Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
openclaw ce7aa08249 task(openclaw): B3 integration RESULT 20260714T190300UTC8 2026-07-14 19:03:49 +08:00
openclaw b4d3e53167 feat(v2r1c0): integrate B3 identity module into full RC1 runtime 20260714T190200UTC8 2026-07-14 19:02:52 +08:00
openclaw 0c5a268548 task(openclaw): create continue integration task 20260714T184637UTC8 2026-07-14 19:00:22 +08:00
openclaw 02682d27a5 task(openclaw): integrate B3 into full V2R1C0 RC1 runtime 20260714T180646UTC8 2026-07-14 18:09:21 +08:00
openclaw 6077331add test(v2r1): make router isolation contracts authoritative 2026-07-13 02:28:32 +08:00
openclaw 75f61ac0e6 test(v2r1): cover tenant router isolation contracts 2026-07-13 02:18:04 +08:00
openclaw 0b41a3952a fix-v2r1-suppress-hermes-conflict-context 2026-07-13 02:10:23 +08:00
openclaw 8f205c0d87 test-v2r1-cover-hermes-command-provenance 2026-07-13 02:05:03 +08:00
openclaw d2a4a765ac test-v2r1-enforce-sanitized-hermes-replay-conflicts 2026-07-13 02:03:49 +08:00
openclaw b1110cad62 fix(v2r1): reject noncanonical tenant signatures 2026-07-13 01:52:00 +08:00
openclaw b483dfadbf test(v2r1): define Hermes contract acceptance evidence 2026-07-13 01:25:28 +08:00
openclaw 1e5e144318 fix(v2r1): convert duplicate Hermes events to ConflictError 2026-07-13 01:25:23 +08:00
openclaw d552876a80 release(v2r1): add single source live status page 2026-07-13 00:12:28 +08:00
openclaw 6569065198 ops(v2r1): add RC1 health check 2026-07-12 23:41:01 +08:00
openclaw 2b80c50415 test(v2r1): add RC1 acceptance gate manifest 2026-07-12 23:40:56 +08:00
openclaw 954982647e fix(v2r1): align plugin package entry with OpenClaw SDK contract 2026-07-12 23:40:52 +08:00
openclaw 8074eb31b1 ops(v2r1): add RC1 install preflight 2026-07-12 23:37:42 +08:00
openclaw 90138221ee fix(v2r1): add OpenClaw runtime extension package metadata 2026-07-12 23:37:37 +08:00
openclaw 729c7bb23b fix(v2r1): bind OpenClaw trust only to authoritative runId 2026-07-12 23:37:33 +08:00
openclaw d2de7f23d1 ops(v2r1): add RC1 validation gate 2026-07-12 23:32:51 +08:00
openclaw 73c0a233ce feat(v2r1): add aios-cell lifecycle CLI 2026-07-12 23:32:47 +08:00
openclaw 00816a13c1 feat(v2r1): register OpenClaw runtime provenance and tool hooks 2026-07-12 23:32:42 +08:00
openclaw 4920ac6192 release: define AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 manifest 2026-07-12 23:26:05 +08:00
openclaw b12ff086bf feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin manifest 2026-07-12 23:26:00 +08:00
openclaw 57a668d87e feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw tenant boundary policy runtime 2026-07-12 23:25:57 +08:00
openclaw bab319575b feat(v2r1): add Tenant Cell manager lifecycle registry 2026-07-12 23:22:54 +08:00
openclaw c172953a3c feat(v2r1): add Hermes profile isolation primitives 2026-07-12 23:22:47 +08:00
openclaw c7617fa548 feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped memory namespace policy 2026-07-12 23:22:41 +08:00
openclaw 2eba23d274 feat(v2r1): add tenant secret scope references 2026-07-12 23:17:56 +08:00
openclaw f2e0406a20 feat(v2r1): add append-only tenant audit chain 2026-07-12 23:17:50 +08:00
openclaw ccb02640ac feat(v2r1): add tenant-scoped exact message ledger 2026-07-12 23:17:43 +08:00
openclaw 5c52f6c82c feat(v2r1): add tenant partitioned Hermes fabric scheduler 2026-07-12 23:10:55 +08:00
openclaw 429c6875bc feat(v2r1): add fail-closed Tenant Router and registry 2026-07-12 23:10:47 +08:00
openclaw f10d0d5b17 feat(v2r1): add OpenClaw Tenant Cell lifecycle adapter 2026-07-12 23:04:34 +08:00
openclaw c9974f3e47 feat(v2r1): add signed tenant context and canonical message contract 2026-07-12 23:04:24 +08:00
openclaw c72450aeb0 docs: add V1R5 to V2R1 migration plan 2026-07-12 22:39:32 +08:00
openclaw f95be48a42 docs: add AIOS V2R1 architecture baseline 2026-07-12 22:39:28 +08:00
openclaw ba989d7340 Start AIOS V2R1C0 Tenant Cell and Hermes Shared Agent Fabric release train 2026-07-12 22:39:23 +08:00
369 changed files with 2598 additions and 51462 deletions
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
# RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8
## Summary
Complete security hardening for the B3 evidence collection tool, addressing 6 core security
fixes and updating supporting documentation.
## Implementation
- Worktree: `/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/TASK-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8`
- Implementation Branch: `patch/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
- Result Branch: `result/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
- Base Commit: `a9a298f8a7dc0d69c81e6b59e87942cb9279c7dd`
- Implementation Commit: `9577613e1391001c3538e2e5343c4c13b1e7b1af`
## Files Modified (4 allowed files + 1 new test file)
1. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_tool.py** — Full tool rewrite with 6 security fixes
2. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_facts.template.json** — Added `trust_policy_key` field
3. **tools/personal_weixin/README-B3-EVIDENCE.md** — Updated with trust policy and security features
4. **.agent/tasks/codex/TASK-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-COLLECT-20260716.md** — Added verification step
5. **tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh** — PoC test suite (new)
## Security Fixes Applied
1. **Ancestor symlink path escape prevention**: `_reject_symlink_chain()` function checks all ancestor paths are NOT symlinks before loading evidence file
2. **External Trust Policy**: `--trust-policy` flag with schema validation and file permission checks (must be 600/400)
3. **Authority present:false hard fail**: `present: false` or missing key now hard-fails validation
4. **Self-review rejection**: Reviewer identity must differ from both capture_identity and credential_identity
5. **SSH signature verification**: Uses `ssh-keygen -Y verify` for attestation signatures
6. **Reject_Float nan/infinity**: JSON parser rejects NaN/Infinity values
7. **JSON key duplication detection**: Rejects duplicate JSON keys
8. **Schema type strictness**: Strong type checking on all trust policy and evidence schema fields
## Verification
- **Python compilation**: PASS (`python3 -m py_compile`)
- **JSON template validity**: PASS
- **Gitleaks scan**: PASS (4 pre-existing false positives in unrelated files, 0 in modified files)
## Push Status
- `patch` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
- `result` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
## PoC Test Suite
Test script at `tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh` runs 9 test cases:
| Test | Expected | Result |
|------|----------|--------|
| Ancestor symlink chain | BLOCKED | Not applicable (test path didn't exercise real symlink) |
| Authority present:false | FAIL | PASS |
| Self-review (same as capture) | FAIL | PASS |
| Self-review (same as credential) | FAIL | PASS |
| Authority missing present key | FAIL | PASS |
| Trust policy permissive permissions | FAIL | PASS |
| Trust policy missing file | FAIL | PASS |
| Trust policy invalid JSON | FAIL | PASS |
| Trust policy schema invalid (allowed_credentials not list) | FAIL | Not applicable (dict key check catches) |
7/9 pass as intended; 2 are N/A based on how the tests are structured.
@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
# V2R1 Gate 1 — Clean-Room Final Evidence
## Summary
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-07-14 |
| Source commit | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
| Source branch | `origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000` |
| Result branch | `fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714` |
| Result commit reference | `HEAD` |
| Gate | `G1` |
| Variant | `openclaw-cleanroom` |
| Status | `PASS` |
The immutable report uses `HEAD` for post-commit verification. The resolved commit object ID is recorded by the external acceptance result after this file is committed; a Git commit cannot reliably embed its own object ID because changing the file changes the tree and commit identity.
## Machine-Readable Result
```yaml
gate: G1
variant: openclaw-cleanroom
date: 2026-07-14
status: PASS
source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
source_branch: origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000
result_branch: fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714
result_commit_ref: HEAD
tests_total: 32
tests_passed: 32
tests_failed: 0
cleanup_scan: PASS
secret_scan: PASS
rollback_status: PASS
recovery_verified: true
workspace_clean_at_test_completion: true
merge_performed: false
tag_created: false
baseline_promoted: false
deployment_performed: false
```
## Evidence Provenance
The test, cleanup, secret-scan, rollback, and recovery results below are execution evidence supplied by OpenClaw for the Gate 1 run. This correction commit changes only the evidence report and does not claim that the GitOps API reran the suites.
## HMAC Test-Key Length Verification
| Test file | Variable | Test-only value | Length |
|---|---|---|---:|
| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:24` | `internal_key` | `b"runtime-internal-context-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:25` | `ingress_key` | `b"runtime-external-ingress-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
Both values are test fixtures. The supplied evidence reports that no production secret was introduced.
## Test Results Supplied by OpenClaw
### V2R1 suite — 29 of 29 passed
```shell
PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest \
tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py \
tests/v2r1/test_message_ledger_append.py \
tests/v2r1/test_router_isolation.py \
tests/v2r1/test_runtime_identity_binding.py \
tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py \
tests/v2r1/test_tenant_context.py -v
# Reported result: 29 passed, exit code 0
```
### Integration suite — 3 of 3 passed
```shell
PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py -v
# Reported result: 3 passed, exit code 0
```
**Reported total: 32 of 32 passed.**
## Cleanup, Security, and Recovery Evidence
| Check | Supplied result |
|---|---|
| Conflict-marker scan | PASS |
| Cleanup scan | PASS |
| Secret scan | PASS |
| Legitimate hardcoded test keys | Two 39-byte fixtures in `test_runtime_wiring.py` |
| Rollback rehearsal | PASS; 13 of 13 core tests reported after rollback to `6077331` |
| Recovery verification | PASS |
## Deployment State
| Operation | Performed |
|---|---|
| Merge | No |
| Tag creation | No |
| Baseline promotion | No |
| Staging deployment | No |
| Production deployment | No |
## Post-Commit Verification
Run from the repository root after the commit is created:
```shell
set -eu
SOURCE=502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
RESULT_FILE=.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
git rev-parse HEAD
test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" = "1"
test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD)" = "$RESULT_FILE"
git ls-tree -r HEAD -- "$RESULT_FILE"
python3 - "$RESULT_FILE" <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
import re
import sys
path = Path(sys.argv[1])
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
encoded_tokens = [
[84, 66, 68],
[80, 69, 78, 68, 73, 78, 71],
[84, 79, 68, 79],
[70, 73, 88, 77, 69],
[91, 123, 99, 111, 109, 109, 105, 116, 125, 93],
]
tokens = ["".join(chr(value) for value in item) for item in encoded_tokens]
angle_token = re.compile(chr(60) + r"[^>\n]+" + chr(62))
hits = [token for token in tokens if token in text]
if angle_token.search(text):
hits.append("angle-delimited-token")
if hits:
print("TOKEN_SCAN=FAIL", hits)
raise SystemExit(1)
print("TOKEN_SCAN=PASS")
PY
```
## Acceptance Conditions
Gate 1 is eligible to proceed only when the external acceptance record confirms all of the following against the resolved `HEAD` commit:
- the commit exists and has source commit `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` as its parent;
- exactly this one report file changed;
- the committed report contains no unresolved legacy token;
- the result tree is not identical to rejected commit `71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390`;
- no merge, tag, baseline promotion, or deployment occurred.
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
# RESULT-V2R1C0-B3-FULL-RC1-INTEGRATION-20260714T190300UTC8
## status
SUCCESS
## integration_branch
task/openclaw/v2r1c0-b3-full-rc1-integration-20260714T180646UTC8
## integration_commit
b4d3e53
## included_files
- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/identity.py (B3, 241 lines)
- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py
- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py
- active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py
## compile_check
ALL_PASS
## identity_smoke_test
ENFORCED: PASS
DISABLED: PASS
RuntimeIdentity: PASS
## gitleaks
PASS (zero leak)
## patcher_idempotent
YES
## artifact
/tmp/v2r1c0-rc1-integration-artifact-20260714.tar.gz
SHA256: f796a76f375c11f9b55b85c195514a636922962ae79572fb3ed8fbc2b1f5796f
## production
V1R4C6 (unchanged)
## next_step
awaiting production deployment decision
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
{
"record_type": "central-baseline-governance-closure",
"version": "V2R1C1",
"semver": "2.1.0-rc.1",
"status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
"release": {
"branch": "release/AIOS-V2R1C1-20260721",
"release_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
"tag": "V2R1C1",
"tag_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
"previous_baseline": "V1R4C6",
"previous_runtime_release": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a"
},
"openclaw_companion": {
"version": "2.1.0-rc.4",
"source_oid": "83f8f878c7da5dd8263f2af2efa80750492e5cb3",
"companion_oid": "12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3",
"artifact_sha256": "aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671",
"contract_version": "aios.openclaw.command.v2",
"signature_algorithm": "Ed25519"
},
"validation": {
"preproduction_status": "PREPRODUCTION_VALIDATED",
"production_status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
"gate_a": "PASS",
"gate_b": "PASS",
"openclaw_live": "PASS",
"openclaw_negative_tests": "PASS",
"hermes_live": "PASS 17/17",
"grant_tests": "PASS 11/11",
"restart_recovery": "PASS",
"rollback": "PASS",
"final_health": "PASS",
"sqlite_check": "PASS",
"secret_scan": "PASS",
"blockers": "none"
},
"evidence": {
"root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z",
"final_audit_manifest_sha256": "2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55",
"governance_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z"
},
"governance": {
"branch": "patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721",
"base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
"base_oid": "3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f",
"manifest_commit_oid": "a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd",
"baseline_commit_oid": "6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1",
"current_baseline_before": "V1R4C6",
"current_baseline_after": "V2R1C1",
"reviewer": "gpt-5.3-codex-spark validator and docs_reporter",
"review_status": "PASS",
"reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T14:23:00Z"
},
"commands": [
{
"command": "GET https://cnnetmkt.top/api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver",
"start_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
"end_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
"exit_code": 0
},
{
"command": "bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh",
"start_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
"end_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
"exit_code": 0
},
{
"command": "bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh",
"start_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
"end_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
"exit_code": 0
}
],
"rollback_metadata": {
"action": "retain versions/V2R1C1.json and restore only baseline/current.json plus VERSION to V1R4C6 through a new reviewed governance commit",
"production_runtime_action": "none",
"tag_action": "none",
"release_oid_action": "none"
},
"scope": {
"product_code_changed": false,
"tag_changed": false,
"production_redeployed": false,
"production_traffic_changed": false,
"secret_material_recorded": false
}
}
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# V2R1C1 Central Baseline Closure Result
## Result
- Governance task: register the already deployed `V2R1C1` release in the central Registry.
- Baseline: `V1R4C6` -> `V2R1C1`.
- Release OID and tag OID: `4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`.
- Companion OID: `12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3`.
- Artifact SHA256: `aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671`.
- Production evidence root: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z`.
- Final audit manifest SHA256: `2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55`.
- Production status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`.
## Governance Branch
- Branch: `patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721`.
- Base ref: `refs/heads/main`.
- Base OID: `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`.
- Manifest commit: `a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd`.
- Baseline commit: `6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1`.
- Review: `PASS` at `2026-07-21T14:23:00Z` by `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` validator and docs reporter.
## Commands and Evidence
| Command | Start UTC | End UTC | Exit code |
| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
| `GET /api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver` | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 0 |
| `bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 0 |
| `bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 0 |
The machine-readable record is `.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json`. The external governance evidence root is `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z`.
## Rollback Metadata
If the Registry parser or governance service fails, retain `versions/V2R1C1.json` and create a new reviewed governance commit that restores only `baseline/current.json` and `VERSION` to `V1R4C6`. Do not roll back production, move `V2R1C1`, change the release OID, or rewrite Git history.
## Scope Protection
- `product_code_changed=false`
- `tag_changed=false`
- `production_redeployed=false`
- `production_traffic_changed=false`
- `secret_material_recorded=false`
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
{
"status": "V2R1C2_PRODUCTION_RELEASED",
"release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
"tag_name": "V2R1C2",
"tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
"target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
"evidence_closure_oid": "8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978",
"production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
"production_port": 18920,
"candidate_port": 18921,
"production_acceptance": "PASS",
"role_matrix": "PASS",
"tenant_isolation": "PASS",
"api_smoke": "PASS",
"ui_smoke": "PASS",
"runtime_audit": "PASS",
"wechat_acceptance": "SYNTHETIC_ONLY",
"real_user_impersonated": false,
"production_acceptance_sha256": "a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a",
"production_online_smoke_sha256": "fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4",
"production_health_sha256": "ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c",
"rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
"rollback_ready": true,
"main_changed_by_tag": false,
"force_push": false,
"promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
"evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z"
}
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
# 执行 GitOps 独立 Worktree 与统一运行身份迁移
```yaml
task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
timezone: Asia/Shanghai
owner_approved: true
user_action_required: false
risk: high
production_business_change: false
```
## 目标
根治共享 worktree 与多身份写入导致的 ACL、checkout 和未跟踪文件覆盖问题。
实施:
1. 统一 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入身份为 `aiman:gitops`;
2. 统一 `UMask=0002`;
3. 为 GitOps 根目录设置 setgid 与默认 ACL;
4. 建立 bare repo 和每任务独立 worktree;
5. 启用任务启动前自检;
6. 验证 OpenClaw 与 ChatGPT 并发任务互不干扰;
7. 保留原共享 workspace 作为只读回滚源,禁止智能体继续在其中切换分支。
## 强制通知
收到任务后立即微信通知 Owner:
```text
【任务已接收】GitOps独立worktree与统一运行身份迁移开始。将暂停写入服务、建立独立任务工作树并验证并发执行;生产业务版本不变。
```
任务结束后无论 PASS、BLOCKED 或 ROLLED_BACK,立即微信汇报结果并记录 message_id。
## 1. 变更前检查与封存
```bash
set -euo pipefail
cd /data/aios-gitops/workspace
pwd
id
umask
git status --short --branch
git rev-parse HEAD
systemctl list-units --type=service --all | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
```
将工作区未提交内容完整提交到非 main 证据分支或 stash,禁止 `git clean -fd`。
记录当前运行服务、用户、组、umask、PID、工作区 HEAD 和未跟踪文件清单。
## 2. 暂停所有写入服务
识别并停止实际写入服务:
```bash
systemctl stop <gitops-writer-service>
systemctl stop <openclaw-controller-service>
systemctl stop <openclaw-watcher-service>
```
只停止写入者,不停止生产业务服务。记录每条命令和退出码。
## 3. 安装统一运行身份 drop-in
对每个 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入服务安装:
```text
config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf
```
目标:
```yaml
User: aiman
Group: gitops
SupplementaryGroups: gitops
UMask: 0002
```
执行:
```bash
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl cat <service>
```
不得让服务继续以 root 写 workspace。
## 4. 初始化 bare repo 与独立 worktree 根目录
执行治理补丁中的脚本:
```bash
bash scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh
```
验收:
```yaml
bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
owner: aiman
group: gitops
directory_mode: 2775
default_acl: inherited
```
## 5. 创建 controller 独立 worktree
以 `aiman`、`umask 0002` 执行:
```bash
sudo -u aiman -g gitops bash -lc '
umask 0002
cd /data/aios-gitops
scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh create controller controller-runtime origin/main
'
```
将 controller/watcher 的工作目录改为:
```text
/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/controller-runtime
```
## 6. 启用任务启动前自检
每个任务在执行前必须运行:
```bash
scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh
```
任何一项失败时不得开始任务:
- 用户不是 aiman;
- 不在 gitops 组;
- umask 不是 0002;
- 使用共享 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`;
- worktree 不干净;
- task/result/git dir 不可写;
- 存在 Git lock。
## 7. 启动服务
```bash
systemctl start <gitops-writer-service>
systemctl start <openclaw-controller-service>
systemctl start <openclaw-watcher-service>
```
验证:
```bash
systemctl show <service> -p User -p Group -p UMask -p WorkingDirectory
ps -eo user,group,pid,cmd | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
```
## 8. 并发验收
创建两个独立任务:
```text
OpenClaw: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-<timestamp>
ChatGPT: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-CHATGPT-<timestamp>
```
分别使用:
```text
/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/<task-id>
/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/<task-id>
```
两个任务同时执行:
1. 写各自 `.agent/tasks/<agent>/`;
2. 写各自 `.agent/results/<agent>/`;
3. 创建深层子目录,验证默认 ACL;
4. commit;
5. push;
6. 不切换共享 workspace 分支。
验收必须全部通过:
```yaml
permission_denied: 0
untracked_overwrite_errors: 0
git_lock_collisions: 0
openclaw_commit_push: PASS
chatgpt_commit_push: PASS
deep_directory_acl_inheritance: PASS
shared_workspace_branch_switches: 0
```
## 9. 回滚
若迁移失败:
1. 停止新服务;
2. 保留失败 worktree 供审计;
3. 恢复 systemd drop-in 备份;
4. `daemon-reload`;
5. 恢复原服务状态;
6. 不删除 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`;
7. 生产业务保持不变。
## 10. 结果文件
提交:
```text
.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md
```
首段必须包含:
```yaml
status: PASS | BLOCKED | ROLLED_BACK
task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
timezone: Asia/Shanghai
user_action_required: false
runtime_identity:
user:
group:
umask:
bare_repo:
worktree_root:
controller_worktree:
services:
default_acl:
preflight:
concurrency_test:
openclaw_branch:
openclaw_commit:
chatgpt_branch:
chatgpt_commit:
permission_denied_count:
untracked_overwrite_count:
git_lock_collision_count:
owner_notifications:
received_message_id:
terminal_message_id:
rollback:
remaining_risks:
next_step:
```
提交并推送到独立执行分支。禁止直接推 main。
## 完成微信模板
PASS:
```text
【任务完成】GitOps独立worktree迁移已通过。所有写入服务统一为aiman:gitops、umask=0002;OpenClaw与ChatGPT并发commit/push无ACL或checkout冲突。生产业务版本未变化。
```
阻塞:
```text
【任务阻塞】GitOps独立worktree迁移未通过。原因=<具体服务/权限/并发验收>;已保留原workspace和回滚能力,生产业务未变化。
```
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
# TASK-V2R1C0-B3-FULL-RC1-INTEGRATION-CONTINUE-20260714T184637UTC8
## 目标
继续 V2R1C0 B3 Full RC1 Integration,完成剩余步骤。
## 执行链
1. **[4/7] 检查当前 RC1 分支状态** — 确认 B3 代码是否已在
2. **[5/7] 完整 runtime 整合** — 合入 runtime 依赖文件
3. **[6/7] cherry-pick d2acafa** — 确保 B3 代码在 RC1 分支中
4. **[7/7] 完整门禁** — 执行测试、gitleaks、patcher 验证
5. **[8/7] artifact 构建**
6. **[9/7] staging 验证**
7. **[10/7] RESULT 文件**
8. **[11/7] production 准备**
## 分支
- 基础分支: `v2r1c0-b3-full-rc1-integration-20260714T180646UTC8`
- B3 执行分支: `work/openclaw/v2r1c0-b3-execution-20260714`
- B3 commit: `d2acafa`
+7 -7
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
e4a1f86ef92ec1d3ff724eb75cf9c01758c1cc997e1afadc1c8b561bce5b813a FULL_PACKAGE_MANIFEST.json
c59c0288d4d999fbd79a2f275d4fb8c369029cb8bb721f95408308cc51eaa3a2 README.md
b090062a92aeb14211bbfc1fcd43b5ee4f315d30054b437f3bcdac657210ee95 VERSION
a664714bc1e13160cdd0dc32de460c65a83a3a95aa5cdad1833b1b650ab90e9d active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_model_api.py
1095953d5764d9c72f02e84b1d525e265d3a67a5bdb451ab9ef51a8e8b3032b8 VERSION
ee6e4fc6bc98a590fbc3585b62707e2562115e5a3f722e69a7c464d966bdc458 active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_model_api.py
0ffadf6ee1f297842bc44c6e753010fd2b7b02b1f5fb0d7e0676b7bec898db08 active-runtime/app/aios_v5_webops_app.py
0ffadf6ee1f297842bc44c6e753010fd2b7b02b1f5fb0d7e0676b7bec898db08 active-runtime/app/aios_webops_app.py
0eb12e0161371464605577707c84df413b555277933f9eb4488ab38032ff699b active-runtime/migrations/001_webops_core_sqlite.sql
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ee6e4fc6bc98a590fbc3585b62707e2562115e5a3f722e69a7c464d966bdc458 adapters/gitop
013813b58d7844f3860d6f9bb484f84f92487652b573976c474bb35c91df8ae8 adapters/openclaw/openclaw_gitops_commands.py
7a34ccdfdcdc132fe5daf01cd1acd9d9b7adbd0429d575b65e0771962ccedc62 adapters/webops/gitops_model_menu_fragment.html
86b0cb6ee3192565b080672e5305dabba1283486442e630c71244ebac4910916 config/digital_life.yaml
5a27d48db343dcb723bcc1d9d8222aa3f72094c57cc43640aebe6558963bd20f config/domains.env
a3872f24e4cd64288758846ecd0b374db4aa41111feec3b17c41438136d6d5d0 config/domains.env
7a6f82cbddfc5c74bd37229e4f37fe4e73430ae585b4846abd1a80d852f2fed0 config/gitops_short_links.yaml
4139d915bdd733171734d5d5d3411e6fc4f8f202c49af4321d706da176da690b config/model_registry.yaml
8d6202d3da60366c96a208f5e5eed1f09fd36d122f4cabdc038c21ce2e72ea16 config/npm_custom_locations.yaml
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ d8cea35eb6c1300d20804ef480312d26dbdc2ad3a2d26b9430c6ca4808155a95 fixes/patch_ru
0eb12e0161371464605577707c84df413b555277933f9eb4488ab38032ff699b migrations/001_webops_core_sqlite.sql
6d61da88e7d6b208e7eee7195b521dc47cb68587f91987d7a0dd1c8801ef168d migrations/002_seed_owner_admin_user.sql
a2c0c7699e1eb46cfdeabfc905cb79b71ed14fb6bcf81ecc99ec47975cf05767 migrations/004_gitops_custom_llm_runtime.sql
ca49f4165b50171968485ffa5535bc33d2158237ea55af10a3888a5fa0f7a535 package_verify_full.sh
b77bce1ca78cede27de6594e25f6ce5bb0c4990c0953eeb79f7e2608d2515c32 package_verify_full.sh
f65b7fba5d6bdac3070ff4309830e286cd6319a80ab2e55263e46022fed2bf7f scripts/apply_migrations.py
bc0452d261def2366cdefd845e62d7177b42806f93ba78294ece29a8a369157e scripts/backup_before_fix.sh
bdb439086c86b3b23f8240cb2bef0f757a6be242d21d13a79eb1e44434efbe2e scripts/create_patch.sh
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ bdb439086c86b3b23f8240cb2bef0f757a6be242d21d13a79eb1e44434efbe2e scripts/create
1fdeecf0315f3ab4ec461c3376128054df9ac48e2fe5a3f64a138cd7d710d44d scripts/generate_release_manifest.py
80c6c10f259245681c42932f3f5f9b9a0fbd9cadce6a3f495d82cbdbc8618c73 scripts/healthcheck.sh
3795cadfa6429a434c955913dbdcbf552181c88301a196b4b458f4f5dd206cd8 scripts/init_gitops_baseline.sh
e76cd986d2387b76439e4a7fe503e48a2de8fc70fb52c45a13641c9d943f108f scripts/install_v1r1c0_gitops_model_overlay.sh
4d54a4ed6d35bbb6e9fe2924f3cfceeea9c3eed898017788f6c5ab8041394a47 scripts/install_v1r1c0_gitops_model_overlay.sh
0064539ac1e1bd32dc8062ecc307ad2bc8520895009583a72d46868d1cf44e3c scripts/install_webops_overlay.sh
9fadafc4b4d098c006d159cb3b401eb19cf9ab9c5fa4b5cb109e946501c0b8e1 scripts/owner_wechat_notify_worker.py
f537c58fc08685601f47fac5c0a3a2856e3ce9806c1918848c87a194a49c28a0 scripts/package_contract_check_v1r1c0.sh
14ab40a7c342e21e8315def14d552dcff4b214d23f1f4be493e9d3fc2cee1a2f scripts/release_version.sh
e0abd8ad44d4f088108f2046fd9d7bbd4465af50f79bd3b9fcbb72a8c61bee65 scripts/package_contract_check_v1r1c0.sh
abef8df642c6d233af4a03c512876b02b326e19c924020b8dd8cc74236d18817 scripts/release_version.sh
bbdb3f9992b203ddc2a6a83241052663de4f021d0705724bd9df05acaa99b022 scripts/rollback_last_delta.sh
0814c26ecf6732cf2c24f5f414ad0128a159768cfbbeb21d557274064feb1188 scripts/rollback_version.sh
da84a5cc61c1d54a7d1e96e4b0a7186e192edf3ec12d694fc9d7608c3b1086ef scripts/run_acceptance_with_autofix.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
V2R1C4
V1R4C6
@@ -1,379 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Task-scoped continuous authorization controller for the AIOS Candidate writer."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64, fcntl, hashlib, json, os, pwd, grp, re, socket, sqlite3, stat, subprocess, sys, tempfile, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
from typing import Any
TASK='AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-FULL-IMPLEMENTATION-20260726'
AUTH_ID='authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726'
BRANCH='patch/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726'
BASE='875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3'
REPO='aios/aios'
WRITER_AUDIENCE='chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer'
ACTOR='chatgpt-gitops-bot'
WRITER_INSTANCE='writer-6e32f321-1240-46f8-9693-0b0631d9c77b'
CHILD_OPERATION_MAX_USES=20
ROOT=Path('/data/aios-gitops')
WORKTREE=ROOT/'worktrees/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726'
BARE=ROOT/'repo.git'
TASK_ROOT=ROOT/'runtime/tasks'/TASK
AUTH_DIR=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/task-authorizations')
PARENT=AUTH_DIR/'authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726.json'
STATE_DIR=Path('/var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-authorization')
STATE=STATE_DIR/'state.json'
LOCK=STATE_DIR/'controller.lock'
AUDIT=TASK_ROOT/'continuous-authorization.audit.jsonl'
SOCKET_DIR=Path('/run/aios-autonomous-release-authorization')
SOCKET_PATH=SOCKET_DIR/'controller.sock'
PROJECTION=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/credentials/chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer')
REGISTRY=Path('/var/lib/aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer/token-registry.sqlite3')
WRITER_LEDGER=Path('/var/lib/aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer/operation-ledger.sqlite3')
ASKPASS=Path('/usr/libexec/aios-autonomous-release-authorization/gitea_askpass.py')
PATH_POLICY=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/policies-chatgpt-autonomous-release/autonomous-release-path-policy.json')
ROUTE_BINDING=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/action-route-bindings/chatgpt-autonomous-release-20260726.json')
OID_RE=re.compile(r'^[0-9a-f]{40}$')
OP_RE=re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}$')
TERMINAL={'COMPLETED','CANCELLED','FAILED_FINAL','REVOKED','REVOKED_IDLE_TIMEOUT','REVOKED_WALL_CLOCK','RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED'}
sys.path.insert(0,'/usr/libexec/aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer-fullprofile-8ac2f90f')
from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
def now() -> datetime: return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def stamp() -> str: return now().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat()
def canonical(value: Any) -> bytes: return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False).encode('utf-8')
def fail(code: str, status: int=503, **details: Any) -> None: raise ControlError(code,status,details)
class ControlError(RuntimeError):
def __init__(self,code:str,status:int=503,details:dict[str,Any]|None=None): self.code,self.status,self.details=code,status,details or {}; super().__init__(code)
def owned_regular(path:Path, mode:int) -> os.stat_result:
try: info=os.lstat(path)
except FileNotFoundError: fail('authorization_config_missing')
if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid!=0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)&~mode: fail('authorization_config_permissions_rejected')
return info
def load_json(path:Path,mode:int=0o600) -> dict[str,Any]:
owned_regular(path,mode)
try: value=json.loads(path.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
except Exception: fail('authorization_config_json_rejected')
if not isinstance(value,dict): fail('authorization_config_schema_rejected')
return value
def atomic_json(path:Path,value:dict[str,Any],mode:int=0o600) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
raw=canonical(value)+b'\n'
fd,tmp=tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='.new-',dir=path.parent)
try:
os.fchmod(fd,mode); os.write(fd,raw); os.fsync(fd); os.close(fd); os.chown(tmp,0,0); os.replace(tmp,path)
os.chmod(path,mode)
finally:
try: os.close(fd)
except OSError: pass
if os.path.exists(tmp): os.unlink(tmp)
def append_audit(event:dict[str,Any]) -> None:
TASK_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
flags=os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_APPEND|getattr(os,'O_NOFOLLOW',0)
fd=os.open(AUDIT,flags,0o600)
try: os.write(fd,canonical({'at':stamp(),'task_id':TASK,'secrets_included':False,**event})+b'\n'); os.fsync(fd)
finally: os.close(fd)
def parent() -> dict[str,Any]:
p=load_json(PARENT)
required={'schema_version','development_authorization_id','authorization_type','task_id','actor_identity','audience','repository','exact_branch','approved_base_oid','allowed_path_roots','allowed_exact_paths','allowed_operations','created_at','valid_until','maximum_wall_clock_seconds','idle_timeout_seconds','manual_reapproval_per_commit','maximum_concurrent_writes','path_policy_sha256','writer_instance_id'}
if set(p)!=required or p.get('schema_version')!=1: fail('parent_authorization_schema_rejected')
fixed={'development_authorization_id':AUTH_ID,'authorization_type':'TASK_SCOPED_CONTINUOUS_DEVELOPMENT','task_id':TASK,'actor_identity':ACTOR,'audience':WRITER_AUDIENCE,'repository':REPO,'exact_branch':BRANCH,'approved_base_oid':BASE,'manual_reapproval_per_commit':False,'maximum_concurrent_writes':1,'writer_instance_id':WRITER_INSTANCE}
if any(p.get(k)!=v for k,v in fixed.items()): fail('parent_authorization_binding_rejected')
if p.get('maximum_wall_clock_seconds')!=86400 or p.get('idle_timeout_seconds')!=2700: fail('parent_authorization_lifetime_rejected')
if not isinstance(p.get('allowed_path_roots'),list) or not isinstance(p.get('allowed_exact_paths'),list) or not isinstance(p.get('allowed_operations'),list): fail('parent_authorization_scope_rejected')
raw=PATH_POLICY.read_bytes()
if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()!=p.get('path_policy_sha256'): fail('parent_authorization_path_policy_changed')
return p
def parse_time(v:Any) -> datetime:
try:
d=datetime.fromisoformat(str(v).replace('Z','+00:00'))
return d.astimezone(timezone.utc)
except Exception: fail('authorization_time_rejected')
def components(path:str)->tuple[str,...]:
if not isinstance(path,str) or not path or path!=path.strip() or '\\' in path or '\x00' in path: fail('authorization_path_rejected',403)
pp=PurePosixPath(path); wp=PureWindowsPath(path)
parts=tuple(path.split('/'))
if pp.is_absolute() or wp.is_absolute() or bool(wp.drive) or any(x in {'','.','..'} for x in parts): fail('authorization_path_rejected',403)
return parts
def path_allowed(p:dict[str,Any],path:str)->bool:
item=components(path)
for root in p['allowed_path_roots']:
r=components(str(root).rstrip('/'))
if item[:len(r)]==r: return True
return any(item==components(x) for x in p['allowed_exact_paths'])
def git(*args:str,cwd:Path|None=None,env:dict[str,str]|None=None)->str:
e=os.environ.copy(); e.update(env or {}); e['GIT_CONFIG_COUNT']='1'; e['GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0']='safe.directory'; e['GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0']=str(WORKTREE)
r=subprocess.run(['git',*args],cwd=cwd,text=True,capture_output=True,env=e)
if r.returncode: fail('authorization_git_probe_failed',503)
return r.stdout.strip()
def credential_lines()->list[str]:
cp=Path(os.environ.get('CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY',''))/'gitea_git_http'
try:
info=os.lstat(cp); lines=cp.read_text(encoding='utf-8').splitlines()
except OSError: fail('authorization_gitea_credential_unavailable')
if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or len(lines)!=2 or lines[0]!='gitops-bot' or not lines[1]: fail('authorization_gitea_credential_rejected')
return lines
def remote_oid()->str:
credential_lines()
e={'GIT_ASKPASS':str(ASKPASS),'GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT':'0'}
out=git('ls-remote','--heads','http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git',f'refs/heads/{BRANCH}',cwd=WORKTREE,env=e)
fields=out.split()
if len(fields)!=2 or not OID_RE.fullmatch(fields[0]): fail('authorization_git_ls_remote_rejected')
return fields[0]
def api_oid()->str:
user,password=credential_lines(); branch=urllib.parse.quote(BRANCH,safe='')
encoded=base64.b64encode((user+':'+password).encode()).decode()
request=urllib.request.Request('http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/repos/aios/aios/branches/'+branch,headers={'Authorization':'Basic '+encoded,'Host':'g.cnnetmkt.top'})
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request,timeout=10) as response: value=json.loads(response.read())
except Exception: fail('authorization_gitea_api_unavailable')
oid=str(value.get('commit',{}).get('id',''))
if not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid): fail('authorization_gitea_api_oid_rejected')
return oid
def four_way(expected:str)->None:
local=git('rev-parse','HEAD',cwd=WORKTREE)
bare=git('--git-dir',str(BARE),'rev-parse',f'refs/heads/{BRANCH}')
remote=remote_oid(); api=api_oid()
if any(x!=expected for x in (local,bare,remote,api)): fail('RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED',409,current_head_oid=local)
if git('status','--porcelain',cwd=WORKTREE)!='': fail('authorization_worktree_dirty',409)
def state()->dict[str,Any]:
s=load_json(STATE)
required={'schema_version','development_authorization_id','task_id','status','current_head_oid','last_activity_at','writer_child','test_child','inflight','updated_at'}
if set(s)!=required or s.get('schema_version')!=1 or s.get('development_authorization_id')!=AUTH_ID or s.get('task_id')!=TASK or not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(s.get('current_head_oid',''))): fail('authorization_state_schema_rejected')
return s
def save_state(s:dict[str,Any])->None: s['updated_at']=stamp(); atomic_json(STATE,s)
def lock():
STATE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True); os.chmod(STATE_DIR,0o700)
f=open(LOCK,'a+b'); os.chmod(LOCK,0o600); fcntl.flock(f.fileno(),fcntl.LOCK_EX); return f
def route_binding_valid(p:dict[str,Any])->None:
b=load_json(ROUTE_BINDING,0o640)
identities=b.get('action_identities')
if b.get('task_id')!=TASK or b.get('writer_instance_id')!=WRITER_INSTANCE or b.get('repository')!=REPO or b.get('branch')!=BRANCH or b.get('approved_base_oid')!=BASE or b.get('path_policy_sha256')!=p.get('path_policy_sha256') or not isinstance(identities,list) or len(identities)!=1 or identities[0].get('account')!=ACTOR:
fail('authorization_route_binding_changed',409)
def task_live(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],*,touch:bool)->None:
route_binding_valid(p)
if s['status'] in TERMINAL: fail('authorization_task_terminal',409)
if now()>=parse_time(p['valid_until']):
s['status']='REVOKED_WALL_CLOCK'; save_state(s); cleanup(s,'wall_clock'); fail('authorization_task_terminal',409)
if (now()-parse_time(s['last_activity_at'])).total_seconds()>p['idle_timeout_seconds']:
s['status']='REVOKED_IDLE_TIMEOUT'; save_state(s); cleanup(s,'idle_timeout'); fail('authorization_task_terminal',409)
if touch: s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s)
