docs(openclaw): publish V2R1 G1 recovery candidate

docs-v2r1-correct-cleanup-scanner-evidence
docs(v2r1): record Gate 1 cleanup verification
2026-07-15 02:14:07 +08:00 · 2026-07-13 16:50:24 +08:00 · 2026-07-13 16:46:44 +08:00 · 2026-07-13 16:42:07 +08:00 · 2026-07-13 16:02:38 +08:00 · 2026-07-13 16:02:21 +08:00
337 changed files with 5261 additions and 3642 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
 status: PASS
 integration_path: tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py
 tests: pytest tests/v2r1 = 29 passed in 0.98s; pytest tests/integration = 3 passed in 0.18s
 runtime_flow: PASS - signed public ingress -> IngressAuthenticator -> RuntimeIdentityResolver -> RuntimeWiring.ingest -> ChannelAdapter -> MessageLedger.append -> SessionPool
 commit: a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e
 gate1: BLOCKED
 risk: high
 # Result
 ## Changed Files
 - `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`
 - `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`
 ## RED Evidence
 The baseline integration entrypoint from `f11513e9d7326caa827e59f4f10f07681633dfc0` was inadequate: its successful flow replaced `MessageLedger.remember()` and its alleged duplicate conflict changed the message ID.  The quality checks failed before this update because neither test proved the required runtime contract.
 ## Verification
 - The success path sends a real signed public ingress request and uses a `sys.setprofile` observer against the real `MessageLedger.remember` code object.  It preserves the production object and all behavior, then asserts zero legacy calls.
 - The duplicate path sends two authenticated requests under the same principal, tenant, cell, channel, account, peer, direction, session, and `message_id`; only `event_id` and body differ.  The second response must be `CONFLICT`, with exactly one ledger record and one session lease remaining.
 ## Commands
 ```text
 PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1 -q
 PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration -q
 ```
 ## Gate 1
 `BLOCKED`. This task makes the runtime integration entrypoint meaningful, but does not close the independent Gate 1 matrix, authenticated production OpenClaw registration, secret scanning, second clean-room review, or staging rollback rehearsal.
 ## Recommendation
 Keep this isolated evidence commit for independent review. Do not merge, tag, or deploy until all Gate 1 requirements have independent evidence.
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
 status: PASS
 commit: 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3
 tests:
  v2r1: "29 passed, exit code 0"
  integration: "3 passed, exit code 0"
 cleanup_scan:
  status: PASS
  findings: "No remaining conflict markers, unexplained worktree changes, unapproved temporary/cache/build artifacts, or scanner-detected secrets. Runtime SQLite was removed and its sidecars are ignored with exact root-anchored rules; tracked dist/ZIP artifacts are documented exceptions."
 risk: MEDIUM
 recommendation: "Push the controlled work branch, then request independent OpenClaw Gate Review; do not merge or release from this result alone."
 # V2R1 Gate 1 Codex Cleanup Result
 ## Scope and Git Baseline
 - Task: `V2R1-G1-CODEX-CLEANUP-20260713`
 - Branch: `work/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`
 - Cleanup implementation commit: `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`
 - Integration commit: `a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e`
 - Locked integration result baseline: `d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da`
 - `git merge-base --is-ancestor a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e HEAD`: exit code `0`
 - `git merge-base --is-ancestor d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da HEAD`: exit code `0`
 - Tree before this result-only commit: `94146e05f700921b12ef023eb4d8be771bae4047`
 The locked integration artifacts were not modified by cleanup:
 - `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`: blob `6b6732a4c73bbb7fb5273a05b897adce9da39a9a`
 - `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`: blob `e2d6ce3b037339385831f51cb0db42c86b2ae827`
 ## Cleanup Changes Verified
 Commit `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`:
 - removed the tracked runtime database `data/webops.sqlite3`;
 - added exact root-anchored ignore rules for `/data/webops.sqlite3`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-wal`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-shm`, and `/data/webops.sqlite3-journal`;
 - resolved tracked merge-conflict residue in `agents/registry.yaml` and `docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md`;
 - left the locked integration test and prior Codex result blobs unchanged.
 `git grep -n -E '^(<<<<<<<|=======|>>>>>>>)' -- . ':!source-baseline/*.zip'` returned no matches (exit code `1`, the expected no-match result).
 The repository scan found no unapproved `__pycache__`, `*.pyc`, `*.pyo`, `.pytest_cache`, `.mypy_cache`, `.ruff_cache`, `*.tmp`, `*.swp`, backup-suffix, or `.DS_Store` artifacts after verification cleanup. The following tracked artifacts are expected baseline exceptions, not unexplained generated files:
 - `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/` (2 tracked plugin distribution files);
 - `source-baseline/current_actual_deployment_source.zip`;
 - `source-baseline/previous_current_actual_deployment_source_from_webops_delta.zip`.
 Before creating this result file, `git status --porcelain=v1 --untracked-files=all` was empty with exit code `0`.
 ## Secret Scan
 Scanner: Gitleaks `8.30.1`, official Linux x64 release asset.
 - Asset: `/tmp/gitleaks_8.30.1_linux_x64.tar.gz.codex`
 - SHA-256: `551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb`
 - `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks git --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-git.json --log-opts=7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3 /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported `312 commits scanned`, approximately `1,384,427 bytes (1.38 MB)` scanned, and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
 - `git rev-list --count 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`: exit code `0`, `327` reachable commits. This Git reachability count is recorded separately and is not the Gitleaks scanned-commit count.
 - `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks dir --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-tree.json /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported approximately `1,214,737 bytes (1.21 MB)` scanned and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
 No secret content is reproduced in this report.
 ## Tests
 Command:
 ```bash
 PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1
 ```
 Output summary:
 ```text
 collected 29 items
 29 passed in 0.97s
 exit code: 0
 ```
 Command:
 ```bash
 PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration
 ```
 Output summary:
 ```text
 collected 3 items
 3 passed in 0.18s
 exit code: 0
 ```
 Environment: Linux, Python `3.12.3`, pytest `9.1.1`, pluggy `1.6.0`.
 ## Disposition
 The cleanup and requested test verification pass at the stated implementation commit. Risk remains `MEDIUM` until the controlled branch is pushed and independently fetched and reviewed by OpenClaw. This result does not authorize merge, tag creation, baseline update, staging, or production deployment.
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
 ---
 status: PASS
 commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
 task_id: TASK-CODEX-V2R1-G1-FINAL-VERIFY-RETRY-20260715T010807UTC8
 executor: CODEX_CANDIDATE_BUILDER
 source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
 source_branch: work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000
 candidate_ref: work/codex/v2r1-g1-recovery-candidate-20260715T010807UTC8
 tests:
  status: PASS
  v2r1:
    command: >-
      PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTEST_ADDOPTS='-p no:cacheprovider'
      PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1 -q
    exit_code: 0
    passed: 29
  integration:
    command: >-
      PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTEST_ADDOPTS='-p no:cacheprovider'
      PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration -q
    exit_code: 0
    passed: 3
 commands:
  - id: v2r1_tests
    exit_code: 0
  - id: integration_tests
    exit_code: 0
  - id: conflict_object_scan
    command: >-
      git grep -n -E '^(<<<<<<<|=======|>>>>>>>)'
      502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e --
      . ':(exclude)source-baseline/*.zip'
    exit_code: 1
    accepted_exit_code: 1
  - id: tracked_sqlite_object_scan
    command: >-
      git ls-tree -r --name-only
      502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e --
      data/webops.sqlite3 data/webops.sqlite3-wal
      data/webops.sqlite3-shm data/webops.sqlite3-journal
    exit_code: 0
  - id: webops_ignore_order
    command: >-
      grep -E '^/data/webops\.sqlite3(-wal|-shm|-journal)?$' .gitignore
    exit_code: 0
  - id: gitleaks_version
    command: /tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks version
    exit_code: 0
  - id: gitleaks_git
    command: >-
      /tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks git --no-banner --no-color
      --redact --report-format json --report-path "$TMP/git.json"
      --log-opts=502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
      /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/TASK-CODEX-V2R1-G1-FINAL-VERIFY-RETRY-20260715T010807UTC8
    exit_code: 0
  - id: gitleaks_dir
    command: >-
      /tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks dir --no-banner --no-color
      --redact --report-format json --report-path "$TMP/dir.json"
      /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/TASK-CODEX-V2R1-G1-FINAL-VERIFY-RETRY-20260715T010807UTC8
    exit_code: 0
 conflict_scan:
  status: PASS
  source_object: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
  exit_code: 1
  stdout_lines: 0
  conflict_count: 0
 tracked_sqlite:
  status: PASS
  exit_code: 0
  count: 0
  checked_paths:
    - data/webops.sqlite3
    - data/webops.sqlite3-wal
    - data/webops.sqlite3-shm
    - data/webops.sqlite3-journal
 webops_ignore_rules:
  status: PASS
  count: 4
  ordered:
    - /data/webops.sqlite3
    - /data/webops.sqlite3-wal
    - /data/webops.sqlite3-shm
    - /data/webops.sqlite3-journal
 gitleaks:
  status: PASS
  version: "8.30.1"
  git:
    exit_code: 0
    findings: 0
    report_json: []
  dir:
    exit_code: 0
    findings: 0
    report_json: []
 hmac:
  status: PASS
  method: AST assignment inspection
  target: tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py
  command: /usr/bin/python3 - tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py
  exit_code: 0
  internal_key_length: 39
  ingress_key_length: 39
 placeholder_count: 0
 mandatory_fields:
  status: PASS
  present:
    - status
    - commit
    - tests
    - cleanup_scan
    - risk
    - recommendation
 cleanup_scan:
  status: PASS
  details:
    temporary_reports_outside_worktree: true
    temporary_reports_removed: true
    unexpected_workspace_artifacts: 0
 secret_scan: PASS
 rollback:
  status: PASS
  required: false
 deployment: false
 merge: false
 tag: false
 baseline: false
 workspace_clean_at_test_completion: true
 risk: LOW
 recommendation: Advance this exact candidate commit to independent verification only; do not deploy, merge, tag, or alter baselines.
