Files
aios/active-runtime/app/aios_v2/provenance_grants.py
T

745 lines
29 KiB
Python
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
"""AIOS V2 最小权限 Run Provenance 子 Grant。
父 Workflow Provenance 只绑定 run/tenant/task/agent/principal 身份,不直接授予
操作权限。每个子 Grant 只允许一个 ExecutionPath;Git Grant 还必须限定具体
GitOperation。子 Grant 具备独立 TTL、nonce、状态、撤销和重放防护。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import sqlite3
import threading
import uuid
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field, replace
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from enum import Enum
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
from .provenance import (
ExecutionPath,
GitOperation,
ProvenanceDenied,
ProvenanceExpired,
ProvenanceIssuer,
ProvenanceNotFound,
ProvenanceReplay,
ProvenanceRevoked,
ProvenanceSignatureError,
ProvenanceStatus,
ProvenanceVerifier,
RunProvenance,
SQLiteProvenanceStore,
Signer,
SignatureVerifier,
_validate_digest,
canonical_json_bytes,
parse_timestamp,
required,
utc_now,
)
WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION = "aios.v2.workflow.v1"
GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION = "aios.v2.provenance-grant.v1"
class GrantType(str, Enum):
CODE_CHANGE = "code_change"
GIT = "git"
DEPLOYMENT = "deployment"
RUNTIME = "runtime"
EVIDENCE = "evidence"
ROLLBACK = "rollback"
AUDIT = "audit"
GRANT_PATHS: Mapping[GrantType, ExecutionPath] = {
GrantType.CODE_CHANGE: ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE,
GrantType.GIT: ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION,
GrantType.DEPLOYMENT: ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT,
GrantType.RUNTIME: ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE,
GrantType.EVIDENCE: ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE,
GrantType.ROLLBACK: ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK,
GrantType.AUDIT: ExecutionPath.AUDIT,
}
class GrantStatus(str, Enum):
ISSUED = "issued"
VERIFIED = "verified"
USED = "used"
EXPIRED = "expired"
REVOKED = "revoked"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProvenanceGrant:
grant_id: str
parent_provenance_id: str
grant_type: GrantType
execution_path: ExecutionPath
run_id: str
issuer: str
tenant_id: str
task_id: str
agent_id: str
principal_id: str
allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str]
issued_at: str
expires_at: str
policy_version: str
key_id: str
nonce: str
signature: str = ""
schema_version: str = GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
for name in (
"grant_id",
"parent_provenance_id",
"run_id",
"issuer",
"tenant_id",
"task_id",
"agent_id",
"principal_id",
"issued_at",
"expires_at",
"policy_version",
"key_id",
"nonce",
"schema_version",
):
object.__setattr__(self, name, required(getattr(self, name), name))
if self.schema_version != GRANT_SCHEMA_VERSION:
raise ValueError(f"unsupported grant schema: {self.schema_version}")
grant_type = GrantType(self.grant_type)
path = ExecutionPath(self.execution_path)
if GRANT_PATHS[grant_type] != path:
raise ValueError("grant_type does not match execution_path")
object.__setattr__(self, "grant_type", grant_type)
object.__setattr__(self, "execution_path", path)
operations = tuple(
sorted({GitOperation(item).value for item in self.allowed_git_operations})
)
if grant_type == GrantType.GIT and not operations:
raise ValueError("Git Grant requires explicit Git operations")
if grant_type != GrantType.GIT and operations:
raise ValueError("only Git Grant may contain Git operations")
object.__setattr__(self, "allowed_git_operations", operations)
issued = parse_timestamp(self.issued_at)
expires = parse_timestamp(self.expires_at)
if expires <= issued:
raise ValueError("grant expires_at must be later than issued_at")
object.__setattr__(self, "signature", str(self.signature or "").strip())
def unsigned_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": self.schema_version,
"grant_id": self.grant_id,
"parent_provenance_id": self.parent_provenance_id,
"grant_type": self.grant_type.value,
"execution_path": self.execution_path.value,
"run_id": self.run_id,
"issuer": self.issuer,
"tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
"task_id": self.task_id,
"agent_id": self.agent_id,
"principal_id": self.principal_id,
"allowed_git_operations": list(self.allowed_git_operations),
"issued_at": self.issued_at,
"expires_at": self.expires_at,
"policy_version": self.policy_version,
"key_id": self.key_id,
"nonce": self.nonce,
}
def canonical_bytes(self) -> bytes:
return canonical_json_bytes(self.unsigned_dict())
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
