGE_UNIT)
+        if not systemd.active(EDGE_UNIT):
+            raise ActivationError("EDGE_SERVICE_NOT_ACTIVE")
+        exec_start = systemd.show(EDGE_UNIT, "ExecStart")
+        environment = systemd.show(EDGE_UNIT, "Environment")
+        if str(app) not in exec_start:
+            raise ActivationError("EDGE_EFFECTIVE_EXECSTART_INVALID")
+        for expected in (
+            f"AIOS_GPT_EDGE_HOST={approval.bind_host}",
+            f"AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PORT={approval.port}",
+            "AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_BIND_APPROVED=1",
+            f"AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_DOMAIN={approval.domain}",
+        ):
+            if expected not in environment:
+                raise ActivationError("EDGE_EFFECTIVE_ENVIRONMENT_INVALID")
+        tls_probe(approval.domain, cert_path, port=approval.port)
+        receipt = receipt_for(approval, release_root, state="ACTIVE")
+        atomic_write(state_path, json.dumps(receipt, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+        return receipt
+    except Exception:
+        if modified:
+            rollback(
+                dropin_path=dropin_path,
+                state_path=state_path,
+                systemd=systemd,
+                reason="activation_failed",
+            )
+        raise
+
+
+def rollback(
+    *,
+    dropin_path: Path,
+    state_path: Path,
+    systemd: Systemd,
+    reason: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if os.geteuid() != 0:
+        raise ActivationError("ROOT_REQUIRED")
+    systemd.run("stop", EDGE_UNIT, check=False)
+    systemd.run("disable", EDGE_UNIT, check=False)
+    dropin_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    systemd.run("daemon-reload")
+    if systemd.active(EDGE_UNIT):
+        raise ActivationError("EDGE_ROLLBACK_SERVICE_STILL_ACTIVE")
+    previous: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    if state_path.is_file():
+        try:
+            previous = json.loads(state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except Exception:
+            previous = {}
+    receipt = {
+        "schema": STATE_SCHEMA,
+        "state": "ROLLED_BACK",
+        "reason": reason[:255],
+        "candidate_oid": previous.get("candidate_oid"),
+        "approval_id": previous.get("approval_id"),
+        "domain": previous.get("domain"),
+        "updated_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+    }
+    atomic_write(state_path, json.dumps(receipt, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+    return receipt
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("command", choices=("check", "activate", "rollback"))
+    parser.add_argument("--candidate")
+    parser.add_argument("--approval", default="/etc/aios-gitops/gpt-https-edge.approved")
+    parser.add_argument("--tls-cert", default="/etc/aios-gitops/gpt-https-edge-tls.crt")
+    parser.add_argument("--tls-key", default="/etc/aios-gitops/gpt-https-edge-tls.key")
+    parser.add_argument("--release-root")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--dropin",
+        default=f"/etc/systemd/system/{EDGE_UNIT}.d/{DROPIN_NAME}",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--state",
+        default="/var/lib/aios-gpt-https-edge-activation/state.json",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("--reason", default="owner_requested")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    systemd = Systemd()
+    if args.command == "rollback":
+        value = rollback(
+            dropin_path=Path(args.dropin),
+            state_path=Path(args.state),
+            systemd=systemd,
+            reason=args.reason,
+        )
+        print(json.dumps(value, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+
+    candidate = str(args.candidate or "")
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(candidate) is None:
+        raise SystemExit("CANDIDATE_REQUIRED")
+    release_root = (
+        Path(args.release_root)
+        if args.release_root
+        else Path(f"/opt/aios/releases/{candidate}-gpt-https-edge-public")
+    )
+    cert_path = Path(args.tls_cert)
+    key_path = Path(args.tls_key)
+    approval = Approval.load(
+        Path(args.approval),
+        candidate_oid=candidate,
+        cert_path=cert_path,
+    )
+    tls = validate_tls_pair(cert_path, key_path, approval.domain)
+    release = validate_release(release_root)
+    require_ingress_ready(systemd)
+
+    if args.command == "check":
+        value = {
+            "status": "READY",
+            "candidate_oid": candidate,
+            "approval_id": approval.approval_id,
+            "approval_sha256": approval.raw_sha256,
+            "domain": approval.domain,
+            "bind_host": approval.bind_host,
+            "port": approval.port,
+            "edge_sha256": sha256_file(release["edge"]),
+            "controller_sha256": sha256_file(release["controller"]),
+            **tls,
+            "public_network_mutation": False,
+        }
+        print(json.dumps(value, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
+
+    value = activate(
+        approval=approval,
+        release_root=release_root,
+        cert_path=cert_path,
+        key_path=key_path,
+        dropin_path=Path(args.dropin),
+        state_path=Path(args.state),
+        systemd=systemd,
+    )
+    print(json.dumps(value, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_online_task_ingress.py

@@ -0,0 +1,816 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Credential-isolated host-side ingress for externally scheduled read-only Online Tasks.
+
+This service is intentionally not a public AIOS control plane. It accepts a tiny,
+authenticated external intent and translates it to the canonical loopback Bridge.
+Callers cannot select repository coordinates, capabilities, execution action,
+worker, branch policy, credentials, verification decisions, or write permissions.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.gpt-online-task-ingress.request.v1"
+RESPONSE_SCHEMA = "aios.gpt-online-task-ingress.response.v1"
+OPENAPI_VERSION = "3.1.0"
+
+REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}$")
+TASK_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+JOB_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^job-[0-9a-f]{32}$")
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+MAX_GOAL = 12_000
+MAX_INSTRUCTIONS = 24_000
+MAX_CRITERIA = 16
+MAX_CRITERION_TEXT = 1_000
+
+READONLY_CAPABILITIES = ("git.read", "git.test")
+REPOSITORY = "aios/aios"
+
+
+class IngressError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def load_secret(path: Path, *, code: str) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError(code + "_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32 or "\n" in value or "\r" in value:
+        raise RuntimeError(code + "_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def normalized_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    allowed = {
+        "schema",
+        "request_id",
+        "goal",
+        "instructions",
+        "success_criteria",
+        "constraints",
+    }
+    if set(value) - allowed:
+        raise IngressError("UNKNOWN_FIELDS")
+    if value.get("schema") != SCHEMA:
+        raise IngressError("SCHEMA_INVALID")
+
+    request_id = value.get("request_id")
+    if not isinstance(request_id, str) or REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id) is None:
+        raise IngressError("REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+
+    goal = value.get("goal")
+    if not isinstance(goal, str) or not goal.strip() or len(goal) > MAX_GOAL:
+        raise IngressError("GOAL_INVALID")
+    instructions = value.get("instructions", "")
+    if not isinstance(instructions, str) or len(instructions) > MAX_INSTRUCTIONS:
+        raise IngressError("INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+
+    criteria = value.get("success_criteria") or []
+    if not isinstance(criteria, list) or len(criteria) > MAX_CRITERIA:
+        raise IngressError("SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+    normalized_criteria = []
+    for item in criteria:
+        if not isinstance(item, Mapping) or set(item) != {"id", "description"}:
+            raise IngressError("SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criterion_id = item.get("id")
+        description = item.get("description")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(criterion_id, str)
+            or not criterion_id.strip()
+            or len(criterion_id) > 120
+            or not isinstance(description, str)
+            or not description.strip()
+            or len(description) > MAX_CRITERION_TEXT
+        ):
+            raise IngressError("SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        normalized_criteria.append(
+            {"id": criterion_id.strip(), "description": description.strip()}
+        )
+
+    constraints = value.get("constraints") or {}
+    if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+        raise IngressError("CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+    allowed_constraints = {
+        "max_files",
+        "focus_paths",
+        "notes",
+    }
+    if set(constraints) - allowed_constraints:
+        raise IngressError("CONSTRAINTS_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    normalized_constraints: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    if "max_files" in constraints:
+        max_files = constraints["max_files"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(max_files, int)
+            or isinstance(max_files, bool)
+            or not 1 <= max_files <= 500
+        ):
+            raise IngressError("MAX_FILES_INVALID")
+        normalized_constraints["max_files"] = max_files
+    if "focus_paths" in constraints:
+        paths = constraints["focus_paths"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(paths, list)
+            or len(paths) > 32
+            or not all(
+                isinstance(path, str)
+                and path
+                and len(path) <= 512
+                and not path.startswith("/")
+                and ".." not in Path(path).parts
+                for path in paths
+            )
+        ):
+            raise IngressError("FOCUS_PATHS_INVALID")
+        normalized_constraints["focus_paths"] = paths
+    if "notes" in constraints:
+        notes = constraints["notes"]
+        if not isinstance(notes, str) or len(notes) > 4_000:
+            raise IngressError("CONSTRAINT_NOTES_INVALID")
+        normalized_constraints["notes"] = notes
+
+    return {
+        "schema": SCHEMA,
+        "request_id": request_id,
+        "goal": goal.strip(),
+        "instructions": instructions,
+        "success_criteria": normalized_criteria,
+        "constraints": normalized_constraints,
+    }
+
+
+def validated_bind_host(value: str) -> str:
+    host = value.strip()
+    if host not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}:
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_INGRESS_NON_LOOPBACK_BIND_DENY")
+    return host
+
+
+def task_id_for(request_id: str) -> str:
+    suffix = hashlib.sha256(request_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:24]
+    return "gpt-readonly-" + suffix
+
+
+def branch_for(task_id: str) -> str:
+    return "agent/external-gpt-readonly/" + task_id[-24:]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Upstream:
+    bridge_base: str
+    task_base: str
+    control_token: str
+    timeout: int = 20
+
+    def _request(
+        self,
+        base: str,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        raw_body = None if body is None else canonical(body)
+        headers = {
+            "Authorization": "Bearer " + self.control_token,
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+        }
+        if raw_body is not None:
+            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+        req = urllib.request.Request(
+            base.rstrip("/") + path,
+            method=method,
+            data=raw_body,
+            headers=headers,
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
+                raw = response.read()
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read()
+            status = exc.code
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise IngressError("UPSTREAM_TRANSPORT_FAILED", 503) from exc
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise IngressError("UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise IngressError("UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502)
+        return status, dict(value)
+
+    def control_snapshot(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        status, value = self._request(
+            self.bridge_base,
+            "GET",
+            "/v2/control-plane-snapshot",
+        )
+        if status != 200:
+            raise IngressError("CONTROL_SNAPSHOT_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+        return value
+
+    def create_governed_task(
+        self,
+        body: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        return self._request(
+            self.bridge_base,
+            "POST",
+            "/v2/governed-task",
+            body,
+        )
+
+    def execution_envelope(
+        self,
+        body: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        return self._request(
+            self.bridge_base,
+            "POST",
+            "/v2/execution-envelope",
+            body,
+        )
+
+    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        return self._request(
+            self.task_base,
+            "GET",
+            "/v1/tasks/" + task_id,
+        )
+
+
+class Store:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as con:
+            con.execute(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS external_task_requests(
+                  request_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                  request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  task_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                  job_id TEXT,
+                  base_oid TEXT,
+                  state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  response_json TEXT
+                )
+                """
+            )
+            con.commit()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        con = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
+        con.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        con.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return con
+
+    def get(self, request_id: str) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
+        with self._connect() as con:
+            return con.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM external_task_requests WHERE request_id=?",
+                (request_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+
+    def reserve(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], task_id: str) -> sqlite3.Row:
+        request_sha = digest(request)
+        timestamp = now()
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as con:
+            con.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            row = con.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM external_task_requests WHERE request_id=?",
+                (request["request_id"],),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None:
+                if row["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise IngressError("IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                con.commit()
+                return row
+            con.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO external_task_requests(
+                  request_id,request_sha256,task_id,state,created_at,updated_at
+                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    request["request_id"],
+                    request_sha,
+                    task_id,
+                    "PENDING",
+                    timestamp,
+                    timestamp,
+                ),
+            )
+            con.commit()
+        row = self.get(request["request_id"])
+        assert row is not None
+        return row
+
+    def bound(
+        self,
+        request_id: str,
+        *,
+        job_id: str,
+        base_oid: str,
+        response: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        with self._lock, self._connect() as con:
+            con.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE external_task_requests
+                   SET job_id=?,base_oid=?,state='BOUND',response_json=?,updated_at=?
+                 WHERE request_id=?
+                """,
+                (
+                    job_id,
+                    base_oid,
+                    json.dumps(response, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    now(),
+                    request_id,
+                ),
+            )
+            con.commit()
+
+
+class IngressService:
+    def __init__(self, upstream: Upstream, store: Store) -> None:
+        self.upstream = upstream
+        self.store = store
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _main_oid(snapshot: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+        candidates = [
+            snapshot.get("authoritative_head_oid"),
+            snapshot.get("head"),
+            (snapshot.get("aggregate") or {}).get("authoritative_head_oid")
+            if isinstance(snapshot.get("aggregate"), Mapping)
+            else None,
+        ]
+        for candidate in candidates:
+            if isinstance(candidate, str) and OID_RE.fullmatch(candidate):
+                return candidate
+        raise IngressError("AUTHORITATIVE_HEAD_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _public_response(
+        request_id: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        job_id: str,
+        state: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": RESPONSE_SCHEMA,
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "job_id": job_id,
+            "state": state,
+            "execution_mode": "source_capture",
+            "capabilities": list(READONLY_CAPABILITIES),
+            "write_access": False,
+            "official_verification_required": True,
+        }
+
+    def _recover_existing(
+        self,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        row: sqlite3.Row,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        task_id = str(row["task_id"])
+        status, task = self.upstream.get_task(task_id)
+        if status == 404:
+            return None
+        if status != 200:
+            raise IngressError("TASK_RECOVERY_FAILED", 503)
+        metadata = task.get("metadata")
+        execution = (
+            metadata.get("execution")
+            if isinstance(metadata, Mapping)
+            and isinstance(metadata.get("execution"), Mapping)
+            else {}
+        )
+        job_id = str(execution.get("job_id") or row["job_id"] or "")
+        base_oid = str(execution.get("base_oid") or row["base_oid"] or "")
+        if (
+            task.get("task_id") != task_id
+            or not JOB_ID_RE.fullmatch(job_id)
+            or not OID_RE.fullmatch(base_oid)
+            or execution.get("action") != "source_capture"
+            or sorted(execution.get("capability_scope") or [])
+            != sorted(READONLY_CAPABILITIES)
+            or (execution.get("governance") or {}).get("writer_lease") is not False
+        ):
+            raise IngressError("TASK_RECOVERY_BINDING_INVALID", 409)
+        response = self._public_response(
+            request["request_id"],
+            task_id,
+            job_id,
+            str(task.get("status") or "BOUND"),
+        )
+        self.store.bound(
+            request["request_id"],
+            job_id=job_id,
+            base_oid=base_oid,
+            response=response,
+        )
+        return response
+
+    def create(self, raw: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request = normalized_request(raw)
+        task_id = task_id_for(request["request_id"])
+        row = self.store.reserve(request, task_id)
+        if row["state"] == "BOUND" and row["response_json"]:
+            return json.loads(row["response_json"])
+
+        recovered = self._recover_existing(request, row)
+        if recovered is not None:
+            return recovered
+
+        snapshot = self.upstream.control_snapshot()
+        base_oid = self._main_oid(snapshot)
+        target_branch = branch_for(task_id)
+        binding_key = "gpt-readonly-binding-" + digest(
+            {"request_id": request["request_id"], "base_oid": base_oid}
+        )[:24]
+        constraints = {
+            **request["constraints"],
+            "repository_mutation": "forbidden",
+            "control_plane_side_effects": "forbidden",
+            "credential_access": "forbidden",
+        }
+        body = {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "repository": REPOSITORY,
+            "base_oid": base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": base_oid,
+            "target_branch": target_branch,
+            "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation": 1,
+            "risk": "low",
+            "description": "Externally requested read-only governed Online Task.",
+            "idempotency_key": binding_key,
+            "priority": 0,
+            "max_attempts": 3,
+            "require_online_task_projection": True,
+            "online_task": {
+                "goal": request["goal"],
+                "instructions": request["instructions"],
+                "success_criteria": request["success_criteria"],
+                "constraints": constraints,
+                "required_capabilities": list(READONLY_CAPABILITIES),
+                "priority": 0,
+                "max_attempts": 3,
+            },
+            "execution": {
+                "action": "source_capture",
+                "adapter": "source_capture",
+                "capability_scope": list(READONLY_CAPABILITIES),
+                "source_signals": [
+                    "external read-only source analysis request",
+                    "no repository mutation no credential access no control-plane side effects",
+                ],
+            },
+        }
+        status, value = self.upstream.create_governed_task(body)
+        if status not in {200, 201, 202}:
+            if status == 409:
+                recovered = self._recover_existing(request, row)
+                if recovered is not None:
+                    return recovered
+            raise IngressError(
+                "GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE_FAILED",
+                409 if status == 409 else 503,
+            )
+        job_id = str(value.get("job_id") or "")
+        if value.get("task_id") != task_id or JOB_ID_RE.fullmatch(job_id) is None:
+            raise IngressError("GOVERNED_TASK_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502)
+
+        envelope_status, envelope = self.upstream.execution_envelope(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "job_id": job_id,
+                "required_capabilities": list(READONLY_CAPABILITIES),
+                "execution": body["execution"],
+            }
+        )
+        if envelope_status != 200:
+            raise IngressError("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_FAILED", 503)
+        if (
+            envelope.get("task_id") != task_id
+            or envelope.get("job_id") != job_id
+            or envelope.get("base_oid") != base_oid
+            or envelope.get("action") != "source_capture"
+            or sorted(envelope.get("capability_scope") or [])
+            != sorted(READONLY_CAPABILITIES)
+            or (envelope.get("governance") or {}).get("writer_lease") is not False
+        ):
+            raise IngressError("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_INVALID", 502)
+
+        response = self._public_response(
+            request["request_id"],
+            task_id,
+            job_id,
+            "BOUND",
+        )
+        self.store.bound(
+            request["request_id"],
+            job_id=job_id,
+            base_oid=base_oid,
+            response=response,
+        )
+        return response
+
+    def status(self, request_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id) is None:
+            raise IngressError("REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+        row = self.store.get(request_id)
+        if row is None:
+            raise IngressError("REQUEST_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+        task_id = str(row["task_id"])
+        status, task = self.upstream.get_task(task_id)
+        if status == 200 and not row["job_id"]:
+            metadata = task.get("metadata")
+            execution = (
+                metadata.get("execution")
+                if isinstance(metadata, Mapping)
+                and isinstance(metadata.get("execution"), Mapping)
+                else {}
+            )
+            job_id = str(execution.get("job_id") or "")
+            base_oid = str(execution.get("base_oid") or "")
+            if (
+                JOB_ID_RE.fullmatch(job_id)
+                and OID_RE.fullmatch(base_oid)
+                and execution.get("action") == "source_capture"
+                and sorted(execution.get("capability_scope") or [])
+                == sorted(READONLY_CAPABILITIES)
+                and (execution.get("governance") or {}).get("writer_lease") is False
+            ):
+                recovered = self._public_response(
+                    request_id,
+                    task_id,
+                    job_id,
+                    str(task.get("status") or "BOUND"),
+                )
+                self.store.bound(
+                    request_id,
+                    job_id=job_id,
+                    base_oid=base_oid,
+                    response=recovered,
+                )
+                row = self.store.get(request_id) or row
+        if status == 404:
+            return {
+                "schema": RESPONSE_SCHEMA,
+                "request_id": request_id,
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "state": "PENDING",
+                "official_verification_required": True,
+            }
+        if status != 200:
+            raise IngressError("TASK_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+
+        result = task.get("result") if isinstance(task.get("result"), Mapping) else {}
+        verification = (
+            task.get("verification")
+            if isinstance(task.get("verification"), Mapping)
+            else {}
+        )
+        safe = {
+            "schema": RESPONSE_SCHEMA,
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "job_id": str(row["job_id"] or ""),
+            "state": str(task.get("status") or "UNKNOWN"),
+            "attempt": int(task.get("attempt") or 0),
+            "claimed": bool(task.get("claimed_by")),
+            "result_status": result.get("status"),
+            "result_classification": result.get("classification"),
+            "official_verification": verification.get("decision"),
+            "official_classification": verification.get("classification"),
+            "write_access": False,
+        }
+        if result.get("execution_mode") == "source_capture":
+            snapshot = result.get("source_snapshot")
+            if isinstance(snapshot, Mapping):
+                safe["source_snapshot_sha256"] = snapshot.get("payload_sha256")
+                safe["source_snapshot_file_count"] = snapshot.get("file_count")
+        return safe
+
+
+def openapi_document() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "openapi": OPENAPI_VERSION,
+        "info": {
+            "title": "AIOS Read-Only Online Task Ingress",
+            "version": "1.0.0",
+        },
+        "paths": {
+            "/v1/read-only-tasks": {
+                "post": {
+                    "operationId": "createReadOnlyOnlineTask",
+                    "security": [{"bearerAuth": []}],
+                    "requestBody": {"required": True},
+                    "responses": {"200": {"description": "Task accepted"}},
+                }
+            },
+            "/v1/read-only-tasks/{request_id}": {
+                "get": {
+                    "operationId": "getReadOnlyOnlineTaskStatus",
+                    "security": [{"bearerAuth": []}],
+                    "responses": {"200": {"description": "Sanitized task status"}},
+                }
+            },
+        },
+        "components": {
+            "securitySchemes": {
+                "bearerAuth": {
+                    "type": "http",
+                    "scheme": "bearer",
+                }
+            }
+        },
+    }
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    service: IngressService | None = None
+    ingress_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def respond(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        raw = canonical(value)
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(raw)
+
+    def authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.ingress_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.ingress_token)
+        )
+
+    def body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "-1"))
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise IngressError("CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID") from exc
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            raise IngressError("REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID", 413)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            raise IngressError("REQUEST_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise IngressError("REQUEST_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
+        return dict(value)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self.respond(
+                {
+                    "status": "ok",
+                    "service": "aios-gpt-online-task-ingress",
+                    "mode": "read-only",
+                },
+                200,
+            )
+            return
+        if self.path == "/openapi.json":
+            self.respond(openapi_document(), 200)
+            return
+        if not self.authorized():
+            self.respond({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/read-only-tasks/([^/?#]+)", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self.respond({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        try:
+            if self.service is None:
+                raise IngressError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            self.respond(self.service.status(match.group(1)), 200)
+        except IngressError as exc:
+            self.respond({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        if self.path != "/v1/read-only-tasks":
+            self.respond({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self.authorized():
+            self.respond({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            if self.service is None:
+                raise IngressError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            value = self.service.create(self.body())
+            self.respond(value, 200)
+        except IngressError as exc:
+            self.respond({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    ingress_token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(
+                Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+                / "gpt_ingress_token"
+            ),
+        )
+    )
+    control_token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(
+                Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+                / "agent_task_control_token"
+            ),
+        )
+    )
+    ingress_token = load_secret(
+        ingress_token_path,
+        code="GPT_INGRESS_CREDENTIAL",
+    )
+    control_token = load_secret(
+        control_token_path,
+        code="CONTROL_PLANE_CREDENTIAL",
+    )
+
+    state_root = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_STATE_ROOT",
+            "/var/lib/aios-gpt-online-task-ingress",
+        )
+    )
+    host = validated_bind_host(
+        os.environ.get("AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    )
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_PORT", "18945"))
+    if not 1024 <= port <= 65535:
+        raise RuntimeError("GPT_INGRESS_PORT_INVALID")
+
+    Handler.service = IngressService(
+        Upstream(
+            bridge_base=os.environ.get(
+                "AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL",
+                "http://127.0.0.1:18892",
+            ),
+            task_base=os.environ.get(
+                "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL",
+                "http://127.0.0.1:18940",
+            ),
+            control_token=control_token,
+        ),
+        Store(state_root / "state.sqlite3"),
+    )
+    Handler.ingress_token = ingress_token
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), Handler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""Uncredentialed deterministic executor for governed Online Agent changes.
+
+This process never receives Agent/Owner/Bridge credentials and never writes Git refs.
+It operates only on an exchange bundle and returns hash-bound changed files + test evidence.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import errno
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import tarfile
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+ALLOWED_PROGRAMS = {"/usr/bin/python3", "/usr/bin/git", "/bin/true", "/usr/bin/true"}
+MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
+SECRET_ENV_TOKENS = ("TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "CREDENTIAL", "AUTHORIZATION", "PRIVATE_KEY")
+REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,254}$")
+SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*bearer\s+\S+|authorization\s+bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
+)
+
+
+class IsolatedExecutorError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def safe_relative(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("/"):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if ".." in path.parts or "." in path.parts or any(part in {"", ".git"} for part in path.parts):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    return path.as_posix()
+
+
+def resolve_under(root: Path, relative: str) -> Path:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    path = (root / safe_relative(relative)).resolve(strict=False)
+    if path == root or root not in path.parents:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_ESCAPE")
+    return path
+
+
+def _credential_exposure(directory: Path) -> str | None:
+    """Return an exposure code; EACCES is the intended credential isolation proof."""
+    try:
+        if not directory.exists():
+            return None
+        if directory.is_symlink():
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_SYMLINK"
+        if os.access(directory, os.R_OK):
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_ACCESSIBLE"
+        if directory.is_dir():
+            for child in directory.iterdir():
+                if child.is_file() and os.access(child, os.R_OK):
+                    return "CREDENTIAL_FILE_ACCESSIBLE"
+    except PermissionError:
+        return None
+    return None
+
+
+def assert_uncredentialed() -> None:
+    credentials = Path("/run/credentials")
+    candidates = {credentials}
+    credentials_directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+    candidates.add(credentials_directory)
+    leaked = sorted(
+        key for key, value in os.environ.items()
+        if value
+        and (any(token in key.upper() for token in SECRET_ENV_TOKENS) or SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE.search(str(value)))
+    )
+    if leaked:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CREDENTIAL_ENV_EXPOSED:" + ",".join(leaked))
+    for directory in candidates:
+        exposure = _credential_exposure(directory)
+        if exposure is not None:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError(exposure)
+    # In the intended PrivateNetwork namespace host loopback services are unreachable.
+    try:
+        probe = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno in {errno.EACCES, errno.EPERM, errno.EAFNOSUPPORT}:
+            return
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("NETWORK_ISOLATION_PROBE_FAILED") from exc
+    probe.settimeout(0.15)
+    try:
+        if probe.connect_ex(("127.0.0.1", 18892)) == 0:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("GOVERNED_BRIDGE_REACHABLE")
+    finally:
+        probe.close()
+
+
+def extract_source(archive: Path, root: Path) -> None:
+    if archive.is_symlink() or not archive.is_file() or archive.stat().st_size > MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_INVALID")
+    with tarfile.open(archive, "r:gz") as tf:
+        for member in tf.getmembers():
+            path = Path(member.name)
+            if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or ".git" in path.parts:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+            if member.issym() or member.islnk():
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_LINK_DENY")
+        tf.extractall(root, filter="data")
+
+
+def run_command(item: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    argv = item.get("argv")
+    if not isinstance(argv, Sequence) or isinstance(argv, (str, bytes)) or not argv:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_INVALID")
+    argv = [str(part) for part in argv]
+    if argv[0] not in ALLOWED_PROGRAMS:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_PROGRAM_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/python3" and "-m" in argv:
+        index = argv.index("-m")
+        if index + 1 >= len(argv) or argv[index + 1] not in {"pytest", "py_compile"}:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("PYTHON_MODULE_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/git" and any(
+        token in {"push", "update-ref", "commit", "merge", "rebase", "reset", "clean", "branch"}
+        for token in argv[1:]
+    ):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("GIT_MUTATION_DENY")
+    timeout = int(item.get("timeout_seconds") or 300)
+    if not 1 <= timeout <= 1800:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+    cwd = root if item.get("cwd", ".") == "." else resolve_under(root, str(item.get("cwd")))
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        cwd=cwd,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
+    )
+    result = {
+        "label": str(item.get("label") or "command"),
+        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
+        "stdout_sha256": sha256(completed.stdout.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "stderr_sha256": sha256(completed.stderr.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+    }
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError(
+            "COMMAND_FAILED:" + result["label"] + ":" + str(completed.returncode)
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def apply_changes(request: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> list[str]:
+    changes = request.get("change_set")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not changes:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    changed: list[str] = []
+    for change in changes:
+        if not isinstance(change, Mapping):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_INVALID")
+        relative = safe_relative(change.get("path"))
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        current = path.read_bytes() if path.is_file() else None
+        expected = change.get("expected_sha256")
+        if expected is not None and (current is None or sha256(current) != expected):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_DRIFT:" + relative)
+        operation = change.get("operation")
+        if operation == "write_file":
+            content = change.get("content")
+            if not isinstance(content, str):
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("WRITE_CONTENT_INVALID")
+            path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "replace_text":
+            if current is None:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_SOURCE_MISSING")
+            old = str(change.get("old"))
+            new = str(change.get("new"))
+            count = int(change.get("count", 1))
+            text = current.decode("utf-8")
+            if text.count(old) != count:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_COUNT_INVALID:" + relative)
+            path.write_text(text.replace(old, new), encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "delete_file":
+            if path.exists():
+                path.unlink()
+        else:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_OPERATION_INVALID")
+        changed.append(relative)
+    return sorted(set(changed))
+
+
+def changed_bundle(root: Path, changed: list[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    files = []
+    for relative in changed:
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        if path.exists():
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGED_FILE_TOO_LARGE:" + relative)
+            files.append({
+                "path": relative,
+                "deleted": False,
+                "sha256": sha256(data),
+                "content_b64": base64.b64encode(data).decode("ascii"),
+            })
+        else:
+            files.append({"path": relative, "deleted": True, "sha256": None, "content_b64": None})
+    return files
+
+
+def execute_request(request_path: Path, result_path: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    request = json.loads(request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if request.get("schema") != "aios.isolated-execution.request.v1":
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    request_id = request.get("request_id")
+    if not isinstance(request_id, str) or not REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+    source_archive = Path(str(request.get("source_archive") or ""))
+    if not source_archive.is_absolute():
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+    expected_archive_sha = str(request.get("source_archive_sha256") or "")
+    if sha256(source_archive.read_bytes()) != expected_archive_sha:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_SHA_MISMATCH")
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-isolated-executor-") as temporary:
+        root = Path(temporary) / "workspace"
+        root.mkdir()
+        extract_source(source_archive, root)
+        changed = apply_changes(request, root)
+        commands = [
+            run_command(item, root)
+            for item in request.get("verification", [])
+            if isinstance(item, Mapping)
+        ]
+        result = {
+            "schema": "aios.isolated-execution.result.v1",
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "request_sha256": sha256(canonical(request)),
+            "changed_files": changed_bundle(root, changed),
+            "verification": commands,
+            "credential_isolation": {
+                "credential_env_absent": True,
+                "credential_mount_inaccessible": True,
+                "governed_bridge_unreachable": True,
+            },
+        }
+        result["result_sha256"] = sha256(canonical(result))
+        temporary_result = result_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary_result.write_text(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")), encoding="utf-8")
+        os.replace(temporary_result, result_path)
+
+
+def serve(root: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    requests = root / "requests"
+    results = root / "results"
+    failed = root / "failed"
+    for path in (requests, results, failed):
+        path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    while True:
+        for request in sorted(requests.glob("*.json")):
+            if request.is_symlink():
+                continue
+            result = results / request.name
+            try:
+                execute_request(request, result)
+                request.unlink()
+            except Exception as exc:
+                (failed / request.name).write_text(
+                    json.dumps({"error": str(exc) or type(exc).__name__}, sort_keys=True),
+                    encoding="utf-8",
+                )
+                request.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    import argparse
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--root", default="/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor")
+    parser.add_argument("--request")
+    parser.add_argument("--result")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.request and args.result:
+        execute_request(Path(args.request), Path(args.result))
+    else:
+        serve(Path(args.root))

active-runtime/app/aios_model_api_staging.py

@@ -3,6 +3,15 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, uuid
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
+
+from aios_caller_admission_projection import (
+    CALLER,
+    SCOPE,
+    GOVERNED_TASK_SCOPE,
+    PROJECTED_SCOPES,
+    CallerProjectionClient,
+    CallerProjectionError,
+)
 from baseline_authority import BaselineAuthority, BaselineAuthorityError
 from typing import Any
 
@@ -89,6 +98,11 @@ SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
     'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
     '/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
 ))
+CALLER_PROJECTION_SOCKET = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_OWNER_AUTH_BROKER_SOCKET',
+    '/run/aios-owner-authorization-broker/broker.sock',
+))
+CALLER_PROJECTION_CLIENT = CallerProjectionClient(CALLER_PROJECTION_SOCKET)
 monitor = ActionMonitor()
 
 BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -112,6 +126,9 @@ READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
     '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
     '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
     '/api/release-acceptance',
+    '/api/governed-write-capabilities', '/api/control-plane-snapshot',
+    '/api/caller-capabilities',
+    '/api/online-agent-task', '/api/online-agent-task-events',
     '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
     '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
     '/getRecoveryStatus',
@@ -124,6 +141,25 @@ SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
     '/startDeployment',
 })
 
+GOVERNED_EXECUTION_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({
+    "governed.write.branch",
+    "governed.write.file",
+})
+
+
+def requires_governed_execution(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    capabilities = value.get("required_capabilities")
+    if capabilities is None:
+        return False
+    if not isinstance(capabilities, list):
+        return True
+    return bool(
+        GOVERNED_EXECUTION_CAPABILITIES.intersection(
+            {str(item) for item in capabilities}
+        )
+    )
+
+
 def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
     if method == 'GET':
         return False
@@ -407,14 +443,113 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         except Exception: return {'_raw':raw}
     def actor(self):
         auth=self.headers.get('Authorization',''); tok=auth[7:].strip() if auth.startswith('Bearer ') else self.headers.get('X-AIOS-Token','')
-        rec=authenticate(tok)
-        if rec: return {'ok':True,'account':safe(rec.get('account') or rec.get('name') or 'token-user'),'role':rec.get('role','user'),'scopes':set(rec.get('scopes') or [])}
-        return {'ok':False,'account':'anonymous','role':'anonymous','scopes':set()}
-    def need(self, scope):
-        a=self.actor()
-        if not a['ok']: self.sendj({'error':'unauthorized','hint':'Bearer token required'},401); return None
-        if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
+        try:
+            rec=authenticate(tok)
+        except Exception:
+            rec=None
+        if not isinstance(rec, dict) or not rec:
+            return {
+                'ok': False,
+                'account': 'anonymous',
+                'role': 'anonymous',
+                'scopes': set(),
+                'static_scopes': set(),
+                'projection': None,
+                'credential_loaded': False,
+            }
+        scopes = set(rec.get('scopes') or [])
+        return {
+            'ok': True,
+            'account': safe(rec.get('account') or rec.get('name') or 'token-user'),
+            'role': rec.get('role', 'user'),
+            'scopes': scopes,
+            'static_scopes': set(scopes),
+            'projection': None,
+            'credential_loaded': False,
+        }
+    def need(self, scope, *, projection_request=None):
+        a = self.actor()
+        if not a['ok']:
+            self.sendj({'error': 'unauthorized', 'hint': 'Bearer token required'}, 401)
+            return None
+        if a['account'] == CALLER and scope in PROJECTED_SCOPES:
+            try:
+                result = CALLER_PROJECTION_CLIENT.rehydrate(
+                    a['account'],
+                    scope,
+                    projection_request,
+                )
+            except CallerProjectionError as exc:
+                self.sendj(
+                    {
+                        'error': 'caller_projection_denied',
+                        'projection_state': 'DENIED',
+                        'detail': exc.code,
+                        'account': a['account'],
+                    },
+                    exc.status,
+                )
+                return None
+            projection = result.public
+            a['scopes'].update(projection.get('effective_scopes') or [])
+            a['projection'] = projection
+            a['credential_loaded'] = result.credential_loaded
+        if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']:
+            self.sendj(
+                {
+                    'error': 'forbidden',
+                    'required_scope': scope,
+                    'account': a['account'],
+                },
+                403,
+            )
+            return None
         return a
+    def caller_capabilities(self):
+        actor = self.actor()
+        if not actor['ok']:
+            return self.sendj(
+                {'error': 'unauthorized', 'hint': 'Bearer token required'},
+                401,
+            )
+        effective = set(actor['static_scopes'])
+        projection_state = 'NOT_REQUIRED'
+        credential_state = 'NOT_REQUIRED'
+        rehydration_state = 'NOT_APPLICABLE'
+        admitted = True
+        projection_error = None
+        if actor['account'] == CALLER:
+            try:
+                result = CALLER_PROJECTION_CLIENT.rehydrate(
+                    actor['account'],
+                    GOVERNED_TASK_SCOPE,
+                    {},
+                )
+            except CallerProjectionError as exc:
+                admitted = False
+                projection_state = 'DENIED'
+                credential_state = 'NOT_REHYDRATED'
+                rehydration_state = 'FAILED'
+                projection_error = exc.code
+            else:
+                effective.update(result.public.get('effective_scopes') or [])
+                projection_state = result.public['projection_state']
+                credential_state = result.public['credential_state']
+                rehydration_state = result.public['rehydration_state']
+        return self.sendj(
+            {
+                'schema': 'aios.caller-capability-introspection.v1',
+                'caller_identity': actor['account'],
+                'admitted': admitted,
+                'effective_scopes': sorted(effective),
+                'projection_state': projection_state,
+                'credential_state': credential_state,
+                'rehydration_state': rehydration_state,
+                'projection_error': projection_error,
+                'secret_exposed': False,
+            }
+        )
+
     def bridge_release(self, path, data):
         route = {
             '/createTagApprovalRequest': '/v2/tag/approval-request',
@@ -446,24 +581,183 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             return self.sendj(body, exc.code)
         except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
             return self.sendj({'error': 'GOVERNED_BRIDGE_UNAVAILABLE', 'detail': type(exc).__name__}, 503)
-    def do_POST(self):
-        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
-        if path in {
-            '/createTagApprovalRequest', '/requestOrCreateTag', '/getTagPublicationStatus',
-            '/buildProductionArtifact', '/executeApprovedProductionRelease',
-            '/getReleaseConsistency', '/runReleaseAcceptance',
-        }:
-            actor = self.need('tag:create')
-            if not actor:
-                return
-            return self.bridge_release(path, self.body())
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path):
-            return
-        return self.sendj({'error': 'not_found', 'path': path}, 404)
+    def bridge_v2_json(self, route, data=None, method='POST'):
+        base = os.getenv('AIOS_BRIDGE_V2_URL', 'http://127.0.0.1:18892').rstrip('/')
+        payload = None if data is None else json.dumps(
+            data, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')
+        ).encode('utf-8')
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + route,
+            data=payload,
+            headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'} if payload is not None else {},
+            method=method,
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
+                return self.sendj(result, response.status)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            try:
+                body = json.loads(exc.read().decode('utf-8'))
+            except Exception:
+                body = {'error': 'bridge_http_error'}
+            return self.sendj(body, exc.code)
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj(
+                {'error': 'GOVERNED_BRIDGE_UNAVAILABLE', 'detail': type(exc).__name__},
+                503,
+            )
+
+    def control_plane_snapshot(self):
+        """Build a non-sensitive snapshot locally when Bridge v2 has no snapshot HTTP route."""
+        base = os.getenv('AIOS_BRIDGE_V2_URL', 'http://127.0.0.1:18892').rstrip('/')
+
+        def bridge_get(route):
+            request = urllib.request.Request(
+                base + route,
+                headers={'Accept': 'application/json'},
+                method='GET',
+            )
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                if response.status != 200:
+                    raise RuntimeError('bridge_read_http_' + str(response.status))
+                value = json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
+                if not isinstance(value, dict):
+                    raise RuntimeError('bridge_read_not_object')
+                return value
+
+        try:
+            runtime = bridge_get('/v2/runtime')
+            capabilities = bridge_get('/v2/capabilities')
+            repository = repository_snapshot(
+                git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+            )
+            if not repository.get('repository_available'):
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'error': 'AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE',
+                    'query_error': repository.get('query_error'),
+                }, 503)
+            baseline = dict(BASELINE_AUTHORITY.read())
+        except BaselineAuthorityError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({
+                'error': 'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED',
+                'detail': str(exc),
+            }, 503)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({
+                'error': 'GOVERNED_BRIDGE_UNAVAILABLE',
+                'detail': 'HTTP_' + str(exc.code),
+            }, 503)
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError, RuntimeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj({
+                'error': 'GOVERNED_BRIDGE_UNAVAILABLE',
+                'detail': type(exc).__name__,
+            }, 503)
+
+        legacy = capabilities.get('legacy_writes_enabled')
+        if legacy is None:
+            legacy = capabilities.get('legacy_global_writes_enabled')
+        payload = {
+            'schema': 'aios.control-plane-snapshot.aggregate.v1',
+            'snapshot_source': 'model-api-local-aggregate',
+            'version': {
+                'target_release': runtime.get('control_plane_release_version'),
+            },
+            'runtime': {
+                'bridge_schema_version': runtime.get('bridge_schema_version'),
+                'control_plane_release_version': runtime.get('control_plane_release_version'),
+                'runtime_release_commit': runtime.get('runtime_release_commit'),
+                'runtime_path': runtime.get('runtime_path'),
+                'artifact_sha256': runtime.get('artifact_sha256'),
+                'drift_status': runtime.get('drift_status'),
+                'deployment_state': runtime.get('deployment_state'),
+            },
+            'repository': {
+                'identity': runtime.get('repository_identity') or runtime.get('repository') or REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                'authority_git_dir': runtime.get('authoritative_git_dir') or repository.get('authoritative_git_dir'),
+                'authority_main_oid': repository.get('authoritative_head_oid'),
+            },
+            'production': {
+                'baseline_version': baseline.get('current_baseline'),
+                'target_oid': baseline.get('target_oid'),
+                'deployment_state': baseline.get('status'),
+                'baseline_generation': baseline.get('generation'),
+                'baseline_sha256': baseline.get('authority_sha256'),
+            },
+            'task': {},
+            'capabilities': {
+                'legacy_writes_enabled': legacy,
+                'governed_writes_enabled': capabilities.get('governed_writes_enabled'),
+                'force_push': capabilities.get('force_push'),
+                'main_write': capabilities.get('main_write'),
+                'tag_write': capabilities.get('tag_write'),
+                'baseline_write': capabilities.get('baseline_write'),
+                'production_write': capabilities.get('production_write'),
+            },
+            'credential_broker': {
+                'status': 'SERVER_SIDE_ONLY',
+                'provider': 'BridgeV2RuntimeCredentialProjection',
+            },
+            'secret_material_exposed': False,
+        }
+        return self.sendj(payload)
+
+    def agent_task_control(self, method, route, data=None):
+        token_path = Path(os.getenv(
+            'AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE',
+            '/run/credentials/aios-gitops-model-api-v2r2c1-staging.service/agent_task_control_token',
+        ))
+        if token_path.is_symlink() or not token_path.is_file():
+            return self.sendj({'error': 'AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE'}, 503)
+        token = token_path.read_text(encoding='utf-8').strip()
+        if len(token) < 32:
+            return self.sendj({'error': 'AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID'}, 503)
+        base = os.getenv('AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL', 'http://127.0.0.1:18940').rstrip('/')
+        payload = None if data is None else json.dumps(
+            data, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')
+        ).encode('utf-8')
+        headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + token, 'Accept': 'application/json'}
+        if payload is not None:
+            headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json'
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + route, data=payload, headers=headers, method=method
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode('utf-8'))
+                return self.sendj(result, response.status)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            try:
+                body = json.loads(exc.read().decode('utf-8'))
+            except Exception:
+                body = {'error': 'agent_task_http_error'}
+            return self.sendj(body, exc.code)
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj(
+                {'error': 'AGENT_TASK_API_UNAVAILABLE', 'detail': type(exc).__name__},
+                503,
+            )
+
     def do_GET(self):
         u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
         if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
         q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        if path == '/api/governed-write-capabilities':
+            return self.bridge_v2_json('/v2/capabilities', method='GET')
+        if path == '/api/control-plane-snapshot':
+            return self.control_plane_snapshot()
+        if path == '/api/caller-capabilities':
+            return self.caller_capabilities()
+        if path in ('/api/online-agent-task', '/api/online-agent-task-events'):
+            actor = self.need('agent-task:control')
+            if not actor:
+                return
+            task_id = (q.get('task_id') or [''])[0]
+            if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}', task_id):
+                return self.sendj({'error': 'task_id_invalid'}, 400)
+            suffix = '/events' if path.endswith('-events') else ''
+            return self.agent_task_control('GET', '/v1/tasks/' + task_id + suffix)
         try:
             if path in ('/health','/api/health'):
                 return self.sendj({
@@ -700,12 +994,68 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
     def do_POST(self):
         path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        governed_routes = {
+            '/createGovernedTask': ('/v2/governed-task', 'branch:create'),
+            '/acquireWriterLease': ('/v2/writer-lease', 'file:write'),
+            '/commitFileGoverned': ('/v2/commit-file', 'file:write'),
+            '/commitFilesGoverned': ('/v2/commit-files', 'file:write'),
+            '/getGitOpsJob': ('/v2/job', 'file:write'),
+            '/resumeGitOpsJob': ('/v2/job/resume', 'file:write'),
+            '/reconcileGitOpsJob': ('/v2/job/reconcile', 'file:write'),
+            '/createTagApprovalRequest': ('/v2/tag/approval-request', 'tag:create'),
+            '/requestOrCreateTag': ('/v2/tag/publish', 'tag:create'),
+            '/getTagPublicationStatus': ('/v2/tag/status', 'tag:create'),
+            '/buildProductionArtifact': ('/v2/release/artifact', 'tag:create'),
+            '/executeApprovedProductionRelease': ('/v2/release/execute', 'tag:create'),
+            '/getReleaseConsistency': ('/v2/release/consistency', 'tag:create'),
+            '/runReleaseAcceptance': ('/v2/release/acceptance', 'tag:create'),
+        }
+        if path in governed_routes:
+            route, scope = governed_routes[path]
+            if path == '/createGovernedTask' and self.actor()['account'] == CALLER:
+                scope = GOVERNED_TASK_SCOPE
+            actor = self.need(scope)
+            if not actor:
+                return
+            return self.bridge_v2_json(route, self.body(), method='POST')
+        if path in {
+            '/createOnlineAgentTask', '/registerOnlineAgent',
+            '/verifyOnlineAgentTask', '/cancelOnlineAgentTask',
+        }:
+            actor = self.need('agent-task:control')
+            if not actor:
+                return
+            data = self.body()
+            if path == '/createOnlineAgentTask':
+                if requires_governed_execution(data):
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        {
+                            'error': 'governed_execution_binding_required',
+                            'hint': 'use createGovernedTask',
+                        },
+                        409,
+                    )
+                return self.agent_task_control('POST', '/v1/tasks', data)
+            if path == '/registerOnlineAgent':
+                return self.agent_task_control('POST', '/v1/agents/register', data)
+            task_id = str(data.pop('task_id', '') or '')
+            if not re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}', task_id):
+                return self.sendj({'error': 'task_id_invalid'}, 400)
+            suffix = '/verify' if path == '/verifyOnlineAgentTask' else '/cancel'
+            return self.agent_task_control('POST', '/v1/tasks/' + task_id + suffix, data)
         if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
         data=self.body()
         try:
             if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
-                a=self.need('release:candidate')
-                if not a: return
+                a = self.need(
+                    'release:candidate',
+                    projection_request={
+                        'source_commit': str(data.get('source_commit') or ''),
+                        'version': str(data.get('version') or ''),
+                    },
+                )
+                if not a:
+                    return
                 return self.sendj(
                     silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
                 )
@@ -996,7 +1346,7 @@ def api_spec():
     return {
         'version': 'V2R2C1-IMMUTABLE-STAGING',
         'openapi': '/api/openapi.yaml',
-        'read': ['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],
+        'read': ['GET /api/caller-capabilities','GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],
         'write': ['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],
         'policy': {
             'bearer_required_for_write': True,
@@ -1011,6 +1361,9 @@ def api_spec():
             'silent_release_shadow_default': True,
             'runtime_mode': 'IMMUTABLE_STAGING',
             'governed_release_routing': 'bridge-v2',
+            'caller_admission_projection': 'durable-owner-policy-server-side-ack',
+            'caller_projection_scope': SCOPE,
+            'caller_projection_caller': CALLER,
         },
     }
 

active-runtime/app/aios_model_governance_admin.py

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Root-owned Model Governance configuration reconciler.
+
+The config contains provider/model/policy metadata only. Raw credentials are rejected by
+aios_model_governance and never stored in the governance database.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_model_governance import (
+    ModelGovernanceError,
+    ModelGovernanceStore,
+    ModelRecord,
+    ProviderRecord,
+    ScopePolicy,
+)
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.model-governance.bootstrap.v1"
+MAX_CONFIG_BYTES = 512 * 1024
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def fail(code: str) -> None:
+    raise SystemExit(code)
+
+
+def _load(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size > MAX_CONFIG_BYTES:
+        fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONFIG_INVALID")
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+        fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONFIG_INVALID")
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != SCHEMA:
+        fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONFIG_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _provider_desired(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> ProviderRecord:
+    return ProviderRecord(
+        provider_id=str(value.get("provider_id") or ""),
+        credential_ref=value.get("credential_ref"),
+        enabled=bool(value.get("enabled", True)),
+        failure_domain=str(value.get("failure_domain") or "default"),
+        max_failures=int(value.get("max_failures") or 3),
+        cooldown_seconds=int(value.get("cooldown_seconds") or 60),
+    )
+
+
+def _model_desired(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> ModelRecord:
+    return ModelRecord(
+        model_id=str(value.get("model_id") or ""),
+        provider_id=str(value.get("provider_id") or ""),
+        version=str(value.get("version") or ""),
+        capabilities=tuple(value.get("capabilities") or ()),
+        input_cost_micros_per_1k=int(value.get("input_cost_micros_per_1k") or 0),
+        output_cost_micros_per_1k=int(value.get("output_cost_micros_per_1k") or 0),
+        max_input_tokens=int(value.get("max_input_tokens") or 0),
+        max_output_tokens=int(value.get("max_output_tokens") or 0),
+        evaluation_state=str(value.get("evaluation_state") or "APPROVED"),
+        evaluation_sha256=str(value.get("evaluation_sha256") or ""),
+        enabled=bool(value.get("enabled", True)),
+        priority=int(value.get("priority") or 100),
+    )
+
+
+def _policy_desired(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> ScopePolicy:
+    return ScopePolicy(
+        scope_type=str(value.get("scope_type") or ""),
+        tenant_id=value.get("tenant_id"),
+        project_id=value.get("project_id"),
+        allowed_models=tuple(value.get("allowed_models") or ()),
+        denied_providers=tuple(value.get("denied_providers") or ()),
+        required_capabilities=tuple(value.get("required_capabilities") or ()),
+        pinned_model_id=value.get("pinned_model_id"),
+        pinned_model_version=value.get("pinned_model_version"),
+        max_input_tokens_per_request=int(value.get("max_input_tokens_per_request") or 0),
+        max_output_tokens_per_request=int(value.get("max_output_tokens_per_request") or 0),
+        daily_token_budget=int(value.get("daily_token_budget") or 0),
+        daily_cost_budget_micros=int(value.get("daily_cost_budget_micros") or 0),
+        fallback_limit=int(value.get("fallback_limit") or 0),
+    )
+
+
+def _row_dict(row: object) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    return dict(row) if row is not None else None
+
+
+def _provider_matches(row: Mapping[str, Any], desired: ProviderRecord) -> bool:
+    return (
+        row["credential_ref"] == desired.credential_ref
+        and bool(row["enabled"]) == desired.enabled
+        and row["failure_domain"] == desired.failure_domain
+        and int(row["max_failures"]) == desired.max_failures
+        and int(row["cooldown_seconds"]) == desired.cooldown_seconds
+    )
+
+
+def _model_matches(row: Mapping[str, Any], desired: ModelRecord) -> bool:
+    return (
+        row["provider_id"] == desired.provider_id
+        and row["version"] == desired.version
+        and tuple(json.loads(row["capabilities_json"])) == tuple(sorted(set(desired.capabilities)))
+        and int(row["input_cost_micros_per_1k"]) == desired.input_cost_micros_per_1k
+        and int(row["output_cost_micros_per_1k"]) == desired.output_cost_micros_per_1k
+        and int(row["max_input_tokens"]) == desired.max_input_tokens
+        and int(row["max_output_tokens"]) == desired.max_output_tokens
+        and row["evaluation_state"] == desired.evaluation_state
+        and row["evaluation_sha256"] == desired.evaluation_sha256
+        and bool(row["enabled"]) == desired.enabled
+        and int(row["priority"]) == desired.priority
+    )
+
+
+def _policy_matches(row: Mapping[str, Any], desired: ScopePolicy) -> bool:
+    return (
+        row["scope_type"] == desired.scope_type
+        and row["tenant_id"] == desired.tenant_id
+        and row["project_id"] == desired.project_id
+        and tuple(json.loads(row["allowed_models_json"])) == tuple(sorted(set(desired.allowed_models)))
+        and tuple(json.loads(row["denied_providers_json"])) == tuple(sorted(set(desired.denied_providers)))
+        and tuple(json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"])) == tuple(sorted(set(desired.required_capabilities)))
+        and row["pinned_model_id"] == desired.pinned_model_id
+        and row["pinned_model_version"] == desired.pinned_model_version
+        and int(row["max_input_tokens_per_request"]) == desired.max_input_tokens_per_request
+        and int(row["max_output_tokens_per_request"]) == desired.max_output_tokens_per_request
+        and int(row["daily_token_budget"]) == desired.daily_token_budget
+        and int(row["daily_cost_budget_micros"]) == desired.daily_cost_budget_micros
+        and int(row["fallback_limit"]) == desired.fallback_limit
+    )
+
+
+def apply_config(db_path: Path, config_path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    config = _load(config_path)
+    config_sha = hashlib.sha256(canonical(config)).hexdigest()
+    providers = config.get("providers") or []
+    models = config.get("models") or []
+    policies = config.get("policies") or []
+    if not all(isinstance(value, list) for value in (providers, models, policies)):
+        fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONFIG_COLLECTION_INVALID")
+
+    store = ModelGovernanceStore(db_path)
+    changes = {"providers": 0, "models": 0, "policies": 0, "unchanged": 0}
+    try:
+        for item in providers:
+            if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+                fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_PROVIDER_CONFIG_INVALID")
+            desired = _provider_desired(item)
+            row = store.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM model_governance_providers WHERE provider_id=?",
+                (desired.provider_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None and _provider_matches(row, desired):
+                changes["unchanged"] += 1
+                continue
+            expected = int(row["revision"]) if row is not None else 0
+            store.register_provider(desired, expected_revision=expected)
+            changes["providers"] += 1
+
+        for item in models:
+            if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+                fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_MODEL_CONFIG_INVALID")
+            desired = _model_desired(item)
+            row = store.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM model_governance_models WHERE model_id=?",
+                (desired.model_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None and _model_matches(row, desired):
+                changes["unchanged"] += 1
+                continue
+            expected = int(row["revision"]) if row is not None else 0
+            store.register_model(desired, expected_revision=expected)
+            changes["models"] += 1
+
+        for item in policies:
+            if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+                fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_POLICY_CONFIG_INVALID")
+            desired = _policy_desired(item)
+            row = store.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM model_governance_scope_policies WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (desired.scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is not None and _policy_matches(row, desired):
+                changes["unchanged"] += 1
+                continue
+            expected = int(row["revision"]) if row is not None else 0
+            store.set_scope_policy(desired, expected_revision=expected)
+            changes["policies"] += 1
+
+        if not store.verify_audit_chain():
+            fail("MODEL_GOVERNANCE_AUDIT_CHAIN_INVALID")
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.model-governance.bootstrap-result.v1",
+            "database": str(db_path),
+            "config_sha256": config_sha,
+            "changes": changes,
+            "audit_chain_valid": True,
+        }
+    finally:
+        store.close()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--db", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--config", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--output")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        result = apply_config(Path(args.db), Path(args.config))
+    except ModelGovernanceError as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAILED", "error": exc.code}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 20
+    data = json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
+    if args.output:
+        Path(args.output).write_text(data, encoding="utf-8")
+    print(data, end="")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_checkpoint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+"""Durable checkpoint journal for the generic Online Agent worker.
+
+The JSON task state remains a fast cache.  This SQLite journal is the durable,
+append-only evidence used for restart/resume/replay decisions.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+PHASE_ORDER = {
+    "claimed": 10,
+    "workspace_prepared": 20,
+    "verification_passed": 30,
+    "agent_runtime_done": 40,
+    "source_capture_done": 40,
+    "commit_done": 40,
+    "reconciliation_required": 45,
+    "result_pending": 50,
+    "result_submitted": 60,
+}
+
+
+class CheckpointError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CheckpointBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    attempt: int
+    execution_digest: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+
+    def material(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "attempt": self.attempt,
+            "execution_digest": self.execution_digest,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "repository": self.repository,
+            "base_oid": self.base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid,
+            "target_branch": self.target_branch,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def binding_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.material())
+
+
+class CheckpointStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoints(
+                  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  repository TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  base_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  expected_branch_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  target_branch TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  PRIMARY KEY(task_id, attempt, sequence)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_task_latest
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt DESC, sequence DESC);
+                CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_exact_replay
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt, phase, payload_sha256);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _phase_order(phase: str) -> int:
+        try:
+            return PHASE_ORDER[phase]
+        except KeyError as exc:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_INVALID") from exc
+
+    def append(
+        self,
+        binding: CheckpointBinding,
+        phase: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        order = self._phase_order(phase)
+        payload_value = dict(payload)
+        payload_sha = sha256_json(payload_value)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND phase=? AND payload_sha256=?
+                """,
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, phase, payload_sha),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                connection.commit()
+                return dict(replay)
+
+            head = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoint_heads WHERE task_id=?",
+                (binding.task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if head is not None:
+                head_attempt = int(head["attempt"])
+                head_order = int(head["phase_order"])
+                if binding.attempt < head_attempt:
+                    raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_ATTEMPT_REGRESSION")
+                if binding.attempt == head_attempt:
+                    if head["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_EXECUTION_DIGEST_CONFLICT")
+                    if head["binding_sha256"] != binding.binding_sha256:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+                    if order < head_order and phase != "reconciliation_required":
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_REGRESSION")
+                    sequence = int(head["sequence"]) + 1
+                else:
+                    sequence = 1
+            else:
+                sequence = 1
+
+            created_at = now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoints(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,job_id,
+                  repository,base_oid,expected_branch_oid,target_branch,generation,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_json,payload_sha256,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.job_id,
+                    binding.repository,
+                    binding.base_oid,
+                    binding.expected_branch_oid,
+                    binding.target_branch,
+                    binding.generation,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    canonical(payload_value).decode("utf-8"),
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_sha256,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                  attempt=excluded.attempt,
+                  sequence=excluded.sequence,
+                  phase=excluded.phase,
+                  phase_order=excluded.phase_order,
+                  execution_digest=excluded.execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256=excluded.binding_sha256,
+                  payload_sha256=excluded.payload_sha256,
+                  updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoints WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND sequence=?",
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            return dict(row)
+
+    def latest(self, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=?
+                 ORDER BY attempt DESC, sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def latest_for_attempt(self, task_id: str, attempt: int) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=?
+                 ORDER BY sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id, attempt),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def verify_latest_binding(self, binding: CheckpointBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        value = self.latest(binding.task_id)
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        if int(value["attempt"]) > binding.attempt:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_FUTURE_ATTEMPT")
+        # A previous attempt may be reused only when the immutable execution/scope binding matches.
+        if value["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+            return None
+        expected = CheckpointBinding(
+            task_id=value["task_id"],
+            attempt=int(value["attempt"]),
+            execution_digest=value["execution_digest"],
+            job_id=value["job_id"],
+            repository=value["repository"],
+            base_oid=value["base_oid"],
+            expected_branch_oid=value["expected_branch_oid"],
+            target_branch=value["target_branch"],
+            generation=int(value["generation"]),
+        )
+        current_scope = binding.material()
+        historical_scope = expected.material()
+        current_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        historical_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        if sha256_json(current_scope) != sha256_json(historical_scope):
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return value