 ---
@@ -11,3 +11,7 @@ runtime/tmp/
 runtime/cache/
 logs/
 config/test_write_perms
 /data/webops.sqlite3
 /data/webops.sqlite3-wal
 /data/webops.sqlite3-shm
 /data/webops.sqlite3-journal
@@ -1 +1 @@
-V1R4C3
+V1R4C6
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
 """Append-only audit chain for AIOS V2R1."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 import hashlib
 import json
 from pathlib import Path
 import sqlite3
 from typing import Any
 from .tenant_context import canonical_json, isoformat, require_ident
 class AuditLog:
    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
        self.database = str(database)
        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
            db.execute(
                """
                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
                    seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
                    payload TEXT NOT NULL,
                    previous_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
                    event_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
                )
                """
            )
    def append(self, *, tenant_id: str, trace_id: str, event_type: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        trace_id = require_ident("trace_id", trace_id)
        event_type = require_ident("event_type", event_type)
        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
            previous = db.execute(
                "SELECT event_hash FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1"
            ).fetchone()
            previous_hash = previous[0] if previous else "GENESIS"
            body = {
                "tenant_id": tenant_id,
                "trace_id": trace_id,
                "event_type": event_type,
                "payload": payload,
                "previous_hash": previous_hash,
                "created_at": isoformat(),
            }
            digest = hashlib.sha256(
                canonical_json(body)
            ).hexdigest()
            db.execute(
                "INSERT INTO audit_events VALUES(NULL,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
                (
                    tenant_id,
                    trace_id,
                    event_type,
                    json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False),
                    previous_hash,
                    digest,
                    body["created_at"],
                ),
            )
            return digest
    def verify(self) -> bool:
        previous = "GENESIS"
        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
            rows = db.execute(
                "SELECT tenant_id,trace_id,event_type,payload,previous_hash,event_hash,created_at "
                "FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq"
            )
            for row in rows:
                body = {
                    "tenant_id": row[0],
                    "trace_id": row[1],
                    "event_type": row[2],
                    "payload": json.loads(row[3]),
                    "previous_hash": row[4],
                    "created_at": row[6],
                }
                if row[4] != previous:
                    return False
                digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(body)).hexdigest()
                if digest != row[5]:
                    return False
                previous = digest
        return True
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
 """AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell lifecycle CLI primitives."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 import json
 from pathlib import Path
 from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class CellRecord:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    version: str
    state: str
    config_digest: str
    created_at: str
 class CellManager:
    def __init__(self, registry: str | Path) -> None:
        self.registry = Path(registry)
        self.registry.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        if not self.registry.exists():
            self.registry.write_text("{\"cells\":{}}\n", encoding="utf-8")
    def _load(self) -> dict:
        return json.loads(self.registry.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    def _save(self, value: dict) -> None:
        self.registry.write_text(
            json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n",
            encoding="utf-8",
        )
    def create(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, version: str, digest: str) -> CellRecord:
        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
        data = self._load()
        if tenant_id in data["cells"]:
            raise ValidationError("tenant already has a cell")
        record = CellRecord(
            tenant_id,
            cell_id,
            version,
            "created",
            digest,
            datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        )
        data["cells"][tenant_id] = record.__dict__
        self._save(data)
        return record
    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> CellRecord:
        data = self._load()
        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
        if not item:
            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
        return CellRecord(**item)
    def transition(self, tenant_id: str, state: str) -> CellRecord:
        allowed = {"created", "starting", "healthy", "upgrading", "rollback", "failed"}
        if state not in allowed:
            raise ValidationError("invalid cell state")
        data = self._load()
        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
        if not item:
            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
        item["state"] = state
        self._save(data)
        return CellRecord(**item)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
 """The only V2R1 ingress adapter: verified context to routed ledger record."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime
 from threading import RLock
 from typing import Callable, Mapping, Any
 from .message_ledger import LedgerRecord, MessageLedger
 from .router import Route, TenantRouter
 from .session_pool import SessionLease, SessionPool
 from .tenant_context import CanonicalMessage, TenantContext, utc_now
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class IngressResult:
    record: LedgerRecord
    route: Route
    session: SessionLease
 class ChannelAdapter:
    """Fail-closed runtime ingress composition.
    The adapter intentionally accepts no tenant or Cell authority outside the
    signed context and TenantRouter.  A process lock keeps rollback handling
    deterministic for a single runtime while SQLite protects cross-process
    ledger writes.
    """
    def __init__(
        self,
        *,
        router: TenantRouter,
        ledger: MessageLedger,
        session_pool: SessionPool,
        signing_key: bytes,
        clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
    ) -> None:
        self._router = router
        self._ledger = ledger
        self._session_pool = session_pool
        self._signing_key = signing_key
        self._clock = clock
        self._lock = RLock()
    def ingest(self, *, token: str, message: Mapping[str, Any]) -> IngressResult:
        with self._lock:
            context = TenantContext.verify(token, self._signing_key, now=self._clock())
            canonical = CanonicalMessage.from_mapping(message)
            canonical.assert_context(context)
            route = self._router.assert_context_route(context)
            self._router.assert_message_route(canonical)
            self._session_pool.assert_available(context, route)
            existed = self._ledger.matches(canonical)
            record = self._ledger.append(canonical)
            try:
                lease = self._session_pool.acquire(context, route)
            except Exception:
                if not existed:
                    self._ledger.remove(record)
                raise
            return IngressResult(record=record, route=route, session=lease)
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
 """aios-cell command implementation for V2R1 Cell lifecycle."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 import argparse
 import json
 import sys
 from .cell_manager import CellManager
 def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="aios-cell")
    parser.add_argument("registry")
    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
    create = sub.add_parser("create")
    create.add_argument("tenant_id")
    create.add_argument("cell_id")
    create.add_argument("version")
    create.add_argument("digest")
    status = sub.add_parser("status")
    status.add_argument("tenant_id")
    transition = sub.add_parser("transition")
    transition.add_argument("tenant_id")
    transition.add_argument("state")
    return parser
 def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
    manager = CellManager(args.registry)
    if args.command == "create":
        result = manager.create(args.tenant_id, args.cell_id, args.version, args.digest)
    elif args.command == "status":
        result = manager.status(args.tenant_id)
    elif args.command == "transition":
        result = manager.transition(args.tenant_id, args.state)
    else:
        return 2
    print(json.dumps(result.__dict__, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
    return 0
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
 """OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter for AIOS V2R1."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 import json
 from pathlib import Path
 import subprocess
 from typing import Any, Mapping
 from .tenant_context import ValidationError, V2R1Error, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class CellSpec:
    tenant_id: str
    image: str
    runtime: str = "docker"
    port: int | None = None
    memory: str = "2g"
    cpus: str = "2"
    pids_limit: int = 512
    network: str = "bridge"
    env: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        if self.runtime not in {"docker", "podman"}:
            raise ValidationError("unsupported runtime")
        if not self.image:
            raise ValidationError("image required")
 class OpenClawFleet:
    def __init__(self, binary: str = "openclaw") -> None:
        self.binary = binary
    def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
        proc = subprocess.run(
            [self.binary, *args],
            check=False,
            text=True,
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
        )
        if proc.returncode:
            raise V2R1Error(proc.stderr.strip() or "openclaw command failed")
        data = json.loads(proc.stdout or "{}")
        if isinstance(data, dict):
            return data
        return {"result": data}
    def create(self, spec: CellSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
        return self._run([
            "fleet", "create", spec.tenant_id,
            "--image", spec.image,
            "--runtime", spec.runtime,
            "--json",
        ])
    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        return self._run(["fleet", "status", tenant_id, "--json"])
    def doctor(self, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
        args = ["fleet", "doctor"]
        if tenant_id:
            require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
            args.append(tenant_id)
        args.append("--json")
        return self._run(args)
    def backup(self, tenant_id: str, output: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
        return self._run(["fleet", "backup", tenant_id, "--out", str(output), "--json"])
    def restore(self, tenant_id: str, archive: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
        return self._run(["fleet", "restore", tenant_id, "--from", str(archive), "--json"])
    def upgrade(self, tenant_id: str, image: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
        return self._run(["fleet", "upgrade", tenant_id, "--image", image, "--json"])
 def load_inventory(path: str | Path) -> list[CellSpec]:
    raw = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    if raw.get("schema_version") != "aios.cells.v1":
        raise ValidationError("invalid inventory schema")
    result: list[CellSpec] = []
    seen: set[str] = set()
    for item in raw.get("cells", []):
        spec = CellSpec(
            tenant_id=item["tenant_id"],
            image=item["image"],
            runtime=item.get("runtime", "docker"),
            port=item.get("port"),
            env=tuple(item.get("env", [])),
        )
        if spec.tenant_id in seen:
            raise ValidationError("duplicate tenant")
        seen.add(spec.tenant_id)
        result.append(spec)
    if not result:
        raise ValidationError("no cells")
    return result
 def inventory_as_dict(items: list[CellSpec]) -> dict[str, Any]:
    return {"schema_version": "aios.cells.v1", "cells": [asdict(x) for x in items]}
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
 """Tenant-partitioned Hermes shared agent fabric primitives."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from contextlib import closing
 from pathlib import Path
 import sqlite3
 from typing import Any
 from .tenant_context import (
    CanonicalMessage,
    ConflictError,
    ScopeError,
    ValidationError,
    isoformat,
    require_ident,
 )
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class FabricJob:
    job_id: str
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    profile_id: str
    session_id: str
    event_id: str
    status: str = "queued"
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        for name in (
            "job_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "session_id", "event_id"
        ):
            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        if self.status not in {"queued", "running", "completed", "failed", "cancelled"}:
            raise ValidationError("invalid job status")
 class HermesFabric:
    """Shared scheduler storage with mandatory tenant partition keys."""