value = self.unsigned_dict()
value["signature"] = self.signature
return value
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ProvenanceGrant":
return cls(**dict(value))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GrantAuthorization:
authorization_id: str
grant_id: str
parent_provenance_id: str
run_id: str
tenant_id: str
task_id: str
agent_id: str
principal_id: str
execution_path: str
git_operation: str | None
request_digest: str
policy_version: str
key_id: str
public_key_fingerprint: str
authorized_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
@property
def provenance_id(self) -> str:
return self.parent_provenance_id
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return asdict(self)
class WorkflowProvenanceIssuer:
"""签发不携带操作权限的父 Workflow Provenance。"""
def __init__(self, signer: Signer, store: SQLiteProvenanceStore) -> None:
self._issuer = ProvenanceIssuer(signer, store)
def issue(
self,
*,
run_id: str,
issuer: str,
tenant_id: str,
task_id: str,
agent_id: str,
principal_id: str,
ttl_seconds: int = 14400,
provenance_id: str | None = None,
nonce: str | None = None,
now: datetime | None = None,
) -> RunProvenance:
return self._issuer.issue(
run_id=run_id,
issuer=issuer,
tenant_id=tenant_id,
task_id=task_id,
agent_id=agent_id,
principal_id=principal_id,
allowed_paths=(),
allowed_git_operations=(),
ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds,
policy_version=WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION,
provenance_id=provenance_id,
nonce=nonce,
now=now,
)
class SQLiteGrantStore:
"""在 Provenance SQLite 数据库中持久化子 Grant 与使用记录。"""
def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
self.path = Path(path).resolve()
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._lock = threading.RLock()
self._connection = sqlite3.connect(
str(self.path), timeout=30.0, check_same_thread=False
)
self._connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
with self._lock:
self._connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
self._connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
self._connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
self._connection.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grants (
grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
parent_provenance_id TEXT NOT NULL,
grant_type TEXT NOT NULL,
execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
signature_verified INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_grants_parent
ON provenance_grants(parent_provenance_id, grant_type, status);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grant_usage (
authorization_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
execution_path TEXT NOT NULL,
git_operation TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
request_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
authorized_at TEXT NOT NULL,
receipt_json TEXT NOT NULL,
UNIQUE(grant_id, execution_path, git_operation, request_digest),
FOREIGN KEY(grant_id) REFERENCES provenance_grants(grant_id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS provenance_grant_events (
event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
grant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY(grant_id) REFERENCES provenance_grants(grant_id)
);
"""
)
self._connection.commit()
def close(self) -> None:
with self._lock:
self._connection.close()
def _event(
self,
grant_id: str,
event_type: str,
details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> None:
self._connection.execute(
"INSERT INTO provenance_grant_events VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
f"gevt_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
grant_id,
event_type,
json.dumps(dict(details or {}), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True),
utc_now(),
),
)
def save_issued(self, grant: ProvenanceGrant) -> None:
payload = json.dumps(
grant.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
)
now = utc_now()
with self._lock:
self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
self._connection.execute(
"INSERT INTO provenance_grants VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?)",
(
grant.grant_id,
grant.parent_provenance_id,
grant.grant_type.value,
grant.execution_path.value,
payload,
GrantStatus.ISSUED.value,
now,
now,
),
)
self._event(grant.grant_id, "issued")
self._connection.commit()
except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
self._connection.rollback()
raise ProvenanceDenied("grant_id already exists") from exc
except Exception:
self._connection.rollback()
raise
def get(self, grant_id: str) -> ProvenanceGrant:
with self._lock:
row = self._connection.execute(
"SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
(required(grant_id, "grant_id"),),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance grant not found")
value = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
raise ProvenanceDenied("stored grant is invalid")
return ProvenanceGrant.from_dict(value)
def status(self, grant_id: str) -> GrantStatus:
with self._lock:
row = self._connection.execute(
"SELECT status FROM provenance_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
(required(grant_id, "grant_id"),),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise ProvenanceNotFound("provenance grant not found")
return GrantStatus(row["status"])
def mark_verified(self, grant_id: str, *, fingerprint: str) -> None:
with self._lock:
self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
current = self.status(grant_id)
if current in {GrantStatus.REVOKED, GrantStatus.EXPIRED}:
raise ProvenanceDenied(f"cannot verify grant in state {current.value}")
next_status = (
GrantStatus.USED.value
if current == GrantStatus.USED
else GrantStatus.VERIFIED.value
)
self._connection.execute(
"UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, signature_verified = 1, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
(next_status, utc_now(), grant_id),
)
self._event(
grant_id,
"verified",
{"public_key_fingerprint": fingerprint},
)
self._connection.commit()
except Exception:
self._connection.rollback()
raise
def mark_expired(self, grant_id: str) -> None:
with self._lock:
self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
if self.status(grant_id) == GrantStatus.REVOKED:
self._connection.rollback()
return
self._connection.execute(
"UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
(GrantStatus.EXPIRED.value, utc_now(), grant_id),
)
self._event(grant_id, "expired")
self._connection.commit()
except Exception:
self._connection.rollback()
raise
def revoke(self, grant_id: str, *, reason: str, principal_id: str) -> None:
with self._lock:
self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
self.get(grant_id)
self._connection.execute(
"UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
(GrantStatus.REVOKED.value, utc_now(), grant_id),
)
self._event(
grant_id,
"revoked",
{
"reason": required(reason, "reason"),
"principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
},
)
self._connection.commit()
except Exception:
self._connection.rollback()
raise
def record_authorization(self, authorization: GrantAuthorization) -> None:
receipt = json.dumps(
authorization.as_dict(), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
)
with self._lock:
self._connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
current = self.status(authorization.grant_id)
if current in {GrantStatus.REVOKED, GrantStatus.EXPIRED}:
raise ProvenanceDenied(f"grant state is {current.value}")
try:
self._connection.execute(
"INSERT INTO provenance_grant_usage VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
authorization.authorization_id,
authorization.grant_id,
authorization.execution_path,
authorization.git_operation or "",
authorization.request_digest,
authorization.authorized_at,
receipt,
),
)
except sqlite3.IntegrityError as exc:
raise ProvenanceReplay(
"identical grant path/operation/request digest already used"
) from exc
self._connection.execute(
"UPDATE provenance_grants SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
(GrantStatus.USED.value, authorization.authorized_at, authorization.grant_id),
)
self._event(
authorization.grant_id,
"used",
{
"authorization_id": authorization.authorization_id,
"execution_path": authorization.execution_path,
"git_operation": authorization.git_operation,
"request_digest": authorization.request_digest,
},
)
self._connection.commit()
except Exception:
self._connection.rollback()
raise
def list_for_parent(self, parent_provenance_id: str) -> list[ProvenanceGrant]:
with self._lock:
rows = self._connection.execute(
"SELECT payload_json FROM provenance_grants WHERE parent_provenance_id = ? ORDER BY grant_type, grant_id",
(required(parent_provenance_id, "parent_provenance_id"),),
).fetchall()
return [ProvenanceGrant.from_dict(json.loads(row["payload_json"])) for row in rows]
class GrantIssuer:
"""从父 Workflow Provenance 派生单一路径最小权限 Grant。"""
def __init__(
self,
signer: Signer,
parent_store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
grant_store: SQLiteGrantStore,
) -> None:
self.signer = signer
self.parent_store = parent_store
self.grant_store = grant_store
def issue(
self,
*,
parent_provenance_id: str,
grant_type: GrantType | str,
ttl_seconds: int = 900,
