Files
aios/active-runtime/app/owner_authorization_broker.py
T

612 lines
21 KiB
Python

"""Audited Owner authorization broker for task-scoped writer provisioning.
The broker closes the bootstrap gap without minting a new general-purpose
Owner token and without modifying the bearer-token registry. It accepts an
already-authenticated, explicitly allow-listed Owner principal, records a
tamper-evident authorization event, and invokes the existing
AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner with a generated authorization reference.
The broker never writes Git refs itself. The governed signer, validator and
one-shot provisioner remain the only components allowed to create the task
branch/worktree/writer.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import tempfile
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Mapping, Protocol
from authorized_task_writer_provisioning import (
AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner,
BRANCH_RE,
OID_RE,
OwnerContext,
ProvisioningError,
REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS,
REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS,
TASK_RE,
)
ACTION = "AUTHORIZE_TASK_WRITER_PROVISIONING"
SCHEMA = "aios.owner-authorization-event.v1"
BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS = frozenset(
{
"action",
"task_id",
"repository",
"base_ref",
"base_oid",
"target_branch",
"one_time_use",
"expires_in_seconds",
"production_change_authorized",
"tag_change_authorized",
"baseline_change_authorized",
"main_write_authorized",
"allowed_operations",
"denied_operations",
}
)
IDENTITY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+/-]{1,254}$")
SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,127}$")
CREDENTIAL_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:@+-]{1,255}$")
WILDCARD_SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"(^\*$)|(^.+:\*$)")
class OwnerAuthorizationError(RuntimeError):
"""Stable fail-closed broker error."""
def __init__(
self,
code: str,
status: int = 400,
*,
details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> None:
super().__init__(code)
self.code = code
self.status = status
self.details = dict(details or {})
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class OwnerPrincipal:
"""Non-secret authentication evidence returned by the existing API."""
identity: str
role: str
authenticated_scope: str
token_scopes: frozenset[str]
credential_id: str = ""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig:
repository_identity: str
state_root: Path
allowed_owner_identities: frozenset[str]
allowed_intake_scopes: frozenset[str]
allowed_credential_ids: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
max_expiry_seconds: int = 900
@classmethod
def from_environment(cls) -> "OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig":
identities = _csv_set(
os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_IDENTITIES", "")
)
scopes = _csv_set(
os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_INTAKE_SCOPES", "")
)
credential_ids = _csv_set(
os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED_CREDENTIAL_IDS", "")
)
if not identities:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"OWNER_IDENTITY_ALLOWLIST_REQUIRED", 503
)
if not scopes:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"OWNER_INTAKE_SCOPE_ALLOWLIST_REQUIRED", 503
)
if any(_is_wildcard_scope(item) for item in scopes):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"WILDCARD_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 503
)
if "writer:provision" in scopes:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"WRITER_PROVISION_SCOPE_BOOTSTRAP_REJECTED", 503
)
try:
maximum = int(
os.getenv(
"AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_MAX_EXPIRY_SECONDS", "900"
)
)
except ValueError:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"BROKER_MAX_EXPIRY_INVALID", 503
) from None
if maximum < 60 or maximum > 1800:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_MAX_EXPIRY_INVALID", 503)
return cls(
repository_identity=os.getenv(
"AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "aios/aios"
).strip(),
state_root=Path(
os.getenv(
"AIOS_GITOPS_OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_STATE_ROOT",
"/var/lib/aios-gitops/owner-authorization-broker",
)
),
allowed_owner_identities=identities,
allowed_intake_scopes=scopes,
allowed_credential_ids=credential_ids,
max_expiry_seconds=maximum,
)
class TaskWriterProvisioner(Protocol):
def provision(
self, raw: Mapping[str, Any], owner: OwnerContext
) -> dict[str, Any]:
...
