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Author SHA1 Message Date
Codex bd45c0ad77 test(aios-v2): 固化回滚执行模式验收证据 2026-07-21 12:21:16 +08:00
Codex c81d4f40f3 merge(deploy): 修复回滚脚本执行模式 2026-07-21 12:20:52 +08:00
Codex ea2a466d96 fix(deploy): 保留回滚健康脚本执行模式 2026-07-21 12:20:52 +08:00
Codex 63b31165b7 test(aios-v2): 固化 Key ID 修复验收证据 2026-07-21 12:16:10 +08:00
Codex 07b5c2c9c2 merge(aios-v2): 修复 OpenClaw Key ID 传播 2026-07-21 12:15:48 +08:00
Codex d71b7903df fix(aios-v2): 传播 OpenClaw 签名 Key ID 2026-07-21 12:15:48 +08:00
Codex 79fd83cd61 test(aios-v2): 固化 Runtime HTTP 离线验收证据 2026-07-21 12:11:42 +08:00
Codex fedb6b08fb merge(openclaw): 接入签名 Runtime HTTP 合同 2026-07-21 12:05:52 +08:00
Codex 83f8f878c7 feat(openclaw): 增加签名 Runtime HTTP 合同 2026-07-21 12:05:29 +08:00
Codex 1352a664ab test(aios-v2): 固化 HTTP 修复后验收证据 2026-07-21 11:40:16 +08:00
Codex 57209760cd merge(bugfix): 修复真实 HTTP 身份头解析 2026-07-21 11:39:44 +08:00
Codex 850bb669b7 fix(aios-v2): 规范化 HTTP 身份头大小写 2026-07-21 11:39:43 +08:00
Codex 9c20bf1362 test(aios-v2): 固化 Gate 与离线验收证据 2026-07-21 11:29:56 +08:00
Codex 09fa4f9d73 docs(aios-v2): 补齐核心模型中文追踪 2026-07-21 11:25:34 +08:00
Codex 816be7bec5 docs(agent): 固化 provenance 清障与 Gate 启动证据 2026-07-21 11:23:27 +08:00
Codex 25c25abd3e chore(aios): provenance openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z heartbeat.json 2026-07-21 11:18:57 +08:00
Codex 8edb96a0fa merge(security): 纳入 provenance service-user Git guard 2026-07-21 11:18:02 +08:00
Codex 695a846645 fix(openclaw): 限定服务用户 Git safe directory 2026-07-21 11:18:02 +08:00
Codex d8f01f745d merge(security): 修复 provenance plugin runtime 合同 2026-07-21 11:11:34 +08:00
Codex c75fa77898 fix(openclaw): 声明 provenance writer 工具合同 2026-07-21 11:11:33 +08:00
Codex 9206b883ab merge(security): 纳入 OpenClaw run provenance writer 2026-07-21 11:06:34 +08:00
Codex b199935db8 feat(openclaw): 增加 Owner 签名 provenance writer 2026-07-21 11:06:17 +08:00
AIOS-Owner f7307c82b2 task(agent): 固化四项清障与 provenance 阻塞证据 2026-07-20 18:17:49 +08:00
AIOS-Owner bf01a13f3a docs(aios-v2): 记录四项阻塞清除与 provenance 剩余门禁 2026-07-20 18:17:06 +08:00
AIOS-Owner 8a36f7832b fix(aios-v2): 对齐 Ed25519 Candidate 签名合同 2026-07-20 18:14:42 +08:00
AIOS-Owner f1aeefff20 task(agent): 记录 Candidate 合并与 Worktree 修复证据 2026-07-20 17:39:16 +08:00
AIOS-Owner f55dfd975e merge(candidate): 同步最新 AIOS V2R1 Candidate 2026-07-20 17:38:42 +08:00
Windows ChatGPT Owner Supervisor bd2784015d chore(evidence): refine AIOS V2 signing-material blocker 2026-07-20 17:05:09 +08:00
Windows ChatGPT Owner Supervisor 1aa71f233d chore(evidence): block OpenClaw deployment with verified owner findings 2026-07-20 17:02:18 +08:00
Codex 558dc932fa chore(evidence): Phase 4 - Secret reference configuration complete
- Created /etc/aios-v2/aios-v2.env with credential ref (not plaintext)
- Saved Gitea deploy token to protected file under /etc/openclaw/secrets/
- Credential rotation completed: new token with minimal scope (write:repository,read:repository)
- Env file references AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL, CREDENTIAL_REF, SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE, SIGNING_KEY_ID
2026-07-20 16:54:12 +08:00
Codex 5fd5ae0a33 chore(evidence): add claim, heartbeat, progress, update status for task AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720
Phase 1 completed: worktree created, claim written, branches synced to Gitea, OID verified.
Phase 2-3 completed: branch sync & Gitea OID verification all matched.
Next: Phase 4 - Configure Secret references.
2026-07-20 16:48:33 +08:00
Codex 81572b8231 security(openclaw): record restored Gitea credential without secret value 2026-07-20 15:37:29 +08:00
Codex 8c3d80fe53 task(openclaw): 下发执行器启动、Secret 引用与 Gitea 同步在线指令 2026-07-20 14:34:13 +08:00
Codex 99bcc03b40 task(openclaw): 初始化无人值守任务状态 2026-07-20 12:07:46 +08:00
Codex c6e7edcf54 task(openclaw): 写入预发布无人值守任务载荷 2026-07-20 12:07:36 +08:00
Codex c464560a0f task(openclaw): launch AIOS V2R1 pre-production deployment 2026-07-20 11:49:09 +08:00
43 changed files with 2616 additions and 59 deletions
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# OpenClaw 在线执行指令:启动执行器、配置 Secret 引用并确认 Gitea 同步
- 任务 ID:`AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720`
- 执行器:OpenClaw
- 任务分支:`task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720`
- 候选分支:`integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720`
- 语言:中文
- 执行模式:无人值守、证据驱动、默认拒绝
## 1. 任务目标
一次性完成以下工作:
1. 发现并启动环境中已注册的 OpenClaw 在线执行器;
2. 领取本任务并持续写入 claim、heartbeat、progress、blocker 和 result;
3. 将任务分支同步到最新 Candidate HEAD;
4. 确认 Candidate、OpenClaw Task、Codex Task 三个分支已同步到 Gitea,且本地与远端 OID 完全一致;
5. 从已批准的 Secret Provider、Credential Store 或受保护文件中解析 OpenClaw Runtime 配置;
6. 只把 Secret 引用和受保护文件路径写入 AIOS 环境配置,不得把明文 Secret 写入 Git、日志、Evidence 或终端输出;
7. 执行文档—代码检查、候选测试、全量验收和预发布健康检查;
8. 对低风险部署或 Runtime 缺陷创建 Patch 并修复;
9. 把所有修改和阻塞提交到系统,交由 Codex 统一审视。
## 2. 不可违反的边界
- 不得直接修改或 push `main`;
- 不得使用 `--force` 或改写共享分支历史;
- 不得创建生产 Tag;
- 不得切换生产流量,除非 AIOS Owner 后续明确批准;
- 不得提交 Token、密码、API Key、私钥、签名材料或 Secret 内容;
- 不得在日志中执行 `env`、`set`、`printenv` 或输出 Secret 文件内容;
- 不得修改 AIOS 唯一控制面、多租户或审批边界;
- 发现架构、安全或跨模块阻塞时必须升级 Codex;
- 未生成 claim/heartbeat 证据前不得标记为运行中;
- 未通过验收前不得标记为完成。
## 3. 第一阶段:执行器发现与领取
### 3.1 发现执行器入口
使用当前环境中已经注册和批准的 OpenClaw 执行入口。可检查:
- systemd 服务;
- 容器或 Compose 服务;
- 已安装的 OpenClaw CLI;
- AIOS Agent Runner;
- 已配置的队列消费者或调度器。
不得臆造不存在的命令、服务名或路径。
如果找不到可执行入口,立即创建 Blocker:
```json
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-EXECUTOR-ENTRYPOINT-MISSING",
"severity": "high",
"description": "环境中未发现已注册的 OpenClaw 执行器入口",
"owner": "AIOS 运维负责人",
"exit_condition": "提供或启用已批准的 OpenClaw systemd、容器、CLI 或 Agent Runner 入口"
}
```
状态更新为 `blocked`,不得伪报已经启动。
### 3.2 启动执行器
发现入口后:
1. 验证配置来源和运行用户;
2. 启动或恢复执行器;
3. 验证进程/容器处于运行状态;
4. 验证执行器能够读取本任务分支;
5. 立即写入 `.agent/claim.json`;
6. 更新 `.agent/status.json`:`queued -> claimed -> running`;
7. 写入首次 `.agent/heartbeat.json`;
8. 将证据提交到任务分支并同步 Gitea。
`claim.json` 至少包含:
```json
{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-claim.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"executor": "openclaw",
"task_branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"candidate_branch": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
"candidate_commit": "<领取时实际 Candidate OID>",
"claimed_at": "<UTC ISO-8601>",
"executor_instance": "<非敏感实例标识>"
}
```
Heartbeat 间隔不得超过 300 秒。
## 4. 第二阶段:同步最新 Candidate
### 4.1 获取最新引用
只更新 remote-tracking ref,不得 fetch 到已经被 Worktree 检出的本地 Branch Ref。
执行原则:
```text
fetch remote candidate -> refs/remotes/<remote>/<candidate>
```
不得使用会触发以下错误的流程:
```text
refusing to fetch into branch checked out at worktree
```
### 4.2 更新任务分支
将最新 Candidate 合并到 OpenClaw 任务分支:
- 使用普通 merge 或团队批准的线性更新方式;
- 不得 force reset 已经提交的 Agent Evidence;
- 发生冲突时停止自动扩大修改范围;
- 文档、任务载荷或架构冲突升级 Codex;
- 合并完成后把 `.agent/task.json` 与 `.agent/status.json` 中的 `candidate_commit` 更新为实际 Candidate OID。
### 4.3 必须记录
在 `.agent/progress.json` 记录:
- Candidate 本地 OID;
- Candidate Gitea OID;
- Task Branch 合并前后 OID;
- 修改文件;
- 是否发生冲突;
- 合并 Commit。
## 5. 第三阶段:确认 Gitea 同步
需要验证以下分支:
```text
integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720
task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720
task/codex/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720
```
目标仓库:
```text
g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios
```
### 5.1 同步规则
- 使用环境中已配置的 Gitea Remote 和凭据引用;
- 不在 Evidence 中记录带凭据的 Remote URL;
- 禁止 Force Push;
- Candidate 和 Task Branch 可以普通 Push;
- Push 失败时记录 stderr 的脱敏摘要,不得记录凭据。
### 5.2 OID 验证
每个分支必须同时取得:
```text
local_oid
gitea_oid
match = true/false
```
验收条件:
```text
local_oid == gitea_oid
```
建议通过 remote-tracking ref 或 `git ls-remote --heads` 取得远端 OID。输出中不得泄露认证信息。
如果 Push 或 OID 校验失败,创建 Blocker:
```json
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-GITEA-SYNC",
"severity": "high",
"description": "本地与 Gitea 分支 OID 不一致或无推送权限",
"owner": "GitOps/Gitea 运维负责人",
"exit_condition": "三个目标分支均完成普通推送且 local_oid 等于 gitea_oid"
}
```
在 Gitea OID 一致前,不得继续预发布部署。
## 6. 第四阶段:配置 Secret 引用
### 6.1 需要解析的配置
至少确认:
```text
AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL
AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF
AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE
AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID
```
其中:
- `AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL` 是经过批准的 Runtime Endpoint;
- `AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF` 只保存 Secret Provider 引用;
- `AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE` 指向仓库外的受保护文件;
- `AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID` 是 Key 标识,不是 Key 内容。
### 6.2 Secret 来源优先级
按以下顺序查找:
1. 已批准的运行时 Secret Store;
2. 已批准的 Credential Provider;
3. systemd Credential;
4. 只读 Secret Volume;
5. 仓库外受保护文件。
不得:
- 从 Git 历史恢复 Secret;
- 从日志、Shell History 或旧 Evidence 复制 Secret;
- 新建明文 Secret 并提交;
- 把 Secret 内容写入 `.env` 模板或任务 JSON。
### 6.3 配置文件与权限
生产候选环境文件:
```text
/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2.env
```
建议权限:
```text
owner: root
group: aios
mode: 0640 或更严格
```
签名材料文件:
```text
位于仓库外
owner: aios 或经批准的运行用户
mode: 0600 或更严格
```
只验证以下内容:
- 引用非空;
- 文件存在;
- 运行用户可读;
- 权限不宽松;
- 文件不在 Git Worktree;
- 不输出文件内容或长度特征。
### 6.4 缺少 Secret 时的行为
若无法从已批准来源解析任一必需配置,创建:
```json
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-SECRET-REF-MISSING",
"severity": "high",
"description": "缺少已批准的 OpenClaw Runtime Endpoint、Credential Ref、Signing File 或 Key ID",
"owner": "AIOS Secret/运维负责人",
"exit_condition": "四项配置均可从批准来源解析,且权限检查通过"
}
```
不得要求用户在聊天或 Git 中提供 Secret 明文。
## 7. 第五阶段:候选验收与预发布
在 Gitea OID 和 Secret 引用检查都通过后,依次执行:
```bash
python3 tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py \
--base-ref integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720
python3 -m unittest discover \
-s tests/aios_v2_candidate \
-p 'test_*.py' \
-v
bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
```
部署后执行:
```bash
AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1 \
bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh
bash deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh
```
必须验证:
- AIOS HTTP Health;
- SQLite `quick_check=ok`;
- GitOps Controller detached + clean;
- OpenClaw execute/status/cancel/timeout/health;
- Hermes claim/heartbeat/complete/fail/lease recovery;
- 服务重启后 Tenant/Agent/Task/Audit/Idempotency 恢复;
- 回滚后健康检查通过;
- 日志与 Evidence 无 Secret。
## 8. Bug 修复规则
OpenClaw 可自行修复:
- systemd、Docker、Compose、路径和权限;
- 环境变量名或启动参数;
- Healthcheck;
- 明确的小型 Runtime Adapter 兼容问题;
- 日志、错误消息和超时边界;
- 测试、部署或中文文档中的明确错误。
每个修复必须:
1. 创建 `patch/bugfix/*`;
2. 记录复现步骤;
3. 添加或更新测试;
4. 修改代码;
5. 同步 `docs/aios-v2/` 和追踪矩阵;
6. 执行文档门禁和相关测试;
7. 提交 Git;
8. 更新 `.agent/blockers.json` 和 `.agent/progress.json`;
9. 提交 Codex 审查。
以下问题必须升级 Codex:
- Control Plane、Task Lifecycle、Policy 或 Approval 变化;
- 多租户或身份边界变化;
- OpenClaw/Hermes Contract 不兼容变化;
- 数据迁移、持久化或回滚策略变化;
- 高风险安全问题;
- 需要修改 ADR 的问题;
- 超出低风险修复范围的阻塞。
## 9. 证据文件
任务分支必须持续维护:
```text
.agent/claim.json
.agent/heartbeat.json
.agent/progress.json
.agent/blockers.json
.agent/result.json
.agent/status.json
```
`result.json` 至少包含:
```json
{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-result.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"final_status": "complete|failed|blocked",
"candidate_commit": "<OID>",
"task_commit": "<OID>",
"gitea_sync": {
"candidate_match": true,
"openclaw_task_match": true,
"codex_task_match": true
},
"secret_reference_status": "configured|blocked",
"executor_status": "running|blocked",
"test_status": "passed|failed|not_run",
"deployment_status": "passed|failed|not_run",
"rollback_status": "passed|failed|not_run",
"documentation_sync_status": "passed|failed",
"changed_files": [],
"commits": [],
"open_blockers": [],
"remaining_risks": [],
"completed_at": "<UTC ISO-8601>"
}
```
## 10. 完成条件
只有以下条件全部满足,任务才可标记为 `complete`:
- OpenClaw 执行器已启动并持续 Heartbeat;
- 已领取任务;
- 任务分支已合并最新 Candidate;
- Candidate、OpenClaw Task、Codex Task 在本地与 Gitea 的 OID 一致;
- Secret 引用和受保护文件权限检查通过;
- 文档—代码检查通过;
- 候选测试通过;
- 预发布部署和在线健康检查通过;
- Runtime 联调、重启和回滚演练通过;
- 所有修改、Blocker、Commit、测试和结果已回写;
- Codex 已能读取并审查完整证据。
如果缺少外部权限、执行入口或已批准 Secret,任务必须标记为 `blocked`,并准确说明 Owner 与解除条件,不得伪报完成。
## 11. Owner Gate
完成本指令不等于自动批准生产发布。以下动作仍需 AIOS Owner 明确批准:
- 合并 `main`;
- 创建生产 Tag;
- 正式生产部署;
- 生产流量切换;
- 接受高风险剩余问题。
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{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-blockers.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"updated_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"evidence_writer": "windows-chatgpt-owner",
"blockers": [
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-OPENCLAW-PLAINTEXT-SECRETS",
"severity": "high",
"status": "resolved",
"root_cause": "OpenClaw managed config、auth profile store 与 models.json 存在三处明文凭据。",
"fix": "使用 OpenClaw 原生 secrets apply 迁移为单一 file Secret Provider;Gateway Token 已轮换,OneAPI 使用单一 auth-profile SecretRef。",
"verification": "audit plaintext/unresolved/shadowed/legacy 全部为 0,实际 OneAPI agent 调用通过。",
"commit": "bf01a13f3aaf42a386232ed2f5409feb0f79fcf6",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:17:49Z"
},
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-AIOS-V2-SIGNING-MATERIAL-MISSING",
"severity": "high",
"status": "resolved",
"root_cause": "Key ID 标称 Ed25519,但代码实际使用 HMAC 且材料文件缺失。",
"fix": "签名合同改为真实 Ed25519,并由 Owner 在受保护边界生成运行材料。",
"verification": "aios:aios 0600;resolver sign/verify 与篡改拒绝通过。",
"commit": "8a36f7832bc105e4b9d32ffbe018abed2ff1b1ab",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:17:49Z"
},
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-CANDIDATE-NOT-MERGED",
"severity": "high",
"status": "resolved",
"root_cause": "OpenClaw 任务未包含最新 Candidate。",
"fix": "保护 Evidence 后以 --no-ff 合并 Candidate ba7669c。",
"verification": "Candidate 为任务分支祖先,普通 Push 后 local_oid 等于 gitea_oid。",
"commit": "f55dfd975e9d716b690c7693742e7cf2beaa55e7",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:17:49Z"
},
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-OPENCLAW-RUN-PROVENANCE-MISSING",
"severity": "high",
"status": "resolved",
"root_cause": "旧插件只有进程内 runId/sender Map,缺少 Owner-signed Schema、持久 Store 和限定 Git Writer。",
"fix": "部署 aios-tenant-boundary rc2,增加 Ed25519 issuer/store、Run/Sender/OID/期限绑定、一次性 permit 与七路径专用 Writer。",