allowed_git_operations: Sequence[str] = (),
grant_id: str | None = None,
nonce: str | None = None,
now: datetime | None = None,
) -> ProvenanceGrant:
if ttl_seconds <= 0:
raise ValueError("grant ttl_seconds must be positive")
parent = self.parent_store.get(parent_provenance_id)
if parent.policy_version != WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION:
raise ProvenanceDenied("child grants require a workflow provenance parent")
if parent.allowed_paths or parent.allowed_git_operations:
raise ProvenanceDenied("workflow provenance parent must not contain operation rights")
parent_status = self.parent_store.status(parent.provenance_id)
if parent_status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
raise ProvenanceRevoked("workflow provenance is revoked")
issued = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
parent_expiry = parse_timestamp(parent.expires_at)
expires = min(issued + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds), parent_expiry)
if expires <= issued:
raise ProvenanceExpired("workflow provenance has expired")
normalized_type = GrantType(grant_type)
operations = tuple(allowed_git_operations)
unsigned = ProvenanceGrant(
grant_id=grant_id or f"grant_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
parent_provenance_id=parent.provenance_id,
grant_type=normalized_type,
execution_path=GRANT_PATHS[normalized_type],
run_id=parent.run_id,
issuer=parent.issuer,
tenant_id=parent.tenant_id,
task_id=parent.task_id,
agent_id=parent.agent_id,
principal_id=parent.principal_id,
allowed_git_operations=operations,
issued_at=issued.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
expires_at=expires.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
policy_version=f"{WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION}.{normalized_type.value}",
key_id=self.signer.key_id,
nonce=nonce or uuid.uuid4().hex,
)
signed = replace(unsigned, signature=self.signer.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes()))
self.grant_store.save_issued(signed)
return signed
class GrantVerifier:
"""验证父 Workflow 与子 Grant,确保单一路径最小权限。"""
def __init__(
self,
parent_store: SQLiteProvenanceStore,
grant_store: SQLiteGrantStore,
verifiers: Mapping[str, SignatureVerifier],
) -> None:
if not verifiers:
raise ValueError("at least one trusted verifier is required")
self.parent_store = parent_store
self.grant_store = grant_store
self.verifiers = {required(key, "key_id"): value for key, value in verifiers.items()}
def _verify_parent(self, parent: RunProvenance, *, now: datetime) -> SignatureVerifier:
status = self.parent_store.status(parent.provenance_id)
if status == ProvenanceStatus.REVOKED:
raise ProvenanceRevoked("workflow provenance is revoked")
if now >= parse_timestamp(parent.expires_at):
self.parent_store.mark_expired(parent.provenance_id)
raise ProvenanceExpired("workflow provenance is expired")
verifier = self.verifiers.get(parent.key_id)
if verifier is None or not parent.signature or not verifier.verify(
parent.canonical_bytes(), parent.signature
):
raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid workflow provenance signature")
if parent.policy_version != WORKFLOW_POLICY_VERSION:
raise ProvenanceDenied("parent is not a workflow provenance")
if parent.allowed_paths or parent.allowed_git_operations:
raise ProvenanceDenied("workflow provenance must not contain operation rights")
return verifier
def authorize(
self,
*,
grant_id: str,
parent_provenance_id: str,
run_id: str,
tenant_id: str,
task_id: str,
agent_id: str,
principal_id: str,
execution_path: str,
request_digest: str,
git_operation: str | None = None,
now: datetime | None = None,
) -> GrantAuthorization:
current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
parent = self.parent_store.get(parent_provenance_id)
self._verify_parent(parent, now=current)
grant = self.grant_store.get(grant_id)
grant_status = self.grant_store.status(grant.grant_id)
if grant_status == GrantStatus.REVOKED:
raise ProvenanceRevoked("provenance grant is revoked")
if current >= parse_timestamp(grant.expires_at):
self.grant_store.mark_expired(grant.grant_id)
raise ProvenanceExpired("provenance grant is expired")
verifier = self.verifiers.get(grant.key_id)
if verifier is None or not grant.signature or not verifier.verify(
grant.canonical_bytes(), grant.signature
):
raise ProvenanceSignatureError("invalid provenance grant signature")
expected = {
"parent_provenance_id": parent.provenance_id,
"run_id": required(run_id, "run_id"),
"tenant_id": required(tenant_id, "tenant_id"),
"task_id": required(task_id, "task_id"),
"agent_id": required(agent_id, "agent_id"),