def utc_now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def iso_utc(value: datetime) -> str:
return value.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
def canonical_json_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
return (
json.dumps(
value,
ensure_ascii=False,
sort_keys=True,
separators=(",", ":"),
)
+ "\n"
).encode("utf-8")
def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
def _csv_set(value: str) -> frozenset[str]:
return frozenset(
item.strip() for item in value.split(",") if item.strip()
)
def _is_wildcard_scope(scope: str) -> bool:
return bool(WILDCARD_SCOPE_RE.fullmatch(scope.strip()))
def _atomic_write_json(path: Path, value: Any, mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".tmp-", dir=path.parent)
try:
os.fchmod(fd, mode)
with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
stream.write(canonical_json_bytes(value))
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
os.replace(temporary, path)
os.chmod(path, mode)
parent_fd = os.open(
path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0)
)
try:
os.fsync(parent_fd)
finally:
os.close(parent_fd)
finally:
if os.path.exists(temporary):
os.unlink(temporary)
def _read_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
if path.stat().st_size <= 0 or path.stat().st_size > 1_048_576:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
try:
value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"BROKER_RECEIPT_JSON_INVALID", 500
) from None
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_RECEIPT_INVALID", 500)
return value
def _prepare_state_root(root: Path) -> None:
if root.is_symlink():
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_STATE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", 500)
root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
os.chmod(root, 0o700)
if root.stat().st_mode & 0o077:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"BROKER_STATE_PERMISSIONS_REJECTED", 500
)
def _event_id(
principal: OwnerPrincipal, request_digest: str
) -> str:
material = (
f"{principal.identity}\0{principal.authenticated_scope}\0"
f"{request_digest}"
).encode("utf-8")
return "owner-auth-" + hashlib.sha256(material).hexdigest()[:32]
def _authorization_reference(event_id: str, request_digest: str) -> str:
return f"owner-auth:{event_id}:{request_digest[:16]}"
def _validate_principal(
principal: OwnerPrincipal,
config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
) -> None:
if principal.role != "owner":
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_ROLE_REQUIRED", 403)
if (
not principal.identity
or not IDENTITY_RE.fullmatch(principal.identity)
or principal.identity not in config.allowed_owner_identities
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_ALLOWED", 403)
if (
not principal.authenticated_scope
or not SCOPE_RE.fullmatch(principal.authenticated_scope)
or principal.authenticated_scope
not in config.allowed_intake_scopes
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_INTAKE_SCOPE_REJECTED", 403)
if principal.authenticated_scope == "writer:provision":
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"WRITER_PROVISION_SCOPE_BOOTSTRAP_REJECTED", 403
)
scopes = principal.token_scopes
if any(_is_wildcard_scope(scope) for scope in scopes):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"WILDCARD_OWNER_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED", 403
)
if scopes:
if principal.authenticated_scope not in scopes:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"OWNER_SCOPE_EVIDENCE_MISMATCH", 403
)
elif (
not principal.credential_id
or principal.credential_id not in config.allowed_credential_ids
):
# handler.need(scope) proves authorization but may hide whether the
# credential was wildcard. When scope metadata is absent, require an
# exact non-secret credential ID allowlist as the alternative proof.
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"OWNER_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_NOT_PROVABLE", 403
)
if principal.credential_id:
if not CREDENTIAL_ID_RE.fullmatch(principal.credential_id):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("OWNER_CREDENTIAL_ID_INVALID", 403)
if (
config.allowed_credential_ids
and principal.credential_id not in config.allowed_credential_ids
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"OWNER_CREDENTIAL_ID_NOT_ALLOWED", 403
)
def _validate_request(
raw: Mapping[str, Any],
config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
if set(raw) != BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
if raw["action"] != ACTION:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BROKER_ACTION_REJECTED")
if raw["repository"] != config.repository_identity:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH", 409
)
if raw["base_ref"] != "refs/heads/main":
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BASE_REF_REJECTED", 409)
if (
not isinstance(raw["base_oid"], str)
or not OID_RE.fullmatch(raw["base_oid"])
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("BASE_OID_REJECTED")
if (
not isinstance(raw["target_branch"], str)
or not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(raw["target_branch"])
or raw["target_branch"] in {"main", "master"}
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("TARGET_BRANCH_REJECTED")
if (
not isinstance(raw["task_id"], str)
or not TASK_RE.fullmatch(raw["task_id"])
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("TASK_ID_REJECTED")
if raw["one_time_use"] is not True:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("ONE_TIME_USE_REQUIRED")
expiry = raw["expires_in_seconds"]
if (
not isinstance(expiry, int)
or isinstance(expiry, bool)
or not 60 <= expiry <= config.max_expiry_seconds
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("GRANT_LIFETIME_REJECTED")
for field in (
"production_change_authorized",
"tag_change_authorized",
"baseline_change_authorized",
"main_write_authorized",
):
if raw[field] is not False:
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"PRODUCTION_CAPABILITY_REJECTED", 403
)
allowed = raw["allowed_operations"]
denied = raw["denied_operations"]
if (
not isinstance(allowed, list)
or frozenset(allowed) != REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("ALLOWED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
if (
not isinstance(denied, list)
or frozenset(denied) != REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError("DENIED_OPERATIONS_MISMATCH", 403)
return dict(raw)
def _response_is_safe(value: Any) -> bool:
"""Reject accidental credential material before writing a receipt."""
sensitive_markers = (
"access_token",
"bearer",
"client_secret",
"private_key",
"raw_token",
"secret_value",
)
if isinstance(value, Mapping):
for key, inner in value.items():
lowered = str(key).lower()
if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
return False
if not _response_is_safe(inner):
return False
elif isinstance(value, list):
return all(_response_is_safe(item) for item in value)
return True
class OwnerAuthorizationBroker:
"""Create an audited Owner event and invoke the governed bridge."""