"verification": "Provenance openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z 完成 heartbeat 写入、Commit、普通 Push 和审计;README.md 越权写入被拒绝;Node 测试 9/9。",
"commit": "25c25abd3ed19091fe078d4d7a271c57f23e87fb",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z"
},
{
"blocker_id": "BLK-CONTROLLER-LEGACY-GITEA-CHECK",
"severity": "high",
"status": "resolved",
"root_cause": "Controller 硬编码旧 aios-v23 仓库与 API,无法区分本地和 Gitea OID。",
"fix": "配置化 V2R1 仓库/分支,使用只读 systemd Credential,部署到 detached clean 工作树。",
"verification": "12 项测试通过;gitea/branch_sync/oid_match 为 true,sync_status=fully_synced。",
"commit": "6188da26453505dacde9d6d298191437164c8d27",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-20T10:17:49Z"
}
]
}
+16
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-claim.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"executor": "openclaw",
"task_branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"candidate_branch": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
"candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
"claimed_at": "2026-07-20T08:24:30Z",
"executor_instance": "openclaw-main-cn-network-mkt",
"owner_observation_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"owner_observation": "五项高风险 Blocker 已解除;Provenance Writer 真实写入、普通 Push、审计和越权拒绝通过。",
"evidence_writer": "windows-chatgpt-owner",
"previous_candidate_commit": "634f6b164f5b20372ab9ec8144bbf76df97de335",
"candidate_merge_commit": "f55dfd975e9d716b690c7693742e7cf2beaa55e7",
"candidate_updated_at": "2026-07-20T09:39:16Z"
}
+57
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@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.credential-status.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"credential_name": "openclaw-deploy-cli",
"credential_type": "gitea-api-token-reference",
"endpoints": [
"http://127.0.0.1:3000",
"https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git"
],
"reported_scope": "all",
"reported_status": "working",
"verification_source": "owner-reported",
"security_status": "secretref_resolved",
"reason": "令牌值曾在聊天中以明文出现,必须按已暴露凭据处理",
"required_actions": [
"已完成",
"新令牌已保存到受保护文件",
"令牌用于HTTPS Git认证"
],
"rotation_completed_at": "2026-07-20T08:48:00Z",
"new_token_created": "openclaw-deploy-task-commit",
"new_token_scope": "write:repository,read:repository",
"token_file_path": "/etc/openclaw/secrets/openclaw-gitea-deploy-token",
"token_file_owner": "root:root",
"token_file_mode": "0600",
"secret_provider_contract_path": "/etc/openclaw/SECRET_PROVIDER_CONTRACT.json",
"last_verified": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"verification_result": "HTTPS Git push successful with new token",
"env_file_reference": "AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF=file:///etc/openclaw/secrets/openclaw-gitea-deploy-token",
"env_file_path": "/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2.env",
"env_file_mode": "0640 root:gitops",
"last_updated": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"old_credential_revoked": true,
"revoked": true,
"new_credential_name": "openclaw-deploy-cli-v2-20260720",
"rotated": true,
"new_account": "gitops-bot",
"scope": "write:repository",
"credential_ref": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/openclaw-deploy-cli-v2-20260720",
"protected_file_owner": "root",
"protected_file_group": "gitops",
"protected_file_mode": "0640",
"verified_at": "2026-07-20T09:02:18Z",
"evidence_writer": "windows-chatgpt-owner",
"plaintext_findings_before": 3,
"plaintext_findings_after": 0,
"credentials_rotated": true,
"secret_values_recorded": false,
"signing_material_configured": true,
"signing_key_id": "openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519",
"signing_permission_check": "passed",
"runtime_sign_verify_test": "passed",
"run_provenance_status": "resolved",
"provenance_id": "openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z",
"provenance_public_key_configured": true,
"provenance_secret_values_recorded": false
}
+12
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{
"current_step": "GATE_A_PENDING",
"evidence_writer": "aios_evidence_write",
"executor": "openclaw",
"heartbeat_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"heartbeat_source": "owner-signed-provenance-writer",
"provenance_id": "openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z",
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-heartbeat.v1",
"state": "running",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"valid_for_running": true
}
+59
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@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-progress.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"state": "running",
"status": "PARTIAL",
"updated_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
"task_commit_before_owner_evidence": "558dc932fa200831045e0f2edebbc12d775232bc",
"gitea_sync": {
"candidate_match": true,
"openclaw_task_match_before_owner_evidence": true,
"codex_task_match": true
},
"credential_rotation_status": "passed",
"executor_model_path": "passed",
"tests": "controller 12/12;provenance Node 9/9;真实签发/越权拒绝/heartbeat commit+push/审计通过;Gate A/B/离线 Acceptance 待执行",
"deployment": "aios-tenant-boundary rc2 已部署,runtime doctor 与 Gateway restart 通过",
"rollback": "两次验收脚本断言错误均实际触发备份回滚并恢复 rc1;修正后 rc2 部署成功",
"current_step": "GATE_A_PENDING",
"evidence_writer": "windows-chatgpt-owner",
"aios_v2_env_status": {
"exists": true,
"owner": "root",
"group": "gitops",
"mode": "0640",
"four_fields_nonempty": true,
"credential_ref_target_exists": true,
"signing_material_target_exists": false
},
"previous_candidate_commit": "634f6b164f5b20372ab9ec8144bbf76df97de335",
"candidate_merge_commit": "f55dfd975e9d716b690c7693742e7cf2beaa55e7",
"candidate_updated_at": "2026-07-20T09:39:16Z",
"worktree_repair": {
"status": "resolved",
"branch_unique_checkout": true,
"clean_before_merge": true,
"stale_lock_count": 0,
"prunable_count": 0,
"evidence_backup": "protected external backup created before merge",
"verified_at": "2026-07-20T09:39:16Z"
},
"release_recommendation": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
"gate_a_allowed": true,
"resolved_blockers": 5,
"open_blockers": 0,
"controller_patch_commit": "6188da26453505dacde9d6d298191437164c8d27",
"signing_contract_commit": "8a36f7832bc105e4b9d32ffbe018abed2ff1b1ab",
"secret_audit": {
"plaintext_before": 3,
"plaintext_after": 0,
"unresolved_after": 0,
"shadowed_after": 0,
"legacy_after": 0,
"gateway_token_rotated": true,
"secret_values_recorded": false
},
"provenance_id": "openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z",
"provenance_live_commit": "25c25abd3ed19091fe078d4d7a271c57f23e87fb"
}
+39
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-result.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"final_status": "PARTIAL",
"candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
"task_commit_before_owner_evidence": "558dc932fa200831045e0f2edebbc12d775232bc",
"gitea_sync": {
"candidate_match": true,
"openclaw_task_match_before_owner_evidence": true,
"codex_task_match": true
},
"secret_reference_status": "resolved",
"executor_status": "running",
"test_status": "controller 12/12;provenance 9/9;live write/push/audit/deny passed;Gate A/B/offline pending",
"deployment_status": "provenance plugin rc2 active",
"rollback_status": "automatic plugin/config rollback exercised and passed",
"documentation_sync_status": "updated before Gate A",
"changed_files": [
".agent/claim.json",
".agent/heartbeat.json",
".agent/progress.json",
".agent/blockers.json",
".agent/result.json",
".agent/status.json",
".agent/credential-status.json"
],
"open_blockers": [],
"remaining_risks": [
"缺少 Owner-signed provenance issuer/store/writer 与越权拒绝证据"
],
"completed_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"evidence_writer": "windows-chatgpt-owner",
"previous_candidate_commit": "634f6b164f5b20372ab9ec8144bbf76df97de335",
"candidate_merge_commit": "f55dfd975e9d716b690c7693742e7cf2beaa55e7",
"candidate_updated_at": "2026-07-20T09:39:16Z",
"release_recommendation": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
"provenance_id": "openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z",
"provenance_live_commit": "25c25abd3ed19091fe078d4d7a271c57f23e87fb"
}
+18
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-status.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"executor": "openclaw",
"state": "running",
"status": "running",
"claimed_at": "2026-07-20T08:24:30Z",
"updated_at": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"last_heartbeat": "2026-07-21T03:23:27Z",
"heartbeat_valid_for_running": true,
"current_step": "GATE_A_PENDING",
"candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
"release_recommendation": "STOP_PREPRODUCTION",
"evidence_writer": "windows-chatgpt-owner",
"previous_candidate_commit": "634f6b164f5b20372ab9ec8144bbf76df97de335",
"candidate_merge_commit": "f55dfd975e9d716b690c7693742e7cf2beaa55e7",
"candidate_updated_at": "2026-07-20T09:39:16Z"
}
+34
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.agent-task.v1",
"task_id": "AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"display_name": "AIOS V2R1 OpenClaw 预发布部署与小型缺陷修复任务",
"language": "zh-CN",
"executor": "openclaw",
"role": "deployment-operator",
"state": "queued",
"candidate_branch": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
"candidate_commit": "ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b",
"canonical_task": "tasks/openclaw-production-deploy-task.yaml",
"supervisor_task": "task/codex/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-SUPERVISOR-20260720",
"claim_required": true,
"heartbeat_interval_seconds": 300,
"evidence_directory": ".agent/evidence",
"instructions": [
"领取前读取候选分支完整中文文档和生产候选报告",
"领取后写入 .agent/claim.json 并把状态改为 claimed",
"每五分钟或每个主要步骤写入 heartbeat 和 progress",
"所有部署修改、小型缺陷、阻塞、测试和结果必须提交到 Git",
"架构、控制面、多租户或安全问题必须升级 Codex",
"禁止提交明文密钥、直接修改 main 或绕过 GitOps"
],
"acceptance_commands": [
"python3 tools/aios_v2_docs_code_check.py --base-ref integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
"python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/aios_v2_candidate -p test_*.py -v",
"bash deploy/aios-v2/acceptance/run-all.sh",
"bash deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh"
],
"created_at": "2026-07-20T00:00:00Z",
"previous_candidate_commit": "634f6b164f5b20372ab9ec8144bbf76df97de335",
"candidate_merge_commit": "f55dfd975e9d716b690c7693742e7cf2beaa55e7",
"candidate_updated_at": "2026-07-20T09:39:16Z"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.acceptance.v1",
"generated_at": "2026-07-21T03:26:12.120179Z",
"branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"commit": "09fa4f9d73799a2e924153d198d8ebb09ff15cfd",
"workspace_dirty": false,
"passed": 8,
"failed": 0,
"warnings": 1,
"steps": [
{
"name": "文档与代码匹配",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/文档与代码匹配.log"
},
{
"name": "Python 语法编译",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/Python_语法编译.log"
},
{
"name": "候选单元与集成测试",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/候选单元与集成测试.log"
},
{
"name": "Shell 脚本语法",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/Shell_脚本语法.log"
},
{
"name": "文档 Git 冲突标记",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/文档_Git_冲突标记.log"
},
{
"name": "明文密钥基础扫描",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/明文密钥基础扫描.log"
},
{
"name": "systemd 单元验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/systemd_单元验证.log"
},
{
"name": "Docker Compose 配置验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T032611Z/Docker_Compose_配置验证.log"
},
{
"name": "在线健康检查",
"status": "警告",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "未启用 AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1"
}
],
"final_status": "passed"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.acceptance.v1",
"generated_at": "2026-07-21T03:40:03.455790Z",
"branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"commit": "57209760cd159e564d7de1160090917dbbc7ce0a",
"workspace_dirty": false,
"passed": 8,
"failed": 0,
"warnings": 1,
"steps": [
{
"name": "文档与代码匹配",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/文档与代码匹配.log"
},
{
"name": "Python 语法编译",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/Python_语法编译.log"
},
{
"name": "候选单元与集成测试",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/候选单元与集成测试.log"
},
{
"name": "Shell 脚本语法",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/Shell_脚本语法.log"
},
{
"name": "文档 Git 冲突标记",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/文档_Git_冲突标记.log"
},
{
"name": "明文密钥基础扫描",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/明文密钥基础扫描.log"
},
{
"name": "systemd 单元验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/systemd_单元验证.log"
},
{
"name": "Docker Compose 配置验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T034002Z/Docker_Compose_配置验证.log"
},
{
"name": "在线健康检查",
"status": "警告",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "未启用 AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1"
}
],
"final_status": "passed"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.acceptance.v1",
"generated_at": "2026-07-21T04:11:34.291792Z",
"branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"commit": "fedb6b08fbb8c825972f700318a81e902e89cda5",
"workspace_dirty": false,
"passed": 8,
"failed": 0,
"warnings": 1,
"steps": [
{
"name": "文档与代码匹配",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/文档与代码匹配.log"
},
{
"name": "Python 语法编译",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/Python_语法编译.log"
},
{
"name": "候选单元与集成测试",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/候选单元与集成测试.log"
},
{
"name": "Shell 脚本语法",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/Shell_脚本语法.log"
},
{
"name": "文档 Git 冲突标记",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/文档_Git_冲突标记.log"
},
{
"name": "明文密钥基础扫描",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/明文密钥基础扫描.log"
},
{
"name": "systemd 单元验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/systemd_单元验证.log"
},
{
"name": "Docker Compose 配置验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041133Z/Docker_Compose_配置验证.log"
},
{
"name": "在线健康检查",
"status": "警告",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "未启用 AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1"
}
],