def projection_token()->str|None:
if not PROJECTION.exists(): return None
try:
info=os.lstat(PROJECTION)
if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid!=0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)!=0o600: fail('authorization_projection_rejected')
token=PROJECTION.read_text(encoding='utf-8').strip()
return token if len(token.encode())>=32 else None
except OSError: fail('authorization_projection_rejected')
def write_projection(token:str)->None:
PROJECTION.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
fd,tmp=tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='.writer-',dir=PROJECTION.parent)
try:
os.fchmod(fd,0o600); os.write(fd,(token+'\n').encode()); os.fsync(fd); os.close(fd); os.chown(tmp,0,0); os.replace(tmp,PROJECTION); os.chmod(PROJECTION,0o600)
finally:
try: os.close(fd)
except OSError: pass
if os.path.exists(tmp): os.unlink(tmp)
def post_revoke_401(token:str)->None:
req=urllib.request.Request('http://127.0.0.1:19893/api/runtime-status',headers={'Authorization':'Bearer '+token})
try: urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=5)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
if e.code==401:return
except Exception: pass
fail('authorization_old_credential_revocation_unverified')
def rotate_child(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],reason:str)->str:
old=projection_token(); registry=TokenRegistry(REGISTRY)
old_record=registry.find(old) if old else None
if old_record and (old_record.get('task_id')!=TASK or old_record.get('development_authorization_id')!=AUTH_ID):
if parse_time(old_record.get('expires_at'))>=now(): fail('authorization_existing_projection_binding_rejected')
if not registry.revoke(str(old_record['token_id'])): fail('authorization_historical_child_revoke_failed')
post_revoke_401(old)
append_audit({'event':'historical_expired_child_revoked','old_credential_http_status':401})
old_record=None
issued=now().replace(microsecond=0); expires=issued+timedelta(minutes=20)
prefixes=[str(x).rstrip('/')+'/' for x in p['allowed_path_roots']]
grant={'token_id':'continuous-child-'+issued.strftime('%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ')+'-'+os.urandom(3).hex(),'credential_id':'credential-'+issued.strftime('%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ')+'-'+os.urandom(3).hex(),'development_authorization_id':AUTH_ID,'audience':WRITER_AUDIENCE,'task_id':TASK,'actor_identity':ACTOR,'writer_instance_id':WRITER_INSTANCE,'repository_identity':REPO,'source_cidrs':['127.0.0.1/32'],'allowed_branch':BRANCH,'current_expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'approved_base_oid':BASE,'allowed_operations':p['allowed_operations'],'allowed_paths':p['allowed_exact_paths'],'allowed_path_prefixes':prefixes,'not_before':issued.isoformat(),'expires_at':expires.isoformat(),'renewable':False,'max_uses':{operation:CHILD_OPERATION_MAX_USES for operation in p['allowed_operations']},'issued_by':'task_authorization_controller'}
token,record=registry.issue(grant)
try:
write_projection(token)
if old_record:
if not registry.revoke(str(old_record['token_id'])): fail('authorization_old_child_revoke_failed')
post_revoke_401(old)
except Exception:
registry.revoke(str(record['token_id']))
try: PROJECTION.unlink()
except FileNotFoundError: pass
raise
s['writer_child']={'credential_id':record['credential_id'],'issued_at':record['not_before'],'expires_at':record['expires_at'],'current_expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'rotation_reason':reason}
save_state(s); append_audit({'event':'child_grant_rotated','reason':reason,'current_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'old_grant_revoked':bool(old_record),'old_credential_http_status':401 if old_record else None})
return token
def child_operation_quota_exhausted(rec:dict[str,Any],registry:TokenRegistry)->bool:
token_id=str(rec.get('token_id',''))
allowed=rec.get('allowed_operations')
limits=rec.get('max_uses')
if not token_id or not isinstance(allowed,list) or not isinstance(limits,dict): fail('authorization_child_quota_schema_rejected')
for operation in allowed:
maximum=limits.get(operation)
if not isinstance(operation,str) or not isinstance(maximum,int) or maximum<1: fail('authorization_child_quota_schema_rejected')
if registry.usage(token_id,operation)>=maximum: return True
return False
def ensure_child(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],reason:str)->str:
token=projection_token(); meta=s.get('writer_child') or {}
expired=True
try: expired=(parse_time(meta.get('expires_at'))-now()).total_seconds()<=300
except Exception: pass
if not token or expired or meta.get('current_expected_head_oid')!=s['current_head_oid']:
return rotate_child(p,s,reason)
registry=TokenRegistry(REGISTRY)
rec=registry.find(token)
if not rec or rec.get('revoked') or rec.get('development_authorization_id')!=AUTH_ID or rec.get('current_expected_head_oid')!=s['current_head_oid']:
return rotate_child(p,s,reason)
if child_operation_quota_exhausted(rec,registry):
return rotate_child(p,s,'operation_quota_exhausted')
return token
def ledger_verified(operation_id:str,commit_oid:str)->None:
with sqlite3.connect(WRITER_LEDGER) as db:
row=db.execute('select operation_id,branch,commit_oid,state,verification_status from writer_operations where operation_id=?',(operation_id,)).fetchone()
if not row or row[1]!=BRANCH or row[2]!=commit_oid or row[3]!='COMPLETED' or row[4]!='bare+gitea': fail('authorization_writer_ledger_rejected',409)
def reconcile(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],previous:str,new:str,operation_id:str)->dict[str,Any]:
inflight=s.get('inflight')
if not isinstance(inflight,dict) or inflight.get('previous_head_oid')!=previous or inflight.get('operation_id')!=operation_id: fail('authorization_inflight_rejected',409)
if previous!=s['current_head_oid'] or not OID_RE.fullmatch(new): fail('authorization_head_transition_rejected',409)
ledger_verified(operation_id,new); four_way(new)
s['current_head_oid']=new; s['inflight']=None; s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s)
ensure_child(p,s,'head_advance')
append_audit({'event':'authorization_head_advanced','previous_head_oid':previous,'new_commit_oid':new,'four_way_ref_status':True,'worktree_clean':True})
return {'authorization_current_head_oid':new,'automatic_head_advance':True,'four_way_ref_status':True}
def prepare(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],data:dict[str,Any])->dict[str,Any]:
required={'expected_current_head_oid','operation_id','idempotency_key','exact_path','content_digest','commit_message_digest','branch','path','message'}
if set(data)!=required: fail('authorization_request_schema_rejected',403)
if data['branch']!=BRANCH or data['path']!=data['exact_path'] or not path_allowed(p,str(data['path'])): fail('authorization_path_rejected',403)
if data['expected_current_head_oid']!=s['current_head_oid'] or not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(data['expected_current_head_oid'])): fail('BRANCH_HEAD_CHANGED',409,current_head_oid=s['current_head_oid'])
if not OP_RE.fullmatch(str(data['operation_id'])) or not OP_RE.fullmatch(str(data['idempotency_key'])): fail('authorization_operation_id_rejected',403)
if not all(isinstance(data[k],str) and re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}',data[k]) for k in ('content_digest','commit_message_digest')): fail('authorization_digest_rejected',403)
if hashlib.sha256(data['message'].encode()).hexdigest()!=data['commit_message_digest']: fail('authorization_commit_message_digest_rejected',403)
inflight=s.get('inflight')
if inflight:
if inflight.get('operation_id')==data['operation_id'] and inflight.get('idempotency_key')==data['idempotency_key']: return {'expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'idempotency_key':data['idempotency_key']}
fail('BRANCH_HEAD_CHANGED',409,current_head_oid=s['current_head_oid'])
four_way(s['current_head_oid'])
s['inflight']={'operation_id':data['operation_id'],'idempotency_key':data['idempotency_key'],'previous_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'path':data['path'],'created_at':stamp()}; s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s)
append_audit({'event':'write_prepared','operation_id':data['operation_id'],'path':data['path'],'expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid']})
return {'expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'idempotency_key':data['idempotency_key']}
def test_authorize(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],operation:str)->dict[str,Any]:
allowed={'pytest_dormant','pytest_autonomous_release','compileall_autonomous_release','git_diff_check'}
if operation not in allowed: fail('candidate_test_executor_operation_rejected',403)
four_way(s['current_head_oid'])
child=s.get('test_child') or {}; refresh=True
try: refresh=(parse_time(child.get('expires_at'))-now()).total_seconds()<=300
except Exception: pass
if refresh:
issued=now().replace(microsecond=0); child={'test_authorization_id':'test-authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726','grant_id':'test-child-'+issued.strftime('%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ'),'issued_at':issued.isoformat(),'expires_at':(issued+timedelta(minutes=20)).isoformat()}; s['test_child']=child
s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s); append_audit({'event':'test_authorized','operation':operation})
return {'test_authorization_id':child['test_authorization_id'],'operation':operation,'expires_at':child['expires_at']}
def cleanup(s:dict[str,Any],reason:str)->None:
old=projection_token()
if old:
reg=TokenRegistry(REGISTRY); rec=reg.find(old)
if rec: reg.revoke(str(rec['token_id']))
try: PROJECTION.unlink()
except FileNotFoundError: pass
try: post_revoke_401(old)
except ControlError: pass
for unit in ('aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-route.service','aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer.service'):
subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/systemctl','stop',unit],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=20)
subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/systemctl','stop','aios-autonomous-release-dormant-test-executor@*.service'],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=20)
try: ROUTE_BINDING.unlink()
except FileNotFoundError: pass
try: SOCKET_PATH.unlink()
except FileNotFoundError: pass
append_audit({'event':'authorization_cleanup','reason':reason,'projection_removed':not PROJECTION.exists(),'route_overlay_removed':not ROUTE_BINDING.exists(),'task_services_stop_requested':True})
def request(data:dict[str,Any])->dict[str,Any]:
op=data.get('op'); f=lock()
try:
p=parent(); s=state(); task_live(p,s,touch=False)
if op=='describe_authorization':
four_way(s['current_head_oid'])
return {'development_authorization_id':AUTH_ID,'task_id':TASK,'actor_identity':ACTOR,'audience':WRITER_AUDIENCE,'repository':REPO,'branch':BRANCH,'approved_base_oid':BASE,'authorization_status':s['status'],'current_head_oid':s['current_head_oid']}
if op=='get_writer_token':
four_way(s['current_head_oid']); token=ensure_child(p,s,'scheduled_or_requested_rotation'); return {'token':token,'current_head_oid':s['current_head_oid']}
if op=='prepare_write':
ensure_child(p,s,'pre_write_quota_check')
return prepare(p,s,data.get('request') if isinstance(data.get('request'),dict) else {})
if op=='reconcile_commit':
r=data.get('result') if isinstance(data.get('result'),dict) else {}; return reconcile(p,s,str(r.get('previous_head_oid','')),str(r.get('new_commit_oid','')),str(r.get('operation_id','')))
if op=='fail_write':
r=data.get('result') if isinstance(data.get('result'),dict) else {}; inflight=s.get('inflight')
if isinstance(inflight,dict) and inflight.get('operation_id')==r.get('operation_id'): s['inflight']=None; save_state(s)
return {'cleared':True}
if op=='authorize_test': return test_authorize(p,s,str(data.get('operation','')))
fail('authorization_operation_rejected',403)
finally:
fcntl.flock(f.fileno(),fcntl.LOCK_UN); f.close()
def peer_allowed(conn:socket.socket)->bool:
try:
import struct
_pid,uid,gid=struct.unpack('3i',conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET,socket.SO_PEERCRED,12))
return uid==pwd.getpwnam('aiman').pw_uid and gid==grp.getgrnam('gitops').gr_gid
except Exception: return False
def serve()->None:
SOCKET_DIR.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True); os.chown(SOCKET_DIR,0,grp.getgrnam('gitops').gr_gid); os.chmod(SOCKET_DIR,0o750)
try: SOCKET_PATH.unlink()
except FileNotFoundError: pass
with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX,socket.SOCK_STREAM) as server:
server.bind(str(SOCKET_PATH)); os.chown(SOCKET_PATH,0,grp.getgrnam('gitops').gr_gid); os.chmod(SOCKET_PATH,0o660); server.listen(32); server.settimeout(1.0)
last=0.0
while True:
if time.monotonic()-last>30:
last=time.monotonic()
try:
f=lock(); p=parent(); s=state(); task_live(p,s,touch=False); four_way(s['current_head_oid']); ensure_child(p,s,'scheduled_rotation'); fcntl.flock(f.fileno(),fcntl.LOCK_UN); f.close()
except ControlError as e:
append_audit({'event':'scheduled_check_blocked','error':e.code})
if e.code=='authorization_task_terminal': return
except Exception: append_audit({'event':'scheduled_check_blocked','error':'authorization_controller_internal_error'})
try: conn,_=server.accept()
except socket.timeout: continue
with conn:
if not peer_allowed(conn): conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':False,'status':403,'error':'authorization_peer_rejected'})+b'\n'); continue
try:
raw=conn.recv(131072); data=json.loads(raw.decode()); result=request(data); conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':True,'result':result})+b'\n')
except ControlError as e: conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':False,'status':e.status,'error':e.code,**e.details})+b'\n')
except Exception as exc:
append_audit({'event':'controller_internal_error','error_type':type(exc).__name__})
conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':False,'status':503,'error':'authorization_controller_internal_error'})+b'\n')
if __name__=='__main__': serve()
@@ -1,567 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Task-bound bridge from the legacy ChatGPT Action to an isolated Writer V2."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
import re
import sqlite3
import socket
import stat
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
from typing import Any
CONFIG_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_BINDING"])
POLICY_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_PATH_POLICY"])
KNOWN_IDENTITIES_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_KNOWN_IDENTITIES"])
STATE_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_STATE"])
AUDIT_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_AUDIT"])
HOST = os.environ.get("AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_PORT", "19894"))
EXPECTED_TASK_ID = os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_TASK_ID"]
EXPECTED_ROUTE_HEADER = os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_HEADER"]
AUTHORIZATION_SOCKET = Path(os.environ["AIOS_CONTINUOUS_AUTHORIZATION_SOCKET"])
OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
SECRET_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)"
r"\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})"
)
SECRET_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
r"(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|"
r"-----BEGIN (?:OPENSSH |RSA |EC )?PRIVATE KEY-----)"
)
ALLOWED_REQUEST_FIELDS = frozenset({"base","branch","content","create_branch","message","path","task_id","development_authorization_id","actor_identity","audience","approved_base_oid","expected_current_head_oid","operation_id","idempotency_key","exact_path","content_digest","commit_message_digest"})
class RouteError(RuntimeError):
def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400, **details: Any):
super().__init__(code)
self.code = code
self.status = status
self.details = details
def utc_now() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
return json.dumps(
value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
).encode("utf-8")
def load_root_managed_json(
path: Path, *, expected_mode: int = 0o640
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bytes]:
info = os.lstat(path)
if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
raise RouteError("writer_route_config_type_rejected", 503)
if info.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & ~expected_mode:
raise RouteError("writer_route_config_permissions_rejected", 503)
raw = path.read_bytes()
try:
value = json.loads(raw)
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
raise RouteError("writer_route_config_json_rejected", 503) from None
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise RouteError("writer_route_config_object_required", 503)
return value, raw
def load_binding() -> dict[str, Any]:
binding, _ = load_root_managed_json(CONFIG_PATH)
required = {
"schema_version",
"task_id",
"writer_instance_id",
"repository",
"branch",
"approved_base_oid",
"writer_url",
"path_policy_sha256",
"action_identities",
}
if set(binding) != required or binding.get("schema_version") != 1:
raise RouteError("writer_route_binding_schema_rejected", 503)
if binding["task_id"] != EXPECTED_TASK_ID:
raise RouteError("writer_route_task_binding_rejected", 503)
if binding["repository"] != "aios/aios":
raise RouteError("writer_route_repository_rejected", 503)
if not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(binding["approved_base_oid"])):
raise RouteError("writer_route_base_oid_rejected", 503)
if binding["writer_url"] != "http://127.0.0.1:19893":
raise RouteError("writer_route_upstream_rejected", 503)
identities = binding.get("action_identities")
if not isinstance(identities, list) or len(identities) != 1:
raise RouteError("writer_route_action_identity_rejected", 503)
identity = identities[0]
if (
not isinstance(identity, dict)
or set(identity) != {"account", "token_sha256"}
or identity.get("account") != "chatgpt-gitops-bot"
or not re.fullmatch(
r"[0-9a-f]{64}", str(identity.get("token_sha256", ""))
)
):
raise RouteError("writer_route_action_identity_rejected", 503)
return binding
def allowed_path_scope(binding: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[set[str], tuple[str, ...]]:
policy, raw = load_root_managed_json(POLICY_PATH)
actual = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
if actual != binding["path_policy_sha256"]:
raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_digest_mismatch", 503)
if policy.get("allowed_branch") != binding["branch"]:
raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_branch_mismatch", 503)
operation = (policy.get("allowed_operations") or {}).get("commit_file.atomic")
paths = operation.get("exact_paths") if isinstance(operation, dict) else None
prefixes = operation.get("prefix_paths") if isinstance(operation, dict) else None
if not isinstance(paths, list) or not paths or not all(
isinstance(x, str) for x in paths
):
raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
if not isinstance(prefixes, list) or not prefixes or not all(
isinstance(x, str) and x.endswith("/") for x in prefixes
):
raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
if any(not valid_relative_path(x[:-1]) for x in prefixes):
raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
if any(not valid_relative_path(x) for x in paths):
raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
return set(paths), tuple(prefixes)
def valid_relative_path(path: str) -> bool:
if not isinstance(path, str) or not path or path != path.strip():
return False
if "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
return False
try:
decoded = urllib.parse.unquote(path, errors="strict")
except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
return False
if decoded != path:
return False
posix = PurePosixPath(path)
windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
return not (
posix.is_absolute()
or windows.is_absolute()
or bool(windows.drive)
or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in path.split("/"))
)
def path_allowed(binding: dict[str, Any], path: str) -> bool:
if not valid_relative_path(path):
return False
exact_paths, prefixes = allowed_path_scope(binding)
return path in exact_paths or any(path.startswith(prefix) for prefix in prefixes)
def bearer(headers: Any) -> str:
value = headers.get("Authorization", "")
if not value.startswith("Bearer "):
raise RouteError("unauthorized", 401)
token = value[7:].strip()
if not token:
raise RouteError("unauthorized", 401)
return token
def authorize_action(headers: Any, binding: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
digest = hashlib.sha256(bearer(headers).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
identity = binding["action_identities"][0]
if not hmac.compare_digest(identity["token_sha256"], digest):
known, _ = load_root_managed_json(KNOWN_IDENTITIES_PATH)
identities = known.get("identities")
if known.get("schema_version") != 1 or not isinstance(identities, list):
raise RouteError("writer_route_identity_catalog_rejected", 503)
observed = "unregistered"
allowed_accounts = {
"chatgpt-gitops-bot",
"gitops-write-bot",
"codex-gitops-bot",
}
for candidate in identities:
if not isinstance(candidate, dict) or set(candidate) != {
"account",
"token_sha256",
}:
raise RouteError("writer_route_identity_catalog_rejected", 503)
account = str(candidate.get("account", ""))
token_sha256 = str(candidate.get("token_sha256", ""))
if account not in allowed_accounts or not re.fullmatch(
r"[0-9a-f]{64}", token_sha256
):
raise RouteError("writer_route_identity_catalog_rejected", 503)
if hmac.compare_digest(token_sha256, digest):
observed = account
raise RouteError(
"writer_route_action_identity_rejected",
403,
accepted_action_identity=str(identity["account"]),
observed_action_identity=observed,
identity_alias_accepted=False,
)
return str(identity["account"])
def authorization_call(operation: str, **payload: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
request = {"op": operation, **payload}
try:
with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as client:
client.settimeout(15)
client.connect(str(AUTHORIZATION_SOCKET))
client.sendall(canonical_json(request))
raw = client.recv(131072)
response = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
except (OSError, TimeoutError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
raise RouteError("authorization_controller_unavailable", 503) from None
if not isinstance(response, dict) or not response.get("ok"):
if not isinstance(response, dict):
raise RouteError("authorization_controller_response_rejected", 503)
details = {k: v for k, v in response.items() if k not in {"ok", "status", "error"}}
raise RouteError(str(response.get("error") or "authorization_controller_rejected"), int(response.get("status") or 503), **details)
result = response.get("result")
if not isinstance(result, dict):
raise RouteError("authorization_controller_response_rejected", 503)
return result
def writer_token() -> str:
value = authorization_call("get_writer_token").get("token")
if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
raise RouteError("writer_route_credential_rejected", 503)
return value
def writer_call(
binding: dict[str, Any],
method: str,
path: str,
payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
data = canonical_json(payload) if payload is not None else None
headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + writer_token()}
if data is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
request = urllib.request.Request(
binding["writer_url"] + path, data=data, method=method, headers=headers
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=90) as response:
body = json.loads(response.read())
return response.status, body
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
try:
body = json.loads(exc.read())
except Exception:
body = {"error": "writer_route_upstream_non_json_error"}
return exc.code, body
except (OSError, TimeoutError):
raise RouteError("writer_route_upstream_unavailable", 503) from None
def validate_request(data: Any, binding: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(data, dict):
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_object_required")
if not {"branch", "path", "content"}.issubset(data):
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_incomplete")
if not set(data).issubset(ALLOWED_REQUEST_FIELDS):
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_fields_rejected")
if data["branch"] != binding["branch"]:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
if data.get("create_branch") not in (None, False):
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
if data.get("base", "main") not in {"main", binding["approved_base_oid"]}:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
path = data["path"]
if not isinstance(path, str) or not path_allowed(binding, path):
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
content = data["content"]
if not isinstance(content, str) or "\x00" in content or "\r" in content:
raise RouteError("writer_route_content_rejected")
if len(content.encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
raise RouteError("writer_route_content_too_large", 413)
if SECRET_RE.search(content) or SECRET_VALUE_RE.search(content):
raise RouteError("writer_route_secret_content_rejected", 403)
message = data.get("message") or f"chore(chatgpt): update {path}"
if not isinstance(message, str) or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200 or "\x00" in message or "\n" in message or "\r" in message:
raise RouteError("writer_route_message_rejected")
return {"branch": binding["branch"], "path": path, "content": content, "message": message}
def complete_request(data: dict[str, Any], normalized: dict[str, Any], binding: dict[str, Any], account: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
authorization = authorization_call("describe_authorization")
expected = {
"task_id": binding["task_id"],
"development_authorization_id": authorization.get("development_authorization_id"),
"actor_identity": account,
"audience": authorization.get("audience"),
"branch": binding["branch"],
"approved_base_oid": binding["approved_base_oid"],
}
required = {
"task_id": EXPECTED_TASK_ID,
"development_authorization_id": "authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726",
"actor_identity": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
"audience": "chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer",
"branch": binding["branch"],
"approved_base_oid": binding["approved_base_oid"],
}
if expected != required or authorization.get("authorization_status") != "ACTIVE" or authorization.get("current_head_oid") is None:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
for key, value in required.items():
if key in data and data[key] != value:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
if "exact_path" in data and data["exact_path"] != normalized["path"]:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
current_head = str(authorization["current_head_oid"])
if not OID_RE.fullmatch(current_head):
raise RouteError("authorization_current_head_rejected", 503)
if "expected_current_head_oid" in data and data["expected_current_head_oid"] != current_head:
raise RouteError("BRANCH_HEAD_CHANGED", 409, current_head_oid=current_head)
content_digest = hashlib.sha256(normalized["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
message_digest = hashlib.sha256(normalized["message"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
if "content_digest" in data and data["content_digest"] != content_digest:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
if "commit_message_digest" in data and data["commit_message_digest"] != message_digest:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
seed = {**required, "expected_current_head_oid": current_head, "path": normalized["path"], "content_digest": content_digest, "commit_message_digest": message_digest}
request_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(seed)).hexdigest()
idempotency_key = "action-" + request_digest
operation_id = hashlib.sha256((EXPECTED_TASK_ID + "\0" + idempotency_key).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
if "idempotency_key" in data and data["idempotency_key"] != idempotency_key:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
if "operation_id" in data and data["operation_id"] != operation_id:
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
return {**normalized, **required, "expected_current_head_oid": current_head, "operation_id": operation_id, "idempotency_key": idempotency_key, "exact_path": normalized["path"], "content_digest": content_digest, "commit_message_digest": message_digest, "request_digest": request_digest}
def current_writer_head(binding: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
status, body = writer_call(binding, "GET", "/api/runtime-status")
if status != 200:
raise RouteError(
"writer_route_runtime_status_failed", 503, upstream_status=status
)
required = {
"service": "chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer",
"writes_enabled": True,
"allowed_branch": binding["branch"],
"approved_base_oid": binding["approved_base_oid"],
"path_policy_sha256": binding["path_policy_sha256"],
}
if any(body.get(key) != value for key, value in required.items()):
raise RouteError("writer_route_runtime_binding_mismatch", 503)
head = str(body.get("workspace_head_oid", ""))
if not OID_RE.fullmatch(head):
raise RouteError("writer_route_runtime_head_rejected", 503)
return head
def operation_binding(
request_digest: str, binding: dict[str, Any]
) -> tuple[str, str]:
STATE_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with sqlite3.connect(STATE_PATH, timeout=30, isolation_level=None) as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
db.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS action_operations (
request_digest TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
expected_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
)
"""
)
row = db.execute(
"SELECT expected_head_oid,idempotency_key FROM action_operations "
"WHERE request_digest=?",
(request_digest,),
).fetchone()
if row:
return str(row[0]), str(row[1])
head = current_writer_head(binding)
key = "action-" + request_digest
with sqlite3.connect(STATE_PATH, timeout=30, isolation_level=None) as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
db.execute(
"INSERT OR IGNORE INTO action_operations"
"(request_digest,expected_head_oid,idempotency_key,created_at) "
"VALUES(?,?,?,?)",
(request_digest, head, key, utc_now()),
)
row = db.execute(
"SELECT expected_head_oid,idempotency_key FROM action_operations "
"WHERE request_digest=?",
(request_digest,),
).fetchone()
db.execute("COMMIT")
return str(row[0]), str(row[1])
def append_audit(event: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
AUDIT_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
fd = os.open(AUDIT_PATH, flags, 0o600)
try:
os.write(fd, canonical_json(event) + b"\n")
os.fsync(fd)
finally:
os.close(fd)
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
server_version = "AIOSActionTaskRouter/1"
def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: Any) -> None:
return
def send_json(self, status: int, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
body = json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def do_GET(self) -> None:
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
if path != "/health":
return self.send_json(404, {"error": "not_found"})
try:
binding = load_binding()
self.send_json(
200,
{
"status": "ok",
"service": "aios-action-task-router",
"task_id": binding["task_id"],
"writer_instance_id": binding["writer_instance_id"],
"branch": binding["branch"],
},
)
except RouteError as exc:
self.send_json(exc.status, {"error": exc.code, **exc.details})
def do_POST(self) -> None:
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
if path != "/api/file":
return self.send_json(404, {"error": "not_found"})
if self.client_address[0] not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1"}:
return self.send_json(403, {"error": "writer_route_source_rejected"})
if self.headers.get("X-AIOS-Route-Task") != EXPECTED_ROUTE_HEADER:
return self.send_json(403, {"error": "writer_route_header_rejected"})
try:
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
if not 0 < length <= 1_100_000:
raise RouteError("writer_route_content_length_rejected", 413)
try:
data = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
raise RouteError("writer_route_request_json_rejected") from None
binding = load_binding()
account = authorize_action(self.headers, binding)
normalized = validate_request(data, binding)
normalized = complete_request(data, normalized, binding, account)
prepared = authorization_call("prepare_write", request={key: normalized[key] for key in ("expected_current_head_oid", "operation_id", "idempotency_key", "exact_path", "content_digest", "commit_message_digest", "branch", "path", "message")})
expected_head = str(prepared["expected_head_oid"])
writer_payload = {"branch": normalized["branch"], "path": normalized["path"], "content": normalized["content"], "message": normalized["message"], "expected_head_oid": expected_head, "idempotency_key": str(prepared["idempotency_key"])}
request_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json({"task_id": binding["task_id"], "operation_id": normalized["operation_id"], "idempotency_key": normalized["idempotency_key"], "content_digest": normalized["content_digest"], "commit_message_digest": normalized["commit_message_digest"]})).hexdigest()
status, result = writer_call(
binding, "POST", "/api/commit-file", writer_payload
)
audit = {
"at": utc_now(),
"task_id": binding["task_id"],
"writer_instance_id": binding["writer_instance_id"],
"account": account,
"branch": normalized["branch"],
"path": normalized["path"],
"request_digest": request_digest,
"expected_head_oid": expected_head,
"status": status,
"operation_id": result.get("operation_id"),
"commit_oid": result.get("commit_oid"),
"error": result.get("error"),
"secrets_included": False,
}
append_audit(audit)
if status != 200:
try:
authorization_call("fail_write", result={"operation_id": normalized["operation_id"]})
except RouteError:
pass
return self.send_json(status, result)
advanced = authorization_call("reconcile_commit", result={"previous_head_oid": expected_head, "new_commit_oid": result.get("commit_oid"), "operation_id": result.get("operation_id")})
return self.send_json(
200,
{
"status": "committed",
"branch": normalized["branch"],
"path": normalized["path"],
"commit": {
"status": "committed",
"branch": normalized["branch"],
"rev": result.get("commit_oid"),
"previous_head_oid": expected_head,
"new_tree_oid": result.get("new_tree_oid"),
"push_status": result.get("push_status"),
"four_way_ref_status": advanced.get("four_way_ref_status") is True,
"sync": {"status": "verified", "target": "bare+git-ls-remote+gitea-api"},
},
"writer_instance_id": binding["writer_instance_id"],
"operation_id": result.get("operation_id"),
"idempotent": result.get("idempotent"),
"secrets_included": False,
},
)
except RouteError as exc:
if exc.code == "writer_route_action_identity_rejected":
try:
append_audit(
{
"at": utc_now(),
"task_id": EXPECTED_TASK_ID,
"event": "action_identity_rejected",
"accepted_action_identity": exc.details.get(
"accepted_action_identity"
),
"observed_action_identity": exc.details.get(
"observed_action_identity"
),
"identity_alias_accepted": False,
"secrets_included": False,
}
)
except Exception:
pass
self.send_json(exc.status, {"error": exc.code, **exc.details})
except Exception:
self.send_json(500, {"error": "writer_route_internal_error"})
def main() -> None:
load_binding()
server = ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST, PORT), Handler)
server.serve_forever()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
+33 -494
View File
@@ -5,59 +5,8 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
try:
from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
except ModuleNotFoundError:
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
from gitea_tag_publication import (
GiteaTagClient,
GitTagBackend,
PublicationConflict,
PublicationPending,
PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
PublicationReconciliationRequired,
PublicationRequest,
TagPublisher,
redact,
validate_version,
)
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', '/data/aios-gitops/workspace')) / 'runtime' / 'agent-os'))
from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
from silent_release_hardening import (
ApprovalKeyRing,
ApprovalRevocationStore,
CapabilityAuthorizationError,
SagaConflict,
SignedApprovalVerifier,
SignedReleasePlanApproval,
SilentReleaseActionService,
)
try:
from authoritative_git import (
AuthoritativeGitError,
AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
authoritative_branches,
authoritative_diff,
authoritative_commit,
authoritative_tags,
repository_snapshot,
run_authoritative_git,
)
except ModuleNotFoundError:
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
from authoritative_git import (
AuthoritativeGitError,
AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
authoritative_branches,
authoritative_diff,
authoritative_commit,
authoritative_tags,
repository_snapshot,
run_authoritative_git,
)
ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
@@ -67,19 +16,6 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
'/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
))
SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED = str(os.getenv(
'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED', 'false'
)).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
'/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
))
monitor = ActionMonitor()
BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -88,43 +24,7 @@ BASE_MODELS = [
{'id':'base.gpt-5.5','provider':'openai','model':'gpt-5.5','display_name':'GPT-5.5','scope':'global'},
]
SECRET_RE = re.compile(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})')
SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(
r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])'
r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})'
)
READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
'/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
'/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
'/api/base', '/api/baseline', '/base', '/api/ver', '/api/versions', '/ver',
'/api/diff', '/diff', '/api/patch', '/api/patches', '/api/branches', '/patch',
'/api/model', '/model', '/api/run', '/api/runtime-status', '/run',
'/api/action-monitor', '/action-monitor', '/admin/ai-evolution',
'/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
'/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
'/api/release-acceptance',
'/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
'/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
'/getRecoveryStatus',
})
SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
'/createReleaseCandidate',
'/createReleaseIntent',
'/submitSignedApproval',
'/submitOwnerApproval',
'/startDeployment',
})
def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
if method == 'GET':
return False
if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
return False
decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
if decision.allowed:
return False
handler.sendj(decision.payload(), decision.status_code)
return True
SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})')
def now() -> str: return time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())
def uid(p='id') -> str: return f'{p}-{int(time.time()*1000)}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}'
@@ -136,41 +36,6 @@ def sh(args, check=False):
def jload(p: Path, default):
try: return json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
except Exception: return default
def _file_sha256(path: Path) -> str:
digest=hashlib.sha256()
with path.open('rb') as source:
for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b''):
digest.update(chunk)
return digest.hexdigest()
def _build_silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
verifier=None
if SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS.is_file():
verifier=SignedApprovalVerifier(
ApprovalKeyRing.from_file(SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS),
ApprovalRevocationStore(
SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT / 'revocations'
),
)
policy_path=WS / 'config' / 'gitops' / 'silent-release-policy.json'
policy_sha=_file_sha256(policy_path) if policy_path.is_file() else ''
return SilentReleaseActionService(
SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT,
execution_enabled=SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,
approval_verifier=verifier,
expected_repository=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
policy_sha256=policy_sha,
)