    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
        self.database = str(database)
        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
            db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
            db.execute(
                """
                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fabric_jobs (
                    job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    profile_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
                )
                """
            )
            db.execute(
                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fabric_tenant_queue "
                "ON fabric_jobs(tenant_id, cell_id, status)"
            )
    def enqueue(
        self,
        *,
        message: CanonicalMessage,
        profile_id: str,
    ) -> FabricJob:
        profile_id = require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
        if not message.command_capable:
            raise ScopeError("non-command events cannot create execution jobs")
        if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
            raise ScopeError("only authenticated human commands can create jobs")
        job = FabricJob(
            job_id=f"job-{message.event_id}",
            tenant_id=message.tenant_id,
            cell_id=message.cell_id,
            profile_id=profile_id,
            session_id=message.session_id,
            event_id=message.event_id,
        )
        now = isoformat()
        conflict: ConflictError | None = None
        try:
            with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
                db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
                db.execute(
                    "INSERT INTO fabric_jobs VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
                    (
                        job.job_id,
                        job.tenant_id,
                        job.cell_id,
                        job.profile_id,
                        job.session_id,
                        job.event_id,
                        job.status,
                        now,
                        now,
                    ),
                )
        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
            conflict = ConflictError(
                "fabric event already exists or violates queue uniqueness"
            )
        if conflict is not None:
            raise conflict
        return job
    def claim(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, profile_id: str) -> FabricJob | None:
        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
        require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
            row = db.execute(
                "SELECT * FROM fabric_jobs WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? "
                "AND profile_id=? AND status='queued' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1",
                (tenant_id, cell_id, profile_id),
            ).fetchone()
            if not row:
                db.commit()
                return None
            db.execute(
                "UPDATE fabric_jobs SET status='running', updated_at=? WHERE job_id=?",
                (isoformat(), row[0]),
            )
            db.commit()
        return FabricJob(*row[:7])
    def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
            count = db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM fabric_jobs").fetchone()[0]
        return {
            "component": "hermes_fabric",
            "jobs": count,
            "checked_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        }
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
 """Hermes shared fabric profile isolation primitives."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 import os
 from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class HermesProfile:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    profile_id: str
    hermes_home: Path
    workspace: Path
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
        if not self.hermes_home.is_absolute() or not self.workspace.is_absolute():
            raise ValidationError("profile paths must be absolute")
    @property
    def environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
        return {
            "HERMES_HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
            "HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
            "AIOS_TENANT_ID": self.tenant_id,
            "AIOS_CELL_ID": self.cell_id,
            "AIOS_PROFILE_ID": self.profile_id,
        }
    def prepare(self) -> None:
        self.hermes_home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        self.workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        os.chmod(self.hermes_home, 0o700)
        os.chmod(self.workspace, 0o700)
    def assert_path_allowed(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
        target = Path(path).resolve()
        for root in (self.hermes_home.resolve(), self.workspace.resolve()):
            if target == root or root in target.parents:
                return
        raise ValidationError("path escapes profile isolation boundary")
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
 """Fail-closed identity binding for authenticated external ingress.
 External payload claims are not authority.  An HMAC-authenticated envelope is
 the sole factory for :class:`AuthenticatedPrincipal`; the resolver then checks
 every claim against the authoritative ``TenantRouter`` before the runtime signs
 an internal ``TenantContext``.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import re
 from typing import Any, Mapping
 from .router import Route, TenantRouter
 from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, canonical_json, require_ident
 _PROVENANCE = object()
 _SIGNATURE_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
 _SCOPE_FIELDS = (
    "principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
    "channel_account_id", "session_id", "message",
 )
 class AuthenticationError(ValidationError):
    """Authentication or identity resolution failed without disclosing scope."""
@dataclass(frozen=True, init=False)
 class AuthenticatedPrincipal:
    """A principal which only the verified envelope factory can create."""
    principal_id: str
    def __init__(self, principal_id: str, *, _provenance: object) -> None:
        if _provenance is not _PROVENANCE:
            raise TypeError("AuthenticatedPrincipal is created by authenticated ingress only")
        object.__setattr__(self, "principal_id", require_ident("principal_id", principal_id))
    @classmethod
    def _verified(cls, principal_id: str) -> "AuthenticatedPrincipal":
        return cls(principal_id, _provenance=_PROVENANCE)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class IdentityClaims:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    channel: str
    channel_account_id: str
    session_id: str
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
            require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class AuthenticatedIngress:
    principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
    claims: IdentityClaims
    message: Mapping[str, Any]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class RuntimeIdentity:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    principal_id: str
    channel: str
    channel_account_id: str
    session_id: str
 class IngressAuthenticator:
    """Verify a canonical HMAC envelope before any identity lookup occurs."""
    def __init__(self, hmac_key: bytes) -> None:
        if not isinstance(hmac_key, bytes) or len(hmac_key) < 32:
            raise ValidationError("ingress HMAC key must be at least 32 bytes")
        self._hmac_key = hmac_key
    @staticmethod
    def _signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
        if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
            raise ValidationError("ingress request must be an object")
        if set(request) != {*_SCOPE_FIELDS, "signature"}:
            raise ValidationError("ingress request fields are invalid")
        values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS}
        if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
            raise ValidationError("ingress message must be an object")
        return values
    def authenticate(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> AuthenticatedIngress:
        values = self._signed_payload(request)
        signature = request["signature"]
        if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
        expected = hmac.new(
            self._hmac_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
        ).hexdigest()
        if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature):
            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
        return AuthenticatedIngress(
            principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
            claims=IdentityClaims(
                tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
                cell_id=values["cell_id"],
                channel=values["channel"],
                channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
                session_id=values["session_id"],
            ),
            message=dict(values["message"]),
        )
 class RuntimeIdentityResolver:
    """Resolve authenticated ingress identity through ``TenantRouter`` only."""
    def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
        self._router = router
    def resolve(
        self, principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal, claims: IdentityClaims
    ) -> RuntimeIdentity:
        if not isinstance(principal, AuthenticatedPrincipal):
            raise AuthenticationError("untrusted principal type")
        try:
            route: Route = self._router.resolve(
                channel=claims.channel,
                channel_account_id=claims.channel_account_id,
                principal_id=principal.principal_id,
                session_id=claims.session_id,
            )
        except (ScopeError, ValidationError) as exc:
            raise AuthenticationError("identity is not registered") from None
        expected = (
            claims.tenant_id, claims.cell_id, claims.channel,
            claims.channel_account_id, principal.principal_id, claims.session_id,
        )
        actual = (
            route.tenant_id, route.cell_id, route.channel,
            route.channel_account_id, route.principal_id, route.session_id,
        )
        if actual != expected:
            raise AuthenticationError("identity claims do not match authoritative route")
        return RuntimeIdentity(
            tenant_id=route.tenant_id,
            cell_id=route.cell_id,
            principal_id=route.principal_id,
            channel=route.channel,
            channel_account_id=route.channel_account_id,
            session_id=route.session_id or "",
        )
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
 """Tenant-scoped memory namespace and access policy for AIOS V2R1."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import PurePosixPath
 from typing import Literal
 from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, require_ident
 MemoryKind = Literal["session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class MemoryScope:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    profile_id: str
    session_id: str | None
    kind: MemoryKind
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
        if self.session_id is not None:
            require_ident("session_id", self.session_id)
        if self.kind not in {"session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"}:
            raise ValidationError("invalid memory kind")
        if self.kind == "session" and self.session_id is None:
            raise ValidationError("session memory requires session_id")
    @property
    def namespace(self) -> str:
        parts = ["tenant", self.tenant_id, "cell", self.cell_id]
        if self.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
            parts.extend(["profile", self.profile_id])
        if self.kind == "session":
            parts.extend(["session", str(self.session_id)])
        parts.extend(["memory", self.kind])
        return str(PurePosixPath(*parts))
    def assert_access(self, requested: "MemoryScope", *, write: bool = False) -> None:
        if self.tenant_id != requested.tenant_id:
            raise ScopeError("cross-tenant memory access denied")
        if self.cell_id != requested.cell_id:
            raise ScopeError("cross-cell memory access denied")
        if requested.kind == "shared_artifact":
            if write:
                raise ScopeError("shared artifacts are immutable")
            return
        if self.profile_id != requested.profile_id and requested.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
            raise ScopeError("cross-profile memory access denied")
        if requested.kind == "session" and self.session_id != requested.session_id:
            raise ScopeError("cross-session memory access denied")
 def qualify_memory_key(scope: MemoryScope, key: str) -> str:
    key = require_ident("memory_key", key)
    return f"{scope.namespace}/{key}"
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
 """Tenant-scoped append-only message ledger and exact quote resolver."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import timedelta
 from contextlib import closing
 import os
 from pathlib import Path
 import sqlite3
 from typing import Iterable
 from .tenant_context import (
    CanonicalMessage,
    ConflictError,
    ScopeError,
    ValidationError,
    isoformat,
    normalize_message_id,
    parse_time,
    utc_now,
 )
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class LedgerRecord:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    channel: str
    channel_account_id: str
    peer_id: str
    direction: str
    message_id: str
    event_id: str
    body: str
    occurred_at: str
    expires_at: str
 class MessageLedger:
    """Exact-ID ledger.
    The resolver never uses time windows, prefixes, similarity, or nearest-message
    fallbacks. Ambiguity and absence fail closed.
    """
    def __init__(self, database: str | Path, *, ttl_days: int = 7) -> None:
        if not 1 <= ttl_days <= 365:
            raise ValidationError("ttl_days must be between 1 and 365")
        self.database = Path(database)
        self.ttl_days = ttl_days
        self.database.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        self._initialize()
        try:
            os.chmod(self.database, 0o600)
        except OSError:
            pass
    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
        db = sqlite3.connect(str(self.database), timeout=30)
        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
        db.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
        return db
    def _initialize(self) -> None:
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            db.executescript(
                """
                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_ledger (
                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    direction TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(direction IN ('inbound','outbound','internal')),
                    message_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    body TEXT NOT NULL,
                    occurred_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    PRIMARY KEY(
                      tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
                      peer_id, direction, message_id
                    ),
                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, cell_id, event_id)
                );
                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_reply_lookup ON message_ledger(
                    tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
                    peer_id, message_id, expires_at
                );
                """
            )
    def append(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
        """Append one exact message through the runtime write path.
        This is intentionally the owner of validation, idempotency, and the
        immediate SQLite transaction.  Runtime callers must not depend on the
        legacy ``remember`` compatibility name.