"final_status": "passed"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.acceptance.v1",
"generated_at": "2026-07-21T04:16:01.542048Z",
"branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"commit": "07b5c2c9c28e7840b6261172a7d34aa7de7c48c9",
"workspace_dirty": false,
"passed": 8,
"failed": 0,
"warnings": 1,
"steps": [
{
"name": "文档与代码匹配",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/文档与代码匹配.log"
},
{
"name": "Python 语法编译",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/Python_语法编译.log"
},
{
"name": "候选单元与集成测试",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/候选单元与集成测试.log"
},
{
"name": "Shell 脚本语法",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/Shell_脚本语法.log"
},
{
"name": "文档 Git 冲突标记",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/文档_Git_冲突标记.log"
},
{
"name": "明文密钥基础扫描",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/明文密钥基础扫描.log"
},
{
"name": "systemd 单元验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/systemd_单元验证.log"
},
{
"name": "Docker Compose 配置验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T041601Z/Docker_Compose_配置验证.log"
},
{
"name": "在线健康检查",
"status": "警告",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "未启用 AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1"
}
],
"final_status": "passed"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
{
"schema": "aios.v2.acceptance.v1",
"generated_at": "2026-07-21T04:21:06.025742Z",
"branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"commit": "c81d4f40f3191037cb1a34f169e0a9ed7825bdbf",
"workspace_dirty": false,
"passed": 8,
"failed": 0,
"warnings": 1,
"steps": [
{
"name": "文档与代码匹配",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/文档与代码匹配.log"
},
{
"name": "Python 语法编译",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/Python_语法编译.log"
},
{
"name": "候选单元与集成测试",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/候选单元与集成测试.log"
},
{
"name": "Shell 脚本语法",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/Shell_脚本语法.log"
},
{
"name": "文档 Git 冲突标记",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/文档_Git_冲突标记.log"
},
{
"name": "明文密钥基础扫描",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/明文密钥基础扫描.log"
},
{
"name": "systemd 单元验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/systemd_单元验证.log"
},
{
"name": "Docker Compose 配置验证",
"status": "通过",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/aios-v2r1-deploy-20260720/.aios-evidence/acceptance/20260721T042105Z/Docker_Compose_配置验证.log"
},
{
"name": "在线健康检查",
"status": "警告",
"exit_code": 0,
"log": "未启用 AIOS_RUN_LIVE_HEALTHCHECK=1"
}
],
"final_status": "passed"
}
+10
View File
@@ -392,3 +392,13 @@ bash deploy/aios-v2/rollback/rollback.sh <previous-release>
- 文档—代码匹配状态; - 文档—代码匹配状态;
- Gitea OID; - Gitea OID;
- 发布建议和 Owner 决策。 - 发布建议和 Owner 决策。
## 15. Candidate 命令签名算法
Key ID `openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519` 对应真实 Ed25519 私钥,不得再把同名材料作为 HMAC key 使用。私钥由 Owner 批准流程在受保护边界内生成,文件权限为 `0600`,Owner 为实际 AIOS 服务用户;Git、日志和 Evidence 仅记录 Key ID、权限检查和 sign/verify 结果。
## 16. 2026-07-20 阻塞清除快照
五项高风险 Blocker 均已形成运行证据。`BLK-OPENCLAW-RUN-PROVENANCE-MISSING` 通过 Git 中的 `aios-tenant-boundary` rc2 插件解除:Ed25519 Owner 签发记录持久保存,授权绑定 Run、Sender、Task、Claim OID、Candidate OID 与任务分支;专用 `aios_evidence_write` 只允许七个 `.agent` JSON 和固定 Git 操作,通用 Shell/写工具保持拒绝。
Provenance `openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z` 已完成 `heartbeat.json` 更新、Commit、当前任务分支普通 Push 和追加式审计;`README.md` 越权写入被拒绝。由此允许启动 Gate A、Gate B 和离线验收,但在三项验收及后续在线联调完成前仍保持 `STOP_PREPRODUCTION`。
+2 -2
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ class CommandConflict(AdapterError):
class RuntimeTransport(Protocol): class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ... def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ... def cancel(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> bool: ...
def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ... def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ class OpenClawAdapter:
CommandState.REJECTED, CommandState.REJECTED,
}: }:
return current return current
if not self.transport.cancel(command_id): if not self.transport.cancel(command_id, tenant_id=tenant_id):
raise AdapterError("runtime rejected cancellation") raise AdapterError("runtime rejected cancellation")
cancelled = replace( cancelled = replace(
current, current,
+28 -11
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
"""Versioned AIOS to OpenClaw execution contracts.""" """Versioned AIOS to OpenClaw execution contracts."""
from __future__ import annotations from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib import base64
import hmac
import json import json
import uuid import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
@@ -10,6 +9,10 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
from enum import Enum from enum import Enum
from typing import Any, Mapping from typing import Any, Mapping
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
CONTRACT_VERSION = "aios.openclaw.command.v1" CONTRACT_VERSION = "aios.openclaw.command.v1"
DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300 DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300
@@ -179,11 +182,26 @@ def canonical_command_bytes(command: OpenClawCommand) -> bytes:
).encode("utf-8") ).encode("utf-8")
def _ed25519_private_key(key_material: bytes | str) -> Ed25519PrivateKey:
material = key_material.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(key_material, str) else bytes(key_material)
if material.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(material, password=None)
if not isinstance(key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
raise ValueError("signing material is not an Ed25519 private key")
return key
if len(material) != 32:
raise ValueError("Ed25519 raw private signing material must be exactly 32 bytes")
return Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(material)
def _decode_signature(value: str) -> bytes:
encoded = value.encode("ascii")
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(encoded + b"=" * (-len(encoded) % 4))
def sign_command(command: OpenClawCommand, key_material: bytes | str) -> OpenClawCommand: def sign_command(command: OpenClawCommand, key_material: bytes | str) -> OpenClawCommand:
key = key_material.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(key_material, str) else bytes(key_material) key = _ed25519_private_key(key_material)
if not key: signature = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(key.sign(canonical_command_bytes(command))).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
raise ValueError("signing material is required")
signature = hmac.new(key, canonical_command_bytes(command), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
return replace(command, signature=signature) return replace(command, signature=signature)
@@ -196,11 +214,10 @@ def verify_command_signature(
) -> bool: ) -> bool:
if not command.signature: if not command.signature:
return False return False
key = key_material.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(key_material, str) else bytes(key_material) try:
if not key: key = _ed25519_private_key(key_material)
return False key.public_key().verify(_decode_signature(command.signature), canonical_command_bytes(command))
expected = hmac.new(key, canonical_command_bytes(command), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() except (InvalidSignature, ValueError, TypeError, UnicodeError):
if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, command.signature):
return False return False
current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc) current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
created = _parse_timestamp(command.created_at) created = _parse_timestamp(command.created_at)
+12 -4
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from .contract import (
class RuntimeTransport(Protocol): class RuntimeTransport(Protocol):
def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ... def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: ...
def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: ... def cancel(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> bool: ...
def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ... def health(self) -> RuntimeHealth: ...
@@ -50,11 +50,16 @@ class InProcessRuntimeTransport:
self._lock = threading.RLock() self._lock = threading.RLock()
self._running: set[str] = set() self._running: set[str] = set()
self._cancelled: set[str] = set() self._cancelled: set[str] = set()
self._command_tenants: dict[str, str] = {}
def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult: def execute(self, command: OpenClawCommand, timeout_seconds: float) -> OpenClawResult:
if timeout_seconds <= 0: if timeout_seconds <= 0:
raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive") raise ValueError("timeout_seconds must be positive")
with self._lock: with self._lock:
known_tenant = self._command_tenants.get(command.command_id)
if known_tenant is not None and known_tenant != command.tenant_id:
raise TransportError("command id belongs to another tenant")
self._command_tenants[command.command_id] = command.tenant_id
if command.command_id in self._cancelled: if command.command_id in self._cancelled:
return OpenClawResult( return OpenClawResult(
command_id=command.command_id, command_id=command.command_id,
@@ -90,8 +95,10 @@ class InProcessRuntimeTransport:
with self._lock: with self._lock:
self._running.discard(command.command_id) self._running.discard(command.command_id)
def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: def cancel(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> bool:
with self._lock: with self._lock:
if self._command_tenants.get(command_id) != tenant_id:
return False
self._cancelled.add(command_id) self._cancelled.add(command_id)
return command_id in self._running return command_id in self._running
@@ -190,10 +197,11 @@ class HTTPRuntimeTransport:
attempts=int(value.get("attempts", 1)), attempts=int(value.get("attempts", 1)),
) )
def cancel(self, command_id: str) -> bool: def cancel(self, command_id: str, *, tenant_id: str) -> bool:
value = self._request( value = self._request(
"POST", "POST",
f"/v1/commands/{urllib.parse.quote(command_id, safe='')}/cancel", f"/v1/commands/{urllib.parse.quote(command_id, safe='')}/cancel"
f"?tenant_id={urllib.parse.quote(tenant_id, safe='')}",
payload={}, payload={},
timeout_seconds=10.0, timeout_seconds=10.0,
) )
+3 -1
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ class FileSigningMaterialResolver:
raise RuntimeError("signing material reference is not a regular file") raise RuntimeError("signing material reference is not a regular file")
if metadata.st_mode & 0o077: if metadata.st_mode & 0o077:
raise RuntimeError("signing material file permissions must be 0600 or stricter") raise RuntimeError("signing material file permissions must be 0600 or stricter")
value = self.path.read_bytes().strip() value = self.path.read_bytes()
if len(value) < 32: if len(value) < 32:
raise RuntimeError("signing material is too short") raise RuntimeError("signing material is too short")
return value return value
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ def build_application() -> CandidateApplication:
openclaw_url = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL", "").strip() openclaw_url = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL", "").strip()
material_file = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE", "").strip() material_file = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE", "").strip()
openclaw_key_id = os.getenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID", "default").strip() or "default"
openclaw = None openclaw = None
resolver = None resolver = None
if openclaw_url and material_file: if openclaw_url and material_file:
@@ -341,6 +342,7 @@ def build_application() -> CandidateApplication:
openclaw=openclaw, openclaw=openclaw,
hermes=hermes, hermes=hermes,
openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver, openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver,
openclaw_key_id=openclaw_key_id,
) )
return CandidateApplication(gateway, orchestrator, tracker, hermes, openclaw) return CandidateApplication(gateway, orchestrator, tracker, hermes, openclaw)
+18 -7
View File
@@ -79,20 +79,31 @@ class GatewayApplication:
@staticmethod @staticmethod
def context_from_headers(headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext: def context_from_headers(headers: Mapping[str, str]) -> RequestContext:
authenticated = str(headers.get(AUTHENTICATED_HEADER, "")).strip().lower() # HTTP field names are case-insensitive. BaseHTTPRequestHandler commonly
# presents them as title-cased (for example ``X-Aios-Authenticated``),
# so copying the message into a plain dict must not make identity lookup
# case-sensitive.
normalized_headers = {
str(key).strip().lower(): value for key, value in headers.items()
}
def header(name: str, default: str = "") -> str:
return str(normalized_headers.get(name.lower(), default))
authenticated = header(AUTHENTICATED_HEADER).strip().lower()
if authenticated not in {"1", "true", "yes"}: if authenticated not in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
raise Unauthorized("trusted authentication assertion is required") raise Unauthorized("trusted authentication assertion is required")
roles = [ roles = [
role.strip() role.strip()
for role in str(headers.get(ROLES_HEADER, "")).split(",") for role in header(ROLES_HEADER).split(",")
if role.strip() if role.strip()
] ]
return RequestContext.create( return RequestContext.create(
tenant_id=str(headers.get(TENANT_HEADER, "")), tenant_id=header(TENANT_HEADER),
principal_id=str(headers.get(PRINCIPAL_HEADER, "")), principal_id=header(PRINCIPAL_HEADER),
trace_id=str(headers.get(TRACE_HEADER, "")).strip() or None, trace_id=header(TRACE_HEADER).strip() or None,
session_id=str(headers.get(SESSION_HEADER, "")).strip() or None, session_id=header(SESSION_HEADER).strip() or None,
policy_version=str(headers.get(POLICY_HEADER, "v1")).strip() or "v1", policy_version=header(POLICY_HEADER, "v1").strip() or "v1",
roles=roles, roles=roles,
) )
+12 -1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ execution runtimes and never own tenant policy or task lifecycle.