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_compact_map.py

@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+"""Bounded read-only repository interface map for governed Online Agent analysis.
+
+The compact map intentionally returns symbols and short source excerpts rather than a
+source archive. It is designed for control-plane consumers that cannot safely ingest a
+multi-megabyte repository snapshot.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ast
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1"
+MAX_RESULT_BYTES = 120 * 1024
+TARGET_RESULT_BYTES = 108 * 1024
+MAX_MODULES = 40
+MAX_SYMBOLS = 80
+MAX_TESTS = 40
+MAX_EXCERPTS = 25
+MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS = 1200
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+ROOTS = (
+    "active-runtime/app",
+    "runtime/agent-os",
+    "tests",
+    "db/migrations",
+    "migrations",
+    "deploy/systemd",
+    "docs/task-plane",
+    "docs/superpowers/specs",
+)
+SUFFIXES = {".py", ".sql", ".service", ".md", ".json", ".yaml", ".yml"}
+
+DEFAULT_TERMS = {
+    "agent", "worker", "fleet", "scheduler", "scheduling", "task", "claim", "lease",
+    "heartbeat", "capacity", "concurrency", "priority", "fairness", "queue", "retry",
+    "backoff", "circuit", "health", "liveness", "scope", "tenant", "project", "trace",
+    "message", "checkpoint", "recovery", "idempotency", "dispatch", "assignment",
+}
+FLEET_CONTRACT_TERMS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION": ("agent", "register", "worker", "capability", "version"),
+    "FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING": ("capacity", "slot", "concurrency", "scheduler", "queue"),
+    "FLEET_FAIRNESS": ("fair", "priority", "queue", "tenant", "project", "starvation"),
+    "FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION": ("failure", "health", "liveness", "timeout", "circuit", "poison"),
+    "FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT": ("reassign", "assignment", "claim", "lease", "retry", "worker"),
+    "FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION": ("tenant", "project", "scope", "conversation", "task", "run"),
+    "FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH": ("idempot", "dispatch", "claim", "lease", "result", "attempt"),
+    "FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY": ("checkpoint", "resume", "recover", "retry", "cleanup", "receipt"),
+}
+
+MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONTRACT_TERMS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "MODEL_PROVIDER_REGISTRY": ("model", "provider", "registry", "endpoint", "capability"),
+    "MODEL_SELECTION_POLICY": ("model", "select", "route", "policy", "capability"),
+    "MODEL_VERSION_PINNING": ("model", "version", "pin", "revision", "snapshot"),
+    "MODEL_BUDGET_ACCOUNTING": ("budget", "token", "cost", "quota", "usage"),
+    "MODEL_FALLBACK_POLICY": ("fallback", "retry", "route", "provider", "model"),
+    "MODEL_SCOPE_ISOLATION": ("tenant", "project", "scope", "policy", "model"),
+    "MODEL_CREDENTIAL_BOUNDARY": ("credential", "secret", "provider", "tool", "token"),
+    "MODEL_TRACE_AUDIT": ("trace", "audit", "model", "provider", "request"),
+    "MODEL_EVALUATION_GATE": ("eval", "evaluation", "approval", "quality", "gate"),
+    "MODEL_ROUTING_RESILIENCE": ("route", "retry", "fallback", "timeout", "health"),
+}
+
+PROFILE_CLASSIFICATION = {
+    "fleet": "P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+    "model_governance": "MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+}
+
+MODEL_PROFILE_MARKERS = {
+    "model", "provider", "llm", "inference", "routing", "router", "budget",
+    "token", "cost", "quota", "fallback", "evaluation", "eval", "approval",
+    "version", "pinning",
+}
+SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^'\"\s,;]+)"
+)
+SQL_TABLE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?is)\bcreate\s+table\s+(?:if\s+not\s+exists\s+)?[\"`[]?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*)"
+)
+
+
+class CompactInterfaceMapError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _sha(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _bounded_excerpt(text: str, start_line: int, end_line: int) -> str:
+    lines = text.splitlines()
+    start = max(0, start_line - 2)
+    end = min(len(lines), max(end_line + 1, start + 1))
+    excerpt = "\n".join(lines[start:end])
+    excerpt = SENSITIVE_RE.sub("<redacted-sensitive-source-pattern>", excerpt)
+    if len(excerpt) > MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS:
+        excerpt = excerpt[: MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS - 1] + "…"
+    return excerpt
+
+
+def _signal_terms(signals: Sequence[str]) -> set[str]:
+    terms = set(DEFAULT_TERMS)
+    for signal in signals:
+        if not isinstance(signal, str):
+            continue
+        terms.update(
+            token.lower()
+            for token in re.findall(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,63}", signal)
+        )
+    return set(sorted(terms)[:96])
+
+
+def _profile(source_signals: Sequence[str]) -> str:
+    tokens: set[str] = set()
+    for signal in source_signals:
+        if not isinstance(signal, str):
+            continue
+        tokens.update(
+            token.lower()
+            for token in re.findall(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,63}", signal)
+        )
+    model_score = len(tokens & MODEL_PROFILE_MARKERS)
+    return "model_governance" if model_score >= 2 else "fleet"
+
+
+def _contract_terms(profile: str) -> Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]]:
+    if profile == "model_governance":
+        return MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONTRACT_TERMS
+    if profile == "fleet":
+        return FLEET_CONTRACT_TERMS
+    raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_PROFILE_INVALID")
+
+
+def _candidate_files(root: Path, terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    candidates: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for relative_root in ROOTS:
+        directory = (root / relative_root).resolve(strict=False)
+        if directory == root or root not in directory.parents:
+            raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not directory.is_dir() or directory.is_symlink():
+            continue
+        for path in sorted(directory.rglob("*")):
+            if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.suffix.lower() not in SUFFIXES:
+                continue
+            resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+            if root not in resolved.parents:
+                raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_PATH_ESCAPE")
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                continue
+            relative = path.relative_to(root).as_posix()
+            text = data.decode("utf-8", "ignore")
+            searchable = (relative + "\n" + text[:384000]).lower()
+            matched = sorted(term for term in terms if term in searchable)
+            if not matched:
+                continue
+            path_bonus = sum(3 for term in terms if term in relative.lower())
+            test_bonus = 3 if relative.startswith("tests/") else 0
+            score = min(250, len(matched) + path_bonus + test_bonus)
+            candidates.append(
+                {
+                    "path": relative,
+                    "sha256": _sha(data),
+                    "bytes": len(data),
+                    "score": score,
+                    "text": text,
+                    "suffix": path.suffix.lower(),
+                }
+            )
+    candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (-item["score"], item["path"]))
+    return candidates
+
+
+def _python_symbols(item: Mapping[str, Any], terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        tree = ast.parse(str(item["text"]), filename=str(item["path"]))
+    except SyntaxError:
+        return []
+    result: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    class Visitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.stack: list[str] = []
+
+        def _record(self, node: ast.AST, kind: str, name: str) -> None:
+            qualified = ".".join([*self.stack, name]) if self.stack else name
+            haystack = f"{item['path']} {qualified}".lower()
+            score = sum(3 if term in haystack else 0 for term in terms)
+            if name.startswith("test_"):
+                score += 12
+            result.append(
+                {
+                    "path": item["path"],
+                    "symbol": qualified,
+                    "kind": kind,
+                    "line": int(getattr(node, "lineno", 1)),
+                    "end_line": int(getattr(node, "end_lineno", getattr(node, "lineno", 1))),
+                    "score": score + int(item["score"]),
+                }
+            )
+
+        def visit_ClassDef(self, node: ast.ClassDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "class", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_AsyncFunctionDef(self, node: ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "async_function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+    Visitor().visit(tree)
+    return result
+
+
+def _surface_ref(symbol: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return f"{symbol['path']}::{symbol['symbol']}"
+
+
+def _contract_map(
+    symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    modules: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    contract_terms: Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    module_paths = [str(item["path"]) for item in modules]
+    for contract, terms in contract_terms.items():
+        scored: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+        for symbol in symbols:
+            haystack = _surface_ref(symbol).lower()
+            score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in haystack)
+            if score:
+                scored.append((score, _surface_ref(symbol)))
+        scored.sort(key=lambda item: (-item[0], item[1]))
+        surfaces = [value for _, value in scored[:6]]
+        if not surfaces:
+            for path in module_paths:
+                score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in path.lower())
+                if score:
+                    surfaces.append(path)
+                if len(surfaces) == 6:
+                    break
+        result[contract] = {
+            "status": "PARTIAL" if surfaces else "GAP",
+            "surfaces": surfaces,
+        }
+    return result
+
+
+def _gap_evidence(
+    symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    profile: str,
+) -> tuple[list[str], list[str], list[str]]:
+    haystack = "\n".join(_surface_ref(item).lower() for item in symbols)
+
+    if profile == "model_governance":
+        invariants = [
+            "Online Task claim/heartbeat remains the authoritative worker ownership boundary.",
+            "Provider/model credentials remain outside uncredentialed planner/executor processes.",
+            "P0-A tenant/project scope and P0-C trace/audit lineage must constrain model routing.",
+            "P1 retry/checkpoint semantics remain authoritative for model-call execution recovery.",
+        ]
+        failure_windows: list[str] = []
+        if "provider" not in haystack and "model" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No first-class model/provider registry surface detected.")
+        if "budget" not in haystack and "cost" not in haystack and "quota" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit durable model budget/cost/quota accounting surface detected.")
+        if "fallback" not in haystack and "route" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit model fallback/routing policy surface detected.")
+        if "eval" not in haystack and "approval" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit evaluation/approval gate surface detected for model changes.")
+        if "version" not in haystack and "pin" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit model-version pinning surface detected.")
+        desired = (
+            ("trace", "P0-C trace/audit lineage"),
+            ("scope", "P0-A tenant/project scope isolation"),
+            ("credential", "P0-C credential governance"),
+            ("checkpoint", "P1 durable execution recovery"),
+            ("message", "P0-B MessageEnvelope/handoff"),
+            ("retry", "P1 retry/idempotency"),
+        )
+    else:
+        invariants = [
+            "Online Task claim/heartbeat remains the authoritative worker ownership boundary.",
+            "Governed mutation remains separated from read-only analysis and requires WriterLease.",
+            "P1 attempt-aware result idempotency and durable checkpoint recovery are reusable fleet primitives.",
+            "Scope/trace/message lineage must remain attached when work is scheduled or reassigned.",
+        ]
+        failure_windows = []
+        if "scheduler" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No first-class durable fleet scheduler symbol detected; worker-local polling may still be the scheduling mechanism.")
+        if "capacity" not in haystack and "slot" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit durable worker-capacity/slot primitive detected.")
+        if "fair" not in haystack and "starvation" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit fairness/starvation policy symbol detected.")
+        if "circuit" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit circuit-breaker primitive detected for repeated worker/task failures.")
+        if "reassign" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit worker-reassignment primitive detected beyond lease expiry/retry semantics.")
+        desired = (
+            ("checkpoint", "P1 durable checkpoint/resume"),
+            ("message", "P0-B MessageEnvelope/handoff"),
+            ("trace", "P0-C trace correlation"),
+            ("scope", "P0-A scope isolation"),
+            ("lease", "claim/WriterLease ownership"),
+            ("heartbeat", "worker liveness"),
+            ("idempot", "retry-safe dispatch/result"),
+        )
+
+    reuse_points: list[str] = []
+    for token, label in desired:
+        match = next((item for item in symbols if token in _surface_ref(item).lower()), None)
+        if match is not None:
+            reuse_points.append(f"{label}: {_surface_ref(match)}")
+    return invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points
+
+
+def _trim_to_budget(value: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def size() -> int:
+        return len(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
+
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and value["bounded_excerpts"]:
+        value["bounded_excerpts"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["functions"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["functions"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["classes"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["classes"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["tests"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["tests"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["modules"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["modules"].pop()
+    final_size = size()
+    if final_size > MAX_RESULT_BYTES:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_RESULT_TOO_LARGE")
+    value["result_bytes"] = final_size
+    return value
+
+
+def build_compact_interface_map(
+    worktree: Path,
+    source_signals: Sequence[str],
+    *,
+    source_commit: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    root = Path(worktree)
+    if not root.is_dir() or root.is_symlink():
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_WORKTREE_INVALID")
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", source_commit) is None:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SOURCE_COMMIT_INVALID")
+
+    profile = _profile(source_signals)
+    terms = _signal_terms(source_signals)
+    candidates = _candidate_files(root, terms)
+    if not candidates:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_EMPTY")
+
+    module_candidates = candidates[:MAX_MODULES]
+    modules = [
+        {
+            "path": item["path"],
+            "sha256": item["sha256"],
+            "bytes": item["bytes"],
+            "score": item["score"],
+        }
+        for item in module_candidates
+    ]
+
+    symbols: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    tables: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    systemd_units: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for item in candidates:
+        if item["suffix"] == ".py":
+            symbols.extend(_python_symbols(item, terms))
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".sql":
+            for table in SQL_TABLE_RE.findall(str(item["text"])):
+                tables.append({"path": item["path"], "table": table, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".service":
+            systemd_units.append({"path": item["path"], "unit": Path(str(item["path"])).name, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    all_symbols = list(symbols)
+    test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][: min(MAX_TESTS, 24)]
+    non_test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if item not in test_symbols
+    ][: max(0, MAX_SYMBOLS - len(test_symbols))]
+    symbols = [*test_symbols, *non_test_symbols]
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    classes = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] == "class"
+    ]
+    functions = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] in {"function", "async_function"} and not str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ]
+    tests = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][:MAX_TESTS]
+
+    excerpts: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    by_path = {str(item["path"]): item for item in candidates}
+    for symbol in symbols:
+        if len(excerpts) == MAX_EXCERPTS:
+            break
+        item = by_path.get(str(symbol["path"]))
+        if item is None:
+            continue
+        excerpt = _bounded_excerpt(str(item["text"]), int(symbol["line"]), int(symbol["end_line"]))
+        if not excerpt.strip():
+            continue
+        excerpts.append(
+            {
+                "path": symbol["path"],
+                "symbol": symbol["symbol"],
+                "sha256": item["sha256"],
+                "excerpt": excerpt,
+            }
+        )
+
+    invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points = _gap_evidence(all_symbols, profile)
+    result = {
+        "schema": SCHEMA,
+        "profile": profile,
+        "classification": PROFILE_CLASSIFICATION[profile],
+        "source_commit": source_commit,
+        "implementation_map": {
+            "modules": modules,
+            "classes": classes[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "functions": functions[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "tables": tables[:40],
+            "systemd_units": systemd_units[:20],
+            "tests": tests,
+            "current_invariants": invariants,
+            "failure_windows": failure_windows,
+            "reuse_points": reuse_points,
+        },
+        "bounded_excerpts": excerpts,
+        "contracts": _contract_map(all_symbols, modules, _contract_terms(profile)),
+    }
+    return _trim_to_budget(result)

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_execution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+"""Canonical governed execution projection for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+The durable governed binding is authoritative.  Natural-language task fields and
+worker configuration are never allowed to invent repository, ref, generation, or
+idempotency coordinates.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+EXECUTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.execution.v2"
+PROJECTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = ("main", "master", "refs/", "tags/", "tag/", "release/", "baseline/", "production/")
+MUTATION_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic"})
+READ_ONLY_ACTIONS = frozenset({"source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+SUPPORTED_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic", "source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS = frozenset({"hermes", "openclaw"})
+MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+
+
+class ExecutionProjectionError(RuntimeError):
+    """A canonical fail-closed projection or validation error."""
+
+
+class OnlineTaskProjectionClient:
+    """Official HTTP projection client using only a control credential reference."""
+
+    def __init__(self, api_base: str, control_token_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.api_base = api_base.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token_path = Path(control_token_path)
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        path = self.control_token_path
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def create(
+        self,
+        projected_task: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding: "GovernedExecutionBinding",
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = dict(projected_task)
+        payload = _canonical(body).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.api_base + "/v1/tasks",
+            method="POST",
+            data=payload,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self._token(),
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read(8192).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+            try:
+                error = json.loads(raw).get("error")
+            except (AttributeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                error = "HTTP_ERROR"
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError(f"ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_FAILED:{exc.code}:{error}") from exc
+        except (OSError, urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if status not in {200, 201} or not isinstance(result, dict):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        if result.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or result.get("status") not in {"QUEUED", "VERIFYING", "SUCCEEDED"}:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        metadata = result.get("metadata")
+        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        returned_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        submitted_metadata = _object(body.get("metadata"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        submitted_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(submitted_metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        if _canonical(returned_execution) != _canonical(submitted_execution):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> None:
+    raise ExecutionProjectionError(code)
+
+
+def _object(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error(code)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        _error(code)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _task_id(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if TASK_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, code)
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _branch(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    if BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(value) is None or value.startswith(PROTECTED_PREFIXES):
+        _error("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _generation(value: object) -> int:
+    if not isinstance(value, int) or isinstance(value, bool) or value < 1:
+        _error("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _source_signals(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Normalize untrusted natural-language hints before they enter a signed envelope."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for item in value:
+        if not isinstance(item, str):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        text = " ".join(item.split()).strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        # Projection may accept long task prose, but execution envelopes stay bounded.
+        text = text[:512].rstrip()
+        if text not in result:
+            result.append(text)
+        if len(result) == 16:
+            break
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+def _agent_runtime_input(value: object) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_REQUIRED")
+    raw = dict(value)
+    allowed = {"goal", "instructions", "success_criteria", "constraints"}
+    if set(raw) - allowed:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    goal = _string(raw.get("goal"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_GOAL_REQUIRED")
+    instructions = raw.get("instructions", "")
+    if not isinstance(instructions, str):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+    criteria = raw.get("success_criteria", [])
+    if not isinstance(criteria, list) or len(criteria) > 32:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+    normalized_criteria: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for item in criteria:
+        if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criterion_id = _string(item.get("id"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        description = _string(
+            item.get("description"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID"
+        )
+        normalized_criteria.append(
+            {"id": criterion_id[:120], "description": description[:1000]}
+        )
+    constraints = raw.get("constraints", {})
+    if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+    sensitive_markers = ("token", "secret", "password", "credential", "authorization", "api_key", "apikey")
+    for key in constraints:
+        lowered = str(key).lower()
+        if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SECRET_FIELD_DENY")
+    normalized = {
+        "goal": goal[:12000],
+        "instructions": instructions[:32000],
+        "success_criteria": normalized_criteria,
+        "constraints": dict(constraints),
+    }
+    if len(_canonical(normalized).encode("utf-8")) > MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_TOO_LARGE")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _capabilities(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    result = tuple(sorted({_string(item, "CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID") for item in value}))
+    if any(len(item) > 120 for item in result):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedExecutionBinding":
+        data = dict(value)
+        task_id = _task_id(data.get("task_id"))
+        job_id = _string(data.get("job_id"), "JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+        if TASK_RE.fullmatch(job_id) is None:
+            _error("JOB_ID_INVALID")
+        repository = _string(data.get("repository"), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            _error("WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY")
+        base_oid = _oid(data.get("base_oid"), "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        expected = _oid(data.get("expected_branch_oid"), "EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        target = _branch(data.get("target_branch"))
+        mode = _string(data.get("branch_mode"), "BRANCH_MODE_MISSING")
+        if mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            _error("BRANCH_MODE_INVALID")
+        generation = _generation(data.get("generation"))
+        if mode == "CREATE_NEW" and expected != base_oid:
+            _error("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+        key = _string(data.get("idempotency_key"), "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        if KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+            _error("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        return cls(task_id, job_id, repository, base_oid, expected, target, mode, generation, key)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def binding_from_bootstrap(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def validate_execution_envelope(
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding | None = None,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    envelope = dict(value)
+    if envelope.get("schema") != EXECUTION_SCHEMA:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA_VALIDATION")
+    candidate = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(envelope)
+    if binding is not None and candidate != binding:
+        comparisons = (
+            (candidate.task_id, binding.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.job_id, binding.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.repository, binding.repository, "WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.base_oid, binding.base_oid, "WRONG_BASE_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.expected_branch_oid, binding.expected_branch_oid, "WRONG_EXPECTED_HEAD_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.target_branch, binding.target_branch, "WRONG_BRANCH_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.generation, binding.generation, "WRONG_GENERATION_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.branch_mode, binding.branch_mode, "BRANCH_MODE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.idempotency_key, binding.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        )
+        for actual, expected, code in comparisons:
+            if actual != expected:
+                _error(code)
+    action = _string(envelope.get("action"), "EXECUTION_ACTION_MISSING")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capability_scope = _capabilities(envelope.get("capability_scope"))
+    if worker_capabilities is not None and not set(capability_scope).issubset(set(worker_capabilities)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    workspace = _object(envelope.get("workspace"), "WORKSPACE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    if workspace.get("authority_git_dir") != "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git" or workspace.get("read_only_repository") is not True:
+        _error("WORKSPACE_POLICY_DENY")
+    governance = _object(envelope.get("governance"), "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    governed_coordinates = (
+        (governance.get("task_id"), candidate.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("job_id"), candidate.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("idempotency_key"), candidate.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+    )
+    for actual_coordinate, expected_coordinate, code in governed_coordinates:
+        if actual_coordinate != expected_coordinate:
+            _error(code)
+    commit_key = _string(governance.get("commit_idempotency_key"), "COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(commit_key) is None:
+        _error("COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if governance.get("writer_lease") is not (action in MUTATION_ACTIONS):
+        _error("WRITER_LEASE_POLICY_DENY")
+    for field in ("main_write", "production_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "force_push", "protected_ref_bypass"):
+        if governance.get(field, False) is not False:
+            _error("POLICY_DENY")
+    changes = envelope.get("change_set")
+    verification = envelope.get("verification")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not isinstance(verification, list):
+        _error("EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_INVALID")
+    if action == "source_capture":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY")
+        signals = list(_source_signals(envelope.get("source_signals") or []))
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") != signals:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") not in (None, {}):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_RUNTIME_INPUT_DENY")
+    elif action == "agent_runtime":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_MUTATION_DENY")
+        adapter = str(envelope.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = _agent_runtime_input(envelope.get("runtime_input"))
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") != runtime_input:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_NOT_CANONICAL")
+        required_runtime_capability = f"agent.runtime.{adapter}"
+        if required_runtime_capability not in capability_scope:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_REQUIRED")
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") not in (None, []):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SOURCE_SIGNALS_DENY")
+    elif not changes:
+        _error("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    declared = str(envelope.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    material = {key: item for key, item in envelope.items() if key != "execution_digest"}
+    actual = _digest(material)
+    if declared != actual:
+        _error("EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    return {**material, "execution_digest": actual}
+
+
+def project_execution_envelope(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    *,
+    required_capabilities: Sequence[str] = (),
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(execution_request or {})
+    action = str(request.get("action") or "source_capture")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capabilities = _capabilities(request.get("capability_scope", required_capabilities))
+    governance = {
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+        "commit_idempotency_key": str(request.get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{binding.task_id}-commit-g{binding.generation}"),
+        "writer_lease": action in MUTATION_ACTIONS,
+        "main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "tag_write": False,
+        "baseline_write": False,
+        "force_push": False,
+        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
+    }
+    supplied_governance = request.get("governance")
+    if supplied_governance is not None:
+        governance.update(_object(supplied_governance, "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED"))
+    material: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema": EXECUTION_SCHEMA,
+        **binding.public(),
+        "action": action,
+        "adapter": str(
+            request.get("adapter")
+            or ("deterministic" if action == "deterministic" else "source_capture")
+        ),
+        "capability_scope": list(capabilities),
+        "change_set": list(request.get("change_set") or []),
+        "verification": list(request.get("verification") or []),
+        "source_signals": list(_source_signals(request.get("source_signals") or [])) if action == "source_capture" else [],
+        "runtime_input": _agent_runtime_input(request.get("runtime_input")) if action == "agent_runtime" else {},
+        "governance": governance,
+        "workspace": {
+            "authority_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+            "read_only_repository": True,
+            "cleanup_policy": "always",
+        },
+    }
+    envelope = {**material, "execution_digest": _digest(material)}
+    return validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding)
+
+
+def project_online_task(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    task_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(task_request)
+    required = _capabilities(request.get("required_capabilities"))
+    execution_value = dict(execution_request or {})
+    if str(execution_value.get("action") or "source_capture") == "agent_runtime":
+        adapter = str(execution_value.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = execution_value.get("runtime_input")
+        if runtime_input is None:
+            runtime_input = {
+                "goal": request.get("goal"),
+                "instructions": request.get("instructions") or "",
+                "success_criteria": request.get("success_criteria") or [],
+                "constraints": request.get("constraints") or {},
+            }
+        execution_value["runtime_input"] = runtime_input
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        execution_value,
+        required_capabilities=required,
+    )
+    metadata = dict(request.get("metadata") or {})
+    if "execution" in metadata:
+        validate_execution_envelope(_object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"), binding=binding)
+        if metadata["execution"] != execution:
+            _error("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_CONFLICT")
+    metadata["execution"] = execution
+    metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+        "schema": PROJECTION_SCHEMA,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+    }
+    return {
+        **request,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "metadata": metadata,
+        "required_capabilities": list(required),
+        "idempotency_key": str(request.get("idempotency_key") or f"online-task:{binding.idempotency_key}"),
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_task_execution(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+    metadata = task.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) and "execution" in metadata:
+        value = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+            worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities,
+        )
+        return value, "persisted"
+    projected = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {"action": "source_capture", "capability_scope": task.get("required_capabilities") or []},
+        required_capabilities=task.get("required_capabilities") or [],
+    )
+    validate_execution_envelope(projected, binding=binding, worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities)
+    return projected, "recovered_projection"

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_plan_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+"""Durable, authority-bound deterministic execution plans for Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _task_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    readable = "".join(ch if ch.isalnum() or ch in "._-" else "-" for ch in task_id).strip("-")[:72] or "task"
+    return readable + "-" + hashlib.sha256(task_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:24]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionPlanRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    source_head_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    plan_digest: str
+    execution: dict[str, Any]
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1",
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": self.source_head_oid,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "plan_digest": self.plan_digest,
+            "execution": dict(self.execution),
+        }
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanStore:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    def _path(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _lock(self, task_id: str):
+        path = self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".lock")
+        with path.open("a+b") as handle:
+            fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            try:
+                yield
+            finally:
+                fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _source_head(binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> str:
+        return binding.expected_branch_oid if binding.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING" else binding.base_oid
+
+    def _read(self, task_id: str) -> ExecutionPlanRecord | None:
+        path = self._path(task_id)
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            return None
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        execution = value.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        return ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=str(value.get("task_id") or ""),
+            job_id=str(value.get("job_id") or ""),
+            source_head_oid=str(value.get("source_head_oid") or ""),
+            generation=int(value.get("generation") or 0),
+            idempotency_key=str(value.get("idempotency_key") or ""),
+            plan_digest=str(value.get("plan_digest") or ""),
+            execution=dict(execution),
+        )
+
+    def register(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock(binding.task_id):
+            return self._register_locked(binding, request)
+
+    def _register_locked(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        if request.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or request.get("job_id") != binding.job_id:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if int(request.get("generation") or 0) != binding.generation:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_GENERATION_CONFLICT")
+        source_head = str(request.get("source_head_oid") or "")
+        if source_head != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_CONFLICT")
+        key = str(request.get("idempotency_key") or "")
+        if len(key) < 8:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+        execution_request = request.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution_request, Mapping) or execution_request.get("action") != "deterministic":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_DETERMINISTIC_REQUIRED")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, execution_request)
+        material = {
+            "task_id": binding.task_id,
+            "job_id": binding.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": source_head,
+            "generation": binding.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": key,
+            "execution": dict(execution_request),
+        }
+        plan_digest = _digest(material)
+        existing = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        expected_previous = request.get("expected_previous_plan_digest")
+        if existing is not None:
+            if existing.idempotency_key == key:
+                if existing.plan_digest != plan_digest:
+                    raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                return {**existing.public(), "idempotent": True, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+            if expected_previous != existing.plan_digest:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            if existing.source_head_oid != source_head:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_STALE_REPLACEMENT_DENY")
+        elif expected_previous not in (None, ""):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+
+        record = ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=binding.task_id,
+            job_id=binding.job_id,
+            source_head_oid=source_head,
+            generation=binding.generation,
+            idempotency_key=key,
+            plan_digest=plan_digest,
+            execution=dict(execution_request),
+        )
+        path = self._path(binding.task_id)
+        temporary = path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary.write_text(
+            json.dumps(record.public(), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        temporary.replace(path)
+        return {**record.public(), "idempotent": False, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+
+    def resolve(self, binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        record = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        if record is None:
+            return None
+        if (
+            record.task_id != binding.task_id
+            or record.job_id != binding.job_id
+            or record.generation != binding.generation
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if record.source_head_oid != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_DRIFT")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, record.execution)
+        return {
+            "execution": dict(record.execution),
+            "plan_digest": record.plan_digest,
+            "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"],
+        }

active-runtime/app/aios_release_lineage_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"""Immutable release-lineage contracts used by activation and recovery."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ReleaseLineage:
+    task_id: str
+    candidate_id: str
+    source_commit: str
+    version: str
+    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+FIXED_V2R2C2 = ReleaseLineage(
+    task_id="r42-release-candidate-v2r2c2-live-20260819",
+    candidate_id="r42-release-candidate-v2r2c2-20260819",
+    source_commit="71e736b05fab13efc06af7a4fe2dc022c1cf9a85",
+    version="V2R2C2",
+    required_capabilities=("release:candidate",),
+)
+
+
+class ReleaseLineageError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def validate_fixed_v2r2c2_task(task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Validate identity/source/version without mutating Task state.
+
+    This contract intentionally does not bind status/attempt/revision, because
+    those are lifecycle state and may change through governed retry/recovery.
+    """
+
+    if str(task.get("task_id") or "") != FIXED_V2R2C2.task_id:
+        raise ReleaseLineageError("FIXED_TASK_ID_DRIFT")
+
+    capabilities = task.get("required_capabilities")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(capabilities, list)
+        or tuple(capabilities) != FIXED_V2R2C2.required_capabilities
+    ):
+        raise ReleaseLineageError("FIXED_TASK_CAPABILITY_DRIFT")
+
+    constraints = task.get("constraints")
+    if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+        raise ReleaseLineageError("FIXED_TASK_CONSTRAINTS_MISSING")
+    release = constraints.get("release_candidate")
+    if not isinstance(release, Mapping):
+        raise ReleaseLineageError("FIXED_RELEASE_BINDING_MISSING")
+
+    actual = {
+        "candidate_id": str(release.get("candidate_id") or ""),
+        "source_commit": str(release.get("source_commit") or ""),
+        "version": str(release.get("version") or ""),
+    }
+    expected = {
+        "candidate_id": FIXED_V2R2C2.candidate_id,
+        "source_commit": FIXED_V2R2C2.source_commit,
+        "version": FIXED_V2R2C2.version,
+    }
+    if actual != expected:
+        raise ReleaseLineageError(
+            "FIXED_RELEASE_LINEAGE_DRIFT:"
+            + repr({"expected": expected, "actual": actual})
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "schema": "aios.release-lineage.validation.v1",
+        "status": "VERIFIED",
+        "lineage": FIXED_V2R2C2.as_dict(),
+        "task_status": task.get("status"),
+        "attempt": task.get("attempt"),
+        "max_attempts": task.get("max_attempts"),
+        "revision": task.get("revision"),
+    }