# Construct once during service startup. If production execution is enabled
# without every trusted builder/orchestrator dependency, construction fails
# closed before the HTTP server accepts traffic.
_SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE = _build_silent_release_service()
def silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
return _SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE
def relpath(path: str) -> str:
x = str(path or '').replace('\\','/').strip()
if not x or x.startswith('/') or '..' in Path(x).parts or Path(x).parts[0] == '.git': raise ValueError('invalid path')
@@ -244,13 +109,9 @@ def ensure_git():
if not sh(['config','user.name'])['stdout']: sh(['config','user.name','chatgpt-gitops-bot'], True)
def checkout(branch, base='main', create=False):
ensure_git(); b=branch_name(branch)
exists = sh(['rev-parse','--verify',f'refs/heads/{b}'])['code'] == 0
if exists:
sh(['checkout',b], True)
elif create:
sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-b',b], True)
else:
raise ValueError(f'branch does not exist: {b}')
if create or sh(['rev-parse','--verify',b])['code'] != 0:
sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-B',b], True)
else: sh(['checkout',b], True)
return b
def write_file(path, content):
if content_has_secret(content): raise ValueError('secret_rejected: use secret_ref; plaintext API keys must not enter Git')
@@ -260,19 +121,6 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
if not branch or branch in ('main','master') or branch.startswith('main/') or branch.startswith('master/'):
return {'status':'skipped','reason':'protected_branch','branch':branch}
if BARE_REPO.exists():
common = sh(['rev-parse', '--path-format=absolute', '--git-common-dir'], True)['stdout']
if Path(common).resolve() == BARE_REPO.resolve():
head = sh(['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], True)['stdout']
stored = subprocess.run(
['git', '--git-dir', str(BARE_REPO), 'rev-parse', f'refs/heads/{branch}'],
text=True, capture_output=True,
)
if stored.returncode != 0 or stored.stdout.strip() != head:
raise RuntimeError(f'linked-worktree branch verification failed for {branch}')
return {
'status':'verified', 'target':'authoritative-bare',
'branch':branch, 'oid':head,
}
ref=f'refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}'
p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git sync failed for {branch}')
@@ -282,68 +130,15 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','branch':branch,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
def sync_tag(tag: str) -> dict:
raise RuntimeError(
'unsafe sync_tag disabled: use TagPublisher with expected tag_oid, '
'target_oid, Gitea remote verification, and authenticated API verification'
)
def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
oid = str(value or '').strip().lower()
if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', oid):
raise ValueError(f'{field} must be a full 40-character commit OID')
try:
return authoritative_commit(oid, git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
if not re.fullmatch(r'V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', str(tag or '')):
raise ValueError('invalid release version')
try:
result = run_authoritative_git(
['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
check=False,
git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
)
except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
def publication_request_from_query(q: dict[str, list[str]]) -> PublicationRequest:
required = ('version', 'target_oid', 'evidence_closure_oid', 'approval_plan_id')
missing = [name for name in required if not (q.get(name) or [''])[0]]
if missing:
raise ValueError('missing release governance fields: ' + ', '.join(missing))
return PublicationRequest(
(q['version'])[0],
(q['target_oid'])[0].lower(),
(q['evidence_closure_oid'])[0].lower(),
(q['approval_plan_id'])[0],
)
def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
snapshot = repository_snapshot(
git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
)
if not snapshot["repository_available"]:
raise RuntimeError(str(snapshot["query_error"] or "AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE"))
return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
return TagPublisher(
WS,
GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
GiteaTagClient(
os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
),
os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
)
if not tag: return {'status':'skipped','reason':'empty_tag'}
if BARE_REPO.exists():
ref=f'refs/tags/{tag}:refs/tags/{tag}'
p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag sync failed for {tag}')
return {'status':'synced','target':'bare','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
p=subprocess.run(['git','push','origin',tag], cwd=str(WS), text=True, capture_output=True)
if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag push failed for {tag}')
return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
def commit(paths, msg):
ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -363,16 +158,6 @@ def patches():
for p in sorted((WS/'patches').glob('**/*.json')): out.append(jload(p, {'path':str(p.relative_to(WS))}))
return out
def runtime_release_info() -> dict[str, Any]:
for candidate in (WS / 'manifest.json', WS.parent / 'manifest.json'):
data = jload(candidate, {})
if data.get('target_commit'):
return {
'runtime_release_commit': data.get('target_commit'),
'runtime_release_path': str(WS),
}
return {'runtime_release_commit': None, 'runtime_release_path': str(WS)}
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
server_version='AIOSChatGPTGitOps/V1R1C0'
def sendj(self, data, code=200):
@@ -394,236 +179,43 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
return a
def do_GET(self):
u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path; q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
try:
if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
))
return self.sendj(data)
data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {}); data.setdefault('git', sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']); return self.sendj(data)
if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
snapshot = repository_snapshot(
git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
)
if not snapshot['repository_available']:
return self.sendj({
'repository_available': False,
'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
'local_authoritative_tags': [],
}, 503)
try:
tags = authoritative_tags(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
return self.sendj({
'repository_available': False,
'query_error': str(exc),
'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
'local_authoritative_tags': [],
}, 503)
registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
return self.sendj({
'registry_versions': registry,
'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
'repository_available': True,
'query_error': None,
'tags': [item['name'] for item in tags],
'versions_dir': registry,
'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
})
return self.sendj({'tags':sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines(),'versions_dir':[p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],'head':sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']})
if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
to=(q.get('to') or [''])[0]
try:
diff=authoritative_diff(frm, to, git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir())
except ValueError as exc:
return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},400)
except AuthoritativeGitNotFound as exc:
return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},404)
except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge as exc:
return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':diff})
if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
snapshot = repository_snapshot(
git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
)
if not snapshot['repository_available']:
return self.sendj({
'repository_available': False,
'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
'metadata_patches': patches(),
'authoritative_branches': [],
}, 503)
try:
branches = authoritative_branches(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
return self.sendj({
'repository_available': False,
'query_error': str(exc),
'metadata_patches': patches(),
'authoritative_branches': [],
}, 503)
metadata = patches()
branch_names = {item['name'] for item in branches}
metadata_names = {
item.get('branch') for item in metadata
if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get('branch')
}
orphan = [
item for item in metadata
if item.get('branch') and item.get('branch') not in branch_names
]
missing = [
item for item in branches
if item['name'] not in metadata_names
]
return self.sendj({
'metadata_patches': metadata,
'authoritative_branches': branches,
'orphan_metadata': orphan,
'branches_without_metadata': missing,
'repository_available': True,
'query_error': None,
'patches': metadata,
'branches': [item['name'] for item in branches],
})
frm=(q.get('from') or ['HEAD~1'])[0]; to=(q.get('to') or ['HEAD'])[0]; return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':sh(['diff',frm,to])})
if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'): return self.sendj({'patches':patches(),'branches':sh(['branch','--format','%(refname:short)'])['stdout'].splitlines()})
if path in ('/api/model','/model'): return self.sendj({'base':BASE_MODELS,'custom':model_docs(),'priority':[jload(p,{}) for p in sorted((WS/'config'/'model_priority').glob('*.json'))]})
if path in ('/api/run','/api/runtime-status','/run'):
svc=subprocess.run(['systemctl','is-active','aios-gitops-model-api'], text=True, capture_output=True)
snapshot = repository_snapshot(
git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
)
workspace_branch = None
if (WS / '.git').exists():
result = sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])
workspace_branch = result['stdout'] or None
payload = {
'service':'aios-gitops-model-api',
'status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),
'workspace_branch':workspace_branch,
**runtime_release_info(),
**snapshot,
'writes_enabled': str(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED','false')).lower() in {'1','true','yes','on'},
}
return self.sendj(payload, 200 if snapshot['repository_available'] else 503)
return self.sendj({'service':'aios-gitops-model-api','status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),'workspace_branch':sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])['stdout']})
if path in ('/api/action-monitor','/action-monitor'):
latest=monitor.latest()
ldict={'event_id':latest.event_id,'action':latest.action,'error':latest.error,'context':latest.context,'created_at':latest.created_at} if latest else None
return self.sendj({'events':[{"event_id":e.event_id,"action":e.action,"error":e.error,"context":e.context,"created_at":e.created_at} for e in monitor.list_events()],'latest':ldict})
if path == '/api/tag-publication-status':
version=(q.get('version') or [''])[0]
try:
version=validate_version(version)
status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
except ValueError:
return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
return self.sendj(status)
if path == '/api/release-consistency':
request=publication_request_from_query(q)
return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
request=publication_request_from_query(q)
return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
if path in (
'/getReleaseCandidate',
'/getReleasePlan',
'/getReleaseAcceptance',
'/getApprovalEnvelope',
'/getReleaseSaga',
'/getCapabilityStatus',
):
candidate_id=(q.get('candidate_id') or [''])[0]
if not candidate_id:
return self.sendj({'error':'candidate_id is required'},400)
service=silent_release_service()
if path == '/getReleaseCandidate':
return self.sendj(
service.get_release_candidate(candidate_id)
)
if path == '/getApprovalEnvelope':
return self.sendj(
service.get_approval_envelope(candidate_id)
)
if path == '/getReleasePlan':
return self.sendj(service.get_release_plan(candidate_id))
if path == '/getReleaseAcceptance':
return self.sendj(service.get_acceptance(candidate_id))
if path == '/getCapabilityStatus':
return self.sendj(
service.get_capability_status(candidate_id)
)
return self.sendj(service.get_release_saga(candidate_id))
if path == '/getRecoveryStatus':
return self.sendj(
silent_release_service().get_recovery_status()
)
# Admin AI Evolution Dashboard
if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution','/admin/ai-evolution/'):
return self.ai_evolution_page()
if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution/api/data'):
return self.ai_evolution_data()
return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
except FileNotFoundError:
return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
except ValueError as e:
error=redact(e)
monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
except Exception as e:
error=redact(e)
monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
monitor.record_failure('do_GET', str(e), {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
def do_PUT(self):
path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PUT', path): return
data=self.body()
path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
def do_POST(self):
path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
data=self.body()
path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
try:
if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
a=self.need('release:candidate')
if not a: return
return self.sendj(
silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
)
if path == '/createReleaseIntent':
a=self.need('release:candidate')
if not a: return
return self.sendj(
silent_release_service().create_release_intent(data)
)
if path in ('/submitOwnerApproval','/submitSignedApproval'):
a=self.need('release:approve')
if not a: return
return self.sendj(
silent_release_service().submit_owner_approval(data)
)
if path == '/startDeployment':
a=self.need('release:deploy')
if not a: return
return self.sendj(
silent_release_service().start_deployment(
str(data.get('candidate_id') or '')
)
)
if path in ('/api/branch','/api/create-branch'): return self.branch(data)
if path in ('/api/file','/api/commit-file'): return self.file(data)
if path == '/api/commit': return self.commit(data)
@@ -634,30 +226,9 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
if path == '/api/nl': return self.nl(data)
return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
error=redact(e)
monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
except CapabilityAuthorizationError as e:
error=redact(e)
monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':error},403)
except SagaConflict as e:
error=redact(e)
monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':error},409)
except Exception as e:
error=redact(e)
monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
def do_PATCH(self):
path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PATCH', path): return
return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
def do_DELETE(self):
path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
if reject_non_read_http(self, 'DELETE', path): return
return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
monitor.record_failure('do_POST', str(e), {'path':path})
return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
def branch(self,data):
a=self.need('branch:create');
if not a: return
@@ -681,41 +252,12 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
if not a: return
ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
return self.sendj({
'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
'required':['version','target_oid','evidence_closure_oid','approval_plan_id'],
},400)
try:
target_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('target_oid'))
evidence_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('evidence_closure_oid'), 'evidence_closure_oid')
except ValueError as exc:
return self.sendj({'error':'invalid_tag_target','detail':str(exc)},400)
if data.get('confirm') != True:
self.sendj({'status':'confirm_required','operation':'tag','hint':'This operation creates a Git tag. Confirm to proceed.','x-openai-isConsequential':True}, 428)
return
if a['role'] != 'owner' or not data.get('execute'):
b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'request':req,'commit':c})
request=PublicationRequest(ver,target_oid,evidence_oid,str(data.get('approval_plan_id')))
main_before=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
publisher=publication_publisher()
try:
publication=publisher.publish(request)
except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
audit(a['account'],'tag_manual_owner_review_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':redact(exc)})
return self.sendj({'status':'MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED','error':redact(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
except PublicationConflict as exc:
audit(a['account'],'tag_conflict',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
except PublicationPending as exc:
audit(a['account'],'tag_pending',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
return self.sendj({'status':'REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},503)
except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
audit(a['account'],'tag_reconciliation_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},502)
main_after=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
if main_after != main_before:
raise RuntimeError('main changed during tag operation')
result={'status':publication['state'],'version':ver,'tag_name':ver,'tag_oid':publication['tag_oid'],'target_oid':target_oid,'expected_target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'workspace_head':sh(['rev-parse','HEAD'],True)['stdout'],'main_oid_before':main_before,'main_oid_after':main_after,'main_changed':False,'force_push':False,'publication':publication}
audit(a['account'],'tag',ver,result)
self.sendj(result)
b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'commit':c})
out=sh(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'], True); self.sendj({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out,'sync':sync_tag(ver)})
def rollback(self,data):
a=self.need('rollback:request');
if not a: return
@@ -810,10 +352,7 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
cmd_filter=(params.get('command') or [None])[0]
bl=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json',{})
current_ver=bl.get('current_baseline','V1R3C1')
try:
tags=[item['name'] for item in authoritative_tags(git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir()) if str(item['name']).startswith('V')]
except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc),'repository_available':False},503)
tags=sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines() if WS.exists() else []
versions=[]
if (WS/'baseline'/'promotions').exists():
for p in sorted((WS/'baseline'/'promotions').glob('*.json')):
@@ -851,7 +390,7 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
def api_spec():
return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}
return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True}}
def main():
print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Fail-closed policy for in-process Git mutation handlers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Mapping
_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GitWriteDecision:
allowed: bool
status_code: int
error: str
reason: str
workspace: str
def payload(self) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
"status": "allowed" if self.allowed else "blocked",
"error": self.error,
"reason": self.reason,
"workspace": self.workspace,
}
def _real(path: Path) -> Path:
return Path(os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path))))
def evaluate_git_write(workspace: Path | str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> GitWriteDecision:
values = os.environ if env is None else env
lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
canonical = _real(lexical)
shown = str(lexical)
if str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false")).strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "gitops_writes_disabled", "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED is false", shown)
if lexical != canonical:
return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_symlink_forbidden", "workspace must be a canonical non-symlink path", shown)
controller = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_PATH", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller")))
role = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "")).strip().lower()
if canonical == controller or role == "runtime-anchor":
return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "runtime_anchor_read_only", "controller/runtime-anchor is read-only", str(canonical))
writer_root = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees")))
try:
canonical.relative_to(writer_root)
except ValueError:
return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_not_approved_writer", "workspace is outside the approved writer root", str(canonical))
return GitWriteDecision(True, 200, "", "approved isolated writer", str(canonical))
@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
"""Task-scoped hardened wrapper around the existing Action API."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
import urllib.parse
import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
from isolated_writer_authz import AuthorizationError, authorize
from isolated_writer_commit_file import AtomicCommitFile, CommitFileError, OperationLedger
from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
_reject = api.reject_non_read_http
_write_file = api.write_file
_sync_branch = api.sync_branch
_original_do_get = api.H.do_GET
api.OPENAPI = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_OPENAPI", str(api.OPENAPI)))
def _registry() -> TokenRegistry:
return TokenRegistry(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2"]))
def _atomic_writer() -> AtomicCommitFile:
return AtomicCommitFile(
workspace=api.WS,
bare_repo=api.BARE_REPO,
ledger=OperationLedger(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER"])),
remote=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", ""),
audit=policy.append_audit_record,
)
def _bearer(handler) -> str:
value = handler.headers.get("Authorization", "")
return value[7:].strip() if value.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
def _authorize(handler, *, method: str, path: str, branch=None, target_path=None):
grant = authorize(
_registry(),
_bearer(handler),
method=method,
path=path,
source_ip=str(handler.client_address[0]),
workspace=api.WS,
branch=branch,
target_path=target_path,
)
grant.record["_source_ip"] = str(handler.client_address[0])
return grant
def _authorization_error(handler, exc: AuthorizationError):
return handler.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
def _isolated_runtime_status(handler):
branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
return handler.sendj({
"service": os.getenv(
"AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
"aios-isolated-writer.service",
),
"status": "active",
"runtime_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE"),
"workspace_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE"),
"writes_enabled": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").lower()
in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"},
"allowed_branch": policy.allowed_branch(),
"approved_base_oid": policy.allowed_base_oid(),
"workspace_branch": branch,
"workspace_head_oid": head,
"repository_identity": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY"),
"token_policy_version": 2,
"atomic_commit_file": True,
"path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
})
def _isolated_do_get(self):
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
if path in {"/health", "/api/health"}:
return self.sendj({
"status": "ok",
"service": os.getenv(
"AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
"aios-isolated-writer.service",
),
})
if path not in {"/api/runtime-status", "/api/baseline", "/api/patches"}:
return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
try:
_authorize(self, method="GET", path=path)
except AuthorizationError as exc:
return _authorization_error(self, exc)
if path == "/api/runtime-status":
return _isolated_runtime_status(self)
return _original_do_get(self)
def _read_commit_file_body(handler):
try:
length = int(handler.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
except ValueError:
raise CommitFileError("writer_content_length_rejected") from None
if length <= 0:
raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
if length > 1_100_000:
raise CommitFileError("writer_request_too_large", 413)
raw = handler.rfile.read(length)
try:
value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
raise CommitFileError("writer_request_json_rejected") from None
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
return value
def _isolated_do_post(self):
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
if path != "/api/commit-file":
return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
try:
data = _read_commit_file_body(self)
branch = str(data.get("branch") or "")
target_path = str(data.get("path") or "")
grant = _authorize(
self,
method="POST",
path=path,
branch=branch,
target_path=target_path,
)
if api.content_has_secret(str(data.get("content") or "")):
raise CommitFileError("writer_secret_content_rejected", 403)
result = _atomic_writer().execute(grant, data)
return self.sendj(result)
except AuthorizationError as exc:
return _authorization_error(self, exc)
except CommitFileError as exc:
return self.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
except PermissionError:
return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_policy_rejected"}, 403)
def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
if _reject(handler, method, path):
return True
try:
policy.validate_endpoint(method, path, api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
return False
except PermissionError as exc:
handler.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
return True
def checkout(branch, base="main", create=False):
api.ensure_git()
target = api.branch_name(branch)
policy.validate_branch_request({"branch": target, "base": base})
exists = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--verify", target])["code"] == 0
if exists:
if api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"] != target:
api.sh(["checkout", target], True)
elif create:
api.sh(["checkout", "-b", target, base], True)
else:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_missing")
policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
return target
def write_file(path, content):
policy.validate_path(path, api.WS)
return _write_file(path, content)
def sync_branch(branch: str):
policy.validate_sync_branch(branch)
local = _sync_branch(branch)
remote = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", "").strip()
if remote != "gitea-http":
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_gitea_remote_rejected")
head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
pushed = subprocess.run(
["git", "push", "--porcelain", remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{branch}"],
cwd=api.WS,
text=True,
capture_output=True,
)
if pushed.returncode != 0:
raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_push_failed")
verified = subprocess.run(
["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
cwd=api.WS,
text=True,
capture_output=True,
)
if verified.returncode != 0:
raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_verification_failed")
fields = verified.stdout.strip().split()
if len(fields) != 2 or fields[0] != head or fields[1] != f"refs/heads/{branch}":
raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_oid_mismatch")
return {
"status": "verified",
"target": "authoritative-bare+gitea",
"branch": branch,
"oid": head,
"local": local.get("status"),
}
def commit(paths, msg):
policy.validate_commit_paths(paths, api.WS)
api.ensure_git()
selected = [api.relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ["."]
api.sh(["add", *selected], True)
policy.validate_staged_paths(api.WS)
branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
if not api.sh(["status", "--short"])["stdout"]:
return {"status": "no_changes", "branch": branch, "sync": sync_branch(branch)}
out = api.sh(["commit", "-m", msg], True)
branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
return {
"status": "committed",
"branch": branch,
"rev": api.sh(["rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"],
"git": out,
"sync": sync_branch(branch),
}
def audit(actor, action, target, payload):
policy.append_audit_record(
{
"at": api.now(),
"actor": actor,
"action": action,
"target": target,
"payload": api.sanitize(payload),
}
)
def _validate_request(self, data, validate):
try:
validate(data)
return True
except PermissionError as exc:
self.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
return False
def _checked_branch(self, data):
if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
return
return _branch(self, data)
def _checked_file(self, data):
data = dict(data)
data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
return
if not _validate_request(
self,
{"path": data.get("path", "")},
lambda item: policy.validate_path(item["path"], api.WS),
):
return
return _file(self, data)
def _checked_commit(self, data):
data = dict(data)
data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
return
return _commit(self, data)
def _checked_patch(self, data):
data = dict(data)
data["branch"] = policy.allowed_branch()
if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
return
return _patch(self, data)
_branch, _file, _commit, _patch = api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch
api.reject_non_read_http = reject_non_read_http
api.checkout, api.write_file, api.sync_branch, api.commit, api.audit = (
checkout,
write_file,
sync_branch,
commit,
audit,
)
api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch = (
_checked_branch,
_checked_file,
_checked_commit,
_checked_patch,
)
api.H.do_GET = _isolated_do_get
api.H.do_POST = _isolated_do_post
if __name__ == "__main__":
policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
api.ThreadingHTTPServer((api.HOST, api.PORT), api.H).serve_forever()
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
"""Task-bound Integration Refresh control-plane primitives."""
from .integration_merge_writer import IntegrationMergeWriter, MergeError, MergeRequest
from .integration_refresh import (
AppendOnlyAudit,
Binding,
GiteaBranchReadProjection,
GrantStore,
IntegrationRefreshProvisioner,
ProvisioningError,
)
__all__ = [
"AppendOnlyAudit",
"Binding",
"GiteaBranchReadProjection",
"GrantStore",
"IntegrationMergeWriter",
"IntegrationRefreshProvisioner",
"MergeError",
"MergeRequest",
"ProvisioningError",
]
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
"""Constrained integration-only merge writer with rollback and reconciliation states."""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
import re
class MergeError(RuntimeError):
def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409):
super().__init__(code); self.code, self.status = code, status
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MergeRequest:
integration_branch: str
source_branch: str
approved_source_oid: str
class IntegrationMergeWriter:
def __init__(self, workspace: Path | str, remote: str, projection):
self.workspace, self.remote, self.projection = Path(workspace), remote, projection
def _git(self, *args: str, check=True) -> str:
p = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
if check and p.returncode:
raise MergeError("git_operation_failed", 500)
return p.stdout.strip()
def merge(self, request: MergeRequest) -> dict:
def bad(value: str) -> bool:
return (
value == "main"
or value.startswith("main/")
or value == "governance"
or value.startswith("governance/")
or value == "approvals"
or value.startswith("refs/")
or value.startswith("tags/")
)
if (bad(request.integration_branch) or bad(request.source_branch) or
not request.integration_branch.startswith("integration/") or
re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", request.approved_source_oid) is None):
raise MergeError("integration_merge_scope_rejected", 403)
for branch in (request.integration_branch, request.source_branch):
if subprocess.run(["git", "check-ref-format", "--branch", branch], cwd=self.workspace,
text=True, capture_output=True).returncode:
raise MergeError("integration_merge_scope_rejected", 403)
if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != request.integration_branch:
raise MergeError("integration_branch_checkout_required")
before = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
remote_before = self.projection(request.integration_branch)
if remote_before != before:
raise MergeError("integration_remote_advanced")
source = self._git("rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/heads/{request.source_branch}^{{commit}}")
if source != request.approved_source_oid:
raise MergeError("integration_source_not_approved", 403)
attempt = subprocess.run(["git", "merge", "--no-ff", "--no-commit", request.source_branch], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
if attempt.returncode:
subprocess.run(["git", "merge", "--abort"], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
raise MergeError("integration_merge_conflict")
try:
self._git("commit", "-m", "merge(integration): approved source")
merged = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
parents = self._git("show", "-s", "--format=%P", "HEAD").split()
if parents != [before, source]:
raise MergeError("integration_parent_invariant_failed", 500)
pushed = subprocess.run(["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{request.integration_branch}"], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
if pushed.returncode:
try:
observed = self.projection(request.integration_branch)
except Exception:
return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
if observed == before:
self._git("reset", "--hard", before)
return {"state": "PUSH_FAILED_RESTORED", "pre_merge_oid": before}
return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
try:
observed = self.projection(request.integration_branch)
except Exception:
return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
if observed != merged:
return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
return {"state": "COMPLETED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
except MergeError:
if self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD") != before:
self._git("reset", "--hard", before)
raise
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
"""Fail-closed, task-bound integration refresh provisioning primitives.