from __future__ import annotations from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from typing import Any, Mapping from typing import Any, Mapping
from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJob, HermesResult from aios_hermes import HermesAdapter, HermesJob, HermesResult
@@ -129,6 +130,15 @@ class ExecutionOrchestrator:
task.tenant_id, task.tenant_id,
self.openclaw_key_id, self.openclaw_key_id,
) )
requested_timeout = (
self.openclaw.default_timeout_seconds
if timeout_seconds is None
else float(timeout_seconds)
)
effective_timeout = min(requested_timeout, 300.0)
expires_at = (
datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=effective_timeout)
).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
command = OpenClawCommand.create( command = OpenClawCommand.create(
tenant_id=task.tenant_id, tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
task_id=task.task_id, task_id=task.task_id,
@@ -136,10 +146,11 @@ class ExecutionOrchestrator:
action=task.action, action=task.action,
payload=task.payload, payload=task.payload,
idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id, idempotency_key=task.idempotency_key or task.task_id,
expires_at=expires_at,
key_id=self.openclaw_key_id, key_id=self.openclaw_key_id,
) )
command = sign_command(command, key_material) command = sign_command(command, key_material)
result = self.openclaw.execute(command, timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds) result = self.openclaw.execute(command, timeout_seconds=effective_timeout)
self.reconcile_openclaw(context, result) self.reconcile_openclaw(context, result)
return DispatchRecord( return DispatchRecord(
tenant_id=task.tenant_id, tenant_id=task.tenant_id,
View File
View File
+27
View File
@@ -419,6 +419,8 @@ X-AIOS-Policy-Version
- 代理必须删除客户端同名头后重新注入。 - 代理必须删除客户端同名头后重新注入。
- 应用不得直接暴露公网端口。 - 应用不得直接暴露公网端口。
- HTTP 字段名按协议不区分大小写;应用把 Header 集合转换为普通映射后,必须先统一字段名大小写再解析身份。`X-AIOS-*`、`X-Aios-*` 与全小写形式必须得到相同的 `RequestContext`,但字段值本身不得被改写。
- 真实监听器回归测试必须覆盖 `BaseHTTPRequestHandler` 的 title-case 行为,避免纯函数测试使用固定大写键而漏掉在线 401。
### 11.2 核心 API ### 11.2 核心 API
@@ -488,6 +490,8 @@ POST /api/v2/hermes/results/reconcile
- 默认只回滚代码。 - 默认只回滚代码。
- 状态恢复需显式授权。 - 状态恢复需显式授权。
- 回滚后必须执行 healthcheck。 - 回滚后必须执行 healthcheck。
- Release Archive 必须保留 `rollback.sh` 与 `healthcheck/check.sh` 的 executable bit;
验收测试必须阻止非执行模式进入候选包。
## 14. 契约变更规则 ## 14. 契约变更规则
@@ -500,3 +504,26 @@ POST /api/v2/hermes/results/reconcile
- Evidence/Audit 格式。 - Evidence/Audit 格式。
不兼容变化必须新增 ADR 和版本号,不得静默修改。 不兼容变化必须新增 ADR 和版本号,不得静默修改。
## 15. OpenClaw Runtime HTTP 合同
AIOS 只通过 OpenClaw loopback Gateway 的签名 Runtime 路由联调:
- `GET /v1/health`
- `POST /v1/execute`
- `GET /v1/commands/<command_id>?tenant_id=<tenant_id>`
- `POST /v1/commands/<command_id>/cancel?tenant_id=<tenant_id>`
`execute` 必须携带 `aios.openclaw.command.v1` Ed25519 签名合同和不超过 300 秒的
`expires_at`。Runtime 同时核对仓库外 CredentialRef;签名错误、过期、身份字段篡改、
跨租户查询/取消以及幂等冲突均失败关闭。取消接口的 `tenant_id` 是 Transport 合同的
组成部分,不允许仅凭 `command_id` 控制另一租户的命令。
Candidate 组合层必须把 `AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID` 原样传入 Orchestrator,
不得在已有批准 Key ID 时回落为 `default`。
Orchestrator 对调用方请求的更长超时执行 300 秒上限收敛,使签名有效期与 Runtime
硬上限保持一致。
当前 Runtime action allowlist 仅包含无副作用的 `status` 和正式验收专用
`acceptance.delay`。其成功只代表 OpenClaw 插件 Runtime 已执行对应合同动作,不代表
模型推理或任意 Agent 工具执行。命令身份、幂等键与终态追加持久化;Gateway 重启时
未完成的 `RUNNING` 记录收敛为 `FAILED/restart_interrupted`,不得误报为真实超时。
+18
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,20 @@
| ExecutionEvidence | §9 | `execution_tracking.py` | evidence persistence test | | ExecutionEvidence | §9 | `execution_tracking.py` | evidence persistence test |
| GitOpsStatus | §10 | `gitops_status.py` | healthcheck detached/clean检查 | | GitOpsStatus | §10 | `gitops_status.py` | healthcheck detached/clean检查 |
### 4.1 核心控制面模型说明
`RequestContext` 是每次控制面请求的不可缺失上下文。它承载租户、调用主体、追踪标识和请求来源,所有读取、写入、审批与调度都必须先用该上下文完成租户边界和身份检查。适配器不得自行补造租户,也不得把缺失上下文解释为默认管理权限。上下文校验失败时,控制面必须拒绝请求并写入不含密钥值的审计记录。
`TaskState` 是权威任务生命周期状态,不是前端展示标签。任务从创建、批准、调度、运行到完成、失败或取消,只能沿合同允许的方向迁移;OpenClaw 与 Hermes 回调只能请求迁移,最终状态由唯一控制面持久化。重复回调依靠幂等键收敛,跨租户回调、旧租约回调和非法逆向迁移必须被拒绝。
`TenantRecord`、`AgentRecord` 与 `TaskRecord` 共同定义所有权:租户拥有 Agent 和 Task,Agent 只能处理其租户与授权 Cell/Profile 范围内的任务。任何查询若缺少租户过滤条件,都不能作为正式实现。`AuditEvent` 记录主体、动作、对象、结果和追踪标识,但不得保存 Token、密码、私钥或签名材料。
`OpenClawCommand` 与 `OpenClawResult` 描述短执行路径;前者必须绑定任务、租户、追踪标识、命令期限和签名合同,后者必须回传相同身份域并接受幂等校验。`RuntimeHealth` 只报告可验证运行事实,不能把本地 Bare Repo 更新误报为 Gitea 完全同步。
`HermesJob`、`HermesResult` 与 `HermesHealth` 描述长任务路径。Job 的领取、心跳和 Lease 续期必须持久化;Result 只有在任务、租户、执行器和租约全部匹配时才能改变权威状态。Worker 崩溃后可重新领取过期 Lease,但不得重复产生业务副作用。
`ExecutionEvidence` 保存 Claim、Heartbeat、Result 与必要的追踪关系,用于重启恢复和审计闭环。Evidence 的写入必须限定任务分支与固定路径;本轮增加的 Owner-signed Provenance Writer 只允许七个 `.agent` JSON,并以普通 Commit 与 Push 固化,不授予通用 Shell 或任意仓库写权限。
## 5. 部署追踪 ## 5. 部署追踪
| 能力 | 文件 | 验收命令 | | 能力 | 文件 | 验收命令 |
@@ -111,3 +125,7 @@
## 8. 更新要求 ## 8. 更新要求
任何代码、API、部署或测试路径变化,必须同步更新本矩阵。验收脚本会检查本文档引用的关键路径存在,并检查架构/功能代码变化是否同时包含 `docs/aios-v2/` 变化。 任何代码、API、部署或测试路径变化,必须同步更新本矩阵。验收脚本会检查本文档引用的关键路径存在,并检查架构/功能代码变化是否同时包含 `docs/aios-v2/` 变化。
### OpenClaw 命令签名材料
`openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519` 使用 Ed25519 私钥对 canonical command bytes 签名,签名以 URL-safe Base64 编码。运行材料只允许是 32 字节 raw private key 或 Ed25519 PEM;`FileSigningMaterialResolver` 不得对 raw bytes 执行 `strip()`。签名、篡改拒绝、过期拒绝由候选测试与运行时 sign/verify 探针共同验证。
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@@ -109,21 +109,15 @@ AIOS V2R1 的核心代码、完整中文文档、任务合同、部署资产和
### 4.4 BLK-OPENCLAW-RUN-PROVENANCE-MISSING ### 4.4 BLK-OPENCLAW-RUN-PROVENANCE-MISSING
- 严重级别:高 - 严重级别:高
- 状态:开放 - 状态:已解决
- 现象:OpenClaw 写工具被 `run_provenance_missing` 策略拒绝。 - 根因:旧插件只有进程内 `runId -> sender` Map,没有 Owner-signed Schema、持久 Store 和限定 Git Writer。
- 风险:无法证明写操作来自已领取、已授权、可审计的执行会话。 - 修复:部署 `aios-tenant-boundary` rc2,增加 Ed25519 issuer/store、Run/Sender/OID/期限绑定、一次性 permit 与专用 `aios_evidence_write`。
- 外部受信输入:允许七个 `.agent` JSON 写入的 OpenClaw Provenance 授权。 - 验证:Provenance `openclaw-v2r1-20260721T031523Z` 完成 Heartbeat 写入、Commit、普通 Push 和审计;`README.md` 越权请求被拒绝;Node 测试 9/9。
- 解除条件:
1. 创建带任务 ID、执行器实例、Claim OID、Candidate OID 和授权主体的 Run Provenance;
2. Provenance 与七个 `.agent` JSON 写入范围绑定;
3. 权限仅覆盖当前任务分支和 Evidence 路径;
4. 由 Owner 或批准策略签发;
5. 写入、Commit、Push 和审计链验证通过。
### 4.5 BLK-CONTROLLER-LEGACY-GITEA-CHECK ### 4.5 BLK-CONTROLLER-LEGACY-GITEA-CHECK
- 严重级别:高 - 严重级别:高
- 状态:开放 - 状态:已解决
- 现象:Controller 健康检查仍硬编码旧 `aios-v23`,并返回 `gitea=false`、`branch_sync=false`。 - 现象:Controller 健康检查仍硬编码旧 `aios-v23`,并返回 `gitea=false`、`branch_sync=false`。
- 风险:健康状态与当前 AIOS V2R1 仓库不一致,可能错误阻止或错误放行发布。 - 风险:健康状态与当前 AIOS V2R1 仓库不一致,可能错误阻止或错误放行发布。
- 解除条件: - 解除条件:
@@ -152,9 +146,9 @@ AIOS V2R1 的核心代码、完整中文文档、任务合同、部署资产和
| Gate | 当前状态 | 说明 | | Gate | 当前状态 | 说明 |
|---|---|---| |---|---|---|
| Gate A:文档与设计 | 未运行 | Candidate 未合并到任务,阻塞未解除 | | Gate A:文档与设计 | 允许启动 | 五项高风险 Blocker 已解除,等待正式执行 |
| Gate B:代码与测试 | 未运行 | 不能基于不完整任务分支测试 | | Gate B:代码与测试 | 等待 Gate A | 等待正式执行候选测试 |
| Gate C:预发布 | 禁止 | Secret、签名、Provenance、Controller Health 未通过 | | Gate C:预发布 | 禁止 | 等待 Gate A、Gate B、离线全量验收和在线联调 |
| Gate D:发布审查 | `STOP_PREPRODUCTION` | Codex 明确停止预发布 | | Gate D:发布审查 | `STOP_PREPRODUCTION` | Codex 明确停止预发布 |
| Gate E:生产发布 | 禁止 | 未满足任何生产 Gate | | Gate E:生产发布 | 禁止 | 未满足任何生产 Gate |
@@ -190,29 +184,18 @@ AIOS V2R1 的核心代码、完整中文文档、任务合同、部署资产和
## 8. 外部受信输入 ## 8. 外部受信输入
目前仅有两项确实需要外部受信输入: 五项高风险 Blocker 当前均不再需要新的外部受信输入。签名材料继续留在受保护边界,Provenance 仍须按 Run 由 Owner 限时签发,不得转化为长期通用权限。
1. **批准的签名材料**
- 不得通过聊天、Git 或普通日志传递;
- 必须通过批准的 Secret/Key 交付链安装。
2. **OpenClaw Run Provenance 授权**
- 仅允许当前任务所需的七个 `.agent` JSON 写入;
- 必须绑定任务、执行器实例、Claim、Candidate 和分支;
- 不得授予通用生产写权限。
其余阻塞均可由 OpenClaw、Codex、Windows ChatGPT Owner 和 GitOps 运维流程处理。
## 9. 监督结论 ## 9. 监督结论
当前状态保持: 当前状态保持:
```text ```text
BLOCKED PARTIAL
STOP_PREPRODUCTION STOP_PREPRODUCTION
``` ```
虽然三分支已经同步 Gitea、凭据已经最小权限轮换、执行服务已经恢复,但当前尚无足够证据允许执行 Gate A–D 或进入预发布。 三分支已同步 Gitea,五项高风险 Blocker 已解除,允许执行 Gate A、Gate B 和离线全量验收;在三项正式结果与后续在线验收形成证据前,不进入预发布。
任何后续状态更新必须同步: 任何后续状态更新必须同步:
@@ -222,3 +205,14 @@ STOP_PREPRODUCTION
- `05-TRACEABILITY-MATRIX.md`; - `05-TRACEABILITY-MATRIX.md`;
- `AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-CANDIDATE.md`; - `AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-CANDIDATE.md`;
- 如涉及架构或发布语义,更新 ADR。 - 如涉及架构或发布语义,更新 ADR。
## 10. 2026-07-20 至 2026-07-21 Owner 修复实况
- Worktree:OpenClaw 与 Codex 独立、目标分支唯一检出、无 lock、无 prunable;现有 Evidence 已先备份。
- Candidate:`ba7669c3b49f98cf3500af6ea966ba0db472ff3b` 已普通 Push 到 Gitea,并以 `--no-ff` 合入 OpenClaw 任务分支。
- Secrets:OpenClaw 原生 audit 从 3 项明文降为 `plaintext=0`、`unresolved=0`、`shadowed=0`、`legacy=0`;Gateway Token 已轮换,OneAPI 实际 agent 调用通过。
- Signing:命令合同已从名实不符的 HMAC 改为真实 Ed25519;`openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519` 材料由 Owner 在受保护边界生成,运行用户权限检查、sign/verify 和篡改拒绝通过。
- Controller:修复分支 `patch/bugfix/controller-gitea-health-v2r1-20260720` 的 OID `6188da26453505dacde9d6d298191437164c8d27` 已部署;12 项测试通过,active worktree detached + clean,`gitea=true`、`branch_sync=true`、`oid_match=true`、`sync_status=fully_synced`。
- Provenance:插件 rc2 已声明原生工具合同并通过 runtime doctor;Owner-signed Store、一次性 permit、七路径 Writer、普通 Push、审计与越权拒绝均通过。首次部署检查脚本曾两次因读取错误 JSON 层级触发自动回滚,旧插件与配置均成功恢复,修正断言后部署成功。
因此当前结论仍为 `STOP_PREPRODUCTION`,但 Gate A 已允许启动;后续结论必须基于 Gate A、Gate B、离线 Acceptance、在线 Runtime、重启恢复和正式回滚演练的最新证据。
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"type": "branch",
"branch": "task/openclaw/AIOS-V2R1-PRODUCTION-DEPLOY-20260720",
"base": "integration/aios-v2r1-cto-production-candidate-20260720",
"created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
"created_at": "2026-07-20T03:49:09Z",
"direct_main_push": false,
"owner_approval_required": true
}
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
# AIOS OpenClaw Run Provenance Writer
本插件为 AIOS V2R1 提供 Owner 签名的运行授权、持久 Provenance Store 与专用 Evidence Writer。它不授予通用 Shell 或任意文件写权限。
## AIOS Runtime HTTP 合同
插件在 OpenClaw loopback Gateway 内注册 `/v1/health`、`/v1/execute` 和
`/v1/commands/<id>`。执行请求必须同时通过本机 CredentialRef 比对与 Ed25519
签名验证;热路径只读取公钥,不读取 Candidate 私密签名材料。
Runtime 仅允许无副作用的 `status` 与在线验收专用 `acceptance.delay`。它不把
返回成功冒充为模型推理或任意 Agent 执行。命令身份、幂等键和终态以追加式
JSONL 持久化;Gateway 重启时遗留的 `RUNNING` 命令会收敛为
`FAILED/restart_interrupted`,避免把重启误报成真实超时。
取消只对当前进程内仍在执行的命令生效,超时由签名命令的 `expires_at` 与
30 秒硬上限共同约束。未知 action、错误签名、过期命令、跨 tenant 状态查询、
冲突的 `command_id` 或幂等键均失败关闭。
## 安全边界
- 签名合同:`aios.run-provenance/v1`,Ed25519,授权最长 15 分钟。
- 授权绑定:`run_id`、`sender_id`、任务、执行器实例、当前 Claim OID、Candidate OID 与任务分支。
- 路径:仅允许七个 `.agent/*.json` Evidence 文件。
- 操作:仅允许 `create/update`,随后执行固定 argv 的 `git add`、`git commit` 和当前任务分支普通 push。
- 通用 `exec/shell/bash/write/edit/apply_patch/file_write` 始终拒绝。
- `toolCallId` permit 只能消费一次;参数摘要变化、过期、签名篡改、Run/Sender 不匹配均拒绝。
- Writer 拒绝 symlink、路径逃逸、脏 Worktree、错误分支、错误 HEAD、Candidate 非祖先及暂存范围扩大。
- Gateway 以服务用户调用 Git 时,仅对配置中的精确 `writerRepoRoot` 注入命令级 `safe.directory`,不写全局 Git 配置。
- 禁止 reset、rebase、amend、Tag 和 force push。提交后 push 失败时保留可审计的 local-ahead 状态,不伪造回滚。
## 组件
- `issuer.mjs`:在受保护边界读取现有 Ed25519 材料,生成公开验签材料并原子写入一次性签发记录。
- `provenance.js`:严格 Schema、canonical JSON、Ed25519 sign/verify 和安全 Store 读取。
- `index.js`:OpenClaw hook、Owner/Run/Sender 验证与一次性 permit。
- `writer.js`:限定路径原子写入、固定 Git 操作和追加式审计。
## 部署与回滚
部署必须先备份运行插件和 OpenClaw 配置,再安装 Git 中已测试的完整目录,配置绝对路径、Key ID、任务分支和审计路径,执行 `openclaw plugins doctor` 后才重启 Gateway。回滚只恢复备份插件与配置并重启,不修改任务分支历史或业务状态。
## 验证
执行:
```bash
node --test test/*.test.js
```
验收还必须包含受保护签发、Heartbeat 实际 commit/push、审计链验证,以及 `README.md` 等未授权路径的拒绝测试。
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export { default } from "../index.js";
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export * from "../policy.js";
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export * from "../provenance.js";
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export * from "../writer.js";
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import crypto from "node:crypto";
import path from "node:path";
import { canonicalize, loadStoredRecord, readPublicKey, validatePayload, verifyRecord } from "./provenance.js";
import { classifyRun, decideToolCall, runKey, validateWriterParams } from "./policy.js";
import { executeEvidenceWrite } from "./writer.js";
import { createRuntimeApi } from "./runtime.js";
const activeRuns = new Map();
const permits = new Map();
const MAX_RUN_AGE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
const DEFAULT_PERMIT_TTL_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000;
function pluginConfig(event, api) {
return event?.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
}
function prune(now = Date.now()) {
for (const [key, value] of activeRuns) if (now - value.recordedAt > MAX_RUN_AGE_MS) activeRuns.delete(key);
for (const [key, value] of permits) if (now - value.recordedAt > value.ttlMs) permits.delete(key);
}
function toolCallId(event) {
return typeof event?.toolCallId === "string" && event.toolCallId.trim() ? event.toolCallId.trim() : undefined;
}
function eventParams(event) {
return event?.params ?? event?.parameters;
}
function requireAbsoluteConfig(config, key) {
const value = config[key];
if (typeof value !== "string" || !path.isAbsolute(value)) throw new Error(`config_${key}_missing`);
return value;
}
export function authorizeEvidenceCall({ event, trust, config, now = Date.now() }) {
const callId = toolCallId(event);
if (!callId) return { ok: false, code: "tool_call_id_missing" };
if (!trust?.trusted) return { ok: false, code: trust?.reason || "run_provenance_missing" };
const params = eventParams(event);
if (!params || typeof params !== "object" || Array.isArray(params)) return { ok: false, code: "tool_params_missing" };
let record;
try { record = loadStoredRecord(requireAbsoluteConfig(config, "provenanceStoreDir"), params.provenance_id); }
catch (error) {
const code = error instanceof Error && ["unsafe_provenance_file", "invalid_provenance_location", "provenance_record_too_large"].includes(error.message)
? error.message : "provenance_store_rejected";
return { ok: false, code };
}
const validation = validatePayload(record.payload, now);
if (!validation.ok) return validation;
let publicKey;
try { publicKey = readPublicKey(requireAbsoluteConfig(config, "provenancePublicKeyPath")); }
catch { return { ok: false, code: "public_key_rejected" }; }
const signature = verifyRecord(record, publicKey, config.provenanceKeyId);
if (!signature.ok) return signature;
const payload = record.payload;
const runId = runKey(event, {});
if (!runId || payload.run_id !== runId) return { ok: false, code: "run_id_mismatch" };
if (payload.sender_id !== trust.senderId) return { ok: false, code: "sender_id_mismatch" };
if (config.writerTaskBranch && payload.task_branch !== config.writerTaskBranch) return { ok: false, code: "task_branch_mismatch" };
if (config.writerTaskId && payload.task_id !== config.writerTaskId) return { ok: false, code: "task_id_mismatch" };
if (config.provenanceIssuer && payload.issued_by !== config.provenanceIssuer) return { ok: false, code: "issuer_mismatch" };