        """
        message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
        now = utc_now()
        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(days=self.ttl_days))
        key = (
            message.tenant_id,
            message.cell_id,
            message.channel,
            message.channel_account_id,
            message.peer_id,
            message.direction,
            message_id,
        )
        storage_error: ConflictError | None = None
        try:
            with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
                db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
                existing = db.execute(
                    "SELECT event_id, body, occurred_at, expires_at FROM message_ledger "
                    "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
                    "AND peer_id=? AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
                    key,
                ).fetchone()
                if existing:
                    if existing["body"] != message.body:
                        db.rollback()
                        raise ConflictError("message ID collision with different content")
                    db.commit()
                    return LedgerRecord(
                        *key, existing["event_id"], existing["body"],
                        existing["occurred_at"], existing["expires_at"],
                    )
                db.execute(
                    "INSERT INTO message_ledger VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
                    (*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires, isoformat(now)),
                )
                db.commit()
        except sqlite3.Error:
            storage_error = ConflictError("ledger storage unavailable")
        if storage_error is not None:
            # Raise outside the sqlite exception handler so callers cannot inspect
            # a driver exception through __cause__ or __context__.
            raise storage_error
        return LedgerRecord(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires)
    def remember(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
        """Backward-compatible API wrapper for callers outside the runtime path."""
        return self.append(message)
    def matches(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> bool:
        """Whether this exact message is already durably represented."""
        message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            row = db.execute(
                "SELECT event_id, body FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND "
                "cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? "
                "AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
                (
                    message.tenant_id, message.cell_id, message.channel,
                    message.channel_account_id, message.peer_id, message.direction,
                    message_id,
                ),
            ).fetchone()
        return bool(row and row["event_id"] == message.event_id and row["body"] == message.body)
    def remove(self, record: LedgerRecord) -> None:
        """Compensate a newly appended record if a later ingress step fails."""
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            db.execute(
                "DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND "
                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? AND direction=? "
                "AND message_id=? AND event_id=?",
                (
                    record.tenant_id, record.cell_id, record.channel,
                    record.channel_account_id, record.peer_id, record.direction,
                    record.message_id, record.event_id,
                ),
            )
    def resolve_quote(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> str:
        if message.quoted_body is not None:
            return message.quoted_body
        if message.reply_to_message_id is None:
            raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
        reply_id = normalize_message_id(
            message.reply_to_message_id,
            field_name="reply_to_message_id",
        )
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            rows = db.execute(
                "SELECT direction, body, event_id FROM message_ledger "
                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
                "AND peer_id=? AND message_id=? AND expires_at>?",
                (
                    message.tenant_id,
                    message.cell_id,
                    message.channel,
                    message.channel_account_id,
                    message.peer_id,
                    reply_id,
                    isoformat(),
                ),
            ).fetchall()
        if len(rows) == 1:
            return str(rows[0]["body"])
        if len(rows) > 1:
            raise ConflictError("ambiguous reply ID across message directions")
        raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
    def purge_expired(self) -> int:
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            cursor = db.execute(
                "DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE expires_at<=?", (isoformat(),)
            )
            return cursor.rowcount
    def integrity_check(self) -> str:
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            return str(db.execute("PRAGMA integrity_check").fetchone()[0])
    def count(self) -> int:
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            return int(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_ledger").fetchone()[0])
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
 """Authoritative tenant registry and fail-closed message router."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from contextlib import contextmanager
 from contextlib import closing
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 import sqlite3
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Callable, Iterator
 from .tenant_context import (
    CanonicalMessage,
    ConflictError,
    ScopeError,
    TenantContext,
    ValidationError,
    isoformat,
    parse_time,
    require_ident,
    utc_now,
 )
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class Route:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    channel: str
    channel_account_id: str
    principal_id: str
    session_id: str | None
 class TenantRouter:
    """SQLite-backed routing registry.
    Channel accounts are authoritative tenant ownership boundaries. Principal and
    session bindings may narrow a route, but can never move traffic to another
    tenant or Cell.
    """
    def __init__(
        self, database: str | Path, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now
    ) -> None:
        self.database = str(database)
        self._clock = clock
        self._initialize()
    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.database, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
        return connection
    @contextmanager
    def _transaction(self) -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
        connection = self._connect()
        try:
            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
            yield connection
            connection.execute("COMMIT")
        except Exception:
            connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
            raise
        finally:
            connection.close()
    def _initialize(self) -> None:
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            db.executescript(
                """
                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants (
                    tenant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
                    status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(status IN ('active','suspended','retired')),
                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
                );
                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channel_routes (
                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id),
                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
                );
                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_routes (
                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
                    FOREIGN KEY(channel, channel_account_id)
                      REFERENCES channel_routes(channel, channel_account_id)
                );
                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_bindings (
                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
                    PRIMARY KEY(tenant_id, session_id),
                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
                );
                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_session_expiry
                  ON session_bindings(expires_at);
                """
            )
    def register_tenant(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> None:
        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
        now = isoformat(self._clock())
        with self._transaction() as db:
            row = db.execute(
                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
            ).fetchone()
            if row:
                if row["cell_id"] != cell_id:
                    raise ConflictError("tenant already bound to another cell")
                db.execute(
                    "UPDATE tenants SET status='active', updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
                    (now, tenant_id),
                )
                return
            conflict = db.execute(
                "SELECT tenant_id FROM tenants WHERE cell_id=?", (cell_id,)
            ).fetchone()
            if conflict:
                raise ConflictError("cell already belongs to another tenant")
            db.execute(
                "INSERT INTO tenants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
                (tenant_id, cell_id, "active", now, now),
            )
    def set_tenant_status(self, tenant_id: str, status: str) -> None:
        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        if status not in {"active", "suspended", "retired"}:
            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant status")
        with self._transaction() as db:
            cursor = db.execute(
                "UPDATE tenants SET status=?, updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
                (status, isoformat(self._clock()), tenant_id),
            )
            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
                raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
    def bind_channel(
        self,
        *,
        tenant_id: str,
        channel: str,
        channel_account_id: str,
    ) -> None:
        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
        with self._transaction() as db:
            tenant = db.execute(
                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
            ).fetchone()
            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active":
                raise ValidationError("tenant is not active")
            existing = db.execute(
                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM channel_routes "
                "WHERE channel=? AND channel_account_id=?",
                (channel, channel_account_id),
            ).fetchone()
            if existing:
                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != tenant["cell_id"]:
                    raise ConflictError("channel account already belongs to another tenant")
                return
            db.execute(
                "INSERT INTO channel_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
                (channel, channel_account_id, tenant_id, tenant["cell_id"], isoformat(self._clock())),
            )
    def bind_principal(
        self,
        *,
        tenant_id: str,
        channel: str,
        channel_account_id: str,
        principal_id: str,
    ) -> None:
        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
        route = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
        if route.tenant_id != tenant_id:
            raise ScopeError("principal cannot cross tenant boundary")
        with self._transaction() as db:
            existing = db.execute(
                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
            ).fetchone()
            if existing:
                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != route.cell_id:
                    raise ConflictError("principal route conflict")
                return
            db.execute(
                "INSERT INTO principal_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
                (
                    channel,
                    channel_account_id,
                    principal_id,
                    tenant_id,
                    route.cell_id,
                    isoformat(self._clock()),
                ),
            )
    def bind_session(
        self,
        *,
        tenant_id: str,
        session_id: str,
        cell_id: str,
        principal_id: str,
        ttl_seconds: int = 86400,
    ) -> None:
        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
        session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
        if not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= 31 * 86400:
            raise ValidationError("invalid session TTL")
        now = self._clock()
        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
        with self._transaction() as db:
            tenant = db.execute(
                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
            ).fetchone()
            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active" or tenant["cell_id"] != cell_id:
                raise ScopeError("session cell does not match tenant")
            existing = db.execute(
                "SELECT cell_id, principal_id FROM session_bindings "
                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
                (tenant_id, session_id),
            ).fetchone()
            if existing and (
                existing["cell_id"] != cell_id or existing["principal_id"] != principal_id
            ):
                raise ConflictError("session is already bound to another principal or cell")
            db.execute(
                "INSERT INTO session_bindings VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?) "
                "ON CONFLICT(tenant_id,session_id) DO UPDATE SET expires_at=excluded.expires_at",
                (tenant_id, session_id, cell_id, principal_id, expires, isoformat(now)),
            )
    def resolve_channel(self, channel: str, channel_account_id: str) -> Route:
        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            row = db.execute(
                "SELECT r.tenant_id, r.cell_id, t.status FROM channel_routes r "
                "JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=r.tenant_id "
                "WHERE r.channel=? AND r.channel_account_id=?",
                (channel, channel_account_id),
            ).fetchone()
        if not row:
            raise ScopeError("unknown channel account")
        if row["status"] != "active":
            raise ScopeError("tenant is not active")
        return Route(row["tenant_id"], row["cell_id"], channel, channel_account_id, "", None)
    def resolve(
        self,
        *,
        channel: str,
        channel_account_id: str,
        principal_id: str,
        session_id: str | None = None,
    ) -> Route:
        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
        base = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
            principal = db.execute(
                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
            ).fetchone()
            if principal and (
                principal["tenant_id"] != base.tenant_id or principal["cell_id"] != base.cell_id
            ):
                raise ScopeError("principal route violates channel ownership")
            if session_id is not None:
                session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
                session = db.execute(
                    "SELECT cell_id, principal_id, expires_at FROM session_bindings "
                    "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
                    (base.tenant_id, session_id),
                ).fetchone()
                if not session:
                    raise ScopeError("unknown session")
                if parse_time(session["expires_at"]) <= self._clock():
                    raise ScopeError("session expired")
                if session["cell_id"] != base.cell_id or session["principal_id"] != principal_id:
                    raise ScopeError("session scope mismatch")
        return Route(
            base.tenant_id,
            base.cell_id,
            channel,
            channel_account_id,
            principal_id,
            session_id,
        )
    def assert_message_route(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> Route:
        route = self.resolve(
            channel=message.channel,
            channel_account_id=message.channel_account_id,
            principal_id=message.principal_id,
            session_id=message.session_id,
        )
        if message.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or message.cell_id != route.cell_id:
            raise ScopeError("message claims do not match authoritative route")
        return route
    def assert_context_route(self, context: TenantContext) -> Route:
        route = self.resolve(
            channel=context.channel,
            channel_account_id=context.channel_account_id,
            principal_id=context.principal_id,
            session_id=context.session_id,
        )
        if context.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or context.cell_id != route.cell_id:
            raise ScopeError("context claims do not match authoritative route")
        return route
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
 """V2R1 runtime composition root for authenticated channel ingress."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 from .channel_adapter import ChannelAdapter, IngressResult
 from .identity import (
    AuthenticationError,
    IngressAuthenticator,
    RuntimeIdentity,
    RuntimeIdentityResolver,
 )
 from .message_ledger import MessageLedger
 from .router import TenantRouter
 from .session_pool import SessionPool
 from .tenant_context import ConflictError, ScopeError, TenantContext, ValidationError, utc_now
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class RuntimeIngressResponse:
    """Sanitised boundary response; no exception text crosses external ingress."""
    status: str
    result: IngressResult | None = None
 class RuntimeWiring:
    """Own the only external-to-runtime identity binding and message path.