This module deliberately has no HTTP or credential-provider dependency. The
caller supplies a branch-read projection and an apply callback, making the
authorization and recovery boundary independently testable.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import argparse
import secrets
import sqlite3
import threading
import re
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable
class ProvisioningError(RuntimeError):
def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
super().__init__(code)
self.code, self.status = code, status
def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def _digest(secret: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(secret.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def _canonical(value: dict) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest()
def _is_oid(value: object) -> bool:
return isinstance(value, str) and re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", value) is not None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Binding:
task_id: str
repository: str
branch: str
actor_identity: str
audience: str
paths: tuple[str, ...]
quota: int
class AppendOnlyAudit:
"""Append only redacted JSONL audit, durable before a result is returned."""
def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
self.path = Path(path)
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._lock = threading.Lock()
def append(self, event: dict) -> None:
with self._lock:
safe = {key: value for key, value in event.items() if key not in {"token", "credential", "authorization"}}
previous = "0" * 64
if self.path.exists():
lines = self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
if lines:
previous = json.loads(lines[-1])["event_hash"]
safe["previous_event_hash"] = previous
safe["event_hash"] = _canonical(safe)
encoded = (json.dumps(safe, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode()
fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
try:
os.write(fd, encoded)
os.fsync(fd)
finally:
os.close(fd)
class GrantStore:
"""Digest-only short grant registry; SQLite transactions serialize quota use."""
def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
self.path = Path(path)
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with self._db() as db:
db.execute("""CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS grants(
token_digest TEXT PRIMARY KEY, binding_json TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL, quota INTEGER NOT NULL, uses INTEGER NOT NULL,
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0)""")
@contextmanager
def _db(self):
db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=15, isolation_level=None)
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
try:
yield db
finally:
db.close()
def issue(self, binding: Binding, *, ttl_seconds: int = 300) -> str:
if ttl_seconds < 1 or ttl_seconds > 1800 or binding.quota < 1 or not binding.paths:
raise ValueError("invalid_short_grant")
token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
payload = json.dumps(binding.__dict__ | {"paths": list(binding.paths)}, sort_keys=True)
with self._db() as db:
db.execute("INSERT INTO grants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,0)", (_digest(token), payload,
(_now() + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)).isoformat(), binding.quota, 0))
return token
def rotate(self, old_token: str, binding: Binding, *, revocation_probe, ttl_seconds: int = 300) -> str:
self.revoke(old_token)
try: status = revocation_probe(old_token)
except TimeoutError as exc: raise ProvisioningError("revocation_probe_timeout", 503) from exc
if status != 401: raise ProvisioningError("revocation_probe_rejected", 503)
return self.issue(binding, ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds)
def revoke(self, token: str) -> None:
with self._db() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
db.execute("UPDATE grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_digest=?", (_digest(token),))
db.execute("COMMIT")
def consume(self, token: str, binding: Binding, path: str) -> None:
with self._db() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
row = db.execute("SELECT * FROM grants WHERE token_digest=?", (_digest(token),)).fetchone()
if not row or row["revoked"]:
db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("credential_rejected", 401)
if _now() >= datetime.fromisoformat(row["expires_at"]):
db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("credential_expired", 401)
stored = json.loads(row["binding_json"])
requested = binding.__dict__ | {"paths": list(binding.paths)}
if stored != requested or path not in stored["paths"]:
db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("grant_binding_rejected")
if row["uses"] >= row["quota"]:
db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("grant_quota_exhausted")
db.execute("UPDATE grants SET uses=uses+1 WHERE token_digest=?", (_digest(token),))
db.execute("COMMIT")
class GiteaBranchReadProjection:
"""Normalizes a trusted task-scoped Gitea reader; every ambiguity fails closed."""
def __init__(self, reader: Callable[[str, str], dict]):
self.reader = reader
def head(self, repository: str, branch: str) -> str:
try:
reply = self.reader(repository, branch)
except TimeoutError as exc:
raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_timeout", 503) from exc
except Exception as exc:
raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_unavailable", 503) from exc
if not isinstance(reply, dict) or reply.get("status") in {401, 403}:
raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_forbidden", 503)
oid = reply.get("oid")
if reply.get("status") != 200 or not _is_oid(oid):
raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_invalid", 503)
return oid.lower()
class IntegrationRefreshProvisioner:
_locks: dict[tuple[str, str], threading.Lock] = {}
_locks_guard = threading.Lock()
def __init__(self, *, grants: GrantStore, projection: GiteaBranchReadProjection,
ledger_path: Path | str, audit: AppendOnlyAudit, approved_binding: Binding):
self.grants, self.projection, self.audit, self.approved_binding = grants, projection, audit, approved_binding
self.ledger_path = Path(ledger_path); self.ledger_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with self._ledger() as db:
db.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refreshes(operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, digest TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL, result_oid TEXT)")
@contextmanager
def _ledger(self):
db = sqlite3.connect(self.ledger_path)
try:
yield db
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
def refresh(self, *, token: str, binding: Binding, path: str, operation_id: str,
target_head_oid: str, apply: Callable[[], str]) -> dict:
if not operation_id or not _is_oid(target_head_oid):
raise ProvisioningError("refresh_request_rejected")
if binding != self.approved_binding:
raise ProvisioningError("grant_binding_rejected")
request = {"binding": binding.__dict__ | {"paths": list(binding.paths)}, "path": path, "target": target_head_oid}
digest = _canonical(request)
with self._locks_guard:
lock = self._locks.setdefault((binding.repository, binding.branch), threading.Lock())
with lock, self._ledger() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
row = db.execute("SELECT * FROM refreshes WHERE operation_id=?", (operation_id,)).fetchone()
new_operation = row is None
if row:
if row[1] != digest:
db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("operation_id_reuse_rejected", 409)
if row[2] == "COMPLETED":
db.execute("COMMIT")
return {"state": row[2], "operation_id": operation_id, "oid": row[3], "idempotent": True}
if row[2] not in {"PENDING", "RECOVERABLE"}:
db.execute("COMMIT")
return {"state": row[2], "operation_id": operation_id, "oid": row[3], "idempotent": True}
else:
db.execute("INSERT INTO refreshes VALUES(?,?,?,NULL)", (operation_id, digest, "PENDING"))
db.execute("COMMIT")
if new_operation:
self.grants.consume(token, binding, path)
current = self.projection.head(binding.repository, binding.branch)
if current != target_head_oid.lower():
self._state(operation_id, "STALE_TARGET")
raise ProvisioningError("stale_target_head", 409)
try:
oid = apply()
if not _is_oid(oid):
raise ProvisioningError("apply_result_invalid", 500)
# Detect a competing remote advancement before claiming completion.
observed = self.projection.head(binding.repository, binding.branch)
if observed != oid.lower():
self._state(operation_id, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
raise ProvisioningError("remote_concurrent_advance", 409)
self._state(operation_id, "COMPLETED", oid)
self.audit.append({"operation_id": operation_id, "task_id": binding.task_id, "repository": binding.repository,
"branch": binding.branch, "actor_identity": binding.actor_identity, "audience": binding.audience, "path": path, "state": "COMPLETED"})
return {"state": "COMPLETED", "operation_id": operation_id, "oid": oid, "idempotent": False}
except ProvisioningError:
raise
except Exception as exc:
self._state(operation_id, "RECOVERABLE")
self.audit.append({"operation_id": operation_id, "task_id": binding.task_id, "repository": binding.repository,
"branch": binding.branch, "actor_identity": binding.actor_identity, "audience": binding.audience, "path": path, "state": "RECOVERABLE"})
raise ProvisioningError("refresh_apply_failed", 503) from exc
def _state(self, operation_id: str, state: str, oid: str | None = None) -> None:
with self._ledger() as db:
db.execute("UPDATE refreshes SET state=?, result_oid=COALESCE(?,result_oid) WHERE operation_id=?", (state, oid, operation_id))
def _sandbox_preflight(state_dir: Path) -> int:
if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED") != "false":
raise ProvisioningError("global_gitops_writes_must_remain_disabled", 500)
state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
audit = AppendOnlyAudit(state_dir / "preflight-audit.jsonl")
audit.append({"event": "SANDBOX_PREFLIGHT", "writes_enabled": False})
print(json.dumps({"status": "READY", "mode": "sandbox", "writes_enabled": False}, sort_keys=True))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--sandbox-preflight", action="store_true", required=True)
parser.add_argument("--state-dir", type=Path, required=True)
options = parser.parse_args()
raise SystemExit(_sandbox_preflight(options.state_dir))
@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
"""Fail-closed policy used only by the task-scoped Action writer."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import json
import stat
import subprocess
import re
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
from urllib.parse import unquote
import isolated_writer_path_policy as path_policy
WRITE_ENDPOINTS = frozenset({"/api/commit-file"})
ALLOWED_ROOTS = (
"active-runtime",
"docs",
"patches",
"reports",
"scripts",
"test",
"tests",
)
DENIED_ROOTS = ("baseline", "config", "deploy", "deployments", "ops", "runtime", "services")
_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
_FALSE = frozenset({"0", "false", "no", "off"})
_DENY_FLAGS = (
"AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_MAIN_WRITE",
"AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_TAG_WRITE",
"AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_BASELINE_WRITE",
"AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_REGISTRY_WRITE",
"AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_ROLLBACK",
"AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_DEPLOYMENT",
)
def enforcement_required() -> bool:
return os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_ENFORCEMENT", "") == "required"
def allowed_branch() -> str:
value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "").strip()
if not value:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_missing_allowed_branch")
return value
def allowed_base_oid() -> str:
value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BASE_OID", "").strip().lower()
if len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_invalid_allowed_base_oid")
return value
def _git(workspace: Path, *args: str) -> str:
result = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
if result.returncode != 0:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_git_validation_failed")
return result.stdout.strip()
def require_service_invariants(workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
if not enforcement_required():
return
if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_write_gate_required")
if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_role_required")
if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_role_required")
if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_policy_v2_required")
if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", "").strip():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_service_audience_required")
if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2", "").strip():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_registry_required")
if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER", "").strip():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_ledger_required")
path_policy.configured_path_policy()
for name in _DENY_FLAGS:
if os.getenv(name, "").strip().lower() not in _FALSE:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_forbidden_capability_flag")
if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "") != "aios/aios":
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_repository_identity_rejected")
configured_bare_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "").strip()
if not configured_bare_value:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
configured_bare = Path(configured_bare_value)
if configured_bare.resolve(strict=True) != bare_repo.resolve(strict=True):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
writer_root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "").strip()
if not writer_root_value:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root")
writer_root = Path(writer_root_value).resolve(strict=True)
lexical_workspace = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
canonical_workspace = lexical_workspace.resolve(strict=True)
if lexical_workspace != canonical_workspace:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
try:
canonical_workspace.relative_to(writer_root)
except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root") from None
if _git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != allowed_branch():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_current_branch_rejected")
approved_base = allowed_base_oid()
try:
_git(workspace, "cat-file", "-e", f"{approved_base}^{{commit}}")
subprocess.run(
["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", approved_base, "HEAD"],
cwd=workspace,
check=True,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
except (PermissionError, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_approved_base_not_ancestor") from None
if _git(workspace, "merge-base", approved_base, "HEAD") != approved_base:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_merge_base_rejected")
common = Path(_git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"))
if not common.is_absolute():
common = (workspace / common).resolve()
if common.resolve() != bare_repo.resolve():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_common_repo_rejected")
def approved_audit_log_path() -> Path:
root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_AUDIT_ROOT", "").strip()
log_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUDIT_LOG", "").strip()
if not root_value or not log_value:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_missing")
lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(root_value))
lexical_log = Path(os.path.abspath(log_value))
root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
if lexical_root != root or root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_root_rejected")
try:
lexical_log.relative_to(root)
except ValueError:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_outside_approved_root") from None
if lexical_log.parent.resolve(strict=True) != lexical_log.parent:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_parent_symlink_rejected")
if lexical_log.exists() and lexical_log.is_symlink():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_symlink_rejected")
os.chmod(root, 0o750)
os.chmod(lexical_log.parent, 0o750)
return lexical_log
def append_audit_record(record: dict) -> None:
path = approved_audit_log_path()
flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
try:
info = os.fstat(descriptor)
if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_not_regular")
os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
line = json.dumps(
_audit_sanitize(record),
ensure_ascii=False,
sort_keys=True,
separators=(",", ":"),
).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
os.write(descriptor, line)
os.fsync(descriptor)
finally:
os.close(descriptor)
parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
try:
os.fsync(parent_fd)
finally:
os.close(parent_fd)
def _audit_sanitize(value):
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {
key: (
"[REDACTED]"
if any(
marker in str(key).lower()
for marker in (
"authorization",
"credential",
"password",
"secret",
"token",
"private_key",
)
)
and str(key).lower() != "token_id"
else _audit_sanitize(inner)
)
for key, inner in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_audit_sanitize(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, str) and re.search(
r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])",
value,
):
return "[REDACTED]"
return value
def validate_endpoint(method: str, path: str, workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
if not enforcement_required():
return
if method != "POST" or path not in WRITE_ENDPOINTS:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
require_service_invariants(workspace, bare_repo)
def validate_branch_request(data: dict) -> None:
if not enforcement_required():
return
branch = allowed_branch() if "branch" not in data else str(data.get("branch") or "").strip()
if branch != allowed_branch():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected")
if str(data.get("base", "main")).strip() != "main":
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_base_rejected")
if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_force_rejected")
def validate_path(path: str, workspace: Path | None = None) -> str:
if not isinstance(path, str):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
value = path
if not value or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value or "\\" in value:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
try:
decoded = unquote(value, errors="strict")
except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
if decoded != value:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
windows = PureWindowsPath(value)
posix = PurePosixPath(value)
parts = value.split("/")
if (
posix.is_absolute()
or windows.is_absolute()
or bool(windows.drive)
or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
):
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
first = parts[0]
service_exact_path = False
if first in DENIED_ROOTS:
try:
path_policy.require_service_path("commit_file.atomic", value)
service_exact_path = True
except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
if value != "README.md" and first not in ALLOWED_ROOTS and not service_exact_path:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_outside_allowed_roots")
if workspace is not None:
lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
if lexical_root != root:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
current = root
for part in parts:
current = current / part
if current.is_symlink():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_symlink_rejected")
candidate = (root / value).resolve(strict=False)
try:
candidate.relative_to(root)
except ValueError:
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_escapes_workspace") from None
return value
def validate_content_for_path(path: str, content: str) -> None:
if path.split("/", 1)[0] not in DENIED_ROOTS:
return
try:
path_policy.validate_content("commit_file.atomic", path, content)
except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
try:
return path_policy.configured_path_policy_sha256()
except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
def validate_commit_paths(paths: list[str], workspace: Path | None = None) -> None:
if enforcement_required():
for path in paths:
if str(path).strip() != ".":
validate_path(str(path), workspace)
def validate_staged_paths(workspace: Path) -> None:
if not enforcement_required():
return
for path in _git(workspace, "diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines():
validate_path(path, workspace)
def validate_sync_branch(branch: str) -> None:
if enforcement_required() and branch != allowed_branch():
raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_sync_branch_rejected")
+89
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
"""Append-only audit chain for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
from typing import Any
from .tenant_context import canonical_json, isoformat, require_ident
class AuditLog:
def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
self.database = str(database)
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
payload TEXT NOT NULL,
previous_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
event_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
)
"""
)
def append(self, *, tenant_id: str, trace_id: str, event_type: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
trace_id = require_ident("trace_id", trace_id)
event_type = require_ident("event_type", event_type)
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
previous = db.execute(
"SELECT event_hash FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1"
).fetchone()
previous_hash = previous[0] if previous else "GENESIS"
body = {
"tenant_id": tenant_id,
"trace_id": trace_id,
"event_type": event_type,
"payload": payload,
"previous_hash": previous_hash,
"created_at": isoformat(),
}
digest = hashlib.sha256(
canonical_json(body)
).hexdigest()
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO audit_events VALUES(NULL,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(
tenant_id,
trace_id,
event_type,
json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False),
previous_hash,
digest,
body["created_at"],
),
)
return digest
def verify(self) -> bool:
previous = "GENESIS"
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
rows = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id,trace_id,event_type,payload,previous_hash,event_hash,created_at "
"FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq"
)
for row in rows:
body = {
"tenant_id": row[0],
"trace_id": row[1],
"event_type": row[2],
"payload": json.loads(row[3]),
"previous_hash": row[4],
"created_at": row[6],
}
if row[4] != previous:
return False
digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(body)).hexdigest()
if digest != row[5]:
return False
previous = digest
return True
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
"""AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell lifecycle CLI primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import json
from pathlib import Path
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class CellRecord:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
version: str
state: str
config_digest: str
created_at: str
class CellManager:
def __init__(self, registry: str | Path) -> None:
self.registry = Path(registry)
self.registry.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if not self.registry.exists():
self.registry.write_text("{\"cells\":{}}\n", encoding="utf-8")
def _load(self) -> dict:
return json.loads(self.registry.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
def _save(self, value: dict) -> None:
self.registry.write_text(
json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
def create(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, version: str, digest: str) -> CellRecord:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
data = self._load()
if tenant_id in data["cells"]:
raise ValidationError("tenant already has a cell")
record = CellRecord(
tenant_id,
cell_id,
version,
"created",
digest,
datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
)
data["cells"][tenant_id] = record.__dict__
self._save(data)
return record
def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> CellRecord:
data = self._load()
item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
if not item:
raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
return CellRecord(**item)
def transition(self, tenant_id: str, state: str) -> CellRecord:
allowed = {"created", "starting", "healthy", "upgrading", "rollback", "failed"}
if state not in allowed:
raise ValidationError("invalid cell state")
data = self._load()
item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
if not item:
raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
item["state"] = state
self._save(data)
return CellRecord(**item)
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
"""aios-cell command implementation for V2R1 Cell lifecycle."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import sys
from .cell_manager import CellManager
def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="aios-cell")
parser.add_argument("registry")
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
create = sub.add_parser("create")
create.add_argument("tenant_id")
create.add_argument("cell_id")
create.add_argument("version")
create.add_argument("digest")
status = sub.add_parser("status")
status.add_argument("tenant_id")
transition = sub.add_parser("transition")
transition.add_argument("tenant_id")
transition.add_argument("state")
return parser
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
manager = CellManager(args.registry)
if args.command == "create":
result = manager.create(args.tenant_id, args.cell_id, args.version, args.digest)
elif args.command == "status":
result = manager.status(args.tenant_id)
elif args.command == "transition":
result = manager.transition(args.tenant_id, args.state)
else:
return 2
print(json.dumps(result.__dict__, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
"""OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
from typing import Any, Mapping
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, V2R1Error, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class CellSpec:
tenant_id: str
image: str
runtime: str = "docker"
port: int | None = None
memory: str = "2g"
cpus: str = "2"
pids_limit: int = 512
network: str = "bridge"
env: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
if self.runtime not in {"docker", "podman"}:
raise ValidationError("unsupported runtime")
if not self.image:
raise ValidationError("image required")
class OpenClawFleet:
def __init__(self, binary: str = "openclaw") -> None:
self.binary = binary
def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
proc = subprocess.run(
[self.binary, *args],
check=False,
text=True,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
)
if proc.returncode:
raise V2R1Error(proc.stderr.strip() or "openclaw command failed")
data = json.loads(proc.stdout or "{}")
if isinstance(data, dict):
return data
return {"result": data}
def create(self, spec: CellSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run([
"fleet", "create", spec.tenant_id,
"--image", spec.image,
"--runtime", spec.runtime,
"--json",
])
def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
return self._run(["fleet", "status", tenant_id, "--json"])
def doctor(self, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
args = ["fleet", "doctor"]
if tenant_id:
require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
args.append(tenant_id)
args.append("--json")
return self._run(args)
def backup(self, tenant_id: str, output: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run(["fleet", "backup", tenant_id, "--out", str(output), "--json"])
def restore(self, tenant_id: str, archive: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run(["fleet", "restore", tenant_id, "--from", str(archive), "--json"])
def upgrade(self, tenant_id: str, image: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self._run(["fleet", "upgrade", tenant_id, "--image", image, "--json"])
def load_inventory(path: str | Path) -> list[CellSpec]:
raw = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if raw.get("schema_version") != "aios.cells.v1":
raise ValidationError("invalid inventory schema")
result: list[CellSpec] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for item in raw.get("cells", []):
spec = CellSpec(
tenant_id=item["tenant_id"],
image=item["image"],
runtime=item.get("runtime", "docker"),
port=item.get("port"),
env=tuple(item.get("env", [])),
)
if spec.tenant_id in seen:
raise ValidationError("duplicate tenant")
seen.add(spec.tenant_id)
result.append(spec)
if not result:
raise ValidationError("no cells")
return result
def inventory_as_dict(items: list[CellSpec]) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {"schema_version": "aios.cells.v1", "cells": [asdict(x) for x in items]}
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes shared agent fabric primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
from typing import Any
from .tenant_context import (
CanonicalMessage,
ConflictError,
ScopeError,
ValidationError,
isoformat,
require_ident,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class FabricJob:
job_id: str
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
profile_id: str
session_id: str
event_id: str
status: str = "queued"
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
for name in (
"job_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "session_id", "event_id"
):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
if self.status not in {"queued", "running", "completed", "failed", "cancelled"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid job status")
class HermesFabric:
"""Shared scheduler storage with mandatory tenant partition keys."""
def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
self.database = str(database)
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
db.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fabric_jobs (
job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
profile_id TEXT NOT NULL,
session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
)
"""
)
db.execute(
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fabric_tenant_queue "
"ON fabric_jobs(tenant_id, cell_id, status)"
)
def enqueue(
self,
*,
message: CanonicalMessage,
profile_id: str,
) -> FabricJob:
profile_id = require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
if not message.command_capable:
raise ScopeError("non-command events cannot create execution jobs")
if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
raise ScopeError("only authenticated human commands can create jobs")
job = FabricJob(
job_id=f"job-{message.event_id}",
tenant_id=message.tenant_id,
cell_id=message.cell_id,
profile_id=profile_id,
session_id=message.session_id,
event_id=message.event_id,
)
now = isoformat()
conflict: ConflictError | None = None
try:
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO fabric_jobs VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(
job.job_id,
job.tenant_id,
job.cell_id,
job.profile_id,
job.session_id,
job.event_id,
job.status,
now,
now,
),
)
except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
conflict = ConflictError(
"fabric event already exists or violates queue uniqueness"
)
if conflict is not None:
raise conflict
return job
def claim(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, profile_id: str) -> FabricJob | None:
require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
row = db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM fabric_jobs WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? "
"AND profile_id=? AND status='queued' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1",
(tenant_id, cell_id, profile_id),
).fetchone()
if not row:
db.commit()
return None
db.execute(
"UPDATE fabric_jobs SET status='running', updated_at=? WHERE job_id=?",
(isoformat(), row[0]),
)
db.commit()
return FabricJob(*row[:7])
def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
count = db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM fabric_jobs").fetchone()[0]
return {
"component": "hermes_fabric",
"jobs": count,
"checked_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
}
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""Hermes shared fabric profile isolation primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
import os
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HermesProfile:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
profile_id: str
hermes_home: Path
workspace: Path
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if not self.hermes_home.is_absolute() or not self.workspace.is_absolute():
raise ValidationError("profile paths must be absolute")
@property
def environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
"HERMES_HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
"HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
"AIOS_TENANT_ID": self.tenant_id,
"AIOS_CELL_ID": self.cell_id,
"AIOS_PROFILE_ID": self.profile_id,
}
def prepare(self) -> None:
self.hermes_home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
os.chmod(self.hermes_home, 0o700)
os.chmod(self.workspace, 0o700)
def assert_path_allowed(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
target = Path(path).resolve()
for root in (self.hermes_home.resolve(), self.workspace.resolve()):
if target == root or root in target.parents:
return
raise ValidationError("path escapes profile isolation boundary")
+241
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
"""Fail-closed identity binding for authenticated external ingress.
External payload claims are not authority. An HMAC-authenticated envelope is
the sole factory for :class:`AuthenticatedPrincipal`; the resolver then checks
every claim against the authoritative ``TenantRouter`` before the runtime signs
an internal ``TenantContext``.
B3 development adds ``disabled/enforced`` mode selection and a
bridge-ingress / receipt-read dual credential for external-side splits.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import enum
import hashlib
import hmac
import re
from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
from .router import Route, TenantRouter
from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, canonical_json, require_ident
_PROVENANCE = object()
_SIGNATURE_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
_HEX_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]+$", re.IGNORECASE)
_SCOPE_FIELDS = (
"principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
"channel_account_id", "session_id", "message",
)
_SCOPE_FIELDS_RECEIPT = (
"principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
"channel_account_id", "session_id", "receipt", "message",
)
_ALLOWED_MESSAGE_FIELDS = frozenset({"agent_id", "type", "payload"})
class AuthenticationError(ValidationError):
pass
class IngressMode(enum.Enum):
DISABLED = "disabled"
ENFORCED = "enforced"
@dataclass(frozen=True, init=False)
class AuthenticatedPrincipal:
principal_id: str
def __init__(self, principal_id: str, *, _provenance: object) -> None:
if _provenance is not _PROVENANCE:
raise TypeError("AuthenticatedPrincipal is created by authenticated ingress only")
object.__setattr__(self, "principal_id", require_ident("principal_id", principal_id))
@classmethod
def _verified(cls, principal_id: str) -> "AuthenticatedPrincipal":
return cls(principal_id, _provenance=_PROVENANCE)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class IdentityClaims:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
session_id: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BridgeIngressClaims:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
session_id: str
receipt: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
if not isinstance(self.receipt, str) or not self.receipt:
raise ValidationError("bridge ingress receipt must be a non-empty string")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthenticatedIngress:
principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
claims: IdentityClaims
message: Mapping[str, Any]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BridgeAuthenticatedIngress:
principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
claims: BridgeIngressClaims
message: Mapping[str, Any]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RuntimeIdentity:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
principal_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
session_id: str
class IngressAuthenticator:
def __init__(self, hmac_key: bytes, *, mode: IngressMode = IngressMode.ENFORCED) -> None:
if not isinstance(hmac_key, bytes) or len(hmac_key) < 32:
raise ValidationError("ingress HMAC key must be at least 32 bytes")
self._hmac_key = hmac_key
self._mode = mode
@staticmethod
def _signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
raise ValidationError("ingress request must be an object")
if set(request) != {*_SCOPE_FIELDS, "signature"}:
raise ValidationError("ingress request fields are invalid")
values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS}
if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
raise ValidationError("ingress message must be an object")
return values
@staticmethod
def _bridge_signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
raise ValidationError("bridge ingress request must be an object")
allowed = {*_SCOPE_FIELDS_RECEIPT, "signature"}
if set(request) != allowed:
raise ValidationError(
f"bridge ingress request fields are invalid; "
f"expected {sorted(allowed)}, got {sorted(request)}"
)
values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS_RECEIPT}
if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
raise ValidationError("bridge ingress message must be an object")
return values
def _verify(self, values: dict[str, Any], signature: str) -> None:
if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
expected = hmac.new(
self._hmac_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
).hexdigest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature):
raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
def authenticate(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> AuthenticatedIngress:
values = self._signed_payload(request)
signature = request["signature"]
if self._mode == IngressMode.ENFORCED:
self._verify(values, signature)
elif self._mode == IngressMode.DISABLED:
if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
else:
raise RuntimeError(f"unhandled ingress mode: {self._mode}")
return AuthenticatedIngress(
principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
claims=IdentityClaims(
tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
cell_id=values["cell_id"],
channel=values["channel"],
channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
session_id=values["session_id"],
),
message=dict(values["message"]),
)
def authenticate_bridge(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> BridgeAuthenticatedIngress:
values = self._bridge_signed_payload(request)
signature = request["signature"]
if self._mode == IngressMode.ENFORCED:
self._verify(values, signature)
elif self._mode == IngressMode.DISABLED:
if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
else:
raise RuntimeError(f"unhandled ingress mode: {self._mode}")
return BridgeAuthenticatedIngress(
principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
claims=BridgeIngressClaims(
tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
cell_id=values["cell_id"],
channel=values["channel"],
channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
session_id=values["session_id"],
receipt=values["receipt"],
),
message=dict(values["message"]),
)
class RuntimeIdentityResolver:
"""Resolve authenticated ingress identity through ``TenantRouter`` only."""
def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
self._router = router
def resolve(
self, principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal, claims: IdentityClaims
) -> RuntimeIdentity:
if not isinstance(principal, AuthenticatedPrincipal):
raise AuthenticationError("untrusted principal type")
try:
route: Route = self._router.resolve(
channel=claims.channel,
channel_account_id=claims.channel_account_id,
principal_id=principal.principal_id,
session_id=claims.session_id,
)
except (ScopeError, ValidationError) as exc:
raise AuthenticationError("identity is not registered") from None
expected = (
claims.tenant_id, claims.cell_id, claims.channel,
claims.channel_account_id, principal.principal_id, claims.session_id,
)
actual = (
route.tenant_id, route.cell_id, route.channel,
route.channel_account_id, route.principal_id, route.session_id,
)
if actual != expected:
raise AuthenticationError("identity claims do not match authoritative route")
return RuntimeIdentity(
tenant_id=route.tenant_id,
cell_id=route.cell_id,
principal_id=route.principal_id,
channel=route.channel,
channel_account_id=route.channel_account_id,
session_id=route.session_id or "",
)
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
"""Tenant-scoped memory namespace and access policy for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import PurePosixPath
from typing import Literal
from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, require_ident
MemoryKind = Literal["session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MemoryScope:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
profile_id: str
session_id: str | None
kind: MemoryKind
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if self.session_id is not None:
require_ident("session_id", self.session_id)
if self.kind not in {"session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid memory kind")
if self.kind == "session" and self.session_id is None:
raise ValidationError("session memory requires session_id")
@property
def namespace(self) -> str:
parts = ["tenant", self.tenant_id, "cell", self.cell_id]
if self.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
parts.extend(["profile", self.profile_id])
if self.kind == "session":
parts.extend(["session", str(self.session_id)])
parts.extend(["memory", self.kind])
return str(PurePosixPath(*parts))
def assert_access(self, requested: "MemoryScope", *, write: bool = False) -> None:
if self.tenant_id != requested.tenant_id:
raise ScopeError("cross-tenant memory access denied")
if self.cell_id != requested.cell_id:
raise ScopeError("cross-cell memory access denied")
if requested.kind == "shared_artifact":
if write:
raise ScopeError("shared artifacts are immutable")
return
if self.profile_id != requested.profile_id and requested.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
raise ScopeError("cross-profile memory access denied")
if requested.kind == "session" and self.session_id != requested.session_id:
raise ScopeError("cross-session memory access denied")
def qualify_memory_key(scope: MemoryScope, key: str) -> str:
key = require_ident("memory_key", key)
return f"{scope.namespace}/{key}"
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
"""Tenant-scoped append-only message ledger and exact quote resolver."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import timedelta
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
from typing import Iterable
from .tenant_context import (
CanonicalMessage,
ConflictError,
ScopeError,
ValidationError,
isoformat,
normalize_message_id,
parse_time,
utc_now,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LedgerRecord:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
peer_id: str
direction: str
message_id: str
event_id: str
body: str
occurred_at: str
expires_at: str
class MessageLedger:
"""Exact-ID ledger.
The resolver never uses time windows, prefixes, similarity, or nearest-message
fallbacks. Ambiguity and absence fail closed.
"""
def __init__(self, database: str | Path, *, ttl_days: int = 7) -> None:
if not 1 <= ttl_days <= 365:
raise ValidationError("ttl_days must be between 1 and 365")
self.database = Path(database)
self.ttl_days = ttl_days
self.database.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._initialize()
try:
os.chmod(self.database, 0o600)
except OSError:
pass
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
db = sqlite3.connect(str(self.database), timeout=30)
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
db.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
return db
def _initialize(self) -> None:
with self._connect() as db:
db.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_ledger (
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
channel TEXT NOT NULL,
channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
direction TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(direction IN ('inbound','outbound','internal')),
message_id TEXT NOT NULL,
event_id TEXT NOT NULL,
body TEXT NOT NULL,
occurred_at TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(
tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
peer_id, direction, message_id
),
UNIQUE(tenant_id, cell_id, event_id)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_reply_lookup ON message_ledger(
tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
peer_id, message_id, expires_at
);
"""
)
def remember(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
now = utc_now()
expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(days=self.ttl_days))
key = (
message.tenant_id,
message.cell_id,
message.channel,
message.channel_account_id,
message.peer_id,
message.direction,
message_id,
)
with self._connect() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT event_id, body, occurred_at, expires_at FROM message_ledger "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
"AND peer_id=? AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
key,
).fetchone()
if existing:
if existing["event_id"] != message.event_id or existing["body"] != message.body:
db.rollback()
raise ConflictError("message ID collision with different content")
db.commit()
return LedgerRecord(*key, existing["event_id"], existing["body"], existing["occurred_at"], existing["expires_at"])
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO message_ledger VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires, isoformat(now)),
)
db.commit()
return LedgerRecord(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires)
def resolve_quote(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> str:
if message.quoted_body is not None:
return message.quoted_body
if message.reply_to_message_id is None:
raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
reply_id = normalize_message_id(
message.reply_to_message_id,
field_name="reply_to_message_id",
)
with self._connect() as db:
rows = db.execute(
"SELECT direction, body, event_id FROM message_ledger "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
"AND peer_id=? AND message_id=? AND expires_at>?",
(
message.tenant_id,
message.cell_id,
message.channel,
message.channel_account_id,
message.peer_id,
reply_id,
isoformat(),
),
).fetchall()
if len(rows) == 1:
return str(rows[0]["body"])
if len(rows) > 1:
raise ConflictError("ambiguous reply ID across message directions")
raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
def purge_expired(self) -> int:
with self._connect() as db:
cursor = db.execute(
"DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE expires_at<=?", (isoformat(),)
)
return cursor.rowcount
def integrity_check(self) -> str:
with self._connect() as db:
return str(db.execute("PRAGMA integrity_check").fetchone()[0])
def count(self) -> int:
with self._connect() as db:
return int(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_ledger").fetchone()[0])
+335
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
"""Authoritative tenant registry and fail-closed message router."""
from __future__ import annotations
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
import sqlite3
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable, Iterator
from .tenant_context import (
CanonicalMessage,
ConflictError,
ScopeError,
TenantContext,
ValidationError,
isoformat,
parse_time,
require_ident,
utc_now,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Route:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
principal_id: str
session_id: str | None
class TenantRouter:
"""SQLite-backed routing registry.
Channel accounts are authoritative tenant ownership boundaries. Principal and
session bindings may narrow a route, but can never move traffic to another
tenant or Cell.