if (config.executor && payload.executor !== config.executor) return { ok: false, code: "executor_mismatch" };
if (config.executorInstance && payload.executor_instance !== config.executorInstance) return { ok: false, code: "executor_instance_mismatch" };
const paramsValidation = validateWriterParams(params, payload);
if (!paramsValidation.ok) return paramsValidation;
const digest = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(canonicalize(params)).digest("hex");
if (permits.has(callId)) return { ok: false, code: "permit_replay" };
const ttlMs = Number.isSafeInteger(config.permitTtlMs) && config.permitTtlMs > 0
? Math.min(config.permitTtlMs, DEFAULT_PERMIT_TTL_MS)
: DEFAULT_PERMIT_TTL_MS;
permits.set(callId, { payload, paramsDigest: digest, recordedAt: now, ttlMs });
return { ok: true };
}
export function consumePermit(toolCallIdValue, params, now = Date.now()) {
const permit = permits.get(toolCallIdValue);
permits.delete(toolCallIdValue);
if (!permit) throw new Error("permit_missing");
if (now - permit.recordedAt > permit.ttlMs) throw new Error("permit_expired");
const digest = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(canonicalize(params)).digest("hex");
if (!crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(digest), Buffer.from(permit.paramsDigest))) throw new Error("permit_params_mismatch");
return permit;
}
function toolResult(details) {
return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(details) }], details };
}
function registerWriterTool(api) {
api.registerTool((toolContext) => ({
name: "aios_evidence_write",
label: "AIOS Evidence Writer",
description: "Write one Owner-authorized JSON evidence file and normally push the current task branch.",
parameters: {
type: "object",
additionalProperties: false,
required: ["provenance_id", "path", "operation", "document"],
properties: {
provenance_id: { type: "string" },
path: { type: "string" },
operation: { type: "string", enum: ["create", "update"] },
document: { type: "object" },
},
},
executionMode: "sequential",
async execute(callId, params) {
const permit = consumePermit(callId, params);
const config = toolContext?.getRuntimeConfig?.()?.plugins?.entries?.["aios-tenant-boundary"]?.config
?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
const result = await executeEvidenceWrite({
repoRoot: requireAbsoluteConfig(config, "writerRepoRoot"),
evidencePath: params.path,
operation: params.operation,
document: params.document,
payload: permit.payload,
pushRemote: config.writerPushRemote ?? "gitea-http",
askPassPath: config.writerAskPassPath ?? "",
auditLogPath: requireAbsoluteConfig(config, "writerAuditLogPath"),
gitBinary: config.gitBinary ?? "/usr/bin/git",
});
return toolResult(result);
},
}), { name: "aios_evidence_write" });
}
export default {
id: "aios-tenant-boundary",
name: "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
description: "Fail-closed Owner provenance and dedicated evidence-writer boundary.",
register(api) {
const runtimeApi = createRuntimeApi(api);
api.registerHttpRoute({ path: "/v1/health", auth: "plugin", match: "exact", handler: runtimeApi.handleHealth });
api.registerHttpRoute({ path: "/v1/execute", auth: "plugin", match: "exact", handler: runtimeApi.handleExecute });
api.registerHttpRoute({ path: "/v1/commands/", auth: "plugin", match: "prefix", handler: runtimeApi.commandRequest });
registerWriterTool(api);
api.on("before_agent_run", async (event, ctx) => {
prune();
const config = pluginConfig(event, api);
const trust = classifyRun(event, ctx, config);
const key = runKey(event, ctx);
if (key) activeRuns.set(key, { ...trust, recordedAt: Date.now() });
if (config.blockUnknownAgentRuns === true && !trust.trusted && trust.reason !== "job_id_present") {
return { outcome: "block", reason: trust.reason, message: "Authenticated Owner provenance is required." };
}
return { outcome: "pass" };
}, { priority: 100 });
api.on("before_tool_call", async (event, ctx) => {
prune();
const config = pluginConfig(event, api);
const trust = activeRuns.get(runKey(event, ctx));
const decision = decideToolCall(event.toolName, trust, config);
if (decision.action === "block") return { block: true, blockReason: `AIOS V2R1 policy denied: ${decision.code}` };
if (decision.action === "verify_provenance") {
const authorized = authorizeEvidenceCall({ event, trust, config });
if (!authorized.ok) return { block: true, blockReason: `AIOS V2R1 provenance denied: ${authorized.code}` };
return undefined;
}
if (decision.action === "approval") {
return { requireApproval: {
title: `Approve ${String(event.toolName)}`,
description: "Authenticated Owner requested a non-evidence side effect.",
severity: "warning", timeoutMs: Number(config.approvalTimeoutMs ?? 60000),
allowedDecisions: ["allow-once", "deny"], pluginId: "aios-tenant-boundary",
} };
}
return undefined;
}, { priority: 100 });
api.on("agent_end", async (event, ctx) => {
const key = runKey(event, ctx);
if (key) activeRuns.delete(key);
});
},
};
export const __state = { activeRuns, permits };
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#!/usr/bin/env node
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { canonicalize, privateKeyFromMaterial, signRecord, validatePayload } from "./provenance.js";
function parseArgs(argv) {
const result = {};
for (let index = 0; index < argv.length; index += 2) {
const key = argv[index];
const value = argv[index + 1];
if (!key?.startsWith("--") || value === undefined) throw new Error("invalid_arguments");
result[key.slice(2)] = value;
}
return result;
}
function atomicWrite(filePath, contents, mode) {
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, mode: 0o750 });
const temporary = `${filePath}.${process.pid}.${crypto.randomUUID()}.tmp`;
fs.writeFileSync(temporary, contents, { mode, flag: "wx" });
fs.renameSync(temporary, filePath);
fs.chmodSync(filePath, mode);
}
function requireProtectedPrivateKey(privateKeyPath) {
const stat = fs.lstatSync(privateKeyPath);
if (!stat.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("unsafe_private_key");
if (process.platform !== "win32" && (stat.mode & 0o077) !== 0) throw new Error("unsafe_private_key_mode");
}
export function issueFromFiles({ payloadPath, privateKeyPath, publicKeyPath, storeDir, keyId, now = Date.now() }) {
for (const value of [payloadPath, privateKeyPath, publicKeyPath, storeDir, keyId]) {
if (typeof value !== "string" || !value) throw new Error("missing_argument");
}
const payload = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(payloadPath, "utf8"));
const validated = validatePayload(payload, now);
if (!validated.ok) throw new Error(validated.code);
requireProtectedPrivateKey(privateKeyPath);
const recordPath = path.join(storeDir, `${payload.provenance_id}.json`);
if (fs.existsSync(recordPath)) throw new Error("provenance_id_already_issued");
const privateMaterial = fs.readFileSync(privateKeyPath);
const privateKey = privateKeyFromMaterial(privateMaterial);
const publicPem = crypto.createPublicKey(privateKey).export({ format: "pem", type: "spki" });
const record = signRecord(payload, privateMaterial, keyId);
atomicWrite(publicKeyPath, publicPem, 0o644);
atomicWrite(recordPath, `${canonicalize(record)}\n`, 0o640);
return payload.provenance_id;
}
const isMain = process.argv[1] && path.resolve(process.argv[1]) === fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
if (isMain) {
try {
const args = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
const provenanceId = issueFromFiles({
payloadPath: args.payload,
privateKeyPath: args["private-key"],
publicKeyPath: args["public-key"],
storeDir: args["store-dir"],
keyId: args["key-id"],
});
process.stdout.write(`PROVENANCE_ISSUED=${provenanceId}\n`);
} catch (error) {
process.stderr.write(`PROVENANCE_ISSUE_FAILED=${error instanceof Error ? error.message : "unknown"}\n`);
process.exitCode = 1;
}
}
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{
"id": "aios-tenant-boundary",
"name": "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
"description": "Enforces Owner-signed run provenance, a dedicated evidence writer, and the signed AIOS runtime contract.",
"version": "2.1.0-rc3",
"entry": "dist/index.js",
"contracts": {
"tools": ["aios_evidence_write"]
},
"configSchema": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"requireExplicitTrustedSenders": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
"requireSenderIsOwner": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
"trustedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
"blockedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
"readOnlyTools": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
"requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
"blockUnknownAgentRuns": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
"approvalTimeoutMs": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1000, "maximum": 300000 },
"permitTtlMs": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1000, "maximum": 120000 },
"provenanceStoreDir": { "type": "string" },
"provenancePublicKeyPath": { "type": "string" },
"provenanceKeyId": { "type": "string" },
"provenanceIssuer": { "type": "string" },
"executor": { "type": "string" },
"executorInstance": { "type": "string" },
"writerRepoRoot": { "type": "string" },
"writerTaskId": { "type": "string" },
"writerTaskBranch": { "type": "string" },
"writerPushRemote": { "type": "string" },
"writerAskPassPath": { "type": "string" },
"writerAuditLogPath": { "type": "string" },
"gitBinary": { "type": "string" },
"runtimeStatePath": { "type": "string" },
"runtimeSigningPublicKeyPath": { "type": "string" },
"runtimeSigningKeyId": { "type": "string" },
"runtimeCredentialRef": { "type": "string" },
"runtimeMaxActive": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 16 },
"runtimeMaxDelayMs": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 100, "maximum": 30000 }
}
}
}
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{
"name": "@aios/openclaw-tenant-boundary",
"version": "2.1.0-rc.3",
"type": "module",
"description": "AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell provenance and side-effect policy boundary for OpenClaw.",
"files": [
"index.js",
"policy.js",
"provenance.js",
"writer.js",
"runtime.js",
"issuer.mjs",
"dist",
"openclaw.plugin.json"
],
"scripts": {
"test": "node --test test/*.test.js"
},
"openclaw": {
"extensions": [
"./dist/index.js"
]
}
}
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import { ALLOWED_OPERATIONS, ALLOWED_PATHS } from "./provenance.js";
const DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS = Object.freeze([
"read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
"memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
]);
const GENERIC_MUTATION_TOOLS = new Set([
"exec", "shell", "bash", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "file_write",
"computer", "process", "terminal",
]);
function strings(value) {
return Array.isArray(value)
? value.filter((item) => typeof item === "string" && item.trim()).map((item) => item.trim())
: [];
}
export function resolveSenderId(ctx = {}) {
const direct = typeof ctx.senderId === "string" ? ctx.senderId.trim() : "";
const nested = typeof ctx.channelContext?.sender?.id === "string" ? ctx.channelContext.sender.id.trim() : "";
return direct || nested || undefined;
}
export function classifyRun(event = {}, ctx = {}, config = {}) {
const senderId = resolveSenderId({ ...ctx, senderId: event.senderId ?? ctx.senderId });
const trusted = new Set(strings(config.trustedSenderIds));
const blocked = new Set(strings(config.blockedSenderIds));
if (typeof ctx.jobId === "string" && ctx.jobId) return { trusted: false, origin: "automation", reason: "job_id_present" };
if (!senderId) return { trusted: false, origin: "system_or_unknown", reason: "sender_id_missing" };
if (blocked.has(senderId)) return { trusted: false, origin: "blocked_sender", reason: "sender_blocked", senderId };
if (config.requireExplicitTrustedSenders !== false && !trusted.has(senderId)) {
return { trusted: false, origin: "untrusted_sender", reason: "sender_not_allowlisted", senderId };
}
if (config.requireSenderIsOwner !== false && event.senderIsOwner !== true) {
return { trusted: false, origin: "non_owner", reason: "sender_not_owner", senderId };
}
return { trusted: true, origin: "authenticated_owner", reason: "owner_verified", senderId };
}
export function runKey(event = {}, ctx = {}) {
const key = event.runId || ctx.runId;
return typeof key === "string" && key.trim() ? key.trim() : undefined;
}
export function decideToolCall(toolName, runTrust, config = {}) {
const name = typeof toolName === "string" ? toolName.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
if (!name) return { action: "block", code: "tool_name_missing" };
if (GENERIC_MUTATION_TOOLS.has(name)) return { action: "block", code: "dedicated_writer_required" };
const configured = strings(config.readOnlyTools).map((item) => item.toLowerCase());
const readOnly = new Set(configured.length ? configured : DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS);
if (readOnly.has(name)) return { action: "allow", code: "read_only" };
if (!runTrust?.trusted) return { action: "block", code: runTrust?.reason || "run_provenance_missing" };
if (name === "aios_evidence_write") return { action: "verify_provenance", code: "dedicated_writer" };
if (config.requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects === false) return { action: "allow", code: "trusted_side_effect" };
return { action: "approval", code: "human_side_effect" };
}
export function validateWriterParams(params = {}, payload) {
const keys = Object.keys(params).sort();
const expected = ["document", "operation", "path", "provenance_id"];
if (keys.length !== expected.length || expected.some((key) => !keys.includes(key))) return { ok: false, code: "tool_params_schema_mismatch" };
if (params.provenance_id !== payload.provenance_id) return { ok: false, code: "provenance_id_mismatch" };
if (!ALLOWED_PATHS.includes(params.path)) return { ok: false, code: "path_not_allowed" };
if (params.operation !== "create" && params.operation !== "update") return { ok: false, code: "operation_not_allowed" };
if (!payload.allowed_paths.includes(params.path)) return { ok: false, code: "path_not_authorized" };
for (const operation of [params.operation, "git add", "git commit", "normal push current task branch"]) {
if (!payload.allowed_operations.includes(operation)) return { ok: false, code: "operation_not_authorized" };
}
let serialized;
try { serialized = JSON.stringify(params.document); } catch { return { ok: false, code: "document_not_json" }; }
if (serialized === undefined || Buffer.byteLength(serialized) > 256 * 1024) return { ok: false, code: "document_invalid_or_too_large" };
return { ok: true };
}
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import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
export const ALLOWED_PATHS = Object.freeze([
".agent/claim.json",
".agent/heartbeat.json",
".agent/progress.json",
".agent/status.json",
".agent/blockers.json",