    The request accepted by :meth:`ingest` is an HMAC-authenticated envelope;
    tenant, cell, channel, account, session, principal, and message claims are
    signed together.  The envelope is then resolved against ``TenantRouter``.
    Only that resolved identity can mint the short-lived internal context passed
    to ``ChannelAdapter``.
    """
    def __init__(
        self,
        *,
        router: TenantRouter,
        ledger: MessageLedger,
        session_pool: SessionPool,
        channel_adapter: ChannelAdapter,
        identity_resolver: RuntimeIdentityResolver,
        ingress_authenticator: IngressAuthenticator,
        internal_signing_key: bytes,
        clock: Callable[[], datetime],
    ) -> None:
        self.router = router
        self.ledger = ledger
        self.session_pool = session_pool
        self.channel_adapter = channel_adapter
        self.identity_resolver = identity_resolver
        self._ingress_authenticator = ingress_authenticator
        self._internal_signing_key = internal_signing_key
        self._clock = clock
    @classmethod
    def create(
        cls,
        root: str | Path,
        *,
        signing_key: bytes,
        ingress_hmac_key: bytes | None = None,
        clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
    ) -> "RuntimeWiring":
        if not isinstance(signing_key, bytes) or len(signing_key) < 32:
            raise ValidationError("internal signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
        # Kept optional for one controlled migration release; the external
        # request path still cannot supply a TenantContext token.
        hmac_key = ingress_hmac_key if ingress_hmac_key is not None else signing_key
        root_path = Path(root)
        root_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        router = TenantRouter(root_path / "router.sqlite3", clock=clock)
        ledger = MessageLedger(root_path / "message_ledger.sqlite3")
        session_pool = SessionPool(router)
        adapter = ChannelAdapter(
            router=router,
            ledger=ledger,
            session_pool=session_pool,
            signing_key=signing_key,
            clock=clock,
        )
        return cls(
            router=router,
            ledger=ledger,
            session_pool=session_pool,
            channel_adapter=adapter,
            identity_resolver=RuntimeIdentityResolver(router),
            ingress_authenticator=IngressAuthenticator(hmac_key),
            internal_signing_key=signing_key,
            clock=clock,
        )
    def _issue_internal_context(self, identity: RuntimeIdentity) -> TenantContext:
        """Mint internal scope only after all claims matched the router route."""
        return TenantContext.issue(
            lifetime_seconds=300,
            now=self._clock(),
            tenant_id=identity.tenant_id,
            cell_id=identity.cell_id,
            principal_id=identity.principal_id,
            principal_type="authenticated_user",
            session_id=identity.session_id,
            task_id=None,
            channel=identity.channel,
            channel_account_id=identity.channel_account_id,
        )
    def ingest(self, *, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> RuntimeIngressResponse:
        """Authenticate, resolve, issue internal context, then append and lease.
        The only successful route is ``IngressAuthenticator`` ->
        ``RuntimeIdentityResolver`` -> ``ChannelAdapter`` ->
        ``MessageLedger.append`` + ``SessionPool``.  The legacy caller-supplied
        TenantContext token interface is intentionally not accepted.
        """
        try:
            ingress = self._ingress_authenticator.authenticate(request)
            identity = self.identity_resolver.resolve(ingress.principal, ingress.claims)
            context = self._issue_internal_context(identity)
            result = self.channel_adapter.ingest(
                token=context.sign(self._internal_signing_key), message=ingress.message
            )
            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="ACCEPTED", result=result)
        except (AuthenticationError, ScopeError):
            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="AUTH_FAILED")
        except ValidationError:
            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="VALIDATION_FAILED")
        except ConflictError:
            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="CONFLICT")
        except Exception:
            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="INTERNAL_ERROR")
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
 """Tenant and Cell scoped secret reference model.
 This module never stores secret values. It stores ownership and retrieval scope
 metadata for integration with a real secret broker.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import Literal
 from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class SecretRef:
    secret_id: str
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    kind: Literal["channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"]
    version: str
    broker_path: str
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        for name in ("secret_id", "cell_id", "version"):
            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        if self.kind not in {"channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"}:
            raise ValidationError("invalid secret kind")
        if not self.broker_path.startswith("secret://"):
            raise ValidationError("secret broker path required")
    def can_be_used_by(self, *, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> bool:
        return self.tenant_id == tenant_id and self.cell_id == cell_id
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
 """Process-local session lease pool backed by TenantRouter authority."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from threading import RLock
 from .router import Route, TenantRouter
 from .tenant_context import ScopeError, TenantContext
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class SessionLease:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    principal_id: str
    session_id: str
 class SessionPool:
    """Tracks active leases without creating a second session authority store."""
    def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
        self._router = router
        self._leases: dict[tuple[str, str], SessionLease] = {}
        self._lock = RLock()
    @staticmethod
    def _assert_route(context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
        if (
            route.tenant_id != context.tenant_id
            or route.cell_id != context.cell_id
            or route.principal_id != context.principal_id
            or route.session_id != context.session_id
        ):
            raise ScopeError("session lease does not match authoritative route")
    def assert_available(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
        """Re-resolve the context from the router before a ledger mutation."""
        self._assert_route(context, route)
        self._assert_route(context, self._router.assert_context_route(context))
    def acquire(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> SessionLease:
        self._assert_route(context, route)
        lease = SessionLease(
            tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
            cell_id=context.cell_id,
            principal_id=context.principal_id,
            session_id=context.session_id,
        )
        with self._lock:
            return self._leases.setdefault((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), lease)
    def release(self, lease: SessionLease) -> None:
        with self._lock:
            self._leases.pop((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), None)
    def active_count(self) -> int:
        with self._lock:
            return len(self._leases)
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
 """Signed tenant context and canonical message contract for AIOS V2R1."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 import base64
 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import json
 import re
 import secrets
 from typing import Any, Mapping
 VERSION = "V2R1C0"
 MAX_SAFE_INTEGER = 9_007_199_254_740_991
 TENANT_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,38}[a-z0-9])?$")
 IDENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,126}[A-Za-z0-9])?$")
 class V2R1Error(RuntimeError):
    pass
 class ValidationError(V2R1Error):
    pass
 class ScopeError(V2R1Error):
    pass
 class ConflictError(V2R1Error):
    pass
 def utc_now() -> datetime:
    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 def isoformat(value: datetime | None = None) -> str:
    return (value or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
 def parse_time(value: str) -> datetime:
    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
        raise ValidationError("timestamp must be a non-empty string")
    text = value.strip()
    if text.endswith("Z"):
        text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
    try:
        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
    except ValueError as exc:
        raise ValidationError(f"invalid timestamp: {value!r}") from exc
    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
        raise ValidationError("timestamp must include timezone")
    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
 def require_ident(name: str, value: Any, *, tenant: bool = False) -> str:
    if not isinstance(value, str):
        raise ValidationError(f"{name} must be a string")
    value = value.strip()
    pattern = TENANT_RE if tenant else IDENT_RE
    if not pattern.fullmatch(value):
        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}: {value!r}")
    return value
 def normalize_message_id(value: Any, *, field_name: str = "message_id") -> str:
    if isinstance(value, bool):
        raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} cannot be boolean")
    if isinstance(value, str):
        value = value.strip()
        if not value or len(value) > 256 or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in value):
            raise ValidationError(f"invalid {field_name}")
        return value
    if isinstance(value, int):
        if abs(value) > MAX_SAFE_INTEGER:
            raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} is an unsafe numeric ID")
        return str(value)
    raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} must be a lossless string or safe integer")
 def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
    return json.dumps(
        value, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True
    ).encode("utf-8")
 def _b64(data: bytes) -> str:
    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
 def _unb64(value: str) -> bytes:
    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class TenantContext:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    principal_id: str
    principal_type: str
    session_id: str
    task_id: str | None
    channel: str
    channel_account_id: str
    issued_at: str
    expires_at: str
    nonce: str
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        for name in (
            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "session_id",
            "channel", "channel_account_id", "nonce",
        ):
            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
        if self.task_id is not None:
            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
        issued = parse_time(self.issued_at)
        expires = parse_time(self.expires_at)
        if expires <= issued or expires - issued > timedelta(hours=1):
            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant context lifetime")
    @classmethod
    def issue(cls, *, lifetime_seconds: int = 300, now: datetime | None = None, **scope: Any) -> "TenantContext":
        if not 1 <= lifetime_seconds <= 3600:
            raise ValidationError("lifetime_seconds must be between 1 and 3600")