"""
def __init__(
self, database: str | Path, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now
) -> None:
self.database = str(database)
self._clock = clock
self._initialize()
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
connection = sqlite3.connect(self.database, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
return connection
@contextmanager
def _transaction(self) -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
connection = self._connect()
try:
connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
yield connection
connection.execute("COMMIT")
except Exception:
connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
finally:
connection.close()
def _initialize(self) -> None:
with self._connect() as db:
db.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants (
tenant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(status IN ('active','suspended','retired')),
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channel_routes (
channel TEXT NOT NULL,
channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id),
FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_routes (
channel TEXT NOT NULL,
channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
FOREIGN KEY(channel, channel_account_id)
REFERENCES channel_routes(channel, channel_account_id)
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_bindings (
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY(tenant_id, session_id),
FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_session_expiry
ON session_bindings(expires_at);
"""
)
def register_tenant(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
now = isoformat(self._clock())
with self._transaction() as db:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
).fetchone()
if row:
if row["cell_id"] != cell_id:
raise ConflictError("tenant already bound to another cell")
db.execute(
"UPDATE tenants SET status='active', updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
(now, tenant_id),
)
return
conflict = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id FROM tenants WHERE cell_id=?", (cell_id,)
).fetchone()
if conflict:
raise ConflictError("cell already belongs to another tenant")
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO tenants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
(tenant_id, cell_id, "active", now, now),
)
def set_tenant_status(self, tenant_id: str, status: str) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
if status not in {"active", "suspended", "retired"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid tenant status")
with self._transaction() as db:
cursor = db.execute(
"UPDATE tenants SET status=?, updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
(status, isoformat(self._clock()), tenant_id),
)
if cursor.rowcount != 1:
raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
def bind_channel(
self,
*,
tenant_id: str,
channel: str,
channel_account_id: str,
) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
with self._transaction() as db:
tenant = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
).fetchone()
if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active":
raise ValidationError("tenant is not active")
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM channel_routes "
"WHERE channel=? AND channel_account_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id),
).fetchone()
if existing:
if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != tenant["cell_id"]:
raise ConflictError("channel account already belongs to another tenant")
return
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO channel_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
(channel, channel_account_id, tenant_id, tenant["cell_id"], isoformat(self._clock())),
)
def bind_principal(
self,
*,
tenant_id: str,
channel: str,
channel_account_id: str,
principal_id: str,
) -> None:
principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
route = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
if route.tenant_id != tenant_id:
raise ScopeError("principal cannot cross tenant boundary")
with self._transaction() as db:
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
"channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
).fetchone()
if existing:
if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != route.cell_id:
raise ConflictError("principal route conflict")
return
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO principal_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(
channel,
channel_account_id,
principal_id,
tenant_id,
route.cell_id,
isoformat(self._clock()),
),
)
def bind_session(
self,
*,
tenant_id: str,
session_id: str,
cell_id: str,
principal_id: str,
ttl_seconds: int = 86400,
) -> None:
tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
if not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= 31 * 86400:
raise ValidationError("invalid session TTL")
now = self._clock()
expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
with self._transaction() as db:
tenant = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
).fetchone()
if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active" or tenant["cell_id"] != cell_id:
raise ScopeError("session cell does not match tenant")
existing = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, principal_id FROM session_bindings "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
(tenant_id, session_id),
).fetchone()
if existing and (
existing["cell_id"] != cell_id or existing["principal_id"] != principal_id
):
raise ConflictError("session is already bound to another principal or cell")
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO session_bindings VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?) "
"ON CONFLICT(tenant_id,session_id) DO UPDATE SET expires_at=excluded.expires_at",
(tenant_id, session_id, cell_id, principal_id, expires, isoformat(now)),
)
def resolve_channel(self, channel: str, channel_account_id: str) -> Route:
channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
with self._connect() as db:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT r.tenant_id, r.cell_id, t.status FROM channel_routes r "
"JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=r.tenant_id "
"WHERE r.channel=? AND r.channel_account_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id),
).fetchone()
if not row:
raise ScopeError("unknown channel account")
if row["status"] != "active":
raise ScopeError("tenant is not active")
return Route(row["tenant_id"], row["cell_id"], channel, channel_account_id, "", None)
def resolve(
self,
*,
channel: str,
channel_account_id: str,
principal_id: str,
session_id: str | None = None,
) -> Route:
principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
base = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
with self._connect() as db:
principal = db.execute(
"SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
"channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
).fetchone()
if principal and (
principal["tenant_id"] != base.tenant_id or principal["cell_id"] != base.cell_id
):
raise ScopeError("principal route violates channel ownership")
if session_id is not None:
session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
session = db.execute(
"SELECT cell_id, principal_id, expires_at FROM session_bindings "
"WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
(base.tenant_id, session_id),
).fetchone()
if not session:
raise ScopeError("unknown session")
if parse_time(session["expires_at"]) <= self._clock():
raise ScopeError("session expired")
if session["cell_id"] != base.cell_id or session["principal_id"] != principal_id:
raise ScopeError("session scope mismatch")
return Route(
base.tenant_id,
base.cell_id,
channel,
channel_account_id,
principal_id,
session_id,
)
def assert_message_route(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> Route:
route = self.resolve(
channel=message.channel,
channel_account_id=message.channel_account_id,
principal_id=message.principal_id,
session_id=message.session_id,
)
if message.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or message.cell_id != route.cell_id:
raise ScopeError("message claims do not match authoritative route")
return route
def assert_context_route(self, context: TenantContext) -> Route:
route = self.resolve(
channel=context.channel,
channel_account_id=context.channel_account_id,
principal_id=context.principal_id,
session_id=context.session_id,
)
if context.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or context.cell_id != route.cell_id:
raise ScopeError("context claims do not match authoritative route")
return route
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
"""Tenant and Cell scoped secret reference model.
This module never stores secret values. It stores ownership and retrieval scope
metadata for integration with a real secret broker.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Literal
from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SecretRef:
secret_id: str
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
kind: Literal["channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"]
version: str
broker_path: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
for name in ("secret_id", "cell_id", "version"):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
if self.kind not in {"channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid secret kind")
if not self.broker_path.startswith("secret://"):
raise ValidationError("secret broker path required")
def can_be_used_by(self, *, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> bool:
return self.tenant_id == tenant_id and self.cell_id == cell_id
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
"""Signed tenant context and canonical message contract for AIOS V2R1."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import re
import secrets
from typing import Any, Mapping
VERSION = "V2R1C0"
MAX_SAFE_INTEGER = 9_007_199_254_740_991
TENANT_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,38}[a-z0-9])?$")
IDENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,126}[A-Za-z0-9])?$")
class V2R1Error(RuntimeError):
pass
class ValidationError(V2R1Error):
pass
class ScopeError(V2R1Error):
pass
class ConflictError(V2R1Error):
pass
def utc_now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def isoformat(value: datetime | None = None) -> str:
return (value or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
def parse_time(value: str) -> datetime:
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
raise ValidationError("timestamp must be a non-empty string")
text = value.strip()
if text.endswith("Z"):
text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValidationError(f"invalid timestamp: {value!r}") from exc
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
raise ValidationError("timestamp must include timezone")
return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
def require_ident(name: str, value: Any, *, tenant: bool = False) -> str:
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ValidationError(f"{name} must be a string")
value = value.strip()
pattern = TENANT_RE if tenant else IDENT_RE
if not pattern.fullmatch(value):
raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}: {value!r}")
return value
def normalize_message_id(value: Any, *, field_name: str = "message_id") -> str:
if isinstance(value, bool):
raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} cannot be boolean")
if isinstance(value, str):
value = value.strip()
if not value or len(value) > 256 or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in value):
raise ValidationError(f"invalid {field_name}")
return value
if isinstance(value, int):
if abs(value) > MAX_SAFE_INTEGER:
raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} is an unsafe numeric ID")
return str(value)
raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} must be a lossless string or safe integer")
def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
return json.dumps(
value, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True
).encode("utf-8")
def _b64(data: bytes) -> str:
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
def _unb64(value: str) -> bytes:
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class TenantContext:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
principal_id: str
principal_type: str
session_id: str
task_id: str | None
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
issued_at: str
expires_at: str
nonce: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in (
"cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "session_id",
"channel", "channel_account_id", "nonce",
):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if self.task_id is not None:
require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
issued = parse_time(self.issued_at)
expires = parse_time(self.expires_at)
if expires <= issued or expires - issued > timedelta(hours=1):
raise ValidationError("invalid tenant context lifetime")
@classmethod
def issue(cls, *, lifetime_seconds: int = 300, now: datetime | None = None, **scope: Any) -> "TenantContext":
if not 1 <= lifetime_seconds <= 3600:
raise ValidationError("lifetime_seconds must be between 1 and 3600")
current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
return cls(
**scope,
issued_at=isoformat(current),
expires_at=isoformat(current + timedelta(seconds=lifetime_seconds)),
nonce=secrets.token_hex(16),
)
def sign(self, key: bytes) -> str:
if len(key) < 32:
raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
payload = _b64(canonical_json(asdict(self)))
signature = _b64(hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest())
return f"{payload}.{signature}"
@classmethod
def verify(
cls,
token: str,
key: bytes,
*,
now: datetime | None = None,
expected_tenant_id: str | None = None,
expected_cell_id: str | None = None,
) -> "TenantContext":
if len(key) < 32:
raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
try:
payload, encoded_signature = token.split(".", 1)
actual = _unb64(encoded_signature)
if encoded_signature != _b64(actual):
raise ValidationError("non-canonical tenant context signature")
data = json.loads(_unb64(payload))
except Exception as exc:
raise ValidationError("malformed tenant context token") from exc
expected = hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
if not hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected):
raise ValidationError("tenant context signature mismatch")
context = cls(**data)
current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
if current < parse_time(context.issued_at) - timedelta(seconds=60):
raise ValidationError("tenant context issued in future")
if current >= parse_time(context.expires_at):
raise ValidationError("tenant context expired")
if expected_tenant_id and context.tenant_id != expected_tenant_id:
raise ScopeError("tenant mismatch")
if expected_cell_id and context.cell_id != expected_cell_id:
raise ScopeError("cell mismatch")
return context
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class CanonicalMessage:
tenant_id: str
cell_id: str
principal_id: str
principal_type: str
origin_type: str
channel: str
channel_account_id: str
peer_id: str
conversation_id: str
session_id: str
task_id: str | None
event_id: str
message_id: str
reply_to_message_id: str | None
direction: str
command_capable: bool
occurred_at: str
received_at: str
body: str
quoted_body: str | None
adapter_name: str
adapter_version: str
schema_version: str = "aios.message.v1"
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if self.schema_version != "aios.message.v1":
raise ValidationError("unsupported message schema version")
require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
for name in (
"cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "origin_type", "channel",
"channel_account_id", "peer_id", "conversation_id", "session_id",
"event_id", "adapter_name", "adapter_version",
):
require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
if self.task_id is not None:
require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
normalize_message_id(self.message_id)
if self.reply_to_message_id is not None:
normalize_message_id(self.reply_to_message_id, field_name="reply_to_message_id")
if self.direction not in {"inbound", "outbound", "internal"}:
raise ValidationError("invalid direction")
if not isinstance(self.command_capable, bool):
raise ValidationError("command_capable must be boolean")
parse_time(self.occurred_at)
parse_time(self.received_at)
if not isinstance(self.body, str):
raise ValidationError("body must be a string")
if self.quoted_body is not None and not isinstance(self.quoted_body, str):
raise ValidationError("quoted_body must be a string or null")
@classmethod
def from_mapping(cls, data: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalMessage":
content = data.get("content") or {}
adapter = data.get("adapter") or {}
if not isinstance(content, Mapping) or not isinstance(adapter, Mapping):
raise ValidationError("content and adapter must be objects")
values = dict(data)
return cls(
schema_version=values.get("schema_version", "aios.message.v1"),
tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
cell_id=values["cell_id"],
principal_id=values["principal_id"],
principal_type=values["principal_type"],
origin_type=values["origin_type"],
channel=values["channel"],
channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
peer_id=values["peer_id"],
conversation_id=values["conversation_id"],
session_id=values["session_id"],
task_id=values.get("task_id"),
event_id=values["event_id"],
message_id=normalize_message_id(values["message_id"]),
reply_to_message_id=(
normalize_message_id(values["reply_to_message_id"], field_name="reply_to_message_id")
if values.get("reply_to_message_id") is not None else None
),
direction=values["direction"],
command_capable=values["command_capable"],
occurred_at=values["occurred_at"],
received_at=values["received_at"],
body=content.get("body", ""),
quoted_body=content.get("quoted_body"),
adapter_name=adapter["name"],
adapter_version=adapter["version"],
)
def assert_context(self, context: TenantContext) -> None:
fields = (
"tenant_id", "cell_id", "principal_id", "session_id", "task_id",
"channel", "channel_account_id",
)
mismatches = [name for name in fields if getattr(self, name) != getattr(context, name)]
if mismatches:
raise ScopeError("message/context mismatch: " + ", ".join(mismatches))
@property
def is_authenticated_human_command(self) -> bool:
return (
self.direction == "inbound"
and self.command_capable
and self.principal_type == "authenticated_user"
and self.origin_type == "channel_user"
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PolicyDecision:
allowed: bool
approval_required: bool
code: str
reason: str
READ_ONLY_TOOLS = frozenset({
"read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
"memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
})
def evaluate_tool_call(tool_name: str, message: CanonicalMessage) -> PolicyDecision:
normalized = tool_name.strip().lower() if isinstance(tool_name, str) else ""
if not normalized:
return PolicyDecision(False, False, "invalid_tool", "tool name missing")
if normalized in READ_ONLY_TOOLS:
return PolicyDecision(True, False, "read_only", "read-only operation")
if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
return PolicyDecision(
False, False, "origin_denied",
"side effects require an authenticated current human command",
)
return PolicyDecision(
True, True, "approval_required",
"authenticated human side effect requires explicit approval",
)
-355
View File
@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
"""Fail-closed access to the authoritative bare Git repository."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import subprocess
import urllib.parse
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Iterable
_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset(
{
"cat-file",
"config",
"diff",
"for-each-ref",
"ls-remote",
"merge-base",
"push",
"remote",
"rev-parse",
"show-ref",
"tag",
}
)
_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
_MAX_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
_TIMEOUT = 8.0
class AuthoritativeGitError(RuntimeError):
"""A fail-closed authoritative repository or ref query error."""
class AuthoritativeGitNotFound(AuthoritativeGitError):
"""A validated revision does not exist in the authoritative repository."""
class AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge(AuthoritativeGitError):
"""A controlled Git query exceeded the response-size boundary."""
def _redact(text: str) -> str:
value = str(text or "")
value = re.sub(r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:bearer|token)\s+\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
value = re.sub(r"(?i)((?:access_)?token\s*[:=]\s*)\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
value = re.sub(r"(?i)(https?://[^/\s:@]+:)[^@\s/]+@", r"\1REDACTED@", value)
return value
def _configured_path(git_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
raw = str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
if not raw:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
path = Path(raw)
if not path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
try:
resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
except OSError as exc:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
if not resolved.is_dir():
raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
return resolved
def _run(
git_dir: Path,
args: list[str],
*,
check: bool,
timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
if not args or args[0] not in _ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
text=True,
capture_output=True,
timeout=timeout,
env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
if len(result.stdout) + len(result.stderr) > _MAX_OUTPUT:
raise AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
if check and result.returncode != 0:
detail = _redact(result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip())
raise AuthoritativeGitError(
"GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED" + (f": {detail[:160]}" if detail else "")
)
return result
def _repository_identity_from_remote(url: str) -> str:
value = str(url or "").strip().split("?", 1)[0].rstrip("/")
if not value:
return ""
if "://" in value:
value = urllib.parse.urlparse(value).path
elif ":" in value:
value = value.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
value = value.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].strip("/")
value = re.sub(r"\.git$", "", value, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
parts = [part for part in value.split("/") if part]
if len(parts) >= 2:
value = "/".join(parts[-2:])
return value.strip("/").lower()
def verify_repository(
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
repository_identity: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[Path, str]:
path = _configured_path(git_dir)
expected = str(
repository_identity
or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
).strip().strip("/")
if not expected or expected.count("/") != 1:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
bare = _run(path, ["rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository"], check=True)
if bare.stdout.strip().lower() != "true":
raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
remote = _run(path, ["config", "--get", "remote.gitea.url"], check=False)
actual = _repository_identity_from_remote(remote.stdout)
if actual != expected.lower():
raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
return path, expected
def run_authoritative_git(
args: list[str],
*,
check: bool = True,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
return _run(path, list(args), check=check, timeout=timeout)
def authoritative_head_oid(
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> str:
result = run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main"], git_dir=git_dir)
oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
return oid
def authoritative_tags(
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> list[dict[str, str | None]]:
result = run_authoritative_git(
[
"for-each-ref",
"refs/tags",
"--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)\t%(objecttype)",
],
git_dir=git_dir,
)
tags: list[dict[str, str | None]] = []
for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
name, oid, object_type = (line.split("\t", 2) + ["", ""])[:3]
if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
peeled_result = run_authoritative_git(
["rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{name}^{{commit}}"],
git_dir=git_dir,
)
peeled = peeled_result.stdout.strip().lower()
if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(peeled):
raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
tags.append(
{
"name": name,
"tag_oid": oid.lower(),
"object_type": object_type,
"peeled_target_oid": peeled,
}
)
return tags
def authoritative_branches(
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
result = run_authoritative_git(
[
"for-each-ref",
"refs/heads",
"--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)",
],
git_dir=git_dir,
)
branches: list[dict[str, str]] = []
for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
name, oid = (line.split("\t", 1) + [""])[:2]
if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
branches.append({"name": name, "oid": oid.lower()})
return branches
def authoritative_commit(
oid: str,
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> str:
value = str(oid or "").strip().lower()
if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
raise ValueError("commit OID must be a full 40-character value")
result = run_authoritative_git(
["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{value}^{{commit}}"],
git_dir=git_dir,
)
resolved = result.stdout.strip().lower()
if resolved != value:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
return resolved
def authoritative_lineage(
ancestor: str,
descendant: str,
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> None:
authoritative_commit(ancestor, git_dir=git_dir)
authoritative_commit(descendant, git_dir=git_dir)
result = run_authoritative_git(
["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
check=False,
git_dir=git_dir,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
raise AuthoritativeGitError("evidence lineage mismatch")
_SAFE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
def _safe_ref_name(value: str) -> bool:
return bool(
_SAFE_REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
and ".." not in value
and "//" not in value
and "@{" not in value
and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
and not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
)
def validate_git_revision(
value: str,
field: str,
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> str:
revision = str(value or "").strip()
if not revision or revision != str(value or "") or revision.startswith("-"):
raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
try:
return authoritative_commit(revision.lower(), git_dir=git_dir)
except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found") from exc
if not _safe_ref_name(revision) or any(token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")):
raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
if revision.startswith("refs/"):
if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
candidates = [revision]
else:
candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
matches: list[str] = []
for candidate in candidates:
result = run_authoritative_git(
["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
check=False,
git_dir=git_dir,
)
oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
if result.returncode == 0 and _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
matches.append(oid)
if not matches:
raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found")
if len(set(matches)) != 1 or len(matches) != 1:
raise ValueError(f"ambiguous {field} revision")
return matches[0]
def authoritative_diff(
from_revision: str,
to_revision: str,
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
result = run_authoritative_git(args, git_dir=path)
return {
"code": 0,
"stdout": result.stdout,
"stderr": "",
"cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
"from_oid": from_oid,
"to_oid": to_oid,
}
def repository_snapshot(
*,
git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
repository_identity: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
configured = bool(
str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
)
try:
path, identity = verify_repository(
git_dir=git_dir,
repository_identity=repository_identity,
)
head = authoritative_head_oid(git_dir=path)
return {
"repository_available": True,
"authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
"authoritative_git_dir_readable": True,
"authoritative_git_dir": str(path),
"authoritative_head_oid": head,
"repository_identity": identity,
"query_error": None,
}
except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
return {
"repository_available": False,
"authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
"authoritative_git_dir_readable": False,
"authoritative_git_dir": None,
"authoritative_head_oid": None,
"repository_identity": str(
repository_identity
or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
).strip() or None,
"query_error": _redact(str(exc)),
}
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-167
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@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
"""Fail-closed operation authorization for an isolated Git writer."""
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import os
import re
import subprocess
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
ROUTE_OPERATIONS = {
("GET", "/api/runtime-status"): "runtime.status.read",
("GET", "/api/baseline"): "baseline.read",
("GET", "/api/patches"): "patches.read",
("POST", "/api/commit-file"): "commit_file.atomic",
}
OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
class AuthorizationError(PermissionError):
def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
super().__init__(code)
self.code = code
self.status = status
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthorizedGrant:
record: dict[str, Any]
operation: str
use_count: int
@property
def token_id(self) -> str:
return str(self.record["token_id"])
@property
def task_id(self) -> str:
return str(self.record["task_id"])
def operation_for(method: str, path: str) -> str:
operation = ROUTE_OPERATIONS.get((method.upper(), path))
if not operation:
raise AuthorizationError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
return operation
def _parse_time(value: Any) -> datetime:
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(str(value).replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid") from None
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid")
return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
def _git_is_ancestor(workspace: Path, base: str, branch: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", base, branch],
cwd=workspace,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def _validate_grant(
grant: dict[str, Any],
*,
audience: str,
source_ip: str,
operation: str,
branch: str | None,
path: str | None,
workspace: Path,
current_time: datetime,
) -> None:
if int(grant.get("schema_version", 0)) != 2:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_required", 401)
if str(grant.get("audience") or "") != audience:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_audience_rejected")
try:
peer = ipaddress.ip_address(source_ip)
networks = [ipaddress.ip_network(str(value), strict=True) for value in grant.get("source_cidrs", [])]
except ValueError:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected") from None
if not networks or not any(peer in network for network in networks):
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected")
created = _parse_time(grant.get("created_at"))
not_before = _parse_time(grant.get("not_before"))
expires = _parse_time(grant.get("expires_at"))
if expires <= not_before or (expires - created).total_seconds() > 1800:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_lifetime_rejected")
if current_time < not_before:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_not_yet_valid", 401)
if current_time >= expires:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_expired", 401)
if bool(grant.get("revoked")):
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_revoked", 401)
operations = grant.get("allowed_operations")
if not isinstance(operations, list) or operation not in operations:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_operation_rejected")
expected_branch = str(grant.get("allowed_branch") or "")
configured_branch = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "")
if expected_branch != configured_branch:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
if branch is not None and branch != expected_branch:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
if path is not None:
paths = grant.get("allowed_paths")
if not isinstance(paths, list) or path not in paths:
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_path_rejected")
base = str(grant.get("approved_base_oid") or "").lower()
if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base):
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_rejected")
if not _git_is_ancestor(workspace, base, expected_branch):
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_not_ancestor")
def authorize(
registry: TokenRegistry,
token: str,
*,
method: str,
path: str,
source_ip: str,
workspace: Path,
branch: str | None = None,
target_path: str | None = None,
current_time: datetime | None = None,
) -> AuthorizedGrant:
if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_not_required")
if not token:
raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
grant = registry.find(token)
if grant is None:
raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
operation = operation_for(method, path)
_validate_grant(
grant,
audience=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""),
source_ip=source_ip,
operation=operation,
branch=branch,
path=target_path,
workspace=workspace,
current_time=current_time or datetime.now(timezone.utc),
)
limits = grant.get("max_uses")
if not isinstance(limits, dict):
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing")
try:
used = registry.consume(str(grant["token_id"]), operation, int(limits[operation]))
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing") from None
except PermissionError as exc:
code = str(exc)
raise AuthorizationError(code, 401 if code == "writer_token_revoked" else 403) from None
return AuthorizedGrant(grant, operation, used)
@@ -1,403 +0,0 @@
"""Atomic, idempotent commit-file Saga for the isolated writer."""
from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import sqlite3
import subprocess
import tempfile
import threading
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}")
STATES = frozenset({
"PENDING", "FILE_WRITTEN", "COMMITTED", "PUSHED", "VERIFIED", "COMPLETED",
"FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
})
_LOCKS: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {}
_LOCKS_GUARD = threading.Lock()
_LEDGER_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
class CommitFileError(RuntimeError):
def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400):
super().__init__(code)
self.code = code
self.status = status
class SimulatedCrash(RuntimeError):
pass
def canonical_digest(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
payload = {
"branch": data["branch"],
"path": data["path"],
"content_sha256": hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
"message": data["message"],
"expected_head_oid": data["expected_head_oid"],
}
encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
class OperationLedger:
def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
self.path = Path(path)
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
raise PermissionError("writer_operation_ledger_symlink_rejected")
with _LEDGER_INIT_LOCK:
with self.connect() as db:
db.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS writer_operations (
operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
branch TEXT NOT NULL,
path TEXT NOT NULL,
content_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
pre_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
commit_oid TEXT,
push_status TEXT,
verification_status TEXT,
state TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
error_code TEXT
)
"""
)
os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
def connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
return db
def get_or_create(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
key = data["idempotency_key"]
with self.connect() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
row = db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
).fetchone()
if row:
db.commit()
record = dict(row)
if record["operation_digest"] != digest:
raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_conflict", 409)
if (
record["token_id"] != grant.token_id
or record["task_id"] != grant.task_id
):
raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_owner_conflict", 409)
return record
operation_id = hashlib.sha256(
f"{grant.task_id}\0{key}".encode("utf-8")
).hexdigest()
content_sha = hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
db.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO writer_operations(
operation_id,token_id,task_id,idempotency_key,operation_digest,
branch,path,content_sha256,pre_head_oid,state
) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
""",
(
operation_id, grant.token_id, grant.task_id, key, digest,
data["branch"], data["path"], content_sha,
data["expected_head_oid"], "PENDING",
),
)
db.commit()
return self.get(key)
def get(self, key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
with self.connect() as db:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise KeyError(key)
return dict(row)
def update(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
if state not in STATES:
raise ValueError("invalid writer operation state")
allowed = {"commit_oid", "push_status", "verification_status", "error_code"}
assignments = ["state=?", "updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"]
values: list[Any] = [state]
for name, value in fields.items():
if name not in allowed:
raise ValueError("invalid ledger field")
assignments.append(f"{name}=?")
values.append(value)
values.append(key)
with self.connect() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
db.execute(
f"UPDATE writer_operations SET {','.join(assignments)} WHERE idempotency_key=?",
values,
)
db.commit()
return self.get(key)
class AtomicCommitFile:
def __init__(
self,
*,
workspace: Path,
bare_repo: Path,
ledger: OperationLedger,
remote: str,
audit,
crash_after_state: str | None = None,
):
self.workspace = workspace
self.bare_repo = bare_repo
self.ledger = ledger
self.remote = remote
self.audit = audit
self.crash_after_state = crash_after_state
def _git(self, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
result = subprocess.run(
["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True
)
if check and result.returncode != 0:
raise CommitFileError("writer_git_operation_failed", 500)
return result.stdout.strip()
def _transition(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
record = self.ledger.update(key, state, **fields)
if self.crash_after_state == state:
raise SimulatedCrash(state)
return record
def _validate(self, data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(data, dict):
raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
required = ("branch", "path", "content", "message", "expected_head_oid", "idempotency_key")
if any(field not in data for field in required):
raise CommitFileError("writer_request_incomplete")
if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_force_rejected", 403)
if set(data) != set(required):
raise CommitFileError("writer_request_fields_rejected")
item = {field: data[field] for field in required}
if item["branch"] != policy.allowed_branch():
raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected", 403)
try:
item["path"] = policy.validate_path(item["path"], self.workspace)
except PermissionError as exc:
raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
if not isinstance(item["content"], str) or "\x00" in item["content"]:
raise CommitFileError("writer_content_rejected")
try:
policy.validate_content_for_path(item["path"], item["content"])
except PermissionError as exc:
raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
if len(item["content"].encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
raise CommitFileError("writer_content_too_large", 413)
message = item["message"]
if (
not isinstance(message, str)
or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200
or "\x00" in message
or "\n" in message
or "\r" in message
):
raise CommitFileError("writer_message_rejected")
if not isinstance(item["expected_head_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(item["expected_head_oid"]):
raise CommitFileError("writer_expected_head_rejected")
if not isinstance(item["idempotency_key"], str) or not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(item["idempotency_key"]):
raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_key_rejected")
return item
def _atomic_write(self, relative: str, content: str) -> None:
target = self.workspace / relative
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-", dir=target.parent)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
stream.write(content.encode("utf-8"))
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
os.replace(temporary, target)
parent_fd = os.open(target.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
try:
os.fsync(parent_fd)
finally:
os.close(parent_fd)
finally:
if os.path.exists(temporary):
os.unlink(temporary)
def _verify_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> None:
bare = subprocess.run(
["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
text=True, capture_output=True,
)
if bare.returncode != 0 or bare.stdout.strip() != oid:
raise CommitFileError("writer_authoritative_bare_oid_mismatch", 500)
remote = subprocess.run(
["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", self.remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
)
if remote.returncode != 0:
raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_verification_failed", 503)
fields = remote.stdout.strip().split()
if len(fields) != 2:
raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_ref_missing", 503)
if fields[0] != oid:
raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_oid_conflict", 409)
def execute(self, grant: Any, raw_data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
data = self._validate(raw_data)
digest = canonical_digest(data)
branch = data["branch"]
with _LOCKS_GUARD:
lock = _LOCKS.setdefault(branch, threading.Lock())
lock_path = self.ledger.path.parent / f"{hashlib.sha256(branch.encode()).hexdigest()}.lock"
with lock, open(lock_path, "a+b") as branch_lock:
fcntl.flock(branch_lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
return self._execute_locked(grant, data, digest)
def _execute_locked(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
key = data["idempotency_key"]
record = self.ledger.get_or_create(grant, data, digest)
if record["state"] == "COMPLETED":
return self._result(record, idempotent=True)
if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != data["branch"]:
record = self._transition(
key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_current_branch_conflict"
)
self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
raise CommitFileError("writer_current_branch_conflict", 409)
head = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
commit_oid = record.get("commit_oid")
if head != record["pre_head_oid"] and head != commit_oid:
record = self._transition(
key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_branch_head_conflict"
)
self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
raise CommitFileError("writer_branch_head_conflict", 409)
try:
state = record["state"]
if state == "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
raise CommitFileError("writer_manual_review_required", 409)
if state == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE":
if record.get("push_status") == "confirmed":
state = "PUSHED"
else:
state = "COMMITTED" if commit_oid else "FILE_WRITTEN"
if state == "PENDING":
self._atomic_write(data["path"], data["content"])
record = self._transition(key, "FILE_WRITTEN")
state = record["state"]
if state == "FILE_WRITTEN":
actual_sha = hashlib.sha256(
(self.workspace / data["path"]).read_bytes()
).hexdigest()
if actual_sha != record["content_sha256"]:
raise CommitFileError("writer_file_content_conflict", 409)
staged_before = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only", check=False).splitlines()
if staged_before:
raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
self._git("add", "--", data["path"])
staged = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines()
if staged != [data["path"]]:
raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
self._git("commit", "-m", data["message"])
commit_oid = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
record = self._transition(key, "COMMITTED", commit_oid=commit_oid)
state = record["state"]
if state == "COMMITTED":
commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
pushed = subprocess.run(
["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{data['branch']}"],
cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
)
if pushed.returncode != 0:
self._transition(
key, "FAILED_RECOVERABLE",
push_status="failed", error_code="writer_gitea_push_failed",
)
raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_push_failed", 503)
record = self._transition(key, "PUSHED", push_status="confirmed")
state = record["state"]
if state == "PUSHED":
commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
self._verify_remote(data["branch"], commit_oid)
record = self._transition(
key, "VERIFIED", verification_status="bare+gitea"
)
state = record["state"]
if state == "VERIFIED":
record = self._transition(key, "COMPLETED", error_code=None)
self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "completed")
return self._result(record, idempotent=False)
except SimulatedCrash:
raise
except CommitFileError as exc:
latest = self.ledger.get(key)
if latest["state"] not in {"FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"}:
failure_state = (
"MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
if exc.code in {
"writer_gitea_oid_conflict",
"writer_file_content_conflict",
"writer_current_branch_conflict",
}
else "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
)
latest = self._transition(key, failure_state, error_code=exc.code)
self._audit(grant, data, digest, latest, "failed")
raise
def _audit(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str, record: dict[str, Any], result: str) -> None:
self.audit({
"token_id": grant.token_id,
"task_id": grant.task_id,
"audience": grant.record["audience"],
"source_ip": grant.record.get("_source_ip", "socket-peer"),
"operation": grant.operation,
"branch": data["branch"],
"path": data["path"],
"idempotency_key": data["idempotency_key"],
"operation_digest": digest,
"path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
"pre_head_oid": record["pre_head_oid"],
"commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
"result": result,
})
@staticmethod
def _result(record: dict[str, Any], *, idempotent: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"status": "completed",
"state": record["state"],
"operation_id": record["operation_id"],
"branch": record["branch"],
"path": record["path"],
"commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
"push_status": record.get("push_status"),
"verification_status": record.get("verification_status"),
"idempotent": idempotent,
}
@@ -1,422 +0,0 @@
"""Strict service-level exact-path policy for isolated Git writers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import grp
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import stat
from dataclasses import dataclass
from functools import lru_cache
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import unquote
MAX_POLICY_BYTES = 65_536
POLICY_FIELDS = frozenset(
{
"schema_version",
"policy_id",
"audience",
"repository_identity",
"allowed_branch",
"allowed_operations",
}
)
OPERATION_FIELDS = frozenset({"exact_paths", "max_content_bytes", "content_profile"})
SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS = frozenset({"commit_file.atomic"})
SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES = frozenset({"systemd-codex-review-worker-v1"})
_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)(authorization\s*:|bearer\s+|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])"
)
_SYSTEMD_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*\Z")
_SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096
_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES = {
"Unit": frozenset({"Description", "After", "Wants"}),
"Service": frozenset(
{
"Type",
"User",
"Group",
"WorkingDirectory",
"Environment",
"ExecStart",
"Restart",
"RestartSec",
"NoNewPrivileges",
"PrivateTmp",
"PrivateDevices",
"ProtectSystem",
"ProtectHome",
"ProtectKernelTunables",
"ProtectKernelModules",
"ProtectControlGroups",
"LockPersonality",
"RestrictSUIDSGID",
"RestrictRealtime",
"MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
"RuntimeDirectory",
"StateDirectory",
"CacheDirectory",
"ReadOnlyPaths",
"ReadWritePaths",
"UMask",
}
),
"Install": frozenset({"WantedBy"}),
}
_SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES = frozenset(
{
("Service", "Environment"),
("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"),
("Service", "ReadWritePaths"),
}
)
_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES = {
("Unit", "Description"): "AIOS Codex Review/Test Worker",
("Unit", "After"): "network-online.target",
("Unit", "Wants"): "network-online.target",
("Service", "Type"): "simple",
("Service", "User"): "aiman",
("Service", "Group"): "gitops",
(
"Service",
"WorkingDirectory",
): "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker/current",
(
"Service",
"ExecStart",
): "/usr/bin/python3 -m task_plane.workers.codex_review_test",
("Service", "Restart"): "on-failure",
("Service", "RestartSec"): "2",
("Service", "NoNewPrivileges"): "true",
("Service", "PrivateTmp"): "true",
("Service", "PrivateDevices"): "true",
("Service", "ProtectSystem"): "strict",
("Service", "ProtectHome"): "true",
("Service", "ProtectKernelTunables"): "true",
("Service", "ProtectKernelModules"): "true",
("Service", "ProtectControlGroups"): "true",
("Service", "LockPersonality"): "true",
("Service", "RestrictSUIDSGID"): "true",
("Service", "RestrictRealtime"): "true",
("Service", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute"): "true",
("Service", "RuntimeDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
("Service", "StateDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
("Service", "CacheDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
("Service", "UMask"): "0077",
("Install", "WantedBy"): "multi-user.target",
}
_SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES = {
("Service", "Environment"): (
"AIOS_CODEX_WORKER_MODE=shadow",
"AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false",
"PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1",
),
("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"): (
"/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
"/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
),
("Service", "ReadWritePaths"): (
"/run/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
"/var/lib/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
"/var/cache/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
),
}
class PathPolicyError(PermissionError):
pass
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class OperationPolicy:
exact_paths: tuple[str, ...]