".agent/result.json",
".agent/credential-status.json",
]);
export const ALLOWED_OPERATIONS = Object.freeze([
"create",
"update",
"git add",
"git commit",
"normal push current task branch",
]);
const PAYLOAD_FIELDS = Object.freeze([
"schema_version", "provenance_id", "run_id", "sender_id", "task_id",
"executor", "executor_instance", "claim_oid", "candidate_oid", "task_branch",
"allowed_paths", "allowed_operations", "issued_by", "issued_at", "expires_at",
]);
const OID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/;
const ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$/;
const MAX_LIFETIME_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
function normalized(value) {
if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return value;
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(normalized);
const result = {};
for (const key of Object.keys(value).sort()) {
if (value[key] !== undefined) result[key] = normalized(value[key]);
}
return result;
}
export function canonicalize(value) {
return JSON.stringify(normalized(value));
}
function exactStringSet(actual, expected) {
if (!Array.isArray(actual) || actual.some((v) => typeof v !== "string")) return false;
if (actual.length !== expected.length || new Set(actual).size !== expected.length) return false;
const set = new Set(actual);
return expected.every((value) => set.has(value));
}
function failure(code) {
return { ok: false, code };
}
export function validatePayload(payload, now = Date.now()) {
if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) return failure("payload_not_object");
const keys = Object.keys(payload).sort();
if (keys.length !== PAYLOAD_FIELDS.length || PAYLOAD_FIELDS.some((key) => !keys.includes(key))) {
return failure("payload_schema_mismatch");
}
if (payload.schema_version !== "aios.run-provenance/v1") return failure("schema_version_mismatch");
for (const key of ["run_id", "sender_id", "task_id", "executor", "executor_instance", "task_branch", "issued_by"]) {
if (typeof payload[key] !== "string" || !payload[key].trim()) return failure(`invalid_${key}`);
}
if (!ID_RE.test(payload.provenance_id)) return failure("invalid_provenance_id");
if (!OID_RE.test(payload.claim_oid) || !OID_RE.test(payload.candidate_oid)) return failure("invalid_oid");
if (!exactStringSet(payload.allowed_paths, ALLOWED_PATHS)) return failure("allowed_paths_mismatch");
if (!exactStringSet(payload.allowed_operations, ALLOWED_OPERATIONS)) return failure("allowed_operations_mismatch");
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(payload.issued_at) || !Number.isSafeInteger(payload.expires_at)) return failure("invalid_time");
if (payload.expires_at <= payload.issued_at || payload.expires_at - payload.issued_at > MAX_LIFETIME_MS) {
return failure("invalid_lifetime");
}
if (now < payload.issued_at) return failure("not_yet_valid");
if (now >= payload.expires_at) return failure("expired");
return { ok: true, payload };
}
export function privateKeyFromMaterial(material) {
if (!Buffer.isBuffer(material)) material = Buffer.from(material);
if (material.length === 32) {
const pkcs8Prefix = Buffer.from("302e020100300506032b657004220420", "hex");
return crypto.createPrivateKey({ key: Buffer.concat([pkcs8Prefix, material]), format: "der", type: "pkcs8" });
}
if (material.subarray(0, 5).toString() === "-----") return crypto.createPrivateKey(material);
return crypto.createPrivateKey({ key: material, format: "der", type: "pkcs8" });
}
export function signRecord(payload, privateMaterial, keyId) {
const signature = crypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(canonicalize(payload)), privateKeyFromMaterial(privateMaterial));
return {
payload,
signature: { algorithm: "Ed25519", key_id: keyId, value: signature.toString("base64url") },
};
}
export function verifyRecord(record, publicKeyPem, expectedKeyId) {
if (!record || typeof record !== "object" || Array.isArray(record)) return failure("record_not_object");
const signature = record.signature;
if (!signature || signature.algorithm !== "Ed25519" || signature.key_id !== expectedKeyId || typeof signature.value !== "string") {
return failure("signature_contract_mismatch");
}
try {
const ok = crypto.verify(
null,
Buffer.from(canonicalize(record.payload)),
crypto.createPublicKey(publicKeyPem),
Buffer.from(signature.value, "base64url"),
);
return ok ? { ok: true } : failure("signature_invalid");
} catch {
return failure("signature_invalid");
}
}
function safeRegularFile(filePath) {
const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
if (!stat.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("unsafe_provenance_file");
if (process.platform !== "win32" && (stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) throw new Error("unsafe_provenance_file");
}
export function loadStoredRecord(storeDir, provenanceId) {
if (!path.isAbsolute(storeDir) || !ID_RE.test(provenanceId)) throw new Error("invalid_provenance_location");
const storeReal = fs.realpathSync(storeDir);
const target = path.join(storeReal, `${provenanceId}.json`);
safeRegularFile(target);
const targetReal = fs.realpathSync(target);
if (path.dirname(targetReal) !== storeReal || path.basename(targetReal) !== `${provenanceId}.json`) {
throw new Error("unsafe_provenance_file");
}
const raw = fs.readFileSync(target, "utf8");
if (Buffer.byteLength(raw) > 128 * 1024) throw new Error("provenance_record_too_large");
return JSON.parse(raw);
}
export function readPublicKey(publicKeyPath) {
if (!path.isAbsolute(publicKeyPath)) throw new Error("invalid_public_key_path");
safeRegularFile(publicKeyPath);
return fs.readFileSync(publicKeyPath, "utf8");
}
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import crypto from "node:crypto";
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
const CONTRACT_VERSION = "aios.openclaw.command.v1";
const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
const CLOCK_SKEW_MS = 300_000;
const COMMAND_FIELDS = [
"command_id", "tenant_id", "task_id", "trace_id", "action", "payload",
"idempotency_key", "created_at", "expires_at", "contract_version", "key_id",
];
function isObject(value) {
return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
}
function sorted(value) {
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(sorted);
if (!isObject(value)) return value;
return Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(value).sort().map((key) => [key, sorted(value[key])]));
}
function canonical(value) {
return JSON.stringify(sorted(value));
}
function nowIso() {
return new Date().toISOString();
}
function sendJson(res, status, body) {
const data = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(body));
res.writeHead(status, {
"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
"Content-Length": String(data.length),
"Cache-Control": "no-store",
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
});
res.end(data);
return true;
}
async function readJson(req) {
const chunks = [];
let size = 0;
for await (const chunk of req) {
size += chunk.length;
if (size > MAX_BODY_BYTES) throw new Error("body_too_large");
chunks.push(chunk);
}
let value;
try { value = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8") || "{}"); }
catch { throw new Error("invalid_json"); }
if (!isObject(value)) throw new Error("invalid_json_object");
return value;
}
function requireAbsolute(config, name) {
const value = config[name];
if (typeof value !== "string" || !path.isAbsolute(value)) throw new Error(`config_${name}_missing`);
return value;
}
function appendRecord(statePath, record) {
const parent = path.dirname(statePath);
fs.mkdirSync(parent, { recursive: true, mode: 0o750 });
const fd = fs.openSync(statePath, "a", 0o640);
try {
fs.writeSync(fd, `${JSON.stringify(record)}\n`, null, "utf8");
fs.fsyncSync(fd);
} finally {
fs.closeSync(fd);
}
fs.chmodSync(statePath, 0o640);
}
function validateCommand(value, expectedKeyId) {
const allowed = new Set([...COMMAND_FIELDS, "signature"]);
if (Object.keys(value).some((key) => !allowed.has(key))) throw new Error("unknown_command_field");
for (const name of COMMAND_FIELDS.filter((name) => name !== "expires_at" && name !== "payload")) {
if (typeof value[name] !== "string" || !value[name].trim()) throw new Error(`invalid_${name}`);
}
if (!isObject(value.payload)) throw new Error("invalid_payload");
if (typeof value.expires_at !== "string" || !value.expires_at) throw new Error("expires_at_required");
if (typeof value.signature !== "string" || !value.signature) throw new Error("signature_missing");
if (value.contract_version !== CONTRACT_VERSION) throw new Error("contract_version_rejected");
if (value.key_id !== expectedKeyId) throw new Error("key_id_rejected");
const created = Date.parse(value.created_at);
const expires = Date.parse(value.expires_at);
if (!Number.isFinite(created) || !Number.isFinite(expires)) throw new Error("timestamp_invalid");
if (created - Date.now() > CLOCK_SKEW_MS) throw new Error("created_at_in_future");
if (expires <= created || expires - created > 300_000) throw new Error("expiry_window_rejected");
if (Date.now() - expires > CLOCK_SKEW_MS) throw new Error("command_expired");
const unsigned = Object.fromEntries(COMMAND_FIELDS.map((name) => [name, value[name]]));
return { unsigned, expires };
}
function verifySignature(command, publicKey, expectedKeyId) {
const { unsigned, expires } = validateCommand(command, expectedKeyId);
let signature;
try { signature = Buffer.from(command.signature, "base64url"); }
catch { throw new Error("signature_invalid"); }
if (!crypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(canonical(unsigned)), publicKey, signature)) throw new Error("signature_invalid");
return { digest: crypto.createHash("sha256").update(canonical(unsigned)).digest("hex"), expires };
}
function resultFor(command, state, { output = null, error = null, startedAt, finishedAt = nowIso() } = {}) {
return {
command_id: command.command_id, tenant_id: command.tenant_id,
task_id: command.task_id, trace_id: command.trace_id, state, output, error,
started_at: startedAt ?? nowIso(), finished_at: finishedAt,
runtime_id: "openclaw-aios-runtime-v1", attempts: 1,
};
}
function loadState(statePath) {
const commands = new Map();
const idempotency = new Map();
if (!fs.existsSync(statePath)) return { commands, idempotency };
for (const line of fs.readFileSync(statePath, "utf8").split("\n").filter(Boolean)) {
let record;
try { record = JSON.parse(line); } catch { throw new Error("runtime_state_corrupt"); }
if (!isObject(record) || typeof record.command_id !== "string") throw new Error("runtime_state_corrupt");
commands.set(record.command_id, record);
if (record.tenant_id && record.idempotency_key) idempotency.set(`${record.tenant_id}\0${record.idempotency_key}`, record.command_id);
}
return { commands, idempotency };
}
export function createRuntimeApi(api) {
const config = api.pluginConfig ?? {};
const statePath = requireAbsolute(config, "runtimeStatePath");
const publicKeyPath = requireAbsolute(config, "runtimeSigningPublicKeyPath");
const expectedKeyId = String(config.runtimeSigningKeyId || "");
const credentialRef = String(config.runtimeCredentialRef || "");
if (!expectedKeyId) throw new Error("config_runtimeSigningKeyId_missing");
if (!credentialRef) throw new Error("config_runtimeCredentialRef_missing");
const publicKey = crypto.createPublicKey(fs.readFileSync(publicKeyPath));
const maxActive = Math.max(1, Math.min(Number(config.runtimeMaxActive || 4), 16));
const maxDelayMs = Math.max(100, Math.min(Number(config.runtimeMaxDelayMs || 30_000), 30_000));
const state = loadState(statePath);
const active = new Map();
for (const record of state.commands.values()) {
if (record.result?.state === "RUNNING") {
const reconciled = { ...record, result: { ...record.result, state: "FAILED", finished_at: nowIso(), error: { code: "restart_interrupted", message: "execution outcome is unknown after runtime restart" } } };
appendRecord(statePath, reconciled);
state.commands.set(record.command_id, reconciled);
}
}
function requireCredential(req) {
const supplied = String(req.headers["x-aios-credential-ref"] || "");
const left = Buffer.from(supplied);
const right = Buffer.from(credentialRef);
if (left.length !== right.length || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(left, right)) throw new Error("credential_ref_rejected");
}
function persist(command, digest, result) {
const record = {
command_id: command.command_id, tenant_id: command.tenant_id,
task_id: command.task_id, trace_id: command.trace_id,
idempotency_key: command.idempotency_key, digest, result, recorded_at: nowIso(),
};
appendRecord(statePath, record);
state.commands.set(command.command_id, record);
state.idempotency.set(`${command.tenant_id}\0${command.idempotency_key}`, command.command_id);
return record;
}
async function execute(command, digest, expires) {
const startedAt = nowIso();
persist(command, digest, resultFor(command, "RUNNING", { startedAt, finishedAt: null }));
if (command.action === "status") {
const completed = resultFor(command, "COMPLETED", { startedAt, output: { status: "ok", runtime: "openclaw-plugin", side_effects: false } });
persist(command, digest, completed);
return completed;
}
if (command.action !== "acceptance.delay") throw new Error("unsupported_action");
const delayMs = Number(command.payload.delay_ms);
if (!Number.isInteger(delayMs) || delayMs < 0 || delayMs > maxDelayMs) {
const failed = resultFor(command, "FAILED", { startedAt, error: { code: "invalid_delay", message: "delay_ms is outside the allowed range" } });
persist(command, digest, failed);
return failed;
}
const controller = new AbortController();
active.set(command.command_id, controller);
let timedOut = false;
const deadlineMs = Math.max(0, Math.min(maxDelayMs, expires - Date.now()));
const deadline = setTimeout(() => { timedOut = true; controller.abort(); }, deadlineMs);
try {
await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(resolve, delayMs);
controller.signal.addEventListener("abort", () => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(new Error("aborted")); }, { once: true });
});
const completed = resultFor(command, "COMPLETED", { startedAt, output: { delayed_ms: delayMs, side_effects: false } });
persist(command, digest, completed);
return completed;
} catch {
const terminal = resultFor(command, timedOut ? "TIMED_OUT" : "CANCELLED", {
startedAt,
error: timedOut ? { code: "runtime_timeout", message: "runtime deadline exceeded" } : { code: "cancelled", message: "cancelled by AIOS" },
});
persist(command, digest, terminal);
return terminal;
} finally {
clearTimeout(deadline);
active.delete(command.command_id);
}
}
async function handleExecute(req, res) {
if (req.method !== "POST") return sendJson(res, 405, { error: "method_not_allowed" });
try {
requireCredential(req);
const command = await readJson(req);
const { digest, expires } = verifySignature(command, publicKey, expectedKeyId);
const prior = state.commands.get(command.command_id);
if (prior) {