active-runtime/app/aios_release_online_agent_worker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Persistent release-preparation Online Agent worker.
+
+The worker is intentionally narrower than the generic engineering worker:
+it can only consume tasks whose required capability set is exactly
+{"release:candidate"} and whose payload asks for immutable release-candidate
+creation. It never receives Owner signing, deployment, tag, baseline or Git
+write credentials.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+from aios_autonomous_control_plane import (
+    classify_failure,
+    repair_for_failure,
+    runtime_admission,
+)
+
+AGENT_ID = os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_AGENT_ID",
+    "online-release-worker-cn-network-mkt-20260819",
+).strip()
+AGENT_VERSION = os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_AGENT_VERSION",
+    "2026-08-19.1-release-candidate",
+).strip()
+TASK_API = os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL",
+    "http://127.0.0.1:18940",
+).rstrip("/")
+RELEASE_API = os.environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_API_URL", "").rstrip("/")
+POLL_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_POLL_SECONDS", "3"))
+LEASE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_LEASE_SECONDS", "60"))
+HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = int(
+    os.environ.get("AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS", "15")
+)
+STATE_ROOT = Path(
+    os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_STATE_ROOT",
+        "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-release",
+    )
+)
+EXPECTED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({"release:candidate"})
+LIVENESS_PATH = Path(
+    os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_WORKER_LIVENESS_PATH",
+        str(STATE_ROOT / "worker-liveness.json"),
+    )
+)
+CANDIDATE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,255}$")
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+VERSION_RE = re.compile(r"^V[0-9]+R[0-9]+C[0-9]+$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+SECRET_MARKERS = (
+    "authorization",
+    "token",
+    "secret",
+    "credential",
+    "password",
+    "private_key",
+    "signature",
+)
+
+
+class ReleaseWorkerError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, *, phase: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.phase = phase
+
+
+def now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value,
+        ensure_ascii=False,
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256(value: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest()
+
+
+def sanitized(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        result: dict[str, Any] = {}
+        for key, inner in value.items():
+            lowered = str(key).lower()
+            if any(marker in lowered for marker in SECRET_MARKERS):
+                result[str(key)] = "[REDACTED]"
+            else:
+                result[str(key)] = sanitized(inner)
+        return result
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [sanitized(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def audit(event: str, **fields: Any) -> None:
+    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    path = STATE_ROOT / "events.jsonl"
+    record = {
+        "schema": "aios.release-worker.event.v1",
+        "event": event,
+        "created_at": now(),
+        "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
+        **sanitized(fields),
+    }
+    with path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        handle.write(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+    os.chmod(path, 0o640)
+
+
+def sd_notify(message: str) -> None:
+    target = os.environ.get("NOTIFY_SOCKET", "")
+    if not target:
+        return
+    if target.startswith("@"):
+        address = "\0" + target[1:]
+    else:
+        address = target
+    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+    try:
+        sock.connect(address)
+        sock.sendall(message.encode("utf-8"))
+    except OSError:
+        # Liveness JSON remains the diagnostic source; systemd will enforce
+        # WatchdogSec if notify transport is persistently broken.
+        pass
+    finally:
+        sock.close()
+
+
+def write_liveness(
+    state: str,
+    *,
+    task_id: str | None = None,
+    stage: str | None = None,
+    error: str | None = None,
+    visible_count: int | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    value = {
+        "schema": "aios.online-agent.worker-liveness.v1",
+        "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
+        "agent_type": "release-preparation-worker",
+        "agent_version": AGENT_VERSION,
+        "pid": os.getpid(),
+        "state": state,
+        "last_seen_epoch": time.time(),
+        "last_seen_at": now(),
+        "poll_seconds": POLL_SECONDS,
+        "heartbeat_seconds": HEARTBEAT_SECONDS,
+        "api_base": TASK_API,
+        "capabilities": sorted(EXPECTED_CAPABILITIES),
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "stage": stage,
+        "error": error,
+        "visible_count": visible_count,
+    }
+    LIVENESS_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    temporary = LIVENESS_PATH.with_name(
+        "." + LIVENESS_PATH.name + f".{os.getpid()}.tmp"
+    )
+    temporary.write_text(
+        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
+    os.replace(temporary, LIVENESS_PATH)
+
+
+def load_credential(name: str) -> str:
+    directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ""))
+    path = directory / name
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+            "CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE:" + name,
+            phase="startup",
+        )
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 24 or any(ch.isspace() for ch in value):
+        raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+            "CREDENTIAL_INVALID:" + name,
+            phase="startup",
+        )
+    return value
+
+
+def http_json(
+    base: str,
+    method: str,
+    route: str,
+    token: str,
+    body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    *,
+    timeout: int = 30,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    data = None if body is None else canonical(body)
+    headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
+    if token:
+        headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token
+    if data is not None:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        base + route,
+        method=method,
+        data=data,
+        headers=headers,
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+            raw, status = response.read(), response.status
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        raw, status = exc.read(), exc.code
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+        raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+            "HTTP_TRANSPORT_UNAVAILABLE",
+            phase="network",
+        ) from exc
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(raw.decode())
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+            "HTTP_RESPONSE_INVALID",
+            phase="network",
+        ) from exc
+    return status, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ReleaseRequest:
+    candidate_id: str
+    source_commit: str
+    version: str
+    projection_id: str | None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_task(cls, task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ReleaseRequest":
+        if not TASK_RE.fullmatch(str(task.get("task_id") or "")):
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError("TASK_ID_INVALID", phase="validation")
+        caps = task.get("required_capabilities")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(caps, list)
+            or frozenset(caps) != EXPECTED_CAPABILITIES
+            or len(caps) != 1
+        ):
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "TASK_CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID",
+                phase="validation",
+            )
+        metadata = task.get("metadata")
+        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+            metadata = {}
+        constraints = task.get("constraints")
+        if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+            constraints = {}
+        release = constraints.get("release_candidate")
+        if not isinstance(release, Mapping):
+            release = metadata.get("release_candidate")
+        if not isinstance(release, Mapping):
+            release = task.get("release_candidate")
+        if not isinstance(release, Mapping):
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "RELEASE_CANDIDATE_PAYLOAD_MISSING",
+                phase="validation",
+            )
+        allowed = {
+            "candidate_id",
+            "source_commit",
+            "version",
+            "projection_id",
+        }
+        if set(release) - allowed:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "RELEASE_CANDIDATE_PAYLOAD_FIELDS_INVALID",
+                phase="validation",
+            )
+        candidate_id = str(release.get("candidate_id") or "")
+        source_commit = str(release.get("source_commit") or "")
+        version = str(release.get("version") or "")
+        projection_id = release.get("projection_id")
+        if CANDIDATE_RE.fullmatch(candidate_id) is None:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "RELEASE_CANDIDATE_ID_INVALID",
+                phase="validation",
+            )
+        if OID_RE.fullmatch(source_commit) is None:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "RELEASE_SOURCE_COMMIT_INVALID",
+                phase="validation",
+            )
+        if VERSION_RE.fullmatch(version) is None:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "RELEASE_VERSION_INVALID",
+                phase="validation",
+            )
+        if projection_id is not None:
+            projection_id = str(projection_id)
+            if not re.fullmatch(r"projection-[0-9a-f]{32}", projection_id):
+                raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                    "RELEASE_PROJECTION_ID_INVALID",
+                    phase="validation",
+                )
+        return cls(
+            candidate_id=candidate_id,
+            source_commit=source_commit,
+            version=version,
+            projection_id=projection_id,
+        )
+
+    def body(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "candidate_id": self.candidate_id,
+            "source_commit": self.source_commit,
+            "version": self.version,
+        }
+
+
+class Heartbeat:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        agent_token: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        lease_token: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.agent_token = agent_token
+        self.task_id = task_id
+        self.lease_token = lease_token
+        self.stage = "claimed"
+        self.failure: str | None = None
+        self.stop = threading.Event()
+        self.thread = threading.Thread(
+            target=self._run,
+            name="release-worker-heartbeat",
+            daemon=True,
+        )
+
+    def first(self) -> None:
+        status, value = http_json(
+            TASK_API,
+            "POST",
+            f"/v1/tasks/{self.task_id}/heartbeat",
+            self.agent_token,
+            {
+                "lease_token": self.lease_token,
+                "lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS,
+                "progress": {
+                    "stage": self.stage,
+                    "worker_version": AGENT_VERSION,
+                },
+            },
+        )
+        if status != 200:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "TASK_HEARTBEAT_FAILED",
+                phase="heartbeat",
+            )
+        audit(
+            "TASK_HEARTBEAT",
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            stage=self.stage,
+            api_status=status,
+        )
+        write_liveness(
+            "BUSY",
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            stage=self.stage,
+        )
+        sd_notify("WATCHDOG=1")
+
+    def _run(self) -> None:
+        while not self.stop.wait(HEARTBEAT_SECONDS):
+            try:
+                status, value = http_json(
+                    TASK_API,
+                    "POST",
+                    f"/v1/tasks/{self.task_id}/heartbeat",
+                    self.agent_token,
+                    {
+                        "lease_token": self.lease_token,
+                        "lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS,
+                        "progress": {
+                            "stage": self.stage,
+                            "worker_version": AGENT_VERSION,
+                        },
+                    },
+                )
+                if status != 200:
+                    self.failure = str(value.get("error") or status)
+                    return
+                audit(
+                    "TASK_HEARTBEAT",
+                    task_id=self.task_id,
+                    stage=self.stage,
+                    api_status=status,
+                )
+                write_liveness(
+                    "BUSY",
+                    task_id=self.task_id,
+                    stage=self.stage,
+                )
+                sd_notify("WATCHDOG=1")
+            except Exception as exc:
+                self.failure = type(exc).__name__
+                return
+
+    def ensure(self) -> None:
+        if self.failure:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "TASK_LEASE_LOST",
+                phase="heartbeat",
+            )
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self.stop.set()
+        if self.thread.ident is not None:
+            self.thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def release_admission(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    release_token: str,
+):
+    required = task.get("required_capabilities")
+    if not isinstance(required, list):
+        required = []
+
+    def release_api_health() -> bool:
+        status, value = http_json(
+            RELEASE_API,
+            "GET",
+            "/health",
+            "",
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+        return status == 200 and str(value.get("status") or "").lower() in {"ok", "healthy"}
+
+    def authenticated_probe() -> bool:
+        status, _ = http_json(
+            RELEASE_API,
+            "POST",
+            "/createReleaseCandidate",
+            release_token,
+            {},
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+        # Authentication + credential projection succeeded; the empty release
+        # request is intentionally rejected by request validation.
+        return status == 400
+
+    probes = {
+        "credential_projection": authenticated_probe,
+        "trusted_builder": release_api_health,
+        "authenticated_probe": authenticated_probe,
+        "release_api_health": release_api_health,
+        "worker_liveness": lambda: True,
+    }
+    return runtime_admission(
+        worker_capabilities=EXPECTED_CAPABILITIES,
+        required_capabilities=required,
+        requested_operations=("prepare_release",),
+        probes=probes,
+    )
+
+
+def result_payload(
+    task_id: str,
+    release: ReleaseRequest,
+    builder: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    builder_candidate = builder.get("candidate_id")
+    if builder_candidate not in {None, release.candidate_id}:
+        raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+            "BUILDER_CANDIDATE_BINDING_INVALID",
+            phase="release",
+        )
+    immutable = {
+        "candidate_id": release.candidate_id,
+        "source_commit": release.source_commit,
+        "version": release.version,
+    }
+    return {
+        "status": "SUCCEEDED",
+        "classification": "RELEASE_CANDIDATE_CREATED",
+        "execution_mode": "release_candidate",
+        "adapter": "release_candidate",
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
+        "release_candidate": immutable,
+        "release_candidate_request_sha256": sha256(canonical(immutable)),
+        "builder_response": sanitized(dict(builder)),
+        "projection_id": release.projection_id,
+        "writer_lease": "NONE",
+        "changed_files": [],
+        "direct_main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "tag_write": False,
+        "baseline_write": False,
+        "runtime_switch": False,
+        "owner_approval_submitted": False,
+        "credential_material_exposed": False,
+    }
+
+
+def execute_task(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    agent_token: str,
+    release_token: str,
+) -> bool:
+    task_id = str(task.get("task_id") or "")
+    release = ReleaseRequest.from_task(task)
+    admission = release_admission(
+        task,
+        release_token=release_token,
+    )
+    if not admission.admitted:
+        audit(
+            "TASK_ADMISSION_BLOCKED",
+            task_id=task_id,
+            admission=admission.as_dict(),
+        )
+        write_liveness(
+            "BLOCKED",
+            task_id=task_id,
+            stage="execution_ready",
+            error=admission.failure_class.value if admission.failure_class else "ADMISSION_FAILED",
+        )
+        return False
+    audit(
+        "TASK_ADMISSION_PASSED",
+        task_id=task_id,
+        admission=admission.as_dict(),
+    )
+    status, claimed = http_json(
+        TASK_API,
+        "POST",
+        f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/claim",
+        agent_token,
+        {"lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS},
+    )
+    if status in {409, 423}:
+        return False
+    if status != 200:
+        raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+            "TASK_CLAIM_FAILED",
+            phase="claim",
+        )
+    lease_token = str(claimed.get("lease_token") or "")
+    if len(lease_token) < 16:
+        raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+            "TASK_LEASE_TOKEN_INVALID",
+            phase="claim",
+        )
+    attempt = int(claimed.get("attempt") or 0)
+    audit(
+        "TASK_CLAIMED",
+        task_id=task_id,
+        attempt=attempt,
+    )
+
+    heartbeat = Heartbeat(agent_token, task_id, lease_token)
+    heartbeat.first()
+    heartbeat.thread.start()
+    try:
+        heartbeat.stage = "release_candidate"
+        heartbeat.ensure()
+        status, builder = http_json(
+            RELEASE_API,
+            "POST",
+            "/createReleaseCandidate",
+            release_token,
+            release.body(),
+            timeout=120,
+        )
+        if status not in {200, 201, 202}:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "RELEASE_CANDIDATE_CREATE_FAILED:"
+                + str(builder.get("error") or status),
+                phase="release",
+            )
+        heartbeat.ensure()
+        result = result_payload(task_id, release, builder)
+        idempotency_key = (
+            f"{task_id}-attempt-{attempt}-release-result-v1"
+        )
+        status, submitted = http_json(
+            TASK_API,
+            "POST",
+            f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/result",
+            agent_token,
+            {
+                "lease_token": lease_token,
+                "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
+                "result": result,
+            },
+        )
+        if status not in {200, 201, 202}:
+            raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                "TASK_RESULT_SUBMIT_FAILED",
+                phase="result",
+            )
+        audit(
+            "RESULT_SUBMITTED",
+            task_id=task_id,
+            attempt=attempt,
+            release_candidate_id=release.candidate_id,
+        )
+        return True
+    finally:
+        heartbeat.close()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    if not RELEASE_API:
+        raise SystemExit("FATAL:AIOS_RELEASE_API_URL_REQUIRED")
+    agent_token = load_credential("agent_token")
+    release_token = load_credential("release_candidate_token")
+    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
+    audit(
+        "WORKER_STARTED",
+        capabilities=sorted(EXPECTED_CAPABILITIES),
+        release_api=RELEASE_API,
+    )
+    write_liveness("STARTING", stage="startup")
+    sd_notify("READY=1\nSTATUS=release worker ready")
+    while True:
+        try:
+            status, response = http_json(
+                TASK_API,
+                "POST",
+                "/v1/tasks/poll",
+                agent_token,
+                {"limit": 100},
+            )
+            if status != 200:
+                raise ReleaseWorkerError(
+                    "TASK_POLL_FAILED",
+                    phase="poll",
+                )
+            tasks = response.get("tasks")
+            if not isinstance(tasks, list):
+                tasks = []
+            write_liveness(
+                "IDLE",
+                stage="poll",
+                visible_count=len(tasks),
+            )
+            sd_notify("WATCHDOG=1\nSTATUS=release worker poll ok")
+            handled = False
+            for raw in tasks:
+                if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+                    continue
+                caps = raw.get("required_capabilities")
+                if (
+                    not isinstance(caps, list)
+                    or frozenset(caps) != EXPECTED_CAPABILITIES
+                ):
+                    continue
+                try:
+                    handled = execute_task(
+                        raw,
+                        agent_token=agent_token,
+                        release_token=release_token,
+                    ) or handled
+                except ReleaseWorkerError as exc:
+                    failure = classify_failure(exc.code, phase=exc.phase)
+                    repair = repair_for_failure(failure)
+                    audit(
+                        "TASK_EXECUTION_FAILED",
+                        task_id=raw.get("task_id"),
+                        phase=exc.phase,
+                        error=exc.code,
+                        failure_class=failure.value,
+                        repair=repair.as_dict(),
+                    )
+            time.sleep(0 if handled else POLL_SECONDS)
+        except KeyboardInterrupt:
+            return 0
+        except Exception as exc:
+            audit(
+                "WORKER_LOOP_ERROR",
+                error=type(exc).__name__,
+            )
+            write_liveness(
+                "DEGRADED",
+                stage="loop",
+                error=type(exc).__name__,
+            )
+            time.sleep(POLL_SECONDS)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_release_preparation_supervisor_coordinator.py

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+"""Credential-isolated durable coordinator for the release-preparation supervisor.
+
+The coordinator owns only its Online Task agent credential.  It never forwards
+that credential to Hermes/OpenClaw and never submits a Task result while the
+supervision goal is incomplete.  Its job is deliberately small: claim the one
+fixed supervisor Task after an exact coordinator projection and keep a durable
+heartbeat lease while later phases observe and repair through governed APIs.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+API_BASE = os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18940"
+).rstrip("/")
+AGENT_ID = os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_AGENT_ID",
+    "online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-autonomous-20260815",
+)
+TASK_ID = os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_RELEASE_PREPARATION_SUPERVISOR_TASK_ID",
+    "r42-release-preparation-autonomous-supervisor-20260820",
+)
+EXPECTED_EXECUTION_DIGEST = os.environ.get(
+    "AIOS_RELEASE_PREPARATION_SUPERVISOR_EXECUTION_DIGEST", ""
+)
+RUNTIME_CAPABILITY = "agent.runtime.openclaw"
+COORDINATOR_CAPABILITY = "engineering.autonomous"
+REQUIRED_CAPABILITIES = [RUNTIME_CAPABILITY, COORDINATOR_CAPABILITY]
+POLL_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_POLL_SECONDS", "5"))
+HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = int(
+    os.environ.get("AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS", "10")
+)
+LEASE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_LEASE_SECONDS", "300"))
+STATE_ROOT = Path(
+    os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_STATE_ROOT",
+        "/var/lib/aios-release-preparation-supervisor-coordinator",
+    )
+)
+
+
+class CoordinatorError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise CoordinatorError("COORDINATOR_STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED")
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=str(path.parent))
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump(dict(value), handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)
+            handle.write("\n")
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def audit(event_type: str, **fields: Any) -> None:
+    record = {
+        "event_type": event_type,
+        "created_at": now(),
+        "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
+        "task_id": TASK_ID,
+        "credential_material_exposed": False,
+        "planner_credential_material_exposed": False,
+        "lease_material_exposed": False,
+        **fields,
+    }
+    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
+    with (STATE_ROOT / "events.jsonl").open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        handle.write(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+    atomic_json(STATE_ROOT / "liveness.json", record)
+
+
+def api_call(
+    method: str,
+    route: str,
+    token: str,
+    body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    payload = None if body is None else canonical(dict(body))
+    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Accept": "application/json"}
+    if payload is not None:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        API_BASE + route, data=payload, headers=headers, method=method
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response:
+            value = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+            return response.status, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(exc.read(4096).decode("utf-8", "replace"))
+        except Exception:
+            value = {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
+        return exc.code, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError):
+        return 599, {"error": "AGENT_TASK_API_UNAVAILABLE"}
+
+
+def load_agent_token() -> str:
+    path = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "")) / "agent_token"
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise CoordinatorError("COORDINATOR_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    token = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(token) < 24 or any(character.isspace() for character in token):
+        raise CoordinatorError("COORDINATOR_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return token
+
+
+def validate_task(task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if task.get("task_id") != TASK_ID or task.get("status") != "QUEUED":
+        raise CoordinatorError("SUPERVISOR_TASK_STATE_INVALID")
+    if task.get("required_capabilities") != REQUIRED_CAPABILITIES:
+        raise CoordinatorError("SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_CAPABILITIES_INVALID")
+    metadata = task.get("metadata")
+    if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+        raise CoordinatorError("SUPERVISOR_EXECUTION_METADATA_MISSING")
+    execution = metadata.get("execution")
+    if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+        raise CoordinatorError("SUPERVISOR_EXECUTION_METADATA_MISSING")
+    governance = execution.get("governance")
+    if (
+        execution.get("action") != "agent_runtime"
+        or execution.get("adapter") != "openclaw"
+        or execution.get("capability_scope") != REQUIRED_CAPABILITIES
+        or execution.get("execution_digest") != EXPECTED_EXECUTION_DIGEST
+        or execution.get("change_set") != []
+        or execution.get("verification") != []
+        or not isinstance(governance, Mapping)
+        or governance.get("writer_lease") is not False
+        or any(
+            governance.get(field) is not False
+            for field in (
+                "main_write",
+                "production_write",
+                "tag_write",
+                "baseline_write",
+                "force_push",
+                "protected_ref_bypass",
+            )
+        )
+    ):
+        raise CoordinatorError("SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_ENVELOPE_INVALID")
+    return dict(execution)
+
+
+def heartbeat_progress(sequence: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "stage": "supervisor_coordinator_active",
+        "phase": "external_caller_projection",
+        "state": "PENDING_EXTERNAL_CONNECTOR_ACK",
+        "sequence": sequence,
+        "control_plane_access_granted": True,
+        "external_planner_role": "UNPRIVILEGED_PLANNER",
+        "credential_forwarded_to_planner": False,
+        "main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "owner_approval_submitted": False,
+    }
+
+
+def coordinate_claim(
+    claim: Mapping[str, Any],
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    max_heartbeats: int | None = None,
+) -> int:
+    lease_token = claim.get("lease_token")
+    if not isinstance(lease_token, str) or len(lease_token) < 24:
+        raise CoordinatorError("COORDINATOR_LEASE_TOKEN_MISSING")
+    sequence = 0
+    while max_heartbeats is None or sequence < max_heartbeats:
+        sequence += 1
+        status, response = api_call(
+            "POST",
+            f"/v1/tasks/{TASK_ID}/heartbeat",
+            token,
+            {
+                "lease_token": lease_token,
+                "lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS,
+                "progress": heartbeat_progress(sequence),
+            },
+        )
+        if status != 200:
+            raise CoordinatorError(
+                "COORDINATOR_HEARTBEAT_FAILED_" + str(response.get("error") or status)
+            )
+        audit(
+            "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_HEARTBEAT",
+            sequence=sequence,
+            task_status=response.get("status"),
+            lease_expires_at=response.get("lease_expires_at"),
+            control_plane_access_granted=True,
+            external_planner_role="UNPRIVILEGED_PLANNER",
+        )
+        if max_heartbeats is None or sequence < max_heartbeats:
+            time.sleep(HEARTBEAT_SECONDS)
+    return sequence
+
+
+def worker_once(token: str) -> bool:
+    status, poll = api_call("POST", "/v1/tasks/poll", token, {"limit": 100})
+    if status != 200:
+        audit("SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_POLL_FAILED", error=poll.get("error") or status)
+        return False
+    task = next(
+        (
+            item
+            for item in poll.get("tasks", [])
+            if isinstance(item, Mapping) and item.get("task_id") == TASK_ID
+        ),
+        None,
+    )
+    if task is None:
+        audit("SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_WAITING_FOR_TASK")
+        return False
+    validate_task(task)
+    status, claim = api_call(
+        "POST", f"/v1/tasks/{TASK_ID}/claim", token, {"lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS}
+    )
+    if status != 200:
+        audit("SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_CLAIM_FAILED", error=claim.get("error") or status)
+        return False
+    audit(
+        "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_CLAIMED",
+        attempt=claim.get("attempt"),
+        revision=claim.get("revision"),
+        claim_mode="server_atomic",
+        control_plane_access_granted=True,
+    )
+    coordinate_claim(claim, token)
+    return True
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    if not EXPECTED_EXECUTION_DIGEST or len(EXPECTED_EXECUTION_DIGEST) != 64:
+        raise CoordinatorError("SUPERVISOR_EXECUTION_DIGEST_CONFIG_INVALID")
+    token = load_agent_token()
+    audit(
+        "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_READY",
+        required_capabilities=REQUIRED_CAPABILITIES,
+        control_plane_access_granted=True,
+        external_planner_role="UNPRIVILEGED_PLANNER",
+    )
+    while True:
+        try:
+            worker_once(token)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            audit(
+                "SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_LOOP_ERROR",
+                error=exc.code if isinstance(exc, CoordinatorError) else type(exc).__name__,
+            )
+        time.sleep(POLL_SECONDS)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_worker_availability_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+"""Self-healing availability guard for persistent Online Agent workers.
+
+The guard never claims Tasks and never writes Task/Job/Git databases. It only:
+- ensures required worker/executor systemd units are enabled + active;
+- checks worker-owned liveness JSON written by the real poll/heartbeat loop;
+- restarts an active worker only when its liveness is stale;
+- honors an explicit maintenance inhibit file;
+- writes a bounded status JSON under /run for observability.
+
+Idle liveness is the successful poll loop itself. Busy liveness is refreshed by the
+Task lease-heartbeat thread, so long-running Tasks are not mistaken for hung workers.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import shlex
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.worker-availability.status.v1"
+DEFAULT_WORKER_UNITS = (
+    "aios-online-agent-worker-20260815.service",
+    "aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service",
+    "aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service",
+)
+DEFAULT_DEPENDENCY_UNITS = (
+    "aios-external-agent-executor.service",
+)
+DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT = Path("/run/aios-worker-availability")
+DEFAULT_STATUS = DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT / "status.json"
+DEFAULT_RECOVERY = DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT / "recovery.json"
+DEFAULT_INHIBIT = DEFAULT_RUN_ROOT / "maintenance.lock"
+DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS = 90
+DEFAULT_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS = 60
+DEFAULT_STARTUP_WAIT_SECONDS = 10
+ACCEPTED_ENABLED_STATES = frozenset({"enabled", "enabled-runtime", "static", "indirect", "generated"})
+
+
+class AvailabilityGuardError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class UnitSnapshot:
+    unit: str
+    role: str
+    load_state: str
+    active_state: str
+    unit_file_state: str
+    enabled_ok: bool
+    liveness_path: str | None = None
+    liveness_state: str | None = None
+    last_seen_epoch: float | None = None
+    liveness_age_seconds: float | None = None
+    fresh: bool | None = None
+    action: str = "NONE"
+    detail: str | None = None
+
+
+class Systemd:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        runner: Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.runner = runner or subprocess.run
+
+    def _run(self, args: Sequence[str], *, check: bool = False) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+        result = self.runner(
+            ["/usr/bin/systemctl", *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+            timeout=20,
+        )
+        if check and result.returncode != 0:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError(
+                "SYSTEMD_COMMAND_FAILED:"
+                + ":".join(args)
+                + ":"
+                + str(result.returncode)
+            )
+        return result
+
+    def property(self, unit: str, name: str) -> str:
+        result = self._run(["show", unit, f"--property={name}", "--value"])
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            return ""
+        return result.stdout.strip()
+
+    def environment(self, unit: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+        text = self.property(unit, "Environment")
+        result: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for item in shlex.split(text):
+            if "=" not in item:
+                continue
+            key, value = item.split("=", 1)
+            result[key] = value
+        return result
+
+    def enable(self, unit: str) -> None:
+        self._run(["enable", unit], check=True)
+
+    def start(self, unit: str) -> None:
+        self._run(["start", unit], check=True)
+
+    def restart(self, unit: str) -> None:
+        self._run(["restart", unit], check=True)
+
+
+def _atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o755)
+    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
+        raise AvailabilityGuardError("STATUS_PATH_SYMLINK_REJECTED")
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o644)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump(value, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2)
+            handle.write("\n")
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+        os.chmod(path, 0o644)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def _load_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        return None
+    try:
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return None
+    return dict(value) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else None
+
+
+def _state_root(environment: Mapping[str, str], unit: str) -> Path:
+    explicit = environment.get("AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT")
+    if explicit:
+        return Path(explicit)
+    fallbacks = {
+        "aios-online-agent-worker-20260815.service": Path(
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815"
+        ),
+        "aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service": Path(
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes"
+        ),
+        "aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service": Path(
+            "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw"
+        ),
+    }
+    if unit not in fallbacks:
+        raise AvailabilityGuardError("WORKER_STATE_ROOT_UNAVAILABLE:" + unit)
+    return fallbacks[unit]
+
+
+def _liveness_path(environment: Mapping[str, str], unit: str) -> Path:
+    explicit = environment.get("AIOS_WORKER_LIVENESS_PATH")
+    if explicit:
+        return Path(explicit)
+    return _state_root(environment, unit) / "worker-liveness.json"
+
+
+class AvailabilityGuard:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        systemd: Systemd | None = None,
+        worker_units: Sequence[str] = DEFAULT_WORKER_UNITS,
+        dependency_units: Sequence[str] = DEFAULT_DEPENDENCY_UNITS,
+        status_path: Path = DEFAULT_STATUS,
+        recovery_path: Path = DEFAULT_RECOVERY,
+        inhibit_path: Path = DEFAULT_INHIBIT,
+        max_stale_seconds: int = DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS,
+        restart_cooldown_seconds: int = DEFAULT_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS,
+        startup_wait_seconds: int = DEFAULT_STARTUP_WAIT_SECONDS,
+        now_fn: Callable[[], float] = time.time,
+        sleep_fn: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.systemd = systemd or Systemd()
+        self.worker_units = tuple(worker_units)
+        self.dependency_units = tuple(dependency_units)
+        self.status_path = Path(status_path)
+        self.recovery_path = Path(recovery_path)
+        self.inhibit_path = Path(inhibit_path)
+        self.max_stale_seconds = int(max_stale_seconds)
+        self.restart_cooldown_seconds = int(restart_cooldown_seconds)
+        self.startup_wait_seconds = int(startup_wait_seconds)
+        self.now_fn = now_fn
+        self.sleep_fn = sleep_fn
+        if self.max_stale_seconds < 15:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("MAX_STALE_SECONDS_TOO_SMALL")
+        if self.restart_cooldown_seconds < 15:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("RESTART_COOLDOWN_TOO_SMALL")
+        if self.startup_wait_seconds < 0 or self.startup_wait_seconds > 60:
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("STARTUP_WAIT_INVALID")
+
+    def _recovery_state(self) -> dict[str, float]:
+        value = _load_json(self.recovery_path) or {}
+        raw = value.get("last_restart_epoch")
+        if not isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            return {}
+        result: dict[str, float] = {}
+        for unit, epoch in raw.items():
+            try:
+                result[str(unit)] = float(epoch)
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                continue
+        return result
+
+    def _save_recovery_state(self, state: Mapping[str, float]) -> None:
+        _atomic_json(
+            self.recovery_path,
+            {
+                "schema": "aios.worker-availability.recovery.v1",
+                "last_restart_epoch": dict(state),
+            },
+        )
+
+    def _basic_snapshot(self, unit: str, role: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, bool]:
+        load = self.systemd.property(unit, "LoadState")
+        active = self.systemd.property(unit, "ActiveState")
+        enabled = self.systemd.property(unit, "UnitFileState")
+        return load, active, enabled, enabled in ACCEPTED_ENABLED_STATES
+
+    def _ensure_enabled_active(self, unit: str, role: str) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+        load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, role)
+        if load != "loaded":
+            raise AvailabilityGuardError("REQUIRED_UNIT_NOT_LOADED:" + unit)
+        action = "NONE"
+        if not enabled_ok:
+            self.systemd.enable(unit)
+            action = "ENABLE"
+        if active != "active":
+            self.systemd.start(unit)
+            action = "START" if action == "NONE" else "ENABLE_START"
+        return action, active == "active"
+
+    def _wait_for_liveness(self, path: Path) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        deadline = self.now_fn() + self.startup_wait_seconds
+        while True:
+            value = _load_json(path)
+            if value is not None:
+                try:
+                    epoch = float(value.get("last_seen_epoch"))
+                except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                    epoch = 0.0
+                if epoch > 0 and self.now_fn() - epoch <= self.max_stale_seconds:
+                    return value
+            if self.now_fn() >= deadline:
+                return value
+            self.sleep_fn(0.5)
+
+    def run(self, *, heal: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = self.now_fn()
+        if self.inhibit_path.exists():
+            result = {
+                "schema": SCHEMA,
+                "status": "MAINTENANCE_INHIBITED",
+                "generated_at_epoch": now,
+                "maintenance_inhibit": str(self.inhibit_path),
+                "workers": [],
+                "dependencies": [],
+                "all_fresh": False,
+                "actions": [],
+            }
+            _atomic_json(self.status_path, result)
+            return result
+
+        actions: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        dependencies: list[UnitSnapshot] = []
+        for unit in self.dependency_units:
+            load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "dependency")
+            action = "NONE"
+            if heal:
+                if load != "loaded":
+                    raise AvailabilityGuardError("REQUIRED_UNIT_NOT_LOADED:" + unit)
+                if not enabled_ok:
+                    self.systemd.enable(unit)
+                    action = "ENABLE"
+                if active != "active":
+                    self.systemd.start(unit)
+                    action = "START" if action == "NONE" else "ENABLE_START"
+                if action != "NONE":
+                    actions.append({"unit": unit, "action": action})
+                load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "dependency")
+            dependencies.append(
+                UnitSnapshot(
+                    unit=unit,
+                    role="dependency",
+                    load_state=load,
+                    active_state=active,
+                    unit_file_state=enabled,
+                    enabled_ok=enabled_ok,
+                    fresh=(active == "active"),
+                    action=action,
+                )
+            )
+
+        recovery = self._recovery_state()
+        workers: list[UnitSnapshot] = []
+        for unit in self.worker_units:
+            load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "worker")
+            environment = self.systemd.environment(unit) if load == "loaded" else {}
+            path = _liveness_path(environment, unit) if load == "loaded" else None
+            action = "NONE"
+
+            if heal:
+                if load != "loaded":
+                    raise AvailabilityGuardError("REQUIRED_UNIT_NOT_LOADED:" + unit)
+                if not enabled_ok:
+                    self.systemd.enable(unit)
+                    action = "ENABLE"
+                if active != "active":
+                    self.systemd.start(unit)
+                    action = "START" if action == "NONE" else "ENABLE_START"
+                    actions.append({"unit": unit, "action": action})
+                    if path is not None:
+                        self._wait_for_liveness(path)
+                load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "worker")
+
+            live = _load_json(path) if path is not None else None
+            last_seen: float | None = None
+            state: str | None = None
+            age: float | None = None
+            fresh = False
+            detail: str | None = None
+            if live is not None:
+                state = str(live.get("state") or "")
+                try:
+                    last_seen = float(live.get("last_seen_epoch"))
+                except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                    last_seen = None
+                if last_seen is not None:
+                    age = max(0.0, now - last_seen)
+                    fresh = age <= self.max_stale_seconds
+                if live.get("agent_id") in (None, ""):
+                    fresh = False
+                    detail = "LIVENESS_AGENT_ID_MISSING"
+            else:
+                detail = "LIVENESS_MISSING"
+
+            if heal and active == "active" and not fresh:
+                previous = float(recovery.get(unit, 0.0))
+                if now - previous >= self.restart_cooldown_seconds:
+                    self.systemd.restart(unit)
+                    recovery[unit] = now
+                    action = "RESTART_STALE"
+                    actions.append({"unit": unit, "action": action})
+                    if path is not None:
+                        live = self._wait_for_liveness(path)
+                    load, active, enabled, enabled_ok = self._basic_snapshot(unit, "worker")
+                    if live is not None:
+                        state = str(live.get("state") or "")
+                        try:
+                            last_seen = float(live.get("last_seen_epoch"))
+                        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                            last_seen = None
+                        if last_seen is not None:
+                            age = max(0.0, self.now_fn() - last_seen)
+                            fresh = age <= self.max_stale_seconds
+                            detail = None if fresh else "LIVENESS_STALE_AFTER_RESTART"
+                else:
+                    detail = "RESTART_COOLDOWN_ACTIVE"
+
+            workers.append(
+                UnitSnapshot(
+                    unit=unit,
+                    role="worker",
+                    load_state=load,
+                    active_state=active,
+                    unit_file_state=enabled,
+                    enabled_ok=enabled_ok,
+                    liveness_path=str(path) if path is not None else None,
+                    liveness_state=state,
+                    last_seen_epoch=last_seen,
+                    liveness_age_seconds=age,
+                    fresh=bool(active == "active" and enabled_ok and fresh),
+                    action=action,
+                    detail=detail,
+                )
+            )
+
+        if heal:
+            self._save_recovery_state(recovery)
+
+        all_fresh = (
+            all(item.active_state == "active" and item.enabled_ok and item.fresh for item in workers)
+            and all(item.active_state == "active" for item in dependencies)
+        )
+        result = {
+            "schema": SCHEMA,
+            "status": "HEALTHY" if all_fresh else "DEGRADED",
+            "generated_at_epoch": self.now_fn(),
+            "max_stale_seconds": self.max_stale_seconds,
+            "maintenance_inhibit": str(self.inhibit_path),
+            "workers": [asdict(item) for item in workers],
+            "dependencies": [asdict(item) for item in dependencies],
+            "all_fresh": all_fresh,
+            "actions": actions,
+        }
+        _atomic_json(self.status_path, result)
+        return result
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    mode = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    mode.add_argument("--heal", action="store_true")
+    mode.add_argument("--check", action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument("--status-file", default=str(DEFAULT_STATUS))
+    parser.add_argument("--recovery-file", default=str(DEFAULT_RECOVERY))
+    parser.add_argument("--inhibit-file", default=str(DEFAULT_INHIBIT))
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--max-stale-seconds",
+        type=int,
+        default=int(
+            os.environ.get(
+                "AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_MAX_STALE_SECONDS",
+                str(DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS),
+            )
+        ),
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--restart-cooldown-seconds",
+        type=int,
+        default=int(
+            os.environ.get(
+                "AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS",
+                str(DEFAULT_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS),
+            )
+        ),
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    guard = AvailabilityGuard(
+        status_path=Path(args.status_file),
+        recovery_path=Path(args.recovery_file),
+        inhibit_path=Path(args.inhibit_file),
+        max_stale_seconds=args.max_stale_seconds,
+        restart_cooldown_seconds=args.restart_cooldown_seconds,
+    )
+    try:
+        result = guard.run(heal=args.heal)
+    except AvailabilityGuardError as exc:
+        print(json.dumps({"status": "FAILED", "error": str(exc)}, sort_keys=True))
+        return 20
+    print(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
+    if args.check and not result.get("all_fresh"):
+        return 10
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py