def __init__(
self,
config: OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig | None = None,
provisioner: TaskWriterProvisioner | None = None,
) -> None:
self.config = (
config or OwnerAuthorizationBrokerConfig.from_environment()
)
self.provisioner = provisioner or AuthorizedTaskWriterProvisioner()
def authorize_and_provision(
self,
raw: Mapping[str, Any],
principal: OwnerPrincipal,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
config = self.config
_validate_principal(principal, config)
request = _validate_request(raw, config)
_prepare_state_root(config.state_root)
request_digest = sha256_json(request)
event_id = _event_id(principal, request_digest)
reference = _authorization_reference(event_id, request_digest)
event_dir = config.state_root / "events" / event_id
event_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
os.chmod(event_dir, 0o700)
lock_path = event_dir / "event.lock"
lock_path.touch(mode=0o600, exist_ok=True)
os.chmod(lock_path, 0o600)
with lock_path.open("r+b") as lock:
fcntl.flock(lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
response_path = event_dir / "response.json"
event_path = event_dir / "event.json"
if response_path.exists():
response = _read_json(response_path)
response["owner_authorization_idempotent"] = True
return response
issued_at = utc_now()
expires_at = issued_at + timedelta(
seconds=int(request["expires_in_seconds"])
)
event: dict[str, Any] = {
"schema": SCHEMA,
"event_id": event_id,
"authorization_reference": reference,
"status": "AUTHORIZED",
"owner": {
"identity": principal.identity,
"role": principal.role,
"authenticated_scope": principal.authenticated_scope,
"credential_id": principal.credential_id or None,
"token_scope_digest_sha256": sha256_json(
sorted(principal.token_scopes)
),
"wildcard_scope_used": False,
},
"request": {
"task_id": request["task_id"],
"repository": request["repository"],
"base_ref": request["base_ref"],
"base_oid": request["base_oid"],
"target_branch": request["target_branch"],
"one_time_use": True,
"production_change_authorized": False,
"tag_change_authorized": False,
"baseline_change_authorized": False,
"main_write_authorized": False,
"allowed_operations": sorted(
REQUIRED_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS
),
"denied_operations": sorted(
REQUIRED_DENIED_OPERATIONS
),
},
"request_digest_sha256": request_digest,
"issued_at": iso_utc(issued_at),
"expires_at": iso_utc(expires_at),
}
event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(event)
_atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
bridge_request = dict(request)
bridge_request.pop("action")
bridge_request["owner_authorization_reference"] = reference
try:
result = self.provisioner.provision(
bridge_request,
OwnerContext(
identity=principal.identity,
role=principal.role,
authorization_reference=reference,
),
)
if not isinstance(result, dict):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"PROVISIONER_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502
)
if result.get("status") != "READY_FOR_CODE_AUTHORING":
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"PROVISIONER_NOT_READY",
409,
details={"status": result.get("status")},
)
if not _response_is_safe(result):
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"PROVISIONER_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_SENSITIVE_DATA", 500
)
except ProvisioningError as exc:
event.update(
{
"status": "PROVISIONING_BLOCKED",
"failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
"error": exc.code,
"error_status": exc.status,
}
)
event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
{
key: value
for key, value in event.items()
if key != "event_digest_sha256"
}
)
_atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
raise
except OwnerAuthorizationError as exc:
event.update(
{
"status": "PROVISIONING_BLOCKED",
"failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
"error": exc.code,
"error_status": exc.status,
}
)
event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
{
key: value
for key, value in event.items()
if key != "event_digest_sha256"
}
)
_atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
raise
except Exception as exc:
event.update(
{
"status": "PROVISIONING_FAILED",
"failed_at": iso_utc(utc_now()),
"error": "OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR",
}
)
event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
{
key: value
for key, value in event.items()
if key != "event_digest_sha256"
}
)
_atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
raise OwnerAuthorizationError(
"OWNER_AUTHORIZATION_BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR", 500
) from exc
completed_at = utc_now()
event.update(
{
"status": "CONSUMED",
"consumed_at": iso_utc(completed_at),
"approval_plan_id": result.get("approval_plan_id"),
"grant_id": result.get("grant_id"),
"grant_digest_sha256": result.get(
"grant_digest_sha256"
),
"branch_oid": result.get("branch_oid"),
"grant_consumed": result.get("grant_consumed") is True,
}
)
event["event_digest_sha256"] = sha256_json(
{
key: value
for key, value in event.items()
if key != "event_digest_sha256"
}
)
_atomic_write_json(event_path, event)
response = dict(result)
response.update(
{
"owner_authorization_event_id": event_id,
"owner_authorization_reference": reference,
"owner_authorization_digest_sha256": event[
"event_digest_sha256"
],
"owner_authorization_consumed": True,
"owner_authorization_idempotent": False,
}
)
_atomic_write_json(response_path, response)
return response