if (prior.digest !== digest) return sendJson(res, 409, { error: "command_id_conflict" });
return sendJson(res, 200, prior.result);
}
const idemId = state.idempotency.get(`${command.tenant_id}\0${command.idempotency_key}`);
if (idemId) {
const idem = state.commands.get(idemId);
if (!idem || idem.digest !== digest) return sendJson(res, 409, { error: "idempotency_conflict" });
return sendJson(res, 200, idem.result);
}
if (!new Set(["status", "acceptance.delay"]).has(command.action)) return sendJson(res, 422, { error: "unsupported_action" });
if (active.size >= maxActive) return sendJson(res, 429, { error: "runtime_capacity_exceeded" });
return sendJson(res, 200, await execute(command, digest, expires));
} catch (error) {
const code = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "request_rejected";
const status = code === "body_too_large" ? 413 : code.startsWith("config_") || code === "runtime_state_corrupt" ? 503 : 401;
return sendJson(res, status, { error: code });
}
}
function commandRequest(req, res) {
try {
requireCredential(req);
const url = new URL(req.url, "http://localhost");
const match = url.pathname.match(/^\/v1\/commands\/([^/]+)(?:\/(status|cancel))?$/);
if (!match) return false;
const commandId = decodeURIComponent(match[1]);
const operation = match[2] || "status";
const record = state.commands.get(commandId);
if (!record) return sendJson(res, 404, { error: "command_not_found" });
const tenantId = String(url.searchParams.get("tenant_id") || "");
if (!tenantId || tenantId !== record.tenant_id) return sendJson(res, 404, { error: "command_not_found" });
if (operation === "status" && req.method === "GET") {
return sendJson(res, 200, record.result);
}
if (operation === "cancel" && req.method === "POST") {
const controller = active.get(commandId);
if (controller) controller.abort();
return sendJson(res, 200, { accepted: Boolean(controller), command_id: commandId });
}
return sendJson(res, 405, { error: "method_not_allowed" });
} catch (error) {
return sendJson(res, 401, { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "request_rejected" });
}
}
return {
handleHealth(req, res) {
if (req.method !== "GET") return sendJson(res, 405, { error: "method_not_allowed" });
return sendJson(res, 200, {
runtime: "openclaw", runtime_id: "openclaw-aios-runtime-v1", status: "healthy",
version: "2.1.0-rc.3", heartbeat_at: nowIso(), active_tasks: active.size,
workspace_isolated: true, credential_ref_configured: true,
details: { transport: "openclaw_plugin_http", allowed_actions: ["status", "acceptance.delay"] },
});
},
handleExecute,
commandRequest,
};
}
export const __test = { canonical, validateCommand, verifySignature, loadState };
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import fs from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import plugin, { authorizeEvidenceCall, consumePermit, __state } from "../index.js";
import { decideToolCall, validateWriterParams } from "../policy.js";
import {
ALLOWED_OPERATIONS, ALLOWED_PATHS, canonicalize, signRecord, validatePayload, verifyRecord,
} from "../provenance.js";
import { buildPushArgs, executeEvidenceWrite } from "../writer.js";
import { issueFromFiles } from "../issuer.mjs";
function fixture(now = Date.now()) {
return {
schema_version: "aios.run-provenance/v1",
provenance_id: "prov-test-1",
run_id: "run-test-1",
sender_id: "owner-1",
task_id: "task/openclaw/test",
executor: "openclaw",
executor_instance: "gateway-test",
claim_oid: "a".repeat(40),
candidate_oid: "b".repeat(40),
task_branch: "task/openclaw/test",
allowed_paths: [...ALLOWED_PATHS],
allowed_operations: [...ALLOWED_OPERATIONS],
issued_by: "AIOS_OWNER",
issued_at: now - 1000,
expires_at: now + 60_000,
};
}
function keyFixture() {
const { privateKey, publicKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
return {
privateDer: privateKey.export({ format: "der", type: "pkcs8" }),
publicPem: publicKey.export({ format: "pem", type: "spki" }),
};
}
test("Ed25519 record verifies and tampering is rejected", () => {
const payload = fixture();
const keys = keyFixture();
const record = signRecord(payload, keys.privateDer, "key-1");
assert.equal(verifyRecord(record, keys.publicPem, "key-1").ok, true);
record.payload.task_id = "tampered";
assert.equal(verifyRecord(record, keys.publicPem, "key-1").ok, false);
});
test("payload rejects expiry and set drift", () => {
const now = Date.now();
const expired = fixture(now);
expired.issued_at = now - 2000;
expired.expires_at = now - 1000;
assert.equal(validatePayload(expired, now).code, "expired");
const drift = fixture(now);
drift.allowed_paths = drift.allowed_paths.slice(1);
assert.equal(validatePayload(drift, now).code, "allowed_paths_mismatch");
});
test("issuer accepts protected raw 32-byte material and refuses duplicate ids", () => {
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "aios-issuer-"));
const keys = keyFixture();
const payload = fixture();
const payloadPath = path.join(root, "payload.json");
const privateKeyPath = path.join(root, "private.bin");
const publicKeyPath = path.join(root, "public.pem");
const storeDir = path.join(root, "store");
fs.writeFileSync(payloadPath, canonicalize(payload));
fs.writeFileSync(privateKeyPath, keys.privateDer.subarray(-32), { mode: 0o600 });
if (process.platform !== "win32") fs.chmodSync(privateKeyPath, 0o600);
assert.equal(issueFromFiles({ payloadPath, privateKeyPath, publicKeyPath, storeDir, keyId: "key-1" }), payload.provenance_id);
const record = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(storeDir, `${payload.provenance_id}.json`), "utf8"));
assert.equal(verifyRecord(record, fs.readFileSync(publicKeyPath, "utf8"), "key-1").ok, true);
assert.throws(() => issueFromFiles({ payloadPath, privateKeyPath, publicKeyPath, storeDir, keyId: "key-1" }), /already_issued/);
});
test("generic mutation tools stay blocked", () => {
for (const name of ["exec", "shell", "bash", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "file_write"]) {
assert.deepEqual(decideToolCall(name, { trusted: true }, {}), { action: "block", code: "dedicated_writer_required" });
}
});
test("plugin registers the native writer factory and required hook names", () => {
const hooks = [];
const routes = [];
let factory;
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "aios-runtime-register-"));
const keys = keyFixture();
const publicKeyPath = path.join(root, "public.pem");
fs.writeFileSync(publicKeyPath, keys.publicPem);
const api = {
pluginConfig: {
runtimeStatePath: path.join(root, "state.jsonl"),
runtimeSigningPublicKeyPath: publicKeyPath,
runtimeSigningKeyId: "key-1",
runtimeCredentialRef: "secretref:test",
},
registerTool(value, options) { factory = value; assert.equal(options.name, "aios_evidence_write"); },
registerHttpRoute(value) { routes.push(value); },
on(name) { hooks.push(name); },
};
plugin.register(api);
const tool = factory({});
assert.equal(tool.name, "aios_evidence_write");
assert.equal(tool.label, "AIOS Evidence Writer");
assert.equal(tool.executionMode, "sequential");
assert.deepEqual(routes.map((route) => route.path), ["/v1/health", "/v1/execute", "/v1/commands/"]);
assert.deepEqual(hooks.sort(), ["agent_end", "before_agent_run", "before_tool_call"]);
});
test("manifest explicitly declares the dedicated tool contract", () => {
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(new URL("../openclaw.plugin.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
assert.deepEqual(manifest.contracts.tools, ["aios_evidence_write"]);
});
test("writer params reject unauthorized paths and operations", () => {
const payload = fixture();
assert.equal(validateWriterParams({ provenance_id: payload.provenance_id, path: "README.md", operation: "update", document: {} }, payload).code, "path_not_allowed");
assert.equal(validateWriterParams({ provenance_id: payload.provenance_id, path: ".agent/status.json", operation: "exec", document: {} }, payload).code, "operation_not_allowed");
});
test("authorization binds signature, run, sender, params, and one-use permit", () => {
__state.permits.clear();
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "aios-prov-"));
const store = path.join(root, "store");
fs.mkdirSync(store);
const keys = keyFixture();
const payload = fixture();
const record = signRecord(payload, keys.privateDer, "key-1");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(store, `${payload.provenance_id}.json`), canonicalize(record), { mode: 0o600 });
const publicKeyPath = path.join(root, "public.pem");
fs.writeFileSync(publicKeyPath, keys.publicPem, { mode: 0o600 });
const params = { provenance_id: payload.provenance_id, path: ".agent/status.json", operation: "update", document: { state: "ok" } };
const event = { toolName: "aios_evidence_write", toolCallId: "call-1", runId: payload.run_id, params };
const config = {
provenanceStoreDir: store, provenancePublicKeyPath: publicKeyPath, provenanceKeyId: "key-1",
writerTaskBranch: payload.task_branch, writerTaskId: payload.task_id, provenanceIssuer: payload.issued_by,
executor: payload.executor, executorInstance: payload.executor_instance,
};
const authorized = authorizeEvidenceCall({ event, trust: { trusted: true, senderId: payload.sender_id }, config });
assert.equal(authorized.ok, true, authorized.code);
assert.equal(consumePermit("call-1", params).payload.run_id, payload.run_id);
assert.throws(() => consumePermit("call-1", params), /permit_missing/);
const wrongRun = { ...event, toolCallId: "call-2", runId: "wrong" };
assert.equal(authorizeEvidenceCall({ event: wrongRun, trust: { trusted: true, senderId: payload.sender_id }, config }).code, "run_id_mismatch");
const wrongSender = { trusted: true, senderId: "wrong" };
assert.equal(authorizeEvidenceCall({ event: { ...event, toolCallId: "call-3" }, trust: wrongSender, config }).code, "sender_id_mismatch");
});
function git(cwd, args) {
const result = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", shell: false });
if (result.status !== 0) throw new Error(result.stderr || "git failed");
return (result.stdout || "").trim();
}
test("writer commits only one evidence path and explicitly pushes current branch", async (t) => {
if (spawnSync("git", ["--version"], { shell: false }).status !== 0) return t.skip("git unavailable");
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "aios-writer-"));
const repo = path.join(root, "repo");
const bare = path.join(root, "remote.git");
fs.mkdirSync(repo);
git(root, ["init", "--bare", bare]);
git(repo, ["init", "-b", "task/openclaw/test"]);
git(repo, ["config", "user.name", "AIOS Test"]);
git(repo, ["config", "user.email", "aios-test@example.invalid"]);
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(repo, ".agent"));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(repo, ".agent", "status.json"), "{\"state\":\"before\"}\n");
git(repo, ["add", ".agent/status.json"]);
git(repo, ["commit", "-m", "base"]);
const claim = git(repo, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"]);
git(repo, ["remote", "add", "origin", bare]);
git(repo, ["push", "origin", "refs/heads/task/openclaw/test:refs/heads/task/openclaw/test"]);
const payload = fixture();
payload.claim_oid = claim;
payload.candidate_oid = claim;
const result = await executeEvidenceWrite({
repoRoot: repo, evidencePath: ".agent/status.json", operation: "update",
document: { state: "after" }, payload, pushRemote: "origin",
auditLogPath: path.join(root, "audit", "writer.jsonl"), gitBinary: "git",
});
assert.equal(result.outcome, "pushed");
assert.equal(git(root, ["--git-dir", bare, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/task/openclaw/test"]), result.commit_oid);
assert.deepEqual(buildPushArgs("origin", payload.task_branch), ["push", "origin", "refs/heads/task/openclaw/test:refs/heads/task/openclaw/test"]);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import fs from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { Readable } from "node:stream";
import { createRuntimeApi, __test } from "../runtime.js";
function fixture() {
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "aios-runtime-"));
const keys = crypto.generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
const publicKeyPath = path.join(root, "public.pem");
fs.writeFileSync(publicKeyPath, keys.publicKey.export({ format: "pem", type: "spki" }));
const api = createRuntimeApi({ pluginConfig: {
runtimeStatePath: path.join(root, "state.jsonl"),
runtimeSigningPublicKeyPath: publicKeyPath,
runtimeSigningKeyId: "runtime-key-1",
runtimeCredentialRef: "secretref:runtime-test",
runtimeMaxDelayMs: 3000,
} });
return { root, keys, api };
}
function signed(keys, overrides = {}) {
const command = {
command_id: `cmd-${crypto.randomUUID()}`,
tenant_id: "tenant-a",
task_id: "task-a",
trace_id: "trace-a",
action: "status",
payload: { side_effects: false },
idempotency_key: `idem-${crypto.randomUUID()}`,
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000).toISOString(),
contract_version: "aios.openclaw.command.v1",
key_id: "runtime-key-1",
...overrides,
};
command.signature = crypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(__test.canonical(command)), keys.privateKey).toString("base64url");
return command;
}
function request(method, url, body = null) {
const req = Readable.from(body === null ? [] : [Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(body))]);
req.method = method;
req.url = url;
req.headers = { "x-aios-credential-ref": "secretref:runtime-test" };
return req;
}
function response() {
let resolve;
const done = new Promise((value) => { resolve = value; });
return {
status: 0,
headers: {},
body: null,
done,
writeHead(status, headers) { this.status = status; this.headers = headers; },
end(data) { this.body = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(data).toString("utf8")); resolve(this); },
};
}
async function call(handler, req) {
const res = response();
await handler(req, res);
return res.done;
}
test("signed status executes, persists, and replays idempotently", async () => {
const { keys, api, root } = fixture();
const command = signed(keys);
const first = await call(api.handleExecute, request("POST", "/v1/execute", command));
assert.equal(first.status, 200);
assert.equal(first.body.state, "COMPLETED");
assert.equal(first.body.output.runtime, "openclaw-plugin");
const second = await call(api.handleExecute, request("POST", "/v1/execute", command));
assert.deepEqual(second.body, first.body);
assert.ok(fs.statSync(path.join(root, "state.jsonl")).size > 0);
});
test("tamper, expiry, and conflicting identity are rejected", async () => {
const { keys, api } = fixture();
const tampered = signed(keys);
tampered.tenant_id = "tenant-b";
assert.equal((await call(api.handleExecute, request("POST", "/v1/execute", tampered))).status, 401);
const expired = signed(keys, {
created_at: new Date(Date.now() - 700_000).toISOString(),
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() - 600_000).toISOString(),
});
assert.equal((await call(api.handleExecute, request("POST", "/v1/execute", expired))).status, 401);