@@ -964,6 +964,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
     required = {
         "schema",
         "task_id",
+        "job_id",
         "repository",
         "branch_mode",
         "base_oid",
@@ -976,6 +977,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
         raise ProvisioningError("LEASE_REQUEST_V2_FIELDS_REJECTED", 409)
     request = WriterLeaseRequestV2(
         task_id=str(raw["task_id"]),
+        job_id=str(raw["job_id"]),
         repository=str(raw["repository"]),
         branch_mode=str(raw["branch_mode"]),
         base_oid=str(raw["base_oid"]),
@@ -988,6 +990,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
     return {
         "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
         "task_id": request.task_id,
+        "job_id": request.job_id,
         "repository": request.repository,
         "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
         "base_oid": request.base_oid,

active-runtime/app/message_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import datetime as dt
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+UTC = dt.timezone.utc
+_ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY = frozenset({"public", "tenant", "project", "private", "run"})
+_PRIVILEGED = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "message.admin", "task.admin"})
+
+
+class HandoffError(RuntimeError):
+    code = "HANDOFF_ERROR"
+
+
+class MessageScopeMismatch(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"
+
+
+class ConfidentialityScopeDenied(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"
+
+
+class MessageExpired(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_EXPIRED"
+
+
+class SequenceGap(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT"
+
+
+class SequenceConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_CONFLICT"
+
+
+class IdempotencyConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"
+
+
+def _utcnow() -> dt.datetime:
+    return dt.datetime.now(UTC)
+
+
+def _iso(value: dt.datetime | str | None) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    parsed = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00")) if isinstance(value, str) else value
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=UTC)
+    return parsed.astimezone(UTC).isoformat()
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _tuple_scope(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({str(item).strip() for item in value if str(item).strip()}))
+
+
+_SECRET_KEY = re.compile(r"(?i)(?:token|secret|password|private[_-]?key|api[_-]?key)")
+_SECRET_VALUE = re.compile(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{8,}|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+")
+_SAFE_REFERENCE = re.compile(r"^(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+
+
+def assert_payload_secret_safe(value: Any, *, key: str = "") -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for child_key, child in value.items():
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=str(child_key))
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        for child in value:
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=key)
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (bytes, bytearray)):
+        raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        if _SECRET_VALUE.search(value):
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        if _SECRET_KEY.search(key) and value and _SAFE_REFERENCE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DeliveryContext:
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_actor(cls, actor: Any) -> "DeliveryContext":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            if isinstance(actor, Mapping):
+                return actor.get(name)
+            return getattr(actor, name, None)
+        return cls(
+            tenant_id=_clean(get("tenant_id")),
+            user_id=_clean(get("user_id")),
+            project_id=_clean(get("project_id")),
+            conversation_id=_clean(get("conversation_id")),
+            run_id=_clean(get("run_id")),
+            capabilities=_tuple_scope(get("capabilities") or get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & _PRIVILEGED)
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MessageEnvelope:
+    source: str
+    target: str
+    message_type: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    sequence: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    capability_scope: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    confidentiality_scope: str = "private"
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = dataclasses.field(default_factory=lambda: _iso(_utcnow()) or "")
+    envelope_id: str = ""
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        assert_payload_secret_safe(self.payload)
+        for field in ("source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key", "tenant_id", "user_id",
+                      "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, field, _clean(getattr(self, field)) if field not in {
+                "source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key"
+            } else (_clean(getattr(self, field)) or ""))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capability_scope", _tuple_scope(self.capability_scope))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "confidentiality_scope", (_clean(self.confidentiality_scope) or "private").lower())
+        object.__setattr__(self, "expires_at", _iso(self.expires_at))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "created_at", _iso(self.created_at) or "")
+        if not self.source or not self.target or not self.message_type or not self.idempotency_key:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_IDENTITY_REQUIRED")
+        if not isinstance(self.sequence, int) or self.sequence < 1:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_MUST_BE_POSITIVE")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope not in _ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope != "public" and self.tenant_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TENANT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and self.project_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PROJECT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and self.user_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_USER_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope == "run" and self.run_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_RUN_REQUIRED")
+        expected = stable_event_id(
+            source=self.source, target=self.target, message_type=self.message_type, payload=self.payload,
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id, user_id=self.user_id, project_id=self.project_id,
+            conversation_id=self.conversation_id, task_id=self.task_id, run_id=self.run_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id, causation_id=self.causation_id,
+            sequence=self.sequence, idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
+        )
+        if self.envelope_id and self.envelope_id != expected:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_ID_MISMATCH")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "envelope_id", expected)
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return _sha(self.payload)
+
+    @property
+    def stream_key(self) -> str:
+        return _sha({
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "source": self.source, "target": self.target,
+            "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "run_id": self.run_id,
+        })
+
+    def is_expired(self, *, now: dt.datetime | None = None) -> bool:
+        if self.expires_at is None:
+            return False
+        return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at) <= (now or _utcnow()).astimezone(UTC)
+
+    def as_record(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "envelope_id": self.envelope_id, "stream_key": self.stream_key, "source": self.source,
+            "target": self.target, "message_type": self.message_type, "payload_json": _canonical(self.payload),
+            "payload_sha256": self.payload_sha256, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "project_id": self.project_id, "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id, "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id, "sequence": self.sequence,
+            "capability_scope_json": _canonical(self.capability_scope),
+            "confidentiality_scope": self.confidentiality_scope, "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at, "created_at": self.created_at,
+        }
+
+
+def stable_event_id(*, source: Any, target: Any, message_type: Any, payload: Any,
+                    tenant_id: Any = None, user_id: Any = None, project_id: Any = None,
+                    conversation_id: Any = None, task_id: Any = None, run_id: Any = None,
+                    correlation_id: Any = None, causation_id: Any = None,
+                    sequence: Any = None, idempotency_key: Any = None) -> str:
+    assert_payload_secret_safe(payload)
+    material = {
+        "source": _clean(source), "target": _clean(target), "message_type": _clean(message_type),
+        "payload_sha256": _sha(payload), "tenant_id": _clean(tenant_id), "user_id": _clean(user_id),
+        "project_id": _clean(project_id), "conversation_id": _clean(conversation_id),
+        "task_id": _clean(task_id), "run_id": _clean(run_id), "causation_id": _clean(causation_id),
+        "sequence": sequence, "idempotency_key": _clean(idempotency_key),
+    }
+    # Preserve historical envelope IDs for legacy rows that predate correlation_id.
+    if _clean(correlation_id) is not None:
+        material["correlation_id"] = _clean(correlation_id)
+    return _sha(material)
+
+
+def bind_envelope_scope(envelope: MessageEnvelope, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return envelope
+    if ctx.tenant_id is None:
+        if envelope.tenant_id is not None:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(MessageScopeMismatch.code)
+        return envelope
+    updates: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for field in ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id"):
+        trusted = getattr(ctx, field)
+        requested = getattr(envelope, field)
+        if requested is not None and requested != trusted:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:{field}")
+        if requested is None and trusted is not None:
+            updates[field] = trusted
+    if not updates:
+        return envelope
+    data = dataclasses.asdict(envelope)
+    data.update(updates)
+    data["envelope_id"] = ""
+    return MessageEnvelope(**data)
+
+
+def authorize_delivery(actor: Any, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> None:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return
+    if not set(envelope.capability_scope).issubset(set(ctx.capabilities)):
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:capability")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "public":
+        return
+    if ctx.tenant_id != envelope.tenant_id:
+        raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:tenant_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and ctx.project_id != envelope.project_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:project_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and ctx.user_id != envelope.user_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:user_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "run" and ctx.run_id != envelope.run_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:run_id")
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  correlation_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);
+"""
+
+
+class DurableHandoffStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            columns = {str(row[1]) for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(message_handoff)")}
+            if "correlation_id" not in columns:
+                conn.execute("ALTER TABLE message_handoff ADD COLUMN correlation_id TEXT")
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_lineage "
+                "ON message_handoff(correlation_id, causation_id)"
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return conn
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _from_row(row: sqlite3.Row) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        return MessageEnvelope(
+            source=row["source"], target=row["target"], message_type=row["message_type"],
+            payload=json.loads(row["payload_json"]), tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], user_id=row["user_id"],
+            project_id=row["project_id"], conversation_id=row["conversation_id"], task_id=row["task_id"],
+            run_id=row["run_id"], correlation_id=row["correlation_id"],
+            causation_id=row["causation_id"], sequence=int(row["sequence"]),
+            capability_scope=tuple(json.loads(row["capability_scope_json"])),
+            confidentiality_scope=row["confidentiality_scope"], idempotency_key=row["idempotency_key"],
+            expires_at=row["expires_at"], created_at=row["created_at"], envelope_id=row["envelope_id"],
+        )
+
+    def put(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        if envelope.is_expired():
+            raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+        record = envelope.as_record()
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(replay)
+                if existing.envelope_id != envelope.envelope_id or existing.payload_sha256 != envelope.payload_sha256:
+                    raise IdempotencyConflict(IdempotencyConflict.code)
+                conn.commit()
+                return "REPLAY", existing
+            seq = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND sequence=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if seq is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(seq)
+                if existing.envelope_id == envelope.envelope_id:
+                    conn.commit()
+                    return "REPLAY", existing
+                raise SequenceConflict(SequenceConflict.code)
+            maximum = int(conn.execute(
+                "SELECT COALESCE(MAX(sequence),0) FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key,),
+            ).fetchone()[0])
+            expected = maximum + 1
+            if envelope.sequence != expected:
+                raise SequenceGap(f"{SequenceGap.code}:expected={expected}:actual={envelope.sequence}")
+            columns = tuple(record)
+            placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in columns)
+            conn.execute(
+                f"INSERT INTO message_handoff ({','.join(columns)}) VALUES ({placeholders})",
+                tuple(record[column] for column in columns),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            return "CREATED", envelope
+
+    def get(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise KeyError(envelope_id)
+            envelope = self._from_row(row)
+            if envelope.is_expired():
+                conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,))
+                conn.commit()
+                raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+            authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+            return envelope
+
+    def pending(self, *, target: str, actor: Any, limit: int = 100) -> list[MessageEnvelope]:
+        if not 1 <= limit <= 1000:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PENDING_LIMIT_INVALID")
+        visible: list[MessageEnvelope] = []
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            rows = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE target=? AND status='PENDING' ORDER BY created_at, sequence LIMIT ?",
+                (target, limit),
+            ).fetchall()
+            for row in rows:
+                envelope = self._from_row(row)
+                if envelope.is_expired():
+                    conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope.envelope_id,))
+                    continue
+                try:
+                    authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+                except HandoffError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(envelope)
+            conn.commit()
+        return visible
+
+    def mark_delivered(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='DELIVERED', delivered_at=? "
+                "WHERE envelope_id=? AND status='PENDING'",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+    def acknowledge(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='ACKED', acked_at=? WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+
+class HandoffFabric:
+    def __init__(self, store: DurableHandoffStore) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+
+    def publish(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope, *, actor: Any | None = None) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        return self.store.put(bind_envelope_scope(envelope, actor) if actor is not None else envelope)

active-runtime/app/message_handoff_adapters.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from message_handoff import MessageEnvelope
+
+
+def _get(value: Any, *names: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    for name in names:
+        if isinstance(value, Mapping) and name in value:
+            return value[name]
+        if hasattr(value, name):
+            return getattr(value, name)
+    return default
+
+
+def agent_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                            idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(event, "payload", "data", default={}) or {}
+    target = target or _get(event, "target", "recipient")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", "producer", "agent_id", default="agent-event")),
+        target=str(target),
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "event_type", "type", "message_type", default="agent.event")),
+        payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default="")) or f"agent-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=_get(event, "causation_id"),
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def taskplane_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str, sequence: int = 1,
+                                idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    data = _get(event, "data", "payload", default={}) or {}
+    event_id = str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default=""))
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", default="task-plane")),
+        target=target,
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "type", "event_type", default="task.event")),
+        payload=dict(data),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or event_id or f"task-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=event_id or None,
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def legacy_message_to_envelope(message: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                               idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(message, "payload", "data", "body", "content", default={})
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping):
+        payload = {"value": payload}
+    target = target or _get(message, "target", "recipient", "receiver")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    source = _get(message, "source", "sender", "agent_id", default="legacy-message-bus")
+    kind = _get(message, "message_type", "type", "kind", default="legacy.message")
+    identifier = _get(message, "id", "message_id", "event_id")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(source), target=str(target), message_type=str(kind), payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or (str(identifier) if identifier else f"legacy:{sequence}"),
+        causation_id=str(identifier) if identifier else None,
+        **scope,
+    )

active-runtime/app/search_agent_adapter.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from typing import Any
 
 from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
         domain_profiles: list[str] | None = None,
         user_scope: str = "public",
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         payload = {
             "query": query,
@@ -59,7 +63,11 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
             "session_profile": context.session_profile,
             "correlation_id": correlation_id,
         }
-        return self.orchestrator.execute(payload)
+        if actor is None and trace is None:
+            # Preserve adapter compatibility; the governed orchestrator itself
+            # still fails closed when trusted context is absent.
+            return self.orchestrator.execute(payload)
+        return self.orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 class OpenClawSearchClient(SearchGatewayAgentAdapter):

active-runtime/app/search_gateway.py

@@ -13,10 +13,18 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
 from typing import Any, Protocol
 from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .search_profile_resolver import DomainQueryProfileRegistry, SearchProfile, SearchProfileResolver
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -156,13 +164,25 @@ class SearchPolicyGuard:
 
 
 class SearchGateway:
-    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None):
+    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.providers = providers or []
+        self.governance_store = governance_store
         self.profile_resolver = SearchProfileResolver()
         self.planner = QueryPlanner()
         self.guard = SearchPolicyGuard()
 
-    def search(self, request: SearchRequest) -> SearchResponse:
+    def search(self, request: SearchRequest, *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> SearchResponse:
+        trusted_actor: GovernanceActor | None = None
+        if self.governance_store is not None:
+            if actor is None or trace is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            if request.requester != trusted_actor.identity:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="requester")
+            if request.correlation_id is not None and request.correlation_id not in {
+                trace.trace_id, trace.correlation_id
+            }:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION", field="correlation_id")
         request_id = request.correlation_id or f"search_{uuid4().hex[:12]}"
         profile = self.profile_resolver.resolve(request.group_profile, request.user_profile, request.session_profile)
         expanded_queries = self.planner.expand(request, profile)
@@ -184,14 +204,60 @@ class SearchGateway:
         attempts: list[SearchProviderAttempt] = []
         providers = self._ordered_providers(profile)
         for provider in providers:
+            if request.authorized_sources and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_DENY"))
+                continue
+            if request.user_scope != "public" and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_REQUIRED"))
+                continue
             try:
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    assert trusted_actor is not None and trace is not None
+                    input_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {"query": request.query, "intent": request.intent, "provider": provider.name},
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    invocation_key = hashlib.sha256(
+                        f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}:{provider.name}:{input_digest}".encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    authorization = self.governance_store.authorize_tool(
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        tool_name=f"search.{provider.name}",
+                        trace=trace,
+                        requested_scope=trace.scope,
+                        input_digest=input_digest,
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                    )
+                    if authorization.get("idempotent"):
+                        raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_REPLAY")
                 provider_evidence, attempt = provider.search(request, expanded_queries)
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    result_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {
+                                "evidence": [item.to_dict() for item in provider_evidence],
+                                "attempt": attempt.to_dict(),
+                            },
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    self.governance_store.record_tool_receipt(
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                        result_digest=result_digest,
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        trace=trace,
+                    )
                 evidence.extend(provider_evidence)
                 attempts.append(attempt)
                 if provider_evidence:
                     break
-            except Exception as exc:
-                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason=str(exc)))
+            except GovernanceError:
+                raise
+            except Exception:
+                # Provider exceptions may contain URLs, tokens, or local paths.
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason="PROVIDER_FAILURE"))
 
         if evidence:
             return SearchResponse(

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_api.py

@@ -7,27 +7,29 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway import SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 from .search_gateway_dashboard import SearchGatewayDashboard
 
 
-gateway = SearchGateway()
+orchestrator = SearchGatewayOrchestrator()
 dashboard = SearchGatewayDashboard()
 
 
-def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = SearchRequest(**payload)
-    return gateway.search(request).to_dict()
+def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 def get_search_gateway_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
     return {
         "module": "search-gateway",
         "status": "ready",
-        "providers_configured": len(gateway.providers),
+        "providers_configured": len(orchestrator.gateway.providers),
         "policy_guard": "enabled",
         "profile_customization": "enabled",
         "fallback_required_when_provider_unavailable": True,
+        "governance": "required",
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_orchestrator.py

@@ -3,24 +3,49 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any
+import os
 
 from .search_audit_store import SearchAuditStore
 from .search_event_bridge import SearchEventBridge
 from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
 from .search_provider_registry import SearchProviderRegistry
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    ToolDescriptor,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
-    def __init__(self):
+    def __init__(self, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.registry = SearchProviderRegistry()
         self.audit = SearchAuditStore()
         self.events = SearchEventBridge()
-        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered())
+        self.governance = governance_store or GovernanceStore(
+            os.environ.get("AIOS_SEARCH_GOVERNANCE_DB", "runtime/search-governance.sqlite3")
+        )
+        registrar = GovernanceActor(
+            "search-runtime-bootstrap", GovernanceScope("system"), ("system.admin",)
+        )
+        for provider in self.registry.ordered():
+            self.governance.register_tool(
+                ToolDescriptor(
+                    f"search.{provider.name}", "tool", GovernanceScope("global"), ("tool.search",)
+                ),
+                registrar,
+            )
+        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered(), governance_store=self.governance)
 
-    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceError
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        self.governance.record_trace(trace, actor)
         request = SearchRequest(**payload)
         self.events.search_started(request.to_dict())
-        response = self.gateway.search(request)
+        response = self.gateway.search(request, actor=actor, trace=trace)
         result = response.to_dict()
         for attempt in result.get("attempts", []):
             self.events.provider_attempted(result["request_id"], attempt)
@@ -35,6 +60,7 @@ class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
             "registry": self.registry.status(),
             "audit": "enabled",
             "events": "enabled",
+            "governance": "required",
         }
 
 

active-runtime/app/task_plane/api.py

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ from .models import (
 )
 from .policy import PolicyEngine
 from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+from .scope import bind_task_scope
 from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry
 
 
@@ -68,28 +69,54 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         self.delegation = DelegationEngine(store)
         self.store.probe_attestation_verifier = self.policy.probe_attestation_verifier
 
-    def create_task(self, body: dict[str, Any], idempotency_key: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def _authorized_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str, action: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id, self.policy.actor_context(actor))
+        self.policy.assert_allowed(action, actor, task=task)
+        return task
+
+    def create_task(
+        self,
+        body: dict[str, Any],
+        idempotency_key: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor_identity: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if body.get("parent_task_id"):
             raise ForbiddenError("child tasks must use the delegate endpoint")
         issuer = body.get("issuer", {})
-        actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        declared_actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        actor = actor_identity or declared_actor
         self.policy.assert_allowed("create", actor)
         try:
             plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body)
         except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
             raise ValidationError("invalid task plan") from exc
+        if actor_identity is not None:
+            plan = bind_task_scope(
+                plan, self.policy.actor_context(actor_identity), public_create=True
+            )
         task = self.store.create_task_with_event(plan, idempotency_key=idempotency_key)
         return task.to_dict()
 
     def list_tasks(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        context = None
         if actor is not None:
             self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
-        return [task.to_dict(include_task=False) for task in self.store.list_tasks()]
+            context = self.policy.actor_context(actor)
+        return [
+            task.to_dict(include_task=False)
+            for task in self.store.list_tasks(context)
+        ]
 
     def get_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        context = None
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        return self.store.get_task(task_id).to_dict()
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+            context = self.policy.actor_context(actor)
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id, context)
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=task)
+        return task.to_dict()
 
     def get_worker(self, worker_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if actor is not None:
@@ -163,9 +190,8 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not worker_id:
             raise ValidationError("worker_id required")
 
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "claim")
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, str(worker_id))
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor, task=task)
         lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
             body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
         )
@@ -184,10 +210,9 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not claim_id:
             raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "heartbeat")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("heartbeat", actor, task=task)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
         lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
@@ -206,10 +231,9 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         message = body.get("message")
         if progress is None:
             raise ValidationError("progress required")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "progress")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("progress", actor, task=task)
         if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
             if message not in {None, ""} or contains_secret_text(stage):
                 raise ValidationError(
@@ -234,7 +258,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not claim_id:
             raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "result")
 
         status = body.get("status", "COMPLETED")
         outputs = body.get("outputs", [])
@@ -247,7 +271,6 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
             raise ValidationError("evidence items must be objects")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("result", actor, task=task)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
         if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
@@ -326,8 +349,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         reason = body.get("reason", "failed")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor)
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor, task=task)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "fail")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
@@ -339,8 +361,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "owner"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor)
         reason = body.get("reason", "cancelled")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor, task=task)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "cancel")
         updated = self.store.cancel_task_with_event(
             task_id, task.revision, reason=reason
         )
@@ -349,8 +370,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
     def delegate(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or "owner"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor)
-        parent = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor, task=parent)
+        parent = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "delegate")
         if "task" in body:
             try:
                 child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body["task"])
@@ -364,25 +384,31 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
             except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
                 raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
         child_plan.parent_task_id = task_id
+        child_plan = bind_task_scope(
+            child_plan, self.policy.actor_context(actor), public_create=False
+        )
         child = self.delegation.delegate(task_id, child_plan, caller=actor)
         return child.to_dict()
 
     def get_events(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "audit")
+        else:
+            self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.store.list_events(task_id)
 
     def get_evidence(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "audit")
+        else:
+            self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.evidence.list(task_id)
 
     def get_children(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "read")
+        else:
+            self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.store.list_children(task_id)
 
 
@@ -506,7 +532,11 @@ class TaskPlaneRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 ):
                     raise ForbiddenError("issuer identity mismatch")
                 body["issuer"] = {"type": "authenticated", "id": identity}
-                return 201, self.service.create_task(body or {}, headers.get("idempotency-key"))
+                return 201, self.service.create_task(
+                    body or {},
+                    headers.get("idempotency-key"),
+                    actor_identity=identity,
+                )
             if body.get("actor_identity") not in {None, identity}:
                 raise ForbiddenError("actor identity mismatch")
             body["actor_identity"] = identity

active-runtime/app/task_plane/events.py

@@ -106,3 +106,8 @@ class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
             receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
             error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
         )
+
+# R4.2 P0-B compatibility adapter.
+def to_handoff_envelope(event, *, target, sequence=1, idempotency_key=None, **scope):
+    from message_handoff_adapters import taskplane_event_to_envelope
+    return taskplane_event_to_envelope(event, target=target, sequence=sequence, idempotency_key=idempotency_key, **scope)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/fleet.py