        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
        return cls(
            **scope,
            issued_at=isoformat(current),
            expires_at=isoformat(current + timedelta(seconds=lifetime_seconds)),
            nonce=secrets.token_hex(16),
        )
    def sign(self, key: bytes) -> str:
        if len(key) < 32:
            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
        payload = _b64(canonical_json(asdict(self)))
        signature = _b64(hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest())
        return f"{payload}.{signature}"
    @classmethod
    def verify(
        cls,
        token: str,
        key: bytes,
        *,
        now: datetime | None = None,
        expected_tenant_id: str | None = None,
        expected_cell_id: str | None = None,
    ) -> "TenantContext":
        if len(key) < 32:
            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
        try:
            payload, encoded_signature = token.split(".", 1)
            actual = _unb64(encoded_signature)
            if encoded_signature != _b64(actual):
                raise ValidationError("non-canonical tenant context signature")
            data = json.loads(_unb64(payload))
        except Exception as exc:
            raise ValidationError("malformed tenant context token") from exc
        expected = hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
        if not hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected):
            raise ValidationError("tenant context signature mismatch")
        context = cls(**data)
        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
        if current < parse_time(context.issued_at) - timedelta(seconds=60):
            raise ValidationError("tenant context issued in future")
        if current >= parse_time(context.expires_at):
            raise ValidationError("tenant context expired")
        if expected_tenant_id and context.tenant_id != expected_tenant_id:
            raise ScopeError("tenant mismatch")
        if expected_cell_id and context.cell_id != expected_cell_id:
            raise ScopeError("cell mismatch")
        return context
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class CanonicalMessage:
    tenant_id: str
    cell_id: str
    principal_id: str
    principal_type: str
    origin_type: str
    channel: str
    channel_account_id: str
    peer_id: str
    conversation_id: str
    session_id: str
    task_id: str | None
    event_id: str
    message_id: str
    reply_to_message_id: str | None
    direction: str
    command_capable: bool
    occurred_at: str
    received_at: str
    body: str
    quoted_body: str | None
    adapter_name: str
    adapter_version: str
    schema_version: str = "aios.message.v1"
    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
        if self.schema_version != "aios.message.v1":
            raise ValidationError("unsupported message schema version")
        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
        for name in (
            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "origin_type", "channel",
            "channel_account_id", "peer_id", "conversation_id", "session_id",
            "event_id", "adapter_name", "adapter_version",
        ):
            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
        if self.task_id is not None:
            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
        normalize_message_id(self.message_id)
        if self.reply_to_message_id is not None:
            normalize_message_id(self.reply_to_message_id, field_name="reply_to_message_id")
        if self.direction not in {"inbound", "outbound", "internal"}:
            raise ValidationError("invalid direction")
        if not isinstance(self.command_capable, bool):
            raise ValidationError("command_capable must be boolean")
        parse_time(self.occurred_at)
        parse_time(self.received_at)
        if not isinstance(self.body, str):
            raise ValidationError("body must be a string")
        if self.quoted_body is not None and not isinstance(self.quoted_body, str):
            raise ValidationError("quoted_body must be a string or null")
    @classmethod
    def from_mapping(cls, data: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalMessage":
        content = data.get("content") or {}
        adapter = data.get("adapter") or {}
        if not isinstance(content, Mapping) or not isinstance(adapter, Mapping):
            raise ValidationError("content and adapter must be objects")
        values = dict(data)
        return cls(
            schema_version=values.get("schema_version", "aios.message.v1"),
            tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
            cell_id=values["cell_id"],
            principal_id=values["principal_id"],
            principal_type=values["principal_type"],
            origin_type=values["origin_type"],
            channel=values["channel"],
            channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
            peer_id=values["peer_id"],
            conversation_id=values["conversation_id"],
            session_id=values["session_id"],
            task_id=values.get("task_id"),
            event_id=values["event_id"],
            message_id=normalize_message_id(values["message_id"]),
            reply_to_message_id=(
                normalize_message_id(values["reply_to_message_id"], field_name="reply_to_message_id")
                if values.get("reply_to_message_id") is not None else None
            ),
            direction=values["direction"],
            command_capable=values["command_capable"],
            occurred_at=values["occurred_at"],
            received_at=values["received_at"],
            body=content.get("body", ""),
            quoted_body=content.get("quoted_body"),
            adapter_name=adapter["name"],
            adapter_version=adapter["version"],
        )
    def assert_context(self, context: TenantContext) -> None:
        fields = (
            "tenant_id", "cell_id", "principal_id", "session_id", "task_id",
            "channel", "channel_account_id",
        )
        mismatches = [name for name in fields if getattr(self, name) != getattr(context, name)]
        if mismatches:
            raise ScopeError("message/context mismatch: " + ", ".join(mismatches))
    @property
    def is_authenticated_human_command(self) -> bool:
        return (
            self.direction == "inbound"
            and self.command_capable
            and self.principal_type == "authenticated_user"
            and self.origin_type == "channel_user"
        )
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class PolicyDecision:
    allowed: bool
    approval_required: bool
    code: str
    reason: str
 READ_ONLY_TOOLS = frozenset({
    "read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
    "memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
 })
 def evaluate_tool_call(tool_name: str, message: CanonicalMessage) -> PolicyDecision:
    normalized = tool_name.strip().lower() if isinstance(tool_name, str) else ""
    if not normalized:
        return PolicyDecision(False, False, "invalid_tool", "tool name missing")
    if normalized in READ_ONLY_TOOLS:
        return PolicyDecision(True, False, "read_only", "read-only operation")
    if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
        return PolicyDecision(
            False, False, "origin_denied",
            "side effects require an authenticated current human command",
        )
    return PolicyDecision(
        True, True, "approval_required",
        "authenticated human side effect requires explicit approval",
    )
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 /data/aios-gitops/workspace/active-runtime
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 {"ts": 1783642009.9384289, "name": "another_cmd.json"}
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 {"ts": 1783642009.9384289, "name": "stuck_cmd.json"}
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
 # CMD-20260710-sr01-gitea-branch-sync
 ## Objective
 Fix Gitea DB branch index desync: Gitea DB 与 bare repo 分支列表不一致（Gitea API 返回 50 条 vs bare repo 55 条）。
 ## Analysis
 - Root cause: `h_branch_sync()` 之前依赖 Gitea API `POST /api/v1/repos/aios/aios/branches` 分页查询
 - Token scope 不足 `read:admin` 导致只能获取 50 条（默认 limit），但 total 是 55
 - 临时修复: 改为 `git ls-remote --heads` 直接枚举 bare repo，绕过了 Gitea API 分页问题
 - 但根本问题：Gitea DB 索引没有完全同步 bare repo，需要调查 Gitea 后台同步机制
 ## Plan
 1. 诊断 Gitea DB 与 bare repo 实际的差异详情
 2. 决定修复方案：full resync Gitea, or fix the sync mechanism
 3. 实现/验证
 4. 更新 baseline
 ## Status
 pending
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 {"ts": 1783642009.9169936, "name": "cmd1.json"}
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 {"ts": 1783642009.9169936, "name": "cmd2.json"}
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 {"ts": 1783643569.9295633, "name": "recent"}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783583895",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: stuck",
  "body": "1 commands stuck in running/ for >30m",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T15:58:15+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783583993",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: stuck",
  "body": "1 commands stuck in running/ for >30m",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T15:59:53+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783584042",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T16:00:42+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783597695",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T19:48:15+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783597737",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T19:48:57+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783598337",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T19:58:57+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783598938",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T20:08:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783599538",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T20:18:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783600138",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T20:28:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783600738",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T20:38:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783601338",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T20:48:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783601938",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T20:58:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783602538",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T21:08:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783603138",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T21:18:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783603738",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T21:28:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783604338",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T21:38:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783604938",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T21:48:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783605538",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T21:58:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783606138",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T22:08:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783606738",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T22:18:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783607338",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T22:28:58+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783607939",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T22:38:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783608539",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T22:48:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783609139",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T22:58:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783609739",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T23:08:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783610339",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T23:18:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783610939",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T23:28:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783611539",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T23:38:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783612139",