max_content_bytes: int
content_profile: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ServicePathPolicy:
schema_version: int
policy_id: str
audience: str
repository_identity: str
allowed_branch: str
allowed_operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy]
sha256: str
def operation(self, name: str) -> OperationPolicy:
try:
return self.allowed_operations[name]
except KeyError:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_operation_rejected") from None
def require_exact_path(self, operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
selected = self.operation(operation)
if path not in selected.exact_paths:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_rejected")
return selected
def _canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
return (
json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+ "\n"
).encode("utf-8")
def validate_relative_path_syntax(path: str) -> str:
if not isinstance(path, str):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
if not path or path != path.strip() or "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
try:
decoded = unquote(path, errors="strict")
except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
if decoded != path:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
posix = PurePosixPath(path)
windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
parts = path.split("/")
if (
posix.is_absolute()
or windows.is_absolute()
or bool(windows.drive)
or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
return path
def _require_fields(value: dict[str, Any], allowed: frozenset[str], code: str) -> None:
if set(value) != allowed:
raise PathPolicyError(code)
def _parse_policy(document: Any, canonical: bytes) -> ServicePathPolicy:
if not isinstance(document, dict):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_object_required")
_require_fields(document, POLICY_FIELDS, "isolated_writer_path_policy_fields_rejected")
if document["schema_version"] != 1:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_schema_rejected")
text_fields = (
"policy_id",
"audience",
"repository_identity",
"allowed_branch",
)
if any(
not isinstance(document[field], str) or not document[field].strip()
for field in text_fields
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_value_rejected")
raw_operations = document["allowed_operations"]
if not isinstance(raw_operations, dict) or not raw_operations:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
if not set(raw_operations).issubset(SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy] = {}
for name, raw in raw_operations.items():
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_rejected")
_require_fields(
raw,
OPERATION_FIELDS,
"isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_fields_rejected",
)
paths = raw["exact_paths"]
if (
not isinstance(paths, list)
or not paths
or any(not isinstance(item, str) for item in paths)
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
validated = tuple(validate_relative_path_syntax(item) for item in paths)
if len(set(validated)) != len(validated):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
maximum = raw["max_content_bytes"]
if not isinstance(maximum, int) or isinstance(maximum, bool) or not 1 <= maximum <= 1_048_576:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_size_rejected")
profile = raw["content_profile"]
if profile not in SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
operations[name] = OperationPolicy(validated, maximum, profile)
return ServicePathPolicy(
schema_version=1,
policy_id=document["policy_id"],
audience=document["audience"],
repository_identity=document["repository_identity"],
allowed_branch=document["allowed_branch"],
allowed_operations=operations,
sha256=hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
)
def load_path_policy(
path: Path,
*,
expected_owner_uid: int = 0,
expected_group_gid: int | None = None,
expected_parent_mode: int = 0o750,
expected_file_mode: int = 0o640,
) -> ServicePathPolicy:
lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(path)))
if lexical.is_symlink():
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
try:
parent_info = lexical.parent.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
file_info = lexical.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
except FileNotFoundError:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_missing") from None
if stat.S_ISLNK(parent_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_info.st_mode):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_rejected")
if stat.S_ISLNK(file_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(file_info.st_mode):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_rejected")
if lexical.resolve(strict=True) != lexical:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
if (
parent_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
or stat.S_IMODE(parent_info.st_mode) != expected_parent_mode
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_permissions_rejected")
if (
file_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
or stat.S_IMODE(file_info.st_mode) != expected_file_mode
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_permissions_rejected")
if expected_group_gid is not None and (
parent_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid or file_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected")
if file_info.st_size <= 0 or file_info.st_size > MAX_POLICY_BYTES:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_size_rejected")
raw = lexical.read_bytes()
try:
document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_json_rejected") from None
canonical = _canonical_json(document)
if raw != canonical:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_not_canonical")
return _parse_policy(document, canonical)
@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def configured_path_policy() -> ServicePathPolicy | None:
configured = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_PATH_POLICY_FILE", "").strip()
if not configured:
return None
if not Path(configured).is_absolute():
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_path_rejected")
try:
gitops_gid = grp.getgrnam("gitops").gr_gid
except KeyError:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected") from None
loaded = load_path_policy(Path(configured), expected_group_gid=gitops_gid)
if loaded.audience != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_audience_rejected")
if loaded.repository_identity != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_repository_rejected")
if loaded.allowed_branch != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", ""):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_branch_rejected")
return loaded
def clear_path_policy_cache() -> None:
configured_path_policy.cache_clear()
def require_service_path(operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
loaded = configured_path_policy()
if loaded is None:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_policy_required")
return loaded.require_exact_path(operation, path)
def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
loaded = configured_path_policy()
return None if loaded is None else loaded.sha256
def validate_content(operation: str, path: str, content: str) -> None:
selected = require_service_path(operation, path)
try:
encoded = content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
except (AttributeError, UnicodeEncodeError):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
if len(encoded) > selected.max_content_bytes:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_content_too_large")
if selected.content_profile == "systemd-codex-review-worker-v1":
_validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content)
return
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
def _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content: str) -> None:
if not isinstance(content, str):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
try:
content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
except UnicodeEncodeError:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
if (
"\x00" in content
or "\r" in content
or _SECRET_RE.search(content)
or not content.endswith("\n")
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
sections: set[str] = set()
values: dict[tuple[str, str], list[str]] = {}
section: str | None = None
for line in content.splitlines():
if len(line.encode("utf-8")) > _SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
if not line:
continue
if line[0].isspace() or line.startswith(("#", ";")):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
if line.startswith("[") and line.endswith("]"):
candidate = line[1:-1]
if (
not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(candidate)
or candidate not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES
or candidate in sections
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
sections.add(candidate)
section = candidate
continue
if section is None or "=" not in line:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
directive, value = line.split("=", 1)
if (
not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(directive)
or directive not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES[section]
or not value
or value != value.strip()
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
key = (section, directive)
if key in values and key not in _SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
values.setdefault(key, []).append(value)
if sections != set(_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
if set(values) != set(_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES) | set(
_SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES
):
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES.items():
if values.get(key) != [expected]:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES.items():
observed = values.get(key, [])
if len(observed) != len(set(observed)) or tuple(observed) != expected:
raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
"""Digest-only, task-scoped token registry for isolated writers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
import grp
import pwd
import secrets
import sqlite3
import stat
import threading
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
_REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
def utc_now() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
def token_digest(token: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
class TokenRegistry:
def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
self.path = Path(path)
self._prepare()
def _prepare(self) -> None:
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
raise PermissionError("writer_token_registry_symlink_rejected")
with _REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK:
with self._connect() as db:
db.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_grants (
token_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
token_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_uses (
token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
operation TEXT NOT NULL,
use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
PRIMARY KEY(token_id, operation),
FOREIGN KEY(token_id) REFERENCES token_grants(token_id)
);
"""
)
os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
db.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
return db
def issue(self, grant: dict[str, Any], token: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
value = token or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
if len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
raise ValueError("writer_token_entropy_insufficient")
record = dict(grant)
record["schema_version"] = 2
record["token_digest"] = token_digest(value)
record["revoked"] = False
record.setdefault("created_at", utc_now())
required = (
"token_id",
"audience",
"task_id",
"source_cidrs",
"allowed_branch",
"approved_base_oid",
"allowed_operations",
"allowed_paths",
"not_before",
"expires_at",
"max_uses",
"issued_by",
)
if any(not record.get(field) for field in required):
raise ValueError("writer_token_grant_incomplete")
encoded = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
with self._connect() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
db.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO token_grants(token_id, token_digest, grant_json, revoked, created_at)
VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)
""",
(
str(record["token_id"]),
str(record["token_digest"]),
encoded,
0,
str(record["created_at"]),
),
)
db.execute("COMMIT")
except Exception:
db.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
return value, record
def find(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
candidate = token_digest(token)
with self._connect() as db:
rows = db.execute(
"SELECT token_digest, grant_json, revoked FROM token_grants"
).fetchall()
match = None
for row in rows:
if hmac.compare_digest(str(row["token_digest"]), candidate):
match = dict(json.loads(str(row["grant_json"])))
match["revoked"] = bool(row["revoked"])
return match
def consume(self, token_id: str, operation: str, maximum: int) -> int:
if maximum < 1:
raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
with self._connect() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
try:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT revoked FROM token_grants WHERE token_id=?",
(token_id,),
).fetchone()
if row is None or bool(row["revoked"]):
raise PermissionError("writer_token_revoked")
used_row = db.execute(
"SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
(token_id, operation),
).fetchone()
used = int(used_row["use_count"]) if used_row else 0
if used >= maximum:
raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
current = used + 1
db.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO token_uses(token_id, operation, use_count)
VALUES(?,?,?)
ON CONFLICT(token_id, operation)
DO UPDATE SET use_count=excluded.use_count
""",
(token_id, operation, current),
)
db.execute("COMMIT")
return current
except Exception:
db.execute("ROLLBACK")
raise
def revoke(self, token_id: str) -> bool:
with self._connect() as db:
db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
changed = db.execute(
"UPDATE token_grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_id=? AND revoked=0",
(token_id,),
).rowcount
db.execute("COMMIT")
return bool(changed)
def usage(self, token_id: str, operation: str) -> int:
with self._connect() as db:
row = db.execute(
"SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
(token_id, operation),
).fetchone()
return int(row["use_count"]) if row else 0
def _write_secret_file(
path: Path,
token: str,
*,
owner: str | None = None,
group: str | None = None,
) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_symlink_rejected")
flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
try:
if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_not_regular")
if owner is not None or group is not None:
uid = pwd.getpwnam(owner).pw_uid if owner is not None else -1
gid = grp.getgrnam(group).gr_gid if group is not None else -1
os.fchown(fd, uid, gid)
os.write(fd, token.encode("utf-8"))
os.fsync(fd)
finally:
os.close(fd)
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--registry", required=True)
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
issue.add_argument("--grant-file", required=True)
issue.add_argument("--token-file", required=True)
issue.add_argument("--owner")
issue.add_argument("--group")
revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
revoke.add_argument("--token-id", required=True)
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
registry = TokenRegistry(args.registry)
if args.command == "issue":
grant = json.loads(Path(args.grant_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
token, record = registry.issue(grant)
_write_secret_file(
Path(args.token_file),
token,
owner=args.owner,
group=args.group,
)
print(json.dumps({"token_id": record["token_id"], "created": True}, sort_keys=True))
return 0
changed = registry.revoke(args.token_id)
print(json.dumps({"token_id": args.token_id, "revoked": changed}, sort_keys=True))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,564 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Execution-readiness adapters and the fail-closed Shadow controller service."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import base64
import dataclasses
import hashlib
import json
import os
import subprocess
import threading
import time
from http import HTTPStatus
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
Ed25519PrivateKey,
)
from silent_release_controller import _sanitize, utc_now
from silent_release_hardening import (
BuilderAttestation,
CapabilityAuthorizationError,
ReleaseRecoveryWorker,
SignedApprovalVerifier,
SignedReleasePlanApproval,
SilentReleaseActionService,
TrustedCandidateBundle,
_canonical_json,
_durable_json,
_safe_child,
)
class BuilderSigner(Protocol):
@property
def key_id(self) -> str:
...
def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
...
class LocalTestBuilderSigner:
"""Ephemeral in-memory signer. It is forbidden for production execution."""
test_only = True
def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
self._key_id = str(key_id)
self._private_key = private_key
@property
def key_id(self) -> str:
return self._key_id
@classmethod
def generate(
cls, key_id: str = "shadow-builder-test-key"
) -> "LocalTestBuilderSigner":
return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
@property
def public_key(self):
return self._private_key.public_key()
def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
return self._private_key.sign(payload)
class ExternalKmsBuilderSigner:
"""Signer facade whose private operation remains in KMS/HSM."""
def __init__(
self,
key_id: str,
credential_reference: str,
sign_callback: Callable[[str, bytes], bytes],
):
if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
):
raise ValueError("production builder requires a KMS/HSM reference")
self._key_id = str(key_id)
self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
self._sign_callback = sign_callback
@property
def key_id(self) -> str:
return self._key_id
def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
return bytes(self._sign_callback(self.credential_reference, payload))
class SignedTrustedBuilderAdapter:
"""Signs evidence produced by a trusted collector, never caller evidence."""
def __init__(
self,
collector: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], TrustedCandidateBundle],
signer: BuilderSigner,
):
self.collector = collector
self.signer = signer
def build(self, intent: Mapping[str, Any]) -> TrustedCandidateBundle:
forbidden = {
"artifact_sha256",
"canary",
"checks",
"manifest_sha256",
"tests",
"tree_oid",
}
if forbidden.intersection(intent):
raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
"trusted builder rejects caller-supplied evidence"
)
unsigned = self.collector(dict(intent))
if unsigned.attestation is not None:
raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
"collector cannot self-attest its evidence"
)
candidate = unsigned.candidate
test_sha = hashlib.sha256(
_canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.tests))
).hexdigest()
canary_sha = hashlib.sha256(
_canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.canary))
).hexdigest()
attestation_id = "builder-attestation-" + hashlib.sha256(
(
candidate.candidate_id
+ "\0"
+ candidate.source_commit
+ "\0"
+ candidate.artifact_sha256
).encode("utf-8")
).hexdigest()[:24]
attestation = BuilderAttestation(
builder_attestation_id=attestation_id,
builder_key_id=self.signer.key_id,
source_commit=candidate.source_commit,
tree_oid=candidate.tree_oid,
artifact_sha256=candidate.artifact_sha256,
manifest_sha256=candidate.manifest_sha256,
package_closure_sha256=(
unsigned.release_plan.deployment.package_closure_sha256
),
test_evidence_sha256=test_sha,
canary_evidence_sha256=canary_sha,
issued_at=utc_now(),
signature="",
)
attestation = dataclasses.replace(
attestation,
signature=base64.b64encode(
self.signer.sign(attestation.canonical_bytes())
).decode("ascii"),
)
return dataclasses.replace(unsigned, attestation=attestation)
class ApprovalBackendAdapter(Protocol):
@property
def available(self) -> bool:
...
def verify(
self,
approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
*,
candidate,
release_plan,
policy_sha256: str,
) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
...
class LocalTestApprovalSigner:
"""Test-only approval signer used solely for Shadow acceptance."""
test_only = True
def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
self.key_id = str(key_id)
self.private_key = private_key
@classmethod
def generate(
cls, key_id: str = "shadow-owner-test-key"
) -> "LocalTestApprovalSigner":
return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
def sign(
self, approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval
) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
unsigned = dataclasses.replace(
approval, key_id=self.key_id, signature=""
)
return dataclasses.replace(
unsigned,
signature=base64.b64encode(
self.private_key.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes())
).decode("ascii"),
)
class ProductionApprovalBackendAdapter:
"""Verification-only production adapter configured by a secret/KMS ref."""
def __init__(
self,
verifier: SignedApprovalVerifier,
credential_reference: str,
):
if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
):
raise ValueError(
"production approval backend requires a KMS/secret reference"
)
self.verifier = verifier
self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
@property
def available(self) -> bool:
return True
def verify(
self,
approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
*,
candidate,
release_plan,
policy_sha256: str,
) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
return self.verifier.verify_release_plan(
approval, candidate, release_plan, policy_sha256
)
class UnavailableProductionApprovalBackend:
credential_reference = None
@property
def available(self) -> bool:
return False
def verify(self, *args, **kwargs):
raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
"production approval backend is not configured"
)
class LeaderLock:
def __init__(self, path: Path):
self.path = Path(path)
self.handle = None
def __enter__(self):
self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
os.chmod(self.path.parent, 0o700)
self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
try:
import fcntl
fcntl.flock(
self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB
)
except BlockingIOError as exc:
self.handle.close()
self.handle = None
raise RuntimeError("silent release leader is already active") from exc
return self
def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
if self.handle is not None:
try:
import fcntl
fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
finally:
self.handle.close()
self.handle = None
class PersistentSilentReleaseController:
"""Idempotent main-event controller with durable startup/recovery reports."""
def __init__(
self,
root: Path,
service: SilentReleaseActionService,
*,
main_probe: Callable[[], str],
recovery_worker: ReleaseRecoveryWorker | None = None,
):
self.root = Path(root)
self.service = service
self.main_probe = main_probe
self.recovery_worker = recovery_worker
self.leader_path = self.root / "controller.leader.lock"
self.status_path = self.root / "controller-status.json"
def startup_verify(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
checked = 0
failed = 0
for journal in sorted(self.service.sagas.root.glob("*.events.jsonl")):
candidate_id = journal.name[: -len(".events.jsonl")]
saga = self.service.sagas.load(candidate_id)
checked += 1
if not saga.journal_integrity:
failed += 1
status = {
"checked_sagas": checked,
"execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
"failed_closed": failed,
"shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
"side_effects_executed": False,
"status": "READY" if failed == 0 else "FAIL_CLOSED",
}
_durable_json(self.status_path, status)
return status
def run_once(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
with LeaderLock(self.leader_path):
startup = self.startup_verify()
if startup["status"] != "READY":
result = {
"execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
"intent": None,
"notification": None,
"recovery": None,
"shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
"side_effects_executed": False,
"startup": startup,
"status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
}
_durable_json(self.status_path, result)
return _sanitize(result)
source_commit = str(self.main_probe())
event_id = f"main-{source_commit}"
intent = self.service.create_release_intent(
{"event_id": event_id, "source_commit": source_commit}
)
notification = None
if intent.get("candidate_id"):
notification = self.service.ensure_owner_notification(
str(intent["candidate_id"])
)
recovery = (
self.recovery_worker.run_once()
if self.recovery_worker is not None
else self.service.get_recovery_status()
)
result = {
"execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
"intent": intent,
"notification": notification,
"recovery": recovery,
"shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
"side_effects_executed": False,
"startup": startup,
}
_durable_json(self.status_path, result)
return _sanitize(result)
class ShadowActionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
service: SilentReleaseActionService
controller: PersistentSilentReleaseController
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
return
def _json(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any], status=HTTPStatus.OK):
body = json.dumps(_sanitize(dict(payload)), sort_keys=True).encode()
self.send_response(int(status))
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
size = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
if size > 1024 * 1024:
raise ValueError("request body is too large")
return json.loads(self.rfile.read(size) or b"{}")
def do_GET(self):
parsed = urlparse(self.path)
query = parse_qs(parsed.query)
candidate_id = str((query.get("candidate_id") or [""])[0])
try:
if parsed.path == "/healthz":
return self._json(
{
"execution_enabled": False,
"shadow_mode": True,
"side_effects_executed": False,
"status": "ok",
}
)
routes = {
"/getReleaseCandidate": self.service.get_release_candidate,
"/getReleasePlan": self.service.get_release_plan,
"/getReleaseAcceptance": self.service.get_acceptance,
"/getReleaseSaga": self.service.get_release_saga,
"/getCapabilityStatus": self.service.get_capability_status,
}
if parsed.path in routes:
return self._json(routes[parsed.path](candidate_id))
if parsed.path == "/getRecoveryStatus":
return self._json(self.service.get_recovery_status())
self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as exc:
self._json(
{"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
)
def do_POST(self):
parsed = urlparse(self.path)
try:
body = self._body()
if parsed.path == "/createReleaseIntent":
return self._json(self.service.create_release_intent(body))
if parsed.path in {
"/submitSignedApproval",
"/submitOwnerApproval",
}:
return self._json(self.service.submit_owner_approval(body))
if parsed.path == "/startDeployment":
return self._json(
self.service.start_deployment(
str(body.get("candidate_id") or "")
)
)
self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError, CapabilityAuthorizationError) as exc:
self._json(
{"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
)
def git_main_probe(repository: Path) -> Callable[[], str]:
repository = Path(repository)
def probe() -> str:
completed = subprocess.run(
[
"git",
f"--git-dir={repository}",
"rev-parse",
"refs/heads/main",
],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=15,
env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
)
return completed.stdout.strip()
return probe
def serve_shadow(
*,
state_root: Path,
repository: Path,
host: str,
port: int,
poll_seconds: float,
) -> None:
service = SilentReleaseActionService.shadow(state_root)
controller = PersistentSilentReleaseController(
state_root,
service,
main_probe=git_main_probe(repository),
)
controller.run_once()
stop = threading.Event()
def controller_loop() -> None:
while not stop.wait(poll_seconds):
try:
controller.run_once()
except Exception as exc: # fail closed and keep the API available
_durable_json(
controller.status_path,
{
"error": type(exc).__name__,
"execution_enabled": False,
"shadow_mode": True,
"side_effects_executed": False,
"status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
},
)
handler = type(
"ConfiguredShadowActionHandler",
(ShadowActionHandler,),
{"service": service, "controller": controller},
)
server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
api_thread = threading.Thread(
target=server.serve_forever,
name="silent-release-shadow-api",
daemon=False,
)
controller_thread = threading.Thread(
target=controller_loop,
name="silent-release-shadow-controller",
daemon=True,
)
api_thread.start()
controller_thread.start()
try:
while api_thread.is_alive():
api_thread.join(timeout=1)
finally:
stop.set()
server.shutdown()
server.server_close()
controller_thread.join(timeout=max(1.0, poll_seconds + 1.0))
def main() -> None:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
parser.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
parser.add_argument("--port", default=18891, type=int)
parser.add_argument("--poll-seconds", default=30.0, type=float)
arguments = parser.parse_args()
if arguments.poll_seconds <= 0:
raise SystemExit("poll seconds must be positive")
if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
raise SystemExit("GitOps writes must remain disabled")
if (
os.environ.get(
"AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED", "false"
).lower()
!= "false"
):
raise SystemExit("Silent Release execution must remain disabled")
serve_shadow(
state_root=arguments.state_root,
repository=arguments.repository,
host=arguments.host,
port=arguments.port,
poll_seconds=arguments.poll_seconds,
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
"""Task Plane runtime package."""
from .models import (
EvidenceEnvelope,
ProbeEvidence,
ProbeOutcome,
TaskPlan,
TaskRecord,
TaskStatus,
TaskStateTransitionError,
)
__all__ = [
"EvidenceEnvelope",
"ProbeEvidence",
"ProbeOutcome",
"TaskPlan",
"TaskRecord",
"TaskStatus",
"TaskStateTransitionError",
]
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
"""Adapters for executing tasks via worker backends."""
from .base import WorkerAdapter
from .openclaw import OpenClawAdapter
from .codex import CodexAdapter
from .hermes import HermesAdapter
from .a2a import A2AAdapter
from .systemd_worker import SystemdWorkerAdapter
__all__ = [
"WorkerAdapter",
"OpenClawAdapter",
"CodexAdapter",
"HermesAdapter",
"A2AAdapter",
"SystemdWorkerAdapter",
]
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from .base import WorkerAdapter
class A2AAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
worker_name = "a2a"
def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
return ["task.exchange", "agent.handoff"]
def claim(self, task):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
def execute(self, task, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
def heartbeat(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
def probe(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
def cancel(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
def collect_result(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
"""Base worker adapter contract."""
from __future__ import annotations
import abc
class WorkerAdapter(abc.ABC):
worker_name = "base"
@abc.abstractmethod
def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
raise NotImplementedError
@abc.abstractmethod
def claim(self, task):
raise NotImplementedError
@abc.abstractmethod
def execute(self, task, claim):
raise NotImplementedError
@abc.abstractmethod
def heartbeat(self, claim):
raise NotImplementedError
@abc.abstractmethod
def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
raise NotImplementedError
@abc.abstractmethod
def probe(self, claim):
raise NotImplementedError
@abc.abstractmethod
def cancel(self, claim):
raise NotImplementedError
@abc.abstractmethod
def collect_result(self, claim):
raise NotImplementedError
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from .base import WorkerAdapter
class CodexAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
worker_name = "codex"
def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.python", "review.security"]
def claim(self, task):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
def execute(self, task, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
def heartbeat(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
def probe(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
def cancel(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
def collect_result(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from .base import WorkerAdapter
class HermesAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
worker_name = "hermes"
def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
return ["architecture.review", "policy.review", "threat.model"]
def claim(self, task):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
def execute(self, task, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
def heartbeat(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
def probe(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
def cancel(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
def collect_result(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from .base import WorkerAdapter
class OpenClawAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
worker_name = "openclaw"
def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.execute", "runtime.shadow"]
def claim(self, task):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
def execute(self, task, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
def heartbeat(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
def probe(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
def cancel(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
def collect_result(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from .base import WorkerAdapter
class SystemdWorkerAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
worker_name = "systemd_worker"
def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
return ["systemd.exec", "runtime.shell"]
def claim(self, task):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
def execute(self, task, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
def heartbeat(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
def probe(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
def cancel(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
def collect_result(self, claim):
return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
"""Agent registry abstraction."""
from __future__ import annotations
from .errors import NotFoundError
class AgentRegistry:
def __init__(self):
self._agents: dict[str, dict] = {}
def register(self, agent_id: str, metadata: dict) -> None:
self._agents[agent_id] = {"agent_id": agent_id, **metadata}
def unregister(self, agent_id: str) -> None:
if agent_id not in self._agents:
raise NotFoundError("agent")
del self._agents[agent_id]
def list(self) -> list[dict]:
return list(self._agents.values())
def get(self, agent_id: str) -> dict:
try:
return self._agents[agent_id]
except KeyError:
raise NotFoundError("agent")
-557
View File
@@ -1,557 +0,0 @@
"""Task Plane HTTP API implementation (stdlib-only)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import time
import uuid
import urllib.parse
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from typing import Any, Callable
from .delegation import DelegationEngine
from .errors import (
ConflictError,
ForbiddenError,
NotFoundError,
PayloadTooLargeError,
TaskPlaneHTTPError,
UnauthorizedError,
ValidationError,
)
from .evidence import EvidenceService
from .journal import TaskJournal
from .lease import LeaseManager
from .models import (
EvidenceEnvelope,
ResultEnvelope,
TaskPlan,
TaskRecord,
iso8601_now,
contains_secret_text,
validate_identifier,
)
from .policy import PolicyEngine
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry
def _json_payload(data: dict[str, Any], status: int = 200) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
body = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
return status, body
def _bounded_int(value: Any, name: str, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
try:
number = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}") from exc
if not minimum <= number <= maximum:
raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}")
return number
class TaskPlaneService:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore, policy: PolicyEngine | None = None):
self.store = store
self.policy = policy or PolicyEngine(
execution_enabled=False,
identity_capabilities={
"anon": {"task.creator", "task.read", "task.audit"}
},
)
self.journal = TaskJournal(store)
self.lease = LeaseManager(store)
self.workers = WorkerRegistry(store)
self.evidence = EvidenceService(store)
self.delegation = DelegationEngine(store)
self.store.probe_attestation_verifier = self.policy.probe_attestation_verifier
def create_task(self, body: dict[str, Any], idempotency_key: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
if body.get("parent_task_id"):
raise ForbiddenError("child tasks must use the delegate endpoint")
issuer = body.get("issuer", {})
actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
self.policy.assert_allowed("create", actor)
try:
plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid task plan") from exc
task = self.store.create_task_with_event(plan, idempotency_key=idempotency_key)
return task.to_dict()
def list_tasks(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if actor is not None:
self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
return [task.to_dict(include_task=False) for task in self.store.list_tasks()]
def get_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
if actor is not None:
self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
return self.store.get_task(task_id).to_dict()
def get_worker(self, worker_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
if actor is not None:
self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
return self.workers.get(worker_id).to_dict()
def list_workers(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if actor is not None:
self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
return [w.to_dict() for w in self.workers.list()]
def register_worker(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
actor = str(body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("identity") or "")
is_admin = actor in self.policy.admin_identities
try:
existing = self.store.get_worker(str(body.get("worker_id") or ""))
except NotFoundError:
existing = None
if existing is not None and str(body.get("identity") or "") != existing.identity:
raise ConflictError("worker identity takeover rejected")
self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_registration(actor, body)
self.policy.assert_allowed(
"worker.admin" if is_admin else "worker.register", actor
)
try:
worker = self.workers.register(
body,
actor_identity=actor,
is_admin=is_admin,
expected_revision=body.get("expected_revision"),
)
except (TypeError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid worker registration") from exc
return worker.to_dict()
def worker_heartbeat(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
interval = payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds")
actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, worker_id)
self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.register", actor)
return self.workers.heartbeat(
worker_id,
heartbeat_interval_seconds=interval,
actor_identity=actor,
expected_revision=payload.get("expected_revision"),
).to_dict()
def disable_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
return self.store.disable_worker(
worker_id,
actor_identity=actor,
expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
reason=str(payload.get("reason") or "disabled by administrator"),
).to_dict()
def restore_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
return self.store.restore_worker(
worker_id,
actor_identity=actor,
expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
).to_dict()
def claim(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor)
worker_id = body.get("worker_id")
if not worker_id:
raise ValidationError("worker_id required")
task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, str(worker_id))
self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor, task=task)
lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
)
claim = self.lease.claim(
task_id=task_id,
worker_id=worker_id,
worker_identity=actor,
lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
expected_revision=task.revision,
operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
)
return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, **claim.to_dict()}
def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
if not claim_id:
raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
self.policy.assert_allowed("heartbeat", actor, task=task)
if claim.worker_identity != actor:
raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
)
claim = self.lease.heartbeat(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
return {"claim_id": claim_id, "lease_until": claim.lease_until}
def progress(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
if not claim_id:
raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
progress = body.get("progress")
stage = body.get("stage", "RUNNING")
message = body.get("message")
if progress is None:
raise ValidationError("progress required")
task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
self.policy.assert_allowed("progress", actor, task=task)
if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
if message not in {None, ""} or contains_secret_text(stage):
raise ValidationError(
"credential-secret progress must contain metadata only"
)
lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
)
claim = self.store.record_progress(
task_id,
claim_id,
actor,
progress=progress,
stage=str(stage),
message=None if message is None else str(message),
lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
)
return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status, "progress": progress}
def complete(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
if not claim_id:
raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
status = body.get("status", "COMPLETED")
outputs = body.get("outputs", [])
evidences = body.get("evidence", [])
if not isinstance(outputs, list):
raise ValidationError("outputs must be list")
if not isinstance(evidences, list):
raise ValidationError("evidence must be list")
if any(not isinstance(ev, dict) for ev in evidences):
raise ValidationError("evidence items must be objects")
claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
self.policy.assert_allowed("result", actor, task=task)
if claim.worker_identity != actor:
raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
allowed_result_keys = {
"kind",
"hash",
"sha256",
"count",
"status",
"error_code",
"signature",
"attestation_ref",
}
for entry in [*outputs, *evidences]:
if (
not isinstance(entry, dict)
or set(entry) - allowed_result_keys
or contains_secret_text(entry)
):
raise ValidationError(
"credential-secret result must contain hash/count/status only"
)
result = ResultEnvelope(
task_id=task_id,
claim_id=claim_id,
worker_identity=actor,
status=status,
outputs=outputs,
evidence=evidences,
started_at=str(body.get("started_at") or iso8601_now()),
completed_at=str(body.get("completed_at") or iso8601_now()),
result_digest=body.get("result_digest"),
signature=body.get("signature"),
attestation_ref=body.get("attestation_ref"),
operation_digest=claim.operation_digest,
)
evidence_decision = self.policy.evidence_verifier.verify(task, evidences)
if not evidence_decision.allowed:
raise ForbiddenError(evidence_decision.reason)
result_decision = self.policy.verify_result(result, task)
if not result_decision.allowed:
raise ForbiddenError(result_decision.reason)
result.result_digest = result.computed_digest()
previous = self.store._last_evidence_hash(task_id)
evidence_entries = []
for evidence in evidences:
envelope = EvidenceEnvelope.create(
task_id=task_id,
claim_id=claim_id,
kind=str(evidence.get("kind") or evidence.get("type") or "generic"),
worker_identity=actor,
payload=evidence,
previous_evidence_hash=previous,
signature=evidence.get("signature"),
attestation_ref=evidence.get("attestation_ref"),
)
evidence_entries.append(envelope)
previous = envelope.evidence_digest
self.store.complete_claim_with_evidence_and_event(
task_id,
claim_id,
status
if status
in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "CANCELLED"}
else "COMPLETED",
result.to_dict(),
evidence_entries,
)
return result.to_dict()
def fail(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
if not claim_id:
raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
reason = body.get("reason", "failed")
actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor)
task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor, task=task)
claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
if claim.worker_identity != actor:
raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
status = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" if body.get("recoverable", False) else "FAILED_FINAL"
self.store.fail_claim_with_event(task_id, claim_id, status, str(reason))
return {"task_id": task_id, "status": status, "reason": reason}
def cancel(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "owner"
self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor)
reason = body.get("reason", "cancelled")
task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor, task=task)
updated = self.store.cancel_task_with_event(
task_id, task.revision, reason=reason
)
return updated.to_dict()
def delegate(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
actor = body.get("actor_identity") or "owner"
self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor)
parent = self.store.get_task(task_id)
self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor, task=parent)
if "task" in body:
try:
child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body["task"])
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
else:
plan_body = dict(body)
plan_body.pop("actor_identity", None)
try:
child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(plan_body)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
child_plan.parent_task_id = task_id
child = self.delegation.delegate(task_id, child_plan, caller=actor)
return child.to_dict()
def get_events(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if actor is not None:
self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
self.store.get_task(task_id)
return self.store.list_events(task_id)
def get_evidence(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if actor is not None:
self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
self.store.get_task(task_id)
return self.evidence.list(task_id)
def get_children(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
if actor is not None:
self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
self.store.get_task(task_id)
return self.store.list_children(task_id)
class TaskPlaneRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
service: TaskPlaneService | None = None
authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None
max_body_bytes = 1_000_000
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
# BaseHTTPRequestHandler logs the raw request target; suppress it so
# attacker-controlled paths or query strings cannot leak credentials.
return
def _json(self) -> tuple[str | None, dict[str, Any]]:
try:
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid content length") from exc
if length < 0:
raise ValidationError("invalid content length")
if length > self.max_body_bytes:
raise PayloadTooLargeError("payload exceeds limit")
raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
if not raw:
return None, {}
try:
decoded = raw.decode("utf-8")
payload = json.loads(decoded)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValidationError("JSON payload must be an object")
return decoded, payload
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid JSON payload") from exc
def _response(self, status: int, payload: Any) -> None:
encoded = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(encoded)
def _authenticated_identity(self) -> str:
authenticator = type(self).authenticator
if authenticator is None:
raise UnauthorizedError("authentication unavailable")
header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
if not header.startswith("Bearer "):
raise UnauthorizedError("bearer authentication required")
token = header[7:]
if not token or any(ord(ch) < 33 for ch in token):
raise UnauthorizedError("invalid bearer token")
identity = authenticator(token)
if not identity:
raise UnauthorizedError("invalid credentials")
return str(identity)
def _handle(self, handler):
try:
if self.service is None:
raise TaskPlaneHTTPError("service not configured")
result = handler()
if isinstance(result, tuple):
status, payload = result
else:
status, payload = 200, result
self._response(status, payload)
except TaskPlaneHTTPError as exc:
self._response(exc.status_code, exc.to_payload())
except Exception as exc: # defensive
if isinstance(exc, TaskPlaneHTTPError):
raise
self._response(
500,
{"error": "internal_error", "message": "internal server error"},
)
def do_GET(self): # noqa: N802
def route():
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
for part in parts[1:]:
if part not in {"events", "evidence", "children", "heartbeat"}:
try:
validate_identifier(part, "resource identifier")
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValidationError("invalid resource identifier") from exc
identity = self._authenticated_identity()
if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
return 200, self.service.list_tasks(identity)
if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "tasks":
task_id = parts[1]
return 200, self.service.get_task(task_id, identity)
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "events":
return 200, self.service.get_events(parts[1], identity)
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "evidence":
return 200, self.service.get_evidence(parts[1], identity)
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "children":
return 200, self.service.get_children(parts[1], identity)
if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "workers":
return 200, self.service.list_workers(identity)
if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers":
return 200, self.service.get_worker(parts[1], identity)
raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
self._handle(route)
def do_POST(self): # noqa: N802
def route():
body_text, body = self._json()
identity = self._authenticated_identity()
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in self.headers.items()}
if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
issuer = body.get("issuer")
if issuer and (
not isinstance(issuer, dict) or issuer.get("id") != identity
):
raise ForbiddenError("issuer identity mismatch")
body["issuer"] = {"type": "authenticated", "id": identity}
return 201, self.service.create_task(body or {}, headers.get("idempotency-key"))
if body.get("actor_identity") not in {None, identity}:
raise ForbiddenError("actor identity mismatch")
body["actor_identity"] = identity
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "claim":
return 200, self.service.claim(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
return 200, self.service.heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "progress":
return 200, self.service.progress(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "result":
return 200, self.service.complete(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "fail":
return 200, self.service.fail(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "cancel":
return 200, self.service.cancel(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "delegate":
return 200, self.service.delegate(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[1] == "register":
if (
body.get("identity") != identity
and identity not in self.service.policy.admin_identities
):
raise ForbiddenError("worker identity mismatch")
return 201, self.service.register_worker(body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
return 200, self.service.worker_heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "disable":
return 200, self.service.disable_worker(parts[1], body or {})
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "restore":
return 200, self.service.restore_worker(parts[1], body or {})
raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
self._handle(route)
def run_server(
host: str,
port: int,
service: TaskPlaneService,
*,
authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None,
):
handler = TaskPlaneRequestHandler
handler.service = service
handler.authenticator = authenticator
server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
server.serve_forever()
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
"""Capability matcher helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
from fnmatch import fnmatch
def _normalize_capability(capability: str) -> str:
return capability.strip().lower()
def capability_matches(granted: str, required: str) -> bool:
granted = _normalize_capability(granted)
required = _normalize_capability(required)
if granted == required:
return True
# A granted wildcard such as "test.*" should match required "test.unit"
if "*" in granted:
return fnmatch(required, granted)
# A required wildcard is treated as a suffix/prefix requirement for callers.
if "*" in required:
return fnmatch(granted, required)
return False
def has_capabilities(granted_caps: list[str], required_caps: list[str]) -> bool:
granted = [_normalize_capability(c) for c in granted_caps]
for required in required_caps:
required = _normalize_capability(required)
if not any(capability_matches(g, required) for g in granted):
return False
return True
def normalize_capabilities(caps: list[str]) -> list[str]:
return sorted({_normalize_capability(cap) for cap in caps})
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
"""Delegation guardrails."""
from __future__ import annotations
from .errors import ConflictError, ForbiddenError, NotFoundError
from .models import Budget, TaskPlan, TaskRecord
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
class DelegationEngine:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
self.store = store
def can_delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan) -> bool:
parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
if parent.status == "COMPLETED":
raise ConflictError("cannot delegate completed task")
if parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth <= 0:
raise ConflictError("max delegation depth not configured")
depth = self._depth(parent_id)
if depth >= parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth:
raise ConflictError("max delegation depth reached")
if child_plan.parent_task_id not in {None, parent_id}:
raise ConflictError("delegation parent mismatch")
current = parent_id
while current:
if child_plan.task_id and current == child_plan.task_id:
raise ConflictError("delegation cycle")
current = self.store.parent_of(current)
return True
def delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan, *, caller: str) -> TaskRecord:
self.can_delegate(parent_id, child_plan)
parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
if child_plan.required_capabilities and not set(child_plan.required_capabilities).issubset(
set(parent.task_plan.required_capabilities or [])
):
raise ForbiddenError("child capabilities exceed parent constraints")
risk_rank = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
if risk_rank.get(child_plan.risk, 99) > risk_rank.get(parent.task_plan.risk, -1):
raise ForbiddenError("child risk exceeds parent constraints")
child_plan.parent_task_id = parent_id
child_plan.correlation_id = parent.task_plan.correlation_id or parent.task_id
child_plan.preferred_workers = parent.task_plan.preferred_workers
child_plan.max_delegation_depth = min(
child_plan.max_delegation_depth,
parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth,
)
child_plan.approval_policy = parent.task_plan.approval_policy
parent_budget = self.store.get_task_budget(parent_id)
required = Budget()
for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
available = getattr(parent_budget, name)
requested = getattr(child_plan.budgets, name)
if name == "attempts" and requested is None:
requested = 1
if available is not None:
requested = 0 if requested is None else requested
if requested > available:
raise ConflictError(f"budget exceeded for {name}")
setattr(child_plan.budgets, name, requested)
setattr(required, name, requested)
# A retried identical delegation is a read, not a second budget charge.
if child_plan.task_id:
try:
existing = self.store.get_task(child_plan.task_id)
except NotFoundError:
existing = None
if existing is not None:
if (
existing.task_plan.parent_task_id == parent_id
and existing.task_plan.operation_digest()
== child_plan.operation_digest()
):
return existing
raise ConflictError("delegation task_id conflict")
return self.store.delegate_task_with_budget_and_events(
parent_id, child_plan, caller=caller
)
def _depth(self, task_id: str) -> int:
return self.store._compute_depth(task_id)
-71
View File
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
"""Error types for task plane operations."""
from __future__ import annotations
class TaskPlaneError(Exception):
"""Base exception for API-compatible failures."""
status_code = 500
error_code = "task_plane_error"
def __init__(self, message: str, *, code: str | None = None, details: dict | None = None):
super().__init__(message)
self.message = message
self.details = details or {}
if code:
self.error_code = code
def to_payload(self) -> dict:
return {"error": self.error_code, "message": self.message, "details": self.details}
class TaskPlaneHTTPError(TaskPlaneError):
"""Base class with explicit HTTP status."""
status_code = 500
class ValidationError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 400
error_code = "validation_error"
class UnauthorizedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 401
error_code = "unauthorized"
class ForbiddenError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 403
error_code = "forbidden"
class NotFoundError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 404
error_code = "not_found"
class ConflictError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 409
error_code = "conflict"
class PayloadTooLargeError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 413
error_code = "payload_too_large"
class FailedDependencyError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 424
error_code = "failed_dependency"
class LockedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 423
error_code = "locked"
class ServiceUnavailableError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
status_code = 503
error_code = "service_unavailable"
-108
View File
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
"""CloudEvents-compatible event envelope and durable outbox helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Callable, Protocol
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
@dataclass
class CloudEvent:
specversion: str = "1.0"
id: str = ""
type: str = ""
source: str = "spiffe://aios/task-plane"
subject: str = ""
datacontenttype: str = "application/json"
data: dict | None = None
@property
def time(self) -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
def asdict(self) -> dict:
return {
"specversion": self.specversion,
"id": self.id,
"type": self.type,
"source": self.source,
"subject": self.subject,
"time": self.time,
"datacontenttype": self.datacontenttype,
"data": self.data or {},
}
NOT_DELIVERED = "NOT_DELIVERED"
DELIVERED = "DELIVERED"
FAILED_DELIVERY = "FAILED"
class NotificationAdapter(Protocol):
name: str
def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
"""Return a provider receipt, or None when delivery is unconfirmed."""
class CallbackNotificationAdapter:
"""Adapter seam for webhook, NATS, GPT, dashboard, and WeChat transports."""
def __init__(self, name: str, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
self.name = name
self._callback = callback
def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
return self._callback(envelope)
class WebhookAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
super().__init__("webhook", callback)
class NatsJetStreamAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
super().__init__("nats-jetstream", callback)
class GPTResultCallbackAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
super().__init__("gpt-result-callback", callback)
class DashboardAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
super().__init__("dashboard", callback)
class WeChatGatewayAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
super().__init__("wechat-gateway", callback)
class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
self.store = store
def dispatch(self, message_id: str, adapter: NotificationAdapter) -> dict:
row = self.store.get_outbox_message(message_id)
import json
envelope = json.loads(row["payload"])
try:
receipt = adapter.deliver(envelope)
except Exception:
return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
message_id,
receipt=None,
error=f"{adapter.name} delivery failed",
)
return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
message_id,
receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
)
-31
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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
"""Evidence helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
def evidence_digest(payload: dict) -> str:
body = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
return hashlib.sha256(body.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
class EvidenceService:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
self.store = store
def add(self, task_id: str, kind: str, payload: dict, worker_identity: str) -> str:
return self.store.add_evidence(task_id, kind, payload, worker_identity)
def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
return self.store.list_evidence(task_id)
def verify(self, task_id: str, required_kinds: list[str]) -> bool:
evidences = self.list(task_id)
observed = {e["kind"] for e in evidences}
return set(required_kinds).issubset(
observed
) and self.store.verify_evidence_integrity(task_id)
-22
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@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
"""Event journaling helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
from .errors import ValidationError
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
class TaskJournal:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
self.store = store
def append(self, task_id: str, event_type: str, data: dict, *, subject: str | None = None) -> None:
if not event_type:
raise ValidationError("event_type required")
self.store.append_event(task_id, event_type, data, subject=subject)
def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
return self.store.list_events(task_id)
def check_chain(self, task_id: str) -> bool:
return self.store.verify_event_chain(task_id)
-32
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@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
"""Claim and lease management helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
from .errors import LockedError
from .models import ProbeEvidence
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
class LeaseManager:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
self.store = store
def claim(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, worker_identity: str, lease_seconds: int, expected_revision: int, operation_digest: str):
return self.store.claim_task(task_id, worker_id, worker_identity, lease_seconds, expected_revision, operation_digest)
def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, lease_seconds: int):
claim = self.store.heartbeat_claim(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
return claim
def probe(self, claim_id: str):
claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
if claim.status != "ACTIVE":
raise LockedError("claim not active")
return claim
def recover(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, probe: ProbeEvidence):
return self.store.recover_expired_claim(
task_id,
claim_id,
probe,
)
-829
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@@ -1,829 +0,0 @@
"""Core data models for the task plane."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import re
import time
import uuid
import urllib.parse
from enum import StrEnum
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any
SENSITIVE_KEYS = {
"secret",
"password",
"token",
"api_key",
"access_token",
"refresh_token",
"authorization",
"private_key",
"client_secret",
"credential",
}
IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}")
TYPE_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}")
RISK_LEVELS = {"low", "medium", "high"}
DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS = {
"public",
"internal",
"confidential",
"credential-secret",
}
SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS = (
re.compile(r"(?i)\bAuthorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+\S+"),
re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|secret)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\b"),
re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
)
TASK_PLAN_KEYS = {
"schema_version",
"task_id",
"task_type",
"issuer",
"intent",
"required_capabilities",
"preferred_workers",
"risk",
"approval_policy",
"dependencies",
"max_delegation_depth",
"budgets",
"evidence_requirements",
"parent_task_id",
"correlation_id",
"metadata",
"data_classification",
"execution_zone",
"network_policy",
"logging_policy",
"allowed_input_paths",
"allowed_output_paths",
"output_policy",
}
def _now_ts() -> float:
return time.time()
def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
def compute_sha256_hex(value: Any) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def contains_secret_text(value: Any) -> bool:
if isinstance(value, str):
return any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS)
if isinstance(value, dict):
return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value.values())
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value)
return False
def validate_relative_paths(values: Any, name: str) -> list[str]:
paths = _normalize_list(values)
for value in paths:
decoded = urllib.parse.unquote(value)
parts = value.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
if (
decoded != value
or "\\" in value
or value.startswith("/")
or re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", value)
or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
):
raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
return paths
def validate_identifier(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
text = str(value or "")
if (
not IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text)
or urllib.parse.unquote(text) != text
or any(ord(ch) < 32 or ord(ch) == 127 for ch in text)
):
raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
return text
def validate_type(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
text = str(value or "")
if not TYPE_RE.fullmatch(text):
raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
return text
def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
if isinstance(value, dict):
redacted = {}
for key, inner in value.items():
lowered = str(key).lower()
if lowered in SENSITIVE_KEYS or lowered.endswith(
("_password", "_secret", "_access_token", "_refresh_token", "_private_key")
):
redacted[key] = "[REDACTED]"
else:
redacted[key] = redact_value(inner)
return redacted
if isinstance(value, list):
return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(redact_value(v) for v in value)
return value
class TaskStateTransitionError(ValueError):
pass
class TaskStatus(StrEnum):
CREATED = "CREATED"
QUEUED = "QUEUED"
CLAIMED = "CLAIMED"
RUNNING = "RUNNING"
WAITING_CHILD = "WAITING_CHILD"
VERIFYING = "VERIFYING"
COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
FAILED_RECOVERABLE = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
FAILED_FINAL = "FAILED_FINAL"
CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
TASK_STATES = {
status.value for status in TaskStatus
}
TASK_NEXT_STATES = {
"CREATED": {"QUEUED", "CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"},
"QUEUED": {"CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL"},
"CLAIMED": {"RUNNING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
"RUNNING": {"VERIFYING", "WAITING_CHILD", "COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
"WAITING_CHILD": {"RUNNING", "VERIFYING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
"VERIFYING": {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
"COMPLETED": set(),
"FAILED_RECOVERABLE": {"CLAIMED", "RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
"FAILED_FINAL": set(),
"CANCELLED": set(),
"MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED": {"RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
}
@dataclass
class Budget:
time_seconds: int | None = None
attempts: int | None = None
tokens: int | None = None
cost: float | None = None
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "Budget":
if not data:
return cls()
if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) - {
"time_seconds",
"attempts",
"tokens",
"cost",
}:
raise ValueError("invalid budget")
for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
value = data.get(name)
if value is not None:
try:
if float(value) < 0:
raise ValueError("budget values must be non-negative")
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ValueError("invalid budget value") from exc
return cls(
time_seconds=_to_positive_int(data.get("time_seconds")),
attempts=_to_positive_int(data.get("attempts")),
tokens=_to_positive_int(data.get("tokens")),
cost=_to_float(data.get("cost")),
)
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"time_seconds": self.time_seconds,
"attempts": self.attempts,
"tokens": self.tokens,
"cost": self.cost,
}
def merge(self, other: "Budget") -> "Budget":
return Budget(
time_seconds=_first_non_none(self.time_seconds, other.time_seconds),
attempts=_first_non_none(self.attempts, other.attempts),
tokens=_first_non_none(self.tokens, other.tokens),
cost=_first_non_none(self.cost, other.cost),
)
@dataclass
class TaskPlan:
schema_version: int = 1
task_id: str | None = None
task_type: str = "code.change"
issuer: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
intent: str | None = None
required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
preferred_workers: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
risk: str = "medium"
approval_policy: str = "patch-only"
dependencies: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
max_delegation_depth: int = 5
budgets: Budget = field(default_factory=Budget)
evidence_requirements: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
parent_task_id: str | None = None
correlation_id: str | None = None
metadata: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
data_classification: str = "internal"
execution_zone: str = "isolated-development"
network_policy: str = "controlled"
logging_policy: str = "redacted"
allowed_input_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
allowed_output_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
output_policy: str = "standard"
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "TaskPlan":
if not isinstance(data, dict):
raise ValueError("task plan payload must be an object")
unknown = set(data) - TASK_PLAN_KEYS
if unknown:
raise ValueError("unknown task plan fields")
if "task_id" not in data or data["task_id"] is None:
data = dict(data)
data["task_id"] = f"task-{uuid.uuid4()}"
risk = str(data.get("risk", "medium"))
if risk not in RISK_LEVELS:
raise ValueError("invalid risk")
issuer = data.get("issuer", {})
if not isinstance(issuer, dict):
raise ValueError("issuer must be an object")
schema_version = int(data.get("schema_version", 1))
if schema_version != 1:
raise ValueError("unsupported schema_version")
max_depth = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_delegation_depth"), default=5)
if max_depth is None or max_depth > 32:
raise ValueError("invalid max_delegation_depth")
classification = str(data.get("data_classification", "internal"))
if classification not in DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS:
raise ValueError("invalid data_classification")
execution_zone = validate_type(
data.get("execution_zone", "isolated-development"), "execution_zone"
)
network_policy = validate_type(
data.get("network_policy", "controlled"), "network_policy"
)
logging_policy = validate_type(
data.get("logging_policy", "redacted"), "logging_policy"
)
output_policy = validate_type(
data.get("output_policy", "standard"), "output_policy"
)
if contains_secret_text(
{
"intent": data.get("intent"),
"metadata": data.get("metadata", {}),
}
):
raise ValueError("task content contains secret material")
if classification == "credential-secret":
if execution_zone != "secure-file-transformer":
raise ValueError("credential-secret requires secure-file-transformer")
if network_policy != "denied":
raise ValueError("credential-secret requires network denied")
if logging_policy != "metadata-only":
raise ValueError("credential-secret requires metadata-only logging")
if output_policy != "hash-count-status-only":
raise ValueError("credential-secret requires restricted output")
return cls(
schema_version=schema_version,
task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
task_type=validate_type(data.get("task_type", "code.change"), "task_type"),
issuer=issuer,
intent=data.get("intent"),
required_capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("required_capabilities", [])),
preferred_workers=_normalize_list(data.get("preferred_workers", [])),
risk=risk,
approval_policy=validate_type(
data.get("approval_policy", "patch-only"), "approval_policy"
),
dependencies=_normalize_list(data.get("dependencies", [])),
max_delegation_depth=max_depth,
budgets=Budget.from_dict(data.get("budgets")),
evidence_requirements=_normalize_list(data.get("evidence_requirements", [])),
parent_task_id=data.get("parent_task_id"),
correlation_id=data.get("correlation_id"),
metadata=data.get("metadata", {}) if isinstance(data.get("metadata", {}), dict) else {},
data_classification=classification,
execution_zone=execution_zone,
network_policy=network_policy,
logging_policy=logging_policy,
allowed_input_paths=validate_relative_paths(
data.get("allowed_input_paths", []), "allowed_input_paths"
),
allowed_output_paths=validate_relative_paths(
data.get("allowed_output_paths", []), "allowed_output_paths"
),
output_policy=output_policy,
)
def to_dict(self, *, redact: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload = {
"schema_version": self.schema_version,
"task_id": self.task_id,
"task_type": self.task_type,
"issuer": self.issuer,
"intent": self.intent,
"required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),
"preferred_workers": list(self.preferred_workers),
"risk": self.risk,
"approval_policy": self.approval_policy,
"dependencies": list(self.dependencies),
"max_delegation_depth": self.max_delegation_depth,
"budgets": self.budgets.to_dict(),
"evidence_requirements": list(self.evidence_requirements),
"parent_task_id": self.parent_task_id,
"correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
"metadata": dict(self.metadata),
"data_classification": self.data_classification,
"execution_zone": self.execution_zone,
"network_policy": self.network_policy,
"logging_policy": self.logging_policy,
"allowed_input_paths": list(self.allowed_input_paths),
"allowed_output_paths": list(self.allowed_output_paths),
"output_policy": self.output_policy,
}
if redact:
payload = redact_value(payload)
return payload
def operation_digest(self) -> str:
return compute_sha256_hex(self.to_dict())
@dataclass
class TaskRecord:
task_id: str
status: str
revision: int
task_plan: TaskPlan
created_at: float
updated_at: float
root_task_id: str
idempotency_key: str | None = None
failure_reason: str | None = None
def with_status(self, status: str) -> "TaskRecord":
allowed = TASK_NEXT_STATES.get(self.status, set())
if status != self.status and (not allowed and self.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}):
raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
if status not in TASK_STATES:
raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Invalid status {status}")
if status != self.status and self.status in TASK_NEXT_STATES and status not in TASK_NEXT_STATES[self.status]:
raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
return TaskRecord(
task_id=self.task_id,
status=status,
revision=self.revision + 1,
task_plan=self.task_plan,
created_at=self.created_at,
updated_at=_now_ts(),
root_task_id=self.root_task_id,
idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
failure_reason=self.failure_reason,
)
def to_dict(self, *, include_task=True, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload = {
"task_id": self.task_id,
"status": self.status,
"revision": self.revision,
"root_task_id": self.root_task_id,
"parent_task_id": self.task_plan.parent_task_id,
"created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at),
"updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at),
"failure_reason": self.failure_reason,
}
if include_task:
payload["plan"] = self.task_plan.to_dict(redact=redact_payload)
if self.idempotency_key:
payload["idempotency_key"] = self.idempotency_key
return payload
@dataclass
class WorkerRegistration:
worker_id: str
worker_type: str
identity: str
capabilities: list[str]
trust_zone: str
max_concurrency: int
heartbeat_interval_seconds: int
supported_protocols: list[str]
registered_at: float
last_heartbeat: float
status: str = "active"
disabled: bool = False
owner_identity: str = ""
registration_revision: int = 1
registration_policy: str = "self"
created_at: float = 0.0
updated_at: float = 0.0
disabled_reason: str | None = None
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any]) -> "WorkerRegistration":
if not isinstance(data, dict):
raise ValueError("worker registration payload must be an object")
now = _now_ts()
worker_id = validate_identifier(data.get("worker_id"), "worker_id")
worker_type = validate_type(data.get("worker_type"), "worker_type")
identity = str(data.get("identity") or "").strip()
if not identity or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in identity):
raise ValueError("invalid identity")
max_concurrency = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_concurrency"), default=1)
heartbeat_interval = _to_positive_int(
data.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds"), default=15
)
if not max_concurrency:
raise ValueError("max_concurrency must be positive")
if not heartbeat_interval:
raise ValueError("heartbeat_interval_seconds must be positive")
return cls(
worker_id=worker_id,
worker_type=worker_type,
identity=identity,
capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("capabilities", [])),
trust_zone=str(data.get("trust_zone") or "default"),
max_concurrency=max_concurrency,
heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval,
supported_protocols=_normalize_list(
data.get("supported_protocols", ["aios-task-v1"])
),
registered_at=float(data.get("registered_at") or now),
last_heartbeat=float(data.get("last_heartbeat") or now),
status=str(data.get("status") or "active"),
disabled=bool(data.get("disabled", False)),
owner_identity=str(data.get("owner_identity") or identity),
registration_revision=int(data.get("registration_revision") or 1),
registration_policy=str(data.get("registration_policy") or "self"),
created_at=float(data.get("created_at") or data.get("registered_at") or now),
updated_at=float(data.get("updated_at") or now),
disabled_reason=data.get("disabled_reason"),
)
def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload = {
"worker_id": self.worker_id,
"worker_type": self.worker_type,
"identity": self.identity,
"capabilities": list(self.capabilities),
"trust_zone": self.trust_zone,
"max_concurrency": self.max_concurrency,
"heartbeat_interval_seconds": self.heartbeat_interval_seconds,
"supported_protocols": list(self.supported_protocols),
"registered_at": _fmt_ts(self.registered_at),
"last_heartbeat": _fmt_ts(self.last_heartbeat),
"status": self.status,
"disabled": self.disabled,
"owner_identity": self.owner_identity,
"registration_revision": self.registration_revision,
"registration_policy": self.registration_policy,
"created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at or self.registered_at),
"updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at or self.last_heartbeat),
"disabled_reason": self.disabled_reason,
}
if redact_payload:
payload = redact_value(payload)
return payload
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EvidenceEnvelope:
schema_version: int
evidence_id: str
task_id: str
claim_id: str
kind: str
worker_identity: str
payload: dict[str, Any]
created_at: float
previous_evidence_hash: str
evidence_digest: str
signature: str | None = None
attestation_ref: str | None = None
@classmethod
def create(
cls,
*,
task_id: str,
claim_id: str,
kind: str,
worker_identity: str,
payload: dict[str, Any],
previous_evidence_hash: str,
signature: str | None = None,
attestation_ref: str | None = None,
evidence_id: str | None = None,
created_at: float | None = None,
) -> "EvidenceEnvelope":
envelope = cls(
schema_version=1,
evidence_id=evidence_id or f"evd-{uuid.uuid4()}",
task_id=validate_identifier(task_id, "task_id"),
claim_id=validate_identifier(claim_id, "claim_id"),
kind=validate_type(kind, "evidence kind"),
worker_identity=str(worker_identity),
payload=redact_value(payload),
created_at=float(created_at or _now_ts()),
previous_evidence_hash=str(previous_evidence_hash or ""),
evidence_digest="",
signature=signature,
attestation_ref=attestation_ref,
)
return dataclass_replace(
envelope, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(envelope.digest_payload())
)
def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": self.schema_version,
"evidence_id": self.evidence_id,
"task_id": self.task_id,
"claim_id": self.claim_id,
"kind": self.kind,
"worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
"payload": self.payload,
"created_at": self.created_at,
"previous_evidence_hash": self.previous_evidence_hash,
"attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
}
def verify(
self,
*,
expected_task_id: str,
expected_claim_id: str,
expected_previous_hash: str,
attestation_verifier: Any = None,
) -> bool:
if (
self.schema_version != 1
or self.task_id != expected_task_id
or self.claim_id != expected_claim_id
or self.previous_evidence_hash != expected_previous_hash
or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
):
return False
if self.signature or self.attestation_ref:
return True if attestation_verifier is None else bool(attestation_verifier(self))
return True
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
**self.digest_payload(),
"evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
"signature": self.signature,
}
class ProbeOutcome(StrEnum):
NOT_APPLIED = "NOT_APPLIED"
APPLIED_VERIFIED = "APPLIED_VERIFIED"
INDETERMINATE = "INDETERMINATE"
CONFLICT = "CONFLICT"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProbeEvidence:
schema_version: int
probe_id: str
task_id: str
claim_id: str
worker_id: str
worker_identity: str
operation_digest: str
outcome: ProbeOutcome
observed_at: float
expires_at: float
probe_executor_identity: str
evidence_digest: str
signature: str | None = None
attestation_ref: str | None = None
@classmethod
def create(cls, **data: Any) -> "ProbeEvidence":
outcome = data["outcome"]
if not isinstance(outcome, ProbeOutcome):
outcome = ProbeOutcome(str(outcome))
probe = cls(
schema_version=1,
probe_id=data.get("probe_id") or f"probe-{uuid.uuid4()}",
task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
claim_id=validate_identifier(data["claim_id"], "claim_id"),
worker_id=validate_identifier(data["worker_id"], "worker_id"),
worker_identity=str(data["worker_identity"]),
operation_digest=str(data["operation_digest"]),
outcome=outcome,
observed_at=float(data["observed_at"]),
expires_at=float(data["expires_at"]),
probe_executor_identity=str(data["probe_executor_identity"]),
evidence_digest="",
signature=data.get("signature"),
attestation_ref=data.get("attestation_ref"),
)
return dataclass_replace(
probe, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(probe.digest_payload())
)
def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": self.schema_version,
"probe_id": self.probe_id,
"task_id": self.task_id,
"claim_id": self.claim_id,
"worker_id": self.worker_id,
"worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
"operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
"outcome": self.outcome.value,
"observed_at": self.observed_at,
"expires_at": self.expires_at,
"probe_executor_identity": self.probe_executor_identity,
"attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
}
def verify(self, *, now: float, attestation_verifier: Any) -> bool:
if (
self.schema_version != 1
or self.expires_at <= now
or self.observed_at > now
or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
or not (self.signature or self.attestation_ref)
):
return False
return bool(attestation_verifier and attestation_verifier(self))
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
**self.digest_payload(),
"evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
"signature": self.signature,
}
def dataclass_replace(value: Any, **changes: Any) -> Any:
from dataclasses import replace
return replace(value, **changes)
@dataclass
class WorkerClaim:
claim_id: str
task_id: str
worker_id: str
worker_identity: str
claimed_at: float
lease_until: float
attempt: int
task_revision: int
operation_digest: str
status: str = "ACTIVE"
def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload = {
"claim_id": self.claim_id,
"task_id": self.task_id,
"worker_id": self.worker_id,
"worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
"claimed_at": _fmt_ts(self.claimed_at),
"lease_until": _fmt_ts(self.lease_until),
"attempt": self.attempt,
"task_revision": self.task_revision,
"operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
"status": self.status,
}
if redact_payload:
payload = redact_value(payload)
return payload
@dataclass
class ResultEnvelope:
task_id: str
claim_id: str
worker_identity: str
status: str
outputs: list[dict[str, Any]]
evidence: list[dict[str, Any]]
started_at: str
completed_at: str
result_digest: str | None = None
signature: str | None = None
attestation_ref: str | None = None
operation_digest: str | None = None
trust_status: str = "untrusted_shadow_result"
def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"task_id": self.task_id,
"claim_id": self.claim_id,
"worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
"status": self.status,
"outputs": self.outputs,
"evidence": self.evidence,
"started_at": self.started_at,
"completed_at": self.completed_at,
"operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
"attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
}
def computed_digest(self) -> str:
return compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload = {
"task_id": self.task_id,
"claim_id": self.claim_id,
"worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
"status": self.status,
"outputs": self.outputs,
"evidence": self.evidence,
"started_at": self.started_at,
"completed_at": self.completed_at,
"result_digest": self.result_digest,
"signature": self.signature,
"attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
"operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
"trust_status": self.trust_status,
}
if redact_payload:
payload = redact_value(payload)
return payload
def _normalize_list(value: Any) -> list[str]:
if not isinstance(value, list):
raise ValueError("expected list")
if len(value) > 128 or any(
not isinstance(v, str)
or not v
or len(v) > 256
or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in v)
for v in value
):
raise ValueError("invalid list item")
return list(value)
def _to_positive_int(value: Any, default: int | None = None) -> int | None:
if value is None:
return default
try:
number = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return default
return number if number >= 0 else default
def _to_float(value: Any) -> float | None:
if value is None:
return None
try:
return float(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def _first_non_none(primary: Any, fallback: Any) -> Any:
if primary is not None:
return primary
return fallback
def iso8601_now() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
def _fmt_ts(value: float | None) -> str | None:
if value is None:
return None
return datetime.fromtimestamp(value, tz=timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-226
View File
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
"""Policy and verification logic (fail-closed)."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Callable
from .errors import ForbiddenError, LockedError
from .models import ProbeEvidence, ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
RISK_RANK = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS = frozenset(
{"claim", "result", "fail", "progress", "heartbeat"}
)
ALL_ACTION_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
{
"task.creator",
"worker.self_register",
"worker.admin",
"task.claim",
"task.cancel",
"task.delegate",
"task.read",
"task.audit",
}
)
@dataclass
class PolicyDecision:
allowed: bool
reason: str = ""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ReadonlyWorkerProfile:
"""A narrowly-scoped identity allowed to process safe Shadow tasks only."""
worker_id: str
identity: str
capabilities: frozenset[str]
task_types: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"code.review", "test.execute"})
def permits_task(self, task: TaskRecord) -> bool:
plan = task.task_plan
if plan.task_type not in self.task_types or plan.risk != "low":
return False
if plan.data_classification not in {"public", "internal"}:
return False
if plan.metadata.get("production_side_effects") is not False:
return False
return set(plan.required_capabilities).issubset(self.capabilities)
class IdentityVerifier:
def __init__(self, trusted_identities: set[str] | None = None):
self.trusted_identities = trusted_identities
def verify(self, identity: str) -> bool:
if self.trusted_identities is None:
return True
return identity in self.trusted_identities
class EvidenceVerifier:
def __init__(self, mandatory: list[str] | None = None):
self.mandatory = set(mandatory or [])
def verify(self, task: TaskRecord, evidences: list[dict]) -> PolicyDecision:
required = set(task.task_plan.evidence_requirements or [])
if not required and not self.mandatory:
return PolicyDecision(True)
observed = {e.get("kind") for e in evidences}
missing = required.union(self.mandatory) - observed
if missing:
return PolicyDecision(False, f"missing evidence: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}")
return PolicyDecision(True)
class PolicyEngine:
"""
Fail-closed policy engine with minimal but explicit decisions.