@@ -0,0 +1,911 @@
+"""Durable multi-agent fleet scheduling for TaskPlane.
+
+The fleet layer decides *which* eligible worker should receive *which* queued task.
+It never replaces TaskPlane claim/lease ownership: callers must still perform the
+authoritative TaskPlane claim CAS after a reservation is returned.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import math
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS = 30
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD = 3
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 15 * 60
+MAX_SLOTS = 128
+
+
+class FleetError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class FleetConflict(FleetError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _text(value: object, default: str = "") -> str:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    return str(value).strip() or default
+
+
+def _int(value: object, default: int, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID")
+    try:
+        result = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID") from exc
+    if result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _float(value: object, default: float, minimum: float, maximum: float) -> float:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    try:
+        result = float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_INVALID") from exc
+    if not math.isfinite(result) or result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _mapping(value: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value
+    if hasattr(value, "to_dict"):
+        data = value.to_dict()
+        if isinstance(data, Mapping):
+            return data
+    if hasattr(value, "__dict__"):
+        return vars(value)
+    return {}
+
+
+def _attr(value: object, name: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value.get(name, default)
+    return getattr(value, name, default)
+
+
+def _task_plan(task: object) -> object:
+    return _attr(task, "task_plan", _attr(task, "plan", task))
+
+
+def _task_id(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "task_id", _attr(_task_plan(task), "task_id", "")))
+
+
+def _task_status(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "status", "")).upper()
+
+
+def _task_revision(task: object) -> int:
+    return _int(_attr(task, "revision", 0), 0, 0, 2**31 - 1)
+
+
+def _task_created_at(task: object) -> float:
+    value = _attr(task, "created_at", _attr(task, "updated_at", 0.0))
+    try:
+        return float(value or 0.0)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return 0.0
+
+
+def _task_required_capabilities(task: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "required_capabilities", ())
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+def _task_metadata(task: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "metadata", {})
+    return value if isinstance(value, Mapping) else {}
+
+
+def _task_scope_key(task: object) -> str:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    scope_type = _text(_attr(plan, "scope_type", "legacy"), "legacy")
+    tenant = _text(_attr(plan, "tenant_id", ""))
+    project = _text(_attr(plan, "project_id", ""))
+    user = _text(_attr(plan, "user_id", ""))
+    if scope_type == "tenant":
+        return "tenant:" + tenant + "|project:" + (project or "*")
+    if scope_type == "system":
+        return "system"
+    return "legacy:" + (user or "*")
+
+
+def _worker_id(worker: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(worker, "worker_id", ""))
+
+
+def _worker_capabilities(worker: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    value = _attr(worker, "capabilities", ())
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        value = value.keys()
+    if not isinstance(value, Iterable) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetWorkerPolicy:
+    worker_id: str
+    max_slots: int = 1
+    failure_domain: str = "default"
+    weight: float = 1.0
+    labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None
+    revision: int = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetDispatchDecision:
+    reservation_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    task_revision: int
+    scope_key: str
+    failure_domain: str
+    reserved_until: float
+    score: tuple[float, float, float, str]
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "reservation_id": self.reservation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "task_revision": self.task_revision,
+            "scope_key": self.scope_key,
+            "failure_domain": self.failure_domain,
+            "reserved_until": self.reserved_until,
+            "score": list(self.score),
+        }
+
+
+class FleetStateStore:
+    """Small durable fleet journal colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database."""
+
+    def __init__(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection, lock: threading.RLock | None = None) -> None:
+        self.conn = connection
+        self.lock = lock or threading.RLock()
+        self._savepoint_counter = 0
+        self._ensure_schema()
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _transaction(self):
+        with self.lock:
+            self._savepoint_counter += 1
+            name = f"fleet_{threading.get_ident()}_{self._savepoint_counter}"
+            self.conn.execute(f"SAVEPOINT {name}")
+            try:
+                yield
+            except Exception:
+                self.conn.execute(f"ROLLBACK TO {name}")
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+                raise
+            else:
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+
+    def _ensure_schema(self) -> None:
+        with self.lock:
+            self.conn.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_capacity (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    max_slots INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    weight REAL NOT NULL,
+                    labels_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_scope_state (
+                    scope_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    virtual_finish REAL NOT NULL,
+                    dispatch_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    last_dispatched_at REAL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_dispatches (
+                    reservation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    scope_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    reserved_until REAL NOT NULL,
+                    claim_id TEXT,
+                    created_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_fleet_dispatch_worker_state
+                    ON fleet_dispatches(worker_id, state, reserved_until);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_failures (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    consecutive_failures INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    circuit_open_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_task_worker_failures (
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    blocked_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(task_id, worker_id)
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def configure_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        *,
+        max_slots: int = 1,
+        failure_domain: str = "default",
+        weight: float = 1.0,
+        labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_ID_REQUIRED")
+        max_slots = _int(max_slots, 1, 1, MAX_SLOTS)
+        weight = _float(weight, 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+        failure_domain = _text(failure_domain, "default")
+        normalized_labels = {
+            _text(k): _text(v)
+            for k, v in dict(labels or {}).items()
+            if _text(k) and _text(v)
+        }
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT revision FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current = int(row[0]) if row else 0
+            if expected_revision is not None and current != int(expected_revision):
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_POLICY_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            revision = current + 1
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_capacity(
+                    worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    max_slots=excluded.max_slots,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    weight=excluded.weight,
+                    labels_json=excluded.labels_json,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    worker_id,
+                    max_slots,
+                    failure_domain,
+                    weight,
+                    json.dumps(normalized_labels, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    revision,
+                    now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id, max_slots, failure_domain, weight, normalized_labels, revision
+        )
+
+    def worker_policy(self, worker_id: str) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision
+                FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return FleetWorkerPolicy(worker_id=worker_id)
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id=str(row[0]),
+            max_slots=int(row[1]),
+            failure_domain=str(row[2]),
+            weight=float(row[3]),
+            labels=json.loads(row[4] or "{}"),
+            revision=int(row[5]),
+        )
+
+    def _cleanup_expired(self, now: float) -> None:
+        self.conn.execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+               SET state='EXPIRED', updated_at=?
+             WHERE state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until<=?
+            """,
+            (now, now),
+        )
+
+    def reserved_slots(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        with self.lock:
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT COUNT(*) FROM fleet_dispatches
+                 WHERE worker_id=? AND state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until>?
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    def scope_virtual_finish(self, scope_key: str) -> float:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+
+    def reserve(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        task_revision: int,
+        scope_key: str,
+        failure_domain: str,
+        score: tuple[float, float, float, str],
+        reservation_seconds: int,
+        now: float,
+        scope_weight: float,
+    ) -> FleetDispatchDecision:
+        reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        reservation_id = "fleet-" + _sha(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "worker_id": worker_id,
+                "task_revision": task_revision,
+                "scope_key": scope_key,
+            }
+        )[:32]
+        reserved_until = now + reservation_seconds
+        with self._transaction():
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            existing = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT reservation_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                       reserved_until,state
+                  FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE task_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            # Capacity is rechecked inside the same durable reservation transaction.
+            # This closes the cross-thread/process race between eligibility scoring and reserve.
+            policy_row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT max_slots FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            max_slots = int(policy_row[0]) if policy_row else 1
+            if existing and str(existing[6]) in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"} and float(existing[5]) > now:
+                if str(existing[1]) != worker_id or int(existing[2]) != task_revision:
+                    raise FleetConflict("FLEET_TASK_ALREADY_RESERVED")
+                return FleetDispatchDecision(
+                    str(existing[0]), task_id, worker_id, task_revision, str(existing[3]),
+                    str(existing[4]), float(existing[5]), score
+                )
+
+            claim_columns = {
+                str(row[1])
+                for row in self.conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(claims)").fetchall()
+            }
+            active_claims = 0
+            if {"worker_id", "status"}.issubset(claim_columns):
+                sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'"
+                params: list[Any] = [worker_id]
+                if "lease_expires_at" in claim_columns:
+                    sql += " AND lease_expires_at>?"
+                    params.append(now)
+                row = self.conn.execute(sql, tuple(params)).fetchone()
+                active_claims = int(row[0] if row else 0)
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT COUNT(*) FROM fleet_dispatches
+                 WHERE worker_id=? AND task_id<>?
+                   AND state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until>?
+                """,
+                (worker_id, task_id, now),
+            ).fetchone()
+            active_reservations = int(row[0] if row else 0)
+            if active_claims + active_reservations >= max_slots:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_CAPACITY_EXHAUSTED")
+
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_dispatches(
+                    reservation_id,task_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                    state,reserved_until,claim_id,created_at,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,'RESERVED',?,NULL,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    reservation_id=excluded.reservation_id,
+                    worker_id=excluded.worker_id,
+                    task_revision=excluded.task_revision,
+                    scope_key=excluded.scope_key,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    state='RESERVED',
+                    reserved_until=excluded.reserved_until,
+                    claim_id=NULL,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+                    failure_domain, reserved_until, now, now,
+                ),
+            )
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish,dispatch_count,revision FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current_finish = float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+            dispatch_count = int(row[1]) if row else 0
+            revision = int(row[2]) if row else 0
+            next_finish = max(current_finish, 0.0) + 1.0 / max(scope_weight, 0.05)
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_scope_state(
+                    scope_key,virtual_finish,dispatch_count,last_dispatched_at,revision
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(scope_key) DO UPDATE SET
+                    virtual_finish=excluded.virtual_finish,
+                    dispatch_count=excluded.dispatch_count,
+                    last_dispatched_at=excluded.last_dispatched_at,
+                    revision=excluded.revision
+                """,
+                (scope_key, next_finish, dispatch_count + 1, now, revision + 1),
+            )
+        return FleetDispatchDecision(
+            reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+            failure_domain, reserved_until, score
+        )
+
+    def bind_claim(self, reservation_id: str, claim_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT state FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE reservation_id=?",
+                (reservation_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_FOUND")
+            if str(row[0]) not in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"}:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_ACTIVE")
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+                   SET state='CLAIMED', claim_id=?, updated_at=?
+                 WHERE reservation_id=?
+                """,
+                (claim_id, now, reservation_id),
+            )
+
+    def release(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        *,
+        state: str = "RELEASED",
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if state not in {"RELEASED", "COMPLETED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED"}:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_STATE_INVALID")
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE fleet_dispatches SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                (state, now, task_id),
+            )
+
+    def worker_circuit_open(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT circuit_open_until FROM fleet_worker_failures WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def task_worker_blocked(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT blocked_until FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def record_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        threshold: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD,
+        base_circuit_seconds: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        threshold = _int(threshold, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD, 1, 20)
+        base_circuit_seconds = _int(base_circuit_seconds, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT consecutive_failures,revision FROM fleet_worker_failures
+                 WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            failures = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            open_until = None
+            if failures >= threshold:
+                exponent = min(failures - threshold, 8)
+                open_until = now + min(
+                    MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, base_circuit_seconds * (2**exponent)
+                )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=excluded.consecutive_failures,
+                    circuit_open_until=excluded.circuit_open_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, failures, open_until, _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now),
+            )
+        return {
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "consecutive_failures": failures,
+            "circuit_open_until": open_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+    def record_worker_success(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,0,NULL,NULL,1,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=0,
+                    circuit_open_until=NULL,
+                    last_failure_class=NULL,
+                    revision=revision+1,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            )
+
+    def record_task_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        quarantine_seconds: int = 60,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        quarantine_seconds = _int(quarantine_seconds, 60, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT failure_count,revision FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            count = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            blocked_until = now + quarantine_seconds
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_task_worker_failures(
+                    task_id,worker_id,failure_count,blocked_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id,worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    failure_count=excluded.failure_count,
+                    blocked_until=excluded.blocked_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id, worker_id, count, blocked_until,
+                    _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "failure_count": count,
+            "blocked_until": blocked_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+
+class FleetScheduler:
+    """Deterministic capacity/fairness scheduler over existing TaskPlane records."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: Any,
+        workers: Any,
+        *,
+        now_fn: Any = time.time,
+        reservation_seconds: int = DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self.workers = workers
+        self.now_fn = now_fn
+        self.reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        connection = getattr(store, "conn", None)
+        if not isinstance(connection, sqlite3.Connection):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASKPLANE_SQLITE_CONNECTION_REQUIRED")
+        lock = getattr(store, "_lock", None)
+        self.state = FleetStateStore(connection, lock)
+
+    def configure_worker(self, worker_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        return self.state.configure_worker(worker_id, **kwargs)
+
+    def _online(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        method = getattr(self.workers, "is_online", None)
+        if not callable(method):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_REGISTRY_ONLINE_CHECK_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            return bool(method(worker_id, now=now))
+        except TypeError:
+            return bool(method(worker_id))
+
+    def _worker_record(self, worker_id: str) -> object:
+        getter = getattr(self.store, "get_worker", None)
+        if not callable(getter):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_LOOKUP_REQUIRED")
+        return getter(worker_id)
+
+    def _active_claims(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        # The TaskPlane store owns one SQLite connection in the current runtime.
+        # Fleet reads must share its lock just like fleet writes do, otherwise two
+        # concurrent pullers can issue overlapping operations on the same handle.
+        with self.state.lock:
+            columns = {
+                str(row[1])
+                for row in self.store.conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(claims)").fetchall()
+            }
+            required = {"worker_id", "status"}
+            if not required.issubset(columns):
+                raise FleetError("FLEET_CLAIMS_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED")
+            sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'"
+            params: list[Any] = [worker_id]
+            if "lease_expires_at" in columns:
+                sql += " AND lease_expires_at>?"
+                params.append(now)
+            row = self.store.conn.execute(sql, tuple(params)).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _labels_match(policy: FleetWorkerPolicy, task: object) -> bool:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        affinity = metadata.get("fleet_affinity_labels") or {}
+        if affinity and not isinstance(affinity, Mapping):
+            return False
+        labels = dict(policy.labels or {})
+        for key, value in dict(affinity).items():
+            if labels.get(_text(key)) != _text(value):
+                return False
+        avoid = metadata.get("fleet_avoid_failure_domains") or []
+        if isinstance(avoid, Sequence) and not isinstance(avoid, (str, bytes)):
+            if policy.failure_domain in {_text(item) for item in avoid}:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+    def _eligible_worker(self, worker_id: str, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[bool, int, FleetWorkerPolicy]:
+        if not self._online(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        worker = self._worker_record(worker_id)
+        policy = self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        if self.state.worker_circuit_open(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if self.state.task_worker_blocked(_task_id(task), worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if not self._labels_match(policy, task):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        required = _task_required_capabilities(task)
+        capabilities = _worker_capabilities(worker)
+        if required and not required.issubset(capabilities):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        active = self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+        reserved = self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+        load = active + reserved
+        if load >= policy.max_slots:
+            return False, load, policy
+        return True, load, policy
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _task_priority(task: object, now: float) -> float:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        base = _int(metadata.get("fleet_priority"), 0, -100, 100)
+        created = _task_created_at(task)
+        waited = max(0.0, now - created) if created > 0 else 0.0
+        aging = min(100.0, waited / 60.0)
+        return float(base) + aging
+
+    def _task_score(self, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[float, float, float, str]:
+        scope = _task_scope_key(task)
+        virtual_finish = self.state.scope_virtual_finish(scope)
+        priority = self._task_priority(task, now)
+        return (virtual_finish, -priority, _task_created_at(task), _task_id(task))
+
+    def _tasks(self, actor_context: Any = None) -> list[object]:
+        lister = getattr(self.store, "list_tasks", None)
+        if not callable(lister):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASK_LIST_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            tasks = lister(actor_context)
+        except TypeError:
+            tasks = lister()
+        return [
+            task for task in tasks
+            if _task_status(task) in {"CREATED", "QUEUED"}
+            and _task_id(task)
+        ]
+
+    def rank_for_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        *,
+        actor_context: Any = None,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> list[object]:
+        """Return fleet-ranked tasks without reserving or claiming anything."""
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        if not worker_id:
+            return []
+        ranked: list[object] = []
+        for task in self._tasks(actor_context):
+            eligible, _, _ = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+            if eligible:
+                ranked.append(task)
+        return sorted(ranked, key=lambda task: self._task_score(task, now))
+
+    def reserve_for_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        task: object,
+        *,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> FleetDispatchDecision:
+        """Reserve exactly one already-ranked task, rechecking eligibility and capacity."""
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        eligible, _, policy = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+        if not eligible:
+            raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_NOT_ELIGIBLE")
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        scope_weight = _float(metadata.get("fleet_scope_weight"), 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+        return self.state.reserve(
+            task_id=_task_id(task),
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            task_revision=_task_revision(task),
+            scope_key=_task_scope_key(task),
+            failure_domain=policy.failure_domain,
+            score=self._task_score(task, now),
+            reservation_seconds=self.reservation_seconds,
+            now=now,
+            scope_weight=scope_weight,
+        )
+
+    def select(
+        self,
+        worker_ids: Sequence[str],
+        *,
+        actor_context: Any = None,
+        limit: int = 1,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> list[FleetDispatchDecision]:
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        limit = _int(limit, 1, 1, 100)
+        worker_ids = tuple(dict.fromkeys(_text(item) for item in worker_ids if _text(item)))
+        tasks = sorted(self._tasks(actor_context), key=lambda task: self._task_score(task, now))
+        decisions: list[FleetDispatchDecision] = []
+        local_load: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for task in tasks:
+            if len(decisions) >= limit:
+                break
+            candidates: list[tuple[int, float, str, FleetWorkerPolicy]] = []
+            for worker_id in worker_ids:
+                eligible, load, policy = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+                if not eligible:
+                    continue
+                effective_load = local_load.get(worker_id, load)
+                if effective_load >= policy.max_slots:
+                    continue
+                candidates.append(
+                    (
+                        effective_load,
+                        -policy.weight,
+                        worker_id,
+                        policy,
+                    )
+                )
+            if not candidates:
+                continue
+            candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (item[0], item[1], item[2]))
+            _, _, worker_id, policy = candidates[0]
+            score = self._task_score(task, now)
+            metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+            scope_weight = _float(metadata.get("fleet_scope_weight"), 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+            try:
+                decision = self.state.reserve(
+                    task_id=_task_id(task),
+                    worker_id=worker_id,
+                    task_revision=_task_revision(task),
+                    scope_key=_task_scope_key(task),
+                    failure_domain=policy.failure_domain,
+                    score=score,
+                    reservation_seconds=self.reservation_seconds,
+                    now=now,
+                    scope_weight=scope_weight,
+                )
+            except FleetConflict:
+                continue
+            local_load[worker_id] = local_load.get(
+                worker_id,
+                self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+                + self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+                - 1,
+            ) + 1
+            decisions.append(decision)
+        return decisions

active-runtime/app/task_plane/models.py

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any
 
+from .scope import normalize_task_scope
+
 
 SENSITIVE_KEYS = {
     "secret",
@@ -66,6 +68,12 @@ TASK_PLAN_KEYS = {
     "allowed_input_paths",
     "allowed_output_paths",
     "output_policy",
+    "scope_type",
+    "tenant_id",
+    "user_id",
+    "project_id",
+    "conversation_id",
+    "run_id",
 }
 
 
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ class TaskPlan:
     schema_version: int = 1
     task_id: str | None = None
     task_type: str = "code.change"
+    scope_type: str = "legacy"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
     issuer: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
     intent: str | None = None
     required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
@@ -311,10 +325,17 @@ class TaskPlan:
                 raise ValueError("credential-secret requires metadata-only logging")
             if output_policy != "hash-count-status-only":
                 raise ValueError("credential-secret requires restricted output")
+        scope = normalize_task_scope(data)
         return cls(
             schema_version=schema_version,
             task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
             task_type=validate_type(data.get("task_type", "code.change"), "task_type"),
+            scope_type=scope.scope_type,
+            tenant_id=scope.tenant_id,
+            user_id=scope.user_id,
+            project_id=scope.project_id,
+            conversation_id=scope.conversation_id,
+            run_id=scope.run_id,
             issuer=issuer,
             intent=data.get("intent"),
             required_capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("required_capabilities", [])),
@@ -348,6 +369,12 @@ class TaskPlan:
             "schema_version": self.schema_version,
             "task_id": self.task_id,
             "task_type": self.task_type,
+            "scope_type": self.scope_type,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "project_id": self.project_id,
+            "conversation_id": self.conversation_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id,
             "issuer": self.issuer,
             "intent": self.intent,
             "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),

active-runtime/app/task_plane/policy.py

@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Callable
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 
 from .errors import ForbiddenError, LockedError
 from .models import ProbeEvidence, ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
+from .scope import TaskActorContext, actor_context as build_actor_context
 
 
 RISK_RANK = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
@@ -93,6 +94,10 @@ class PolicyEngine:
         result_signature_verifier: Callable[[ResultEnvelope], bool] | None = None,
         probe_attestation_verifier: Callable[[ProbeEvidence], bool] | None = None,
         identity_capabilities: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None,
+        identity_actor_contexts: Mapping[
+            str, TaskActorContext | Mapping[str, Any]
+        ]
+        | None = None,
         admin_identities: set[str] | None = None,
         readonly_worker_execution_enabled: bool = False,
         readonly_worker_profiles: list[ReadonlyWorkerProfile] | None = None,
@@ -109,12 +114,26 @@ class PolicyEngine:
             identity: set(capabilities)
             for identity, capabilities in (identity_capabilities or {}).items()
         }
+        self.identity_actor_contexts = dict(identity_actor_contexts or {})
         self.admin_identities = set(admin_identities or ())
         self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled = readonly_worker_execution_enabled
         self.readonly_worker_profiles = {
             profile.identity: profile for profile in (readonly_worker_profiles or [])
         }
 
+    def actor_context(self, identity: str) -> TaskActorContext:
+        configured = self.identity_actor_contexts.get(
+            identity, self.identity_actor_contexts.get("*")
+        )
+        capabilities = set(
+            self.identity_capabilities.get(
+                identity, self.identity_capabilities.get("*", set())
+            )
+        )
+        if identity in self.admin_identities:
+            capabilities.add("task.admin")
+        return build_actor_context(identity, configured, capabilities)
+
     def _readonly_worker_allows(
         self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None
     ) -> bool:

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scheduler.py

@@ -74,3 +74,203 @@ class TaskScheduler:
             operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
         )
         return claim
+
+# R4.2 P2 durable multi-agent fleet scheduling public surface.
+from .fleet import (
+    FleetConflict,
+    FleetDispatchDecision,
+    FleetError,
+    FleetScheduler,
+    FleetStateStore,
+    FleetWorkerPolicy,
+)
+# R4.2 P2-B fleet-aware pull scheduling.
+#
+# The original TaskScheduler remains the security oracle and claim-CAS implementation.
+# Fleet ordering only controls the order presented to that oracle.
+import inspect as _fleet_inspect
+import threading as _fleet_threading
+from collections.abc import Mapping as _FleetMapping
+
+from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry as _FleetWorkerRegistry
+from .errors import NotFoundError as _FleetNotFoundError
+
+_LegacyTaskScheduler = TaskScheduler
+_LegacyScheduleParameters = _fleet_inspect.signature(
+    _LegacyTaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker
+).parameters
+_LegacyNextParameters = _fleet_inspect.signature(
+    _LegacyTaskScheduler.next_queued_task
+).parameters
+
+
+class _FleetOrderedStoreProxy:
+    def __init__(self, delegate, tasks):
+        self._delegate = delegate
+        self._tasks = tuple(tasks)
+
+    def list_tasks(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return list(self._tasks)
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name):
+        return getattr(self._delegate, name)
+
+
+def _fleet_claim_field(claim, name, default=None):
+    if isinstance(claim, _FleetMapping):
+        return claim.get(name, default)
+    return getattr(claim, name, default)
+
+
+class TaskScheduler(_LegacyTaskScheduler):
+    """Fleet-integrated pull scheduler preserving legacy security and claim semantics."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        store = getattr(self, "store", args[0] if args else None)
+        if store is None:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_SCHEDULER_STORE_REQUIRED")
+        registry = getattr(self, "workers", None)
+        if registry is None:
+            registry = _FleetWorkerRegistry(store)
+        self.fleet_scheduler = FleetScheduler(store, registry)
+        self._fleet_local = _fleet_threading.local()
+
+    def _fleet_legacy_next(self, worker_id, tasks, *args, **kwargs):
+        proxy = _FleetOrderedStoreProxy(self.store, tasks)
+        legacy = _LegacyTaskScheduler(proxy)
+        legacy_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyNextParameters:
+            legacy_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        return legacy.next_queued_task(worker_id, *args, **legacy_kwargs)
+
+    def next_queued_task(self, worker_id, *args, **kwargs):
+        actor_context = kwargs.get(
+            "actor_context", getattr(self._fleet_local, "actor_context", None)
+        )
+
+        # Preserve legacy fail-closed worker checks before fleet ordering.
+        probe_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyNextParameters:
+            probe_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        legacy_probe = _LegacyTaskScheduler(self.store).next_queued_task(
+            worker_id, *args, **probe_kwargs
+        )
+        if legacy_probe is None:
+            return None
+
+        ranked = self.fleet_scheduler.rank_for_worker(
+            worker_id, actor_context=actor_context
+        )
+        # Preserve FleetScheduler fairness order. The legacy scheduler is used
+        # only as a fail-closed security oracle: present one fleet-ranked task
+        # at a time so its internal sort cannot reorder across scopes.
+        # Keep the legacy priority dimension ahead of Fleet fairness for
+        # compatibility with existing TaskPlane scheduling contracts; the
+        # Fleet order remains authoritative among equal-priority tasks.
+        def _legacy_priority(task):
+            plan = getattr(task, "task_plan", task)
+            metadata = getattr(plan, "metadata", {}) or {}
+            if not isinstance(metadata, _FleetMapping):
+                return 0
+            try:
+                return int(metadata.get("priority", 0))
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                return 0
+
+        ranked = sorted(ranked, key=lambda task: -_legacy_priority(task))
+        for ranked_candidate in ranked:
+            try:
+                candidate = self._fleet_legacy_next(
+                    worker_id, [ranked_candidate], *args, **kwargs
+                )
+            except _FleetNotFoundError:
+                continue
+            if candidate is None:
+                continue
+
+            ranked_id = getattr(
+                ranked_candidate,
+                "task_id",
+                getattr(getattr(ranked_candidate, "task_plan", None), "task_id", None),
+            )
+            candidate_id = getattr(
+                candidate,
+                "task_id",
+                getattr(getattr(candidate, "task_plan", None), "task_id", None),
+            )
+            if candidate_id != ranked_id:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_LEGACY_ORACLE_ORDER_VIOLATION")
+
+            try:
+                decision = self.fleet_scheduler.reserve_for_worker(
+                    worker_id, candidate
+                )
+            except FleetConflict:
+                continue
+            self._fleet_local.pending = decision
+            return candidate
+        return None
+
+    def schedule_for_worker(self, worker_id, *args, **kwargs):
+        actor_context = kwargs.get("actor_context")
+        legacy_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyScheduleParameters:
+            legacy_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        self._fleet_local.actor_context = actor_context
+        self._fleet_local.pending = None
+        try:
+            claim = _LegacyTaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker(
+                self, worker_id, *args, **legacy_kwargs
+            )
+            decision = getattr(self._fleet_local, "pending", None)
+            if claim is None:
+                if decision is not None:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                return None
+            if decision is not None:
+                claim_id = _fleet_claim_field(claim, "claim_id")
+                claim_task_id = _fleet_claim_field(claim, "task_id", decision.task_id)
+                if not claim_id:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                    raise FleetError("FLEET_CLAIM_ID_REQUIRED")
+                if claim_task_id != decision.task_id:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                    raise FleetConflict("FLEET_CLAIM_TASK_MISMATCH")
+                self.fleet_scheduler.state.bind_claim(
+                    decision.reservation_id, str(claim_id)
+                )
+            return claim
+        except Exception:
+            decision = getattr(self._fleet_local, "pending", None)
+            if decision is not None:
+                self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                    decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                )
+            raise
+        finally:
+            self._fleet_local.pending = None
+            self._fleet_local.actor_context = None
+
+    def record_worker_failure(self, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_worker_failure(
+            worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+        )
+
+    def record_worker_success(self, worker_id, **kwargs):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_worker_success(
+            worker_id, **kwargs
+        )
+
+    def quarantine_task_worker(
+        self, task_id, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+    ):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_task_worker_failure(
+            task_id, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+        )

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Trusted TaskPlane scope model and SQL authorization helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from .errors import ForbiddenError, ValidationError
+
+SCOPE_FIELDS = ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id")
+PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
+    {"*", "admin", "system.admin", "task.admin", "task.read.all"}
+)
+
+
+def _value(value: Any, field: str) -> Any:
+    if hasattr(value, "task_plan"):
+        value = value.task_plan
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value.get(field)
+    return getattr(value, field, None)
+
+
+def _text(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    result = str(value).strip()
+    return result or None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskScope:
+    scope_type: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskActorContext:
+    identity: str
+    scope_type: str = "legacy"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    capabilities: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
+
+
+def normalize_task_scope(value: Any) -> TaskScope:
+    fields = {field: _text(_value(value, field)) for field in SCOPE_FIELDS}
+    declared = _text(_value(value, "scope_type"))
+    if declared is None:
+        declared = "tenant" if fields["tenant_id"] else "legacy"
+    if declared == "tenant":
+        if fields["tenant_id"] is None:
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "tenant scope requires tenant_id", code="TASK_SCOPE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED"
+            )
+    elif declared == "legacy":
+        if any(fields.values()):
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "legacy scope cannot contain scoped ownership",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_LEGACY_WITH_SCOPED_FIELDS",
+            )
+    elif declared == "system":
+        if any(fields[field] for field in ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id")):
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "system scope cannot contain tenant ownership",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_SYSTEM_WITH_TENANT_FIELDS",
+            )
+    else:
+        raise ValidationError("invalid task scope type", code="TASK_SCOPE_TYPE_INVALID")
+    return TaskScope(declared, **fields)
+
+
+def actor_is_privileged(actor: TaskActorContext) -> bool:
+    return bool(actor.capabilities & PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES)
+
+
+def actor_context(
+    identity: str,
+    configured: TaskActorContext | Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    capabilities: set[str] | frozenset[str],
+) -> TaskActorContext:
+    if isinstance(configured, TaskActorContext):
+        context = configured
+    else:
+        data = dict(configured or {})
+        data.pop("identity", None)
+        data.pop("capabilities", None)
+        context = TaskActorContext(identity=str(identity), **data)
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(context)
+    return replace(
+        context,
+        identity=str(identity),
+        scope_type=scope.scope_type,
+        tenant_id=scope.tenant_id,
+        user_id=scope.user_id,
+        project_id=scope.project_id,
+        conversation_id=scope.conversation_id,
+        run_id=scope.run_id,
+        capabilities=frozenset(str(item) for item in capabilities),
+    )
+
+
+def bind_task_scope(plan: Any, actor: TaskActorContext, *, public_create: bool) -> Any:
+    requested = normalize_task_scope(plan)
+    if actor_is_privileged(actor):
+        trusted = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+        if requested.scope_type == "legacy" and trusted.scope_type != "legacy":
+            plan.scope_type = trusted.scope_type
+            for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+                setattr(plan, field, getattr(actor, field))
+        return plan
+    trusted = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+    if public_create and trusted.scope_type == "legacy":
+        raise ForbiddenError(
+            "authenticated identity has no tenant scope",
+            code="TASK_ACTOR_SCOPE_UNAVAILABLE",
+        )
+    if trusted.scope_type != "tenant":
+        if requested.scope_type == "legacy":
+            plan.scope_type = trusted.scope_type
+            for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+                setattr(plan, field, getattr(actor, field))
+            return plan
+        if requested.scope_type != trusted.scope_type:
+            raise ForbiddenError("task scope mismatch", code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return plan
+    if requested.scope_type not in {"legacy", "tenant"}:
+        raise ForbiddenError("task scope mismatch", code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    updates: dict[str, Any] = {"scope_type": "tenant"}
+    for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+        declared = getattr(requested, field)
+        authoritative = getattr(actor, field)
+        if declared is not None and declared != authoritative:
+            raise ForbiddenError(
+                "task scope mismatch",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY",
+                details={"field": field},
+            )
+        updates[field] = authoritative
+    for field, item in updates.items():
+        setattr(plan, field, item)
+    return plan
+
+
+def actor_scope_sql(actor: TaskActorContext | None) -> tuple[str, tuple[Any, ...]]:
+    if actor is None or actor_is_privileged(actor):
+        return "", ()
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+    if scope.scope_type == "legacy":
+        return "scope_type = 'legacy'", ()
+    if scope.scope_type == "system":
+        return "scope_type = 'system'", ()
+    clauses = ["scope_type = 'tenant'", "tenant_id = ?"]
+    params: list[Any] = [scope.tenant_id]
+    for field in ("user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id"):
+        value = getattr(scope, field)
+        if value is None:
+            clauses.append(f"{field} IS NULL")
+        else:
+            clauses.append(f"({field} IS NULL OR {field} = ?)")
+            params.append(value)
+    return " AND ".join(clauses), tuple(params)
+
+
+def task_scope_values(value: Any) -> tuple[str | None, ...]:
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(value)
+    return (
+        scope.scope_type,
+        scope.tenant_id,
+        scope.user_id,
+        scope.project_id,
+        scope.conversation_id,
+        scope.run_id,
+    )

active-runtime/app/task_plane/store.py

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ from .models import (
     redact_value,
     validate_identifier,
 )
+from .scope import TaskActorContext, actor_scope_sql, task_scope_values
 
 
 EventEnvelope = tuple[str, str, str, str, str, float]
@@ -134,6 +135,12 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                     status TEXT NOT NULL,
                     task_json TEXT NOT NULL,
                     task_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'legacy',
+                    tenant_id TEXT,
+                    user_id TEXT,
+                    project_id TEXT,
+                    conversation_id TEXT,
+                    run_id TEXT,
                     root_task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                     parent_task_id TEXT,
                     correlation_id TEXT,
@@ -272,6 +279,21 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                 )
                 """
             )
+            self._ensure_columns(
+                "tasks",
+                {
+                    "scope_type": "TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'legacy'",
+                    "tenant_id": "TEXT",
+                    "user_id": "TEXT",
+                    "project_id": "TEXT",
+                    "conversation_id": "TEXT",
+                    "run_id": "TEXT",
+                },
+            )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET scope_type='legacy' "
+                "WHERE scope_type IS NULL OR TRIM(scope_type)=''"
+            )
             self._ensure_columns(
                 "workers",
                 {
@@ -299,6 +321,14 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             )
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_status ON tasks(status)")
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_parent ON tasks(parent_task_id)")
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_scope_tenant_project "
+                "ON tasks(scope_type, tenant_id, project_id)"
+            )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_scope_owner "
+                "ON tasks(scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id)"
+            )
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_workers_status ON workers(status)")
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_claims_task ON claims(task_id)")
             self.conn.execute(
@@ -347,6 +377,42 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             raise NotFoundError("task")
         task_json = json.loads(row["task_json"])
         task_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(task_json)
+        stored_scope = tuple(
+            row[field]
+            for field in (
+                "scope_type",
+                "tenant_id",
+                "user_id",
+                "project_id",
+                "conversation_id",
+                "run_id",
+            )
+        )
+        json_has_scope = any(
+            field in task_json
+            for field in (
+                "scope_type",
+                "tenant_id",
+                "user_id",
+                "project_id",
+                "conversation_id",
+                "run_id",
+            )
+        )
+        if json_has_scope and stored_scope != task_scope_values(task_plan):
+            raise ConflictError(
+                "task scope persistence mismatch",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_PERSISTENCE_MISMATCH",
+            )
+        if not json_has_scope:
+            (
+                task_plan.scope_type,
+                task_plan.tenant_id,
+                task_plan.user_id,
+                task_plan.project_id,
+                task_plan.conversation_id,
+                task_plan.run_id,
+            ) = stored_scope
         task_plan.parent_task_id = row["parent_task_id"]
         task_plan.correlation_id = row["correlation_id"]
         return TaskRecord(
@@ -389,6 +455,7 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
         task_id = task_plan.task_id or f"task-{uuid.uuid4()}"
         task_plan.task_id = task_id
         task_json = redact_value(task_plan.to_dict(redact=False))
+        scope_values = task_scope_values(task_plan)
         now = _now()
         with self._transaction():
             if idempotency_key:
@@ -397,7 +464,11 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                     (idempotency_key,),
                 ).fetchone()
                 if existing:
-                    if _canonical(json.loads(existing["task_json"])) != _canonical(task_json):
+                    existing_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(
+                        json.loads(existing["task_json"])
+                    )
+                    existing_json = redact_value(existing_plan.to_dict(redact=False))
+                    if _canonical(existing_json) != _canonical(task_json):
                         raise ConflictError("idempotency key payload mismatch")
                     return self.get_task(existing["task_id"])
             root_task_id = task_id
@@ -412,14 +483,18 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             self.conn.execute(
                 """
                 INSERT INTO tasks
-                (task_id, revision, status, task_json, task_type, root_task_id, parent_task_id, correlation_id, idempotency_key, created_at, updated_at, failure_reason)
-                VALUES (?, 1, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, NULL)
+                (task_id, revision, status, task_json, task_type,
+                 scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, conversation_id, run_id,
+                 root_task_id, parent_task_id, correlation_id, idempotency_key,
+                 created_at, updated_at, failure_reason)
+                VALUES (?, 1, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, NULL)
                 """,
                 (
                     task_id,
                     "CREATED",
                     json.dumps(task_json, ensure_ascii=False),
                     task_plan.task_type,
+                    *scope_values,
                     root_task_id,
                     task_plan.parent_task_id,
                     task_plan.correlation_id,
@@ -451,21 +526,30 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                 )
             return self.get_task(task.task_id)
 
-    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord:
+    def get_task(
+        self, task_id: str, actor_context: TaskActorContext | None = None
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
         task_id = _validated_id(task_id, "task_id")
+        predicate, scope_params = actor_scope_sql(actor_context)
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?"
+        if predicate:
+            sql += f" AND ({predicate})"
         with self._lock:
-            row = self.conn.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
+            row = self.conn.execute(sql, (task_id, *scope_params)).fetchone()
         if row is None:
             raise NotFoundError(f"task {task_id} not found")
         return self._row_to_task(row)
 