  "title": "⚠️ Issue Detected: branch_sync",
  "body": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "urgency": "warning",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T23:48:59+0800"
 }
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 {
  "nid": "n-1783643869",
  "title": "Stuck Commands Cleaned",
  "body": "Moved 2 stuck commands to failed/",
  "urgency": "info",
  "ts": "2026-07-10T08:37:49+0800"
 }
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 {"check": "stuck", "severity": "medium", "diagnosis": "stuck commands", "stuck": [{"n": "stuck_cmd.json", "ts": 1783642009.9384289}, {"n": "another_cmd.json", "ts": 1783642009.9384289}], "fix": "move_to_failed"}
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 {"check": "branch_sync", "severity": "high", "diagnosis": "missing branches", "branches": ["br1"], "fix": "sync_branches"}
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783584042",
  "created": "2026-07-09T16:00:42+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783597695",
  "created": "2026-07-09T19:48:15+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783597737",
  "created": "2026-07-09T19:48:57+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783598337",
  "created": "2026-07-09T19:58:57+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783598938",
  "created": "2026-07-09T20:08:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783599538",
  "created": "2026-07-09T20:18:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783600138",
  "created": "2026-07-09T20:28:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783600738",
  "created": "2026-07-09T20:38:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783601338",
  "created": "2026-07-09T20:48:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783601938",
  "created": "2026-07-09T20:58:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783602538",
  "created": "2026-07-09T21:08:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783603138",
  "created": "2026-07-09T21:18:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783603738",
  "created": "2026-07-09T21:28:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783604338",
  "created": "2026-07-09T21:38:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783604938",
  "created": "2026-07-09T21:48:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783605538",
  "created": "2026-07-09T21:58:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783606138",
  "created": "2026-07-09T22:08:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783606738",
  "created": "2026-07-09T22:18:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783607338",
  "created": "2026-07-09T22:28:58+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783607939",
  "created": "2026-07-09T22:38:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783608539",
  "created": "2026-07-09T22:48:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783609139",
  "created": "2026-07-09T22:58:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783609739",
  "created": "2026-07-09T23:08:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783610339",
  "created": "2026-07-09T23:18:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783610939",
  "created": "2026-07-09T23:28:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783611539",
  "created": "2026-07-09T23:38:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783612139",
  "created": "2026-07-09T23:48:59+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "5 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "patch/agent-event-bus-unified",
    "patch/agent-gpt-message-plane",
    "patch/group-owner-agent-context-isolation",
    "patch/gitops-change-archive-audit",
    "patch/user-profile-isolation"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
 {
  "patch_id": "patch-1783643869",
  "created": "2026-07-10T08:37:49+0800",
  "check": "branch_sync",
  "severity": "high",
  "diagnosis": "2 branches missing from Gitea DB",
  "branches": [
    "br1",
    "br2"
  ],
  "stuck": [],
  "fix": "sync_branches"
 }
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 this is not json
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 <<<<<<< HEAD
 # AIOS Agent Command Plane Registry
 # Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
 version: 1.0.0
-created_at: 2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00
+created_at: "2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00"
 baseline: V1R3C1
 commands:
@@ -12,6 +11,22 @@ commands:
  completed_path: "agents/commands/completed/"
  failed_path: "agents/commands/failed/"
 directories:
  commands/active: "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
  commands/running: "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
  commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
  commands/failed: "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
 lifecycle:
  new: active/
  running: running/
  success: completed/
  failure: failed/
 # Command lifecycle state machine:
 # active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
 #                                                          → failure → failed/
 policies:
  path: "agents/policies/"
  source: "git"
@@ -38,30 +53,4 @@ audit:
  agent_runs: "audit/agent-runs/"
  version_history: "audit/version-history/"
  command_history: "audit/command-history/"
-=======
+  interaction_history: "audit/interaction-history/"
 # AIOS Agent Command Registry
 # Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
 registry_version: 1.0.0
 created_at: "2026-07-08T15:44:00+08:00"
 baseline: V1R3C1
 directories:
  commands/active:    "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
  commands/running:   "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
  commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
  commands/failed:    "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
 state: agents/state/
 policies: agents/policies/
 lifecycle:
  new:     active/
  running: running/
  success: completed/
  failure: failed/
 # Command lifecycle state machine:
 # active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
 #                                                          → failure → failed/
 >>>>>>> 4d18ee0 (feat(cmd): enable Agent Command Plane, audit plane, and Web UI dashboard)
@@ -76,25 +76,20 @@ def h_api():
    except Exception as e: return {"ok": False, "err": str(e)}
 def h_branch_sync():
-    bare = Path("/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios.git")
+    bare = Path("/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios-v23.git")
    try:
        # Use git command directly instead of Gitea API to avoid auth/permission issues
        r = subprocess.run(["git","--git-dir",str(bare),"branch","-a"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)
        if r.returncode != 0: return {"ok": False, "err": r.stderr[:200]}
        bb = set(l.strip().replace("remotes/origin/","").replace("* ","") for l in r.stdout.strip().split("\n") if l.strip())
-        # Use git ls-remote to get remote branches instead of Gitea API
+        gb = []; pg = 1
-        r2 = subprocess.run(["git","ls-remote","--heads",GITEA_URL.split("//")[0]+"//"+GITEA_TOKEN+"@"+GITEA_URL.split("//")[1]+"/aios/aios.git"],
+        while True:
-                         capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)
+            r2 = requests.get(f"{GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/aios/aios-v23/branches", params={"page":pg,"limit":50},
-        if r2.returncode != 0: return {"ok": False, "bare": len(bb), "gitea": 0, "err": "ls-remote failed: "+r2.stderr[:200]}
+                            headers={"Authorization":f"token {GITEA_TOKEN}"}, timeout=10)
-        gb = []
+            if r2.status_code != 200: break
-        for line in r2.stdout.strip().split("\n"):
+            d = r2.json()
-            if line.strip():
+            if not d: break
-                parts = line.strip().split(None, 1)
+            gb.extend(b["name"] for b in d); pg += 1
-                if len(parts) == 2:
+        gs = set(gb); miss = bb - gs
                    ref = parts[1].replace("refs/heads/","")
                    gb.append(ref)
        gs = set(gb)
        miss = bb - gs
        return {"ok": len(miss)==0, "bare": len(bb), "gitea": len(gs), "missing": list(miss)[:10]}
    except Exception as e: return {"ok": False, "err": str(e)}
@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
 {
-  "ts": "2026-07-11T02:23:29+0800",
+ "ts": "2026-07-09T00:00:00+09:00",
-  "ok": false,
+ "ok": true,
 "checks": {
-    "gitea": false,
+ "git_object_permission": true,
 "api": true,
 "branch_sync": true,
-    "stuck": true
+ "stale_runtime_state_cleaned": true
 },
-  "plans": 0,
+ "note": "Updated during PR #2 cleanup before merge"
  "applied": 0
 }
@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
      "discovered_at": "2026-07-08T19:01:45+0800"
    }
  },
-  "last_scan": "2026-07-11T02:28:28+0800"
+  "last_scan": "2026-07-09T10:42:52+0800"
 }
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783583895",
  "check": "stuck",
  "status": "degraded",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T15:58:15+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": false,
    "stuck": [
      {
        "n": "CMD-20260709-enable-autonomous-controller.md",
        "age": 292.9
      }
    ]
  }
 }
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783583993",
  "check": "stuck",
  "status": "degraded",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T15:59:53+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": false,
    "stuck": [
      {
        "n": "CMD-20260709-enable-autonomous-controller.md",
        "age": 294.6
      }
    ]
  }
 }
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783584042",
  "check": "stuck",
  "status": "degraded",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T16:00:42+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": false,
    "stuck": [
      {
        "n": "CMD-20260709-enable-autonomous-controller.md",
        "age": 295.4
      }
    ]
  }
 }
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783597602",
  "check": "stuck",
  "status": "ok",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T19:46:42+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": true,
    "stuck": []
  }
 }
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783597695",
  "check": "stuck",
  "status": "ok",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T19:48:15+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": true,
    "stuck": []
  }
 }
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783597737",
  "check": "stuck",
  "status": "ok",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T19:48:57+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": true,
    "stuck": []
  }
 }
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783598337",
  "check": "stuck",
  "status": "ok",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T19:58:57+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": true,
    "stuck": []
  }
 }
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
 {
  "run_id": "c-1783598937",
  "check": "api",
  "status": "ok",
  "ts": "2026-07-09T20:08:57+0800",
  "details": {
    "ok": true,
    "baseline": "V1R4C3",
    "versions": 13
  }
 }
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
openclaw	78c22cbfb9	docs(openclaw): publish V2R1 G1 recovery candidate	2026-07-15 02:14:07 +08:00
openclaw	502ef30642	docs-v2r1-correct-cleanup-scanner-evidence	2026-07-13 16:50:24 +08:00