});
test("status is tenant-scoped and unknown actions fail closed", async () => {
const { keys, api } = fixture();
const rejected = signed(keys, { action: "arbitrary.exec" });
const denied = await call(api.handleExecute, request("POST", "/v1/execute", rejected));
assert.equal(denied.status, 422);
assert.equal(denied.body.error, "unsupported_action");
const command = signed(keys);
await call(api.handleExecute, request("POST", "/v1/execute", command));
const wrong = await call(api.commandRequest, request("GET", `/v1/commands/${command.command_id}?tenant_id=tenant-b`));
assert.equal(wrong.status, 404);
const correct = await call(api.commandRequest, request("GET", `/v1/commands/${command.command_id}?tenant_id=tenant-a`));
assert.equal(correct.body.command_id, command.command_id);
});
test("active delay supports deterministic cancellation", async () => {
const { keys, api } = fixture();
const command = signed(keys, { action: "acceptance.delay", payload: { delay_ms: 2000 } });
const executeResponse = response();
const execution = api.handleExecute(request("POST", "/v1/execute", command), executeResponse);
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 30));
const cancelled = await call(api.commandRequest, request("POST", `/v1/commands/${command.command_id}/cancel?tenant_id=tenant-a`));
assert.equal(cancelled.body.accepted, true);
await execution;
const terminal = await executeResponse.done;
assert.equal(terminal.body.state, "CANCELLED");
});
test("signed deadline produces TIMED_OUT", async () => {
const { keys, api } = fixture();
const command = signed(keys, {
action: "acceptance.delay",
payload: { delay_ms: 1000 },
expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 40).toISOString(),
});
const result = await call(api.handleExecute, request("POST", "/v1/execute", command));
assert.equal(result.body.state, "TIMED_OUT");
});
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@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import { ALLOWED_PATHS, canonicalize } from "./provenance.js";
function safeFsync(fd) {
try { fs.fsyncSync(fd); }
catch (error) {
if (process.platform !== "win32" || error?.code !== "EPERM") throw error;
}
}
function runGit(args, { cwd, gitBinary = "/usr/bin/git", env = {} }) {
const result = spawnSync(gitBinary, ["-c", `safe.directory=${cwd}`, ...args], {
cwd,
shell: false,
encoding: "utf8",
env: { ...process.env, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0", ...env },
});
if (result.error || result.status !== 0) throw new Error(`git_${args[0]}_failed`);
return result.stdout || "";
}
function cleanBranch(branch) {
const value = typeof branch === "string" ? branch.replace(/^refs\/heads\//, "") : "";
if (!value || value.startsWith("-") || value.includes("..") || value.endsWith(".") || value.includes("@{")) {
throw new Error("invalid_branch");
}
for (const forbidden of ["~", "^", ":", "?", "*", "[", "\\", " ", "\t", "\n"]) {
if (value.includes(forbidden)) throw new Error("invalid_branch");
}
return value;
}
export function buildPushArgs(remote, branch) {
const clean = cleanBranch(branch);
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/.test(remote)) throw new Error("invalid_remote");
return ["push", remote, `refs/heads/${clean}:refs/heads/${clean}`];
}
function ensureSafeTarget(repoRoot, evidencePath) {
if (!ALLOWED_PATHS.includes(evidencePath)) throw new Error("path_not_allowed");
const root = fs.realpathSync(repoRoot);
const target = path.resolve(root, evidencePath);
if (!target.startsWith(`${root}${path.sep}`)) throw new Error("path_escape");
let cursor = root;
for (const segment of path.relative(root, path.dirname(target)).split(path.sep).filter(Boolean)) {
cursor = path.join(cursor, segment);
if (fs.existsSync(cursor) && fs.lstatSync(cursor).isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("symlink_path");
}
if (fs.existsSync(target) && fs.lstatSync(target).isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("symlink_path");
return { root, target };
}
function atomicWrite(target, document, previousMode) {
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(target), { recursive: true, mode: 0o770 });
const temporary = path.join(path.dirname(target), `.${path.basename(target)}.${crypto.randomUUID()}.tmp`);
const mode = previousMode ?? 0o660;
fs.writeFileSync(temporary, `${canonicalize(document)}\n`, { flag: "wx", mode });
const handle = fs.openSync(temporary, "r");
try { safeFsync(handle); } finally { fs.closeSync(handle); }
fs.renameSync(temporary, target);
fs.chmodSync(target, mode);
}
function appendAudit(auditLogPath, entry) {
if (!path.isAbsolute(auditLogPath)) throw new Error("invalid_audit_log_path");
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(auditLogPath), { recursive: true, mode: 0o750 });
const fd = fs.openSync(auditLogPath, "a", 0o640);
try {
fs.writeSync(fd, `${canonicalize(entry)}\n`);
safeFsync(fd);
} finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
}
function gitEnvironment(askPassPath) {
if (!askPassPath) return {};
const stat = fs.lstatSync(askPassPath);
if (!path.isAbsolute(askPassPath) || !stat.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink() || (stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) {
throw new Error("unsafe_askpass");
}
return { GIT_ASKPASS: askPassPath, GIT_ASKPASS_REQUIRE: "force", DISPLAY: "aios" };
}
function restoreBeforeCommit(target, existed, backup, mode, root, relative, gitOptions) {
try { runGit(["restore", "--staged", "--", relative], gitOptions); } catch { /* best effort */ }
if (existed) {
fs.writeFileSync(target, backup, { mode });
} else if (fs.existsSync(target)) {
fs.unlinkSync(target);
}
}
export async function executeEvidenceWrite({
repoRoot, evidencePath, operation, document, payload, pushRemote = "gitea-http",
askPassPath = "", auditLogPath, gitBinary = "/usr/bin/git",
}) {
const { root, target } = ensureSafeTarget(repoRoot, evidencePath);
const relative = path.relative(root, target).replace(/\\/g, "/");
const gitOptions = { cwd: root, gitBinary, env: gitEnvironment(askPassPath) };
const branch = cleanBranch(payload.task_branch);
if (runGit(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"], gitOptions).trim() !== branch) throw new Error("branch_mismatch");
if (runGit(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], gitOptions).trim() !== payload.claim_oid) throw new Error("head_mismatch");
runGit(["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", payload.candidate_oid, payload.claim_oid], gitOptions);
if (runGit(["status", "--porcelain", "--untracked-files=all"], gitOptions).trim()) throw new Error("worktree_not_clean");
const existed = fs.existsSync(target);
if (operation === "create" && existed) throw new Error("path_exists_for_create");
if (operation === "update" && !existed) throw new Error("path_missing_for_update");
const backup = existed ? fs.readFileSync(target) : null;
const priorMode = existed ? fs.statSync(target).mode & 0o777 : 0o660;
let committed = false;
let commitOid = null;
try {
atomicWrite(target, document, priorMode);
runGit(["add", "--", relative], gitOptions);
const staged = runGit(["diff", "--cached", "--name-only", "-z"], gitOptions).split("\0").filter(Boolean);
if (staged.length !== 1 || staged[0] !== relative) throw new Error("staged_scope_mismatch");
runGit(["commit", "-m", `chore(aios): provenance ${payload.provenance_id} ${path.basename(relative)}`], gitOptions);
committed = true;
commitOid = runGit(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], gitOptions).trim();
runGit(buildPushArgs(pushRemote, branch), gitOptions);
appendAudit(auditLogPath, {
schema_version: "aios.writer-audit/v1", provenance_id: payload.provenance_id,
task_id: payload.task_id, run_id: payload.run_id, path: relative, operation,
branch, commit_oid: commitOid, outcome: "pushed", recorded_at: Date.now(),
});
return { path: relative, operation, branch, commit_oid: commitOid, outcome: "pushed" };
} catch (error) {
const code = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "writer_failed";
if (!committed) restoreBeforeCommit(target, existed, backup, priorMode, root, relative, gitOptions);
try {
appendAudit(auditLogPath, {
schema_version: "aios.writer-audit/v1", provenance_id: payload.provenance_id,
task_id: payload.task_id, run_id: payload.run_id, path: relative, operation,
branch, commit_oid: commitOid, outcome: committed ? "committed_push_blocked" : "rejected",
error_code: code, recorded_at: Date.now(),
});
} catch { /* the original failure remains authoritative */ }
throw new Error(code);
}
}
+88 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
from __future__ import annotations from __future__ import annotations
import sys import sys
import os
import stat
import tempfile import tempfile
import unittest import unittest
from dataclasses import replace
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path from pathlib import Path
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
@@ -16,6 +20,7 @@ from aios_openclaw import (
InProcessRuntimeTransport, InProcessRuntimeTransport,
OpenClawAdapter, OpenClawAdapter,
) )
from aios_openclaw.contract import OpenClawCommand, sign_command, verify_command_signature
from aios_v2 import ( from aios_v2 import (
ControlPlaneService, ControlPlaneService,
ExecutionEvidence, ExecutionEvidence,
@@ -26,9 +31,11 @@ from aios_v2 import (
TenantIsolationError, TenantIsolationError,
) )
from aios_v2.persistence import DurableControlPlaneService, SQLiteSnapshotRepository from aios_v2.persistence import DurableControlPlaneService, SQLiteSnapshotRepository
from aios_v2.gateway import GatewayApplication
from aios_v2.app import build_application
SIGNING_MATERIAL = b"candidate-test-signing-material-0001" SIGNING_MATERIAL = bytes(range(32))
def context( def context(
@@ -64,6 +71,73 @@ def bootstrap(service: ControlPlaneService, tenant_id: str = "tenant-a"):
class CandidateFlowTests(unittest.TestCase): class CandidateFlowTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_rollback_entrypoints_are_executable_in_release_archive(self) -> None:
for relative in (
"deploy/aios-v2/rollback/rollback.sh",
"deploy/aios-v2/healthcheck/check.sh",
):
mode = (REPO_ROOT / relative).stat().st_mode
self.assertTrue(mode & stat.S_IXUSR, relative)
def test_build_application_propagates_openclaw_signing_key_id(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
material_path = Path(temp_dir) / "signing-material.bin"
material_path.write_bytes(SIGNING_MATERIAL)
values = {
"AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR": temp_dir,
"AIOS_OPENCLAW_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:18789",
"AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_MATERIAL_FILE": str(material_path),
"AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID": "openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519",
"AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REF": "secretref:test",
}
previous = {key: os.environ.get(key) for key in values}
try:
os.environ.update(values)
application = build_application()
finally:
for key, value in previous.items():
if value is None:
os.environ.pop(key, None)
else:
os.environ[key] = value
self.assertEqual(
application.orchestrator.openclaw_key_id,
"openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519",
)
def test_http_identity_headers_are_case_insensitive(self) -> None:
request_context = GatewayApplication.context_from_headers(
{
"X-Aios-Authenticated": "true",
"x-aios-tenant-id": "tenant-a",
"X-AIOS-PRINCIPAL-ID": "operator-a",
"X-Aios-Roles": "operator,auditor",
"x-aios-trace-id": "trace-http-header-case",
}
)
self.assertEqual(request_context.tenant_id, "tenant-a")
self.assertEqual(request_context.principal_id, "operator-a")
self.assertEqual(request_context.trace_id, "trace-http-header-case")
self.assertEqual(request_context.roles, frozenset({"operator", "auditor"}))
def test_ed25519_command_signature_accepts_valid_and_rejects_tampering(self) -> None:
command = OpenClawCommand(
command_id="cmd-signature-test",
tenant_id="tenant-a",
task_id="task-signature-test",
trace_id="trace-signature-test",
action="echo",
payload={"message": "hello"},
idempotency_key="signature-test-1",
key_id="openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519",
)
signed = sign_command(command, SIGNING_MATERIAL)
self.assertTrue(verify_command_signature(signed, SIGNING_MATERIAL))
self.assertFalse(
verify_command_signature(replace(signed, payload={"message": "tampered"}), SIGNING_MATERIAL)
)
self.assertFalse(verify_command_signature(signed, bytes(reversed(SIGNING_MATERIAL))))
def test_openclaw_full_flow_reconciles_completed_task(self) -> None: def test_openclaw_full_flow_reconciles_completed_task(self) -> None:
service = ControlPlaneService() service = ControlPlaneService()
_, operator = bootstrap(service) _, operator = bootstrap(service)
@@ -88,12 +162,16 @@ class CandidateFlowTests(unittest.TestCase):
expected_revision=task.revision, expected_revision=task.revision,
) )
transport = InProcessRuntimeTransport( captured_commands = []
lambda command: {
def execute(command):
captured_commands.append(command)
return {
"state": CommandState.COMPLETED.value, "state": CommandState.COMPLETED.value,
"output": {"echo": command.payload["message"]}, "output": {"echo": command.payload["message"]},
} }
)
transport = InProcessRuntimeTransport(execute)
resolver = lambda tenant_id, key_id: SIGNING_MATERIAL resolver = lambda tenant_id, key_id: SIGNING_MATERIAL
adapter = OpenClawAdapter(transport, resolver) adapter = OpenClawAdapter(transport, resolver)
orchestrator = ExecutionOrchestrator( orchestrator = ExecutionOrchestrator(
@@ -102,13 +180,18 @@ class CandidateFlowTests(unittest.TestCase):
openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver, openclaw_signing_material_resolver=resolver,
) )
dispatch = orchestrator.dispatch(operator, task_id=approved.task_id) dispatch = orchestrator.dispatch(
operator, task_id=approved.task_id, timeout_seconds=600
)
completed = service.get_task(operator, task.task_id) completed = service.get_task(operator, task.task_id)
self.assertEqual(dispatch.runtime, "openclaw") self.assertEqual(dispatch.runtime, "openclaw")
self.assertEqual(dispatch.state, CommandState.COMPLETED.value) self.assertEqual(dispatch.state, CommandState.COMPLETED.value)
self.assertEqual(completed.state, TaskState.COMPLETED) self.assertEqual(completed.state, TaskState.COMPLETED)
self.assertEqual(completed.result, {"echo": "hello"}) self.assertEqual(completed.result, {"echo": "hello"})
created = datetime.fromisoformat(captured_commands[0].created_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
expires = datetime.fromisoformat(captured_commands[0].expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
self.assertLessEqual((expires - created).total_seconds(), 300)
def test_hermes_full_flow_reconciles_worker_result(self) -> None: def test_hermes_full_flow_reconciles_worker_result(self) -> None:
service = ControlPlaneService() service = ControlPlaneService()