"principal_id": required(principal_id, "principal_id"),
}
for field_name, expected_value in expected.items():
if getattr(grant, field_name) != expected_value:
raise ProvenanceDenied(f"grant {field_name} mismatch")
if field_name != "parent_provenance_id" and getattr(parent, field_name) != expected_value:
raise ProvenanceDenied(f"workflow {field_name} mismatch")
path = ExecutionPath(execution_path)
if grant.execution_path != path:
raise ProvenanceDenied(
f"grant permits {grant.execution_path.value}, not {path.value}"
)
operation: str | None = None
if path == ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION:
if git_operation is None:
raise ProvenanceDenied("Git operation is required")
operation = GitOperation(git_operation).value
if operation not in grant.allowed_git_operations:
raise ProvenanceDenied(f"Git operation is not allowed: {operation}")
elif git_operation is not None:
raise ProvenanceDenied("git_operation is only valid for a Git Grant")
digest = _validate_digest(request_digest)
self.grant_store.mark_verified(grant.grant_id, fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint)
authorization = GrantAuthorization(
authorization_id=f"gauth_{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
grant_id=grant.grant_id,
parent_provenance_id=parent.provenance_id,
run_id=grant.run_id,
tenant_id=grant.tenant_id,
task_id=grant.task_id,
agent_id=grant.agent_id,
principal_id=grant.principal_id,
execution_path=path.value,
git_operation=operation,
request_digest=digest,
policy_version=grant.policy_version,
key_id=grant.key_id,
public_key_fingerprint=verifier.fingerprint,
)
self.grant_store.record_authorization(authorization)
return authorization
class LeastPrivilegeProvenanceWriter:
"""按路径选择独立子 Grant 的生产 Writer。
``provenance_id`` 参数始终指父 Workflow Provenance;Grant ID 来自受保护
配置映射,调用方无法通过请求体临时扩大权限。
"""
def __init__(
self,
verifier: GrantVerifier,
receipt_root: str | Path,
grant_ids: Mapping[str, str],
*,
writer_id: str = "aios-v2-least-privilege-writer",
) -> None:
self.verifier = verifier
self.receipt_root = Path(receipt_root).resolve()
self.receipt_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.grant_ids = {
ExecutionPath(path).value: required(grant_id, f"grant_id[{path}]")
for path, grant_id in grant_ids.items()
}
missing = sorted(path.value for path in ExecutionPath if path.value not in self.grant_ids)
if missing:
raise ValueError(f"missing least-privilege Grant mappings: {missing}")
self.writer_id = required(writer_id, "writer_id")
self._lock = threading.RLock()
@staticmethod
def _component(value: str) -> str:
normalized = required(value, "path component")
if normalized in {".", ".."} or "/" in normalized or "\\" in normalized:
raise ProvenanceDenied("invalid receipt path component")
return normalized
def authorize(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
path = ExecutionPath(values["execution_path"]).value
grant_id = self.grant_ids[path]
parent_provenance_id = values.pop("provenance_id")
authorization = self.verifier.authorize(
grant_id=grant_id,
parent_provenance_id=parent_provenance_id,
**values,
)
tenant = self._component(authorization.tenant_id)
parent = self._component(authorization.parent_provenance_id)
grant = self._component(authorization.grant_id)
target_dir = self.receipt_root / tenant / parent / grant
target = target_dir / f"{authorization.authorization_id}.json"
payload = authorization.as_dict()
payload["writer_id"] = self.writer_id
with self._lock:
target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
temporary = target.with_suffix(f".tmp-{os.getpid()}")
temporary.write_text(
json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
os.replace(temporary, target)
return authorization
def authorize_code_change(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.CODE_CHANGE.value, **values)
def authorize_git_operation(
self, *, git_operation: str, **values: Any
) -> GrantAuthorization:
return self.authorize(
execution_path=ExecutionPath.GIT_OPERATION.value,
git_operation=git_operation,
**values,
)
def authorize_deployment(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.DEPLOYMENT.value, **values)
def authorize_runtime_execute(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.RUNTIME_EXECUTE.value, **values)
def authorize_evidence_write(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.EVIDENCE_WRITE.value, **values)
def authorize_rollback(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.ROLLBACK.value, **values)
def authorize_audit(self, **values: Any) -> GrantAuthorization:
return self.authorize(execution_path=ExecutionPath.AUDIT.value, **values)