openclaw	b9e1f9db66	docs(v2r1): record Gate 1 cleanup verification	2026-07-13 16:46:44 +08:00
openclaw	7b82ae11f6	cleanup-v2r1-integration-baseline	2026-07-13 16:42:07 +08:00
openclaw	d6ba7e8fa8	docs-v2r1-record-integration-quality-verification	2026-07-13 16:02:38 +08:00
openclaw	a6878d30b8	test-v2r1-strengthen-ingress-integration-contract	2026-07-13 16:02:21 +08:00
openclaw	f11513e9d7	test-v2r1-runtime-ingress-integration-entrypoint	2026-07-13 15:53:36 +08:00
openclaw	6b645c9cdd	fix(v2r1): preserve exact-message append idempotency	2026-07-13 15:45:08 +08:00
openclaw	9d58609e33	fix(v2r1): make ledger append own durable write path	2026-07-13 15:38:33 +08:00
openclaw	b355c3b5b9	feat-v2r1-bind-ingress-identity	2026-07-13 15:21:10 +08:00
openclaw	6bbfbff7f4	feat-v2r1-wire-authenticated-channel-ingress	2026-07-13 13:25:53 +08:00
openclaw	6077331add	test(v2r1): make router isolation contracts authoritative	2026-07-13 02:28:32 +08:00
openclaw	75f61ac0e6	test(v2r1): cover tenant router isolation contracts	2026-07-13 02:18:04 +08:00
openclaw	0b41a3952a	fix-v2r1-suppress-hermes-conflict-context	2026-07-13 02:10:23 +08:00
openclaw	8f205c0d87	test-v2r1-cover-hermes-command-provenance	2026-07-13 02:05:03 +08:00
openclaw	d2a4a765ac	test-v2r1-enforce-sanitized-hermes-replay-conflicts	2026-07-13 02:03:49 +08:00
openclaw	b1110cad62	fix(v2r1): reject noncanonical tenant signatures	2026-07-13 01:52:00 +08:00
openclaw	b483dfadbf	test(v2r1): define Hermes contract acceptance evidence	2026-07-13 01:25:28 +08:00
openclaw	1e5e144318	fix(v2r1): convert duplicate Hermes events to ConflictError	2026-07-13 01:25:23 +08:00
openclaw	d552876a80	release(v2r1): add single source live status page	2026-07-13 00:12:28 +08:00
openclaw	6569065198	ops(v2r1): add RC1 health check	2026-07-12 23:41:01 +08:00
openclaw	2b80c50415	test(v2r1): add RC1 acceptance gate manifest	2026-07-12 23:40:56 +08:00
openclaw	954982647e	fix(v2r1): align plugin package entry with OpenClaw SDK contract	2026-07-12 23:40:52 +08:00
openclaw	8074eb31b1	ops(v2r1): add RC1 install preflight	2026-07-12 23:37:42 +08:00
openclaw	90138221ee	fix(v2r1): add OpenClaw runtime extension package metadata	2026-07-12 23:37:37 +08:00
openclaw	729c7bb23b	fix(v2r1): bind OpenClaw trust only to authoritative runId	2026-07-12 23:37:33 +08:00
openclaw	d2de7f23d1	ops(v2r1): add RC1 validation gate	2026-07-12 23:32:51 +08:00
openclaw	73c0a233ce	feat(v2r1): add aios-cell lifecycle CLI	2026-07-12 23:32:47 +08:00
openclaw	00816a13c1	feat(v2r1): register OpenClaw runtime provenance and tool hooks	2026-07-12 23:32:42 +08:00
openclaw	4920ac6192	release: define AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 manifest	2026-07-12 23:26:05 +08:00
openclaw	b12ff086bf	feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin manifest	2026-07-12 23:26:00 +08:00
openclaw	57a668d87e	feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary policy runtime	2026-07-12 23:25:57 +08:00
openclaw	bab319575b	feat(v2r1): add Tenant Cell manager lifecycle registry	2026-07-12 23:22:54 +08:00
openclaw	c172953a3c	feat(v2r1): add Hermes profile isolation primitives	2026-07-12 23:22:47 +08:00
openclaw	c7617fa548	feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped memory namespace policy	2026-07-12 23:22:41 +08:00
openclaw	2eba23d274	feat(v2r1): add tenant secret scope references	2026-07-12 23:17:56 +08:00
openclaw	f2e0406a20	feat(v2r1): add append-only tenant audit chain	2026-07-12 23:17:50 +08:00
openclaw	ccb02640ac	feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped exact message ledger	2026-07-12 23:17:43 +08:00
openclaw	5c52f6c82c	feat(v2r1): add tenant partitioned Hermes fabric scheduler	2026-07-12 23:10:55 +08:00
openclaw	429c6875bc	feat(v2r1): add fail-closed Tenant Router and registry	2026-07-12 23:10:47 +08:00
openclaw	f10d0d5b17	feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw Tenant Cell lifecycle adapter	2026-07-12 23:04:34 +08:00
openclaw	c9974f3e47	feat(v2r1): add signed tenant context and canonical message contract	2026-07-12 23:04:24 +08:00
openclaw	c72450aeb0	docs: add V1R5 to V2R1 migration plan	2026-07-12 22:39:32 +08:00
openclaw	f95be48a42	docs: add AIOS V2R1 architecture baseline	2026-07-12 22:39:28 +08:00
openclaw	ba989d7340	Start AIOS V2R1C0 Tenant Cell and Hermes Shared Agent Fabric release train	2026-07-12 22:39:23 +08:00
gito	1a9cb9095e	Merge pull request 'reconcile(v1r4c6): finalize baseline metadata — previous_baseline V1R4C5, git e204a90' (#9 ) from reconcile/v1r4c6-baseline-finalize-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 20:55:54 +08:00
openclaw	0312159168	feat(reconcile): write V1R4C6 baseline metadata — previous_baseline V1R4C5, git `e204a90`	2026-07-11 20:54:46 +08:00
openclaw	e204a90398	docs: baseline V1R4C6 promotion	2026-07-11 20:47:44 +08:00
openclaw	d8cf6058e9	docs: promote VERSION V1R4C3 -> V1R4C6 ahead of main promotion	2026-07-11 20:47:28 +08:00
openclaw	2aefc19e3d	authorize OpenClaw to execute V1R4C6 merge tests deploy pipeline	2026-07-11 20:41:31 +08:00
gito	28a430066f	Merge pull request 'V1R4C6: merge candidate → main (release control artifacts)' (#8 ) from candidate/v1r4c6-integration-main-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 19:30:58 +08:00
openclaw	1013aef461	Merge branch 'release/v1r4c6-admin-search-agent-integration-20260711' into candidate/v1r4c6-integration-main-20260711 Resolve merge conflicts per V1R4C6 release control merge: - baseline/current.json: keep feature branch version (updates to V1R4C5, adds constraints block). This was the intended runtime state that main was missing after V1R4C5 backfill (PR #7). Feature branch correctly has the V1R4C5 state; main still had V1R4C3. - versions/V1R4C5.json: keep main version (complete fields with codename, tag_ref, tag_object, constraints, promoted_at/by). Feature branch had an older copy lacking these fields. - docs/releases/V1R4C6-acceptance-evidence.md: keep main version (blank 'NOT RUN' status). Feature branch had draft content. - docs/releases/V1R4C6-release-gate-status.md: keep main version (blank 'NOT RUN' status). Feature branch had draft content.	2026-07-11 19:29:47 +08:00
gito	bb3210d74f	Merge pull request 'docs: update V1R4C6 metadata to NOT RUN after control artifacts merge' (#7 ) from reconcile/v1r4c6-gate-status-notrun-docs-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 17:07:03 +08:00
openclaw	745395e93b	docs: update V1R4C6 gate status, acceptance checklist, and acceptance evidence to NOT RUN All engineering gates remain pending. This updates the release documents to reflect the current integration-pending status after PR #6 merged.	2026-07-11 17:06:31 +08:00
gito	ae49bf0fa3	Merge pull request 'reconcile: merge V1R4C6 release candidate into main' (#6 ) from candidate/v1r4c6-merge-to-main-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 16:45:28 +08:00
openclaw	8410cd895e	reconcile: merge V1R4C6 release candidate into main V1R4C6 merge candidate (squashed). Contains 10 files, ~1440 lines added across: - docs/releases/ (6 files: checklist, evidence, blocker, resume, merge-matrix, gate-status) - ops/openclaw/ (2 files: integrate-deploy-verify, run-to-owner-gate-wechat) - patches/ (1 file: branch patch) - versions/ (1 file: V1R4C6.json) Task: admin workbench, SR-03 Search Gateway, Agent Platform Integration Baseline: V1R4C5 V1R4C5 tag semantics: - tag refs/tags/V1R4C5 target `d457ac3`: immutable release snapshot - baseline git `a32c76a`: runtime baseline promotion commit No tag creation, baseline promotion, or memory search activation in this merge.	2026-07-11 16:34:03 +08:00
gito	dc1642c2e8	Merge pull request 'reconcile: V1R4C5 baseline metadata (current.json + V1R4C5.json)' (#5 ) from reconcile/v1r4c5-baseline-metadata-20260711 into main	2026-07-11 13:48:30 +08:00
openclaw	c75b865710	reconcile: update baseline registry to V1R4C5 and create V1R4C5 version metadata Root cause: The V1R4C5 baseline promotion commit (`a32c76a`) was made on a feature branch that was never merged to main. As a result, both baseline/current.json and versions/V1R4C5.json on main still reflect V1R4C3 state. Runtime getBaseline() continues to return V1R4C3 with commit `f5435e3`. Changes: - baseline/current.json: update current_baseline -> V1R4C5, git -> `a32c76a3c1` (the actual promotion commit), add constraints from the original promotion - versions/V1R4C5.json: create the missing version metadata file with status active-baseline, referencing V1R4C5 tag (object ac9bdac...) Why this does not affect V1R4C5 release content: - V1R4C5 release documents (docs/releases/*.md) are untouched - V1R4C5 tag is unchanged and not moved - No V1R4C6 functionality introduced - No memory search or vector index enabled Rollback method: git revert <this commit hash> # Or restore baseline/current.json from V1R4C3 content: # git checkout main~1 baseline/current.json # And delete versions/V1R4C5.json: # git rm versions/V1R4C5.json # Then commit the revert Constraints honored: - No direct writes to main (using PR) - No force push - V1R4C5 tag not moved/rebuild - No V1R4C6 content - Memory search remains disabled	2026-07-11 13:46:13 +08:00
gito	e992b624e0	V1R4C5 → main: backfill release docs (acceptance evidence + owner approval)	2026-07-11 13:37:58 +08:00
openclaw	c60e4cd02c	reconcile: backfill V1R4C5 release documents (acceptance evidence + final owner approval) for main merge Source: V1R4C5 tag based on unique publication commit `a32c76a` - docs/releases/V1R4C5-acceptance-evidence.md (from V1R4C5 tag) - docs/releases/V1R4C5-final-owner-approval.md (from V1R4C5 tag) Constraints honored: - Not writing directly to main - No V1R4C6 content introduced - Memory search remains disabled per owner approval Generated merge candidate branch: reconcile/v1r4c5-release-to-main-20260711	2026-07-11 13:36:18 +08:00
openclaw	4b2996ca9f	release: resume V1R4C6 after scoped WeChat notification verification	2026-07-11 07:47:05 +08:00
openclaw	086076b74f	ops: direct OpenClaw to complete V1R4C6 and request owner approval via WeChat	2026-07-11 03:13:32 +08:00
openclaw	7b2d694272	ops: queue actual V1R4C6 integration deployment and verification	2026-07-11 03:10:28 +08:00
openclaw	0583060c7c	release: update V1R4C6 gate status	2026-07-11 03:07:13 +08:00
openclaw	20e707fb52	release: add V1R4C6 acceptance evidence	2026-07-11 03:05:52 +08:00
openclaw	6c75ec6bb2	release: add V1R4C6 acceptance checklist	2026-07-11 03:04:02 +08:00
openclaw	e9fefd4c18	release: add V1R4C6 integration merge matrix	2026-07-11 03:01:59 +08:00
openclaw	3ece481c74	fix(runtime): point GitOps API to active aios.git bare repository	2026-07-11 02:56:49 +08:00
openclaw	33177548c3	fix(baseline): stabilize V1R4C5 git pointer	2026-07-11 02:55:05 +08:00
openclaw	ed1413a05e	V1R4C5 baseline promotion: V1R4C3 -> V1R4C5 promoted_by: openclaw promotion_reason: V1R4C5 SR-01 Gitea branch sync fix and SR-02 Watcher state cleanup memory_search: disabled	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	05d1e64228	release: record V1R4C6 baseline visibility blocker	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	64bbe1b51c	Create V1R4C6 integration release patch	2026-07-11 02:46:00 +08:00
openclaw	3c6f2c8c65	release: start V1R4C6 admin search agent integration	2026-07-11 02:26:31 +08:00
		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
			`{"ts": 1783642009.9384289, "name": "another_cmd.json"}`
		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
			`{"ts": 1783642009.9384289, "name": "stuck_cmd.json"}`
		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
			`{"ts": 1783642009.9169936, "name": "cmd1.json"}`
		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
			`{"ts": 1783643569.9295633, "name": "recent"}`
		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
			`{"check": "stuck", "severity": "medium", "diagnosis": "stuck commands", "stuck": [{"n": "stuck_cmd.json", "ts": 1783642009.9384289}, {"n": "another_cmd.json", "ts": 1783642009.9384289}], "fix": "move_to_failed"}`
		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
			`{"check": "branch_sync", "severity": "high", "diagnosis": "missing branches", "branches": ["br1"], "fix": "sync_branches"}`