-    def list_tasks(self) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+    def list_tasks(
+        self, actor_context: TaskActorContext | None = None
+    ) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+        predicate, scope_params = actor_scope_sql(actor_context)
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM tasks"
+        if predicate:
+            sql += f" WHERE ({predicate})"
+        sql += " ORDER BY created_at DESC"
         with self._lock:
-            rows = self.conn.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM tasks ORDER BY created_at DESC"
-            ).fetchall()
+            rows = self.conn.execute(sql, scope_params).fetchall()
         return [self._row_to_task(row) for row in rows]
 
     def get_task_budget(self, task_id: str) -> Budget:

active-runtime/app/trace_tool_credential_governance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,759 @@
+"""Scope-bound governance for traces, Tool/MCP calls, and credentials.
+
+This module deliberately stores references and audit metadata only.  Secret
+material remains in the configured credential provider boundary.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+
+SCOPE_FIELDS = ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id")
+PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "governance.admin"})
+REFERENCE_RE = re.compile(r"^(systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,179}$")
+
+
+class GovernanceError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, *, field: str | None = None) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code if field is None else f"{code}:{field}")
+        self.code = code
+        self.field = field
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _scope_tuple(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({_clean(item) for item in value if _clean(item)}))
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _identifier(value: Any, code: str) -> str:
+    text = _clean(value)
+    if text is None or IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text) is None:
+        raise GovernanceError(code)
+    return text
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceScope:
+    """Explicit resource scope; system/global resources never get fake tenants."""
+
+    scope_type: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "scope_type", (_clean(self.scope_type) or "").lower())
+        for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _clean(getattr(self, name)))
+        if self.scope_type == "tenant":
+            if self.tenant_id is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED")
+        elif self.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_NON_TENANT_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        elif self.scope_type == "legacy":
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        else:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_TYPE_INVALID")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceScope":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+        declared = _clean(get("scope_type"))
+        tenant_id = _clean(get("tenant_id"))
+        return cls(
+            scope_type=declared or ("tenant" if tenant_id else "legacy"),
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            user_id=get("user_id"),
+            project_id=get("project_id"),
+            conversation_id=get("conversation_id"),
+            run_id=get("run_id"),
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceActor:
+    identity: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "identity", _identifier(self.identity, "GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.capabilities))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceActor":
+        if isinstance(value, cls):
+            return value
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID")
+        return cls(
+            identity=value.get("identity") or value.get("actor_id") or value.get("user_id"),
+            scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(value),
+            capabilities=_scope_tuple(value.get("capabilities") or value.get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES)
+
+
+def authorize_scope(actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], resource: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    resource = resource if isinstance(resource, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(resource)
+    if actor.privileged:
+        return
+    if resource.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SYSTEM_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+    if resource.scope_type == "legacy":
+        if actor.scope.scope_type != "legacy":
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        return
+    if actor.scope.scope_type != "tenant":
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field="scope_type")
+    for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+        expected = getattr(resource, name)
+        actual = getattr(actor.scope, name)
+        if expected is not None and expected != actual:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field=name)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TraceContext:
+    trace_id: str
+    span_id: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "trace_id", _identifier(self.trace_id, "TRACE_ID_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "span_id", _identifier(self.span_id, "TRACE_SPAN_ID_INVALID"))
+        for name in ("parent_span_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id"):
+            value = _clean(getattr(self, name))
+            if value is not None and IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_IDENTIFIER_INVALID", field=name)
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, value)
+
+    def child(self, *, span_id: str, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], **lineage: Any) -> "TraceContext":
+        authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        for name in ("trace_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id", "correlation_id"):
+            supplied = _clean(lineage.get(name))
+            expected = getattr(self, name)
+            if supplied is not None and expected is not None and supplied != expected:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field=name)
+        requested_scope = lineage.pop("scope", self.scope)
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != self.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return TraceContext(
+            trace_id=self.trace_id,
+            span_id=span_id,
+            parent_span_id=self.span_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id,
+            causation_id=_clean(lineage.get("causation_id")) or self.span_id,
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            claim_id=self.claim_id,
+            message_id=self.message_id,
+            scope=self.scope,
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "span_id": self.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": self.parent_span_id,
+            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "message_id": self.message_id,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+def bind_trace_lineage(
+    *,
+    actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+    task: Any,
+    message: Any,
+    trace_id: str,
+    span_id: str,
+    parent: TraceContext | None = None,
+) -> TraceContext:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    task_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(task)
+    message_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(message)
+    if task_scope != message_scope:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    authorize_scope(actor, task_scope)
+
+    def get(value: Any, name: str) -> Any:
+        return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+    task_id = _clean(get(task, "task_id"))
+    message_task = _clean(get(message, "task_id"))
+    if task_id and message_task and task_id != message_task:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    context = TraceContext(
+        trace_id=trace_id,
+        span_id=span_id,
+        parent_span_id=parent.span_id if parent else None,
+        correlation_id=_clean(get(task, "correlation_id")) or _clean(get(message, "correlation_id")),
+        causation_id=_clean(get(message, "causation_id")) or (parent.span_id if parent else None),
+        task_id=task_id or message_task,
+        claim_id=_clean(get(task, "claim_id")) or _clean(get(message, "claim_id")),
+        message_id=_clean(get(message, "envelope_id")) or _clean(get(message, "id")),
+        scope=task_scope,
+    )
+    if parent is not None:
+        if parent.trace_id != context.trace_id or parent.scope != context.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY")
+        if parent.task_id and context.task_id and parent.task_id != context.task_id:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    return context
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ToolDescriptor:
+    name: str
+    kind: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    credential_ref: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "name", _identifier(self.name, "TOOL_NAME_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "kind", (_clean(self.kind) or "").lower())
+        if self.kind not in {"tool", "mcp"}:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_KIND_INVALID")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "required_capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.required_capabilities))
+        if self.credential_ref is not None and REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref) is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CredentialGrant:
+    grant_id: str
+    credential_ref: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    operations: tuple[str, ...]
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    tool_name: str | None = None
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "grant_id", _identifier(self.grant_id, "CREDENTIAL_GRANT_ID_INVALID"))
+        if REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref or "") is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "operations", _scope_tuple(self.operations))
+        if not self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_OPERATIONS_REQUIRED")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+            if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+
+    def authorize(
+        self,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None = None,
+        tool_name: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> str:
+        try:
+            authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        except GovernanceError as exc:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field=exc.field) from exc
+        if operation not in self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="operation")
+        if self.task_id is not None and self.task_id != _clean(task_id):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="task_id")
+        if self.tool_name is not None and self.tool_name != _clean(tool_name):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="tool_name")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            expiry = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00")).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            if current >= expiry:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="expires_at")
+        return self.credential_ref
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "grant_id": self.grant_id,
+            "credential_ref": self.credential_ref,
+            "operations": list(self.operations),
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_schema_metadata (
+  singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK(singleton=1),
+  schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tools (
+  name TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+  scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  required_capabilities_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  credential_ref TEXT,
+  descriptor_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_trace_spans (
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  parent_span_id TEXT,
+  context_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  context_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  PRIMARY KEY(trace_id, span_id)
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_credential_grants (
+  grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  grant_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tool_invocations (
+  invocation_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tool_name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  claim_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL,
+  receipt_sha256 TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_audit_evidence (
+  sequence INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  evidence_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  action TEXT NOT NULL,
+  actor_identity TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT,
+  span_id TEXT,
+  resource_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  outcome TEXT NOT NULL,
+  details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  previous_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  evidence_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+"""
+
+
+class GovernanceStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            has_metadata = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT 1 FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='governance_schema_metadata'"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if has_metadata:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is not None and int(row[0]) != 1:
+                    raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED")
+            connection.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO governance_schema_metadata(singleton,schema_version) VALUES(1,1)"
+                )
+            connection.commit()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _connection(self):
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            yield connection
+            connection.commit()
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def _audit(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        *,
+        action: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor,
+        resource_id: str,
+        outcome: str,
+        trace: TraceContext | None,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        previous = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT evidence_sha256 FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence DESC LIMIT 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        previous_sha = str(previous[0]) if previous else ""
+        created_at = _now()
+        material = {
+            "action": action,
+            "actor_identity": actor.identity,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id if trace else None,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id if trace else None,
+            "resource_id": resource_id,
+            "outcome": outcome,
+            "details": dict(details),
+            "previous_sha256": previous_sha,
+            "created_at": created_at,
+        }
+        digest = _sha(material)
+        evidence_id = "gev-" + digest[:32]
+        connection.execute(
+            """INSERT INTO governance_audit_evidence
+               (evidence_id,action,actor_identity,trace_id,span_id,resource_id,outcome,
+                details_json,previous_sha256,evidence_sha256,created_at)
+               VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+            (
+                evidence_id, action, actor.identity, material["trace_id"], material["span_id"],
+                resource_id, outcome, _canonical(material["details"]), previous_sha, digest, created_at,
+            ),
+        )
+        return {"evidence_id": evidence_id, "evidence_sha256": digest, **material}
+
+    def record_trace(self, trace: TraceContext, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        context = trace.as_dict()
+        digest = _sha(context)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            if trace.parent_span_id:
+                parent = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT context_json FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                    (trace.trace_id, trace.parent_span_id),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if parent is None:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="parent_span_id")
+                parent_context = json.loads(parent[0])
+                if GovernanceScope.from_value(parent_context) != trace.scope:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_trace_spans VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, trace.parent_span_id, _canonical(context), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TRACE_RECORDED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}", outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"context_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def register_tool(self, descriptor: ToolDescriptor, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        public = {
+            "name": descriptor.name,
+            "kind": descriptor.kind,
+            "required_capabilities": list(descriptor.required_capabilities),
+            "credential_ref": descriptor.credential_ref,
+            **descriptor.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT descriptor_sha256 FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (descriptor.name,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_DESCRIPTOR_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_tools VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (descriptor.name, descriptor.kind, _canonical(descriptor.scope.as_dict()),
+                 _canonical(descriptor.required_capabilities), descriptor.credential_ref, digest),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_REGISTERED", actor=actor, resource_id=descriptor.name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=None, details={"descriptor_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_tool(
+        self,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        tool_name: str,
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        requested_scope: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any],
+        input_digest: str,
+        invocation_key: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", input_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INPUT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        if trace.task_id is None or trace.claim_id is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="active_claim")
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != trace.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION")
+        authorize_scope(actor, requested_scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            persisted_trace = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if persisted_trace is None or persisted_trace[0] != _sha(trace.as_dict()):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="trace")
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (tool_name,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            descriptor_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(json.loads(row["scope_json"]))
+            if descriptor_scope.scope_type == "tenant" and descriptor_scope != requested_scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            required = set(json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"]))
+            if not required.issubset(set(actor.capabilities)):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            request_sha = _sha({
+                "tool_name": tool_name, "input_digest": input_digest,
+                "task_id": trace.task_id, "claim_id": trace.claim_id,
+                "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+                "scope": requested_scope.as_dict(),
+            })
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                if replay["status"] != "VERIFIED":
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+                return {
+                    "tool_name": tool_name, "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+                    "span_id": trace.span_id, "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+                    "status": "VERIFIED", "receipt_sha256": replay["receipt_sha256"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+            created_at = _now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """INSERT INTO governed_tool_invocations
+                   (invocation_key,request_sha256,tool_name,task_id,claim_id,trace_id,span_id,
+                    status,receipt_sha256,created_at,updated_at)
+                   VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                (invocation_key, request_sha, tool_name, trace.task_id, trace.claim_id,
+                 trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, "AUTHORIZED", None, created_at, created_at),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor, resource_id=tool_name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"input_sha256": input_digest, "scope_sha256": _sha(requested_scope.as_dict()),
+                         "invocation_key": invocation_key},
+            )
+        return {
+            "tool_name": tool_name,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+            "status": "AUTHORIZED",
+            "credential_required": row["credential_ref"] is not None,
+            "evidence": evidence,
+        }
+
+    def record_tool_receipt(
+        self,
+        *,
+        invocation_key: str,
+        result_digest: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", result_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None or row["trace_id"] != trace.trace_id or row["span_id"] != trace.span_id:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_BINDING_INVALID")
+            if row["status"] == "VERIFIED":
+                if row["receipt_sha256"] != result_digest:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_CONFLICT")
+                return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "idempotent": True}
+            if row["status"] != "AUTHORIZED":
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE governed_tool_invocations SET status='VERIFIED',receipt_sha256=?,updated_at=? "
+                "WHERE invocation_key=? AND status='AUTHORIZED'",
+                (result_digest, _now(), invocation_key),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=row["tool_name"], outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"invocation_key": invocation_key, "result_sha256": result_digest},
+            )
+        return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def store_grant(self, grant: CredentialGrant, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        public = grant.public()
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_sha256 FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant.grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_GRANT_CONFLICT")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_credential_grants VALUES (?,?,?,?)",
+                (grant.grant_id, _canonical(public), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_GRANT_STORED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant.grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=None,
+                details={"grant_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"grant": public, "grant_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_credential(
+        self,
+        *,
+        grant_id: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None,
+        tool_name: str | None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_json FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+            raw = json.loads(row[0])
+            grant = CredentialGrant(
+                grant_id=raw["grant_id"], credential_ref=raw["credential_ref"],
+                scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(raw), operations=tuple(raw["operations"]),
+                task_id=raw.get("task_id"), tool_name=raw.get("tool_name"),
+                expires_at=raw.get("expires_at"),
+            )
+            if trace.scope != grant.scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="trace_scope")
+            reference = grant.authorize(
+                actor, operation=operation, task_id=task_id, tool_name=tool_name, now=now
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"operation": operation, "task_id": task_id, "tool_name": tool_name,
+                         "credential_ref_sha256": _sha(reference)},
+            )
+        return {"credential_ref": reference, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def verify_audit_chain(self, required_actions: Iterable[str] = ()) -> bool:
+        ordered_actions: list[str] = []
+        previous = ""
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            rows = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence").fetchall()
+        for row in rows:
+            details = json.loads(row["details_json"])
+            material = {
+                "action": row["action"], "actor_identity": row["actor_identity"],
+                "trace_id": row["trace_id"], "span_id": row["span_id"],
+                "resource_id": row["resource_id"], "outcome": row["outcome"],
+                "details": details, "previous_sha256": row["previous_sha256"],
+                "created_at": row["created_at"],
+            }
+            if row["previous_sha256"] != previous or row["evidence_sha256"] != _sha(material):
+                return False
+            previous = row["evidence_sha256"]
+            ordered_actions.append(row["action"])
+        position = 0
+        for required in required_actions:
+            try:
+                position = ordered_actions.index(required, position) + 1
+            except ValueError:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "CredentialGrant", "GovernanceActor", "GovernanceError", "GovernanceScope",
+    "GovernanceStore", "ToolDescriptor", "TraceContext", "authorize_scope",
+    "bind_trace_lineage",
+]

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes-config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+providers:
+  oneapi:
+    name: oneapi
+    base_url: http://172.18.0.2:3000/v1
+    key_env: OPENAI_API_KEY
+    default_model: deepseek-v4-flash
+model:
+  provider: oneapi
+  name: deepseek-v4-flash

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/local/bin/hermes",
+    "run",
+    "--non-interactive"
+  ],
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "hermes",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 900
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes.profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/opt/aios-hermes-agent/hermes-agent/.venv/bin/hermes",
+    "-z",
+    "{prompt}",
+    "--provider",
+    "oneapi",
+    "-m",
+    "{model_id}",
+    "--no-restore-cwd"
+  ],
+  "credential_env": {
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY": {
+      "credential": "aios-external-agent-oneapi-env",
+      "format": "dotenv",
+      "key": "ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN"
+    }
+  },
+  "environment": {
+    "HERMES_HOME": "/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes-home"
+  },
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "model_governance": {
+    "max_output_tokens": 512,
+    "model_capabilities": [
+      "text"
+    ],
+    "provider_ids": [
+      "oneapi"
+    ],
+    "required": true
+  },
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "hermes",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 180
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw-config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+  "tools": {
+    "profile": "minimal"
+  },
+  "memory": {
+    "search": {
+      "enabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "agents": {
+    "defaults": {
+      "workspace": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace",
+      "model": {
+        "primary": "openai/deepseek-v4-flash"
+      },
+      "thinkingDefault": "off"
+    },
+    "entries": {
+      "main": {
+        "default": true,
+        "workspace": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "models": {
+    "providers": {
+      "openai": {
+        "baseUrl": "http://172.18.0.2:3000/v1",
+        "api": "openai-completions",
+        "models": [
+          {
+            "id": "deepseek-v4-flash",
+            "name": "deepseek-v4-flash",
+            "contextWindow": 32768,
+            "maxTokens": 256
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/local/bin/openclaw",
+    "run",
+    "--non-interactive"
+  ],
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "openclaw",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 900
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw.profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/bin/node",
+    "/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering/v2026.7.2-beta.7/openclaw.mjs",
+    "agent",
+    "--local",
+    "--json",
+    "--agent",
+    "main",
+    "--thinking",
+    "off",
+    "--message",
+    "{prompt}",
+    "--model",
+    "{model_id}",
+    "--timeout",
+    "180"
+  ],
+  "credential_env": {
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY": {
+      "credential": "aios-external-agent-oneapi-env",
+      "format": "dotenv",
+      "key": "ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN"
+    }
+  },
+  "environment": {
+    "OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH": "/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw-config.json",
+    "OPENCLAW_HOME": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-home",
+    "OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-state"
+  },
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "model_governance": {
+    "input_reservation_floor_tokens": 16384,
+    "max_output_tokens": 256,
+    "model_capabilities": [
+      "text"
+    ],
+    "provider_ids": [
+      "openai"
+    ],
+    "required": true
+  },
+  "output_mode": "stdout_json",
+  "runtime": "openclaw",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 240
+}

config/model-governance/model-governance.staging.json

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+{
+  "models": [
+    {
+      "capabilities": [
+        "agent.runtime.hermes",
+        "text"
+      ],
+      "enabled": true,
+      "evaluation_sha256": "43ae0db1640daeb6d33e2787769732844f366d36070065d3a2239905bd9a823b",
+      "evaluation_state": "APPROVED",
+      "input_cost_micros_per_1k": 0,
+      "max_input_tokens": 32768,
+      "max_output_tokens": 512,
+      "model_id": "deepseek-v4-flash",
+      "output_cost_micros_per_1k": 0,
+      "priority": 10,
+      "provider_id": "oneapi",
+      "version": "profile-sha:54615e533bfdb6a2e8b870ae74bb8cd7fc45177495bcf6e8c45a50837cefb85a"
+    },
+    {
+      "capabilities": [
+        "agent.runtime.openclaw",
+        "text"
+      ],
+      "enabled": true,
+      "evaluation_sha256": "7b1c89634eb9c0e7cb5a3d75323d904ebbd91b3ae5494ce938bd8316a4cf5b12",
+      "evaluation_state": "APPROVED",
+      "input_cost_micros_per_1k": 0,
+      "max_input_tokens": 32768,
+      "max_output_tokens": 256,
+      "model_id": "openai/deepseek-v4-flash",
+      "output_cost_micros_per_1k": 0,
+      "priority": 10,
+      "provider_id": "openai",
+      "version": "profile-sha:2a31c480226aa78d44ed9692bddcedc99c3aa03c23c0dd5f031a5cbbb8bbd7ba"
+    }
+  ],
+  "policies": [
+    {
+      "allowed_models": [
+        "deepseek-v4-flash",
+        "openai/deepseek-v4-flash"
+      ],
+      "daily_cost_budget_micros": 0,
+      "daily_token_budget": 250000,
+      "denied_providers": [],
+      "fallback_limit": 1,
+      "max_input_tokens_per_request": 16384,
+      "max_output_tokens_per_request": 512,
+      "project_id": null,
+      "required_capabilities": [
+        "text"
+      ],
+      "scope_type": "legacy",
+      "tenant_id": null
+    },
+    {
+      "allowed_models": [
+        "deepseek-v4-flash",
+        "openai/deepseek-v4-flash"
+      ],
+      "daily_cost_budget_micros": 0,
+      "daily_token_budget": 250000,
+      "denied_providers": [],
+      "fallback_limit": 1,
+      "max_input_tokens_per_request": 16384,
+      "max_output_tokens_per_request": 512,
+      "project_id": "staging",
+      "required_capabilities": [
+        "text"
+      ],
+      "scope_type": "tenant",
+      "tenant_id": "model-governance-live"
+    }
+  ],
+  "providers": [
+    {
+      "cooldown_seconds": 60,
+      "credential_ref": "runtime-profile:hermes",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "failure_domain": "oneapi",
+      "max_failures": 2,
+      "provider_id": "oneapi"
+    },
+    {
+      "cooldown_seconds": 60,
+      "credential_ref": "runtime-profile:openclaw",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "failure_domain": "oneapi",
+      "max_failures": 2,
+      "provider_id": "openai"
+    }
+  ],
+  "schema": "aios.model-governance.bootstrap.v1"
+}

db/migrations/20260817_message_handoff.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+-- R4.2 P0-B durable Message/Handoff Fabric.
+-- Forward-only. The existing 20260707 message_outbox remains a compatibility source.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-execution-rebind.service

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task execution-rebind API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-execution-rebind.env
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_PORT=18942
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-initial-execution-projection.service

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task initial execution projection API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZATION_ID=owner-initial-execution-projection-recovery-20260820
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_PORT=18943
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_initial_execution_projection.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-retry-extension.service

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task retry-extension API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-retry-extension.env
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT=18941
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-supervisor-coordinator-projection.service

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled supervisor coordinator projection API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_INITIAL_EXECUTION_PROJECTION_AUTHORIZATION_ID=owner-supervisor-coordinator-projection-recovery-20260820
+Environment=AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_PROJECTION_PORT=18944
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_supervisor_coordinator_projection.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-external-agent-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS credential-isolated external Agent runtime executor
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-executor
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_external_agent_runtime.py --root /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor --profile-root /etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+IPAddressDeny=127.0.0.0/8
+IPAddressDeny=::1/128
+IPAddressAllow=172.18.0.2/32
+LoadCredential=aios-external-agent-oneapi-env:/data/agent/secrets/oneapi-model-ready.env
+InaccessiblePaths=/etc/aios-gitops
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/agent/secrets
+ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d
+ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios-hermes-agent
+ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering
+Environment=AIOS_MODEL_GOVERNANCE_DB=/var/lib/aios-model-governance/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_MODEL_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=1
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-model-governance
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-gpt-https-edge.service

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS disabled-by-default HTTPS edge for GPT read-only Online Task ingress
+After=network-online.target aios-gpt-online-task-ingress.service
+Wants=network-online.target aios-gpt-online-task-ingress.service
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/gpt-https-edge.approved
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+DynamicUser=yes
+LoadCredential=tls_cert:/etc/aios-gitops/gpt-https-edge-tls.crt
+LoadCredential=tls_key:/etc/aios-gitops/gpt-https-edge-tls.key
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_TLS_CERT_FILE=%d/tls_cert
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_TLS_KEY_FILE=%d/tls_key
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PORT=18443
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_BIND_APPROVED=0
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_EDGE_PUBLIC_DOMAIN=
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_https_edge.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=yes
+PrivateTmp=yes
+PrivateDevices=yes
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=yes
+ProtectKernelTunables=yes
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ProtectControlGroups=yes
+ProtectKernelLogs=yes
+ProtectClock=yes
+LockPersonality=yes
+RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
+RestrictRealtime=yes
+RestrictNamespaces=yes
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops /etc/aios-gitops /home /var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-gpt-online-task-ingress.service

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS external GPT read-only Online Task ingress
+After=network.target aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+DynamicUser=yes
+StateDirectory=aios-gpt-online-task-ingress
+StateDirectoryMode=0750
+LoadCredential=gpt_ingress_token:/etc/aios-gitops/gpt-online-task-ingress.token
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_TOKEN_FILE=%d/gpt_ingress_token
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_STATE_ROOT=%S/aios-gpt-online-task-ingress
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_GPT_INGRESS_PORT=18945
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_gpt_online_task_ingress.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=yes
+PrivateTmp=yes
+PrivateDevices=yes
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=yes
+ProtectKernelTunables=yes
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ProtectControlGroups=yes
+ProtectKernelLogs=yes
+ProtectClock=yes
+LockPersonality=yes
+RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
+RestrictRealtime=yes
+RestrictNamespaces=yes
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+IPAddressDeny=any
+IPAddressAllow=127.0.0.0/8
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops /etc/aios-gitops /home
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS Hermes Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-hermes-worker-cn-network-mkt
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=external-agent-runtime-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-18.1-hermes-runtime
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.hermes
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=hermes
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-isolated-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS uncredentialed deterministic Planner/Executor
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-executor
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py --root /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateNetwork=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+IPAddressDeny=any
+IPAddressAllow=localhost
+InaccessiblePaths=/run/credentials
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS governed Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=trusted-online-engineering-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-17.2-durable
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=git.read,git.test,governed.write.branch,governed.write.file
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_ISOLATED_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS OpenClaw Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-openclaw-worker-cn-network-mkt
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=external-agent-runtime-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-18.1-openclaw-runtime
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-owner-durable-authorization-broker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS durable Owner authorization broker
+After=network.target aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+Wants=aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=root
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+RuntimeDirectory=aios-owner-authorization-broker
+RuntimeDirectoryMode=0750
+StateDirectory=aios-owner-authorization-broker
+StateDirectoryMode=0750
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_OWNER_DURABLE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY=/etc/aios-gitops/owner-durable-authorization.json
+Environment=AIOS_OWNER_DURABLE_AUTHORIZATION_REVOCATIONS=/etc/aios-gitops/owner-durable-authorization-revocations.json
+Environment=AIOS_OWNER_AUTH_BROKER_ACCOUNT=chatgpt-governed-implementer-singlehost
+Environment=AIOS_OWNER_AUTH_BROKER_SOCKET=%t/aios-owner-authorization-broker/broker.sock
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_durable_owner_authorization.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=yes
+PrivateTmp=yes
+PrivateDevices=yes
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=yes
+ProtectKernelTunables=yes
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ProtectControlGroups=yes
+ProtectKernelLogs=yes
+ProtectClock=yes
+LockPersonality=yes
+RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
+RestrictRealtime=yes
+RestrictNamespaces=yes
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+IPAddressDeny=any
+IPAddressAllow=127.0.0.0/8
+ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios-gitops/owner-durable-authorization.json
+ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios-gitops/owner-durable-authorization-revocations.json
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops /home
+UMask=0007
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-release-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS release-candidate Online Agent worker
+After=network.target aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+NotifyAccess=main
+WatchdogSec=90
+User=root
+Group=root
+StateDirectory=aios-online-agent-release
+StateDirectoryMode=0750
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-release-online-agent-worker/agent_token
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=release_candidate_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-release-online-agent-worker/release_candidate_token
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_AGENT_ID=online-release-worker-cn-network-mkt-20260819
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-19.1-release-candidate
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-release
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-release
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_POLL_SECONDS=3
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_LEASE_SECONDS=60
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_WORKER_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS=15
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18890
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_release_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=yes
+PrivateTmp=yes
+PrivateDevices=yes
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=yes
+ProtectKernelTunables=yes
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ProtectControlGroups=yes
+ProtectKernelLogs=yes
+ProtectClock=yes
+LockPersonality=yes
+RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
+RestrictRealtime=yes
+RestrictNamespaces=yes
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+IPAddressDeny=any
+IPAddressAllow=127.0.0.0/8
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops /home
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-release-preparation-supervisor-coordinator.service

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS credential-isolated release-preparation supervisor coordinator
+After=network-online.target aios-agent-task-api.service aios-autonomous-agent-register.service
+Wants=network-online.target aios-agent-task-api.service
+Requires=aios-autonomous-agent-register.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-autonomous-agent-worker
+Group=aios-autonomous-agent-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=aios-agent-runtime
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-autonomous-20260815
+Environment=AIOS_RELEASE_PREPARATION_SUPERVISOR_TASK_ID=r42-release-preparation-autonomous-supervisor-20260820
+Environment=AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-release-preparation-supervisor-coordinator
+Environment=AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_POLL_SECONDS=5
+Environment=AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS=10
+Environment=AIOS_SUPERVISOR_COORDINATOR_LEASE_SECONDS=300
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_release_preparation_supervisor_coordinator.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+UMask=0027
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_UNIX
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-release-preparation-supervisor-coordinator
+InaccessiblePaths=-/etc/credstore.encrypted
+CapabilityBoundingSet=
+AmbientCapabilities=
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-worker-availability-guard.service

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS persistent Online Agent worker availability guard
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=root
+Group=root
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_MAX_STALE_SECONDS=90
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_AVAILABILITY_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS=60
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_worker_availability_guard.py --heal
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
+ReadWritePaths=/run/aios-worker-availability
+UMask=0022

deploy/systemd/aios-worker-availability-guard.timer

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Periodically ensure AIOS Online Agent workers remain available
+
+[Timer]
+OnBootSec=15s
+OnUnitActiveSec=30s
+AccuracySec=5s
+RandomizedDelaySec=3s
+Persistent=true
+Unit=aios-worker-availability-guard.service
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target

deploy/sysusers.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+g aios-executor-exchange -
+u aios-engineering-executor - "AIOS isolated engineering executor" /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor /usr/sbin/nologin
+m aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange
+m aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-external-agent-runtime.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/requests 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/results 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/failed 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-state 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-home 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/workspaces 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/workspaces 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d 0755 root root -

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-model-governance.conf

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-model-governance 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/requests 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/results 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/failed 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/sources 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-worker-availability.conf

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+d /run/aios-worker-availability 0755 root root -

docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml

@@ -240,6 +240,114 @@ components:
       additionalProperties: false
       properties:
         candidate_id: {type: string}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds]
+      properties:
+        schema:
+          type: string
+          enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2, aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2]
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, job_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds, create_target_branch, worktree_mode, cas_ref_update_required]
+      properties:
+        schema: {type: string, enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2]}
+        task_id: {type: string}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+        create_target_branch: {type: boolean}
+        worktree_mode: {type: string, enum: [detached_at_base_oid, detached_at_expected_head]}
+        cas_ref_update_required: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        lease_expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, job_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds, lease_expires_at, create_target_branch, worktree_mode, cas_ref_update_required, recovered, bootstrapped, idempotent, runtime_rehydrated, durable_branch_lease_present]
+      properties:
+        schema: {type: string, enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2]}
+        task_id: {type: string}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+        lease_expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+        create_target_branch: {type: boolean, const: false}
+        worktree_mode: {type: string, enum: [detached_at_base_oid, detached_at_expected_head]}
+        cas_ref_update_required: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        recovered: {type: boolean}
+        bootstrapped: {type: boolean}
+        idempotent: {type: boolean}
+        runtime_rehydrated: {type: boolean}
+        durable_branch_lease_present: {type: boolean}
+    BridgeCommitFileRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [task_id, repository, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, idempotency_key, path, content_base64, message]
+      properties:
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        idempotency_key: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        path: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 512}
+        content_base64: {type: string, format: byte}
+        message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}
+    BridgeCommitFilesRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [task_id, repository, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, idempotency_key, files, message]
+      properties:
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        idempotency_key: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        files: {type: object, additionalProperties: {type: string, format: byte}, minProperties: 1}
+        message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}
+    BridgeCommitResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: true
+      required: [job_id, commit_oid, commit_visible, branch_mode, target_branch, generation]
+      properties:
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        commit_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        commit_visible: {type: boolean}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+    BridgeGovernedCapabilities:
+      type: object
+      required: [bridge_schema_version, governed_writes_enabled, operations, operation_contracts]
+      properties:
+        bridge_schema_version: {type: string, const: aios.chatgpt-gitops-bridge.v2}
+        governed_writes_enabled: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        operations: {type: array, items: {type: string}}
+        operation_contracts: {type: object, additionalProperties: true}
 paths:
   /createReleaseIntent:
     post:
@@ -567,3 +675,118 @@ paths:
         '200': {description: Safe GitOps plan}
         '401': {description: Unauthorized}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/capabilities:
+    get:
+      operationId: getGovernedWriteCapabilities
+      summary: Read the governed Bridge v2 capability contract
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Governed operations and their request/response contracts
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeGovernedCapabilities'}
+  /v2/writer-lease:
+    post:
+      operationId: acquireWriterLease
+      summary: Acquire the exact governed writer lease for a task generation
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Exact detached worktree lease binding
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid lease binding}
+        '409': {description: Branch, base, or generation conflict}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/writer-lease/bootstrap:
+    post:
+      operationId: bootstrapWriterLease
+      summary: Bootstrap a governed writer runtime without creating a durable lease
+      description: >
+        Staging-only runtime recovery. It validates the exact task, repository,
+        base OID, expected branch OID, target branch, and generation. It must
+        not create a branch, insert a branch lease, or consume a generation.
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Runtime binding bootstrapped or returned idempotently
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid lease binding}
+        '409': {description: A matching durable lease already exists or binding conflicts}
+        '503': {description: Runtime or durable state unavailable}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/writer-lease/renew:
+    post:
+      operationId: renewWriterLease
+      summary: Recover an expired governed writer lease without changing its binding
+      description: >
+        Renews only the current task generation and exact repository, base OID,
+        expected branch OID, and target branch. Durable renewal is revision-CAS
+        protected; runtime rehydration is reported separately.
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Lease recovered or idempotently observed as already active
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid schema, generation, or lease duration}
+        '409': {description: Task, base, repository, branch, generation, or durable lease conflict}
+        '503': {description: Durable job store or runtime unavailable}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/commit-file:
+    post:
+      operationId: commitFileGoverned
+      summary: Commit one file through the governed writer lease
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitFileRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Authority and remote visibility receipt
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitResponse'}
+        '409': {description: Lease, expected-head, idempotency, or repository conflict}
+        '503': {description: Reconciliation required}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/commit-files:
+    post:
+      operationId: commitFilesGoverned
+      summary: Atomically commit a bounded set of files through the governed writer lease
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitFilesRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Authority and remote visibility receipt
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitResponse'}
+        '409': {description: Lease, expected-head, idempotency, or repository conflict}
+        '503': {description: Reconciliation required}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-16-r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# R4.2 P0-A TaskPlane Scope Isolation Design
+
+Status: approved candidate design. This document is not evidence of a protected-main merge or production deployment.
+
+## Boundary
+
+- Task: `r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-20260816`
+- Governed Job: `job-3fd743b51971c6007923699c1233f84c`
+- Repository: `aios/aios`
+- Base: `0eb6e1a864edfdaeef37b438991707a110e21558`
+- Target branch: `agent/r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-20260816`
+- Generation: `1`
+
+The implementation reuses this exact boundary. It does not create a replacement Task, Job, branch, generation, or idempotency key.
+
+## Model and invariants
+
+`TaskPlan` gains first-class `scope_type`, `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `project_id`, `conversation_id`, and `run_id` fields. The fields participate in accepted-key validation, parsing, serialization, persistence, and authorization.
+
+Historical rows without scope data normalize to `scope_type=legacy`; no tenant is inferred. Tenant-scoped tasks require a non-empty `tenant_id`. System/global resources use an explicit `scope_type=system` invariant and do not receive a fabricated tenant. A task may add user, project, conversation, and run ownership within its tenant.
+
+## Trusted ActorContext
+
+TaskPlane defines a small immutable `TaskActorContext` used only for authorization. The HTTP authenticator returns an identity. `PolicyEngine` resolves that identity through server-owned policy configuration into the effective context and capabilities. Request fields such as `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `group_id`, and `role` are declarations only and never expand authority.
+
+Public create, list, and get paths always use the resolved context. Internal compatibility calls may omit a context and retain explicit legacy behavior, but the HTTP adapter never uses that path.
+
+## Persistence
+
+SQLite remains the current runtime. `_create_schema()` performs an idempotent forward migration that adds the six scope columns and indexes, then backfills only missing `scope_type` values to `legacy`.
+
+New writes persist scope in both the canonical `task_json` representation and first-class columns. Reads accept historical JSON without scope, using legacy columns, but reject a new-row mismatch between JSON and columns. SQL list/get predicates are parameterized and applied before row hydration.
+
+PostgreSQL remains a separate migration target and is not claimed by this change.
+
+## Authorization flow
+
+1. HTTP bearer authentication yields an identity.
+2. `PolicyEngine` verifies capability and resolves the identity to `TaskActorContext`.
+3. Create binds the requested scope to the trusted context and rejects mismatches.
+4. List/get pass the trusted context to `TaskPlaneStore`.
+5. Store applies tenant and ownership predicates in SQL; privileged capabilities may explicitly cross scope.
+
+Tenant actors cannot read legacy tasks, another tenant, or mismatched owned resources. Legacy actors can only read legacy tasks. System actors require explicit privileged capability for cross-scope access.
+
+## Failure behavior
+
+Missing tenant scope, forged scope, unknown scope types, JSON/column divergence, and unauthorized list/get operations fail closed with canonical TaskPlane errors. Public get does not reveal whether an out-of-scope task exists.
+
+## Verification
+
+Tests exercise real model round trips, SQLite migration/restart, Service/Policy/Store wiring, tenant A versus tenant B list/get denial, ownership filtering, forged create payload rejection, legacy isolation, privileged access, and SQL parameterization. Existing TaskPlane API, RBAC, recovery/security, and security-contract suites remain mandatory.
+
+The candidate is complete only after real `TASK_CLAIMED`, `TASK_HEARTBEAT`, exact WriterLease, governed commit, OID convergence, result submission, and `TASK_VERIFIED`. Protected main and production remain unchanged.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p0c-trace-tool-credential-governance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# R4.2 P0-C Trace / Tool-MCP / Credential Governance
+
+## Status boundary
+
+This change is a candidate implementation on the governed P0-C branch. It does
+not promote protected `main`, deploy Production, or assert that all R4.2 target
+architecture is complete.
+
+## Scope model
+
+Governance resources use an explicit `scope_type`:
+
+- `tenant` requires `tenant_id` and may narrow to user, project,
+  conversation, and run;
+- `system` and `global` prohibit tenant ownership fields;
+- `legacy` preserves unscoped historical records without inventing ownership.
+
+System and global tools therefore never receive a synthetic tenant merely to
+satisfy a tenant-oriented schema.
+
+## Trace lineage
+
+`TaskPlan` and `MessageEnvelope` scope is bound to a `TraceContext`. The trace
+records `trace_id`, `span_id`, parent span, correlation, causation, task,
+message, and the canonical P0-A scope. Child spans must keep the parent's trace,
+task, and scope. Privileged visibility does not permit cross-scope trace
+splicing.
+
+`MessageEnvelope.correlation_id` is persisted and identity-bound. Existing
+handoff databases are upgraded in place with an idempotent column migration;
+legacy rows retain their prior event IDs because a null correlation field is
+not added to the historical identity material.
+
+Observability keeps its legacy presentation fields, but new governed records
+also carry immutable trace and scope fields. Scoped records require a trusted
+server actor for queries. A repeated execution ID is an idempotent replay only
+when the complete record matches; conflicting overwrites are denied.
+
+## Tool and MCP governance
+
+`ToolDescriptor` binds a tool or MCP server to:
+
+- an explicit resource scope;
+- required actor capabilities;
+- an optional credential reference.
+
+Invocation authorization requires exact propagation of the trace scope and a
+capability superset. Unknown tools, cross-tenant calls, scope substitution, and
+non-privileged access to system/global resources fail closed. Every successful
+registration and invocation appends hash-chained audit evidence.
+
+## Credential governance
+
+Credentials are represented only by references whose schemes are
+`systemd-credential`, `vault`, or `secret-manager`. Raw bearer tokens, passwords,
+and arbitrary values are rejected. Grants are bound to scope, operation, task,
+tool, and expiry. Public/audit records contain a reference hash where disclosure
+is unnecessary; secret material is never persisted by this module.
+
+The existing runtime credential broker remains backward compatible for system
+leases, adds explicit tenant/system/global invariants, and rejects providers
+that attempt to return raw token/secret/password environment values instead of
+file/reference indirection.
+
+## Durable evidence
+
+The SQLite governance store is restart-safe and idempotently initializes four
+tables: governed tools, trace spans, credential grants, and audit evidence.
+Audit entries form a SHA-256 chain. Acceptance requires the chain to verify and
+contain the required actions; missing evidence is not treated as success.
+
+## Acceptance tests
+
+The candidate must pass:
+
+- `TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY`;
+- `TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY`;
+- `AUDIT_EVIDENCE_COMPLETENESS`;
+- P0-A scope and P0-B handoff regression suites;
+- Python compilation, `git diff --check`, and a diff-scoped secret scan.
+
+The repository-wide baseline currently has seven unrelated failures in the
+isolated host environment (five stale continuation-contract fixtures and two
+host-permission fixtures). The same seven failures reproduce at the untouched
+`a642b045775b9154a00ae78543037fbef4fb447b` base; they are not suppressed or
+modified by P0-C.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p1-durable-execution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# R4.2 P1 — Durable Online Agent Execution
+
+Status: candidate implementation. This document does not imply protected-main promotion or Production deployment.
+
+## State model
+
+The generic worker uses two local durable layers:
+
+1. `tasks/<task_id>.json`: atomic fast-state cache for compatibility and quick restart.
+2. `checkpoints.sqlite3`: append-only attempt/phase journal with `synchronous=FULL`.
+
+Checkpoint identity is bound to:
+
+- task_id
+- attempt
+- execution_digest
+- job_id
+- repository
+- base_oid
+- expected_branch_oid
+- target_branch
+- generation
+
+A checkpoint from another repository/branch/generation is never reused.
+
+Phases are monotonic within an attempt:
+
+`claimed → workspace_prepared → verification_passed → source_capture_done|commit_done → result_pending → result_submitted`
+
+`reconciliation_required` is an explicit recovery phase.
+
+## Attempt-aware result idempotency
+
+Result submission idempotency keys include the official Task attempt and the execution digest. The same
+attempt reuses the same key after a timeout/restart; a later official attempt cannot collide with an
+earlier result.
+
+Before submitting a result the worker durably writes `result_pending`, including the result hash and
+idempotency key. After a successful or exact-idempotency-reconciled API response it writes
+`result_submitted`.
+
+A 409 is accepted only if the Task API already contains the exact same result body and the Task is
+VERIFYING/SUCCEEDED. A conflicting result remains a hard failure.
+
+## Resume rules
+
+- `source_capture_done` and `result_pending` may be reused across later official attempts only when the
+  execution/scope binding is identical. This avoids repeating read-only source capture.
+- A deterministic task that crashed before governed commit replays from a new clean detached worktree.
+  This is safe because there is no external side effect yet.
+- `commit_done` is never recommitted. Recovery requires exact Job receipt OID convergence plus exactly
+  one ACTIVE WriterLease whose `current_head_oid` equals the governed commit.
+- delayed Git visibility remains `RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`, preserving an explicit recovery entry.
+
+## Crash cleanup
+
+On worker startup, stale `task-*` workspaces under the configured workspace root are removed before
+polling begins. The path boundary is verified before deletion.
+
+## Contracts
+
+P1 gates include:
+
+- CHECKPOINT_DURABLE_WRITE
+- RESUME_FROM_CHECKPOINT
+- RETRY_IDEMPOTENT_NO_DUPLICATE_SIDE_EFFECT
+- CRASH_RECOVERY_CONVERGENCE
+- WORKER_RESTART_RESUME
+- CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_ISOLATION
+- RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE
+- WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_RECOVERY
+- LEASE_RENEWAL_RECOVERY
+
+WriterLease and governed Job authority remain in the existing Bridge/GitOps durable stores; the worker
+checkpoint DB is not a competing authority for Git state.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-agent-fleet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Agent Fleet / Multi-Agent Scheduling / Fault Isolation
+
+P2 adds a durable fleet decision layer inside TaskPlane without replacing TaskPlane claim/lease
+ownership. Worker registration/heartbeat remains authoritative for liveness. TaskPlane claim CAS
+remains authoritative for ownership. Probe-before-reassignment remains mandatory after an expired
+lease. P1 checkpoint/result replay remains authoritative after worker restart.
+
+`FleetScheduler` adds durable worker capacity slots, weighted scope fairness, starvation aging,
+affinity/anti-affinity labels, worker circuit breakers, per-task/worker quarantine and idempotent
+dispatch reservations. Fleet state is colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database and is
+created idempotently; no new daemon or database is introduced.
+
+A fleet reservation is only a scheduling decision. It does not claim a Task. Callers must perform
+the normal TaskPlane claim and may then bind the returned claim ID to the reservation. This preserves
+the existing ownership and recovery invariants.
+
+Failure recovery never bypasses probe evidence. When TaskPlane recovery places work back in a
+claimable state, P2 may quarantine the failed worker and prefer another worker/failure domain.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Compact Interface Map Runtime
+
+## Purpose
+
+The persistent Online Agent already supports the canonical read-only `source_capture` action, but
+its `SourceCaptureExecutor` always returns an `aios.engineering.source-snapshot.v2` tar.gz+base64
+payload. That is correct for implementation source transfer, but too large for control-plane
+consumers that only need a bounded implementation map.
+
+P2 adds a new **adapter**, not a new execution action:
+
+```text
+action=source_capture
+adapter=compact_interface_map
+```
+
+This preserves the existing execution-v2 schema and Bridge policy:
+
+- read-only repository;
+- no change set;
+- no verification commands;
+- `writer_lease=false`;
+- no branch or commit;
+- existing capability and execution-digest validation.
+
+## Compact map contract
+
+`aios_online_agent_compact_map.py` scans only approved repository roots and source suffixes. It
+returns:
+
+- at most 40 relevant modules;
+- at most 80 selected Python symbols in total;
+- at most 40 test symbols;
+- at most 25 excerpts;
+- at most 1200 characters per excerpt;
+- SQL table names;
+- systemd unit names;
+- current invariants, failure windows and reuse points;
+- P2 fleet contract-to-surface mappings.
+
+The result is hard-bounded to 120 KiB and contains no source archive or `payload_b64`.
+
+Source excerpts apply a conservative sensitive-pattern redaction before result construction.
+
+## P2 contracts
+
+The map supplies evidence surfaces for:
+
+- `FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION`
+- `FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING`
+- `FLEET_FAIRNESS`
+- `FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT`
+- `FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH`
+- `FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY`
+
+Missing first-class scheduling/fleet primitives are reported as gaps rather than invented.
+
+## Result
+
+When the adapter is selected, the worker returns:
+
+```text
+status=SUCCEEDED
+classification=P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED
+execution_mode=compact_interface_map
+writer_lease=NONE
+```
+
+The existing `source_capture_done` / P1 checkpoint/retry path is reused, so the compact analysis
+inherits attempt-aware result idempotency and restart-safe result submission.
+
+## Governance
+
+This capability is runtime infrastructure only. The implementation candidate may use a governed
+branch/WriterLease for its own code change, but any task executed through `compact_interface_map`
+is read-only and must not create a WriterLease, branch, commit, protected-ref write, or Production
+side effect.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2b-fleet-order-preservation-repair.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# R4.2 P2-B Fleet Order Preservation Repair
+
+P2-C live acceptance exposed a real integration defect in the verified P2-B candidate. The fleet
+scheduler correctly produced durable cross-scope fairness order, but the integration passed the
+entire ranked list to the legacy scheduler. The legacy scheduler then applied its own priority /
+created_at / task_id sort and silently discarded fleet ordering.
+
+The repair preserves the legacy scheduler as the fail-closed security oracle while changing how it
+is called: one fleet-ranked candidate is presented at a time. A candidate rejected by legacy
+security/policy advances to the next fleet candidate. A candidate returned by the oracle must have
+the same task ID as the candidate presented, otherwise execution fails closed.
+
+Task ownership remains unchanged: the original schedule_for_worker/claim_task CAS remains
+authoritative, and a fleet reservation is still only bound after the claim succeeds.
+
+This repair does not modify FleetScheduler state semantics, capacity, WriterLease, checkpoint,
+protected refs or Production behavior.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2b-fleet-runtime-integration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# R4.2 P2-B Fleet Runtime Integration
+
+P2-B connects the verified P2 fleet primitives to the existing TaskPlane pull scheduler without
+replacing its security or ownership logic.
+
+The integration uses two stages. `FleetScheduler.rank_for_worker()` performs only read-only
+capacity/fairness/fault-isolation ranking. The original `TaskScheduler.next_queued_task()` is then
+run over that ordered list and remains the fail-closed security oracle for worker liveness,
+capabilities, data classification, execution zone and other existing policy checks. Only a task
+accepted by the original scheduler receives a short durable fleet reservation.
+
+The original `TaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker()` remains the sole claim path and continues to call
+the existing TaskPlane `claim_task` CAS. After a successful claim, the claim ID is bound to the
+fleet reservation. A claim error releases the reservation. A fleet reservation is never treated as
+task ownership.
+
+P2-B also makes the reservation capacity check atomic inside the fleet SQLite transaction so two
+concurrent pullers cannot oversubscribe the same worker slot. Circuit and task/worker quarantine
+state are enforced on the real pull path. Explicit execution-failure signals can be recorded through
+the integrated scheduler's failure/success/quarantine methods; policy/claim failures are not
+automatically mislabeled as worker crashes.
+
+No new daemon, database or production write path is introduced.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-external-agent-attempt-request-identity.md

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# External Agent Attempt-Scoped Request Identity
+
+## Problem
+
+External Agent execution previously derived its durable request ID from:
+
+```text
+task_id
+job_id
+execution_digest
+runtime
+```
+
+The Online Task attempt was missing.
+
+That is incorrect for retryable external side effects. A failed Model Governance route reservation is
+durable and terminal for that request ID. Reusing the same external request ID on a later official
+Task attempt therefore reuses the old route decision/reservation and can fail settlement with:
+
+```text
+MODEL_RESERVATION_STATE_INVALID
+```
+
+Archiving an exchange failed marker does not fix the root cause because the Model Governance
+reservation remains intentionally durable.
+
+## Contract
+
+External request identity is now:
+
+```text
+hash(
+  task_id,
+  job_id,
+  execution_digest,
+  runtime,
+  attempt
+)
+```
+
+The attempt is a **transient execution coordinate**. It is not added to the signed governed execution
+envelope and does not alter the Task/Job binding or execution digest.
+
+The worker gets the authoritative attempt from the successful claim response and passes it through:
+
+```text
+process_claim
+→ RuntimeAdapter.execute(..., attempt=N)
+→ ExternalAgentExecutor
+→ ExternalAgentExchange
+→ external request JSON
+→ external result JSON
+```
+
+The external result must bind the same attempt.
+
+## Idempotency
+
+This gives the intended two-level behavior:
+
+```text
+same Task/Job/execution/runtime + same attempt
+→ same external request ID
+→ same external result/reservation can be replayed safely
+
+same Task/Job/execution/runtime + next official attempt
+→ different external request ID
+→ different Model Governance request ID
+→ new reservation
+```
+
+Old FAILED reservations are retained for audit. No Model Governance DB cleanup is required or
+permitted.
+
+## Model Governance
+
+Model Governance already derives its route request ID from:
+
+```text
+external_request_id + ":model"
+```
+
+Therefore making the external request ID attempt-scoped automatically makes route decisions and
+reservations attempt-scoped without creating another state authority.
+
+## Recovery
+
+For the current Hermes live Task:
+
+```text
+attempt 6
+→ old request/reservation remains FAILED
+
+official NEEDS_REWORK
+→ bounded retry extension 6 → 7
+
+attempt 7
+→ new external request ID
+→ new route request ID
+→ new reservation
+→ provider execution
+→ settlement
+```
+
+No replacement Task/Job, direct DB rewrite, failed-reservation deletion or marker deletion is
+required.
+
+## Worker Availability
+
+The repair must preserve the already verified Worker Availability runtime. Runtime switches use the
+maintenance inhibit and must finish with the guard healthy and all three workers fresh.
+
+## Verification
+
+Required regression coverage:
+
+- request ID stable within one attempt;
+- request ID different across attempts;
+- request schema requires a valid attempt;
+- external result binds attempt;
+- old failed Model Governance reservation remains FAILED;
+- next attempt gets a new reservation and can settle;
+- existing external-agent and Model Governance runtime tests still pass.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-generic-compact-interface-map-profiles.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Generic Compact Interface-Map Profiles
+
+The compact interface-map runtime is a reusable read-only control-plane capability. It keeps the
+canonical `source_capture` action and `compact_interface_map` adapter, but selects a bounded semantic
+profile from the task's source signals.
+
+The existing `fleet` profile remains backward compatible and returns
+`P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED` with the `FLEET_*` contracts.
+
+The new `model_governance` profile is selected when model/provider/routing/budget/evaluation terms
+are present. It returns `MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED` and model-specific contracts for
+provider registry, selection policy, version pinning, budget accounting, fallback, scope isolation,
+credential boundary, trace/audit, evaluation gates and routing resilience.
+
+Profile and classification are emitted by the compact-map module and revalidated by the worker
+before result submission. Unknown or mismatched profile/classification pairs fail closed.
+
+No new Bridge action, daemon, database, WriterLease, mutation path or credential surface is added.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-hermes-openclaw-online-agent-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Hermes / OpenClaw Online Agent Runtime
+
+## Goal
+
+Promote Hermes and OpenClaw from shadow-only adapter descriptions to real Online Agent workers
+without creating a second Task/claim protocol.
+
+Both workers reuse the existing P1/P2 Online Agent lifecycle:
+
+```text
+Online Task projected
+→ capability-filtered poll
+→ automatic claim
+→ heartbeat
+→ durable checkpoint
+→ external Agent execution
+→ attempt-aware result submission
+→ official verification
+```
+
+They do **not** change the existing TaskPlane `OpenClawAdapter/HermesAdapter` shadow contract. Those
+adapters remain side-effect-free compatibility surfaces.
+
+## Execution action
+
+The canonical execution envelope adds a read-only action:
+
+```text
+action=agent_runtime
+adapter=hermes | openclaw
+```
+
+The action requires capability `agent.runtime.<adapter>`, has an empty change set, no verification
+commands, and `writer_lease=false`.
+
+`project_online_task()` copies only bounded task fields into the signed execution envelope:
+
+- goal;
+- instructions;
+- success criteria;
+- non-secret constraints.
+
+The task may not choose a command, executable, URL, credential path, environment, or shell string.
+
+## Worker separation
+
+The generic engineering worker defaults to:
+
+```text
+AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=deterministic,source_capture,compact_interface_map,codex
+```
+
+so it skips Hermes/OpenClaw tasks before claim.
+
+Dedicated services advertise:
+
+```text
+Hermes:
+  AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.hermes
+  AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=hermes
+
+OpenClaw:
+  AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.openclaw
+  AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=openclaw
+```
+
+This makes adapter selection a pre-claim capability/fleet decision instead of a post-claim failure.
+
+## Credential-isolated executor
+
+The Online Agent worker itself still owns only Task API/Bridge coordination credentials. It writes
+a hash-bound request to `/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor`.
+
+`aios-external-agent-executor.service` runs as the existing uncredentialed engineering executor user.
+It has:
+
+- one provider-only `LoadCredential` projection for the model-ready OneAPI environment;
+- `/etc/aios-gitops`, `/data/aios-gitops`, and the original provider-secret directory inaccessible;
+- no repository path;
+- no shell execution;
+- loopback denied, preventing direct access to the AIOS Task/Bridge control plane;
+- only the staging OneAPI container address allowed for the installed Agent runtime/provider;
+- only the exchange directory writable.
+
+The root-owned runtime profile in `/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/<runtime>.json` decides the
+absolute executable, fixed non-secret environment, provider-only credential mapping, and I/O mode.
+A task cannot override any of these values. The profile may select `OPENAI_API_KEY` only from the
+systemd credential named `aios-external-agent-oneapi-env`; it cannot name a credential, inject an
+environment variable, or carry an inline secret. The runtime executor parses only the selected
+`ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN` entry and does not expose the source file or other provider tiers to the
+child.
+
+## Runtime profile
+
+A profile supports:
+
+- `argv`: fixed argv, absolute allowlisted executable;
+- `input_mode`: `stdin_text`, `stdin_json`, or `file_json`;
+- `output_mode`: `stdout_text`, `stdout_json`, or `file_json`;
+- timeout;
+- bounded output size.
+
+`{input_json}` and `{output_json}` placeholders are allowed only for file modes. `{prompt}` is a
+root-profile-only argv placeholder populated from the bounded, signed task projection.
+
+The repository includes the staging profile templates validated against the installed Hermes
+v0.20.0 and OpenClaw v2026.7.2-beta.7 CLIs. Before activation, the Agent must re-run the actual
+`--help`/version probes and install the profiles and static configs root-owned. If the installed
+CLI differs, update only the root-owned profile/config projection and record the observed command;
+do not modify the Task contract to compensate.
+
+The provider projection is staging-only and uses the existing model-ready OneAPI source. It is not
+an AIOS Task, Bridge, GitOps, SSH, or Writer credential. Live activation remains blocked if the
+model-ready source cannot be projected through systemd or if the selected provider credential is
+missing/quota-invalid. This worker never passes API keys through task metadata or arbitrary
+environment variables.
+
+## Retry/restart
+
+The external request ID is deterministic over Task/Job/execution digest/runtime. The exchange keeps
+the request/result across worker restart. A repeated attempt with the exact execution digest reuses
+the durable external result instead of invoking the Agent twice.
+
+The normal P1 result idempotency/checkpoint path remains authoritative for Task result submission.
+
+## Result
+
+Successful execution returns:
+
+```text
+status=SUCCEEDED
+classification=EXTERNAL_AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCEEDED
+execution_mode=agent_runtime
+agent_runtime=hermes | openclaw
+writer_lease=NONE
+changed_files=[]
+credential_material_exposed=false
+control_plane_access_granted_to_runtime=false
+```
+
+This first runtime version is intentionally read-only with respect to the repository. Engineering
+changes continue to use assistant-authored deterministic plans and governed WriterLease/commit.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-model-governance-policy-profile-floor-compatibility.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# Model Governance Policy / Profile Floor Compatibility
+
+## Problem
+
+The root-owned OpenClaw runtime profile reserves a minimum of 16,384 input tokens so Model
+Governance can cover OpenClaw-injected workspace, skills and system context before provider
+execution.
+
+The staging scope policies still limited input to 16,000 tokens per request. Route selection
+therefore failed before reservation with:
+
+```text
+MODEL_INPUT_TOKEN_LIMIT_DENY
+```
+
+This was a configuration invariant violation:
+
+```text
+scope max_input_tokens_per_request
+<
+root-owned profile input_reservation_floor_tokens
+```
+
+The registered OpenClaw model itself supports 32,768 input tokens, so the model capability was not
+the blocker.
+
+## Invariant
+
+For every Model Governance scope that allows a model/runtime whose root-owned profile declares an
+input reservation floor:
+
+```text
+scope.max_input_tokens_per_request
+>=
+profile.model_governance.input_reservation_floor_tokens
+```
+
+The profile floor remains root-owned. Task payloads cannot alter it.
+
+## Staging policy
+
+The two staging policies that allow `openai/deepseek-v4-flash` are updated from:
+
+```text
+16000
+```
+
+to:
+
+```text
+16384
+```
+
+This is the minimum compatible value. It intentionally remains below the model's 32,768-token
+technical input ceiling.
+
+The daily token budget is unchanged.
+
+## Governance path
+
+The live SQLite policy must be changed only through the repository bootstrap and
+`aios_model_governance_admin.py`.
+
+The admin reconciler:
+
+- reads the governed repository config;
+- uses current policy revision as CAS;
+- calls `ModelGovernanceStore.set_scope_policy`;
+- appends normal Model Governance audit evidence;
+- verifies the audit chain.
+
+Direct SQL updates remain forbidden.
+
+## Exhausted OpenClaw recovery
+
+The fixed OpenClaw live Task has exhausted its normal three attempts.
+
+After the governed policy candidate is officially verified and the live policy is reconciled:
+
+```text
+attempt 3 VERIFYING/FAILED result
+→ official NEEDS_REWORK
+→ Task becomes FAILED 3/3
+→ official bounded retry extension 3 → 4
+→ same Task / same Job returns QUEUED
+→ persistent OpenClaw worker auto-claims attempt 4
+```
+
+AR1 attempt-scoped external request identity ensures attempt 4 receives a new external request and a
+new Model Governance reservation.
+
+No historical reservation is deleted or rewritten.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+Attempt 4 must prove:
+
+```text
+scope max_input_tokens_per_request=16384
+profile input_reservation_floor_tokens=16384
+reserved_estimated_input_tokens>=16384
+actual input <= reserved input
+settlement=SETTLED
+usage_source=runtime
+audit_chain_valid=true
+```
+
+If attempt 4 exposes a new failure, stop. No additional retry extension is authorized by this
+repair.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-model-governance-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+# AIOS Model Governance Runtime
+
+## Status and purpose
+
+This component turns the previously `PARTIAL` Model Governance interface map into an enforceable
+runtime policy for the already verified Hermes/OpenClaw Online Agent path.
+
+It is intentionally a **single SQLite library**, not a new network service. The existing external
+Agent executor calls the library immediately before launching a model-backed runtime and settles the
+same reservation immediately after the result.
+
+The authoritative execution chain remains:
+
+```text
+Online Task scope / trace
+→ dedicated worker claim + heartbeat
+→ external Agent executor
+→ ModelGovernanceStore.route()
+→ root-owned runtime profile binds provider/model/version
+→ Hermes / OpenClaw process
+→ ModelGovernanceStore.record_success() / record_failure()
+→ durable Online Agent checkpoint/result
+```
+
+P0 scope/trace/credential, P1 checkpoint/retry, P2 fleet scheduling and the existing external Agent
+credential boundary remain authoritative.
+
+## Ten Model Governance contracts
+
+### MODEL_PROVIDER_REGISTRY
+
+`model_governance_providers` stores provider identity, failure domain, circuit policy and an opaque
+credential reference. Raw credentials are rejected.
+
+Allowed reference prefixes:
+
+- `systemd-credential:`
+- `runtime-profile:`
+- `credential-broker:`
+
+### MODEL_SELECTION_POLICY
+
+`model_governance_scope_policies` constrains eligible models/providers/capabilities. Routing is
+deterministic: explicit preferred models, then configured priority, then stable provider/model IDs.
+
+### MODEL_VERSION_PINNING
+
+A registry row always includes a model version. A scope can additionally pin a model ID + exact
+version. Every route decision persists both model ID and version plus model/policy revisions.
+
+### MODEL_BUDGET_ACCOUNTING
+
+A route first reserves estimated input/output tokens and estimated cost inside `BEGIN IMMEDIATE`.
+Settled usage and outstanding reservations both count against the daily scope budget, preventing two
+concurrent requests from oversubscribing the same budget.
+
+Runtime-reported usage is preferred. When telemetry is absent, the reserved upper bound is charged
+rather than silently under-counting.
+
+OpenClaw's verified result shape is supported directly:
+
+```text
+meta.agentMeta.usage.input
+meta.agentMeta.usage.output
+meta.agentMeta.costUsd
+```
+
+Hermes currently has no structured usage in the verified output, so it uses conservative
+reservation settlement.
+
+### MODEL_FALLBACK_POLICY
+
+Provider failures are durable. Repeated failures open a circuit for the configured cooldown. A
+fallback request excludes the failed provider and increments `fallback_index`; the scope policy
+bounds the number of fallback attempts.
+
+### MODEL_SCOPE_ISOLATION
+
+The signed `agent_runtime` execution envelope now carries authoritative Task scope + trace identity.
+
+The projection layer always overwrites `runtime_input.scope` and `runtime_input.trace_id` from the
+Online Task, even if an execution request attempts to supply different values.
+
+Tenant/project lookup may fall back only to the same tenant's policy. It never falls back to a
+system or legacy policy. `system` and `legacy` require their own explicit policies, avoiding fake
+tenant identities.
+
+### MODEL_CREDENTIAL_BOUNDARY
+
+Model governance stores credential references only. The root-owned external-runtime profile still
+owns the actual provider credential projection. Task payloads cannot select executable, argv,
+environment, provider credential, or credential path.
+
+The external child process remains unable to reach the AIOS control plane.
+
+### MODEL_TRACE_AUDIT
+
+Every route, failure, provider/model/policy update and settlement appends to a SHA-256 hash-chained
+audit table with task ID, trace ID and scope key. `verify_audit_chain()` detects tampering.
+
+### MODEL_EVALUATION_GATE
+
+A model cannot enter the registry unless its state is `APPROVED` and it has a 64-hex evaluation
+evidence digest.
+
+The staging bootstrap uses the already verified Hermes/OpenClaw E2E external-result SHA256 values as
+evaluation evidence, rather than a configuration-file hash.
+
+### MODEL_ROUTING_RESILIENCE
+
+Route request IDs are idempotent and bound to a canonical request hash. Conflicting replay is
+rejected. Provider health, reservations, usage settlement and policy/provider/model updates use
+transaction/CAS semantics.
+
+## Runtime profile contract
+
+A root-owned Hermes/OpenClaw profile may declare:
+
+```json
+{
+  "model_governance": {
+    "required": true,
+    "provider_ids": ["provider-a"],
+    "model_capabilities": ["text"],
+    "max_output_tokens": 512
+  }
+}
+```
+
+When `required=true`:
+
+- `provider_ids` must be non-empty;
+- `max_output_tokens` must be positive;
+- argv/environment must contain at least one governance-controlled marker:
+  `{provider_id}`, `{model_id}`, or `{model_version}`;
+- `AIOS_MODEL_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED` must be enabled;
+- a matching scope policy/model/provider must exist;
+- budget reservation must succeed before the child process is launched.
+
+The task cannot provide these markers or their values.
+
+## SQLite authority
+
+Default database:
+
+```text
+/var/lib/aios-model-governance/state.sqlite3
+```
+
+The executor process already owns the only runtime mutation path. The directory is created by
+tmpfiles and is the only new writable path added to that executor.
+
+No direct Task/Job/Git database writes are introduced.
+
+## Bootstrap/reconciliation
+
+`aios_model_governance_admin.py` applies a root-owned JSON bootstrap idempotently. It compares desired
+state to current rows and uses the current revision as the CAS input only when a change is actually
+required.
+
+The repository staging bootstrap is not a Production policy. It exists only to reproduce and
+govern the already verified non-production Hermes/OpenClaw runtimes.
+
+## Cost caveat
+
+The current verified OneAPI-backed runtime evidence reports zero authoritative provider cost for
+OpenClaw and no structured cost for Hermes. The staging bootstrap therefore does **not** invent
+pricing and sets cost rates/budget to zero/unbounded.
+
+Token budgets remain enforced. Real monetary budget enforcement becomes effective as soon as
+authoritative per-model pricing is entered into the root-owned registry.
+
+## OpenClaw JIT/WASM compatibility
+
+The previous live acceptance proved that OpenClaw Node/WASM requires
+`MemoryDenyWriteExecute=no`. Model Governance must preserve that already-evidenced runtime exception;
+it must not further weaken `NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `ProtectHome`, loopback deny,
+credential isolation or repository isolation.
+
+## Failure/recovery invariants
+
+- Budget denial occurs before provider execution.
+- Missing scope policy fails closed.
+- Missing/disabled governance fails closed when a profile requires it.
+- Actual usage cannot exceed the reservation.
+- Provider failure releases that reservation into `FAILED` state before fallback.
+- Settlement is idempotent.
+- Route replay is idempotent only for the exact canonical request.
+- Audit corruption is detectable.
+- Online Agent checkpoint/result retry remains unchanged and remains the outer recovery authority.
+
+## Verification
+
+Required unit/integration coverage includes:
+
+- registry/evaluation/CAS;
+- scope isolation and no system→tenant fallback;
+- model/version pinning;
+- atomic budget reservation;
+- settlement/replay;
+- missing telemetry conservative settlement;
+- provider circuit/fallback;
+- trace/audit tamper detection;
+- authoritative scope/trace projection;
+- task runtime-input scope override attack;
+- root-owned provider/model binding;
+- OpenClaw nested usage extraction;
+- real Hermes/OpenClaw staging live tasks with Model Governance evidence.
+
+The governed implementation is not complete without the unified all-modified-files bundle for the
+candidate delta and the cumulative lineage bundle.