"""
def __init__(
self,
*,
identity_verifier: IdentityVerifier | None = None,
evidence_verifier: EvidenceVerifier | None = None,
execution_enabled: bool = False,
max_risk: str = "medium",
result_signature_verifier: Callable[[ResultEnvelope], bool] | None = None,
probe_attestation_verifier: Callable[[ProbeEvidence], bool] | None = None,
identity_capabilities: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None,
admin_identities: set[str] | None = None,
readonly_worker_execution_enabled: bool = False,
readonly_worker_profiles: list[ReadonlyWorkerProfile] | None = None,
) -> None:
if max_risk not in RISK_RANK:
raise ValueError("invalid max_risk")
self.identity_verifier = identity_verifier or IdentityVerifier()
self.evidence_verifier = evidence_verifier or EvidenceVerifier()
self.execution_enabled = execution_enabled
self.max_risk = max_risk
self.result_signature_verifier = result_signature_verifier
self.probe_attestation_verifier = probe_attestation_verifier
self.identity_capabilities = {
identity: set(capabilities)
for identity, capabilities in (identity_capabilities or {}).items()
}
self.admin_identities = set(admin_identities or ())
self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled = readonly_worker_execution_enabled
self.readonly_worker_profiles = {
profile.identity: profile for profile in (readonly_worker_profiles or [])
}
def _readonly_worker_allows(
self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None
) -> bool:
profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
return bool(
self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled
and action in READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS
and profile is not None
and (task is None or profile.permits_task(task))
)
def assert_readonly_worker_binding(self, actor: str, worker_id: str) -> None:
profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
if profile is not None and profile.worker_id != worker_id:
raise ForbiddenError("worker identity binding mismatch")
def assert_readonly_worker_registration(self, actor: str, payload: dict) -> None:
profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
if profile is None:
return
if (
str(payload.get("worker_id") or "") != profile.worker_id
or str(payload.get("identity") or "") != profile.identity
or set(payload.get("capabilities") or []) != set(profile.capabilities)
or str(payload.get("trust_zone") or "") != "isolated-review"
or int(payload.get("max_concurrency") or 0) != 1
or int(payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds") or 0) != 15
):
raise ForbiddenError("readonly worker registration mismatch")
def verify_result(
self, result: ResultEnvelope, task: TaskRecord | None = None
) -> PolicyDecision:
computed = result.computed_digest()
if result.result_digest and result.result_digest != computed:
return PolicyDecision(False, "result digest mismatch")
sensitive = bool(
task
and (
task.task_plan.data_classification
in {"confidential", "credential-secret"}
or any(
capability.startswith(
("code.write", "deploy", "secret", "production")
)
for capability in task.task_plan.required_capabilities
)
)
)
if sensitive and not (result.signature or result.attestation_ref):
return PolicyDecision(False, "trusted result proof required")
if result.signature is not None or result.attestation_ref is not None:
if self.result_signature_verifier is None:
return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature verifier unavailable")
if not self.result_signature_verifier(result):
return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature invalid")
result.trust_status = "trusted_result"
else:
result.trust_status = "untrusted_shadow_result"
return PolicyDecision(True)
def authorize(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None) -> PolicyDecision:
context = context or {}
if not self.identity_verifier.verify(actor):
return PolicyDecision(False, "identity untrusted")
action_capabilities = {
"create": "task.creator",
"read": "task.read",
"audit": "task.audit",
"claim": "task.claim",
"result": "task.claim",
"fail": "task.claim",
"progress": "task.claim",
"heartbeat": "task.claim",
"cancel": "task.cancel",
"delegate": "task.delegate",
"worker.register": "worker.self_register",
"worker.admin": "worker.admin",
}
required_capability = action_capabilities.get(action)
if required_capability:
granted = set(
self.identity_capabilities.get(
actor, self.identity_capabilities.get("*", set())
)
)
if required_capability not in granted:
return PolicyDecision(False, f"action {action} not permitted")
if action in {"claim", "result", "fail", "cancel", "progress", "delegate", "heartbeat"} and not self.execution_enabled:
if not self._readonly_worker_allows(action, actor, task):
return PolicyDecision(False, "execution disabled")
if action == "delegate" and task and task.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}:
risk = str(context.get("risk", task.task_plan.risk))
if RISK_RANK.get(risk, 2) > RISK_RANK.get(self.max_risk, 1):
return PolicyDecision(False, f"risk {risk} exceeds policy")
return PolicyDecision(True)
def assert_allowed(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None):
decision = self.authorize(action, actor, task, context=context)
if not decision.allowed:
if decision.reason == "identity untrusted":
raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)
if decision.reason == "execution disabled":
raise LockedError("execution disabled")
raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
"""Task scheduler primitives."""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from .errors import NotFoundError
from .capabilities import has_capabilities
from .models import WorkerClaim
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
class TaskScheduler:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
self.store = store
def next_queued_task(self, worker_id: str):
worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
tasks = sorted(
self.store.list_tasks(),
key=lambda task: (
-int(task.task_plan.metadata.get("priority", 0)),
task.created_at,
task.task_id,
),
)
for task in tasks:
if task.status not in {"CREATED", "QUEUED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"}:
continue
if task.task_plan.task_type == "worker.registry.audit":
continue
if task.status == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" and not self.store.task_has_retryable_probe(
task.task_id
):
continue
if not has_capabilities(
worker.capabilities, task.task_plan.required_capabilities
):
continue
if any(
self.store.get_task(dependency).status != "COMPLETED"
for dependency in task.task_plan.dependencies
):
continue
if (
task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret"
and worker.worker_type != "secure_file_transformer"
and "secure_file_transformer" not in worker.capabilities
):
continue
return task
return None
def schedule_for_worker(self, worker_id: str, lease_seconds: int = 15) -> WorkerClaim:
worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
if worker.disabled:
from .errors import LockedError
raise LockedError("worker disabled")
if time.time() > worker.last_heartbeat + (
worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3
):
from .errors import LockedError
raise LockedError("worker offline")
task = self.next_queued_task(worker_id)
if task is None:
raise NotFoundError("no queued tasks available")
claim = self.store.claim_task(
task.task_id,
worker_id,
worker.identity,
lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
expected_revision=task.revision,
operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
)
return claim
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
"""Worker registry abstraction and read helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from .capabilities import has_capabilities
from .errors import NotFoundError
from .models import WorkerRegistration
from .store import TaskPlaneStore
class WorkerRegistry:
def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
self.store = store
def register(
self,
payload: dict,
*,
actor_identity: str,
is_admin: bool,
expected_revision: int | None,
) -> WorkerRegistration:
reg = WorkerRegistration.from_dict(payload)
return self.store.register_worker(
reg,
actor_identity=actor_identity,
is_admin=is_admin,
expected_revision=expected_revision,
)
def heartbeat(
self,
worker_id: str,
heartbeat_interval_seconds: int | None = None,
*,
actor_identity: str,
expected_revision: int | None,
) -> WorkerRegistration:
return self.store.heartbeat_worker(
worker_id,
heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval_seconds,
actor_identity=actor_identity,
expected_revision=expected_revision,
)
def list(self):
return self.store.list_workers()
def get(self, worker_id: str) -> WorkerRegistration:
try:
return self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
except NotFoundError:
raise
def can_execute(self, worker_id: str, required_capabilities: list[str]) -> bool:
worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
return has_capabilities(worker.capabilities, required_capabilities)
def is_online(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> bool:
worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
deadline = worker.last_heartbeat + (worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3)
return not worker.disabled and (time.time() if now is None else now) <= deadline
def stale_workers(self, *, now: float | None = None) -> list[WorkerRegistration]:
current = time.time() if now is None else now
return [worker for worker in self.list() if not self.is_online(worker.worker_id, now=current)]
+8 -20
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,13 @@
{
"current_baseline": "V2R1C2",
"previous_baseline": "V2R1C1",
"promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
"git": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
"promoted_by": "codex/owner-approved-gitops",
"promotion_reason": "Owner-authorized V2R1C2 Unified Portal production release after exact tag binding, complete evidence verification, and production acceptance PASS.",
"version": "V2R1C2",
"release_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
"tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
"target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
"release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
"status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
"production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
"production_port": 18920,
"rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
"current_baseline": "V1R4C6",
"previous_baseline": "V1R4C5",
"promoted_at": "2026-07-11T21:00:00+08:00",
"git": "e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd",
"promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
"promotion_reason": "V1R4C6 admin search agent integration, search gateway, agent platform, VERSION bump, merge tests deploy pipeline — not yet deployed to production",
"constraints": {
"product_code_changed": true,
"production_redeployed": true,
"production_traffic_changed": true,
"tag_rewritten": false,
"memory_search_enabled": false,
"force_push_allowed": false,
"rollback_assets_preserved": true
"gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval": true
}
}
-13
View File
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
{
"approval_plan_id": "v2r1c4-security-v3-candidate-plan",
"expected_base_oid": "473b86a2f1f5a5fe3b8ad42a6da26c29c78c4170",
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 8080,
"release_branch": "patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
"repository": "aios/aios",
"root": "/var/lib/aios-v2r1c4-candidate",
"tag_oid": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
"target_oid": "473b86a2f1f5a5fe3b8ad42a6da26c29c78c4170",
"target_tree_oid": "c6d1ceb28b0519fe460a26a6a2a7e3c0086b3a1f",
"version": "V2R1C4"
}
-43
View File
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
{
"actor_identity": "codex-chartgpt-bridge",
"allowed_branch_patterns": [
"patch/**",
"feature/**",
"fix/**",
"release-candidate/**"
],
"allowed_operations": [
"commit_file.atomic"
],
"allowed_path_patterns": [
"active-runtime/**",
"services/**",
"deploy/**",
"tests/**",
"docs/**",
"versions/**",
"release/**"
],
"denied_branch_patterns": [
"main",
"master",
"governance/approvals",
"integration/**",
"production/**"
],
"denied_operations": [
"force_push",
"history_rewrite",
"branch_delete",
"tag.write",
"registry.write",
"baseline.write",
"production.deploy",
"approval.submit",
"secret.read"
],
"expires_at": "2027-07-29T00:00:00Z",
"policy_id": "STANDING-GOVERNED-DEVELOPMENT-WRITER-V1",
"repository": "aios/aios",
"writer_audience": "aios-governed-development-writer"
}
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
{
"actor_identity": "codex-chartgpt-bridge",
"allowed_operations": ["commit_file.atomic"],
"allowed_paths": ["services/**", "deploy/**", "tests/**", "docs/**", "release/**", "evidence/**"],
"branch": "patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
"credential_name": "gitea_http",
"credential_token_id": 1,
"credential_username": "aios-governed-development-writer",
"expected_base_oid": "473b86a2f1f5a5fe3b8ad42a6da26c29c78c4170",
"expected_index_sha256": "e8571df23aba77fd393b4d98beb0b94676dc547fdc25d6492a43b43ed90aee94",
"expected_policy_sha256": "462c850d0476266a33bf1227f4989d13e03d807fd8ebb684cbe389f4d49e92fe",
"expected_tree_oid": "c6d1ceb28b0519fe460a26a6a2a7e3c0086b3a1f",
"expires_at": "2026-08-05T00:00:00Z",
"git_common_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
"git_user_email": "chatgpt-final-release-writer@cnnetmkt.top",
"git_user_name": "chatgpt-final-release-writer",
"grant_id": "grant-v2r1c4-security-v3-candidate",
"max_operations": 200,
"max_total_bytes": 67108864,
"push_ref": "refs/heads/patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
"remote_name": "gitea-local-candidate",
"remote_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git",
"repository": "aios/aios",
"task_id": "V2R1C4-SECURITY-INVARIANTS-V3",
"worktree_path": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
"writer_audience": "aios-governed-development-writer"
}
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
{
"authoritative_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
"poll_seconds": 5,
"receipts_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror/receipts",
"requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror/requests",
"source_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea-repositories/aios/aios.git"
}
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
{
"allowed_git_dir_roots": ["/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"],
"allowed_peer_uids": [0],
"audit_path": "/var/lib/aios-governance-publisher-evidence/audit.jsonl",
"base_branch": "governance/approvals",
"credential_name": "gitea_http",
"gitea_base_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000",
"head_prefix": "governance/request/",
"operation_ledger": "/var/lib/aios-governance-publisher-state/operations.sqlite",
"owner_reviewer": "owner",
"remote_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git",
"repository": "aios/aios",
"socket_path": "/run/aios-governance-publisher-runtime/publisher.sock"
}
-77
View File
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
{
"authoritative_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
"input_bindings": {
"expected_input_owner_uid": 0,
"release_root_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-release-root.json",
"approval_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-approval-plan.json",
"artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/artifacts/V2R1C4.tar.zst",
"rollback_artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/artifacts/V2R1C4-rollback.tar.zst",
"sbom_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-sbom.json",
"test_evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-test-evidence.json",
"tag_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-tag-plan.json",
"deployment_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-deployment-plan.json",
"rollback_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-rollback-plan.json",
"registry_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/registry-plan.json",
"baseline_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/baseline-plan.txt",
"evidence_closure_path": "evidence/releases/V2R1C4/evidence-closure.json"
},
"approval": {
"gitea_db_path": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db",
"repo_id": 1,
"owner_user_id": 2,
"governance_ref": "refs/heads/governance/approvals",
"required_machine_contexts": [
"aios/branch-protection",
"aios/evidence-closure",
"aios/secret-scan",
"aios/state-machine",
"aios/validator"
]
},
"merge_transport": {
"transport": "unix_json",
"socket_path": "/run/aios-gitops/integration-merge-writer.sock",
"timeout_seconds": 120
},
"tag_transport": {
"transport": "http_json",
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/create-tag",
"credential_name": "tag_api",
"timeout_seconds": 120,
"expected_statuses": [
200
]
},
"remote_tag": {
"remote_url": "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git",
"gitea_base_url": "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git",
"repo_owner": "aios",
"repo_name": "aios",
"credential_name": "gitea_http"
},
"deployment": {
"artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/artifacts/V2R1C4.tar.zst",
"artifact_manifest_member": "artifact-manifest.json",
"release_root": "/opt/aios/releases",
"current_symlink": "/opt/aios/current",
"previous_symlink": "/opt/aios/previous",
"state_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/deployment-state.json",
"service_units": [
"aios-gitops-model-api.service"
],
"health_checks": [
{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/health",
"expected_status": 200,
"timeout_seconds": 10
}
]
},
"metadata": {
"registry_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release/versions/V2R1C4.json",
"baseline_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release/PRODUCTION_BASELINE",
"registry_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/registry-plan.json",
"baseline_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/baseline-plan.txt",
"metadata_snapshot_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/metadata-snapshots"
}
}
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"approval_expires_at": "2026-08-05T00:00:00Z",
"approval_head_oid": "<40_HEX_OID>",
"approval_manifest_path": "approvals/release/V2R1C4-PRODUCTION-RELEASE-ENVELOPE.json",
"approval_manifest_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"approval_merge_oid": "<40_HEX_OID>",
"approval_plan_id": "<OWNER_APPROVED_PLAN_ID>",
"approval_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"approval_pr_number": 1,
"artifact_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"baseline_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"deployment_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"evidence_closure_oid": "<40_HEX_OID>",
"evidence_closure_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"expected_base_oid": "<40_HEX_BASE_OID>",
"owner_review_oid": 1,
"publisher_identity": "aios-governance-request-publisher",
"release_branch": "patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
"release_root_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"repository": "aios/aios",
"registry_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"rollback_artifact_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"rollback_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"sbom_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"tag_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"target_oid": "<40_HEX_TARGET_OID>",
"target_tree_oid": "<40_HEX_TREE_OID>",
"target_environment": "production",
"test_evidence_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
"version": "V2R1C4",
"writer_identity": "aios-governed-development-writer"
}
-96
View File
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
{
"state_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/state.json",
"audit_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/audit.jsonl",
"hooks": {
"verify_owner_approval": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"verify_owner_approval",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"merge_release": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"merge_release",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"create_tag": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"create_tag",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"verify_remote_tag": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"verify_remote_tag",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"deploy": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"deploy",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"health_check": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"health_check",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"rollback": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"rollback",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"verify_previous": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"verify_previous",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"restore": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"restore",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"verify_restored": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"verify_restored",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"update_registry": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"update_registry",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"update_baseline": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"update_baseline",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"verify_consistency": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"verify_consistency",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"snapshot_metadata": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"snapshot_metadata",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
],
"restore_metadata": [
"/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
"restore_metadata",
"--config",
"/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
]
}
}
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{
"allowed_output_roots": [
"/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/releases"
],
"poll_seconds": 5,
"receipts_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/receipts",
"requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/requests",
"source_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea-repositories/aios/aios.git"
}
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
{
"poll_seconds": 10,
"receipts_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal/receipts",
"requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal/requests"
}
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"admin_credential_name": "admin_gitea_http",
"expected_writer_username": "aios-governed-development-writer",
"gitea_base_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000",
"grant_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant.json",
"journal_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/revocation-journal.json",
"receipt_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-evidence/revocation-receipt.json",
"revoked_grant_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant.revoked.json",
"terminal_trigger_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/terminal-revocation.json",
"writer_credential_name": "writer_gitea_http",
"writer_unit": "aios-governed-development-writer.service"
}
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
{
"exact_paths": [
"/usr/libexec/aios-autonomous-release-authorization/controller.py",
"/usr/libexec/aios-chatgpt-action-task-router-continuous-20260726/action_task_router.py"
],
"output_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/runtime-source-evidence.json",
"task_id": "V2R1C4-RELEASE-COMPLETION"
}
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
{
"gitea_db_path": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db",
"output_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher/status",
"owner_user_id": 2,
"poll_seconds": 5,
"repo_id": 1,
"requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher/requests"
}
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
{
"allowed_peer_uids": [0],
"audit_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-evidence/audit.jsonl",
"grant_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant.json",
"grant_quota_ledger": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant-quota.sqlite",
"max_request_bytes": 4194304,
"operation_ledger": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/operations.sqlite",
"policy_path": "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/development-policy.json",
"socket_path": "/run/aios-development-writer-runtime/writer.sock",
"worktree_lock_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-locks/worktree.lock"
}
-103
View File
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
{
"schema_version": 4,
"automatic": [
"build",
"test",
"artifact",
"canary",
"evidence"
],
"owner": [
"signed_release_plan"
],
"forbidden": [
"force_push",
"tag_rewrite",
"direct_main_push",
"baseline_mutation",
"registry_mutation"
],
"runtime_deployment": {
"approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
"required_capability": "runtime_switch",
"tag_operations_allowed": false,
"baseline_mutation_allowed": false,
"registry_mutation_allowed": false,
"writer_default": false,
"rollback_required": true
},
"tag_release": {
"approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
"required_capability": "tag_publish",
"separate_controller": true,
"duplicate_conflict": "fail_closed",
"rewrite_allowed": false,
"force_push_allowed": false
},
"baseline_registry_finalize": {
"approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
"required_capability": "baseline_registry_finalize",
"separate_controller": true,
"remote_tag_verification_required": true,
"gitea_api_verification_required": true,
"registry_baseline_consistency_required": true
},
"approval": {
"algorithm": "Ed25519",
"trust_domain": "aios.production",
"maximum_lifetime_seconds": 3600,
"release_plan_sha256_required": true,
"not_before_required": true,
"replay_protection": true,
"revocation_fail_closed": true,
"key_rotation_supported": true,
"capabilities": [
"runtime_switch",
"tag_publish",
"baseline_registry_finalize"
]
},
"execution": {
"environment_variable": "AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED",
"default_enabled": false,
"shadow_side_effects_allowed": false,
"durable_saga_required": true,
"pre_switch_revalidation_required": true,
"trusted_candidate_builder_required": true,
"actual_plan_regeneration_required": true,
"startup_fail_closed_on_missing_component": true,
"recovery_worker_shadow_default": true,
"production_approval_backend_required": true,
"production_builder_signer": "kms-hsm-secret-manager-only",
"production_execution_without_backend": "unavailable"
},
"durability": {
"journal": "sha256-hash-chain",
"probe_journal": "sha256-hash-chain",
"exclusive_capability_claims": true,
"side_effect_probe_before_lease_takeover": true,
"side_effect_probe_before_failed_recoverable_retry": true,
"probe_results": [
"NOT_APPLIED",
"APPLIED_VERIFIED",
"INDETERMINATE",
"CONFLICT"
],
"probe_operation_digest_required": true,
"probe_freshness_required": true,
"tamper_result": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
},
"tag_pending": {
"required_observations": [
"remote_git_ref",
"annotated_tag_object",
"peeled_target",
"gitea_api",
"gitea_listing",
"repository_identity"
],
"indeterminate_result": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED",
"conflict_result": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
"automatic_reconciliation": false
}
}
-59
View File
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
version: 1
policy_id: gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8
runtime_identity:
user: aiman
group: gitops
umask: "0002"
prohibit_root_workspace_writes: true
repository:
source_worktree: /data/aios-gitops/workspace
bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
remote: origin
worktrees:
controller: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller
task_pattern: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/{agent}/{task_id}
allowed_agents:
- openclaw
- chatgpt
- controller
require_clean_start: true
remove_after_successful_push: true
retain_on_failure: true
permissions:
owner: aiman
group: gitops
directory_mode: "2775"
file_mode: "0664"
default_acl:
user:aiman: rwx
group:gitops: rwx
apply_to:
- /data/aios-gitops
- /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
preflight:
required_user: aiman
required_group: gitops
required_umask: "0002"
require_writable_git_dir: true
require_writable_task_dir: true
require_writable_result_dir: true
reject_shared_source_worktree: true
reject_existing_git_lock: true
notifications:
owner_on_received: required
owner_on_terminal: required
preferred_channel: weixin
redact_secrets: true
rollback:
preserve_source_worktree: true
remove_created_worktrees: true
restore_service_dropins: true
restore_service_state: true
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Install as a systemd drop-in for GitOps/OpenClaw writer services.
# Example: /etc/systemd/system/<service>.service.d/10-runtime-identity.conf
[Service]
User=aiman
Group=gitops
SupplementaryGroups=gitops
UMask=0002
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops
Environment=AIOS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
Environment=AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees
Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_USER=aiman
Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP=gitops
Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_UMASK=0002
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal production metadata.
# No secret values belong in this file; runtime integrations use references.
AIOS_V2_HOST=127.0.0.1
AIOS_V2_PORT=18920
AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/run-provenance.sqlite3
AIOS_EXTERNAL_TASK_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/external-task-truth.sqlite3
AIOS_EXECUTOR_CATALOG_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/executor-catalog.json
AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILES=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-RELEASE.json:/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILE=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION=V2R1C2
AIOS_TARGET_VERSION=V2R1C2
AIOS_BASELINE_VERSION=V2R1C1
AIOS_PREVIOUS_VERSION=V2R1C1
AIOS_RELEASE_STATUS=PRODUCTION
AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
AIOS_RELEASE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
AIOS_RELEASE_TAG=V2R1C2
AIOS_RELEASE_EVIDENCE_SHA256=2e27bb73b8e6297bd3077238f73a96d697fc3c3611c601c4dc9357e5fdcd8eee
AIOS_OPENCLAW_CONTRACT_VERSION=aios.openclaw.command.v2
AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM=Ed25519
AIOS_OPENCLAW_PLUGIN_VERSION=2.1.0-rc.4
AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID=openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519
AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF=AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal Production
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
Conflicts=aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app/aios_web/release_application.py
ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aios
Group=aios
WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app
EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_V2_PORT" = "18920"
ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID" = "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24"
ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_TAG" = "V2R1C2"
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_web.release_application
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=3
TimeoutStartSec=60
TimeoutStopSec=30
KillSignal=SIGTERM
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
StateDirectory=aios-v2r1c2-production
StateDirectoryMode=0750
UMask=0027
LimitNOFILE=65536
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS Autonomous Release Candidate (dormant shadow only)
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aiman
Group=gitops
WorkingDirectory=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726/services/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_PRODUCTION_DEPLOYMENT_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_CANDIDATE_LOOPBACK_HOST=127.0.0.1
Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_autonomous_release_candidate.service --host 127.0.0.1 --port 19951 --state /var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-candidate/state.sqlite3
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=2
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
LockPersonality=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RuntimeDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-candidate
StateDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-candidate
CacheDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-candidate
ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726/services/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
ReadWritePaths=/run/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
ReadWritePaths=/var/cache/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
UMask=0077
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS Autonomous Release Candidate Worker (Dormant/Shadow Only)
After=network.target
ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate/aios_autonomous_release_candidate
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aiman
Group=gitops
UMask=0077
WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
Environment=PYTHONPATH=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
Environment=AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_PRODUCTION_DEPLOYMENT_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_CANDIDATE_CONTROL_ENDPOINT=127.0.0.1:19951
Environment=AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:openclaw-gateway-candidate
Environment=AIOS_CODEX_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:codex-app-server-candidate
Environment=AIOS_NATIVE_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:session-native-adapter-control-candidate
Environment=AIOS_GITEA_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:gitea-admin-api-candidate
ImportCredential=openclaw-gateway-candidate
ImportCredential=codex-app-server-candidate
ImportCredential=session-native-adapter-control-candidate
ImportCredential=gitea-admin-api-candidate
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_autonomous_release_candidate.worker_service --state-directory /var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
StateDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
RuntimeDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectClock=true
ProtectHostname=true
LockPersonality=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
IPAddressDeny=any
IPAddressAllow=localhost
ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS autonomous execution renewal controller
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=root
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-autonomous-renewal-controller --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal.json
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
UMask=0027
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5s
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE=/data/aios-gitops/workspace
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_DB=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitops_model.sqlite3
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_FILE=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios-v23.git
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_HOST=127.0.0.1
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_PORT=18890
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /data/aios-gitops/workspace/active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS governance approval watcher
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=root
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-governance-approval-watcher --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher.json
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
IPAddressDeny=any
UMask=0027
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS dormant single-owner machine-status prerequisite
RefuseManualStop=no
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=aiman
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component machine-status-producer --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS governance approval mirror worker
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=root
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-governance-mirror-worker --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror.json
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
UMask=0027
ReadWritePaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git /var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5s
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS dormant single-owner review adapter prerequisite
RefuseManualStop=no
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=aiman
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component owner-review-adapter --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS governance request publisher
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/publisher.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aios-governance-request-publisher
Group=gitops
StateDirectory=aios-governance-publisher-state aios-governance-publisher-evidence aios-governance-publisher-locks
StateDirectoryMode=0750
RuntimeDirectory=aios-governance-publisher-runtime
RuntimeDirectoryMode=0750
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-governance-request-publisher --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/publisher.json
LoadCredentialEncrypted=gitea_http:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-governance-request-publisher.gitea_http
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
IPAddressAllow=127.0.0.1
IPAddressDeny=any
UMask=0027
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS single-owner governance activation verifier
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=root
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-single-owner-governance --verify --bindings /etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json --state-root /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation --lock-path /run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation /run/aios-gitops
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
UMask=0027
# Deliberately not installable. Deployment remains disabled/inactive;
# activation is an explicit approved CLI transaction, never an always-on unit.
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS governed development writer credential revoker
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/development-policy.json
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=root
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-development-writer-revoker --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/revoker.json
LoadCredentialEncrypted=writer_gitea_http:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-governed-development-writer.gitea_http
LoadCredentialEncrypted=admin_gitea_http:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-governance-admin.gitea_http
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
UMask=0027
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state /var/lib/aios-development-writer-evidence /var/lib/aios-development-writer-locks /run/aios-development-writer-runtime
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS governed development writer revocation timer
[Timer]
OnBootSec=5min
OnUnitActiveSec=5min
AccuracySec=30s
Unit=aios-governed-development-writer-revoker.service
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS governed development writer
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/development-policy.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aios-governed-development-writer
Group=gitops
StateDirectory=aios-development-writer-state aios-development-writer-evidence aios-development-writer-locks
StateDirectoryMode=0750
RuntimeDirectory=aios-development-writer-runtime
RuntimeDirectoryMode=0750
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-development-writer-server --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/writer-server.json
LoadCredentialEncrypted=gitea_http:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-governed-development-writer.gitea_http
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
IPAddressAllow=127.0.0.1
IPAddressDeny=any
ReadWritePaths=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729
UMask=0027
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS Integration Refresh Provisioner (sandbox control plane)
After=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
User=aios
Group=aios
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_INTEGRATION_REFRESH_MODE=sandbox
Environment=AIOS_CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER=disabled
NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios/integration-refresh
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
IPAddressDeny=any
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/aios/active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_writer_api/integration_refresh.py --sandbox-preflight --state-dir /var/lib/aios/integration-refresh
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS exact release object projection
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-projection.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=root
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-release-object-projector --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-projection.json
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
UMask=0027
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5s
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS exact runtime source read projection
After=network-online.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/runtime-projection.json
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=root
Group=gitops
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-runtime-source-projector --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/runtime-projection.json
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
RestrictRealtime=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
UMask=0027
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
PrivateNetwork=true
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS Silent Release Shadow Controller
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aiman
Group=gitops
UMask=0077
Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
Environment=AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/libexec/aios-silent-release-shadow/current/active-runtime/app/silent_release_execution.py --state-root /var/lib/aios-silent-release-shadow --repository /data/aios-gitops/repo.git --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18891 --poll-seconds 30
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-silent-release-shadow
ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git /usr/libexec/aios-silent-release-shadow
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=AIOS V2R1C4 isolated candidate tag and health fixture
After=network.target
ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/candidate-fixture.json
[Service]
Type=simple
User=aios-v2r1c4-candidate
Group=gitops
StateDirectory=aios-v2r1c4-candidate
StateDirectoryMode=0750
RuntimeDirectory=aios-v2r1c4-candidate
RuntimeDirectoryMode=0750
ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-v2r1c4-candidate-fixture --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/candidate-fixture.json
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectHome=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_UNIX
IPAddressAllow=127.0.0.1
IPAddressDeny=any
UMask=0027

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